SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 149372. September 11, 2007.]

RICARDO BACABAC , petitioner, vs . PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ,

respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO-MORALES , J : p

In the evening of December 23, 1990, Hernani Quidato (the victim) was at a
dance hall in Purok 4, San Joaquin, Iloilo City in the company of Eduardo Selibio
(Eduardo) and Melchor Selibio (Melchor). And so were Jonathan Bacabac (Jonathan)
and Edzel Talanquines (Edzel). 1
Jonathan and Edzel left the dance hall. Not long after, the victim and his
companions also left and on their way home, they encountered Jonathan and Edzel. It
appears that the two groups then and there figured in a misunderstanding.
On his way home, Jesus Del n Rosadio (Jesus), who was also at the dance hall,
noticed a commotion. He soon saw that Melchor was "hugging" Edzel, and later "tying"
Jonathan "with his hands". Still later, he saw the victim hit Edzel with a "stick." 2 He thus
told the victim and his companions that Edzel is the son of Councilor Jose Talanquines,
Jr. (Jose), whereupon Eduardo 3 told him (Jesus) to go away for they might shoot him.
Jesus thus left and proceeded to Edzel's residence to report to his father what he had
witnessed. In the meantime, Edzel and Jonathan managed to flee.
The victim and his companions thereafter headed for home in the course of
which they met Pat. Ricardo Bacabac (herein petitioner), together with Edzel and
Jonathan who are his nephews, and Edzel's father, Jose, his mother, and two sisters at
the corner of M.H. Del Pilar and Sto. Domingo Streets. Petitioner and Jose were
carrying M-16 armalites, while Jonathan and Edzel were carrying a piece of wood and a
revolver, respectively.
Jesus thereupon pointed to the victim and his companions as the ones who had
manhandled Jonathan and Edzel. The victim apologized, explaining that he and his
companions mistook Jonathan and Edzel for other persons. Jesus blurted out,
however, "You are just bragging that you are brave. You are only bullying small children."
4 Petitioner, at that instant, red his armalite into the air, while Jose red his armalite
("as if spraying his ri e from right to left") at the victim and Eduardo, even hitting
Jonathan in the thigh as he (Jonathan) "was on the move to strike [the victim] with a
piece of wood." Eduardo fell. And so did the victim who was in a kneeling position, and
as he was raising his hands in surrender, Jose shot him again.
Meanwhile, Melchor escaped. 5
The victim, Eduardo, and Jonathan were brought to the hospital. The victim was
pronounced dead on arrival. Eduardo died two hours later.
Post-mortem examination showed that the victim sustained two bullet wounds in
the thoraco-abdominal regions and one bullet wound in the extremities, and that he died
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 due to "maceration of the internal organs due to bullet wounds." 6 Eduardo sustained
two bullet wounds in the thoraco-abdominal region, and died of "hemorrhage due to
gunshot wounds." 7
Two Informations for Murder were led with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Iloilo City against Jose, Edzel, Jonathan, Jesus, and the herein petitioner. The
accusatory portion of the rst Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 35783,
reads:
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1990, in the Municipality of
San Joaquin, Province of Ilo-ilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another to better realize their purpose, armed with two (2)
M16 [a]rmalite [r]i es and one (1) nickel-plated revolver of unknown make and
caliber, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation and without any justi able cause or motive, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one HERNANI
QUIDATO with the rearms they were then provided, in icting upon the latter
gunshot wounds on the different parts of his body which caused the immediate
and instantaneous death of said Hernani Quidato.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 8

The accusatory portion of the second Information, docketed as Criminal Case

No. 35784, reads:
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1990, in the Municipality of
San Joaquin, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another to better realize their purpose, armed with two (2)
M16 [a]rmalite [r]i es and one (1) nickel-plated revolver of unknown make and
caliber, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation and without any justi able cause or motive, did then and
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one EDUARDO
SELIBIO with the rearms they were then provided in icting upon the latter
gunshot wounds on the different parts of his body which caused the immediate
and instantaneous death of said Eduardo Selibio.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 9

The cases were jointly tried.

