RULE 119

1. Ampatuan Jr. v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197291, [April 3, 2013], 708 PHIL
153-168

The crucial issue is whether respondents may be compelled by writ

of mandamus to charge Dalandag as an accused for multiple murder in
relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the
Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.

The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime

may become a state witness are, namely: (a) by discharge from the
criminal case pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court; and (b) by the approval of his application for admission into the
Witness Protection Program of the DOJ in accordance with Republic Act
No. 6981 (The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act).
These modes, while seemingly alike, are distinct and separate
from each other.
Also worth noting is that an accused discharged from an
information by the trial court pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 may also
be admitted to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ provided he
complies with the requirements of Republic Act No. 6981.
A participant in the commission of the crime, to be discharged to
become a state witness pursuant to Rule 119, must be one charged as an
accused in the criminal case. The discharge operates as an acquittal of
the discharged accused and shall be a bar to his future prosecution for
the same offense, unless he fails or refuses to testify against his
co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the
basis for his discharge. 40 The discharge is expressly left to the sound
discretion of the trial court, which has the exclusive responsibility to see
to it that the conditions prescribed by the rules for that purpose exist. 41
While it is true that, as a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of
a co-accused from the information in order that he may be utilized as a
Prosecution witness rests upon the sound discretion of the trial
court, 42 such discretion is not absolute and may not be exercised
arbitrarily, but with due regard to the proper administration of
justice. 43 Anent the requisite that there must be an absolute necessity for
the testimony of the accused whose discharge is sought, the trial court
has to rely on the suggestions of and the information provided by the
public prosecutor. The reason is obvious — the public prosecutor should
know better than the trial court, and the Defense for that matter, which of
the several accused would best qualify to be discharged in order to
become a state witness. The public prosecutor is also supposed to know
the evidence in his possession and whomever he needs to establish his
case, 44 as well as the availability or non-availability of other direct or
corroborative evidence, which of the accused is the 'most guilty' one, and
the like. 45
CIDaTc

On the other hand, there is no requirement under Republic Act No.

6981 for the Prosecution to first charge a person in court as one of the
accused in order for him to qualify for admission into the Witness
Protection Program. The admission as a state witness under Republic
Act No. 6981 also operates as an acquittal, and said witness cannot
subsequently be included in the criminal information except when he fails
or refuses to testify. The immunity for the state witness is granted by the
DOJ, not by the trial court. Should such witness be meanwhile charged in
court as an accused, the public prosecutor, upon presentation to him of
the certification of admission into the Witness Protection Program, shall
petition the trial court for the discharge of the witness. 46 The Court shall
then order the discharge and exclusion of said accused from the
information. 47
The admission of Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of
the Government as a state witness since August 13, 2010 was warranted
by the absolute necessity of his testimony to the successful prosecution
of the criminal charges. Apparently, all the conditions prescribed
by Republic Act No. 6981 were met in his case. That he admitted his
participation in the commission of the Maguindanao massacre was no
hindrance to his admission into the Witness Protection Program as a
state witness, for all that was necessary was for him to appear not the
most guilty. Accordingly, he could not anymore be charged for his
participation in the Maguindanao massacre, as to which his admission
operated as an acquittal, unless he later on refuses or fails to testify in
accordance with the sworn statement that became the basis for his
discharge against those now charged for the crimes.

2. Pacoy v. Cajigal, G.R. No. 157472, [September 28, 2007], 560 PHIL
598-614

We find no merit in petitioner's contention that the respondent

judge committed grave abuse of discretion in amending the
Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the
charge in the Information for Homicide. The argument of petitioner —
Considering the fact that the case for Homicide against
him was already terminated without his express consent, he
cannot anymore be charged and arraigned for Murder which
involve the same offense. The petitioner argued that the
termination of the information for Homicide without his express
consent is equivalent to his acquittal. Thus, to charge him again,
this time for Murder, is tantamount to placing the petitioner in
Double Jeopardy. 18
is not plausible. Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of
amendment or substitution under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court, to wit —
SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or
information may be amended, in form or in substance, without
leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.
After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may
only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake
has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall
dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a
new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule
119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed
thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses
to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
with Section 19, Rule 119 of which provides:
SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense. — When it becomes manifest at any time before
judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense
charged or any other offense necessarily included therein, the
accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to
detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to
answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case
upon the filing of the proper information.
First, a distinction shall be made between amendment and
substitution under Section 14, Rule 110. For this purpose, Teehankee
v. Madayag 19is instructive, viz:
 The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of
the information or complaint, while the second paragraph refers
to the substitution of the information or complaint.
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and
substitution of the information may be made before or after the
defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects:
1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial
changes, while substitution necessarily involves a substantial
change from the original charge;
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be
effected without leave of court, but substitution of information
must be with leave of court as the original information has to be
dismissed; TacESD

3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no

need for another preliminary investigation and the retaking of
the plea of the accused; in substitution of information, another
preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to
plead anew to the new information; and
4. An amended information refers to the same offense
charged in the original information or to an offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original
charge, hence substantial amendments to the information after
the plea has been taken cannot be made over the objection of
the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn,
the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand,
substitution requires or presupposes that the new information
involves a different offense which does not include or is not
necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused
cannot claim double jeopardy.
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an
amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110,
or a substitution of information under the second paragraph
thereof, the rule is that where the second information involves
the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of
the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new
information charges an offense which is distinct and different
from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.
There is identity between the two offenses when the
evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be
sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the
second offense is exactly the same as the first, or when the
second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or
 when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the
offense charged in the first information. In this connection, an
offense may be said to necessarily include another when some
of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is
alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa,
an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another
when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a
part of those constituting the latter. 20
In the present case, the change of the offense charged from
Homicide to Murder is merely a formal amendment and not a
substantial amendment or a substitution as defined in Teehankee.
While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the
Information shows that the only change made was in the caption of the
case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of the Information,
with the crossing out of word "Homicide" and its replacement by the
word "Murder." There was no change in the recital of facts constituting
the offense charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the
court. The averments in the amended Information for Murder are
exactly the same as those already alleged in the original Information
for Homicide, as there was not at all any change in the act imputed to
petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying
circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption
and preamble from "Homicide" to "Murder" as purely formal. 21
Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal
amendments in cases in which the accused has already pleaded, it is
necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of the
accused. The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced
by the amendment of a complaint or information is whether a defense
under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no
longer be available after the amendment is made; and when any
evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the
complaint or information. 22 Since the facts alleged in the accusatory
portion of the amended Information are identical with those of the
original Information for Homicide, there could not be any effect on the
prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there be any possible
prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner.
While the respondent judge erroneously thought that
"disrespect on account of rank" qualified the crime to murder, as the
same was only a generic aggravating circumstance, 23 we do not find
that he committed any grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
amendment of the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not
 guilty to the charge of Homicide, since the amendment made was only
formal and did not adversely affect any substantial right of petitioner.

3. Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos, G.R. No. 152643, [August 28, 2008],

585 PHIL 490-503

t is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial
of the case in the presence of the judge. 25 This is especially true in
criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his
constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. 26 It also
gives the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such
questions as they deem material and necessary to support their
position or to test the credibility of said witnesses. 27 Lastly, this rule
enables the judge to observe the witnesses' demeanor. 28
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to
28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of discovery
that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are
adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes
of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 29 13 30 and
15, 31 Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of
both the defense and prosecution witnesses. SAaTHc

In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a

prosecution witness, who, according to the petitioners, was too sick to
travel and appear before the trial court. Section 15 of Rule 119 thus
comes into play, and it provides:
Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution.
— When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the
prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as
directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no
definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally
examined before the court where the case is pending. Such
examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his
absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination
has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same
manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the
accused to attend the examination after notice shall be
considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in
behalf of or against the accused. HECTaA
 Petitioners contend that Concepcion's advanced age and
health condition exempt her from the application of Section 15, Rule
119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus, calls for the
application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The contention does not persuade.
The very reason offered by the petitioners to exempt
Concepcion from the coverage of Rule 119 is at once the ground
which places her squarely within the coverage of the same provision.
Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be conditionally
examined: 1) if the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or
2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of
returning. Thus, when Concepcion moved that her deposition be
taken, had she not been too sick at that time, her motion would have
been denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside the trial
court, she would have been compelled to appear before the court for
examination during the trial proper. EAcTDH

Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the

case at bar. It is thus required that the conditional examination be
made before the court where the case is pending. It is also necessary
that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the examination,
subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to
the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in
the same manner as an examination during trial, that is, through
question and answer.
At this point, a query may thus be posed: in granting
Concepcion's motion and in actually taking her deposition, were the
above rules complied with? The CA answered in the negative. The
appellate court considered the taking of deposition before the Clerk of
Court of Makati City erroneous and contrary to the clear mandate of
the Rules that the same be made before the court where the case is
pending. Accordingly, said the CA, the RTC order was issued with
grave abuse of discretion. prcd

We agree with the CA and quote with approval its ratiocination

in this wise:
Unlike an examination of a defense witness which,
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 119 of the previous Rules, and
now Section 13, Rule 119 of the present Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, may be taken before any "judge, or, if not
practicable, a member of the Bar in good standing so
designated by the judge in the order, or, if the order be made
by a court of superior jurisdiction, before an inferior court to be
 designated therein," the examination of a witness for the
prosecution under Section 15 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure (December 1, 2000) may be done only "before the
court where the case is pending". 32
Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of
a prosecution witness shall be made before the court where the case
is pending. Contrary to petitioners' contention, there is nothing in the
rule which may remotely be interpreted to mean that such requirement
applies only to cases where the witness is within the jurisdiction of
said court and not when he is kilometers away, as in the present case.
Therefore, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions.
Neither may it engraft into the law (or the Rules) qualifications not
contemplated. 33 When the words are clear and categorical, there is
no room for interpretation. There is only room for application. 34
Petitioners further insist that Rule 23 applies to the instant case,
because the rules on civil procedure apply suppletorily to criminal
cases. TSEcAD

It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides

that the rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal,
and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil
procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it
is likewise true that the criminal proceedings are primarily governed by
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule 119
adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we
find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution
witness for the purpose of taking his deposition should be made
before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is
pending. Such is the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of
the Rules. We find no necessity to depart from, or to relax, this rule.
As correctly held by the CA, if the deposition is made elsewhere, the
accused may not be able to attend, as when he is under detention.
More importantly, this requirement ensures that the judge would be
able to observe the witness' deportment to enable him to properly
assess his credibility. This is especially true when the witness'
testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case.

