Developmental

Psychology
Developmental
Psychology
The Growth of Mind and Behavior

Frank Keil
YALE UNIVERSITY

B W. W. N O R T O N & C O M P A N Y NEW YORK • LONDON

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Keil, Frank C., 1952–

Developmental psychology : the growth of mind and behavior / Frank Keil. — First edition.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-393-97885-8 (hardcover)
1. Developmental psychology. I. Title.
BF713.K443 2014
155—dc23
2013034957

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 About the Author
Frank C. Keil is the Charles C. and Dorathea S. Dilley Professor of Psychology and Linguistics
and chair of the Psychology Department at Yale University. Keil received his B.S. in Biology
from M.I.T. in 1973, an M.A. in Psychology from Stanford University in 1975, and a Ph.D. in
Psychology from the University of Pennsylvania in 1977. He was a faculty member at Cornell
University from 1977 to 1998 and has been at Yale since 1998. For over 35 years, he has taught
an undergraduate lecture course in developmental psychology, as well as advanced seminars at the
undergraduate and graduate level on topics in cognitive development and cognition.
Keil has published extensively on topics concerned with many areas of the development of
cognition and language. He wrote two books on aspects of conceptual development and, with
the philosopher Robert Wilson, he edited the MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences, which
was selected as the Outstanding Book in Psychology by the Association of American Publishers
in 1999. Keil served as president of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology and has received
numerous awards for his scholarship, including the Boyd R. McCandless Award (Developmental
Psychology), the Distinguished Scientific Award for an Early Career Contribution to Psychology,
a Guggenheim Fellowship, a fellowship at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral
Sciences, a MERIT Award from the National Institutes of Health, and the Ann L. Brown
Award for Excellence in Developmental Research. Keil served as Master of Morse College at Yale
University from 2001 until 2012. Keil and his wife Kristi Lockhart, a clinical and developmental
psychologist, are parents of three sons who are now in their twenties and thirties.
 Contents in Brief
PART I Framing Psychological Development
Chapter 1 Approaching Psychological Development 2
Chapter 2 The Biology of Development 33

PART II Origins
Chapter 3 Coming to Perceive the World 76
Chapter 4 The Emergence of Action 115
Chapter 5 Coming to Understand the Physical World 145
Chapter 6 Connecting with the Social World 187
Chapter 7 The Origins of Emotion, Temperament,
and Personality 227

PART III Developing Competencies

Chapter 8 Language Development 260
Chapter 9 The Growth of Knowledge 303
Chapter 10 The Growth of Cognitive Skills 343
Chapter 11 Intelligence and Schooling 385

PART IV The Self and Others

Chapter 12 Morality in Thought and Action 426
Chapter 13 Knowing Ourselves, Knowing Others 467
Chapter 14 Becoming Part of the Family 503
Chapter 15 Becoming Part of the Community 543

PART V Broader Developmental Context

Chapter 16 Psychopathology in Childhood 586
Chapter 17 Development after Childhood and
Adolescence 629

vi
Contents
ABOUT THE AUTHOR v
PREFACE xvii

PART I Framing Psychological

Development

Psychoanalytic Perspectives 20
CHAPTER 1
Cognitive Science Perspectives 20
Approaching Psychological Studying Psychological Development 22
Development 2 Observational Studies 22
Experimental Studies 23
Why Study Development? 4 Longitudinal Approaches 26
Development as a Key to Understanding Children’s Cross-Sectional Approaches 27
Capabilities 4
Converging Methods 28
Development as a Means for Insight into the Mature Form 5
Designing a Sound Study 28
Development and Social Policy 6 Reliability and Validity
The Nature of Development 6 Within-Subjects and Between-Subjects Designs
Categorizing Developmental Phenomena 7 Conclusions 30
Periods of Development Summary 31
Areas of Development
Basic Questions about Psychological Development 9
Is Development Stage-like or Continuous?
CHAPTER 2
Is Development Global or Local?
How Do Nature and Nurture Shape Development?
The Biology of Development 33
The Basis of Development 35
Perspectives on Development 14
Inputs to the Biological System 36
Empiricist and Nativist Perspectives 14
The Genes
Empiricism
The Environment
Nativism
Interactions between Genes and Environment
Comparative and Evolutionary Perspectives 17
Constraints on Development 38
Cross-Cultural Perspectives 18 Viability
Neuroscience Perspectives 19 Differentiation of Cells and Structures
Behaviorist Perspectives 19 Timing and Sequencing

vii
The Beginnings of Development 41 Brain Development 56
Meiosis and Fertilization 41 Major Changes to Brain Structures 57
Meiosis and Mitosis Neurons and Neurotransmitters 58
Fertilization Development of Neurons 60
The First Patterns of Differentiation 43 Proliferation
Migration and Synaptogenesis
Anatomical Development 44
Consolidation
Structures and Systems in the Embryo and Fetus 44
Myelination
The Embryonic Period
The Fetal Period Experience and Brain Development 63
Preterm Births 47 Puberty and Brain Development 64
Why Does Anatomical Development Progress Behavioral Genetics 67
As It Does? 49 Heritability 67
Diversity out of Uniformity 49 Behavioral Genomics 68
Sexual Differentiation 52
Conclusions 70
Adverse Influences on the Developing
Embryo and Fetus 53
Summary 72

PART II Origins

Hearing 100
CHAPTER 3
Noticing and Remembering Sounds 100
Coming to Perceive the World 76 Locating Sounds 101
Perceiving Complex Sound Patterns 104
Vision 78
Perceiving Differences in Brightness and Acuity 79 The Chemical Senses: Taste and Smell 107
Visual Acuity Taste 107
Visual Experience and Brain Development Smell 109
Color 84
Intermodal Perception 109
Perceiving Hue and the Clustering of Hues
Categorical Perception of Color Conclusions 112
Depth Perception 86 Summary 112
Cues to Depth
Which Depth Cues Predominate? Gibson’s Visual
Cliff Studies
Functional Significance of the Depth Perception System
CHAPTER 4
Perceiving Patterns and Recognizing Objects 91 The Emergence of Action 115
Pattern Perception in Other Species
Plasticity in Perceptual Development Foundations of Motor Development 116
Perceptually Grouping the World Reflexes in Infancy 117
Face Perception 95 Theories of Motor Development 118
Development of Face Perception: A Two-System Model The Maturational Account
Facial Attractiveness Dynamic Systems Theory

viii CONTENTS
Perception and Action 122 CHAPTER 6
Coordination in Changing Bodies 122
Reaching 123
Connecting with the Social
Empiricist View of Eye-Limb Coordination
Constraints on Links between Eye and Limb
World 187
Navigating Space 125 Developing Bonds between Infants and Caregivers 189
Active versus Passive Visual Experience and Action
Early Perspectives on Infants’ Bonds with Others 190
Walking and Seeing
Psychoanalytic Approaches to Infant-Parent Bonds 190
Learning to Engage in Specific Actions 131 Learning Theory Approaches 191
Early Imitation 131 Bowlby’s Ethological Approach 192
The Process of Imitation
The Development of Birdsong: Variations on the The Underpinnings of Attachment 194
Imitation Theme Components of Attachment 194
Imprinting, Action, and Critical Periods 135 Smiling
Conditioning 136 Clinging and Touching
Classical Conditioning Cuteness
Operant Conditioning Bases of Social Interactions 199
Constraints on Learning Contingent Responding
Social Referencing
Conclusions 142 Joint Attention and Gaze Following
Summary 143
Individual Differences in Attachment Style 201
Studying Attachment Styles in the Strange Situation 202
Causes of Different Attachment Styles 203
CHAPTER 5 Parent Effects on Insecure Attachment
Coming to Understand the Child Effects on Insecure Attachment
Interactions of Parent Effects and Child Effects
Physical World 145 Consequences of Different Attachment Styles 208
Correlations between Infant Attachment Styles and Children’s Social Interactions
Piaget’s Approach 146 Long-Term Links between Infant Attachment Styles and Adult Relationship
Piaget’s Theory of Cognitive Development 147 Styles
The Sensorimotor Period in Infancy 149 Cross-Cultural Differences in Attachment Styles 210
Stage 1: Use of Reflexes
Stage 2: Emergence of Primary Circular Reactions
Effects of Early Social Deprivation 214
Stage 3: Appearance of Secondary Circular Reactions Social Deprivation in Humans 214
Stage 4: Coordination of Secondary Circular Reactions Deficits in Socially Deprived Infants
Stage 5: Appearance of Tertiary Circular Reactions Untangling Causation
Stage 6: Invention of New Means through Mental Deprivation Studies in Nonhuman Primates 218
Combinations Tactile Stimulation and Physiological Needs
Key Aspects of Piaget’s Theory 154 Peer-Raised Infants
Examining the A-Not-B Error 155 Critical-Period Effects? 222

Infant Knowledge and Understanding 157 Conclusions 223

Thinking about the Unseen 158 Summary 224
Studies of Object Permanence and Solidity
Principles That Guide How Infants Understand
Comparative Considerations
CHAPTER 7
Understanding Causation 164 The Origins of Emotion,
The Use of Number 166
Spatial Knowledge in Infants 169 Temperament, and Personality 227
Categorization in Infants 171 Emotional Development 228
Distinguishing the Physical World from Approaches to Emotional Development 229
the Social World 175 Differentiation of Emotions in Infancy 230
Action at a Distance and Social Contingency 176 Basic Emotions
Complex Emotions
Goal and Belief Attribution 177
Moral Emotions?
Conclusions 183 Perceiving and Thinking about Emotions 236
Summary 184 Recognizing Emotions in Others
Emotional Contagion

CONTENTS ix
Emotional Regulation in Infancy 237 Determining Differences in Temperament 249
Situational Factors The New York Longitudinal Study
Attentional Deployment Modern Approaches to Studying Temperament
Response Modification Linking Temperament to Personality Development
Evolutionary Preparedness and Emotional Development 242 Child–Environment Interactions and Goodness of Fit 252
Preparedness for Acquiring Certain Fears Environments for “Squeaky Wheels”
Preparedness and the Development of Disgust Parental Influences on Temperament
Preparedness and the Development of Other Emotions
Conclusions 255
Temperament and the Origins of Personality 247 Summary 256
Temperament-Based Components of Personality and Early
Development 248

PART III Developing

Competencies

The Growth of Grammar 280

CHAPTER 8
Effects of Age on Language Acquisition 281
Language Development 260 Acquiring Language after the Critical Period 282
The Structure and Complexity of Language 262 Acquiring American Sign Language after the
Components of Language 262 Critical Period 283
Universal Constraints on Language 263 Inventing a New Language 283

Acquiring a First Language 263 The Domain Specificity of Language 284

Developmental Patterns 263 Neural Dissociations 285
Prelinguistic Perception and Communication Aphasias
One-Word Utterances Williams Syndrome
Multiword Utterances Specific Language Impairment (SLI)
Linguistic Rules Species Specificity 288
Child-Directed Speech 267 Chimp as Child
Nonhuman Primates and Sign Language
Theories of Language Acquisition 268 Bonobos and Joint Attention
Behaviorist Approaches 269
Language and Thought 290
Connectionist Approaches 270
Linguistic Relativity and Linguistic Determinism 290
Statistical Learning Approaches 270 The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis
Nativist Approaches 272 Color and Number
Other Influences of Language on Thought
Discovering the Meanings of Words 273
Linking Words to Concepts 273 Language as an Amplifier of Thought 292
Constraints on Word Meanings 275 Influences of Cognitive Development on Language 294
Perceptual Constraints Language and Communication 295
Conceptual Constraints
Pragmatic Constraints Conclusions 299
The Nature of Constraints on Word Meanings Summary 300
Developmental Changes in Word Meanings 278
Overextensions and Underextensions
Linking Features with Meanings

x CONTENTS
 A Developmental Disorder in Attention: ADHD 363
CHAPTER 9 Biological Bases of ADHD
The Growth of Knowledge 303 Misdiagnosis of ADHD

Reasoning and Thinking about Knowledge 366

Dimensions of Cognitive Development 305
Analogical Reasoning 366
Qualitative versus Quantitative Development 305
Scientific Reasoning 368
Global versus Local Patterns of Development 306
Metacognition and Accessing Knowledge 370
Foundational versus Emergent Constraints 306
Illusions of Knowing
A Closer Look at Piaget’s Theory 308 Evaluating Others’ Knowledge
The Preoperational Period 308 Three Specific Skills 372
The Concrete Operational Period 311 Reading 372
The Formal Operational Period 311 Learning to Read
Alternative Explanations of Piaget’s Theory and Results 313 Teaching Reading
Seriation When Reading Is a Challenge: Dyslexia
Thinking about Classes Mathematical Reasoning 376
Conservation Growth of Mathematical Skills
Teaching Mathematics
Domains of Knowledge 320
Developing Problem-Solving Strategies
Spatial Relations 321
Using Symbolic Representations 378
Number 324 Using Maps and Models
Biology 327 Children’s Drawings
Other Domains of Thought 334
Conclusions 380
Beliefs about Physical Mechanics
Beliefs about Substance Summary 381
Beliefs about Cosmology

