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MIKE POMPEO: HOW TO CONFRONT IRAN
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2018
Do Nuclear
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2018 • VOLUME 97 • NUMBER 6 •
Weapons Matter?
DO NUCLEAR WEAPONS MATTER?
F O R E I G N A F F A I R S .C O M
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Volume 97, Number 6

Nuclear Weapons Don’t Matter 10
But Nuclear Hysteria Does
John Mueller
The Vanishing Nuclear Taboo? 16

How Disarmament Fell Apart
Nina Tannenwald
C O V E R : C O N C E P T B Y D E L C A N & C O. ; P H O T O I L L U S T R A T I O N B Y J U S T I N M E T Z
If You Want Peace, Prepare for Nuclear War 25

A Strategy for the New Great-Power Rivalry
Elbridge Colby
Armed and Dangerous 35

When Dictators Get the Bomb
Scott D. Sagan
Beijing’s Nuclear Option 44

Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control
Caitlin Talmadge
Moscow’s Nuclear Enigma 52

What Is Russia’s Arsenal Really For?
Olga Oliker
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ESSAYS
Confronting Iran 60
The Trump Administration’s Strategy
Michael R. Pompeo
The Committee to Save the World Order 72

America’s Allies Must Step Up as America Steps Down
Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay
The Crisis Next Time 84

What We Should Have Learned From 2008
Carmen Reinhart and Vincent Reinhart
How to Save Globalization 98

Rebuilding America’s Ladder of Opportunity
Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter
The Next Arab Uprising 113

The Collapse of Authoritarianism in the Middle East
Marwan Muasher
Venezuela’s Suicide 126

Lessons From a Failed State
Moisés Naím and Francisco Toro
The Use and Misuse of Economic Statecraft 139

How Washington Is Abusing Its Financial Might
Jacob J. Lew and Richard Nephew
ON FOREIGNAFFAIRS.COM
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Generation Stress 150
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American Philanthropies and the Defense of Liberal Democracy
Darren Walker
Health Without Wealth 168

The Worrying Paradox of Modern Medical Miracles
Thomas Bollyky
REVIEWS & RESPONSES

The Unheard Nerds 180
How Economists Can Talk So Policymakers Will Listen
Karen Dynan
Doomsday Delusions 187

The Case for Optimism in a Pessimistic Age
Steven Radelet
Praying for Pakistan 193

Extremism and Corruption in a Troubled State
Mohammed Hanif
The Secret Sharers 199

Leaking and Whistle-Blowing in the Trump Era
Peter Feaver; Allison Stanger; Michael Walzer
Recent Books 207
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CONTRIBUTORS
MICHAEL POMPEO , a former U.S. Army officer and four-term
Republican congressional representative from Kansas,
served as director of the CIA from 2017 to 2018. In that
role, he set up back-channel talks with the North Korean
regime in advance of the June 2018 summit in Singapore.
After the dismissal of U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson,
Pompeo was sworn in as secretary of state in April 2018. In
“Confronting Iran” (page 60), Pompeo lays out the Trump
administration’s strategy toward the Islamic Republic after
Washington’s recent withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal.
MARWAN MUASHER has held a number of influential posts

in the Jordanian government. In 1995, he was appointed
Jordan’s first ambassador to Israel and worked extensively on
negotiations for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. He went on to become ambassador to the United
States, foreign minister, and deputy prime minister. Now,
he is at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
In “The Next Arab Uprising” (page 113), Muasher warns
that the Middle East is in for more chaos unless its rulers
remake social contracts from the bottom up.
As secretary of health and human services during the

Obama administration, SYLVIA MATHEWS BURWELL
oversaw the implementation of the Affordable Care Act
and led her department’s response to the Ebola and
Zika outbreaks. Before that, she served as director of the
Office of Management and Budget and held leadership
positions at the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and
the Walmart Foundation. In “Generation Stress” (page
150), Burwell, now president of American University,
describes the growing mental health crisis among
American youth and what can be done to fix it.
Born in southwestern Louisiana, DARREN WALKER worked

at a law firm and at an investment bank before entering
the nonprofit world. Now, he heads the Ford Foundation,
one of the world’s largest philanthropies, with $600 million
a year in grants in the United States and abroad. In “Old
Money, New Order” (page 158), he lays out the unique
challenge facing philanthropies today: when it comes to
promoting human rights, governance, and global equality,
they have more work to do than ever before, yet they can
no longer count on support from Washington.
I
t is obvious that nuclear weapons are demonstrate the risks, so why continue
incredibly important. Vast sums are to play Russian roulette? U.S. President
spent on them, concerns about their Barack Obama tried to jump-start a
spread—most recently, to North Korea disarmament movement in Prague in
and Iran—dominate headlines, and they 2009, but his efforts were blocked, so
could blow up the world in a flash. the threats remain.
And yet. They haven’t been used Elbridge Colby agrees about the
since World War II. They are purchased, dangerous complacency, but for the
deployed, and discussed on separate opposite reason. The real risks come
tracks from the rest of the foreign policy from a weakened United States without
agenda, and they are largely ignored the capabilities or the will to maintain
by nonspecialists, with little apparent deterrence in the twenty-first century.
consequence. Only a modernized U.S. arsenal and
In fact, nearly three-quarters of a an updated American strategy can
century into the atomic age, it is sobering continue to preserve global peace.
to consider how little we really know. Do The actual challenge is narrower, says
nuclear weapons truly matter, and if so, Scott Sagan: what to do when personalist
how and why? Should we worry about dictatorships, such as North Korea, get
them more or less? As the “whiz kids” the bomb. Careful handling and creative
working under U.S. Secretary of Defense policymaking might contain the situation,
Robert McNamara famously asked, how but Washington is not providing either.
much is enough? Caitlin Talmadge’s warning is down-
John Mueller kicks off this issue’s right scary: the United States and China
lead package bluntly. For generations, the could slip into a nuclear war because of
world has supposedly been on the brink careless strategizing. Better communica-
of one nuclear catastrophe or another: tion would help, but the real challenge
“bolts from the blue, accidental wars, lost is unlocking the escalatory gears inside
arms races, proliferation spirals, nuclear current war plans.
terrorism.” He notes: “The common Olga Oliker, finally, reports that
feature among all these disasters is that Russia is modernizing its arsenal, but
none of them has ever materialized. Either not its basic strategy. Moscow believes
we are the luckiest people in history or the that any major war with the United States
risks have been overstated.” The policies could result in a massive U.S. nuclear
adopted to ward off those hypothetical attack, so it wants a powerful retaliatory
disasters, meanwhile, have had terrible capacity of its own, to deter an American
consequences. You do the math. nuclear first strike.
Such complacency is dangerous, Let’s hope the risks are as low as
counters Nina Tannenwald. Worst-case Mueller thinks—or that we stay lucky.
scenarios may not have materialized, but —Gideon Rose, Editor
there have been enough near misses to
Nearly three-quarters
of a century into the
atomic age, it is
sobering to consider
how little we really
know about it.
Nuclear Weapons Don’t Matter Armed and Dangerous

P H O T O I L L U ST R AT I O N BY J U ST I N M E T Z
John Mueller 10 Scott D. Sagan 35

C O N C E P T BY D E L CA N & C O.;
The Vanishing Nuclear Taboo? Beijing’s Nuclear Option

Nina Tannenwald 16 Caitlin Talmadge 44
If You Want Peace, Prepare for Moscow’s Nuclear Enigma

Nuclear War Olga Oliker 52
Elbridge Colby 25
Return to Table of Contents
want them, and they seem to be out of

Nuclear Weapons reach for terrorists. Their impact on
international affairs has been minor

Don’t Matter compared with the sums and words
expended on them.
The costs resulting from the nuclear
But Nuclear Hysteria Does weapons obsession have been huge. To
hold its own in a snarling contest with
John Mueller the Soviet Union during the Cold War,
the United States spent $5–$10 trillion
T
“ he unleashed power of the atom,” maintaining a vast nuclear arsenal—
Albert Einstein wrote in 1946, resources that could have been used
“has changed everything save more productively on almost anything
our modes of thinking, and we thus drift else. To head off the imagined dangers
toward unparalleled catastrophe.” Winston that would result from nuclear prolif-
Churchill noted in 1955, however, that eration, Washington and its allies have
nuclear deterrence might produce stability imposed devastating economic sanctions
instead and predicted that “safety will on countries such as Iraq and North Korea,
be the sturdy child of terror, and survival and even launched a war of aggression—
the twin brother of annihilation.” Einstein’s sorry, “preemption”—that killed more
view became the touchstone of the mod- people than did the nuclear bombs
ern peace movement. Churchill’s view dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
evolved into mainstream Western nuclear The time has long since come to
strategy and doctrine. Both argued that acknowledge that the thinkers of the
the nuclear revolution had fundamen- early nuclear age were mistaken in believ-
tally transformed international politics. ing that the world had been made anew.
Both were wrong. In retrospect, they overestimated the
Since the 1940s, nuclear weapons importance of the nuclear revolution
have greatly affected defense budgets, and the delicacy of the balance of terror.
political and military posturing, and This spurred generations of officials to
academic theory. Beyond that, however, worry more about nuclear matters than
their practical significance has been they should have and to distort foreign
vastly exaggerated by both critics and and security policies in unfortunate
supporters. Nuclear weapons were not ways. Today’s policymakers don’t have
necessary to deter a third world war. to repeat the same mistakes, and every-
They have proved useless militarily; in body would be better off if they didn’t.
fact, their primary use has been to stoke
the national ego or to posture against real THE ATOMIC OBSESSION
or imagined threats. Few states have or Over the decades, the atomic obsession
JOHN MUELLER is Adjunct Professor of has taken various forms, focusing on an
Political Science and Woody Hayes Senior endless array of worst-case scenarios:
Research Scientist at Ohio State University and bolts from the blue, accidental wars, lost
a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. He is the
author of Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism arms races, proliferation spirals, nuclear
From Hiroshima to al-Qaeda. terrorism. The common feature among
10 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Nuclear Weapons Don’t Matter
On the warpath: U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell making the case for invading Iraq, 2003
all these disasters is that none of them 2. A reversion to barbarism after a
has ever materialized. Either we are the catastrophic diminution of the
luckiest people in history or the risks population of the globe.
have been overstated. 3. A unification of the world under
The cartoonist and inventor Rube a single government, possessing a
Goldberg received a Pulitzer Prize for monopoly of all the major weapons
a 1947 cartoon showing a huge atomic of war.
bomb teetering on a cliff between “world The novelist and scientist C. P.
control” and “world destruction.” In 1950, Snow proclaimed it a “certainty” in 1960
the historian John Lewis Gaddis has that several nuclear weapons would go
noted, no U.S. official could imagine off within ten years, and the strategist
“that there would be no World War” Herman Kahn declared it “most unlikely”
or that the superpowers, “soon to have that the world could live with an uncon-
tens of thousands of thermonuclear trolled arms race for decades. In 1979,
weapons pointed at one another, would the dean of realism, Hans Morgenthau,
agree tacitly never to use any of them.” proclaimed the world to be moving
And in 1951, the great philosopher “ineluctably” toward a strategic nuclear
R AY S T U B B L E B I N E / R E U T E R S
Bertrand Russell put the matter simply: war and assured us that nothing could
Before the end of the present century, be done to prevent it.
unless something quite unforeseeable A 1982 essay by the author Jonathan
occurs, one of three possibilities will Schell asserted that the stakes were
have been realized. These three are:— nothing less than the fate of the earth
1. The end of human life, perhaps and concluded that soon “we will make
of all life on our planet. our choice.” Schell continued: “Either
Buy CSS Books Online https://cssbooks.net November/December 2018 11

John Mueller The CSS Point
we will sink into the final coma and end there might not have been without
it all or, as I trust and believe, we will nuclear weapons, since they staved off
awaken to the truth of our peril . . . and a third world war, right?
rise up to cleanse the earth of nuclear Actually, no. Nuclear strategy—a
weapons.” In the spirit of the times, theoretical and nonexperimental
the following year, a chart-topping pop enterprise—has been built on a grand
song traced the dangers of accidental counterfactual: the notion that without
nuclear war, and the year after, Brown the prospect of nuclear devastation
University students passed a referendum hanging over its head, the postwar
demanding that the university health world would have collapsed into a
service stockpile suicide pills for imme- major conflict yet again. But this
diate dispensation to survivors in the turns out to be just a story, and less
event of a nuclear attack. history than fable.
Disasters were certainly possible, and The nuclear-deterrence-saved-the-
a healthy appreciation of the dangers world theory is predicated on the notion
nuclear weapons posed eventually led that policymakers after 1945 were so
to the development and spread of best stupid, incompetent, or reckless that,
practices in strategy and safety. But but for visions of mushroom clouds, they
prudence in controlling tail-end risks would have plunged the great powers
sometimes evolved into near hysteria. back into war. But the catastrophic
Nuclear exchanges were assumed to be destruction they experienced in their
easy to start, hard to stop, and certain recent war (one they had tried to avoid)
to end up destroying life on earth. proved more than enough to teach that
Nuclear proliferation has been a lesson on its own, and there is little
perennial source of fear. During the 1960 reason to believe that nuclear weapons
U.S. presidential campaign, John F. were needed as reinforcement.
Kennedy predicted that there might be Moreover, the Soviet Union never
“ten, 15, or 20” countries with a nu- seriously considered any sort of direct
clear capability by the next election, military aggression against the United
and similar declarations continue. And States or Western Europe. After exam-
since 9/11, nuclear terrorism has been ining the documentation extensively,
the nightmare of choice. the historian Vojtech Mastny concluded
Ever since the dropping of the bomb, that the strategy of nuclear deterrence
in short, Armageddon and apocalypse was “irrelevant to deterring a major war
have been thought to be looming just that the enemy did not wish to launch in
over the horizon. Such fears and anxie- the first place.” He added: “All Warsaw
ties were understandable, especially at Pact scenarios presumed a war started
first. But they haven’t been borne out by NATO.” In 1987, George Kennan, the
by the lived record of the nuclear era. architect of containment himself, had
agreed, writing in these pages, “I have
WHAT ABOUT THAT LONG PEACE? never believed that [Soviet leaders] have
Fine, one might concede. In retrospect, seen it as in their interests to overrun
perhaps the risks were exaggerated. But Western Europe militarily, or that they
at least there is a retrospect—which would have launched an attack on that
region generally even if the so-called
nuclear deterrent had not existed.”
Moscow’s global game plan stressed
revolutionary upheaval and subversion
from within, not Hitlerian conquest.
AT A
Given Russia’s calamitous experience
with two world wars, a third was the
CROSSROADS
last thing Soviet policymakers wanted, so
nuclear deterrence was largely irrelevant
to postwar stability. Nor has anyone Russia in the Global Economy
ever come up with a compelling or even
plausible rationale for using such weap- An examination of the challenges Russia faces in the
ons in conflicts short of total war— global economy given its current foreign policies and
because there simply aren’t many targets globalization’s impact on its decision-making process.
that can’t be attacked as effectively with
conventional weapons. Globalization proceeds
Nuclear weapons have also proved apace, taking on new forms
that affect global economic,
useless in conventional or guerrilla financial and social
warfare, lousy at compellence (think processes. Interdependence
Saddam Hussein refusing to leave is not simply strengthening
the range of possibilities
Kuwait), and not very good at deter- for national economies
rence (think the Yom Kippur War or to participate in these
Argentina’s seizure of the Falklands). developments, but
expanding the opportunities
There are circumstances in which such that are available to them.
By Sergey Kulik,
weapons would come in handy—say, Nikita Maslennikov The question is: how do
in dealing with a super-aggressive, and Igor Yurgens states take advantage of
these global developments?
risk-acceptant fanatic leading a major
Although Russia actively participates in the
country. But that has always been a globalization process, it is confronting greater
remote possibility. The actual contri- economic, technological, structural and institutional
bution of nuclear weapons to postwar problems than other countries. These problems exist
alongside the risk that the gap between Russia and
stability, therefore, has been purely other economies in terms of economic performance
theoretical—extra insurance against an and technological development and growth will
unlikely calamity. continue to widen.
The old model of Russian development has been
exhausted and a new one must be chosen. Russia’s
HOW ABOUT PROLIFERATION choice at this juncture will determine the future of its
AND TERRORISM? economic development for many years to come.
Great powers are one thing, some might
say, but rogue states or terrorist groups
CIGI Press books are distributed by McGill-Queen’s University Press (mqup.ca)
are another. If they go nuclear, it’s game and can be found in better bookstores and through online book retailers.
over—which is why any further prolifera-
tion must be prevented by all possible
measures, up to and including war.
That logic might seem plausible at
first, but it breaks down on close
Buy CSS Books Online https://cssbooks.net 13

John Mueller The CSS Point
examination. Not only has the world threats would cause its rivals to join
already survived the acquisition of together against the provocateur—just
nuclear weapons by some of the craziest as countries around the Persian Gulf
mass murderers in history (Stalin and responded to Saddam’s invasion of
Mao), but proliferation has slowed down Kuwait by closing ranks to oppose,
rather than sped up over time. Dozens rather than acquiescing in, his effort
of technologically sophisticated countries at domination.
have considered obtaining nuclear arse- If the consequences of proliferation
nals, but very few have done so. This is have so far proved largely benign, how-
because nuclear weapons turn out to be ever, the same cannot be said for efforts
difficult and expensive to acquire and to control it. During the 2008 U.S.
strategically provocative to possess. presidential campaign, Senator Barack
They have not even proved to Obama of Illinois repeatedly proclaimed
enhance status much, as many expected his commitment to “do everything in
they would. Pakistan and Russia may [his] power to prevent Iran from obtain-
garner more attention today than they ing a nuclear weapon—everything,” and
would without nukes, but would Japan’s his opponent, the Republican senator
prestige be increased if it became nuclear? from Arizona John McCain, insisted
Did China’s status improve when it went that Iran must be kept from obtaining
nuclear—or when its economy grew? a nuclear weapon “at all costs.” Neither
And would anybody really care (or even bothered to tally up what “everything”
notice) if the current British or French entailed or what the eventual price tag
nuclear arsenal was doubled or halved? of “all costs” would be.
Alarmists have misjudged not only the All they needed to do was consider
pace of proliferation but also its effects. the fate of one country to understand
Proliferation is incredibly dangerous the potentially disastrous consequences
and necessary to prevent, we are told, of such thinking. The Iraq war had been
because going nuclear would supposedly sold as an act of preventive counter-
empower rogue states and lead them to proliferation, with President George W.
dominate their region. The details of Bush pointedly warning that “the United
how this domination would happen are States of America will not permit the
rarely discussed, but the general idea world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten
seems to be that once a country has us with the world’s most destructive
nuclear weapons, it can use them to weapons.” A nuclear Iraq was considered
threaten others and get its way, with unacceptable because it would “hold
nonnuclear countries deferring or paying [its] neighbors hostage.” Put aside for
ransom to the local bully out of fear. a moment the fact that Saddam had
Except, of course, that in three-quarters actually mothballed his covert weapons
of a century, the United States has never of mass destruction programs years
been able to get anything close to that earlier, so that the war turned out to
obedience from anybody, even when it be unnecessary by its own rationale.
had a nuclear monopoly. So why should Imagine that Saddam, with his resent-
it be true for, say, Iran or North Korea? ful population and unreliable army, had
It is far more likely that a nuclear rogue’s managed to acquire a modest nuclear
Nuclear Weapons Don’t Matter
capability. What would have happened The grand mistake of the Cold War was
then? What could and would he have to infer desperate intent from apparent
done with the weapons? Something capacity. For the war on terrorism, it has
worse than launching the war to pre- been to infer desperate capacity from
vent Iraq from going nuclear, which, apparent intent.
along with its aftermath, has killed
hundreds of thousands of people and DON’T DO STUPID STUFF
destabilized an entire region? For nearly three-quarters of century,
As for nuclear terrorism, ever since the world has been told it is perched
al Qaeda operatives used box cutters so precariously on Rube Goldberg’s preci-
effectively to hijack commercial airplanes, pice, perennially at risk of plunging
alarmists have warned that radical Islamist into apocalyptic devastation. But oddly
terrorists would soon apply equal talents enough, both we and the weapons are
in science and engineering to make and still here. Understanding their actual
deliver nuclear weapons so as to destroy impact and putting them into the proper
various so-called infidels. In practice, context would enable policymakers to
however, terrorist groups have exhibited view nuclear matters more sensibly.
only a limited desire to go nuclear and In practice, that would mean retaining
even less progress in doing so. Why? the capabilities needed to respond to
Probably because developing one’s own the wildly unlikely nightmare scenario
bomb from scratch requires a series of of having to deter a possible future
risky actions, all of which have to go right Hitler while pruning nuclear arsenals
for the scheme to work. This includes and stepping back from dangerous
trusting foreign collaborators and other strategies and postures. It would mean
criminals; acquiring and transporting working with North Korea to establish a
highly guarded fissile material; establish- normal condition in the region and
ing a sophisticated, professional machine worrying about reducing its nuclear
shop; and moving a cumbersome, untested capabilities later. There is nothing
weapon into position for detonation. And wrong with making nonproliferation a
all of this has to be done while hiding high priority—indeed, it would do a
from a vast global surveillance net looking favor to countries dissuaded from
for and trying to disrupt such activities. pursuing nuclear weapons by saving
Terrorists are unlikely to get a them a lot of money and pointless
bomb from a generous, like-minded effort. However, that priority should
nuclear patron, because no country be topped by a somewhat higher one:
wants to run the risk of being blamed avoiding policies that can lead to massive
(and punished) for a terrorist’s nuclear numbers of deaths under the obssessive
crimes. Nor are they likely to be able sway of worst-case fantasies.∂
to steal one. Notes Stephen Younger,
the former head of nuclear weapons
research and development at Los
Alamos National Laboratory: “All
nuclear nations take the security of
their weapons very seriously.”

The CSS Point
his call for nuclear disarmament. More

The Vanishing than six decades after humanity first
harnessed the destructive power of

Nuclear Taboo? nuclear reactions, the only country to
have ever used nuclear weapons was
How Disarmament Fell Apart charting a path for the world to put
the genie back in the bottle.
Fast forward to 2018. In the space of
Nina Tannenwald barely ten years, the dream of disarma-
ment now seems more distant than ever.
O
n April 5, 2009, U.S. President All the nuclear-armed states are devot-
Barack Obama stood before a ing vast resources to upgrading their
massive crowd in Prague and arsenals. The United States and Russia
gave a soaring speech announcing his are leading the way, undertaking mas-
commitment to “a world without nuclear sive modernization programs that entail
weapons.” In pursuit of that goal, he new warheads and methods for deliver-
pledged to seek an arms reduction treaty ing them. China is steadily increasing
with Russia, ratify the Comprehensive the size of its arsenal and developing
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and new types of delivery systems, including
convene a global summit to discuss the missiles tipped with multiple warheads.
eventual elimination of nuclear stockpiles. These are considered more destabilizing
He acknowledged that a nuclear-free because they create an incentive for
world was unlikely to be achieved in the other side to strike first in order to
his lifetime, yet his speech marked the knock them out early in a conflict. India
first time a U.S. president had set out and Pakistan, locked in a dangerous
a step-by-step agenda for abolishing rivalry, are also expanding and upgrading
nuclear arms. It represented a sharp their arsenals. If current trends continue,
break from the approach of U.S. President the combined stockpiles of nuclear
George W. Bush, who had expanded weapons in China, India, and Pakistan
nuclear missions and rejected arms control. could grow by around 250 warheads over
Much of the world was elated. Nuclear the next ten years, from about 560 now
disarmament was back on the global to more than 800. Meanwhile, several
agenda. That September, the UN Security of these countries have adopted danger-
Council unanimously adopted a resolution ously escalatory nuclear doctrines and
endorsing Obama’s vision and strength- loosened their rules on the use of
ening various disarmament and nonnuclear weapons.
proliferation measures. The following At the same time, arms control
month, the Nobel Committee awarded agreements are unraveling. Joint reduc-
Obama the Nobel Peace Prize, citing tions by the United States and Russia—
NINA TANNENWALD is Director of the which together hold more than 90 percent
International Relations Program at the Watson of the world’s nuclear weapons—have
Institute for International and Public Affairs at stalled as tensions have increased. On
Brown University. She is the author of The
Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the the multilateral front, the global effort to
Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945. prevent the spread of nuclear weapons—
The Vanishing Nuclear Taboo?
A dream deferred: U.S. President Barack Obama speaking in Prague, April 2009
enshrined in the Nuclear Nonprolifera- turning nuclear weapons into symbols of
tion Treaty, one of the most successful national power, describing their capabili-
security treaties in history—is fraying. ties in public, parading their weapons
The NPT’s nonproliferation norms and in the streets, and even issuing nuclear
monitoring procedures have helped threats. Then there is U.S. President
stem the spread of nuclear weapons and Donald Trump. He has boasted about
are a key reason there are only nine the size of his nuclear “button,” threat-
nuclear weapons states today—many ened that North Korea “will be met with
fewer than the “15 or 20 or 25 nations” fire and fury like the world has never
that U.S. President John F. Kennedy seen,” and backed a massive program
forecast in 1963. But the bargain at the to expand the U.S. arsenal.
core of the treaty is breaking down. How did we get from the Prague
The states without nuclear weapons speech’s “world without nuclear weapons”
agreed to stay that way in exchange for to where we are today? The answer is
a commitment to disarmament on the not simply Trump. For all his nuclear
part of the states with nuclear weapons, one-upmanship, Trump did not create
and the nonnuclear states increasingly the current crisis in disarmament and
feel that the nuclear powers have failed nonproliferation; he merely exacerbated
PETR JOSEK / REUTERS
to uphold their end of the deal. trends that were already under way. Before
Most disturbing, however, is a trend Trump took office, rising geopolitical
among some leaders to glorify the world’s tensions, a resurgent Russia, arms mod-
most destructive weapons. Russian ernization, and a hawkish Republican
President Vladimir Putin and North Congress hostile to international law
Korean leader Kim Jong Un are again and agreements had all conspired to

Nina Tannenwald The CSS Point
impede further weapons reductions. nuclear first strike, the administration

Facing a tidal wave of opposition, promised to develop no new warheads.
Obama’s vision of a nuclear-free world Beginning in 2012, the Obama adminis-
got swept away. tration began to engage Iran diplomatically
Ever since the dawn of the nuclear on its nuclear program, resulting in the
age, the world has gradually developed Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action a
a consensus that nuclear weapons are so few years later.
destructive and abhorrent that it would Obama also ushered in important
be unacceptable to use them, a notion shifts in thinking about nuclear use. His
often referred to as “the nuclear taboo.” administration’s Nuclear Posture Review,
But the norms and institutions of nuclear released in 2010, substantially narrowed
restraint are unraveling. Arms control the conditions under which the United
agreements are being torn up. Coopera- States said it would use nuclear weap-
tion is being replaced by unilateralism. ons—only “in extreme circumstances,”
Restraint is being replaced by excess. to defend the vital interests of the United
Now more than ever before, humanity States and its allies. For the first time
risks facing a future in which the nuclear ever, the report explicitly endorsed the
taboo, a hard-won norm that makes the nuclear taboo: “It is in the U.S. interest
world a safer place, is in retreat. and that of all other nations that the
nearly 65-year record of nuclear non-use
THE VISION THING be extended forever.”
Obama’s disarmament efforts got off Yet Obama largely failed to achieve
to a good start. In 2009, he shelved a the lofty goals he laid out in Prague.
controversial plan from the George W. There was no follow-up to the 2010 New
Bush administration to put ground-based START treaty. Despite his administra-
strategic missile defense interceptors tion’s narrow nuclear doctrine, Pentagon
in Europe, replacing it with a more planning remained mired in outdated
modest plan that was less threatening to Cold War nuclear strategies that empha-
Russia. In 2010, the United States and sized first-strike capabilities. By late
Russia concluded the New START treaty, 2010, the Obama administration had
a relatively modest but symbolically signed off on a massive effort to modern-
important agreement under which the ize the U.S. arsenal, with plans to spend
two countries committed to reduce some $1 trillion on the development of
the number of their deployed strategic a whole new generation of bombs and
warheads by nearly one-third, to a total delivery systems. These included smaller,
of 1,550 each. The treaty portended a more discriminate nuclear warheads,
new era of reductions. Soon after it which arms control advocates worried
was signed, the Obama administration might prove more tempting to use.
convened the first of four global sum- Pretending that this weapons buildup
mits on nuclear security, which resulted somehow constituted “disarmament,” as
in tangible improvements in the safe- Obama administration officials regularly
guarding of nuclear materials. In 2011, did, only caused nonnuclear states to
while warning that the United States grow more cynical about the United
would retain the ability to launch a States’ commitment to the cause.
Buy CSS Books Online https://cssbooks.net
Most striking for an administration the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002

that had talked about the need for a marked the start of a new arms race
“moral revolution” regarding nuclear with the United States—a qualitative
weapons, the Obama administration one focused on new capabilities, rather
refused to endorse a UN-organized than a quantitative one based on num-
campaign that sought to highlight the bers alone. By 2011, Russia had begun
“humanitarian impact” of any use of modernizing its old Cold War systems,
such weapons. Launched in 2012 and both strategic and tactical. It also started
inspired partly by the Prague speech, developing new weapons, including sea-
this campaign brought together civil and air-launched cruise missiles that
society groups and nonnuclear states can carry either conventional or nuclear
in a series of conferences designed to payloads, and it conducted various
mobilize support for the elimination of military exercises combining conven-
nuclear arms. The United States, along tional and nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
with the other permanent members of Things got worse after Vladimir
the Security Council, mostly boycotted Putin returned to the Russian presidency
these meetings. Nevertheless, the in 2012. Russian leaders had long objected
campaign resulted in negotiations at to the eastward expansion of NATO and
the UN and ultimately a vote to adopt the deployment of U.S. ballistic missile
a total legal ban on nuclear weapons, a defenses in Europe, but their obstinacy
treaty that now counts 60 signatories. on nuclear issues shifted into high gear.
Supporters of the ban are under no (Obama, under pressure from hard-liners,
illusions that the nuclear-armed states showed little willingness to make any
will sign the treaty anytime soon. Rather, concessions on missile defense, other
the aim is to further stigmatize the than to offer repeated assurances that
possession and use of nuclear weapons. the systems were not intended for use
In snubbing the meetings that led to the against Russia.) In 2013, when Obama
treaty, the United States and the other proposed an agreement in which the
permanent members of the Security United States and Russia would further
Council likely missed an opportunity reduce their strategic nuclear weapons,
to steer the campaign away from an Putin didn’t bite, and the next year, he
all-out ban and toward measures that, invaded Ukraine. Later in 2014, Russia
while still reducing nuclear dangers, pulled out of the 1991 Nunn-Lugar
might have proved more palatable to Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,
the nuclear-armed states. through which the United States had
assisted Russia with securing its fissile
WHAT WENT WRONG material to prevent the problem of
Why was Obama largely unable to follow “loose nukes.” Occasionally, Russian
through on the promise of a nuclear-free leaders made explicit nuclear threats
world? The answer has a lot to do with against other countries, as when Russia’s
deteriorating relations with Russia, the ambassador to Denmark said in 2015
United States’ main disarmament partner. that if that country joined NATO’s missile
For Russian leaders, the George W. defense system, Danish warships would
Bush administration’s withdrawal from become targets of Russian missiles. And
in 2016, Moscow boycotted the Nuclear Obama threw the GOP a bone of billions
Security Summit, the global forum of dollars to spend on nuclear moderniza-
first organized in 2010 by the Obama tion, a goal that most Republicans felt was
administration. These were final nails long overdue. The Republican-controlled
in the coffin of the U.S.-Russian security Senate also opposed the administration’s
relationship. efforts to ratify the CTBT, even though
Yet Russia was hardly alone in the treaty would lock in an area of U.S.
blocking Obama’s nuclear ambitions; advantage: the United States has little
even U.S. allies got in on the act. NATO need to conduct nuclear testing, given
has 180 to 200 nuclear bombs based in its unmatched ability to simulate tests
Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, on supercomputers.
and Turkey. Although some NATO allies, The Pentagon, meanwhile, was never
such as Germany and the Netherlands, really on board with Obama’s nuclear-free
had been enthusiastic about the abolition world. It remained committed to the belief
agenda, renewed Russian aggression that a large nuclear arsenal was necessary
eroded European governments’ support to retain allies’ confidence that the United
for reducing the role of nuclear weapons States was willing and able to defend
in NATO security policy. France, mean- them. Both the Pentagon and the State
while, was always much more dismissive of Department opposed the UN’s humanitar-
Obama’s vision of a nuclear-free world and ian campaign as an explicit attempt to
opposed discussing disarmament propos- delegitimize nuclear deterrence, on which
als in NATO, fearing that its own nuclear U.S. security and alliances depended.
arsenal would be dragged into the talks. State Department officials, more enthusi-
Poland and the Baltic states worried about astic than their Pentagon colleagues about
a resurgent Russia and did not support the Prague agenda, nevertheless worried
de-emphasizing nuclear deterrence. that the humanitarian campaign’s insistent
U.S. allies stymied Obama’s nuclear demands for faster progress on disarma-
goals until the very end of his tenure. ment detracted attention from the patient,
In the summer of 2016, as Obama contem- step-by-step approach to disarmament
plated declaring a “no first use” policy, they favored. White House officials
France, Japan, South Korea, and the wanted the allies to remained united in
United Kingdom lobbied against changes their opposition to a ban, and some officials
to the U.S. nuclear doctrine. In the face worried that participating in the meetings
of rising nuclear tensions with Russia would send the wrong signal and weaken
and North Korea, U.S. allies’ defense allied unity. (Eventually, the United States
ministries worried that a “no first use” did attend one meeting, in Vienna in
pledge might be perceived as weakness. 2014.) Yet even U.S. arms control officials
The White House relented. admitted privately to me that, as the
Obama also faced formidable domes- United States repeatedly failed to deliver
tic opposition to key parts of his arms on any of the vaunted steps toward
control agenda—especially from hawks disarmament, such as ratifying the CTBT
on Capitol Hill and in the Pentagon. or negotiating further arms cuts with
In Congress, in exchange for Republican Russia, the step-by-step approach was
support of the 2010 New START treaty, beginning to ring hollow.

Obama faced major international excess. The president has not only
and domestic obstacles to pursuing his enthusiastically embraced Obama’s
Prague agenda, but in truth, his policies modernization program but also com-
were also undermined by internal contra- mitted the United States to an even
dictions. For one thing, it was hard to more massive expansion of its nuclear
reconcile the huge modernization program arsenal. Nearly every element of the
with disarmament. Moreover, even as the U.S. nuclear arsenal is slated to be
administration was promoting its vision upgraded, at a mind-boggling cost of
of a nuclear-free world, it ultimately gave $1.7 trillion over the next 30 years. This
priority to U.S. security, and the United includes $100 billion for an expansion
States continued to rely on the threat of of the intercontinental ballistic missile
nuclear retaliation for its defense. One program, including 666 new missiles;
National Security Council spokesperson the development of a novel, technically
managed to capture the contradiction risky “interoperable” warhead that the
efficiently, telling a Washington Post colum- Obama administration had put on hold;
nist that the administration was “always and 80 new warhead “pits” per year (a
looking for additional ways to achieve pit is the fissile core of a weapon). It
progress” on Obama’s Prague agenda, also includes a significant increase in
“while maintaining a credible deterrent spending on developing, testing, and
for the United States, our allies and deploying new nuclear weapons. These
partners.” Hence, the administration had changes were enshrined in doctrine in
to oppose the humanitarian campaign, February 2018, with the release of the
the very group working the hardest for Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture
disarmament. Review, which calls for the development
Perhaps most tragic, Obama’s inter- of two new warheads and expanded ways
est in disarmament was genuine and to use nuclear weapons. The United
deep, dating back to his undergraduate States is now pursuing the most bellig-
days at Columbia University, when the erent arms buildup since the end of
“nuclear freeze” movement, a reaction the Cold War.
to the Reagan administration’s arms There is little reason to expect
buildup, swept through college cam- Trump to pursue arms control talks. As
puses. During his senior year there, in president-elect, when asked about his
1983, he wrote a paper for a class on proposal to expand the arsenal, Trump
how to negotiate arms reductions with responded, “Let it be an arms race. We
the Soviets and was even published in will outmatch them at every pass and
a campus newsmagazine writing about outlast them all.” His national security
the “vision of a nuclear-free world.” By adviser, John Bolton, has been a persistent
the time he became president, nuclear critic of the New START treaty, which he
disarmament had been on his mind for has derided as “unilateral disarmament,”
at least 26 years. as have Republican hawks in the Senate.
Although the Trump administration has
THE NEW NUCLEAR EXCESS so far maintained the New START treaty,
Since taking office, Trump has ushered which is set to expire in February 2021,
in a frightening new world of nuclear it has yet to hold talks with Russia about
extending it. If the treaty is not extended, THE CASE FOR DISARMAMENT
the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals The nonuse of nuclear weapons since
will be unregulated for the first time 1945 is the single most important accom-
since 1972. plishment of the nuclear age. Leaders
At the same time, Trump is taking a must do everything possible to preserve
sledgehammer to the norms of nuclear this 73-year tradition. Despite the rever-
restraint. The interviews he has given sals since the launch of Obama’s Prague
suggest that he has little understand- agenda, disarmament is still the right
ing of nuclear weapons or their role in goal for the United States.
alliances, and there is little evidence There are 15,000 nuclear weapons in
that he cares about the norms of non- the world’s arsenals, many on high-alert
use, nonproliferation, or disarmament. status. The risk of a nuclear launch or
Trump has implied that Japan and exchange started by accident or mis-
South Korea should get their own calculation remains high, and the conse-
nuclear weapons. He has not declared quences of even one such incident would
the United States’ legal obligation, as be catastrophic. In fact, since the nuclear
a member of the NPT, to pursue disar- age began, there have been an alarmingly
mament, something every other U.S. high number of nuclear near misses—
president has done since the 1970s. accidents or miscalculations that almost
He also withdrew from the Iran nuclear led to a nuclear detonation or nuclear war.
agreement, dealing yet another blow to The qualitative arms race now under way,
the nonproliferation regime. If Iran which increasingly mixes conventional
decides to tear up the deal and get back and nuclear capabilities in deterrence
to work on its nuclear program, then strategies, is raising the risk of nuclear
an arms race in the Middle East would use. The new technologies increase the
likely unfold. Trump’s decision also likelihood that a conventional strike
effectively eliminated the prospect of could provoke a nuclear attack, whether
reaching a similar deal to restrain North through misperception or miscalculation.
Korea’s nuclear program, since Pyong- The threat to incinerate millions of people
yang now has little reason to expect in the name of national security is both
any agreement to last. Furthermore, bad policy and morally bankrupt.
his erratic behavior and bellicose rheto- Many have argued that nuclear weap-
ric have vastly increased concerns about ons are the United States’ “instruments
a U.S. president’s unilateral ability to of peace,” that they deter major-power
push the nuclear button. The media war, or that they are needed as an insur-
have even reported that Trump once ance policy. Yet one need not be a radical
asked a foreign policy expert what the antinuclear activist to arrive at the same
point of nuclear weapons was if they conclusion that former Secretaries of
couldn’t be used. For the first time State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz,
since the end of the Cold War, the former Secretary of Defense William
possibility that an American president Perry, and former Senator Sam Nunn
might actually contemplate the use of arrived at in 2007, when they went public
nuclear weapons has become a terrify- with their belief that disarmament—
ingly real prospect. working toward “global zero”—is in the

United States’ interest. As these senior about use. Finally, the way policymakers
statesmen realized, nuclear deterrence and diplomats think about “responsible
comes with tremendous risks and costs. nuclear states” should also change: it is
The arguments in favor of deterrence, if time for that oft-used label to apply only
sometimes true, are not likely to be true to those states that have demonstrated a
in every case. What happens when concrete commitment to disarmament.
deterrence fails? After decades of arms control agree-
The growing risks of a catastrophic ments, security cooperation, and a growing
nuclear war outweigh the uncertain consensus about the unacceptability of
benefits of deterrence for the United nuclear weapons, the world is now headed
States. Given its overwhelming conven- in the opposite direction. Geopolitical
tional military power, the only thing tensions have heightened. New arms
that can really challenge the United races have started. States have reverted to
States on the battlefield is another valorizing nuclear weapons. The nuclear
country armed with nuclear weapons. taboo is weakening. But nothing about
That means that the United States this is inevitable; it is a choice our leaders
would be better served by a world in have made. Nuclear disarmament will
which no country had these weapons. have to be a long-term project. Today’s
It is true that given the current decision-makers may not be able to
international political context, nuclear complete the task, but they have an
disarmament is unlikely for the moment. obligation to pursue it.∂
For now, all nuclear-armed states remain
committed to nuclear deterrence. But
they can still take steps toward disarma-
ment. As a first step, they should recom-
mit to norms of nuclear restraint. This
could include taking weapons off high
alert and starting a dialogue about adopt-
ing mutual “no first use” policies. The
United States and Russia, for their part,
should negotiate an extension of the
New START treaty. Furthermore, the
nuclear-armed states should find a way
to engage constructively with the goals
of the treaty banning nuclear weapons,
rather than simply dismiss it. For exam-
ple, they could offer more public trans-
parency about how their nuclear war
plans meet humanitarian criteria. Such
steps could be part of an expanded
effort—possibly organized by the UN—
to hold all the nuclear-armed states
accountable for the possible consequences
of their nuclear doctrines and decisions
Asia and ultimately beyond. To accom-

If You Want plish this, each country has developed

military forces ideally suited to fight
Peace, Prepare for and defeat the United States in a future
war. And modern, mobile nuclear capa-
Nuclear War bilities are a key part of their strategies.
These capabilities could allow Russia
or China to pressure or attack U.S. allies
A Strategy for the New and to block any efforts by the United
Great-Power Rivalry States to fight back. This should cause
great alarm among U.S. policymakers:
Elbridge Colby American grand strategy is rooted in a
network of alliances designed to main-
tain favorable regional balances of power
I
n a little under three decades, nuclear and protect U.S. access and trade across
weapons have gone from center stage the globe. These alliances work as long
to a sideshow in U.S. defense strategy. as they can be credibly defended against
Since the 1990s, the United States has outside challengers. But if Russia and
drastically reduced its stockpile and China can win wars against the United
concentrated on its conventional and States in Europe and Asia, respectively,
irregular warfare capabilities. Nuclear then these revisionist states will press
weapons policy has focused overwhelm- their advantage—with painful and possi-
ingly on stemming proliferation to bly disastrous consequences for U.S.
countries such as Iran and North Korea, interests in the world.
and prominent political and national Washington’s task is clear. It must
security figures have even called for demonstrate to Moscow and Beijing that
abolishing nuclear weapons altogether. any attempt to use force against U.S.
What was once the core of the country’s friends and allies would likely fail and
Cold War strategy has been reduced would certainly result in costs and risks
to an afterthought. well out of proportion to whatever they
Immediately after the Cold War, when might gain. This requires conventional
the United States enjoyed unprecedented military power, but it also means having
global power, this approach seemed reason- the right strategy and weapons to fight a
able. Washington didn’t need much of a limited nuclear war and come out on top.
nuclear strategy against Iraq or Serbia. For the first time in a generation,
But now, great-power competition has then, getting U.S. defense strategy right
returned. Russia wants to upend the means getting nuclear strategy right. This
post–Cold War status quo in Europe. A requires more than just modernizing the
rising China seeks ascendancy, first over current arsenal of immensely destructive
strategic nuclear weapons and their
ELBRIDGE COLBY is Director of the Defense delivery systems. This arsenal, designed
Program at the Center for a New American to inflict unimaginable damage in an
Security. He served as U.S. Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force apocalyptic war, is necessary to deter the
Development in 2017–18. gravest forms of attack. But threatening

Elbridge Colby The CSS Point
to use such weapons in a limited war in Warsaw Pact’s much larger conventional
defense of allies thousands of miles from forces. Thankfully, these strategies never
U.S. shores is just too extreme to be had to be put to use, probably because
convincing and therefore unlikely to work. they were credible enough to dissuade
Instead, the United States needs the Soviet Union from risking a major
weapons systems that can bridge the wide offensive—a testament to their value
gulf between conventional and all-out for deterrence.
nuclear war. In particular, Washington After the collapse of the Soviet Union,
should step up its efforts to develop the United States turned its focus to the
low-yield tactical nuclear weapons and rogue states that now posed the main, if
associated strategies that could help blunt far more modest, threat to its interests.
or defeat a Russian or Chinese attack on U.S. conventional forces demonstrated
U.S. allies without provoking a nuclear their ability to quickly defeat such foes,
apocalypse. Demonstrating to potential whether Saddam Hussein’s army in Iraq
opponents that the United States has in 1990–91, Serbian forces in 1998–99, or
this ability is the best way to avoid ever the Taliban government in Afghanistan
having to put it into practice. in 2001. If nuclear strategizing had seemed
morbidly excessive during the Cold War,
DOING GOOD WHILE DOING WELL it seemed positively absurd in this world
During the Cold War, nuclear weapons of U.S. dominance.
formed the centerpiece of U.S. strategy. Accordingly, Washington’s emphasis
Initially, when the United States enjoyed shifted to conventional forces that could
vast nuclear superiority over the Soviet be used for preventive attacks and regime
Union, it relied on the threat of an imme- change abroad. The United States dramat-
diate and decisive nuclear attack to deter ically downsized its nuclear forces and
aggression in Europe. By the early 1960s, reduced their role in its defense strategy.
U.S. strategic forces dwarfed the Soviet Concerns about nuclear weapons now
Union’s. NATO’s defenses in Western focused on fears about their acquisition
Europe bristled with nuclear weapons, by rogue states or terrorists. As a result,
while conventional forces largely played successive administrations worked to
second fiddle. As the Soviet nuclear arsenal contain proliferation and to delegitimize
ballooned and the United States’ advantage the use of nuclear weapons except in the
faded, however, Washington decided that narrowest of circumstances. This approach
this strategy was no longer enough to was appealing: given the United States’
credibly defend Western Europe. As a unrivaled conventional military might,
result, it reinvigorated its conventional pushing nuclear weapons out of the
forces and devised strategies for limited picture seemed like it would only solidify
nuclear use designed to blunt a Soviet U.S. power.
invasion and persuade Moscow to end Moreover, the strategy enjoyed support
any war short of nuclear Armageddon. from across the political spectrum. It was
Thus, although Washington continued no surprise that doves applauded getting
investing in strategic nuclear forces, it rid of the weapons they so loathed, but
also developed tactical nuclear weapons even hawks welcomed the shift. Nuclear
and capabilities designed to offset the weapons, after all, tend to raise the
If You Want Peace, Prepare for Nuclear War
Locked and loaded: maintaining a U.S. Air Force missile complex in Wyoming, February 2018
threshold for military action. Thus, partners (think Poland or the Baltics in
President George H. W. Bush cut over Europe and Japan or Taiwan in Asia).
5,000 warheads from the stockpile in It is also that any future confrontation
1992. Every administration after him— with Russia or China could go nuclear.
Democratic and Republican—continued First, in a harder-fought, more uncer-
the drawdown. All in all, the U.S. nuclear tain struggle, each combatant may be
arsenal has shrunk to a fraction of its tempted to reach for the nuclear saber
Cold War size. to up the ante and test the other side’s
resolve, or even just to keep fighting.
A RUDE AWAKENING Second, should Moscow seize the Baltics
But if this approach once made sense, it or Beijing invade Taiwan, both U.S. foes
no longer does. Russia and China have are likely to threaten to use or actually
made impressive strides toward building use nuclear weapons to close the door
militaries that can take on the United on U.S. counterattacks, or to drastically
States and its allies over key strategic curtail their effectiveness. In fact, this
B R AY D O N W I L L I A M S / U . S . A I R F O R C E
interests. Gone are the days when the forms a central pillar of their theories
United States could easily swat away a of victory—the potential playbooks
Chinese attack on Taiwan or when it did they could use to take on the United
not even have to contemplate a Russian States and come out the better for it.
assault on the Baltics. This threat is not a figment of the
The problem is not just that Russia’s imagination. Russia has spent much of
and China’s increasingly sophisticated its limited money building a modern and
and powerful conventional militaries varied nuclear weapons arsenal. Much
are well poised to strike U.S. allies and of this arsenal is designed to attack specific

military targets rather than to wipe out power to politically isolate one of these
major cities in one fell swoop. For instance, states. If the situation escalated, China’s
Russia fields a substantial number of conventional forces could try to seize
naval nuclear weapons, including antiship Taiwan or the disputed territories and
cruise missiles, nuclear torpedoes, and prepare to block an effective response from
nuclear depth charges. As Russian exer- U.S. and allied troops. If this didn’t prove
cises and military journals suggest, the enough, China’s increasingly accurate and
idea behind Moscow’s nuclear strategy is flexible nuclear forces could hit U.S. air
to use tailored nuclear weapons to settle and naval bases in the western Pacific,
a war on Russia’s terms, gambling that testing how far the United States would be
going nuclear will intimidate the United willing to go in defense of its allies and
States into backing down—a strategy partners. The bottom line is that if the
known as “escalate to de-escalate.” United States wants to sustain its alliance
If Russia wished to challenge NATO, it architecture in Europe and Asia, it must
could deploy “little green men”—soldiers adapt its strategy to face an opponent
or intelligence officers in disguise or prepared to escalate with nuclear weapons.
unmarked uniforms—to Poland or the
Baltics in an attempt to sow confusion GETTING THE THREAT RIGHT
and shape opinion in Moscow’s favor, as Above all, this requires jettisoning the
it did in Crimea in 2014. It could then outdated assumptions that continue to
send in lethal conventional forces, which shape current debates on U.S. nuclear
could rapidly seize ground, dig in, and strategy. On one side are the doves, who
set up a formidable defensive position. argue that nuclear war simply cannot
Threatened or real nuclear attacks designed be limited or controlled and that the
to knock back any conventional counter- specter of nuclear devastation is enough
attack that U.S. and NATO forces might to deter a major war. The key, as they
launch in defense of their allies would see it, is to make sure that no one thinks
seal the deal. Moscow could, for example, otherwise and to avoid rocking the boat
hit key U.S. bases in western Europe or lest things get out of hand. In the mean-
U.S. flotillas in the Atlantic. Washington time, all the United States needs to deter
would be left with a simple choice: a Russia or China is a relatively small arsenal
settlement or a major nuclear war. of nuclear weapons with little purpose
China has been more restrained than other than to destroy highly valued but
Russia in its nuclear buildup, but it is unprotected targets such as cities. This
also developing modern, nuclear-capable threat is enough, the argument goes,
forces that could be used in a regional provided that all parties maintain power-
conflict, such as the DF-21 and DF-26 ful but carefully constrained conventional
ballistic missiles. These are just the type of forces and avoid unnecessary skirmishes.
weapons China would need to checkmate This line of reasoning has influential
the United States in Asia. In the event supporters. In 2012, a study group chaired
that it wanted to force the Taiwan question by James Cartwright, the former vice
or dictate the terms of a settlement of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
territorial disputes with Japan, Beijing concluded that “there is no conceivable
could rely on its newfound wealth and situation in the contemporary world” in
which a nuclear attack would be in the
United States’ or Russia’s interest. The
group’s report urged the United States
to reduce its nuclear arsenal substantially
and eliminate its tactical nuclear weap-
ons altogether. In the same vein, a letter
signed this year by former Secretary of
Defense William Perry and other heavy-
weights contended, “It is unlikely that
there is such a thing as a limited nuclear
Bring the
war; preparing for one is folly.”
Unfortunately, this view ignores the
REAL WORLD
incentives that U.S. foes would face in
a war and the evidence about how they
to your classroom
would likely behave. Russia and, to a
lesser extent, China field increasingly
accurate, lower-yield nuclear weapons
Case Studies
that would add little in an all-out nuclear
conflagration but would be useful in a
in Global Affairs
limited nuclear exchange. It appears that
they believe that limited nuclear escala- American foreign policy
tion is possible—and that it may even Global institutions
represent their winning move against Conflict negotiations
the United States.
This shouldn’t come as a surprise to Terrorism & security
Washington. The risks of nuclear brink- International trade
manship may be enormous, but so is the Women, peace and security
payoff from gaining a nuclear advantage
over an opponent. Nuclear weapons are, Health and science
after all, the ultimate trump card: if you and more...
can convince your enemy that you have
a way to play the card and are actually
prepared to go through with it, nothing
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the limited and effective use of nuclear case studies and simulations
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perfected this approach against the Soviet
Union during the Cold War. The doves’
of your course
strategy, however, would leave the United
States without any means to do this,
https://casestudies.isd.georgetown.edu/
encouraging adversaries to exploit this
gap and making war—including nuclear
war—more likely.
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Yet some super-hawk thinking would Russian and Chinese projectiles. This is
also lead U.S. policymakers astray. For a function of the inherent difficulty of
many hawks, the solution is for the United defending against incoming ballistic
States to develop forces of all kinds able missiles traveling at several times the
to hobble Russia’s or China’s nuclear speed of sound, not to mention dealing
arsenal, while setting up massive missile with stealthy cruise missiles and under-
defenses to block any retaliation. If the water torpedoes. As James Winnefeld,
United States perfected this approach, then the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs
it could carry out a disarming first strike of Staff, put it in 2015, “Missile defense
against an adversary. The long shadow of against these high-end threats is too hard
this threat alone would discourage Russia and too expensive and too strategically
or China from mounting an attack on destabilizing to even try.” Put simply,
U.S. friends or allies. there is no plausible scenario in which
The problem with this approach is that the super-hawk approach makes sense.
it is simply too difficult to pull off and is And patent bluffing is not a wise long-
therefore an obvious bluff. Destroying term strategy.
or blocking all Russian or Chinese nuclear
forces would be a mind-boggling chal- GETTING THE ARSENAL RIGHT
lenge. And in a nuclear war, you have Ultimately, the logic of deterrence
to be perfect or just shy of it: allowing dictates that the United States’ defense
even a handful of thermonuclear weap- strategy for its new great-power rivals
ons through U.S. defenses would mean must balance two competing demands:
staggering death and destruction. This whatever actions Washington threatens
human cost would be completely out must be potent enough to coerce the
of proportion with whatever interests opponent but not so apocalyptic as to
prompted the United States to engage. be implausible. For the United States,
In order to fully disarm Russia or striking this balance is not easy. A coun-
China, the United States would have to try trying to defend its home territory
not only destroy or disable large num- may be able to convince opponents that
bers of widely dispersed mobile missile it will risk nuclear annihilation to avoid
launchers, submarines, and aircraft but foreign occupation. But for Washington,
also do so concurrently, at most within which is trying to help defend far-flung
hours, to prevent a counterstrike. This allies against foreign aggression, such
would involve finding and fixing mobile threats are far less credible. As one U.S.
targets, tracking them if they moved, official quoted former Secretary of State
destroying them, and confirming their Henry Kissinger as saying, “Great powers
demise—a task the United States has don’t commit suicide for their allies.”
found extremely difficult even against The good news is that the United
much weaker opponents, such as Iraq. States can protect its allies without going
Meanwhile, U.S. defenses would have after its opponents’ entire nuclear arse-
to keep any enemy missiles from reaching nals or marching on Moscow or Beijing.
their targets—yet U.S. missile defenses Instead, American forces must be able to
have struggled against primitive ballistic blunt any invasion of allied territory by
and cruise missiles, let alone advanced quickly attacking the conventional and
If You Want Peace, Prepare for Nuclear War
tactical nuclear forces that Russia or systems designed for a regional military
China would use to seize and hold on fight. As it exists today, the U.S. arsenal
to that territory. Once the United States consists mostly of strategic weapons,
had successfully done so, Russia or China built for waging a large-scale nuclear
might decide to end the conflict there— war against an enemy’s strategic forces,
an outcome that Washington could accept. leadership targets, and the like. Almost
If they decided, however, to press on even all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons have
after U.S. forces had warded off an initial been dismantled. The few that remain
offensive, the burden of escalation would are of only limited use in a war against
rest squarely on their shoulders. Russia or China.
Consider the case of China: instead The Pentagon’s 2018 Nuclear Posture
of being able to quickly seize Taiwan and Review recognized this gap. It committed
create facts on the ground, Chinese leaders to modernizing its air-delivered tactical
would face a choice between backing down bombs and developing low-yield nuclear
and risking a major, prolonged war with warheads for submarine-launched ballistic
the United States—not to mention U.S. missiles. But the United States should go
allies galvanized into action by large-scale further and specifically develop or adapt
Chinese aggression in East Asia. Once the a modest number of nuclear weapons and
path to a quick invasion of territory was delivery systems that could damage key
blocked, any escalatory actions that China Russian or Chinese conventional targets,
might turn to would, in effect, be self- especially those needed for an invasion
defeating, as they would set off a unified of the Baltics or Taiwan: entrenched
response by the United States and its allies. ground forces, maneuver troops, naval
U.S. conventional forces would still do flotillas, and invasion fleets. The new
most of the work of blocking the adver- weapons would need lower yields than
sary’s advance by delaying, degrading, most of those in the current arsenal, which
and ideally halting any invading forces. have been optimized to destroy hardened
Accordingly, preparing combat-ready silos sheltering enemy missiles, not to
conventional forces to fight alongside stop conventional forces.
allied militaries must be a central pillar of These weapons would not replace
U.S. strategy. But American nuclear forces, U.S. conventional forces. They would,
especially those designed for a limited war, however, help offset any advantages that
would have an equally important role to Russia and China derive from their own
play. For one, Russia or China might nuclear arsenals. Risking a confrontation
decide to escalate to the nuclear level, with a similarly well-equipped United
forcing the United States to respond in States would mean courting defeat or
kind or risk defeat. Moreover, if the United near-suicidal escalation.
States’ conventional edge further erodes
in the coming decades, particularly in East TRIED AND TRUE
Asia, it may have to rely on its nuclear Because there is no effective deter-
forces to halt Chinese conventional forces. rence without effective communication,
To be able to pull of such a strategy, Washington also has to change the way
Washington will have to invest in modern it talks about its nuclear strategy. In
tactical nuclear warheads and delivery recent decades, the U.S. government

has tended to stress that nuclear war is century—but the world has changed.
uncontrollable. There is obviously great The United States now faces great-power
merit to this point, since crossing the competitors that believe they could success-
nuclear threshold would indeed be tre- fully take on the United States, hoping
mendously perilous. But fixating too to exploit Washington’s fear of the
much on the uncontrollability of nuclear nuclear precipice. Disabusing them of
war actually invites escalation. Oppo- any such notion is the best deterrent
nents may quite reasonably conclude against such a scenario. Perhaps para-
that Washington is so convinced that doxically, then, the best way to avoid
any limited nuclear operations will a nuclear war is be ready to fight a
escalate to Armageddon that it would limited one.
never dare cross the threshold except To critics, this approach will smack
for its own survival—which would of Cold War thinking. But when it
leave U.S. allies out in the cold. comes to defense strategy, that may
Accordingly, U.S. officials need to not be a bad thing. After all, Cold War
change their line. They should continue thinking enabled the United States and
to stress that a nuclear war could quickly its allies to deter major aggression for
spin out of control, with calamitous effects. 45 years, even though their conventional
Yet they should also demonstrate—by forces in Europe were consistently out-
deed, in the exercises the military holds, numbered. The United States should
the training it undertakes, and the capa- consider itself lucky if it achieves such
bilities it develops, and by word, in the a result over the next half century. A
official statements Washington issues— certain kind of Cold War thinking
that the United States is prepared to may be just what Washington and its
conduct limited, effective nuclear opera- allies need.∂
tions. This would signal to Russia and
China that the United States has the
will and the way to frustrate any nuclear
brinkmanship.
Such a nuclear strategy is compatible
with arms control. After all, the goal of
arms control is not disarmament but
strategic stability. In practice, this means
ensuring that all sides have confidence
in their own ability to launch an effective
retaliatory nuclear strike, while leaving
ample room for cooperative steps to reduce
the risk that an accident or a miscalcu-
lation could lead to war.
For decades, the dominant thinking
in U.S. nuclear policy has been to
reduce, minimize, and eliminate. This
approach may have been defensible in
the 1990s and the early years of this
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power that other state institutions—