4. People v. Webb, G.R. No. 132577, [August 17, 1999], 371 PHIL
491-523
 Whether the taking of the depositions of witnesses may be allowed
in criminal cases before the Philippine courts must be squarely resolved.
I take an affirmative stand on the issue. For one, we have Sections 4 and
5 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court which provides for the "Application for
examination of witness for accused before trial" and "Examination of
defense witness; how made," respectively. These Sections refer to
the conditional examination of defense witnesses, which is "one mode of
perpetuating testimony available to the accused" (REGALADO
F.D.,REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, vol. 2, 1995 ed.,428).This
deposition, being to perpetuate testimony, may be done before the
commencement of the trial state, or anytime thereafter, as the need
therefor arises, but before the promulgation of judgment. Then, too, there
is Section 7 of Rule 24 of the Rules of Court, which provides for
"Depositions pending appeal" applies to criminal cases. (REGALADO
F.D.,REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, vol. 1, 1997 ed.,322).According
to Justice Regalado the procedure in Section 7 is available in all actions,
including criminal cases. Thus, the ruling in the case ofDasmariñas
Garments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,(225 SCRA 622, 634 [1993]),is
applicable in the case at bar, to wit: ...Depositions may be taken at any
time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient.
There is no rule that limits depositions-taking only to the period of pre-trial
or before it; no prohibition against the taking of deposition after pre-trial.
Indeed, the law authorizes the taking of depositions of witnesses before
or after an appeal is taken from the judgment of a Regional Trial Court "to
perpetuate their testimony for use in the event of further proceedings in
the said court" (Rule 134, Rules of Court),and even during the process of
execution of a final and executory judgment (East Asiatic Co. v. C.I.R., 40
SCRA 521, 5440). And more importantly, deposition in criminal cases of
a witness for the defense who is residing abroad must be allowed.
Involved in a criminal case is not just the status or the property of the
defendant; but the life or limb or the liberty of the accused. If, then, a
deposition is allowed for a witness in a civil case, then it is with more
reason that it be allowed in a criminal case; its denial would amount to a
deprivation of due process and to the accused's right to compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his favor, which are
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights (Sections 1 and 14(2), Article
III, Constitution).
EaScHT

3. ID.;ID.;ID.;RULE ON CIVIL PROCEDURE MUST BE

APPLIED ON HOW TO DO THE SAME. — As to how to take the
testimony of a defense witness who is unable to come to testify in open
court because he is a resident of a foreign country, I respectfully submit,
however, that the rule on the matter under Rules on Civil Procedure may
be applied suppletorily. Section 11 of Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure which provides for "Persons before whom depositions may be
taken in foreign countries." There are provisions of the Rule on Civil
Procedure which have been made applicable in criminal cases. For one,
as earlier mentioned, Section 7 of Rule 24 is applicable in criminal cases.
See also the instances allowed in Canos v. Peralta,(115 SCRA 843
[1982]);Naguiat v. Intermediate Appellate Court,(164 SCRA 505
[1988]);and Cojuangco v. Court of Appeals,(203 SCRA 619 [1991]).Also,
an authority on criminal procedure asserts that in all matters not
specifically touched on by Section 6 and the preceding Sections of Rule
119, "Rule 24, Rules of Court, ante,applies in a suppletory character,
since the taking of depositions under Rule 24 and conditional
examination of defense witnesses under Sections 4 and 5, Rule
119, supra,are taken under the same circumstances and for the same
purpose; that is, the preservation of a material witness' testimony."
(PAMARAN, THE 1985 RULES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ANNOTATED, 1998 ed.,402).Finally, Section 6 of Rule 1 of the 1997
Rule of Civil Procedure (formerly Sec. 2, Rule 1 of the 1964 Rules of
Court),expressly provides that the rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

4. People v. Mamarion, G.R. No. 137554, [October 1, 2003], 459

PHIL 51-100

Appellants assail Gale's plea to a lesser offense arguing that it

should have been made during the plea bargaining stage of the trial and
that it should not be subject to the condition that he will testify against
appellants. In the Brief for the State, the OSG maintains that Gale was
validly discharged as a state witness. Under the circumstances, it is not
correct to state that Gale was discharged as a state witness
under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Gale was allowed to
change his plea pursuant to the then prevailing Section 2, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court, 45 which provided:
Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — The accused,
with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be
allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense,
regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the
crime charges, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction
than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary.
 A conviction under this plea, shall be equivalent to a
conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double
jeopardy.
Records show that during the May 13, 1997 hearing, the Chief
State Prosecutor manifested that he has approved Gale's motion to be
allowed to plead to a lesser offense, i.e. Slight Illegal Detention. 46 Private
complainant Teresita Cokin, upon query of the trial court, consented to
Gale's offer of plea to a lesser offense Slight Illegal Detention. 47
It is immaterial that said plea was not made during the pre-trial
stage or that it was made only after the prosecution already presented
several witnesses. In People vs. Villarama, Jr., 48 a 1992 case, the trial
court allowed the accused therein to change his plea even after the
prosecution had rested its case, applying the herein above-quoted
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. The Court elucidated, thus:
Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process whereby
the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It
usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser
offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count
indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the
graver charge. Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the
pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the law still
permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change his plea
thereafter. Thus, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, Section 2
thereof, provides:
xxx xxx xxx
However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a
lesser offense under the aforequoted rule is not demandable by
the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed
entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court.
In the case at bar, the private respondent (accused)
moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense after the prosecution
had already rested its case. In such situation, jurisprudence has
provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with a
yardstick within which their discretion may be properly
exercised. Thus, in People vs. Kayanan, we held that the rules
allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime
charged. 49 (Emphasis supplied)
 Gale's testimony was crucial to the prosecution as there was no
other direct evidence linking appellants to the commission of the crime.
Hence, the trial court did not err in allowing Gale to plead guilty to a lesser
offense.

5. People v. Marcial, G.R. Nos. 152864-65, [September 27,

2006], 534 PHIL 664-672
After considering the arguments of both parties herein, the Court
finds that the RTC did not commit any reversible error in denying the
request for a reverse order of trial, a matter which under the rules is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In fact, the rule relied
upon by petitioner clearly reflects this discretionary nature of the
procedure, thus:
Rules of Court, Rule 119, Section 3(e):
xxx xxx xxx
(e) When the accused admits the act or omission
charged in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful
defense, the order of trial may be modified. 10 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Republic Act No. 8493, Section 7, likewise states:
xxx xxx xxx
If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged,
he/she shall state whether he/she interposes a negative or
affirmative defense. A negative defense shall require the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt while an affirmative defense may modify
the order of trial and require the accused to prove such
defense by clear and convincing evidence. (Emphasis
supplied.)
So also Circular No. 38-98, Section 3, reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
If the accused has pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged, he may state whether he interposes a negative or
affirmative defense. A negative defense shall require the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyong
reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense may modify
the order of trial and require the accused to prove such
defense by clear and convincing evidence. (Emphasis
supplied.)
 Accordingly, the RTC correctly exercised its discretion in denying
petitioner's request for a reverse order of trial.

6. People v. Sunga, G.R. No. 126029, [March 27, 2003], 447

PHIL 776-814

Appellants Sunga and Lansang were found guilty by the trial court of the
crime of rape with homicide and sentenced each to suffer the penalty of
death. Appellant Pascua was found guilty by the trial court of the crime of
rape and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
conviction of appellants was based primarily on the testimony of Locil, an
accused who turned state witness. Hence, the automatic review of the
case.

From the records, it appears that the following conditions for Locil's
discharge under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court were
satisfied: "1. the discharge must be with the consent of the accused
sought to be a state witness; 2. his testimony is absolutely necessary; 3.
no other direct evidence is available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed except his testimony; 4. his testimony can be
substantially corroborated in its material points; 5. he does not appear to
be the most guilty; and 6. he has not at any time been convicted of any
offense involving moral turpitude." It is undisputed that at the start of the
trial, the prosecution did not have direct evidence, testimonial or
otherwise, to establish the culpability of the accused. Based on Locil's
sworn statement, she was the only person who saw what happened to
Jocelyn. Her testimony was thus indispensable. That she did not appear
to be the most guilty among the accused and that she had not been
convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude were shown, as was the
susceptibility of material corroboration of her testimony at the time of her
discharge in view of the other evidence in the hands of the prosecution.
HEARING IN SUPPORT OF THE DISCHARGE; SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE THEREOF, WHEN PRESENT; CASE AT BAR. — The
requirement of "a hearing in support of the discharge" had been
substantially complied with when the trial court, during the hearings on
the bail petition, already received evidence from the
prosecution including Locil's sworn statement and also heard in open
court the defense's arguments in opposition thereto. A hearing did take
place but interspersed with the hearings on the bail petition. So long as
the trial court was able to receive evidence for and against the discharge,
its subsequent order granting or denying the motion for discharge is in
order notwithstanding the lack of actual hearing on said motion. aHSAIT

TESTIMONY OF STATE WITNESS MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY

CORROBORATED IN ITS MATERIAL POINTS BY UNIMPEACHABLE
TESTIMONY AND STRONG CIRCUMSTANCES AND MUST BE TO
SUCH EXTENT THAT ITS TRUSTWORTHINESS BECOMES
MANIFEST; EXCEPTION; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — The
rule in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a self-confessed
accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his
co-accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as
proof to a moral certainty that the latter committed or participated in the
commission of the crime. The testimony must be substantially
corroborated in its material points by unimpeachable testimony and
strong circumstances and must be to such an extent that its
trustworthiness becomes manifest. . . . Standing alone and
uncorroborated, can Locil's testimony serve as a basis for appellants'
conviction? As an exception to the general rule on the requirement of
corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice or co-conspirator-turned
state witness, her testimony may, even if uncorroborated, be sufficient as
when it is shown to be sincere in itself because it is given
unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner and full of details which,
by their nature, could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought.
An exhaustive review of the transcript of stenographic notes of Locil's
testimony reveals, however, that the manner by which she related it was
punctuated with marks of tentativeness,
uncertainty and indecisiveness which the trial court unfortunately failed
to take note of in its decision on review.

7. People v. Chaves, G.R. No. 131377, [February 11, 2003], 445

PHIL 227-238

Sometime in 1986, informations for Multiple Murder for the killing of

members of the Bucag family in Gingoog City were filed against Felipe
Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John
Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe, with the Regional Trial Court of
Gingoog City. Only Felipe Galarion was tried and convicted. All the other
accused were at large. Two years later, a certain Felizardo Roxas was
identified as another member of the group who was responsible for the
slaying of the Bucag family. An amended information was filed to implead
Roxas as a co-accused. He engaged the services of private respondent
Atty. Miguel Paderanga as his counsel. In order to give Roxas the
opportunity to adduce evidence in support of his defense, a preliminary
investigation was conducted. In his counter-affidavit, Roxas implicated
Atty. Paderanga as the mastermind of the killings. Consequently, the
amended information was again amended to include private respondent
Paderanga as one of the accused in the criminal case. Trial of the case
ensued. Private respondent objected to the presentation of Roxas'
testimony. The trial court sustained private respondent's objection on the
ground that the presentation of Roxas' testimony will violate his right
against self-incrimination. The trial court ruled further that before Roxas
can be presented as a witness for the prosecution, he must first be
discharged as a state witness. The prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration or, in the alternative, to discharge Roxas as a state
witness. It also manifested its intention to present Julito Ampo as another
state witness or ordinary prosecution witness. The trial court issued an
Order denying the prosecution's motion for reconsideration, but setting
the motion for the discharge of Roxas as state witness. Private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the
presentation of Roxas' testimony will be tantamount to allowing him to
testify as a state witness even before his discharge as such; that the
qualification of a proposed state witness must be proved by evidence
other than his own testimony; and that at the hearing for the discharge of
a proposed state witness, only his sworn statement can be presented
and not his oral testimony. Eventually, the trial court issued an Omnibus
Order granting private respondent's motion for reconsideration. On
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed by the prosecution
before the Court of Appeals, the appellate court dismissed the petition for
lack of merit. Hence, the present petition.
|||