By Decision of April 30, 1993, Branch 39 of the Iloilo RTC, nding the presence of
conspiracy among petitioner and his co-accused, 1 0 convicted them of murder quali ed
by treachery. 1 1 The dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:

In Criminal Case No. 35783, all the accused, namely; Jose Talanquines, Jr.,
Edzel Talanquines, Jonathan Bacabac, Pat. Ricardo Bacabac, and Jesus Del n
Rosadio are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
and there being no aggravating circumstances with one mitigating circumstance
[immediate vindication for Jose and Jesus; voluntary surrender for Pat. Ricardo
Bacabac 1 2 ], and applying the indeterminate sentence law, accused Jose
Talanquines, Jr., Ricardo Bacabac and Jesus Del n Rosadio are hereby
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 sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for a period of 10 years and 1 day, as
minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day as maximum; while accused Edzel
Talanquines and Jonathan Bacabac who are entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority and the ordinary mitigating circumstance of immediate
vindication of a grave offense are hereby sentenced each to suffer imprisonment
for a period of four (4) years, 2 months, and 1 day, as minimum, to 10 years and 1
day as maximum. All the accused are ordered to pay jointly and severally the
heirs of the deceased Hernani Quidato, the amount of P50,000.00 for his wrongful
death; P20,000.00 for moral damages; P10,000.00 for attorneys fees; and the
costs of the suit. (Underscoring supplied)
In Criminal Case No. 35784, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

All the accused, namely; Jose Talanquines, Jr., Edzel Talanquines,

Jonathan Bacabac, Pat. Ricardo Bacabac and Jesus Del n Rosadio are hereby
found guilty of the crime of Murder and there being no aggravating circumstance
with one mitigating circumstance, accused Jose Talanquines, Jr., Ricardo
Bacabac and Jesus Del n Rosadio are hereby sentenced each to suffer
imprisonment for a period of 10 years and 1 day as minimum, to 17 years, 4
months and 1 day, as maximum; while accused Edzel Talanquines and Jonathan
Bacabac who are entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
and the ordinary mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave
offense, are hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period of 4 years, 2
months and 1 day, as minimum to 10 years and 1 day as maximum. All the
accused are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased
Eduardo Selibio, the amount of P50,000.00 for his wrongful death; P20,000.00 for
moral damages; P10,000.00 for attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit.
(Underscoring supplied)

Accused Jesus Del n Rosadio, who is detained, is hereby credited with the
number of days he spent under detention, if he is qualified.

SO ORDERED. 1 3

While petitioner and his co-accused led a Notice of Appeal 1 4 which was given
due course, 1 5 only petitioner led a Brief, albeit beyond the extensions granted to him,
drawing the Court of Appeals to dismiss his appeal. 1 6 The conviction of petitioner's co-
accused had thus become final and executory.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 1 7 of the dismissal of his appeal having
been denied, 1 8 he led a Petition for Review with this Court which, by Resolution of
October 22, 1997, directed the Court of Appeals to reinstate petitioner's appeal. 1 9
By Decision 2 0 of June 28, 1999, the Court of Appeals a rmed the trial court's
decision. Entry of nal judgment was made by the Court of Appeals on July 22, 1999. 2 1
The trial court thereafter issued a February 7, 2000 Order directing the issuance
of warrants for the arrest of the accused. 2 2 Except petitioner, all were arrested. 2 3
On February 24, 2000, petitioner led before the appellate court a Petition for
Relief from Judgment, Order, and/or Denial of Appeal 2 4 which was granted, 2 5 hence,
the Entry of Judgment issued by the appellate court on July 22, 1999 was set aside. He
thereafter led a Motion for Reconsideration 2 6 of the appellate court's June 28, 1999
Decision which was denied by Resolution of August 8, 2001; 2 7 hence, the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari. 2 8
Petitioner assails the Court of Appeals' decision as follows:
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 First: Contrary to its conclusion on the basis of the facts of the case,
Petitioner may not be deemed to be in conspiracy with the other Accused.