Armed and such as parties, politburos, or military

officers—cannot overrule the decisions
Dangerous made at the top. Personalist dictators
can make decisions on a whim, which
creates a grave challenge to the concept
When Dictators Get of nuclear stability. The world has faced
the Bomb this particular nuclear danger only once
before: between 1949 and 1953, when
Scott D. Sagan Joseph Stalin enjoyed unchallenged
personal dominion over a nuclear-armed
T
here have always been good Soviet Union.
reasons to worry about nuclear Of course, other threats from nuclear
weapons, but those reasons have proliferation persist. Pakistan’s nuclear
changed over time. During the Cold War, arsenal is growing, for example. But it
U.S. national security experts fretted remains in the hands of professional
about an expensive nuclear arms race military officers who share at least some
with the Soviet Union. After the 9/11 degree of power with a democratically
attacks, specialists and the American elected civilian government. Iran also has
public alike were afraid that terrorists latent nuclear capabilities. Yet despite
might get their hands on highly enriched the Trump administration’s unilateral
uranium and make a primitive nuclear withdrawal from the 2015 agreement that
device. Those dangers remain. But the limited Iran’s nuclear activities and the
first concern has been mitigated to some reimposition of U.S. economic sanctions
degree by strategic arms control agree- on Iran, the Islamic Republic has, at least
ments between the United States and for now, decided to keep its commitments
Russia, which are still in place (although to not enrich uranium to bomb-grade
not always adhered to). And the second levels and to permit international
concern has been ameliorated through a inspectors to monitor any suspected
significant reduction in the amount of nuclear facilities.
highly enriched uranium used in research To understand why a nuclear-armed
reactors around the world. personalist dictatorship poses a much
Today, however, there is another graver danger than those countries, look
reason to worry about nuclear weapons: no further than Kim Jong Un, the eccentric
the rise of personalist dictatorships in ruler of North Korea. In the six years
states that possess or could acquire the since he came to power following the
bomb. These dictatorships differ from death of his father, Kim has solidified
other autocratic governments because his control of the state apparatus and
their leaders have such dominant personal purged potential rivals, including his
SCOTT D. SAGAN is Caroline S. G. Munro uncle, whom he executed in 2013, and
Professor of Political Science, Mimi and Peter his half brother, who was murdered in
Haas University Fellow in Undergraduate an airport in Malaysia in 2017 by assailants
Education, and a Senior Fellow at the Center for
International Security and Cooperation and the armed with the chemical weapon VX—
Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University. almost certainly on Kim’s orders. At the

Scott D. Sagan The CSS Point
same time, Kim has achieved unprecedented administration is not thinking creatively
success in North Korea’s pursuit of enough and the president is making
nuclear weapons. After testing a thermo- matters worse by issuing belligerent
nuclear device in September 2017 and threats and making unfounded claims
an intercontinental ballistic missile in of success.
November of that year, Kim announced
in his 2018 New Year’s address that North BOMB THROWERS
Korea had “perfected” its nuclear arsenal After 1945, the list of nuclear states
and that “the nuclear button is on my grew to include five democracies (the
office desk all the time.” United States, the United Kingdom,
Kim soon entered into direct negotia- France, Israel, and India) and five non-
tions with South Korea and, separately, democratic states (the Soviet Union,
with the United States. Like his three China, Pakistan, North Korea, and
immediate predecessors, U.S. President apartheid South Africa). A number of
Donald Trump seeks North Korea’s democracies, such as Australia and
“complete, verifiable, and irreversible Sweden, started nuclear weapons pro-
nuclear disarmament.” After meeting grams and then abandoned them, as have
with Kim in June, Trump announced a few nondemocracies, such as Brazil
that the United States would suspend and Egypt in the 1970s. Democracies and
what he called “tremendously expen- autocracies alike have joined the 1968
sive” and “very provocative” military Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),
exercises with South Korea and declared pledging “not to manufacture or other-
that “there is no longer a nuclear threat wise acquire nuclear weapons.”
from North Korea.” In fact, Kim has Yet only autocracies have started or
shown no intention of giving up his maintained illicit nuclear weapons pro-
weapons, and it is unclear how Wash- grams after joining the NPT. These nuclear
ington can achieve its ambitious goal. cheaters were Iran, Iraq, Libya, North
This dynamic is unlikely to remain Korea, Romania, Syria, Taiwan, and,
confined to North Korea. Personalist for a brief period in the 1970s, South
dictators elsewhere are more likely to Korea. When they began their nuclear
seek nuclear weapons in the future and, weapons programs, all these states were
if they get them, more likely than other led by autocrats who enjoyed nearly
leaders to use them. The United States unchallenged authority. Such dictators
therefore needs to tailor its nuclear find nuclear weapons particularly appeal-
doctrine to better deter such leaders— ing, in part for the usual reason of warding
and, if necessary, to fight and defeat off foreign military intervention, but
them more effectively and ethically. also because nuclear weapons, unlike
The problem is daunting. The good conventional ones, provide a way of
news is that Washington and its allies countering external threats without
have successfully adapted their strate- increasing the risk of internal threats,
gies to meet new nuclear threats in the especially that of a military coup. Such
past, and the steps they must take to leaders are also less likely to fear the
do so once again are well within reach. effects of international economic isolation
But the bad news is that the Trump and are not constrained by domestic
Armed and Dangerous
Atomic autocrat: Kim Jong Un watching a missile launch in Pyongyang, September 2017
rivals who might oppose spending scarce despite having no serious background
resources on a nuclear weapons program. in scientific research. In Iraq during the
Nor are personalist dictators constrained late 1970s and early 1980s, the dictator
much by the rule of law, which embold- Saddam Hussein executed his deputy
ens them to engage in nuclear cheating, prime minister, reportedly for opposing
since they face little chance of being outed his defense spending plans, and sent a
by internal whistleblowers and because, number of senior nuclear scientists to
even if they are caught cheating by foreign prison because he deemed them insuf-
powers, they will pay few domestic ficiently loyal. During the late 1990s, the
political costs. Libyan strongman Muammar al-Qaddafi
Yet many of the traits that make put together a gang that couldn’t prolifer-
personalist dictatorships dangerous also ate straight: program managers imported
make them incompetent. Such dictators the wrong nuclear components because
often weaken their state institutions by they did not consult scientists first, and
prizing loyalty over professionalism in no one monitored progress in the program.
military and scientific organizations, Indeed, when the International Atomic
thus impeding their nuclear ambitions. Energy Agency inspected Libya’s nuclear
In the 1980s, Romania’s laughable nuclear sites in 2003, they found smuggled-in
program was run as a pet project by Elena centrifuges still in their packing crates.
KCNA / REUT E RS
Ceausescu, the wife of the strongman North Korea’s success therefore

leader Nicolae Ceausescu, who was represents a watershed. For the first time,
appointed the head of the National a poor and highly personalist dictatorship
Council for Science and Technology has developed large numbers of nuclear

weapons and long-range missiles to members and cronies more than the lives
deliver them. North Korea’s persistence, of their countries’ citizens. They vanquish
skillful engineering, and extensive support rivals in order to make their regimes
for its scientists helped. So, too, did the coup-proof and rely on sycophants,
illicit assistance that the regime received often family members, to run their
from the proliferation network run by the regimes, prizing personal loyalty over
Pakistani nuclear physicist A. Q. Khan professional competence or expertise.
(which provided centrifuges to enrich A leader surrounded by yes men will
uranium) and from companies in Ukraine have no one who can question faulty
(which supplied the North Koreans with assumptions, much less challenge his
high-performance liquid-propellant rocket decision-making authority.
engines). Lastly, Washington failed to Recent history demonstrates how such
get strong global sanctions placed on proclivities make personalist dictators
North Korea until after Pyongyang had particularly likely to miscalculate. In 1986,
already tested its first nuclear weapon, Libyan operatives, following Qaddafi’s
in 2006; by then, it was too late. orders to carry out a campaign of terrorism
North Korea’s success may now serve against Americans, planted a bomb at a
as an inspiration. Other governments may nightclub in Berlin popular with U.S.
calculate that they can copy the North service members, killing two U.S. soldiers
Korean model, especially if Pyongyang and one foreign civilian and injuring 229
offers to carry them across the nuclear other service members and civilians. In
threshold, as it has attempted to do at response, the United States launched air
least once in the past. In 2007, the strikes against military targets in Libya
North Koreans were caught helping and the compound outside Tripoli where
Bashar al-Assad’s regime construct a Qaddafi lived with his family. In 1980,
secret plutonium-producing reactor in Saddam decided to attack Iran without
the Syrian desert, which the Israeli consulting his advisers (resulting in an
Air Force promptly destroyed. eight-year-long war), and in 1990, he
ordered an attack on Kuwait after consult-
THIS IS NOT A DRILL ing with only his son-in-law (leading to the
It is difficult to predict which country humiliating Persian Gulf War). Saddam
with a personalist regime—or with a even forbade his intelligence agencies
leader who is working to establish such a from providing reports on the United
regime—will be the next to pursue States, telling them that intelligence was
nuclear weapons. Egypt, Syria, and his “specialty.” (He also elaborated on
Turkey all seem like contenders. Saudi the sources of his unique insight: “some
Arabia might be next in line, if Crown of it out of deduction, some of it through
Prince Mohammed bin Salman contin- invention and connecting the dots, all
ues his ruthless consolidation of power without having hard evidence.”)
when he eventually becomes king. Flawed decision-making of this sort
Armed with nuclear weapons, the also makes personalist regimes accident-
personalist rulers of these countries will prone. According to North Korean
be difficult to deter. They likely value government pronouncements, Pyongyang
their own lives and those of their family has a preemptive military doctrine, which
calls for striking first if Kim receives
intelligence that a U.S. attack is deemed
imminent and unavoidable. But no
outsiders know the exact indicators on
which Kim would base his decision.
Perhaps he might react to a formal
warning issued by trusted organizations
within the state. But even in techno-
logically sophisticated societies, these
are imperfect. In January, for example,
the Hawaii Emergency Management
Agency issued a false alarm: “Ballistic
missile threat inbound to Hawaii. Seek
immediate shelter. This is not a drill.”
Throughout the islands, citizens pan-
icked, some running for the beaches,
others (more appropriately) sheltering
inside their homes. In Washington,
fortunately, no one panicked: the U.S.
military’s sophisticated sensors did
not detect an inbound missile, highly
professional military officers quickly
reported up the chain of command
that the Hawaiian agency had made a
mistake, and no high-level official
believed that Kim would launch an
unprovoked nuclear attack on Hawaii.
But just imagine what would have
taken place had a similar false alarm
occurred in Pyongyang rather than
Honolulu. North Korea’s missile warning
system relies on archaic Soviet radar
technology. The North Koreans lack the
multiple and independent satellite-based
warning systems that create redundancy
and reliability for the United States: if
someone in North Korea issued an errone-
ous warning of an attack, no alternative
system would correct it. And it’s unlikely
that the military in North Korea would
report a serious mistake, because if a
bureaucrat or a military officer makes an
error in North Korea, he doesn’t just get
fired; he might also get executed. Finally,

Kim is likely to believe that the United dates that signatories permit inspectors
States would launch a first strike against to enter any suspected nuclear facilities
North Korea thanks to Trump’s frequent on demand. There are many holdouts
over-the-top threats to do just that. against universal ratification of the
Additional Protocol, including states
HOW DO YOU SOLVE A PROBLEM that may seek nuclear weapons, such
LIKE KOREA? as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. In
Even though a nuclear North Korea will 2020, the UN will host the next NPT
remain a dire threat, there are ways to Review Conference, where all member
reduce the likelihood of further prolif- states will meet to discuss how to improve
eration. The United States should never nonproliferation. In the run-up to the
rule out using military force against conference, Washington, Beijing, and
would-be proliferators if they are caught Moscow should agree to make a major
cheating, but diplomacy is always prefer- push for universal ratification of the
able. There is ample room for improve- Additional Protocol and should pursue
ment on the diplomatic front. In 2003, the a coordinated bargaining strategy, offer-
George W. Bush administration created ing nonnuclear states improved access
the Proliferation Security Initiative, to nuclear technology in exchange for
through which more than 100 countries agreeing to inspections.
coordinate intelligence and interdiction In addition, the United States should
efforts to prevent the smuggling of develop a common strategy with China,
components for weapons of mass destruc- Russia, and other nuclear technology
tion. China, however, is not a member. exporters to ensure that countries con-
During the Obama administration, the structing civilian nuclear power plants
United States, the Netherlands, and for the first time abstain from also taking
South Korea hosted a series of summits steps consistent with pursuing a nuclear
where more than 40 countries with weapons program—namely, enriching
nuclear power facilities shared best uranium or reprocessing plutonium. This
practices regarding security, training, will be a severe challenge since the major
and equipment. But Russia dropped exporters—China, France, Russia, South
out of the process after its invasion of Korea, and the United States—have a
Crimea in 2014. And North Korea’s clear incentive to prioritize sales over
success in developing nuclear weapons security and to not impose rules on
has demonstrated that these efforts importers. At a minimum, Washington
were insufficient. That’s why Wash- should refuse to help countries acquire
ington must work with its allies and nuclear energy if they do not sign and
partners—and also with rivals such as ratify the Additional Protocol and agree
China and Russia—to establish even not to enrich uranium or reprocess
stricter export controls and counter- plutonium.
smuggling measures. When it comes to the threat of
One improvement would be to require nuclear-armed dictatorships, multilat-
all NPT members to ratify the so-called eral diplomacy can do only so much.
Additional Protocol of the International Washington also needs to update its
Atomic Energy Agency, which man- approach to deterrence and its nuclear
Armed and Dangerous
arsenal. In an interview with ABC News new U.S. nuclear doctrine should make
in August 2017, H. R. McMaster, explicit what the Obama doctrine
Trump’s national security adviser at the implied: any military commander in a
time, expressed intense skepticism about personalist dictatorship who disobeys a
the possibility of deterring Kim. “Classi- command to use nuclear weapons will
cal deterrence theory, how does that not be held responsible for the conse-
apply to a regime like the regime in quences of his leader’s aggression.
North Korea?” he asked. The Trump administration’s 2018
A regime that engages in unspeak- Nuclear Posture Review also got this
able brutality against its own people? aspect of deterrence right, by threatening
A regime that poses a continuous retaliation against the appropriate target:
threat to its neighbors in the region
and now may pose a threat, direct For North Korea, the survival of the
threat, to the United States with Kim regime is paramount. Our deter-
weapons of mass destruction? A rence strategy for North Korea makes
regime that imprisons and murders clear that any North Korean nuclear
anyone who seems to oppose that attack against the United States or its
regime, including members of [Kim’s] allies and partners is unacceptable and
own family [by] using [VX] in a will result in the end of that regime.
public airport? There is no scenario in which the
Kim regime could employ nuclear
The answer is that the United States weapons and survive.
can deter such a regime not by threat-
ening its subjects but by threatening its But Trump himself has repeatedly
leader. Washington must make clear threatened to start a war with North
that it will respond with military force Korea and to harm the North Korean
only to acts of aggression and that it people rather than just their leaders.
will target only the dictator himself, In August 2017, Trump declared that
the regime’s leadership, and its military “North Korea best not make any more
forces. And it should discourage senior threats to the United States. . . . They
military officers in such personalist will be met with fire and fury like the
dictatorships from following any rash world has never seen.” At the UN in
and suicidal orders by offering them September 2017, he warned that he
“golden parachutes” if they disobey. might “totally destroy North Korea,”
This will not be easy. The Obama admin- which sounded grossly indiscriminate.
istration’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review And in a press conference in May 2018,
walked that fine line by stating that any Trump threatened to start a preventive
country that “uses chemical or biologi- war against North Korea that would
cal weapons against the United States target the entire country: “In Libya, we
or its allies and partners would face the decimated that country,” he said. “That
prospect of a devastating conventional model would take place [in North Korea]
military response” and that “any individu- if we don’t make a deal, most likely.”
als responsible for the attack, whether Despite Trump’s loose talk, his admin-
national leaders or military commanders, istration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
would be held fully accountable.” A recognized the need to tailor deterrence

to specific adversaries. For example, it feasible to spare the lives of innocent

called for the development of nuclear civilians.
warheads with smaller yields for U.S. In an era of nuclear-armed personalist
submarines to counter new Russian dictators, the United States should adopt
lower-yield weapons. Some eminent what the arms control expert Jeffrey
experts, such as William Perry, a former Lewis and I have termed “the nuclear
U.S. secretary of defense, and George necessity principle.” Washington should
Shultz, a former U.S. secretary of state, not aim nuclear weapons against any
have criticized this step as making nuclear target that could be effectively destroyed
war more likely. But the logic of deter- with conventional weapons. And if the
rence suggests the opposite is true. By U.S. military does determine that it
enabling a limited and smaller-scale U.S. needs to attack a target that is so deeply
nuclear response, lower-yield weapons buried or otherwise hardened that it
would enhance the credibility of a U.S. cannot be destroyed with conventional
threat to retaliate and thus make weapons, it should use the lowest-yield
aggression by Russia less likely. nuclear weapon possible to accomplish
The Trump administration, however, the mission.
missed an opportunity by neglecting to The historian Alex Wellerstein has
call for the broader development of more developed a website called NUKEMAP
lower-yield nuclear warheads and advanced that allows users to estimate the civilian
conventional weapons to reduce the col- fatalities that would result from a nuclear
lateral damage in a future conflict with a strike anywhere in the world (not includ-
proliferator. Such weapons would make ing the longer-term deaths that would
U.S. deterrence both more ethical and result from radioactive fallout). NUKE-
more effective—more ethical because MAP bases its results on data from the
they could be used to kill only the leaders 1945 attack in which the United States
and military personnel responsible for dropped a 15-kiloton bomb on Hiroshima,
acts of aggression, and more effective instantly killing more than 70,000
because they would make the possibility of civilians. The website lets users adjust
U.S. retaliation inherently more credible. the yield of the weapon deployed in
any hypothetical strike and thus grimly
THE NUCLEAR NECESSITY demonstrates the significance of lower-
PRINCIPLE yield nuclear weapons. NUKEMAP can’t
Washington should always prefer con- predict whether a nuclear strike would
ventional military options over nuclear destroy any particular target. Still, the
ones. Yet as long as the United States exercise is sobering and revealing. For
possesses nuclear weapons, it must have example, a U.S. attack with a one-megaton
war plans for how to use them when bomb on the North Korean command-
necessary. Such plans should always and-control bunker near the town of
conform to the laws of armed conflict Chunghwa, 20 miles from Pyongyang,
and the just war principles of never would kill approximately 37,500 civil-
deliberately targeting noncombatants, ians, according to NUKEMAP, whereas a
adjusting the use of force in propor- 100-kiloton weapon would immediately
tion to the threat, and doing everything kill some 16,000 civilians. An attack on the
Armed and Dangerous
same site with a 6.5-kiloton weapon (the against an Iranian city that would kill
reported size of a new warhead that the two million civilians in order to avoid a
Trump administration has proposed land war that might kill up to 20,000
building) would kill around 2,900 American soldiers.
civilians—still a terrible toll, but far The final reason to support this change
lower. Using a one-megaton bomb to in U.S. nuclear doctrine is because it is
destroy the tunnels near Sunchon, a the right thing to do. The arc of history
city 35 miles north of Pyongyang where should be bent, slowly but surely, toward
the North Koreans have test-launched just war doctrine.
long-range missiles, would produce
about 70,000 immediate civilian deaths. THE WORLD AS IT IS
A 100-kiloton warhead would cause After the Cold War, many politicians
5,700 fatalities. A 6.5-kiloton warhead and scholars thought that the danger of
would immediately kill approximately nuclear war had receded. In the years
800 civilians—again, a dreadful outcome, that followed, a number of states went
but far less tragic. nuclear (or tried to), but the threat of
In addition to making U.S. deter- nuclear war seemed to remain far lower
rence more ethical, a more discriminate than it had been in the decades after
doctrine and the development of lower- World War II. In a 2009 speech in
yield weapons would allow Washington Prague, U.S. President Barack Obama
to better assure its allies that it is neither renewed the United States’ commit-
too cautious nor reckless. Developing ment to work toward “a world without
lower-yield weapons and more clearly nuclear weapons.” It was a brave and
articulating limits on their use would also lofty vision.
demonstrate Washington’s commitment What a difference a decade makes.
under the NPT to work in good faith Today, thanks to North Korea’s break-
toward the eventual elimination of nuclear through, the world faces a future in
weapons. (The Trump administration’s which unpredictable, unconstrained
2018 Nuclear Posture Review conspicu- personalist dictators might hold the
ously failed to mention that pledge.) fate of millions of people in their hands.
A more ethical targeting doctrine The United States should remain com-
would also reduce the risk that a permitted to the distant goal of disarmament.
sonalist dictator might think that the But in the meantime, Washington will
United States could be “self-deterred” have to be much smarter about tailoring
by concerns about civilian deaths. In its nuclear arsenal and its nuclear doctrine
reality, the American public would likely to meet this current challenge.∂
demand vengeance if the United States
or its allies were attacked even in a limited
way. And Americans are quite hawkish
on the use of nuclear weapons: surveys
that the political scientist Benjamin
Valentino and I commissioned in 2015
found that nearly 60 percent of Ameri-
cans would approve of a nuclear strike

Return to Table of Contents The CSS Point
as it once did. And the odds of such a

Beijing’s Nuclear confrontation going nuclear are higher
than most policymakers and analysts think.

Option Members of China’s strategic com-
munity tend to dismiss such concerns.
Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war
Why a U.S.-Chinese War with China often exclude nuclear weapons
Could Spiral Out of Control from the analysis entirely, treating them
as basically irrelevant to the course of a
Caitlin Talmadge conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015,
Dennis Blair, the former commander of
A
s China’s power has grown in U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated
recent years, so, too, has the the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear
risk of war with the United crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.”
States. Under President Xi Jinping, This assurance is misguided. If
China has increased its political and deployed against China, the Pentagon’s
economic pressure on Taiwan and built preferred style of conventional warfare
military installations on coral reefs in would be a potential recipe for nuclear
the South China Sea, fueling Washing- escalation. Since the end of the Cold War,
ton’s fears that Chinese expansionism the United States’ signature approach
will threaten U.S. allies and influence in to war has been simple: punch deep
the region. U.S. destroyers have tran- into enemy territory in order to rapidly
sited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests knock out the opponent’s key military
from Beijing. American policymakers assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon
have wondered aloud whether they developed this formula in wars against
should send an aircraft carrier through Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia,
the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets none of which was a nuclear power.
have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies China, by contrast, not only has
above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled
U.S. President Donald Trump has brought them with its conventional military forces,
long-simmering economic disputes to a making it difficult to attack one without
rolling boil. attacking the other. This means that a
A war between the two countries major U.S. military campaign targeting
remains unlikely, but the prospect of a China’s conventional forces would likely
military confrontation—resulting, for also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced
example, from a Chinese campaign against with such a threat, Chinese leaders could
Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible decide to use their nuclear weapons
while they were still able to.
CAITLIN TALMADGE is Associate Professor As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate
of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh
School of Foreign Service at Georgetown a relationship fraught with mutual suspi-
University. This essay is adapted from “Would cion, they must come to grips with the
China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of fact that a conventional war could skid
Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional
War With the United States,” International into a nuclear confrontation. Although
Security, Spring 2017. this risk is not high in absolute terms,
Beijing’s Nuclear Option
Flash point: a military drill in Hualien, Taiwan, January 2018

its consequences for the region and the coercion. Historically, this narrow pur-
world would be devastating. As long as pose required only a handful of nuclear
the United States and China continue weapons that could ensure Chinese
to pursue their current grand strategies, retaliation in the event of an attack. To
the risk is likely to endure. This means this day, China maintains a “no first
that leaders on both sides should dispense use” pledge, promising that it will never
with the illusion that they can easily fight
be the first to use nuclear weapons.
a limited war. They should focus instead The prospect of a nuclear conflict can
on managing or resolving the political, also seem like a relic of the Cold War.
economic, and military tensions that might Back then, the United States and its allies
lead to a conflict in the first place. lived in fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive
rapidly overrunning Europe. NATO stood
A NEW KIND OF THREAT ready to use nuclear weapons first to
There are some reasons for optimism. stalemate such an attack. Both Washing-
For one, China has long stood out for its ton and Moscow also consistently worried
nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. After its that their nuclear forces could be taken out
first nuclear test, in 1964, China largely in a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike by
TYRON E SIU / REUTE RS
avoided the Cold War arms race, build- the other side. This mutual fear increased
ing a much smaller and simpler nuclear the risk that one superpower might rush
arsenal than its resources would have to launch in the erroneous belief that it
allowed. Chinese leaders have consistently was already under attack. Initially, the
characterized nuclear weapons as useful danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed
only for deterring nuclear aggression and large. In the 1950s, lax safety procedures

Caitlin Talmadge The CSS Point
for U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on long-term objective of reunifying the

NATO soil, as well as minimal civilian island with mainland China is clearly in
oversight of U.S. military commanders, conflict with Washington’s longstanding
raised a serious risk that nuclear escala- desire to maintain the status quo in the
tion could have occurred without explicit strait. It is not difficult to imagine how
orders from the U.S. president. this might lead to war. For example,
The good news is that these Cold War China could decide that the political or
worries have little bearing on U.S.-Chinese military window for regaining control
relations today. Neither country could over the island was closing and launch
rapidly overrun the other’s territory in a an attack, using air and naval forces to
conventional war. Neither seems worried blockade Taiwanese harbors or bombard
about a nuclear bolt from the blue. And the island. Although U.S. law does not
civilian political control of nuclear weap- require Washington to intervene in such a
ons is relatively strong in both countries. scenario, the Taiwan Relations Act states
What remains, in theory, is the comfort- that the United States will “consider any
ing logic of mutual deterrence: in a war effort to determine the future of Taiwan
between two nuclear powers, neither side by other than peaceful means, including
will launch a nuclear strike for fear that by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the
its enemy will respond in kind. peace and security of the Western Pacific
The bad news is that one other trigger area and of grave concern to the United
remains: a conventional war that threatens States.” Were Washington to intervene
China’s nuclear arsenal. Conventional on Taipei’s behalf, the world’s sole super-
forces can threaten nuclear forces in power and its rising competitor would
ways that generate pressures to escalate— find themselves in the first great-power
especially when ever more capable U.S. war of the twenty-first century.
conventional forces face adversaries In the course of such a war, U.S.
with relatively small and fragile nuclear conventional military operations would
arsenals, such as China. If U.S. opera- likely threaten, disable, or outright elimi-
tions endangered or damaged China’s nate some Chinese nuclear capabilities—
nuclear forces, Chinese leaders might whether doing so was Washington’s stated
come to think that Washington had aims objective or not. In fact, if the United
beyond winning the conventional war— States engaged in the style of warfare it
that it might be seeking to disable or has practiced over the last 30 years, this
destroy China’s nuclear arsenal outright, outcome would be all but guaranteed.
perhaps as a prelude to regime change. In Consider submarine warfare. China
the fog of war, Beijing might reluctantly could use its conventionally armed attack
conclude that limited nuclear escalation— submarines to blockade Taiwanese harbors
an initial strike small enough that it or bomb the island, or to attack U.S.
could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation— and allied forces in the region. If that
was a viable option to defend itself. happened, the U.S. Navy would almost
certainly undertake an antisubmarine
STRAIT SHOOTERS campaign, which would likely threaten
The most worrisome flash point for a China’s “boomers,” the four nuclear-
U.S.-Chinese war is Taiwan. Beijing’s armed ballistic missile submarines that
form its naval nuclear deterrent. China’s two such incidents would eliminate half
conventionally armed and nuclear-armed of its sea-based deterrent. Meanwhile,
submarines share the same shore-based any Chinese boomers that escaped this
communications system; a U.S. attack fate would likely be cut off from com-
on these transmitters would thus not munication with onshore commanders,
only disrupt the activities of China’s left without an escort force, and unable
attack submarine force but also cut off to return to destroyed ports. If that
its boomers from contact with Beijing, happened, China would essentially have
leaving Chinese leaders unsure of the fate no naval nuclear deterrent.
of their naval nuclear force. In addition, The situation is similar onshore, where
nuclear ballistic missile submarines any U.S. military campaign would have
depend on attack submarines for protec- to contend with China’s growing land-
tion, just as lumbering bomber aircraft based conventional ballistic missile force.
rely on nimble fighter jets. If the United Much of this force is within range of
States started sinking Chinese attack Taiwan, ready to launch ballistic missiles
submarines, it would be sinking the very against the island or at any allies coming
force that protects China’s ballistic to its aid. Once again, U.S. victory would
missile submarines, leaving the latter hinge on the ability to degrade this
dramatically more vulnerable. conventional ballistic missile force. And
Even more dangerous, U.S. forces once again, it would be virtually impos-
hunting Chinese attack submarines could sible to do so while leaving China’s nuclear
inadvertently sink a Chinese boomer ballistic missile force unscathed. Chinese
instead. After all, at least some Chinese conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles
attack submarines might be escorting are often attached to the same base
ballistic missile submarines, especially in headquarters, meaning that they likely
wartime, when China might flush its share transportation and supply networks,
boomers from their ports and try to send patrol routes, and other supporting
them within range of the continental infrastructure. It is also possible that
United States. Since correctly identify- they share some command-and-control
ing targets remains one of the trickiest networks, or that the United States
challenges of undersea warfare, a U.S. would be unable to distinguish between
submarine crew might come within the conventional and nuclear networks
shooting range of a Chinese submarine even if they were physically separate.
without being sure of its type, especially To add to the challenge, some of
in a crowded, noisy environment like the China’s ballistic missiles can carry either
Taiwan Strait. Platitudes about caution a conventional or a nuclear warhead, and
are easy in peacetime. In wartime, when the two versions are virtually indistin-
Chinese attack submarines might already guishable to U.S. aerial surveillance. In a
have launched deadly strikes, the U.S. war, targeting the conventional variants
crew might decide to shoot first and ask would likely mean destroying some nuclear
questions later. ones in the process. Furthermore, sending
Adding to China’s sense of vulner- manned aircraft to attack Chinese missile
ability, the small size of its nuclear- launch sites and bases would require at
armed submarine force means that just least partial control of the airspace over

China, which in turn would require other parts of China’s nuclear deterrent.
weakening Chinese air defenses. But It does not help that China’s real-time
degrading China’s coastal air defense awareness of the state of its forces would
network in order to fight a conventional probably be limited, since blinding the
war would also leave much of its nuclear adversary is a standard part of the U.S.
force without protection. military playbook.
Once China was under attack, its Put simply, the favored U.S. strategy
leaders might come to fear that even to ensure a conventional victory would
intercontinental ballistic missiles located likely endanger much of China’s nuclear
deep in the country’s interior were arsenal in the process, at sea and on
vulnerable. For years, observers have land. Whether the United States actu-
pointed to the U.S. military’s failed ally intended to target all of China’s
attempts to locate and destroy Iraqi nuclear weapons would be incidental.
Scud missiles during the 1990–91 Gulf All that would matter is that Chinese
War as evidence that mobile missiles are leaders would consider them threatened.
virtually impervious to attack. There-
fore, the thinking goes, China could LESSONS FROM THE PAST
retain a nuclear deterrent no matter At that point, the question becomes,
what harm U.S. forces inflicted on its How will China react? Will it practice
coastal areas. Yet recent research sug- restraint and uphold the “no first use”
gests otherwise. Chinese interconti- pledge once its nuclear forces appear
nental ballistic missiles are larger and to be under attack? Or will it use those
less mobile than the Iraqi Scuds were, weapons while it still can, gambling that
and they are harder to move without limited escalation will either halt the
detection. The United States is also likely U.S. campaign or intimidate Washing-
to have been tracking them much more ton into backing down?
closely in peacetime. As a result, China Chinese writings and statements
is unlikely to view a failed Scud hunt in remain deliberately ambiguous on this
Iraq nearly 30 years ago as reassurance point. It is unclear which exact set of
that its residual nuclear force is safe today, capabilities China considers part of its
especially during an ongoing, high- core nuclear deterrent and which it
intensity conventional war. considers less crucial. For example, if
China’s vehement criticism of a China already recognizes that its sea-
U.S. regional missile defense system based nuclear deterrent is relatively
designed to guard against a potential small and weak, then losing some of its
North Korean attack already reflects ballistic missile submarines in a war
these latent fears. Beijing’s worry is might not prompt any radical disconti-
that this system could help Washington nuity in its calculus.
block the handful of missiles China The danger lies in wartime develop-
might launch in the aftermath of a U.S. ments that could shift China’s assumptions
attack on its arsenal. That sort of cam- about U.S. intentions. If Beijing interprets
paign might seem much more plausible the erosion of its sea- and land-based
in Beijing’s eyes if a conventional war nuclear forces as a deliberate effort to
had already begun to seriously undermine destroy its nuclear deterrent, or perhaps
even as a prelude to a nuclear attack, it step in itself, as it increased the risk of

might see limited nuclear escalation as an unauthorized or accidental launch.
a way to force an end to the conflict. Only after numerous preparations for
For example, China could use nuclear Soviet nuclear attacks that never came
weapons to instantaneously destroy the did Beijing finally agree to negotiations.
U.S. air bases that posed the biggest China is a different country today
threat to its arsenal. It could also launch than it was in the time of Mao Zedong,
a nuclear strike with no direct military but the 1969 conflict offers important
purpose—on an unpopulated area or at lessons. China started a war in which
sea—as a way to signal that the United it believed nuclear weapons would be
States had crossed a redline. irrelevant, even though the Soviet arsenal
If such escalation appears far-fetched, was several orders of magnitude larger
China’s history suggests otherwise. In than China’s, just as the U.S. arsenal
1969, similar dynamics brought China to dwarfs China’s today. Once the conven-
the brink of nuclear war with the Soviet tional war did not go as planned, the
Union. In early March of that year, Chinese reversed their assessment of the
Chinese troops ambushed Soviet guards possibility of a nuclear attack to a degree
amid rising tensions over a disputed bordering on paranoia. Most worrying,
border area. Less than two weeks later, China signaled that it was actually
the two countries were fighting an unde- considering using its nuclear weapons,
clared border war with heavy artillery even though it had to expect devastating
and aircraft. The conflict quickly esca- retaliation. Ambiguous wartime infor-
lated beyond what Chinese leaders had mation and worst-case thinking led it to
expected, and before the end of March, take nuclear risks it would have consid-
Moscow was making thinly veiled nuclear ered unthinkable only months earlier.
threats to pressure China to back down. This pattern could unfold again today.
Chinese leaders initially dismissed
these warnings, only to radically upgrade KEEP THEM GUESSING
their threat assessment once they learned Both the United States and China can
that the Soviets had privately discussed take some basic measures to reduce these
nuclear attack plans with other countries. dangers. More extensive dialogue and
Moscow never intended to follow through exchange—formal and informal, high
on its nuclear threat, archives would level and working level, military and
later reveal, but Chinese leaders believed political—could help build relationships
otherwise. On three separate occasions, that might allow for backchannel de-
they were convinced that a Soviet nuclear escalation during a conflict. The two
attack was imminent. Once, when Moscow countries already have a formal military
sent representatives to talks in Beijing, hot line in place, although it does not
China suspected that the plane transport- connect political leaders. A dedicated
ing the delegation was in fact carrying and tested infrastructure for senior
nuclear weapons. Increasingly fearful, military and political leaders to reliably
China test-fired a thermonuclear weapon and easily communicate during wartime
in the Lop Nur desert and put its rudimen- would provide at least one off-ramp in
tary nuclear forces on alert—a dangerous the event of a crisis.

But better communication can only warheads on the same missiles and to
do so much for a problem that ultimately attach both conventional and nuclear
stems from military doctrine and grand launch brigades to the same bases. It
strategy. Given that the United States’ likely sees some strategic advantage in
standard wartime playbook is likely to these linkages. Precisely because these
back China into a nuclear corner, it would entanglements raise the prospect of
be logical for Washington to consider nuclear escalation, Beijing may believe
alternative strategies that would leave that they contribute to deterrence—
China’s nuclear capabilities untouched. that they will make the United States
For example, some analysts have pro- less likely to go to war in the first place.
posed coercing China through a distant But just as China benefits if the
naval blockade, and others have suggested United States believes there is no safe
confining any U.S. campaign to air and way to fight a war, the United States
naval operations off China’s coast. The benefits if China believes that war would
goal in both cases would be to avoid attacks result not only in China’s conventional
on the Chinese mainland, where the bulk defeat but also in its nuclear disarma-
of Chinese nuclear forces reside. ment. In fact, the United States might
The problem with these alternatives believe that this fear could give it greater
is that the mainland is also where the leverage during a conflict and perhaps
bulk of Chinese conventional capabilities deter China from starting one at all.
are located. The United States is unlikely In short, neither side may see much
to voluntarily leave these capabilities value in peacetime reassurance. Quite
intact, given its predilection for reducing the opposite: they may be courting
its own casualties and rapidly destroy- instability. If this is the case, however,
ing enemy forces. If China is using its then U.S. and Chinese leaders should
mainland bases to lob ballistic missiles recognize the tradeoffs inherent in their
at U.S. troops and allies, it is hard to chosen policies. The threat of escalation
imagine a U.S. president ordering the may make war less likely, but it also
military to hold back in the interest of makes war radically more dangerous if
de-escalation. U.S. allies are particularly it does break out. This sobering reality
unlikely to accept a cautious approach, should encourage leaders on both sides to
as they will be more exposed to Chinese find ways of resolving political, economic,
military power the longer it is left intact. and military disputes without resorting to
No one wants a U.S.-Chinese war to go a war that could rapidly turn catastrophic
nuclear, but a U.S. campaign that avoids for the region and the world.∂
escalation while letting China’s conven-
tional forces turn Taiwan—not to mention
Japan or South Korea—into a smoking
ruin would not seem like much of a
victory either.
Of course, Beijing could also take
steps to ameliorate the problem, but
this is just as unlikely. China has chosen
to mount both conventional and nuclear
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own nuclear arsenal. Above all, Washing-

Moscow’s ton should develop more low-yield nuclear
weapons for use on the battlefield or risk

Nuclear Enigma being outgunned in a future war.
But those who fret about the Russian
arsenal misread the Kremlin’s intentions
What Is Russia’s Arsenal and put forward the wrong solutions. The
Really For? real danger is not a new and more aggres-
sive Russian nuclear strategy; it is the
Olga Oliker Kremlin’s failure to communicate its goals
effectively to leaders in Washington and
T
alk to anybody in Washington elsewhere. Russia’s actual strategy has not
(except, perhaps, the U.S. diverged much from plain old-fashioned
president), and you will hear an deterrence: Russia believes that any major
ominous mantra: the Russians are back. war with the United States could result
Moscow, resurgent, is sowing discord in a massive U.S. nuclear attack, and so
among Western states and trying to it maintains a nuclear arsenal of its own
reestablish its sphere of influence in in order to discourage such an attack. But
former Soviet countries and beyond. its policy of deliberate ambiguity is feeding
One development, in particular, has caused into apprehension in Washington, driving
much hyperventilating in Western minis- a dangerous cycle of escalation that is
tries and think tanks: the Russian Federa- bound to worsen suspicions and heighten
tion not only has more nuclear weapons the risk that clashes will escalate.
than any other country in the world but
also is investing in an arsenal of modern, MOVING UP THE LADDER
low-yield nuclear weapons that could The Soviet Union became a nuclear power
be used for limited nuclear warfare. in 1949, just four years after the United
These investments have many analysts States did, kicking off a dizzying arms
worried that Russia would be the first race. For decades, each country feared
to pull the nuclear trigger in a future that the other might develop a nuclear
war, and that it would do so early on, advantage, be it technological or numeri-
hoping to quickly bomb its adversary cal, that would enable it to deliver a single,
into submission and end the conflict—a lethal blow and wipe out its opponent.
strategy dubbed “escalate to de-escalate.” As a result, simply possessing nuclear
If military confrontation of any kind might weapons was not enough; each side sought
push Moscow to go nuclear, preparing parity with or—better yet—dominance
for war with Russia means preparing over the other. As part of these efforts,
for a potential nuclear war. The United the two sides built both strategic weap-
States, the thinking goes, can only defend ons, many hundreds of times as powerful
itself and its allies by modernizing its as the bombs dropped on Japan in World
War II, and lower-yield, shorter-range
tactical nuclear weapons. Strategists argued
OLGA OLIKER is Senior Adviser and Director
of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center that these tactical weapons could be used
for Strategic and International Studies. to wage a limited and controlled nuclear
Moscow’s Nuclear Enigma
Bringing out the big guns: at a military parade in Moscow, September 2017
war, invoking an “escalation ladder,” The collapse of the Soviet Union in
with many rungs on the climb up toward 1991 brought new challenges to the nuclear
all-out annihilation. relationship. On the one hand, with the
But as arsenals grew large enough to Cold War over, both sides strengthened
wipe out humankind several times over, their commitment to arms reduction
cooler heads began to prevail. Starting in and drastically cut their arsenals. Even
1972, a series of arms control agreements today, as Russia and the United States
between Moscow and Washington enabled are modernizing their nuclear programs
each side to reduce the size of its arsenal and developing new capabilities, both
and eliminate weapons systems that the countries are complying with the 2010
other found provocative. In a 1982 speech New START treaty, which bars them from
at the United Nations, Soviet Premier deploying more than 1,550 strategic
Leonid Brezhnev even announced that the warheads each.
Soviet Union would never be the first to On the other hand, post-Soviet
use nuclear weapons in a war. At the time, Russia’s nuclear strategy seemed more
much of the U.S. national security estab- trigger-happy than before. In 1993, it
lishment dismissed this announcement dropped Brezhnev’s “no first use” pledge,
as disingenuous propaganda. Yet many citing the weakness of its conventional
Russian analysts, including those in senior military as a reason to use its nuclear
roles at the time, argue that in the final arsenal as a fallback against a broader
POOL / REUTERS
stretch of the Cold War, the Soviet range of threats. A 1999 article by a group
playbook was, indeed, to go nuclear only of Russian military analysts outlined
after receiving warning of an incoming how this might work: it argued that
nuclear attack by the United States. Russia should consider using nuclear

Olga Oliker The CSS Point
weapons in future regional conflicts to country’s long-range ballistic missiles

signal its resolve and thus convince its clearly exist first and foremost to deter
adversaries to back down—that it should, a U.S. nuclear attack, just as they did in
in today’s nuclear lingo, “escalate to Soviet times. In the event of a war, Russia
de-escalate.” The following year, Russia expects that the United States will unleash
updated its military doctrine to permit massive barrages of airpower to take out
nuclear escalation against conventional Russian defenses. Because the United
enemy forces “in situations deemed States’ nuclear strategy emphasizes the
critical to the national security of the importance of quickly disabling enemy
Russian Federation.” capabilities, Russian strategists also believe
that the United States would seek to
MOSCOW MISREAD eliminate Russia’s nuclear arsenal at the
For many Western analysts, this escala- outset, using its own conventional or
tory strategy is still—or perhaps once nuclear strategic weapons to do so. Just
again—the essence of Russian nuclear as the Soviet Union planned to do before
strategy. The Pentagon’s 2018 Nuclear it, Russia is therefore likely to launch its
Posture Review makes this assumption most vulnerable nuclear weapons sys-
explicit, arguing that the United States tems as soon as it receives warning of an
must prepare for “limited nuclear first incoming U.S. attack, lest its ability to
use” by Moscow in any potential retaliate be destroyed. This posture may
confrontation. sound disconcerting, but it puts the
The Pentagon’s assessment, however, bar for escalation relatively high, in line
ignores Russia’s actual strategy. In 2010, with Russian military doctrine.
Russia contradicted the expectations Why, then, have so many U.S. and
of many experts and of some of its own Western analysts come to a much darker
officials when, instead of lowering the conclusion about Russia’s nuclear inten-
bar for nuclear use, it raised it. That tions? Much of the answer lies in the way
year, it released a new military doctrine Russia has developed its nuclear arsenal
that made clear that Russia would use in recent years. Arms control treaties
nuclear weapons under just two circum- have capped the number of deployed
stances: either in response to an attack strategic warheads, but they place no
with weapons of mass destruction, nuclear limits on shorter-range, lower-yield
or otherwise, or in the face of a conven- capabilities. By a conservative estimate,
tional offensive threatening the “very Russia now has 2,000 of these tactical
existence of the state.” Russia’s most recent nuclear weapons stockpiled, whereas the
doctrine, issued in 2014, reaffirmed this United States has only a few hundred.
language. It also emphasized the need Moreover, Russia has been moderniz-
to develop “nonnuclear” deterrence—a ing its tactical inventory, developing
capacity to prevent attacks without weapons systems such as the Iskander
having to threaten nuclear war. missile launcher and the Kalibr cruise
Taken at face value, this posture is a missile, both of which can be armed
far cry from the aggressive mindset that with nuclear warheads, although they
many Washington policymakers consider are currently being used as conven-
to be the core of Russia’s playbook. The tional systems.
The development of these weapons not necessarily clash with the more
systems may seem at odds with Russia’s restrained approach to deterrence out-
stated strategy. In the 1950s and 1960s, lined in other Russian documents.
tactical nuclear weapons were conceived Moreover, if “escalate to de-escalate”
for active warfare; their purpose was not were Russia’s new guiding strategy, it
so much to deter conflict as to help would be odd for this shift away from the
defeat or intimidate an adversary when 2014 position to be tucked away inside a
the shooting had already begun. Many tangled passage of its naval doctrine. If
analysts believe that the same holds true Moscow sought to strengthen its deter-
today, arguing that there is no good reason rence capabilities by lowering the bar for
for a country to maintain, let alone mod- nuclear use, one would expect it to broad-
ernize, a large arsenal of nonstrategic cast this change loud and clear. It might,
nuclear weapons unless it plans on using for instance, make a public announcement
them on the battlefield. These analysts that from now on, Russia would use
also point out that Russian military nuclear weapons whenever it deemed it
exercises often incorporate Iskander and necessary. By contrast, a muted announce-
Kalibr weapons systems, thus suggesting ment would risk making an adversary
that Russia will escalate a conflict by more sanguine about the probable costs
launching low-yield nuclear weapons of war, encouraging, rather than deter-
against its enemy. But the assumption ring, an attack.
that Russian weapons systems are built Western analysts accusing Russia of
for this purpose does not hold up. Because nuclear brinkmanship misread its public
these new weapons systems can deliver statements. Granted, lower-level Russian
both conventional and nuclear warheads, officials and pundits have made rather
one could just as easily argue that the liberal use of hyperbole in their nuclear
exercises involving them are merely threats against NATO members and other
rehearsals for a conventional war. countries. It is also true that new nuclear-
Some analysts argue that recent capable weapons systems are a point
changes to Moscow’s military doctrine of pride for the country. In a speech
signal a shift toward the “escalate to to parliament in March, for example,
de-escalate” strategy. Specifically, they Russian President Vladimir Putin
point to Russia’s 2017 naval doctrine, emphasized the country’s nuclear mod-
where one convoluted sentence notes ernization efforts and its new, exotic
that being ready and willing to use weapons. But in the same speech, Putin
nonstrategic nuclear weapons in an explained that Russia’s newest strategic
escalating conflict can successfully deter weapons could overcome U.S. missile
an enemy. At first glance, this looks like defenses, a capacity that would be
an explicit threat to cross the nuclear relevant only if Russia were retaliating,
threshold. Yet analysts may be reading not attacking. Putin later affirmed that
too much into the text. The clear-cut Russia would use nuclear weapons only
reference to escalation is noteworthy, if a U.S. attack were imminent or had
but the naval doctrine does not state already occurred—further confirming
that Russia would be the first to cross that Russia’s arsenal is for deterrence,
that threshold. As such, the line does not escalation.