D.; ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; TRIAL; AN ACCUSED MAY

TESTIFY AGAINST A CO-DEFENDANT WHERE HE HAS AGREED TO
DO SO, WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE OF HIS RIGHT AND THE
CONSEQUENCES OF HIS ACTS; DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED TO BE
STATE WITNESS IN SUCH A CASE IS NOT NECESSARY. — It is true
that an accused cannot be made a hostile witness for the prosecution, for
to do so would compel him to be a witness against himself. However, he
may testify against a co-defendant where he has agreed to do so, with full
knowledge of his right and the consequences of his acts. It is not
necessary that the court discharges him first as state witness. There is
nothing in the rules that says so. There is a difference between testifying
as state witness and testifying as a co-accused. In the first, the proposed
state witness has to qualify as a witness for the state, after which he is
discharged as an accused and exempted from prosecution. In the
second, the witness remains an accused and can be made liable should
he be found guilty of the criminal offense. However, we cannot simply rely
on petitioner's representation that Roxas and Ampo have volunteered to
testify for the prosecution. This is a matter that the trial court must
determine with certainty, lest their right against self-incrimination be
violated.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED TO BE STATE
WITNESS; THE RULES DOES NOT MAKE ANY DISTINCTION AS TO
THE KIND OF EVIDENCE THE PROSECUTION MAY PRESENT IN
SUPPORT OF THE DISCHARGE. — Petitioner also maintains that it can
validly present the testimony of Ely Roxas and Julito Ampo at the hearing
for their discharge as state witnesses. We agree. Rule 119, Section 17 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (formerly Rule 119, Section 9),
provides that the trial court may direct one or more of the accused to be
discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state
"after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge" (italics ours). The provision does not make any distinction as
to the kind of evidence the prosecution may present. What it simply
requires, in addition to the presentation of the sworn statement of the
accused concerned, is the presentation of such evidence as are
necessary to determine if the conditions exist for the discharge, so as to
meet the object of the law, which is to prevent unnecessary or arbitrary
exclusion from the complaint of persons guilty of the crime charged. No
exemption from the term evidence is provided by the law as to exclude
the testimony of the accused. When the law does not distinguish, we
should not distinguish.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A CO-ACCUSED CAN INTERPOSE THE
PROPER OBJECTION DURING THE DIRECT EXAMINATION OF THE
PROPOSED STATE WITNESS WHEN THE PROSECUTION
PROPOUNDS QUESTIONS WHICH MAY TOUCH ON THE MATTER
OF CONSPIRACY; CASE AT BAR. — There is no other evidence more
competent than the testimony of the proposed witness himself to prove
the conditions that his testimony is absolutely necessary in the case; that
there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of
the offense; that his testimony can be corroborated in its material points;
that he does not appear to be the most guilty; and that he has not been
convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Further, the trial judge
will not be able to clarify matters found in the sworn statements of the
proposed witnesses if they are not allowed to testify. Private respondent
counters Roxas and Ampo cannot be allowed to testify because their
testimony will effectively constitute an admission by a conspirator which,
under Rule 130, Section 30 of the Rules of Court, is inadmissible as
evidence against a co-conspirator until the conspiracy is established by
evidence other than said declaration. In this regard, suffice it to state that
private respondent can interpose the proper objection during the direct
examination of these witnesses, when the prosecution propounds
questions which may touch on the matter of conspiracy. Indeed, it is still
premature for private respondent to raise this objection in the instant
petition.

8. Go v. People, G.R. No. 185527, [July 18, 2012], 691 PHIL

440-457

The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge

in open court. 13 This is true especially in criminal cases where the
Constitutionsecures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet
the witnessess against him face to face. The requirement is the "safest
and most satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the
judge to test the witness' credibility through his manner and deportment
while testifying. 14 It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of
Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of
their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court
testimony. cCSDaI

Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability

of conditional examination of witnesses — both for the benefit of the
defense, as well as the prosecution. The Court's ruling in the case of Vda.
de Manguerra v. Risos 15 explicitly states that —
". . . As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of
Court provide for the different modes of discovery that may be
resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted
either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of
discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional
examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses."
(Underscoring supplied) 16
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the
taking of depositions in civil cases, either upon oral examination or written
interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or person authorized to
administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before any
Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to
administer oaths in a foreign state or country, with no additional
requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the other party. 17
But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more
particularly of a prosecution witness who would forseeably be
unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before
the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as
required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision reads thus:
SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. —
When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the
prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as
directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no
definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally
examined before the court where the case is pending. Such
examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his
absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination
has been served on him shall be conducted in the same
manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the
accused to attend the examination after notice shall be
considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in
behalf of or against the accused.
Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must
take place at no other place than the court where the case is pending, the
RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders granting the motion to take the
deposition of Li Luen Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos,
Cambodia. We quote with approval the RTC's ratiocination in this wise:
The condition of the private complainant being sick and
of advanced age falls within the provision of Section 15 Rule
119 of the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially
provides that he should be conditionally examined before the
court where the case is pending. Thus, this Court concludes
that the language of Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to
require the parties to present testimony at the hearing through
live witnesses, whose demeanor and credibility can be
evaluated by the judge presiding at the hearing, rather than by
means of deposition. No where in the said rule permits the
taking of deposition outside the Philippines whether the
deponent is sick or not. 18 (Underscoring supplied) STcEIC

Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness

elsewhere and not before the very same court where the case is pending
would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the
proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe
the prosecution witness' deportment and properly assess his credibility,
which is especially intolerable when the witness' testimony is crucial to
the prosecution's case against the accused. This is the import of the
Court's ruling in Vda. de Manguerra19 where we further declared that —
While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve
the testimony of its witness in order to prove its case, we cannot
disregard the rules which are designed mainly for the protection
of the accused's constitutional rights. The giving of testimony
during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of a
witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such,
calls for a strict construction of the rules. 20 (Underscoring
supplied)
It is argued that since the Rules of Civil Procedure is made
explicitly applicable in all cases, both civil and criminal as well as special
proceedings, the deposition-taking before a Philippine consular official
under Rule 23 should be deemed allowable also under the
circumstances. However, the suggested suppletory application of Rule
23 in the testimonial examination of an unavailable prosecution witness
has been categorically ruled out by the Court in the same case of Vda. de
Manguerra, as follows:
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of
Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to all
actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it
says that the rules of civil procedure have suppletory
application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that
criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule 119
adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case,
we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or
otherwise.

d the MeTC Orders granting the deposition-taking, following the

ruling in the case of People v. Webb 28 that the taking of an unavailable
witness' deposition is in the nature of a discovery procedure the use of
which is within the trial court's sound discretion which needs only to be
exercised in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the
law. 29
But the ruling in the cited case is not instantly applicable herein as
the factual settings are not similar. The accused in the Webb case had
sought to take the oral deposition of five defense witnesses before a
Philippine consular agent in lieu of presenting them as live witnesses,
alleging that they were all residents of the United States who could not be
compelled by subpoena to testify in court. The trial court denied the
motion of the accused but the CA differed and ordered the deposition
taken. When the matter was raised before this Court, we sustained the
trial court's disallowance of the deposition-taking on the limited ground
that there was no necessity for the procedure as the matter sought to be
proved by way of deposition was considered merely corroborative of the
evidence for the defense. 30
In this case, where it is the prosecution that seeks to depose the
complaining witness against the accused, the stringent procedure under
Section 15, Rule 119 cannot be ignored without violating the
constitutional rights of the accused to due process.
Finally, the Court takes note that prosecution witness Li Luen Ping
had managed to attend the initial trial proceedings before the MeTC of
Manila on September 9, 2004. At that time, Li Luen Ping's old age and
fragile constitution should have been unmistakably apparent and yet the
prosecution failed to act with zeal and foresight in having his deposition or
testimony taken before the MeTC pursuant to Section 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Court. In fact, it should have been imperative for the
prosecution to have moved for the preservation of Li Luen Ping's
testimony at that first instance given the fact that the witness is a
non-resident alien who can leave the Philippines anytime without any
definite date of return. Obviously, the prosecution allowed its main
witness to leave the court's jurisdiction without availing of the court
procedure intended to preserve the testimony of such witness. The loss
of its cause is attributable to no other party.
ICAcaH

Still, even after failing to secure Li Luen Ping's conditional

examination before the MeTC prior to said witness' becoming sick and
unavailable, the prosecution would capitalize upon its own failure by
pleading for a liberal application of the rules on depositions. It must be
emphasized that while the prosecution must provide the accused every
opportunity to take the deposition of witnesses that are material to his
defense in order to avoid charges of violating the right of the accused to
compulsory process, the State itself must resort to deposition-taking
sparingly if it is to guard against accusations of violating the right of the
accused to meet the witnesses against him face to face. Great care must
be observed in the taking and use of depositions of prosecution
witnesses to the end that no conviction of an accused will rely on ex
parte affidavits and depositions. 31
Thus, the CA ignored the procedure under the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure for taking the deposition of an unavailable
prosecution witness when it upheld the trial court's order allowing the
deposition of prosecution witness Li Luen Ping to take place in a venue
other than the court where the case is pending. This was certainly grave
abuse of discretion.

9. People v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 173308, [June 25, 2008], 578

PHIL 314-330

For his part, De la Cruz questioned the trial court's act of

discharging accused Tano as a state witness on two points: Tano did
not appear to be the least guilty among the accused and his testimony
was not necessary.
For an accused to be discharged as a state witness, the
following conditions must be present:
When two or more persons are jointly charged with the
commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution
before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the
accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may
be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the
prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of
each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge, the court is satisfied that:
a. There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the
accused whose discharge is requested;
b. There is no other direct evidence available for the
proper prosecution of the offense committed,
except the testimony of said accused;
c. The testimony of said accused can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
d. Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty;
and,
e. Said accused has not at any time been convicted of
any offense involving moral turpitude. 13
xxx xxx xxx
The provision does not require that a state witness should
appear to be the "least guilty" among the accused. Rather, it provides
that he "does not appear to be the most guilty". The findings of the
lower court revealed that Tano merely facilitated the commission of
the crime. He merely boarded the car and sat beside
accused-appellant De la Cruz throughout the whole ride and
 accompanied accused-appellant Martinez in going back to Batasan
Hills after leaving Aaron and accused-appellant De la Cruz in Bulacan.
True, he was the one who placed the call to Erwin to demand ransom.
However, he was neither the mastermind nor the one who hatched the
plan to kidnap Aaron in exchange for money. Clearly, he did not
appear to be the most guilty among the accused. Thus, we uphold the
propriety of the trial court's designation of Tano as state witness.
HEDCAS

Moreover, his testimony was absolutely necessary as it was the

only direct evidence establishing the presence of conspiracy, 14 from
the planning stage up to the commission of the crime.
On the issue of conspiracy, we hold that the prosecution
sufficiently established it. There is conspiracy when two or more
persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. It need not
be proven by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct
of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime,
showing that they acted with common purpose and design. 15
The prosecution was able to present direct evidence of the
conspiracy (by state witness Tano) and to show that the conduct of all
the accused overwhelmingly pointed to the unanimity in design, intent
and execution of the crime against the victim. Each of them performed
specific acts according to place and in close coordination with one
another, unmistakably indicating a common purpose to bring about
Aaron's abduction in exchange for money.

