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ANIMA
An Anatomy of a Personified Notion
ANIMA
An Anatomy of a Personified Notion
James Hillman
with excerpts from the writings of

C.G. Jung
and original drawings by Mary Vernon
Bed Whiter [oe4—

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Spring Publications, Inc.
Dallas, Texas
Essay on righthand pages Copyright 1985 by James Hillman
All rights reserved
A shorter version, differently arranged, appeared in Spring 1973 and Spring 1974,
Copyright by Spring Publications, Inc. All rights reserved
All excerpts from The Collected Works of C. G. Jung and the two volumes of C. G.
Jung Letters are Copyright by Princeton University Press and by Routledge & Kegan
Paul. Reprinted with permission of Princeton University Press. All excerpts from
Memories, Dreams, Reflections are Copyright by Random House, Inc.
Published by Spring Publications, Inc.; Box 222069; Dallas, Texas 75222

Printed in the United States of America
International Distributors:
Spring; Postfach; 8800 Thalwil; Switzerland.
Japan Spring Sha, Inc.; 1-2-4, Nishisakaidani-Cho;
Ohharano, Nishikyo-Ku; Kyoto, 610-11, Japan.
Element Books Ltd; Longmead; Shaftesbury;
Dorset SP7 8PL; England.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Hillman, James.
Anima : an anatomy of a personified notion.
Bibliography: p.
1. Anima (Psychoanalysis) 2. Jung, C. G. (Carl
Gustav), 1875-1961. 1. Jung, C. G. (Carl Gustav),
1875-1961. II. Title.
BF175.5.A52H55 1985 150.19°54 85-18320
ISBN 0-88214-316-6
Third Printing 1987

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Cover design by Catherine Meehan and Sven Doehner. The anima image on the cover:
Bernardo Buontalenti, Ninfa marina, Firenze, B.N.F., C.B., 3, 53!', c. 10r; Fotocolor G.
Sansoni, per concessione della Bibi. Naz. Firenze and selected by Pierre Denivelle.
Mary Vernon acknowledges the following sources for assorted details of her images:
Carol B. Grafton, Treasury of Art Nouveau Design and Ornament; Jim Harter, Harter’s
Picture Archive; Jim Harter, Women: A Pictorial Archive from Nineteenth-Century
Sources; and Theodore Menten, Pictorial Archive of Quaint Woodcuts: Joseph Crawhall,
all from Dover Publications.
Most of all, the author and publisher gratefully acknowledge the use of excerpts from the
following volumes of The Collected Works of C. G. Jung, trans. R. F.C. Hull, Bollingen
Series XX. The excerpts are reprinted with permission of Princeton University Press.
Vol. 5 Symbols of Transformation, copyright © 1956 by Princeton University Press.

Vol. a Psychological Types, copyright © 1971 by Princeton University Press.
Vol. 7 Two Essays on Analytical Psychology, copyright 1953, © 1966 by Princeton
University Press.
Vol. The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, copyright © 1960, 1969 by Princeton
University Press.
Vol. 1, The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, copyright © 1959, 1969 by
Princeton University Press.
Vol. II, Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self, copyright © 1959 by
Princeton University Press.
Vol. Civilization in Transition, copyright © 1964, 1970 by Princeton University Press.
Vol. Psychology and Religion: West and East, copyright © 1958, 1969 by Princeton
University Press.
Vol. Psychology and Alchemy, copyright 1953, © 1968 by Princeton University Press.
Vol. Alchemical Studies, copyright © 1967 by Princeton University Press.
Vol. Mysterium Coniunctionis, copyright © 1965, 1970 by Princeton University Press.
Vol. The Spirit in Man, Art, and Literature, copyright © 1966 by Princeton University
Press.
Vol. The Practice of Psychotherapy, copyright 1954, © 1966 by Princeton University
Press.
Vol. The Development of Personality, copyright 1954 by Princeton University Press.
Vol. The Symbolic Life, copyright 1950, 1953, copyright © 1955, 1958, 1959, 1963, 1968,
1969, 1970, 1973, 1976 by Princeton University Press.
The author and publisher also thank Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. (London), publisher
of the above-mentioned edition of The Collected Works of C. G. Jung in Great Britain.
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1 ANIMA AND CONTRASEXUALITY

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184
Editorial Note
In the pages that follow, an essay by James Hillman appears on the

righthand pages, while relevant quotations from the works of Carl
Gustav Jung are printed to the left. Bold superscript letters in Hillman’s
essay refer the reader to the appropriate material, which may be one
quote or several. These alphabetic letters start over again at “A” on every
set of facing pages.
Hillman’s introduction lists on page five the two abbreviations of
Jung’s works used to identify the quotations’ sources. Readers unfamiliar
with his Collected Works should know these are referred to by volume
and paragraph numbers.
Excluding capitalization of initial letters, all of Spring Publications’
editorial interpolations in Jung’s material are indicated by bold brackets.
Regular brackets are either reproduced from the original material or
enclose Jung’s material which has been transposed from one place to
another in a given quote. An “N” in parentheses in a quote’s reference
shows that Spring has appended the relevant footnote from the Collected
Works.
MHGS
1985
Vill
Preface
Here is an essay that can stand for itself. Usually after twelve years
one wants to re-do the job. The urge to improve. Instead, I am
amazed with the way it is — that it was done so thoroughly and that
it was done at all. It needed only some re-formulations, exten-
sions, and practical cautions — in twelve years one does learn a
thing or two about anima. But once embarked on these expan-
sions, I could barely contain them within these pages. What an in-
stigator anima can be, though I doubt whether this essay, aimed at
clarifying her notion in my mind, did much to untangle her effects
in my life. Still today I defend myself against her with both ideali-
zations and scepticism.
The essay began as an excursion that I felt was essential to the
body of Re-Visioning Psychology (1975), but soon anima claimed
more display than the proportions of that work would allow. The
essay was even too flamboyant to print as one piece and so had to
be cut into halves (Spring 1973 and Spring 1974). Those issues of
that annual are long out of print, which gives the efficient cause for
making the essay into this book.
There are further causes, more deep-seated reasons. As I look
back, it seems my work has always been anima-based, from Emo-
tion (1960) to “Betrayal” and the Psyche/Eros tale as the myth of
analysis, on to “soul-making,” and more recently, the focus on the
aesthetic imagination and the soul of the world (anima mundt).
Specialized chapters of investigation into the salt, the silver, and
the color blue in alchemy also elaborate upon anima phenomenol-
ogy. If anima is my root metaphor, it seems psychologically neces-
sary to delve into this component who dominates my thought,
colors my style, and has so graciously proffered themes for my at-
tention.
Moreover, isn’t devotio to anima the calling of psychology? So,
ix
PREFACE
another deep-seated reason for this book is to provide grounding

for the vision of soul in psychology, so that psychology doesn’t
abandon itself to the archetypal perspectives of the Child and de-
velopmentalism or the Mother and material causalism. The vision
of soul given by anima is more than just one more perspective. The
call of soul convinces; it is a seduction into psychological faith, a
faith in images and the thought of the heart, into an animation of
the world. Anima attaches and involves. She makes us fall into
love. We cannot remain the detached observer looking through a
lens. In fact, she probably doesn’t partake in optical metaphors at
all. Instead, she is continually weaving, stewing, and enchanting
consciousness into passionate attachments away from the vantage
point of a perspective.
The book could never have happened had not Gerald James
Donat checked every single reference for probable inaccuracies —
and there are some five hundred references to Jung in what fol-
lows. Mr. Donat raised many serious questions that had to be
dealt with, and this text stands refined owing to his genius for de-
tail and his powers of stubborn reasoning. Peter Bishop then cop-
ied the passages from Jung and set them en face, giving the book its
basic form. Mr. Bishop was studious and exacting with his labor,
and he carried it out beautifully. Then Joseph Cambray reviewed
what had been done, carefully finishing up loose ends and adjust-
ing my last-minute irrational insertions.
Finally, Mary Helen Gray Sullivan stepped in, copy-editing,
checking the references again, matching passages that didn’t
match, inserting alterations and additions, designing the book
page-by-page, discovering new queries — once again making me
conscious of my failings. Though the book goes forth under one
sole name, there are really four other authors — Mrs. Sullivan and
the Messrs. Donat, Bishop, and Cambray. (The faults, however,
are all mine.) And of course, a fifth, whose words, and whose ani-
ma, made the whole task worthwhile for us all — C.G. Jung.
I take the occasion also to thank Tree Swenson for giving so
much good advice on the design of the book and to Princeton Uni-
versity Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul for permission to
quote from the writings of C.G. Jung.
eGhs
1985
Take for instance animus and anima. No philosopher in his
senses would invent such irrational and clumsy ideas.
Cc, G. JUNG, Letter to Calvin S. Hall
The ground principles, the archai, of the unconscious are

indescribable because of their wealth of reference. ... The
discriminating intellect naturally keeps on trying to estab-
lish their singleness of meaning and thus misses the essential
point; for what we can above all establish as the one thing
consistent with their nature is their manifold meaning, their
almost limitless wealth of reference, which makes any uni-
lateral formulation impossible.
C. G. JUNG, CW 9,i, §80
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...ifa man does not know what a thing is, it is at least
an increase in knowledge if he knows what it is not.
C. G. JUNG
last phrase of Aion
Introduction
Tu IS excursion is intended to supplement the main literature

on the anima.' Since that literature provides a goodly phenome-
nology of the experience of anima, I shall look here more closely at
the rather neglected phenomenology of the notion of anima. Expe-
rience and notion affect each other reciprocally. Not only do we
derive our notions out of our experiences in accordance with the
fantasy of empiricism, but also our notions condition the nature of
our experiences. In particular there seems to me to be a sentimen-
talism suffusing “anima” which I suspect is embedded in the notion
itself, thereby coloring pale and pink our experiences and the
assessments of those experiences. So, examining our experiences
cannot rectify this sentimentalism, since they have already been
prejudged by the rose-tinted glasses given us, I suspect, by the no-
tion. We do better looking into the notion, if that is where the sen-
timentalism lies. Of course, “anima” marks out a difficult region of
the psyche, hardly lending itself to any sort of examination. But
the difficulty we have with anima arises as much from our indis-
tinct concepts of her as from her indistinct nature. Jung often ex-
1
JUNG/SCRIPTA
a
According to these Gnostics, ... the feminine figure of Wisdom,

[was] Sophia-Achamoth. . . . Sophia, partly by an act of reflection
and partly driven by necessity, entered into relation with the outer
darkness. The sufferings that befell her took the form of various
emotions — sadness, fear, bewilderment, confusion, longing; now
she laughed and now she wept....
The emotional state of Sophia sunk in unconsciousness . . . , her
formlessness, and the possibility of her getting lost in the darkness
characterize very clearly the anima of a man who identifies himself
absolutely with his reason and his spirituality.
| Cw 13, 8452 ff.
(b) If the encounter with the shadow is the “apprentice-piece” in the

individual’s development, then that with the anima is the “master-
plece:”
CW 9,i, §61 (cf. 9 February 1959, Letter to Traugott Egloff)
(c) ... I have noticed that people usually have not much difficulty in
picturing to themselves what is meant by the shadow.... But it
costs them enormous difficulties to understand what the anima is.
They accept her easily enough when she appears in novels or as a
film star, but she is not understood at all when it comes to seeing
the role she plays in their own lives, because she sums up every-
thing that a man can never get the better of and never finishes cop-
ing with. Therefore it remains in a perpetual state of emotionality
which must not be touched. The degree of unconsciousness one
meets with in this connection is, to put it mildly, astounding.
CW 9,1, 8485
INTRODUCTION/HILLMAN
plained the therapeutic value of concepts as ways of taking hold,

of grasping and comprehending, so that precise conceptual think-
ing and feeling, especially in regard to such a vague and subtle
fascinosum as the anima, serve psychological consciousness.
It may be argued that the very uncertainty is appropriate to ani-
ma and that conceptual clarification is to use intellect where it does
not belong. Our concepts reflect her best when they are vague. To
me, this all-too-familiar argument means having embraced the ani-
ima foolishly and having been dragged by her into the woods. As
we are supposed not to let her rule in the realm of personal rela-
tionship where, as Eve, she would make us all too fleshly and
literal, so too we may not let her dominate the realm of ideation
where, as Sophia, she would make us confused and formless.2 We
can as well be victims of anima projection with sentimental ideas
that cloud and turn our heads as with persons. The sacrificium in-
tellectus in analytical psychology today sometimes becomes per-
verted from its authentic meaning — dedicating intellect to the
Gods — to abandoning the burden of it for tendermindedness and
fuzz. Neither Freud nor Jung had to cut off his head in order to
serve psyche. If Sophia is one face of anima, then a subtleness in
the application of mind is surely no affront to her and may instead
be one of her claims upon the psychologist and an exercise in
which she delights.
Precision in regard to anima seems particularly relevant for two
further reasons: first, because our society, and psychology as part
of it, is in high tension concerning feeling, femininity, eros, soul,
fantasy — all areas which analytical psychology has involved with
anima; and second, because Jung has said that for the individual
the Auseinandersetzung “with the anima is the ‘master-piece’” of
psychological work.> Again, clarification of what the notion car-
ries may afford some insight into the social and the individual con-
fusions, including mine, as I write, and yours, as you read.‘
“Anima” receives several definitions in Jung. These can be taken
as levels of distinction which we may separate before attempting to
understand their inter-relation. By levels I do not want to imply a
hierarchy of stages or grades of value but merely facets superim-
posed upon one another. These several definitions need not be
treated historically, for we are not engaged in a study of the devel-
3
JUNG/SCRIPTA
eS
_ valuable reference to Tristram Shandy [1759-67]. (“the two

souls in every man living, — the one . . . being called the animus, the
other, the anima” (London, 1911, p. 133).] To begin with I did not
have the feeling at all that I was guilty of plagiarism with my
[anima/animus] theory, but in the last 5 years .. . [have discovered
... traces of it also in the old alchemists. .. . 1can only think that
Laurence Sterne drew upon the secret teachings (presumably Rosi-
crucian) of his time. They contain the Royal Secret of the King and
Queen, who were none other than the animus and anima, or Deus
and Dea. 8 December 1938, Letter to Georgette Boner
NS No man is so entirely masculine that he has nothing feminine in

him. ... The repression of feminine traits . . . causes these contra-
sexual demands to accumulate in the unconscious.
CW 7, §297 (cf. §§296-301)
... the feminine belongs to man as his own unconscious feminin-

ity, which I have called the anima. CW S, §678
It is normal for a man to resist his anima, because she represents

... all those tendencies and contents hitherto excluded from con-
scious life. CW 11, §129
CONTRASEXUALITY/HILLMAN
opment of the anima concept in Jung’s mind.? Rather, I would

regard the notions phenomenologically, using the Collected Works
(CW), and occasionally Memories, Dreams, Reflections (MDR)
and Jung’s Letters (referred to by date and recipient),? as a single
corpus without special attention to the chronological order of the
anima notions or their contexts.
1. Anima and Contrasexuality
UNG and the literature of analytical psychology mainly em-

ploy “anima” to refer to the contrasexual, less conscious aspect of
the psyche of men. “The anima can be defined as the image or ar-
chetype or deposit of all the experiences of man with woman” (CW
13, §58). This basic definition, which places anima in the psyche of
men only, is reinforced with a biological speculation: “The anima
is presumably a psychic representation of the minority of female
JUNG/SCRIPTA
We might compare masculinity and femininity and their psychic

components to a definite store of substances. . . . CW 8, §782
Either sex is inhabited by the opposite sex up to a point, for, bio-

logically speaking, it is simply the greater number of masculine
genes that tips the scales in favour of masculinity. The smaller
number of feminine genes seems to form a feminine character,
which usually remains unconscious because of its subordinate po-
sition. CW 9,1, §58
... sex is determined by a majority of male or female genes, as the

case may be. But the minority of genes belonging to the other sex
does not simply disappear. A man therefore has in him a feminine
side, an unconscious feminine figure — a fact of which he is gener-
ally quite unaware. I may take it as known that I have called this
figure the “anima”.... CW 9,i, §512
The anima, being psychologically the female counterpart of the

masculine consciousness, based upon the minority of female genes
in a masculine body...
8 January 1948, Letter to Canon H.G. England
... every man “carries Eve, his wife, hidden in his body.” It is this
feminine element in every man (based on the minority of female
genes in his biological make-up) which I have called the anima.
CW 18, §429
The fact that the rotundum is ... contained in the anima and is
prefigured by her lends her that extraordinary fascination. ... Ata
certain level, therefore, woman appears as the true carrier of the
longed-for wholeness and redemption. CW 14, §500
Whenever this drive for wholeness appears, it begins by disguising

itself under the symbolism of incest, for, unless he seeks it in him-
self, a man’s nearest feminine counterpart is to be found in his
mother, sister, or daughter. CW 16, §471
ee eS
6
genes in a man’s body” (Cw 11, §48)2 Anima thus becomes the
carrier and even the image of “wholeness,”> since she completes
the hermaphrodite both psychologically and as representative of
man’s biological contrasexuality.
If anima represents man’s female lacuna, then a therapy gov-
erned by the idea of individuation toward wholeness focuses main-
ly upon her development. Anima development has thus become a
major therapeutic tenet in the minds of many analytical psychol-
ogists, and the “development of the feminine,” a major plank in
the platform of analytical psychology. But as long as “anima” re-
mains a portmanteau idea packed thick with other notions - eros,
feeling, human relationships, introversion, fantasy, concrete life,
and others we shall be uncovering as we proceed — the develop-
ment of anima, like anima herself, continues to mean many things
to many men. In the guise of “anima development,” there takes
place a rich trade in smuggled hypotheses, pretty pieties about
eros, and eschatological indulgences about saving one’s soul
through relationship, becoming more feminine, and the sacrifice of
intellect.
JUNG/SCRIPTA
el
To the young boy a clearly discernible anima-form appears in his

mother. ... An infantile man generally has a maternal anima; an
adult man, the figure of a younger woman. The senile man finds
compensation in a very young girl, or even a child.
CW 9,1, §357
In both cases [anima and animus] the incest element plays an im-
portant part: there is a relation between the young woman and her
father, the older woman and her son, the young man and his moth-
er, the older man and his daughter. Cw 16,§521
If she is old, this is an indication that one’s consciousness has be-

come considerably more childish. If she is young, then one is too
old in one’s conscious attitude. 22 March 1935, Letter to Dr. S.
The feelings of a man are so to speak a woman’s and appear as

such in dreams. I designate this figure by the term anima, because
she is the personification of the inferior functions which relate a
man to the collective unconscious. CW 18, §187
The inner personality is the way one behaves in relation to one’s in-
ner psychic processes; it is the inner attitude, the characteristic
face, that is turned towards the unconscious. I call the outer atti-
tude, the outward face, the persona; the inner attitude, the inward
face, I call the anima. CW 6, §803
...in aman the soul, i.e., anima, or inner attitude, is represented

in the unconscious by definite persons with the corresponding
qualities. Such an image is called a “soul-image.” Sometimes these
images are of quite unknown or mythological figures.
CW 6, §808
SS
SS SSS
8
The first notion of anima as the contrasexual side of man is con-

ceived within a fantasy of opposites.2 Men and women are
Opposites, conscious and unconscious are opposites, conscious
masculinity and unconscious femininity are opposites. These op-
positions are qualified further by others: a youthful consciousness
has an elderly anima figure; an adult pairs with a soror image near
his own age; senile consciousness finds correspondence in a girl
child. Then, too, a social factor enters into the contrasexual defi-
nition. In several passages> “anima” refers to the contrasocial, in-
ferior personality. There is an opposition between the external role
one plays in social life and the interior, less conscious life of the
soul. This less conscious aspect which is turned inward and expe-
rienced as one’s personal interiority is the anima as “soul-image.”*
JUNG/SCRIPTA
LS
When the anima continually thwarts the good intentions of the

conscious mind, by contriving a private life that stands in sorry
contrast to the dazzling persona, it is exactly the same as when a
naive individual, who has not the ghost of a persona, encounters
the most painful difficulties in his passage through the world.
... But if we reverse the picture and confront the man who pos-
sesses a brilliant persona with the anima, . . . then we shall see that
the latter is just as well informed about the anima and her affairs as
the former is about the world. CW 7, §318
We might compare masculinity and femininity and their psychic

components to a definite store of substances of which, in the first
half of life, unequal use is made. A man consumes his large supply
of masculine substance and has left over only the smaller amount
of feminine substance, which must now be put to use.
CW 8, §782
After the middle of life, however, permanent loss of the anima

means a diminution of vitality, of flexibility, and of human kind-
ness. The result, as a rule, is premature rigidity, crustiness, stere-
otypy, fanatical one-sidedness, obstinacy, pedantry, or else resig-
nation, weariness, sloppiness, irresponsibility, and finally a child-
ish ramollissement with a tendency to alcohol. After middle life,
therefore, the connection with the archetypal sphere of experience
should if possible be re-established. CW 9,1, 8147
10
The more a man identifies with his biological and social role as
man (persona), the more will the anima dominate inwardly.’ As
the persona presides over adaptation to collective consciousness,
so the anima rules the inner world of the collective unconscious.
As male psychology, according to Jung,> shifts after mid-life
toward its female opposite, so there is a physiological and social
softening and weakening toward “the feminine,” all of which are
occasioned by the anima.
No doubt experience does confirm this first notion of the anima
which holds her to be the inferior distaff side of men. Indeed, she is
first encountered through the dream figures, emotions, symp-
tomatic complaints, obsessive fantasies and projections of Western
men. Anima is “the glamorous, possessive, moody, and sentimen-
JUNG/SCRIPTA
a
The anima... is the “energy of the heavy and the turbid”; it clings
to the bodily, fleshly heart. Its effects are “sensuous desires and im-
pulses to anger.” “Whoever is sombre and moody on waking . . . is
fettered to the anima.” Cw 13,857
Take, for example, the “spotless” man of honour and public ben-
efactor, whose tantrums and explosive moodiness terrify his wife
and children. What is the anima doing here? CW 7, §319
When the shadow, the inferior personality, is in large measure un-

conscious, the unconscious is represented by a masculine figure.
Cw 10, §714n21
The growing youth must be able to free himself from the anima
fascination of his mother. There are exceptions, notably artists,
where the problem often takes a different turn; also homosexual-
ity, which is usually characterized by identity with the anima.
... Such a disposition should not be adjudged negative in all cir-
cumstances, in so far as it preserves the archetype of the Original
Man, which a one-sided sexual being has, up to a point, lost.
CW 9,i, 8146
The homosexual relation between an older and a younger man can

thus be of advantage to both sides and have a lasting value. An in-
dispensable condition for the value of such a relation is the stead-
fastness of the friendship and their loyalty to it. But only too often
this condition is lacking. . .. A friendship of this kind naturally in-
volves a special cult of feeling, of the feminine element in a man.
He becomes gushing, soulful, aesthetic, over-sensitive, etc. — in a
word, effeminate... . Cw 10, §220
12
tal seductress in a man” (CW 9,ii, §422). “She intensifies, exag-

gerates, falsifies, and mythologizes all emotional relations. . . .”4
However, the syndrome of inferior feminine traits in the per-
sonal sphere, like other syndromes (conversion hysteria or raving
mania, for example), is relative to the dominants of the culture and
the Zeitgeist. Syndromes current when Freud began psycho-
analysis are less current today; the anima as a syndrome of exces-
sive or inferior feminine traits is less evident as the culture moves
toward incorporation of “typically anima” attitudes into its collec-
tive values. We should therefore not identify a description of the
anima in a rigidly patriarchal, puritanically defensive, extravert-
edly willful and unsoulful period of history with her definition.
Even if the anima exaggerates and mythologizes, her influence
upon emotional relationships today when interiority of soul and
contrasexuality are de rigueur will appear differently and be gov-
erned by other myths. The task now is to discover what descrip-
tions suit her in this time and how she is mythologizing today.
Besides, quite independent of historical periods and their no-
tions of effeminacy, there might be a sophisticated anima con-
sciousness (in the troubadour, stage-actor, courtier, diplomat,
painter, florist, decorator, or psychologist — although all these
with a grain of salt) which refers less to unconscious femininity
than to actual ego identity. A man may be mainly governed by
anima without being unconscious, i.e., without showing undif-
ferentiated or compulsive contrasexual traits. A man may indeed
be quite a child of the anima in overt social behavior, living
adaptedly in a collective consciousness that has again made room
for what hitherto in this century would have been considered
preposterously inferior anima subjectivity and feminine sensitivity.
In face of these phenomena, analytical psychology is yet able to
maintain its theory again by referring to the fantasy of opposites.
This time “anima” is paired with the masculine shadow. When a
man’s ego shows a preponderance of classical anima traits, then
the unconscious is represented by the chthonic male shadow; when
the ego in a man is feminine, then his unconscious contrasexuality
must be masculine. Jung sometimes discusses male homosexuality
as anima identification.‘
Today the notions of “masculine” and “feminine” are in dispute.
This dispute has helped differentiate gender roles from social ones,
: 13
JUNG/SCRIPTA
ee ______________._
... it is essentially the overvaluation of the material object without

that constellates a spiritual and immortal figure within (obviously
for the purpose of compensation and self-regulation). . . . [A] com-
pensatory relationship exists between persona and anima.
CW 7, §8303-04
Just as the persona is the image of himself which the subject pre-
sents to the world, and which is seen by the world, so the anima is
the image of the subject in his relation to the collective uncon-
scious. . . One could also say: the anima is the face of the subject
as seen by the collective unconscious. ... If the ego adopts the
standpoint of the anima, adaptation to reality is severely compro-
mised. CW 728571
... the character of the anima can be deduced from that of the per-
sona. Everything that should normally be in the outer attitude, but
is conspicuously absent, will invariably be found in the inner atti-
tude. This is a fundamental rule... . CW 6, §806
—— As to the common human qualities, the character of the anima can

be deduced from that of the persona. ... But as regards its individ-
ual qualities, nothing can be deduced. ... We can only be certain
that when a man is identical with his persona, his individual quali-
ties will be associated with the anima. This association frequently
gives rise in dreams to the symbol of psychic pregnancy.... The
child that is to be born signifies the individuality, which, though
present, 1s not yet conscious. CW 6, §806
14
and even to differentiate kinds of gender identity, i.e., whether

based on primary or secondary, manifest or genetic, physical or
psychic gender characteristics. It has become difficult to speak of
the anima as inferior femininity since we are no longer certain just
what we mean with “femininity,” let alone “inferior” femininity.
Moreover, archetypal psychology has placed the very notion of the
ego in doubt.‘ Ego-identity is not just one thing, but in a polythe-
istic psychology “ego” reflects any of several archetypes and enacts
various mythologems. It may as well be influenced by a Goddess as
by a God or Hero, and it may as well display ‘feminine’ styles in
behavior without this indicating either ego-weakness or incipient
ego-loss. A man’s ego may perform all the required functions of an
ego without its being modeled upon Hercules or Christ. Neither
captain, father, nor builder of cities, instead moving through the
world as a child of Luna or of Venus, yet with all ego-functions of
orientation, memory, association, and proprioception intact. We
shall return to the ego/anima relation in chapters five and ten
below.
Because the fantasy of opposites? keeps the anima in a social
tandem with either the persona or the shadow and in a gender
tandem with masculinity, we neglect her phenomenology per se
and so find it difficult to understand her except in distinction to
these other notions (masculinity, shadow, animus, persona). We
are always regarding anima phenomenology from within a harness
or from the opposite arm of a balance. Our notions are drawn in
compensation to something else to which she is always yoked. (See
below chapter ten on the Syzygy.) And, as the differences between
social and sexual masculinity remain muddled, and our ideas of
ego have hardened into dogmatic clichés, the anima’s definition
tends to be derivative of — and not demarcated enough from — her
cultural and historical occasions. Yet, the phenomenology of ani-
ma existed before and continues to exist independently of the psy-
chological framework into which she has been put. In other
words, anima gives each of us a sense of an individualized soul, al-
together apart from whatever she might compensate. But this indi-
vidualized soul is merely an intimation. And just this latency, this
pregnancy in her unknownness, ignites the compulsions toward
her. Because she bears in her belly our individualized becoming,
we are drawn into soul-making.>
BS
JUNG/SCRIPTA
ee
on a low level the anima is a caricature of the feminine

Eros. ... Eros is an interweaving. ... Eros is relatedness. ...
CW 13, 860
It [salt] represents the feminine principle of Eros, which brings

everything into relationship. ... [S]alt, as the soul or spark of the
anima mundi, is . . the daughter of the spiritus vegetativus of cre-
ation. CW 14, §322
Apart from its lunar wetness and its terrestrial nature, the most
outstanding properties of salt are bitterness and wisdom. . . Salt,
as the carrier of this fateful alternative, is co-ordinated with the na-
ture of woman. CW 14, §330
Confirmation of our interpretation of salt as Eros (i.e., as a feeling

relationship) is found in the fact that the bitterness is the origin of
the colours.... CW 14, §333
... the anima corresponds to the maternal Eros. CW 9, ii, §29
. man will be forced to develop his feminine side, to open his

eyes to the psyche and to Eros. It is a task he cannot avoid, unless
he prefers to go trailing after woman in a hopelessly boyish fash-
ion, worshipping from afar but always in danger of being stowed
away in her pocket. CW 10, §259 (cf. §§255-58)
The anima has an erotic, emotional character. . . Hence most of

what men say about feminine eroticism, and particularly about the
emotional life of women, is derived from their own anima projec-
tions and distorted accordingly. CW 17, §338
16
EROS/HILLMAN
2. Anima and Eros
Tu IS implies that, in trying to lay bare a definite idea of anima,

we shall beware of whatever descriptive traits she currently bears.
The first ones to be questioned are the erotic traits.2 Erotic con-
tents and feelings have become attached by the anima archetype,
but do they belong necessarily to it?
JUNG/SCRIPTA
The Latin words animus, ‘spirit’, and anima, ‘soul’, are the same as
the Greek anemos, ‘wind’. The other Greek word for ‘wind’, pneu-
ma, also means ‘spirit’. In Gothic we find the same word in us-
anan, ‘to breathe out’, and in Latin it is anhelare, ‘to pant’. In Old
High German, spiritus sanctus was rendered by atum, ‘breath’. In
Arabic, ‘wind’ is mh, and rub is ‘soul, spirit’. The Greek word
psyche has similar connections; it is related to psychein, ‘to
breathe’, psychos, ‘cool’, psychros, ‘cold, chill’, and physa, ‘bel-
lows’. These connections show clearly how in Latin, Greek, and
Arabic the names given to the soul are related to the notion of
moving air, the “cold breath of the spirits.” CW 8, §664
For Heraclitus the soul at the highest level is fiery and dry, because
Ywuxh as such is closely akin to “cool breath” — Yvxelv means ‘to
breathe,’ ‘to blow’; Yuxpds and Ywxos mean ‘cold,’ ‘chill,’ ‘damp.’
CW 91,855
... the soul ... was visualized sensuously as a breath-body....