Olga Oliker The CSS Point
NUCLEAR MIND GAMES States—even a nuclear one—could stay

Even though the evidence suggests that limited and that limited nuclear escala-
Russia does not have a strategy of using tion in such a scenario would play out in
nuclear weapons early on in a conven- Russia’s favor. Yet most Russian strate-
tional conflict, there’s a reason this view gists do not believe that such a conflict
has become predominant among outside would ever be limited in scope: having
observers. The Russian government studied how the Pentagon fights its wars,
has refused to clearly explain the exact they expect that a military clash with
purpose of its tactical nuclear weapons— the United States would almost certainly
a deliberate ambiguity that is probably lead to, if not begin with, a large-scale
intended to increase deterrence but in attack on Russia, including an early strike
fact only heightens the risks of escalation. on its nuclear capabilities. If Russia
Until about a decade ago, Russia’s thought such an attack was imminent or
stocks of nonstrategic nuclear weapons under way, it would certainly consider
and dual-use systems had largely fallen by going nuclear. For Moscow, this is fully
the wayside. It was only after Western in line with its doctrine.
analysts noted the nuclear capabilities of The bottom line is that Russian leaders
Iskander missile launchers that Russian see a possible conflict with the United
rhetoric began emphasizing such capa- States not as a limited skirmish but as
bilities. This suggests that Russia may the prelude to the potential destruction
value the nuclear element of these systems of their country—what Putin has called
because they make its adversaries nervous. “a world without Russia.” To prevent this
There is little reason to have a stated from happening, the Kremlin retains the
policy that precludes going nuclear if capabilities needed to wage an earth-
one in fact plans to use nuclear weapons, destroying retaliatory campaign. Against
but there is a logic to a nuclear strategy this background, Russia may indeed be
that keeps an adversary guessing. Moscow developing tactical nuclear weapons and
may be using its nonstrategic capabilities dual-use systems. Yet these are not part of
to plant seeds of doubt in the minds of a plan to escalate and quickly win a war.
the United States and its allies. If this leads They are meant to send a strong signal
to a more cautious U.S. policy toward to the United States about the dangers
Russia, then Russia has strengthened of starting one in the first place.
its deterrent. Moscow’s nuclear strategy
may owe something to the national secu- KEEP CALM
rity scholar Thomas Schelling’s concept This ambiguity is backfiring. Russia’s
of “the threat that leaves something to emphasis on dual-capable weapons may be
chance”: if you can convince your adver- intended to strengthen deterrence, but it
saries that the worst-case scenario, how- undermines it in practice. Rather than
ever unlikely, is at all possible, they will deterring the United States, this
think twice about attacking you. ambiguity has led U.S. policymakers to
But a strategy of ambiguity is not one interpret Russian posturing and rhetoric
of “escalate to de-escalate.” After all, the as a lowered bar for the use of nuclear
premise of the latter is that the Kremlin weapons in any kind of conflict. And since
thinks a confrontation with the United Pentagon officials view any ability by
Russia to change their decision-making Russia might launch a nuclear weapon

calculus as a threat in and of itself, their if it believed itself to be under attack,
response has not been to back off and whether with conventional or nuclear
reduce tensions; it has been to consider weapons. It would, however, help deter
developing more low-yield nuclear any aggressive Russian action in eastern
weapons of their own, as discussed in the Europe or elsewhere, thus addressing one
Pentagon’s most recent Nuclear Posture of the biggest fears among NATO member
Review. If Russia wants to reduce the risk states. And it would shift Russian incen-
of nuclear war, it needs to make its doc- tives and encourage Moscow to focus
trine clearer and ensure that the weapons on strengthening its own conventional
it deploys match that doctrine. capabilities, creating more nonnuclear
The United States, meanwhile, should rungs on the escalation ladder.
be careful not to overreact in the face of The more the United States high-
Russian posturing. The prevailing view lights nuclear weapons in its posture,
in the Trump administration is that if planning, and rhetoric, on the other hand,
Russia is developing tactical nuclear the more Russia will come to rely on them
weapons, the United States must show as crucial defensive and coercive tools.
that it is willing to do the same. But the Blurring the lines between conventional
underlying logic that smaller nuclear and nuclear warfare may serve the pur-
weapons mean that a nuclear war could pose of deterrence if all parties involved
be controlled is deeply flawed and danger- understand one another’s reasoning and
ous. As long as one or both sides in such signals, or interpret them as threatening
a conflict feel that their survival is at the very worst, but both Moscow and
stake—which Russia would certainly Washington fall short on the first, and on
assume—a U.S. playbook that relies the second, Moscow’s posture is proving
more and more on nuclear weapons, counterproductive. Unless policymakers
no matter how low yield, would have on both sides come to understand this,
disastrous consequences. they are following a path that could lead
If the United States truly wants to to unthinkable consequences.∂
avoid the worst, it should work to ensure
that any future clashes with Russia stay
out of the nuclear realm altogether. To
do this, it must emphasize, through its
force posture, planning, and stated policy,
those capabilities that have long made
Russia jittery: American advanced conven-
tional systems. This is because, contrary
to hawkish narratives in Washington,
Russia fears the consequences of crossing
the nuclear threshold and is therefore
unlikely to take that step in any but the
most extreme of circumstances. Greater
U.S. emphasis on conventional weapons
would not eliminate the possibility that

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ESSAYS
With Iran and other

countries, President Trump
has made it clear that he
will not tolerate attempts to
bully the United States.
—Michael Pompeo
Confronting Iran Venezuela’s Suicide

Michael R. Pompeo 60 Moisés Naím and Francisco Toro 126
The Committee to Save the The Use and Misuse of

World Order Economic Statecraft
Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay 72 Jacob J. Lew and Richard Nephew 139
The Crisis Next Time Generation Stress

Carmen Reinhart and Vincent Reinhart 84 Sylvia Mathews Burwell 150
How to Save Globalization Old Money, New Order

EDGAR SU / REUTERS
Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew J. Darren Walker 158

Slaughter 98
Health Without Wealth
The Next Arab Uprising Thomas Bollyky 168
Marwan Muasher 113
Confronting Iran
The Trump Administration’s Strategy
Michael R. Pompeo
T
he end of the Cold War forced new thinking among policy-
makers and analysts about the greatest challenges to U.S.
national security. The emergence of al Qaeda, cybercriminals,
and other dangerous entities affirmed the threat of nonstate actors.
But equally daunting has been the resurgence of outlaw regimes—
rogue states that defy international norms, fail to respect human
rights and fundamental freedoms, and act against the security of the
American people, U.S. allies and partners, and the rest of the world.
Chief among these outlaw regimes are North Korea and Iran.
Their transgressions against international peace are many, but both
nations are most notorious for having spent decades pursuing nuclear
weapons programs in violation of international prohibitions. Despite
Washington’s best efforts at diplomacy, Pyongyang hoodwinked U.S.
policymakers with a string of broken arms control agreements going
back to the George H. W. Bush administration. North Korea’s nuclear
weapons and ballistic missile programs continued apace, to the point
where after Donald Trump was elected, President Barack Obama
told him that this would be his greatest national security challenge.
With Iran, likewise, the deal that the Obama administration struck
in 2015—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA—failed
to end the country’s nuclear ambitions. In fact, because Iran knew
that the Obama administration would prioritize preserving the deal
over everything else, the JCPOA created a sense of impunity on the part
of the regime, allowing it to increase its support for malign activity.
The deal has also given Tehran piles of money, which the supreme
leader has used to sponsor all types of terrorism throughout the Middle
East (with few consequences in response) and which have boosted
MICHAEL R. POMPEO is U.S. Secretary of State.
Confronting Iran
the economic fortunes of a regime that remains bent on exporting its

revolution abroad and imposing it at home.
That the threats from North Korea and Iran grew in the post–Iraq
war era has further complicated the question of how best to counteract
them; Americans are rightly skeptical of the costs of a protracted mili-
tary commitment in the name of protection from weapons of mass
destruction. With the difficulties of Iraq fresh in mind, and with pre-
vious agreements to restrain the threats from North Korea and Iran
having proved impotent, stopping these recalcitrant regimes from
doing harm demands new diplomatic paradigms.
Enter President Trump. For all of the Washington establishment’s
fretting over his style of international engagement, his diplomacy is
anchored in a deliberate approach that gives the United States an
advantage in confronting outlaw regimes.
THE TRUMP DOCTRINE

Both on the campaign trail and in office, President Trump has been
clear about the need for bold American leadership to put the United
States’ security interests first. This commonsense principle reverses
the Obama administration’s preferred posture of “leading from behind,”
an accommodationist strategy that incorrectly signaled diminished
American power and influence. Leading from behind made North
Korea a greater threat today than ever before. Leading from behind
at best only delayed Iran’s pursuit of becoming a nuclear power, while
allowing the Islamic Republic’s malign influence and terror threat
to grow.
Today, both North Korea and Iran have been put on notice that
the United States will not allow their destabilizing activities to go
unchecked. The aggressive multinational pressure campaign that the
United States has led against North Korea, combined with the presi-
dent’s clear and unequivocal statements that the United States will
defend its vital interests with force if necessary, created the condi-
tions for the talks that culminated in President Trump’s summit with
Chairman Kim Jong Un in Singapore this past June. It was there that
Chairman Kim committed to the final, fully verified denuclearization
of North Korea. North Korea has made similar commitments in the
past, but unlike those, this was the first time there was a personal,
leader-to-leader commitment on denuclearization. That may or may
not signal a major strategic shift on the part of Chairman Kim, and

Michael R. Pompeo The CSS Point
we have much work to do to gauge his intentions and make sure his
commitment is implemented. But President Trump’s approach has
created an opportunity to peacefully resolve an issue of vital national
security that has long vexed policymakers. The president, our special
representative for North Korea (Stephen Biegun), and I will continue
to work with clear eyes to seize this opportunity.
With Iran, similarly, the Trump administration is pursuing a “max-
imum pressure” campaign designed to choke off revenues that the
regime—and particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),
part of Iran’s military that is directly beholden to the supreme leader—
uses to fund violence through Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the
Palestinian territories, the Assad regime in Syria, the Houthi rebels
in Yemen, Shiite militias in Iraq, and its own agents covertly plotting
around the world.
Yet President Trump does not want another long-term U.S. military
engagement in the Middle East—or in any other region, for that
matter. He has spoken openly about
North Korea and Iran have the dreadful consequences of the 2003
invasion of Iraq and the 2011 interven-
been put on notice that tion in Libya. Pundits may gin up fear
the United States will not over the idea that this administration
allow their destabilizing will get the United States into a war,
but it is clear that Americans have a
activities to go unchecked. president who, while not afraid to use
military power (just ask the Islamic
State, the Taliban, or the Assad regime), is not eager to use it, either.
Overwhelming military force will always be a backstop for protecting
the American people, but it should not be the first option.
Another important aspect of the president’s diplomacy is his willing-
ness to talk to the United States’ staunchest adversaries. As he said in
July, “Diplomacy and engagement is preferable to conflict and hostility.”
Consider his approach to North Korea: his diplomacy with Chairman
Kim diffused tensions that were escalating by the day.
Complementing the president’s willingness to engage is his instinctual
aversion to bad deals. His understanding of the importance of leverage
in any negotiation eliminates the potential for deeply counterproductive
agreements like the JCPOA. He is willing to forge agreements with
U.S. rivals, but he is also comfortable walking away from negotiations
if they don’t end up furthering U.S. interests. This is in stark con-
Confronting Iran
trast to the Obama administration’s approach to the JCPOA, in which

the deal itself became an objective to be obtained at all costs.
When considering a future North Korea deal that is superior to
the JCPOA, we have described our objective as “the final, fully verified
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, as agreed to by Chairman
Kim Jong Un.” “Final” means that there will be no possibility that
North Korea will ever restart its weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missile programs—something the JCPOA did not provide for
with Iran. “Fully verified” means that there will be stronger verifica-
tion standards than were required under the JCPOA, which, among
other weaknesses, did not require inspections at key Iranian military
facilities. The exact contours of a North Korea agreement remain to
be negotiated, but “final” and “fully verified” are centerpieces on which
we will not compromise.
THE IRANIAN THREAT

President Trump’s commitment to the American people’s security,
combined with his aversion to the unnecessary use of military force
and his willingness to talk to adversaries, has provided a new frame-
work for confronting outlaw regimes. And today, no regime has more
of an outlaw character than that of Iran. That has been the case since
1979, when a relatively small cadre of Islamic revolutionaries seized
power. The regime’s revolutionary mindset has motivated its actions
ever since—in fact, soon after its founding, the IRGC created the
Quds Force, its elite special forces unit, and tasked it with exporting
the revolution abroad. Ever since, regime officials have subordinated
all other domestic and international responsibilities, including their
obligations to the Iranian people, to fulfilling the revolution.
As a result, over the past four decades, the regime has sown a great
deal of destruction and instability, bad behavior that did not end with
the JCPOA. The deal did not permanently prevent Iran’s pursuit of a
nuclear weapon—indeed, the statement in April by Iran’s top nuclear
official that the country could restart its nuclear program in days
suggests that it may not have delayed that program very much at all.
Nor did the deal curtail Iran’s violent and destabilizing activity in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Gaza. Iran still supplies
the Houthis with missiles that are fired at Saudi Arabia, supports
Hamas’ attacks on Israel, and recruits impressionable Afghan, Iraqi, and
Pakistani youth to fight and die in Syria. Thanks to Iranian subsidies,

the average Lebanese Hezbollah fighter earns two or three times per
month what a fireman in Tehran brings home.
In May 2018, President Trump withdrew from the nuclear deal
because it was clearly not protecting the national security interests of
the United States or our allies and partners, nor was it making Iran
behave like a normal country. In July, an Iranian diplomat based in Vienna
was arrested for supplying explosives to terrorists seeking to bomb a
political rally in France. It is telling that while Iran’s leaders try to convince
Europe to stay in the nuclear deal, they are covertly plotting terrorist
attacks in the heart of the continent. Taken together, Iran’s actions have
made the country a pariah, much to the despair of its own people.
THE PRESSURE CAMPAIGN

In place of the Iran nuclear deal, President Trump has initiated a multi-
pronged pressure campaign. Its first component is economic sanctions.
The president recognizes the power of sanctions to squeeze the regime
while incurring a low opportunity cost for the United States. Under the
Trump administration, the United States has imposed 17 rounds of Iran-
related sanctions, targeting 147 Iran-related individuals and entities.
The goal of these aggressive sanctions is to force the Iranian regime
to make a choice: whether to cease or persist in the policies that triggered
the measures in the first place. Iran’s decision to continue its destructive
activity has already had grave economic consequences, which have been
exacerbated by officials’ gross mismanagement in pursuit of their own
self-interests. Extensive meddling in the economy by the IRGC, under
the guise of privatization, makes doing business in Iran a losing propo-
sition, and foreign investors never know whether they are facilitating
commerce or terrorism. Instead of using what wealth the JCPOA has
generated to boost the material well-being of the Iranian people, the
regime has parasitically consumed it and shelled out billions in subsidies
for dictators, terrorists, and rogue militias. Iranians are understandably
frustrated. The rial’s value has collapsed in the past year. A third of Iranian
youth are unemployed. Unpaid wages are leading to rampant strikes.
Fuel and water shortages are common.
This malaise is a problem of the regime’s own making. Iran’s elite
resembles a Mafia in its racketeering and corruption. Two years ago,
Iranians rightfully erupted in anger when leaked pay stubs showed
massive amounts of money inexplicably flowing into the bank accounts
of senior government officials. For years, clerics and officials have
Confronting Iran
wrapped themselves in the cloak of religion while robbing the Iranian

people blind. Today, protesters chant to the regime, “You have plundered
us in the name of religion.” According to the London-based newspaper
Kayhan, Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani, the head of Iran’s judiciary, who the
United States sanctioned this year for human rights abuses, is worth at
least $300 million, thanks to the embezzlement of public funds. Nasser
Makarem Shirazi, a grand ayatollah, is also worth many millions of
dollars. He became known as “the Sultan of Sugar” for having pressured
the Iranian government to lower subsidies to domestic sugar producers
while flooding the market with his own, more expensive imported
sugar. This type of activity puts ordinary Iranians out of work. Ayatollah
Mohammad Emami Kashani, one of the leaders of Friday prayers
in Tehran for the last 30 years, had the government transfer several
lucrative mines to his personal foundation. He, too, is now worth mil-
lions. The corruption goes all the way to the top. Iran’s supreme leader,
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has his own personal, off-the-books hedge
fund called the Setad, which is worth $95 billion. That untaxed and ill-
gotten wealth, often earned by expropriating the assets of political
and religious minorities, is used as a slush fund for the IRGC. In other
words, Iran’s leading holy man captains the kind of plundering charac-
teristic of Third World strongmen.
The regime’s greed has created a chasm between the people of Iran
and their leaders, making it difficult for officials to credibly persuade
young Iranians to be the vanguard of the next generation of the revolu-
tion. The theocratic ayatollahs can preach “Death to Israel” and “Death
to America” day and night, but they cannot mask their rank hypocrisy.
Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister, has degrees from San
Francisco State University and the University of Denver, and Ali Akbar
Velayati, the supreme leader’s top adviser, studied at Johns Hopkins
University. Khamenei himself is chauffeured around in a BMW, even as he
calls for the Iranian people to buy goods made in Iran. This phenomenon
is similar to what occurred in the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s,
when the spirit of 1917 began to ring hollow on account of the hypocrisy
of its champions. The Politburo could no longer with a straight face tell
Soviet citizens to embrace communism when Soviet officials were them-
selves secretly peddling smuggled blue jeans and Beatles records.
Iran’s leaders—especially those at the top of the IRGC, such as Qasem
Soleimani, the head of the Quds Force—must be made to feel the painful
consequences of their violence and corruption. Given that the regime

is controlled by a desire for self-enrichment and a revolutionary ideology

from which it will not easily depart, sanctions must be severe if they are
to change entrenched habits. That’s why the Trump administration is
reimposing U.S. sanctions that were lifted or waived as part of the
nuclear deal; the first of these went back into effect on August 7, with
the remainder coming back on November 5. We intend to get global
imports of Iranian crude oil as close to
zero as possible by November 4. As part
The United States will of our campaign to crush the Iranian
continue its pressure regime’s terrorist financing, we have also
campaign until Iran worked with the United Arab Emirates
demonstrates tangible and to disrupt a currency exchange network
that was transferring millions of dollars
sustained shifts in its policies. to the Quds Force. The United States is
asking every nation that is sick and tired
of the Islamic Republic’s destructive behavior to stand up for the Iranian
people and join our pressure campaign. Our efforts will be ably led
by our new special representative for Iran, Brian Hook.
Economic pressure is one part of the U.S. campaign. Deterrence is
another. President Trump believes in clear measures to discourage Iran
from restarting its nuclear program or continuing its other malign
activities. With Iran and other countries, he has made it clear that he
will not tolerate attempts to bully the United States; he will punch back
hard if U.S. security is threatened. Chairman Kim has felt this pres-
sure, and he would never have come to the table in Singapore without
it. The president’s own public communications themselves function
as a deterrence mechanism. The all-caps tweet he directed at Iranian
President Hassan Rouhani in July, in which he instructed Iran to stop
threatening the United States, was informed by a strategic calculation:
the Iranian regime understands and fears the United States’ military
might. In September, militias in Iraq launched life-threatening rocket
attacks against the U.S. embassy compound in Baghdad and the U.S.
consulate in Basra. Iran did not stop these attacks, which were carried out
by proxies it has supported with funding, training, and weapons. The
United States will hold the regime in Tehran accountable for any attack
that results in injury to our personnel or damage to our facilities. America
will respond swiftly and decisively in defense of American lives.
We do not seek war. But we must make painfully clear that escalation
is a losing proposition for Iran; the Islamic Republic cannot match
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• Master of Arts in German and European Studies
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the United States’ military prowess, and we are not afraid to let Iran’s
leaders know it.
IRAN EXPOSED
Another critical component of the U.S. pressure campaign against Iran
is a commitment to exposing the regime’s brutality. Outlaw authori-
tarian regimes fear nothing more than having the lid blown off their true
workings. The Trump administration will continue to reveal the regime’s
illicit revenue streams, malign activities, crooked self-dealing, and
savage oppression. The Iranian people themselves deserve to know the
grotesque level of self-interest that fuels the regime’s actions. Khamenei
and his ilk would not be able to tolerate the domestic and international
outrage that would ensue if everything they were up to came to light.
Beginning last year, protesters have taken to the street saying, “Leave
Syria, think about us!” and “The people are paupers while the mullahs
live like gods!” The United States stands with the Iranian people.
U.S. President Ronald Reagan understood the power of exposure
when he cast the Soviet Union as “an evil empire.” By throwing a spot-
light on the regime’s abuses, he was pledging solidarity with a people
who had long suffered under communism. It is likewise for the sake of
the Iranian people that the Trump administration has not been afraid to
expose the regime’s merciless domestic repression. The regime is so wed-
ded to certain ideological principles—including the export of the Islamic
Revolution through proxy warfare and the subversion of fellow Muslim-
majority countries, implacable opposition to Israel and the United States,
and stringent social controls that restrict the rights of women—that it
cannot endure any competing ideas. Hence, it has for decades denied
its own people human rights, dignity, and fundamental freedoms. That
is why in May, for example, Iranian police arrested Maedeh Hojabri, a
teenage gymnast, for posting an Instagram video of herself dancing.
The regime’s views on women are particularly retrograde. Since
the revolution, women have been required to wear the hijab, and as
enforcement, government morality police beat women in the streets
and arrest those who refuse to comply. Recent protests against this
policy on female dress show that it has failed, and Khamenei surely
must know it. Yet in July, an activist was sentenced to 20 years in
prison for removing her hijab.
The regime also regularly arrests religious or ethnic minorities,
including Bahais, Christians, and Gonabadi dervishes, when they
Confronting Iran
speak out in support of their rights. Untold numbers of Iranians are

tortured and die in Evin Prison—a place no kinder than the base-
ment of the Lubyanka, the dreaded headquarters of the KGB. Those
imprisoned include several innocent Americans detained on spurious
charges, victims of the regime’s use of hostage taking as a tool of
foreign policy.
Beginning last December, demonstrators took to the streets of
Tehran, Karaj, Isfahan, Arak, and many other cities to peacefully call
for a better life. In response, the regime welcomed in the new year
in January by arbitrarily arresting up to 5,000 of them. Hundreds
reportedly remain behind bars, and more than a dozen are dead at
the hands of their own government. The leaders cynically call these
deaths suicide.
It is in keeping with the character of the United States that we expose
these abuses. As President Reagan said in a speech at Moscow State
University in 1988, “Freedom is the recognition that no single person,
no single authority or government, has a monopoly on the truth, but
that every individual life is infinitely precious, that every one of us put
on this world has been put there for a reason and has something to offer.”
In May, the Trump administration enumerated 12 areas in which Iran
must make progress if there is to be any change in our relationship,
including fully halting its uranium enrichment, providing a full account
of the prior military dimensions of its nuclear program, ending its pro-
liferation of ballistic missiles and provocative missile launches, releasing
imprisoned U.S. citizens, ending its support for terrorism, and more.
President Trump has made clear that the pressure will only increase
if Iran does not live up to the standards the United States and its
partners and allies—and the Iranian people themselves—want to
see. That is why Washington is also demanding that Tehran make
substantial improvements on human rights. As the president has
consistently said, he remains open to talks. But as is the case with
North Korea, the United States will continue its pressure campaign
until Iran demonstrates tangible and sustained shifts in its policies.
If Iran makes those shifts, the possibility of a new comprehensive
agreement will greatly increase. We think a deal with the regime is
possible. In the absence of one, Iran will face increasing costs for all
its reckless and violent activity around the world.
President Trump prefers not to conduct this campaign alone; he
wants U.S. allies and partners on board. Indeed, other countries already

share a common understanding of the threat Iran poses beyond its

nuclear aspirations. French President Emmanuel Macron has said, “It
is important to remain firm with Iran over its regional activities and
its ballistic program”; British Prime Minister Theresa May has said
that she is “clear-eyed about the threat that Iran poses to the Gulf and
the wider Middle East.” This widespread agreement about the Iranian
threat leaves no room for countries to remain ambivalent about whether
to join the global effort to change Iran’s behavior, an effort that is big
and getting bigger.
THE POWER OF MORAL CLARITY

President Trump inherited a world in some ways as dangerous as
the one faced by the United States on the eve of World War I, the
one right before World War II, or that during the height of the
Cold War. But his disruptive boldness, first on North Korea and
now on Iran, has shown how much progress can be made by marrying
clarity of conviction with an emphasis on nuclear nonproliferation
and strong alliances. President Trump’s actions in confronting out-
law regimes stem from the belief that moral confrontation leads to
diplomatic conciliation.
This was the blueprint for one of the great foreign policy triumphs
of the last century: the American victory in the Cold War. In the
first week of his presidency, President Reagan described Soviet leaders,
saying, “The only morality they recognize is what will further their
cause, meaning they reserve unto themselves the right to commit
any crime, to lie, to cheat.” Foreign policy analysts derided his com-
ments, believing their candor would hinder progress toward peace.
But the president had also emphasized a commitment to negotiate
with the Soviets, a fact that went largely ignored. President Reagan’s
combination of moral clarity and diplomatic acuity laid the ground-
work for the 1986 talks in Reykjavik and, later, the downfall of Soviet
communism itself.
Those who still bow to the same totemic conviction that candor
impedes negotiations must recognize the effect that targeted rhetorical
and practical pressure have had—and are having—on outlaw regimes.
At the rate that the Iranian economy is declining and protests are inten-
sifying, it should be clear to the Iranian leadership that negotiations
are the best way forward.∂
NORWICH
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The Committee to Save

the World Order
America’s Allies Must Step Up as America
Steps Down
Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay
T
he order that has structured international politics since the
end of World War II is fracturing. Many of the culprits are
obvious. Revisionist powers, such as China and Russia, want
to reshape global rules to their own advantage. Emerging powers,
such as Brazil and India, embrace the perks of great-power status but
shun the responsibilities that come with it. Rejectionist powers, such
as Iran and North Korea, defy rules set by others. Meanwhile, inter-
national institutions, such as the UN, struggle to address problems
that multiply faster than they can be resolved.
The newest culprit, however, is a surprise: the United States, the
very country that championed the order’s creation. Seventy years after
U.S. President Harry Truman sketched the blueprint for a rules-based
international order to prevent the dog-eat-dog geopolitical competition
that triggered World War II, U.S. President Donald Trump has upended
it. He has raised doubts about Washington’s security commitments to
its allies, challenged the fundamentals of the global trading regime,
abandoned the promotion of freedom and democracy as defining
features of U.S. foreign policy, and abdicated global leadership.
IVO H. DAALDER is President of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and served as U.S.
Ambassador to NATO from 2009 to 2013.
JAMES M. LINDSAY is Senior Vice President, Director of Studies, and Maurice R.

Greenberg Chair at the Council on Foreign Relations.
This essay is adapted from their forthcoming book, The Empty Throne: America’s Abdica-
tion of Global Leadership (PublicAffairs, 2018). Copyright © 2018 by Ivo H. Daalder and
James M. Lindsay. Reprinted by permission of PublicAffairs.
The Committee to Save the World Order
Grownups of the world, unite: at the G-7 summit in Quebec, June 2018
Trump’s hostility toward the United States’ own geopolitical inven-
tion has shocked many of Washington’s friends and allies. Their early
hopes that he might abandon his campaign rhetoric once in office and
embrace a more traditional foreign policy have been dashed. As Trump
has jettisoned old ways of doing business, allies have worked their way
through the initial stages of grief: denial, anger, bargaining, and depres-
sion. In the typical progression, acceptance should come next.
But the story does not have to end that way. The major allies of the
United States can leverage their collective economic and military
might to save the liberal world order. France, Germany, Italy, the
United Kingdom, and the EU in Europe; Australia, Japan, and South
Korea in Asia; and Canada in North America are the obvious candidates
to supply the leadership that the Trump administration will not.
Together, they represent the largest economic power in the world,
LEAH MILLIS / REUT E RS
and their collective military capabilities are surpassed only by those of

the United States. This “G-9” should have two imperatives: maintain
the rules-based order in the hope that Trump’s successor will reclaim
Washington’s global leadership role and lay the groundwork to make
it politically possible for that to happen. This holding action will require

Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay The CSS Point
every member of the G-9 to take on greater global responsibilities.

They all are capable of doing so; they need only summon the will.
Economic cooperation is a good place to start, and G-9 members
are already creating alternatives to the trade deals Trump is abandoning.
But they will have to go further, increasing military cooperation and
defense spending and using a variety of tools at their disposal to take
over the U.S. role as the defender and promoter of democracy, freedom,
and human rights across the globe. If they seize this opportunity, the
G-9 countries will not just slow the erosion of an order that has served
them and the world well for decades; they will also set the stage for
the return of the kind of American leadership they want and that the
long-term survival of the order demands. Indeed, by acting now, the
G-9 will lay the basis for a more stable and enduring world order—
one that is better suited to the power relations of today and tomorrow
than to those of yesterday, when the United States was the undisputed
global power.
THE WORLD AMERICA MADE

The emergence of a rules-based order was not an inevitability but the
result of deliberate choices. Looking to avoid the mistakes the United
States made after World War I, Truman and his successors built an
order based on collective security, open markets, and democracy. It
was a radical strategy that valued cooperation over competition: countries
willing to follow the lead of the United States would flourish, and as
they did, so, too, would the United States.
“The world America made,” as the historian Robert Kagan has put
it, was never perfect. During the Cold War, the reach of American
influence was small. The United States at times ignored its own lofty
rhetoric to pursue narrow interests or misguided policies. But for all
its shortcomings, the postwar order was a historic success. Europe and
Japan were rebuilt. The reach of freedom and democracy was extended.
And with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S.-led postwar order
was suddenly open to all.
But that success also created new stresses. The rapid growth in the
movement of goods, money, people, and ideas across borders as more
countries joined the rules-based order produced new problems, such as
climate change and mass migration, that national governments have
struggled to handle. Economic and political power dispersed as countries
such as Brazil, China, and India embraced open markets, complicating
efforts to find common ground on trade, terrorism, and a host of other

issues. Iran and Russia recoiled as the U.S.-led order encroached on
their traditional spheres of interest. And the U.S. invasion of Iraq in
2003 and the global financial crisis of 2007–8 raised doubts about the
quality and direction of U.S. leadership.
Upon leaving office in 2017, U.S. President Barack Obama urged
his successor to embrace the indispensability of U.S. leadership. “It’s
up to us, through action and example,
to sustain the international order that’s
expanded steadily since the end of the
For all its shortcomings,
Cold War, and upon which our own the postwar order was a
wealth and safety depend,” he wrote in historic success.
a note he left in the Oval Office. Trump
took the opposite approach. He had cam-
paigned on a platform that global leadership was the source of the
United States’ problems, not a solution to them. He argued that friends
and allies had played Washington for a sucker, free-riding on its mili-
tary might while using multilateral trade deals to steal American jobs.
At the start of Trump’s tenure, his selection of proponents of main-
stream foreign policy, such as James Mattis as secretary of defense and
Rex Tillerson as secretary of state, for top national security jobs spurred
hopes at home and abroad that he would temper his “America first”
vision. But by withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),
the Paris agreement on climate change, and the Iran nuclear deal; embrac-
ing mercantilist trade policies; and continuing to question the value of
NATO, Trump has shown that he said what he meant and meant what he
said. He is not looking to reinvigorate the rules-based order by leading
friends and allies in a common cause. They are the foes he wants to beat.
Trump’s preference for competition over cooperation reflects his
belief that the United States will fare better than other countries in a
world in which the strong are free to do as they will. But he fails to
understand that doing better than others is not the same as doing well.
In fact, he is forfeiting the many advantages the United States has
derived from the world it created: the support of strong and capable
allies that follow its lead, the ability to shape global rules to its advantage,
and the admiration and trust that come from standing up for freedom,
democracy, and human rights.
Worse, by alienating allies and embracing adversaries, Trump is pro-
viding an opening for China to rewrite the rules of the global order in

its favor. “As the U.S. retreats globally, China shows up,” Jin Yinan, a
top Chinese military official, gloated last year. Beijing has positioned
itself as a defender of the global trading system, the environment, and
international law even as it exploits trade rules, builds more coal-burning
power stations, and expands its control in the South China Sea. This
bid to supplant the United States as the global leader is hardly destined
to succeed. China has few friends and a lengthy list of internal challenges,
including an aging work force, deep regional and economic inequalities,
and a potentially brittle political system. But a world with no leader
and multiple competing powers poses its own dangers, as Europe’s
tragic history has demonstrated. The United States will not be the only
country to pay the price for a return to such a world.
THE NEW GUARD

The consequences of the United States’ abdication of global leadership
have not been overlooked abroad. If anything, Trump’s policies have
highlighted how much other countries have invested in the rules-based
order and what they stand to lose with its collapse. “The fact that our
friend and ally has come to question the very worth of its mantle of
global leadership puts in sharper focus the need for the rest of us to set
our own clear and sovereign course,” said Chrystia Freeland, Canada’s
foreign minister, early in Trump’s presidency.
That recognition has driven repeated efforts by U.S. allies to placate
Trump. They have looked for common ground despite deep substantive
disagreements—not to mention Trump’s ham-handed tactics, petty
insults, and unpopularity among their own citizens. But so far, these
efforts to compromise haven’t worked, and they aren’t likely to for one
simple reason: what U.S. allies want to save, Trump wants to upend.
The United States’ friends and allies—with the G-9 countries in
the lead—need to act more ambitiously. They must focus less on how
to work with Washington and more on how to work without it—and,
if necessary, around it. As German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas told
a Japanese audience in Tokyo last July, “If we pool our strengths . . .
we can become something like ‘rule shapers,’ who design and drive an
international order that the world urgently needs.”
Of the potential areas for G-9 cooperation, trade holds the greatest
promise, as the G-9 pulls significant economic weight and has already
looked for ways to blunt Trump’s protectionist policies. The G-9
countries clearly have the capacity to push their point. Collectively,
they generate one-third of global output, more than double China’s

share and nearly 50 percent more than that of the United States. And
they account for roughly 30 percent of global imports and exports,
more than double both China’s and the United States’ share.
As important as the economic pull of the G-9 countries is the willing-
ness they have already shown to counter Trump’s mercantilist policies.
After Trump withdrew the United States from the TPP shortly after
taking office, Australia, Canada, and Japan led the effort to salvage the
trade deal as a counterweight to China. In early 2018, the 11 remaining
members agreed on a revised pact that preserved most of the deal’s
market-opening provisions; it will create
a free-trade zone of 500 million people
that will account for about 15 percent of
The United States’ friends
global trade. Colombia, Indonesia, South and allies need to act more
Korea, and Thailand are among the na- ambitiously.
tions that have expressed an interest in
joining the so-called TPP-11, broadening its potential clout. The EU is
also a logical partner for the TPP-11 countries. It has already negotiated
separate trade agreements with Canada, Japan, and South Korea and
has begun negotiating one with Australia; the EU-Japanese deal created
a market of 600 million people, the largest open economic area in
the world.
The TPP-11, the EU-Japanese free-trade agreement, and similar
deals will intensify competition between the G-9 and the United
States. The agreements give G-9 exporters an advantage over their
U.S. counterparts in terms of market access and standards. But even
with the growing need to work around or without the United States,
the G-9 should still explore ways to cooperate with Washington. One
example is the need to reform the World Trade Organization. Trump
has repeatedly criticized the WTO, at times suggesting he might
pull the United States out. That’s likely an empty threat, because
leaving would decidedly disadvantage U.S. firms. But Washington
and the G-9 share legitimate concerns about the global trading
regime, particularly when it comes to China’s predatory practices.
They might, for example, work to limit the sorts of subsidies that give
state-owned enterprises in China and elsewhere a competitive advan-
tage, replace the current system of “self-graduation” with objective
standards for when developing countries must shoulder their full
WTO obligations, and revamp the dispute-settlement process so that

decisions are rendered more quickly and adhere more closely to the
rules member countries have agreed on.
COOPERATION IS KEY
Security cooperation will be more challenging. European allies have
the necessary mechanisms for cooperation through NATO and the EU,
but they don’t spend sufficiently on defense. Asian allies spend more
on defense, but they lack an equivalent to NATO or the EU. Yet if G-9
members can make good on commitments to invest more in their own
security, the potential waiting to be tapped is impressive. The G-9
represents a military power second only to the United States. In 2017,
G-9 countries together spent more than $310 billion on defense, at
least a third more than what China spends and more than four times
what Russia spends. Every G-9 country ranked in the top 15 of the
largest military spenders in the world.
When it comes to defense, much of Trump’s criticism of U.S. allies
is misguided, if not outright wrong. Despite Trump’s griping that
allies don’t pay their fair share, they in fact cover a substantial part of
the cost of the United States’ military presence in their countries:
Germany contributes 20 percent of the cost, South Korea contributes
40 percent, and Japan pays half. What is more, the integrated com-
mand structures of U.S. and NATO forces act as a force multiplier to
deliver a far bigger punch than would be possible if the United States
had to act on its own. It should also not be forgotten that large num-
bers of allied troops have fought and died alongside Americans in
Afghanistan and elsewhere.
But Trump’s complaint about free-riding allies—which several of
his predecessors shared but expressed more diplomatically—has some
merit with regard to both European and Asian allies. No alliance can
survive if its members refuse to carry their own weight, and many
U.S. allies, especially in Europe, depend too heavily on Washington
for their security. They conceded as much in 2014, when every NATO
member pledged to spend at least two percent of GDP on defense
by 2024. Although the United States’ global security responsibilities
require it to spend far more, the two percent target would still represent
a significant increase for many countries and allow Europe to carry its
fair share of the overall defense burden.
If all of NATO’s European members met the two percent target,
their combined annual defense spending would jump from about
“The United States requires the
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security professionals to face a
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Dean of Graduate Studies, Daniel Morgan Graduate School
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$270 billion to $385 billion—an increase nearly twice the size of

Russia’s total defense budget. An increase of that scale would allow for
a major upgrade in military capabilities, especially if new funds were
spent with an eye toward enhancing cooperation and connectivity
among the armed forces. That is precisely the goal of the EU’s Perma-
nent Structured Cooperation, founded earlier this year, which aims
to deepen European defense cooperation. The challenge is to make
sure that the aggregation of this military potential adds up to more
than the sum of its parts by avoiding duplication, consolidating
research-and-development expenditures, and procuring complemen-
tary military capabilities.
When it comes to military cooperation, U.S. allies in Europe have
an edge over those in Asia. Asia has no equivalent to NATO and is
unlikely to develop one anytime soon. U.S. allies there are, however,
strengthening their defense and security cooperation in the face of
China’s growing power and concerns over the reliability of the United
States as a military partner. In January 2018, Australia and Japan
pledged to work together more closely, including by allowing joint
exercises of their armed forces. The two countries are also developing
ties with India and exploring ways to conduct joint naval exercises.
These early steps toward collaboration could evolve into regular plan-
ning, training, and cooperation on defense research, development,
and procurement.
The lack of deep, multilateral military cooperation among Asian
allies is partially offset by their willingness to invest in defense. Australia
and South Korea both spend at least two percent of GDP on their
militaries. Australia and New Zealand have long sent forces in support
of major military operations in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and
even Europe, demonstrating their belief that their own regional security
is linked to security worldwide. Japan spends just one percent of GDP
on defense, in accordance with its unique pacifistic constitution
drafted by occupying U.S. forces after World War II. In spite of consti-
tutional constraints, the Japanese military is one of the most capable
in Asia, and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has opened an important
national debate about changing the constitution and increasing the
country’s military capabilities.
For the G-9 to function as a unit when it comes to security, European
and Asian countries will need to collaborate more directly. Although
the major European military powers are unlikely to take on a large
defense role in Asia, they can and should do more. The threat posed
by North Korea has long preoccupied European capitals, and Euro-
pean forces continue to be part of the UN command established at the
onset of the Korean War. China is a major concern as well. Europe has
a critical interest in ensuring freedom of navigation throughout the
Asia-Pacific region and sustaining a balance of power there. Strength-
ening defense ties between Europe and Asia will be key to counterbal-
ancing China’s rise. During a May 2018 visit to Sydney, French
President Emmanuel Macron had this goal in mind when he called
for an alliance among Australia, France, and India, saying, “If we want
to be seen and respected by China as an equal partner, we must organ-
ize ourselves.”
STEPPING UP
Liberal democracy has come under assault after many decades of
advancing across the globe. Led by China, authoritarian countries are
openly challenging global rules and ideas about freedom and making
the case that their sociopolitical systems work better than liberal
democracy. The rise of populist movements in many Western countries
has led to increased support for illiberalism even within established
democracies. A growing refugee and migration crisis is challenging
liberal norms regarding tolerance and diversity. But the loss of the
United States as a strong global leader is perhaps the biggest change.
For 70 years, Western allies shared a commitment to democracy, free-
dom, and human rights and a belief that advancing them globally was an
essential contribution to international peace and prosperity. The G-9
needs to carry on this work, even if Washington bows out. It can start
by taking the lead in international institutions, such as the UN and the
World Bank. Washington’s voice has fallen silent in these forums. The
G-9 countries must speak up loudly, clearly, and in unison in favor of
democracy and freedom wherever and whenever these are challenged.
Political exhortation is unlikely to be sufficient on its own. The G-9
needs to flex its economic muscles, too. For example, it could use
trade preferences and development assistance as leverage (a strategy
China never shies away from). In 2017, the G-9 spent more than
$80 billion on official development assistance, well over twice what
the United States spent. Conditioning aid on the protection and pro-
motion of democracy, freedom, and human rights would be a powerful
way for G-9 countries to defend and extend these core values.

The G-9 will also have to use military force independent of Wash-
ington. France and the United Kingdom have already led military
interventions for humanitarian purposes, mainly in northern and
western Africa. In June 2018, together with seven other EU allies, the
British and the French agreed to establish a joint military force to
intervene in times of crisis. This is another small but important step
that could serve as a model for similar collaborations.
PROTECTING THE ORDER

To be effective, the G-9 will have to institutionalize in some form.
Annual leader summits and regular meetings of foreign, defense, and
other ministers will be needed to give the group’s efforts weight and
significance. The G-9 could also form an informal caucus in interna-
tional institutions, such as the UN, the WTO, and the G-20. In strength-
ening formal ties and cooperation, the G-9 should avoid appearing
exclusive; it should at all times welcome the participation and support
of like-minded countries, including the United States. The goal should
be to uphold and rejuvenate the existing order, not to create a new,
exclusive club.
The primary obstacle the G-9 will face, however, isn’t likely to be
institutional; it will be a lack of political will to step up and defend the
order. Washington has exhorted its European and Asian allies to carry
more weight for years and has been met mostly with shrugs and
excuses. Meanwhile, countries such as Germany and Japan have grown
comfortable complaining about U.S. policy but remain unprepared to
take on more responsibility. European countries have tended to look
inward, and U.S. allies in Asia have preferred to deal with Washington
bilaterally rather than work with one another.
U.S. allies are also tempted to avoid taking action by the hope that
Trump might not actually do what he threatens or that a new president
will take office in January 2021, and the storm will pass. But Trump’s
first 20 months in office suggest that he believes his nationalist, unilat-
eralist, and mercantilist policies have produced “wins” for the United
States. And even if Trump serves only one term, his successor may
pay a political price for trying to reclaim a global leadership role for
the United States. Although recent polls by the Chicago Council on
Global Affairs and others have shown that the American public rejects
critical parts of “America first”—support for an active U.S. role in the
world, for trade deals, and for defending U.S. allies has increased
markedly since Trump took office—the idea that lingering resentment

toward ungrateful allies propelled Trump to victory has become conven-
tional wisdom in some circles. Without evidence that the United States’
partners are doing their fair share, a new president may choose to remain
on the sidelines of international politics and focus on domestic issues.
The G-9 must act now to prepare for such risks. Yet at the same
time, it should recognize that without U.S. help, it can sustain the
order for only so long. In the long run, the best the G-9 can hope to
accomplish is to keep the door open for the eventual return of the
United States. The challenges to the postwar order are too broad and
the task of collective action too great to expect G-9 members to sustain
alliances, maintain open markets, and defy democratic regression
indefinitely. Unlike the United States, the G-9 consists of nine different
political entities (including one that represents 28 nations), each of
which faces distinct political pressures and requirements. Their ability
to act in concert and to lead globally will invariably be less effective
than that of a single great power.
Fortunately, “America first” need not become America’s future.
Instead, it could be a productive detour that reminds Washington and
its allies why the order was created in the first place. Indeed, by invest-
ing more in that order and carrying a greater share of the burdens and
responsibilities of global leadership, the G-9 may not only help sustain
the order but also place it on a more stable and enduring foundation.
The outcome may be one many U.S. leaders have long sought—a
more balanced partnership with European and Asian allies in which
everyone contributes their fair share and has a say in how the order
should evolve to meet the new challenges.
Allied leaders know that they need to take more action. They under-
stand that although the demise of the liberal order will cost the United
States dearly, it will cost them even more. Great-power competition
will intensify, predatory trade practices will spread, and the democratic
reversal already under way will pick up speed. “The times when we
could completely count on others, they are over to a certain extent,”
German Chancellor Angela Merkel remarked a few months after
Trump came to office. “We Europeans really must take our fate into
our own hands.” Now is the time for Germany and the other G-9
countries to match deeds to words. If they settle for complaints and
laments, they will have more than Trump to blame for the passing of
the rules-based order.∂

The Crisis Next Time

What We Should Have Learned From 2008
Carmen Reinhart and Vincent Reinhart
A
t the turn of this century, most economists in the developed
world believed that major economic disasters were a thing
of the past, or at least relegated to volatile emerging mar-
kets. Financial systems in rich countries, the thinking went, were too
sophisticated to simply collapse. Markets were capable of regulating
themselves. Policymakers had tamed the business cycle. Recessions
would remain short, shallow, and rare.
Seven years later, house prices across the United States fell sharply,
undercutting the value of complicated financial instruments that used
real estate as collateral—and setting off a chain of consequences that
brought on the most catastrophic global economic collapse since the
Great Depression. Over the course of 2008, banks, mortgage lenders,
and insurers failed. Lending dried up. The contagion spread farther
and faster than almost anyone expected. By 2009, economies making up
three-quarters of global GDP were shrinking. A decade on, most of these
economies have recovered, but the process has been slow and painful,
and much of the damage has proved lasting.
“Why did nobody notice it?” Queen Elizabeth II asked of the crisis
in November 2008, posing a question that economists were just starting
to grapple with. Ten years later, the world has learned a lot, but that
remains a good question. The crash was a reminder of how much more
damage financial crises do than ordinary recessions and how much
longer it takes to recover from them. But the world has also learned
that how quickly and decisively governments react can make a crucial
CARMEN REINHART is Minos A. Zombanakis Professor of the International Financial

System at the Harvard Kennedy School. She is the author, with Kenneth Rogoff, of This
Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly.
VINCENT REINHART is Chief Economist at Standish, a brand of BNY Mellon Asset

Management North America.
difference. After 2008, as they scrambled to stop the collapse and

limit the damage, politicians and policymakers slowly relearned this
and other lessons of past crises that they never should have forgotten.
That historical myopia meant they hesitated to accept the scale of the
problem and use the tools they had to fight it. That remains the central
warning of 2008: countries should never grow complacent about
the risk of financial disaster. The next crisis will come, and the more
the world forgets the lessons of the last one, the greater the damage
will be.
CRASH LANDING
Before 2007, most economists had been lulled into a false sense of
security by the unusual economic calm of the preceding two and a half
decades. The prior U.S. recession, in 2001, was shallow and brief.
Between 1990 and 2007, rates of economic growth in the United States
varied far less than they had over the previous 30 years. The largest
annual decline in GDP was 0.07 percent (in 1991), and the largest
increase was 4.9 percent (in 1999). Inflation was low and steady.
The period came to be known as “the Great Moderation.” The
economists Olivier Blanchard and John Simon reflected the views of
their profession when they wrote in 2001, “The decrease in output
volatility appears sufficiently steady and broad based that a major
reversal appears unlikely. This implies a much smaller likelihood of
recessions.” That view ignored much of what was happening outside
the West, and even those whose perspectives stretched back more
than just two decades tended to look back only to the end of World
War II. In that narrow slice of history, the U.S. economy had always
grown unless the Federal Reserve raised interest rates too high. When
it did, the Fed reversed course and the economy recovered quickly.
That assurance was further bolstered by another belief about down-
turns. Economists compared them to plucking a guitar string: the
more forcefully it is pulled, the faster it snaps back. More painful
recessions, the wisdom went, produce more vigorous recoveries.
Yet had economists looked farther afield, they would have realized
that financial crises were by no means a thing of the past—and that
they have always led to particularly large and persistent losses in
economic output. As research we have published since the crisis with
the economist Kenneth Rogoff has demonstrated, systemic financial
crises almost invariably cause severe economic downturns, and the

Carmen Reinhart and Vincent Reinhart The CSS Point
string does not snap back. This fact screams out from every aspect of
the historical record. Data on the 14 worst financial crises between the
end of World War II and 2007 show that, on average, these led to
economic downturns that cost the affected countries seven percent of
GDP, a much larger fall than what occurred in most recessions not
preceded by a financial crisis.
In the worst case, when a financial crisis in 2001 forced Argentina
to default on over $100 billion in foreign debt, the country’s GDP per
capita fell by more than 21 percent below its prior peak. On average
across these episodes, per capita GDP took four years to regain its pre-
recession level. That is far longer than after normal recessions, when
growth does snap back. In the worst case, after Indonesia was hit by the
1997 Asian financial crisis, it took the country seven years to recover.
Also noteworthy was that all 14 of the largest postwar crises took
place after the mid-1970s. The three decades beginning in 1946 were
unusually free of financial catastrophe.
(That likely resulted from the tight con-
Systemic financial crises trols on international flows of capital
almost invariably cause that formed part of the Bretton Woods
severe economic downturns. system, a reminder that although open
global capital markets bring major bene-
fits, they also produce volatility.) But the crises after the mid-1970s
show how much economic output can be lost when capital flows come to
a sudden stop—and how hard it can be to recover from the downturn.
Given this background, the economic pain that followed the financial
crisis of 2007–8 should have come as no surprise. As it turned out, the
effects were even worse than history would have predicted. We compiled
data from the 11 economies that suffered the deepest crises in 2007–8,
as assessed by the loss of wealth in the stock market and the housing
market, the market capitalization of the financial institutions that
failed, and the amount spent by the government on bailing everyone
out. On average, these countries saw a nine percent drop in real GDP
per capita, compared with the average seven percent fall among the
countries that experienced the previous 14 worst financial crises since
World War II.
Not only did output fall further, it recovered more slowly. On average,
it took over twice as long to regain the ground lost in the recession—
nine years rather than four. Some countries have still not fully recovered.
The economies of Greece and Italy experienced falls in per capita GDP—
Bad news, bankers: at Lehman Brothers’ offices in London, September 2008

26 percent and 12 percent, respectively—of a scale seldom seen in the
modern world outside of wartime. Today, both countries have yet to
climb back to the levels of per capita GDP they reached in 2007. They
are not likely to anytime soon. According to the latest forecast from
the International Monetary Fund, per capita real GDP in Greece and
Italy will come in below 2007 levels through 2023, as far out as the
IMF forecast runs.
THE LONG ROAD BACK

Financial crises do so much economic damage for a simple reason:
they destroy a lot of wealth very fast. Typically, crises start when the
value of one kind of asset begins to fall and pulls others down with it.
The original asset can be almost anything, as long as it plays a large
KEVIN COOM BS / REUT E RS
role in the wider economy: tulips in seventeenth-century Holland,

stocks in New York in 1929, land in Tokyo in 1989, houses in the United
States in 2007.
From their peak at the end of 2006 to their nadir at the beginning
of 2009, U.S. house prices fell so far that the average American
homeowner lost the equivalent of more than a year’s worth of dispos-

able income. The destruction of wealth was about 50 percent larger

than that resulting from the previous major financial shock, the tech-
nology stock crash in 2000. The bursting of the tech bubble led to a
brief and shallow downturn. The collapse of house prices triggered
something far more serious. The crucial difference lay in the form of
wealth destroyed.
The 2000 crash had little effect on the wider economy since most
people and institutions owned few technology stocks. In 2007, by
contrast, houses formed a major part of most Americans’ wealth, and
banks around the world had used them as collateral in vast numbers
of complicated and opaque financial instruments. Once house prices
fell and Americans began defaulting on their mortgages, the elaborate
system of financial obligations built on top of U.S. household debt
came crashing down. The bursting of the tech bubble was just a stock
market crash; the bursting of the housing bubble became a systemic
financial crisis.
Recovering from a severe financial crisis typically involves three
stages. First, the affected country must acknowledge the extent of the
wealth that has been destroyed. This can take some time if the assets
that have collapsed in value are held by institutions that have opaque
balance sheets and are protected by risk-averse government agencies.
The housing market, for example, often takes some time to account
for price falls, as owners hang on in the hope of better days ahead, and
even if the price continues to fall, they have legal protections in bank-
ruptcy law that delay forced sales. The many complicated instruments
that use those underlying mortgages as collateral can also be slow to
adjust, as they are difficult to price and banks often cannot sell them
once trading dries up in a crisis. All too often, the day of reckoning is
put off as banks fail to acknowledge how much the value of their assets
has fallen.
Financial supervisors sometimes look the other way because once
they have admitted the depth of the problem, their governments will
be forced to take the second step: allocating the losses among their
citizens. Even doing nothing marks an implicit decision, as the people
and financial institutions that own the assets then have to bear all the
pain. Officials usually worry that major banks are too important to the
economy to go under, so the government steps in with bailouts.
Understanding these first two steps goes a long way toward explain-
ing why countries have followed such different paths since the financial
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crisis. In the United States, the Troubled Asset Relief Program, passed
by Congress in 2008, and the bank stress tests that followed, which
measure whether banks have enough capital to survive another catas-
trophe, created a formal mechanism to recognize and allocate losses.
Europe, by contrast, lagged behind the United States because some
governments were unwilling to admit how much wealth had been
destroyed. And even once European governments did face the facts,
some were reluctant to allocate the losses within their own economies
because of the international nature of the institutions affected and, in
a few cases, the sheer magnitude of the sums involved.
The five European countries hit hardest by the crisis were Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, and Spain. The governments of Iceland,
Ireland, and Spain ultimately forced their banks to acknowledge their
losses and relieved them of some of the junk weighing down their bal-
ance sheets. But Greece and Italy lumbered along with impaired
banking systems, which acted as a drag on economic activity. Partly
out of concern about the consequences for their own balance sheets if
they bailed out the banks—they had the continent’s highest levels of
debt even before the crisis—the Greek and Italian governments
looked the other way for as long as possible.
THE CENTRALITY OF CENTRAL BANKS