10. People v. Monje y Rosario, G.R. No. 146689, [September 27,

2002], 438 PHIL 716-736

Accused-appellant, together with three (3) others, were charged with

the crime of rape with homicide for the brutal rape and killing of 15
year-old Imee. After trial, the three were acquitted, but accused was
convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to death, based mainly
on the testimony of Cordero, whose evidence against the accused were
purely circumstantial since he did not see the actual rape-slay of the
victim.
|||

. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; RIGHT

TO CROSS EXAMINE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM; REFUSAL OF
WITNESS TO APPEAR FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION VIOLATES DUE
PROCESS; CASE AT BAR. — It bears stressing that the
cross-examination of a witness is an absolute right, not a mere privilege,
of the party against whom he is called. With regard to the accused, it is a
right guaranteed by the fundamental law as part of due process. Article III,
Sec. 14, par. (2),of the 1987 Constitution specifically mandates that "the
accused shall enjoy the right to meet the witnesses face to face," and
Rule 115, Sec. 1, par. (f),of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure enjoins
that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be entitled to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. ...The ultimate
purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth or falsity of the
statements of a witness during direct examination. Unfortunately, for the
accused, these objectives of cross-examination were never attained in
this case because of the continued failure and refusal of witness Cordero
to appear for his cross-examination. How can the truth be ascertained if
the cross-examination is not completed? CAaEDH

2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; QUANTUM OF PROOF

REQUIRED IN CRIMINAL CASES; CANNOT BE ATTAINED WITHOUT
FULL CROSS-EXAMINATION; CASE AT BAR. — The verdict in a
criminal case can be sustained only when there is relevant evidence from
which the court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.Thus, the test in determining the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence can be summed up as follows: Is the evidence
sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis proving innocence,
except the guilt of the accused, given the circumstances of the case? In
reviewing criminal cases that could very well exact the ultimate penalty
of death,we should do more than merely determine whether the trial court
could reasonably conclude that the established facts were more probable
than not. We must, in every instance, determine whether the trial court
could reasonably conclude that the facts were certain to have occurred. It
bears stressing that even the trial judge who was privy to the entire
proceedings below did not lend full credence to the entire testimony of
Cordero. On the contrary, he even expressed doubt as to their
veracity. ..Apparently, the case for the prosecution is woven principally
around the testimony of witness Michael Cordero. It must be emphasized
however that his testimony was not sufficiently tested on the crucible of
cross-examination, specifically, that significant portion of his direct
examination where he purportedly saw the accused and three (3)
unidentified persons returning to the tricycle from the ricefield without the
victim around 1:00 o'clock the following morning. After his initial
cross-examination by defense counsel, witness Cordero failed and
refused to return to court for the continuation of his cross-examination. In
other words, except for his brief cross-examination which had barely
scratched the surface, so to speak, and despite the insistence of the
defense counsel to pursue his cross-examination and the repeated
warnings from the trial court that it would be constrained to strike out and
disregard his testimony should he fail to appear again, the witness
stubbornly refused to return to court for his cross-examination. Without
the benefit of a full cross-examination, the ex parte statements of the
witness are too uncertain, shaky and unreliable to be included in the
review of controverted facts. They cannot be allowed to form part of the
evidence and their consideration by the court a quo was clearly
unwarranted.
3. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE LINKING
ACCUSED TO RAPE-SLAYING OF VICTIM IN CASE AT BAR. —
Indeed, other than the anemic testimony of Cordero, there is no evidence
effectively linking the accused to the rape and brutal slaying of Imee Diez
Paulino. The testimony of the second witness for the prosecution, Jojit
Vasquez, as to the presence of the accused and his companions in the
house of a certain Alvin, is likewise disappointingly unreliable to establish
a logical relationship between the commission of the crime and
complicity of the accused therein. This evidence, even if tied up with the
testimony of Cordero that accused was last seen with the victim, does not
establish a causal connection, nor support an inference, much less a
conclusion, that accused had something to do with the rape and killing of
the victim.
4. ID.;ID.;CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; REQUISITES FOR
CONVICTION; CASE AT BAR. — Under the rules, circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to convict an accused if the following requisites
concur: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from
which the inferences are derived are proved; and, (c) The combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence finds application in crimes
such as rape with homicide. The nature of the crime of rape, where
usually only the victim and the rapist are present at the crime scene,
makes prosecutions for the complex crime of rape with homicide
particularly difficult since the victim can no longer testify against the
perpetrator of the crime. Circumstantial evidence must form a complete
and unbroken chain which, taking the evidence as a whole, leads directly
to the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt excluding any
reasonable inference other than that of guilt. Conceding arguendo that
indeed Imee was last seen alive at 11:00 o'clock in the evening of 24 April
1997 in the company of the accused, yet, there was no other
circumstance tending to prove that he was the one who raped and killed
her. In fact, the time of the rape as well as the killing was not even
satisfactorily established. The medico-legal officer did not give a
categorical answer as to the exact time of death of the victim. On the
contrary, he merely gave an approximation, i.e.,"two (2),three (3),four (4)
days or more." In fact, this approximation is of no help at all because if we
reckon it from the time when the decomposing body of the victim was
found,i.e.,on 27 April 1997, the three (3) dates when the victim
supposedly died would be 25 April (counting two (2) days from 27
April),24 April (counting three (3) days from 27 April),23 April (counting
four (4) days from 27 April),and 22 April backwards (counting more than
four (4) days).This would have been absurd and in no way coincide with
the date when the victim was supposedly last seen alive.
5. ID.;ID.;FLIGHT; INDICATIVE OF GUILT WHEN IT IS
UNEXPLAINED; CASE AT BAR. — Accused-appellant allegedly "fled" to
Cagayan after the filing of the Information,supposedly when he learned
he was included therein. which the trial court considered as evidence of a
guilty conscience. Although as a general rule flight is an indication of guilt,
the same should not be flippantly considered. "Flight" is a circumstance
from which an inference of guilt may be drawn only when it is unexplained
and with an evident purpose of evading prosecution. The
accused-appellant adequately explained that he went home to Cagayan
upon the prodding of an uncle after a quarrel with his cousin who chided
him as one they had to feed or "palamunin" since he was allegedly
jobless. Accused-appellant went to his home province after more than
two (2) weeks from the filing of the Information.Thus, he did not leave the
place immediately after learning he was being implicated in the crime.
There was no indication whatsoever that he intentionally made his
presence scarce in his community to evade prosecution.

11. People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 118670, [February 22, 2000],

383 PHIL 30-46

In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,

herein appellants were charged with robbery with homicide for having
willfully and feloniously killed Dr. Amadeo Belmonte and Teresa Hape
and then robbed and took away, without the victims' consent, several
articles and cash totaling the amount of P325,650.00. Only De Guzman,
Ramos and Mosqueda were apprehended. Ancheta remained at large.
When they were arraigned, the three accused entered a plea of not guilty.
At the trial and upon motion of the prosecution, Mosqueda was
discharged and was utilized as state witness. On December 21, 1994, the
Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding de Guzman and Ramos
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Unsatisfied with the
verdict, appellants filed an appeal before the Court questioning the
decision of the lower court. Before the decision in this case, appellant de
Guzman withdrew his appeal, leaving Ramos as the only appellant.

REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; STATE WITNESS;

ERROR IN DISCHARGING THE ACCUSED AS STATE WITNESS
DOES NOT AFFECT THE COMPETENCY AND THE QUALITY OF THE
TESTIMONY OF THE DEFENDANT. — While this Court agrees that
some of the requirements under Section 9 of Rule 119 for the discharge
of Mosqueda to become state witness were not strictly and properly met,
nonetheless, this Court does not subscribe to the suggestion of the
defense that Mosqueda's testimony should be disregarded. This issue
has long been settled. Although the trial court may have erred in
discharging the accused, such error would not affect the competency and
the quality of the testimony of the defendant. The discharge of an
accused under these circumstances is not reversible. Once his discharge
is effected, the legal consequence of acquittal follows unless the accused
so discharged fails or refuses to testify pursuant to his commitment. The
order for his discharge may only be recalled in one instance, and that is
when he subsequently fails to testify against his co-accused.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE ONLY INSTANCE WHEN A DISCHARGED
WITNESS MAY BE VALIDLY RECALLED IS WHEN HE REFUSES TO
TESTIFY AGAINST HIS CO-ACCUSED PURSUANT TO HIS
COMMITMENT. — Although it appears that the court below erred in
discharging accused Mosqueda, his recall at this time would not be
proper. If recalled, Mosqueda would be placed in double jeopardy
because upon his discharge from the Information, he is deemed to have
been acquitted of the charges against him. Besides, there is no proper
and valid ground for his recall considering that he testified against his
co-accused. To repeat, the only instance when a discharged accused
may be validly recalled is when he refuses to testify against his
co-accused pursuant to his commitment. Based on the foregoing, the
protestation by the defense that "minus the testimony of state witness
Frederick Mosqueda whose discharge is in error, the only evidence left
for the prosecution are the testimonies of Marilyn Serran and Patricio
Domantay," would not hold water.

12. Yu v. Presiding Judge, RTC of Tagaytay City, Br. 18, G.R. No.
142848, [June 30, 2006], 526 PHIL 594-607
 Petitioner maintains that since the private respondents were
already charged along with the other accused including him (petitioner)
before they were admitted to the WPSBP, their admission is a judicial
prerogative which requires prior determination by the trial court of their
qualification as state witnesses, in accordance with Section 17, Rule 119
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Petitioner further asserts that the case of Webb v. De
Leon, 9 which the RTC relied on in granting the discharge of the private
respondents and their admission to the WPSBP, does not apply. In that
case, Jessica Alfaro was not charged as a respondent before her
application and admission to the WPSBP. Thus, the issue of whether or
not she can be discharged from the information upon the filing of the
petition for discharge never arose. On the other hand, petitioner contends
in this case that the private respondents were already charged along with
the other accused, including him, before they were admitted to the
WPSBP and discharged as an accused to be utilized as a state witness.
Petitioner argues that if this were to be allowed, the same is tantamount
to permitting the prosecution to supplant with its own the court's exercise
of discretion on how a case over which it has acquired jurisdiction, will
proceed.
The argument of petitioner fails to persuade.
Pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 6981 employed by the
prosecution in the discharge of the private respondents reads:
SEC. 3. Admission into the Program. — Any person who
has witnessed or has knowledge or information on the
commission of a crime and has testified or is testifying or about
to testify before any judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before any
investigating authority, may be admitted into the Program:
Provided, That:
a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a
grave felony as defined under the Revised Penal Code, or its
equivalent under special laws;

b) his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its

material points;
c) he or any member of his family within the second civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity is subjected to threats to his
life or bodily injury or there is a likelihood that he will be killed,
forced, intimidated, harassed or corrupted to prevent him from
testifying, or to testify falsely, or evasively, because or on
account of his testimony; and
d) he is not a law enforcement officer, even if he would
be testifying against other law enforcement officers. In such a
case, only the immediate members of his family may avail
themselves of the protection provided for under this Act.
If the Department, after examination of said applicant
and other relevant facts, is convinced that the requirements of
this Act and its implementing rules and regulations have been
complied with, it shall admit said applicant to the Program,
require said witness to execute a sworn statement detailing his
knowledge or information on the commission of the crime, and
thereafter issue the proper certification. For purposes of this Act,
any such person admitted to the Program shall be known as the
Witness.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 10. State Witness. — Any person who has
participated in the commission of a crime and desires to be a
witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined
in this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted into the
Program whenever the following circumstances are present:
a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a
grave felony as defined under the Revised Penal Code or its
equivalent under special laws;
b) there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
c) there is no other direct evidence available for the
proper prosecution of the offense committed;
d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its
material points;
e) he does not appear to be most guilty; and
f) he has not at any time been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude.
An accused discharged from an information or criminal
complaint by the court in order that he may be a State Witness
pursuant to Sections 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Court may upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he
complies with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this
Act shall prevent the discharge of an accused, so that he can be
used as a State Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
 On the other hand, Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, upon which petitioner relies reads:
Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. —
When two or more persons are jointly charged with the
commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution
before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the
accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be
witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to
present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed
state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court
is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony
of the accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for
the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except
the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be
substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most
guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been
convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge
shall automatically form part of the trial. If the court
denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state
witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
The discharge of an accused under Republic Act No. 6981 as
availed of by the prosecution in favor of the private respondents, is
distinct and separate from the discharge of an accused under Section 17,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
The discharge of an accused to be a state witness under Republic
Act No. 6981 is only one of the modes for a participant in the commission
of a crime to be a state witness. Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, is another mode of discharge. The
immunity provided under Republic Act No. 6981 is granted by the DOJ
while the other is granted by the court.
Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
contemplates a situation where the information has been filed and the
accused had been arraigned and the case is undergoing trial. The
discharge of an accused under this rule may be ordered upon motion of
the prosecution before resting its case, that is, at any stage of the
proceedings, from the filing of the information to the time the defense
starts to offer any evidence. 10
On the other hand, in the discharge of an accused under Republic
Act No. 6981, only compliance with the requirement of Section 14, Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 is required but not the
requirement of Rule 119, Section 17.
More to the point is the recent case of Soberano v.
People 12 where this Court held:
An amendment of the information made before plea
which excludes some or one of the accused must be made only
upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party
and with leave of court in compliance with Section 14, Rule
110. Section 14, Rule 110 does not qualify the grounds for
the exclusion of the accused. Thus, said provision applies
in equal force when the exclusion is sought on the usual
ground of lack of probable cause, or when it is for
utilization of the accused as state witness, as in this case,
or on some other ground.
At this level, the procedural requirements of Section
17, Rule 119 on the need for the prosecution to present
evidence and the sworn statement of each state witness at
a hearing in support of the discharge do not yet come into
play. This is because, as correctly pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, the determination of who should be criminally charged
in court is essentially an executive function, not a judicial
one. . . . . (Underscoring supplied.)
In this connection, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6981 13 provides
that the issuance of a certification of admission into the program shall be
given full faith by the provincial or city prosecutor who is required not to
include the witness in the criminal complaint or information, and if
included, to petition for his discharge in order that he can be utilized as a
state witness. This provision justifies the regularity of the procedure
adopted by the prosecution for the discharge of the private
respondents. ECDaTI