Sociocultural Views of the Development of

Knowledge 337 CHAPTER 11
Vygotsky’s Views 337 Intelligence and Schooling 385
Conclusions 339 What Is Intelligence? 387
Summary 340 The Psychometric Approach 387
Interpreting Test Scores
Correlates of Intelligence Test Scores
CHAPTER 10 Psychometric Theories of Intelligence 390
The Growth of Cognitive Skills 343 Spearman’s Theory of General Intelligence
Carroll’s Three-Stratum Theory of Intelligence
Memory 344 Cattell’s Theory of Fluid and Crystallized Intelligence
Components of Memory 345 Alternative Views of Intelligence 393
Types of Long-Term Memory 346 Gardner’s Theory of Multiple Intelligences
Explicit Memory versus Implicit Memory Sternberg’s Theory of Successful Intelligence
Procedural Memory versus Declarative Memory Origins of Intelligence 396
Semantic Memory versus Episodic Memory
Infant Indicators of Intelligence Test Performance 396
Memory Strategies 349
The Heritability of Intelligence 397
Development of Metamemory 350
Memory and Expertise 352 Group Differences and Intelligence Tests 400
Infantile and Early Childhood Amnesia 353 Sex Differences 400
Memory Format Change Hypothesis Ethnic and “Racial” Differences 402
Neural Change Hypothesis Explaining Group Differences 402
Cueing Hypothesis Are Group Differences Irrelevant?
Culture, Gender, and Early Childhood Amnesia Genetic Factors
Emergence of Long-Term Autobiographical Memory 356 Socioeconomic Factors
Sociocultural Stereotypes
Attention 358
Group Differences over Time 406
Attention as an Active Exploratory System 359
Three Components of Attention 359 Environmental Influences on Intelligence
Orienting Test Scores 407
Alerting Enhancing Early Environmental Influences: Head Start
Executive Functioning Programs 408

CONTENTS xi
Schooling 409 Implementing Cognitive Science Ideas in the
Classroom
Characterizing Schools 409
Aptitude-Treatment Interactions
Two Prominent Models of Education
What Schools Do 411 Creativity 417
Schools as Socializing Agents Measures of Creativity 417
Schools as Cultural Institutions The Development of Extraordinary Creativity 420
Schools as Vehicles of Values
Schools and Thought 412 Conclusions 421
Cognitive Science and Teaching Summary 422
Three Cognitive Science Themes for Education

PART IV The Self and Others

The Development of Moral Behavior 444

CHAPTER 12
Consistency of Moral Behavior 444
Morality in Thought and Action 426 Antisocial and Prosocial Behavior 448
Antisocial Behavior
The Development of Moral Thought 427 Prosocial Behavior
Debating the Origins of Moral Thought 428 Temperament, Personality, and Moral
Evolutionary and Cultural Psychology and Morality 429 Behavior 452
Characterizing the Basis of Moral Thought 430 Self-Regulation
Arousal Level and Positive Emotionality
Piaget’s Theory of Moral Development 431 Empathy
Piaget’s Stages of Moral Reasoning 432 Social Influences on Moral Behavior 456
Stage 0: Premoral Development Punishment and Learning Theories
Stage 1: The Heteronomous Stage Modeling Theory and Moral Behaviors
The Transition between Stage 1 and Stage 2 Parent-Child Interactions and the Development of
Stage 2: The Autonomous Stage Conscience
Evaluating Piaget’s Account 434
Distinguishing Morality from Conventions
Conclusions 463
Accounting for Intentions Summary 464
Immanent Justice across Cultures

Kohlberg’s Theory of Moral Reasoning 437

Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Reasoning 437 CHAPTER 13
Evaluating Kohlberg’s Theory 438
Unclear Stages Knowing Ourselves,
Cross-Cultural Variations
Possible Gender Biases Knowing Others 467
Alternative Theories of Moral Development 440 Self-Concepts and Self-Representations 468
Gilligan’s Theory of Moral Development 440 Senses of Self 468
A Pluralistic Approach to the Development of Moral Thought 441 Neisser’s Five Senses of Self
Contributions from Personality Psychology The Mirror Test and Self-Concept 471
Contributions from Cultural Psychology Variations on the Mirror Test
Domain-Specific Moral Reasoning Gender Identity 472

xii CONTENTS
Developing a Sense of Self-Worth 474 Working Parents and Child Care 529
Self-Esteem 474 Changes in Family Structures 530
Self-Efficacy 476 Single-Parent Families
Same-Sex Parents
Self-Regulation 477 Divorce
Brain Maturation and the Development of Self-Regulation 480 Blended Families
Contextual Influences on Self-Regulation 481 Child Abuse 536
Developing a Theory of Mind 482 Effects of Abuse 537
Early Aspects of Theory of Mind 483 Explaining the Cycle of Abuse 537
Comparative Perspectives on Theory of Mind 484 Foster Care 538
Understanding False Beliefs 487 Conclusions 539
Evaluating the False-Belief Task
Summary 540
A Theory of Mind Module? 490
Beyond False Beliefs 492
Making Attributions about Ourselves and Others 493 CHAPTER 15
Emerging Explanations of Behavior 493 Becoming Part of the
Traits and Optimism 496
Attribution, Motivation, and Creativity 497 Community 543
Conclusions 499 Levels of Affiliation 544
Summary 501 The Changing Nature of Social Interactions 545
Developing Relationships 546
Friends
CHAPTER 14 Imaginary Companions

Becoming Part of the Family 503 Bully-Victim Relationships

Enemies
Parenting 505 Dating and Romantic Relationships
Parenting Styles 506 Social Groups 553
Cliques and Crowds
Parenting Contexts 508
Sociometric Status and Social Interaction
Parenting across Cultures
Parenting across Socioeconomic Groups Developmental Patterns in Levels of Affiliation 558
The Ecological Systems Approach Social Network Effects 558
Interventions to Improve Parenting 510 Media Influences on Development 559
Parent Effects in Relation to Other Influences 511 Television 560
Child Effects The Pervasiveness of Television Watching
Genetic Effects Changes in Television Watching with Age
The Interactionist Approach to Family Dynamics 514 Positive Effects of Television
Gender Socialization in the Family: A Web of Interacting Negative Cognitive Effects of Television
Influences 515 Negative Social Effects of Television
Responding to the Influences of Television Violence
Siblings and Family Dynamics 518 Stereotyping in the Media
Birth Order Effects 518 Video Games, Computers, and the Internet 569
An Interactionist Approach to Birth Order Effects
Video Games
Sibling Relationships and Socialization 520 Internet Communities
Jealousy and Conflict between Siblings
Siblings and Social Understanding Roles in the Larger Culture 574
Sibling Relationships within the Family Distinctive Cultural and Subcultural Roles 574
Gender Roles and Stereotyping 576
Changes in the Family 525
Changes in Parents’ Age 525 Conclusions 581
Changes in Family Size 527 Summary 582

CONTENTS xiii
 PART V Broader Developmental
Context

Schizophrenia 614
CHAPTER 16
Features of Schizophrenia 614
Psychopathology in Childhood 586 Causal Factors 616
Early-Onset Schizophrenia 619
Autism 588
Features of Autism 588 Treatment of Childhood Psychopathologies 619
Diagnosis of Autism 589 Behavioral Therapies 619
Incidence of Autism 589 Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy 620
Causal Factors 590 Psychoanalytic Therapies 621
Family Therapies 622
Anxiety Disorders 592
Pharmacological Treatments 622
Incidence of Anxiety Disorders 592
Evaluating Therapies 624
Causal Factors 593
Cognitive Factors Conclusions 625
Biological Factors Summary 625
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder 595
Types of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder
Incidence of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder CHAPTER 17
Diagnosis of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder
Causal Factors Development after Childhood
Eating Disorders 598 and Adolescence 629
Anorexia Nervosa 598
Incidence of Anorexia
Physical and Physiological Changes in Adulthood 630
Cognitive Distortions in Anorexia Cognitive Changes in Adulthood 635
Genetic and Environmental Causal Factors Reaction Time and Speed of Processing 635
Bulimia Nervosa 602 Memory, Higher Cognitive Functions, and Reasoning 635
Incidence of Bulimia
Daily Activities and Cognitive Aging 639
Causal Factors
Circadian Rhythms, Cognition, and the Lifespan 641
Depression 603
Changes in Personality in the Lifespan: Individual and
Unipolar Depression 604
Biological Causes
Group Changes 643
Social Causes Changes in Individuals 643
Cognitive Causes Stressful Life Events 644
Bipolar Disorder 607 Group Changes 645
Causal Factors
Stages of Life? 648
Diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder
Erik Erikson’s Approach 648
Conduct Disorder: The Case of Psychopathy 609 Stage 1: Trust versus Mistrust
Features of Psychopathy 610 Stage 2: Autonomy versus Shame/Doubt
Diagnosis of Psychopathy 611 Stage 3: Initiative versus Guilt
Stage 4: Industry versus Inferiority
Causal Factors 612

xiv CONTENTS
 Stage 5: Identity versus Role Confusion EPILOGUE 659
Stage 6: Intimacy versus Isolation
Stage 7: Generativity versus Stagnation GLOSSARY G-1
Stage 8: Integrity versus Despair REFERENCES R-1
Understanding Stages of Adult Development 652
CREDITS AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS C-1
What Does It Mean to Be Old? 652
NAME INDEX N-1
Stereotypes and Ageism 654
Cultural Variation in Stereotypes and Ageism? 655 SUBJECT INDEX S-1
Conclusions 656
Summary 657

CONTENTS xv
Boxed Features
Development and Social Policy A Language Gene? 287
Biological Knowledge and Exposure to Nature 333
What Kinds of Experimental Research Are Justified? 25
The Genetics of Dyslexia 375
Visiting Nurses, Prenatal Care, and Child Development 51
A g for Emotional Intelligence? 395
Legislating Early Stimulation 106
Moral Dumbfounding: Judgment or Intuition? 446
Can a Toddler’s Motor Development Be Accelerated? 137
Theory of Mind in Dogs? 486
The Myth of the First 3 Years 181
Epigenetics and Families 512
Day Care and Attachment 212
The Development of Racial and Ethnic Occupational
The Causes and Consequences of Problems in Emotional
Stereotypes 578
Regulation 244
Co-rumination, Gender, and Depression 608
The Cognitive Effects of Bilingualism 296
Why Do We Age and Why Do We Live as Long as We
Sputnik and Intuitive Science 328
Do? 632
Children as Witnesses 360
Computers and e-Learning in the Schools 418
Scientific Method Boxes
At What Age Should an Offender Be Treated as an
Adult? 457 Diet and Methylation 40
Potential Drawbacks of Self-Esteem 478 Intersensory Perception at Birth 111
China’s One-Child Policy 522 The Genetics of Early Handedness 124
Free Speech and Children’s Rights 570 Agents and Order 182
Prescribing Psychoactive Medications to Young Internal Working Models and Attachment Styles 209
Children 623 Inferring Actions from Emotions 238
When Is It Acceptable to Deprive the Elderly of Some Early Use of Syntax to Guide Learning New Words 276
Rights? 650
Early Motivation to Learn about Kinds over Individuals 318

New Directions in Developmental Research Maternal Reminiscing and Children’s Autobiographical

Memories 357
Measuring Infants’ Brain Function: Near-Infrared
Direct versus Inquiry-Based Methods of Instruction 414
Spectroscopy (NIRS) 21
Instrumental Helping in Toddlers 450
Repairing Brain Damage Later in Life? 66
Gaze Following in Human Infants and Great Apes 485
Cochlear Implants and the Question of Critical Periods for
Auditory Processing 102 Training Parents to Moderate Sibling Conflicts 524
Mirror Neurons and Early Imitation 134 Effects of “Minimal” Group Affiliations 580
Advances in Infant Eye-Tracking Methods 172 Psychopathy and Fear Processing 613
New Insights into the Role of the Father 204 The Positivity Bias in Older Adults 647
The Effect of Parenting on Emotion Processing in
Children 240

xvi
Preface

have been deeply involved in teaching introductory making some progress in linking scholarly work to my own