The final step in dealing with a financial crisis is for governments and
central banks to do what they can to blunt the effects. How far the
economy falls and how fast it recovers depend on what tools officials
have available—and on how willing they are to use them.
For most advanced economies, the events of 2008–9 will go down in
history as “the Great Recession,” not “the Second Great Depression.”
That should stand as a credit to the governments that prevented a new
depression by actively managing their economies. This was a far cry
from the 1920s and early 1930s, when politicians believed that it was
best to let the economy correct on its own. From 2008 to 2011, across
the 11 countries hit hardest by the crisis, governments spent an average
of 25 percent of GDP on stimulating their economies.
But they all could have done better. The United States spent heavily
but too slowly and inefficiently. In Europe, too much of the stimulus
went toward picking up the pieces of failed financial institutions,
which provided neither the immediate fillip that would have come
from policies such as raising compensation for the unemployed nor the
permanent benefits that would have come from building infrastruc-

ture. Moreover, the governments that had the most room to borrow—
most notably Germany, the eurozone’s largest economy—did the least
to boost spending.
Europe also wasted valuable time when it came to monetary policy.
In 2012, Mario Draghi, the president of the European Central Bank,
famously promised to “do whatever it takes to preserve the euro.” He
kept his word, by lowering interest rates below zero and buying vast
quantities of financial assets. But his U.S. counterpart, Ben Bernanke,
the chair of the Federal Reserve, was more than three years ahead of
him. In December 2008, the Fed cut the nominal interest rate to zero
and then over the next four years broke new ground in several other
ways. It launched new lending programs that accepted collateral the
Fed had previously never touched from institutions it had not previously
lent to. And it bought huge tranches of financial assets, inflating its
balance sheet to an unprecedented size, around one-quarter of U.S.
nominal GDP.
Yet as effective as central banks ultimately were at fighting the crisis,
they may come to regret their unconventional policies, some of which
had the effect of reducing democratic accountability. In particular, the
Fed supported financial institutions well beyond the commercial
banks it usually deals with. It lent to investment banks and an insur-
ance company and directly supported money market mutual funds
(which buy and sell mostly short-term government and commercial
debt) by starting special lending programs that accepted a wider range
of collateral than was normal. By lending to some institutions and
industries but not others, the Fed affected their stock prices and the
relative interest rates they had to pay. That effectively favored specific
companies and industries and, by extension, the people who owned
the companies and lent to them. Such policies are normally carried
out by Congress. But now that the Fed has opened the door to them,
future politicians might see an opportunity to achieve some public
policy aim by supporting a particular company or industry without
having to pass a law; if politicians believe that they only need to make
a phone call to the Fed, the Fed could come under far more political
pressure than in the past.
Early on in the crisis, the Fed also extended huge loans to foreign
commercial banks and central banks that needed dollar funding, obviating
the need for the U.S. Treasury to supply them with dollars. That saved

the Treasury from having to report the actions to Congress, which

would have looked askance at U.S. government support for foreign
banks. Another legacy of the central banks’ assertiveness is that the
majority of government debt that is
sold on the open market in the United
It shouldn’t have taken States, Japan, and the eurozone is now
policymakers as long as it owned by central banks. That threatens
did to relearn what they to erode central bank independence by
should have already known. tempting politicians to fix their bud-
getary math by forcing central banks to
write off the government debt they
own. Concentrating government debt in official coffers has also made
the private market for it less liquid, which might make it harder for
governments in advanced economies to borrow more in the future.
The regulated banking sector is healthier today than it was before
the crisis, both because a generation of bankers were chastened by the
crash and because governments have erected a firmer scaffold of reg-
ulation around it. In the United States, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010
gave regulators the power to force the largest banks to significantly
increase the amounts of capital they hold, making them more able to
absorb losses in the future. Banks were also induced to reduce their
reliance on short-term funding, giving them more breathing room
should their access to short-term markets be shut off, as it was in 2008.
To make sure banks are following the rules, regulators now super-
vise them more closely. Large banks undergo regular stress tests, with
real money riding on the results. If a bank fails the test, regulators
may block it from paying dividends to shareholders, buying back its
own shares, or expanding its balance sheet. Large banks also have to
show that their affairs are in order by submitting “living wills” to the
authorities that detail how their assets and liabilities will be allocated
should they go bust. This has made the traditionally opaque business
of banking a little more transparent.
Yet the fatal flaw in the Dodd-Frank Act is its focus on the main-
stream banking system. The act makes it more expensive for banks to
operate by forcing them to hold more capital, pay more for longer-term
funding, and comply with increased reporting requirements. But
American attitudes toward risk taking remain the same: aspiring home-
owners still want to borrow, and investors still want to lend to them.
By making it more expensive to take out a mortgage with a mainstream
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bank, regulators have shifted borrowing and lending from the monitored
sector to the unmonitored one, with homebuyers increasingly turning
to, say, Quicken Loans rather than Wells Fargo. A majority of U.S.
mortgages are now created by such nonbanking institutions, also
known as “shadow banks.” The result is that the financial vulnerability
remains but is harder to spot.
After a crisis, the regulatory pendulum typically swings too far,
moving from overly lax to overly restrictive. Dodd-Frank was no
exception; it swept more institutions into a burdensome compliance
scheme than was necessary to limit systemic risk. The Trump admin-
istration has undone some of this overreach by directing agencies to
regulate less aggressively and passing legislation to amend Dodd-
Frank. So far, the changes have mostly trimmed back excesses. But at
some point, if efforts to cut the fat continue, they will reach the meat
of the supervisory process.
DOOMED TO REPEAT
Ten years after the financial crisis, what have we learned? The most
disquieting lesson is how complacent politicians, policymakers, and
bankers had grown before the crisis and how much they had forgotten
about the past. It shouldn’t have taken them as long as it did to relearn
what they should have already known.
Several other specific lessons stand out. First, authorities must
follow the three-step process of dealing with a crisis—admit the losses,
decide who should bear them, and fight the ensuing downturn—as
quickly as possible. Delay allows problems to fester on bank balance
sheets, increasing the ultimate cost of bailing out the financial system.
This was the mistake Europe made and the United States avoided.
The second lesson of the crash is that a system of fixed exchange
rates can turn into an economic straitjacket. When aggregate demand
falls sharply, central banks usually respond by cutting interest rates
and using every other tool at their disposal to get the economy going
again. The effect of such policies is to lower the value of the country’s
currency, stoke domestic inflation, and reduce the interest rates at
which domestic banks lend to customers and to one another. This
boosts exports, stimulates demand at home, and encourages lending.
As members of the eurozone, some of the hardest-hit countries—
Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Spain—had neither independent central
banks nor their own currencies, so this course of action was unavailable
to them. Monetary policy for the entire region was instead set in
Frankfurt by the European Central Bank, which took too long to
react aggressively to the crisis, since it was initially focused on the
performance of the countries at the eurozone’s core—France and
Germany—not that of those at the periphery. The only way to
make Greek, Irish, Italian, and Spanish goods and services more
attractive to foreign customers was to cut wages and accept lower
profit margins, a slow and painful process compared with devaluing
one’s currency.
The crisis also showed that it matters how much room governments
have to borrow, even when interest rates are extremely low. In times
of trouble, policymakers are less likely to be sure that investors will
buy new government debt. In the eurozone, they are limited in another
way: governments cannot borrow as much as they want, since they
worry their fellow member states will trigger the EU’s enforcement
mechanisms meant to prevent excessive borrowing. During the 2007–8
crisis, government debt exploded. From 2007 to 2011, the Greek
government borrowed an amount equivalent to about 70 percent of the
country’s GDP, and Italy borrowed about 20 percent of its GDP, bringing
government debt in both countries to over 100 percent of GDP. Ice-
land, Ireland, and Spain borrowed equally spectacular sums. Yet most
of this new debt went toward propping up these countries’ financial
systems, leaving the governments with little left over to boost growth.
The final lesson of the crisis is that it is possible for inflation to be
too low. Before 2007, inflation in most advanced economies (with the
notable exception of Japan) was stable and close to the goal set by
central banks, typically two percent. This was a measure of the progress
made by the world’s central bankers over the previous three decades.
Markets had come to expect that central banks would keep prices
steady. After the crash, that progress became a poisoned chalice. Central
banks cut nominal interest rates close to zero, but this pulled the real
interest rate (that is, the nominal interest rate less the expected rate
of inflation) to no lower than negative two percent, which was not low
enough to stimulate economies suffering from massive losses in wealth
and confidence.
The tragedy is that none of these lessons is new. The importance of
moving quickly to stimulate the economy after a financial crisis was
shown by Japan’s “lost decade” in the 1990s, when a period of low GDP
growth followed an economic bubble. The value of a system of flexible

exchange rates was demonstrated in 1953, when the economist Milton

Friedman showed how devaluing one’s currency would avoid the need
to cut wages and prices. For decades, economists in the United States
and Europe have urged governments to control spending during times
of growth. The EU even imposes rules limiting the size of the deficits
member states can run, although countries routinely break them. There
are many good economic reasons to limit the buildup of debt, includ-
ing avoiding crowding out private spending, but the most practical
warning may have come from the American diplomat John Foster
Dulles in the first issue of this magazine: large debt loads take away
oxygen from the discussion of other political issues. Finally, the fact
that a higher background inflation rate can be a good thing, because it
allows for a lower real interest rate and thus faster recoveries, has been
known since 1947, when the economist William Vickrey argued that
higher inflation made economies more resilient.
That the world had to relearn so many important lessons during the
last crisis suggests that it will forget them again. Economic vulnera-
bilities vary from place to place. Some countries default on their debt,
in some cases frequently; others never do. Some have repeated bouts
of virulent inflation; others avoid the problem entirely. Some have
exchange-rate crises; others do not. What determines which countries
are prone to these problems is a combination of institutional design,
the strength of the rule of law, and national attitudes, such as an aversion
to debt. Despite this diversity, financial crises turn up in every country,
whatever its history of sovereign defaults, periods of high inflation, or
exchange-rate volatility. This suggests that there are important human
elements behind financial meltdowns: greed, fear, and the tendency to
forget history. The most recent crisis, dramatic as it was, will not be
the last.∂
CO LU M B I A U N I V E R S I T Y P R E SS
A New Foreign Policy Nuclear North Korea The Art of Sanctions

Beyond American Exceptionalism A Debate on Engagement Strategies A View from the Field
Revised and updated edition RICHARD NEPHEW
JEFFREY D. SACHS
VICTOR D. CHA
A New Foreign Policy explores both “Sanctions have become a hot policy
AND DAVID C. KANG
the danger of the “America first” tool and Richard Nephew—a key
Foreword by Stephan Haggard
mindset and the possibilities for a sanctions policy practitioner during
new way forward, proposing timely “[Cha and Kang’s] contribution is the Obama administration—has
and achievable plans to foster global important for its frank discussion of written a masterful insider’s how-to
economic growth, reconfigure the the possibility of a nuclear attack guide. Those dealing with or worried
United Nations for the twenty-first and their presentation of potential about North Korea, Russia, or Iran
century, and build a multipolar world courses of action.” would do well to learn lessons from
that is prosperous, peaceful, fair, and —The New York Times The Art of Sanctions.”
resilient. (review of the previous edition)
—Daniel Fried,
former U.S. State Department
coordinator for sanctions policy, and
distinguished fellow, Atlantic Council
Noteworthy Titles
Triadic Coercion The Return of Bipolarity Contesting Cyberspace in China
Israel’s Targeting of States That Host Nonstate in World Politics Online Expression and Authoritarian Resilience
Actors China, the United States, and Geostructural RONGBIN HAN
WENDY PEARLMAN AND BOAZ ATZILI Realism
Politics Recovered
Columbia Studies in Terrorism and ØYSTEIN TUNSJØ
Realist Thought in Theory and Practice
Irregular Warfare Series
The Conflicted Superpower EDITED BY MATT SLEAT
Changing Cultures in Congress America’s Collaboration with China and India
From Fair Play to Power Plays in Global Innovation What Is a Nation?
DONALD R. WOLFENSBERGER
and Other Political Writings
ANDREW B. KENNEDY
Realist Thought in Theory and Practice
Woodrow Wilson Center Press Series A Nancy Bernkopf Tucker and Warren
I. Cohen Book on American–East Asian ERNEST RENAN
Relations Series
Translated and edited by M. F. N. Giglioli
Red China’s Green Revolution Columbia Studies in Political Thought /

Political History
Technological Innovation, Institutional Change,
and Economic Development Under the Commune
JOSHUA EISENMAN
CUP . COLUMBIA . EDU · CUPBLOG . ORG

How to Save Globalization

Rebuilding America’s Ladder of Opportunity
Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter
W
e live in a time of protectionist backlash. U.S. President
Donald Trump has started a trade war with China, upended
the North American Free Trade Agreement, imposed
tariffs on the United States’ closest allies, withdrawn from the Trans-
Pacific Partnership, and talked endlessly about building a wall on the
U.S.-Mexican border. But the backlash against globalization goes far
beyond Trump himself. In fact, his presidency is more a symptom of
it than its cause. Even as they may decry Trump’s particular methods,
many voters and politicians in both parties approve of his objectives.
By now, it is well known that this backlash followed a dramatic rise
in inequality in the United States. Whether one looks at the percent-
age of income going to the highest earners (the top ten percent earn
47 percent of national income now, versus 34 percent in 1980), differences
in income across educational groups (the premium that college-educated
workers earn over high-school-educated workers nearly doubled over
the same period), or stagnating real wage performance for many workers
(the median real weekly wages for men working full time have not
grown at all since 1980), the United States has become markedly more
unequal over the past four decades. That period was also characterized
by rapid globalization and technological change, which, as a large body
of research demonstrates, helped increase inequality.
Still, the strength of the backlash continues to take many observers
by surprise. That’s because focusing only on the increase in income
inequality misses the full extent of the dissatisfaction driving the reaction.
For many Americans, a deteriorating labor market brings not just lower
KENNETH F. SCHEVE is Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and a Senior
Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.
MATTHEW J. SLAUGHTER is Paul Danos Dean and Earl C. Daum 1924 Professor of
International Business at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College.
wages and less job security; it also cuts to the heart of their sense of
dignity and purpose and their trust and belief in their country. That
is especially true for those workers who can no longer provide for
their family’s basic needs or have dropped out of the labor market
altogether. In a series of recent studies we conducted in communities
across the United States, we heard the same sentiments from a range
of respondents in a variety of circumstances: anxiety and anger about
globalization and change that was not related to income alone but more
broadly concerned whether Americans can still secure meaningful
roles in their families and communities.
There is good reason to find a way to counter the backlash: it threat-
ens to reverse a trend toward global openness and integration that,
even with its drawbacks, has delivered real gains in the United States
and around the world while bringing global inequality—as opposed to
inequality within countries—to its lowest level in centuries. But because
the problem goes beyond income inequality, the usual policy solutions
are inadequate. It is not enough simply to redistribute income to
financially compensate the losers from globalization. Addressing the
backlash requires giving all Americans the tools they need to carve
out the sense of security and purpose they have lost amid change.
That can happen only if the United States completely transforms
the way it invests in and builds human capital. No longer can those
efforts be limited mostly to the early years of a person’s life, with
minimal public expenditures. The country needs to rethink the role
of government in developing human capital and invest substantially in
doing so. The goal must be to erect a lifelong ladder of opportunity
that goes from early childhood education to employment-based
training throughout an individual’s working life—saving globalization
in a way that appeals to people from across the political spectrum.
NO NEW DEAL
Just over a decade ago, we argued in this magazine that stagnant income
growth among American workers was leading to a protectionist drift
in public policy. As we saw it, “a New Deal for globalization,” with a
significant income redistribution that would allow globalization’s gains
to be shared more widely, was required to prevent a harmful backlash.
There was, of course, no such deal. Instead, what followed was the
financial crisis and a set of inadequate policy responses to globalization
and technological change. The stew of vast success for a few, uneasy

Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter The CSS Point
stagnation for the great majority, and an actual decline for many others
came to a boil in the 2016 election. Leading presidential candidates
for both parties called for less globalization, not more.
Our diagnosis a decade ago emphasized that income growth in the
United States had become extremely skewed. That trend has continued.
From 2000 through 2016, the inflation-adjusted total money income (the
broadest official measure of worker compensation) of most Americans
fell. The only two educational categories to enjoy an increase were
workers with advanced professional degrees and those with doctorates.
For the vast majority of American workers, earnings fell: by 0.7 percent
for high school graduates and high school dropouts, by 7.2 percent for
those with some college, by 4.3 percent for college graduates, and by
5.5 percent for those with a nonprofessional master’s degree. In 2016,
the median household’s real income stood at $59,039—only $374 higher
than it had been a generation earlier, in 1999.
Both globalization and technological change have contributed to
this trend. (The financial crisis exacerbated the effects: because of
the plunge in home prices, the net worth of the median U.S. household
in 2016 was 30 percent less than it was in 2007.) As research by David
Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson found, about 40 percent of
the decline in U.S. manufacturing employment between 2000 and
2007 was due to surging U.S. imports from China—with persistent
income losses in the communities most exposed to this trade compe-
tition. Of course, technology has also played a role. But so far, the
backlash has focused on globalization, at least in part because citizens
see technological change as both inevitable and fair—and globalization
as neither.
IDENTITY AND FAIRNESS

Even as income inequality has grown over the past decade, it explains
only part of the anxiety and dissatisfaction. Changes in labor markets
have undermined people’s ability to fulfill their expected roles in their
families and their communities. And so people have grown angry
at globalization for eroding both their identity and their basic sense
of fairness.
People care not just about their absolute levels of income but also
about their incomes over time—relative to their expectations and
relative to what their parents made and other reference points. In the
United States today, fewer children are growing up to earn more
than their parents. For the cohort of Americans born in 1940, more
than 90 percent earned more at age 30 than their parents did at the same
age. For the cohort of Americans born in 1984, this share had fallen
to barely 50 percent. Moreover, a growing number of Americans
have stopped seeking work altogether. Labor-market participation,
especially among the groups with stagnant incomes, has fallen dra-
matically in recent years. From 1970 to 2015, among American men
with only a high school degree, the labor-force participation rate fell
from 98 percent to 85 percent. For American male high school drop-
outs, that rate fell from 94 percent to 79 percent.
The human consequences of these changes have been devastating.
The economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton have shown that many of
the groups with the poorest labor-market outcomes (and non-Hispanic
whites without a college degree, in particular) have seen their health
deteriorate markedly, with surging “deaths of despair”—suicide, drug
overdoses, alcohol poisoning—raising overall mortality rates. Other
researchers have connected trade-induced income changes to poor
health; Justin Pierce and Peter Schott, for example, have shown that
counties whose economic structures gave them greater exposure to
Chinese competition had higher rates of suicide.
There has also been growing inequality across physical space. For
most of American history, different regions have grown more equal
in relation to one another over time, as firms and workers have taken
advantage of variations in cost. But more recently, this convergence
has slowed or reversed. As the value of new ideas has dramatically
increased, the value of living or locating a business in a large, high-
talent city has grown; an accumulating body of research shows that
workers are more productive when they are surrounded by other
highly skilled workers. The metropolitan areas already doing well
have thus started to do even better, while areas that are suffering
have had a harder time catching up.
As of 2016, there were 53 metropolitan areas in the United States
with a population of at least one million. From 2010 through 2016,
their output grew by an average of more than 14 percent, compared
with under seven percent for cities with populations under 250,000.
Total employment in the largest cities grew by 15 percent, compared
with just four percent in small cities and two percent in rural areas.
Those 53 cities have accounted for 93 percent of the United States’
population growth over the past decade, even though they account for

only 56 percent of the overall population. From 2010 through 2016,

they also accounted for about two-thirds of total GDP growth and
nearly three-quarters of total job growth. And even among the largest
cities, there has been growing divergence. Over the last three and a
half decades, the difference in GDP per capita between the ten wealthiest
and the ten poorest large cities more than doubled in real dollars.
Amid such divergences, Americans have lost faith in the future.
For decades, The Wall Street Journal and NBC have periodically asked,
“Do you feel confident or not confident that life for our children’s
generation will be better than it has been for us?” Even during the
two recessions that preceded the financial crisis (in 1990 and 2001),
more Americans said they felt confident than said they felt not
confident in their children’s future. But more recently, that confidence
has evaporated. Even in August 2017—the start of the ninth year of
the current economic recovery—nearly twice as many Americans
were not confident about the future as were confident.
THE CASE FOR GLOBALIZATION

If the backlash against globalization is driven by such developments,
that does not mean that simply letting the backlash proceed—shutting
down trade, cutting off imports, putting up walls—will solve the un-
derlying problems. Despite its very real role in increasing inequality,
globalization does, as its champions argue, still do more good than
harm. The United States’ connections to the global economy through
trade, investment, and immigration have spurred gains for millions of
American workers, families, and communities that, in total, exceed the
losses. One study by the Peterson Institute for International Econom-
ics estimated that U.S. national output and income today would be
about ten percent lower had the United States not liberalized interna-
tional trade and investment as it did over the past two generations.
A United States that is cut off from the world would be a less
prosperous place. An economy behind walls must generate its own
ideas, technologies, and techniques rather than relying on innova-
tions from around the world. It must provide its own savings for
investment in new ideas and opportunities rather than tapping into
savings abroad. And it must produce all its own goods and services
rather than specializing in its particular strengths.
Indeed, the research shows that global engagement is correlated
with innovation—which, by driving productivity, is the key factor in
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raising incomes. Companies that export and import or are part of a

multinational enterprise tend to outperform their purely domestic
counterparts, and global companies pay higher wages. Consider the
performance of U.S.-based multinational companies. In 2015 (the last
year for which data are available), they
spent $700 billion on new capital in-
Saving globalization vestment, 43 percent of all private-sector
requires restoring to tens of nonresidential investment in the United
millions of Americans the States; exported $794 billion worth of
dignity and the trust and goods, 53 percent of all U.S. goods ex-
ported; and spent $284 billion on re-
faith in the United States search and development, a remarkable
that they have lost. 79 percent of total U.S. private-sector
R & D. That translates directly into
good jobs. In 2015, U.S. multinationals employed 28 million Ameri-
cans (making up 23 percent of all private-sector jobs), paying them a
third more than the average private-sector job. And contrary to con-
ventional wisdom, academic research has repeatedly found that expan-
sion abroad in these companies’ foreign affiliates tends to create jobs in
their U.S. parents, not destroy them.
Perhaps the most immediate and long-lasting damage from walling
off the United States would come from new restrictions on the immi-
gration of high-skilled workers. Immigrants have long made substantial
contributions to American innovation. Immigrants, only 13 percent of
all U.S. residents today, made up 39 percent of the U.S.-resident
Nobel Prize winners in chemistry, medicine, and physics over the past
20 years; 31 percent of the U.S.-resident Nobel winners in all categories
during that time; and 37 percent of all the U.S.-based MacArthur
Foundation “genius award” winners since 2000. One recent study
by the Kauffman Foundation concluded that immigrants accounted
for 25 percent of all new high-tech companies founded from 2006
through 2012. As of 2017, immigrants or their children had founded
43 percent of Fortune 500 companies.
On top of the economic case for saving globalization, there is a
national security case. Open markets contribute to peaceful relations
between countries by raising the costs of military disputes. As trade
fosters economic development, it also contributes to greater state
capacity and political stability, preventing civil conflict and state failure,
which can create the conditions for terrorism and other threats. And
the United States’ outsized role in launching and governing institu-

tions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade
Organization has projected U.S. power and values in peaceful ways
unprecedented in world history.
A LIFELONG LADDER OF OPPORTUNITY

If globalization has substantial benefits but is contributing to the prob-
lem of growing inequality, what can be done? The political establishment
is offering Americans three alternatives: the status quo, walls that limit
engagement with the world, and income redistribution. The status
quo sparked the backlash and thus will only further inflame it. Walls
will leave the country poorer and less secure.
Redistribution should be part of the solution. It is a policy we rec-
ommended a decade ago, when we proposed making the U.S. tax
system more progressive by eliminating payroll taxes for all workers
earning below the median income while requiring high earners to
pay the tax on a greater percentage of their income. But redistribu-
tion is not sufficient, because the problem extends beyond money.
Saving globalization requires restoring to tens of millions of
Americans the dignity and the trust and faith in the United States
that they have lost. This, in turn, requires building a lifelong ladder
of opportunity that will give all citizens the human capital needed
to adapt to the forces of globalization. Such a ladder would not
guarantee success for everyone. But it is human capital, more than
any other asset, that determines an individual’s chances of thriving
in a dynamic economy. The United States should expand its invest-
ments in human capital at every stage of every American’s life.
The first rung of this ladder should be a collection of early child-
hood education programs for every American child from birth to
kindergarten, funded by the federal government and based on evi-
dence of what works. Recent research confirms the enormous private
and social gains from investing in children’s human capital—and,
conversely, the costs of neglecting to do so. A series of studies by the
Nobel laureate James Heckman and other researchers, for example,
looked at two early childhood interventions in North Carolina and
concluded that the benefits were seven times as large as the costs.
Today, there are about 25 million children in the United States
between the ages of zero and five. Every one of these children should
each year receive an average of $4,000 worth of early childhood

programming, for a total annual fiscal cost of about $100 billion. This
programming should focus on activities that have well-documented
cognitive benefits, including classroom instruction for parents on
language development and high-quality prekindergarten childcare.
The second rung of the ladder of opportunity should be federal
funding for two years of community-college tuition for every high
school graduate who is not pursuing a bachelor’s degree, which would
ensure that each could earn an associate’s degree. The economic case
for this is compelling. In the United States today, the median lifetime
earnings of a high school graduate is about $1.3 million in constant
dollars. The figure for someone with an associate’s degree is $1.7 mil-
lion, nearly a third higher. That additional $400,000 in income comes
from spending only about $30,000 on the typical two-year associate’s
degree—a substantial return on investment, which is even larger for
many in-demand programs, such as radiation therapy.
Last year, about 1.6 million of the United States’ 2.9 million high
school graduates did not go on to a four-year college or university. Every
one of them should receive full tuition, limited income support, and as-
sistance for other related costs to attend a two-year community college,
for a total annual cost to the federal government of about $50 billion.
Providing income support and covering other costs beyond just tuition
are important to substantially boost graduation rates, which are widely
acknowledged to be far too low. (This investment would more directly
address the needs of those most harmed by globalization than would
current proposals to make four-year public colleges tuition free.)
The third rung should be a lifetime training scholarship for every
working American who does not have a four-year college degree. Each
person would get $10,000 a decade through his or her 20s, 30s, 40s, and
50s for use as a tax credit by his or her employer to invest in that person’s
skills. Eligible investments would include online courses, in-person pro-
grams at local colleges, and in-house training crafted by the employer.
Rather than rely on the ability of the government or higher education
institutions to identify the skills needed by workers across the U.S.
labor force, this program would harness the insights that businesses
uniquely have about which skills they need the most. (Since the pro-
gram would be available to every worker without a college degree,
the stigma that has been attached to many similar training programs
would be removed; those programs often fail to boost earnings because
companies infer that individuals chosen for them suffer from some
shortcoming.) Companies should prove willing to make these once-

a-decade, $10,000 investments in their employees because of the tax
credit and because of the competitive pressures. Today, there are
about 100 million U.S. workers who never graduated from college.
With a tax credit of up to $10,000 per decade for every one of these
workers, about ten million of whom can be expected to take up the
scholarship a year, the annual price tag would be about $100 billion.
The three rungs together would cost the U.S. government about
$250 billion each year, which would represent the largest federal
investment in human capital in American history. (For comparison’s
sake, the 2018 budget of the U.S. Department of Education is $68 bil-
lion.) But there is a way to fund this new federal spending. First,
Congress could reverse the 2017 tax cuts for individuals, which are
estimated to have cost the government an annual average of over
$125 billion in revenue. Second, it could partially cut the exemption
that allows employers to deduct the money they spend on health insur-
ance premiums from their taxable income—an exemption that costs
the federal government $250 billion a year in lost revenue. That
exemption is both regressive, in that it benefits high-income taxpayers
more than low-income ones, and economically inefficient, in that it
fuels higher health-care costs. There are, of course, other ways to
come up with $250 billion. The important point is that this invest-
ment in the human capital of Americans would be not just feasible
but also economically productive.
BEYOND BACKLASH
There is good reason to think that Americans will see a lifelong
ladder of opportunity as a response both suited to the problem and
in line with their particular goals and values—giving it a chance to
help reestablish a political consensus in favor of globalization. We
recently conducted a representative online survey of over 5,000
U.S. adults across the country and asked them to think about how
the U.S. economy could better deliver good jobs and incomes in
today’s world. We presented three broad policy options.
The first was walls: “Implement policies that reduce international
trade, prevent firms from going overseas, and decrease immigration.”
The second, safety nets: “Adopt new policies that substantially tax
those firms and individuals that benefit from globalization and then
spend the new revenue on government income programs for everyone

else.” And the third, ladders: “Adopt new policies that substantially tax
those firms and individuals that benefit from globalization and then
spend the new revenue on programs—for example, training and edu-
cation—that provide more people with greater opportunity to benefit
from globalization.” The third option, ladders, was overwhelmingly
the preferred strategy: 45 percent of respondents selected it, versus just
29 percent opting for walls and 26 percent choosing safety nets.
We also held focus groups in several cities and asked about the
preference for ladders. Several points stood out in the discussions.
First, participants emphasized that globalization does make signifi-
cant contributions to overall growth. “I think the whole economy has
become a world economy, so I don’t think you can start cutting off
international trade,” said one respondent. “It’s going to hurt everybody.”
Many also expressed ambivalence about programs that redistribute
income, articulating a desire to help those in need but also concerns
about the fairness and incentive effects of such programs; some of
these respondents also stressed that such programs can sometimes
generate as much resentment as globalization itself.
Most important, a majority of the members of these focus groups
recognized the ladders strategy as a way to help people share in the ben-
efits of a dynamic economy rather than just mitigate its harms. As one
respondent put it, “You’re not just spreading revenue across to every-
body; you’re using it to provide greater opportunity and training and
education—which then, in theory, should bring everybody up, also, to
where they benefit from trade.” Many also stressed that the strategy
would not just address income disparity but also help workers fulfill
their perceived duties to their families and communities. “I want to take
care of my family,” one told us. “I can start my own business if I want to.
I think there are too many people who don’t feel that way, who can’t.”
The large number of Americans who believe that the United States’
economic and political institutions are no longer delivering enough
opportunity are right. It should be no surprise that they are anxious,
angry, and open to proposals to build walls to keep out the rest of the
world. But the right response to these trends is not complacently
accepting the status quo or simply letting the backlash against global-
ization proceed. By investing seriously in ladders of opportunity, the
United States can give all its citizens the human capital that will let
them take part in a changing economy—not just saving globalization
but also ensuring that Americans benefit from it.∂
SPONSORED REPORT
[www.gmipost.com] AUSTRALIA
BRIDGING THE DISTANCE

F
or nearly 30 years, Australia reported positive economic growth each year and has grown its
GDP per capita to become the fifth largest in the world. Consolidating its status as a regional
and even a global economic powerhouse, the vast country has surmounted its geographical
disadvantage. Its distance from the world’s major markets meant growth came most from domestic
consumption, rather than foreign trade.
“We were so distant Australian Trade & this year Australia’s eco- Singapore and Vietnam
from the rest of the world, Investment Commission nomic growth will be the earlier this year, and pur-
but we were able to de- (AUSTRADE), last year highest among major ad- suing trade talks with the
velop our own economy the value of Australian vanced economies. European Union.
from that,” Australia exports of goods and “Australia benefited “Australia is a trading
Industry Group (Ai services increased 17 per- enormously from China’s nation. Our prosperity is
Group) Chief Executive cent following a two year economic boom and its built on opening access
Innes Willox explains. decline. This was mainly huge demand for natu- to new markets,” says
In the last decade, as driven by the higher pric- ral resources. That was Steven Ciobo, a member
supply chains improved es of minerals and fuel, one essential reason we of parliament and former
and business grew more which account for more avoided the global finan- minister of trade, tourism
globalized in the last de- than 45 percent of total cial crisis,” Melbourne and investment.
cade, Australia adapted exports. Business School Dean In terms of revenue,
quickly by developing Buying almost 30 per- Ian Harper says. some of Australia’s indus-
its services sector, which cent of exports, China A strong advocate of tries are ranked among
now accounts for most of has become the most globalization, Australia the largest in the world:
its overall GDP, as well as important trading part- has free trade agree- mining and fuels (3rd), in-
strengthening its exports, ner of Australia, a long- ments with China, Japan ternational tourism (10th)
particularly from min- term supplier of natural and Korea. It also signed and agricultural prod-
ing. As of 2017, Australia resources and premium the Asia-Pacific Trade ucts (12th). It also has the
sends out close to $230 agricultural produce to Agreement (APTA) with third-largest enrolment of
billion worth of goods an- the Chinese market and Brunei, Canada, Chile, foreign students and the
nually. the rest of the Asia-Pacific. Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, sixth-largest investment
According to the AUSTRADE predicts that New Zealand, Peru, CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

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Bridging the distance LOCALLY TESTED, GLOBALLY APPROVED
AUSTRALIA
CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE

fund in the world. While the United States A s automotive manufacturing
in Australia declined, many
in the supply chain were forced
of engineering and test services
to many FTSE100, Fortune500,
ASX200, and Nikkei225 companies.
Yet, the international and the United Kingdom re- to overhaul their business model Its success in the defense sec-
perception of Australia is main the top sources of FDI, and seek growth overseas. Among tor helped strengthen APV’s in-
still associated more with investments from South those most affected by this shift ternational reputation. Working
beaches, landscapes and Korea, Hong Kong and was Australian Performance with leading military forces, APV
Vehicles (APV), an industrial showed that its military applica-
wildlife than its economic mainland China have seen testing services organization and tions were “battle proven.”
prowess. double digit growth in the a global OEM “We are very
“Australians are historically last five years, a trend that within the passive proud of our track
quite modest. We are trying does not appear to be slow- safety systems record in keeping
market supplying U.S. and Austra-
to change some of that and ing down, according to the occupant restraints lian soldiers safe in
encourage our businesses Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (seatbelts) for the Afghanistan with
to be braver and bolder. We So, Australia’s midterm automotive, bus, no loss of life from
would like our businesses to and long-term economic defense, truck and 15,000 military
be born global. This coun- growth is strongly connect- materials handling APV Managing Director Harry restraints. We are
Hickling
sectors. also proud to sup-
try has been built and deed to its neighboring Asian “It wasn’t enough port the new gen-
veloped on foreign invest- markets. By 2022, China and for us to provide capability but eration of military vehicles in the
ment,” AUSTRADE CEO Dr. India alone are expected to to offer something more than United States,” Hickling says.
Stephanie Fahey says. represent almost a third of our competitors. A large part of Although determined to ex-
our success was being able to pand abroad, particularly in Eu-
For Australia to sustain its global GDP. help in solving problems that our rope, APV still regards the U.S.
continuous growth, all sec- Leaving behind domestic clients didn’t even know they had,” market as an important part of its
tors agree that attracting consumption as an engine APV Managing Director Harry global strategy.
foreign direct investment of growth and well-integrat- Hickling says. “You may not have heard about
must be a priority. ed with the fastest growing Only one of 12 such facilities who APV is, but the United States
in the world, APV Tech Centre or is a strategic market for us. We are
“Australia welcomes for- economies, Australia is per- APV-T is the most advanced dy- focused on supporting the trans-
eign investments that are fectly positioned to become namic, static, crash, and environ- port, bus and coach and defense
consistent with its national the world’s next economic mental test facility in the Southern companies there,” Hickling says.
interest,” Ciobo says. powerhouse. Hemisphere and a Tier-1 provider www.apvcorporation.com
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Investing in
AUSTRALIA
the future
W
hile its distance location. There are already
to key markets 600 multinationals located
like the United here. We also offer con-
States and Europe stood as nectivity between busi-
a disadvantage for a long ness programs, support
time, Australia has defied startups, SMEs, a well-
expectations by strength- connected education and Monash University’s Caulfield Campus in Melbourne, Australia
ening its network in the research industry. That School Dean Ian Harper
fast-growing Asian-Pacific really drives a whole-of- says.
region. With its highly de- industry approach to in- While the wide gap be-
veloped infrastructure and dustry development,” NSW tween research and indus- School and also its great-
young population, particu- Department of Industry try stands as a huge chal- est challenge. We are part
larly in its major cities like Executive Director Kylie lenge to surmount, the ro- of the country’s number
Sydney and Melbourne, Bell says. bustness of the two fields one ranked research uni-
the country has attracted For many years, Australia also represents the key to versity. We are part of the
a lot of foreign investment invested heavily into its the sustainable growth of fastest growing knowledge
and built strong trade rela- education system while Melbourne and, by exten- economy in the country.
tionships across the globe. aggressively recruiting sion, Australia. Melbourne has a bit of a
The development of the brightest foreign stu- “ This is the big- comparative advantage in
megaprojects, such as dents from around the gest opportunity fac- making these things work
World Trade Center Sydney world. This has not only ing Melbourne Business CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE
and a new airport complex built a strong skill-based
in Western Sydney, hopes workforce but, just as im-
to further facilitate trade portantly, has established
and foreign investment by a very strong research cul-
enhancing the city’s con- ture, which has devoted its
nectivity to the rest of the efforts to solving some of
world. the world’s most complex
“There is a lifetime of issues.
investment opportuni- Melbourne, in the state
ties created in the various of Victoria, has developed
components of this mixed- a reputation as a hotbed
use development. With of innovation. Many of
Aerotropolis Group as the the city’s most innovative
developer, foreign direct companies have become
investment partners will be success stories in health
part of shaping this city as care, life sciences, fintech
they create significant eco- and even in transportation
nomic and employment and defense. APV Safety
activity near Australia’s Systems, just of the many
new gateway airport,” SMEs, is an example of an
Aerotropolis Group CEO Australian company whose
and Managing Director pioneering technology has
Jomon Varghese says. saved many lives around
For its part, the New the world.
South Wales Department “We’ve got lots of ideas
of Industry has taken a and more patents per cap-
more expansive approach ita than many other coun-
to industrial development tries. But for various rea-
in its effort to attract more sons, we find it difficult to
business. Buy CSS Books Online https://cssbooks.net
commercialize these ven-
“Sydney is a world class tures,” Melbourne Business
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Investing in the future of the country’s territory,
the Northern Territory (NT)
northernmost city, is
geographically closer to
AUSTRALIA
CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE accounts represent only Indonesia than it is to

to catalyze the knowledge mercialization of technol- one percent of the total Sydney.
economy,” Harper says. ogy, new venture start-ups population. Aside from its expanding
In the same city, an- and international business,” NT’s abundant reserves seaport, Darwin is expand-
other leading institution Butler adds. of minerals, natural gas ing its international airport,
is rethinking its approach “Our Global Executive and petroleum have pow- building a much-needed
to education as part of its MBA students study at ered the region’s export cold storage facility and
continuous contribution to leading business schools sector and attracted mas- adding routes to major
narrow the gap between internationally and under- sive investments from Asian cities. The infrastruc-
research and industry. take projects in advanced the United States, Europe ture projects are laying the
“In recent years, the manufacturing, life sci- and Japan. It has also put groundwork for NT’s eco-
Monash MBA program ences and digital transfor- forward agriculture, aero- nomic takeoff.
has reimagined what busi- mation for Australian busi- space and defense as its fa- In the field of science,
ness leaders want from nesses. Our economy re- vorable investment sectors. the Menzies School of
an MBA program. So, we ally needs these ambitious, “We are the only de- Health Research is making
designed and launched tech-savvy executives with veloping e c o n o m y, a name for itself around
new programs fit for the a global mindset,” he also within a developed na- the world as a leading re-
21st century,” says Monash says. tion, in a tropical research institute in tropical
Business School MBA gion, on the planet,” NT diseases and indigenous
Programs Director Prof. The next frontier Department of Trade, health.
Patrick Butler. Although regarded as an Business and Innovation “We are on the doorstep
“The Monash MBA fo- advanced economy, some Chief Executive Michael of the fastest growing area
cuses on next-generation of Australia’s regions pres- Tennant says. in the planet with the fast-
challenges including AI, ent untapped investment The NT wants to posi- est growing middle class.
sustainability and gover- opportunities similar to tion itself as a gateway to The opportunities for trade
nance. We take on consult- those of developing na- and from Asia. Its capital and investment here are
ing projects in the com- tions. Comprising one-fifth Darwin, also Australia’s limitless,” Tennant says.
The Next Arab Uprising

The Collapse of Authoritarianism in the
Middle East
Marwan Muasher
T
wo perfect storms have struck the Arab world in the past
decade. In 2011, in what was at first optimistically called “the
Arab Spring,” popular uprisings unseated autocrats across the
region. Hopes ran high that these peaceful protest movements would
usher in a new era of democracy in the Middle East. But except in
Tunisia, they ended in turmoil or deadly civil wars. Then, in 2014,
the region’s leaders were dealt another blow when the price of oil
plummeted, threatening the basic model of governance on which their
power rested. Low oil prices since have made it difficult for regimes
to fund bloated budgets, buy off elites, and hold up long-postponed
reforms. This is not a temporary aberration: it is unlikely that the
price of oil will ever again rise to its pre-2014 levels.
On the surface, many Arab states appear to have weathered these
two storms—however shakily. But there is more turbulence ahead.
The shocks of 2011 and 2014 were just the first symptoms of a deeper
transformation under way in the region: the fundamental bargain
underpinning stability in Middle Eastern states is coming undone,
and unless regional leaders move quickly to strike new bargains with
their citizens, even larger storms will come.
For more than half a century, Middle Eastern governments have
used oil wealth to fund a system of economic patronage. Known as
“rentier states,” these governments derive a substantial portion of
their revenue from selling off national resources or bargaining for
foreign backing rather than extracting taxes from citizens. In some
countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
(UAE), the revenue has come from the sale of domestic oil resources; in
MARWAN MUASHER is Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace.

Marwan Muasher The CSS Point
others, such as Egypt and Jordan, they have come in the form of
transfers from regional patrons with oil wealth. Throughout the
Middle East, governments have used oil resources to fund stable
jobs, education, and health care, and in return, leaders have received
political submission. But as oil prices have remained low and the
region’s demographics have shifted, that basic tradeoff has begun to
seem unsustainable. Without the revenue necessary to continue
feeding bloated, inefficient systems, governments are struggling to
hold up their end of the bargain. Their primary source of political
legitimacy is slipping away.
If they respond to these shifting fortunes by tightening their grip
on power and failing to implement meaningful reforms, Middle Eastern
governments risk unleashing social unrest on a scale beyond anything
they’ve seen before. The only way around such a disruption will involve
economic and political reforms that create a fundamentally new social
contract in the Middle East, one negotiated from the bottom up. With-
out the rentier model to lean on, governments must build productive
economies that are based on merit rather than loyalty and dominated
by the private sector rather than the state. Because such large structural
changes will create pushback and problems of their own, they will be
impossible without the buy-in of the public. Economic adjustments
will not succeed without political changes that are at least as dramatic.
If Middle Eastern governments embrace economic reforms in conjunction
with greater political accountability and participation, they may have
a fighting chance at long-term stability. If they do not, the next, larger
storm will arrive before long.
THE BROKEN BARGAIN

The social contracts binding Middle Eastern governments and their
citizens have traditionally been imposed from the top down. These
authoritarian bargains, in which rulers secure legitimacy and support
through public spending rather than participatory political processes,
have been predicated on a rentier system. Using oil wealth, governments
would provide economic patronage, acting as the main purveyors of
jobs, subsidies, and basic health care and education. The oil-producing
states—Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—used revenue from the sale of their own
oil. Oil-importing states—Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia—
relied on large grants from their flush oil-producing neighbors and
We’re not gonna take it: during protests in Amman, Jordan, June 2018
remittances from their citizens working abroad in the oil industry.
The Gulf states supported oil-importing countries, especially Egypt
and Jordan, for political reasons (to ensure that these countries’ positions
were largely in line with their own) and economic ones (Egypt and
Jordan provided cheap, educated labor). By the turn of the century,
grants and remittances accounted for, on average, over ten percent of
Egypt’s and Jordan’s GDPs. Rentierism took different forms in different
states, but in one way or another, oil revenues long allowed many
oil-importing Middle Eastern countries to live beyond their means.
In return for their patronage, states expected citizens to leave
governing to a small elite, which, over time, became more and more
isolated from the general population. Meanwhile, oil rents helped
regimes buttress themselves with political, economic, and bureau-
A M M A R AWA D / R E U T E R S
cratic circles whose loyalty was ensured and whose interests were
tied to their own. The more jobs and subsidies governments could
provide, the better. But rather than creating jobs through productive
systems based on merit and led by the private sector, they found
that providing public-sector jobs, whether or not they were useful,

was the best way to ensure allegiance and dampen demands for
accountability. The ratio of public-sector jobs to private-sector jobs
in the Middle East and North Africa was the highest in the world.
Social contracts predicated on rentierism functioned throughout the
second half of the twentieth century—that is, for as long as citizens
considered the services provided in exchange for their acquiescence to
be at least minimally satisfactory. But in the 1990s, the conditions
states needed to hold up their end of the deal had begun to disappear.
As governments grew, they needed the price of oil to remain high in
order to fund expanding bureaucracies and the needs of elites. States
were stretched well beyond their means. In Jordan, for example, the
government and the army employed a whopping 42 percent of the
labor force by the early years of this century. Energy subsidies provided
by the government to citizens reached 11 percent of GDP in Egypt, ten
percent in Saudi Arabia, nine percent in Libya, eight and a half percent
in Bahrain and the UAE, and eight percent in Kuwait.
Once the size of these states’ bureaucracies began to outpace the
rise in oil prices at the turn of the century, something had to give.
Governments could no longer afford to hire more people or pay for
subsidies on commodities such as bread and gasoline. Unemployment
rates in the Middle East and North Africa reached an average of
11 percent in 2000; among young people, the average was 30 percent.
As governments struggled to maintain bloated states, the quality of
health and educational services started to decline. But rather than
offer citizens more political representation to help ease the blow,
governments continued to insist that citizens uphold their end of the
authoritarian bargain—refrain from demanding greater influence—
even as leaders came up short on theirs.
SHOCK WAVES
Many Middle Eastern governments tried to address the fracturing of
the old social contract by introducing economic reforms without
accompanying political changes. Although these reforms were largely
intended to help regimes preserve their grip on power, some of them,
if well implemented, could have also benefited citizens. But without
the systems of checks and balances necessary to oversee economic
transformations, even well-intended efforts—privatizing state-run
industries, liberalizing trading systems, integrating into the global
economy—ended up benefiting elites rather than the broader population.
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Without proper monitoring bodies, corruption skyrocketed. Most

Middle Eastern publics came to associate the economic reforms of the
beginning of this century with elite self-enrichment rather than their
own betterment. The ranking of several Middle Eastern countries on
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index declined
considerably. Jordan fell from a ranking of 43 (out of 133 countries) in
2003 to 50 (out of 178) in 2010. During the same period, Egypt’s ranking
fell from 70 to 98, and Tunisia’s from 39 to 59.
In some cases, the breaking of the old social contract proved too
much for societies to bear. Although it was by no means the only factor
that led to the Arab uprisings of 2011, it contributed to the collapse of
several regimes, particularly those in countries where institutions were
already weak. Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak were
the first to fall. In Libya, Syria, and
The uprisings of 2011 should Yemen, where the sitting regimes
have taught Middle Eastern had never been interested in build-
governments that serious ing solid institutions, street protests
attention to governance was overwhelmed weak states and led
to the crumbling of the existing
long overdue. order and, ultimately, civil war. In
Bahrain, antigovernment demon-
strations gave way to an ongoing low-level insurgency that has irritated
but not seriously threatened the monarchy. The monarchies in Jordan
and Morocco faced sustained protests but survived the upheaval
relatively unscathed.
In the Gulf countries, regimes had a solution at hand, at least in
the short term: throw money at the problem in order to pacify the
public. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia promised an aid package of
$130 billion that included higher salaries and more housing assistance
for Saudi citizens. Other Gulf governments offered similar packages,
all made possible by high oil prices. In February 2011, the Kuwaiti
government gave every citizen 1,000 Kuwaiti dinars (about $3,560)
and free staple foods for over a year. In Oman, the government
funded 30,000 more jobs and 40 percent more university scholarships.
In Jordan, King Abdullah responded to protests by immediately
introducing ad hoc reform measures that helped temporarily stave
off discontent. A $5 billion aid package put together by various
Gulf states helped the country withstand the pressure from the
street. But even this turned out to be only enough to quell dissent
until the next storm struck, in 2014.
The uprisings of 2011 should have taught Middle Eastern govern-
ments that serious attention to governance—not just economic
reforms—was long overdue. But once the initial pressure had sub-
sided, the surviving governments reverted to their old habits almost
immediately. They were bolstered in their turn back toward authori-
tarianism by the violence and enormous human suffering unfolding
in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, as well as by the rise of Islamists in Egypt,
which discouraged citizens elsewhere from pursuing further confron-
tations with the state.
Then came the next shock. In August 2014, the price of oil, which
had reached over $140 a barrel in 2008, fell below $100 a barrel. It
reached a low of $30 a barrel in 2016 before rebounding to around
$70 a barrel, where it remains today. For Saudi Arabia, which needs
the price of oil to stay above approximately $85–$87 a barrel to
maintain a balanced budget and to fund lavish assistance to other
regional governments, this decline meant that the government had
to dramatically change its spending habits to avoid going into debt.
Other grant-giving countries, such as Kuwait and the UAE, also had
to curtail their regional assistance. Across the Middle East, oil producers
could no longer afford to function as welfare states, and oil-importing
countries could no longer rely on grants awarded by oil-producing
ones or remittances from their citizens working in those countries
to finance their patronage systems.
The end of the era of high oil prices triggered a new wave of
protests. In 2018, demands for change escalated in Saudi Arabia,
including by leading preachers, women, and political activists, and
Jordan witnessed street protests for the first time since the Arab
Spring. These two countries illustrate particularly well the repercus-
sions of the end of rentierism in the region. The first, Saudi Arabia,
is an example of an oil-producing country that can no longer act as
welfare state. The second, Jordan, is an example of an oil-importing
country that can no longer depend on oil money from abroad to fuel
an inefficient economic and political system.
CHANGING COURSE
In Saudi Arabia, the end of high oil prices coincided with the passing
of power to a new generation of leaders—most prominent among

them Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, also known as MBS. The
economic writing was on the wall for Saudi Arabia well before MBS,
who is only in his early 30s, rose
to prominence. Starting in 2015,
Apparent stability concealed large deficits meant that Saudi
deeper problems. Arabia could no longer afford to
maintain its generous internal and
external subsidies. In 2017, the budget deficit reached $61 billion, or 9.2
percent of GDP. The country expects to run deficits until at least 2023.
As a consequence, the Saudi government has cut subsidies and allowed
the price of services to rise. Saudi Arabia’s regional interventions in
Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere have further strained its struggling economy.
The Yemeni war alone is estimated to cost the Saudi government
$6–$7 billion each month.
The Saudi government has responded to this new reality with a
weak package of reforms that are unlikely to fully address the challenges.
In an attempt to boost the country’s stagnant economy, the govern-
ment announced a radically expansionary budget for 2018 but offered
no sense of how it will be financed. The Saudi government has stopped
its traditional assistance to Jordan for three years and can no longer
support the regime of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt to the tune of
tens of billions of dollars each year, a program the Saudis began after
Sisi ousted Egypt’s Islamist government in 2013. It has also embarked
on an impressive social reform agenda, including allowing women to
drive, reopening movie theaters, and curtailing the powers of the
Islamist police force, in what is probably an effort to appease the new
generation and divert attention from demands for political reform.
These social reforms have gained MBS significant popularity among
young Saudis. But youth unemployment in the kingdom remains stagger-
ing: it reached almost 35 percent in 2017. Will the new generation accept
austerity and the loss of privileges and subsidies without more of a voice
in the running of their country in exchange? If the revolts of 2011 offer
any evidence, the answer is likely no. The Jordanian example, in particular,
suggests that continued economic austerity, coupled with over 30 percent
youth unemployment, is likely to push the new generation to demand
more of a voice. Those demands may even include calls for the introduc-
tion of an elected parliament, which would be a first in Saudi history.
Saudi Arabia is not the only Gulf country facing the challenge of
low oil prices. Kuwait, which already has an elected parliament, faced
a drop in its oil revenues of around $15 billion in 2014 and again in
2015. As in the Saudi case, Kuwait first relied on its massive fiscal
reserves (estimated at over $600 billion) but is now introducing cuts in
subsidies and a medium-term plan of economic reforms that will begin
steering the Kuwaiti economy away from its reliance on oil. Oman
has reacted similarly to the low oil prices: cutting subsidies, reducing
benefits for public-sector workers, and hiking taxes.
PRECARIOUS PEACE
In Jordan, declining financial support from neighboring oil-producing
countries and a drop in remittances have challenged the government’s
ability to continue funding a system of economic patronage. Although
Jordan is ruled by a monarchy that much of society accepts as legitimate,
recent waves of protests suggest that the system is more vulnerable
than many think. The monarchy has traditionally responded to demands
for reform by implementing ad hoc measures that pacify the public
but never result in true power sharing with the legislative and judicial
branches of government. Essential to such measures has been generous
financial aid from the Gulf states (and other powers, including the
United States), which has allowed the Jordanian government to maintain
an inefficient, patronage-based political and economic system. The
government has used the money to continue buying the support of the
elite and funding a bloated bureaucracy in a system that prioritizes
patronage over merit.
In 2011 and 2012, large-scale protests erupted throughout Jordan in
response to economic and political grievances, but they petered out
after King Abdullah made a series of political reforms and regional
instability directed attention elsewhere. But King Abdullah’s actions—
firing prime ministers, reforming the constitution, and replacing the
government three times in 18 months—were quick fixes designed to
appease the protesters rather than lasting, serious reforms. By 2016,
Jordan’s political elite was so confident that it had gotten through the
Arab uprisings unharmed that it amended the constitution to give the
king additional powers and further consolidate the executive branch’s
grip on power.
But the apparent stability concealed deeper problems. Jordan is in
the grip of a slowly developing economic crisis, driven by soaring
public debt, which now stands at 95 percent of GDP; low growth, now
around two percent; and high unemployment, now 18.5 percent and

over 30 percent among young people. The sharp reduction in financial

support from oil-producing states has meant that the country can no
longer rely on that aid to keep its debt in check and finance its public
deficit. Saudi Arabia, which headed a Gulf initiative that provided
Jordan with $5 billion after the 2011 protests, put a three-year freeze
on subsidies to Jordan starting in 2015. (After more recent protests,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE announced a new, $2.5 billion aid
package to Jordan, mostly in the form of guarantees to pay the country’s
loans, but that hardly replaced the lost assistance.)
Successive Jordanian governments have treated such challenges as
purely technical problems. Among the public, however, demands have
escalated beyond the need for economic changes. In May 2018, protests
erupted throughout Jordan, particularly in affluent neighborhoods in
western Amman, led by the middle class (the Islamists, who had
spearheaded protests in 2011 and 2012, were conspicuously absent). In
addition to calling for the withdrawal of a controversial income tax
law, the protesters demanded the dissolution of Parliament and a
change of government. Evidently, King Abdullah’s quick fixes in 2011
and 2012 failed to address the roots of the unrest: without the rents
necessary to keep funding a system of patronage, the social contract in
Jordan has broken down. Durable solutions to the protesters’ demands
will require a new social contract, not symbolic reforms.
Egypt continues to suffer from the economic effects of its revolution
and from the decrease in the massive assistance it used to receive
from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In 2016, two years after that Gulf
assistance dropped, Egypt floated its currency and had to rely on a
$12 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund to help it restore
economic stability.
The one notable exception to the current state of affairs in the
Middle East is Tunisia. After its revolution in 2011, Tunisia may not
have solved its political, economic, and security issues, but its leaders
understood the need for a new social contract. For three difficult years,
an elected constituent assembly negotiated and ultimately agreed on
a new constitution that upheld the principle of the peaceful rotation
of power, gave women almost full rights, and affirmed a commitment
to the collective and individual rights of all parts of Tunisian society.
Tunisia is by no means out of the woods, but it has achieved a solid
footing for future stability and prosperity.
A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT

If the message coming from the Arab street was lost on the region’s
leaders in 2011, in part due to the failure of the protests to spark
serious efforts to build new institutions (except in Tunisia), the end of
rentierism is giving Middle Eastern governments another chance to
hear it. Economic reforms must be accompanied by political ones that
give people a meaningful say in the running of their countries.
The transition to more efficient economies is sure to be slow and
rocky and to face significant pushback from the forces that benefit
from the status quo. Decades-old rentier systems have created vested
interests with little desire to usher in merit-based structures that might
rob them of their privileges.
Political will at the top will be needed to put in place gradual, serious,
and participatory processes that the public can believe in. The neces-
sary reforms will require a period of material hardship. Middle Eastern
citizens will accept short-term sacrifices in the name of badly needed
long-term change—but only if they are included in the process and
guided by leadership they can trust.
Middle Eastern governments should begin this process by doing
more to empower women. Women’s participation in the work force
in the region is the lowest in the world (32 percent, compared with
a world average of 58 percent, according to a 2009 World Bank
report). Governments must also better exploit technology to raise
productivity and gear their efforts toward a more knowledge-based
economy. They must rapidly diversify their sources of revenue
away from oil by empowering the private sector and encouraging
public-private partnerships. And they must promote the rule of law
and a culture of equality among all citizens, which will help foster
innovation. This will require ending legal discrimination against
women and minority groups.
Critically, governments cannot remain the primary employers in
Middle Eastern countries. Fostering the proper legal and financial
environments to promote the private sector, particularly small and
medium-sized enterprises, will help companies expand and replace
public-sector jobs. This is easier said than done: outdated educational
systems and inadequate health services have left large parts of the
population in most Middle Eastern states ill equipped for work in the
private sector. In order to minimize unemployment and hardship,
transitions to economies dominated by the private sector must include

big changes to educational and health-care systems. In particular, schools

and universities need to shift from promoting the rote learning of
absolute truths toward encouraging critical thinking, innovation, and
the acceptance of diverse viewpoints.
Even if governments start now, these changes will require a gen-
eration or two to fully take effect. But the uprisings of 2011 should
have already taught Middle Eastern leaders that they are short on
time. They must make painful economic decisions now to avoid
worse suffering down the road. And whether leaders like it or not,
the consent of the governed will be a critical factor in the success of
transitions from rentier economies to productive systems. Citizens
and leaders will have to agree on a new social contract. This time,
rather than governments imposing contracts from the top down,
the ethnically, culturally, and religiously diverse communities that
make up Middle Eastern countries must be allowed to negotiate them
from the bottom up.
Forging this new social contract will require visionary leaders
who have the will to stand up to their country’s own elite, who
grasp that the way to keep power is to share it, and who can persuade
the populace that they are capable of guiding it to a better future.
Sadly, not many such leaders exist today. (They are rare everywhere,
not just in the Middle East.) But Middle Eastern governments have
no choice. If they continue to ignore the need for change, the havoc
to come will bring change on its own.∂
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Venezuela’s Suicide
Lessons From a Failed State
Moisés Naím and Francisco Toro
C
onsider two Latin American countries. The first is one of the
region’s oldest and strongest democracies. It boasts a stronger
social safety net than any of its neighbors and is making progress
on its promise to deliver free health care and higher education to all its
citizens. It is a model of social mobility and a magnet for immigrants from
across Latin America and Europe. The press is free, and the political
system is open; opposing parties compete fiercely in elections and
regularly alternate power peacefully. It sidestepped the wave of military
juntas that mired some Latin American countries in dictatorship. Thanks
to a long political alliance and deep trade and investment ties with the
United States, it serves as the Latin American headquarters for a slew
of multinational corporations. It has the best infrastructure in South
America. It is still unmistakably a developing country, with its share
of corruption, injustice, and dysfunction, but it is well ahead of other
poor countries by almost any measure.
The second country is one of Latin America’s most impoverished
nations and its newest dictatorship. Its schools lie half deserted. The
health system has been devastated by decades of underinvestment,
corruption, and neglect; long-vanquished diseases, such as malaria and
measles, have returned. Only a tiny elite can afford enough to eat. An
epidemic of violence has made it one of the most murderous countries
in the world. It is the source of Latin America’s largest refugee migra-
tion in a generation, with millions of citizens fleeing in the last few
years alone. Hardly anyone (aside from other autocratic governments)
recognizes its sham elections, and the small portion of the media not
MOISÉS NAÍM is a Distinguished Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Chief International Columnist for El País, and a Contributing Editor at The Atlantic.
FRANCISCO TORO is Chief Content Officer at the Group of Fifty, Founder of Caracas
Chronicles, and a Global Opinion Columnist at The Washington Post.
Venezuela is burning: at an anti-Maduro rally in Caracas, June 2017

under direct state control still follows the official line for fear of reprisals.
By the end of 2018, its economy will have shrunk by about half in the
last five years. It is a major cocaine-trafficking hub, and key power
brokers in its political elite have been indicted in the United States on
drug charges. Prices double every 25 days. The main airport is largely
deserted, used by just a handful of holdout airlines bringing few
passengers to and from the outside world.
These two countries are in fact the same country, Venezuela, at two
different times: the early 1970s and today. The transformation Venezuela
has undergone is so radical, so complete, and so total that it is hard to
believe it took place without a war. What happened to Venezuela? How
C A R L O S G A R C I A R AW L I N S / R E U T E R S
did things go so wrong?