The case of Webb v. De Leon, 14 reiterated in the subsequent case

of People v. Peralta, 15 is quite elucidating in this regard.
Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty
assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial
function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive
 and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes
appertains to the executive department of government whose
principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are
faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to
execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The
right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of
discretion — the discretion of whether, what and whom to
charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of
factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus
hold that it is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to
enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in the Department of Justice the
power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program
and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution. Section 9
of Rule 119 does not support the proposition that the power to
choose who shall be a state witness is an inherent judicial
prerogative. Under this provision, the court is given the power to
discharge a state witness only because it has already acquired
jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. The discharge of an
accused is part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a
recognition of an inherent judicial function. Moreover, the Rules
of Court have never been interpreted to be beyond change by
legislation designed to improve the administration of our justice
system. R.A. No. 6981 is one of the much sought penal reform
laws to help government in its uphill fight against crime, one
certain cause of which is the reticence of witnesses to testify.
The rationale for the law is well put by the Department of
Justice, viz: "Witnesses, for fear of reprisal and economic
disclocation, usually refuse to appear and testify in the
investigation/prosecution of criminal complaints/cases.
Because of such refusal, criminal complaints/cases have been
dismissed for insufficiency and/or lack of evidence. For a more
effective administration of criminal justice, there was a
necessity to pass a law protecting witnesses and granting them
certain rights and benefits to ensure their appearance in
investigative bodies/courts. Petitioner Webb's challenge to the
validity of R.A. No. 6981cannot therefore succeed.
Anent the second issue, petitioner argues that the petition to
discharge is not supported by any proof or evidence. He claims that the
prosecution did not establish that the private respondents have complied
with the requisites of Republic Act No. 6981 because the certificate of
admission from the DOJ showing that the private respondents were
qualified, and the memorandum of agreement between the DOJ and
private respondents, as required by Section 5 16 of Republic Act No.
6981, were not presented before the trial court.
We reject the argument for being vacuous.
 As found by the DOJ, based on the extrajudicial statements
executed by the private respondents regarding their participation in the
abduction and killing of Atty. Eugene Tan and his driver, it appears that
they were included in an alleged military operation and unaware that the
persons they abducted were innocent civilians because they were misled
by their military superiors into believing that these individuals were
unnamed communist rebels. From their account, private respondents
claim to have been oblivious that the persons subject of their surveillance
were to be abducted and subsequently killed.

The rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is that the discharge of an

accused to be utilized as a state witness because he does not appear to
be the most guilty, is highly factual in nature. The discretionary judgment
of the trial court on this factual issue is seldom interfered with by the
appellate courts except in case of grave abuse of discretion, 17 which we
find not present in the case at bar.
On the issue of failure of the prosecution to present the sworn
statement and memorandum of agreement between the private
respondents and the DOJ, there is no requirement under Republic Act
No. 6891 that the same be first presented in court before an accused may
be admitted to the WPSBP. Moreover, the DOJ which is tasked to
implement the provisions of Republic Act No. 6981, has determined that
the private respondents have satisfied the requirements for admission
under the WPSBP. This interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 6981 by the DOJ deserves the respect of the court under the
principle that the determination of a government agency tasked to
implement a statute is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the
construction of the courts.

13. Merciales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124171, [March 18,

2002], 429 PHIL 70-82
Petitioner, who is the mother of the victim in Criminal Cases Nos.
6307-6312 for rape with homicide, filed before the Court of Appeals a
petition to annul the order of the trial court which dismissed the charge of
rape with homicide based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the private
respondents, accused therein for failure of the prosecution to present
evidence in support of its prayer for the discharge of accused Nuada to
be a state witness. However, the said petition was dismissed by the Court
of Appeals.
 D.; ID.; DISCHARGE OF AN ACCUSED TO BE A STATE
WITNESS; PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE BY THE PROSECUTION
IN SUPPORT THEREOF IS REQUIRED. — Indeed, Rule 119, Section 9
(now Section 17) of the Rules of Court expressly requires the
presentation of evidence in support of the prosecution's prayer for the
discharge of an accused to be a state witness, viz: "When two or more
persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon
motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one
or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they
may be witnesses for the state when after requiring the prosecution to
present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state
witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, . . . ."
4. ID.; ID.; TRIAL; DUTY OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR TO
PROTECT THE INTEREST OF THE OFFENDED PARTY HAS BEEN
VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR. — [T]he public prosecutor violated his
bounden duty to protect the interest of the offended party, at least insofar
as the criminal aspect is concerned. After the trial court denied his motion
to discharge Nuada as a state witness, he should have proceeded to
complete the evidence of the prosecution by other means. Instead, he
willfully and deliberately refused to present an available witness, i.e., the
NBI Agent who was present in court on that date and time. The public
prosecutor was duty-bound to exhaust all available proofs to establish
the guilt of the accused and bring them to justice for their offense against
the injured party.

14. Valencia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 165996, [October 17,

2005], 510 PHIL 70-91

The issues for resolution are (1) was petitioner's Motion for Leave
to File Demurrer to Evidence premature? (2) may the prosecution be
allowed to present evidence after it orally manifested its intention to rest
its case? (3) was petitioner denied his right to speedy trial?
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, provides:
SEC. 23. Demurrer to evidence. — After the prosecution
rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the
prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to
evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.
Corollarily, Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court states:
 SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider
no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose
for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
A demurrer to evidence tests the sufficiency or insufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence. As such, a demurrer to evidence or a motion for
leave to file the same must be filed after the prosecution rests its case.
But before an evidence may be admitted, the rules require that the same
be formally offered, otherwise, it cannot be considered by the court. A
prior formal offer of evidence concludes the case for the prosecution and
determines the timeliness of the filing of a demurrer to evidence.
As held in Aquino v. Sison, 16 the motion to dismiss for insufficiency
of evidence filed by the accused after the conclusion of the
cross-examination of the witness for the prosecution, is premature
because the latter is still in the process of presenting evidence. The
chemistry report relied upon by the court in granting the motion to dismiss
was disregarded because it was not properly identified or formally offered
as evidence. Verily, until such time that the prosecution closed its
evidence, the defense cannot be considered to have seasonably filed a
demurrer to evidence or a motion for leave to file the same.
In the present case, petitioner's motion for leave to file demurrer to
evidence is premature because the prosecution had yet to formally rest
its case. When the motion was filed on January 19, 2004, the latter had
not yet marked nor formally offered the Joint Stipulation of Facts as
evidence. It is inconsequential that petitioner received by mail on January
27, 2004, a motion and formal offer of evidence dated January 20,
2004 from Prosecutor Salindong, 17 because, as aptly observed by the
Office of the Ombudsman, the records of the Sandiganbayan bear no
such motion or formal offer of evidence filed by the prosecution. The
motion and formal offer found in the records are those attached as Annex
"B" 18 to petitioner's Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration 19 and
not copies filed by the prosecution. Under Section 12, Rule 13 of the
Rules of Court, the filing of a pleading or paper shall be proved by its
existence in the case records. The absence of the motion to rest the case
in the records of the Sandiganbayan and the failure to offer the Joint
Stipulation of Facts prove that the prosecution did not formally rest or
conclude the presentation of its evidence, rendering petitioner's motion
for leave to file demurrer to evidence, premature.
At any rate, had the prosecution actually filed said motion and
formally offered the evidence before the Sandiganbayan, the motion for
leave to file demurrer to evidence still suffers prematurity because it was
filed on January 19, 2004, or one day before the date of the motion and
offer, i.e., January 20, 2004. In fact, even petitioner admitted in his
motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence that the prosecution failed
to mark and offer any evidence against him.
15. People v. Sandiganbayan [Fourth Division], G.R. No.
153304-05, [February 7, 2012], 681 PHIL 90-127
Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Sandiganbayan is
under no obligation to require the parties to present additional
evidence when a demurrer to evidence is filed. In a criminal
proceeding, the burden lies with the prosecution to prove that the
accused committed the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt, as
the constitutional presumption of innocence ordinarily stands in favor
of the accused. Whether the Sandiganbayan will intervene in the
course of the prosecution of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction,
competence and discretion, provided that its actions do not result in
the impairment of the substantial rights of the accused, or of the right
of the State and of the offended party to due process of law. 72
A discussion of the violation of the State's right to due process
in the present case, however, is intimately linked with the gross
negligence or the fraudulent action of the State's agent. The absence
of this circumstance in the present case cannot but have a negative
impact on how the petitioner would want the Court to view
the Sandiganbayan's actuation and exercise of discretion.
The court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, may require or
allow the prosecution to present additional evidence (at its own
initiative or upon a motion) after a demurrer to evidence is filed. This
exercise, however, must be for good reasons and in the paramount
interest of justice. 73 As mentioned, the court may require the
presentation of further evidence if its action on the demurrer to
evidence would patently result in the denial of due process; it may also
allow the presentation of additional evidence if it is newly discovered,
if it was omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or if it is intended to
correct the evidence previously offered. 74 TCDHaE

In this case, we cannot attribute grave abuse of discretion to

the Sandiganbayan when it exercised restraint and did not require the
presentation of additional evidence, given the clear weakness of the
case at that point. We note that under the obtaining circumstances,
the petitioner failed to show what and how additional
available evidence could have helped and the paramount interest of
justice sought to be achieved. It does not appear that pieces of
evidence had been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or that
these pieces of evidence are intended to correct evidence previously
offered. More importantly, it does not appear that these contemplated
additional pieces of evidence (which the special prosecutor allegedly
should have presented) were ever present and available. For instance,
at no point in the records did the petitioner unequivocally state that it
could present the three UL officers, Cueto, Jiao and Sison. The
petitioner also failed to demonstrate its possession of or access to
these documents (such as the final audit report) to support the
prosecution's charges — the proof that the State had been deprived of
due process due to the special prosecutor's alleged inaction.
IIIa. Grave abuse of discretion and the demurrers to evidence
In Criminal Case No. 20345 that charged conspiracy for
abstracting P57.59 Million out of the P100 Million KSS fund, the
prosecution's evidence showed that P60 Million of this fund was
disbursed by respondent Benitez, as approving officer, in the nature of
cash advances to Zagala (who received a total amount of P40 Million)
and Dulay (who received P20 Million).
To prove the misappropriation, the prosecution tried to establish
that there was an irregularity in the procedure of liquidating these
amounts on the basis of COA Auditor Cortez' testimony that the
liquidation should have been made before the COA Chairman (not to
the resident auditor of the MHS) because these funds were
confidential. 75
Quite evident from the prosecution's position is that it did not
dispute whether a liquidation had been made of the whole amount of
P60 Million; rather, what it disputed was the identity of the person
before whom the liquidation should have been made. Before the
directive of former President Marcos was made which declared the
KSS funds (of which the P60 Million formed part) to be confidential,
the liquidation of this amount must be made before the resident
auditor of the MHS. With the issuance of the directive, liquidation
should have been made to the COA Chairman who should have then
issued a credit memo to prove proper liquidation. 76
To justify conviction for malversation of public funds, the
prosecution has to prove that the accused received public funds or
property that they could not account for, or was not in their possession
and which they could not give a reasonable excuse for the
disappearance of such public funds or property. 77 The prosecution
failed in this task as the subject funds were liquidated and were not
shown to have been converted for personal use by the respondents.
The records reveal that the amounts of P50 Million and P10
Million were liquidated by Zagala and Dulay, respectively. 78 On
Zagala's part, the liquidation of P50 Million (P10 Million of which was
the cash advance given to Dulay) was made to resident auditor
Flerida V. Creencia on September 25, 1984 or before the directive of
former President Marcos (declaring the said funds confidential) was
issued on November 7, 1984. 79 Hence, at the time the liquidation of
the amount was made, the liquidation report submitted to the resident
auditor was the proper procedure of liquidation. Respondent Benitez,
for his part, submitted Journal Voucher No. 4350208 dated November
27, 1984 stating, among others, that as early as June 22, 1984, the
supporting papers for the liquidation of the P50 Million had already
been submitted to the COA. 80
Moreover, even if the liquidation should have been made in
compliance with the former President's directive, the prosecution's
evidence did not sufficiently establish the non-existence of a credit
memo. As admitted by COA Auditor Cortez, certain documents they
were looking for during the audit examination (including the credit
memo) could no longer be located after the (EDSA) revolution. 81 She
further declared that she did not know if COA Chairman Alfredo
Tantingco complied with the required audit examination of the
liquidated P60 Million. 82
In Criminal Case No. 20346, respondents are sought to be held
liable under the criminal information for converting P40 Million
(subdivided to P21.6 Million, P3.8 Million and P17 Million or a total of
P42.4 Million) to their own use given that these funds were never
allegedly transferred to UL, the intended beneficiary.
Records show that the disputed amount allegedly malversed
was actually P37,757,364.57 Million because of evidence that an
amount of P4.5 Million was returned by respondent Benitez. 83 As
previously mentioned, the documentary evidence adduced reveals
the existence of treasury warrants and disbursement vouchers issued
in the name of UL bearing the amounts of P21.6 Million, P3.8 Million
and P17 Million. 84 Documentary evidence also exists showing that
these amounts were deposited in the UCPB and drawn afterwards by
means of checks issued for purchases intended for
the Kabisig Program of the MHS. EaCDAT