I courses in developmental psychology since my first year

as a teaching assistant at Stanford University in 1973. And
I have taught my own lecture course since joining the faculty
of Cornell University in 1977. While there have always
been a range of available textbooks for this course, I have
always felt the need for a book that comes closer to my own
vision of how developmental psychology should be taught.
personal experiences, our second son was born, and then
our third son. And each child offered dramatic new insights
and perspectives into development. Many years later, after
our youngest son finished college and was out in the world,
it was finally time to finish writing this textbook.
I have worked on various drafts of this book for over
30 years, writing and rewriting as my insights changed and
I thought that there should be a book celebrating the beauty the field of developmental psychology itself has undergone
and incredible complexity of psychological development dramatic changes. I have also used drafts of the text in my
while also offering clear and compelling accounts of why courses at Yale for over a decade, constantly refining it in
development occurs as it does. Equally important, I wanted response to feedback from my ever gracious and helpful
a book that showed how an understanding of development is students. Throughout this entire process, which has
essential to understanding psychological processes in adults continued throughout most of my academic career, I have
and how a developmental perspective offers unique insights written and rewritten three or four drafts of the entire
into mature psychological functioning. I believed a textbook book, finally winnowing down the material into the book
on developmental psychology should illustrate common that you have before you. In the course of writing the
developmental themes across all areas of psychology while book, I have gained an immense appreciation for all of my
also explaining how trajectories within broad domains can colleagues in the field who have contributed so spectacularly
each take on their own special characteristics. And I thought to the flowering of the discipline over the past few decades.
that a textbook should discuss commonalities and contrasts Developmental psychology today is an incredibly vibrant and
across cultures and even across species, as well as considering exciting field that is far more closely connected to the rest of
how psychological development fits into a broader context the psychology and other disciplines than ever before, and
of biological and neurobiological development. Moreover, my excitement and pleasure in writing about it has increased
I believed that to fully illuminate the study of development, every year. I hope that some of that excitement and pleasure
a textbook should situate psychology within a larger set of is contagious to readers of this text. I deeply appreciate how
disciplines—including anthropology, computer science, this first edition is only the beginning of an evolutionary
linguistics, neuroscience, philosophy, and sociology—that process that will continue in future editions, but after three
intersected with psychology. Different texts touched on some decades of immersion in this project, it finally seemed time
of these ideas, but none covered all of them, and many did to take it out of my classroom and share it more widely.
not seem to have a single voice that wove topics and themes
into an integrated whole.
Finally, and perhaps most immediately compelling,
the birth of our first son in 1981 made me want to dive
much more deeply into the broad literature on all aspects
Overarching Themes
of psychological development. But this also created an
unanticipated challenge. As any parent knows, a newborn
and Principles
child is an instant lesson into just how much we don’t know There are fascinating themes and principles that keep
about development, a lesson that keeps expanding in scope recurring throughout developmental psychology and that
as that child grows up. Moreover, as soon as I thought I was help to show how different threads of research mutually

xvii
reinforce each other. These themes and principles serve emotional states have functional values both for themselves
as constant touchstones for organizing the material in the and for their interactions with others, and while their
book. Seven themes stand out as recurring most frequently. emotions change considerably in the first year of life,
One key theme is the centrality of feedback loops, both infants cannot simply shut down their emotional systems
positive and negative. Development is rarely, if ever, a one- when transitioning to new kinds of emotions or emotional
way process in which one factor causes another to happen interaction patterns. The same is true for everything from
without some kind of feedback. Parents influence their language to friendship and is closely related to the idea that
children, who in turn influence their parents, in cycles the most functionally vital aspects of systems often appear
of interaction that can reinforce desirable outcomes or earliest in both development and in the evolutionary history
aggravate undesirable ones. The simple acts of learning of organisms.
to walk and successfully reaching toward objects involve A sixth theme is the ever-present links and interdependencies
constant feedback loops between what a child sees and between different areas of development. It simply isn’t possible
how she acts. Even at the neural level, the growth of neural to consider cognitive development without also considering
circuits can depend on feedback from experience, which in social and emotional development, just as understanding
turn can change how future events are experienced. In all social development depends on related changes in cognitive
areas of development, we will see the central importance of development, and a full account of emotional development
feedback loops. depends on understanding both social and cognitive
A second major theme is that development is a dynamic development. We will often focus primarily on one area at a
exploratory process in which the child is more than a passive time, but we will always take into account how the different
recipient of experiences and information. When children are areas of development also interact and must be understood
viewed as actively engaging with the world, it is much easier in their entirety to obtain a full picture of what develops.
to understand development, whether it is development of A final theme is that developmental psychology is not
perception, cognition, motivation, or morality. just a human-based process. All organisms with significant
A third theme is to see that development is constrained behavioral components grow from immature states to
by factors that arise both internally from within the child and mature states and show fascinating patterns of change
externally from the environment. While constraints may and constancy. Comparisons across these organisms and
seem to somehow hinder development they may actually especially with humans are not just interesting in their own
foster development by acting as scaffolds and guiding right, they can also greatly help us to understand what is
frameworks that make otherwise overwhelming problems of unique about human psychological development, as well as
learning and skill development manageable. We will see the telling us about what kinds of developmental problems tend
value of constraints and how they can guide development to converge on one common class of solutions and what
in many areas, while still allowing for enormous diversity kinds of problems embrace an enormous diversity of possible
of outcomes. Discussions of constraints also allow for a solutions. This comparative perspective also highlights the
balanced treatment of the tradeoffs between nativist and ways in which evolutionary considerations can inform
empiricist views of development and the related, often thinking about development. These seven themes and
needlessly contentious, nature/nurture debate. principles recur throughout this book and provide a way
A fourth theme is to focus on what children can do and of weaving together all of the book’s content to create an
how their basic capacities emerge and serve as foundations for integrated and more memorable whole that reveals larger
later development, as opposed to focusing on what children developmental patterns.
cannot do compared with older children and adults. While
younger children and infants certainly have limitations that
are not found in later years, it is almost always more fruitful
to avoid “deficit models” of development and instead ask
how children progress as they grow.
Linking Theory and Evidence
A related fifth theme that occurs in all areas of development Developmental psychology has emerged robustly in the
is that infants and children usually have some viable version of past few decades as a full-fledged science in which scholars
a skill throughout development; they rarely go “offline” as they propose theories and models and then test them rigorously.
retool or improve on a system. Just as the human heart must This book celebrates the ways in which ideas, many of
beat continuously as it goes through remarkable anatomical which have been with us for centuries, are now being tested
and physiological changes from its early embryonic stages in carefully designed experiments or through powerful new
to birth and beyond, most perceptual, cognitive, emotional, statistical analyses of large data sets. It is fascinating to see
and social systems must have some working functional how classic issues are now coming into much clearer focus
capacity throughout development. For example, infants’ as a result of clever new studies. Throughout this text, we

xviii PREFACE
will encounter theories, sometimes conflicting theories, and discussion of psychopathology in development. More than
ask how they can be tested and what the current evidence just a review of the psychopathology literature, Chapter 16
tells us. In many cases, the debate continues with more than shows how aspects of development that are covered in earlier
one view remaining viable, but also with a much better chapters, ranging from brain development to cognitive
understanding of the research path forward. executive functioning to socialization, come together in
I am convinced that even the most complex and intricate an interwoven manner to contribute to the emergence of
theories of development, ranging from neural growth various forms of psychopathology. Students will see how all
patterns to changing social network analyses, can be that they have learned bears on powerful and compelling
explained in such a way that any introductory student can problems. They will then experience a different form of
appreciate their key dimensions and how to evaluate them integration of the same range of topics in the final chapter,
in light of the right kinds of studies and evidence emerging which considers development after childhood and in which
from those studies. All the theories and studies in this text there is a fascinating set of questions that can have some
have been written up, reviewed, and rewritten several times striking resonances to earlier developmental questions and
to ensure that they are clear and accessible and that the themes. I have taken great pains to present the full spectrum
links to empirical research are compelling. I want all the of theories and approaches but always with an eye toward
readers of this text to be able to step into the shoes of leading how they relate to each other and to larger developmental
investigators in developmental psychology so that they can issues that transcend any one school of thought. In doing
understand what drove the researchers both in terms of so, I have immersed myself in reading the literature on
theory and their passion to design and execute studies to different aspects of development, as well as engaging in
answer developmental questions. many conversations and corresponding with experts across
many disciplines, far more deeply than I ever could have
imagined I would do when I first started on this project.
The entire process has fed back into this book, and it has
Integrated Treatment been great fun as well!

As already is clear from the way our themes and principles

cut across diverse areas, a hallmark of this text is the way
it integrates material across all the chapters and keeps
illustrating how certain patterns and ideas keep recurring.
Distinctive Pedagogical
There are several forms of such integration throughout
the book. Some themes recur across all the different times
Features
of development, from the prenatal period to the period To best convey the themes and principles, to set forth the
of old age. Some themes recur across domains, ranging relations between theory and evidence, and to provide the
from perceptual to cognitive to social to moral domains. most integrated treatment possible, this book has several
Some themes recur across cultures and even across species. distinctive pedagogical features. Throughout every chapter,
The child develops as a whole person in which many there are comprehension checkup questions, a pedagogical
different psychological systems are linked together and tool that enables readers to immediately know if they
depend on each other and which have strong continuities have mastered the key issues they have just encountered.
with earlier and later periods of development. This book In each chapter, there are also highlighted key terms that
reflects that integration both in terms of how it has been are defined in the Glossary of the book. Each chapter ends
organized and written and in terms of my own perspective. with a conclusion that brings together the key ideas and
The book is topically organized within a chronological often offers a novel integrative insight. The summaries
framework, which serves to provide maximum integrations that follow the conclusions are comprehensive digests of
in distinctive developmental periods, as well as providing the entire chapter in a bulleted format. Any students who
more coherent treatments of each area of development. As a can clearly recognize and elaborate on each bulleted point
single author of this book, an increasingly vanishing breed will have a good sense of how well they have mastered
of introductory text authors, I have been able to develop the chapter. Finally, at the end of each chapter, for more
a voice and lines of thought that are woven throughout in-depth consideration of the material, there are sets of
every chapter and that mutually reinforce each other. After extended thought questions that challenge students to
reading a chapter or two, students should have a constantly consider a problem more thoroughly.
building feeling of familiarity with ideas and approaches Every chapter has a box that is concerned with a social
that helps make everything hang together. Near the end of policy issue connected to material in the chapter so that
the book, I offer a different kind of integration through a students can see how basic research can be linked to

PREFACE xix
important and socially relevant real-world issues. A second of developmental psychology leads to the theories students
box in each chapter is concerned with an example of an are learning about in class.
exciting new direction of developmental research so students The Developmental Psychology Lecture PowerPoints were
can see how the field continues to evolve through innovative written by David Barner and Jessica Sullivan, both of
research initiatives. It is an important way of illustrating whom are at University of California, San Diego.
how developmental psychology is a dynamic, active field. • All of the art in the book is available as PowerPoints and
A third box in each chapter illustrates in more detail the JPEGs to make creating custom presentation materials
methodology of scientific research relevant to the topics easy.
of that chapter. The purpose here is to show in a manner • Presentation tools are downloadable at wwnorton.com/
closely analogous to posters at scientific conferences how instructors.
an experiment is organized in terms of hypothesis, method,
results, and conclusion, and to include illustrations of the
experimental setup and results. These boxes are somewhat
simpler than most posters at meetings, but they very much Videos
capture their spirit. • Chapter Opening Videos from Frank Keil himself serve as
Throughout the book, there are brief historical discussions an introduction to the chapter topics and help convey his
of research topics that make clear how current ideas and enthusiasm and voice to the reader.
research emerged from older traditions. There is also careful • Classroom Videos with discussion questions feature
documentation of cutting-edge research that serves not only enactments of classic experiments and demonstrate a
to ground the research in particular studies but also serves variety of characteristics from varying developmental
as a rich source of references for further explorations by periods, showing developmental psychology as a science in
students, references that are also available on the instructor action. The Developmental Psychology videos were curated
Web site and in prepared LMS materials available free of by Tasha Howe of Humboldt State University.
charge to every instructor using the book. • Videos are available at wwnorton.com/instructors as part
In the end, these pedagogical devices all serve the of the Interactive Instructor’s Guide and as part of our
overarching goal of this book, which is to get to the heart LMS-ready materials.
of developmental psychology. My aim is to expose readers
to developmental psychology’s big questions in an engaging
and compelling way that invites students to join researchers
in one of the most lively and fascinating areas of intellectual Interactive Instructor’s Guide
inquiry that also has immense personal relevance and social • The searchable Interactive Instructor’s Guide offers class-
importance. room activity suggestions with print-ready handouts, chapter
opening videos, and classroom videos with discussion
questions. The Developmental Psychology videos were curated
by Tasha Howe of Humboldt State University, and the
Supplementary Materials activities were written by Melissa Barnett at the University
of Arizona.
Our supplements package was developed based on data from • The Interactive Instructor’s Guide is downloadable from
a survey of 60 instructors currently teaching developmental wwnorton.com/instructors.
psychology at a wide variety of schools. Our book-specific
resources are easy to access in one place through wwnorton
.com/instructors. They are also searchable on the Interactive
Instructor’s Guide, making lecture planning easy. Test Bank
• The Test Bank for Developmental Psychology is designed to
help instructors prepare their exams. The Test Bank has
been developed using the Norton Assessment Guidelines,
Presentation Tools and each chapter of the Test Bank consists of five
• Lecture PowerPoints offer images and instructor-only question types classified according to the first five levels
lecture notes that include additional examples and of Bloom’s taxonomy of knowledge types: remembering,
teaching suggestions, which will help ease the transition understanding, applying, analyzing, and evaluating.
to using a new textbook. Each chapter also includes an Questions are further classified by section and difficulty,
optional set of slides that cover the research behind a making it easy to construct tests and quizzes that are
concept covered in the chapter to illustrate how the science meaningful and diagnostic.

xx PREFACE
• The Test Bank questions were written by Thompson Davis of the print book and allow students to highlight and take
of Louisiana State University and Lisa Rosen of Texas notes with ease, print chapters as needed, and search the text.
Woman’s University, with Tasha Howe of Humboldt State Norton eBooks are available online and as downloadable
University. PDFs. They can be purchased directly from our Web site, or
• The Test Bank is available in paperback and on disk; it is with a registration folder that can be sold in the bookstore.
also downloadable in PDF, RTF, or ExamView formats
from wwnorton.com/instructors.