The short answer is Chavismo. Under the leadership of Hugo Chávez
and his successor, Nicolás Maduro, the country has experienced a
toxic mix of wantonly destructive policy, escalating authoritarianism,
and kleptocracy, all under a level of Cuban influence that often resembles
an occupation. Any one of these features would have created huge prob-
lems on its own. All of them together hatched a catastrophe. Today,
Venezuela is a poor country and a failed and criminalized state run by

Moisés Naím and Francisco Toro The CSS Point
an autocrat beholden to a foreign power. The remaining options for

reversing this situation are slim; the risk now is that hopelessness will
push Venezuelans to consider supporting dangerous measures, such as
a U.S.-led military invasion, that could make a bad situation worse.
CHAVISMO RISING
To many observers, the explanation for Venezuela’s predicament is sim-
ple: under Chávez, the country caught a strong case of socialism, and all
its subsequent disasters stem from that original sin. But Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Uruguay have also elected socialist
governments in the last 20 years. Although each has struggled politically
and economically, none—aside from Nicaragua—has imploded. Instead,
several have prospered.
If socialism cannot be blamed for Venezuela’s demise, perhaps oil is
the culprit. The most calamitous stage of Venezuela’s crisis has coin-
cided neatly with the sharp fall in international oil prices that started
in 2014. But this explanation is also insufficient. Venezuela’s decline
began four decades ago, not four years ago. By 2003, Venezuela’s GDP per
worker had already declined by a disastrous 37 percent from its 1978
peak—precisely the decline that first propelled Chávez into office.
Moreover, all of the world’s petrostates suffered a serious income shock
in 2014 as a result of plummeting oil prices. Only Venezuela could not
withstand the pressure.
The drivers of Venezuela’s failure run deeper. Decades of gradual
economic decline opened the way for Chávez, a charismatic demagogue
wedded to an outdated ideology, to take power and establish a corrupt
autocracy modeled on and beholden to Cuba’s dictatorship. Although
the crisis preceded Chávez’s rise to power, his legacy and Cuba’s influence
must be at the center of any attempt to explain it.
Chávez was born in 1954 into a lower-middle-class family in a rural
town. He became a career military officer on a baseball scholarship
and was soon secretly recruited into a small leftist movement that
spent over a decade plotting to overthrow the democratic regime. He
exploded into Venezuela’s national consciousness on February 4, 1992,
when he led an unsuccessful coup attempt. This misadventure landed
him in jail but turned him into an improbable folk hero who embod-
ied growing frustration with a decade of economic stagnation. After
receiving a pardon, he launched an outsider bid for the presidency in
1998 and won in a landslide, upending the two-party system that had
anchored Venezuelan democracy for 40 years.

What drove the explosion of populist anger that brought Chávez to
power? In a word, disappointment. The stellar economic performance
Venezuela had experienced for five decades leading up to the 1970s had
run out of steam, and the path to the middle class had begun to narrow.
As the economists Ricardo Hausmann and Francisco Rodríguez noted,
“By 1970 Venezuela had become the richest country in Latin America
and one of the twenty richest countries in the world, with a per capita
GDP higher than Spain, Greece, and Israel
and only 13 percent lower than that of the
United Kingdom.” But by the early 1980s, a
Chávez was brilliant at
weakened oil market had brought the era of mining discontent.
fast growth to an end. Lower oil revenue
meant cuts in public spending, scaled-down social programs, currency
devaluation, runaway inflation, a banking crisis, and mounting unem-
ployment and hardship for the poor. Even so, Venezuela’s head start
was such that when Chávez was elected, it had a per capita income in
the region that was second only to Argentina’s.
Another common explanation for Chávez’s rise holds that it was
driven by voters’ reaction against economic inequality, which was
driven in turn by pervasive corruption. But when Chávez came to
power, income was more evenly distributed in Venezuela than in
any neighboring country. If inequality determined electoral outcomes,
then a Chávez-like candidate would have been more probable in
Brazil, Chile, or Colombia, where the gap between the well-off and
everyone else was larger.
Venezuela may not have been collapsing in 1998, but it had been
stagnating and, in some respects, backsliding, as oil prices slumped
to just $11 per barrel, leading to a new round of austerity. Chávez was
brilliant at mining the resulting discontent. His eloquent denuncia-
tions of inequality, exclusion, poverty, corruption, and the entrenched
political elite struck a chord with struggling voters, who felt nostalgic
for an earlier, more prosperous period. The inept and complacent
traditional political and business elite who opposed Chávez never came
close to matching his popular touch.
Venezuelans gambled on Chávez. What they got was not just an out-
sider bent on upending the status quo but also a Latin American leftist
icon who soon had followers all around the world. Chávez became
both a spoiler and the star attraction at global summits, as well as a

leader of the burgeoning global wave of anti-American sentiment

sparked by U.S. President George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq. At
home, shaped by his career in the military, Chávez had a penchant for
centralizing power and a profound intolerance of dissent. He set out to
neuter not just opposition politicians but also political allies who
dared question his policies. His collaborators quickly saw which way
the wind was blowing: policy debates disappeared, and the government
pursued a radical agenda with little forethought and no real scrutiny.
A 2001 presidential decree on land reform, which Chávez handed
down with no consultation or debate, was a taste of things to come. It
broke up large commercial farms and turned them over to peasant
cooperatives that lacked the technical know-how, management skills,
or access to capital to produce at scale.
The relationship between Food production collapsed. And in sec-
tor after sector, the Chávez government
Cuba and Venezuela enacted similarly self-defeating policies.
became more than an It expropriated foreign-owned oil ventures
alliance. without compensation and gave them to
political appointees who lacked the tech-
nical expertise to run them. It nationalized
utilities and the main telecommunications operator, leaving Venezuela
with chronic water and electricity shortages and some of the slowest
Internet connection speeds in the world. It seized steel companies,
causing production to fall from 480,000 metric tons per month before
nationalization, in 2008, to effectively nothing today. Similar results
followed the seizure of aluminum companies, mining firms, hotels,
and airlines.
In one expropriated company after another, state administrators
stripped assets and loaded payrolls with Chávez cronies. When they
inevitably ran into financial problems, they appealed to the govern-
ment, which was able to bail them out. By 2004, oil prices had spiked
again, filling government coffers with petrodollars, which Chávez spent
without constraints, controls, or accountability. On top of that were the
easy loans from China, which was happy to extend credit to Venezuela
in exchange for a guaranteed supply of crude oil. By importing whatever
the hollowed-out Venezuelan economy failed to produce and borrowing
to finance a consumption boom, Chávez was able to temporarily shield
the public from the impact of his disastrous policies and to retain
substantial popularity.
But not everyone was convinced. Oil industry workers were among
the first to sound the alarm about Chávez’s authoritarian tendencies.
They went on strike in 2002 and 2003, demanding a new presidential
election. In response to the protests, Chávez fired almost half of
the work force in the state-run oil company and imposed an arcane
currency-exchange-control regime. The system morphed into a cesspool
of corruption, as regime cronies realized that arbitraging between
the state-authorized exchange rate and the black market could yield
fortunes overnight. This arbitrage racket created an extraordinarily
wealthy elite of government-connected kleptocrats. As this budding
kleptocracy perfected the art of siphoning off oil proceeds into its
own pockets, Venezuelan store shelves grew bare.
It was all painfully predictable—and widely predicted. But the
louder local and international experts sounded the alarm, the more
the government clung to its agenda. To Chávez, dire warnings from
technocrats were a sign that the revolution was on the right track.
PASSING THE TORCH

In 2011, Chávez was diagnosed with cancer. Top oncologists in Brazil
and the United States offered to treat him. But he opted instead to
search for a cure in Cuba, the country he trusted not only to treat him
but also to be discreet about his condition. As his illness progressed,
his dependence on Havana deepened, and the mystery about the real
state of his health grew. On December 8, 2012, an ailing Chávez made
one final television appearance to ask Venezuelans to make Maduro,
then vice president, his successor. For the next three months, Venezuela
was governed spectrally and by remote control: decrees emanated from
Havana bearing Chávez’s signature, but no one saw him, and speculation
was rife that he had already died. When Chávez’s death was finally
announced, on March 5, 2013, the only thing that was clear amid the
atmosphere of secrecy and concealment was that Venezuela’s next
leader would carry on the tradition of Cuban influence.
Chávez had long looked to Cuba as a blueprint for revolution, and
he turned to Cuban President Fidel Castro for advice at critical
junctures. In return, Venezuela sent oil: energy aid to Cuba (in the form
of 115,000 barrels a day sold at a deep discount) was worth nearly
$1 billion a year to Havana. The relationship between Cuba and
Venezuela became more than an alliance. It has been, as Chávez
himself once put it, “a merger of two revolutions.” (Unusually, the senior

partner in the alliance is poorer and smaller than the junior partner—
but so much more competent that it dominates the relationship.) Cuba
is careful to keep its footprint light: it conducts most of its consultations
in Havana rather than Caracas.
It did not escape anyone’s attention that the leader Chávez annointed
to succeed him had devoted his life to the cause of Cuban communism.
As a teenager, Maduro joined a fringe pro-Cuban Marxist party in
Caracas. In his 20s, instead of going to university, he sought training
in Havana’s school for international cadres to become a professional
revolutionary. As Chávez’s foreign minister from 2006 to 2013, he
had seldom called attention to himself: only his unfailing loyalty to
Chávez, and to Cuba, propelled his ascent to the top. Under his leader-
ship, Cuba’s influence in Venezuela has become pervasive. He has stacked
key government posts with activists trained in Cuban organizations,
and Cubans have come to occupy sensitive roles within the Venezuelan
regime. The daily intelligence briefs Maduro consumes, for instance,
are produced not by Venezuelans but by Cuban intelligence officers.
With Cuban guidance, Maduro has deeply curtailed economic free-
doms and erased all remaining traces of liberalism from the country’s
politics and institutions. He has continued and expanded Chávez’s
practice of jailing, exiling, or banning from political life opposition
leaders who became too popular or hard to co-opt. Julio Borges, a key
opposition leader, fled into exile to avoid being jailed, and Leopoldo
López, the opposition’s most charismatic leader, has been moved back
and forth between a military prison and house arrest. Over 100 political
prisoners linger in jails, and reports of torture are common. Periodic
elections have become farcical, and the government has stripped the
opposition-controlled National Assembly of all powers. Maduro has
deepened Venezuela’s alliances with a number of anti-American and
anti-Western regimes, turning to Russia for weapons, cybersecurity, and
expertise in oil production; to China for financing and infrastructure;
to Belarus for homebuilding; and to Iran for car production.
As Maduro broke the last remaining links in Venezuela’s tradi-
tional alliances with Washington and other Latin American democ-
racies, he lost access to sound economic advice. He dismissed the
consensus of economists from across the political spectrum: al-
though they warned about inflation, Maduro chose to rely on the
advice of Cuba and fringe Marxist policy advisers who assured him
that there would be no consequences to making up budget shortfalls
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with freshly minted money. Inevitably, a devastating bout of hyper-

inflation ensued.
A toxic combination of Cuban influence, runaway corruption, the
dismantling of democratic checks and balances, and sheer incompetence
has kept Venezuela locked into catastrophic economic policies. As
monthly inflation rates top three digits, the government improvises
policy responses that are bound to make the situation even worse.
ANATOMY OF A COLLAPSE
Nearly all oil-producing liberal democracies, such as Norway, the
United Kingdom, and the United States, were democracies before
they became oil producers. Autocracies that have found oil, such as
Angola, Brunei, Iran, and Russia, have been unable to make the leap to
liberal democracy. For four decades, Venezuela seemed to have miracu-
lously beat these odds—it democratized and liberalized in 1958, decades
after finding oil.
But the roots of Venezuelan liberal democracy turned out to be
shallow. Two decades of bad economics decimated the popularity of
the traditional political parties, and a charismatic demagogue, riding the
wave of an oil boom, stepped into the breach. Under these unusual con-
ditions, he was able to sweep away the whole structure of democratic
checks and balances in just a few years.
When the decadelong oil price boom ended in 2014, Venezuela lost
not just the oil revenue on which Chávez’s popularity and international
influence had depended but also access to foreign credit markets. This
left the country with a massive debt overhang: the loans taken out during
the oil boom still had to be serviced, although from a much-reduced
income stream. Venezuela ended up with politics that are typical of
autocracies that discover oil: a predatory, extractive oligarchy that ignores
regular people as long they stay quiet and that violently suppresses them
when they protest.
The resulting crisis is morphing into the worst humanitarian disaster
in memory in the Western Hemisphere. Exact figures for Venezuela’s
GDP collapse are notoriously difficult to come by, but economists
estimate that it is comparable to the 40 percent contraction of Syria’s
GDP since 2012, following the outbreak of its devastating civil war.
Hyperinflation has reached one million percent per year, pushing
61 percent of Venezuelans to live in extreme poverty, with 89 percent
of those surveyed saying they do not have the money to buy enough
food for their families and 64 percent reporting they have lost an
average of 11 kilograms (about 24 pounds) in body weight due to
hunger. About ten percent of the population—2.6 million Venezu-
elans—have fled to neighboring countries.
The Venezuelan state has mostly given up on providing public
services such as health care, education, and even policing; heavy-handed,
repressive violence is the final thing left that Venezuelans can rely on
the public sector to consistently deliver. In the face of mass protests in
2014 and 2017, the government responded with thousands of arrests,
brutal beatings and torture, and the killing of over 130 protesters.
Meanwhile, criminal business is increasingly conducted not in defi-
ance of the state, or even simply in cahoots with the state, but directly
through it. Drug trafficking has emerged alongside oil production and
currency arbitrage as a key source of profits to those close to the ruling
elite, with high-ranking officials and members of the president’s family
facing narcotics charges in the United States. A small connected elite
has also stolen national assets to a unprecedented degree. In August, a
series of regime-connected businessmen were indicted in U.S. federal
courts for attempting to launder over $1.2 billion in illegally obtained
funds—just one of a dizzying array of illegal scams that are part of the
looting of Venezuela. The entire southeastern quadrant of the country
has become an exploitative illegal mining camp, where desperate
people displaced from cities by hunger try their luck in unsafe mines
run by criminal gangs under military protection. All over the country,
prison gangs, working in partnership with government security forces,
run lucrative extortion rackets that make them the de facto civil authority.
The offices of the Treasury, the central bank, and the national oil com-
pany have become laboratories where complicated financial crimes are
hatched. As Venezuela’s economy has collapsed, the lines separating the
state from criminal enterprises have all but disappeared.
THE VENEZUELAN DILEMMA

Whenever U.S. President Donald Trump meets with a Latin American
leader, he insists that the region do something about the Venezuelan
crisis. Trump has prodded his own national security team for “strong”
alternatives, at one point stating that there are “many options” for
Venezuela and that he is “not going to rule out the military option.”
Republican Senator Marco Rubio of Florida has similarly flirted with
a military response. Secretary of Defense James Mattis, however, has

echoed a common sentiment of the U.S. security apparatus by publicly

stating, “The Venezuelan crisis is not a military matter.” All of Venezuela’s
neighboring countries have also voiced their opposition to an armed
attack on Venezuela.
And rightly so. Trump’s fantasies of military invasion are deeply
misguided and extremely dangerous. Although a U.S.-led military
assault would likely have no problem overthrowing Maduro in short
order, what comes next could be far worse, as the Iraqis and the Libyans
know only too well: when outside powers overthrow autocrats sitting
atop failing states, open-ended chaos is much more likely to follow
than stability—let alone democracy.
Nonetheless, the United States will continue to face pressure to
find some way of arresting Venezuela’s collapse. Each initiative un-
dertaken so far has served only to highlight that there is, in reality,
little the United States can do. During the Obama administration,
U.S. diplomats attempted to engage
The other Latin American the regime directly. But negotiations
proved futile. Maduro used interna-
countries are finally grasping tionally mediated talks to neutralize
that Venezuela’s instability massive street protests: protest lead-
will inevitably spill across ers would call off demonstrations
during the talks, but Chavista nego-
their borders. tiators would only stonewall, parceling
out minor concessions designed to
divide their opponents while they themselves prepared for the next
wave of repression. The United States and Venezuela’s neighbors
seem to have finally grasped that, as things stand, negotiations only
play into Maduro’s hands.
Some have suggested using harsh economic sanctions to pressure
Maduro to step down. The United States has tried this. It passed several
rounds of sanctions, under both the Obama and Trump administra-
tions, to prevent the regime from issuing new debt and to hamper the
financial operation of the state-owned oil company. Together with
Canada and the EU, Washington has also put in place sanctions against
specific regime officials, freezing their assets abroad and imposing travel
restrictions. But such measures are redundant: if the task is to destroy
the Venezuelan economy, no set of sanctions will be as effective as the
regime itself. The same is true for an oil blockade: oil production is
already in a free fall.
Washington can sharpen its policy on the margins. For one thing,
it needs to put more emphasis on a Cuban track: little can be achieved
without Havana’s help, meaning that Venezuela needs to be front and
center in every contact Washington and its allies have with Havana.
The United States can cast a wider net in countering corruption,
preventing not just crooked officials but also their frontmen and families
from enjoying the fruits of corruption, drug trafficking, and embezzle-
ment. It could also work to turn the existing U.S. arms embargo into
a global one. The Maduro regime must be constrained in its authoritarian
intent with policies that communicate clearly to its cronies that continuing
to aid the regime will leave them isolated in Venezuela and that turning on
the regime is, therefore, the only way out. Yet the prospects of such a
strategy succeeding are dim.
After a long period of dithering, the other Latin American countries
are finally grasping that Venezuela’s instability will inevitably spill
across their borders. As the center-left “pink wave” of the early years
of this century recedes, a new cohort of more conservative leaders in
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru has tipped the regional
balance against Venezuela’s dictatorship, but the lack of actionable
options bedevils them, as well. Traditional diplomacy hasn’t worked
and has even backfired. But so has pressure. For example, in 2017,
Latin American countries threatened to suspend Venezuela’s membership
in the Organization of American States. The regime responded by
withdrawing from the organization unilaterally, displaying just how
little it cares about traditional diplomatic pressure.
Venezuela’s exasperated neighbors are increasingly seeing the crisis
through the prism of the refugee problem it has created; they are anxious
to stem the flow of malnourished people fleeing Venezuela and placing
new strains on their social programs. As a populist backlash builds against
the influx of Venezuelan refugees, some Latin American countries
appear tempted to slam the door shut—a temptation they must resist, as
it would be a historic mistake that would only worsen the crisis. The reality
is that Latin American countries have no idea what to do about Venezuela.
There may be nothing they can do, save accepting refugees, which will at
least help alleviate the suffering of the Venezuelan people.
POWER TO THE PEOPLE

Today, the regime is so solidly entrenched that a change of faces is much
more likely than a change of system. Perhaps Maduro will be pushed

out by a slightly less incompetent leader who is able to render Cuban

hegemony in Venezuela more sustainable. Such an outcome would
merely mean a more stable foreign-dominated petro-kleptocracy, not
a return to democracy. And even if opposition forces—or a U.S.-led
armed attack—somehow managed to replace Maduro with an entirely
new government, the agenda would be daunting. A successor regime
would need to reduce the enormous role the military plays in all areas
of the public sector. It would have to start from scratch in restoring
basic services in health care, education, and law enforcement. It would
have to rebuild the oil industry and stimulate growth in other economic
sectors. It would need to get rid of the drug dealers, prison racketeers,
predatory miners, wealthy criminal financiers, and extortionists who
have latched on to every part of the state. And it would have to make
all these changes in the context of a toxic, anarchic political environ-
ment and a grave economic crisis.
Given the scale of these obstacles, Venezuela is likely to remain
unstable for a long time to come. The immediate challenge for its
citizens and their leaders, as well as for the international community,
is to contain the impact of the nation’s decline. For all the misery they
have experienced, the Venezuelan people have never stopped struggling
against misrule. As of this summer, Venezuelans were still staging
hundreds of protests each month. Most of them are local, grass-roots
affairs with little political leadership, but they show a people with the
will to fight for themselves.
Is that enough to nudge the country away from its current, grim
path? Probably not. Hopelessness is driving more and more Venezuelans
to fantasize about a Trump-led military intervention, which would
offer a fervently desired deus ex machina for a long-suffering people.
But this amounts to an ill-advised revenge fantasy, not a serious strategy.
Rather than a military invasion, Venezuelans’ best hope is to ensure
that the flickering embers of protest and social dissent are not extin-
guished and that resistance to dictatorship is sustained. Desperate
though the prospect may seem, this tradition of protest could one day
lay the foundations for the recovery of civic institutions and demo-
cratic practices. It won’t be simple, and it won’t be quick. Bringing a
state back from the brink of failure never is.∂
The Use and Misuse of

Economic Statecraft
How Washington Is Abusing
Its Financial Might
Jacob J. Lew and Richard Nephew
S
ince the end of the Cold War, the United States has come to rely
more and more on economic tools to advance its foreign policy goals.
Some of these tools, such as sanctions, involve the direct application
of economic pressure. Others, such as the promotion of free trade and
open markets, work by changing other countries’ incentives. But all of
them rest on a recognition that unrivaled economic power gives the United
States a singular capacity to pursue its interests without resorting to force.
But economic power, like any tool, can have unfortunate results if
wielded unwisely, producing unwanted short-term consequences and
prompting the long-term decline of U.S. economic leadership. Today,
Washington is increasingly using its economic power in aggressive
and counterproductive ways, undermining its global position and thus
its ability to act effectively in the future. Symptoms of the problem
have been evident for years, but it has gotten markedly worse under
the Trump administration, which has pursued reckless tariffs against both
allies and rivals, reimposed sanctions on Iran without any pretense of
international support, and acted in both cases with little evident regard
for the negative consequences to U.S. interests.
Every policy presents a tradeoff. Yet U.S. officials seem to have adopted
the belief that the United States is so large and powerful that the laws of
JACOB J. LEW is Visiting Professor of International and Public Affairs at the School of
International and Public Affairs (SIPA) at Columbia University and a Partner at Lindsay
Goldberg. He served as U.S. Treasury Secretary from 2013 to 2017.
RICHARD NEPHEW is Senior Research Scholar at SIPA’s Center on Global Energy Policy
and served as Deputy Coordinator for Sanctions Policy at the U.S. State Department from
2013 to 2015.

Jacob J. Lew and Richard Nephew The CSS Point
economic and political gravity no longer apply to it. According to this line
of thinking, the country can start trade wars and no one will retaliate
because, in the words of Peter Navarro, the director of the Trump admin-
istration’s National Trade Council, “we are the most lucrative and biggest
market in the world.” The United States can threaten sanctions against
its closest partners and allies, and they will somehow still cooperate, now
and in the future. And it can continue to make poor economic choices, and
the primacy of the U.S. dollar will somehow remain unchallenged.
But in an increasingly multipolar world, the economic influence that
the United States has enjoyed since the end of World War II can no
longer be taken for granted. And an aggressive or unilateral approach to
economic statecraft—a dynamic that was evident at times across multiple
administrations but that has reached an extreme under the current one—
threatens that very influence. If the Trump administration continues
down its current road, then it runs the risk not only of provoking global
resistance that will thwart its immediate policy goals but also of reducing
the United States’ long-term leverage on the global stage. That outcome
would be both tragic and ironic: U.S. policymakers, blinded by a belief
in their country’s unlimited power, will have accelerated its decline.
THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING PRUDENT

Economic statecraft—the use of economics as a tool of foreign policy—
can take many forms. The best example is sanctions, which directly
impose economic penalties on foreign countries or individuals for
noneconomic reasons, but other types of economic policy can also be
used for strategic ends. Trade, for example, is often used to gain inter-
national influence or pursue diplomatic goals. And as with military
power, the tools of economic statecraft don’t always have to be used to
achieve their desired effect: sanctions sometimes work best when the
mere threat of them prompts a concession.
Over the past three decades, globalization has increased the impor-
tance of good economic statecraft. Greater interconnectedness means
that countries are now benefiting from opportunities around the world;
at the same time, they are more exposed than ever to risks that flow from
decisions made on the other side of the planet. This interconnected-
ness gives policymakers, especially those in a country as economically
powerful as the United States, an important source of leverage. Thanks
to globalization, foreign banks and companies will often comply with
U.S. sanctions not because their own governments require it but because
The Use and Misuse of Economic Statecraft
they wish to retain access to the U.S. market, dollar, and financial
system, greatly magnifying the power of those sanctions.
Yet this advantage is not a license for the United States to do whatever
it wants. There are risks and costs to economic statecraft, and using it
properly is a careful balancing act. Before imposing sanctions, for
instance, U.S. policymakers should consider whether the measures
might violate trade agreements or other international obligations and,
if so, whether the benefits will still outweigh the costs. They should
be doubly cautious in cases where their actions could undermine funda-
mental U.S. interests, whether in the promotion of free trade, the
creation of markets for U.S. goods and services, or the protection of
institutions that facilitate global business and development. In fact,
prudence and restraint are often cardinal virtues in U.S. economic
statecraft, since radical changes may threaten the United States’ current
position of economic power.
KING OF THE HILL

Although sanctions and other forms of economic coercion had long been
tools in the U.S. foreign policy arsenal, their use greatly expanded
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which left the United States
with unprecedented economic and political power. According to the
economists Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, and Kimberly Ann
Elliott, during the 1990s, Washington used some form of unilateral
sanctions against 35 countries, up from 20 the previous decade. In some
cases, including the U.S. sanctions against Iraq in 1990–91, Yugoslavia
in 1991, and Rwanda in 1994, the United States worked with other
countries in the UN Security Council to legitimize the measures. But
if coordinated international pressure was unachievable or failed to
convince a country to change its behavior, Washington did not hesitate
to resort to more aggressive, unilateral measures.
The most important of these were what policymakers call “secondary
sanctions.” Regular, or “primary,” sanctions bar U.S. citizens and firms
from doing business with particular companies or individuals. Secondary
sanctions, by contrast, prohibit Americans from doing business not only
with sanctioned companies and people but also with any third parties
dealing with them. If a bank in France made a loan to a company in Iran,
for instance, Americans could be barred from dealing with that bank, even
if the loan were legal under French law. The result would be to effectively
shut the French bank out of the U.S. financial system. And because so

many of the world’s major companies are involved in the American finan-
cial system or conduct business in U.S. dollars, secondary sanctions give
U.S. policymakers a far longer reach than they would otherwise enjoy.
Other countries often bristle at secondary sanctions, viewing them
as a particularly brazen example of American unilateralism and an
illegal, extraterritorial application of U.S. law. In 1996, Congress
authorized the U.S. government to sanction foreign companies for
doing business with Cuba or for investing in the Iranian or Libyan
oil sectors. The EU responded by accusing Washington of violating
both European sovereignty and inter-
Other countries often view national law, initiating proceedings
against the United States at the World
secondary sanctions as a Trade Organization (WTO), and pass-
particularly brazen example ing legislation prohibiting European
of U.S. unilateralism. firms from complying with U.S. sanc-
tions against those countries. Tensions
were defused only when the Clinton
administration agreed not to enforce secondary sanctions against
European companies in exchange for greater U.S.-European policy
harmonization on Cuba, Iran, and Libya.
After the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush took a more ag-
gressive line as part of the war on terrorism, regularly asserting that
the United States could impose penalties against companies and peo-
ple that had no physical presence in the country yet did business in
dollars or through U.S. financial institutions. In 2006, for instance,
U.S. officials invoked an executive order concerning the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction (signed by Bush the year before) to
warn foreign firms that they could be sanctioned for working with
Iranian companies. And in 2010, in an effort to further punish Tehran
for its nuclear program, Congress dramatically expanded secondary
sanctions on foreign financial institutions doing business with Iran
while limiting the president’s authority to waive their enforcement.
European governments, among others, could have resisted these sanc-
tions and complained about their enforcement, as they did in the 1990s.
At the time, however, they were working closely with the United States
to deal with the Iranian threat, including by tightening UN sanctions on
Iran. The Europeans were therefore willing to cooperate with the United
States in sanctions enforcement, leading many in Washington to believe
that they had accepted secondary sanctions as a legitimate policy tool.
They had not. Although the Europeans agreed that Iran needed to
be pressured, they continued to insist that the EU pass its own sanctions
and that European companies follow European, not U.S., law. European
officials continued to object, moreover, when Washington enforced its
primary sanctions on European banks using the U.S. financial system
to do business with sanctioned entities. In 2014, for example, the United
States fined the French bank BNP Paribas nearly $9 billion for violating
U.S. sanctions on Cuba, Iran, and Sudan, prompting accusations from
Paris of “economic warfare” and an attempt by French President François
Hollande to convince Washington to waive the fine. Europe’s frustrations
sent a clear signal: aggressive use of U.S. economic power can produce
blowback, even from close allies.
Yet even as U.S. policymakers became more willing to assert global
sanctioning authority during the Bush and Obama administrations,
they understood the limits of confrontation. Consider how the Obama
administration dealt with getting China to join the sanctions against
Iran. True, the administration compelled China to reduce its purchases
of Iranian oil and used secondary sanctions to punish myriad Chinese
entities for doing business with Iran. But the administration picked its
battles. Although China reduced its purchases of Iranian oil by less
than the 20 percent that other countries did, Washington accepted
China’s contribution to the pressure campaign and declined to apply
secondary sanctions against Chinese entities buying Iranian oil, since
doing so could have undermined progress on other important bilateral
issues or started a costly sanctions or trade war.
The Obama administration also chose to tread carefully when orga-
nizing sanctions against Russia in response to its invasion and annexation
of the Crimean Peninsula in early 2014. Unlike China, Russia is not a
global economic power, but it does have a great deal of leverage in
Europe, particularly in the energy sector. Even today, the country is
the EU’s fourth-largest trading partner, and the Russian and European
financial sectors are tightly linked, meaning that any damage done to
financial institutions in Russia could easily spread to those in Europe,
creating the risk of global contagion.
In deciding how to respond to Russian aggression, U.S. policymakers
thus had to consider the interests of their European allies. When the
United States and the EU finally agreed on sanctions, they carefully
engineered them to concentrate pressure on the key decision-makers in
Moscow while leaving Russia’s energy exports to Europe intact. The early

sanctions, enacted in the initial months of 2014, targeted influential indi-

viduals around Russian President Vladimir Putin and their preferred
financial institution, Bank Rossiya. As Russia moved deeper into Ukraine
throughout 2014, the campaign intensified, with the United States, the
EU, and other allies passing new sanctions limiting Russian access to inter-
national debt and equity financing. Although the results of these sanctions
were mixed—Russia did not withdraw from Ukraine, but it did suffer real
economic pain and eventually came to the negotiating table—Washington
managed to preserve a cooperative relationship with its allies.
To be sure, excessive deference to international concerns is not
always a virtue. For example, the Obama administration could have—
and in retrospect perhaps should have—pushed China earlier and harder
to join in the international sanctions against North Korea. Believing that
Pyongyang was still years away from developing a deliverable nuclear
warhead, the White House limited its short-term pressure on Beijing
over this issue in order to secure its cooperation in other areas, such
as the negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program and the Paris
agreement on climate change. Only once it became clear in 2016 that
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs were advancing rapidly did
the Obama administration increase pressure on China and win support
in the UN Security Council for tougher international sanctions.
President Donald Trump, to his credit, has been more willing to
squeeze China for concessions on North Korea. Through bellicose rhetoric
and a tightened multilateral sanctions regime, he succeeded in convincing
China to step up its enforcement of international sanctions on North
Korea. It is doubtful whether the current U.S.–North Korean talks will
go anywhere, but even so, Trump’s high-risk approach helped drive
North Korea to the negotiating table. A potential side effect, however,
is that the Trump administration has learned the wrong lesson from its
success: that the aggressive use of sanctions pressure always pays off.
PENNY WISE, DOLLAR FOOLISH

Although sanctions have been key instruments for the United States,
they are not the only tools of U.S. economic statecraft. During the 1990s
and the first decade of this century, the United States worked to remove
trade barriers through both bilateral and multilateral agreements while
strengthening institutions behind them, such as the WTO. In so doing,
it expanded growth, encouraged developing countries to embrace free
markets and open societies, and helped reduce global poverty.
Yet in its engagement with international institutions, as with sanc-

tions, Washington’s perception of its own invulnerability has at times
undermined its interests. Even as it promoted free trade, the United
States was gradually becoming a less reliable partner in funding the
institutions that held up the global economic order. It fell into arrears
at the UN in 1985, and its commitments to the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund have been in constant peril since the
1990s. Washington has historically been the main funder of the largest
international financial institutions (IFIs)—the World Bank and the
IMF—which has granted the United States powerful influence within
them, including veto power over their major decisions. Although U.S.
funding for those IFIs has remained sufficient to retain that veto power,
it has been shrinking as a percentage of total new commitments.
Helping fund IFIs serves U.S. interests. By contributing to international
financial stability, IFIs reduce the risk of crises that could damage the
U.S. economy; by establishing common standards for financial behavior,
they get emerging-market countries invested in the rules-based liberal
order; and by distributing economic burdens, they allow the United
States to pursue its interests at a reduced cost to itself, as was the case
with the U.S.-led IMF campaign to stabilize Ukraine’s economy in
the face of Russian aggression. But when Washington does not pay its
bills or prevents the institutions from giving greater voice to emerging-
market countries, it limits its own ability to project power.
The IMF is a case in point. Since the 1990s, its funding has been a
source of fractious debates in Congress. In 1998, a bill to appropriate
money for the fund passed thanks mainly to the bipartisan efforts of
senators representing agricultural states, who saw the IMF as a means to
maintain U.S. export markets abroad. And when the IMF attempted to
enact reforms in 2008 and 2010 to replenish its capital after the global
financial crisis, proposing a doubling of total member contributions
and a greater vote share for developing countries, it took Congress until
2015 to approve the reforms. Frustrated by the long delay and their
lack of influence within the organization, emerging-market countries
responded by creating new multilateral institutions, such as the New
Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
U.S. leadership at the World Bank and IMF grants Washington enor-
mous leverage. But although it has veto power in these institutions, it
cannot automatically win support for its priorities within them. Doing so
requires international consensus, which becomes harder to achieve the

more that other countries think the United States is shirking its respon-
sibilities. Washington supported IMF loans to Europe after the 2007–8
economic crisis, which reduced U.S. exposure to financial contagion, and
to Iraq in 2004 and 2016, which helped the U.S. war effort by stabilizing
the Iraqi economy. In both cases, IFIs bore much of the financial burden
for policies important to the United States. Washington was able to win
support for these efforts, but the longer its commitment to IFIs withers,
the harder such support will be to obtain.
TRUMP’S WRONG TURN

Although international concerns about Washington’s aggressive use of
economic tools have been growing for decades, they have become even
more acute under Trump. His administration is behaving as if the United
States is immune to consequences, whether in the form of adversaries
exerting economic pressure or allies rejecting the legitimacy of U.S. policy.
This hubris is particularly evident in two areas: the administration’s
protectionist trade policy and its withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal.
On trade, Trump got off to bad start by pulling out of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership, a 12-nation free-trade agreement, during his first
week in office. Matters have only gotten worse in 2018, as the United
States has imposed tariffs on a wide range of imports, including alumi-
num, solar panels, steel, and washing machines. These have applied
not only to rival states, such as China, but also to close allies, such as
Canada, Mexico, and the EU. Although the United States can point to
legitimate concerns, such as China’s exporting of aluminum and steel
at artificially low prices, Trump’s policies are doing more harm than
good. Other countries have responded with retaliatory tariffs against
U.S. goods, from soybeans to Harley-Davidson motorcycles, but even
more concerning than the economic costs is the damage that has been
done to relations with allies. Moreover, Trump’s tariffs, coming at the
same time as his shift on Iran, have antagonized Washington’s European
allies, in particular, with leaders across the continent now calling for
greater EU independence from the United States.
On Iran, Trump has also managed to undermine U.S. interests through
bellicose, unilateral action. When Trump withdrew the United States from
the Iran deal in May, he did so against the wishes of every other party to
the agreement and despite all available evidence suggesting that Iran was
complying with it. The administration then began reimposing U.S. sanc-
tions and threatening to aggressively enforce secondary sanctions against
companies whose governments have remained in the deal, including

those of the United States’ Asian and European allies.
Trump’s decision has begun to seriously affect Iran’s already shaky
economy. Iranian oil exports have been dropping since April, and analysis
by BMI Research estimates that the country’s GDP will shrink by 4.3 per-
cent in 2019. This should come as no surprise. Officials in the Obama
administration often stated that U.S.
sanctions, if reimposed, could damage
the Iranian economy, notwithstanding
The Trump administration
the relief it had enjoyed under the Iran is behaving as if the
deal. But the point of sanctions is not United States is immune
simply to impose pain; it is to use this to consequences.
pain as part of a negotiating process,
with the aim of getting policy conces-
sions from the other side. Sanctions work only if other countries believe
that they can obtain relief by changing their behavior. If a country bows
to U.S. demands only for Washington to reimpose sanctions, as Trump
has done with Iran, there is little incentive for compliance in the future.
By going it alone and pulling out of the Iran deal, the United States
has potentially failed in terms of both exerting pain and prompting
concessions. Washington’s closest European allies, such as France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom, are now working directly with
the Iranian government to find ways of diverting business away from
the dollar-based financial system in order to avoid U.S. sanctions and
keep the existing deal in place. In July, the remaining participants in
the nuclear deal released a joint statement that included a lengthy list of
efforts to block the enforcement of U.S. sanctions, such as maintaining
financial channels with Iran, promoting trade and export credits, and
encouraging European investment in the country. Even if these efforts
fail in the short term, they could eventually lead to the development of
new strategies for working around U.S. policy.
LOSING THE RACE

The outlook for U.S. economic statecraft, if it continues on its present
trajectory, is bleak. When it comes to sanctions, other countries will
likely soon begin challenging or ignoring measures that have been im-
posed by Washington without international support. The more that other
countries are willing to cheat on sanctions or simply look the other way,
the more the United States alone will have to shoulder the burden for

monitoring and enforcing them. As more nations find means of avoiding

enforcement, such as business structures that separate companies
transacting with the United States from those transacting with sanctioned
entities, U.S. sanctions will begin to lose their effectiveness. And if
other countries band together to reject U.S. sanctions, Washington could
find itself having to choose between enforcing against everyone and
giving up on the sanctions.
Things will get even worse as the United States loses its dominant
position in the global economy. Today, the country largely gets its way
because there is no alternative to the dollar and no export market as
attractive as the United States. But if Washington continues to force
other nations to go along with policies that they consider both illegal
and unwise, over the next 20 to 30 years, they are likely to shift
away from the United States’ economy and financial system. On a
long enough timeline, the formation of alternative centers of eco-
nomic power may be inevitable, but it would be foolish to accelerate
this process and worse to make the United States toxic while doing so.
On trade, too, the United States faces a future of more, and possibly
more unfair, competition. The current international economic system
does not operate perfectly, but it does have rules against unfair trading
practices and the means of enforcing them. Moreover, the system
incentivizes all nations to obey the rules. China and Russia did not join
the WTO simply for prestige; they also wanted to obtain the benefits
that flow from membership, such as preferential tariff rates and a legal
remedy against protectionism. If the United States abandons its role as
the guarantor of this system, other countries may rewrite the rules of
trade. They are unlikely to do so with U.S. interests in mind.
GETTING BACK ON TRACK

If Washington wants to maintain its economic leverage in the future, U.S.
policymakers will have to temper the unilateral approach to economic
statecraft that they have increasingly adopted since the end of the Cold
War. To begin with, they must be honest with themselves about the limits
of U.S. power and the tradeoffs that accompany any policy. The United
States must protect its right to act unilaterally, and in some cases, it will
make sense to pursue an aggressive line or act against the wishes of U.S.
allies. But policymakers should do so in full knowledge of the potential
consequences and only when truly necessary—indeed, unilateral actions
will be easier to justify if they are seen as exceptions rather than the rule.
There are three immediate policy changes that would help get U.S.
economic statecraft back on track. First, the Trump administration
should stop its destructive and divisive trade war, especially with U.S.
allies. Given its economic strength, the United States may not lose a
trade war with Canada or the EU, but it will not win one, either.
Regardless of which side suffers more, a sustained trade war will not
just damage the U.S. economy by disrupting long-standing patterns
of trade and incentivizing companies to avoid doing business in the
United States. It will also limit U.S. power and influence.
Second, the United States should restrict its use of secondary sanc-
tions, deploying them only in pursuit of the most important national
security objectives and only after trying and failing to persuade other
nations to join in multilateral sanctions. Secondary sanctions are a
tempting policy tool, since using them is far easier than working through
international institutions or diplomacy. But they should be used sparingly
and in coordination with partners. If Washington continues to rely on
them without developing a broad consensus in favor of its policy goals,
efforts on the part of other countries to reduce their dependence on the
United States will only accelerate.
Finally, the United States should seek to coordinate internationally
when possible. The Trump administration has sung the praises of inde-
pendent action, which allows Washington to avoid the compromises
that come with multilateral approaches. But although getting buy-in can
be time consuming and frustrating, the resulting measures are more
likely to succeed and persist. Multilateralism also strengthens interna-
tional institutions, which distribute responsibility and make it less
likely that the United States will have to shoulder a disproportionate
share of the burden.
At present, it seems unlikely that Trump will arrest the trend toward
more aggressive unilateralism in U.S. economic statecraft; indeed, he may
accelerate it. If he does, it will fall to Congress to both control its own
impulses toward unilateral action and exercise oversight over executive-
branch decisions on sanctions and trade policy, ensuring that these are
prudent and in keeping with U.S. interests. It is not too late for the
United States to mitigate some of the risks it currently faces and to set the
stage for a more effective use of economic statecraft in the future. Doing
so, however, will require something more than threats and bluster—it
will require an honest reckoning on the part of U.S. policymakers with
the limits of American power.∂

Generation Stress
The Mental Health Crisis on Campus
Sylvia Mathews Burwell
I
t is supposed to be the time of their life—the halcyon days of college,
when young adults grow, acquire knowledge, and learn new skills. But
according to the 2016–17 Healthy Minds Study, an annual survey of
mental health on American college campuses, while 44 percent of students
said that they were flourishing, 39 percent reported experiencing symp-
toms of depression or anxiety. The proportion of students experiencing
suicidal ideation has grown from six percent in 2007 to 11 percent in 2017.
The percentage of students receiving psychotherapy has jumped from
13 percent to 24 percent over the same period. Even though more stu-
dents are getting help, only a little more than half of those with symptoms
of depression and anxiety had received treatment in the previous year.
The rise in mental health challenges is not limited to college students.
One in every four adults in the United States will suffer from an anxiety
disorder in the course of his or her lifetime, and suicide rates for men
and women have risen since 2000. Whether these figures are a passing
trend, the new normal, or a harbinger of greater challenges to come,
one cannot fully know. But no matter what, universities need to deal
with this uptick in psychological distress. No longer can they consider
students’ mental health to be outside their area of responsibility.
Nowadays, that responsibility has broadened to include increasing
students’ resiliency—that is, helping them not just avoid stress but
also develop the tools to work through it. Resiliency is about decreasing
students’ sense of overwhelming stress while fostering their growing
autonomy to tackle difficult life challenges. It’s also about treating their
very real depression and anxiety.
Taking responsibility for students’ mental health needs is particularly
complex at a time when universities are rightfully under pressure about
SYLVIA MATHEWS BURWELL is President of American University. From 2014 to 2017,
she was U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services.
Generation Stress
cost and access. And it is all the more complex given that part of the core
mission of higher education is to challenge students. To put it succinctly,
college is supposed to be hard. How to balance the natural challenges
and stress that university life presents while supporting students’ mental
health is an increasingly difficult tightrope to walk. Yet it needs to be walked,
since students’ mental health is a growing concern, and when that health
is poor, it can inhibit the core mission of learning. To address the issue,
universities must raise awareness of the problem through education inside
and outside the academy; focus on prevention, detection, and treatment;
and acknowledge the importance of community—all while recognizing
that stress is a part of life.
Following World War II, the United States built a thriving middle
class and became the engine of the global economy thanks to the founda-
tion of a thriving higher education system. Now, that same system must
be a part of resolving today’s mental health crisis, which presents a
broad challenge to American competitiveness and productivity.
STRESSED OUT
In my first year as president of American University, I met with students
from a variety of backgrounds and quickly learned that they have a
great deal of insight into why they experience more stress and anxiety
than previous generations. The answer boils down to three factors:
safety, economics, and technology.
Students’ concerns about safety stem from different sources. Most
undergraduates have no memory of a world before 9/11. They have
grown up with bag searches on subways, SWAT teams at stadiums, and
body scanners at airports—constant visual reminders that the United
States was attacked and could be again. Students of an older generation
would note that those are no different from Cold War–era “duck
and cover” drills. Yet today’s students point out that Americans never
experienced nuclear war, only the threat of it.
They have also grown up with increasingly deadly mass shootings.
This fall, students arrived on campus with the 2018 attack at Marjory
Stoneman Douglas High School, in Parkland, Florida, fresh in their
minds, but they also remember the attacks in 2017 at a concert in Las
Vegas, in 2016 at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, in 2012 at Sandy Hook
Elementary School, and in 2007 at Virginia Tech. For some students
on campus, incidents that have involved racially motivated acts of
violence—such as the events in Charlottesville, Virginia, in 2017—

Sylvia Mathews Burwell The CSS Point
add to their fear, stress, and anxiety. Female students have additional
cause for worry. While the increasing transparency about how often
sexual assault occurs on campus has helped advance the conversation
about the issue, it has also added to safety concerns.
Other fears are rooted in economics. A college education is essential
to social mobility, but tuition at both public and private universities
continues to rise. Many students, especially first-generation college
students, come from families with already stretched budgets and little
experience in the nuances of financing higher education, making the
prospect of student debt particularly daunting.
Students also worry about the economy they are graduating into—
they are old enough to remember the Great Recession—and fear
that they will end up jobless, unable to pay off their debt, and forced
to live with their parents. Although unemployment is now low in the
United States, wage growth has stayed relatively flat throughout the
recovery, and early career salaries, in particular, dropped
during the recession.
As a result, many students worry that they will do
no better than their parents, and with good reason:
in the United States, the likelihood that a child
will earn more than his or her parents has dropped
from 90 percent to 50 percent over the past half
century. Students also see an economy that offers
them not a single career choice but an ever-
changing panoply of career steps. Such a path
may be exciting, but it is nowhere as conducive to
stable health insurance and a secure retirement as
the one their parents and grandparents followed.
Then there is the anxiety that results from social
media. Part of the stress has to do with the pressure on
young people to constantly present a curated version of their
lives on Instagram, Snapchat, and other platforms. The way I
translate this concern to older generations is by asking, “What
would it be like if you had to update your resumé every day?” The
obvious answer: incredibly stressful. Another part of the stress
comes from the observing side of social media. Because people tend
to heavily curate what they present, it can sometimes seem as if
everyone else has better internships, earns higher grades, and attends
more exclusive parties.
Generation Stress
THINGS REALLY ARE DIFFERENT

Some argue that all this is nothing new, that school has always been
anxiety inducing. But regardless of whether today’s students really do
face a greater number of stressors than generations past, there is little
doubt that the impact of those stressors is felt more than before. Today’s
young adults seem to arrive at college with less resiliency and a lower
appetite for risk and failure.