CW 14, 8748
... another fact to which I have already alluded, [is] the character-
istically historical aspect of the soul. CW 7, §303
... the historical aspect of . . anima figures. CW 7, §299
With this anima, then, we plunge straight into the ancient world.
CW 12, 8112 (cf. CW 7, §§299-303)
If we examine their content, ... we find countless archaic and

“historical” associations.... They [the anima and animus] evi-
dently live and function . . . especially in that phylogenetic substra-
tum which I have called the collective unconscious. ... [T]hey
bring into our ephemeral consciousness an unknown psychic life
belonging to a remote past. It is the mind of our unknown ances-
TORSHeeon CW 95 S518
Sennen
18
EROS/HILLMAN
Linguistically and phenomenologically, anima and psyché5 have

more to do with air, the living air of the head as a holy seat of gen-
erative power (later, our anima rationalis or intellectual soul), with
breath as Jung points out,? with dew and heavy cool vapor, and
even with earth and death (p’o soul, anima telluris) than with fire
and desire.* This vaporous soul substance, like the mists that hang
over marshes, the water-fowl, the hollow reeds and the breezes
stirring the reeds, finds parallels in Bachofen (“hetaerism”), in
Roscher’s Lexikon (“nymphs”), in Emma Jung (“Naturwesen”).”
Elsewhere® I have set out some of the traditionally contrasting
phenomenologies of anima and eros so that there is no need to
resume them but briefly here. The first is moist, vegetative, recep-
tive, indirect, ambiguous; its consciousness is reflective and in
flux. The second is fiery, phallic, spirited, directed, sporadic and
unattached, vertical as an arrow, torch, or ladder.
Anima “immediately surrounds herself with a peculiar historical
feeling” (Cw 10, §85).° There is a sense of history evoked especially
by the anima archetype; “She likes to appear in historic dress”
(CW 9,i, 860), and she “has a peculiar relationship to time” (CW
9,1, §356). Her historical associations go down to the archaic, even
phylogenetic, past.© Although animus may come through the
father and be represented by a senex court of fathers and thus
show equally strong conservatism, and even in “deepest essence”
be “just as historically-minded as the anima” (CW 10, §89), none-
theless Jung makes one contrast between anima and animus in
terms of a “mystical sense of history.” Where anima reaches back-
ward, animus is “more concerned with the present and the future”
(ibid., §86). This distinction could be practically extrapolated:
anima draws us into history, so that the struggle with history — of
ourselves as cases, and of our ancestors and our culture — is a way
of soul-making. The occupation with history, and the historical
perspective, reflects anima. Occupation with the present in the
political scene, social reform, comment on trends, and all futur-
ology are animus — and this whether in men or women. Anima and
animus need each other; for animus can make the past now rele-
vant for the present and future, while anima gives depth and cul-
ture to current opinion and predictions. Without both together,
we are either lost in archeological digs of academic anima-
19
JUNG/SCRIPTA
Four stages of eroticism were known in the late classical period:

Hawwah (Eve), Helen (of Troy), the Virgin Mary, and Sophia.
The series is repeated in Goethe’s Faust: in the figures of Gretchen
as the personification.of a purely instinctual relationship (Eve);
Helen as an anima figure; Mary as the personification of the
“heavenly,” i.e., Christian or religious, relationship; and the “eter-
nal feminine” as an expression of the alchemical Sapientia. As the
nomenclature shows, we are dealing with the heterosexual Eros or
anima-figure in four stages, and consequently with four stages of
the Eros cult. The first stage - Hawwah, Eve, earth — is purely
biological; woman is equated with the mother and only represents
something to be fertilized. The second stage is still dominated by
the sexual Eros, but on an aesthetic and romantic level where
woman has already acquired some value as an individual. The
third stage raises Eros to the heights of religious devotion and thus
spiritualizes him: Hawwah has been replaced by spiritual mother-
hood. Finally, the fourth stage illustrates something which unex-
pectedly goes beyond the almost unsurpassable third stage: Sapi-
entia.... This stage represents a spiritualization of Helen and
consequently of Eros as such. CW 16, §361
Se
“[Anima] is a subtle imperceptible smoke.” CW 12, §394n105
20
EROS/HILLMAN
refinement or riding the wave of the future, following animus into

space-age science-fiction and pollution/population doom.
In contradistinction to the historical depth of anima, Eros is
forever young, has no history and even wipes out history, or
creates its own, its “love-story.” And where anima withdraws
toward meditative isolation — the retreat of the soul — eros seeks
unions.
Even where Jung speaks of “four stages of eroticism”? and cor-
relates the four stages of erotic phenomenology with four grades of
the anima (Eve, Helen, Mary, Sophia), the feminine images are not
the eros itself but the objects of its longing (pothos). A drive has a
corresponding projection, a goal it seeks, a grail to hold its blood.
These containers may be represented by the anima images which
Jung describes, and a quality of eros may be correlated with each
of these figures, but the figures are not the eros. They are not the
lovers but the beloveds; they are reflections of love. They are the
means by which eros can see itself. When our desire is mirrored by
a cheering coed or a nursing nun, through the specificity of the
soul-image we are able to know more precisely about the quality of
our desire. But the desire is not the cheerleader, not the nurse. The
images are soul-portraits by means of which eros is drawn into the
psychic field and can be witnessed as a psychic event.
Bachelard’® associates anima with reverie (in contradistinction
to animus and the activity of dreaming); Corbin!! with imagina-
tion; Ficino!? with fantasy (idolum) and fate; Onians'> with life
and death; Porphyry" with a damp spirit and “aerial opacity.” 15>
These traditional phenomenologies of the notion of soul, including
the lengthy lunar descriptions of anima in Jung (CW 14,
§§154-233), do not have markedly erotic traits. These notions do
not identify anima with eros or attribute the eros principle to soul.
Moreover, where anima has classically referred to an internally
located function in deepest association with human life and its
fate, eros is a daimon, external, that visits itself upon life and fate.
We fall in and out of love or are carried and redeemed, or cursed,
through its working, but that which love works upon is not love
but soul. Soul is the arrow’s target, the fire’s combustible material,
the labyrinth through which it dances. It is especially this struc-
tural notion that I would emphasize: anima as an archetypal struc-
ture of consciousness. As such it provides a specifically structured
21
22,
EROS/HILLMAN
mode of being in the world, a way of behaving, perceiving, feeling

that gives events the significance not of love but of soul. Now,
what more can we say about this structure? What are its differen-
tiating features, if they are not erotic?
Anima is inward (hence “closed” and called “virginal” in reli-
gious and poetic metaphors of the soul), devoted, yet labile, gener-
ous and generative, yet reserved (shy, shameful, retreating, pure,
veiled — these latter qualities presented by the virgin nymphs and
Goddesses such as Maria or Artemis). To this interiority belongs a
movement of deepening downward'* (caves, deeps, graves) which
in the phenomenology of Kore—Persephone connects her with the
realm of the underworld. “Anima was not the usual name for the
life-soul till after death.”!7 She carries our death; our death is
lodged in the soul. Again, these notions are far from any thought
of the anima as the eros principle, especially where eros has come
to mean — and not only through Freud — the libido, the life-impulse
opposed to death.
This consciousness is mood-determined, a notion that has been
represented in mythological phenomenology by images of natural
atmospheres (clouds, waves, still waters). Anima-consciousness
favors a protective mimicry, an attachment to something or some-
one else to which it is echo. Here we see the wood nymphs that
belong to trees, the souls which hover over waters, speak from
dells and caves, or sing from sea-rocks and whirlpools — and, most
vividly, the succubus. That we conceive anima in tandems is al-
ready given by her phenomenology. So, we think of her in notions
of attachment with body or with spirit, or in the mother-daughter
mystery, in the masculine-feminine pairings, or in compensation
with the persona, in collusion with the shadow, or as guide to the
self.
In these pairs, like in the mythological imagery, anima is the
reflective partner; she it is who provides the moment of reflection
in the midst of what is naturally given. She is the psychic factor in
nature, an idea formulated in the last century as “animism.” We
feel this moment of reflection in the contrary emotions that anima
phenomena constellate: the fascination plus danger, the awe plus
desire, the submission to her as fate plus suspicion, the intense
awareness that this way lie both my life and my death. Without
these soul-stirring emotions, there would be no significance in the
23
JUNG/SCRIPTA
eS,
But how do we dare to call this elfin being the “anima”? Anima
means soul and should designate something very wonderful and
immortal. Yet this was not always so. We should not forget that
this kind of soul is a dogmatic conception whose purpose it is to
pin down and capture something uncannily alive and active. The
German word Seele is closely related, via the Gothic form saiwald,
to the Greek word ald\os , which means ‘quick-moving,’ ‘change-
ful of hue,’ ‘twinkling,’ something like a butterfly — yux7 in
Greek — which reels drunkenly from flower to flower and lives on
honey and love. CW 9,i, §55
. the soul, that glancing, Aeolian thing, elusive as a butterfly

(anima, Wwx7 ). CW 9,i, §391
Hermes, originally a wind god, and his counterpart the Egyptian

Thoth, who “makes the souls to breathe,” are the forerunners of
the alchemical Mercurius in his aerial aspect. The texts often use
the terms pneuma and spiritus in the original concrete sense of “air
in motion.” ... He is the ... stone uplifted by the wind. ...
“Soul” represents a higher concept than “spirit” in the sense of
air or gas. As the “subtle body” or “breath-soul” it means some-
thing non-material and finer than mere air. Its essential character-
istic is to animate and be animated... . Mercurius is often desig-
nated asanima.... CW 13, §§261-62
... the anima iliastri can burst forth from the heart when it lacks
“air”; that is to say, if psychic remedies are not applied, death oc-
curs prematurely. Cw 13,§201
24
EROS/HILLMAN
natural places and human affairs to which she is attached. But,

life, fate, and death cannot become ‘conscious,’ so that with her is
constellated a consciousness of our fundamental unconsciousness.
In other words, consciousness of this archetypal structure is never
far from unconsciousness. Its primary attachment is to the state of
nature, to all things that simply are — life, fate, death — and which
can only be reflected but never separated from their impenetrable
opacity. Anima stays close to this field of the natural unconscious
mind.
A consciousness that does not soar but stays attached, that
hovers and flutters over the field of natural events, is imaged also
by the butterfly. The fascination of moth for flame has long stood
for the soul’s fluttering attachment to eros, and the butterfly suck-
ing its sustenance from the flowers of feeling again has represented
the psyche-eros relation. The butterfly points again to air as the
psyche’s element. To be in the air, put on airs, be breezy, windy,
breathless, or show shifts of atmospheric pressure all belong to
anima.» Low-flying in dreams, especially over furniture or persons
in rooms (closed, interior, within), can be distinguished from puer-
soaring and is not necessarily a dangerous sign of “having no
earth,” of inflation, of being out of the body. I take this flying as
part of anima phenomenology and air as a legitimate element for
certain conditions of the soul. Low-flying in childhood dreams I
take as a possible announcement of anima consciousness.
Like the butterfly, anima-consciousness moves through phases,
bearing a process, a history. It is egg, worm, cocoon, bright wing —
and not only successively but all at once. Our strongly evolutional
approach to events and images makes us always see development
first, forgetting that in the realm of the imaginal all processes that
belong to an image are inherent to it at all times. There is not
merely a coincidentia oppositorum but a coincidence of processes.
All phases at once: no first and last, better and worse, progression
and regression. Instead, soul history as a series of images, superim-
posed. The tale of their interaction the Mother would turn into
growth, the Child into futurity, and the Hero into an evolutionary
epic of achievement. Because our consciousness is in thrall to these
archetypal structures, we are unable to envision a phenomenology
of phases except as development, as if the butterfly were a moral
pilgrim. But the choice of an image from nature does not imply the
25
JUNG/SCRIPTA
eS
The whore (meretrix) is a well-known figure in alchemy. She char-

acterizes the arcane substance in its initial, “chaotic,” maternal
state... . “That noble whore Venus... .” Cw 14, §415
Everything the anima touches becomes numinous — unconditional,

dangerous, taboo, magical. CW 9,i, §59
... the anima is bipolar and can therefore appear positive one mo-
ment and negative the next; now young, now old; now mother,
now maiden; now a good fairy, now a witch; now a saint, now a
whore. CW 9,i, §356
... Michael Maier’s journey to the seven mouths of the Nile,

which signify the seven planets.... is a description of the
dreamer’s ascent to a world of gods and heroes, of his initiation in-
to a Venus mystery....
... Our author was led in the first place by the anima-sibyl to
undertake the journey through the planetary houses. .. .
CW 14, 8297 f.
26
EROS/HILLMAN
naturalistic fallacy in regard to its interpretation. Psyché as butter-

fly does not demand that we view the soul developmentally.
Despite these distinctions between eros and psyche and a char-
acterization of psyche apart from eros, there remain of course the
ladies of pleasure who pay their sensuous call in our dreams. They
seem erotic in themselves, thus giving phenomenological ground to
the notion of anima as eros.
Here I believe we do well to remember that all that is female is
not necessarily anima and that all that is anima is not necessarily
Venusian. Venus phenomenology in dream and fantasy becomes
ennobled by the word ‘soul,’ which both overloads the aphrodisiac
facet of the psyche and also undervalues Venus in her own right.
The whore in a dream is a whore, who can take on deeper
psychological significance (cf. the “great whore” [meretrix] in al-
chemy)? as an archetypal image in her own right and need not be
the anima, my mistress soul, psychopomp to the self, that is, un-
less she be numinous? and carry all the fascinating bipolar perplex-
ities by which the anima archetype is recognized‘ — old and young,
frail and physical, culture and nature, innocent and vile, intimate
and occult. We do injustice to the complexity of anima by calling
every woman streetwalking through our dreams an ‘anima image’;
and we neglect Aphrodite as an authentic structure of con-
sciousness when we psychologize her into an ‘anima figure.’
To take seriously Aphrodite’s archetypal realm and its patterns
of behavior means to take them as such without conflating, and in-
flating, them with the import of soul. The seductive Venusian fig-
ures draw me into the realm of Venus as Ulysses went to Calypso
and to Circe or as Michael Maier journeys into the planetary hous-
es.4 But neither in the Odyssey nor in Maier’s alchemy does Venus
stand for soul. Ulysses has as guide Athene, and Maier’s psycho-
pompos is a sibyl — soul as psychological understanding rather
than as eros. There is evidently more to soul than Venus, and more
to Venus than soul.
On the one hand, giving soul to each chick and duck and silly
goose that enters fantasy loads these images and the human rela-
tionships in which they appear with disproportionate significance.
When analysts put soul values onto simply Venusian affairs, they
serve her as couplers, even while burdening the pleasures of life
with ‘anima development.’
27
JUNG/SCRIPTA
ae SS
(a) Of course, I did not invent the term Eros. I learnt it from Plato.
But I never would have applied this term if I hadn’t observed facts
that gave me a hint how to use this Platonic notion. With Plato
Eros is still a daimonion or daemonium....
18 June 1947, Letter to Ermine Huntress Lantero
Four stages of eroticism were known in the late classical peri-

od.... The series is repeated in Goethe’s Faust: in the figures of
Gretchen as the personification of a purely instinctual relationship
(Eve); Helen as an anima figure; Mary as the personification of the
“heavenly” ...; and the “eternal feminine” as an expression of the
alchemical Sapientia. CW 16, §361
28
EROS/HILLMAN
On the other hand, Venus is one of the way-stations, and she

must get her due. Modern man has an accumulated debt to
Aphrodite on which she is today exacting payments at a furious
rate. It is as if she were actually demanding our souls for all the
centuries that they were denied to her by Judeo-Christian repres-
sion. But we pay her back best in the true coin of Aphrodite. To
pay her in the guise of soul-indulgences cheats the real cost. It is
more comforting to visit her planetary house in the name of anima
development than it is to suffer the venereal evils, entanglements,
perversions, revenges, furies, and soporific pleasures for her sake
alone.
The contemporary analytical confusion of soul with eros has its
source, I believe, in the archetypal perspective of Aphrodite. She
would insist that we look at phenomena through the eyes of Eros,
her son. By maintaining this perspective she would be perpetually
reclaiming this son to serve a Venusian and venereal view of soul
and of femininity. She above all has an interest in keeping Eros on
the feminine side of the coniunctio. If Eros is kept on her side, his
eroticism will be stimulated in an aphrodisiac fashion, giving that
cast to eros in our consciousness today in which it is so highly sex-
ualized. Socratic/Platonic Eros — from where Jung says he took the
expression? — is definitely masculine. This Eros had Hermes in his
genealogy, and so it has further aims than the Eros of Aphrodite
which was for Socrates only one phase of erotic activity.
But Aphrodite still awaits recognition for the influence she has
upon analytical psychology’s notion of anima. The realm of anima
often seems nothing other than Aphrodite’s realm, erotic relation-
ships, or as they are transmuted into Helen’s, who was imagined in
antiquity as Aphrodite’s incarnation. There we supposedly find
anima and there we develop it. (So much does Helen-Aphrodite
color our notion that, when Jung writes of the four stages of eroti-
cism,> it is to Helen in particular that he gives the qualification
“anima figure.”)
The paradigm of this erotic exercise is transference which in
both Freud and Jung receives primarily an Aphroditic cast. This
was so from the beginning in Paris at Charcot’s clinic. Jung soon
recognized the influence of Paris and Vienna upon the formulation
of psychic events, and, in separating out the school of Zitrich (a
city where Venus is less at home), he first focused upon the libido
22
JUNG/SCRIPTA
| EE ES TAT a
TEI
- SN EE
Green, the life-colour, suits her [the anima] very well. ...
CW 5, 8678
The colour green . . . is associated with Venus. CW 14, §393
As regards the psychology of this picture, we must stress above all

else that it depicts a human encounter where love plays the decisive
part. CW 16, 8419
As to the frank eroticism of the pictures, ... they have a sym-

bolical rather than a pornographic meaning. CW 16, §460
30
EROS/HILLMAN
concept, renaming it psychic energy. With Jung’s de-libidinizing
the very basis of psychoanalytic theory, the archetypal premise of
the unconscious shifted from Aphrodite to Hermes-Mercurius,
and the soul’s fluxions were removed from the sexual eroticism
and personal concretism of Aphrodite.
But stili she influences our notions. How we welcome her color
green in fantasy and dreams,? indicating to what extent Venus has
colored our view of psychic events. They are seen through the
green lenses of her world, growth, nature, life, and love, so that in-
dividuation tends to mean increasing beauty and harmony of soul.
Little wonder that contemporary psychotherapeutic work — en-
counter, sensitivity, gestalt, Reichean — has led finally into overt
demonstrations of Aphrodite: non-verbal, nakedness, feel-and-
touch, body awareness, orgasm.
We may know a good deal about the manifestations of Aph-
rodite in myth and in our personal lives. But we know far too little
about how she governs the premises and conclusions of our think-
ing. These we naively think are based on empirical facts. But the
very idea of concrete, sensate facts suits her style of consciousness.
The erotic ‘facts’ on which we build our ideas are her creations.
Psychological evidence is never simply objective givens, lying
around like moonrocks, waiting to be picked up. Empirical evi-
dence of any psychological premise forms part of the same arche-
typal perspective: we find what we are looking for; we see what is
allowed to fit in by the perceptual defenses in the archetypal struc-
ture of our consciousness. So we see the soul filled with sexual
wishes when our premises and observations are Aphroditic. The
Aphroditic cast of the anima in Jung’s essay on transference is an
excellent case in point.>
Aphrodite may have given the correct perspective to trans-
ference and may have been the gateway to the repressed (in our
culture between 1870 and 1960), but it is not the anima’s only, or
even main, perspective. Athene, Artemis, Hera, and Persephone
produce ideas of soul that would show another twist. To place
anima events upon the altar of Aphrodite puts Psyche back in her
service, back to the beginning of Apuleius’s tale, the rest of which,
and the very point of which, displays a movement away from
Aphrodite, both of Eros and of Psyche.
If anima is defined as the eros factor, then we are always bound
a1
JUNG/SCRIPTA
ae
——
The unknown woman or anima [in dreams] always represents the

“inferior,” i.e., the undifferentiated function, which in the case of
our dreamer is feeling. CW 12,§150
Intellect and feeling ... conflict with one another by definition.

Whoever identifies with an intellectual standpoint will occasional-
ly find his feeling confronting him like an enemy in the guise of the
anima... . CW 9,ii, §58
The feelings of a man are so to speak a woman’s and appear as

such in dreams. I designate this figure by the term anima. ...
CW 18, §187
This spiritual inflation is compensated by a distinct inferiority of

feeling, a real undernourishment of your other side, the feminine
earth (Yin) side, that of personal feeling.
25 August 1928, Letter to Count Hermann Keyserling
32
FEELING/HILLMAN
to assume that sexual excitation is a soul message and cannot be

denied —- who would deny the call of his soul? And we are bound
to assume that active human relationships and uplifting enthusi-
asms are anima-inspired, whereas in truth they are less promoted
by the reflective moisture of the soul than by eros captivating the
soul. For here we must concede that, though anima is not eros, her
first inclination is toward love. So she seduces in order to be turned
on, set afire, illumined. So she makes advances in order to move
pure reflection into connection. So she commands an incredible
range of voluptuous imagery in order to draw eros down upon her
for what Plato called “generation,” or soul-making. Nevertheless,
though love be essential to soul, as theology insists and psycho-
therapy confirms, and though soul be that by which we receive
love, soul is not love.
By drawing them apart in contrasts of moisture and fire, serpent
and hare, waterfowl and dove, reflection and desire, fantasy and
impulse, nature and spirit, mind and activity, depths and ascent, I
am following the alchemists’ dictum that only what has been prop-
erly separated can be adequately joined.
3. Anima and Feeling**
B ESIDES eros, feeling too has been generally attributed to

anima, as if she were the archetype of the feeling function. This
confusion has several roots. The first and simplest lies in the idea
of inferiority. When the feeling function in men is inferior (as is
generally claimed by analytical psychology), it merges with men’s
contrasexual anima inferiority.? Then we believe we discriminate
the anima by discriminating feeling, whereas the task more likely is
one of discriminating anima from feeling, from the human related-
33
JUNG/SCRIPTA
a
The most striking feature about the anima-type is that the mater-
nal element is entirely lacking. She is the companion and friend in
her favourable aspect, in her unfavourable aspect she is the courte-
san.... But the anima-type is presented in the most succinct and
pregnant form in the Gnostic legend of Simon Magus. . . . [who]
was always accompanied on his travels by a girl, whose name was
Helen. He had found her in a brothel in Tyre; she was a reincarna-
tion of Helen of Troy. Cw 10, §75
..» Helen as an anima figure. . . . CW 16, §361
Now comes the first transformation: he [Goethe] discovers his

countertype (“feeling is all”) and at the same time realizes the
projection of the anima.... Behind Gretchen stands the Gnostic
sequence: Helen-Mary-Sophia.
22 March 1939, Letter to Anonymous
or It is principally among women that I have found the predominance

of introverted feeling. CW 6, §640
Feeling is a specifically feminine virtue. .. . Cw 10, §79
34
FEELING/HILLMAN
ness and personal evaluations that feeling has come to mean and
which confine anima into the personal feeling world of Helen?
Another source of the confusion between anima and feeling lies
in an idea, only occasionally occurring in Jung? but bruited widely
by later analytical psychologists, that feeling is a feminine prerog-
ative. (Women are more at home in the feeling world; men learn
about feeling from women; the development of the feminine goes
by way of the feeling function.) Since anima is by definition fem-
inine, then feeling refers to anima. Next in these steps of spurious
reasoning erected on questionable premises is the equation: anima
development = feeling development. Behind this equation still
lurks the idea of eros, which is supposed to be the force within
both the anima and the feeling function.
Just as anima is not eros or its psychic representative, so too the
relation between the God-daimon Eros and eros as an archetypal
principle, on the one hand, and feeling as a psychological function,
on the other hand, has never been established — neither empiri-
cally, nor logically, nor phenomenologically. The feeling function
works mainly through the realm of feeling of which at least fifteen
hundred different ones have been named by psychology. Only
some of this feeling has to do with eros. To give to eros either feel-
ing or the anima puts too many events all upon one altar, claiming
all for love. Not only is this biasedly Christian — in the sense of lim-
ited to only the one perspective of love — but also authentic aspects
of anima become judged only from the standpoint of love. Hatred,
spite, suspicion, jealousy, rejection, enmity, deception, betrayal,
cruelty, misanthropy, ridicule play their part in anima experiences.
35
JUNG/SCRIPTA
2
The nixie is ... a magical feminine being whom I call the anima.
She can also be a siren, melusina (mermaid), wood-nymph, Grace,
or Erlking’s daughter, or a lamia or succubus, who infatuates
young men and sucks the life out of them....
... An alluring nixie . . . is today called an “erotic fantasy,” and
she may complicate our psychic life in a most painful way. She
comes upon us just as a nixie might; she sits on top of us like a suc-
cubus; she changes into all sorts of shapes like a witch... . [and]
causes states of fascination that rival the best bewitchment. . . . She
is a mischievous being who crosses our path in numerous transfor-
mations and disguises, playing all kinds of tricks on us, causing
happy and unhappy delusions, depressions and ecstasies, out-
bursts of affect, etc.... the nixie has not laid aside her roguery.
The witch has not ceased to mix her vile potions of love and death;
her magic poison has been refined into intrigue and self-deception,
unseen though none the less dangerous for that.
CW 9,1, 8853-54
.. the anima becomes, through integration, the Eros of con-

sciousness, ... the anima gives relationship and relatedness to a
man’s consciousness... . CW 9, ii, §33
In the case of the individual, the problem constellated by the shad-

ow is answered on the plane of the anima, that is, through related-
ness. CW 9,1, 8487
... to the degree in which the shadow is recognized and integrat-

ed, the problem of the anima, i.e., of relationship, is constellated.
CW 9,1, §485n18
“She” [the anima] consists essentially in a certain inferior kind of

relatedness to the surroundings and particularly to women... .
CW 18, §429
... the anima of a man consists of inferior relatedness, full of af-

fect: <.. cw 13,860
ee ee ee
36
FEELING/HILLMAN
These emotions are appropriate to many of the cold-blooded,

witchy creatures whom we find in legend and poetry* — and our
dreams and lives — even where such “negative” emotions are far
from the eros and the feeling function that would conform with
the mediocre niceness of Christian humanism.
Yet another source lies in the idea of relationship. Jung (as we
shall explore in chapter seven) often calls the anima the function of
relationship. He also sometimes does consider anima to be that
factor which can give “relationship and relatedness to a man’s con-
sciousness.” >Although Jung himself only rarely describes feeling
(a) It often happens that the patient is quite satisfied with merely reg-
istering a dream or fantasy. . . . Others try to understand with their
brains only.... That they should also have a feeling-relationship
to the contents of the unconscious seems strange to them....
CW 16, §489
38
FEELING/HILLMAN
as relatedness,” but rather feeling as valuation, analytical psychol-

ogy now tends to stress the relational aspect. Feeling is generally
spoken of as the instrument of connection between persons and
between an individual and his outer and inner worlds. To have
‘poor feeling’ and to be ‘unrelated’ have become synonymous. Be-
cause both anima and feeling are called the function of relation-
ship, they merge with each other.
Now, the two meanings of relationship, that of anima and that
of feeling, touch each other only here and there. Yet today in some
analytical psychology they have tended to fuse completely, so that
anima = relationship = feeling has become the simple formula,
nay, panacea. Before we swallow any more of this sweet elixir, or
prescribe it to our patients, let us look at its ingredients.
Anima as relationship means that configuration which mediates
between personal and collective, between actualities and beyond,
between the individual conscious horizon and the primordial
realm of the imaginal, its images, ideas, figures, and emotions.
Here anima functions as mediatrix and psychopompos (see chap-
ter seven below). The quality of relationship will be determined by
this function. So, relationship governed by anima will show unsta-
ble paradoxes of longing and trepidation, involvement and skit-
tishness, faith and doubt, and an intense sense of personal signifi-
cance owing to the importance of the imaginal soul at large. The
other main characteristic here, besides the emotional paradoxes
and swollen importance, is the uncanny autonomy - the basic un-
consciousness — of anima relationship because such relationship
reflects her as bridge to everything unknown.
Anima as function of relationship is far indeed from relatedness.
It seems odd that anima could ever have been considered as a help
in human relationship. In each of her classical shapes she is a non-
human or half-human creature, and her effects lead us away from
the individually human situation. She makes moods, distortions,
illusions, which serve human relatedness only where the persons
concerned share the same mood or fantasy. If we want ‘to relate,’
then anima begone! Nothing disturbs more the accurate feeling be-
tween persons than anima. Even when her supposedly higher
forms (Diotima, Aphrodite-Urania, Maria, Sophia) enter a rela-
tionship, a queenly atmosphere oppresses, and her psychopompos
role is overshadowed with psychic pomposity.
39
40
FEELING/HILLMAN
Feeling as relationship is another kettle of fish. It refers to that

function which brings object and subject into an evaluative relat-
edness. | size you up; or an event is discriminated by my scale of
values into a particular shape (‘feel’) so that I recognize its impor-
tance relative to other events. “Relationship” here refers to a rela-
tively constant process of assessment and valuation going on
between consciousness and its content. By means of this process a
relationship is established between consciousness and this content
and among the contents themselves. (Thinking, also a rational
function, provides relationship as well. It too discriminates, or-
ders, and makes coherent connections among contents and be-
tween subject and object. Of course, it thinks these relationships in
accordance with principles of thought, rather than feels them as
values.)
The relatedness of George and Mary depends upon the specific
natures of George and Mary. Their relatedness reflects their living
process of feeling, and their relationship is unique to them. If their
relationship were anima-determined, it would become a reflection
less of them and more of an archetypal fantasy playing through
them. Then they become collective actors performing an uncon-
scious fantasy, i.e., lovers, quarrelers, cohorts, mother—son, fa-
ther—daughter, nurse-patient, etc. Even the feeling function is
usurped by the dominant fantasy. Then the specific complexity of
the relatedness between George and Mary has become upstaged by
an archetypal drama directed by the anima. Her purpose? To insist
that the human respect her wider, more fateful kind of inhuman
relatedness to impersonal factors that are archetypally prior even
to human feeling.
One impersonal factor is culture. We have already seen that ani-
ma “surrounds herself with a peculiar historical feeling” (CW 10,
§85). Her embeddedness in the history of a culture shapes human
feeling in conformity with ethnic values and national manners
(Jung’s “racial” unconscious —- CW 7, §434). Holding-hands and
reciting poems among Arab youths are (or were) expressions of af-
fection as correct as fighting among the Irish and keeping to one-
self among Nordics. Culture determines even Jung’s definition of
the feeling function (CW 6, 8723), for Jung refers mainly to late
nineteenth-century German writers for his notion of it. Moreover,
the authorities, whom he analyzes for determining his larger the-
41
42
FEELING/HILLMAN
ory of typology, are mainly Goethe, Nietzsche, Schiller, Spitteler,