Acknowledgments
Norton Coursepacks: Our Content, My deepest debt goes to my wife Kristi Lockhart, who was
Your Course assigned to the same office as me on our first day of graduate
school and who has been my one true love and colleague ever
• Easily add high-quality Norton digital media to your
since. Kristi has made major career sacrifices for the sake of
online, hybrid, or lecture course—all at no cost. Norton
our family and my career and has always done so with great
Coursepacks work with and leverage your existing Learning
generosity and good humor, spreading that spirit of generosity
Management System, so there’s no new system to learn, and
and good humor to our children as well. As a parent and partner
access is free and easy. Comprehensive coursepacks are ready
she has been loving, supportive, and playful in ways that have
to use, right from the start, but they are easy to customize,
sustained and inspired all of us. I am infinitely fortunate that
using the system you already know and understand. The
she is the love of my life and marvel every day that she was
Developmental Psychology Coursepack includes classroom
willing to spend her life with me. She has taught me more
videos with discussion questions, Quiz+ review questions,
about children, parenting, and family dynamics than all other
and flashcards available for the students (or assignable as
sources combined and has been the best parent ever. Through
instructors see fit), as well as the Test Bank.
countless discussions with her about almost all the topics in
• Quiz questions were written by Thompson Davis of
this book and through listening to her many observations
Louisiana State University and Lisa Rosen of Texas
about children, I have been a most grateful recipient of her
Woman’s University, with Tasha Howe of Humboldt State
wisdom. I owe her everything. I have also shared with Kristi in
University.
the delight of watching our three sons grow, each in their own
• All of these materials are downloadable in Blackboard,
ways, into remarkable young men. From their first moments
Moodle, D2L, Angel, and Canvas formats.
as newborns to their lives as young adults, Derek, Dylan, and
Martin have taught us both many volumes about development
and continue to do so, as well as providing us with the most
eBook rewarding and meaningful experiences of our lives. Kristi,
• Same great book, a fraction of the price. Derek, Dylan, and Martin have also been incredibly patient
• An affordable and convenient alternative to the printed and tolerant of my obsession with this book and the ways it
textbook, Norton eBooks retain the content and design has hovered over all of us for decades. These two photos of our

PREFACE xxi
family cover only part of the entire period of writing this book, evolution, sometimes sending me extensive comments on
but they show the passage of time during which I was writing earlier drafts, other times providing confirmatory reviews to
it. The many hours I have spent working on this book have Norton editors about the near final drafts. I have included
been all too evident to every member of my family, and they the affiliations of the reviewers at the time that they wrote
all have been tremendously gracious about its intrusions into their reviews, and some may since have moved on to other
their lives. I thank all of them from the bottom of my heart colleges and universities. I deeply appreciate all the work
for their support, their inspiration, and their forbearance and that the reviewers have done and thank the following:
I thank the heavens that I was lucky enough to be part of this
family. Joseph Allen, University of Virginia
Certain people at W. W. Norton also deserve extraordinary Richard Aslin, University of Rochester
thanks, starting with Don Lamm and Don Fusting, Terry Au, University of Hong Kong
who originally signed me up to write the book years ago. Melissa Barnett, University of Arizona
I appreciate the support I have received from the Acquisitions Kymberley Bennett, Indiana State University
Editors Sheri Shavely, Roby Harrington, Jon Durbin, Cathy Paul Bloom, Yale University
Wick, and, especially recently, Aaron Javsicas, who made Amanda Brandone, Lehigh University
sure the whole project met critical deadlines and who has Sara Broaders, Northwestern University
been very helpful in selecting art. I have also been blessed Gwen Broude, Vassar College
with brilliant copy editing by Janet Greenblatt and project Jean Burr, Hamilton College
editing by Rachel Mayer. I thank Vanessa Drake-Johnson, Joseph Campos, University of California, Berkeley
who served as an early Developmental Editor of the book, Carol Cheatham, University of North Carolina
and Photo Editor Mike Fodera, Photo Researchers Donna Judith Danovitch, Michigan State University
Ranieri and Julie Tesser, Media Editor Callinda Taylor, Daniel Dickman, Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana
Editorial Assistant Shira Averbuch, Production Manager Ann Edworthy, Swansea Metropolitan University
Eric Pier-Hocking, and Marketing Manager Lauren Leanne Franklin, Cardiff Metropolitan University
Winkler. I also would like to thank Jonathan Kominsky Janet Frick, University of Georgia
who worked on the art manuscript in New Haven. Jeffrey Gagne, University of Texas at Arlington
But I must especially acknowledge the massive contribu- Susan Gelman, University of Michigan
tions made by two Developmental Editors, Sarah Mann and Gilbert Gottlieb, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Sandy Lifland. Sarah became involved in the project in 2007 Joan Grusec, University of Toronto
and went through the entire text and asked me probing ques- Amy Halberstadt, North Carolina State University
tions about what I really wanted to say and if I was saying it Jacqui Harrison, University of Bolton
in the best and briefest ways possible. She helped enormously Brett Hayes, University of New South Wales
to shape what had become a far too long body of text into Fay Julal, Southampton Solent University
something much more workable. Even more critically, Sandy Robert Kavanaugh, Williams College
Lifland has had a profound influence. She is a legendary edi- Rachel Keen, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
tor who early on gave me challenging feedback on the crude Debby Kemler Nelson, Swarthmore College
first drafts of this book and made me realize just how much Susan Kemper, University of Kansas
more I had to do if I wanted to write the book I really envi- Katherine Kinzler, University of Chicago
sioned. She then rejoined the project in 2011 and worked Kristin Lagattuta, University of California, Davis
full time on the book until its publication. We studied, con- Alan Leslie, Rutgers University
sidered, and often extensively discussed every word of text, Robert Lickliter, Virginia Tech
every line in every figure and graph for ways that they could Gary Marcus, New York University
be clearer, better connected to the big ideas of the book and Ellen Markman, Stanford University
to the basic scientific literature. Sandy herself read hundreds Lori Markson, University of California, Berkeley
of original articles to understand more deeply what I had in Carol Murphy, National University of Ireland, Maynooth
mind and to ensure that I was getting across to the reader Simone Nguyen, University of North Carolina, Wilmington
exactly what I really intended. She also kindly pointed out Bjorn Nilsson, Skovde University College
to me several cases where I still wasn’t clear in my own head Samuel Putnam, University of Oregon
about what I actually wanted to say. I honestly cannot imag- Philippe Rochat, Emory University
ine a better editor who cared more about creating a product Lisa Rosen, Texas Women’s University
of real intellectual and aesthetic value. Karl Rosengren, Northwestern University
This book has been reviewed through the years by Paul Rozin, University of Pennsylvania
many scholars who have been involved in all stages of its Jenny Saffran, University of Wisconsin, Madison

xxii PREFACE
Rose Scott, University of California, Merced I am also grateful to those scholars who have written the
Meghan Sinton, College of William and Mary ancillaries: Tasha Howe, Humboldt State University, who
Susan Sonnenschein, University of Maryland, Baltimore worked on the Test Bank, Student Study Quizzes, and Video
County Curation; Thompson Davis III, Louisiana State University,
Hiroko Sotozaki, Western Illinois University and Lisa Rosen, Texas Woman’s University, both of whom
Caroline Stanley, Wilmington College of Ohio worked on the Test Bank and Student Study Quizzes; Melissa
Michael Steele, University of Utah Barnett, University of Arizona, who worked on the Classroom
Catherine Tamis-LaMonda, New York University Activities; and David Barner, University of California, San
Ross Thompson, University of Nebraska Diego, who with the help of Jessica Sullivan, worked on the
Elliot Turiel, University of California, Berkeley Lecture PowerPoints.
Eva Twetman, Halmstad University College Finally, I thank those many colleagues at Cornell and
Mike vanDuuren, University of Winchester Yale who have inspired and educated me on a daily basis.
Kristy vanMarle, University of Missouri
Peter Vishton, William & Mary College Frank Keil
Maria Wong, Idaho State University August 2013
Fei Xu, University of California, Berkeley

PREFACE xxiii
 PA R T I
Framing Psychological
Development
 1
Approaching Psychological
Development
Why Study Development? Perspectives on Development Studying Psychological
• Development as a Key to Understanding • Empiricist and Nativist Perspectives Development
Children’s Capabilities • Comparative and Evolutionary • Observational Studies
• Development as a Means for Insight into Perspectives • Experimental Studies
the Mature Form • Cross-Cultural Perspectives • Longitudinal Approaches
• Development and Social Policy • Neuroscience Perspectives • Cross-Sectional Approaches
The Nature of Development • Behaviorist Perspectives • Converging Methods
• Categorizing Developmental • Psychoanalytic Perspectives • Designing a Sound Study
Phenomena • Cognitive Science Perspectives
Conclusions
• Basic Questions about Psychological
Development Summary
 baby is born and seems totally helpless. He can’t

A feed himself or warm himself or move to avoid

danger. Does he know anything that will help
him get what he needs? Can he do anything that
will draw the attention of those who can
help him?
Consider some of the perceptual challenges a baby faces
in the first week of life (see Figure 1.1). It’s the middle of
winter, and a 3-day-old baby boy is leaving the hospital
with his parents. In the morning, he is moved rapidly from
the nursery, where he has been looking up at the white ceil-
ing with its blinking red light and hearing the intermit-
tent cries of other infants and the muffled conversations of
nurses. He is wheeled in a nursery cart into a noisy hallway
where many large people bustle past on both sides of him,
occasionally looming over and cooing at him. On arrival in
his mother’s room, she scoops him up and embraces him,
as she has many times in the past 3 days. As she nurses
him, he feels her warmth and hears her voice as he tastes
and smells sweetness. He is then rushed down the busy
hall again, this time held in his mother’s lap as she sits in a FIGURE 1.1 A newborn baby. William James, the philosopher/
wheelchair—and outside into a blast of cold air and a 100- psychologist, described the newborn’s first perception of the world
fold increase in brightness. He is buckled into an infant as encountering a “blooming, buzzing confusion.”
seat in a rumbling older car and driven home over bumpy
roads, with trees and telephone poles whizzing by the win- comparison of the newborn’s mind to a blank slate appears
dows. When the car stops, he is carried into a house where to be warranted.
a dog is barking, two children are shouting excitedly, and Moreover, when it comes to making sense of the world,
a telephone is ringing. Finally, he is brought into a quiet, the infant faces remarkable perceptual challenges. How
darkened bedroom and laid in a crib for a nap. All of this could our 3-day-old boy possibly understand his trip home?
takes about 1 hour. He typically sees only the top half of people’s bodies, and
Many observers would consider this infant a completely those people often appear and disappear too rapidly for him
helpless creature with no behavioral or perceptual abilities to recognize them as individuals. How could he form an
and a brain like a blank canvas, waiting for experiences to impression of the body as a whole? As he is brought to his
be painted on it in his encounters with a richly structured mother in her hospital room, how does he know that she is
environment. This view is the basis for the seventeenth- getting closer rather than staying the same distance away
century philosopher John Locke’s famous statement that the and blowing up in size like a balloon? And how does he
child’s mind is a tabula rasa, or “blank slate,” upon which link his experience of seeing her face as she approaches with
knowledge and perceptual skills will be “written” through his completely different experience of her when nursing? At
experience (Locke, 1690/1964). The great psychologist home, when he hears a dog barking, children shouting, and
and philosopher William James described this view more a telephone ringing, how can he tell which sounds come
colorfully when, at the turn of the twentieth century, he from which objects?
wondered if all the newborn saw was a “blooming, buzzing If babies did not have any perceptual abilities to help
confusion,” a meaningless collage of fleeting images, colors them make sense of the world’s patterns, these challenges
and sounds (James, 1890). might overwhelm them. In fact, they are born remarkably
Newborns’ behaviors might seem to reinforce the notion well equipped to begin making sense of the world they per-
that they are completely helpless and passive, waiting to ceive. Indeed, even newborns make interpretations that
gain understanding and meaning through experience. go far beyond seeing the world as a blooming, buzzing
They sleep a great deal, and even when they are awake, confusion.
they do not clearly attend to any one stimulus. In fact, Understanding what newborns can see or hear or under-
their eye movements often seem uncoordinated, and they stand and how they add to their knowledge and abilities
seem unable to track moving objects visually. In addition, as they age is an area of great interest to developmental
there is no easy indication that they recognize anything psychologists. Developmental psychology can be viewed
they see. In casual observations of young infants, Locke’s as a scientific way to address our intrinsic fascination with

APPROACHING PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 3

similar developmental questions throughout the lifespan. It for example, must learn how to talk, to walk, to find their
looks at the challenges that confront the growing child and way home, to count, to catch an object, and to know when
asks how the child or adolescent or young adult is able to others are mistaken. Developmental psychologists ask how
master these mental and physical challenges. skills and knowledge are acquired by children. They look
In this chapter, we will explore some of the strategies at how children master motor skills, cognitive skills, and
used in the scientific study of psychological development. social skills. They examine the universal commonalities
We will present several reasons for examining development. that affect the development of children throughout the
We will then discuss the nature of development, looking world. And they study how developmental constraints can
first at periods of development (the child at different ages) affect the age at which particular skills and knowledge are
and then at domains of development (the spheres in which acquired.
development occurs, such as perception and cognition). We Consider two key components of this story in a bit more
will briefly address some basic questions about development detail. For one, children throughout the world must learn to
before going into different perspectives on development. decode and respond to communication from others. In just a
Finally, we will consider how to study psychological devel- few short years, virtually all children master much of their cul-
opment, discussing different kinds of studies and approaches ture’s language, even though languages vary widely. As they
and the criteria for sound studies that give us valid, reliable, come to understand and produce new and complex linguistic
and replicable results. expressions, they must refine several skills—from decoding
speech sounds to making inferences about a speaker’s mean-
ing. As a second example, all children must form a sense of
themselves as individuals within their own family and com-
Why Study Development? munity. Even very young children weave together several
skills and forms of understanding in the course of develop-
A child is born and grows from infant to toddler to school- ing a sense of self. As an adult, this self-knowledge—seeing
age child to adolescent and to adult, regardless of where he yourself as distinct from others and possessed of particular
is born or who his parents are. In the course of development, abilities and traits, as well as having a sense of the choices and
he acquires a wide range of perceptual and motor skills as goals that direct your journey through life—is easy to take
well as cognitive and social abilities. Developmental pat- for granted. In fact, this kind of understanding depends on a
terns are intrinsically interesting, since we all have faced rich array of early accomplishments, ranging from controlling
the challenges of acquiring skills and knowledge and fitting the movement of your limbs to knowing which parts of your
into a family, a peer group, and a community. These pat- knowledge are private and unavailable to others. Over the
terns are the key to understanding what changes over the course of childhood, these abilities and many others become
course of development, what stimulates and what constrains integrated into a unified sense of self.
development, and what problems may develop along the The problems facing the developing child require com-
way. Knowing what occurs in infancy or early childhood or plex solutions far beyond the capacities of even the most
adolescence can give us clues to understanding adult mental advanced computers, yet all children either solve them com-
states and behaviors as well. Finally, studying development pletely or are well on their way to a solution within the first
can also give us insight as we make decisions and formulate few years of life. The course of development is a fascinat-
social policies that affect children. ing story in which a limited range of abilities and behaviors
starts the infant on a developmental pathway leading to a
variety of remarkable achievements, including social col-
Development as a Key to Understanding laborations, problem solving, and acquisition of specialized
expertise. One major goal of this book is to explain how
Children’s Capabilities that success is possible.
The process of psychological development is a remarkable As the story of development unfolds, parents do not simply
story, informed by sophisticated scientific methods and mold their children into a desired form. Instead, if things go
theories. This story is animated by the problems that chil- well, they work as mentors, coaches, and partners with their
dren confront at different ages and the ways they tend to children, helping them develop in optimal ways. Studying
solve them. Many of these problems are universal, faced development is one way to better understand children—to
by children in all cultures throughout the world, as in the appreciate them as individuals in their own right and to see
perceptual challenges faced by a newborn, as described their nobler goals and beliefs. In addition, each child’s devel-
at the beginning of the chapter. For that reason, many opment takes place within many different communities,
aspects of the development story follow a similar arc including family, peers, school, town, and the entire culture,
regardless of where and how children live. All children, each of which exerts its own influences.