In raising their children, parents have focused more on protecting

them from stress and anxiety and less on teaching them how to cope.
Today’s incoming classes are of a generation that received athletic
trophies merely for participating. Becoming so used to winning makes
it all the harder to deal with losing. It
Today’s young adults seem makes it harder to learn resiliency.
On top of this, parents have created a
to arrive at college with less culture of risk aversion. Today’s students
resiliency and a lower were warned as children not to walk
appetite for risk and failure. home alone, and they grew up playing
on playgrounds designed to break their
falls. In many ways, children have been
taught both explicitly and implicitly to avoid risk, and for many of
them, the resulting safety has made them less capable of coping with
failure and disappointment.
When students have a panic attack because they received a B minus
on a test, it becomes clear that parents have probably not done enough
to prepare them for the fact that life involves both success and failure.
Today, high school graduates arrive on American University’s campus
with higher SAT scores, more Advanced Placement credits, and more
International Baccalaureate degrees than ever before. They are book
smart but perhaps less life ready. This problem can be seen not only
in how they deal with bad news but also in what they know about basic
life skills, from managing their finances to doing their laundry. There
are exceptions, of course, but American University’s faculty and staff
are probably not unique in observing that students increasingly come
to college with less mastery of such skills.
Another way that today’s students differ from their predecessors is
in their relationships with their parents and other adults in their lives.
Gone are the days when a five-minute phone call every Sunday was the
extent of communication with family. For many students, thanks in
part to advances in technology, there is nearly constant communication
with parents through texting and calls. In the interactions I see with
faculty and staff on campus, students seem to seek more adult guidance
and assistance with problem solving than previous generations did.
Stress can play out in different ways. One common type of student
is the overachiever: a first-year student who was at the top of his class
in high school and never needed to exert much effort to get there. In
his first semester at college, he fails a couple of midterm exams and
Generation Stress
finds himself too embarrassed to lean on his support network from

home. At night, when his friends have gone to bed, he heads to the
library and immerses himself in his studies. Eventually, he’s sleeping
less than four hours a night. And only when he reaches a breaking
point does he seek out counseling that can help him work through his
own expectations and time management.
Another common type is the overcommitted student. She comes to
college with a strong sense of what she wants to do afterward—say,
work on a political campaign—and loads up on extracurricular activities
in pursuit of that goal. In her first semester, she joins several political
clubs, runs for student government, and takes on a part-time internship
on Capitol Hill. She even adds an extra class to get ahead. Without
this level of commitment, she fears, she won’t be competitive for the
best campaigns. The result is long days of meetings, work, and classes,
along with late nights trying to catch up. Only after she breaks down
emotionally does she confide in her dorm’s resident assistant, who
refers her to the counseling center.
CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE

According to a 2015 report from the Center for Collegiate Mental
Health, the number of students visiting counseling centers increased by
30 percent between 2009 and 2015 (enrollment grew by only six percent).
Across the country, colleges and universities are adding extra professional
staff to help students, in part because the types of counseling needs have
also expanded. Some students arrive with complex medication regimes,
whereas others are part of the growing number of students experiencing
thoughts of suicide, a trend that requires more emergency services, such
as 24-hour rapid-response counseling. As student bodies become more
diverse, schools need support staff who can reach across cultural divides.
Adding all these resources is not easy, especially for schools in rural areas,
where mental health providers are in short supply.
Universities are struggling to keep up with rising numbers of students
seeking support: according to the Association for University and College
Counseling Center Directors, in 2016–17, 34 percent of college counsel-
ing centers had to put some students on a waitlist. And it’s important to
note that many students remain reluctant to talk to a professional: while
stigma concerning mental health today is less than what it was in the
past, it still impedes students from recognizing their challenges, seeking
out help, and committing to treatment.

Universities are putting more effort into prevention. Harvard

University has started the Success-Failure Project, a program that hosts
discussions aimed at redefining success and dealing with rejection.
Duke University offers a mindfulness program designed to help students
manage stress. At American University, we introduced a mandatory,
two-semester course aimed at helping students adjust to their first year
in college. Of course, it’s important to make sure such programs don’t end
up adding to the problem: when I asked students if stress-reduction
seminars might be helpful, one responded, “Please don’t add anything
to my already packed schedule that will further stress me out!”
Campuses that focus on creating a sense of community and belonging
find that students who have support networks to turn to are better able
to work through their challenges and stress. This sense of belonging
can act as a preventive tool, countering students’ feelings of loneliness
and depression and providing a way for them to alert others to the
problems they are facing. Increasing a campus’ sense of community can
often mean running into long-standing questions—for instance, about
the value of fraternities and sororities and about whether to increase
student engagement by offering more activities and clubs. Universities
must face these old questions in the new context of growing mental
health issues.
PRODUCING HAPPIER GRADUATES

Universities are in the early stages of grappling with the increase in
stress and anxiety. Although there is no agreed-on formula at this time,
there are some approaches that show promise.
There is general agreement that the solution lies in more education
about the issue, inside and outside the academy. Creating awareness
of the problem and teaching faculty, staff, and students how to prevent,
recognize, and respond to it can help. Just as many campuses have
made progress on educating students about sexual assault, they can do
the same when it comes to mental health.
Moreover, as odd as it may sound, universities should draw on some
of the lessons learned during the 2014 Ebola outbreak—a global health
threat that emerged during my tenure as U.S. secretary of health and
human services—and adopt a public health approach to the problem.
With Ebola, the priorities were prevention, detection, and treatment.
These core elements can also guide universities in framing their approach
to mental health. Prevention can mean introducing courses that help
Generation Stress
students adjust to college life. Detection might mean developing ways

to quickly notice when a student doesn’t download an assignment or
show up for classes.
As for treatment, universities need to secure adequate resources for
counseling so that students seeking help receive timely and effective
care. On many campuses, triage systems prioritize the most acute
cases, determine which students can be treated in a limited number of
sessions, and refer to other providers those who require long-term
care. No university is capable of offering unlimited sessions and all
kinds of care, so administrators need to determine which cases to
refer and which to keep in house. They must also have the capacity to
meet demand without long waitlists for treatment. To inform their
investments, universities should use data about their campus’ particular
needs—especially at a time when the economics of higher education
are under both scrutiny and pressure.
Universities also need to acknowledge the power of communities.
Communities can not only act as a knowledge base and a source of
referrals; at a more basic level, they can also stem the problem to begin
with. Study after study has found that social connectedness is correlated
with well-being and resiliency, so universities should strive to build
inclusive communities. Encouraging in-person (not Instagram) con-
nections can help. Administrators should make sure that students are
aware of the clubs and groups on campus, offer a sense of belonging,
and invest in first-year residence halls and other communities for living
and learning. Faculty and staff should recognize the value of engaging
with students.
Finally, students, parents, and universities should embrace the
healthy idea that stress is a part of what makes college great. College
students develop intellectually, socially, and morally through a com-
bination of challenge and support. Their time on campus should be
not so overwhelming that they retreat, yet not so comfortable that
there is no incentive to grow. Thus, the college experience should
teach students not to avoid challenges—life is full of them, after
all—but how to handle the stress that results. Recognizing this is
the first step to producing more resilient students, as well as happier,
better-adjusted graduates.∂

Old Money, New Order

American Philanthropies and the Defense
of Liberal Democracy
Darren Walker
T
he world is experiencing a realignment unlike any other since
the end of World War II. Nationalism and populism are surging
in the United States and Europe, at the expense of liberal
internationalism and democratic values. This poses a challenge to a
wide range of institutions, including philanthropies committed to inter-
national development and social justice. Such foundations played a
crucial role in building the liberal international order that has come
under assault in recent years, and that the United States seems less
willing to defend than ever before.
During much of the last century, philanthropic foundations based
in the United States exported American ideals about democracy,
market economies, and civil society. That mission was made possible
by ideological support from and alignment with the U.S. government,
which, in turn, imbued foundations with prestige and influence as
they operated around the world. American philanthropies such as the
Ford Foundation can no longer count on such support. Nor can they
be sure that the goals of increased equality, the advancement of human
rights, and the promotion of democracy will find backing in Washington.
As U.S. leadership of the global order falters, American foundations
must blaze a new path. The first step will be recognizing difficult truths
about their history. The old order they helped forge was successful in
many ways but also suffered from fundamental flaws, including the
fact that it often privileged the ideas and institutions in prosperous
Western countries and failed to foster equitable growth and stability
in poorer countries. For all the good that American philanthropies
have done, they have also helped perpetuate a system that produces far
DARREN WALKER is President of the Ford Foundation.
too much inequality. Their task today is to contribute to the construction

of a new, improved order, one that is more just and sustainable than
its predecessor.
HOW TO SPEND IT
Although it was founded in 1936, prior to World War II, the Ford
Foundation as it exists today took shape mostly in the war’s aftermath.
The social and political upheaval that the war left in its wake and the
widespread anxiety about future conflict colored every decision the
foundation made from 1950 onward.
The foundation was chartered in Michigan by Henry Ford’s son,
Edsel, and was designed in part to protect the Ford family’s estate
from new federal inheritance taxes. In its early years, the foundation
was a modest organization that funded projects of interest to the Ford
family. But the war, along with the deaths of Edsel Ford, in 1943,
and his father, in 1947, fueled the foundation’s transformation into
a global actor.
Their bequests to the foundation totaled nearly 90 percent of the stock
of the Ford Motor Company and created an endowment that was
valued officially at $417 million in 1954 but was likely much larger.
(A 1955 New Yorker article put the number, based on Ford Motor
Company earnings, at closer to $2.5 billion, or $23.6 billion in today’s
dollars.) That wealth made the foundation the largest philanthropy
in the world, overtaking older institutions such as the Carnegie
Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation.
In 1948, Edsel Ford’s eldest son, Henry Ford II, asked the lawyer
and investment banker H. Rowan Gaither to lead a study to determine
what the foundation should do. Gaither’s team collected input from a
wide range of figures across the American establishment, from Dwight
Eisenhower to Walt Disney. Its report recommended that the organi-
zation commit itself to human welfare through, first and foremost,
“the establishment of peace,” a lofty goal that could be achieved only
by international cooperation and global economic development. This
mission aligned perfectly with Washington’s push to construct a liberal
order backed by U.S. military power and composed of alliances such
as NATO, multilateral organizations such as the International Monetary
Fund and the UN, and trade agreements such as the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. In embracing this emerging order, the
Ford Foundation was hardly alone among the philanthropic set: the

Darren Walker The CSS Point
Rockefeller family, for example, had helped secure land for the UN head-
quarters and facilitated the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, which led
to the creation of the IMF.
To define the foundation’s role in the emerging order, Ford turned
to some of the order’s most influential shapers. The first person from
outside the Ford family to serve as president of the foundation was
Paul Hoffman, who took charge in 1950 after having overseen the
execution of the Marshall Plan in postwar Europe. To Hoffman, the
foundation’s mission represented, in a
sense, a global extension of the Marshall
American philanthropies Plan’s goals: to foster democratic insti-
have helped perpetuate a tutions and free markets, ward off the
system that produces far too spread of communism, prevent the return
much inequality. of fascism, and secure American influ-
ence abroad. Hoffman toured the world,
identifying projects to fund in democra-
cies that Ford and the U.S. government deemed essential. Hoffman’s
goals were to mitigate global tensions, develop understanding among
peoples, strengthen international institutions such as the UN, and
improve how the United States engaged in global affairs.
Other boldface names served in important positions at Ford, creating
a revolving door between the foundation and the highest levels of
the U.S. government. In 1950, George Kennan, the author of the famous
“Long Telegram” (and a related, seminal article titled “The Sources
of Soviet Conduct,” published pseudonymously in this magazine in
1947), took a leave from the State Department, during which he
advised the foundation on its early programming and worked on a
Ford-funded project to create, in his words, “a more up-to-date, more
realistic concept of the objectives of American foreign policy: that
is, what the American government ought to be trying to achieve in its
foreign policies.” In 1952, John McCloy, after having served as U.S.
assistant secretary of war, U.S. high commissioner for Germany,
and the first president of the World Bank, was tasked by Hoffman
with investigating “the conditions of peace”—a project that led to
the foundation’s support of the Council on Foreign Relations (which
publishes Foreign Affairs) and of organizations such as the Brookings
Institution and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
McCloy later served as chair of the foundation’s board, from 1958
to 1965.
The cozy relationship between Ford and the U.S. government

would eventually draw a fair amount of criticism, particularly when
it came to the foundation’s influence on American foreign policy.
John Howard, a staff member who accompanied Hoffman on his
world tour, remarked that in India, “there was already suspicion
that the foundations were just arms of the State Department; [Indian
commentators] could never make the distinction between State and
the Ford Foundation.” At the same time, critics in India and Latin
America accused the foundation of entanglement with the CIA. It’s
easy to imagine how their interests might have converged during
that period, given the close relationship between the foundation
and the U.S. government. Nonetheless, efforts were made to ensure
that, as Francis Sutton, a foundation official, wrote, “the CIA was
kept at a prudent distance.”
Ford’s critics in Washington were more concerned with the foun-
dation’s domestic programs than with its international ones. In the
early 1950s, the U.S. House of Representatives’ Select Committee
to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations
(known as the Cox Committee, after Representative Edward Cox,
a Democrat from Georgia) sought to discover whether such foundations
were using their resources for “un-American and subversive activities.”
In a familiar Cold War paradox, some accused Ford and other foun-
dations of being agents of American imperialism, and others accused
them of being secret Soviet sympathizers.
COLD WARRIORS
As the Cold War intensified, alignment between the U.S. government
and major U.S. foundations became a de facto alliance against com-
munism, which both official Washington and its philanthropic allies
saw as a major threat to peace and to their joint mission. A memo from
Hoffman’s very first board meeting, in January 1951, makes clear that
“the main danger of war stems from tension between the East, led by
the Soviet Union, and the West, led by the United States.” According
to Howard, Hoffman’s visits to places such as India and Pakistan
stemmed from a “Cold War philosophy.” Although Hoffman “didn’t
speak like a Cold War warrior,” Howard later recalled, “the mere
choice of the underbelly of China was in the same genre of thinking.”
A foundation annual report from 1953 stated that the Ford Founda-
tion would work “only in those nations whose political philosophy and

objectives, if sustained or achieved, are incompatible with Communism.”

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Ford invested millions of dollars to
build state capacity in emerging democracies in Africa, Latin America,
and Southeast Asia. The foundation established its first international
office in New Delhi in 1952, in part due to concerns that intense poverty
would imperil the newly democratic and independent India by giving
communists an opening.
Fighting communism and promoting democracy through massive
poverty-reduction initiatives became a mainstay of Cold War–era
U.S. philanthropy. Beginning in the late 1950s, for instance, Ford
collaborated with the Rockefeller Foundation to support what became
known as the green revolution, helping to build and fund institutions
focused on agricultural research all over the world. Vastly improving
agricultural output, these efforts saved hundreds of millions—perhaps
billions—of lives and helped lift millions more out of destitution.
Many of Ford’s activities abroad involved connecting foreign gov-
ernment officials with American academics and experts, who could
aid postcolonial democracies in crafting plans for economic develop-
ment and institutional reform. The foundation also trained foreign
civil servants in fields such as business, finance, law, management, and
urban planning. The Ford Foundation followed in the Rockefeller
Foundation’s footsteps by building academic centers abroad and creating
exchange programs for policymakers and academics. By the late 1970s,
Ford had invested $450 million (approximately $1.7 billon in today’s
dollars) in these programs.
In 1968, in coordination with the State Department, the foundation
formalized these activities in the International Research and Exchanges
Board, which became extraordinarily influential in places such as Hun-
gary and Poland, and even in the Soviet Union itself. It also sought to
consolidate postwar democratic gains in Western Europe. The origins
of the European Union can be traced back to grants from Ford and
other American foundations, which funded scholarly research on Euro-
pean integration in the early 1950s, the work of the French diplomat
Jean Monnet (one of the founding fathers of the EU), and a series of
conferences for young leaders from across the continent who wanted to
forge a common European identity.
Through these kinds of projects, the foundation trained and supported
a generation of civil servants, diplomats, and leaders around the world,
thousands of whom went on to achieve great things—most notably
the late UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Some, however, later served

repressive, even violent regimes. These include a number of Indonesian
economists at the University of California, Berkeley, who became
known as “the Berkeley Mafia” when they went to work for Suharto’s
dictatorship. Ford also helped train the so-called Chicago Boys, a
group of Chilean economists who were educated at the University of
Chicago with the help of Ford grants and who later joined the authori-
tarian government of Augusto Pinochet. These kinds of outcomes
serve as reminders that foundations such as Ford do not have complete
control over the downstream impact of their grants. Inevitably, some
funding will have unintended consequences and confounding results.
SHOCKS TO THE SYSTEM

Pinochet’s rise was part of a larger turning point for the Ford Foun-
dation in the late 1960s and the first half of the 1970s. In democracies
across Latin America in which the foundation operated—not only
Chile but also Argentina and Brazil—right-wing autocrats came to
power, often with Washington’s direct or tacit backing. Ford could
no longer work closely with those governments and had to find new
approaches to supporting democratic ideals there. It pivoted from
assisting officials with national planning to supporting civil society
organizations such as think tanks, watchdog groups, grass-roots
organizations, and even certain religious societies. It also began to
prioritize its advocacy for the rights and norms required to protect
such groups, including freedom of expression and association and
the rule of law. In Chile, following Pinochet’s 1973 overthrow of
Salvador Allende, the foundation began to support groups that pro-
tected Chilean scholars and their academic work from the dictator-
ship, including the Latin American Council of Social Sciences, the
Emergency Committee to Aid Latin American Scholars, and the
Vicariate of Solidarity.
This new focus on civil society organizations informed the foundation’s
work in authoritarian countries in other regions, as well. The foundation
supported a 1973 conference on legal aid at the University of Natal,
in South Africa, which drew international attention to the apartheid
regime’s abuses. In 1975, at the urging of several staff members, the
foundation’s board of trustees approved a human rights program, which
began with $500,000 to support reforms, individual rights, local organi-
zations, and social movements in various countries.

Political change also led philanthropies to modify their approaches

in the wealthy countries of the West. Foundations had played a sig-
nificant role in building the postwar global economic architecture,
including the system of international financial exchange that emerged
from Bretton Woods. But in 1971, the so-called Nixon shock—
which saw, among other developments, the United States abandon
the gold standard—transformed the world economy. Ford adapted
by establishing a program on international economic order, which
supported research into new fiscal models, inflation, and national
stabilization policies, and helped establish networks to connect
economists and policymakers.
Ford also became increasingly known for its work on social issues in
the United States, particularly civil rights and women’s rights, and the
creation of new disciplines at universities. Much of the research that
informed President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society agenda was funded
by the Ford Foundation—including Head Start, the federal program
that supports early childhood education. (As a five-year-old in Ames,
Texas, I attended one of the first preschools funded by Head Start.)
Whereas World War II had bred near-universal alignment between
foundations and the U.S. government on most issues, the Vietnam
War had the opposite effect. By sowing public distrust of the U.S.
foreign policy establishment and reminding institutions of the danger
of uncritically supporting government policies, Vietnam gave foun-
dations ample reason to assert more independence.
MULTIPOLAR GIVING
Today, the world is once again undergoing tectonic shifts. Liberal val-
ues and the U.S.-led global order have come under assault. If Washing-
ton continues to retreat from its traditional role as the order’s principle
guarantor, authoritarian regimes will grow stronger and illiberal ideas
will spread. The rise of China means that foundations will have to
learn to operate in a world defined by multiple spheres of influence.
This learning process has already begun. Consider, for example, the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s establishment, in 2010,
of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, in Beijing, or the
Brookings Institution’s investment in research centers in Beijing,
Doha, and New Delhi. More foundations should follow suit by estab-
lishing partnerships outside the United States and making their pro-
gramming less reliant on U.S.-centric views of global order and
economic development. Just this year, for instance, the Ford Foundation
has adjusted its own programs to be more global in nature, seeking to
use our footprint in ten countries out-
side the United States to work together
toward global outcomes on global is-
Foundations must abandon
sues—issues such as imbalanced finan- the old habit of relying on
cial flows from extractive industries, top-down initiatives
violence against women and girls, and designed by technocrats in
the increasingly endangered space for
civil society. In order to address such New York and Washington.
problems effectively, we will have to
draw on ideas and talent from all parts of the world, working toward
solutions that help encourage a new kind of international cooperation
in a multipolar era.
Foundations must also invest in non-U.S. institutions and indi-
viduals who intend to stay in and serve their home countries. In 2001,
Ford invested $280 million—its largest single grant ever—to create
the International Fellowships Program, which funded the education
of foreign scholars around the world and sought to build the capacity
of universities outside the United States. By 2013, the program had
paid for more than 4,300 fellows from 22 developing countries to
earn graduate or postgraduate degrees, many of whom were educated
in the global South. When the program ended, in 2013, 82 percent
of the fellows it had funded were working for social change in their
home countries.
A multipolar world will also foster the proliferation of non-American
philanthropy. For most of the twentieth century, international giving
was dominated by the great families of U.S. industry: the Carnegies,
the Fords, the Rockefellers, and many others. During the first two
decades of the twenty-first century, American philanthropic preemi-
nence has persisted and even expanded, as foundations established by
Michael Bloomberg, Bill and Melinda Gates, and George Soros have
made tremendous contributions to human progress. But as other parts
of the world produce greater wealth, U.S.-based foundations will have
to share the stage with foundations established by wealthy individuals
such as Mukesh Ambani of India, Aliko Dangote of Nigeria, Jack Ma
of China, and Carlos Slim of Mexico.
This is a hopeful development, because American foundations cannot
address the world’s most pressing problems alone. U.S. foundations

must find ways to support the growth of philanthropy in other countries

and unleash the potential of new wealth around the world.
The Ford Foundation has provided seed funding for local and
regional foundations, such as TrustAfrica, and networks of philan-
thropies, such as the African Philanthropy Forum, the East Africa
Philanthropy Network, and the China Global Philanthropy Institute.
By sharing ideas, best practices, and strategies for funding with
these smaller, non-American groups, legacy foundations can offer the
perspective they’ve gained through their own successes and failures. Yet
at the same time, they must abandon the old habit of relying on top-
down initiatives designed by technocrats in New York and Washington
and listen instead to people with on-the-ground knowledge. Over
the past 15 years, Ford has moved away from the practice of staffing
its offices in the developing world with Americans and has benefited
from tapping deep reservoirs of local talent.
In the postwar era, American foundations—working with the
U.S. government and other countries, development agencies, the
private sector, and civil society—helped build a global order that
brought impressive advances in poverty reduction, the promotion
of democracy, gender equality, and social progress but that also
produced unsustainable inequality. Today, U.S. foundations have a
responsibility to contribute to a more just and sustainable order.
Doing so will require working with a broader range of partners and
including voices that were left out of the twentieth century’s order-
building project. The time for change is now, and there isn’t a moment
to lose.∂
BUILDING DEMOCRACY
CREATING OPPORTUNITY
PROMOTING PEACE
November 16—18, 2018 • Halifax Nova Scotia
HalifaxTheForum.org


The Worrying Paradox of Modern
Medical Miracles
Thomas Bollyky
F
or the first time in recorded history, bacteria, viruses, and other
infectious agents do not cause the majority of deaths or dis-
abilities in any region of the world. Since 2003, the number of
people who die each year from HIV/AIDS has fallen by more than 40
percent. Deaths from malaria, tuberculosis, and diarrheal diseases have
fallen by more than 25 percent each. In 1950, there were nearly 100
countries, including almost every one in sub-Saharan Africa, South
Asia, and Southeast Asia, where at least one out of five children died
before his or her fifth birthday, most of them from infectious diseases.
Today, there are none. The average life expectancy in developing
countries has risen to 70.
But the news is not all good. In the past, gains in longevity went hand
in hand with broader improvements in health-care systems, governance,
and infrastructure. That meant the byproducts of better health—a
growing young work force, less deadly cities, and a shift in countries’
health-care needs to the problems of older people—were sources of
wider prosperity and inclusion. Today, improvements in health are
driven more by targeted medical interventions and international aid
than by general development. Without that development, the changes
that now accompany declines in infectious diseases are potential sources
of instability: rising youth unemployment, overcrowded and underbuilt
cities, surging rates of premature chronic diseases, and more migration.
Many developing countries are not investing enough to ensure
that children who survive past adolescence get a good education,
solid job opportunities, and high-quality health care as adults. Many
THOMAS BOLLYKY is Director of the Global Health Program at the Council on Foreign
Relations. He is the author of Plagues and the Paradox of Progress (MIT Press, 2018), from
which this essay is adapted.
Against medical advice: a miner smoking in Heilongjiang Province, China, October 2015
rich countries, meanwhile, are embracing policies on trade, immigration,
and climate change that make those tasks even harder.
There is a paradox in humanity’s progress against infectious diseases:
the world has been getting healthier in ways that should make us
worry. The recent hard-won gains threaten to bring a host of new and
destabilizing problems. Whether the dramatic improvements in global
health turn out to be a blessing or a curse depends on what the world
does next.
THE ALMIGHTY GERM

Infectious disease, the historian William McNeill once wrote, has been
“one of the fundamental parameters and determinants of human history.”
Epidemics helped bring down the Roman Empire; parasites delayed the
colonization of Africa; and measles, smallpox, and other infections
JASON LE E / REUTE RS
enabled the Spanish conquest of the Aztec and Inca Empires. The inven-
tion of the printing press came partly in response to the scarcity of labor
that followed the Black Death in fourteenth-century Europe.
The power of microbes over human affairs comes from several traits.
Infectious diseases, by definition, spread. The risk of transmission is

Thomas Bollyky The CSS Point
greatest when large numbers of people and animals come into close
contact. And people who haven’t previously been exposed to a particular
disease—isolated populations, such as the Aztecs and the Incas or
infants and children—are the most
vulnerable to it. These traits mean that
Recent dramatic declines diseases such as smallpox and malaria
in plagues and parasites shaped the outcomes of wars, enabling
have brought more modest some conquests and thwarting others.
economic benefits than They also explain why for most of his-
tory, the only large cities were wealthy
past declines did. industrial centers or the capitals of
empires, such as Rome, which could
draw enough migrants from the countryside to compensate for the
death toll caused by dysentery, tuberculosis, and other diseases of
urban density.
The measures taken to fight infectious diseases have driven human
history just as much as the diseases themselves have. Preventing and
controlling pestilence depend on cooperation between people and
governments. Individuals and communities could not isolate them-
selves from the risk of infectious disease for long, and even then only
at great cost. The historian Mark Harrison has argued that starting in
the fourteenth century, the need to control infectious diseases helped
create the modern state by forcing local and national authorities to
begin assuming greater power over their citizens’ lives.
The same factors that made infectious diseases so influential
through history also explain why overcoming them can lead to so
much prosperity. As mortality rates from infectious diseases declined
in the United States and Europe at the end of the nineteenth century,
larger urban areas became more viable. Packed in cities, people swapped
ideas, improved on one another’s inventions, and started success-
ful businesses. Indeed, no country has ever grown wealthy without
urbanizing first.
Better health brought other benefits, too. Lower child mortality
meant a larger share of young working-age adults in the population.
Once fewer children died of infectious diseases, parents generally had
fewer of them, freeing up women to join the labor force and leaving
more resources to educate the children they did have. The govern-
ment measures taken to reduce the incidence of infectious disease,
such as quarantining the sick, mandating vaccinations, and building
sewers and safe water systems, set early precedents for other forms of
social regulation, such as compulsory schooling and military service,
and for public investments in roads, railways, and ports.
This combination of better health and broad social improvement
was a recipe for prosperity. As the economist Robert Gordon has
written, “The historic decline in infant mortality centered in the six-
decade period of 1890–1950 is one of the most important single facts
in the history of American economic growth.” In the 1950s, China was
among the world’s poorest countries and on the cusp of a famine that
would kill some 30 million people when it began a dramatic campaign
against infectious diseases. Between 1960 and 1976, average life expec-
tancy in China rose by 21 years, despite the Great Famine and the
Cultural Revolution. The success of that campaign, which was built
around immunization programs and a massive rural hygiene, health-
education, and sanitation effort, helped the country emerge decades
later as one of the great global economic powers. Most of the countries
that achieved sustained economic booms over the past 50 years did so
some two decades after getting infectious diseases and child mortality
under control.
PROGRESS AIN’T WHAT IT USED TO BE

This same opportunity to harness the benefits of a healthier population
is now emerging in today’s poor countries. But taking advantage of it
will be harder than it was in the past, since more recent improvements
in public health have not been accompanied by the same economic
and social benefits.
Progress against infectious diseases over the past two decades has
not occurred in the same way as such progress did in the past. When
now-wealthy countries took on infectious diseases in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, they did so before the invention of
effective medicines for most diseases. The main drivers of progress in
public health were government-mandated measures—such as milk
pasteurization, laws against overcrowded tenements, and investments
in clean water and sewage treatment systems—and better social norms
around hygiene, childcare, and girls’ education. In fact, nearly two-
thirds of the gains in U.S. life expectancy since 1880 came before
widespread access to antibiotics and the development of most vaccines.
Only half of the decline in death rates in China and other developing
countries between World War II and 1970 was due to antibiotics and

immunization, with education, sanitation, and improved local oversight

of public health playing large roles.
Today, large-scale quality-of-life improvements are no longer the main
drivers of public health progress in many countries. Take Niger. Its
citizens are poorer now, with the country’s per capita GDP at $363 in
2016, than they were in 1980, when the per capita GDP was $419. A child
in Niger today can expect to receive
The average government in five years of schooling, tied for the low-
est amount of education in the world.
the developing world The national government spends just
spends just $23 per person $17 per person each year on health care.
on health care each year. Of the 188 countries that the United
Nations ranked in its 2015 Human
Development Index, Niger finished sec-
ond to last. Yet despite these difficulties, a person born in Niger today
can expect to live to be 61 years old, 16 years longer than someone
born in that country 25 years ago. Infant mortality has declined by
nearly 60 percent over the same period. Death and disability from
infectious diseases has fallen by 17 percent since 1990.
The progress in Niger—and in other poor countries like it—
reflects the tireless efforts of foreign donors, international agencies,
and local governments. From 2002 to 2012, aid to address infectious
diseases in poor countries rose from $11 billion to $28 billion. The returns
on that investment have been impressive: longer lives, fewer dead chil-
dren, and less human suffering. Yet the focus on narrow medical inter-
ventions against specific infectious diseases has come at the expense
of broader investments in infrastructure, governance, good health
care, and the other determinants of health. Without those societal
gains, recent dramatic declines in plagues and parasites have brought
more modest economic benefits than past declines did.
In fact, although extreme poverty has declined everywhere, in Africa
and Southeast Asia, the places that have recently seen the greatest
progress against infectious diseases, the middle class has hardly grown at
all. According to the Pew Research Center, the middle class in develop-
ing countries—people making between $10 and $20 per day—expanded
by 385 million people between 2001 and 2011. But that growth occurred
almost exclusively in China, eastern Europe, and South America. When
low-income countries achieved an average life expectancy of 60 in 2011,
their median per capita GDP was $1,072, a quarter of the figure for high-
income countries when they reached that same average life expectancy,
in 1947. In other words, the world has gotten dramatically better at
lengthening life spans and reducing child suffering in poor places, but
the improvements in much of everything else that matters to people’s
well-being have failed to keep pace.
RICH-WORLD DISEASES GO GLOBAL

The decline in infectious diseases has enabled many more people in
poor countries to survive past infancy and adolescence, but their
prospects for good health on reaching adulthood have not improved
nearly as much. The life expectancy of a 15-year-old in the average
low-income country is no better than it was in 1990. That is in large
part due to the rise in chronic diseases.
People have to die sometime, so it is unsurprising that fewer children
dying from plagues and parasites means more adults dying from cancer,
heart attacks, and diabetes. Yet the decline in infectious diseases does
not explain why so many people in poor countries are developing
chronic ailments at much younger ages and with much worse outcomes
than people in wealthier countries. Deaths from hypertensive heart
disease (caused by high blood pressure) among people under 60 have
increased by nearly 50 percent in sub-Saharan Africa in the past 25 years.
In 1990, heart disease, cancer, and other noncommunicable diseases
caused about a quarter of deaths and disabilities in poor countries. By
2040, that number is expected to jump as high as 80 percent in countries
that are still quite poor. At that point, the share of the total deaths and
disabilities from chronic diseases in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Myanmar,
for example, will be roughly the same as it is in the United Kingdom
and the United States, but the diseases will affect much younger people.
Part of the problem is that most noncommunicable diseases are
chronic, require more sophisticated health-care infrastructure, and
cost more to treat than infectious diseases. Yet the average government
in the developing world still spends just $23 per person on health care
each year. In comparison, the United Kingdom spends $2,695 per per-
son on health care, and the United States spends $3,860. So great is
the disparity that in 2014, the governments of all 48 sub-Saharan
African countries together spent less on health care ($67 billion) than
the government of Australia did ($68 billion).
International donors have been slow to adjust to a world in which
infectious diseases no longer pose the chief threat to public health.

Although noncommunicable diseases now cause the majority of deaths

in developing countries, they receive less than two percent of annual
health aid. It is simply unsustainable to spend a lot of money to save
someone from a preventable and treatable infectious disease in child-
hood only for that same person to succumb to a preventable and, in
many cases, equally treatable chronic disease in middle age, when he or
she will leave behind a family that needs to be cared for and a job that
needs to be done. Those knock-on effects mean that noncommunicable
diseases, in addition to claiming lives, also sap the labor force and dimin-
ish economic productivity. The World Economic Forum projects that
these diseases will cost developing countries some $21 trillion in lost
economic output between 2011 and 2030.
WHEN IN ROME
Perhaps no places have been more affected by the rise and fall of infectious
diseases than cities. History remembers the great urban epidemics,
such as the Plague of Athens, which reduced the city to “unprece-
dented lawlessness,” according to the Greek historian Thucydides.
But it was everyday killers—tuberculosis, typhoid fever, and other
food- and fecal-borne diseases—that for millennia made large cities
deadly for their inhabitants. In the late seventeenth century, John
Graunt, an amateur demographer in England, noted that London was
recording significantly more deaths than christenings and that about
6,000 migrants had to come from the countryside each year to make
up the shortfall. In the United States, as late as 1900, life expectancy
was ten years higher in rural areas than in towns and cities.
The combination of public health reform, laws against overcrowded
tenements, and better sanitation revolutionized urban health. In 1857, no
U.S. city had a sanitary sewer system; by 1900, 80 percent of Ameri-
cans living in cities were served by one. According to the economists
David Cutler and Grant Miller, improved access to filtered and chlori-
nated water alone accounted for nearly half of the decline in mortality
in U.S. cities between 1900 and 1936. Clean running water had the
secondary benefit of enabling more manufacturing, especially in the
textile sector, and indoor plumbing freed women from the drudgery
of carrying fresh water into their homes and dirty water out of them.
Building these waterworks and sanitation systems also marked the
first major undertakings for many city governments that required
significant public financing, usually in the form of long-term bonds.
Having learned how to finance big projects, city councils later turned
to the same methods to build railways, ports, highways, canals, and
electrical grids.
As infectious disease rates fall in developing countries, their cities are
now experiencing population booms. By 2020, 1.48 billion more people
will live in cities than did in 2000, and the vast majority—1.35 billion
of them—will be in lower-income countries. But urban infrastructure
has not kept pace, leaving many city dwellers living in slums. The UN
estimates that in 2014, roughly one out of every eight humans, some
881 million people, lived in slums in poor countries. Some 96 percent
of the urban population of the Central African Republic, for example,
lives in slums. By 2030, the global population of slum dwellers is ex-
pected to reach two billion.
Although the urban residents of poor nations are healthier than
their parents and grandparents, many do not enjoy the accompanying
benefits that residents of now-wealthy metropolises once did. In too
many developing countries, the electricity in cities is unreliable. The
municipal water systems are old and poorly maintained and suffer from
low or intermittent water pressure, which reduces the effectiveness of
adding chlorine to kill bacteria and other microbes. Waste treatment
plants are rare in Africa and Asia and treat only 15 percent of municipal
wastewater in Latin America.
Many urban transportation networks have also failed to keep up with
all the extra people. In the past ten years, according to the World Bank,
the average driving speed in Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh, which
has nearly 16 million inhabitants, has dropped to less than four miles
an hour, little faster than walking. Sitting in traffic consumes 3.2 mil-
lion of Dhaka’s residents’ work hours each day. Clogged roads, slums,
and overwhelmed electrical and sewer systems threaten to cancel out the
economic benefits that urbanization usually provides. If that pattern
persists, fast-growing cities in developing countries may become the
first to keep their residents poor rather than make them rich.
THE PERILS OF YOUTH

Both the promise and the peril of the recent decline in infectious diseases
are most acute in sub-Saharan Africa. By 2035, more sub-Saharan
Africans will be reaching working age (15 to 64) each year than will
people in the rest of the world combined. Each year for the next ten years,
11 million young people in sub-Saharan Africa will join the job market.

In the past, countries with a fast-growing work force of young adults

employed them in labor-intensive manufacturing industries, from the
textile mills in nineteenth-century Lancashire to smartphone factories in
Shenzhen today. Yet manufacturing has
Progress against infectious made up the same share of economic out-
put in sub-Saharan Africa since the 1960s.
diseases cannot be In 2010, only seven percent of the region’s
measured just in terms of work force was employed in factories,
the lives that were once lost compared with 15 percent in Asia and 12
percent in Latin America. On top of that,
to plagues and parasites. agricultural employment is falling as
climate change makes it harder for Afri-
can farmers to earn a living. And most of the private-sector jobs created in
the region over the past two decades have been in temporary or day labor.
Some of the reasons for the lack of manufacturing jobs in sub-
Saharan Africa are unsurprising: too few roads and ports, too little access
to reliable electricity, too much corruption, and too many cumber-
some labor regulations. Robots in wealthy countries are doing more
and more of the jobs for which companies might have once hired low-
skilled workers in poorer countries. But the biggest factor operating
against manufacturing in sub-Saharan Africa may be that the decline
of infectious diseases arrived in the region too late.
With improved health, the working-age populations of many African
countries are growing, but they face stiff competition from workers in
China and other countries that achieved their big gains against plagues
and parasites earlier. A few African countries, such as Ethiopia, have
made some headway in textile manufacturing, but the wages in China
and other low-cost Asian labor centers are not rising fast enough to push
most factory owners to leave for Africa. That poses a problem for Afri-
can countries trying to build a domestic consumer base, make inroads
into global markets, and employ their over 200 million young people.
One alternative is to increase employment in the service sector, but
here, too, poor countries are running into problems. Many service-
sector jobs require specialized education—medical school, law school,
an accounting degree. Although sub-Saharan Africa has greatly
increased school attendance, the World Bank reports that as many as
40 percent of children in the region still do not meet basic learning
standards in numeracy and around half fall short in literacy. Lower-
skilled services, such as building and grounds maintenance, are harder
to automate and can employ large numbers of people, but they do not
offer the same track to the middle class that manufacturing jobs do.
Demographics are working against many poor countries just when
these characteristics should be the engine of economic prosperity. The
World Bank estimates that the working-age population in developing
countries will increase by 2.1 billion by 2050. Unless national employment
rates improve, that will mean nearly 900 million more young adults
without work. A disproportionate number of young unemployed or
underemployed adults can lead to social unrest, particularly in weak
or corrupt states already riven by ethnic or religious conflicts.
THE RIGHT MEDICINE

In the past, people have often responded to dramatic reductions in infec-
tious diseases and potentially destabilizing youth bulges by emigrating.
The nineteenth-century wave of migration from Europe to North Amer-
ica came primarily from countries with a surplus of young adults, around
20 years after sharp declines in infant mortality. In the 1980s and 1990s,
similar demographic factors pushed large numbers of people to migrate
from Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, and South Asia
to Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Today, it is sub-Saharan Africans who are on the move. Between
1990 and 2013, the number of economic migrants leaving sub-Saharan
Africa increased sixfold, from less than one million to six million each
year. Most went to France, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. In 2016, 311,000 migrants passed through Niger on
their way to Europe, and over 5,000 of them died trying to cross the
Mediterranean in ramshackle boats. Most came from Niger, Nigeria,
and neighboring poor countries that all experienced sharp declines in
child mortality and infectious diseases in the past 20 years.
This wave of migration has sparked a backlash in the United States and
Europe, where more and more politicians are campaigning for office—and
sometimes winning—on platforms opposing immigration and espousing
economic nationalism. Yet limiting trade undermines economic growth,
making it even harder for developing countries to generate enough jobs
to keep pace with their rising numbers of young adults.
Populist politicians in the United States, Europe, and the rest of
the developed world must come to terms with the inconsistencies in
their policies on global health, trade, and immigration. More economic
opportunity alone will not stop all young people from emigrating—

their aspirations often go beyond a better job—but it can make waves

of migration shorter, less desperate, and less intense. American and
European voters can choose opposition to trade from low-wage countries
or opposition to immigration; they cannot have both.
The lesson is not that progress against disease is not worthwhile or
that it came too soon to developing nations. Nor is it that the war against
microbes is over: global health threats, such as pandemic flu and antibiotic-
resistant bugs, still loom. There is no worthier goal than reducing unnec-
essary pain and preventing deaths, especially among children. And a
dire future is not inevitable; healthier populations can still lead poor
countries to prosperity, just as they did in the past.
To make sure that they do, the world needs to pair global health aid
with investments that can help countries improve their health-care
systems, make their cities more livable, and enable their companies to
employ more people more productively. Voluntary family-planning and
girls’ education initiatives have helped reduce fertility rates in countries,
such as Senegal, to sustainable levels and better integrate women into the
economy. Programs that encourage private investors to put their money
toward building infrastructure and electricity generation, such as the
U.S. government’s Power Africa initiative, which aims to get enough
government and private investment to provide energy to 20 million
African households and companies by 2030, can make it easier for entre-
preneurs to start businesses and for factories to hire more young workers.
At the same time, developing countries need to devote more resources
to their cities and health-care systems. Establishing more easily enforce-
able urban land rights can promote investment in formal housing, free up
workers to move to find jobs, and create the foundation for a system of
property taxes. Strong health-care systems can help doctors spot disease
outbreaks quickly and diagnose chronic diseases early enough that
patients can still be treated. That makes investments in basic health-care
infrastructure a cost-effective way to improve public health. Brazil’s Family
Health Strategy, for example, covers more than half the population,
costs the government roughly $50 per person per year, and has sharply
reduced deaths from heart disease, diabetes, and infectious diseases.
Progress against infectious diseases cannot be measured just in
terms of the lives that were once lost to plagues and parasites. The real
miracles in global health will happen when the people whose lives are
saved by better health care can seize the opportunities and gain the
prosperity that have come with health improvements in the past.∂
REVIEWS & RESPONSES
An uncomfortable
truth for American
economists is that they
have limited influence
on economic policy.
—Karen Dynan
M A R C O VA C C A / G E T T Y I M A G E S
The Unheard Nerds The Secret Sharers

Karen Dynan 180 Peter Feaver; Allison Stanger;
Michael Walzer 199
Doomsday Delusions
Steven Radelet 187 Recent Books 207
Praying for Pakistan

Mohammed Hanif 193
introduced quotas on Japanese auto

The Unheard imports in 1981, and the North American
Free Trade Agreement faced opposition
Nerds from both Democrats and Republicans
when it was introduced to Congress in
1993. And many previous administrations
How Economists Can Talk So have imposed trade restrictions on steel
Policymakers Will Listen in order to support U.S. producers: Richard
Nixon imposed import quotas, Jimmy
Karen Dynan Carter set price floors for foreign steel,
and both George W. Bush and Barack
Obama enacted steel tariffs during
their presidencies.
Advice and Dissent: Why America Suffers Trade is hardly the only area in which
When Economics and Politics Collide economic policy goes against expert
BY ALAN BLINDER. Basic Books, consensus. The Republicans’ 2017 tax
2018, 368 pp. reform left largely intact the mortgage
interest deduction, which allows home-
A
n uncomfortable truth for owners to deduct the interest on loans
American economists is that used to buy or build a home, even though
they have limited influence on the vast majority of economists believe
economic policy. Take trade, for example. that it leads to overinvestment in housing
Anyone who has studied introductory and excessive mortgage debt relative to
economics knows that free trade benefits the social optimum. And in recent decades,
countries in the long run, by allowing U.S. states have greatly expanded occupa-
them to specialize in producing the goods tional licensing—regulations setting
and services in which they have a compara- minimum qualifications for entering a
tive advantage. Economists are in near- field—for florists, hair stylists, interior
universal agreement about this point, designers, and other professions for
although most also agree that it is impor- which the consumer protection benefits
tant to help workers who lose their jobs of licensing are doubtful. Most econo-
in the short run because of trade. mists agree that this sort of occupational
Yet free trade has never been very licensing hurts workers by restricting
popular in Washington. The administra- entry into a profession and hurts consum-
tion of U.S. President Donald Trump has ers by keeping prices high.
imposed costly tariffs on imports from Why don’t economists have more
Canada, China, Mexico, and the EU, but influence? This is the question posed
such restrictions are not a mere idiosyn- by Alan Blinder in his new book, Advice
crasy of Trump. President Ronald Reagan and Dissent. And Blinder, a prominent
macroeconomist who formerly served
KAREN DYNAN is Professor of the Practice of on President Bill Clinton’s Council of
Economics at Harvard University. From 2014 to Economic Advisers and as vice chair of the
2017, she served as Assistant Secretary for
Economic Policy and Chief Economist at the Federal Reserve Board, is well equipped to
U.S. Department of the Treasury. answer it. Based on decades of experience
The Unheard Nerds
in both economics and policymaking, reporting, limiting experts’ ability to

Blinder argues that political incentives better inform the electorate. Together,
often force elected officials to ignore these factors produce a strong incentive
the best advice of economists, to the for politicians to champion simple ideas
clear detriment of all. Although Blinder that sell well over the more complex, less
recognizes that there are no simple solu- emotionally charged solutions preferred
tions, he provides clear and compelling, by economists.
albeit modest, suggestions for how to The situation is made worse by
design economic policy that takes account political short-termism and the influence
of political reality. of interest groups. Politicians who face
reelection every few years tend to adopt
GET SMART policies that will deliver gains in the near
Blinder, riffing on a famous quote often future, even if the costs will eventually
misattributed to the Scottish writer outweigh the benefits. Conversely, econo-
Andrew Lang, argues that politicians mists favor bearing short-term costs in
typically use economists “the same way order to realize long-term gains. For
that a drunk uses lamp-posts—for support example, Blinder notes that although
rather than illumination.” Economic “many economists favor a consumption
policy is too often shaped by officials tax over an income tax,” arguing that
and their advisers in accordance with the former is more efficient, “the transi-
political goals, with economists used tional problems that would arise” from
after the fact to justify policies that have enacting a consumption tax—such as the
been chosen by others. There are enough potentially steep penalty on retirees,
economists that a politician can always who paid income taxes while working
find one to support almost any policy, only to face higher consumption costs
even one that most economists reject. in retirement—are “enough to make a
The result is policies that make political strong politician weep.” Likewise, a
sense but leave the country as a whole politician’s survival may require policies
worse off. that disproportionately benefit small,
The root of the problem, according well-organized groups yet impose signifi-
to Blinder, is that politicians are dealing cant costs on the rest of the population.
with a fundamentally different set of Advice and Dissent also explores how
incentives and constraints than economists voters’ misconceptions and politicians’
are. The framers of the U.S. Constitution devotion to special interests conspire to
designed a system in which it is difficult keep policymakers in Washington from
to make sweeping policy changes, meaning applying economists’ knowledge in a
that politicians generally need broad number of hotly debated areas, such as
popular support to do anything. Voters, inequality, international trade, and tax
in turn, have a limited understanding reform. On the topic of inequality, for
of many issues, especially those related instance, Blinder argues that if more
to economic policy. And members of people understood that “it is harder to
the media often privilege raising their raise taxes on mobile factors of produc-
own profile—or the market share of tion than immobile factors,” they would
their employer—over fair and balanced be more willing to “assign the job of

Karen Dynan The CSS Point
redistribution to the federal government,” Michael Gove, then the British justice
since “people are far less likely to change secretary and a pro-Brexit campaigner,
countries than to change cities.” that people “have had enough of experts.”
Yet even considering the conflicting This likely has multiple causes, including
incentives and uninspiring record, Blinder the rise of the Internet, a collapse of
believes that there is room for improve- confidence in the press, and understand-
ment. He points out that contrary to the able frustration over the role played by
popular impression, economists agree experts in the 2003 U.S. invasion of
on a great many things: that people Iraq, the 2007–8 financial crisis, and
and companies are heavily influenced by trade policies that have led to unem-
incentives, that there is a tradeoff between ployment in certain sectors of the
the size of a country’s economy and how economy. But although these examples
equally its wealth is distributed, and show that experts can clearly be wrong,
that simple policy fixes, such as conges- expert economic opinion is generally
tion charges for car use, could help solve more right than political guesswork. For
common problems that inconvenience example, despite economists’ failure to
everyone, such as gridlock. Against the predict the financial crisis, the Federal
populist, antiestablishment sentiment Reserve’s response to it—providing
driving much of U.S. politics today, additional liquidity to backstop the
Blinder advocates giving technocrats a financial system—generated a much
greater role in government, especially in better outcome than would have been
areas that are more or less value neutral. achieved by following the advice of
“An issue is a good candidate for tech- politicians who wanted to let the banks
nocratic decision making,” he writes, “if fail. As trust in experts has declined,
it is technically complex, if it requires a however, it has become easier for
long time horizon, and if it involves the politicians to offer far-fetched solutions
apportionment of pain. It is a bad candi- regardless of their economic merit.
date if value judgments are central to the To make matters worse, the major
decision.” For instance, Blinder proposes U.S. political parties have been severely
the creation of a federal infrastructure weakened in their ability to select their
bank and a nonpolitical federal tax board preferred candidates or target their finan-
to redesign the details of the tax system, cial resources. This has only exacerbated
both of which would represent a signifi- short-termism. Party leaders generally
cant change from current arrangements. have longer time horizons than individual
politicians because they are responsible
BIG LITTLE LIES for ongoing relationships with the other
Blinder deserves ample credit for taking party and with voters. Concern for main-
the interaction between economics and taining these relationships and protecting
politics seriously at a time when the their party’s reputation gives party leaders
challenge of making good economic an incentive to restrain their members
policy has become even more acute. from pursuing misguided policies that
Politicians and the public now show less deliver enticing short-term gains. And
deference to expertise than in the past, a traditionally, party leaders have gotten
view encapsulated in the 2016 remark by what they wanted.
In the 2016 U.S. presidential election, with those of Trump: in 2009, 57 percent
however, Trump and Senator Bernie of Republican or Republican-leaning
Sanders of Vermont ran insurgent cam- voters polled thought that trade agree-
paigns directly challenging their respective ments had been a good thing for the
party establishments, with Trump winning United States; by 2018, only 43 percent
the Republican nomination and Sanders thought so, with most of the drop occur-
only narrowly losing the Democratic one. ring in the lead-up to the 2016 election.
Insurgent candidates are, as a rule, less (Similar shifts, among both Democrats
worried about longer-term reputational and Republicans, can be seen on other
consequences than are those beholden to a issues strongly associated with the presi-
party hierarchy and are thus more willing dent, including immigration and U.S.
to make wildly unrealistic proposals. relations with Russia.) When politi-
Trump, for example, promised to simulta- cians deliberately mislead voters, it
neously cut taxes, reduce deficits, maintain makes it even more difficult for experts
Social Security and Medicare benefits, and to advocate effective but potentially
provide good health insurance to everyone. unpopular policies.
Dishonest communication with the
public is especially problematic because MARGINAL EVOLUTION
politicians shape the views of their con- Blinder acknowledges that there is much
stituents. According to data from the more that economists could do to build
Pew Research Center, Republicans’ bridges with politicians and voters. He
views on trade have been converging urges his colleagues to speak in ways

that nonexperts can understand and to policy may be much easier to explain
recognize that “fairness is far more than the first-best, and there is real value
meaningful and important to most in having policies that people can under-
people than the economist’s cherished stand. In other cases, such as the opposi-
notion of efficiency.” tion to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (a
There are other ways that economists trade deal that Trump scrapped shortly
who want to influence policy could after entering office), political resistance
increase their own relevance. First, they may reflect in part the fact that voters
need to take political constraints more place greater value on equity than effi-
seriously. Economists often see their job as ciency. Economists need not become
designing policies that get the economics legislative experts, but everyone would
right and delivering them to Washington, benefit if they showed more interest in
at which point it becomes someone else’s working with politicians to find work-
job to turn those ideas into law. One able compromises.
problem with this attitude is that nearly Economists could also increase their
all policy proposals require reworking influence by developing more realistic
before they can be put into action—and models that account for institutional
some need a great deal of reworking. considerations, such as the complex
Economists should keep this in mind and linkages among different parts of the
be more willing to develop what they financial system, and for behavior that
call “second-best” solutions, or policies does not fit the simplifying assumptions
that move in a desirable direction while of traditional economics, which hold that
getting the economics as right as possible fully informed individuals will rationally
given political and other constraints. For pursue their preferences without any
example, most economists agree that the cognitive biases or limitations. Making
most efficient way to cut taxes in order to these changes will make economic research
stimulate a weak economy is to narrowly messier and less conclusive, but politicians
target the cuts at those who are most and voters probably won’t support propos-
likely to spend the extra money. But it als based on analyses that only vaguely
will usually be more politically feasible resemble the real world anyway.
to enact a broad-based payroll tax cut. The financial crisis was a wake-up call
This is a case in which it would be better in this regard. Despite clear warning signs,
to accept the less efficient policy if the economists were slow to recognize the
alternative is having no fiscal stimulus inflation of a housing bubble in the years
at all. leading up to the crash because most were
More broadly, economists should view taught that markets were too efficient to
political constraints as potentially useful overprice an asset for a long period of time.
sources of information about people’s Economists also missed the ways in which
preferences. Although resistance to what risky mortgage-backed securities linked the
economists regard as an ideal policy may housing market to the broader financial
sometimes reflect the entrenched influence system, causing them to vastly underesti-
of a powerful few, at other times it may mate the impact of a wave of foreclosures.
represent a constructive form of popular Since the financial crisis, economists
feedback. For example, the second-best have made considerable strides in their
understanding of financial institutions
and how they are connected to the real
economy. They are paying more atten- Not all readers
tion to institutional considerations in
other policy areas, as well. In student are leaders,
loan policy, for instance, economists
are beginning to recognize the risks to but all leaders
students and taxpayers posed by for-
profit colleges, many of which encourage are readers.
students to borrow from the federal - Harry S. Truman
government to fund educations that are
unlikely to result in high enough incomes
to repay the debt. And in labor-market
policy, there is a new focus on the chal- SIGN UP for the
lenge of developing institutions that can Foreign Affairs
finance and administer benefits in the Books & Reviews
newsletter
gig economy comparable to the arrange-
ments, such as employer-provided health
insurance, that have grown up over time
with traditional employers.
Similarly, a thriving behavioral
economics literature has emerged over
the past two decades that incorporates
more realistic assumptions about behav-
ior than those embedded in traditional
economic models. Consider retirement
savings. Economists used to assume that
individuals decided how much to save
by projecting their income and consump-
tion needs into the future and then
saving in order to maintain a preferred
standard of living over their lifetime.
Yet behavioral economics has shown that
people are generally not so sophisticated:
they make decisions using simple rules
of thumb and often have self-control
problems, consuming in the present
even when they know they shouldn’t.
This insight has led to policies designed
to address these limitations, such as
workplace retirement saving plans, in
which people commit to saving a certain
amount out of every paycheck. These are ForeignAffairs.com/newsletters
effective at encouraging saving, especially

if employers “nudge” their workers into Based Policymaking. The commission,

such plans by signing them up automati- which includes many economists in its
cally and making them request to opt ranks, issued a report last fall with
out. Although economists are still only recommendations for how the federal
beginning to understand the degree to government can improve its gathering
which individual economic decisions can and use of data to shape policy, including
be explained by cognitive limitations and increasing the coordination of evidence-
biases, rather than rational calculations gathering efforts within the government
based on preferences, advances in and developing a uniform process for
behavioral economics will pave the way outside researchers to gain secure access
for improved policy. to confidential government data.
Finally, economists must develop more There is no silver bullet for making
and better evidence about which policies economic policy better in the face of
work. Such evidence can be hard to come political constraints. Economists and
by, because opportunities to conduct elected officials will continue to face
experiments and collect data on outcomes, different incentives, and in many cases,
especially across longer time periods, are political necessity will triumph over
necessarily limited. But today, both the economic sense. There is certainly some
accumulation of evidence from previous scope for increasing the influence of
policies and improvements in methodology economists and other experts, through
are allowing economists to more rigorously changes both in the policymaking process
evaluate what works and why. One and in the way that economists do their
particularly important line of research work. But these changes need to go hand
has examined the long-term effects of in hand with a commitment by elected
government programs aimed at providing leaders to communicate honestly and show
better education, health care, housing, respect for evidence. Political leaders
and nutrition to children in low-income need to recognize that they will ultimately
families. The economists Hilary Hoynes, get more support from voters by address-
Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, and ing their problems, which they can do
Douglas Almond, for instance, have shown effectively only with help from experts.
that access to food stamps in childhood Voters, for their part, need to hold their
leads to significantly better adult outcomes leaders responsible for outcomes. Other-
in health and, for women, economic wise, honesty, for a politician, will
self-sufficiency. Politicians are likely to continue be a fool’s game.∂
find policy proposals backed by hard
evidence much more appealing than
those that simply sound good on paper.
Such research may hold the potential
to help move policy beyond the left-right
divide. In 2016, Paul Ryan, the Republican
Speaker of the House, and Patty Murray,
a Democratic senator from Washington
State, sponsored legislation creating the
bipartisan Commission on Evidence-
The world does indeed face challenges.