Lipps, Worringer, Gross, etc. “Gefiihl ist alles,” said Goethe in re-
gard to Faust’s encounter with Gretchen, and perhaps this was a
Germanic anima speaking through him and then to Jung and now
to us, blurring distinctions between feeling and anima.
If Jung’s psychology reflects a Germanic anima, specifically it is
Germanic Romantic. Ellenberger lists several major characteristics
of Romanticism as they bear upon modern depth psychology.'? All
appear again and again in Jung’s notion of anima as well as being
basic to his psychology. First, “deep feeling for nature” and “specu-
lations of the philosophy of nature.” (Emma Jung entitled her
paper on anima Naturwesen.) Second, penetration to the Grund
which lies in the emotional soul (rather than reason), manifested
best in universal symbols, parapsychology, dreams, and madness.
Third, “the feeling for ‘becoming’. ... (which C. G. Jung was later
to call individuation)” and “a strong emphasis upon the notion of
the individual” whose perfectability is aided by the passions of
love. Fourth, empathic feeling into other cultures and their differ-
ences, available through the study of myths, folktales, etc. Fifth,
“a new feeling for history,” especially the Middle Ages (the period
of alchemy and Christian theology). According to Ellenberger,?°
even the term anima was partly influenced by the Romantic
historian and mythologist Bachofen of Basel.*!
By this turn to cultural history, I do not mean to reduce anima,
or Jung, to Romanticism. I want only to show the influence of that
specific anima, called Romantic, upon Jung’s entire enterprise. For
this enterprise is less concerned with society and family, science
and technology, city and politics, reason and wit, classics and arts
which an anima less romantic might well have inspired.
If anima is a cultural factor that shapes personal expression,
then work on anima does re-work the feeling function at its roots.
This helps to understand why changes in feeling are so slow: sim-
ply ‘to relate’ in a different style requires changes in our ancestors’
modes and values, our culture’s habits and tastes. We are working
at the roots, racines, race. Those unchanging residues after con-
version (Protestant to Catholic and vice versa), the adjustment
snarls in interracial marriages, the culture shock after emigration
from South to North (and v.v.) — these obduracies of feeling refer
more deeply to matters of soul, to anima as conservative ancestress
43
44
FEELING/HILLMAN
who roots our human feeling in her historical soil. And, when
human feeling departs at death and we join our ancestors, anima
as the p’o soul (see below, chapter four) is reabsorbed into the cul-
tural earth of one’s racial geography perhaps only slightly affected
by whatever courageous development of feeling has been achieved
by an individual personality.
Yet when we look at Jung’s drawings in the Red Book and the
first incursion of anima in his active imaginations as described in
his memoirs, it was neither Gretchen nor any Alpine or Rheinisch
Magd who appeared to him, but blind Salome, a pathologized
companion of a Gnostic sage (see below, chapter nine).
That is: there seems to be another impersonal factor in anima
which is individual, endogenous, and independent of the racial un-
conscious. She and her companions brought Jung an individual
fate and perhaps also a style of feeling. I mean by this his range of
Einfithlung across cultures, his ability to distance by relating im-
personally through ancient symbols, his fascination with and un-
derstanding of pathology, and, accompanying his wisdom, the
blindness of which he has been accused in crucial relations, evalua-
tions, and judgments (Helene, Sabina, Freud, National Socialism,
and his choice of pupils).
The appreciation of Jung’s feeling and his contribution to the
psychology of feeling as a function must start with anima as an an-
cestrally ethnic dominant on the one hand, and, on the other, as an
individually fateful constellation. Neither aspect, however, is hu-
man. Precisely this inhuman quality is her gift to feeling.
The muddling of anima and feeling contributes to that primrose
path in analytical psychotherapy which considers the cure of souls
to be an anima cultivation of a specific kind, i.e., feeling develop-
ment. But anima cultivation, or soul-making to use the wider idea,
is first of all a complex process of fantasying and understanding of
which only part is the sophistication of feeling. Besides, the feeling
that is developed through soul-making is perhaps more imperson-
al, a detailed sensitivity to the specific worth of psychic contents
and attitudes, than it is personal. This development does not pro-
ceed from the impersonal to the personal, related, and human.
Rather, the movement goes from the narrower embrace of my em-
pirical human world and its personal concerns toward archetypal
events that put my empirical, personal world in a more significant
45
46
FEELING/HILLMAN
frame. This frame is given, not by feeling or relatedness, but by the

anima whose mythologizing fantasy and reflective function remind
of life, fate, and death. She does not lead into human feeling but
out of it. As the function that relates conscious and unconscious,
she occludes conscious feeling, making it unconscious and making
the human, inhuman. She puts other things in mind than the hu-
man world. But should Dante and Petrarch today go into psycho-
therapy, would they not be told that Beatrice and Laura were
immature anima projections, unreal, regressive, revealing inferior-
ity of feeling and unrelatedness to woman and ‘the feminine’?
I, for one, have yet to be given convincing demonstration that in
dreams a lizard requires development into something warm-blood-
ed and a hyena into something more kindly, or that a little girl calls
for development into mature feelings, and an uncanny witch-like
woman or one impoverished or primitive is to be upgraded into the
human world through feeling and personal relationships.
In these instances, ironically, maybe even tragically, the actual
(anima?) images of lizard, little girl, and primitive slattern are not
given feelings or evaluated with feeling for themselves as they are.
Rather, in the name of feeling/anima development the actual im-
age is depotentiated. All the feeling goes to the development, to the
transformational progress of the images into something more hu-
man. It is as if the Christian myth of incarnation is continually be-
ing applied to the images of the anima, that all images must follow
the model of the inhuman becoming human (incarnating), and that
all psychic factors are to enter human relationships. Ridiculous, of
course. Yet, putting anima development into the path of feeling
development, as feeling is now humanistically understood, means
precisely the slaying of the animals, the daimones, and the Gods. It
means turning the sacred numinosum of an archetypal image into
something safe, sane, and secular. Analytical psychotherapy, so
bent upon humanizing the images and developing archetypal real-
ities into relationships, is not only caught in Darwinism but also in
the simplest sort of secularism where man is the measure and the
Gods aberrations. But did not the Gods always have an aberrant
and distorted aspect; were they not always strange forms in animal
shapes, grotesque, bizarre, awe-full? Who says they must have
warm blood or have human blood at all.
The dream child and the anima child (an anima-girl from child-
47
JUNG/SCRIPTA
es
ae
(a) We think we can congratulate ourselves on having already reached

such a pinnacle of clarity, imagining that we have left all these
phantasmal gods far behind. But what we have left behind are only
verbal spectres, not the psychic facts that were responsible for the
birth of the gods. We are still as much possessed by autonomous
psychic contents as if they were Olympians. Today they are called
phobias, obsessions, and so forth; in a word, neurotic symptoms.
The gods have become diseases. .. . Cw 13,854
48
FEELING/HILLMAN
hood, the thought of whom can still catch one’s breath) do not
necessarily signify undeveloped feelings. They may also be the
gateways to the elfin world, or they may awaken nostalgic pothos,
that yearning for intimacy with ‘earlier’ times and the first home.
The archetypal child whom mythologists, and Jung, call Divine
leaves its radiance on every undeveloped trait. Hence these traits
are so difficult to renounce in the name of maturity. This peculiar
radiance pulls us not only regressively to the childish and inferior,
for it is also childlike and superb. We must be careful how we
touch the ‘immature.’ Development as adaptive normalcy to the
real world can be psychic child abuse, resulting in an imagination
without access to its Real world.
To read the psyche’s inhuman images as signals for feeling de-
velopment leads right into the “humanistic fallacy,” the belief that
psyche is a function of the human being and is meant to serve the
human life, its images humanized. I still see the connection be-
tween man and soul the other way around, as in the main Platonic
tradition where man is a function of psyche and his job is to serve
it. The therapist of psyche, which in root means “soul-servant,”
translates human events into the language of the psyche, rather
than the psyche into the language of humanism.
At the front of therapy’s secular humanism flies the banner of
feeling. Where the Church and then psychoanalysis did not quite
drive out the devils, ‘personal relatedness in a human context’ will
finally do the job. The anima will become socially presentable,
adapted. But if, as Jung says, “the Gods have become diseases,”#
then curing the soul of its unrelated, inhuman images may also
cure it of its Gods. The confusion of anima with feeling, and the
attempt to humanize by feeling, is thus not psychotherapy at all.
Rather it is part of contemporary secularism’s sickness of soul, or
psychopathology. We have yet to discover which archetypal per-
son has captured consciousness through the sentimental appeal of
humanism and feeling. At least we know it is not Eros, who pre-
fers the dark and silence to ‘relatedness,’ ‘communicating,’ and
‘sharing.’ Yet some archetypal power does influence therapy by in-
terpreting the psychic movement of our images and their animal-
daimonic forms into social relations and personal connections and
by raising such guilt over ‘unrelatedness.’ I suspect Hera, especially
in her ‘young-married’ form of Hebe.
49
TUNG/S
CR UP TA
ee Ee eee
The anima is the archetype of the feminine and plays a very impor-
tant role in a man’s unconscious. CW 5, §406n142
... the feminine figure of the anima . . . requires a different evalua-

tion and position. ... [A] personalistic interpretation always re-
duces her to the personal mother or some other female person. The
real meaning of the figure naturally gets lost in the process... .
[S]he is more or less immortal, because outside time.
... [T]he archetypes .. . are unconsciously projected upon more
or less suitable human personalities. CW 9,i, §§356—57
When projected, the anima always has a feminine form with def-
inite characteristics. This empirical finding does not mean that the
archetype is constituted like that in itself. CW 9,i, §142
. . aman’s consciousness projects all perceptions coming from the

feminine personification of the unconscious onto an anima figure,
i.e., areal woman.... Cw 10, 8714
We encounter the anima historically above all in the divine syzy-

gies, the male-female pairs of deities. These reach down ... into
. Classical Chinese philosophy, where the cosmogonic pair of
concepts are designated yang (masculine) and yin (feminine).
CW 9,1, 8120
In Eastern symbolism the square . . . has the character of the yoni:

femininity. A man’s unconscious is likewise feminine and is person-
ified by the anima. CW 12, §192
. the heavenly bride ... is a typical anima projection....

Spitteler also likens the “Lady Soul” to a tiger. (In China, the tiger
is a symbol of yin.) CW 13, §460 (and n14)
50
THE FEMININE/HILLMAN
4. Anima and The Feminine
We NOW come to two definitions which put in question

anima as image of man’s contrasexual genetic structure and experi-
ence. Jung calls anima “the archetype of the feminine”? and “the
archetype of life.” He further draws analogies between anima and
yin> and the Chinese p’o soul; between anima and the Indian
JUNG/SCRIPTA
ee
The spiritual man was seduced into putting on the body, and was
bound to it by “Pandora, whom the Hebrews call Eve.” She played
the part, therefore, of the anima .. . just as Shakti or Maya entan-
gles man’s consciousness with the world. CW 13, §126
... the deceptive Shakti, must return to the watery realm if the
work is to reach its goal. She should no longer dance before the
adept with alluring gestures, but must become what she was from
the beginning: a part of his wholeness. (The anima is thereby
forced into the inner world. .. .) CW 13, §223 (and n15)
He will learn to know his soul, that is, his anima and Shakti who
conjures up a delusory world for him. CW 14, §673
What, then, is this projection-making factor? The East calls it the

“Spinning Woman” -— Maya, who creates illusion by her danc-
ing. (I have defined the anima as a personification of the uncon-
SCiOuS. ) CW 9, ii, §20 (and n1)
... She is the great illusionist, the seductress, who draws him into
life with her Maya....
... T have suggested ... the term “anima”...
CW 9,11, 8824-25
es As a psychopomp she [Sophia] leads the way to God and assures

immortality. CW 11, §613
Looked at theologically, my concept of the anima ... is pure

Gnosticism... . CW 11, §460
The emotional state of Sophia sunk in unconsciousness ... , her

formlessness, and the possibility of her getting lost in the darkness
characterize very clearly the anima of a man who identifies himself
absolutely with his reason and his spirituality. CW 13, §454
eeeeet ee A
52
ideas of Maya and Shakti; and he relates anima to the Gnostic

Sophia (wisdom) (see index to Cw 11 and cw 14, but especially
CW 11, 8613 where the description of Sophia as psychopomp has
rich ‘anima characteristics, and CW 11, §460, where anima is
called “pure Gnosticism”).
At this level we can hardly attribute anima to the male sex only.
The “feminine” and “life” as well as the Chinese, Indian, and
Gnostic analogies to anima are relevant to men and women equal-
lv. We are now at an archetypal level of anima, the “feminine ar-
chetypal image” (CW 9, ii, §41n5), and an archetype as such cannot
be attributed to or located within the psyche of either sex. We may
take this yet one step further, for we cannot be sure that the arche-
types are only psychic, belonging only to the realm of psyche, un-
less we extend psyche first beyond sexual differences, then beyond
the human person and psychodynamics (compensation), and be-
yond psychology too. Jung already made this extension in his
notion of the archetype as psychoid, stating that “the archetypes,
JUNG/SCRIPTA
ee a RS A ET
the archetypes are not found exclusively in the psychic

spherégu sn CW 8, §964
Although there is no form of existence that is not mediated to us

psychically .. . it would hardly do to say that everything is merely
psychic. We must apply this argument logically to the archetypes
as well. Cw 8, §420
There are certain types of women who seem to be made by nature

to attract anima projections; indeed one could almost speak of a
definite “anima type.” The so-called “sphinx-like” character is an
indispensable part of their equipment, also an equivocalness, an
intriguing elusiveness . . . an indefiniteness that seems full of prom-
ises, like the speaking silence of a Mona Lisa. Cw 17, §339
I have seen Mrs. X. and I assure you she is quite an eyeful and be-
yond! ... If ever there was an anima it is she....
21 September 1951, Letter to Father Victor White
The “maiden” corresponds to the anima of the man.... But as

long as a woman is content to be a femme a homme, she has no
feminine individuality. She is empty and merely glitters — a wel-
come vessel for masculine projections. GW: 9:1, $355
If a mother-complex in a woman does not produce an overdevel-

oped Eros, it leads to identification with the mother and to paral-
ysis of the daughter’s feminine initiative. . .. These bloodless maid-
ens. ... are so empty that a man is free to impute to them anything
he fancies. In addition, they are so unconscious that the uncon-
scious puts out countless invisible feelers, veritable octopus-tenta-
cles, that suck up all masculine projections; and this pleases men
enormously. CW 9,i, §169
54
therefore have a nature that cannot with certainty be designated as

psychic” (CW 8, §439).* An adequate notion of anima thus requires
that one look beyond men and beyond man, and even beyond psy-
che. But a metaphysics or metapsychics of the anima is not our di-
rection here. Rather, it is to realize that anima, as archetype, is too
wide to be contained by the notion of contrasexuality (chapter
one). Anima, released from this containing definition, bears upon
the psyche of women too.
According to the first notion (contrasexuality), there is no anima
in women. “The anima, being of feminine gender, is exclusively a
figure that compensates the masculine consciousness” (CW 7,
§328). “(T]he same figure is not to be found in the imagery of a
woman’s unconscious” (CW 11, §48). In accordance with the yoke
of opposites women have the animus instead.
But what of “anima women,” those women who play the anima
for men and are called in analytical psychology “anima types.”>
Jung says that such women can best play this anima part by being
empty themselves. They therefore catch the projections of men,
mirroring and mimicking them, so that a man’s inner woman is
lived out by an anima type.
JUNG/SCRIPTA
ES
(a) The anima is indeed the archetype of life itself... . CW 14, §646
... the anima, who expresses life... Cw 14, §313
... the anima is the archetype of life itself. CW 9,i, 866
(b) ... now a good fairy, now a witch; now a saint, now a whore....
the anima also has “occult” connections with “mysteries”. . . . [S]he
is more or less immortal, because outside time....|T]he anima...
belongs to a different order of things. CW 9,1, §356
The anima also has affinities with animals, which symbolize her
characteristics. Thus she can appear as a snake or a tiger or a bird.
CW 9,1, §358
56
For, besides the romantic idealizations of anima, she can also be
tawdry, trite, trivial, barren, and cheap. And men can spend
hours, years, in nothingness with a silly ‘anima-type,’ fluff and
prattle. Seven years Ulysses passed in Calypso’s cavernous empti-
ness. Why? What for? Hedonism? Incarnation into the flesh? Or is
it to rescue and transform the woman, like Orpheus seeking to
bring Eurydice to the upper light? Rather, this ‘anima-type’ pre-
sents us with an archetypal condition of soul that is drowsily nym-
phic, neither asleep nor awake, neither self-sustainingly virginal
nor faithfully conjoined, lost and empty, a tabula rasa. Perhaps
Eurydice wants to remain marginal, a shade insubstantial, and
therefore the long years of escapes to dark bars and motel contra-
ceptions, the mute waste in a limbo without light and without
depth are a style of anima fascinations in which the absence of sig-
nificance is precisely the significance. Anima, as archetype of life,?
can be utterly devoid of meaning. Hence, she constellates the
search for the wise old Man, archetype of meaning.
Here again I believe we have an instance of our psychic premises
being determined by an archetypal figure so that we see that which
is already given in the premise. We call these women anima types
and we connect them with the ancient figure of the hetaera; yet
because of theory (no anima in women), we assume that the anima
archetype can affect a woman’s life only through men and their
fatuous projections.
Let us look at this more closely. The roles which Jung assigns to
the anima? — relation with the mysteries, with the archaic past,
enactment of the good fairy, witch, whore, saint, and animal asso-
ciations with bird, tiger, and serpent (to mention only those he
there mentions) — all appear frequently and validly in the psychol-
ogy of women. Anima phenomenology is not restricted to the male
sex. Women have little girls in their dreams, and whores; they too
are lured by mysterious and unknown women. The Saint, Sappho,
and Sleeping Beauty are part of their inscapes too. And as the im-
ages are not restricted to men only, so gnima emotion cannot be
confined only to the male sex. Women too bear an expectancy, an
interiority that is opposed to their outer persona actions. They too
lose touch and may be drawn away to meditate their fate, their
death, their immortality. They too sense soul and suffer its mystery
ny!
JUNG/SCRIPTA
Ce es
(a) ... I have reserved the term “animus” strictly for women....
Feminine psychology exhibits an element that is the counterpart of
a man’s anima. CW 13, §60
. a man in trying to attain his ideal of manhood represses all

feminine traits — which are really part of him, just as masculine
traits are part of a woman’s psychology.... If we carefully exam-
ine the uncontrolled emotions of a man ... we soon arrive at a
feminine figure which I call... the anima. On the same ground the
ancients conceived of a feminine soul, a “psyche” or “anima”... .
CW 10, 879
58
and confusion. We say of a woman “she has soul,” and we mean

much the same as when we say this of a man.
Women are as salty in their weeping and resentments, as bitchy
in their gossip, as abysmal in their dour brooding as men. The in-
tensifications, exaggerations, and mythologizings that belong to
the description of anima do appear in women and may not be as-
cribed to her unconscious feminine personality, the woman within,
or attributed to a minority of female genes. Here the anima, arche-
type of life and archetype of the feminine, influences the psychic
process regardless of sex, and we are freed from the mascu-
line-feminine fantasy of anima, from the endless oscillations of
compensation, and also from the epistemological deceit of expla-
nations through “projection.”
Why do we call the same behavior in one sex “anima” and in the
other “naturally feminine” or “shadow”? What effect does this
have on the psychological differences between the sexes, if the
same image in a man and a woman is in his case ennobled as a
soul-image (anima) while in hers it is part of the realm of shadow?
By depriving by definition women of anima — “Woman has no ani-
ma, no soul, but she has an animus” (CW 17, §338)4 — is not analy-
tical psychology willy-nilly continuing a very ancient tradition of
denying woman soul and casting the images of this soul into shad-
ow? This is to doubt neither the reality of her shadow nor the
pressing spiritual question in woman that is figured by animus.
But I do doubt that woman’s psychological development means
animus development, for this is an erosion of the categories of
psyche and spirit. Animus refers to spirit, to logos, word, idea, in-
tellect, principle, abstraction, meaning, ratio, nous. The discrimi-
nation of spirit is not at all of the same order as the cultivation of
soul. If the first is active mind in its broadest sense, the second is
the realm of the imaginal, equally embracing, but very different.
The assumption has been that because women are of the femi-
nine gender they have soul — or rather are soul. As long as soul and
femininity are an identity, then of course the soul problem of
women is taken care of, again by definition, and by biology.
(Freud, in his lecture on femininity, found himself in the same di-
lemma which he casts onto women as theirs: “You too will have
pondered over this question [the nature of femininity] in so far as
you are men; from the women among you that is not to be expect-
ee)
ete
: os 4 Bheey pr?”
Pe m
60
ed, for you are the riddle yourselves.”)?2 But psyche, the sense of
soul, is not given to woman just because she is born female. She is
no more blessed with a congenitally saved soul than man who
must pass his life in worry over its fate. She is no more exonerated
from the tasks of anima cultivation than man; for her to neglect
soul for the sake of spirit is no less psychologically reprehensible
than it is in man who is ever being told by analytical psychology
that he must sacrifice intellect, persona, and extraversion for the
sake of soul, feeling, inwardness, i.e., anima.
The immense difficulty which some women have with imagina-
tion and the torment some go through in regard to a sense of inner
emptiness both point to soul as area of their need. No less than
men, women need fantasy, mythologizings in which they can read
themselves and discover fate. To find a sense of worth, confidence
as a person, or “psychological faith” as Grinnell?3 has called it, is
as much a need of woman as of man. The hokey substitutes for
soul, the anima sentimentalities and anima inflations, are found
equally in both sexes; women’s attempts at depth, inwardness,
sensitivity, and wisdom are as prey to pseudo-soul as those of men.
In women perhaps pseudo-soul is even more evident, for in the
absence of anima, animus fills the gap, a transvestite travesty.
Animus is given with the civilization, and its psychic representa-
tion which we foreshorten into the notion of ego is, as Neumann?4
pointed out, masculine in women too. Ego’s archetype is the Hero,
and so its underside in women too will show the soulful qualities
of anima. The neglected area is not animus but anima.
An animus development with which anima does not keep pace
will lead a woman away from psychological understanding. This
occurs by drying her fantasy, narrowing her range of mood and in-
volvement with life, turning her into at best a spiritual paragon
and a psychological dunce, her wisdom, her concern, her counsel
all being developed opinion, detached, rather than soul reflection
in the midst of her attachments — and this we see even where the
preferred field of animus development be psychology itself. The
domain of psychology does not guarantee that its inhabitants are
particularly psychological. The shingle over the door, “psychol-
ogist,” unfortunately attests to nothing about the soul of the prac-
titioner. And if the practitioner be a woman, then the epithet
“psychologist” even more certainly has nothing to do with soul,
61
JUNG/SCRIPTA
he
eeea a SS
(a) But as long as a woman is content to be a femme a homme, she has

no feminine individuality. She is empty and merely glitters — a wel-
come vessel for masculine projections. CW 9,i, §355
(b) ... the Kore often appears in woman as an unknown young girl,
not infrequently as Gretchen or the unmarried mother. . . . [or] the
dancer, ... the corybant, maenad, or nymph.
CW 9,1, 8311
62
since the (animus) developmental process which led to the title has
been by definition one of spirit, not of soul. To state this implies
nothing against the development of logos or against respect for
ideas in women, but as spirit is not soul, so animus is not anima,
and neither can be neglected nor substituted for the other. The
syzygy means both.
The power of our theoretical notions cannot be overestimated.
By our denying woman anima and giving her animus instead, an
entire archetypal pattern has been determined for women’s psy-
chology. The per definitionem absence of anima in women is a
deprivation of a cosmic principle with no less consequence in the
practice of analytical psychology than has been the theory of penis
deprivation in the practice of psychoanalysis.
While raising this doubt about the animus, I would as well raise
a hope that the typically anima constellations in a woman’s psyche
be treated as such, and no longer as shadow simply because these
manifestations are feminine. This in turn would lead to a more
precisely refined notion of shadow, perhaps keeping it reserved for
the morally repressed. Whenever it comes to a choice between sav-
ing the theory and saving the phenomena, the history of thought
shows that it profits more to side with the phenomena, even if for a
while theory is dislocated and some things we had considered clear
fall back into a new obscurity.
Returning now to the emptiness of the anima-type woman, we
may remember that hitherto her relationship to the anima arche-
type has had by definition to come through a man. But now we
may no longer regard her psychology in this way. The emptiness is
no mere void for catching a projection from the opposite sex. Nor
may we account for this emptiness through the notions of an un-
conscious shadow or an undeveloped animus. To derive it from a
father-complex again puts the origin onto man, leaving the woman
only a daughter, only an object created by projection, an Eve born
out of Adam’s sleep, without independent soul, fate, and individu-
ality.?
Rather this emptiness would be considered an authentic arche-
typal manifestation of the anima in one of her classical forms,
maiden, nymph, Kore, which Jung so well describes,” and hee
he also states that “she often appears in woman.” Even should we
63
JUNG/SCRIPTA
a_____________ El
Se
Melusina comes into the same category as the nymphs and sirens
who dwell in the “Nymphidida,” the watery realm.... [T]he
birthplace of Melusina is the womb of the mysteries, obviously
what we today would call the unconscious. . . . Melusina is clearly
an anima figure. Cw 13, §180
... Melusina, the water-nixie, . . . [can] change herself into human

form. Dorn thinks of this as a “vision appearing in the mind” and
not as a projection on a real woman....
... The anima belongs to those borderline phenomena which
chiefly occur in special psychic situations.... One is confronted
with a hopeless and impenetrable darkness, an abysmal void that is
now suddenly filled with an alluring vision, the palpably real pres-
ence of a strange yet helpful being. ...
This peculiarity of the anima is found ... in the Melusina leg-
end: 3." CW 13, §§215-17
Mythologically, nymphs, dryads, etc. are nature- and tree-num-

ina, but psychologically they are anima projections. ...
CW 14, §70
ae When projected, the anima always has a feminine form with defi-
nite characteristics. This empirical finding does not mean that the
archetype is constituted like that in itself. CW 9,i, 8142
64
relate this maiden to the daughter, it may remain within the anima
constellation. There is no need to search outside for origins in a fa-
ther.
We all know that fathers create daughters; but daughters create
fathers too. The enactment of the maiden-daughter in all her re-
ceptive charm, shy availability, and masochistic wiliness draws
down a fathering spirit. But its appearance and her victimization
are her creation. Even the idea that she is all a result of the father
(or the absent or bad father) is part of the father-fantasy of the ani-
ma archetype. And so, she must be ‘so attached’ to father because
anima is reflection of an attachment. She creates the figurative
father and the belief in its responsibility which serves to confirm
the archetypal metaphor of Daughter that owes its source, not to
the father, but to the anima inherent in a woman’s psyche, too.
Moreover, the muse, to whom the nymph has a special connec-
tion and toward whom her consciousness is intending, if we follow
W.F. Otto,?> belongs also authentically to the potential of
women’s psychology in its own right and is not only in reflection to
men. It is not man’s anima, and so it is not a man’s inner life that
the nymph, hetaera, or muse is reflecting but anima as archetype,
which by other names is psyche or soul.
At this level of distinction Jung himself raises a doubt whether
we can truly speak of the anima per se as feminine. He suggests
that we may have to confine the archetype’s femininity to its pro-
jected form.> Paradoxically, the very archetype of the feminine
may not itself be feminine. (Cf. 8 June 1959, Letter to Traugott
Egloff: “The androgyny of the anima may appear in the anima her-
self... .”) One could raise a similar doubt about the “femininity”
of life of which anima is the archetype.
65
JUNG/SCRIPTA
LL
... [in] classical Chinese philosophy ... the anima (p’o or kuez?) is
regarded as the feminine and chthonic part of the soul.
CWO i ehh
... Lused the term “anima” in a way quite analogous to the Chi-
nese definition of p’o.... [T]he affective character of a man has
feminine traits. From this psychological fact derives the Chinese
doctrine of the p’o soul as well as my own concept of the anima.
CW 13, 858
“Anima,” called p’o, and written with the characters for “white”
and “demon,” that is, “white ghost,” belongs to the lower, earth-
bound, bodily soul, the yin principle, and is therefore feminine.
CW 23.557
... the anima is the archetype of life itself. CW 9,i, §66
Being that has soul is living being. Soul is the living thing in man,
that which lives of itself and causes life... . With her cunning play
of illusions the soul lures into life the inertness of matter that does
not want to live. She makes us believe incredible things, that life
may be lived. She is full of snares and traps, in order that man
should fall, should reach the earth, entangle himself there, and
stay caught.... CW 9,i, §56
66
The contentless asexual description of the anima archetype as

“life,” analogous with Maya, Shakti, Sophia, and the p’o soul,?
points to a specific kind of life, life which projects out of itself con-
sciousness. In other words, the life which Jung attributes to the
anima archetype is psychic life: “The anima. . . . is a ‘factor’ in the
proper sense of the word. Man cannot make it; on the contrary, it
is always the a priori element in his moods, reactions, impulses,
and whatever else is spontaneous in psychic life. It is something
that lives of itself, that makes us live; it is a life behind conscious-
ness that cannot be completely integrated with it, but from which,
on the contrary, consciousness arises” (CW 9,i, §57).
JUNG/SCRIPTA
ee
(a) In the case of an anima-possession, for instance, the patient will

want to change himself into a woman through self-castration, or
he is afraid that something of the sort will be done to him by force.
The best-known example of this is Schreber’s Memoirs of My Ner-
vous Illness. Patients often discover a whole anima mythology
with numerous archaic motifs. CW 9,i, §82
The psoriasis of the anima figure is due to certain contents which

the anima has within her, as though in the blood, and which sweat
out on the surface. This is also indicated by the snakelike patterns
of the psoriasis. It is a kind of painting that appears on the skin.
Very often this points to the need to portray certain contents or
states graphically, and in colour.... This “art” activity.... these
works of the anima are products of the feminine mind in a man.
The feminine mind is pictorial and symbolic and comes close to
what the ancients called Sophia.
22 March 1935, Letter to Dr. S.
68
To consider anima as the life behind consciousness from which

consciousness arises deepens our understanding of her strange ex-
pressions in images, emotions, and symptoms. She projects herself
into consciousness through expression; expression is her art,
whether in the extraordinary artfulness of symptom formation and
clinical ‘picture’* or the artifices of anima bewitchments. And the
wisdom that Sophia imparts is seeing sophically into these expres-
sions, seeing the art in the symptom.»
Anima here is not a projection but is the projector. And our con-
sciousness is the result of her prior psychic life. Anima thus be-
comes the primordial carrier of psyche, or the archetype of psyche
itself.
69
JUNG/SCRIPTA
ce ES
Anima means soul. ... [T]he soul is the magic breath of life (hence
the term “anima”).... CW 9,i, 855
But I should be carrying brevity too far if I described the anima

merely as a primordial image of woman consisting of irrational
feelings, and the animus merely as a primordial image of man
consisting of irrational views. Both figures present . . . elementary
forms of that psychic phenomenon which from primitive times has
been called “soul.” They are also the cause of that deep human
need to speak of souls or daemons at all. CW 10, §82
... the queen and the king are one, in the sense that body and soul
or spirit and soul are one.... the queen corresponds to the soul
(anima).... CW 14, §536 (cf. CW 10, §243; Cw 13, §168n62)
The archaic souls, the ba and ka of the Egyptians, are complexes

of this kind. At a still higher level, . . . this complex is invariably of
the feminine gender — anima.... CW 7, §295
SS Anima means soul and should designate something very wonderful

and immortal. Yet this was not always so. We should not forget
that this kind of soul is a dogmatic conception whose purpose it is
to pin down and capture something uncannily alive and active.
CW 934, 9529
Here I would like to guard against a misunderstanding. The con-

cept of “soul” which I am now using can be compared more with
the primitive idea of the soul . . . than with the Christian idea of it,
which is an attempt to make a philosophical construct.... My
conception of the soul has absolutely nothing to do with this. ...
CW 10, §84 (cf. CW 7, §§302, 371)
70
PSYCHE/HILLMAN
5. Anima and Psyche
We ARE led to another consideration: the relation of anima

to psyche itself. In many places* Jung uses anima and soul inter-
changeably. Nevertheless, he applies his main effort to the difficult
task of keeping distinct the three terms — anima, soul, psyche.
From one side he differentiates anima from soul, saying, “I have
suggested instead the term ‘anima,’ as indicating something spe-
cific, for which the expression ‘soul’ is too general and too vague”
(CW 9,ii, §25). He wants to make sure that his concept, ‘anima,’ is
not confused with the traditional ideas of soul in religion and phi-
losophy.> From another side he also wants to define anima so that
it does not refer to psyche, of which it is only one archetype. Nei-
ther soul nor anima can be identified with the “totality of the psy-
chic functions” (CW 6, §420). For this totality the term “self” is
71
JUNG/SCRIPTA
SS
ee
[In the German text the word Anima is used only twice....
Everywhere else the word used is Seele (soul). In this translation
anima is substituted for “soul” when it refers specifically to the
feminine component in a man.... “Soul” is retained only when it
refers to the psychic factor common to both sexes. The distinction
is not always easy to make....| CW 6, §803n80
[... there is no consistent equivalent of Seele in English.... in

the essay “Spirit and Life,” ... “soul” would give entirely the
wrong meaning. It has therefore been translated . . . either as “psy-
che” or as “mind”.... [There is] an increasing tendency to re-
place the concept Seele by Psyche, until, in “The Real and the Sur-
real” (1933), Psyche alone occupies the field.] Cw 8, p. 300
[The translation of ... Seele presents almost insuperable diffi-

culties ... because it combines the two words “psyche” and
“soul 7a.
... either Psyche or Seele — has been used with reference to the
totality of all psychic processes. ... “Soul,” on the other hand, ...
is more restricted in meaning and refers to a “function complex” or
partial personality... It is often applied specifically to “anima”
and “animus”... .] CW 12, §9n2
Tes
PSYCHE/HILLMAN
generally reserved. (For more on these differentiations see the

editors’ and translator’s notes.)*
In another context?* I attempted to separate some of the threads
in the nexus ‘anima,’ ‘psyche,’ ‘soul.’ I suggested there that the
moods and behavior peculiar to what analytical psychology calls
anima are best seen against the archetypal background of Psyche in
Apuleius’s tale and that, therefore, this anima behavior was pre-
cisely where to look for the emergence of psyche. My point there
was to show phenomenologically that what starts out as mere
anima moods and fantasies becomes psychological ambiguity, that
is, receptivity, containment and imagination, so that the way to
psychological understanding is through anima. My point here is to
show conceptually that the process of anima becoming psyche can
be deduced from Jung’s notion of anima itself. In fact, I think a
case can be made for another definition of anima: archetype of
psyche. Although this definition does not directly appear in Jung,
it can be derived from Jung in the following ways:
>
i
73
JUNG/SCRIPTA
a
... Prakrti dancing before Purusha in order to remind him of “dis-

criminating knowledge,” does not belong to the mother archetype
but to the archetype of the anima.... CW 9,i, §158
Nor is she [the anima] a substitute figure for the mother.