Second: Contrary to its conclusion, there was no treachery.

Third: Contrary to its conclusion, Petitioner, assuming in gratis argumenti
the correctness of the pronouncement of guilt, should have been credited with the
mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense , in
the same manner that the other Accused were so credited.
Fourth: Contrary to its conclusion, the guilt of the Petitioner has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt; hence, by the equipoise rule, should have been
acquitted.
Fifth: Contrary to its conclusion, Petitioner is not civilly liable . 29
(Emphasis in the original)

The Court notes that the rst, second, and fth arguments of petitioner were, in the
main, raised before the appellate court. 3 0
During the pendency of the present petition, petitioner, through counsel, led
before the trial court an "Urgent Ex Parte Alternative Motions (Re: Pat. Ricardo
Bacabac's Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Vacate the Order dated February 7,
2000 [directing the arrest of the accused] and to Recall the Warrant of Arrest Dated the
Same Date in so far as the Accused Pat. Ricardo Bacabac Only is Concerned)." 3 1 The
trial court denied 3 2 the motion as it did deny 3 3 petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
3 4 drawing petitioner to le before this Court on October 5, 2006 a "Motion to Vacate
Order for the Arrest of the Accused and the Warrant of Arrest Issued by the Regional
Trial Court (Branch 39) of Iloilo City." 3 5
In his "Motion to Vacate Order for the Arrest of the Accused and the Warrant of
Arrest Issued by the Regional Trial Court . . .," petitioner argues that
[T]he basis of the RTC's Order of February 7, 2000 was the Entry of
Judgment by the Court of Appeals dated 25 November 1999 . 3 6 BUT THE
SAID ENTRY OF JUDGMENT was ALREADY VACATED and SET-ASIDE
BY THE COURT OF APPEALS ITSELF ON ITS RESOLUTION DATED 13
DECEMBER 2000 . Therefore, the RTC's Order of 7 February 2000 was ipso facto
vacated. 3 7 (Emphasis in the original)

and that
[T]he second sentence of Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court cited
by the Order of 13 July 2006 does not apply to the case at bench because the
main case on the merits which originated in the RTC as Criminal Cases Nos.
35783-84, went to the Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. No. 16348 and is now pending
in the Supreme Court (Third Division) as G.R. No. 149372 because of the Petition
for Review On Certiorari led by Movant herein . . . . THE MAIN CASE IS NO
LONGER PENDING IN THIS HONORABLE COURT [ sic ]. THEREFORE, THE
RTC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO REITERATE AND EXECUTE THE ORDER
OF 7 FEBRUARY 2000 . 3 8 (Emphasis in the original)

As this Court hereby a rms petitioner's conviction, resolution of his "Motion to

Vacate . . ." is rendered unnecessary.
Petitioner, denying the presence of conspiracy on his part, argues:

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 [The petitioner] a rms that he was at the scene of the incident and
merely fired a warning shot into the air to respond to a public
disturbance , and his ring a warning shot into the air was intended to avert
further acts of violence ; both circumstances, therefore, being merely and solely
in pursuance to his avowed duty to keep peace and order in the community and
clearly not to be part of any alleged community of design to kill the victims.
xxx xxx xxx