Doomsday Yet by almost any measure, life for most
people has been getting better in almost
Delusions every way. Levels of war and conflict
are near historic lows. People are living
longer and healthier lives and are better
The Case for Optimism in a educated than ever before. Incomes for
Pessimistic Age most families are higher than at any time
in history. One billion people around
Steven Radelet the world have been lifted out of extreme
poverty in the last two decades, and
although income inequality has worsened
within many Western countries, across
It’s Better Than It Looks: Reasons for the globe, income is more equal than it
Optimism in an Age of Fear has been in centuries. Far fewer people
BY GREGG EASTERBROOK. than ever go hungry, and the world now
PublicAffairs, 2018, 352 pp. grows more food than it needs. Women
have more opportunities, democracy has
Factfulness: Ten Reasons We’re Wrong expanded, and basic human rights are
About the World—and Why Things Are more widely respected than ever before.
Better Than You Think Electricity, automobiles, the Internet,
BY HANS ROSLING. Flatiron Books, modern medicines, and simple conven-
2018, 352 pp. iences have made most people’s lives far
easier than their great-grandparents
Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, could have imagined. And after centuries
Science, Humanism, and Progress of being largely confined to the West,
BY STEVEN PINKER. Viking, 2018, since the 1980s, such benefits have spread
576 pp. across the world—not just to China and
India but also to Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica,
A
nyone glancing at a newspaper Ghana, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia,
these days finds a litany of woes: Mozambique, Peru, South Africa, South
war, crime, disease, terrorism, and Korea, and dozens of other countries.
environmental disasters, all sandwiched Amid the prevailing pessimism, few
between predictions of the coming people—especially in the West—are aware
collapse of market capitalism and liberal of the extent of this progress. That
democracy. U.S. politicians on both the ignorance matters. For as three terrific
right, such as President Donald Trump, recent books—Gregg Easterbrook’s It’s
and the left, such as Senator Bernie Better Than It Looks, Hans Rosling’s
Sanders of Vermont, warn that the United Factfulness, and Steven Pinker’s Enlighten-
States and the world are sliding toward ment Now—make clear, continuing this
calamity. Pessimism rules the day. progress is possible but not guaranteed; if
people fail to appreciate the institutions and
STEVEN RADELET holds the Donald F.
McHenry Chair in Global Human Development policies that have generated this success,
at Georgetown University. citizens and policymakers are more likely

Steven Radelet The CSS Point
to abandon them going forward. A full carbon monoxide is down by 77 percent,

understanding of the unprecedented and smog is down by 33 percent. The
progress in human development is share of the world’s population that is
essential to ensuring that it continues. malnourished has fallen from 50 percent
to 13 percent since the 1960s. Between
ALWAYS LOOK ON THE World War II and 1990, there were an
BRIGHT SIDE OF LIFE average of ten military coups each year;
Easterbrook, a writer for The Atlantic, since then, there have been about three
focuses primarily on the United States, each year as democracies have replaced
while also examining global patterns. dictatorships.
He wants to explain why the country’s Easterbrook recognizes that not all is
politics have gotten so gloomy at a time well. The United States and other coun-
of such prosperity. In his view, Trump tries must contend with climate change,
succeeded in 2016 in part because he inequality, and other threats. But his core
convinced voters that their country was argument is that to tackle those problems,
near collapse: its economy broken, its the world needs to recognize its successes
borders overrun by illegal immigrants, and draw the right lessons about how they
its cities rife with crime. That none of were achieved. He pushes back against
these things were true did not matter. those who confuse optimism with naiveté.
Instead, these falsehoods won Trump “Optimism,” he believes, “is the convic-
accolades for “telling it like it is.” tion that problems can be solved if we
Easterbrook notes that Sanders played all roll up our sleeves and get to work.”
into some of the same sentiment by He devotes a full chapter to addressing
arguing that the country was getting climate change and another to over-
worse for all but the wealthiest few. coming inequality.
Easterbrook attacks this pessimism Easterbrook is clearly exasperated
by documenting a series of crises that by popular myopia. He lays a large part
past commentators predicted but that of the blame on the media, where “if it
never happened: humanity has not bleeds, it leads,” and part of it on politi-
starved, nor has it run out of energy; cians who demonize their opponents,
there are no runaway plagues; pollution cast nearly everything as a failure, and
has not made the world’s air unbreathable hark back to an idealized past. Research
or its water undrinkable; and dictators centers and government agencies, he says,
have not taken over. Just the opposite has “lean towards doom predictions because
occurred. Technology, far from bringing they justify more funding.” Demographic
annihilation, has made nearly every aspect changes add to the pessimism: Western
of human life safer and easier. Violent societies are getting older, and Easter-
crime in the United States has fallen brook argues that older people tend to
by almost 30 percent since 1993. More be gloomier. And he asserts that part of
Americans, especially minorities and it is simple human nature: “People want
women, have greater freedom than ever to believe the worst about society.”
before. Air pollution in the United States Easterbrook’s arguments are not always
has fallen sharply over the last 50 years: convincingly backed up by the data. For
levels of lead are down by 99 percent, example, his contention that middle-class
Doomsday Delusions
Looking up: students at a public school outside Juba, South Sudan, April 2013
buying power in the United States has professor of international health in
been rising faster than most analysts Stockholm, which was cut short by his
believe is not persuasive, and the citations untimely passing just before the book
he gives do not support it. In other cases, was published. “This book,” he writes,
he provides data that look plausible but “is my very last battle in my lifelong
are not well documented, which weakens mission to fight devastating global
his analysis. ignorance.”
Easterbrook’s core conclusions are Rosling carried out surveys that asked
compelling, and he writes with a jour- thousands of people simple questions
nalist’s flair. But convincing skeptics about global trends. The results show
will require comprehensively document- that people are not just uninformed but
ing all the facts and figures. also systematically biased toward pessi-
mism. In 2013, Rosling asked what had
KNOW-NOTHINGS happened to the proportion of the world’s
In Factfulness, Rosling steps in to fill this population living in extreme poverty
A N D R E EA CAM P EA N U / R E U T E R S
gap. He is as perplexed as Easterbrook during the previous 20 years and pro-

is by the common misunderstandings vided three choices: almost doubled,
of progress. How, he wonders, can so remained the same, or almost halved.
many people get the world so wrong? If people had guessed randomly, about
In the book, which was co-written with one-third would have chosen the correct
Rosling’s son Ola and daughter-in-law answer (almost halved). But only seven
Anna, he draws on years of research percent got the answer right. He asked
he carried out during his career as a what share of one-year-old children have

been vaccinated against various diseases THE AGE OF MIRACLES

and again provided three options: 20 Although Rosling richly documents the
percent, 50 percent, or the correct answer world’s gains, he does not address the
of 80 percent. This time, 13 percent of underlying question: What accounts for
respondents chose correctly. On question all this progress in the first place? Pinker,
after question, people did not just guess a psychology professor, aims to provide
wrong. They consistently demonstrated an answer. Enlightenment Now is the
that they believed the world was much most comprehensive and compelling
worse off than it actually is. of the three books. In it, Pinker offers
Rosling’s goal is not just to provide rich historical data on a wide variety
the facts, although he offers plenty of of indicators of human development.
them. He wants people to change the On average, people are approximately
way they think so that they can see the 100 times as wealthy as they were 200
world more accurately and better equip years ago. IQ scores have increased at
themselves to solve problems. He frames an astonishing rate of three points per
the book around ten human instincts decade over the last century. Americans
that lead people to see disaster rather are more than 90 percent less likely to
than progress. The “fear instinct,” for die in a fire or from a lightning strike
example, is an evolutionary trait that than they were a century ago, thanks
helps people avoid danger, but it also to better safety measures. Deaths in car
pushes them toward irrational fear of crashes per mile driven have fallen by
rare events, such as shark attacks and over 95 percent since 1921, for the same
lightning strikes. That instinct also reason. Annual global deaths in battle
helps explain the constant crisis mode have fallen by 75 percent since the 1980s
of the press, which profits from public (although they have recently increased
anxiety: “Fears that once helped keep due to the Syrian civil war). Pinker
our ancestors alive, today keep journalists underscores how widely these gains
employed.” Another human trait, the have spread and the speed with which
“gap instinct,” pushes people to divide gaps in well-being between rich and
the world into “us” and “them” and to poor countries are closing. For exam-
imagine much larger differences between ple, child mortality has fallen in every
themselves and others. single country in the world since the
Rosling argues that people can 1950s. The share of the global popula-
combat these instincts by consciously tion living in extreme poverty fell
learning to be “factful”: examining the from 40 percent in 1980 to less than
data, being wary of stories of impend- ten percent in 2015. And although
ing doom and skeptical of quick fixes, income inequality has worsened
seeking to understand the reality that within the United States and many
lies behind simple averages and extreme other Western countries since 1980,
events. Pursuing a mindset of “factful- globally it has improved: the global
ness,” in his view, will allow people to Gini coefficient, which ranges from
control their negative instincts, see the zero (perfect equality) to one (perfect
world more accurately, and act to inequality), improved from 0.60 in
improve it. 1990 to 0.47 in 2013.
Doomsday Delusions
Pinker argues that the progress has Pinker spares no criticism for anti-
gone beyond material gains: individual modern intellectuals and those he terms
and societal norms of behavior and “romantic Green” activists, who resist
morality are also improving. At the new technologies, and he jabs at the
same time as technology has advanced, antiscientific beliefs of those who oppose
morals have, too. Tyranny, slavery, the use of genetically modified organisms
torture, violence, racism, and the subju- and nuclear power. But he sees the rise
gation of women were all accepted by of authoritarian populism as the greatest
past generations; today, most people threat to Enlightenment values. The
understand them to be morally wrong. central problem with these movements,
In Pinker’s view, these gains stem Pinker argues, is that they focus on tribes
from the eighteenth-century Enlighten- rather than individuals and place no
ment and the accumulation of knowl- value on protecting the rights of those
edge and changes in thinking that it outside the chosen group or promoting
brought about. Pinker focuses on four human welfare in other countries. They
Enlightenment themes—reason, science, disdain knowledge and diverse opinions,
humanism, and progress—and the valorize strong leaders, and scorn rules-
accompanying belief that applying these based governance, compromise, and
ideas would lead to continuous improve- checks on power. They look backward
ment in the quality of life. It was these to the greatness of a fictionalized past
forces, he argues, that transformed a rather than embracing progress. Yet
world of near-universal poverty, disease, despite the populist threat, Pinker believes
illiteracy, and violence into one of that liberal democratic institutions will
healthy people earning middle-class survive. Right-wing populism, he argues,
incomes and with much greater per- is “better understood as the mobilization
sonal security and freedom. “The of an aggrieved and shrinking demo-
Enlightenment has worked,” he writes. graphic . . . than as the sudden reversal
Its success is “perhaps the greatest story of a century-long movement toward
seldom told.” equal rights.”
Yet for 250 years, various counter-
Enlightenment movements have tried to DON’T STOP BELIEVING
turn back the tide. Nationalism, author- One of the dangers of public pessimism
itarianism, religious orthodoxy, anti- is that it empowers political leaders who
science campaigns, and various forms want to destroy the institutions that foster
of “declinism” that predict impending progress. In the United States, this is
global doom have all sought to supplant especially true when it comes to foreign
reason and a belief in progress. Pinker policy. After World War II, Washington
argues that Enlightenment values are advanced an international system designed
once again under attack by those who to ensure U.S. security and prosperity
denounce scientific knowledge, espouse while spreading, however imperfectly, the
nationalism and tribalism, and seek to ideals of freedom, opportunity, and the
erode trust in modern institutions. He sees rule of law. The United States aimed to
these attacks coming from the political strengthen countries that shared those
left and right alike. values so that they would become allies

in promoting them, something that in The Trump administration is doing

turn would help secure the peace. just the opposite. It starts from the false
These goals have been achieved far premise that the world is getting worse
more fully than anyone in 1945 could and the United States is losing from the
have imagined. Germany and Japan, once current international system. As a result,
sworn enemies of the United States, are Trump seems intent on taking a wreck-
now among its closest allies. Western ing ball to the old order. He thrills in
Europe is at peace. Most countries insulting U.S. allies, glad-handing
around the world have signed on to the dictators, starting trade wars, and loudly
economic and political system founded walking away from international agree-
by the United States. Even China has ments, including the Trans-Pacific
joined the club and is closer to sharing Partnership, the Iran nuclear agree-
some of these ideals than it was in the ment, and the Paris climate accord.
days of Mao Zedong and the Cultural The liberal world order that has
Revolution. China now has more eco- brought so much progress is not dead,
nomic opportunities, a slightly greater nor is it doomed. But it is under threat,
degree of personal freedom, and better not from some outside hegemon but
rule of law. from within. The threat is aggravated
The fact that there has been so much by the widespread inability to recognize
progress does not mean that all is well progress and people’s tendency to focus
and that no changes are necessary—far on only bad news. As all three authors
from it. The very breadth of this prog- point out, pessimism can be self-fulfilling:
ress means that the global institutions in countries where people believe the
that produced it must change if they are world is getting worse, they may
to keep working to address the world’s dismantle some of the very institutions
problems. The structures, decision- that made it better and thereby fulfill
making processes, and power balances the predictions of decline. As has always
that functioned well after World War II been the case, the supporters of the
are no longer appropriate now that so liberal order will have to fight hard to
many countries rightly demand a voice keep it—and to improve it. Only that
in the system. The United Nations, the way will the world sustain the unprec-
International Monetary Fund, the World edented progress in the human condi-
Bank, the World Trade Organization, tion that the order helped create and
regional security pacts, and other continue to expand the reach of peace,
institutions will all have to give develop- prosperity, and freedom.∂
ing countries greater influence. Only
then will these countries be willing to
work with the United States to fight
the major challenges the world faces.
The United States must be willing, once
again, to share power rather than
simply wield it. It needs to understand
that doing so will strengthen, not
weaken, its long-term security.
affects people’s minds, so we wanted

Praying for to be sure.”
That day, the imam’s sermon was
Pakistan suitably vague: health and wealth for
everyone, sweet words about the ummah
(the global community of Muslims), and
Extremism and Corruption in no calls to arms or support for holy wars.
a Troubled State The imam did take a jab or two at those
who preached “enlightened moderation”—
Mohammed Hanif a meaningless label that Musharraf had
apparently picked up during his numer-
ous visits to think tanks in the United
States and that he had begun using to
Pakistan Under Siege: Extremism, Society, describe the ideological direction of his
and the State dictatorship. Musharraf was at the height
BY MADIHA AFZAL . Brookings of his double game: allowing the United
Institution Press, 2018, 208 pp. States to use Pakistani military bases to
bomb the Afghan Taliban while signing
A
round a dozen years ago, during peace deals with the Pakistani Taliban.
a visit to my ancestral village The new imam might have been a moder-
in Pakistan, I joined my brother ate by my brother’s standards, but he had
for Friday prayers at the local mosque. At no appetite for Musharraf’s brand of
the time, the country’s military dictator, enlightenment. I wondered if this imam
President Pervez Musharraf, was busy could help stem the tide of radicalism
explaining to Pakistanis that they were in or whether he was part of it.
the middle of a do-or-die battle against I found my answer around midnight,
militants—although it seemed that, for when a loudspeaker attached to the
ordinary people, this mostly involved mosque’s exterior came alive with the
dying. People all over the country were sound of the imam performing a long
wary of prayer leaders preaching about recitation from the Koran and exhorting
jihad or creating pretexts for others to people to perform their midnight prayer.
wage it. The speaker was remarkably loud; the
My brother, who runs a business in a house where I was staying was a few
fruit and vegetable market, served on a hundred meters from the mosque, but
committee of mosque leaders that had the imam seemed to be shouting directly
recently hired a new imam. Before offering into my ears. It is not traditional for an
him the job, the committee had checked imam to call people to the midnight
him out to make sure he was not a radical. prayer. Performing it is completely
“The new imam is not a troublemaker,” voluntary; one is not even supposed
my brother assured me. “Times are to go to the mosque for it. In Pakistan,
bad, and what goes on in the mosque most people seem to not even know
that such a prayer exists. The imam, it
MOHAMMED HANIF is a journalist, novelist,
and playwright. He is a contributing opinion seemed, was a moderate by day but a
writer for The New York Times. zealot at night.

Mohammed Hanif The CSS Point
“Why make such a big deal of your it’s what makes the country a subject of
personal piety?” my brother’s wife, a such fascination for scholars and social
homemaker, groused in the morning. scientists. Books about Pakistan by
“What kind of imam have you hired? Western and Pakistani experts alike
He doesn’t let us sleep at night.” My tend to focus on religion and radicalism.
brother mumbled that he would bring They are often suffused with a sense of
it up at the next committee meeting. It alarm and danger, as many of their titles
was clear that he wasn’t quite sure how or subtitles demonstrate: Can Pakistan
to stop a man of faith from reminding Survive? Pakistan: A Hard Country. The
the faithful of their duty to Allah—even Scorpion’s Tail. Deep Inside the World’s
if it was the middle of the night, and Most Frightening State. Courting the Abyss.
even if they had no such duty. Eye of the Storm.
My brother is one of many Pakistani With its title, Madiha Afzal’s Pakistan
Muslims who believe that a revolution Under Siege follows in this tradition. But
akin to the one that transformed Iran in compared with what is found in other
1979 is the only solution to the country’s recent books on the country, her analysis
problems. (Although they hope for a is mild, even matter of fact. Afzal’s multi-
revolution like Iran’s, which was led by layered approach to explaining Pakistan
Shiite clerics, they also suspect that makes it sound like a normal country—
Shiites are not good enough Muslims— almost. The book details the rise of
and they don’t really see any contradic- religious extremism and explains how
tion there.) By Western standards, he the state has been both complicit in
acts like a radical; by a radical’s standards, extremist violence and victimized by
he acts like a moderate. In this, he is like it. Afzal, a young Pakistani economist,
many other Pakistanis, who go about examines the evolution of legal and
making a living and raising families, educational institutions in the country
only to find themselves accused of being and relates how they have fostered a
not good enough Muslims whenever hatred for ethnic and religious minori-
they pause to pray in the company of ties and a general antipathy toward the
more pious people. Most Muslims are West. The book delves into the Pakistani
encouraged to think of themselves as army’s efforts to create a “good Taliban”
sinners; when confronted about the to counter the “bad Taliban” and empha-
quality of their faith, they promise to sizes the ways in which civilian officials
strive to be better Muslims. This is the have been kept out of the decision-
original meaning of “jihad”—a struggle making process behind such policies.
to better oneself, to get over the baser “There is doubt that the civilians are up
urges, to become a better Muslim. Of to the task of handling security policy,”
course, according to extremists, no one she writes. “But it is also clear that the
is a better Muslim than the one who military is not ready to let it go.”
lays down his life for Allah. In August, the former cricket star
This tension between the urge to be Imran Khan led the political party he
a better Muslim in this world and the founded to victory in national elections
wish to take a short cut to paradise has and became prime minister. Throughout
riven Pakistani society for decades, and the campaign, Khan seemed to enjoy the
A time to mourn: remembering victims of an attack in Peshawar, Pakistan, January 2016

tacit backing of the military establish- the country, the combination of extrem-
ment. Many analysts believe that with ism and growing prosperity may prove
the army and the civilian political leader- even more dangerous.
ship finally on the same page, Khan
has a historic opportunity to slowly ZIA’S LEGACY
wrest away the military’s control of Pakistanis’ attitude toward extremism
foreign policy and national security. changes frequently and depends to a great
Those analysts may be expecting too degree on context. When Pakistan itself
much from Khan—and, moreover, they is not under attack, Pakistanis take a fairly
have things backward. In fact, it is the benign view of militants. But if the same
military that has a historic opportunity: militants start blowing themselves up
to finally learn to live with the aspirations near Pakistan’s mosques or shops, many
of its civilian partners and acknowledge Pakistanis’ first reaction is to think, “These
that the army cannot be the sole arbiter can’t really be my brothers in faith.”
of the country’s fate. The army, how- The question of foreign intervention
ever, seems unlikely to do so. in the country scrambles things even
K H U R AM PA RV E Z / R E U T E R S
Afzal’s book offers a useful survey of further. Afzal shares the results of a survey
the many pressures—cultural, religious, conducted in 2009 by the Program on
economic—that add to social and politi- International Policy Attitudes in Pakistan,
cal instability in Pakistan. One of the in which 90 percent of respondents
ironies that emerges is that although expressed opposition to the presence of
commentators have long focused on the al Qaeda in Pakistan and neighboring
intersection of extremism and poverty in Afghanistan. On the other hand, she

reports, a different survey conducted the accused. Members of the Ahmadiyya

around the same time found that 63 per- sect were declared non-Muslims by
cent of Pakistanis opposed the 2011 U.S. Pakistan’s parliament in 1974, and they
raid in Abbottabad that killed Osama remain one of the most persecuted minor-
bin Laden. Pakistanis don’t want violent ity groups. (To apply for a passport or a
jihadists in their backyards, but they national identity card, Pakistani Muslims
also do not want American assassins must sign the following statement: “I
stealing into their country in the middle consider Mirza Ghulam Ahmad”—the
of the night. founder of the sect—“to be an imposter
Afzal rightly assigns much of the prophet [and] also consider his follow-
blame for Pakistan’s confusing relation- ers . . . to be non-Muslims.”)
ship with extremism to Muhammad One can also still see Zia’s legacy in
Zia-ul-Haq, the military dictator who Pakistan’s educational system, which
ruled the country from 1978 until his teaches children a number of astounding
death in 1988. Zia sought to “Islamize” lies about their country’s history and place
society by establishing and enforcing in the world. According to Afzal, history
his version of sharia, bolstering religious textbooks borrow language and concepts
education, and preventing Pakistanis about the relationship between Islam and
from accessing Western cultural products. politics from Jamaat-e-Islami, the oldest
To accomplish this goal, he made a Islamist political party in Pakistan. In
mockery of Pakistani democracy. In examining Pakistan’s schools, Afzal usefully
1984, he held a referendum in which debunks the common myth that madrasahs
Pakistani voters were asked whether are central to jihadist movements. In
they supported the imposition of an reality, it is the country’s mainstream
Islamic system and another five-year educational system that fosters militancy.
term in office for Zia himself. The only
acceptable answers were yes and no. MOSQUES AND MONEY
Since it would have been almost un- Afzal also sheds light on how eco-
thinkable for anyone to vote “against nomic change has fueled religiosity
Islam,” it was practically impossible for and extremism in Pakistan. In recent
anyone to vote against Zia. Many voters decades, Pakistan’s middle class has grown
abstained altogether; some cities looked substantially. According to the Pakistani
like ghost towns on polling day. On top economist S. Akbar Zaidi, Pakistan’s
of that, Zia’s cronies stuffed ballot upper- and middle-class population now
boxes, awarding him and his initiative stands at 84 million—larger than the
more than 98 percent of the votes. entire population of Germany. Most
Zia’s successors curtailed some political scientists or economists would
aspects of his Islamization program, expect newly prosperous Pakistanis to
but much of it remains in place, as become more secular in their outlook
Afzal reveals. Authorities frequently and behavior. But middle-class Pakistanis
invoke discriminatory laws against often spend their newfound wealth not
minorities. Charges of blasphemy have on material comforts but on things they
led to the imprisonment of hundreds, believe will ensure their safe passage to
and sometimes lynch mobs have killed paradise after they leave this world.
They go on luxury pilgrimages to Mecca, and deep participation in the Pakistani

donate to Islamic charities, and fund economy, military officials enjoy privi-
the construction of new mosques. (They leges unavailable to their counterparts
really love building mosques: through- in most other countries. The armed
out Pakistan, one can find freshly minted forces have recently added processing
houses of worship with marble floors and selling meat to the already large
and minarets decorated with elaborate portfolio of businesses in which they
mirror work, even in places that lack dabble, which also includes cereals,
sewage systems and paved roads.) cement, banking, sugar, telecommunica-
A few years ago, a man who was a tions, transport, and many other sectors.
classmate of mine in high school opened In some countries, such profiteering
a gas station in central Punjab. He proudly might generate a popular backlash against
showed me a tastefully designed mosque the military. To prevent such an out-
that he’d built on the premises, to offer come in Pakistan, military officers have
his customers a place to pray. A few years taken a cue from the civilian nouveaux
later, he built another gas station—and riches, funneling some of their profits to
another mosque—on the same piece of religious charities and mosque-building
property. When I visited, I noticed that projects. The idea that money can buy
the first mosque was mostly empty. “Why one a ticket to paradise is so well en-
another mosque in the same spot?” I trenched that most Pakistanis don’t
asked him. “Because if God has given even question the obvious corruption
me two businesses instead of one, why that has enriched the military elite.
shouldn’t I pay him back?” he replied. By publicly performing their piety
Afzal also focuses on Pakistan’s and thus allowing judgments about religi-
military, which she correctly identifies osity to shape public debate, middle-class
as the most powerful institution in the Pakistanis and the military have aided
country, even when civilians are in control the cause of the extremist militants who
of the government. The military has a loathe them. Seven years ago, the gover-
strong hold on Pakistanis; it is widely nor of Punjab Province, Salman Taseer,
feared but also widely respected. The was assassinated by his own bodyguard.
generals have suffered losses and humilia- Taseer was a liberal who lived a secular
tions but have always managed to get lifestyle and who had raised questions
back on their feet quickly. In 2010, the about Pakistan’s harsh law against blas-
entire world was looking for bin Laden. phemy, which calls for the death penalty
When he was found living a stone’s for offenders. Among many middle-class
throw away from a major Pakistani and educated Pakistanis, discussions of
military academy, the generals more or his assassination often began with the
less shrugged it off. observation that murder can never be
Whenever I interact with midranking justified but then quickly shifted to cata-
army officials, they don’t want to discuss loging the many things that a “good
religion, regional security, or any of the Muslim” shouldn’t do in order to avoid
other issues that Afzal analyzes. All they Taseer’s fate: never speak up for minori-
want to talk about is real estate prices. ties, for example, and never say anything
Thanks to the military’s vast holdings that might offend a religious scholar.

In May, as Pakistan prepared for another to court over minor land

national elections, a gunman attempted disputes. “What I don’t understand is
to kill the country’s interior minister, that when fewer people came to the
Ahsan Iqbal; he was shot in the arm but mosque, there were hardly any crimes
survived. As with the attack on Taseer, in the village,” he said. “People didn’t
it appeared that Iqbal’s assailant was think they could commit fraud and get
motivated by extremist views relating away with it in such a small place. But
to the laws prohibiting blasphemy. But today, everyone’s lying, everyone’s
unlike Taseer, Iqbal is a highly observant cheating, everyone’s stealing, and they
Muslim; he comes from a conservative think by coming to the mosque, they
family known for its affiliation with have booked themselves a plot in para-
Islamist movements. He is, by all pre- dise and they don’t need to fulfill their
vailing standards, a pious man. For the obligations in this world.”
man who tried to kill him, however, When people come into a bit of
Iqbal wasn’t a good enough Muslim. money, their expectations rise. They
Pakistanis try hard to become better also start craving respect and demand-
Muslims—and the country’s courts, ing that the state provide them with
media, and educational system work to basic services. But the Pakistani state
ensure that they do. But every so often, is still stuck in its old ways, relying on
someone comes along wielding a gun, colonial-era laws and riddled with
telling them that they have been doing corrupt patronage networks. When the
it all wrong. And unfortunately, they state inevitably fails to meet people’s
seem willing to listen. raised expectations, they turn to reli-
gious parties and look for messiahs who
EXPECTATIONS GAME can fix their broken world, as well as
Recently, I returned to my family’s village promise a shiny bridge to paradise in
and attended Friday prayers. The mosque the afterlife.
was full of worshipers; others were lined I called my brother on election day
up outside on the pavement. Since my and asked him if he had voted yet. He
last visit, the mosque had let go the said that it was quite hot and that he
imam who had called them to the was waiting for the weather to cool
midnight prayer and chosen a more down a bit. “And who are you going to
moderate one. My brother found the new vote for?” I asked. He chuckled and
imam’s Friday sermons a bit dull and was said, “I am going to go out and find a
contemplating inviting someone more good mullah on the ballot.”∂
lively to deliver an occasional sermon.
I mentioned to him that many more
people turned up for prayer these days
than when we were children. He agreed.
Then he sighed and pointed out that,
at the same time, there were now more
petty crimes in the village and that people
were stealing water and electricity from
their neighbors and dragging one
even encouraged in a healthy bureaucracy.

The Secret Sharers Whistle-blowing to the public, on the
other hand, is a punishable violation of
professional standards or even criminal
Leaking and Whistle-Blowing law. It should not be differentiated
in the Trump Era from leaking.
To be sure, officially sanctioned
whistle-blowing still entails risks. If one
blows the whistle on legitimate behavior,
Too Many Leaks
the whistleblower could lose credibility
Peter Feaver or even her job. And whistle-blowing
might not accomplish anything if the
I
s leaking sensitive national security chain of command itself is corrupt.
information ever justified? Yes, under Appealing through proper channels is
rare and exacting circumstances. no guarantee that the outcome will be
Does the kind of leaking that has become optimal, but it is preferable to the alter-
the new normal during the Trump admin- native, which sets up the individual as a
istration meet those conditions? Almost law unto herself.
certainly not, even if it hasn’t imperiled A second problem with Walzer’s
the republic—at least so far. typology is that his definition of leaking
Sorting through the complex moral excludes many of the day-to-day exchanges
calculus of leaking is precisely in Michael that take place between the government
Walzer’s wheelhouse, and there is much and the media. For Walzer, an anonymous
to admire about his measured assessment quote does not count as a leak unless it
(“Just and Unjust Leaks,” March/April was intended to embarrass officials or
2018). Walzer is right not to blindly engender unwanted public scrutiny. But
celebrate leaking as some sort of First most interactions belong to another
Amendment sacrament. Yet he does not category, which could be called “benign
go far enough in parsing the different leaking.” Communications offices in the
types of leaks. government depend on anonymous or
Walzer distinguishes between a “leaker,” unattributed sourcing to provide context
who “anonymously reveals information and detail about their initiatives in a
that might embarrass officials or open way that keeps the focus on the project
up the government’s internal workings rather than the individuals involved.
to unwanted public scrutiny,” and a Briefing journalists is part of any well-
“whistleblower,” who “reveals what she executed policy rollout. In some cases,
believes to be immoral or illegal official governments will also authorize leaks to
conduct to her bureaucratic superiors gauge an idea’s political viability with-
or to the public.” From the point of out committing the administration’s
view of national security professionals, prestige and credibility to the project.
however, there is a world of difference Perhaps these sanctioned forms of
between whistle-blowing to one’s bureau- contact with the media should not be
cratic superiors and whistle-blowing to considered leaking at all. Yet in terms of
the public. The former is permitted and sheer volume, benign leaking accounts

Walzer and His Critics The CSS Point
for more of the anonymous quotes in illegal ones. Some officers believe that
the media than malign leaking, regard- this means they have an obligation to
less of the administration. Most of the refuse orders that are unethical or unwise,
time, benign leaking serves a noble First but the Uniform Code of Military Justice
Amendment purpose: fostering a better- provides no such exception. This does
informed, more balanced media market- not mean that members of the military
place. Still, it can be overdone. Over are powerless; they can express concerns
the past several decades, there has been within their chain of command or the
a marked expansion of the practice. In regular civil-military advisory process.
previous eras, administrations relied on In fact, they have a professional obliga-
clubby relationships with well-sourced tion to speak up, but not to speak out.
reporters to shape public narratives; today, When those in the military circumvent
they use anonymous quotes. This tactic the internal process in order to gener-
has metastasized into an overused and ate political pressure on their civilian
possibly self-defeating communications bosses, they undermine the norm of
strategy. The unintended consequence has civilian control.
been an increase in leaking of all sorts. Those serving in the military should
And although every modern president assume that orders coming down through
has occasionally resorted to unattributed the regular chain of command are legal.
quotes to provide context or float an idea, Indeed, commanders have access to
reporters claim that Donald Trump does lawyers whose job it is to make sure
this more than any of his predecessors. that this is the case. An individual who
Likewise, although all administrations decides to exercise her own judgment
simultaneously leak and criticize leakers, and refuse an order on the grounds of
this kind of hypocrisy has become partic- illegality should expect to be arrested
ularly acute under Trump. and face a court-martial. If she is right,
It is the other kind of leaking, malign the system should vindicate her. If not,
leaking, that drives the most sensation- she should be punished.
alistic stories and all too often wins those The same logic applies to malign
involved fame and fortune, not to men- leaking. Malign leaking is fundamentally
tion coveted journalism awards. Malign antidemocratic because the individual
leaking is the focus of Walzer’s attention, leaker places her own judgment over
and he claims that it can serve the broader the authority of the system established
public good. It can, but this probably by the Constitution. Walzer leans heavily
happens less often than people think. on the counterargument that leaking
And at their current level, unauthor- provides a vital public service by rescu-
ized leaks are creating a climate that ing the country from disastrous policies
undermines effective and accountable that leaders are able to impose only by
governance. hiding things. It is certainly possible
Malign leaking is the moral equiva- to conjure up hypotheticals that fit this
lent of disobeying an order. Is that ever tidy morality tale: for example, a mentally
the right thing to do? Consider the U.S. unhinged president seeking to launch
military: those who serve are supposed an unjustified nuclear strike. Clearly,
to obey all legal orders but disobey all the crime of leaking is preferable to a
The Secret Sharers
needless nuclear war, but these hypo- Some of the most celebrated leaks in
theticals tend to collapse under closer the Trump era fit this pattern. When the
scrutiny. For starters, the system already contents of December 2016 conversations
provides avenues to push back within between Sergey Kislyak, the Russian
the chain of command. Lower-ranking ambassador to the United States, and
officials do not need to rely on leaks to Michael Flynn, whom Trump had tapped
save the globe. Moreover, actual cases to serve as national security adviser,
are rarely so tidy. As Walzer himself were leaked to The Washington Post,
observes, even those who believe that they set in motion a media frenzy that
the former National Security Agency eventually led to extensive congressional
contractor Edward Snowden was justified investigations into the Trump campaign’s
in leaking information about controver- possible collusion with Russia. Similarly,
sial surveillance programs must grapple former FBI Director James Comey admit-
with the inconvenient truth that he ted that he asked a friend to leak the
leaked much more than was needed to contents of his confidential memos in
prompt a public debate about the civil order to trigger a special counsel investi-
liberties of U.S. citizens—including, as gation. It would have been better if that
Walzer notes, “information about U.S. information had initially gone to the
intelligence operations against non- relevant congressional committees, which
American targets in mainland China.” are already empowered to explore such
Snowden also leaked information about issues. (And better still if Trump had
programs that were authorized by estab- authorized an independent commission
lished executive-branch protocols and had to fully investigate the entire affair.)
been properly briefed to congressional The same goes for the New York Times
overseers. Snowden does not deserve op-ed published anonymously in Septem-
the moral protection of whistleblower ber and purportedly written by a senior
status. If he disagrees, he should come Trump administration official who claimed
back and face the legal system. If he to be part of a “quiet resistance” to Trump,
has truly done a public service, the whom the author described as amoral,
courts can take that into consideration. ill informed, impetuous, and petty.
The Snowden case is a reminder that Writing the op-ed was legal but prob-
the U.S. Constitution already provides ably counterproductive. It did nothing
a legitimate way to prevent abuses of to empower constitutional checks and
power and official misconduct: rigorous balances, and it has likely driven Trump
congressional oversight. Congress has to do more of the very things that the
the capacity to compel testimony from author complained about. It would have
the executive branch. Revealing informa- been better for the official to resign and
tion to an open session of Congress— then testify before Congress.
or discussing classified information in Of course, congressional oversight
a closed hearing—does not count as leaves much to be desired. And Congress
malign leaking. Most leaks to the itself is generally considered to be a foun-
media bypass this kind of oversight: tain of malign leaks. Still, congressional
they catalyze investigations rather than investigations into the Iraq war; the assault
result from them. on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya;

and now Russian interference in the

U.S. election show that this oversight No Ordinary Time
can bring information into the public Allison Stanger
eye that the administration might
prefer to keep private.
M
Walzer’s argument that the ends ichael Walzer identifies
justify the means treats leaking like several types of leaking and
speeding. But if you need to rush some- whistle-blowing and explores
one to the hospital, you should call an their ethical implications. His reasoning
ambulance before deciding to disregard is thoughtful and nuanced and fine for
the speed limit yourself. If that is not politics as usual. But American politics
feasible, then speed, but be prepared today are highly unusual, and taking that
to face the consequences. Yet the vast context into account changes the moral
majority of speeding does not take place calculus he presents.
under such extreme circumstances. Like- Extraordinary times demand extra-
wise, the vast majority of malign leaking ordinary actions. Because the current
advances the selfish interests of the administration has launched an assault
leaker rather than the public interest. on the rule of law and the norms and
Reckless leaking may be irresistible to practices of American democracy, officials
watch, but it will likely end in a crash. in a position to blow the whistle on that
It is possible to overreact on the other effort are justified in doing so.
side, as well. Ruthlessly tracking down Walzer argues that “whistleblowers
every malign leaker would be no wiser have a role to play in a democratic politi-
than an analogous effort to catch every cal universe” but that “it is an unofficial
speeder. This means that there will role, and one must recognize both its
always be leeway for the rare instances possible value and its possible dangers.”
when a leaker really does need to do In general, that is and should be true.
the dirty deed. But it should not be difficult to see that
The prevalence of leaking today is today, the value outweighs the danger.
likely a symptom, not a disease. The Whistle-blowing is the exposure of
underlying cause has many components, illegal or improper activity, and it has
including a government that does not been recognized as a legitimate part of
value transparency, a national security American politics from the founding
establishment that overclassifies informa- onward. (It was first given legal protection
tion, a hyperpartisan and dysfunctional by the Second Continental Congress
oversight system, and a media market- in 1778.) It has never been extended
place that is dominated by shrill advo- coherently and consistently to national
cacy. Until those factors are addressed, security, however—a realm in which
the leaking, and the complaints about it can clash with another professional
leaking, will continue. imperative, the duty not to reveal
classified material to the public without
PETER FEAVER is Professor of Political authorization.
Science and Public Policy at Duke University.
In the corporate world, protection of
whistle-blowing has become increasingly
formalized in legislation such as the
1986 amendments to the False Claims
Act, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.
National security employees, however,
were explicitly excluded from the Whistle-
blower Protection Act of 1989, an exclusion
ratified when Congress updated the act
in 2012.
Extending whistleblower protection
to the national security arena is admit-
tedly a complex challenge. In ordinary
circumstances, officials should not
have the right to decide for themselves
whether classified information should
be made public. And even today, leaks
such as the release of transcripts of the
president’s conversations with foreign We don't break
the news;
leaders do not constitute whistle-blowing,
because the behavior revealed did not
involve a gross violation of the rule of
law. In such circumstances, Walzer’s
we break it down.
invocation of the ethical calculus of civil Educate your employees and
disobedience is valid.
customers about the most
But when high officials in the execu-
tive branch who are sworn to uphold pressing global issues of today
the law openly flout and subvert it, and with a Foreign Affairs Foreign
Congress fails to exercise its oversight Policy Briefing. Bring us to
responsibilities, then internal channels your office or event space to
of dissent atrophy and a whistleblower’s provide expert perspective on
calculations change. When the rule of the forces shaping your world
law itself is threatened, whistle-blowing
can be necessary to defend liberal democ-
and your business.
racy as a whole. Illegal leaks that expose
true betrayals of American democracy
are neither partisan nor political. They For inquiries about events
are patriotic. at your organization,
Within days of taking office, President please contact us at
Donald Trump fired Sally Yates, the acting
attorney general, and a few months events@foreignaffairs.com
later, he fired James Comey, the FBI
director. Since then, Trump has repeatedly
tried to impede the investigation of

Robert Mueller, the special counsel who have been used to uphold the rule of law.
is looking into Russian interference in the The author overlooked the philosopher
2016 U.S. presidential election; attacked Hannah Arendt’s warning that those who
and slandered anybody who criticizes him claim to be choosing the lesser evil often
or refuses to accept his claims of absolute forget that they are nevertheless still
authority; and polluted public discourse choosing to do evil.
with a constant stream of lies. “Our whole In his classic Just and Unjust Wars,
system falls apart when the citizens of our Walzer discusses the case of Arthur
country lose confidence in the justice Harris, the leader of the United King-
system and the Department of Justice,” dom’s Bomber Command and the
Yates would later say. “But almost from architect of terror bombing raids on
the very beginning [of the Trump admin- Germany. Walzer argues that in cases
istration], we’ve seen breaches of these of supreme emergency, when the very
rules and norms from the White House.” existence of the state is at stake, it
As a dedicated public servant confronting might be possible to fight unjustly for
the danger firsthand, Yates came out in a a just cause. (He cites Dresden and
different place than Walzer. Her recom- Hiroshima as examples.) But when
mendation? “When you see something the emergency has passed, he continues,
happening that you [think] is wrong— moral order (and ordinary bureaucratic
and that’s different from something that behavior) needs to be restored.
you just don’t think will be effective—I If such reasoning could encompass
encourage you to speak up.” and excuse those strategically worthless,
Yates was not alone in believing that random massacres of vast numbers of
these are exceptional times. An unprece- unarmed civilians, how can it not—at
dented number of former senior officials least hypothetically—encompass and
from the intelligence and national excuse the occasional unauthorized
security communities, of both political disclosure of accurate but classified
parties, have spoken out against what information? Accepting that point allows
they consider a unique threat to Ameri- the national discussion to turn to the
can political culture and institutions. real issue: whether Trump does indeed
Many of their counterparts inside the constitute a threat to the republic, and
system agree and feel obliged to cry foul if so, what to do about it.
themselves, as well—not on a whim or as Once these unique depredations end,
an act of partisanship but to honor their the leaking that is occurring in response
own sworn oath to preserve, protect, and will obviously need to end, as well. (There
defend the Constitution. The anonymous is every reason to expect it to, since there
author of the New York Times op-ed who has never been any previous outbreak
claimed to be “working diligently from of such widespread whistle-blowing that
within to frustrate parts of [Trump’s] anyone can remember.) And at that
agenda and his worst inclinations” point, it will be possible to draw up the
argued that accommodating Trump’s ethical balance sheets and assign every-
“amorality” was justified by the pursuit one involved his or her proper penance.
of a higher cause. But he or she failed to But until the immediate danger has
provide any new information that might passed, it makes sense to focus on the
The Secret Sharers
shocking substance of the information Feaver is wrong, however, to say that

being revealed rather than the question- soldiers “should assume that orders
able means by which that information coming down through the regular chain
is coming to light. In short: don’t shoot of command are legal.” The whole point
the messenger; listen to the message. of teaching military personnel the rules of
engagement is to make it possible for
them to know whether the orders are
ALLISON STANGER is Russell J. Leng ‘60 legal or not. And even in cases in which
Professor of International Politics and Economics
at Middlebury College and Scholar-in-Residence soldiers are not certain, they should
with the Cybersecurity Initiative at New America. assume that monstrously immoral orders
Her forthcoming book is Life, Liberty, and the are also illegal.
Pursuit of Leaks: The Story of Whistleblowing
in America. Feaver’s phrase “tidy morality tale”
doesn’t accurately describe the hypo-
thetical cases (let alone the actual cases)
that I and other critics cite when defend-
Walzer Replies ing whistle-blowing. Say, for example,
that the U.S. president decided to use
T
hese two responses to my military force without congressional
article present an interesting oversight or democratic debate. Such an
contrast. Peter Feaver thinks action might fit an expansive definition
that I am too ready to defend whistle- of the powers granted to the executive
blowing; Allison Stanger thinks that I branch by the U.S. Constitution, but it
am not ready enough—indeed, she wouldn’t be an obvious fit. Internal
argues that we should all be encouraging protest and whistle-blowing might well
whistle-blowing in these dark times. be justified in such a situation, and to
Criticized from both sides, I could just make such a judgment, one would rely
enjoy the comforts of the middle posi- not on morality tales but on answers to
tion. But I am not exactly in the middle; specific questions: Is this government
it’s more as if I am moving from side policy legal or illegal, restrained or brutal?
to side. I admire the nuance of Feaver’s Is its violence necessary or gratuitous?
response, and I share Stanger’s sense In some cases, the end (an informed
of urgency. public) will justify the means (whistle-
Feaver’s enhanced typology is blowing). What other justification is
helpful. I should have said more about possible? Means are not self-justifying.
“benign leaking” and about the way A whistleblower aims to tell citizens in
that officials use leaks for their own a democracy things that he or she believes
purposes. And I obviously could have they need to know—and if the whistle-
said more about working within the blower is right about the need, his or
bureaucracy and about the ways in her aim does indeed justify the means.
which any given chain of command is Feaver concludes his critique by trying
open, or not, to internal protest. Feaver to explain “the prevalence of leaking
is a bit too sanguine about bureaucratic today,” which he deplores. But his account
openness, but I agree that this should of the causes of the prevalence—the lack
always be tested. of transparency, the overclassification of

information, dysfunctional oversight— The official who wrote that piece is not
suggests strongly that, as Stanger argues, a whistleblower. He or she doesn’t name
the leaking is not entirely deplorable. any of the dangerous or immoral steps
The conditions that explain it also that Trump supposedly wanted to take
sometimes justify it. but was prevented from taking by the
Stanger is certainly right to defend author or others in the internal “resis-
the exposure of “true betrayals of Amer- tance.” I, like Feaver, am opposed to
ican democracy,” but she doesn’t tell us anonymous writing of this kind. If I
enough about what she means by “true believed that the author were actually
betrayals.” Despite some qualifications, engaged in saving the republic, I would
her argument has a wholesale quality. excuse the anonymity. I am inclined
What is necessary, even in the age of instead to believe that salvation will
Donald Trump, is retail analysis—case have to come from another place.∂
by case. Like Stanger, I would defend
whistleblowers who exposed authori-
tarian behavior that the public didn’t
know about. But I would still insist on
the conditions that I described in my
article—that the act of the whistle-
blower expressed in all its aspects a
democratic intention.
I also need to clarify two points.
Stanger wrongly suggests that in Just
and Unjust Wars, I defend the British
firebombing of Dresden during World
War II and the U.S. atomic bombing
of Japan as examples of “supreme emer-
gency,” a phrase Winston Churchill
coined in 1940 to justify violating
Norway’s neutrality in the fight against
the Axis powers by sinking Norwegian
ships carrying ore to Germany. In fact,
I condemn both actions, in Dresden
and in Hiroshima, in very strong terms.
Nor do I think that a doctrine as radical
as “supreme emergency” is necessary
to justify “the occasional unauthorized
disclosure” of illegal or monstrously
immoral government activity. Whistle-
blowing should never be routine, but it
doesn’t have to be an act of desperation.
Finally, I agree with Feaver’s and
Stanger’s criticisms of the anonymous
author of the New York Times op-ed.
as a moral ideal, a vision of political

Recent Books community that is based not just on
interests but also on values: respect,
tolerance, and justice.
Political and Legal
Can Democracy Work? A Short History
G. John Ikenberry of a Radical Idea, From Ancient Athens
to Our World
BY JAMES MILLER . Farrar, Straus and
The Lost History of Liberalism: From Giroux, 2018, 320 pp.
Ancient Rome to the Twenty-first Century
BY HELENA ROSENBLAT T . Princeton Many people today worry that John
University Press, 2018, 368 pp. Adams might have been onto some-
thing when he observed that “there has
A
lthough liberalism dominates never been a democracy yet that did
Western politics, there is little not commit suicide.” Miller tries to put
agreement over what “liberalism” these worries in perspective by tracing
means. For some, it is the Lockean idea the tumultuous history of democracy
of individual rights and limited govern- from its ancient Athenian origins through
ment; for others, it is the doctrine of the American and French Revolutions
the modern welfare state. In this lively to the populist upheavals afoot today.
and penetrating book, Rosenblatt offers What makes the book compelling is its
an intellectual history of the term, from focus on colorful thinkers, activists, and
its roots in Roman notions of civic duty political leaders who lived and breathed
and public morality down to its modern the democratic moment throughout
use. She shows how the idea was “Chris- history, from Pericles and Socrates in
tianized, democratized, socialized, and ancient Athens to Woodrow Wilson and
politicized” over the centuries. She also Vladimir Lenin in the early twentieth
challenges the traditional narrative of century. Miller shows that democracy’s
liberalism as an Anglo-American project, ascent is best seen not as a gradual unfold-
placing greater emphasis on nineteenth- ing of a political principle driven by
century French and German thinkers reason and moral destiny but rather as
who tried to conjure up “liberal prin- a grand roller coaster ride of struggle,
ciples” of politics—the rule of law, revolution, and backlash. Today’s
civic equality, constitutionalism, and populist outbursts look quite ordinary
freedom of the press and religion— alongside this history. Miller’s message
that could answer the radical forces is that democracy is not just a fixed
unleashed by the French Revolution. set of governing institutions; it is, as
It was only in the twentieth century, the French political theorist Alexis de
particularly during the Cold War, that Tocqueville argued, a way of life. If
liberalism became a uniquely American democracy is to survive, the first
creed of individualism and political imperative is to recognize its fragility
rights. Rosenblatt shows that liberal- and step forward and defend it.
ism has survived thanks to its appeal

Recent Books The CSS Point
Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the which sees economic development as
World’s Sole Superpower leading to shifts in society toward liberal
BY MICHAEL BECKLEY . Cornell democracy. Modernization theory has
University Press, 2018, 248 pp. gone in and out of fashion over the years,
as critics have questioned its Western
It has become conventional wisdom that biases and its vision of universal pathways
the United States is in decline, the uni- of development. Yet in previous work
polar era is ending, and China is on the using data from the World Values Survey,
rise. In this smart and sophisticated book, Inglehart has identified systematic con-
Beckley tackles this thesis head-on. He nections between long-term economic
does not dispute that the United States changes and shifts in attitudes on gender
has its problems or that misguided leaders equality, religion, and democratic values.
often squander its advantages. But he In this book, Inglehart offers a restatement
points out that the United States’ deep of modernization theory, focusing on
geographic, demographic, and institutional the links between economic and physical
reserves give the country unique resilience. security and tolerance of outsiders and
The United States is the only great power openness to new ideas. For most of history,
without regional rivals. Its companies and people lived under the constant threat
universities dominate the world. And most of violence and disease, leading societies
important, Beckley argues that it has by far to emphasize solidarity with fellow mem-
the best fundamentals for future economic bers, conformity to group norms, and
growth, thanks to its abundant natural suspicion of outsiders. Inglehart argues
resources, favorable demographics, secure that in the second half of the twentieth
property rights, and lasting political century, industrialization, urbanization,
institutions. China’s growth prospects, in and mass literacy systematically reduced
contrast, are “dismal.” Beckley also thinks the “existential insecurity” of vast num-
the declinists use the wrong measures of bers of people, making modern societies
power. GDP, for example, exaggerates the more open and tolerant. Inglehart claims
influence of populous but poor countries, that these more liberal societies generated
such as China, while overlooking problems a surge in democratization in the 1990s.
that drain those countries’ economic and Now, he sees a creeping return of economic
military resources. He does not argue that insecurity in the rich world, which is
the United States can—or should—try opening the door to intolerance and
to preserve the unipolar era, but he does authoritarianism.
think that it will long remain the world’s
leading power. Restraining Great Powers: Soft Balancing
From Empires to the Global Era
Cultural Evolution: People’s Motivations BY T. V. PAUL . Yale University Press,
Are Changing, and Reshaping the World 2018, 256 pp.
BY RONALD F. INGLEHART .
Cambridge University Press, 2018, 288 pp. For some 400 years, the world’s leading
states pursued security by preserving
Inglehart is one of the last great postwar the balance of power. But since the end
exponents of modernization theory, of the Cold War, the idea has been
Recent Books
strangely absent. Paul argues that the economists to conduct a cost-benefit

idea of a balance of power is not dead; analysis of each one (except for those
it has simply taken new, more peaceful that were too qualitative to evaluate).
forms, which he calls “soft balancing.” This useful book is the result, covering
This seems to have been largely driven topics ranging from air pollution to water
by economic interdependence, which and sanitation. For each SDG, the contrib-
has made it more costly for great powers utors assess how much the world will
to disrupt markets by splitting the world have to spend and what it will get for
into competing blocs. The modern global the money. Prioritizing is important,
norm of territorial integrity and the since governments and donors will not
availability of nuclear weapons both be able to spend nearly enough to meet
serve to deter great-power aggression all the targets. The contributors conclude
and make balancing less necessary. And that the highest return would come from
the creation of international institutions completing the stalled Doha Round of
has given the United States and China trade negotiations, which they estimate
ways to signal their restraint and thus would boost the global economy by over
dampen the worries that might otherwise $2,000 for each $1 spent. On the other
push other countries to balance against hand, they project that trying to meet
them. U.S. President Donald Trump’s some other targets, such as guaranteeing
“America first” strategy and China’s employment for everyone, would return
growing military power will put his thesis less than it would cost. The book concludes
to the test. that apart from trade liberalization, the
highest payoffs would come from immu-
nizing vulnerable populations, reducing
Economic, Social, and malnutrition among young children, and
Environmental fighting tuberculosis.
Richard N. Cooper Mastering Catastrophic Risk: How