CW 9,ii, §26
We may ... assume that the transferring of the water of life to the
sister really means that the mother has been replaced by the anima.
CW 125892
. the anima appears equally as maiden and mother, which is

why a personalistic interpretation always reduces her to the per-
sonal mother or some other female person. The real meaning of
the figure naturally gets lost in the process... . CW 9,i, 8356
74
PSYCHE/HILLMAN
a) Jung associates a host of feminine forms with anima; but one

in particular he generally keeps outside its confines. This is the
mother. “The most striking feature about the anima-type is that
the maternal element is lacking.”* The anima makes possible a
“purely human relationship” independent of the maternal element
of procreation?” (CW 10, §76). Anima thus represents the move-
ment into adulthood and the “growth away from nature” (ibid.).
In alchemy the growth away from nature is spoken of as the
opus contra naturam, a key concept for the psychological, in dis-
tinction to the naturalistic, understanding of psychic events. The
movement from mother to anima represents this shift in perspec-
tive from naturalistic to psychological understanding. In alchemy
the relationship corresponding with the psychological perspective
was exemplified in the adept’s relationship with an anima-soror.
The psychological approach essential to alchemy required anima,
so that she becomes the archetypal premise of psychological work.
a
JUNG/SCRIPTA
... two empirically very common archetypes, namely the anima

and the Wise Old Man, flow together in the symbolic phenome-
nology of Mercurius. CW 12, §218
... Mercurius is the anima mundi. CW 9, ii, §212
Soul, from Old German saiwalé, may be cognate with alddos,

‘quick-moving, changeful of hue, shifting.’ It also has the meaning
of ‘wily’ or ‘shifty’; hence an air of probability attaches to the al-
chemical definition of anima as Mercurius. CW 9,i, §391n5
Mercurius is often designated as anima....

... Very much more material is the definition of Mercurius as a
“life-giving power like a glue, holding the world together and
standing in the middle between body and spirit.” This concept cor-
responds to... Mercurius as the anima media natura. From here it
is but a step to the identification of Mercurius with the anima
mundi.... CW 13, §§262-63
As the anima mundi, Mercurius can in fact be compared with the

Gnostic ... (virgin of light) and with the Christian Virgin
Mary.... CW 12, §506
... outwardly Mercurius corresponds to quicksilver but inwardly

heis...ananima mundi.... CW 14, 8699
(b) I have defined the anima as a personification of the unconscious.

CW 9, ii, 820n1
... the unconscious is often personified by the anima. ...

CW 11, 8107
... the anima ... represents the collective unconscious.

CW 14, 8128
76
PSYCHE/HILLMAN
b) In a series of passages Jung demonstrates the identity of ani-

ma and Mercurius.* Mercurius receives various anima and soul
names; and, as Mercurius is called (Cw 13, §299) “the archetype of
the unconscious,” so the anima is the archetype who “personifies
the collective unconscious” (CW 10, §714).>
Mercurius and anima have similarly shifty, flighty, iridescent,
hard-to-catch, hard-to-fathom natures, a quality imaged by quick-
silver in Mercurius and by the anima as elf and Melusine, and by
the shimmering wings of psyché. Their similarity does not make
them one in all respects, but it does help substantiate the idea that
the special significance of anima is psychic, since Mercurius is the
representation par excellence of psychic nature. (I believe their
identity is more pronounced when soul and spirit have not been
discriminated; then anima is exaggeratedly mercurial, less the con-
tainer than seductively elusive — all over the place — and then the
spirit is predominately moist, vaporous, and in a soulful flux of
uncertainties. It is in this condition when soul and spirit are con-
founded that the spirit is garbed in white, her color [the albedo,
anima candida], and soul appears dressed by his blue or his red.
Some of the ‘puella’ phenomena in young women express this mix-
ture of spirit and soul: an unfixed mercurial spirit that acts as
fascinating spark in a soul innocent of what it contains.)
Ti.
JUNG/SCRIPTA
ee
... the queen and the king are one, in the sense that body and soul
or spirit and soul are one.... the queen corresponds to the soul
(anima) and the king to spirit... . the secret of the work was some-
times called the “Reginae Mysteria.” CW 14, §536
. .. our picture represents the union of the spirit with material real-
ity.... [T]he spirit of the gold, [is] only the right half of the
king.... The queen is a sulphur, ... a chthonic spirit.... [T]he
self or imago Dei ... is here united with its chthonic counterpart.
... [T]his is personified in the psychological anima figure....
[T]he alchemical queen ... corresponds to the psychological
anima. CW 14, §736
[For Richard White] ... The human soul is “androgynous,” “be-

cause a girl has a masculine and a man a feminine soul.” ... [He]
adds ... the soul is also called an “old woman”....
... [H]e writes that the soul is an idea “of such great power that
she creates the forms and things themselves,” also “she has within
herself the ‘selfness’ of all mankind.” She transcends all individual
differences. ... It should be noted that he describes this soul quite
differently from the way it would be described by a biological or
personalistic psychology today.... CW 14, §§92-93
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PSYCHE/HILLMAN
c) But the basic alchemical cluster of ideas associated with anima

is that of Luna and Regina and their many other names for the one
component of the arcane pair. This component, which, following
Jung,* we abbreviate here by Regina, is regarded alchemically in
one conjunction to be the counterpart of body, while in another
conjunction she becomes the counterpart of spirit. Jung lets Regina
stand equally for the feminine, for eros, for soul, the unconscious,
the anima, and for the psyche. That is to say, in these alchemical
syzygies Regina means psyche itself when psyche is imagined to be
different from body or different from spirit.
We should note here that Jung employs the term psyche in two
senses. In the narrower and traditional usage, psyche is the soul
component of the conjunction. It is in this sense that psyche is phe-
nomenologically and terminologically indistinguishable from ani-
ma. In the broader usage, and one rather specific to Jung, psyche
means more than a component and therefore cannot be equated
with the anima archetype. Psyche in this sense means all the proc-
esses depicted in alchemy, including body, spirit, sun and moon,
mercurius, etc. They are each psychological; they are all taking
place in the psyche. Anima would only be one of these factors.
This sort of extended notion of soul appears in alchemy, e.g.,
the soul described by Richard White> which, Jung points out, dif-
fers extremely from the idea of psyche in “biological and person-
alistic psychology.” This soul is at once the personified anima
figured in a female form and the reflective psychological principle.
As Jung notes, she joins in one the distinction between the wider
notion of soul (anima mundi) and the narrower one (anima vag-
ula). This distinction between soul and the soul or my soul did not
bother the alchemists, and it was a distinction upon which Neo-
platonism refused to insist, for Plotinus was able to discuss psy-
chology on both levels at once: what takes place in psyche of
course takes place in man’s soul. Archetypal psychology is of
course reflected within an individual psyche. Jung sometimes con-
curs, saying for instance (CW 16, 8469), “it often seems advisable
to speak less of my anima or my animus and more of the anima
and the animus. As archetypes, these figures are semi-collective
and impersonal quantities. . . .” He also regrets (CW 11, §759) that:
“Man himself has ceased to be the microcosm and eidolon of the
cosmos, and his ‘anima’ is no longer the consubstantial scintilla, or
a
JUNG/SCRIPTA
|a SS a
(a) ... when anima forfeits the daemonic power of an autonomous

complex ... she is depotentiated.... no longer is the soul to be
called “Mistress,” but a psychological function of an intuitive na-
ture, akin to what the primitives mean when they say, “He has
gone into the forest to talk with the spirits” or “My snake spoke
with me”.... CW 7, §374
(b) The soul functions ... in the body, but has the greater part of its
function .. . outside the body.... CW 12, §396
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PSYCHE/HILLMAN
spark of the Anima Mundi, the World Soul.” Because we take the
anima personalistically, or she dupes the ego this way, we lose the
wider significance of anima. This loss of soul goes on even while
we are most engaged in the attempt to gain it: “developing my
anima” through relatedness, creativity, and individuation.
Unless we understand the “within” in a radically new way —- or
classically old way — we go on perpetuating the division between
my anima and world soul (objective psyche). The more we concen-
trate her inside and literalize interiority within my person, the
more we lose the sense of soul as a psychic reality interiorly within
all things. Anima within is not merely within my breast; introjec-
tion and internalization do not mean making my head or my skin
the vessel inside of which all psychic processes take place. The
“within” refers to that attitude given by the anima which perceives
psychic life within natural life. Natural life itself becomes the vessel
the moment we recognize its having an interior significance, the
moment we see that it too bears and carries psyche. Anima makes
vessels everywhere, anywhere, by going within.*
The means of doing this is fantasy. Phenomena come alive and
carry soul through our imaginative fantasies about them. When we
have no fantasy about the world, then it is objective, dead; even
the fantasy of pollution helps bring the world back to life as having
significance for soul. Fantasy is not merely an interior process go-
ing on in my head. It is a way of being in the world and giving back
soul to the world.
The attempt to take back soul from life outside deprives the out-
side of its “within,” stuffing the person with subjective soulfulness
and leaving the world a slagheap from which all projections, per-
sonifications, and psyche have been extracted. For this reason, the
more we work at our own personalities and subjectivities in the
name of the anima, the less we are truly soul-making and the more
we are continuing in the illusion that anima is in us rather than we
in it. Psyche is the wider notion than man, and man functions by
virtue of psyche and is dependent upon it Eanes than the other way
round: “man... is... in the psyche (not in his psyche)” (14 May
1950, Letter to esse @elibrnsien: “The greater part of the soul is
outside the body,” says Jung, quoting the alchemist Sendivogius
(12 July 1951, Letter to Karl Kerényi).? Because the anima notion
always implicates the world-soul, or soul of and in the world, a de-
j 81
(a) Although neither anima nor animus can be constellated without
the intervention of the conscious personality, this does not mean
that the resultant situation is nothing but a personal relation-
ship... [W]e are dealing with an archetype which is anything but
personal. CW 16, §469
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PSYCHE/HILLMAN
velopment of anima-consciousness never takes place merely

through the development of individual subjectivity.
‘My’ anima expresses the personalistic fallacy. Even though ani-
ma experiences bring with them a numinosity of person, the feel-
ing of a unique inwardness and sense of importance (exaggerations
and mythologizations of mood, insight, or fantasy), to take these
experiences literally, as literally personal, puts anima inside ‘me.’
The heightened subjectivity of anima events “is anything but per-
sonal” because it is archetypal.* The anima is the archetype behind
these personalisms, and therefore the experiences are archetypally
personal, making us feel both archetypal and personal at one and
the same instant. But to take the archetypal literally as personal is a
personalistic fallacy. So, when under the domination of anima our
soulfulness makes us feel most uniquely ‘me,’ special, different,
called — this is precisely the moment when, as Jung goes on to say
in the same passage, “we are in fact most estranged from ourselves
and most like the average type of Homo sapiens.”
Returning now to the dilemma arising from the two senses of
anima — the narrower meaning of one component in the coniunctio
and the wider meaning of the region in which the entire process
takes place — we may understand it as follows: anima may be only
one ingredient in the alchemy of psychic processes. But because of
her conjunctive role (anima mercurius), she is that factor through
which it all occurs as psychic; she is the means by which (anima as
copula and ligament) and in which (anima as vessel) the entire
process takes place. Because of her these events become personally
experienced as mine, going on in my soul. It is by virtue of the ani-
ma ingredient that events which are impersonal and only natural
reactions or only spiritual ideas become psychic experiences.
Thus we find the idea in Jung that, the more realized the anima
(as one archetypal factor in the psyche), the more “psychic ex-
istence becomes reality” (CW 16, §438). The reality of psyche as an
all-too-convincing experience begins in the subjectivized moods
and follies of the highly personalized anima. Nowhere do we more
stubbornly encounter the reality of soul — in itself such a dim and
wispy idea — than in the crosspatch nastiness of bad tempers, the
insights that slip away, the sensitive vanities that will not be molli-
fied. Within these commonplace disturbances, as Jung points out
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JUNG/SCRIPTA
... the anima [can] continually thwart[s] the good intentions of the
conscious mind, by contriving a private life that stands in sorry
contrast to the dazzling persona....
_.. [T]he “nothing but fantasy” attitude will never persuade me ,
to regard my anima manifestations as anything more than fatuous
weakness. If, however, I take the line that the world is outside and
inside, .. . I must logically accept the upsets and annoyances that
come to me from inside as symptoms of faulty adaptation to the
conditions of that inner world. CW 7, §§318-19
... the reflective instinct.... Reflexio means ‘bending back’...

the fact that the reflex which carries the stimulus over into its in-
stinctive discharge is interfered with by psychization.... Reflexio
is a turning inwards, with the result that . . . there ensues a succes-
sion of derivative contents or states which may be termed reflec-
tion or deliberation.
Through the reflective instinct, the stimulus is more or less
wholly transformed into a psychic content, that is, it becomes an
experience CW 8, §§241-43
Luna ... is the counterpart of Sol, cold, moist, feebly shining or

dark, feminine, corporeal, passive. Accordingly her most signifi-
cant role is that of a partner in the coniunctio.... [S]he is a uni-
versal receptacle, of the sun in particular; ... she “receives and
pours out” the powers of heaven.... [S]ilver is yet another
synonym or symbol for the arcanum “Luna.” Cw 14, §154
In the shape of the goddess the anima is manifestly projected, but

in her proper (psychological) shape she is introjected; she is . . . the
“anima within.” She is the natural sponsa, ... the companion
whom the endogamous tendency vainly seeks to win in the form of
mother and sister. She represents that longing which has always
had to be sacrificed.... Layard therefore speaks very rightly of
“internalization through sacrifice.” CW 16, 8438
SS SSE
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PSYCHE/HILLMAN
in a detailed example extending through a whole chapter, is an

anima fantasy;* and psychic existence also becomes reality when
we recognize the driving power and full import of fantasy itself.
Anima refers to a “quintessence of fantasy-images” (CW 14, §736)
and an “‘air-coloured’ quintessence” (ibid., §749) whose final ef-
fect in bringing home the reality of the psyche is a realization “that
this fantasy is happening, and it is as real as you — as a psychic enti-
ty — are real,” “just as if you were one of the fantasy figures” (ibid.,
§753). My conviction that psyche and its fantasies are as real as
matter and nature, as real as spirit, depends on how convincing
anima has made herself to me. Thus on her depends the psycholog-
ical calling.
d) The relation of anima and psyche comes out in yet one more
way: through Jung’s idea of reflection. On the five instinctual
drives (hunger, sexuality, activity, reflection, and creation) upon
which he elaborates, his notion of reflection — “bending back”
and “turning inwards” away from the world and its stimuli in favor
of psychic images and experiences — correlates most closely with
his notion of anima. Anima as Luna, passive, cool, breeding,
brooding, inward, describes reflection in alchemical language. The
archetype corresponding with the instinct of reflection would be
the anima.
Primordial images of this bending back and away are presented
by the retreating but fecund nymphs and the illusionary voices and
ephemera (moonlight, mists, echoes, musings, fantasies) of which
we have spoken above and which I have discussed in more detail in
relation with the feminine figures associated with Pan.*® The turn-
ing inwards from the object in favor of internal images correlates
again with the endogamous introjection of the anima, or ““inter-
nalization through sacrifice’” (CW 16, §438),4 necessary for psychic
consciousness. Another image of reflection associated traditionally
with anima is the mirror and the activity of mirroring.
“When Jung discourses briefly upon the nature of “unconscious
reflection” (CW 11, §237), he says: “Where judgments and flashes
of insight are transmitted by unconscious activity, they are often
attributed to an archetypal feminine figure, the anima or mother-
beloved. It then seems as if the inspiration came from the mother
or from the beloved, the ‘femme inspiratrice’” (CW 11, §240). At
another level he speaks in his Seminars of the same unconscious
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JUNG/SCRIPTA
——
EEE
(a) Through his imagination the timid man has made his eyes basilisk-
like, and he infects the mirror, the moon, and the stars.... Thus
man in turn will be poisoned by this mirror of the moon.... And
as the mirror is defiled by the woman, thus conversely the eyes... .
are being defiled by the moon, for the reason that at such times the
eyes of the timid imagining man are weak and dull....
CW 14, §215
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PSYCHE/HILLMAN
mental activity as “the ‘natural mind’” (CW 9,i, §167n5), where we

do not think but are thought, and he holds this natural mind to be
exclusively a feminine property.
The autonomy of the instinct to reflect, which Jung calls the nat-
ural mind, appears in a more baleful context as the lunar mind de-
scribed by Paracelsus in his De pestilitate, a text Jung expands
upon when discussing the poisonous and paralyzing aspect of re-
flection. The “lunar anima” (CW 14, §225) is evidently responsible
for what Paracelsus calls the “disheartened” and “timid imagining
man” who poisons and is poisoned by the mirror of the moon, so
that the very instrument of reflection is damaged by a basilisk eye.
These conditions of despairing introspection and foreboding spec-
ulation show the dark side of the moon where the instinct to “bend
back” and “turn inwards” literalizes into a timid retreat from the
bold heart required for what Paracelsus elsewhere calls “true im-
agining.”
But the key passages which relate anima to psyche via reflection
are these: “The richness of the human psyche and its essential
character are probably determined by this reflective instinct” (CW
8, §242). Thus psyche is mainly a result of the instinct of reflection,
which in turn is intimately tied with the anima archetype.
“Through reflection, ‘life’ and its ‘soul’ are abstracted from Nature
and endowed with a separate existence” (CW 11, §235). The arche-
type of both life and soul as distinct from ‘only Nature’ (procrea-
tive, biological Mother Nature) is anima, so that she would be that
archetype which both performs the abstraction through reflection
and personifies the life and soul in a reflected form. Anima is na-
ture now conscious of itself through reflection. Or, as Jung puts it
(ibid., §235n9): “reflection is a spiritual act that runs counter to
the natural process; an act whereby we stop, call something to
mind, form a picture, and take up a relation to and come to terms
with what we have seen. It should, therefore, be understood as an
act of becoming conscious.”
Far-reaching consequences emerge from these passages. They

indicate nothing less than an altogether other vision for the arche-
typal base of consciousness. If “becoming conscious” has its roots
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JUNG/SCRIPTA
(a) The anima is... a natural archetype that satisfactorily sums up all
the statements of the unconscious, of the primitive mind, of the
history of language and religion. ... [I]t is always the a priori ele-
ment in his moods, reactions, impulses, and whatever else is spon-
taneous in psychic life. It is something that lives of itself, that
makes us live; it is a life behind consciousness that cannot be com-
pletely integrated with it, but from which, on the contrary, con-
sciousness arises. CW 9,i, §57
88
PSYCHE/HILLMAN
in reflection and if this instinct refers to the anima archetype, then

consciousness itself may more appropriately be conceived as based
upon anima than upon ego.
We have already heard Jung suggest as much, saying about the
anima, “it is a life behind consciousness ... from which ... con-
sciousness arises” (CW 9,i, §57).4 He elaborates upon this notion
when discussing the primitive idea that “the name of an individual
is his soul” (CW 8, §665), which “means nothing less than that ego-
consciousness is recognized as being an expression of the soul.” He
says further (ibid., §668) that “the sense of the ‘I’ — the ego-con-
sciousness — grows out of unconscious life.” And the life he speaks
of in these passages is “soul.” Again (CW 14, §125), when he says
“our consciousness issues from a dark body, the ego,” “full of un-
fathomable obscurities,” a “mirror in which the unconscious
becomes aware of its own face,” we are given a description ap-
proaching that of the anima. This kind of ego is reflective; it is a
complex of opposites; and like the anima it is defined as a “person-
ification of the unconscious itself.” In yet another significant pas-
sage Jung contrasts ego and anima as bases of consciousness.
When commenting upon a Chinese text, he notes that there “con-
sciousness (that is, personal consciousness) comes from the anima”
and says the East “sees consciousness as an effect of the anima”
(CW 13, §62). Here the two archetypal bases are contrasted by
means of the East-West fantasy.
The ego as base of consciousness has always been an anach-
ronistic part of analytical psychology.?° It is a historical truth that
our Western tradition has identified ego with consciousness, an
identification that found formulation especially in nineteenth-cen-
tury psychology and psychiatry. But this part of Jung’s thought
does not sit well with either his notion of psychic reality or his
therapeutic goals of psychic consciousness. What brings cure is an
archetypal consciousness (mediated by the anima as we know from
other passages), and this notion of consciousness is definitely not
based upon ego:
It is as though, at the climax of the illness, the destructive powers were

converted into healing forces. This is brought about by the archetypes
awaking to independent life and taking over the guidance of the psychic
personality, thus supplanting the ego with its futile willing and
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JUNG/SCRIPTA
a FL SE SE a EE SS ET ET
Consciousness consists in the relation of a psychic content to the

ego. Anything not associated with the ego remains unconscious.
CW 14, §522n400 (cf. CW 14, 8131n68)
When, therefore, an alchemist conjured up the spirit of Saturn as

his familiar, this was an attempt to bring to consciousness a stand-
point outside the ego, involving a relativization of the ego and its
contents. CW 14, 8504 (cf. CW 9, ii, §11)
... there are good grounds for the prejudice that the ego is the cen-
tre of the personality, and that the field of consciousness is the psy-
che per se.... {I]t is only since the end of the nineteenth century
that modern psychology ... has discovered the foundations of
consciousness and proved empirically the existence of a psyche
outside consciousness. With this discovery the position of the ego,
till then absolute, became relativized. ... It is part of the personal-
ity but not the whole of it. CW 9, ii, §11
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PSYCHE/HILLMAN
striving. . . . the psyche has awakened to spontaneous activity. . . . some-
thing that is not his ego and is therefore beyond the reach of his personal
will. He has regained access to the sources of psychic life, and this marks
the beginning of the cure. (CW 11, §534)
The entire movement of Jung’s work is away from ego and

toward a widening of consciousness that strikes its roots in and re-
flects other psychic dominants — yet, even in late work, he uses
“the word ‘consciousness’ here as being equivalent to ‘ego’” (CW
14, §131n68).4 This equivalence necessitates a series of compensa-
tory operations, e.g., sacrifice of intellect, development of fourth
function, development of anima, introversion, shifting conscious-
ness to the second-half of life and its focus on death, all of which is
summed up as the “relativization of the ego,”® for the sake of
“psychic consciousness.”3° But precisely this latter is a conscious-
ness structured by the anima archetype.
Here I depart from Onians’s analysis of anima in Roman con-
texts and follow Jung and Bachelard. Onians says: “anima has
nothing to do with consciousness.” Much of what we commonly
mean by consciousness today belongs to animus: “Consciousness
with all the variations of emotion and thought is a matter of ani-
mus. To contemplate some action is ‘to have it in one’s animus’; to
turn one’s attention to something ... is ‘to turn the animus
towards it’; ... to feel faint, to be on the way to losing conscious-
ness, was ... ‘it goes ill with one’s animus’.” “Anima was ge-
neric”3! and thus a far vaguer term, to do with airs of all sorts, lo-
cated in the head. But following Jung, every archetype, by forming
a pattern of behavior and a cluster of imagery, informs conscious-
ness and has a kind of consciousness. If consciousness is defined as
it is today, and as Onians regards it, that is, mainly as attention
and self-referent experience, it is more an ego-consciousness and as
we suggested above is more associated with animus than anima.
Onians’s statement in regard to Rome, “Anima has nothing to do
with consciousness,” is applicable to today’s term “anima,” only if
we modify his statement to mean: anima has nothing to do with a
certain style of consciousness, namely, ego-consciousness. Like-
wise, Bachelard gives anima the consciousness of images, reverie,
and depths (and much more) and assigns to animus “projects and
worries,” or what we usually call (ego-) ‘consciousness.’ “Animus
valk
a2
PSYCHE/HILLMAN
is a bourgeois with regular habits” again refers to the continuity of

the ego and its adaptation to ‘reality.’32
The “relativization of the ego,” that work and that goal of the
fantasy of individuation, is made possible, however, from the be-
ginning if we shift our conception of the base of consciousness
from ego to anima archetype, from I to soul. Then one realizes
from the very beginning (a priori and by definition) that the ego
and all its developmental fantasies were never, even at the start,
the fundament of consciousness, because consciousness refers to a
process more to do with images than will, with reflection rather
than control, with reflective insight into, rather than manipulation
of, ‘objective reality.” We would no longer be equating conscious-
ness with one phase of it, the developmental period of youth and
its questing heroic mythology. Then, too, while educating con-
sciousness even in youth, the aim of nourishing anima would be no
less significant than that of strengthening ego.
Instead of regarding anima from the viewpoint of ego where she
becomes a poisonous mood, an inspiring weakness, or a contra-
sexual compensation, we might regard ego from soul’s perspective
where ego becomes an instrument for day-to-day coping, nothing
more grandiose than a trusty janitor of the planetary houses, a
servant of soul-making. This view at least gives ego a therapeutic
role rather than forcing it into the anti-therapeutic position, a
stubborn old king to be relativized. Then, too, we might relativize
the myth of the Hero, or take it for what it has become today for
our psyche — the myth of inflation — and not the secret key to the
development of human consciousness. The Hero-myth tells the
tale of conquest and destruction, the tale of psychology’s “strong
ego,” its fire and sword, as well as the career of its civilization, but
it tells little of the culture of its consciousness. Strange that we
could still, in a psychology as subtle as Jung’s, believe that this
King-Hero, and his ego, is the equivalent of consciousness. Images
of this psychological equivalence were projected from television
screens straight and live from the heroic-ego’s great contemporary
epic in Vietnam. Is this consciousness?
Basing consciousness upon soul accords with the Neoplatonic
tradition — which we still find in Blake — where what today is
called ego-consciousness would be the consciousness of the Pla-
tonic cave, a consciousness buried in the least aware perspectives.
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JUNG/SCRIPTA
Ea
(a) ... only an insignificant minority regards the psychic phenomenon

as a category of existence per se and draws the necessary conclu-
sions. It is indeed paradoxical that the category of existence, the
indispensable sine qua non of all existence, namely the psyche,
should be treated as if it were only semi-existent. Psychic existence
is the only category of existence of which we have immediate
knowledge, since nothing can be known unless it first appears as a
psychic image. CW 11, 8769
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PSYCHE/HILLMAN
These habits and continuities and daily organizations of personal-