Except for the appropriated P17 Million, the petitioner's

evidence does not sufficiently show how the amounts of P21.6 Million
and P3.8 Million were converted to the personal use by the
respondents. The testimony of COA Auditor Cortez revealed that
documents showing the disbursements of the subject funds were in
possession of one Flordeliz Gomez as the Records Custodian and
Secretary of UL. For undisclosed reasons, however, COA Auditor
Cortez failed to communicate with Gomez but merely relied on the
documents and checks, which the audit team already had in its
possession. 85
This omission, in our view, raises doubts on the completeness
and accuracy of the audit examination pertaining to the P21.6 Million
and P3.8 Million funds. Such doubt was further strengthened by COA
Auditor Cortez' testimony showing that P3.8 Million was listed in the
books of the MHS as a direct expense account to which UL is not
required to render an accounting or liquidation. 86 Also, she admitted
that the amount of P21.6 Million was contained in a liquidation
voucher submitted by Dulay, which was included in the transmittal
letter signed by the respondents to the COA and accompanied by a
performance report on the Kabisig Program. This performance report
showed that the total amount of P21.6 Million was exhausted in
the Kabisig Program. 87
With respect to the P17 Million, evidence adduced showed that
270 units of the motorcycles have already been transferred in the
name of MHS by UL. 88 There is also evidence that the audit team
initially found nothing irregular in the documentation of the 500
motorcycles during the audit examination conducted in April 1986; the
same goes for the eight cars purchased.
Under the circumstances, we agree with
the Sandiganbayan that registration of these vehicles in UL's name
alone did not constitute malversation in the absence of proof, based
on the available evidence, to establish that the respondents benefited
from the registration of these motor vehicles in UL's name, or that
these motor vehicles were converted by the respondents to their own
personal use. 89 In the end, the prosecution's evidence tended to
prove that the subject funds were actually used for their intended
purpose.
IV. Conclusion
In dismissing this petition, we observe that the criminal cases
might have been prompted by reasons other than injury to
government interest as the primary concern. 90 These other reasons
might have triggered the hastiness that attended the conduct of audit
examinations which resulted in evidentiary gaps in the prosecution's
case to hold the respondents liable for the crime of malversation. 91 As
matters now stand, no sufficient evidence exists to support the
charges of malversation against the respondents. Hence,
the Sandiganbayan did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
 amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it granted the
demurrers to evidence and, consequently, dismissed the criminal
cases against the respondents.
We take this opportunity to remind the prosecution that this
Court is as much a judge in behalf of an accused-defendant whose
liberty is in jeopardy, as it is the judge in behalf of the State, for the
purpose of safeguarding the interests of society. 92 Therefore, unless
the petitioner demonstrates, through evidence and records, that its
case falls within the narrow exceptions from the criminal protection of
double jeopardy, the Court has no recourse but to apply the
finality-of-acquittal rule.

16. People v. Garcia Cristobal, G.R. No. 159450, [March 30,

2011], 662 PHIL 164-188

The accused contended that:

xxx xxx xxx
(2) The trial court denied accused (sic) 'Demurrer to
Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense Evidence' and ruled that
the accused is considered to have waived her evidence (for
alleged lack of leave of court). Although the accused is not
principally relying on this error (because the prosecution's own
evidence show that she is not guilty), still it was error for the trial
court to deprive the accused of her day in court because the
demurrer was at the same time, as stated in the title thereof,
also a motion to defer defense evidence. 15
The CA rejected her contention in the following manner: 16
As to whether or not the Trial Court correctly ruled that
appellant waived the presentation of her evidence when she
filed her "Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to Defer Evidence"
without prior leave of court, We rule in the affirmative. SaTAED

Appellant's theory that prior leave of court had been

requested because her demurrer was, at the same time, also a
motion to defer defense evidence, cannot be sustained. A
motion to defer evidence does not constitute a request for leave
to file a demurrer to evidence. In fact, such motion indicates that
appellant wanted the Trial Court to consider the demurrer
before proceeding to hear her evidence. Furthermore, there is
nothing in appellant's Demurrer from which it can be inferred
that appellant was asking the Trial Court permission to move for
the dismissal of the case.
 Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
Sec. 15. Demurrer to Evidence. — After the
prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss
the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1)
on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an
opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused
filed with prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the
accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the
accused files such motion to dismiss without
express leave of court, he waives the right to
present evidence and submits the case for judgment
on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution. (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, when the accused files such motion to dismiss
without express leave of court, he waives the right to present
evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the
evidence for the prosecution. In such a case, the waiver of the
right to present defense evidence is unqualified.
Unavoidably, Our attention is drawn to the apparent
negligence of appellant's counsel in failing to secure prior leave
of court before filing her Demurrer to Evidence. However, We
cannot lose sight of the fact that in law, the negligence of
appellant's counsel binds her. Indeed, jurisprudence teems with
pronouncements that a client is bound by the conduct,
negligence and mistakes of his counsel.
The CA did not thereby err.
The rule in point is Section 15, Rule 119, of the Revised Rules
of Court, viz.:
Section 15. Demurrer to evidence. — After the
prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own
initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard;
or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused
may adduce evidence in his defense. When the accused files
such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he
waives the right to present evidence and submits the case
for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution. (n)
 Under the rule, the RTC properly declared the accused to have
waived her right to present evidence because she did not obtain the
express leave of court for her demurrer to evidence, thereby reflecting
her voluntary and knowing waiver of her right to present evidence. The
RTC did not need to inquire into the voluntariness and intelligence of
the waiver, for her opting to file her demurrer to evidence without first
obtaining express leave of court effectively waived her right to present
her evidence.
It is true that the Court has frequently deemed the failure of the
trial courts to conduct an inquiry into the voluntariness and intelligence
of the waiver to be a sufficient cause to remand cases to the trial
courts for the purpose of ascertaining whether the accused truly
intended to waive their constitutional right to be heard, and whether
they understood the consequences of their waivers. 17 In People v.
Bodoso, 18 a prosecution for a capital offense, we leaned towards the
protection of the accused's constitutional right to due process by
outlining the proper steps to be taken before deeming the right to
present evidence as waived, thus:
Henceforth, to protect the constitutional right to due
process of every accused in a capital offense and to avoid any
confusion about the proper steps to be taken when a trial court
comes face to face with an accused or his counsel who wants to
waive his client's right to present evidence and be heard, it shall
be the unequivocal duty of the trial court to observe, as a
prerequisite to the validity of such waiver, a procedure akin to a
"searching inquiry" as specified in People v. Aranzado when an
accused pleads guilty, particularly —
1. The trial court shall hear both the prosecution and the
accused with their respective counsel on the
desire or manifestation of the accused to waive
the right to present evidence and be heard. SIDTCa

2. The trial court shall ensure the attendance of the

prosecution and especially the accused with their
respective counsel in the hearing which must be
recorded. Their presence must be duly entered in
the minutes of the proceedings.
3. During the hearing, it shall be the task of the trial court
to —
a. ask the defense counsel a series of
question to determine whether he had conferred
with and completely explained to the accused that
he had the right to present evidence and be heard
 as well as its meaning and consequences,
together with the significance and outcome of the
waiver of such right. If the lawyer for the accused
has not done so, the trial court shall give the latter
enough time to fulfill this professional obligation.
b. inquire from the defense counsel with
conformity of the accused whether he wants to
present evidence or submit a memorandum
elucidating on the contradictions and insufficiency
of the prosecution evidence, if any, or in default
theory, file a demurrer to evidence with prior leave
of court, if he so believes that the prosecution
evidence is so weak that it need not even be
rebutted. If there is a desire to do so, the trial court
shall give the defense enough time to this
purpose.
c. elicit information about the personality
profile of the accused, such as his age,
socio-economic status, and educational
background, which may serve as a trustworthy
index of his capacity to give a free and informed
waiver.
d. all questions posed to the accused
should be in a language known and understood
by the latter, hence, the record must state the
language used for this purpose as well as reflect
the corresponding translation thereof in English.
In passing, trial courts may also abide by the foregoing
criminal procedure when the waiver of the right to be present
and be heard is made incriminal cases involving non-capital
offenses. After all, in whatever action or forum the accused is
situated, the waiver that he makes if it is to be binding and
effective must still be exhibited in the case records to have been
validly undertaken, that is, it was done voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences. As a matter of good
court practice, the trial court would have to rely upon the most
convenient, if not primary, evidence of the validity of the waiver
which would amount to the same thing as showing its
adherence to the step-by-step process outlined above.
Also, in Rivera v. People, 19 which involved an accused
charged with a non-capital offense who filed a demurrer to evidence
without leave of court, the Court, citing People v. Bodoso, supra,
remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings
 upon finding that the accused had not been asked whether he had
understood the consequences of filing the demurrer to evidence
without leave of court.
Yet, the accused cannot be extended the benefit of People v.
Bodoso and Rivera v. People. The factual milieus that warranted the
safeguards in said criminal cases had nothing in common with the
factual milieu in which the RTC deemed the herein accused to have
waived her right to present evidence. The accused in People v.
Bodoso, without filing a demurrer to evidence, expressly waived the
right to present evidence. The Court felt that the trial court ought to
have followed the steps outlined therein. The accused in Rivera v.
People filed a demurrer to evidence without having to obtain an
express leave of court, considering that the Sandiganbayan itself had
told him to file the demurrer to evidence. Thus, after the demurrer to
evidence was denied, the accused was held to be still entitled to
present his evidence.
The accused and her counsel should not have ignored the
potentially prejudicial consequence of the filing of a demurrer to
evidence without the leave of court required in Section 15, Rule 119,
of the Revised Rules of Court. 20 They were well aware of the risk of a
denial of the demurrer being high, for by demurring the accused
impliedly admitted the facts adduced by the State and the proper
inferences therefrom. 21 We cannot step in now to alleviate her
self-inflicted plight, for which she had no one to blame but herself;
otherwise, we may unduly diminish the essence of the rule that gave
her the alternative option to waive presenting her own evidence.