Companies Are Coping With Disruption
BY HOWARD KUNREUTHER AND
Prioritizing Development: A Cost Benefit MICHAEL USEEM . Oxford University
Analysis of the United Nations’ Sustainable Press, 2018, 248 pp.
Development Goals
EDITED BY BJORN LOMBORG. This interesting book uses interviews
Cambridge University Press, 2018, 554 pp. and case studies from the business world
to identify 21 categories of risk faced by
I
n 2015, the UN General Assembly publicly traded companies and to draw
adopted the Sustainable Develop- useful lessons about how to prepare for
ment Goals (SDG), which identify them. The categories cover not only
169 targets for the world to hit by 2030. natural disasters, such as earthquakes
Lomborg’s think tank, the Copenhagen and tsunamis, but also risks arising from
Consensus Center, thought that was too employee behavior, regulations, and
many, so it brought together a group of financial shocks caused by human error

or by the wider political, social, and grown in income earned from labor,
economic environments. The resulting such as wages, and in income derived
damage can be physical, financial, or from the ownership of capital, such as
reputational. The authors urge corpora- stock dividends. Data on wealth are public
tions to plan for potentially catastrophic for far fewer countries, but the infor-
incidents, even remote ones, and to train mation that is available shows that the
teams to deal with unexpected events distribution of wealth has also grown
when they occur. The authors offer many more unequal. The editors end the book
concrete examples of companies that with a discussion of various policies that
dealt successfully with the unforeseen, could reduce these inequalities.
and of ones that failed, and show how
those that did better had learned from Renewables: The Politics of a Global
the experience of others. Energy Transition
BY MICHAËL AKLIN AND
World Inequality Report 2018 JOHANNES URPELAINEN . MIT
EDITED BY FACUNDO ALVAREDO, Press, 2018, 344 pp.
LUCAS CHANCEL, THOMAS
PIKET TY, EMMANUEL SAEZ, AND The world is going through a slow
GABRIEL ZUCMAN . Harvard transition from coal and oil to renew-
University Press, 2018, 344 pp. ables, mainly solar and wind power, as
its main sources of energy. This is
This is the latest installment of an ongo- partly due to the much higher price of
ing effort by a team of economists to oil and partly to cost-cutting techno-
assemble and refine data on the distri- logical breakthroughs and greater
bution of income and wealth within and practical experience using solar and
across many large countries, including wind power. But those factors don’t
Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, explain the whole story, since different
Russia, South Africa, and the United economies have adopted renewable
States. The authors combine informa- technologies at very different speeds.
tion from household surveys, national Aklin and Urpelainen persuasively
income accounts, and tax records to argue that a combination of domestic
create what is sure to become a standard politics and external shocks, such as
source for data on income and wealth the OPEC oil price hikes of the mid-
inequality. Since 1980, the distribution 1970s and the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear
of income, as measured by the shares of disaster, has led to different levels of
total national income earned by the top support for renewables from country to
one percent, the top ten percent, and country. The book usefully documents
the bottom 50 percent, has grown more the most important shocks and explains
unequal in all but one of the countries how domestic policies have changed
studied. (The exception is Brazil, where since the 1970s, focusing on Denmark,
inequality has declined but still exceeds the Germany, and the United States.
levels in most other countries.) Although
increases in inequality differ greatly
across countries, in most, inequality has
Recent Books
Outsourcing Welfare: How the Money points out, battle was far from the typical
Immigrants Send Home Contributes to experience. Many would-be conscripts
Stability in Developing Countries were deemed unfit for service, most of
BY ROY G ERMANO . Oxford those who passed their physical exams
University Press, 2018, 240 pp. were given jobs away from the frontlines,
and many of those assigned combat roles
This illuminating book addresses an never saw any fighting. A lot of young
important but often overlooked conse- men, therefore, came away with a sense of
quence of international migration: remit- personal failure. And since the selection
tances sent by immigrants to relatives of officers was based on merit rather than
in their countries of origin. Each year, social class or ethnicity (except for African
these amount to an estimated $500 billion, Americans, who were excluded as a
three times the annual total spent by group), many men resented watching
governments, aid agencies, and charities those they considered their social inferiors
on foreign assistance to poor countries. giving orders. Much of the postwar
Germano has carried out extensive field- literature, Gandal argues, was therefore
work in the Americas, but the book also about emasculation more than danger. He
covers other parts of the world, includ- shows how unsatisfactory wartime experi-
ing Africa and the Middle East. As he ences informed the fiction of a range of
explains, remittances amount to a kind writers, including William Faulkner and
of “outsourcing” of welfare that immi- Ernest Hemingway, both of whom lied
grants’ home countries do not or cannot about their military roles in later years.
provide. Recipients use them to pay
for a wide variety of things, including Wars of Law: Unintended Consequences in
medical care, clothing, and food for the Regulation of Armed Conflict
themselves and their children. BY TANISHA M. FAZAL . Cornell
University Press, 2018, 342 pp.
Military, Scientific, and Ever since World War II, countries have
Technological been reluctant to officially declare war
on one another, even after they appear
to be fighting one. Because a declaration
Lawrence D. Freedman of war brings burdensome legal conse-
quences, the simplest approach is to find
a euphemism to describe the conflict.
War Isn’t the Only Hell: A New Reading of In this intriguing book, Fazal argues
World War I American Literature that this is a consequence of the separa-
BY KEITH GANDAL . John Hopkins tion between the lawyers who write
University Press, 2018, 288 pp. international humanitarian law and the
military personnel who have to follow
C
ontrary to what is often assumed, it. As a result, the laws have become
the American literature generated so complex and demanding that even
by World War I was not based states that intend to comply with them
on the trauma of combat. As Gandal sometimes struggle to do so. The situation

has been further complicated by the claims by leaders, for example, about the
rise of civil wars, for which the laws of effectiveness of their missile defense
war were not designed. The idea that systems, create risks.
ill-judged regulations can produce per-
verse incentives is not new, but Fazal’s Democracy in Exile: Hans Speier and the
analysis of this tendency within the laws Rise of the Defense Intellectual
of war skillfully blends quantitative and BY DANIEL BESSNER . Cornell
qualitative methods to produce something University Press, 2018, 312 pp.
genuinely original.
Hans Speier was one of the many Ger-
The 2020 Commission Report on the North man intellectuals who left Germany for
Korean Nuclear Attacks Against the United the United States before World War II
States: A Speculative Novel and later came to play a major part in the
BY JEF F REY LEWIS . Mariner Books, war effort against the Nazis. Speier began
2018, 304 pp. his academic career studying the sociology
of knowledge, and after he arrived in
This clever and gripping book, written the United States, he directed the U.S.
in the manner of the 9/11 Commission’s government’s propaganda effort against
report, takes as its starting point the Germany. The debates recounted in
United States’ failure to get North Korea Bessner’s biography between Speier and
to give up its nuclear arsenal. It then other officials over how to develop effec-
imagines that the North’s air defenses tive campaigns are particularly fascinating
shoot down a South Korean civilian in the context of contemporary worries
airliner, sparking a crisis that escalates about information warfare. Speier relished
rapidly to nuclear war. Although the book his influential advisory role in government
is a work of fiction, each step in the plot is and later drew on his experience at the
backed up by research into past incidents new RAND Corporation, where he made
and current capabilities. The war snowballs sure that academic work still flowed to
thanks to a risky retaliation by South senior policymakers. Bessner’s book, which
Korean President Moon Jae-in, undertaken largely focuses on the intellectual and says
without consulting the United States (the little about Speier’s personal life, picks up
part of the book that is the least convinc- on an issue that bothered Speier but did
ing). The crisis is worsened by the dys- not ultimately deter him from his work:
function of the Trump administration— What are the implications for democracy
including, inevitably, a tweet from U.S. when unelected experts, often working in
President Donald Trump that convinces secret, shape government policy?
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un that
the South’s attack is part of a coordinated LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media
effort to topple his regime. Although the BY P. W. SINGER AND EMERSON T.
plot is not entirely persuasive, one does BROOKING . Eamon Dolan, 2018, 416 pp.
not have to accept every aspect to appreci-
ate Lewis’ warnings about the dangers of Many books have charted the use and
poor communication within governments misuse of social media, but this is one
and between states and how exaggerated of the most comprehensive and up to
Recent Books
date. It comes after a shocking few years most Americans outside the academy
in which the abuse of the Internet has would assume that Calhoun was wrong
had profound political consequences. and Lincoln right, the contrary view has
Belligerents now prepare for Twitter gained so much ground among academics
wars at the same time as conventional in recent years that Wilentz’s qualified
ones. Activists understand the subver- endorsement of Lincoln’s interpretation
sive potential of online campaigns, but is both bracing and brave. Wilentz’s
so do governments that seek to stifle thoroughly researched argument serves
them. The Chinese government has as a useful example of solid scholarship
built the most extensive mechanisms and effective writing on a sensitive topic.
to prevent free expression and weed It also highlights the growing impor-
out dissent, showing the way forward tance of historians to legal studies as
for authoritarian states everywhere. the federal bench fills with originalist
Meanwhile, the main online platforms— interpreters of the Constitution. Wilentz
Facebook, Google, and Twitter—have is not an originalist himself, but the
come to realize how their creations have historical methods he employs here to
been used to stir up hate and spread uncover the intended meaning of the
false stories, and they are belatedly Constitution are exactly those that
wrestling with ways to curb the worst originalists use. Lawyers and jurists
offences. Singer and Brooking explain looking to develop arguments that will
not only how this new information impress conservative judges would be
environment developed but also why well advised to study the tools Wilentz
our attitudes and behaviors are so deploys to such great effect.
susceptible to manipulation.
Political Tribes: Group Instinct and the
Fate of Nations
The United States BY AMY CHUA . Penguin Press, 2018,
304 pp.
Walter Russell Mead
Chua is no stranger to controversy, and
her latest book is sure to provoke. She
argues on the basis of psychological
No Property in Man: Slavery and research that humans are hard-wired
Antislavery at the Nation’s Founding to prefer members of their own tribe
BY SEAN WILENTZ . Harvard and to regard outsiders with suspicion.
University Press, 2018, 368 pp. Chua argues that American ignorance
about the power of tribalism led U.S.
W
as the U.S. Constitution, as officials to make costly errors in Vietnam,
the South Carolinian Iraq, and elsewhere. Her second point
statesman John C. Calhoun is more controversial: that the rise of
believed, a pro-slavery document, or identity politics is linked to a resurgent
did it, as President Abraham Lincoln American tribalism that will ultimately
argued, deny slavery a place in national divide Americans and undermine their
law and point toward abolition? Although common identity and the common good.

Chua’s speculations about the future of Our American Israel: The Story of an
U.S. politics are interesting, if unsettling; Entangled Alliance
her portrayal of the consequences in BY AMY KAPLAN . Harvard University
foreign policy of ignorance about the Press, 2018, 368 pp.
power of group identity should be
required reading for U.S. policymakers. Kaplan’s perspective as a scholar of
American studies provides the key insight
The Rise of Andrew Jackson: Myth, of this book: that the United States’ affinity
Manipulation, and the Making of for Israel has less to do with American
Modern Politics Jewish activism than with deep cultural
BY DAVID S. HEIDLER AND forces that have manifested themselves
JEANNE T. HEIDLER . Basic Books, on both the left and the right over the
2018, 448 pp. years. In the 1940s and 1950s, for exam-
ple, the left was the source of Israel’s most
Since the election of U.S. President vocal U.S. support. Kaplan’s sympathies
Donald Trump in 2016, Jacksonian lie not just with the left in general but
populism has begun to receive serious, also with the pro-Palestinian trend that
if not always sympathetic, scholarly has supplanted the left’s earlier Zionism,
treatment. In this detailed and diverting and perhaps as a result, the book is better
book, the Heidlers look at something at analyzing the myths and assumptions
quite different but equally relevant: behind right-wing pro-Israel sentiment
the political and media machinery that today than at examining the equally
Andrew Jackson’s core supporters fascinating mythmaking behind contem-
erected to assist his presidential bids. porary left-wing views. Kaplan largely
The Heidlers call these savvy media ignores the international context of
manipulators and occasional purveyors views on Israel, apparently forgetting
of fake news “Jacksonites” rather than that the European left was even more
“Jacksonians” to reflect the fact that pro-Israel than the U.S. left until the
some of them were more interested in 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and so her other-
associating with a successful presidential wise keen analysis misses some impor-
candidate than in promoting Jackson’s tant detail. Even so, Kaplan’s approach
(often inchoate) ideas. The Jacksonites is so fresh, her command of the sources
created a network of patronage and so solid, and her prose so engaging that
media influence that led to positive both casual readers and experts will
press coverage for Jackson across the find new insights in the book.
country, and they leaped into action to
suppress unfavorable reports, including Tailspin: The People and Forces Behind
accounts of Jackson’s many incivilities America’s Fifty-Year Fall—and Those
and gaffes. The Jacksonites did not invent Fighting to Reverse It
collusion between politicians and journal- BY STEVEN BRILL . Knopf, 2018, 464 pp.
ists, but they did create the integrated
approach to media that made mass politics Brill blends journalism and history to
possible and continues to this day. tell a complex but vital story: how the
stable world of postwar U.S. capitalism
Recent Books
transformed into the volatile and often Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe are
ruthless economic system of today. There so contentious—and what might be done
is no single culprit in Brill’s account. He about it. The author and his research team
shows how a series of apparently unrelated spent four years interviewing Muslims in
developments in law, finance, corporate Europe, including many religious and
management, and campaign funding community leaders. Their troubling, if
combined to cause a dramatic decline in unsurprising, finding: Muslims feel
the fairness, decency, and prosperity of the disadvantaged, stereotyped, and margin-
United States. Perhaps the most interest- alized. Sadly, the book has little to say
ing theme is how often liberal reforms led about the roots of these perceptions.
to massive, unforeseen problems later on. Ahmed seems more interested in his
Brill blames the catastrophic fall in U.S. policy prescription: to override Muslim
social mobility, for example, on the shift to extremists and white nationalists alike in
meritocratic college admissions policies in favor of a more tolerant and pluralistic
the 1960s. The Supreme Court’s Citizens European culture. That is a laudable goal,
United decision, which opened the flood- but Ahmed’s vague proposal—to reform
gates to corporate money in politics, began modern Europe along the lines of medi-
with a lawsuit filed by the Green Party eval Muslim Spain—seems far-fetched
presidential candidate Ralph Nader. Brill and inappropriate, not least because medi-
offers a rare thing: an intelligible summary eval tolerance was a strategy designed to
of the political and policy changes that accommodate a popular majority. Even if
transformed American life in the last 50 Ahmed’s project were feasible and desir-
years. But one is left wondering why, as able, the rest of his vision is too hazy to
Brill describes the havoc wreaked by the resolve the everyday disputes that would
unforeseen consequences of one liberal still arise over how people dress, whom
reform after another, he is so confident they marry, and what political ideals
that one more round of liberal reforms they favor.
will set the country right.
Rescue Board: The Untold Story of
America’s Efforts to Save the Jews of Europe
Western Europe BY REBECCA ERBELDING .
Doubleday, 2018, 384 pp.
Andrew Moravcsik
Conventional wisdom holds that the
United States did too little, too late, to
stop the Holocaust. It did not bomb
Journey Into Europe: Islam, Immigration, Auschwitz or the railroads leading to it,
and Identity for example. Fearing public opposition,
BY AKBAR AHMED . Brookings the Roosevelt administration admitted
Institution Press, 2018, 592 pp. few Jewish refugees. And the State
Department deliberately suppressed
T
his sprawling book by a Pakistani information about the murder of Jews.
diplomat and anthropologist This sober, well-documented book by
examines why relations between an archivist at the U.S. Holocaust

Memorial Museum acknowledges these property, consumer safety, the environ-

basic facts but advances a more nuanced ment, human rights, energy, and much
view. It describes how in early 1944, else. Brexit means the United Kingdom
American Jewish leaders finally man- must first rewrite all these rules and then
aged to convince President Franklin realign them with those of the EU and
Roosevelt to create the War Refugee 180 countries across the globe in order
Board, which was tasked with coordi- to maintain economic relations with
nating U.S. efforts to rescue Jews and them. In this book, a group of European
other persecuted minorities. In its legal specialists examine the practical
19-month existence, the board engaged issues the British are up against, covering
in ransom negotiations, organized the topics as varied as what regional electrical
rescue of the Swedish businessman grids are permissible under EU law, how
Raoul Wallenberg and others in Buda- to manage bankruptcies of multinational
pest, evacuated Jews to peaceful parts companies, and which types of parody
of Europe and to Palestine, established the EU’s intellectual property rules allow.
a refugee camp in upstate New York,
and helped deliver 300,000 food parcels Scots and Catalans: Union and Disunion
to prisoners in Europe. Almost all writing BY J. H. ELLIOT T . Yale University
on the Holocaust triggers controversy, Press, 2018, 360 pp.
as this book already has. Yet Erbelding’s
book shows that governments do some- In this erudite and engaging book,
times act for humanitarian purposes, Elliott, one of the most distinguished
even in the midst of war. historians of early modern Spain, explores
the similarities and differences between
Complexity’s Embrace: The International Scottish and Catalan nationalism. The
Law Implications of Brexit two movements’ histories run in striking
EDITED BY OONAGH E. parallel, starting with the construction
FITZGERALD AND EVA LEIN . CIGI of their founding myths five centuries
Press, 2018, 352 pp. ago and moving through common stages
of rebellion, dynastic union, nation-
To understand what Brexit really means, statehood, home rule, and, finally, the
throw away your newspapers and podcasts clamor for independence. Despite the
and read this book instead. Pro-Brexit book’s magisterial scope and subtle
pundits and populist politicians proclaim detail, however, a lack of method ham-
that the situation is simple. Two years pers the analysis. Elliott is an old-school
ago, they told British referendum voters historian; for him, great men, wars, and
that Brexit was about reclaiming democ- national interests drive policy. He is less
racy, sovereignty, and identity. Yet the interested in analyzing the masses,
British government’s effort to implement something that requires a firm grasp of
the voters’ will has revealed the opposite: popular psychology, social change, and
Brexit has created an almost unfathom- ground-level politics. Ignoring these factors
able amount of complexity. Millions of leaves him perplexed about why separat-
EU rules and regulations govern indus- ism is rising in both places. “There seems
trial trade, farming, banking, intellectual no good reason,” he says. Nor can he sort
Recent Books
out why Catalan nationalists appear convincingly criticizes the Habsburg

more fervent than their Scottish counter- empire for rampant “anti-intellectualism”
parts. Is it their distinct language, the in its foreign policy; for provoking and
potential economic gains of indepen- ultimately empowering, rather than subtly
dence, their sometimes more repressive deflecting, its enemies; for overspending
central government, failures of imagi- on its military; and, most important, for
nation by Scottish leaders, indoctrination alienating its allies through “self-isolation.”
by pro-independence Catalan govern- The Trump administration ought to
ments, or some combination of these keep these lessons in mind.
factors? Or is it just chance? Elliott
cannot say. Fryderyk Chopin: A Life and Times
BY ALAN WALKER . Farrar, Strauss
The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire and Giroux, 2018, 768 pp.
BY A. WESS MITCHELL . Princeton
University Press, 2018, 416 pp. Fryderyk Chopin’s music is one of
Europe’s great cultural legacies. Many
In 1914, the Habsburg empire’s fatal of his compositions were based on Polish
combination of belligerence and weak- folk tunes and reflected Chopin’s nostal-
ness triggered World War I and, four gia for a homeland that he left early and
years later, the empire’s own dissolution. to which he never returned. Chopin did
This graceful account of Habsburg diplo- not live long: he was born in 1810 and
macy from 1700 to that fateful moment died in 1849. Yet those 39 years were
explains how the empire survived so extraordinary, and not one paragraph of
long: its diplomats dampened threats this meticulously researched and often
through minor acts of appeasement, poignant account is wasted. Chopin
always playing for time. The most began composing memorable works at
celebrated case of this strategy came the age of seven; a few years later, he
after the Napoleonic Wars, when Prince dismissed his only piano teacher. Despite
Metternich, the empire’s chancellor, his virtuoso talent, he hated playing in
constructed the Concert of Europe, a public so much that he did so less than
system for preserving the balance of two dozen times as an adult, in part
power and deflecting the hostility of because his uniquely delicate tone could
the Habsburgs’ stronger neighbors: the not fill large spaces. Chopin’s music
Russian, German, and Ottoman empires. often seems improvised, yet he was a
Mitchell synthesizes rather than chal- dogged perfectionist, drafting and
lenges existing interpretations, and his redrafting even his shortest pieces.
portrait of unitary states managing the He was a fastidiously polite, almost
military balance is a bit archaic. But aristocratic figure. Yet for a decade, he
the book deserves attention for other scandalized society by living with the
reasons. Mitchell currently serves as U.S. cross-dressing author George Sand.
assistant secretary of state for European Chopin suffered from tuberculosis for
and Eurasian affairs and seeks to identify nearly 20 years, sometimes coughing up
lessons for today’s U.S. policymakers bowls full of blood, until it finally killed
from the Habsburgs’ experience. He him. Yet throughout, he found ways to

sublimate longing, frustration, and pain engaged with Cuba, in late 2014, it was
into transcendent masterpieces. too late to make the new, warmer relation-
ship politically irreversible—to the
eventual delight of anti-Castro Cuban
Western Hemisphere Americans in Miami and U.S. President
Donald Trump, who has undone much
Richard Feinberg of the progress Barack Obama made.
Electoral Rules and Democracy in

Latin America
Our Woman in Havana: A Diplomat’s BY CYNTHIA M C CLINTOCK . Oxford
Chronicle of America’s Long Struggle With University Press, 2018, 334 pp.
Castro’s Cuba
BY VICKI HUDDLESTON. Overlook The durability of democracies can depend
Press, 2018, 304 pp. on the electoral rules they adopt. In this
richly documented study, McClintock
T
his candid memoir features many finds that democracies where presidential
revealing and entertaining anec- candidates need only a plurality of the
dotes from Huddleston’s time vote to triumph are in serious danger
as head of the U.S. mission in Havana, of losing their popular legitimacy and
a position she held from 1999 to 2002. eventually falling victim to tyranny. In
(Without an embassy of their own, U.S. support of her thesis, she highlights the
diplomats used the Swiss one instead.) democratic breakdowns of Nicaragua and
When Huddleston first met Cuban Venezuela, both of which allow plurality
President Fidel Castro, she introduced winners. Aware of the risks, 75 percent of
herself as “the director of Cuban affairs”; Latin American countries have adopted
Castro boomed back, “Oh? I thought second-round runoffs between the top
I was!” Huddleston also discusses the two contenders. Runoff systems are
political pressures under which she more likely to sustain popular support,
operated. U.S. policy toward Cuba was McClintock finds, and also create more
driven largely by militant anti-Castro opportunities for third parties, thus
Cuban exiles in Miami, whose leader- injecting new blood into the political
ship Huddleston paints as vengeful and arena and avoiding the danger of spoilers.
delusional. As a result, U.S. diplomats Turning to the United States, whose
concentrated on connecting with dissi- electoral rules she calls “anachronistic,
dent activists on the island, even though sclerotic relics,” McClintock urges
they did not pose “the slightest threat Americans to stop revering their consti-
to Castro’s rule.” Later, in 2006, when tution as a “quasi-biblical revelation” and
Raúl Castro assumed power, the U.S. learn from innovative Latin American
mission, still focusing on the wrong democratic engineering.
things, failed to fully brief Washington
on Raúl’s reforms and the opportunities
they presented for better relations.
By the time the Obama administration
Recent Books
Military Missions in Democratic The Tango War: The Struggle for the
Latin America Hearts, Minds, and Riches of Latin
BY DAVID PION-BERLIN . Palgrave America During World War II
Macmillan, 2016, 218 pp. BY MARY JO M C CONAHAY .
St. Martin’s Press, 2018, 336 pp.
During the Cold War, Latin American
generals often invoked the specter of During World War II, the United States
national security to seize political power, urged Latin America to join the struggle.
enrich themselves, and violate human Washington aimed to deny Germany
rights. That left the region’s govern- and Italy access to vital raw materials
ments distrustful of men in uniforms. from the continent, disrupt fascist spy
But things have changed. Pion-Berlin networks there, and protect transatlantic
persuasively argues that democratic sea-lanes. The U.S. war machine relied
regimes can now safely turn to their on Mexican oil and Brazilian rubber;
armed forces to perform important Mexicans replaced American farm work-
tasks, such as fighting criminal gangs, ers diverted to military service; and a
providing disaster relief, and expand- Brazilian expeditionary force fought
ing access to social programs, without bravely in the invasion of Italy. These
compromising civilian control of the facts have been well recorded elsewhere,
military. The decision to deploy soldiers, but McConahay, a seasoned journalist,
he writes, should be based on how bad enriches her dramatic account of the
the problem is, how much the military period with sympathetic interviews of
can do to help, and what alternative survivors whose lives were scarred by
solutions are available. To mitigate the wartime disruptions. She reminds readers
risks, governments need firm mechanisms that U.S. behavior was not always noble.
to ensure civilian control. Pion-Berlin People of German and Japanese origin
draws on careful case studies to present living in Latin America were kidnapped,
other caveats, as well. Mexico’s military shipped to remote prison camps in the
operations against cartel kingpins were United States, and sometimes bartered for
largely successful, but patrols in urban American prisoners of war. And oppor-
areas lacked adequate safeguards. And tunistic U.S. firms seized market shares
the large-scale social programs under- from their excluded Axis competitors.
taken by Venezuela’s military lasted Distrustful of U.S. power, some Latin
too long and had too little oversight, American countries leaned toward neu-
leading to corruption within the ranks trality or even the Axis, but McConahay
and the politicization of the armed forces. reveals the essential truth that, in a time
But overall, well-structured military of great peril, the United States and
missions can strengthen popular sup- most of Latin America found common
port for democracy by demonstrating cause against a shared enemy.
that democratic governments can
deliver public goods.

Empire by Invitation: William Walker Eastern Europe and Former

and Manifest Destiny in Central America
BY MICHEL GOBAT . Harvard Soviet Republics
University Press, 2018, 384 pp.
Robert Legvold
This account of the life and times of the
American adventurer William Walker,
who briefly seized the presidency of The Dawn of Eurasia: On the Trail of the
Nicaragua in the 1850s, defies the conven- New World Order
tional wisdom, which holds that Walker BY BRUNO MAÇÃES . Yale University
was bent on adding new slave states to the Press, 2018, 304 pp.
United States. Gobat paints him instead
F
as a private standard-bearer of Ameri- or six months, Maçães traveled
can democracy, entrepreneurialism, and across a portion of Eurasia to
technological progress. Far from being see how the world is changing.
an aberrant mercenary, Gobat suggests, The future, he argues in this startlingly
Walker marched in step with the idea original assessment, will be dominated
of manifest destiny and the Monroe by an emerging Eurasian “superconti-
Doctrine, which, taken together, legiti- nent,” shaped by China’s, Russia’s, and
mized U.S. military intervention in the the EU’s competing visions. The Arctic
Caribbean. Walker’s escapades followed will become one of its superhighways,
the U.S. occupation of Mexican territo- and the roads and railways envisaged
ries and the subsequent California gold in China’s vast Belt and Road Initiative
rush and anticipated U.S. efforts in the will tie it together. The fusing of Europe
twentieth century to project power in and Asia, he contends, is already far
Latin America and around the globe. But more advanced than most realize. The
his was not just a story of U.S. imperi- drama is over what form this integra-
alism. One of the sides in Nicaragua’s tion will take, but he is confident that
civil war contracted with Walker and it will be different from the political
his mercenaries to advance their cause and economic models familiar in the
and in the hope that the United States West. In the second part of the book,
would select their country to build a Maçães gives texture and immediacy to
canal between the Atlantic and Pacific his broader argument by sharing images
Oceans. In the event, Walker behaved and discoveries he made during his many
miserably, wantonly razing the old colonial diversions from familiar paths, skillfully
city of Granada. Meanwhile, the canal integrating his travel stories into the
was eventually dug—in Panama. Gobat larger trends he discusses: trade flows,
concludes that U.S. liberal imperialism megaprojects, changing lifestyles, new
represented an “extraordinary threat transport links, and the visions of
and promise . . . to peoples outside the those designing the future in Beijing
United States.” and Moscow.
Recent Books
A Sacred Space Is Never Empty: A History Russian President Vladimir Putin’s role as
of Soviet Atheism the centerpiece of something more
BY VICTORIA SMOLKIN . Princeton complex: “Putinism,” a “solar system” of
University Press, 2018, 360 pp. interlocking and often competing clans.
To understand how these informal
Much has been written about the Soviet networks govern the country and carry
Union’s war on religion and its vigorous out foreign policy, one needs to know the
efforts to set up atheism and the Bolshevik “code” that guides them, which Taylor
revolutionary project as a new faith. says includes ideas, habits, and emotions.
Most such accounts treat religion and The key ideas behind Putinism are the
atheism as simple opposites. Smolkin need for a strong state, anti-Westernism,
describes a more nuanced and variable and conservatism. Putinism’s habits
relationship between them. She lays out express themselves in preferences for
three main “oppositions” at the heart control, unity, loyalty, and “hypermascu-
of the contest: one political, between linity.” And its emotions come out in its
communist ideological purity and preoccupation with respect, resentment,
effective governance; one ideological, and fear. The code, Taylor argues, explains
between superstition and science; and Russia’s drift toward authoritarianism and
one spiritual, between “emptiness and its aggressive foreign policy. He concludes
indifference and fullness and convic- that Putinism has created a domestic
tion.” How the regime managed the political order that can be controlled but
balance in each case changed radically not easily modernized and that Russian
over time. It began with a wholesale foreign policy is “overambitious” and
assault on religion as a threat to the ultimately counterproductive. The
communist project, moved toward toler- political system is likely doomed to “a
ance during World War II in order to slow muddling down,” although he does
rally national unity, then renewed the not see Putinism ending anytime soon.
assault under Nikita Khrushchev in
the 1950s and 1960s, and, in the Soviet Rich Russians: From Oligarchs to
Union’s later years, reached a kind of Bourgeoisie
coexistence that recognized the need BY ELISABETH SCHIMPFÖSSL .
for atheism to create a spirituality that Oxford University Press, 2018, 248 pp.
could match that offered by religion.
The term “Russian oligarch” suggests
The Code of Putinism ostentatious wealth and gangster-like
BY BRIAN D. TAYLOR . Oxford behavior. But Schimpfössl argues that is
University Press, 2018, 264 pp. an outdated image, more suited to the
1990s than today. Russia’s current super-
“Putin is Russia, and Russia is Putin,” rich are less interested in flaunting their
the Russian politician Vyacheslav wealth than in the quest for social respect-
Volodin famously commented in 2014. ability and an image of refinement, even
Most Americans believe the same thing, moral probity. Like the very wealthy
although they do not mean it as a compli- elsewhere, they see their good fortune as
ment. Taylor argues that this misses the product of their talents and superior

qualities, which they often attribute to and even compassion mixed with
their genetic heritage. Their sense of cunning, ego, and brutality—for example,
superiority, desire to separate them- he never confessed to second thoughts
selves from “the tasteless rich,” and about ordering the massacre of over
pursuit of legitimacy have led them to 100,000 “collaborationists” at the end
give to charity, support the arts, and of World War II—but Pirjevec succeeds
help foster civil society. Schimpfössl’s handsomely.
book benefits from the long parade of
interviews she has conducted with Communists and Their Victims: The Quest
nearly 100 of these millionaires and for Justice in the Czech Republic
billionaires, their families, and their BY ROMAN DAVID . University of
associates, which put a human face on Pennsylvania Press, 2018, 280 pp.
her analysis.
After the fall of an authoritarian
Tito and His Comrades regime, countries often spend years
BY JOZE PIRJEVEC . University of trying to come to terms with the past
Wisconsin Press, 2018, 552 pp. and find justice for the victims of state
oppression. Those working in this area
Josip Broz, later known as Marshal Tito, call these efforts “transitional justice,”
was born in 1892 and died in 1980; he but David believes the label is too impre-
lived for almost twice as long as the cise. He takes the example of the Czech
country that he led as president existed. Republic, which has employed an array
His biography has been picked over many of mechanisms meant to deliver justice
times. Early treatments of his life tended for its communist past. He identifies
to be official hagiographies; more recent four main types: “retributive” (punishing
ones, written after Yugoslavia’s collapse, the perpetrators), “reparatory” (compen-
have often demonized him. Even the sating the victims), “revelatory” (exposing
best of them, as the historian Emily the guilty and their abuses), and “reconcil-
Greble writes in the foreword to this iatory” (offering apologies). The results
book, aimed “to investigate Yugoslavia’s depend on who is being targeted—
place in the global history of the Second those once loyal to the system, those
World War and the Cold War rather who suffered, or society at large. David
than to understand the country’s leader.” employs a variety of survey data to con-
Pirjevec fills this gap with a dispassion- clude that the ambitious Czech effort
ate and meticulously detailed account of has largely failed. Neither punishing
Tito’s life from his birth into grueling the perpetrators nor compensating the
peasant poverty, to his struggles as a victims is enough, unless the former
member of the nascent Yugoslav Com- repudiate the system of which they
munist Party in Moscow during Stalin’s were a part.
Great Purge, and finally to his complex
relationships with key comrades across
the tumultuous decades that followed. It
is no small feat to capture the essence of
a figure in whom courage, stalwartness,
Recent Books
Middle East Salman’s Legacy: The Dilemmas of a New

Era in Saudi Arabia
EDITED BY MADAWI AL-RASHEED .
John Waterbury Oxford University Press, 2018, 320 pp.
The merit of this collection of essays

State of Repression: Iraq Under Saddam comes from the critical stance it takes
Hussein toward the Saudi ruling family. In her
BY LISA BLAYDES . Princeton contribution, Rasheed argues that the
University Press, 2018, 376 pp. top-down, arbitrary power acquired by
the royal family over the past several
I
n 1989, the Iraqi dissident Kanan decades cannot be explained by looking
Makiya published Republic of Fear, at the rational interests of the rulers and
a terrifying look at Iraq under the ruled; rather, it involves religious and
Saddam Hussein’s violent, totalitarian mystical factors. She and other contributors
rule. Ever since, the world has recognized suggest that Crown Prince Mohammed
that Saddam was no run-of-the-mill bin Salman’s plans to distance the regime
autocrat. In this carefully structured from Wahhabism, the fundamentalist
analysis, Blaydes draws on Iraqi secret religious sect, may severely weaken the
police files to argue that Saddam, brutal dynasty. A brief contribution by the analyst
as he was, was trapped by Iraq’s unique Cole Bunzel reveals the deep reserves of
characteristics into adopting repressive respect that most senior members of the
but self-destructive policies. The key House of Saud still have for extremist
problem, Blaydes suggests, was that Wahhabi leaders. All the contributors
language, geography, and other barriers accept that there are direct links between
made it difficult for the regime to “read” Wahhabism and violent jihadism, but as
some groups within Iraqi society. The Rasheed points out, many, including
authorities knew the least about the the United States, have often chosen to
Shiites and the Kurds. Those groups overlook them. In the only chapter on
were subjected to collective punishment, the kingdom’s economy, the political
resulting in collective resistance. Repres- scientist Steffen Hertog explores the
sion was more finely targeted when it structural difficulties that the crown
came to the Sunnis. Those closest to prince’s proposed reforms will encounter,
Saddam’s birthplace of Tikrit were pointing out that Saudi Arabia suffers
rewarded, whereas more peripheral from a combination of high costs and
Sunnis were deprived and grew resentful low productivity.
as a result. Yet the idea that Saddam’s
exceptional brutishness resulted from Into the Hands of the Soldiers: Freedom
Iraq’s exceptional complexity is not and Chaos in Egypt and the Middle East
entirely convincing. Iran, Lebanon, and BY DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK . Viking,
Syria are just as complex as Iraq, after 2018, 384 pp.
all, but have vastly different regimes.
There are many accounts of the Egyptian
revolution of 2011, the country’s first

free elections the next year, and the and effectiveness of foreign aid. He
subsequent military coup that deposed shows that even if Egypt implemented
the new president, Mohamed Morsi, the right policies, it likely could not
but this book offers the best retelling replicate the success enjoyed by East
yet. Kirkpatrick was present for many Asian countries. Major attempts at
of the main events, including the massacre reform in 1977 and 1991 failed to create
of hundreds of members of the Muslim a sustainable, healthy economy. Egypt
Brotherhood by the Egyptian security saves and invests too little and suffers
forces in August 2013. Kirkpatrick’s from low productivity, and government
account makes clear that for him, there spending and borrowing are both high.
were few good guys and one overwhelm- Successive governments have filled the
ingly bad guy: Egypt’s “deep state.” The gaps in their budgets by relying on oil
United States, meanwhile, comes across money, funding from allies such as the
as ignorant and confused. U.S. President United States, and remittances from
Barack Obama and his ambassador to workers abroad. Ikram does not offer a
Egypt, Anne Patterson, were lonely path forward other than recommending
voices arguing that the U.S. government that Egypt overhaul its institutions and
should respect the electoral process. improve its productivity. Egypt today
John Kerry, U.S. secretary of state; has over 100 million inhabitants, who
Chuck Hagel, U.S. secretary of defense; by and large live much better than their
James Mattis, the head of U.S. Central predecessors did 50 years ago. As Ikram
Command; and Michael Flynn, the rightly says, “One must not underesti-
director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence mate the country’s resilience.”
Agency, all supported the military,
whatever the cost, as an asset in the fight Tunisia: An Arab Anomaly
against Islamic extremism. They won the BY SAFWAN M. MASRI . Columbia
argument, and Egypt’s current president, University Press, 2017, 416 pp.
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has since cracked
down on human rights to an extent that Tunisia is the only Arab state to remain
would have made his predecessors blush. on the path to democracy after the Arab
Spring. Masri tries to explain why. Tuni-
The Political Economy of Reforms in sia has existed in one form or another
Egypt: Issues and Policymaking Since 1952 within more or less its current borders
BY KHALID IKRAM . American for millennia. It underwent a long series
University in Cairo Press, 2018, 384 pp. of basic reforms in the mid-nineteenth
century that led to a progressive defini-
This outstanding book puts Egypt’s tion of women’s rights, tolerance of
economic history in the context of those religious minorities, and, eventually,
of other developing countries, compar- state secularism. That history makes
ing it to such histories in East Asia and Tunisia unique, Masri notes, and means
Latin America. Ikram skillfully weaves that the rest of the Arab world is unlikely
economic theory into his account of to follow its path to democracy. Masri
Egyptian economic policies over the pays particular attention to the country’s
last half century and assesses the role educational system, contrasting it with
Recent Books
the dismal conditions elsewhere in the Internet, but her argument also applies
region. Masri’s rendering of Tunisia to what China does in print and broad-
does not offer much new information; cast media. And as she points out, similar
it is his conclusion, in which he worries techniques are popping up elsewhere in
that the country’s nasty neighborhood the world, as well, including in democ-
will ultimately devour this promising racies, where governments promote or
experiment in democracy, that makes hide information and Internet providers
the book so noteworthy. tweak algorithms to influence what
users see.
Asia and Pacific Political Corruption and Scandals in Japan

BY MAT THEW M. CARLSON AND
Andrew J. Nathan STEVEN R. REED . Cornell University
Press, 2018, 204 pp.
Japan has had some spectacular cases of

Censored: Distraction and Diversion Inside corruption, such as the 1976 Lockheed
China’s Great Firewall scandal, in which politicians took bribes
BY MARGARET E. ROBERTS . to buy airplanes, and the 1988 Recruit
Princeton University Press, 2018, 288 pp. scandal, in which a Japanese company
sold shares to politicians at artificially
R
oberts disputes the conven- low prices. It has also seen a steady
tional wisdom that the Chinese stream of garden-variety bureaucratic
government exerts near-total corruption, campaign law violations, and
control over the Internet. Instead, she sex scandals. But this book avoids gossip
shows that Beijing uses “porous censor- in favor of analysis. The authors identify
ship,” accomplished by techniques she three types of corruption—bad-apple
labels “fear, friction, and flooding.” The corruption, standard-operating-procedure
first consists of threats and punishments corruption, and systemic corruption—
aimed at deterring the most vocal critics and assess what kinds of reforms have
from posting online. The second consists been effective in reducing each. The
of blocks that make it difficult, but not biggest improvement came after reforms
impossible, for ordinary users to access to the electoral system in 1994, which
undesirable content. The third involves shifted the electoral system for the lower
inundating the Internet with informa- house from one of multimember districts
tion the government wants people to to one of single-member districts (plus
see. Using some innovative research additional seats allocated proportion-
techniques, Roberts shows that most ally) and thus reduced the prevalence
users, having only limited time and of patronage politics. Rules mandating
energy, settle for the information they transparency have also helped. Carlson
can readily get. She argues that porous and Reed conclude that reform has
control is more effective than total control, made Japanese democracy healthier but
because it is less conspicuous and arouses that nothing can completely eliminate
little opposition. Roberts focuses on the misbehavior by politicians.

Human Rights in Thailand China, the United States, and the Future of
BY DON F. SELBY . University of Latin America
Pennsylvania Press, 2018, 256 pp. EDITED BY DAVID B. H. DENOON .
New York University Press, 2017, 432 pp.
In 1997, during a democratic phase,
Thailand established the National Human The Red Star and the Crescent: China and
Rights Commission. (The commission the Middle East
still exists, although its work has suffered EDITED BY JAMES REARDON-
since the most recent military coup, in ANDERSON . Oxford University Press,
2014.) Selby observed the commission’s 2018, 288 pp.
staff and activist lawyers over several
years as they worked to improve the China’s influence is growing in different
way the Thai police treated Burmese ways in different regions with different
migrant workers and to help victims of implications for U.S. interests. In two
land seizures. His observations led him previous volumes in Denoon’s informa-
to reject the “Asian values” thesis, the tive series on U.S.-Chinese relations,
idea that human rights are a foreign the focus was on Central Asia, where
transplant that Asian societies commonly Beijing’s goals are predominantly eco-
reject. Thai practitioners, he notes, built nomic and the United States is concerned
their concept of rights out of local ideas, chiefly with the war in Afghanistan, and
such as Buddhist compassion, and advo- on the contrasting situation in Southeast
cated on behalf of victims in ways that Asia, where China and the United States
drew on local norms, such as saving face are engaged in a multifaceted economic
and honoring mothers. The point is well and strategic competition. This third
taken, but Selby understates the cosmo- volume, dealing with Latin America and
politan aspects of the Thai human rights the Caribbean, presents a complex
movement. Thai nongovernmental picture that lies somewhere between
organizations rely on foreign funding, the previous two. Denoon and the other
advocates use international human contributors describe China’s rapidly
rights law as a benchmark for pressuring growing presence as a buyer of raw
the government, and the very idea of materials, supplier of manufactured
establishing national human rights goods, builder of infrastructure, investor,
institutions originally came from a and donor. Some of the contributors
1993 UN General Assembly resolution. believe that China is also pursuing
greater military and ideological influence
in Latin America, especially with regimes
that are in economic trouble or at odds
with the United States, such as the one in
Venezuela. With Washington doing little
to shore up its position on the continent
and Beijing accumulating more interests
to protect, a serious challenge to U.S.
preeminence in the region may not be
inevitable, but it is no longer unthinkable.
Recent Books
The Middle East presents yet another receiving some special blessing from
pattern of growing Chinese influence, Peking.” There are about 130,000
according to Reardon-Anderson and Tibetan exiles living in the Indian city
his contributors. Here, too, China has of Dharamsala (the site of the Central
acquired major economic interests; it Tibetan Administration’s headquarters)
buys large volumes of oil, sells manu- and elsewhere in South Asia, Europe,
factured goods, and builds a growing and the United States. China has directed
proportion of the region’s infrastructure. relentless, if not very successful, propa-
But it lacks the capability to defend ganda at the exiled community, has
these interests militarily and so relies on used its economic leverage over Nepal
the United States to preserve regional to block the traditional route for emigra-
stability and protect the crucial sea-lanes tion from Tibet to India, and has played
over which tankers carry oil to China. diplomatic hardball in its efforts to isolate
The funding China offers through its the Dalai Lama internationally. Yet
Belt and Road Initiative is less useful to internal divisions among Tibetan exiles
wealthy Gulf states than it is to countries are even more threatening than China’s
in other parts of the world, and Beijing’s repression. Young Tibetans who move
mistreatment of its Muslim Uighur to the West identify less strongly with
minority creates friction with Iran, Tibet, many exiles and residents of Tibet
Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Instead of are growing impatient with the Dalai
challenging the United States, China Lama’s peaceful “middle way,” and the
often acts as a tacit ally—for example, community has no visible succession
in pressing Iran to halt its nuclear weap- plan that could keep it together after its
ons program and helping rehabilitate leader’s passing. The Dalai Lama’s host,
the Iraqi oil industry. This book breaks India, wants to avoid unduly antagoniz-
new ground on Chinese military diplo- ing China, so it gives the Tibetans a
macy in the Middle East, Chinese media- temporary status that is less secure than
tion in the negotiations over Iran’s refugee status or citizenship, heightening
nuclear program, and the history of the exiles’ sense of insecurity.
religious ties between China and the
Middle East. What Is China? Territory, Ethnicity,
Culture, and History
Blessings From Beijing: Inside China’s BY GE ZHAOGUANG. TRANSLATED
Soft-Power War on Tibet BY MICHAEL GIBBS HILL . Belknap
BY GREG C. BRUNO . University Press Press, 2018, 224 pp.
of New England, 2018, 240 pp.
This erudite polemic targets the aggressive
The title of this book alludes to a nationalism that is widespread in China
sarcastic comment made by the Dalai today. The author draws on a wide range
Lama in 2009 about Chinese efforts of Chinese and foreign sources to describe
to suppress the Tibetan diaspora. how the majority Han ethnic group was
“Totalitarian regimes sort of pressure forged, how it negotiated relations with
everywhere, even in the United States,” surrounding peoples, and how China’s
he said. “I think India and Nepal are borders grew and shrank and grew again

over time. He accepts that China has a problems. She is particularly scathing
distinct Han culture, characterized by about what she describes as the “medical-
a belief in an orderly moral hierarchy ization” of food aid, under which pro-
flowing from nature through the state, grams no longer aim to ensure broad,
society, and family to the individual. self-sustaining access to food; they are
But he denies that this culture is eter- designed merely to help people grow
nally fixed, essentially benevolent, or more resilient so that they can survive
inherently superior, or that it can speak despite chronic insecurity. Jaspars
for China’s other ethnic groups. In a concedes that donors, aid workers, and
similar way, he sees China’s current governments in Sudan and abroad have
borders as a product of history, not learned a lot about how to deliver food
cosmically mandated or, as the Chinese aid over the last half century, but she
government claims when speaking of argues that this expertise is often ill used.
Tibet, unaltered “since ancient times.” Much of the food does not go to the
Only in the final chapter does he explic- most needy because the Sudanese gov-
itly address what he calls “practical ernment allows politics to dictate who
questions,” drawing together the threads gets what and donors either acquiesce
of his argument to criticize those who or partly withdraw from the country in
use a mythicized version of history to the face of political meddling.
justify a China-centric world order.
Blood Papa: Rwanda’s New Generation
BY JEAN HATZF ELD . TRANSLATED
Africa BY JOSHUA DAVID JORDAN . Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, 2018, 240 pp.
Nicolas van de Walle
This is Hatzfeld’s fourth book on the
Rwandan genocide. As in his previous
work, he investigates the topic with
Food Aid in Sudan: A History of Power, remarkable empathy by allowing both
Politics, and Profit Hutu and Tutsi people to recount their
BY SUSANNE JASPARS . Zed Books, experiences in their own voices as they
2018, 252 pp. try to make sense of the events of 1994
and their legacy. In this book, Hatzfeld
J
aspars begins this lively history of focuses on young Rwandans who were
international food aid in Sudan by born either right before or right after
noting that the country has received the genocide. His Hutu subjects con-
foreign assistance for over 50 years and front the mind-boggling crimes of their
yet much of its population still has barely parents and ponder their own communal
enough to eat. According to UN estimates, guilt. Young Tutsis, meanwhile, reflect on
over six million Sudanese needed emer- the violence that befell their relatives.
gency help in 2016. Jaspars documents Both sides wonder about the memories
how ideas about food aid have changed and qualities of the other, not always
over the decades but shows that succes- with much generosity. What emerges
sive reforms have failed to address key from the book is that a vast gulf continues
to divide Hutus and Tutsis, even as both
understand that they need to figure out
how to live together. In its descriptions
of everyday life, the book makes clear
that the genocide and the prosecution
of Hutu participants shape Rwandan
society to this day. Yet the youthful
voices of Hatzfeld’s subjects, preoccu- Assistant Editor
pied with romance, academic ambition,
and idealism, also deliver some grounds
Foreign Affairs is looking for
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The Politics of Deforestation in Africa:
Madagascar, Tanzania, and Uganda
The Assistant Editor position
BY NADIA RABESAHALA HORNING .
is a full-time paid job offering
Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, 183 pp.
exceptional training in serious
journalism. Previous Assistant
In recent years, officials have lavished
Editors have included recent
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should have a serious interest in
of deforestation on the continent does
international relations, a flair for
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writing, and a facility with the
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English language.
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She argues that donor programs often
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for ecological efforts to work. Horning
argues persuasively that people who live
closest to natural resources must take full
ownership of environmental programs.

Epidemic: Ebola and the Global Scramble African Actors in International Security:
to Prevent the Next Killer Outbreak Shaping Contemporary Norms
BY REID WILSON . Brookings EDITED BY KATHARINA P.
Institution Press, 2018, 300 pp. COLEMAN AND THOMAS K. TIEKU .
Lynne Rienner, 2018, 308 pp.
The 2013 Ebola outbreak in West Africa
killed at least 11,000 people, mostly in This collection of essays argues that
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. As most commentators underestimate the
this excellent book shows, the interna- extent to which Africans help shape
tional health community was woefully contemporary norms about international
unprepared to address the epidemic. peace and security. Based on a number
West Africa suffered from weak health- of excellent case studies, the contributors
care infrastructure, particularly in the make a strong case that African publics,
three worst-hit countries, which had governments, and intergovernmental
each recently been ravaged by civil war organizations have played key roles in
or political turmoil. In some cases, the development of norms regarding
individual acts of heroism by health-care conflict diamonds, humanitarian inter-
workers, some of whom lost their lives, ventions, peace negotiations, and the
mitigated the institutional weakness. trade in small arms. The essays identify
But as the epidemic widened and panic several areas in which distinctively
spread around the globe, the World African norms have emerged, such as
Health Organization, which was designed the reliance on retired African heads
to lead the international response to of state to mediate between different
such a catastrophe, proved dysfunctional. sides in a conflict.
Much of the action in Wilson’s book
takes place in the United States, where FOR THE RECORD
the Obama administration led the effort The review essay “Muslim Brothers”
to better understand and contain the (September/October 2018) misidentified
epidemic. He also shows how nongov- the year Sayyid Qutb joined the Muslim
ernmental organizations, such as Doctors Brotherhood. It was 1953, not 1954.
Without Borders, played key roles on the The review essay “Good Fences Make
ground in West Africa. Wilson offers Good Politics” (September/October
many lessons to help everyone involved 2018) misstated the context of a quote
prepare for the inevitable next outbreak. from the book under review. The book’s
author, Sasha Polakow-Suransky, was
commenting on the work of the French
writer Renaud Camus, not an interview
he conducted with him.∂
Foreign Affairs (ISSN 00157120), November/December 2018, Volume 97, Number 6. Published six times annually (January, March,
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The CSS Point
A Broken Alliance?
Foreign Affairs Brain Trust
We asked dozens of experts whether they agreed or disagreed that the transatlantic alliance has been
irreparably damaged. The results from those who responded are below.
20
10
STRONGLY DISAGREE NEUTRAL AGREE STRONGLY

DISAGREE AGREE
DISAGREE, CONFIDENCE LEVEL 7 AGREE, CONFIDENCE LEVEL 6
David Miliband Amanda Sloat

President and CEO, Robert Bosch Senior Fellow in the Center
International Rescue Committee on the United States and Europe,
Brookings Institution
“The Trump administration has been a wake-
up call for the European Union. But the United “Although transatlantic relations have been
States still represents the EU’s best hope for a strained before, the current crisis is qualitatively
convergence of interests and values. So damage? different given the erosion of trust.”
Yes. Irreparable? No.”
See the full responses at ForeignAffairs.com/TransatlanticAlliance

The CSS Point
Global Leaders in Insurance

(and Doing Business in China)
Starr Insurance Companies is proud to celebrate 100 years of operation
in China, and a century of providing tailored insurance solutions to almost
every imaginable business and industry in virtually every part of the world.
Starr is expert at helping companies from around the world do business

in China. As the first 100% foreign-owned commercial insurer licensed
in China, we offer a full range of property-casualty and specialty lines
solutions and loss prevention services to address our clients’ complex
risks and infrastructure needs. And clients can leverage our long-standing
relationships and local knowledge to navigate the nuances and make
the right connections to succeed in one of the world’s most dynamic,
growing economies.
To learn more about our perspectives on China, contact Jerry Komisar

(jerry.komisar@starrcompanies.com) to request a copy of our One Belt,
One Road Executive Intelligence report.
Property / Casualty / Accident / Aviation / Marine
S TA R R C O M PA N I E S . C O M
Starr Insurance Companies is a marketing name for the operating insurance and travel assistance companies and subsidiaries
of Starr International Company, Inc., and for the investment business of C.V. Starr & Co., Inc., and its subsidiaries.

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