ity certainly cannot encompass the definition of consciousness, a
mystery that still baffles every area of research. To put it together
with ego limits consciousness to the perspectives of the cave which
today we would call the literalistic, personalistic, practicalistic,
naturalistic, and humanistic fallacies. From the traditional psy-
chology (of Neoplatonism), ego-consciousness does not deserve
the name of consciousness at all.
Consciousness arising from soul derives from images and could
be called imaginal. According to Jung, the sine qua non of any
consciousness whatsoever is the “psychic image.”* “Every psychic
process is an image and an ‘imagining,’ otherwise no consciousness
could exist. . .” (CW 11, §889). On the one hand an image is the in-
ward reflection of an external object. On the other hand, and this
is the way Jung prefers to use the word, images are the very stuff of
psychic reality. Image is “a concept derived from poetic usage,
namely, a figure of fancy or fantasy-image” (CW 6, §743). Images
are “inner,” “archaic,” “primordial”; their ultimate source is in the
archetypes, and their expression is presented most characteristic-
ally in the formulation of myth. Consciousness arising from anima
would therefore look to myth, as it manifests in the mythologems
of dreams and fantasies and the pattern of lives; whereas ego-con-
sciousness takes its orientations from the literalisms of its perspec-
tives, i.e., that fantasy it defines as “reality.”
Because fantasy-images provide the basis of consciousness, we
turn to them for basic understanding. “Becoming conscious”
would now mean becoming aware of fantasies and the recognition
of them everywhere and not merely in a ‘fantasy world’ separate
from ‘reality.’ Especially, we would want to recognize them as they
play through that “mirror in which the unconscious becomes
aware of its own face” (CW 14, §129), the ego, its thought struc-
tures and practical notions of reality. Fantasy-images now become
the instrumental mode of perceiving and insighting. By means of
them we realize better what Jung so often insisted upon: the psy-
che is the subject of our perceptions, the perceiver through fantasy,
rather than the object of our perceptions. Rather than analyzing
fantasies, we analyze by means of them; and translating reality in-
to fantasy-images would better define becoming conscious than
would the former notion given by ego of translating fantasy into
95
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PSYCHE/HILLMAN
realities. “The psyche creates reality every day. The only expres-
sion I can use for this activity is fantasy” (CW 6, §78).
In particular, the fantasies arising from and giving insight into
attachments would refer to anima consciousness. Because anima
appears in our affinities, as the fascinosum of our attractions and
obsessions, where we feel most personal, here this consciousness
best mythologizes. It is a consciousness bound to life, both at the
level of the vital, vegetative soul as it used to be called (the psy-
chosomatic symptom as it is now called) and at the level of in-
volvements of every kind, from petty passions, gossip, to the
dilemmas of philosophy. Although consciousness based on anima
is inseparable from life, nature, the feminine, as well as from fate
and death, it does not follow that this consciousness is naturalistic,
or fatalistic, otherworldly and morose, or particularly ‘feminine.’
It means merely in these realms it turns; these are the metaphors to
which it is attached.
Attachment now becomes a more significant term in anima con-
sciousness than do those more guilt-making, and thus ego-refer-
ent, terms like commitment, relatedness, and responsibility. In
fact, the relativization of the ego means placing in abeyance such
metaphors as: choice and light, problem-solving and reality test-
ing, strengthening, developing, controlling, progressing. In their
place, as more adequate descriptions of consciousness and its ac-
tivities, we would use metaphors long familiar to the alchemy of
analytical practice: fantasy, image, reflection, insight, and, also,
mirroring, holding, cooking, digesting, echoing, gossiping, deep-
ening.
97
t ; ; - - :j
: P al me
— Tv? ws io A) 7
| alae ot s7 : oe Od )
Para : rab Seuaees BIaie)
bd ice wear et Altsalarae
arth) ieee
9 x j
=) ~ lagi =
t
~ i?
rane “2 +
Pe
: gis
mh
—— hall
Da \a '
i —< — = ye
ai be
i A)
im
m~ =
:
rae it.
ty = , =
71
7
a
a >i oa 7 >,
I]
... there can be no consciousness

without the perception of differences.
CW 14, §603
Tu ERE are further perceptions of differences in the notion of

anima that may help us become more conscious about what we are
saying and doing, and even experiencing, in regard to this arche-
type. Here again I am drawing a distinction between anima as ex-
perience, or an empirical phenomenology, and anima as notion, or
a critical phenomenology, utterly convinced that in psychology we
cannot make observations about any phenomena without being
aware of the ideas by means of which we are making our observa-
tions. Ideas that we do not know we have have us. And then they
shape our experiences from behind, unbeknown. Psychology’s job,
it seems to me, is to see the subjective, archetypal factor in our
sight, before or while looking at facts and events. Other sciences
have to pretend to being objective, to be describing things as they
are; psychology fortunately is always bound by its psychic limita-
tions and can be spared the pretense of objectivity. In place of the
obligation to be objectively factual, it is obliged to be subjectively
aware, which becomes possible only if we are willing to have an
exhaustive go at the assumptions in our primary notions.
99
100
DEPERSONALIZATION/HILLMAN
6. Anima and Depersonalization
Towa RD the end of the previous chapter, a group of pas-

sages from Jung stressed the difference between anima conscious-
ness and ego consciousness, indicating the reliance of ego upon a
factor behind it, the anima. In these passages it is implied that the
sense of personal identity is given, not by the ego, but to the ego by
the anima. These passages are relevant for understanding that clin-
ical condition called “depersonalization.”
Although psychiatry textbooks usually give but a sentence or
paragraph to depersonalization (sometimes called derealization),
there is, as with everything else, a substantial body of literature on
the subject. A collection of basic papers on the theme has been
edited by J.-E. Meyer, Depersonalisation (Darmstadt: Wissen-
schaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968), the English language chapters
having been put into German for the occasion. A plethora of cases
serve as examples, and most papers include ample references.
The collection begins with a long paper by Dilthey on the belief
in the reality of the external world (Ges. Schrift. V, pp. 90-135)
and follows with the major study by Paul Schilder (1914), which
has provided the basis for most later discussions. Here is Schilder’s
definition in my translation (Meyer, p. 46*):
A condition in which an individual feels himself thoroughly changed in

regard to his former state of being. This change encompasses both the
ego and the external world and results in the individual not recognizing
himself as a personality. His actions seem to him automatic. As an on-
looker he observes his activities and deeds. The outer world appears alien
and new and has lost its reality.
A person says: “I am not I,” or “I feel that I am not a person at

all?
* All page references in this section, unless otherwise indicated, are to Depersonalisation.
101
102
Bearing in mind the notion of anima, let us review depersonal-

ization’s major characteristics. First, it is not specific to any syn-
drome. It is reported in toxic states, epilepsy, and organic brain
diseases, as well as in normals, in puberty as well as in old age, and
in hysteria, melancholia, anxiety states, neurotic phobias and
compulsions, as well as in both schizophrenia and manic-depres-
sive psychoses. It has no standard span of time, sometimes of long
duration, sometimes ephemeral. It seems to be central and general,
not peripheral; brain-oriented authors try to localize it. Second,
many authors have conceived depersonalization as a disturbance
of the ego—world relationship, particularly the relationship which
constitutes the sense of reality of both: the depersonalized individ-
ual feels not only that he is not real but also that the world is not
real. It is behind a veil or a glass wall; there and not really there.
Third, it is said to occur particularly in situations of monotony,
apathy, routine, with a poverty of sensory input. Experiences be-
come mere events and no longer mean “me” (Meinhaftigkeit, K.
Schneider, pp. 256-59). Fourth, following Janet, the type of per-
sonality that shows the symptom is the asthenic or psychasthenic.
It belongs to psychic lability, what we would today call insecure,
vague, spaced out. This type did not disappear with Janet but
seems to exist today in a group reported by M. Roth (1960). These
are young men scarcely turned twenty, compulsive neurotics and
introverted worriers who are also highly intelligent and can por-
tray fascinating descriptions of their depersonalization experi-
ences. Roth (p. 380) finds depersonalization rarely in women and
then in connection with hysteria.* Fifth, together with the empty-
ing of “I,” there is a transformation of world: it loses its aesthetic,
physiognomic, and empathic character. It is no longer personally
significant; there is no “importance” in A. N. Whitehead’s sense.
There is a loss of time value, of depth perception and visual per-
spective. Here and there, near and far merge; the world becomes
flatland (B. Kimura, 1963, p. 394).
Schilder shows that the depersonalized experience does not de-
pend on any of the usual functions of ego consciousness: memory,
perception, association, feeling, thinking, willing. These all re-
main intact, but their intention and vitality are relativized by an in-
* On the relation of hysteria and the Kore anima figure, see Niel Micklem, “On Hysteria:
The Mythical Syndrome,” Spring 1974, pp. 147-65.
103
JUNG/SCRIPTA
The richness of the human psyche and its essential character are
probably determined by this reflective instinct. CW 8, §242
Through reflection, “life” and its “soul” are abstracted from Na-
ture and endowed with a separate existence. (reflection is a spirit-
ual act that runs counter to the natural process; ... it should,
therefore, be understood as an act of becoming conscious.)
CW 11, §235 (and n9)
... sulphur is the soul . . . of all living things; . . . it is equated with

“nostra anima” (our soul). ... Paracelsus likewise calls sulphur the
soul. CW 14, §136
The green colour attributed to Sulphur he has in common with

Venus.... CW 14, §140n124
... permanent loss of the anima means. ... resignation, weariness,

sloppiness, irresponsibility. . . . CW 9,i, §147
104
dependent factor that has been called the “personal co-efficient”

(p. 118). Indeed, depersonalization abstracts the ego to its barest
dictionary definition: “the individual’s experience of himself.”34
All the functions of consciousness, including ego itself, are there
and working, but the personal sense of being, subjective interior-
ity, the sense of “me-ness,” is gone, and with this absence is lost
too the sense of world. Gebsattel (p. 244) sees in this loss and ab-
sence an existential “void” and “abyss.”
These salient features of depersonalization are relevant to our
pursuit of anima. According to Jung, it is the anima who provides
the relationship between man and world as well as between man
and his interior subjectivity. She is in fact the personification of
that interiority and subjectivity, the very sense of personality:
“man derives his human personality . . . his consciousness of him-
self as a personality ... primarily from the influence of quasi-per-
sonal archetypes” (CW 5, §388). But it is particularly the anima
archetype which makes possible experience as personal as we saw
in chapter five, “Anima and Psyche.”
As we saw there, too, anima refers to the reflexive instinct which
Jung associates with the basis of consciousness;? and he defines her
as archetype of life, as the personification which unconsciously in-
volves us with larger collectivities of both inner and outer worlds.
In this sense Jung frequently speaks of anima as the projection-
making factor, the Shakti and the Maya that gives life to a person.
In alchemy, the active effulgence of sulphur can represent anima?
as can green, color of nature, hope, and life (chapter two).
The condition can be distinguished from depression since deper-
sonalization is less the inhibition of vital functions and the narrow-
ing of focus than it is a loss of personal involvement with and
attachment to self and world. There seems another archetype at
work than in depression. As Roth noted with his young men, there
is a curious ability to observe one’s condition coupled with morbid
iitrospection by the ego in search of soul. We each may have expe-
rienced depersonalization and derealization in less extreme degree.
I refer to those states of apathy, monotony, dryness, and weary
resignation, the sense of not caring and of not believing in one’s
value, that nothing is important or all is voided, outside and in-
side. Jung attributes states such as these to the anima archetype.‘
We might see this now less as a “negative” anima state than as a
105
106
mild depersonalization, a loss of soul, or what Jung calls (CW 9,i,

8147) “permanent loss of the anima.”
Loss of anima is familiar at the end of a love-affair. There is a
loss of vitality and reality, not only about the other person, the af-
fair, and love but also in regard to oneself and the very world
itself. “Nothing seems real anymore.” “I feel dead, empty, mech-
anical like a robot.” It happens in men and women: Demeter’s lost
soul, when Kore is captured by an invisible dark power, brings the
whole world of nature to a stop.
One passage from Jung is especially relevant to Schilder’s idea of
the missing personal co-efficient. About the anima Jung says (CW
9, 857):
It is a “factor” in the proper sense of the word. Man cannot make it; on
the contrary, it is always the a priori element in his moods, reactions, im-
pulses, and whatever else is spontaneous in psychic life. It is something
that lives of itself, that makes us live; it is a life behind consciousness that
cannot be completely integrated with it, but from which, on the contrary,
consciousness arises.
This statement accords with the notion of anima in Roman

Latin,?> where anima connoted a breath soul, a generative force in
the head, associated with one’s individual genius (or personal
daimon in the Greek sense). Anima did not refer to the specific
functions of consciousness (thinking, willing, perceiving, feeling,
etc.), nor did it refer to the registration of experiences (attention),
functions, and activities that later became ego. Anima meant
something deeper than that and thus was a term, much like the
early Greek psyché and the Egyptian ba, that also referred to soul
apart from life (in relation with death). Anima was the deeper
generic force behind specific conscious functions in life, much as
Jung describes it in the above passage. An absence of anima would
affect less the functions of consciousness than the personal genius
or daimon (now technically called “the personal co-efficient”).
Depersonalization presents a striking similarity with what an-
thropology has called “loss of soul.” And in fact “depersonaliza-
tion” is “also used of a philosophy of the universe, which no longer
regards natural forces as manifestations of supernatural agents or
107
(a) The anima is nothing but a representation of the personal nature
of the autonomous system in question. CW 13,861
108
gods.”3° Loss of anima means both the loss of internal animation

and external animism.
As I tried to present in my Terry Lecture “Personifying,”?7 the
native habit of the soul to personify is the ground of animism, an-
thropomorphism, and the personifications of language, poetry,
and myth; it is the ground of dreams and of our experience of
divine figures. Our sense of personality, attachment to persons,
beliefs in personal immortality, and our cult of personal relation-
ships and development — all rest upon personifying, which in turn
is an effect of the anima archetype.
Absence of anima opens one to the soul’s immeasurable depths,
that primary characteristic of the psyche according to Hera-
kleitos,** revealing those depths as an abyss. Not only is the guide
and the bridge gone, but so too is the possibility of a personal con-
nection through personified representations. For it is through
anima that the autonomous systems of the psyche are experienced
in personified form.* Without her the depths become a void, as the
existentialist von Gebsattel says. This happens because the anima
who “personifies the collective unconscious” (CW 10, §714 and
other passages listed below in chapter eight) is not there to mediate
the depths in personified images with personal intentions. At the
same time, the world outside is perceived without its depths, losing
perspective, becoming a soulless flatland.
This loss is not merely a psychiatric condition; it is also a cos-
mology. We all live to a larger extent than we realize in the state of
depersonalization. Hence the work with anima - including my
writing and your reading — because it is at the same time a work on
the moribund anima mundi, is a noble task. The self-knowledge
that depth psychology offers is not enough if the depths of the
world soul are neglected. A self-knowledge that rests within a cos-
mology which declares the mineral, vegetable, and animal world
beyond the human person to be impersonal and inanimate is not
only inadequate. It is also delusional. No matter how well we may
know ourselves, we remain walking, talking ghosts, cosmo-
logically set apart from the other beings of our milieu. From Plato
through the alchemists on whom Jung leans, and for Jung himself,
it was not the personal anima alone that counted but also the ani-
ma mundi (CW 8, §393). The work on one’s own person aims to
open the senses and the heart to the life and beauty of an animated
109
CW 13, 854
110
world. Jung’s philosophical position of being in soul, restated else-

where as not the psyche is in man but man is in the psyche, main-
tains the ancient connection and the ancient concern with anima
mundi; and Jung’s animated sense of things at Bollingen presents
this position as his Lebensphilosophie. Even his conceptual writing
that requires animated ideas such as shadow, trickster, or wise old
man protects his thought from the depersonalized, soulless flat-
land of academic psychology. Wherever he speaks of soul and ani-
ma he never yields the ambiguity, thereby maintaining against the
Luciferian temptation of enlightenment through severance which
would sharply distinguish the processes within my intimate soul
and those of the anima mundi, resulting in singleness of meaning,
Newton’s sleep.
In sum, if the essence of depersonalization can be condensed in-

to an absence of the personal co-efficient, I believe we have located
the missing person in anima — but found it in notion only. How to
recapture it in therapy is another matter.
But where to look tells us something about how to look. By
relating archetype and symptom we have an inkling at which altar
to place the complaint — there are Gods in our diseases, suggests
Jung,’ and so we can relate our disease to them. Relating the ani-
ma archetype to the depersonalization symptom could take place
by revivifying images. In a somewhat similar condition where “the
patient’s world had become cold, empty, and grey,” Jung turned to
fantasy because: “Libido can never be apprehended except in a
definite form; that is to say, it is identical with fantasy-images”
(CW 7, §345). Imagination is the particular province of the anima:
“image is psyche” says Jung (CW 13, §75). (This relation between
anima and fantasy we discussed in chapter five, and the relation
between soul and imagination has been a theme in articles by
Casey, Corbin, Durand, Whitmont, and Woolger in issues of the
Spring annual during the early ’70s.)
The revivification of images reconstructs personal belief through
belief in a personified world with personal intentions and confi-
dence in oneself as a carrier of interior personalities. Grinnell
(Spring 1970) has described this as “psychological faith.” As he
ie ak
JUNG/SCRIPTA
Instead of allowing himself [Western man] to be convinced once

more that the daemon is an illusion, he ought to experience once
more the reality of this illusion. ... His dissociative tendencies are
actual psychic personalities possessing a differential reality....
The personification enables us to see the relative reality of the au-
tonomous system, and not only makes its assimilation possible but
also depotentiates the daemonic forces of life. CW 13, §55
The light that gradually dawns on him [modern man] consists in

his understanding that his fantasy is a real psychic process which is
happening to him personally... . But if you recognize your own in-
volvement you yourself must enter into the process with your per-
sonal reactions, just as if you were one of the fantasy figures, or
rather, as if the drama being enacted before your eyes were real. It
is a psychic fact that this fantasy is happening, and it is as real as
you — as a psychic entity — are real. If this crucial operation is not
carried out, all the changes are left to the flow of images, and you
yourself remain unchanged. CW 14, 8753
For decades I always turned to the anima when I felt that my emo-
tional behavior was disturbed, and that something had been con-
stellated in the unconscious. I would then ask the anima: “Now
what are you up to? What do you see? I should like to know.”
After some resistance she regularly produced an image. As soon as
the image was there, the unrest or sense of oppression vanished.
The whole energy of these emotions was transformed into interest
in and curiosity about the image. I would speak with the anima
about the images she communicated to me....
MDR, pp. 187-88
112
shows in the case of Jung — his dream of the little girl and the dove
— faith in psyche and in oneself as personality is a particular effect
of anima. Anima has this effect through the presentation of im-
ages, i.e., in Jung’s case, as Grinnell shows, after the break-up
with Freud and the break-down in Jung, Jung became Jung
through his encounter with imagination. The vivification of im-
ages led to his psychological faith, his personal psychological posi-
tion, and his sense of personality. But any therapeutic method for
restoring an animated, repersonalized world must constellate -
and in the therapist himself — the sense of utter reality of the per-
sonified image.
JUNG/SCRIPTA
... the autonomous complex of anima and animus is essentially a

psychological function that has usurped, or rather retained, a “per-
sonality” only because this function is itself autonomous and unde-
veloped. But already we can see how it is possible to break up the
personifications, since by making them conscious we convert them
into bridges to the unconscious. It is because we are not using them
purposefully as functions that they remain personified complexes.
So long as they are in this state they must be accepted as relatively
independent personalities. They cannot be integrated into con-
sciousness while their contents remain unknown. The purpose of
the dialectical process is to bring these contents into the light; and
only when this task has ‘been completed, and the conscious mind
has become sufficiently familiar with the unconscious processes re-
flected in the anima, will the anima be felt simply as a function.
CW 7, 8339
To the degree that the patient takes an active part, the personified
figure of anima or animus will disappear. It becomes the function
of relationship between conscious and unconscious.
CW 7, §370
... the immediate goal has been achieved, namely the conquest of
the anima as an autonomous complex, and her transformation in-
to a function of relationship between the conscious and the uncon-
scious. CW 7, §374
The immediate goal of the analysis of the unconscious, therefore,

is to reach a state where the unconscious contents no longer re-
main unconscious and no longer express themselves indirectly as
animus and anima phenomena; that is to say, a state in which
animus and anima become functions of relationship to the uncon-
scious. ... With that the anima phenomenon comes to a stop.
CW 7, §387
SSS
114
INTEGRATION/HILLMAN
7. Integration of the Anima
On E OF Jung’s many passages may lead us to believe that at

some point personifying comes to an end and is even a desired end.
The implication is clear: integration into consciousness means con-
verting the person into a function.? It also means moving from
image to content, from the sensate immediacy of fantasies to the
psychology of meanings. For anima presents herself in fantasies,
rather than meanings. It is implied that the anima as function is su-
perior to the anima personified. Further support for anima integra-
tion as “breaking up the personifications” can be drawn from other
115,
JUNG/SCRIPTA
—
The dissolution of the anima means that we have gained insight in-
to the driving forces of the unconscious, but not that we have
made these forces ineffective. CW 7, §391
paee
It is not we who personify them [unconscious figures]; they have a
personal nature from the very beginning. Only when this is thor-
oughly recognized can we think of depersonalizing them, of “sub-
jugating the anima”.... CW 13, §62
The unconscious anima is a creature without relationships, an au-

toerotic being whose one aim is to take total possession of the indi-
vidual. CW 16,8504
His mistress appears before him . . . seeming to him like a goddess

in heaven. The repressed erotic impression has activated the latent
primordial image of the goddess, i.e., the archetypal soul-image.
Through insight into the actual existence of his erotic desire,
Hermas was able to acknowledge this metaphysical reality. The
sensual libido ... now passed to his soul-image and invested it
with the reality which the object had claimed exclusively for itself.
Consequently his soul could speak to good effect and successfully
enforce her demands. CW 6, §§383-87
es After the middle of life, however, permanent loss of the anima

means a diminution of vitality, of flexibility, and of human kind-
ness. The result, as a rule, is premature rigidity, crustiness, stere-
otypy, fanatical one-sidedness, obstinacy, pedantry, or else resig-
nation, weariness, sloppiness, irresponsibility, and finally a child-
ish ramollissement with a tendency to alcohol. CW 9,i, §147
116
INTEGRATION/HILLMAN
passages where Jung speaks of “the dissolution of the anima”? and

of “depersonalizing” and “subjugating the anima.”® See also CW
16, §504 and the long discussion of Hermas with his Rhoda (Cw 6,
§381 ff.) and the early Christian struggle with sexuality evoked by
the anima.°
The notion of anima integration in the long passage cited above
(CW 7, §339), and elsewhere (CW 7, §374), has a heroic tinge; its
formulation is in the language of “conquest,” battle, darkness and
light. The process is described in the ego language of compensa-
tion with a moralistic undertone (“because we are not using them
purposefully as functions . . . they remain personified complexes,”
CW 7, §339). Consequently, we have that antagonism of “mascu-
line ego versus the feminine ‘other,’ i.e., conscious versus uncon-
scious personified as anima” (CW 16, §434). The entire relationship
with anima is placed into the mythologem of the heroic ego and his
archetypal fight with the dragon. Then efforts to integrate, “to
bring these contents to light,” become a depotentiating of per-
sonifications and of their imaginal power, a drying-up of the
waters, and a slaying of the angel (seen to be a dangerous fairy-
demon by the ego), whose real purpose is to individualize itself
within a personal relation to an individual. This Corbin has point-
ed out.3? The feminine image that the hero meets is his guardian
angel, not his enemy, and it is her individualization, not his or
mine, that matters to the soul. Her individualization into distinct
personality is precisely what soul-making is all about. To deper-
sonify anima — if this is truly possible at all — would serve only one
psychological purpose: to keep the ego forever in its heroic stance.
Depersonalizing the anima can produce unnecessary damage in
human affairs when this idea is taken literally, leading to brutal re-
jection (presented as noble renunciations) and a subsequent “dim-
inution of vitality, of flexibility, and of human kindness” in a series
of psychic horrors Jung goes on to recount in the same paragraph.¢
The entire operation of literal choice between spirit and body, in-
ner and outer, positive and negative has its source in “ego con-
sciousness’ which maintains itself best through giving reality to
these fantasies, forcing opposition between them, suppressing one,
and then calling this game ‘choice.’ So the anima always presents
heroic consciousness with a moral dilemma. But the moral dilem-
ma is in the nature of the ego and not in the nature of the anima.
1 ig
JUNG/SCRIPTA
... for the archetypes are universal and belong to the collective
psyche over which the ego has no control. Thus animus and anima
are images representing archetypal figures which mediate between
consciousness and the unconscious. Though they can be made
conscious they cannot be integrated into the ego-personality, since
as archetypes they are also autonomous.
2 January 1957, Letter to Anonymous
I have defined the anima as a personification of the unconscious in

general, and have taken it as a bridge to the unconscious. .. . If the
unconscious figures are not acknowledged as spontaneous agents,
we become victims of a one-sided belief in the power of conscious-
NESSa ee CW 13, §62
Together they [the anima and animus] form a divine pair, one of
whom ...is... rather like Hermes ... while the other .. . wears
the features of Aphrodite, Helen (Selene), Persephone, and
Hecate. Both of them are unconscious powers, “gods” in fact....
CW 9,11, 841
To the men of antiquity the anima appeared as a goddess or a

witch, while for medieval man the goddess was replaced by the
Queen of Heaven and Mother Church. CW 9,i, §61
It is not we who personify them; they have a personal nature from

the very beginning. Only when this is thoroughly recognized can
we think of depersonalizing them, of “subjugating the anima”... .
CW 13, §62
Consciousness can only exist through continual recognition of the

unconscious.... CW 9,i, §178
... Michael Maier’s journey to the seven mouths of the Nile... . is

a description of the dreamer’s ascent to a world of gods and
heroes, of his initiation into a Venus mystery... . CW 14, §297
118
INTEGRATION/HILLMAN
When we read the major passage with which we began this sec-
tion in the light of others on the same theme, we discover more
precisely what “integration” means. “Though the effects of anima
and animus can be made conscious, they themselves are factors
transcending consciousness and beyond the reach of perception
and volition. Hence they remain autonomous despite the integra-
tion of their contents” (CW 9,ii, §40).2 All we can do is remember
their spontaneous reality behind contents, projections, effects® and
grant “relative autonomy and reality” to these psychic “figures”
(CW 9, ii, §44), which Jung often presents as Gods and Goddesses.°
Anima “integration” is thus “knowledge of this structure,” a recog-
nition of her as archetype (CW 14, §616). The operative term is
thorough recognition.4 And just what is to be recognized? — the
relatively autonomous, personified nature of the archetype. From
this it would seem that anima integration means just the reverse of
turning personification into function and that, by continuing to
recognize her as a relatively independent person, we are indeed
performing the work of integration.
The question as answered by alchemy is no longer simply a dis-
junction: either figure or function, person or process. The person-
al image of anima is necessary for performing certain functions and
constellating certain contents. Without the personal image (e.g.,
Michael Maier’s imaginatio)* we would not be led (seduced) or
interested (tempted); we would not experience certain qualities
(the bitterness of salt, a personified substance); we could not expe-
rience the endogamous libido (incest with the soror); we would
not find the delight and delusion in the dissolving, coloring, and
whitening.
Consequently, the “depersonalizing” of anima (CW 13, §62) may
mean depriving the anima of her personalistic effects and projec-
eiie
{fUNG/SOCRIP
TA
(a) Melusina, the deceptive Shakti. ... should no longer dance before
the adept with alluring gestures, but must become what she was
from the beginning: a part of his wholeness. As such she must be
“conceived in the mind.” CW 13, §223
The “mother” corresponds to the “virgin anima,” who is not

turned towards the outer world and is therefore not corrupted by
it. She is turned rather towards the “inner sun”... . Cw 5,§464
(b) Recognizing the shadow is what I call the apprenticepiece, but

making out with the anima is the masterpiece which not many can
bring off. 9 February 1959, Letter to Traugott Egloff
120
INTEGRATION/HILLMAN
tions, but mot of her appearance to the interior sense as a personi-

fied numen.* The “ ‘internalization through sacrifice’” (CW 16,
8438), which seems Jung’s method for working through the “Meis-
terstiick”> of anima integration does not require dissolving her as a
personified figure.
Internalization through sacrifice — the principal concern of chap-
ters VII and VIII of Symbols of Transformation (CW 5) and of
Jung’s theory of transference (CW 16), in fact, the latent program
throughout the process of individuation (CW 12 and 14) — takes on
a far subtler meaning. This internalization and this sacrifice cannot
be conceived as suppression of the extraverted soul or as sublima-
tion (raising something lower to a more noble condition). It is not
an immolation but a consecration. Sacrifice takes on its original
sense of returning some event in the human world to the Gods,
thereby raising the value (not the substance) of that event; and
where internalizing means working into the interior of that event
so that its value, and thus its sacredness, appears to insight. And,
curiously, what appears during this sacrificial procedure called “in-
ternalization” and what enables insight to happen at all is the per-
sonified voice or figure of an anima.
The crucial support for my understanding of anima integration
to mean recognition of the anima as personified numen comes
from Jung himself:
There are no conclusive arguments against the hypothesis that these ar-
chetypal figures are endowed with personality at the outset and are not
just secondary personalizations. In so far as the archetypes do not repre-
sent mere functional relationships, they manifest themselves as daimones,
as personal agencies. In this form they are felt as actual experiences and
are not “figments of the imagination,” as rationalism would have us be-
lieve. (CW 5, §388) ... instead of deriving these figures from our psychic
conditions, [we] must derive our psychic conditions from these figures.
‘(CW 13, §299) It is not we who personify them; they have a personal na-
ture from the very beginning. (ibid., §62) [It] . . . is quite right to treat the
anima as an autonomous personality. ... (CW 7, §322; cf. §§317-27)
This personal nature is experienced in and through personified

images. To leave these behind leaves the archetype itself, since ar-
121
122
INTEGRATION/HILLMAN
chetypes are personified a priori, “at the outset.” Therefore, “inter-

nalization through sacrifice” must mean something other than
“depersonalizing.” Does it mean moving the anima image from
outer person to inner person, i.e., withdrawing the projections
from a human being?
Here we take an excursion to consider those wrangles in therapy
about anima projections in love relationships. Sometimes one feels
in Jung a horror animae, as when he says “marriage with the ani-
ma” is “possible only in the complete absence of psychological self-
knowledge” (CW 16, §433). Here I believe it is the literalization
against which he warns and not the actuality of anima lived in life.
It is yet to be established that we find a truer and more authentic
relationship with soul by dispensing with its living carrier in con-
crete existence. To break off a complex-ridden relationship
charged with anima projections would be to literalize her into the
person carrying the projections. Every prescription or proscription
concerning what to do or how to behave literalizes. This is as true
for actions in the “inner” world as for the “outer.” Internalizing
can become just as literal as acting out.
Whenever internalization through sacrifice means putting the
knife to concrete life because it is concrete — e.g., renouncing
“marriage with the anima,” or sexuality, or tangible fascinations
for the sake of the self’s individuation process — then there has been
no internalization whatsoever, merely a more radical literalization.
Instead of internalization through sacrifice, there is literalization
through suppression. Then, sacrifice itself has been literalized as
denying, cutting, or killing concrete life, and internalization has
been placed literally “inside” one’s head or skin. (This primitive or
Philistine*® notion of internality was reviewed in chapter five
above.) Likewise externality is not ‘out there’ in the concrete, ex-
traverted world. It refers to the evident, obvious, prima facie, or
superficial aspect of all events (“inner” or “outer”). We fall into
externality all the time, even when internalizing in active imagina-
tion, taking the figures at face value, listening to their counsel liter-
ally, or simply by having to do active imagination at all in order to
find depth, interiority, fantasy, and anima. Then the world of psy-
chic images and the anima figure within this world hold magic
sway. One is in thrall to Mistress Soul. No matter how introvert-
edly performed, this is externality, acting in, literalism, absolutiz-
123
JUNG/SCRIPTA
a
eee 9
Prometheus surrenders himself ... to his soul, that is, to the func-
tion of relation to the inner world. . .. Prometheus concedes her an
absolute significance, as mistress and guide.... He sacrifices his
individual ego to the soul, to the relation with the unconscious as
the matrix of eternal images and meanings.... Prometheus loses
all connection with the surrounding world, and hence also the very
necessary corrective offered by external reality. CW 6, §278
. it is readily understandable that the primordial image of the

