Animal Rights
Animal Rights
Animal Rights
Introduction
The concept of “animal rights” is relatively modern. Throughout history, human societies have
had to contend with two contradictory goals: first, the need to use animals. Second, the ethical
obligation to treat them properly, This second and goal is what is generally referred to as
“animal ethics”. In modern western society where social rules are usually defined in terms of
rights, there has been a development calling for animals to be included within the scope of
ethical and/or religious considerations, doing so in terms of rights. And the concept of animal
rights has emerged as a specific, mainly western way of developing ethics to be applied to
animals.
The Concepts
The basic assumption of any argument in favor of animal rights is that (nonhuman) animals, or
at least the most intelligent or sentient animals, are independent and capable of managing their
own lives, that they have basic individual interests, e.g., avoiding suffering, and should
therefore be entitled to rights similar to those granted to human beings, such rights, of course,
always being granted to animals by humans.
In a philosophical context, also considering the Aristotelian or utilitarian view of moral actions,
animal rights could be seen in relation to deontological moral theory (Kant), deontological
morals having to comply with clearly defined principles such as rights. The difference with the
classical Kantian view is that in this case, rights are granted not only to human beings, but also
to (nonhuman) animals.
I. The Ethical Dimension
1. Animal rights according to Tom Regan and Gary Francione
In 1983, Tom Regan argued (Regan 1983) in his book The Case for Animal Rights, that some
nonhuman animals have intrinsic value as they are “subjects of a life” with all the relevant
cognitive skills, the ability to feel, to desire or suffer, memory function, and decision-making
capacity. They therefore cannot be reduced to nothing more than a means for use to achieve a
human end. Regan thus took the Kantian principle that subjects (human beings only for Kant,
but in this case animals) should always be treated as being ends in themselves, and extended
this to animals. When considering animals, the classical oppositions is between radical
(abolitionist) stances endeavoring to do away with any and every form of human exploitation
of animals likely to inflict pain (including meat production), and moderate, welfare stances
which maintain that humans may still exploit animals for their own purposes (including the
possibility of eating them), provided that there is no unnecessary suffering.
The abolitionist stance was further developed by Gary Francione, the advocate of ethical
veganism, who argued that (nonhuman) animals need only one basic right which is the right
not to be considered as property, not to be owned; all other rights should then follow on
spontaneously from this one. Francione had no qualms about comparing exploitation of animals
to human slavery. For Francione, the moderate stance is a totally ineffective way of protecting
animals. While Francione includes all sentient animals, he only rarely refers to nonvertebrates.
He investigates in great depth possible transpositions of moral rights for animals into law and
into practice. In English-speaking countries, many universities propose animal law studies. One
question that is still open is whether nonhuman animals, or some of them, should be granted
the legal status of personhood, and if so, which characteristics would define an animal endowed
with personhood.
The Universal Declaration of Animal Rights was published in 1978. The Declaration was
solemnly proclaimed at the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
UNESCO, in Paris on October 15, 1978. To achieve a greater degree of consensus amongst
advocates of animal rights, whether radical or welfarist, vegetarian or meat-eating, a revised
version of the Universal Declaration of Animal Rights was published in 1989, and is the text
referred to in the present article.
The Declaration is designed to recognize that all living nonhuman beings have the right to exist
on earth. The original scope is thus very broad, clearly embracing all animals. However, the
preamble states that “any animal with a nervous system has specific rights,” reintroducing, for
sentient animals, the utilitarian reference to suffering. In Article 1, the Declaration states that:
“all animals have equal rights to exist within the context of biological equilibrium,” and that
“the equality of rights does not overshadow the diversity of species and of individuals.” Taken
together, these statements show that the Declaration has taken modern biological data into
account. Respect for animals must not be arbitrarily restricted to one or more groups of animals,
such as mammals, butmust include all animals, and give consideration to specific biological
and behavioral characteristics; for example, the rights of bees are obviously not the same as the
rights of chimpanzees. The existence of biological balance in nature should set ecological limits
on human action; e.g., humans should not interfere with the law of the jungle, endeavoring to
protect prey against predators or stopping predators from attacking prey (Neumann 2012).
Animal rights are obviously granted by humans to animals, and are not rights applying to
animals between themselves.
Among the specific projects involving animal rights, the Great Ape Project (GAP) deserves
special mention and analysis as it highlights a number of difficulties encountered in the
implementation of animal rights. The issue of rights is not central to the arguments, yet there
is clearly a need for recognition of something similar to formal rights. The authors argue that
as great apes are similar to humans in their emotional and cognitive skills, they therefore
deserve the same consideration as human beings. Specifically, this means that nonhuman great
apes should be granted the right to life, the right to individual liberty, and the right to protection
from torture (including scientific research and experimentation). The idea was that once these
rights were granted to apes, the international organization would then call for great apes in
captivity to be released, and specifically the large numbers of chimpanzees used for biological
research in the United States.
While there should obviously be proper welfare and protection for great apes, which include
our nearest cousins, the chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans, the Great Ape Project
still came up against opposition. There were the standard anthropocentric claims that when
clear benefits could be achieved for human health, there should be a possibility of conducting
experimental investigations, even on chimpanzees. A number of objections can also be made
to this on the basis of both practical and the theoretical arguments. Of the practical
considerations, there is the plight of great apes in their countries of origin where the situation
is often disastrous. While changes to legislation in western countries would be a positive step,
it would not solve the problem. Amongst the theoretical considerations, there is the question
of the demarcation boundaries which, in the case of apes, comes back to the issue of
gradualism.
Conclusion
The question of animal rights is closely linked to the question of animal suffering. While other
aspects of what is in the interest of animals are occasionally mentioned, and the avoidance of
suffering. Most animals are sensitive to influences felt in their environment, and three degrees
of negative response can be observed: nociception, pain, and suffering. In most animals,
nociception is a reflex avoidance of any stimulus damaging or threatening the body, inducing
a flight response or the withdrawal of the body part affected by the noxious stimulus. Pain is a
real phenomenon for animals that possess both nociception and emotional reactions. Scientific
observations have reported these reactions mainly in vertebrates, plus certain invertebrates such
as cephalopods, all being animals with a limbic system or equivalent in the brain. Suffering is
observed in animals which with nociception and pain have and use cognitive functions
involving awareness of the environment. Once again these are mostly vertebrates, and likely
cephalopods; and there is a highly developed capacity for suffering in mammals and birds.
Scientific findings suggest that suffering could be a function of the cerebral cortex, which is
found in all vertebrates, or an equivalent structure as in the case of cephalopods.
Further scientific studies will no doubt clarify such categories, but for the moment the Universal
Declaration of Animal Rights offers a general framework for consideration of animal rights
overall, and a sensible answer to the challenging question of gradualism when applied to groups
of animals. The analysis by Regan and Francione offers scope for strong philosophical
arguments justifying the recognition of rights for animals capable of feeling pain and suffering
as described above. The Great Ape Project addresses specific rights to be granted to animal
species close to the human species. The question of the transposition of animal rights into law
is still a basic and unresolved issue. As was the case for human rights, only legislation and
implementation will provide efficient protection for animals. Once laws are drawn up defining
which rights may be granted for which group of animals, decisions will have to be made on the
basis of scientific knowledge to establish the rights needed so that a given animal can live a life
without being subject to abuse at the hands of humans.