Another indication that there was no unity of purpose and of

execution in so far as the Petitioner is concerned is his conduct after Jose
Talanquines , Jr. shot the victims . Eyewitness accounts state that after that
lone warning shot, closely followed by Jose Talanquines, Jr. ring at the victims,
the petitioner merely stood there and did nothing and said nothing. This is
obviously because he was himself stunned by the fast happening of events. The
investigating police o cer, PO3 NESTOR SANTACERA , on rebuttal, likewise,
admitted to the facts that ten (10) minutes after the incident, they (the police)
responded and upon arrival thereat, learned that the Petitioner already reported
the incident to their station and that it was th e Petitioner who first reported
the shooting incident officially to their office. The aforedescribed proven
conduct of the Petitioner during and immediately after the incident in question
are, Petitioner respectfully submits, inconsistent with what a co-conspirators
is [sic] wont to do under the circumstances. It is submitted instead that his
conduct on the contrary underscores the lack or want of community of purpose
and interest in the killing incident to make him criminally liable under the
conspiracy theory.
Finally, in connection with the conspiracy theory and anent the finding
below that the Petitioner and his Co-Accused waited for the victims ' arrival at
the corner of St. Domingo and M.H. del Pilar Streets, it is asserted that the same
runs counter to the natural and ordinary experience of things and event
[sic], and raises a cloud of doubt over the correctness of the lower Courts decision
which are based on the Prosecution's version of the incident. Since, according to
the prosecution, the Petitioner and the other Accused were armed with high-
powered rearms (armalite ri es and revolver); they waited at the stated street
corner for thirty (30) minutes; the stated street corner was well lighted ;
accompanying them were the wife and two (2) young daughters of Jose
Talanquines, Jr.; and they stood there conversing with the group of Elston
Saquian [a prosecution witness who testi ed that he saw the petitioner and his
co-accused waiting for the victims] 3 9 and admitting that they were waiting for
certain persons who mauled Edzel Talanquines and Jonathan Bacabac.
In other words, the lower Courts gave credence to an improbable
scenario painting the Petitioner, known to the place as a police o cer, and co-
accused to have recklessly and uncaringly displayed, for all and sundry to see,
their alleged criminal intentions. It would indeed be the height of foolishness for
them to be by a well lighted street corner, perhaps even well traversed,
conspicuously fully armed, waiting for persons who were not even sure would
pass by such place, and apparently willing to admit to other passers-by that they
were indeed waiting for the persons who mauled Edzel and Jonathan, and
consequently give out the impression that they were intending to retaliate — which
is what the lower Courts regrettably observed.

xxx xxx xxx

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 Likewise, the presence of the wife and two (2) young daughters of
the accused Jose Talanquines, Jr. at the scene of the alleged crimes, as
testi ed to by the prosecution witnesses and believed by the lower Courts,
assumes importance in the matter of determining which version of the incident is
correct.
The Prosecution places the wife and the daughters with the alleged fully
armed Petitioner and Co-Accused at Sto. Domingo Streets, also waiting during the
same length of time as the men for the (probable) arrival of the group of the
victims. But such a scenario is, likewise , unnatural . Because , will the
male relatives unhesitatingly expose their defenseless womenfolk to
imminent danger? 4 0 (Citations omitted, emphasis in the original, and
underscoring supplied)

Petitioner's argument that it is improbable for him and his co-accused to have
waited for the victims at a well-lighted street corner does not persuade. Crimes are
known to have been brazenly committed by perpetrators, undeterred by the presence
of onlookers or even of peace o cers, completely impervious of the inevitability of
criminal prosecution and conviction. 4 1
From the mode and manner in which the crimes were perpetrated, the conduct of
petitioner before, during, and after their commission, 4 2 and the conditions attendant
thereto, 4 3 conspiracy, which need not be proved by direct evidence, is deduced. 4 4
Petitioner's ring of his armalite could not have amounted to none other than lending
moral assistance to his co-accused, thereby indicating the presence of conspiracy. 4 5
As the appellate court observed which is quoted with approval:
In the present recourse, when informed that Jonathan and Edzel were
being manhandled and assaulted by male persons, Appellant armed himself
with an M-16 armalite . Jose Talanquines, Jr., the father of Edzel, followed suit
and armed himself with an M-16 armalite gun. Jesus armed himself with a
revolver while Jonathan armed himself with a piece of wood. Jonathan and Edzel
were nephews of the Appellant who resided in the house of Jose Talanquines, Jr.
All the Accused including the Appellant then proceeded posthaste to the
corner of M.H. del Pilar corner Sto. Domingo Streets where the culprits
would pass by and waited for the advent of the culprits. Even as
Hernani apologized for his and his companions' assault of Edzel and
Jonathan, Jesus berated Hernani and his companions. Almost
simultaneously , the Appellant red his gun into the air as Jonathan
lunged at Hernani and his companions to hit them with the piece of
wood . Almost simultaneously, Jose Talanquines, Jr. red his gun at Hernani and
shot Eduardo hitting them and, in the process, hitting his nephew, Jonathan
Bacabac. The Appellant did not lift a finger when Jose fired at and shot
Hernani and Eduardo . He stood by as Jose shot Hernani anew when the
latter on bended knees , raised his two ( 2 ) hands , in surrender . The
Appellant and the other Accuse d then ed from the scene, with their
respective rearms and weapons . The overt act of the Accused and the
Appellant in conjunto, constitute proof of conspiracy.
The Appellant and Jose were armed with high-powered guns .
Jesus was armed with a revolver. The nature of the weapons of the Accused
evinced a common desire to do away with the culprits, not merely to
scare them . cADEIa