hermaphrodite should reappear in modern psychology in the guise
of the male-female antithesis, in other words as male conscious-
ness and personified female unconsciousness. . . .
Originally this archetype played its part entirely in the field of
fertility magic and thus remained ... a purely biological phenom-
enon. ... But even in early antiquity the symbolical meaning of the
act seems to have increased. ... and natural philosophy turned it
into an abstract theoria. These developments meant the gradual
transformation of the archetype into a psychological process
which, in theory, we can call a combination of conscious and un-
conscious processes. CW 9,1, 8§296-97
124
INTEGRATION/HILLMAN
ing, or whatever else one likes to call it. Jung gives an example of it
in Spitteler’s Prometheus.
This obtuse sort of literalism also affects the notion of the her-
maphrodite, as if it were simply a matter of joining the characteris-
tics of two genders in one person. A man attempts to become more
feminine, feeling and ‘eros-connected’ with the aim of integrating
the anima — a notion of anima which we have already tried to dis-
pel in earlier chapters. All the while that he is performing this imi-
tatio animae, he is actually becoming more literal than imaginal
and metaphorical which is what anima consciousness more likely
implies. As Jung shows all through the Mysterium Coniunctionis
(CW 14) and elsewhere, “male” and “female” are biological meta-
phors for the psychic conditions of conscious and unconscious.»
Anima integration in the model of the hermaphrodite does not
mean acquiring characteristics of the other gender; rather, it
means a double consciousness, mercurial, true and untrue, action
and inaction, sight and blindness, living the impossible oxymoron,
more like an animal who is at once superbly conscious in its ac-
tions and utterly unconscious of them. To take the freakish image
of the hermaphrodite and literalize it into sexual genders and then
moralize it into a bi-sexual goal for behavior is a move as mistaken
as considering the phallus to be the biological penis or the great
mother to be one’s own mother of one’s childhood. The battle over
literalism is never won; it simply reappears in new guises — thereby
forcing us to be psychological.
It is not persons that we sacrifice but the personal. Now the

several questions of this chapter come to one issue. Internalizing
through sacrifice has nothing to do with choices between outer and
inner. Such is literalism. Nor has it anything to do with deperson-
alizing in either form: changing personifications into functions and
contents or transmigrations of soul from outer persons to inner im-
ages.
Depersonalizing the anima means what it says: seeing through
the personal aspects of all personifications. It refers to that recog-
nition that all the personal me-ness and self-important subjectivity
derive from an archetype that is quite impersonal. Precisely this
LB)
JUNG/SCRIPTA
ie ee ee 4 ee ee ne re ee
(a) As I see it, the psyche is a world in which the ego is contained.
CW 13, 875
You rightly emphasize that man in my view is enclosed in the psy-

che (not in his psyche).
14 May 1950, Letter to Joseph Goldbrunner
126
INTEGRATION/HILLMAN
connection between the personal and the archetype of the personal

both depersonalizes and is sacrifice. For sacrifice, as we all know
and always forget, means just this sort of connecting personal hu-
man events with their impersonal divine background. It means see-
ing the anima archetype in what’s personally going on — and wher-
ever it’s going on, both with outer anima persons and inner anima
images. The personal aspects of inner images, too, need seeing
through as relatively autonomous archetypal events. They are im-
personal and not concerned with “me” on the level of my subjec-
tive importance. Conversations with the inner anima image and
her actions in dreams can make “me” anima-ridden just as any in-
volvement with outer anima persons.
By returning the infusions, the beauty, the wiles, and vanities to
their origins in the Goddesses, giving it all back to its background,
we depersonalize the entire compulsive, autonomous perfor-
mance. Then we can acknowledge that definition: “The anima is
nothing but a representation of the personal nature of the autono-
mous system in question” (CW 13, 861).
Integrating the anima, which means becoming an integer or one
with her, could only take place by our remembrance that we are al-
ready in her. Human being is being-in-soul (esse in anima) from
the beginning. Integration is thus a shift of viewpoint from her in
me to me in her. “Man is in the psyche (not in his psyche),”* which
we also discussed in chapter five above. This recognition of where
we actually and ontologically are is a sacrifice of our habitual con-
sciousness, internalizing it within the embrace of the wider notion
of psyche. This too is an “internalization through sacrifice” which
can be spoken of more accurately as “relativizing the ego” (above,
pp. 91-93) than as “integrating the anima.”
ee
127
JUNG/SCRIPTA
ace
(a) The anima personifies the collective unconscious. ...

Cw 10, §714
... the unconscious is often personified by the anima....

Cw 11, §107
I have defined the anima as a personification of the unconscious.

CW 9,11, 820n1
(b) I have defined the anima as a personification of the unconscious in

general, and have taken it as a bridge to the unconscious, in other
words, as a function of relationship to the unconscious.
CW 13, 862
... by making them [anima and animus] conscious we convert

them into bridges to the unconscious. CW 7, §339
... anima ... is the personification of the inferior functions which

relate a man to the collective unconscious. CW 18, §187
... the anima is the image of the subject in his relation to the col-
lective unconscious.... CW 758521
128
MEDIATRIX/HILLMAN
8. Mediatrix of the Unknown
Le T US now turn to three further and closely allied defini-

tions: 1) anima personifies the collective unconscious; 2) anima is
the function of relationship to the unconscious; 3) anima is medi-
127
JUNG/SCRIPTA
nS
—
X. is undoubtedly the anima, representing the coll.[ective] unc.
[onscious].
24 December 1931, Letter to Count Hermann Keyserling
... mostly it is the anima who in singular or plural form represents

the collective unconscious. Cw 14, §128
... encounter with the anima logically leads to a great expansion

of our sphere of experience. The anima is a representative of the
unconscious and hence a mediatrix....
13 March 1958, Anonymous
... the anima plays the role of the mediatrix between the uncon-
scious and the conscious.... Cw 10,8715
The anima mediates between consciousness and the collective un-

conscious.... CW 14, §498n381
... soul is a life-giving daemon who plays his elfin game above and
below human existence. ... CW 9,1, §56
... the figure of the unknown woman is a personification of the

unconscious, which I have called the “anima.” CW 16, §17
At the top of the whole picture is the personification of the uncon-

scious, a naked anima-figure who turns her back. That is a typical
position; in the beginning of the objectivation of these images the
anima-figure often turns her back. Cw 18, §412
~ When projected, the anima always has a feminine form with defi-
nite characteristics. This empirical finding does not mean that the
archetype is constituted like that in itself. CW 9,i, §142
130
MEDIATRIX/HILLMAN
atrix of the unknown,? acts as psychopompos to the unknown,

and appears herself as unknown.>
These definitions refer to the phenomenology of “unknown-
ness” which we have been noticing throughout - anima as inno-
cent, empty, vague, white (or dark); the smoke, mist, and opacity;
her elusive, enigmatic, obscurantist behavior; her dubious, shady
origins or her associations with remote history or alien culture; the
images of her turning her back,‘ or veiled, or hidden, or incarcer-
ated in the darkness of primal matter. Or she is unknown as the
projection-maker and illusion-maker. The unknown also sub-
sumes the phenomenology of sudden unwilled moods and attrac-
tions that come without reason and go just as inexplicably. Finally,
anima is the unknown as the mystery of consciousness in its rela-
tion with nature and life.
It is this fundamental unconsciousness of the archetype — ab-
sence of light, morality, meaning, conflict, intention, historical
time, and cultural image - that Jung points to in some passages
about the “unknown” nature of the anima. For the anima’s “irrup-
tion into consciousness often amounts to a psychosis.” “Unlike
other contents, they [anima and animus] always remain strangers
to the world of consciousness, unwelcome intruders saturating the
atmosphere with uncanny forebodings or even with the fear of
madness.” “They [anima and animus] undoubtedly belong to the
material that comes to light in schizophrenia” (CW 9,i, 8§517-20).
He also suggests that anima “might explain the very much greater
number of suicides among men” (CW 10, §79).
So when Jung says the archetypes are unknowable I do not be-
lieve he means merely that their theoretical structure is beyond the
possibility of knowledge. I do not believe he is here speaking of the
anima archetype only as a Kantian noumenon, an unknowable po-
tential, a hypothetical conjecture. He is speaking both epistemo-
logically and phenomenally, empirically: the unconscious psyche
cannot altogether be known. That is what “unconscious” means:
both unknown and unknowable. What is unknown can become
known, but what is unknowable remains fundamentally and al-
ways unable to be known; and it is precisely this psychic uncon-
sciousness, beyond the reach of insight and knowledge, that the
anima mediates. She makes us unconscious. As she is the very cra-
131
JUNG/SCRIPTA
———
In elfin nature wisdom and folly appear as one and the same; and
they are one and the same as long as they are acted out by the ani-
ma. Life is crazy and meaningful at once. CW 9,i, §65
. the anima emerges in exemplary fashion from the primeval

slime, laden with all the pulpy and monstrous appendages of the
deep. 13 August 1931, Letter to Count Hermann Keyserling
When such a fate [Nekyia] befalls a man . . . he usually encounters

the unconscious in the form of the “Dark One,” a Kundry of horri-
bly grotesque, primeval ugliness or else of infernal beauty. In
Faust’s metamorphosis, Gretchen, Helen, Mary, and the abstract
“Eternal Feminine” correspond to the four female figures of the
Gnostic underworid, Eve, Helen, Mary, and Sophia.
CW 15, §211
Atrophy of feeling is a characteristic of modern man and always

shows itself as a reaction when there is too much feeling around,
and in particular too much false feeling. CW 15,8183
Everything the anima touches becomes numinous — unconditional,

dangerous, taboo, magical.... She affords the most convincing
reasons for not prying into the unconscious, an occupation that
would break down our moral inhibitions and unleash forces that
had better been left unconscious and undisturbed.
CW 9,1, §59
132
MEDIATRIX/HILLMAN
ziness of life,* she drives us crazy. “With the archetype of the

anima we enter the realm of the gods. ... Everything the anima
touches becomes numinous - unconditional, dangerous, taboo,
magical” (CW 9,i, §59).
Sentimentalities in analytical practice forget this “psychotic” as-
pect, so taken — that is, mistaken — is practice with the eros and re-
latedness of anima. Remember: her personalizing, subjectivity,
and sensitivity are all archetypal qualities; they need sifting
through by the feeling function and deliteralizing. Else one takes
over these qualities, identifies with them, believing that, by becom-
ing more intimately personal, deeply subjective, and sensitive, one
is, again, “integrating the anima,” whereas one has let her catch
one’s feeling, making it false by making it into an imitation of hers.
The imitatio animae shows first in pseudo-subjectivity, -sensitivity,
and -depth. Because she is archetypal she enlarges the dimension of
this feeling; it’s over-rich, over-refined, and it smells. Vox populi
calls it hokey.
This infiltration of feeling by anima is how practice gets sub-
orned by one of her clever duplicities: the absence of human feel-
ing in the anima archetype is precisely that which she covers with
sentimentalities about herself. But she is her own cure; for, her
cold and crazed aspect, La Belle Dame Sans Merci, brings an ar-
chetypal correction to her own sentimentality. *1’>
So let us not imagine anima bridging and mediating inward only
as a sibylline benefactrice, teaching us about all the things we did
not know, the girl guide whose hand we hold. This is a one-way
trip, and there is another direction to her movement. She would
also “unleash forces” © of the collective unconscious, for across her
bridge roll fantasies, projections, emotions that make a person’s
consciousness unconscious and collective. She makes us like every-
one else, mouthing the same clichés, chasing the same ephemera,
clinging to the same needs. As mediatrix to the eternally unknow-
able she is the bridge both over the river into the trees and into the
sludge and quicksand, making the known ever more unknown.
The deeper we descend into her ontology, the more opaque con-
sciousness becomes. Then to follow her we must declare like the
alchemists that understanding moves from the known to the un-
known in an epistemology based upon the dictum ignotum per ig-
notius. Anima explanations point to the unconscious and make us
i3
JUNG/SCRIPTA
ee
ee es Se
... the first encounter with her usually leads one to infer anything
rather than wisdom. This aspect appears only to the person who
gets to grips with her seriously. Only then. . . does he come to real-
ize more and more that behind all her cruel sporting with human
fate there lies something like a hidden purpose which seems to
reflect a superior knowledge of life’s laws. It is just the most unex-
pected, the most terrifyingly chaotic things which reveal a deeper
meaning. And the more this meaning is recognized, the more the
anima loses her impetuous and compulsive character.
CW 9,1, §64
The anima no longer crosses our path as a goddess, but, it may be

as an intimately personal misadventure, or perhaps as our best
venture. When, for instance, a highly esteemed professor in his
seventies abandons his family and runs off with a young red-head-
ed actress. ... This is how daemonic power reveals itself to us.
CW 9,1, §62
~~ In his quest for wholeness ... Michael Maier ... has found the
animal soul and the sibylline anima, who now counsels him to
journey to the seven mouths of the Nile. ... CW 14, §287
The sibyl, the guide of souls. ... Cw 14, §300
Our author was led in the first place by the anima-sibyl to under-
take the journey through the planetary houses. ...
CW 14, §313
But a conscious attitude that renounces its ego-bound intentions

... and submits to the suprapersonal decrees of fate, can claim to
be serving a king. This more exalted attitude raises the status of
the anima from that of a temptress to a psychopomp.
CW 14, §540
The anima ... now appears as the psychopomp, the one who
shows the way.... CW 12,874
134
MEDIATRIX/HILLMAN
more unconscious. She mystifies, produces sphinx-like riddles,

prefers the cryptic and occult where she can remain hidden: she in-
sists upon uncertainty. By leading whatever is known from off its
solid footing, she carries every question into deeper waters, which
is also a way of soul-making.
The deeper we follow her, the more fantastic consciousness
becomes.“ Then in dreams she reveals herself as psychotic, a
wraith with queer eyes, an “inmate” of my nightly asylum. Union
with anima also means union with my psychosis, my fear of mad-
ness, my suicide. This conjunction with its sweet sentimentalities
is purged by her salt, for it is a conjunction with the craziness of
life that is at the same time my own craziness, mediated and per-
sonalized through her bringing home a “me” that is an oddity, pe-
culiar and mine, or what Jung calls self.
Analytical psychology in lesser hands than Jung’s sometimes lets
slip these implications of the unknown. By ruses of lunar or matri-
archal consciousness, psychologists sometimes suggest that the ob-
scurity of anima states is not real menace, not real darkness, but a
light of another kind. It is as if analytical practice, living out its
wise old man fantasy, must cling to the sweet anima at all costs,
for this milk-giving daughter is inherent to the senex mythologem
so dominant in the analyst. He depends on her help, so he must see
her as helpful. Then mediatrix means only mediation and harmon-
ia only harmony. These comforting positions are another of the
ways anima befuddles thought with her gentle persuasion, protect-
ing herself by preventing us from seeing through to her demonic
depths.” After all, the reconciling go-between is also that which
comes between and, as Jung points out, the cross-cousin kinship
marriage with my soul also crosses up my plans, finally becoming
the cross of soul. Thus “the encounter with anima and animus
means conflict” (CW 16, §470), which is also a pattern of relating
with the collective unconscious. Nothing mediates unconscious-
ness and collectivity better than confusion, rage, and suffering.
Harmonia in myth is the daughter of War, and harmonia in philos-
ophy (Herakleitos, frgs. 44, 45, 47, 59, 62 — Burnet)*? is inseparable
from strife and discord.
When anima is defined as mediating psychopomp,° we are ob-
liged to inquire precisely what is her style of guidance and precisely
to what state she takes one, since the soul has other guides. There
135
136
MEDIATRIX/HILLMAN
is also the little child who leads, and the old sage or mentor, and
Hermes, and the heroic leader, and the friendly animal. Each of
these leads in a different way and to different conclusions. If her
route and goal is not feeling, femininity, counter-sexuality, or eros
— each of which did not stand the acid test in Part I — then what are
we left with?
In chapter five we said anima is the archetype of psychic con-
sciousness. But now we have been saying that anima is the arche-
type that mediates unconsciousness. Putting these two statements
together means that anima consciousness, consciousness of anima,
means first of all awareness of one’s unconsciousness. She brings
the possibility of reflection in terms of the unconscious; i.e., in
which way does this image, event, person, idea, feeling that is now
the content of my reflection produce unconsciousness? This is the
depth psychological viewpoint, and this is why anima (and not
wise old man or mother nature or culture hero) is the archetype of
the psychological calling. This is also why soul-making precedes
self-individuating. For, before we can become conscious we must
be able to know that we are unconscious, and where, when, and to
what extent. Soul-making in this context becomes nothing more
grandiose than the rather humiliating recognition of the anima ar-
chetype. It is first of all a “perception of differences” among her
endless guiles and guises, seeing where we are entangled in her gos-
samers; it is an ongoing fantasy activity about fantasies. Here soul-
making, to use an anima metaphor from Jung (CW 9,i, §158),
refers to the “‘discriminating knowledge’” that Prakrti evokes in
Purusha by dancing before him. Purusha, by the way, does not use
a sword for this discriminating. He watches.
Because anima mediates unconsciousness, making us not more
conscious but less, she therefore flourishes where unconsciousness
harbors: complexes, the illusion in life-attachments, states of
drowsiness and mood, isolated reflection, hysterical wetness and
vapors, and the follies of nympholepsy, those fascinations with
natural, simple, innocent, and cloudy causes and cures and per-
sons who embody them.
By believing that through integrating the manifestations we in-
tegrate and make conscious anima, we lose touch with the auton-
omy of her archetypal unconsciousness, and ours. The notion of
unconsciousness means autonomous, spontaneous, ubiquitous,
137
JUNG/SCRIPTA
ot
ee oe ee ae ee
. the anima is always associated with the source of wisdom and

enlightenment, whose symbol is the Old Wise Man. As long as you
are under the influence of the anima you are unconscious of that
archetype, i.e., you are identical with it and that explains your pre-
occupation with Indian philosophy. You are then forced to play
the role of the Old Wise Man.
21 April 1948, Letter to Walter Lewino
(cf. on Sophia, pp. 39, 53 above)
The symbolic process is an experience in images and of images.

CW ot 352
The numinosity of this archetype [the anima] causes a panic....

The reason for this lies in the fateful significance of the anima fig-
ure: she is the Sphinx of Oedipus, a Cassandra, the messenger of
the Grail, the “white lady” who gives warning of death, etc.
. a man’s consciousness projects all perceptions coming from
the feminine personification of the unconscious onto an anima fig-
ure.... This explains the fateful quality of the anima. .
Cw 10, 88713-14
Both these archetypes [the anima and animus] . . . possess a fatality

that can on occasion produce tragic results... . It is only when we
throw light into the dark depths of the psyche and explore the
strange and tortuous paths of human fate that it gradually be-
comes clear to us how immense is the influence wielded by these
two factors that complement our conscious life. CW 9,ii, §41
. on a low level the anima is a caricature of the feminine

Eros.... [T]he Eros of woman corresponds to ming, “fate” or
"destiny ae CW 13, §60
. the harbinger of fate, the anima.... CW 13, §218
138
MEDIATRIX/HILLMAN
collective: it hits us ever and again, popping up and spilling out

smack in the middle of the market place. Each event that occurs in
a day has an entropic, disintegrating effect. Each conversation,
analytical hour, meditation, and dream, by moving consciousness,
makes us unconscious in a new way. She mediates these shifts in
unconsciousness.
As consciousness of soul is primarily imaginal, that is, a self-re-
flection or recognition of the parade of fantasies which compose
the psyche (chapter five above), she mediates the ceaseless move-
ments of interiority. This interiority is not just within my head or
within the proprioceptive gurgles of internal sensations. She
reports the interiority of all attachments, whether in tandems to
other persons (her gossip, suspicions, remembering resentments)
or in the primordial tandems — spirit, body, and world — with
which soul is attached and of which soul is the interiority.
But these reports are not answers. To ask the anima figure via
active imagination for answers, to believe she brings counsel, other
than the knowledge of not-knowing (ambiguity, indecision, uncer-
tainty), is an analytical blunder no less foolish than those we ex-
plored earlier concerning her supposed eros or feeling or locus only
in men. Jung suggests that her wisdom is actually an undifferen-
tiated identification with the wise old man.? Even the knowledge
that wise Sophia mediates is pistis, faith, a conviction in psychic
reality and its fantasies, which leads one right away from knowing
and toward imagining. The Gnostic world from where Sophia
comes is a populated realm of imaginal figures, and the wisdom
she mediates is participation in that realm.
Manifestations of the anima show that she has no answers: the
images of her as innocent tell us of her ignorance, as echo tell us of
her unoriginality, as slippery mermaid say that she is incomprehen-
sible, just as her inability to speak clearly or think straight is im-
aged in the oracular sibyl and the muse.
The answers she does mediate are images. She responds imag-
inatively and magically, stirring imagination to musings, inspira-
tions, machinations, quests, and chases. These image-answers may
have little to offer in a practical dilemma. Yet they touch fate:
“Perhaps — who knows? — these eternal images are what men mean
by fate” (CW 7, §183).° Perhaps, too, amor fati, the love of one’s
fate, is loving images. Images present themselves and in some way
159
\
a7, ;
<
MEDIATRIX/HILLMAN
can be known, but there always remains an unknowable, unfath-

omable depth to an image. Is this where fate resides? For fate is the
unknown, in a way less known than death, which is an absolute
surety. As anima pertains to unknowable fate, so all the deeper
areas of her dominion are unknown: the archaic, phylogenetic
past, the exotic cultures, the mystery religions of Goddesses, and
the pre-conscious life of nature, as well as death. None of this can
be known. To read her images and messages in dreams for pre-
cognition is either a delusion or a hybris. Dream analysis brings us
knowledge of dreams — not of life, of fate, or of death. Nor does
dream analysis make the unconscious conscious; it merely moves
illusions, offering a new opportunity for seeing through.
Anima consciousness clings to unconsciousness, as the nymphs

adhere to their dense wooden trees and the echoes cannot leave
their caves. It is an attached consciousness that sits like a small bird
with a small voice upon the back of materia prima, roiling in the
sludge of our stupidities, and so our possibility of greatest anima
consciousness is where we are most unconsciously involved. Con-
sequently, I have emphasized gossip, petty resentments, clinging
needs, kitschy tastes, back-biting, old scores, and pouts. Not
because these refer to inferior feelings of the anima or inferior
femininity. Not at all. These conditions of intense attachment are
thick with prima materia, offering the best ground for anima in-
sights.
Anima consciousness not only relativizes ego consciousness but
also relativizes the very idea of consciousness itself. It then is no
longer clear when we are psychologically conscious and when un-
conscious. Even this fundamental discrimination, so important to
the ego-complex, becomes ambiguous. Ego therefore tends to re-
gard anima consciousness as elusive, capricious, vacillating. But
these words describe a consciousness that is mediated to the un-
known, conscious of its unconsciousness and, so, truly reflecting
psychic reality.
Psychic reality, anima consciousness, soul-making — to be wres-
tling with any one of these involves us with the others. Soul-
making calls for consciousness of anima, which is the archetype of
141
JUNG/SCRIPTA
ae
ee hol a AS 20 ee
I II
Opus naturalium Aqua
Divisio naturae Terra
Anima Aer
da Intellectus
ie
Rie Ignis
CW 9, ii, 8414
142
MEDIATRIX/HILLMAN
soul and of psychic reality. But we can understand what is meant

by “psychic reality” and “soul-making” no better than the anima
allows us, and we can follow her no further than we can under-
stand what is meant by the notion “anima,” and by the notions
“soul” and “psyche.” In other words, just as a psychological intel-
lect requires anima consciousness, anima consciousness requires
psychological intellect. The soul would be understood. Psycho-
logical understanding thus consists of two interpenetrating consti-
tuents, psyche and logos, soul and intellect.
The interpenetration of intellectual understanding and soul oc-
curs already in earlier notions of psyché in Greece and anima in
Rome. As we have seen, these sometimes referred to a living gener-
ative air in the head, or soul in the breath, i.e., a psyche with
logos, psychology. The “airs in the head” which Onians says refer
to anima in the Latin tradition (chapter five, above) are a primary
activity of the psyche, its production of “air-coloured” fantasies,
the vaporous ephemera passing through the mind (pp. 25, 85,
above, on air and anima).? The aerial phenomenology of the ani-
ma points not only to wispiness and flightiness. It also refers to one
of the four primordial elements of the imagination (Bachelard).
The alchemical psychologist Ripley said: “The aerial soul is the se-
cret fire of our philosophy, our oil, our mystic water” (CW 12,
§336n7). Air refers to the one invisible element, which like psychic
reality we know only indirectly. If the aerial soul or airy anima is
secret of the alchemical opus (and of course there are innumerable
“secrets”), I would bring this psychic air into relation with im-
aginatio, “perhaps the most important key to the understanding of
the opus” (ibid., §396). The secret and key to psychological work
requires the airy imagination of the soul, that is, the capacity of
imagining events “outside” (ibid.) of the natural bodily perspective
of empirical and material literalism but in regard to a subtle or fan-
tasy body of psychic reality. Being-in-soul requires being in a body
too, but this body is built of soul stuff; it is a “breath-body” (CW
14, §748). Fantasy-images are this stuff, this “‘subtle body’” (CW
12, §394).
So when we depreciate anima-airiness, or consider air insub-
stantial, we give lesser value to fantasy and to mind in general.
Moreover and far worse, if that is possible, we lose the key to the
entire psychological: opus, the secret of which is body-building via
143
JUNG/SCRIPTA
| EEE
They [“Syrena”] cause storms.... CW 13,§218
In psychotherapy it is a well-known fact that neurotic symptoms

which seem impossible to attack can often be rendered harmless by
conscious understanding. .. . CW 13, §436 f.
... aesthetic formulation needs understanding of the meaning, and

understanding needs aesthetic formulation. The two supplement
each other to form the transcendent function. CW 8, 8177
...in the end it makes very little difference whether the doctor un-
derstands or not, but it makes all the difference whether the pa-
tient understands. CW 16, §314
... lack of knowledge ... has exactly the same effect as uncon-
ScloUusness. CW 16, 8546
I am indeed convinced that creative imagination is the only pri-

mordial phenomenon accessible to us, the real Ground of the psy-
che, the only immediate reality. Therefore, I speak of esse in ani-
ma, the only form of being we can experience directly.
10 January 1929, Letter to Kurt Plachte
What indeed is reality if it is not a reality in ourselves, an esse in

anima? Living reality is the product neither of the actual, objective
behaviour of things nor of the formulated idea exclusively, but
rather of the combination of both ... through esse in anima.
CW 6, 877
... the man’s opus is concerned with the erotic aspect of the ani-
ma.... Out of the prima materia grows the philosophical tree, the
unfolding opus.... Eve [stands] for the man’s anima who, as Sa-
pientia or Sophia, produces out of her head the intellectual content
of the work. CW 16, §519
144
MEDIATRIX/HILLMAN
imagination. So we need to recollect the full range of psychic sig-

nificance of the air element.
Anima-air pertains: to the tempests? named after her (“Anna,”
“Betty,” “Carol” . . . )by the weather bureau; to the entire realm of
internal weather, its pressure, its moisture, its mists; to enthusiasm
and inspirations, explosions and collapses; to the creatures of the
air like butterflies and spiders, angels and witches, little red bal-
loons and gas-bags, every kind of bird and stinging winged thing;
to distancing, depth of perspective and horizon, to invisibilities,
and hunches that fall from the sky, auguries too; to the evocative
power of scents, and to sound and song and speech, mind and in-
tellect. The psychological intellect is itself an aspect of soul, one of
its airy phenomena.
Jung’s psychology derives from a thorough interpenetration of
soul and intellect; that’s why it understands, why it belongs among
the psychologies of understanding (verstehen). Jung strongly urged
the importance of understanding the psyche.» His understanding is
based upon “esse in anima’”© which provides the standpoint in-
forming his psychological thinking and which makes his thought
psychological. Esse in anima is also the basis of the massive body
of his intellectual work.
Jung’s esse in anima refers primarily to the “continually creative
act” of fantasy (CW 6, §§77-78). But the term originates as a point
of view within the universals arguments, a modus of soul between
spirit and matter or between words and things. Now, we might
call this point of view “psychological speculation,” resulting from
the speculum-mirror of anima reflection upon our spiritual and
material involvements. By means of that mirror we engage in intel-
lectual fantasy, build a psychology which can hold the psyche and
which becomes its body. Out of head comes the opus, the material,
embodied stuff of mind — and this too, as Jung says, is the work of
Eve.4
145
JUNG/SCRIPTA
a
... the anima, personifies itself in a single figure. CW 7, §332
Every man carries within him ... a definite feminine image. ...
The same is true of the woman: she too has her inborn image of
man. Actually, we know from experience that it would be more
accurate to describe it as an image of men, whereas in the case of
the man it is rather the image of woman. CW 17, §338
... the “uni-personality” of the anima. ... A passionate exclusive-

ness... attaches to the man’s anima.... CW 7, §338
. as a rule, a woman’s consciousness is restricted to one man,

whereas a man’s consciousness has a tendency to go beyond the
one personal relationship.... In the unconscious, therefore, we
may expect a compensation by contraries. The man’s sharply de-
fined anima figure fulfils this expectation perfectly, as also does the
indefinite polymorphism of the woman’s animus. Cw 10, §81
With regard to the plurality of the animus as distinguished from

what we might call the “uni-personality” of the anima, this re-
markable fact seems to me to be a correlate of the conscious atti-
tude. CW 7, §338
As it is made up of a plurality of preconceived opinions, the ani-

mus is far less susceptible of personification by a single figure, but
appears more often as a group or crowd.... On a low level the
animus is an inferior Logos, . . . just as on a low level the anima is a
caricature of the feminine Eros.... Eros is relatedness, Logos is
discrimination.... CW 13, §60
. sex is determined by a majority of male or female genes. ...