17. Jimenez, Jr. v. People, G.R. Nos. 209195 & 209215,

[September 17, 2014]
We agree with the CA that the prosecution has complied with the
requisites under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedurewhich provides that:
In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a
state witness, the following conditions must be present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the
commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it
rests its case;
 (3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the
sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a
hearing in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the
accused whose discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the
proper prosecution of the offense committed,
except the testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty;
and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of
any offense involving moral turpitude.
No issues have been raised with respect to conditions (1), (2), (4),
and 5 (e). The parties dispute the compliance with conditions (3) and 5 (a)
to (d) as the issues before us. We shall discuss these issues separately
below.
Absolute necessity of the testimony
of Montero
We see no merit in Jimenez's allegation that no absolute necessity
exists for Montero's testimony.
Absolute necessity exists for the testimony of an accused sought to
be discharged when he or she alone has knowledge of the crime. In more
concrete terms, necessity is not there when the testimony would simply
corroborate or otherwise strengthen the prosecution's evidence. 43 aCcEHS

We do not agree with Jimenez that the Court's pronouncement

in Chua v. CA, et al. is inapplicable in the present case simply because
more than two accused are involved in the present case. The
requirement of absolute necessity for the testimony of a state witness
depends on the circumstances of each case regardless of the number of
the participating conspirators.
In People v. Court of Appeals and Perez, et al., 44 the Court
ordered the discharge of the accused Roncesvalles, ruling that his
testimony is absolutely necessary to prove conspiracy with his other
co-accused. The Court agreed with the Solicitor General that considering
the circumstances of the case and that the other accused could not be
compelled to testify, certain facts necessary for the conviction of the
accused would not come to light unless the accused Roncesvalles was
allowed to testify for the State. Specifically, unless accused Roncesvalles
was allowed to testify for the government, there would be no other direct
evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense charged,
particularly on the role of his co-accused in the preparation and
completion of the falsified loan application and its supporting papers.
Similarly in People v. Court of Appeals and Tan, 45 the Court
reinstated the ruling of the trial court which ordered the discharge of
accused Ngo Sin from among the five accused. The record justified his
discharge as a state witness considering the absolute necessity of his
testimony to prove that the accused Luciano Tan had planned and
financed the theft.
In the present case, not one of the accused-conspirators, except
Montero, was willing to testify on the alleged murder of Ruby Rose and
their participation in her killing. Hence, the CA was correct in ruling that
Judge Docena acted properly and in accordance with jurisprudence in
ruling that there was absolute necessity for the testimony of Montero. He
alone is available to provide direct evidence of the crime.
That the prosecution could use the voluntary statements of
Montero without his discharge as a state witness is not an important and
relevant consideration. To the prosecution belongs the control of its case
and this Court cannot dictate on its choice in the discharge of a state
witness, save only when the legal requirements have not been complied
with.
The prosecution's right to prosecute gives it "a wide range of
discretion — the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the
exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best
appreciated by prosecutors." Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court is given the power to discharge a
state witness only after it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime
and the accused. 46
Montero's testimony can be substantially corroborated
We also do not find merit in Jimenez' argument that Montero's
testimony cannot be substantially corroborated in its material points and
is even contradicted by the physical evidence of the crime.
As the trial court properly found, the evidence consisting of the
steel casing where the cadaver was found; the drum containing the
cadaver which the prosecution successfully identified (and which even
the acting Judge Almeyda believed) to be Ruby Rose; the spot in the sea
that Montero pointed to (where the cadaver was retrieved); the apparel
worn by the victim when she was killed as well as her burned personal
effects, all partly corroborate some of the material points in the sworn
statements of Montero. 47 ASICDH

With these as bases, Judge Docena's ruling that Montero's

testimony found substantial corroboration cannot be characterized as
grave abuse of discretion.
Jimenez points to the discrepancies in Montero's statements and
the physical evidence, such as the absence of "busal" in the mouth of the
retrieved cadaver; his failure to mention that they used packaging tape
wrapped around the head down to the neck of the victim; and his
declaration that the victim was killed through strangulation using a
rope (lubid).
However, the corroborated statements of Montero discussed
above are far more material than the inconsistencies pointed out by
Jimenez, at least for purposes of the motion to discharge.
The alleged discrepancies in the physical evidence, particularly on
the height and dental records of Ruby Rose, are matters that should
properly be dealt with during the trial proper.
We emphasize at this point that to resolve a motion to discharge
under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the Rules only require that that the testimony of the accused sought to be
discharged be substantially corroborated in its material points, not on all
points.CIaDTE

This rule is based on jurisprudential line that in resolving a motion

to discharge under Section 17, Rule 119, a trial judge cannot be expected
or required, at the start of the trial, to inform himself with absolute
certainty of everything that may develop in the course of the trial with
respect to the guilty participation of the accused. If that were practicable
or possible, there would be little need for the formality of a trial. 48
Montero is not the most guilty
We also do not agree with Jimenez that the CA erred in finding that
Montero is not the most guilty.
By jurisprudence, "most guilty" refers to the highest degree of
culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the offense and
does not necessarily mean the severity of the penalty imposed. While all
the accused may be given the same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet
one may be considered to have lesser or the least guilt taking into
account his degree of participation in the commission of the offense. 49
What the rule avoids is the possibility that the most guilty would be
set free while his co-accused who are less guilty in terms of participation
would be penalized. 50
Before dwelling on the parties' substantive arguments, we find it
necessary to first correct the rulings of the CA that are not exactly correct.
Contrary to the CA's findings, a principal by inducement is not
automatically the most guilty in a conspiracy. The decision of the Court
in People v. Baharan 51 did not involve the resolution of a motion to
discharge an accused to become a state witness. Instead, the
pronouncement of the Court related to the culpability of a principal by
inducement whose co-inducement act was the determining cause for the
commission of the crime.
Thus viewed, Baharancannot be the basis of a peremptory
pronouncement that a principal by inducement is more guilty than the
principal by direct participation.
In Chua v. People, 52 which involved a motion to discharge an
accused, the Court declared that if one induces another to commit a
crime, the influence is the determining cause of the crime. Without the
inducement, the crime would not have been committed; it is the inducer
who sets into motion the execution of the criminal act.
To place the Chua ruling in proper perspective, the Court
considered the principal by inducement as the most guilty based on the
specific acts done by the two accused and bearing in mind the
elements constitutive of the crime of falsification of private
documents where the element of "damage" arose through the
principal by inducement's encashment of the falsified check. This
led the Court to declare that the principal by inducement is the "most
guilty" (or properly, the more guilty) between the two accused.
Thus, as a rule, for purposes of resolving a motion to discharge an
accused as a state witness, what are controlling are the specific acts of
the accused in relation to the crime committed.
We cannot also agree with Jimenez' argument that a principal by
direct participation is more guilty than the principal by inducement as the
Revised Penal Code penalizes the principal by inducement only when
the principal by direct participation has executed the crime.
We note that the severity of the penalty imposed is part of the
substantive criminal law which should not be equated with the procedural
rule on the discharge of the particeps criminis. The procedural remedy of
the discharge of an accused is based on other considerations, such as
the need for giving immunity to one of several accused in order that not all
shall escape, and the judicial experience that the candid admission of an
accused regarding his participation is a guaranty that he will testify
truthfully. 53
On the substantive issues of the present case, we affirm the CA
ruling that no grave abuse of discretion transpired when Judge Docena
ruled that Montero is not the most guilty.
We draw attention to the requirement that a state witness does not
need to be found to be the least guilty; he or she should not only "appear
to be the most guilty." 54
From the evidence submitted by the prosecution in support of its
motion to discharge Montero, it appears that while Montero was part of
the planning, preparation, and execution stage as most of his co-accused
had been, he had no direct participation in the actual killing of Ruby
Rose.
While Lope allegedly assigned to him the execution of the killing,
the records do not indicate that he had active participation in hatching the
plan to kill Ruby Rose, which allegedly came from accused Lope and
Jimenez, and in the actual killing of Ruby Rose which was executed by
accused Lennard. 55Montero's participation was limited to providing the
steel box where the drum containing the victim's body was placed,
welding the steel box to seal the cadaver inside, operating the skip or tug
boat, and, together with his co-accused, dropping the steel box
containing the cadaver into the sea.
At any rate, the discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state
witness because he does not appear to be the most guilty is highly factual
in nature as it largely depends on the appreciation of who had the most
participation in the commission of the crime. The appellate courts do not
interfere in the discretionary judgment of the trial court on this factual
issue except when grave abuse of discretion intervenes. 56
In light of these considerations, we affirm the ruling of the CA that
Judge Docena did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ruling that
Montero is not the most guilty. cCHETI

The discharge of Montero as a state

witness was procedurally sound
We agree with the People that Jimenez is estopped from raising
the issue of lack of hearing prior to the discharge of Montero as a state
witness. Jimenez did not raise this issue when Acting Judge Almeyda
denied the motion to discharge. This denial, of course, was favorable to
Jimenez. If he found no reason to complain then, why should we entertain
his hearing-related complaint now?
The People even supported its argument that Jimenez actively
participated in the proceedings of the motion to discharge such as his
filing of a 20-page opposition to the motion; filing a reply to the People's
comment; submitting his memorandum of authorities on the qualification
of Montero as state witness; and filing a consolidated opposition on the
People's and Montero's motion for reconsideration of Judge Almeyda's
order. 57
In these lights, Jimenez cannot impute grave abuse of discretion
on Judge Docena for not conducting a hearing prior to his grant of the
motion to discharge. In People v. CA and Pring, 58 the Court ruled that
with both litigants able to present their sides, the lack of actual hearing is
not sufficiently fatal to undermine the court's ability to determine whether
the conditions prescribed for the discharge of an accused as a state
witness have been satisfied.
Contrary to Jimenez' argument, the Pring ruling is applicable in the
present case. In Pring, the sworn statements of the accused sought to be
discharged (Nonilo Arile), together with the prosecution's other evidence,
were already in the possession of the court and had been challenged by
the respondent in his Opposition to Discharge Nonilo Arile and in his
Petition for Bail. The issue in that case was the propriety of the trial
court's resolution of the motion to discharge Nonilo Arile without
conducting a hearing pursuant Section 9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure (now Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure).
With Jimenez' active participation in the proceeding for the motion
to discharge as outlined above, the ruling of the Court in Pring should
squarely apply.
Montero's Notice of Withdrawal of
Consent is not material in the
resolution of the present case
We find no merit in Jimenez' argument that Montero's submission
of his notice of withdrawal of consent and testimony of Manuel dated
February 26, 2013 rendered the present case moot, since the Court
cannot consider this document in this petition.
 It must be recalled that the present case involves an appellate
review of the CA's decision which found no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of Judge Docena in granting the motion to discharge.
Under the present recourse now before this Court, we cannot rule
on the notice of withdrawal and consider it in ruling on the absence or
presence of grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the assailed
orders. The present case is not the proper venue for the determination of
the value of the notice.
This conclusion is all the more strengthened by the fact that
Montero already testified on direct examination on June 28, 2011 and
October 25, 2011. He attested and affirmed his statements in his
affidavits dated May 18 and June 11, 2009; he not only narrated the grisly
murder of Ruby Rose, but also revealed Jimenez' participation in the
murder.
With this development, the notice may partake of the nature of a
recantation, which is usually taken ex parte and is considered inferior to
the testimony given in open court. It would be a dangerous rule to reject
the testimony taken before a court of justice simply because the witness
who gave it later changed his/her mind. 59
In sum on this point, the appreciation of the notice of withdrawal
properly belongs to the trial court.
Interplay between the judge and
prosecutor in the motion to discharge
an accused to become a state witness
As a last point, we find it necessary to clarify the roles of the
prosecution and the trial court judge in the resolution of a motion to
discharge an accused as a state witness. This need arises from what
appears to us to be a haphazard use of the statement that the trial court
judge must rely in large part on the prosecution's suggestion in the
resolution of a motion to discharge. IEaCDH