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 What is outrageous is that the Appellant was a policeman. He
could very well have just arrested the culprits as they sauntered by and
brought them to the police station for the requisite investigation and
the institution of criminal complaints, if warranted. He could have
dissuaded Jose and Jesus and assured them that the culprits will be
duly investigated and charged if warranted. The Appellant did not. He
armed himself with an M-16 armalite . . . . [T]he three (3) positioned themselves at
the corner of M.H. del Pilar and Sto. Domingo Streets for the culprits to arrive.
Hernani and his companions were doomed. It may be true that the Appellant did
not aim his gun at the deceased but the same is peu de chose. By his overt acts,
in unison with the other Accused and his kinship with Jonathan and Edzel, We are
convinced that he conspired with Jose Talanquines, Jr. and the other Accused to
achieve a common purpose to kill Hernani and Eduardo. 4 6 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Petitioner's failure to assist the victims after the shooting reinforces this Court's
appreciation of community of design between him and his co-accused to harm the
victims. That it was he who rst o cially reported the shooting to the police station 4 7
does not make him any less a conspirator. Voluntary surrender and non- ight do not
conclusively prove innocence. 4 8 Besides, a conspirator who wants to extricate himself
from criminal liability usually performs an overt act to dissociate or detach himself
from the unlawful plan to commit the felony while the commission of the felony is in
progress. 4 9 In petitioner's case, he reported the shooting incident after it had already
taken place. In legal contemplation, there was no longer a conspiracy to be repudiated
since it had already materialized. 5 0
Contrary to petitioner's assertion, 5 1 the appellate court did not err in
appreciating the presence of conspiracy despite its nding that there was no evident
premeditation. This Court's pronouncement that conspiracy presupposes the existence
of evident premeditation 5 2 does not necessarily imply that the converse — that evident
premeditation presupposes the existence of a conspiracy — is true. In any event, a link
between conspiracy and evident premeditation is presumed only where the conspiracy
is directly established and not where conspiracy is only implied, as in the present case.
53

Neither did the appellate court err in nding the presence of treachery. Treachery,
under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code, is present "when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make."
What is decisive in treachery is that "the attack was executed in such a manner as
to make it impossible for the victim to retaliate." 5 4 In the case at bar, petitioner, a
policeman, and his co-accused were armed with two M-16 armalites and a revolver. The
victim and his companions were not armed. 5 5 The attack was sudden and unexpected,
5 6 and the victim was already kneeling in surrender when he was shot the second time.
Clearly, the victim and his companion Eduardo had no chance to defend themselves or
retaliate.
Petitioner nevertheless argues that he not being the trigger man, it is not logical
nor legal to hold him guilty of treachery. 5 7 This argument falls in the face of the settled
doctrine that once conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all even if not
all actually hit and killed the victim. 5 8
As for petitioner's invocation of the mitigating circumstance of "immediate
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 vindication of a grave offense", it fails. For such mitigating circumstance to be credited,
the act should be, following Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code,
"committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing
the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural
or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same
degree . " 5 9 The offense committed on Edzel was "hitting" his ear with a stick 6 0
(according to Jesus), a bamboo pole (according to Edzel). 6 1 By Edzel's own
clari cation, "[he] was hit at [his] ear, not on [his] head." 6 2 That act would certainly not
be classi ed as "grave offense". And Edzel is petitioner's nephew, hence, not a relative
by a nity "within the same degree" contemplated in Article 13, paragraph 5 of the
Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appellate court's decision is
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno * , C.J., Carpio, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1. TSN, December 2, 1991, p. 8; TSN, December 3, 1991, pp. 5, 36-37; Records, Folder 1, pp.
366, 426, 457-458.
2. TSN, December 3, 1991, p. 39; Records, Folder 1, p. 460.
3. TSN, December 2, 1991, p. 16; id. at 374.