4 CHAPTER 1 APPROACHING PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

 Understanding these developmental patterns can also
grant each of us a new perspective on our own developmental
journey. To appreciate these common developmental stories,
as well as their individual variations, is to gain insight into a
new world of remarkable complexity and wonder. Put differ-
ently, all the intriguing questions about the adult’s mind and
behavior apply to development as well; and in the field of
development, these questions are enriched by a host of new
ones about origins and changes. Successful psychological
development is one of the great wonders of modern science.

Development as a Means for

Insight into the Mature Form FIGURE 1.2 Studying development to understand adult
structures. Even the closest examination of an adult zebra does not
At some point in our lives, almost all of us stumble across clarify whether it is a black animal with white stripes or a white one
clues about what our parents were like as children or as much with black stripes. But prenatal developmental analyses suggest an
younger adults—an old photo album, a grainy home movie, answer to this question.
a saved drawing from preschool, or a surprising story from
someone who knew them many years ago. These records tions; it also provides insights into why that coloring might
of the past seem to hold answers to all kinds of nagging have evolved, how skin patterns relate to embryonic growth,
questions: Was my mother always so outgoing and friendly? what might go wrong in deviant cases, and so on. The devel-
Was my father always so concerned about tidying up? Did opmental context greatly enriches our understanding of the
something happen early in their lives that made both of my final form.
parents so thrifty? Knowledge about someone’s origins and Leaving biology and returning to psychology offers many
background often offers clues into that person’s thoughts similar examples. Understanding how psychological skills
and behavior in the present. develop—such as recognizing faces, handling threatening
Studying development offers unique insights into some situations, or even understanding that a multicolored thing
of psychology’s oldest and most intriguing questions. For is one object rather than two—is central to understand-
example, are our personalities the same both as children ing the mature form of these abilities in adults. Studying
and as adults? What are the roots of our moral intuitions? development can allow us to see subtle distinctions that
How does language change the nature of thought? And become blurred in adults, but it can also allow us to see
how does conscious experience differ from mental life that the foundational framework for a behavior as it emerges.
occurs outside of consciousness? Researchers in both biol- For example, for hundreds of years, scholars have debated
ogy and psychology are increasingly discovering that they whether people are basically selfish but learn from society’s
can sometimes answer questions about mature organisms constraints how to behave appropriately, or whether they
by considering how they emerge and change in the course are, at their core, caring and altruistic but become “cor-
of development. rupted by society.” Developmental studies are enormously
A surprising discovery from the field of embryology revealing here, as they can suggest whether one aspect of
helps to illustrate this principle, though the question that morality or the other is truly foundational. This particular
motivated the research might appear obviously—or even developmental story is still unfolding, but recent work sug-
ridiculously—unanswerable: Are zebras white animals with gests that both facets of morality, self-interest and altru-
black stripes or black animals with white stripes? Those who ism, may appear very early as equally intrinsic components
studied adult zebras for the answer concluded that zebras of human nature (Bloom, 2013; Warneken & Tomasello,
must be white with black stripes, because the adult under- 2009). These findings certainly do not mean that infants
belly was often white (see Figure 1.2). But a different answer and young toddlers hold fully formed moral beliefs, but
emerges when considering how the stripes develop (Gould, they make strong suggestions about the nature of humans’
1983): zebras actually seem to be black animals with white deepest moral impulses.
stripes. Studies of the developing fetus revealed a process of
inhibiting the skin’s dark pigment in particular areas to lay
down a series of white stripes on a black background (Bard, Q: Give an example of how patterns of
1977). This example not only shows how studying develop- development provide insight into a mature form.
ment can sometimes resolve seemingly unanswerable ques-

WHY STUDY DEVELOPMENT? 5

Development and Social Policy mild fear of dogs to paralyzing distress about almost every-
thing outside the home. An understanding of anxieties and
As citizens in a democracy and as decision-making adults how they develop in children requires considering how the
and potential parents, we are also in a position to put devel- child perceives and thinks about the world and how these per-
opmental insights to practical use (see Figure 1.3). Just a ceptions and thoughts change as the child matures. Knowing
sample of today’s headlines shows that we will all need to more about how thoughts and emotions interrelate in develop-
make choices concerning children’s education and welfare: ment can also help you understand children with emotional
When should a child be tried as an adult if he or she commits problems, such as depression or uncontrollable anger.
a crime? What is the appropriate age to start sex education? When a school district decides how to teach children
Are preschool programs for disadvantaged children effec- with special needs, when there are debates about expand-
tive? Is joint custody best for children of divorced parents? ing children’s health care coverage to include treatment for
Should birth parents always have access to the adopted child? emotional difficulties, or when a community establishes a
We owe it to the younger generations to make these decisions program to help children recover from a natural disaster,
based on sound information. it is critical to understand the nature of both normal and
Although we will not resolve these difficult questions in abnormal psychological development. Without an apprecia-
this book, we will see how developmental psychology bears tion of how both normal and abnormal thoughts, feelings,
on them and how to interpret and use information about and behaviors develop, it is difficult to effectively support
these issues. This kind of critical thinking is one of the most those who are affected by these decisions. Such an apprecia-
valuable aspects of education—and one important way of tion also reduces social stigma and prejudice, as it brings
putting this skill to use is in the decisions we make, as indi- to light all that we have in common with those who are
viduals and as a society, about our children. In that sense, impaired.
studying development provides tools for evaluating the kind
of nuanced information you will encounter, and often have
to act on, for the rest of your life.
Knowledge of psychological development also affects how
Q: Name a social policy question involving
each of us relates to those who depart from behavioral norms, children, and explain how basic research in
how we value them as individuals, and how we make deci- developmental psychology might help to
sions about their welfare. Some of the most challenging social answer it.
policy decisions concern individuals with special needs. These
include children with learning disabilities, social deficits, or
emotional problems. All of us have encountered or heard
about children who struggle with anxieties, ranging from a
The Nature of Development
When we study development, we are interested in the pat-
terns of change that occur in an organism as it progresses
through its lifespan. In this book, we will focus on pat-
terns of change between birth and young adulthood, but
it is possible to extend the idea of developmental change
to include adulthood and older age. Indeed, midlife and
later life changes—including some faculties that come only
with advanced age, such as wisdom (Baltes & Staudinger,
2000)—are discussed in Chapter 17.
Psychological development includes patterns of change
in mind and behavior that occur as an organism progresses
through its lifespan. The mental changes involve the growth
of processes such as perception and reasoning, as well as
changes in emotion and motivation. Behavioral changes over
FIGURE 1.3 Child labor. Basic research in developmental
the lifespan range from young children’s toilet training or
psychology can have important implications for social policy. A better
understanding of psychological development can help support argu-
learning to avoid temper tantrums to adolescents beginning
ments against the use of children as laborers. Although most people to date. Psychological development is one of the most chal-
consider child labor a thing of the past, as depicted in this photo, the lenging and rewarding areas of psychology because it explains
practice is still common in many parts of the world. how we come to be who we are. There is a popular misconcep-

6 CHAPTER 1 APPROACHING PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

tion that studying young children might be simpler because ment usually do not enter the picture until shortly before
young children have fewer abilities than adults. As we will see, birth, at which point some researchers ask how experiences in
however, understanding psychological development requires the womb might influence behaviors after birth. As we will
careful consideration of both the child’s early abilities and the see, research in this area has revealed that infants prenatally
mature mind toward which a child is progressing. develop a preference for some of the sounds of their mother’s
language such that, at birth, they already prefer to listen to
her language over others. The developmental psychology of
the prenatal period also involves understanding the psycho-
Categorizing Developmental Phenomena logical effects of substances that can harm the developing
To study the rich, vast scope of a lifetime of changes, psy- fetus. For example, children whose mothers drank excessive
chologists group developmental patterns in several ways. We amounts of alcohol during pregnancy are more likely to have
will consider how development can be divided into periods a host of cognitive and emotional problems.
and domains before turning to some of the broader ques- Infancy usually refers to the first year to year and a half of
tions that developmental psychologists ask and the diverse life. The most notable feature of this period is that infants
perspectives that inform their search for answers. are largely preverbal. The absence of language has led some
researchers to propose that the infant’s mind works differ-
Periods of Development One way of categorizing devel- ently from the minds of older children, hypothesizing that
opmental patterns involves dividing the lifespan into a series of the infant may lack the ability to think about anything that
developmental periods based on age—most commonly these is not present. Infants’ behavior also shows many differences
are the prenatal period, infancy, the preschool period, young from the behavior of older children, ranging from young
school age, later school age, and adolescence. Researchers who infants’ sleep patterns, to crawling, to the pronounced fear
consider the entire lifespan would add young adulthood, mid- of strangers that emerges at around 8 months of age. Study-
dle adulthood, and late adulthood to this list (see Figure 1.4). ing infancy also requires a specialized set of research meth-
One reason for dividing development into these periods is ods, since infants can’t say in words what they like or dislike.
that each one shows unique patterns of change in mind and The preschool period, from roughly age 1½ to 4, includes
action, so it makes sense to treat each period as a distinct changes on several fronts. Language appears and flourishes
area of study. A second, more practical reason is that certain such that most 4-year-olds can chatter away on any number of
periods require their own specialized research methods. Most topics. During this period, children clearly show the ability to
researchers who study infancy, for example, use the same set think about things that are not present, and their memory skills
of techniques. often improve considerably. Socially, children improve in their
Considering these periods in a little more detail, the prena- ability to understand other people’s minds, and they develop
tal period covers development from the moment of conception the capacity for much more complex social interactions.
to birth some 9½ months later. The study of early prenatal Young school age, from roughly age 5 to 7, is a period in
development focuses largely on anatomical and physiologi- which children’s social and cognitive skills expand consider-
cal development. Considerations of psychological develop- ably. Their memory strategies become much more effective,
their mathematical skills become more sophisticated, and
they usually learn to read. They can understand more com-
plex discussions and seem to follow more elaborate lines of
reasoning. Socially, one of their most significant changes is
the child’s experience in the world outside the family, most
notably in school. Another major socialization tool in many
cultures, the television, becomes ever more influential.
In later school age, from roughly age 8 to 12, children
continue to make clear advancements as they improve their
ability to express complicated thoughts and solve complex
problems. As self-control improves, they appear increasingly
able to inhibit impulses and delay gratification. Their real-
world knowledge increases greatly as they come to under-
stand their community and its place in the world. At the
same time, their social networks expand and tend to focus
FIGURE 1.4 Periods of development. The members of this on friendships with peers of the same sex.
extended family represent many developmental periods, from infancy Adolescence, from roughly age 13 to 20, is another period
and the preschool period through adolescence and late adulthood. of salient changes. Some are physical, as the differences