But the minority of genes belonging to the other sex does not sim-
ply disappear. A man therefore has in him a feminine side... . I
have called this figure the “anima”... . CW 9,i, §512
146
UNI-PERSONALITY/HILLMAN
9. Anima as Uni-Personality
A SUBSIDIARY definition of the anima is that there is only

one image of her in a man’s psyche, whereas the animus is defined
as a multiplicity (CW 10, §81 — “he is not so much a unity as a plu-
rality”). “The woman’s incubus consists of a host of masculine
demons; the man’s succubus is a vampire” (CW 7, §370).
Jung accounts for this difference between anima and animus
mainly through social and historical differences in gender roles:
women are more individually related and monogamous in con-
sciousness, men more indiscriminately related and polygamous;
these attitudes find compensation in unconscious contrasexual po-
sitions.> But the account may also be put as a Jungian contrast
between the differentiation of spirits (animus) and the unifying
power of eros (anima).° Another account (that I have not found in
Jung) elaborates a biological analogy similar to one that Jung does
use,? that of male and female genes. Sperm are many, the ovum
one; so, animus is a multiplicity, anima a unity.*?
147
JUNG/SCRIPTA
The dreamer is surrounded by a throng of vague female forms....

The figures that appear in the dream are ... pointing to the
feminine nature of the unconscious. They are fairies or fascinating
sirens and lamias ... who infatuate the lonely wanderer and lead
him astray. CW 12, §§58-61
.. . primitives assume the existence of several souls. . . . 1am there-

fore inclined to think that autonomous complexes are among the
normal phenomena of life and that they make up the structure of
the unconscious psyche.. CW 8, §§217-18
. it is frequently supposed that people have two or more

souls... . CW 8,§577
The plurality of souls indicates a plurality of relatively autono-

mous complexes. ... CW 8, §587
This is an age-old experience of mankind which is reflected in the

universal supposition of a plurality of souls in one and the same in-
dividual. As the plurality of psychic components at the primitive
level shows, the original state is one in which the psychic processes
are very loosely knit and by no means form a self-contained unity.
CW 8, §365
It strikes me as significant, particularly in regard to our hypothesis

of a multiple consciousness and its phenomena, that the character-
istic alchemical vision of sparks scintillating in the blackness of the
arcane substance should, for Paracelsus, change into the spectacle
of the “interior firmament” and its stars. ...
... It is in my view not too much to assume that these multiple
luminosities correspond to tiny conscious phenomena.
CW 8, 88392-96
148
Now I do not want to question the phenomenologicai findings

either of Jung (including Cw 12, 8858-61 where anima appears sig-
nificantly as a multiplicity) or of later analytical psychologists in
regard to the unity or plurality of the anima. (To repeat: this essay
is written not within an empirical fantasy but within a critical one.
We are thinking about thoughts, not about things, or about the ef-
fect of thoughts upon our experience of things.) But we do have to
explore the notion of unity and multiplicity since it enters into the
anima’s definition.
The main question opened by these pairings is the ancient and
perplexing issue concerning the unity or multiplicity of soul. Jung
points to the multiplicity of souls in several contexts. “The prim-
itive assertion that the individual has a plurality of souls is in agree-
ment with our findings” (CW 14, §504n386).> By “primitive” Jung
means “primordial” (CW 8, §218) and therefore always present at
our deepest levels, since a multiplicity of autonomous complexes
“make up the structure of the unconscious psyche” (ibid.).°
149
JUNG/SCRIPTA
———
asinine a a I SE SE ES
I have always been greatly impressed by the character of dissoci-

ated fragments as personalities. ... [I]f such fragments have per-
sonality, the whole from which they were broken off must have
personality to an even higher degree. ... Personality need not im-
ply consciousness. It can just as easily be dormant or dreaming.
... It may be that all of the [hidden] personality to be found in
the unconscious is contained in the fragmentary personifications
mentioned before....
. in the unconscious of every man there is hidden a feminine
personality.... CW 9,i, §§508-11
(b) The classical world thought of this pneuma as Dionysus . . . whose

divine substance is distributed throughout the whole of nature.
CW 11, §387
Psychologically, this doctrine testifies to the personality- or ego-

character of psychic complexes: just as the distinguishing mark of
the ego-complex is consciousness, so it is possible that other, “un-
conscious” complexes may possess, as splinter psyches, a certain
luminosity of their own. CW 14, 847
... the motif of dismemberment ... is well known in alchemy.

The atoms are or become “white sparks” shining in the terra
foetida. CW 14, §64
In actual fact, however, the psychic substratum, that dark realm of

the unknown, exercises a fascinating attraction that threatens to
become the more overpowering the further he penetrates into it.
[fn.48: Symbolized by a sorceress or by wanton girls . . . ]The psy-
chological danger that arises here is the disintegration of personal-
ity into its functional components, i.e., the separate functions of
consciousness, the complexes, hereditary units, etc....
. . that is to say, the body and the psychic representatives of the
organs gain mastery over the conscious mind.
CW 12, 88439-40
SS
150
Another excursion on psychic multiplicity leads directly into a re-

view of the anima concept. We find multiplicity again in his idea
of soul fragments dispersed throughout matter and body,? a sub-
ject that I went into via “Dionysus in Jung’s Writings” (Spring
1972; reprinted in Facing the Gods). At times Jung seems to agree
with the description of the self as the “collective aggregate of all in-
dividual souls” and to be “compounded of many,” quoting Origen:
“Each of us is not one, but many” (CW 9,i, §675).
The history of psychology shows many kinds or parts of soul, or
soul-systems with specific names — animal, corporal, sanguinal,
rational, seminal, spiritual, mercurial, vegetative, sensitive, vital —
and has located these souls in different zones and regions of the ac-
tual human and animal being. Alchemy is replete with these names
of soul as is pre-modern medicine. As well, multiplicity of souls is
commonly found by anthropologists investigating the psycholog-
ical conceptions of pre-literate peoples. These different kinds of
soul express the idea that there is a psychic aspect, or animation,
within or attached to every bit of physical nature, an “organ con-
sciousness” (CW 15, §112n8).
And myths love to enchant us with the figures of innumerable
maidens, such as the Gopi girls of Krishna, the Houris of Persian
paradise, or the multiple daughters of the Sun who show Parmen-
ides the way to truth. A delight in multiplicity and multiple de-
lights seem to belong to anima phenomenology.
151
JUNG/SCRIPTA
(a) On the one hand the anima is the connecting link with the world
beyond and the eternal images, while on the other hand her emo-
tionality involves man in the chthonic world and its transitoriness.
CW 13, 8457
... the anima, as she personifies the plurality of the archetypes .. .

CW 14, 8218
(b) [The anima]. . . in accordance with her Eros nature, wears the fea-
tures of Aphrodite, Helen (Selene), Persephone, and Hecate.
CW 9,11, 841
(c) His[Prometheus’s] soul is Minerva. ... The Prometheus of mythol-

ogy has his soul-relation with Pandora or Athene....
CW 6, §§289-95
(d) ... the Kore as observable in man, the anima. CW 9,i, 8356
(e) ... Pandora has the value of a soul-image. . . . CW 6, §305
(f) Four stages of eroticism were known in the late classical period:
Hawwah (Eve), Helen (of Troy), the Virgin Mary, and Sophia... .
[W]e are dealing with the ... anima-figure in four stages. ...
CW 16, §361
... the four female figures of the Gnostic underworld, Eve, Helen,
Mary, and Sophia. Cw 15, §211
ey
Unlike philosophy, and scientific medicine too, which chooses

among statements, aiming always toward a coherent unity, or uni-
fied field, psychology may include all the positions about soul as
valid descriptions. Each statement reflects a valid reality; each is
an expression of soul telling about itself according to its present
constellation. Because anima comprises so many contrarieties, a
psychology true to anima describes soul in so many contrary ways.
From the perspective of delight in plurality, anima as a uni-person-
ality is merely one of her many guises.
Anima specifically connects with plurality through its definition
as representative of the collective unconscious involving us in innu-
merable images and body-bound emotions? Anima and plurality
again connect in the idea that the “anima/animus stage is corre-
lated with polytheism, the self with monotheism” (CW 9, ii, §427),
a statement that opened a considerable discussion in Spring 1971,
pp. 193-232.
Because anima is “the matrix of all the divine and semi-divine
figures, from the pagan goddess to the Virgin” (CW 16, 8504), her
images range through a variety of figures from Gnosticism and
classical polytheism. Jung mentions Aphrodite, Selene, Perseph-
one, Hecate,» Athene-Minerva,° Kore,‘ and Pandora‘ besides the
four classical “stages” of the anima! and the elf, nixie, and nymph
creatures we have already referred to. He also draws parallels with
the doubling of souls in Egyptian, Hebrew, and Chinese thought.
Clearly, when describing the anima, Jung’s imagination turns fre-
quently to the polyvalence of pagan myth and to primitive or
exotic ideas of soul, i.e., to reflections that are extra- or pre-
Christian.
153
JUNG/SCRIPTA |
e
oe 8 e Se e
(a) The dreamer is surrounded by a throng of vague female forms....

The figures that appear in the dream are . . . pointing to the fem-
inine nature of the unconscious. They are fairies or fascinating si-
rens and lamias, ... who infatuate the lonely wanderer and lead
him astray. CW 12, §§58-61
(b) The splitting of the anima into many figures is equivalent to disso-
lution into an indefinite state, i.e., into the unconscious, from
which we may conjecture that a relative dissolution of the con-
scious mind is running parallel with the historical regression (a
process to be observed in its extreme form in schizophrenia).
CW 12, 8116
154
Despite these passages, the definition of anima as a “‘uni-per-
sonality’” (CW 7, §338) means that when the anima appears in
plural form* a regressive “dissolution”® must be taking place.
Moreover, each man has one anima figure that truly represents his
soul. Even if the psyche is a plurality of complexes, each with its
soul-spark, one man, one anima is the formula.
The first advantage of anima unity is practical. It limits. It places
a stricture upon our use of the term. We may not call “anima”
every female figure, mood, and aesthetic or historical concern.
Without this stricture every cat-like creature, every waitress, tele-
phone operator, usherette becomes anima, as well as sisters,
nieces, daughters, cousins, and so on through the public, familial,
historical, literary, legendary worlds. Then, as Graham Hough al-
ready recognized (Spring 1973, p. 93):
... we are faced with an embarras de richesse: .. . Are all the heroines of
romantic and idealised fiction anima figures? Yes. Are they equally ani-
ma figures regardless of the quality of the fictions in which they appear? I
am afraid, yes. . . From Dante’s Beatrice and Petrarch’s Laura to the vul-
garest heroines of soap-operas and girlie magazines, all are recognisable
as anima images.
The notion of only one empirical anima configuration says no to

this sloppiness. We may call “anima” only that particular gestalt
which precisely, continually, and specifically signifies the core
quality of my soul. This gestalt must also bear definitive attributes
that are archetypally anima: mystery, emotion, paradox, impor-
tance; she must stir my loving and link backwards through tradi-
tion to pre-history, trailing the archaic, phylogenetic and psychotic
psyche in her roots; as well, she must be instrumental to fate and
be the prime mover of fantasy and reflection by remaining “un-
known.”
To be replete with all these attributes is a tall order for any one
figure to fill. What about all the figures that fill only some aspects
— do we drop the epithet “anima” from them or accord it nonethe-
less though in diminished strength? In other words we have been
forced back to the same problem: one anima or many. Before we
try to work on this in another way, let’s look at the effects in ther-
apy of the uni-personality notion.
thy)
JUNG/SCRIPTA
SS
a
... start some dialogue with your anima. ... put a question or two
to her: why she appears as Beatrice? why she is so big? why you
are so small? why she nurses your wife and not yourself? ... Treat
her as a person, if you like as a patient or a goddess, but above all
treat her as something that does exist. ... talk to this person .. . to
see what she is about and to learn what her thoughts and character
are. If you yourself step into your fantasy, then that overabun-
dance of material will soon come to more reasonable propor-
tions.... Keep your head and your own personality over against
the overwhelming multitude of images. ... treat the anima as if she
were a patient whose secret you ought to get at.
7 May 1947, Letter to Mr. O.
[The patient] .. . is quite right to treat the anima as an autonomous

personality and to address personal questions to her.
I mean this as an actual technique. ... The art of it consists only
in allowing our invisible partner to make herself heard. ... [O]ne
should cultivate the art of conversing with oneself in the setting
provided by an affect.... CW 7, §§322-23
... scintilla, the “little soul-spark” of Meister Eckhart. . . . Similar-

ly Heraclitus . .. is said to have conceived the soul as a “spark of
stellar essence.” ...
Alchemy, too, has its doctrine of the scintilla. . . “For all things
have their origin in this source. ...”
CW 14, §§842-43
Were it not for the leaping and twinkling of the soul, man would
rot away in his greatest passion, idleness. CW 9,i, §56
156
The therapeutic recommendation to concentrate upon the ani-

ma through dialogue with her? knits her into a more centered and
defined figure. When my therapeutic intention accords with the
notion of uni-personality, I will be aiming for a single figure who
can be my muse or genie, draining off affects from subsidiary fan-
tasies, forsaking all others, by definition.
Definitions are rules that have all the power of ruling principles,
determining what belongs and what is excluded. If multiplicity and
anima become by definition mutually exclusive, then not only is
my individual soul-image deprived of unlimited multiplicity, but
also multiplicity is deprived of soul — and indeed in much of Jung’s
writings on Dionysus, multiplicity is a threat to soul. In other
places (e.g., CW 9,i, §279), where he contrasts unity and plurality,
the latter refers to “dissociation,” “fragmentation,” “dissolution,”
or at best an “incomplete synthesis of personality.”
Deep under the surface of therapy’s skirmishes with anima uni-
fication, there rumble great battle chariots of antiquity, persecu-
tions, and the slaughter of martyrs. For within our engagement
with anima lies the historical conflict in the Western soul about the
soul. Is it “Christian” or “Classical” (or “Pagan” as the Christians
called Classical culture)? Anima as uni-personality takes her stand
within the main line of the Christian view of soul.** Then the pa-
gan elements excluded from anima lose soul and become demon-
ized areas of guilt and inferiority. They are only soul-sparks,>
splinters, splits, but never are they fully able to become soul unless
their energy is transformed and held by the dominant anima sys-
tem of Mistress Soul as Mother Church.*5 Unification through
transformation is an equivalent in psychological language to what
religion calls conversion of soul.
But what of the soul-sparks, the anima fragments that do not
cohere, do not convert? These always threaten a great conflagra-
LS7,
JUNG/SCRIPTA
eT
S Only a little more than a thousand years ago we stumbled out of

the crudest beginnings of polytheism into a highly developed
Oriental religion which lifted the imaginative minds of half-sav-
ages to a height that in no way corresponded to their spiritual de-
velopment. ... The repressed elements naturally did not develop,
but went on vegetating in the unconscious, in their original bar-
barism. Cw 13,870
Spiritually the Western world is in a precarious situation, and the

danger is greater the more we blind ourselves ... with illusions
about our beauty of soul. Western man lives in a thick cloud of in-
cense which he burns to himself so that his own countenance may
be veiled from him in the smoke.
... that megalomania of ours which leads us to suppose . . . that
Christianity is the only truth and the white Christ the only re-
deemer.
No wonder that unearthing the psyche is like undertaking a full-
scale drainage operation. CW 10, §§183-86
Christian civilization has proved hollow to a terrifying degree: it is

all veneer, but the inner man has remained untouched and there-
fore unchanged.... Inside reign the archaic gods, supreme as of
olde cw 12,312
cs The Christian principle which unites the opposites is the worship

of God, in Buddhism it is the worship of the self (self-develop-
ment), while in Spitteler and Goethe it is the worship of the soul
symbolized by the worship of woman. Implicit in this categoriza-
tion is the modern individualistic principle on the one hand, and
on the other a primitive poly-daemonism which assigns to every
race, every tribe, every family, every individual its specific religious
principle. CW 6, §375
The animus does not appear as one person, but as a plurality of

persons. CW 7, §332 (cf. CW 10, §698)
... the woman’s animus... his name is legion. CW 9, ii, §424

SS
158
tion. They are the pre-Christian level always at the threshold, a re-
curring fantasy in Jung’s writings* — “how thin is the wall that sep-
arates us from pagan times” (CW 9, ii, §272). In fact Jung explicitly
connects — in a remarkable paragraph on “the worship of woman
and the worship of the soul” in the Romantics? — “the modern indi-
vidualistic principle” and “primitive poly-daemonism.” In this fan-
tasy of soul, Christian and Pagan constellate and compensate each
other. The fantasy of barbarian hinterlands, Wotan, Dionysus,
and the “poly-daemonic” unconscious that has not been Christian-
ized — all contrast strongly with the fantasy of the individualized
“uni-personality” of soul who is the guide of individuation toward
unified wholeness. Anima is thus anima naturaliter christiana, the
soul as naturally Christian because of her uni-personality defini-
tion. But! — should the contrast between the one and the many be
placed within the model of compensation, then the more the soul
image coalesces into unity, is not the likelihood increased at the
same time of even more psychotic and barbaric threats behind the
thin wall? In other words: the anxiety of some analysts about la-
tent psychosis in their patients may be a direct consequent of their
anima notion. Worship of the unified anima and “primitive poly-
daemonism” are two sides of the same coin.
To say it another way: a unified, unconscious anima constel-
lates its opposite, polygamous consciousness, in the masculine
ego. The multiple, unconscious animus constellates its opposite,
monogamous consciousness, in the feminine ego. Archetypally,
what is going on is projection in a reverse direction. Then we see
monogamy to be an idea born of the animus: an attempt to dis-
criminate among the many spirits by choosing one and sticking by
it. And polygamy is an idea born of anima, an attempt to loosen
masculine, compulsive singleness by paganizing and demonizing
with multiplicity.
By evoking the Christian—Pagan conflict, I am trying to make
explicit the historical background in Jung’s fantasy regarding this
question. I am trying to grasp why he had to insist on unity of ani-
ma in face of evidence that could just as well have turned it the oth-
er way. But evidence is not the determining factor, neither in our
discussion nor probably in Jung’s notion. There is something deep-
er at work, the subjective factor, which partly forms the empirical
ground of every anima definition.
159
JUNG/SCRIPTA
... L caught sight of two figures, an old man with a white beard
and a beautiful young girl. ... The old man explained that he was
Elijah, and that gave me a shock. But the girl staggered me even
more, for she called herself Salome! She was blind. What a strange
couple: Salome and Elijah. But Elijah assured me that he and
Salome had belonged together from all eternity. | MDR, p. 181
It has been objected that Christ cannot have been a valid symbol of
the self... . I can agree with this view only if it refers strictly to the
present time, when psychological criticism has become possible,
but not if it pretends to judge the pre-psychological age. Christ did
not merely symbolize wholeness, but, as a psychic phenomenon,
he was wholeness. CW 9,ii, §115n75
The Christ-symbol is of the greatest importance for psychology in

so far as it is perhaps the most highly developed and differentiated
symbol of the self, apart from the figure of the Buddha. We can see
this from the scope and substance of all the pronouncements that
have been made about Christ: they agree with the psychological
phenomenology of the self in unusually high degree, although they
do not include all aspects of this archetype. CW 12, §22
. hysteria is characterized by a centrifugal movement of

libido.... CW 6, §859 (cf. §8858-63)
She [Eve, Pandora] played the part ... of the anima, who func-
tions as the link between body and spirit, just as Shakti or Maya
entangles man’s consciousness with the world. CW 13, 8126
... in schizophrenia the movement is more centripetal. ... During

the incubation of his illness the schizophrenic . . . turns away from
the outer world in order to withdraw into himself... .
CW 6, §§859-63
a
160
Therefore I do not believe that the question can be resolved

merely philosophically, i.e., that anima as a noumenal archetype is
one; anima as phenomenal images is many. This kind of out leaves
the door open for new questions to crowd in. The leading one is:
how do we know that the noumenal anima is ‘one’ since the nou-
menal is beyond knowledge? All we know are the many anima im-
ages, and they appear the world over as Hough points out, and
they appear in particular in each person’s variegated imagination.
Answers such as the-many-in-the-one and the-one-in-the-many are
conundrums or wise saws: the psychology of the matter is still un-
touched.
Rather I believe the question is resolvable only in terms of an-
other anima tandem. This time it is the tandem which has highest
place in Jung’s psychology — the soul/self pair or anima/wise old
man. They appeared early in Jung’s imagination as Salome with
Elijah-Philemon.* With them comes an “Egypto-Hellenistic atmos-
phere with a Gnostic coloration,” the very world rife with conflict
between Christian and Classical for the soul of Western man. It is
within a tandem to wise old man (senex) that anima is perceived
and defined as a uni-personality, not because she is one but be-
cause she is seen through an eye that sees ‘ones.’ The point of view
is from the self archetype which sees soul with a unified eye.*°“. .
if therefore thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of
light” (Matt. 6:22). The unipersonal anima finds its background in
tandem with self, its centricity and unity, its transcending synthesis
and inwardness — and its Christianity. For it is less the soul that is
naturally Christian than it is the se/f that has naturally been sym-
bolized in our culture by Christ.
Here the notion of anima is affected by another group of opposi-
tional pairings. On the one hand: outside, centrifugal extraver-
sion, hysteria,“ “multiplicity of the world” (Cw 9,i, §632), and
anima in the wrong place creating all the illusions of Shakti.4 On
the other: inside, centripetal introversion, schizophrenia,’ the ar-
co
161
JUNG/SCRIPTA
es
—— The withdrawal of projections makes the anima what she original-

ly was: an archetypal image which, in its right place, functions to
the advantage of the individual. CW 16, §504
Melusina, the deceptive Shakti.... should no longer dance before

the adept with alluring gestures, but must become what she was
from the beginning: a part of his wholeness. As such she must be
“conceived in the mind.” CW 13, §223
es In the shape of the goddess the anima is manifestly projected, but

in her proper (psychological) shape she is introjected; she is, as
Layard says, the “anima within.” She is the natural sponsa, man’s
mother or sister or daughter or wife from the beginning, the com-
panion whom the endogamous tendency vainly seeks to win in the
form of mother and sister. CW 16,8438
162
chaic, primordial imagination of myth and anima in the “right

place.”* The extraverted movement is Epimethean, “constantly
giving out and responding in a soulless fashion” (CW 6, §310),
whereas the introverted movement presents anima functioning ap-
propriately, endogamous, “within,”> mediatrix to archetypal im-
ages (not patterns of behavior). Anima development thus proceeds
from outside to inside as well as from lower to higher (Eve to
Sophia), quite in accordance with St. Augustine’s prescription for
the soul’s development: “ab exterioribus ad interiore, ab inferi-
oribus ad superioria.”
By mediating to the center and its unity rather than to the pe-
riphery and its soulless ten thousand things, the uni-personality
notion implies three fundamental movements for anima develop-
ment: from many to one, from outer to inner, from lower to
higher. When these notions are taken literally as ways to behave,
then anima ‘development’ actually results in a superiority, an ani-
ma inflation, and then too unification is brought about at the ex-
pense of the lower, outer, and multiple events of the soul. Anima
has indeed led to wise old man, but as a dogmatic, literal-encrust-
ed senex.
The consequences of this movement — if not thoroughly larded
with the richness of Jung’s thought about psychic plurality and the
myriad possibilities of soul figures, soul emotions, and soul sparks
— may shrivel consciousness to the one-sidedness that Jung consid-
ered a definition of neurosis. I would specify the neurosis as reli-
gious and find its etiology in analysis itself, because it would be
fostered by the analytical notions of anima. Moreover, this neuro-
sis would go unnoticed in the consulting room since the attitudes
of the patient would comply with the anima fantasy of the therapy.
By the religious neurosis of analysis, I mean specifically what
happens when individuation is guided by a notion of anima that
takes integration as unity and interiority as superiority. Then one
finds soul only by turning inward to a single guide. By concentrat-
ing upon this uni-personality, she herself becomes concentrated,
drawing off the surplus exuberance of fantasy. When this concen-
tration of anima dominates, it exudes the sanctimonious balm of
superiority that seeps through the analysis as a by-product of its
identification with interiority. Then anima loses her ties with life
of which she is the very archetype. A peculiar religiosity, together
163
JUNG/SCRIPTA
(a) The plurality of Ufos ... is a projection of a number of psychic

images of wholeness which appear in the sky because on the one
hand they represent archetypes charged with energy and on the
other hand are not recognized as psychic factors.
CW 10, §635 (cf. §§633-34)
(b) The goal [unity] is important only as an idea; the essential thing is
the opus which leads to the goal: that is the goal of a lifetime.
CW 16, 8400
Personality, as the complete realization of our whole being, is an

unattainable ideal. But unattainability is no argument against the
ideal, for ideals are only signposts, never the goal.
CWal nec o8
164
with the soul-magic of synchronicity, anoints the analysis, and the

worldly failures, obtuseness, and insignificance of the two persons
become mere wrappings within which are hid higher powers of
wisdom regarding the ‘inner’ world, analysis its glass vessel. Then,
horribile dictu, individuation becomes insulation, introversion be-
comes introspection, and insights are replaced by inspirations, as
soul merges with the spirituality of a logos Self, so that the enigmas
of life are resolved in vitro by means of internal dialogues with an
oracular priestess, ‘my anima.’
“But the striving for unity is opposed by a possibly even stronger

tendency to create multiplicity, so that even in strictly monotheistic
religions like Christianity the polytheistic tendency cannot be sup-
pressed” (CW 5, §149). The irrepressible many return from the far
periphery as multiple flying saucers, a plurality of units.* A similar
plurality of units occurs at the culminating stage of the alchemical
work “beyond which it is impossible to go except by means of the
multiplicatio” (CW 16, §526). For unity, Jung reminds us, is not an
empirical reality, not part of our lived world. It is the fantasy im-
age of a goal “Reality consists of a multiplicity of things. But one
is not a number; the first number is two, and with it multiplicity
and reality begin” (CW 14, §659). “So far, I have found no stable or
definite center in the unconscious and I don’t believe such a center
exists. I believe that the thing which I call the Self is an ideal
Centers. 3-7"
Jung’s insistence upon the paradoxical nature of the Self be-
comes especially important in regard to its definition as archetype
of psychic unity. Because by definition it is always partly uncon-
scious, it has no closure and is therefore susceptible to interfusion
with other archetypal dominants. The notion of Self and even an
experience or dream image called Self will be subject to the color-
ing of other archetypes. So, there are notions and experiences that
impress shadow on Self (darkness, unknowing, the sol niger), or
great mother (cyclical in time or regenerative in effect), or anima
(natural, aesthetic, and historical symbols). Self is not self-same,
and as a “stable and definite center” it is an ideal. Ideals lead to
idealizations, so that a therapeutic focus on Self is better conceived
165
JUNG/SCRIPTA
a i pe
(a) The anima/animus stage is correlated with polytheism. ...