In the present case, the CA cited Quarto v. Marcelo 60 in ruling that

the trial court must rely in large part upon the suggestions and the
information furnished by the prosecuting officer, thus:
A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform
himself with absolute certainty at the very outset of the trial as to
everything which may be developed in the course of the trial in
regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the
commission of the crime charged in the complaint. If that were
practicable or possible there would be little need for the
formality of a trial. He must rely in large part upon the
 suggestions and the information furnished by the prosecuting
officer in coming to his conclusions as to the "necessity for the
testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested"; as to
the availability or non-availability of other direct or corroborative
evidence; as to which of the accused is "most guilty," and the
like.
We deem it important to place this ruling in its proper context lest
we create the wrong impression that the trial court is a mere "rubber
stamp" of the prosecution, in the manner that Jimenez now argues.
In Quarto, we emphasized that it is still the trial court that
determines whether the prosecution's preliminary assessment of the
accused-witness' qualifications to be a state witness satisfies the
procedural norms. This relationship is in reality a symbiotic one as the
trial court, by the very nature of its role in the administration of justice,
largely exercises its prerogative based on the prosecutor's findings and
evaluation. 61
Thus, we ruled in People v. Pring 62 that in requiring a hearing in
support of the discharge, the essential objective of the law is for the court
to receive evidence for or against the discharge, which evidence shall
serve as the court's tangible and concrete basis — independently of the
fiscal's or prosecution's persuasions — in granting or denying the motion
for discharge. We emphasize, in saying this, that actual hearing is not
required provided that the parties have both presented their sides on the
merits of the motion.
We likewise do not agree with Jimenez that Quarto should not
apply to the present case, since the principles laid down in that case
similarly operate in the present case, specifically, on issue of the
procedural processes required in the discharge of the accused as a state
witness.

18. Mari v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 187728, [September 12, 2011],

673 PHIL 46-58
Petitioners insist that the RTC dismissed the criminal case
|

against private respondent too hurriedly, despite the provision in

Section 10 of theSpeedy Trial Act of 1998 (Republic Act No. 8493),
now incorporated in Section 3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 3. Exclusions. — The following periods of delay
shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must
commence:
 (a) Any period of delay resulting from other
proceedings concerning the accused, including but
not limited to the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or
proceedings relating to change of venue of cases or transfer
from other courts;
xxx xxx xxx 18
A careful reading of the above rule would show that the only
delays that may be excluded from the time limit within which trial must
commence are those resulting from proceedings concerning
the accused. The time involved in the proceedings in a petition for
transfer of venue can only be excluded from said time limit if it was the
accused who instituted the same. Hence, in this case, the time during
which the petition for transfer of venue filed by the private complainant
is pending, cannot be excluded from the time limit of thirty (30) days
from receipt of the pre-trial order imposed in Section 1, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court. THcaDA

The records reveal that the 30-day time limit set by Section 1,
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court had, in fact, already been breached.
The private prosecutor received the Pre-trial Order 19 dated
November 24, 2008 on December 3, 2008, while the Provincial
Prosecutor received the same on December 2, 2008. 20 This means
that at the latest, trial should have commenced by January 2, 2009, or
if said date was a Sunday or holiday, then on the very next business
day. Yet, because of the prosecution's failure to appear at the
December 12, 2008 hearing for the initial presentation of the
prosecution's evidence, the RTC was constrained to reset the hearing
to January 16, 2009, which is already beyond the 30-day time limit.
Nevertheless, the prosecution again failed to appear at the January 16,
2009 hearing. Indeed, as aptly observed by the RTC, petitioners
showed recalcitrant behavior by obstinately refusing to comply with
the RTC's directives to commence presentation of their evidence.
Petitioners did not even show proper courtesy to the court, by filing
motions for cancellation of the hearings on the very day of the hearing
and not even bothering to appear on the date they set for hearing on
their motion. As set forth in the narration of facts above, the
prosecution appeared to be intentionally delaying and trifling with
court processes.
Petitioners are likewise mistaken in their notion that mere
pendency of their petition for transfer of venue should interrupt
proceedings before the trial court. Such situation is akin to having a
pending petition for certiorari with the higher courts. In People v.
Hernandez, 21 the Court held that "delay resulting from extraordinary
remedies against interlocutory orders" must be read in harmony with
Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Courtwhich provides that the
"[p]etition [under Rule 65] shall not interrupt the course of the principal
case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued against the public respondent from
further proceeding in the case." 22 The trial court was then correct
and acting well within its discretion when it refused to grant petitioners'
motions for postponement mainly because of the pendency of their
petition for transfer of venue.
The trial court cannot be faulted for refusing to countenance
delays in the prosecution of the case. The Court's ruling in Tan v.
People 23 is quite instructive, to wit:
An accused's right to "have a speedy, impartial, and
public trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14 (2) of
Article III of the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be
defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays, its "salutary objective" being to assure that an innocent
person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court
litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within
the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may
interpose. Intimating historical perspective on the evolution of
the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal maxim,
"justice delayed is justice denied." This oft-repeated adage
requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more so in
criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed
the right to a speedy trial.IEaCDH

Following the policies incorporated under the 1987

Constitution, Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as "The
Speedy Trial Act of 1998," was enacted, with Section 6 of said
act limiting the trial period to 180 days from the first day of trial.
Aware of problems resulting in the clogging of court dockets, the
Court implemented the law by issuing Supreme Court Circular
No. 38-98, which has been incorporated in the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Section 2 of Rule 119.
In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court had occasion to
state —
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a
speedy disposition of the case against him was designed
to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding
 criminal prosecution suspended over him for an
indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the
administration of justice by mandating the courts to
proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal
cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy
disposition of a case is violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an
accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by
precise qualification. The concept of a speedy
disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a
flexible concept.
While justice is administered with dispatch, the
essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere
speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in
a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but
deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon
circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it
does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it
must be borne in mind that the rights given to the
accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are
shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning
to that intent.
The Court emphasized in the same case that:
A balancing test of applying societal interests and
the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court
to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
In determining whether the accused has been
deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case
and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a)
length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the
defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the
defendant. . . . .
SICDAa

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason

or justification of the State for such delay. Different
weights should be assigned to different reasons or
justifications invoked by the State. . . . .
Exhaustively explained in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an
accused's right to speedy trial is deemed violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays. In determining whether petitioner was
deprived of this right, the factors to consider and balance
are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason
 therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and
(d) prejudice caused by such delay.
xxx xxx xxx
We emphasize that in determining the right of an
accused to speedy trial, courts are required to do more
than a mathematical computation of the number of
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. A
mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is
clearly insufficient, and particular regard must be given to
the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. 24
Here, it must be emphasized that private respondent had already
been deprived of his liberty on two occasions. First, during the
preliminary investigation before the MCTC, when he was incarcerated
from November 18, 2004 to March 16, 2005, or a period of almost four
months; then again, when an Information had already been issued
and since rape is a non-bailable offense, he was imprisoned
beginning June 27, 2008 until the case was dismissed on January 16,
2009, or a period of over 6 months. Verily, there can be no cavil that
deprivation of liberty for any duration of time is quite oppressive.
Because of private respondent's continued incarceration, any delay in
trying the case would cause him great prejudice. Thus, it was
absolutely vexatious and oppressive to delay the trial in the subject
criminal case to await the outcome of petitioners' petition for transfer
of venue, especially in this case where there is no temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction issued by a higher
court against herein public respondent from further proceeding in the
case.

19. Olbes v. Buemio, G.R. No. 173319, [December 4, 2009],

622 PHIL 357-368

Petitioner draws attention to the time gap of 105 days from his
arraignment on February 12, 2003 up to the first pre-trial setting on
May 28, 2003, and another gap of 148 days from the latter date up to
the second pre-trial setting on October 23, 2003 or for a total of 253
days — a clear contravention, according to petitioner, of the 80-day
time limit from arraignment to trial.
It bears noting, however, that on his arraignment on February
12, 2003, petitioner interposed no objection to the setting of the
pre-trial to May 28, 2003 which was, as earlier stated, later declared a
non-working day. Inarguably, the cancellation of the scheduled
pre-trial on that date was beyond the control of the trial court.
Petitioner argues, however, that the lapse of 253 days (from
arraignment to October 23, 2003) was not justified by any of the
excusable delays as embodied in the time exclusions 22 specified
under Section 3 of Rule 119. The argument is unavailing.
In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge How, 23 the Court
stressed that the exceptions consisting of the time exclusions
provided in theSpeedy Trial Act of 1998 reflect the fundamentally
recognized principle that "speedy trial" is a relative term and
necessarily involves a degree of flexibility. This was reiterated
in People v. Hernandez, 24 viz.:
The right of the accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed
under Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
In 1998, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8493, otherwise known as
the "Speedy Trial Act of 1998." The law provided for time limits
in order "to ensure a speedy trial of all criminal cases before the
Sandiganbayan, [RTC], Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court." On August 11, 1998,
the Supreme Court issued Circular No. 38-98, the Rules
Implementing R.A. No. 8493. The provisions of said circular
were adopted in the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
As to the time limit within which trial must commence after
arraignment, the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
states:
Sec. 6, Rule 119. Extended time limit. —
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1(g), Rule 116 and the
preceding section 1, for the first twelve-calendar-month period
following its effectivity on September 15, 1998, the time limit
with respect to the period from arraignment to trial
imposed by said provision shall be one hundred eighty (180)
days. For the second twelve-month period, the time limit shall
be one hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third
twelve-month period, the time limit shall be eighty (80) days.
R.A. No. 8493 and its implementing rules and the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerate certain
reasonable delays as exclusions in the computation of the
prescribed time limits. They also provide that "no provision of
law on speedy trial and no rule implementing the same shall be
interpreted as a bar to any charge of denial of speedy trial as
provided by Article III, Section 14(2), of the 1987
Constitution." Thus, in spite of the prescribed time limits,
jurisprudence continues to adopt the view that the concept
 of "speedy trial" is a relative term and must necessarily be
a flexible concept. In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, we held: TIAEac

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy

disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the
oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution
suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays
in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to
proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal
cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a
case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. . . .
While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential
ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot
be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice
is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with
delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to
the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice.
Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights given to the
accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields,
not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.
A balancing test of applying societal interests and
the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to
approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
In determining whether the accused has been
deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case
and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a)
length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the
defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the
defendant. (citations omitted) (underscoring supplied)
The time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do not thus
preclude justifiable postponements and delays when so warranted by
the situation. 25 To the Court, the reasons for the postponements and
delays attendant to the present case reflected above are not
unreasonable. While the records indicate that neither petitioner nor his
counsel was notified of the resetting of the pre-trial to October 23,
2003, the same appears to have been occasioned by oversight or
simple negligence which, standing alone, does not prove fatal to the
prosecution's case. The faux pas was acknowledged and corrected
when the MeTC recalled the arrest warrant it had issued against
petitioner under the mistaken belief that petitioner had been duly
notified of the October 23, 2003 pre-trial setting. 26
 Reiterating the Court's pronouncement in Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc. 27 that "speedy trial" is a relative and flexible
term, Lumanlaw v. Peralta, Jr. 28 summons the courts to maintain a
delicate balance between the demands of due process and the
strictures of speedy trial on the one hand, and the right of the State to
prosecute crimes and rid society of criminals on the other. EaCSTc

Applying the balancing test for determining whether an accused

has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, or a speedy
disposition of his case, taking into account several factors such as the
length and reason of the delay, the accused's assertion or
non-assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the accused resulting
from the delay, 29 the Court does not find petitioner to have been
unduly and excessively prejudiced by the "delay" in the proceedings,
especially given that he had posted bail.
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