THE NATURE OF DEVELOPMENT 7

between the sexes become more distinct during puberty. At development, but developmental psychologists usually pose
the cognitive level, adolescents are increasingly able to con- specific questions, focusing on changes in particular kinds
sider hypothetical situations and to see how two people can of psychological processes. Thus, besides dividing the life-
disagree without either being mistaken. There is also a surge span into chronological periods, developmental psychologists
of risk taking in this period that may involve underestimat- also categorize developmental phenomena into the different
ing some risks, thrill seeking, and difficulty in control- types of psychological processes that undergo developmental
ling impulses, representing both cognitive and emotional changes—including perception, action, cognition, morality,
changes. Other more purely social and emotional hallmarks social behavior, and emotions (see Figure 1.5).
of adolescence involve entering romantic and sexual rela- Perceptual development involves the ways people grow
tionships and establishing independence from one’s parents. in their ability to pick up information from the world by
Young adulthood, from roughly age 21 to 30, is a period using their senses and by processing sensory information.
of consolidation of the many changes that have occurred We will see, for example, that infants may perceive faces and
in earlier years. The wildness or volatility of adolescence speech sounds in quite different ways from older children
typically diminishes, and this period’s cognitive changes and adults, raising profound questions about how people
may mostly involve gaining more detailed knowledge and transition from one way of perceiving to another. Percep-
applied skills. In most cultures, adults in this age group tual development also involves changes in the ability to inte-
commit to a particular role in life, either in a career or as a grate information from different senses, such as hearing and
homemaker. vision, and to use that information to guide action.
Characteristics of middle adulthood, roughly age 31 to Development of action is concerned with how people
60, vary considerably across cultures. It is important to change in their ability to move about in the world and pur-
keep in mind that a century ago, members of most com- posefully guide their bodies and limbs. It also includes the
munities in the world had an average lifespan of 40 years. development of reflexes and conditioning, a particular type
Even today, the average lifespan of a man in Sierra Leone is of learning that focuses on behavioral changes in response
37 years, while that of a woman in Japan is 86 (CIA World to positive and negative reinforcements. Developmental
Factbook, 2010). Given such an enormous range in life changes in this area are often most obvious among young
expectancies, it is difficult to generalize about experiences children—for example, as a child progresses from crawling
during this period. In specific cultures, such as the United to walking or from being unable to catch a ball at age 2 to
States, more consistent patterns take shape. For example, catching a ball while running at age 5.
most adults in the United States and other developed coun- The study of cognitive development focuses on how
tries are likely to reach their career peak during this period people change over the lifespan in the ways that they
and enter the period when their own children reach adult- understand and use information. Research in this area
hood and leave home. usually involves observing changes in behavior in order to
Late adulthood, from the late 60s onward, encompasses make inferences about the changes in a person’s thoughts
a gradually increasing age range in many cultures as life- and beliefs. Thus, when a 7-year-old first demonstrates
spans increase. Like middle adulthood, late adulthood is that she understands multiplication, researchers will ask
characterized by huge individual variations. Some people how that child’s mental representations of mathemati-
show a substantial decline in cognitive and motor skills, cal concepts have changed in accordance with her new
whereas others show only modest changes even in very old understanding. Cognitive development includes not only
age. Moreover, performance in some tasks that draw on large gaining particular types of knowledge, such as under-
amounts of stored knowledge can continue to improve well standing the characteristics of physical objects or the bio-
into old age. In terms of social and emotional change, older logical world, but also developing mental abilities such
adults show a strong tendency to experience the present and as memory and attention that support many kinds of
remember the past more positively than younger adults. thought and behavior.
This brief chronology merely serves as a reminder of The study of moral development asks how a child’s sense of
the enormous amount of change that occurs from birth values emerges as well as how moral and immoral behaviors
through childhood and adulthood and into old age. These develop. Examining the development of values can include
nine periods are also somewhat arbitrary; the lifespan could studying how children reason through moral decisions and
potentially be divided into either fewer periods or more, also exploring their particular beliefs about whether behav-
depending on what kind of developmental changes serve as iors like cheating or physical aggression are ethical under
a basis for the divisions. various circumstances.
The field of social development looks at how a wide range
Areas of Development Our overview of the hallmarks of relationships between people form and change. Psy-
of different periods helps to illustrate the full sweep of chologists in this area may investigate how an infant forms

8 CHAPTER 1 APPROACHING PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

 Perceptual development Cognitive development Moral development

Social development Action development Emotional development

FIGURE 1.5 Areas of development. The different areas of development interact constantly throughout the lifespan. Nonetheless, researchers
tend to focus on a particular areas—such as changes in perceptual, cognitive, action, social, moral, or emotional processes.

a special attachment to a caregiver and shows distress at Basic Questions about

separation. They may examine how teasing and bullying
in middle school affect both the bullies and the victims. Psychological Development
Studying social development in adolescence might focus on Clearly, psychological development is not a monolithic
how teens’ first romantic relationships differ from earlier concept; changes over a lifetime happen in several differ-
close relationships. Other topics of interest within social ent dimensions. Furthermore, specific periods and psycho-
development include how particular social qualities, such as logical processes show their own distinct patterns in the
shyness or leadership, emerge. ways that developmental changes unfold. These differences
Research on emotional development examines how the lead to questions about which patterns happen in what cir-
full range of emotions takes shape, beginning in infancy. Its cumstances. We will consider three broad questions about
concerns range from which basic emotions are present in a dimensions of development that pertain to many develop-
newborn to the way complex emotions, such as guilt, emerge mental periods and processes.
out of simpler ones, such as sadness and fear. Because psy-
chologists often construe motivation in emotional terms— Is Development Stage-like or Continuous? Are there
that is, behaving in a particular way to feel better (or to points in development when children gain a new capacity that
avoid negative feelings)—the field of emotional develop- is completely different from what they previously were able to
ment may also study motivational changes that occur with do? Or is development more of a continuous process in which
increasing age. These include the disillusionment that often thoughts and behaviors slowly become more elaborate and
emerges in adolescence or the more positive outlook that complex? Qualitative change takes place when a new kind
can come with older age. of structure or process emerges that was not present before. In

THE NATURE OF DEVELOPMENT 9

developmental psychology, discussions of qualitative change In the course of normal development, we typically see
often refer to different stages of development; a child is said a mix of qualitative and quantitative patterns of change in
to be in one stage before a qualitative change occurs and in a the same organism. Animals that undergo metamorphoses
different stage after the change. Stages involve relatively dis- (for example, tadpole to frog, caterpillar to butterfly) exhibit
continuous changes in thinking and behaving, resulting in especially dramatic qualitative changes, but more typically
new kinds of accomplishments and patterns of thought that the two kinds of change are both apparent. Thus, when a
were not present before that stage. This stands in contrast deer grows its first set of antlers, it makes a clear qualita-
to quantitative change, in which the same structures and tive transition from its earlier antler-free period; yet other
processes remain but show differences in their magnitude. aspects of its anatomy, such as its skeleton and muscles,
Discussions of quantitative change focus on incremental grow larger in a more quantitative fashion at the same time.
expansions to a mental or physical process or capacity. In human development, the most obvious patterns of
In physical development, we can easily see both qualita- qualitative physical change occur during adolescence. After
tive and quantitative patterns of change. For example, a tad- a period of relatively incremental change in childhood in
pole’s body undergoes qualitative changes as it develops into which the body gradually increases in size on most dimen-
a frog (Gilbert, 2010). A series of interactions between genes sions, patterns of change during puberty take on a different
and hormones causes the tadpole’s body to break down and character (see Figure 1.7). In girls, these changes include a
resorb the tail that it used for swimming and then to use broadening of the hips relative to the rest of the body and
the resorbed material to generate new structures that distin- the development of breasts as new functional organs. The
guish the frog’s body from the tadpole’s. This tail resorption reproductive system changes as well. At the biochemical
happens in the context of many related changes, including level, the onset of menses represents a major new hormonal
a reshaping of the head and massive development of the cycle that was not taking place in the childhood years.
tongue, a shift from the tadpole’s herbivorous digestive sys- For boys, a different set of qualitative changes occurs. The
tem to the frog’s carnivorous one, and the development of upper body develops more extensively relative to the lower
a middle ear that allows the frog to hear in the air. Thus, a body, and facial hair grows from previously hairless skin.
whole constellation of interconnected changes in structure The male reproductive system also changes substantially.
and function serve the developing organism’s needs. Each of Keeping in mind the case of the supersized tadpoles, it is
these physical developments can be considered a qualitative easy enough to picture how a pattern of exclusively quanti-
change in its own right, as each bodily system has structur-
ally and functionally distinct “before” and “after” states.
The difference between qualitative and quantitative
changes is especially clear in the tadpole’s case because we
can contrast the qualitative changes that transform the tad- 1 2
pole into a frog with the very different outcome that results
when a tadpole undergoes purely quantitative change:
blocking the action of thyroid hormones can create a devel-
opmental path in which the tadpole can reach enormous
dimensions (see Figure 1.6). When a tadpole retains its same
3 4
basic structure and grows ever larger without undergoing
the normal transformation of its anatomy or physiology,
then it exhibits quantitative change.

FIGURE 1.6 Qualitative versus quantitative development. It

can be difficult to tell whether a pattern of psychological develop-
5 6
ment is qualitative or quantitative, but the contrast is often clearer in
A
biological change. (A) The tadpole’s dramatic qualitative change into
a frog (from eggs to tadpoles to adults) is caused by a rise in thyroid
hormone production that occurs in the tadpole’s normal development.
(B) Quantitative change, but not qualitative change, occurs when a
tadpole lacks thyroid glands and hence cannot produce thyroid
hormones. As such, it cannot metamorphose from a tadpole into
a frog (qualitative change). Instead, the tadpole continues to grow
(quantitative change), resulting in a giant tadpole (bottom) compared
to a normal tadpole (top). B

10 CHAPTER 1 APPROACHING PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

 LH short period of time (see Figure 1.8). By contrast, the abil-

hormone levels
FSH ity to see patterns in high resolution, which is called visual
Increases in DHEA acuity, gradually sharpens from birth through the first year
Androstenedione
of life and seems to be a clear case of quantitative change.
Estradiol
As we consider developmental patterns during particular
periods of life and within different domains, we will often
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 ask if the changes seem to be continuous and quantitative
Age (in years) or if they seem more qualitative and therefore suggestive
FIGURE 1.7 Increases in hormone levels and qualitative of distinct developmental stages. In some cases, as you will
changes during puberty. There is a surge of blood hormone see, experts disagree about which kind of change is occur-
levels during puberty in both girls and boys that produces dramatic ring, and a series of experiments can often help us choose
qualitative physical changes in their bodies. LH (luteinizing hor- between the alternatives. These debates are important not
mone) stimulates ovulation in girls and growth of testes in boys; FSH just for understanding what kind of change is happening;
(follicle-stimulating hormone) stimulates the formation of ova in girls
they can also, for example, help teachers design strategies
and sperm in boys; DHEA (dehydroepiandrosterone) and androstene-
dione are involved in the production of testosterone and estrogen;
that suit children’s emerging abilities.
estradiol is produced as estrogen and affects breast development
and body shape in girls and bone maturation and growth in boys.
Adapted from Gordon and Laufer (2005). Q: What is the difference between stage-like
tative changes would differ from one involving qualitative
and continuous change?
changes. Imagine a child who simply grows larger and larger,
never changing in body proportions and never acquiring
any of the secondary sex characteristics that develop during
puberty. In an extreme case of purely quantitative change, Is Development Global or Local? In some cases, devel-
this child would continue growing at the same rate through- opmental change sweeps across many types of processes or
out his lifespan and never show other signs of aging. abilities at once. When such global changes occur, similar
This distinction between qualitative and quantitative developments occur at roughly the same time in very differ-
change also applies in the psychological realm. Consider, for ent areas of thought. Global changes are therefore general
example, the consistent finding that infants who are younger changes that apply across all situations or domains. For exam-
than 6 months old are unable to see the depth relations con- ple, during middle childhood, children seem to show strong
veyed in pictures, but after the first 6 months of life, they improvement in the ability to focus on the information most
perceive these relations easily (Yonas et al., 2002). Their relevant to a task and ignore irrelevant or distracting informa-
visual systems change qualitatively at around 6 months of tion (Houde et al., 2010). This new ability to sustain atten-
age, acquiring a whole new kind of functional capacity in a tion could support improvements in a variety of areas where
the ability to stay focused is critical. Thus, a child at this age
might show gains in making moral judgments, reasoning
about video game puzzles, and solving math problems.
Other times, particular skills and mental competencies
each show their own unique sets of developmental changes.
When development is characterized by such local changes,
different kinds of psychological capacities develop relatively
independently of each other. Local changes are therefore
specific changes that occur in restricted areas or domains.
In this case, a change in patterns of moral judgment would
not necessarily coincide with or resemble a change in under-
standing mathematical concepts. Consider an example in
which a researcher carefully tracks a child’s patterns of both
moral and mathematical reasoning from age 5 to 10. Dur-
ing this period, the child seems to undergo a major shift in
FIGURE 1.8 Qualitative change in depth perception. Because
3-month-old infants cannot yet see depth as it is depicted in two-
how she thinks about moral dilemmas. Perhaps in the early
dimensional pictures, they would not find this “impossible” figure years she has difficulty understanding immoral acts that
troubling. In contrast, a 7-month-old can see depth in pictures and cause no physical harm but may cause psychological harm,
might well find this illustration odd. but in later years she becomes attuned to the psychological