CW 9,11, 8427
The transformation of libido through the symbol is a process that

has been going on ever since the beginnings of humanity and con-
tinues still.... This age-old function of the symbol is still present
today, despite the fact that for many centuries the trend of mental
development has been towards the suppression of individual sym-
bol-formation. ... [A] step[s] in this direction was . . . the extermi-
nation of polytheism. ... Cw 8,§92
166
SA 2iiGao
40 Lala MAN
if it attends to its differentiations — that is, the actual language, im-

age, and feelings — in order to recognize under which dominant,
within which myth, Self is now appearing.
Just as the within is not literally inside me and the superior not
literally higher, so unity is not literally singleness, in one place, one
voice, one image. Just as the within refers to the point of view of
interiority everywhere and the higher refers to the subtle fantasy
aspect of events, so unity of anima refers to the recognition that all
things are ways of soul and signify it, that existence is a psychic
network, and that nothing given to human being is alien to soul.
Unity of soul refers to unity of an outlook that sees all events as
psychic realities. A uni-personality of anima personifies this uni-
fied perspective. By means of it we recognize that the ten thousand
attachments represented by the multiplicity of anima images and
experiences are each and all soul-making possibilities. Anima is the
function that gives psyche to multiplicity by being the psycholog-
ical correlate to polytheism and to individual symbol formations.@
Anima enables the many not to become one but to become psychic
materia. Then anima cannot have any specific known identity,
cannot be identified. “Anima” refers to the viewpoint of soul that
we bring (or she brings) toward experience. Then the question of
one or many is psychologically irrelevant and, as Jung himself
says, the anima can be “in singular or plural form” (CW 14, §128).
10. The Anima in the Syzygy
S O FAR we have generally been examining the anima notion

independent of its context within the field of archetypes. Even if
this aids conceptual clarification, it can result in phenomenological
distortion since the archetypes by definition are inextricably inter-
167
2}
(a) Together they [anima and animus] form a divine pair.... the di-
vine syzygy.... CW 9,ii, 841 (cf. 8825-42)
168
SYZYGY/HILLMAN
twined “in a state of contamination, of the most complete mutual

interpenetration and interfusion.”4®
The discriminating intellect naturally keeps on trying to establish their

singleness of meaning and thus misses the essential point; for what we
can above all establish as the one thing consistent with their nature is
their manifold meaning, their almost limitless wealth of reference, which
makes any unilateral formulation impossible. (CW 9,i, §80)
The archetypal field presents a polycentric picture, a theater of

personified powers always implicating one another. The perspec-
tive that would cleanly etch out their distinct lines reflects the mon-
otheistic consciousness of the scientific and philosophical ap-
proach; the perspective that would speak of them ambiguously
and in images reflects the polytheistic, hermetic, or anima con-
sciousness of the psychological approach.
From this second position every archetype always implies anoth-
er: child—mother, mother—hero, hero—father, father—son,
son—wise old man, wise old man—daughter, daughter—mother,
mother—child — and so on, no matter where we start or how we
proceed. Alchemy excels in exemplifying this interlocking of
terms, where each term shifts its valence according to the constel-
lation. Thus anima can have all sorts of names and valences and
images depending upon the tandem she is in. We seem able to
grasp her essence only in contradistinction to something else. Usu-
ally this contradistinction has been identified with contrasexuality.
But we have also reported upon anima in tandems with ego, shad-
ow, persona, and self.
But of all the tandems and couplings, it is especially with the
animus that this notion is paired. Jung calls this pair the syzygy.?
He says: “Anyone, therefore, who does not know the ... signif-
icance of the syzygy motif ... can hardly claim to say anything
about the concept of the anima” (CW 9,i, §115). His last major
treatments of anima in 1951 (CW 9,ii, §20 ff.), 1954 (CW 9,i,
8111 ff.), and 1955-56 (CW §14) consider anima and animus to-
gether. They are exemplifications in psychological experience of
the archetypal image of the divine conjuncted pair, the syzygy.
Now we can look back at all the contrasted pairings (e.g. , multi-
and uni-personality in chapter nine, anima- and ego-consciousness
169
... the syzygy motif ... expresses the fact that a masculine ele-
ment is always paired with a feminine one. CW 9,i, 8134
170
SYZYGY/HILLMAN
in chapter five, contra-sexuality in chapter one) as ineluctable con-

sequences, even literalizations, of the syzygy. Now we can see why
our enquiry has been shadowed from the beginning by a style of
viewing anima through an opposite. The archetypal perspective of
the syzygy will always perceive events in compensatory pairings.
This must be so, for in “the realm of the syzygies” “the One is
never separated from the Other” (Cw 9,i, §194). If anima belongs
archetypally to this pair, we “can hardly lay claim to say anything
about the concept of anima” without speaking also of animus.
Phenomenally she can never appear alone without him.* To be
engaged with anima is to be engaged simultaneously with animus
in some way or another.
The implications of this are staggering, so let us move cautious-
ly. Have all our scrutinizings and speculations been vain since we
have not fully taken into account the other half of the archetypal
pair? Or, has the Other been present throughout in the perspec-
tives toward the anima, and thus in the author, making this essay
on anima both an esse im anima and an animus exercise? For if ani-
ma has been the subject of investigation, animus has been the
investigator. Or does it work the other way around-—if animus has
been the logos plan and the activity of making words serve critical
discrimination, anima has been feathering those words and guid-
ing their direction with her fantasies. We cannot take any stand re-
garding anima without, horribile dictu, taking up an animus posi-
tion. There is no other vantage point toward either than the other.
And since the syzygy insists that we cannot have one without the
other, we cannot intuit or fantasy our way beyond the archetypal
limitations placed on all consciousness of either member of this
pair by the pair itself. “From this fact we may reasonably conclude
that man’s imagination is bound by this [syzygy] motif, so that he
was largely compelled to project it again and again, at all times and
in all places” (CW 9,i, §120).
This essay is one more of those compelled projections, part of
the endless mythologizing about divine pairs, stimulated by them
and reflecting them: Aphrodite peitho (persuasion), persuasive
rhetoric joined alternatively with Hephaistos in the forging of con-
structions and with Ares in battle rage. This essay is a mythical ac-
tivity of anima coming on as a critical activity of animus. Yet just
this is psychology, the interpenetration of psyche and logos, within
171
JUNG/SCRIPTA
(a) ... the motif of polyophthalmia . .. point[s] to the peculiar nature

of the unconscious, which can be regarded as a “multiple con-
sciousness.” CW 9,i, §614
(b) ... the soul (anima) released at the “death” is reunited with the
dead body and brings about its resurrection, or again the “many
colours” ... or “peacock’s tail” ... lead to the one white colour
that contains all colours. CW 12, §334
(c) ... the archetypes appear as active personalities in dreams and

fantasies. CW 9,i, §80
ips
SYZYGY/HILLMAN
the bounds of the syzygy who sets the limits to our psychological
field so that we cannot imagine beyond it. Within it, however, our
possibilities are as limitless as the ceaseless pairings and couplings
and interpenetrations of anima and animus.
To imagine in pairs and couples is to think mythologically.
Mythical thinking connects pairs into tandems rather than sep-
arating them into opposites which is anyway a mode of philos-
ophy. Opposites lend themselves to very few kinds of description:
contradictories, contraries, complementaries, negations — formal
and logical. Tandems, however, like brothers or enemies or trad-
ers or lovers show endless varieties of styles. Tandems favor inter-
course — innumerable positions. Opposition is merely one of the
many modes of being in a tandem.
The notion of the syzygy demands that an exhaustive explora-
tion of anima examine animus to the same extent. To do her full
justice one has to give him equal time. But this has been happening
indirectly. All our observations have come from a contrasting posi-
tion, and each of these other positions can be conceived as repre-
senting the other, the animus, in one of his perspectives. This gives
some justification to an old argument of Neumann’s (chapter four)
that the development of ego consciousness in men and women
alike was essentially a masculine process (or protest) out of a femi-
nine unconscious. There is the syzygy once more. They play into
each other, constellated by particular patterns, or mythologems.
Some we have already seen: chapter nine, where the unity—plural-
ity controversy turns anima into a polyopthalmic,? multicolored
peacock’s tailb and animus into a monotheistic cyclops; chapter
seven, where one notion of integrating the anima conceives her as
a dark dragon and him as a loin-girded swords-man.
By continuing to call the syzygy “her” and “him,” I am stressing
their personified nature.© Persons come in genders, even if psychic
persons do indeed transgress this naturalism (as Rupprecht’s Mar-
tial Maid shows in Spring 1974, pp. 269-93). Jung notes that: “The
male-female syzygy is only one among the possible pairs of oppo-
sites” (CW 9,i, §142). He hints in the same paragraph that in itself
anima and animus may have no special sexual gender, or as I tried
to put it above (p. 65): “Paradoxically, the very archetype of femi-
ninity may not itself be feminine.”
173
JUNG/SCRIPTA
Anima c Animus
(a) An uncomplicated personal relationship.

(b) A relationship of the man to his anima and of the woman to
her animus.
(c) A relationship of anima to animus and vice versa.
(d) A relationship of the woman’s animus to the man (which hap-
pens when the woman is identical with her animus), and of the
man’s anima to the woman (which happens when the man is iden-
tical with his anima).
CW 16, §§422-23 (cf. CW 9,ii, §§328, 359-98;
CW 14, 88611-12; CW 16, 88431-32)
On the psychological level, the tangle of relationships in the cross-

cousin marriage reappears in the transference problem. The dilem-
ma here consists in the fact that anima and animus are projected
upon their human counterparts. ... But in so far as anima and ani-
mus undoubtedly represent the contrasexual components of the
personality, their kinship character ... point|s] . . . to the integra-
tion of personality.... CW 16, §441
174
SYZYGY/HILLMAN
Nonetheless, essential to thinking in syzygies is thinking in gen-
ders. Unfortunately, the next step in analytical psychology has
been identifying these genders with actual men and women, cou-
pling kinds of syzygies between man-and-anima, woman-and-ani-
mus, man-and-woman, and fourth, anima-and-animus, even with
diagrams, for example, the lengthy discussion of the Gnostic sym-
bol of the Self.*
Anima~—animus, the fourth of these syzygies, has two meanings:
a) a syzygy between two persons in an interpersonal relation, and
b) a syzygy of anima and animus within any man or any woman as
an intrapersonal relation. It is this latter that needs real attention.
It has been neglected because we have been locked into the con-
trasexual definition of anima and animus. But, as we worked out
above (pp. 51-65), archetypes cannot be confined to human gen-
der, and we saw how anima works equally in women. The next
consequent is to observe animus working in men.
The archetypal syzygy takes place inside us each and not only as
projected into our relationships.» That’s why men carry on and
talk like animuses, and women gaze and fade like animas. To ac-
count for this everyday behavior in terms of “animus of the moth-
er” or “anima of the animus,” etc. — contortions that analysts have
had to resort to — misses a main point about anima—animus projec-
tions.
Projections occur between parts of the psyche, not only outside
into the world. They occur between internal persons and not only
onto external people. The alchemical idea of projection referred to
interior events. Ruland’s alchemical dictionary describes projection
as a “violent interpenetration” of substances; there is a “sudden
egression” which is projected over a matter by another matter
therewith transforming it. Projection too can be psychologized; we
can take back projection itself, interiorizing it as an activity going
on blindly between anima and animus within.
Each anima figure projects a particular sort of animus figure and
vice versa.4? A Hebe wants a Hercules and Hercules does it for
Hebe - and not just on the college campus between cheerleader
and linebacker but “in here.” My hebephrenic soul, young and silly
and tied by social conventions, the bride and her shower, produces
an ego that comes home like a hero showing off and bearing tro-
175
SYZYGY/HILLMAN
phies. Or, within the smiling, innocent girl is ruthless ambition in a

lionskin, forever wrestling Old Age and able to harrow Hell itself.
Another, more intellectual example: during anima imagining of
whatever sort — spiteful, lascivious, or productive — an animus
spirit rises up and begins to criticize. Precisely here is the origin of
the critical spirit as that part of fantasy which detaches itself, ab-
stracts, makes comparisons, and looks down. This animus serves
soul by separating mind from mood to gain distance. However, as
an animus bound in tandem with anima, this critical spirit still re-
tains traces of moodiness, now ‘objectified’ into opinion. So it is
not altogether freed of subjectivism. (Little wonder that critics
seem anima-ridden and opinionated, both.) The objective spirit,
that goal of our Western intellectual endeavor, is an attempt of the
soul to free itself by means of the animus from the valley of its at-
tachments. And the figure in dreams who judges is the one who
both frees us from anima imprisonments and sentences us with his
opinions.
To consider every position in terms of the syzygy reflects a “her-
maphroditic” consciousness in which the One and the Other are
co-present, a priori, at all times, a hermetic duplicity and aphro-
ditic coupling going on in every event. This works in the following
way:
When we feel we have caught a glimpse of anima in an image,
mood, or projection, the immediate next question is ‘where is
animus?’ Most likely it is in the perceiving ego itself that has made
the observation possible in the first place (i.e., we see the one
through the other). Thus the observation is also a projection, part
of the mutual fantasy system of the anima-animus which the ego
does not recognize.
By looking to the ego for the missing other, we can see the ego’s
attitudes and behaviors as part of a tandem. For example: am I
now sun-lit Apollo in my ego (animus) consciousness because Sis-
ter Soul is Artemisian, a good clean companion that keeps her dis-
tance; or is anima Hyacinthic, a beautiful, dying boy, or Daphnic,
a flighty, vegetating symptom, or Dionysian in wet rout. Or, to
turn it around the other way: does the anima show Aphrodisian
qualities because my ego (animus) attitudes are like Hephaistos
hammering away in the heat, or young and chosen Paris, or old
Kronos with cut-off sexuality. ... Endless tandems.
LZ.
178
SYZYGY/HILLMAN
The principal tandem concerns the very qualities by which ana-

lytical psychology has been characterizing anima and animus. As
long as anima refers to interiority, to reflexive and fantasy func-
tions, to the attached and the personal, then animus must appear
in exteriorities, activities, and in literal, impersonal, and objective
ways. This sort of pairing inheres in the Latin words themselves
where anima was the substantive “breath” and animus the “activity
of breathing.” And, as animus is defined in A Latin Dictionary
(Lewis and Short) with the phrase “the rational soul in man,” then
anima of course is left to pick up the irrational, emotional, and
fantastic. Yet more revealing is that the qualities of animus in Latin
— activities and functions of consciousness, attention, intellect,
mind, will, courage, arrogance, and pride — are those which we
nowadays in somewhat different terms attribute to the ego. In-
deed, it seems that much of what psychology has been calling ego
is the animus-half of the syzygy.
This leads into a job for another time: an examination of the no-
tion of “ego” and a comparison of it with “animus.” I suspect that
the archetype behind the ego of Western culture as it has issued in-
to ego psychology would reveal itself as the animus, that, in fact,
ego is an animus idea. An animus that loses its soul (anima) con-
nection, that posits itself as independent of the syzygy, is ego. The
‘weak ego’ would be the one affected by the syzygy with anima,
and ‘strengthening the ego’ would mean strengthening the animus.
Ego may be heroic in content, but as a psychic function it derives
from animus, enacting particular projections of anima. As a func-
tion of the syzygy, ego cannot have a valid identity of its own. If
this conjecture were borne out, then we might be able to rearrange
much of our psychic furniture. We might structure the psyche
without ego, letting this concept drop out and experiencing in its
place the imaginal constellations playing through various mytho-
logical pairings.
To put all this more succinctly: syzygy consciousness is of and
within a tandem; it is an awareness of being in a particular pairing,
the dynamics of which are best described by myths. (Psycho-
dynamics is one of the things mythology is all about.) Anima or
animus consciousness would mean recognizing the kind of uncon-
sciousness in any particular constellation, its other archetypal side.
179
JUNG/SCRIPTA
xm SP ESR GS STE RTE EE TB SE SET,
(a) ... we lack all knowledge of the unconscious psyche and pursue
the cult of consciousness to the exclusion of all else. Our true reli-
gion is a monotheism of consciousness, a possession by it, coupled
with a fanatical denial of the existence of fragmentary autonomous
systems. CW 13,851
180
SYZYGY/HILLMAN
Ego consciousness would refer to what Jung calls the “monotheism
of consciousness,”* the single-minded viewpoint of the individual
“T,” where the other is lost sight of and which results in literalism.
Thus, ego consciousness is an unconsciousness of psychic actual-
ity.
Psychic actuality is such that “the two figures are always tempt-
ing the ego to identify itself with them” (CW 16, 8469). The iden-
tification of the conscious ego personality with one of them seems
to be the archetypal role the ego is bound to play, since “neither
anima nor animus can be constellated without the intervention of
the conscious personality” (ibid.). Because they always appear to-
gether, it logically follows that the “intervention of the conscious
personality” is actually an enacting of anima or animus, the other
half.
This is most difficult to recognize because in the conscious per-
sonality of the ego is where Jung locates our darkest spot. Sol, the
alchemical image of ego consciousness, is itself a “dark body,”
“light without and darkness within,” a “relatively constant per-
sonification of the unconscious itself” in “the source of [whose]
light there is darkness enough for any amount of projections” (CW
14, §129).
Although the conscious personality is relatively constant, it is
nevertheless subject to the sudden egressions of intrapsychic pro-
jections. However, because of its constancy, these projections,
which the ego calls its attitudes, decisions, and positions, are ex-
tra-durable, their very constancy making them extra hard to see
through. But it is in that opaque spot that we must look for the ac-
tual unconscious. The prima materia is ego.
Another consequent of the syzygy concerns the soul-spirit rela-

tion. Being-in-soul (esse in anima) implies being infused with ani-
mus, its pneuma, its spirit. The airy aspect of anima discussed
above can also be considered anima in syzygy with animus. Being-
in-soul, psychological being, implicates spiritual being; spirit will
be constellated whenever we are in touch with soul.
This happens often enough in experience. At the very moment
of a new psychological move, we hear animus voices driving us
181
182
SYZYGY/HILLMAN
from it by spiritualizing the experience into abstractions, extract-

ing its meaning, carrying it into actions, dogmatizing it into gener-
al principles, or using it to prove something. Where anima is vivid,
animus enters. Similarly, when at work intellectually, or in spirit-
ual meditation, or where courage is screwed to the sticking place,
then anima invades with images and fears, with distractions of at-
tachments and connections, telephoning, natural urges, suicidal
despairs, or disturbing with ever deeper questions and puzzling un-
knowns. Moved by a new idea or spiritua! impetus, anima is right
there, wanting to make it personal, asking, “How does it relate?”
and “What about me?” These torturing incursions of soul into
spirit and spirit into soul are the syzygy in action. This is the con-
iunctio.
Because of the anima—animus syzygy, psychology cannot omit
spirit from its purview. The syzygy says that where soul goes there
goes spirit too. Their syzygy illumines imagination with intellect
and refreshens intellect with fantasy. Ideas become psychological
experiences, and experiences become psychological ideas. The job
is to keep spirit and soul distinct (the spirit’s demand) and to keep
them attached (the demand of the soul).
183
Notes
ABBREVIATIONS
CW C.G. Jung, The Collected Works, trans. R. F.C. Hull, ed. H. Read, M.
Fordham, G. Adler, Wm. McGuire, Bollingen Series XX, vols. 1-20
(Princeton: Princeton University Press and London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1953 ff.), paragraph numbers.
MA J. Hillman, The Myth of Analysis (Evanston: Northwestern University

Press, 1972; New York: Harper & Row, 1978).
RP J. Hillman, Re-Visioning Psychology (New York: Harper & Row, 1975).
DU J. Hillman, The Dream and the Underworld (New York: Harper &
Row, 1979).
A Short List of the Main Literature on Anima

A. From Jung’s CW
1) Anima-titled writings
[Psyche, personality, persona, anima]: CW 6, §§797-811; Anima
and Animus: CW 7, §§296-340; Concerning the Archetypes, with Special
Reference to the Anima Concept: CW 9,i, §§111-47; The Syzygy: Anima
and Animus: CW 9,ii, §§20-42; Animus and Anima: CW 13, 8§57-63.
2) From Jung’s writings about Anima, but not so titled
“The Psychological Aspects of the Kore,” especially: CW 9, ii,
§§306-11, 355-58; Mysterium Coniunctionis: CW 14, passim.
3) Other Jung references from the General Index, Cw 20. Clusters of
passages on Anima and frequently indexed paragraphs.
CW 5, §§605-08, 678; CW 7, §§370, 374, 521; CW 9,i, §§53-66,
512-18; CW 9,ii, 8853-59, 422-25; CW 10, §§75-79, 713-15; CW 11,
§847-49, 71-73; CW 12, §§92-94, 112, 116, 192, 394-98; CW 13, §§216-18,
223, 261-63, 453-60; CW 15, §§210-13; CW 16, §§432-38, 454, 469, 504;
CW 17, §8338-41.
184
NOTES
B. Anima by classical authors of the Jungian tradition

H.G. Baynes, The Mythology of the Soul (London: Baillitre, Tindall
& Cox, 1940); E. Bertine, “The Story of Anima Projection” in Human
Relationships (New York: Longmans, Green, 1958); C. Brunner, Die
Anima als Schicksalsproblem des Mannes (Ziirich: Rascher Verlag,
1963); L. Fierz-David, The Dream of Poliphilo (New York: Pantheon,
1950); E. Harding, The Way of All Women (New York: Longmans,
Green, 1933), pp. 1-40; E. Jung, Animus and Anima, trans. C.F. Baynes
and H. Nagel (Spring Publications, 1957); E. Jung and M.-L. von Franz,
The Grail Legend (New York: Putnam’s, 1971); J. Layard, “The Incest
Taboo and the Virgin Archetype” in Images of the Untouched (Dallas:
Spring Publications, Inc., 1982); J. Singer, Boundaries of the Soul (New
York: Doubleday, 1972), chap. 9; M. Stein, ed., Jungian Analysis
(LaSalle, Il.: 1982), pp. 74-84, 282-91; A.B. Ulanov, The Feminine in
Jungian Psychology and Christian Theology (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1971); M.-L. von Franz, The Problem of the Feminine
in Fairy Tales (Spring Publications, 1972); M.-L. von Franz, “The
Anima” in Man and His Symbols (London: Aldus, 1964); E.C. Whit-
mont, “The Anima” in The Symbolic Quest (New York: Putnam’s, 1969);
F.G. Wickes, The Inner World of Choice (New York: Harper & Row,
1963), chap. 11, “The Woman in Man.”
C. Other writings on anima phenomenology by James Hillman
“Inner Femininity: Anima Reality and Religion” in Insearch:
Psychology and Religion (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967;
Dallas: Spring Publications, 1979); “Anima and Psyche” in MA; “Pan’s
Nymphs” in Pan and the Nightmare (with W.H. Roscher) (Spring
Publications, 1972); “Betrayal” and “Schism” in Loose Ends: Primary
Papers in Archetypal Psychology (Spring Publications, 1975); RP: q.v. in-
dex; J. Hillman, ed., Puer Papers (Dallas: Spring Publications, 1979),
pp. 38-42, 66-71, 119-21; “Silver and the White Earth,” Spring 1980 and
Spring 1981; “Alchemical Blue and the Unio Mentalis,” Sulfur 1 (1981);
“Salt: A Chapter in Alchemical Psychology” in Images of the Untouched,
“Anima Mundi: The Return of the Soul to the World,” Spring 1982; The
Thought of the Heart (Dallas: Spring Publications, 1984), pp. 33-50.
2. C.G. Jung Letters, trans. R.F.C. Hull and ed. G. Adler and A. Jaffe,
Bollingen Series XCV (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973-75), Volume
I: Letters 1906-50, Volume II: Letters 1951-1961.
3. Fora succinct study of kinds of oppositional pairs and some of the confu-
sions arising when the kinds are not kept distinct, see C.K. Ogden, Opposition
(1932) (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967).
4. MA, “Toward an Imaginal Ego,” pp. 183-90; DU, pp. 55-59.
5. Cf. R.B. Onians, The Origins of European Thought about the Body, the
Mind, the Soul, the World, Time and Fate, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1954), chapters “The Psyche” and “Anima and Animus”; F.E.
Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms (New York: New York University Press,
185
NOLES
1967), section “psyche”; also my discussions in DU, chapter “Psyche,” and in RP,
section “Anima” and pp. 44-51.
6. Because of the soul’s motility - a prime trait that sometimes even defined
soul — some Greek philosophy did associate psyche with fire (Atomists), and
Aristotle considered orexis (appetite, desire) the ultimate cause of the soul’s mo-
tion.
7. J.J. Bachofen, Myth, Religion, and Mother Right: Selected Writings,
Bollingen Series (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 93 ff. W.H.
Roscher, Lexikon d. Griech. u. Rom. Mythologie (Hildesheim: Olms, 1965), vol.
Ill, i: “Pan,” pp. 1392 f. and “Nymphen,” pp. 500 ff. E. Jung, “The Anima as an
Elemental Being,” in her Animus and Anima. Cf. T. Wolffs amplification of the
hetaera in connection with the anima: “Strukturformen der weiblichen Psyche,”
in her Studien zu C.G. Jung’s Psychologie (Ziirich: Daimon Verlag, 1981),
pp. 175-76.
8. MA, pp. 61-79; “Peaks and Vales” in Puer Papers.
9. C.G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, recorded and ed. A. Jaffe,
trans. R. and C. Winston (New York: Vintage, 1965), p. 286, for Jung’s ex-
perience and formulation of the historical anima personified in the Galla Placidia
incident in Ravenna: “The anima of a man has a strongly historical character.”
10. G. Bachelard, The Poetics of Reverie (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), chap-
ter 2, “Animus and Anima.”
11. Fora brief statement by Corbin on soul and imagination, see H. Corbin,
“Mundus Imaginalis,” Spring 1972, pp. 6-7.
12. M. Ficino, Theologia platonica, XII, in C. Trinkaus, In Our Image and
Likeness (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), 2:476-78 and notes.
13. Onians, Origins, pp. 168-73 with notes.
14. Porphyry, “Concerning the Cave of Nymphs,” in Thomas Taylor the
Platonist: Selected Writings, ed. G.H. Mills and K. Raine, Bollingen Series
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 304. The discourse, too long to
quote, is upon nymphs and naiads and the Neoplatonic meaning of the moist ele-
ment.
15. Further on the aerial anima, see my “The Imagination of Air and the Col-
lapse of Alchemy” in Eranos Jahrbuch 50-1981 (Frankfurt a/M: Insel Verlag,
1982), pp. 273-333, and DU, pp. 185-88 on “Smell and Smoke.”
16. Bachelard, Poetics, p. 66: “anima becomes deeper and reigns in descend-
ing toward the cave of being. By descending, ever descending, the ontology of the
qualities of the anima is discovered.”
17. Onians, Origins, p. 170n.
18. Fora fuller discussion, see my “The Feeling Function,” Part Two of Lec-
tures on Jung’s Typology (with M.-L. von Franz) (Spring Publications, 1971), es-
pecially, “Feeling and the Anima,” pp. 121-29.
19. H.F. Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious (New York: Basic
Books, 1970), pp. 199-201.
20. Ibid., p. 233.
21. Ph. Wolff-Windegg, “C.G. Jung - Bachofen, Burckhardt, and Basel,”
186
NOTES
Spring 1976, pp. 137-47.

22. S. Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (London: Ho-
garth, 1957), chapter 33, p. 145.
23. R. Grinnell, “Reflections on the Archetype of Consciousness: Personality
and Psychological Faith,” Spring 1970, pp. 15-39.
24. E. Neumann, The Origins and History of Consciousness, Bollingen Series
(New York: Pantheon, 1954), p. 42.
25. W.F. Otto, Die Musen (Darmstadt, 1954), pp. 9-20.
26. MA, pp. 49-61; also my Insearch, chapter “Inner Femininity.”
27. Two letters bring out the ambiguity of the anima-mother configuration in
Jung’s own imagery. In a letter to Victor White (30 January 1948), Jung writes
that he had his “first anima-experience, the woman that was not my mother”
when he was three years old. Ina letter to Ignaz Tauber (13 December 1960), Jung
describes his old-age stone carving of a primitive woman stretching out her hands
to the udder of a mare. “The woman is obviously my anima in the guise of a mil-
lennia-old ancestress.” As there is a need to differentiate anima from mother, so
there seems an equal need not to lose their interpenetration.
28. J. Hillman, “An Essay on Pan,” in Pan and the Nightmare, pp. xliv—lvi.
29. Ihave discussed some of the historical background to the ego notion and
its anachronistic retention in analytical psychology in MA, pp. 148-54, 183-90,
279, 290.
30. J. Layard, “On Psychic Consciousness” (Eranos Jahrbuch 1959 (Zurich:
Rhein}), reprinted in his The Virgin Archetype (Spring Publications, 1972).
31. All passages here from Onians are found on p. 169 of Origins.
32. Bachelard, Poetics, pp. 64, 67.
33. Cf. D. Henderson and R.D. Gillespie, A Text Book of Psychiatry (Ox-
ford: Cumberlege, 1950), p. 128.
34. J. Drever, A Dictionary of Psychology (London: Penguin, 1952), p. 78.
35. Cf. Onians, Origins, pp. 168 ff.; C.T. Lewis and C. Short, A Latin
Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon, 1894), “anima,” pp. 120-21.
36. Drever, Dictionary, p. 62.
37. Ibid., and also DU, pp. 24-26 et passim, where I have discussed
Heraclitus’s notion of depth in relation with depth psychology.
3585_RP, pp. 1-51.
39. H. Corbin, Avicenna and the Visionary Recital (Dallas: Spring Publica-
tions, 1980), p. 21.
40. Cf. P. Berry, “On Reduction,” in her Echo’s Subtle Body: Contributions
to an Archetypal Psychology (Dallas: Spring Publications, 1982), pp. 163-85, for
an examination of the “Philistine literalist” within each of us.
41. On the disastrous confusions of anima and feeling in notions and in be-
havior, see chapters two and three above and my “The Feeling Function” in Lec-
tures on Jung’s Typology, chapter 6.
42. J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (London: Black, 1948), p. 143; accord-
ing to M. Marcovich, Heraclitus—Editio Maior (Merida, Venezuela: Los Andes
University Press), only fragments 45 and 47 (Bywater—Burnet) contain the actual
word harmonia.
187
NJOSISEsS
43. H. Binswanger, “Positive Aspects of the Animus,” Spring 1963,

pp. 82-101.
44. The complicated development of the Christian idea of soul is traced sum-
marily by H. Robinson in J. Hastings, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (Edin-
burgh: Clark, 1920), 11:733a-737b. A. Hultekrantz, “Seele,” Die Religion in
Geschichte und Gegenwart (Tiibingen: Mohr, 1961), 5: 1634-636, sees an upward
development of the soul idea from the pluralistic souls of primitive peoples,
through a dualism of souls, to a “soul-monism” of “high civilisations” (including
Christian). The argument echoes the one examined and refused by J. Hillman,
“Psychology: Monotheistic or Polytheistic?”, Spring 1971, pp. 193-208, reprinted
with extensions in D.L. Miller, The New Polytheism (Dallas: Spring Publica-
tions, 1981), pp. 109-42.
45. Onschism and heresy as the inevitable consequence of unification, see my
“Schism as Differing Visions” in Loose Ends, pp. 82-97.
46. The curious intermixture of monocular senex and anima appears in
Jung’s insight into Kant’s categorical imperative (the one single rule on which all
morality must be based). In a letter to Gustav Senn on 13 October 1941, Jung
writes: “Kant’s categorical imperative is of course a philosophical touching-up of
a psychic fact which, as you have quite correctly seen, is unquestionably a mani-
festation of the anima.”
47. From a conversation cited in Miguel Serrano, C. G. Jung and Hermann
Hesse: A Record of Two Friendships, trans. F. MacShane (New York: Schocken,
1968), pp. 50, 56.
48. C.G. Jung, The Integration of the Personality, trans. Stanley Dell (Lon-
don: Kegan Paul, 1940), p. 91.
49. For examples of such syzygies in ordinary life, see my Insearch,
pp. 96-101.
188
Anima and Contrasexuality
Anima and Eros
Anima and Feeling
Anima and The Feminine
Anima and Psyche

Anima and Depersonalization
Integration of the Anima
Mediatrix of the Unknown
Anima as Uni-Personality
Anima in the Syzygy
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@

with excerpts from the writings of

Bed Whiter [oe4—

Published by Spring Publications, Inc.; Box 222069; Dallas, Texas 75222

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Third Printing 1987

Vol. 5 Symbols of Transformation, copyright © 1956 by Princeton University Press.

eee nt ean Ts maapaeg

We yi Al- aa at .) ‘Gri al Wor @r ee,

a woud ae oi) Oia

1 ANIMA AND CONTRASEXUALITY

2 ANIMA AND EROS

3 ANIMA AND FEELING

4 ANIMA AND THE FEMININE

SAG NialeMinAGeAGNDs Pz) YoCeHor

Vane ERG ReACIAL

SeMEDIAT RIX OF THE UNKNOWN

SOTA NaMea AGS “UNI P EB Ros ON ACL TT Y

OAS Net MicAve lyNita rier S bY¥e7a ¥aGa:

In the pages that follow, an essay by James Hillman appears on the

another deep-seated reason for this book is to provide grounding

The ground principles, the archai, of the unconscious are

= a task we,a ote ey

ay; er >: i eet.

Tu IS excursion is intended to supplement the main literature

According to these Gnostics, ... the feminine figure of Wisdom,

(b) If the encounter with the shadow is the “apprentice-piece” in the

plained the therapeutic value of concepts as ways of taking hold,

_ valuable reference to Tristram Shandy [1759-67]. (“the two

NS No man is so entirely masculine that he has nothing feminine in

... the feminine belongs to man as his own unconscious feminin-

It is normal for a man to resist his anima, because she represents

opment of the anima concept in Jung’s mind.? Rather, I would

1. Anima and Contrasexuality

UNG and the literature of analytical psychology mainly em-

We might compare masculinity and femininity and their psychic

Either sex is inhabited by the opposite sex up to a point, for, bio-

... sex is determined by a majority of male or female genes, as the

The anima, being psychologically the female counterpart of the

Whenever this drive for wholeness appears, it begins by disguising

To the young boy a clearly discernible anima-form appears in his

If she is old, this is an indication that one’s consciousness has be-

The feelings of a man are so to speak a woman’s and appear as

...in aman the soul, i.e., anima, or inner attitude, is represented

The first notion of anima as the contrasexual side of man is con-

When the anima continually thwarts the good intentions of the

We might compare masculinity and femininity and their psychic

After the middle of life, however, permanent loss of the anima

When the shadow, the inferior personality, is in large measure un-

The homosexual relation between an older and a younger man can

tal seductress in a man” (CW 9,ii, §422). “She intensifies, exag-

... it is essentially the overvaluation of the material object without

—— As to the common human qualities, the character of the anima can

and even to differentiate kinds of gender identity, i.e., whether

on a low level the anima is a caricature of the feminine