4. TSN, August 19, 1991, p. 10; id. at 128.

5. TSN, August 26, 1991, pp. 9-10; id. at 21, 205-206.
6. Records, Folder 2, p. 24.
7. Records, Folder 1, p. 24.
8. Id. at 1.
9. Records, Folder 2, p. 1.
10. Records, Folder 1, pp. 702-706.
11. Id. at 707.
12. Id. at 12, 708.
13. Id. at 709-711.
14. Id. at 713-714.
15. Id. at 715.
16. CA rollo, pp. 139-140.
17. Id. at 142-159.
18. Id. at 178-179.
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 19. Id. at 203-209.
20. Penned by then Court of Appeals Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., with the
concurrence of Court of Appeals Associate Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. and
Mariano M. Umali. Id. at 259-275.
21. Records, Folder 1, p. 763.
22. Id. at 764-768.
23. Id. at 769-773.
24. CA rollo, pp. 279-298.

25. Id. at 335.

26. Id. at 339-355.
27. Id. at 372.
28. Rollo, pp. 11-32.
29. Id. at 14-15.
30. Decision, CA rollo, pp. 266-267.
31. Rollo, pp. 282-285.
32. Id. at 286-288.
33. Id. at 293.
34. Id. at 289-292.
35. Id. at 269-278.
36. The judgment was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on July 22, 1999 but
the certification of such entry is dated November 25, 1999. Vide records, Folder 1, p. 763.
37. Id. at 275.
38. Ibid.
39. TSN, August 19, 1991, pp. 3-7; id. at 121-125.

40. Rollo, pp. 18-19, 24-26.

41. Vide People v. Chua, G.R. No. 149538, July 26, 2004, 435 SCRA 192, 202.
42. Vide People v. Rojas, G.R. Nos. L-46960-62, January 8, 1987, 147 SCRA 169, 176.
43. Vide People v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 99258, September 13, 1991, 201 SCRA 616, 629.
44. Vide Orodio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-57519, September 13, 1988, 165 SCRA 316,
323.
45. Vide People v. Luayon, 329 Phil. 560, 576 (1996).
46. CA rollo, pp. 272-273.
47. Rollo, p. 24.

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 48. Vide People v. Quijada, 328 Phil. 505, 532 (1996).
49. Vide People v. De los Reyes, G.R. No. 44112, October 22, 1992, 215 SCRA 63, 71.
50. Ibid.
51. Rollo, p. 27.
52. People v. Regalario, G.R. No. 101451, March 23, 1993, 220 SCRA 368, 387.
53. Vide People v. Herbias, 333 Phil. 422, 431-432 (1996).
54. People v. Hingan, 311 Phil. 108, 120 (1995).
55. Records, Folder 1, p. 707.
56. Ibid.
57. Rollo, p. 224.
58. Vide People v. Ambrocio, G.R. No. 140267, June 29, 2004, 434 SCRA 67, 83.
59. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
60. TSN, December 3, 1991, p. 39; Records, Folder 1, p. 460.

61. TSN, December 2, 1991, p. 12; id. at 370.

62. Id. at 38; id. at 396.
* Designated member pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 75-2007.

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