THE NATURE OF DEVELOPMENT 11

consequences as well. During this 5-year period, her math- improvements in memory over the course of development
ematical skills also show great changes. Initially, she can affected every area of thought, those improvements would
only do the simplest addition, while by age 10, after some need to be taken into account in such diverse areas as lan-
training with the researcher, she can easily do long division. guage acquisition, mathematical reasoning, and conflict
This child has shown strong changes in moral reasoning resolution skills—even as each one of these areas showed its
and mathematical skills during the same period, but these own local patterns of change as well.
would still be considered local changes if there were no rela-
tionship between the two patterns of change. For example,
by taking frequent measurements, the researcher might dis-
cover that the two domains showed different developmental Q: What are some domains of behavior that
trends (see Figure 1.9). Perhaps the improvements in moral might be examined to determine if change is
judgment started off rapidly at age 5 and then gradually local or global?
slowed down by age 10, while changes in mathematical
ability showed the opposite pattern, changing slowly at first,
then showing steep gains. We would have further evidence
for local change if, after additional training in math, the How Do Nature and Nurture Shape Development?
child improved at solving a broad range of similar math- Few aspects of developmental psychology are as prominent
ematics problems but showed no gains in moral reasoning. in popular culture as the “nature/nurture” debate. In these
Taken together, these findings would clearly indicate that discussions, patterns of thought and behavior that emerge
the changes in these domains took place independently of in much the same way regardless of experience are consid-
one another, in the form of local changes. By contrast, if the ered the results of “nature,” whereas “nurture” is said to
changes in both moral and mathematical reasoning seemed describe psychology and behavior that result from specific
tightly linked in their patterns and timing, and if training experiences. This basic “nature/nurture” distinction can be
in one of these areas also helped in the other, those results fruitful in discussing development—but it must be applied
would suggest more global change. carefully. It makes little sense to talk about any behavior
In reality, global changes and local changes happen or psychological process as exclusively a product of either
together and often affect the same processes and skills. nature or nurture.
Development in capacities such as memory, which con- Consider two physical developments that might seem to
tributes to a variety of psychological processes, can support illustrate either pure nature or pure nurture. Beard growth
broad, global changes that affect many different areas. At in men seems like a development rooted completely in
the same time, more specific, focused patterns of change “nature,” the unfolding of a genetically predetermined pro-
can take shape within local areas. If, for example, general cess. In reality, however, the environment is also impor-
tant, as an extreme environment that disrupts hormonal
output can prevent beard growth. Hundreds of years ago
in Italy, preadolescent boys who were talented singers were
sometimes castrated to preserve their high voices (Peschel &
Increasing ability

Moral Peschel, 1986). Castration is obviously an extreme circum-

judgment
stance, but strictly speaking, it involves an environmen-
tal, or “nurture”-related, influence. Similarly, although a
Mathematical person becomes sunburned from exposure to ultraviolet
reasoning light, the influence of “nature” also plays a role. Different
individuals burn to differing degrees in the same sunlight
in the same environment because of genetic differences in
Increasing age pigmentation and other light-sensitive molecules in the
FIGURE 1.9 Local developmental change. If two developmental skin. Thus, even traits subject to very strong and specific
processes show their own distinct patterns of change, their devel- genetic influences cannot emerge without the support of a
opment would be considered local rather than global. Here we see particular range of environments. And even the most expe-
different developmental trends for two hypothetical processes. Note rience-associated traits can develop only within constraints
that both processes start at the same lower level and end up at the
that are heavily influenced by genes.
same higher level, but moral judgment changes rapidly at an early age
and then levels off, while mathematical reasoning increases slowly at
Because all development, whether physical or psychologi-
an early age but increases rapidly at an older age. It is implausible that cal, involves an interplay of nature and nurture, it can be
these two processes would reflect different aspects of changes in the tempting to assume that the entire nature/nurture debate is
same underlying system. misguided—an argument about a dichotomy that does not

12 CHAPTER 1 APPROACHING PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

really exist. According to such accounts, all development is as different colored lines. The upper panel represents a more
a mixture of both, and it makes no sense to ask how a par- nature-biased account, where environmental variations have
ticular trait, behavior, or psychological process is influenced little effect on the development of face perception. The out-
by nature or nurture. There are, however, good reasons why comes at the right fall quite close together, signifying, in this
the debate has been a topic of fascination for millennia. scenario, that the mind comes to represent faces in much
While it is true that all psychological development the same way, regardless of the environment an individual
involves interactions between nature and nurture, there experiences. On the other hand, the lower panel represents
are real differences in developmental patterns that can be a nurture-biased account. Here, the triangles representing
understood by asking about the relative influences of genes outcomes are widely dispersed, signifying that quite differ-
and environment. For example, we can ask if across a wide ent ways of representing faces develop, depending on differ-
range of “normal” environments (that is, environments that ences in the environment.
do not involve such unusual occurrences as brain surgery, Of course, Figure 1.10 is an idealized representation; in
hormone disruption, or extreme trauma and deprivation) practice, it is much more challenging to determine how the
a child will develop the ability to mentally fuse the sepa- influences of nature and nurture affect development. More-
rate images seen by the right and left eyes. This capacity for over, individuals do not really begin life at exactly the same
binocular vision requires repeated experiences in a lighted “initial state.” Nonetheless, this illustration helps to convey
environment with both eyes at the same time; if such envi- what is often at stake in nature/nurture debates; accounts of
ronmental conditions are met over time, the vast majority development may predict different patterns of change, and
of children will acquire binocular vision in essentially the even different outcomes, depending on which kind of influ-
same manner. In contrast, quite specific environmental ences they emphasize.
experiences are needed to be able to learn how to read—for Up to this point, we have considered nature and nurture
example, being taught to recognize groups of letters and to largely in terms of whether a particular psychological process
associate them with what they represent. This ability does or structure tends to develop in the same way regardless of
not develop automatically in any environment. the environments experienced or whether the developmental
In this book, we will consider the nature/nurture ques- outcomes vary widely, depending on particular kinds of expe-
tion in many different contexts and at several periods in riences. A different angle on nature/nurture tends to focus
development. We will see that scientists have disagreed less on such qualitatively different outcomes and instead
about the roles of nature and nurture in areas ranging from looks at how genes and the environment each contribute to
language, to morality, to spatial navigation. These debates individual differences (Plomin, 1989). For example, there
are worthwhile, and they can often be illuminated by the are intense debates about the extent to which an individual’s
data patterns produced by careful research. For example, if intelligence is more a product of nurture (including educa-
some aspects of language development happen in the same tion) as opposed to nature (including genes). It is important
way worldwide, regardless of the particular language spoken to keep in mind that even if the qualitative aspects of a skill
and regardless of whether parents speak to their children emerge the same way in most environments, individual dif-
often or just a little, those linguistic developments might ferences in the degree of the skill could still depend on how
be considered more a function of nature than a function the environments differed. For example, in humans, the
of nurture. If, however, those same aspects of language are anatomy and structure of particular muscles develop in the
closely linked to the particular language a child is exposed same way across most environments—but when we compare
to, and if they vary greatly, depending on how parents speak two individuals, the strength of each muscle is significantly
to their children, nurture would seem to be more central. related to experience. We will need to keep in mind these
Even in cases like these, however, it is important not to over- different ways of framing nature/nurture discussions as we
simplify the question into a matter of “either/or,” in which explore psychological development.
one kind of influence completely excludes the other. We
will see that carefully designed studies can be essential to
disentangling the relative contributions of nature and nur- Q: What are some ways in which scholars
ture to many aspects of development.
One way of thinking about how nature and nurture con- might disagree about the initial mental state of
tribute to some aspect of development involves imagining the newborn infant?
how a range of different environments might affect these
developmental changes (Chomsky, 1975, 1988). Figure 1.10
depicts a situation in which a particular initial state (say, the The three questions that we posed in this section—
way a newborn mentally represents human faces) develops concerning qualitative and quantitative change, global and
in different environmental conditions, shown in the figure local change, and nature and nurture—are relevant in each

THE NATURE OF DEVELOPMENT 13

FIGURE 1.10 Envisioning the
“nature versus nurture” debate. This At first, mental representations are
all very similar across individuals.
diagram shows one way of depicting
the differences between developmental Initial state End state
accounts that emphasize nature’s influ- Across diverse environments,
mental representations remain
ences and those that emphasize nurture.
similar.
Think of tracing developmental changes
from an initial state, as shown on the
left, across a range of different environ- Strong
ments. (These developmental paths nature
are shown as different colored lines.) case
In the strong nature account at the top,
development that takes place in a wide
range of environments results in very Each colored line is a
similar outcomes. In the strong nurture different environment.
account, development that takes place
in different environments leads to quite
different outcomes due to the influences
Across diverse environments, mental
of distinct environmental factors and representations become different.
Initial state End state
experiences.

Strong
nurture
case

and every chapter that follows. In studying development, it helps to frame a set of phenomena in a manner that
is always useful to consider how these three questions reflect emphasizes some aspects over others. When different per-
on a particular aspect of development. The answers are not spectives are applied to the same phenomena, they often
always easy to determine, but just posing these questions raise different kinds of questions and therefore yield dif-
can guide further exploration of developmental phenomena. ferent answers. Because each perspective invariably leaves
out some aspects of a problem and emphasizes others, you
might think of them as different lenses for examining
patterns of change, each one bringing certain issues into
Perspectives on Development sharp focus. For these reasons, we will often find it useful
to consider how multiple perspectives provide their own
The fundamental questions just described are usually unique insights into a developmental pattern. It is also
posed within a particular psychological perspective on the important to keep in mind which perspectives are in play
process of development. These different perspectives— as you pose questions about psychological development.
which include comparative and evolutionary perspectives, We start by considering a pair of broad philosophical per-
cross-cultural perspectives, neuroscience perspectives, behav- spectives on development commonly known as empiri-
iorist perspectives, psychoanalytic perspectives, cognitive cism and nativism.
science perspectives, and more broadly empiricist and nativ-
ist perspectives—are each based on specific intellectual
traditions. They are each associated with certain research Empiricist and Nativist Perspectives
methods, styles of argument, and theoretical positions.
Thus, each perspective tends to approach developmental By the time psychology emerged as a separate discipline in
questions somewhat differently. the late nineteenth century, philosophers, biologists, and
Rather than contradicting each other, these perspec- others had been actively discussing many of its central issues
tives usually offer complementary approaches. Each one for centuries, and some of the most persistent, intriguing

14 CHAPTER 1 APPROACHING PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

questions focused on the origins of human perceptions and brain) made sense of the world by linking together any bits
knowledge. Two philosophical perspectives on develop- of information that co-occurred frequently enough in expe-
ment, empiricism and nativism, helped to shape these dis- rience. Any piece of information, such as the sound of the
cussions, which often led to inquiries about how knowledge word “no,” could become associated with any other, such
originates and takes shape in the mind of an infant or child as an angry facial expression, provided that an individual
(Spelke & Newport, 1998). experienced that particular combination—in this case, a
word and an expression—sufficiently often. In this way, the
Empiricism Empiricism is a view of development that empiricists argued, sensory experiences that were relatively
emphasizes the idea that a general, all-purpose learning sys- meaningless on their own became meaningful over time
tem, with few or no biases toward acquiring particular kinds through learned associations.
of information, is present at birth. Empiricists’ proposals
and speculations can be traced back thousands of years, but Nativism Nativism is a view of development that empha-
they are best exemplified by three remarkable seventeenth- sizes the idea that a set of different learning systems is
and eighteenth-century philosophers (see Figure 1.11). John present at birth, in which each system is biased to acquire
Locke (1632–1704) laid out the general idea that all human particular kinds of information better than others. The
knowledge is built up by forming links, or mental associa- roots of nativist philosophies go at least as far back as the
tions, between the phenomena we experience. George Berke- ancient Greek philosopher Plato, and their influence contin-
ley (1685–1753) incorporated this idea of association-based ued into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with schol-
knowledge in his explanation of how we perceive and inter- ars such as René Descartes and Gottfried Leibniz. Unlike
pret the visual world. And David Hume (1711–1776) used the empiricists, nativists believed that human knowledge
this same association-based view of knowledge to develop a could never be understood solely in terms of an increasingly
theory about how complex mental processes work, includ- complex web of associations. Their early discomfort with
ing how humans understand cause-and-effect relationships. the empiricists’ view arose from the observation that differ-
“All knowledge through the senses” is perhaps the best- ent breeds of domesticated animals, such as dogs, showed
known slogan associated with the empiricist movement. distinct dispositions and abilities; for example, Labrador
It simply means that the content of all knowledge and retrievers retrieve and sheepdogs herd (see Figure 1.12).
thought—an elaborate web of learned associations—could Since empiricism could not explain these differences in
only be gained from experience. This slogan, however, other species, the nativists asked, why should it be consid-
hardly does justice to the empiricist position. The empiri- ered plausible for explaining differences in humans? Other
cists were committed to the idea that the mind (and the arguments against empiricism arose from the sense that it

A B C
FIGURE 1.11 The early empiricists. Empiricist philosophers (A) John Locke, (B) George Berkeley, and (C) David Hume supported the
idea that all knowledge is based on learned associations. This view of how the human mind comes to perceive the world, understand causality,
and have new ideas is still with us today.

PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT 15
was impossible to account for the enormous differences in ing a mental map of your neighborhood in memory. These
people’s specific talents, like musical talent, mathematical nativist approaches suggest that we use specialized capacities
ability, or athleticism, only in terms of their prior “associa- for processing much more than just sensory input and that
tive” experiences. these specializations may include higher mental functions that
Instead, the nativists held that certain aspects of men- are far “downstream” from the perceptual system.
tal life were intrinsic to being human and that these Nativism is commonly focused on the influences of
capacities were present at birth. The nativists also agreed “nature” on development, while empiricism is linked to
that these inborn capacities were more specialized and “nurture” (Cowie, 1999), but these links can be misleading.
more complex than the general associative mechanism In fact, both empiricism and nativism are based on the idea
proposed by the empiricists. Beyond these points of that organisms must be born with initial capacities that help
agreement, however, there was—for good reason—enor- them perceive and understand their physical and social envi-
mous diversity among the nativists about the nature of ronment (see Figure 1.13). Sensory organs such as the eyes
the human mind. Without the insights of modern experi- and ears gather and process information right from birth,
mental psychology and cognitive science, they could only and they relay that information about the world to the brain,
speculate based on dissatisfaction with the empiricists’ which processes and interprets that information. Thus, both
much simpler model. traditions emphasize that nature endows the newborn with
The empiricist and nativist perspectives still influ- sensory organs and a brain with the capacity to process infor-
ence the study of development today, but at a much more mation from the start.
sophisticated level (Carruthers et al., 2007; Pinker, 2002, Empiricists and nativists disagree, however, on the rela-
2004). The nativists no longer have to rely on intuitions tive roles of nature and nurture in the particular ways we
that certain kinds of knowledge—of God, or morals, or process and interpret information as it moves “downstream”
mathematics—seem inborn. Instead, they now have exper- from the sensory organs to the highest levels of thought. For
imental data that they can analyze. They propose specific empiricists, once sensory information has undergone some
models of mind that make different predictions about such initial perceptual processing, nature’s only role is to provide
experimental data than do the models proposed by the for a general, all-purpose associative mechanism that allows
empiricists. the mind to link together any kind of inputs—whether
Empiricist models of psychological development typically they are visual or auditory, social or physical, or of any other
involve general learning mechanisms that apply in pretty sort—based on how often they co-occur.
much the same way to all sorts of content and experience. In In contrast, a nativist perspective tends to favor preex-
these models, the mind’s only specializations for handling dif- isting specializations not just for the simplest processing of
ferent kinds of information occur at early stages in the pro- incoming information but for all levels of the mind. Nativ-
cess, such as in the way we perceive the initial input from our ists believe that infants come into the world with mental
different sense organs. Nativist approaches, on the other hand, structures tailored for learning specific kinds of informa-
focus on learning mechanisms tailored for processing particu- tion, such as language, moral principles, or number con-
lar kinds of information, such as learning language or retain- cepts. These theories consider the brain’s specializations

A B C
FIGURE 1.12 Intrinsic behavioral tendencies. People have recognized for centuries that different dog breeds can have distinct disposi-
tions and reasoning capacities in areas like (A) retrieving (as in this Labrador retriever), (B) herding (as in this sheepdog), and (C) attacking
(as in this Doberman). These kinds of strong, intrinsic behavioral differences among animals provided early support for a nativist view of
development.

16 CHAPTER 1 APPROACHING PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

 (for example, the growth of a beard) can still be more a
product of nature than of nurture.
We will often find it more useful to consider whether a
line of experimental research fits better with a nativist or an
empiricist view rather than thinking in terms of a simple
nature-versus-nurture dichotomy. These debates between
empiricist and nativist views are less about whether or not
something “built in” or something “learned” enables per-
ception or cognition to develop. Instead, they focus on
whether the mind is initially specialized only at the low-
est levels of processing different types of sensory informa-
tion or whether specialized mechanisms exist at all levels of
FIGURE 1.13 The initial state. Watching a newborn observe the
world immediately raises questions about the human mind’s initial
information processing. Nature and nurture are part of this
state. Clearly, the newborn’s brain already differs in important ways story, but they are not enough on their own.
from those of other creatures, yet the newborn also clearly has a
great deal to learn through experience. Developmental psychologists
are intimately concerned with questions about how a baby’s biologi- Comparative and Evolutionary
cal nature interacts with input from the environment.
Perspectives
Questions about developmental psychology have never been
for capacities like language use and social interactions to confined to humans. Many other species have offspring that
be “built in” or heavily influenced by nature in much the grow and develop more elaborate behaviors. Indeed, more
same way that particular parts of the brain are specialized than most psychological questions, inquiries about develop-
to process visual input from the eyes and other parts of ment naturally seem to lead to comparisons across species,
the brain process auditory information from the ears. It which are the main focus of the comparative perspective. Even
is important, however, to remember that just because a a casual observer of a dog nuzzling her puppies or a baby
particular specialization is strongly influenced by nature monkey clinging to its mother cannot help but be struck
does not necessarily mean that it is evident at birth. by the close bonds between parents and offspring and won-
Remember that male facial hair, which is largely driven der why they exist, how they came about, and what they
by nature, usually doesn’t manifest until after puberty. mean to the animals (see Figure 1.14). In fact, an extraor-
If a particular specialized mechanism is typically present dinary diversity of organisms seems to confront similar
at birth, that often suggests a dominant role for nature challenges during development, such as coordinating visual
in the mechanism’s development; but later developments and motor skills with changing body size and ensuring that

FIGURE 1.14 Comparative and evolutionary perspectives. These perspectives often examine a comparable developmental process
across several species, as shown in these examples of mothers caring for their young. Researchers may then ask if these behaviors are alike
at a deeper psychological level—perhaps because they have evolved to serve similar functions.

PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT 17
FIGURE 1.15 Cross-cultural perspectives. Developmental researchers often ask if developmental patterns unfold in the same ways across
cultures. For example, do friendships form in similar ways in all these groups of children? Are the roles of boys and girls the same in all cultures?

fragile young survive to an age of self-sufficiency. A true already own more than things you are about to acquire, a
appreciation and a genuine understanding of developmen- bias known as the endowment effect. Comparative research
tal psychology must keep in mind the common problems has demonstrated that monkeys show similar biases even
that many organisms confront, even as they sometimes solve without observing similar behaviors in others (Lakshmi-
them quite differently. naryanan et al., 2008). Those results suggest that future
Closely related to comparative perspectives, evolution- developmental studies of the endowment effect in humans
ary perspectives ask how and why a particular trait, whether may find its earliest traces even before culture has much of
it is a body part or a behavior, emerged over successive an influence.
generations of a population through the process of natural
selection. Ethology is the study of traits from an adaptive
evolutionary perspective that usually involves comparisons
across species. Thus, ethologists examine how certain traits Cross-Cultural Perspectives
improve a species’ fitness within its specific environment, Before making general statements about the development
conferring advantages that make members of the species of any process, whether it is a child’s attachment to a
that have these traits more likely to survive and produce parent, the concept of self, or almost any other aspect of
viable offspring. Understanding how particular traits psychological development, it is crucial to gain a sense
affect a species’ ability to reproduce in its environment also of how that process develops in different cultures (see
requires closely analyzing the local environment itself in Figure 1.15). All too often, we take our own culture’s pat-
terms of its physical features and the other organisms that terns as the obvious default options, only to be surprised
inhabit it. that these familiar tendencies actually may be quite rare
Evolutionary and comparative perspectives, however, in other cultures.
do far more than describe the range of patterns of devel- The cross-cultural perspective on development focuses on
opment and how they relate to a population’s particular two main issues. First, how do cultural variations influ-
environment. Using these perspectives, we can pose specific ence patterns of development? Research addressing this
questions about the origins of various psychological capaci- question has become increasingly sophisticated in recent
ties, including our earliest emotions. For example, feelings years, demonstrating how development in such diverse
of disgust at bodily excretions do not seem to be present areas as moral reasoning, folk biology (intuitive patterns
at birth, but they emerge in all cultures during the third of reasoning about the living world), and religious beliefs
year of life. From an evolutionary perspective, minimiz- differ between cultures. The most insightful approaches
ing contact with bodily excretions makes sense, since this have developed models in which specific aspects of cul-
would reduce the spread of disease. But perhaps there are tures, such as cultural values or norms, are thought to
also evolutionary reasons that disgust doesn’t appear until have distinct psychological outcomes. For example, some
an age when the child is actually able to do something to cross-cultural researchers have argued that growing up in
avoid the contamination by means of toilet training and a collectivist culture, where the group is considered more
hygiene. Researchers are currently trying to learn whether important than the individual, results in different patterns
both factors—the desire to avoid contamination and the of reasoning than growing up in a more individualist cul-
inability to do so before about the age of 3—affect the ture (Nisbett et al., 2001).
way the emotion of disgust develops. Comparative analyses The cross-cultural perspective’s second main concern is
often pose similar questions about the roots of particular with consistency across cultures: What aspects of behavior
human tendencies, such as the tendency to value things you or mind, if any, develop in the same way throughout the

18 CHAPTER 1 APPROACHING PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

world? Whereas some kinds of psychological development gence of various capacities, such as learning language, delay-
differ systematically across cultures, others show little varia- ing gratification, searching for hidden objects, and perceiving
tion and reflect universal patterns of psychological develop- faces. As the methods of measuring the developing brain’s
ment. For example, the way children come to learn about structures and patterns of activity become more refined, it
rules of etiquette or religious practices may vary dramatically will be possible to study how brain growth influences psycho-
as a function of culture, but the way they learn to walk or to logical development in greater detail (see Figure 1.16).
perceive visual depth develops in much the same way regard- A second way the neuroscience perspective informs the field
less of culture. Some of the more interesting and controver- of psychological development has to do with how the nervous
sial questions within cross-cultural perspectives involve how system changes as a result of experience. Experience modifies
culture contributes to the development of morality, spatial the brain in many different species, and it is essential to keep
abilities, and interpretations of events. in mind that the causal relationships between changes in the
brain and psychological development run in both directions:
brain development can cause psychological changes, and
experiences—including their psychological components—
Neuroscience Perspectives can also change the brain. For example, as mentioned earlier,
Neuroscience perspectives focus primarily on the neurobiologi- experience with visual information that reaches both eyes
cal systems that give rise to psychological development. One simultaneously is essential to the development of normal
way to do this is to consider the maturation of the brain. For binocular vision, raising the question of how early visual
example, between birth and age 2, extensive changes occur experiences cause changes to individual brain cells.
in brain size and physiology, raising questions about how
those changes relate to the psychological developments tak-
ing place during these years. Thus, the hippocampus, a brain
structure centrally involved in forming new memories, was Behaviorist Perspectives
once thought to be fully mature late in infancy—so that older In the history of psychology, the great challenge of study-
infants would likely form memories in similar ways to older ing internal events and mental states in a scientific, unam-
children and adults. However, more recent work suggests that biguous way has fueled some major disputes. In the last
between birth and 3 years, hippocampal structure changes few decades, some researchers have developed innovative
substantially at the neural level, and these changes may help and increasingly precise techniques for inferring mental
explain how memory abilities change in the first 3 years of life states. Others, however, find it more prudent to focus on
(Ghetti et al., 2010). Because of this neuroanatomical research, observable behaviors and how they are shaped by external
psychological views of early memory are changing. In recent factors over the course of development. Proponents of this
years, neuroscience researchers have claimed similar linkages behavior-focused approach favor behaviorist perspectives,
between specific aspects of brain development and the emer- which have a long history in North American psychology
(Watson, 1913). As we will see in Chapter 4, behaviorists
developed particular methods that enabled researchers and
animal trainers to shape behaviors through carefully con-
trolled patterns of reinforcement (Skinner, 1938). Despite
severe limitations to behaviorism that emerged in the
1960s, some of its techniques for modifying behavior
are still commonly used with both humans and nonhu-
man animals. A behaviorist perspective can be helpful in
some clinical situations, as in modifying the behavior of
an aggressive child who is hurting others in the classroom.
Because the child’s aggression may arise from several fac-
tors that are difficult to tease apart, a clinical psychologist
might focus initially on trying to change the child’s behav-
ior through positive, and possibly negative, reinforcements
(see Figure 1.17). Behaviorist perspectives can have severe
limitations when they deliberately ignore all information
FIGURE 1.16 Neuroscience perspectives. This infant is hooked
up to an EEG (electroencephalogram). Neuroscience perspectives on
about mental states and processes, but by emphasizing rela-
psychological development ask how biological changes in the brain tionships between changes in the environment and changes
(here measured as electrical waves picked up on the head’s surface) in behavior, they can bring into sharp focus aspects of psy-
relate to psychological changes over the course of development. chological development that might otherwise be neglected.

PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT 19
FIGURE 1.17 Behaviorist perspectives. Behaviorist perspectives
on development ask how various external reinforcements, such as
rewards and punishments, can shape a child’s behavior. Here, stick-
ers seem to be a strong reward for a recent behavior.

FIGURE 1.18 Psychoanalytic perspectives. Psychoanalytic

perspectives often ask how an emotionally powerful early experience,
Psychoanalytic Perspectives such as toilet training, might relate to later personality development.
In contrast to behaviorism, psychoanalytic perspectives focus
on understanding internal mental states and processes. Psy- infants’ attachments to their parents, the development of moral
choanalytic perspectives, which originated from Sigmund beliefs and behaviors, and the nature of toilet training, among
Freud’s psychoanalytic theory, cover several different ways of many others. These challenges often seek to refute specific
talking about mental life, but they tend to share a few key psychoanalytic proposals, very often those of Freud himself,
features. Their proponents see the mind as having distinct which seem to make incorrect predictions about parent-
components that exert different kinds of influences on behav- child relations or to propose developmental psychological
ior. Among these components, they emphasize the power of processes for which there is no evidence. It can therefore be
the unconscious—thoughts and emotions occurring outside tempting to dismiss all psychoanalytic perspectives as quaint
awareness—to affect behavior. They also view many kinds of historical curiosities. Yet, in a broad sense, these perspectives
psychological problems as a result of conflicts between differ- highlight several important aspects of psychological develop-
ent components of the mind, such as between conscious and ment that are still of great interest, such as the influence of
unconscious desires. processes outside of consciousness, the role of early experi-
Psychoanalytic views of development tend to see early ences, the idea that the mind develops distinct components
childhood experiences as having important and lasting with different characteristics, and the presence of develop-
influences later in life (see Figure 1.18). Sometimes those mental stages.
early experiences are thought to set up internal conflicts
or provoke strong emotional reactions that can stay unre-
solved and outside of awareness until a skilled therapist
unearths them. Most psychoanalytic perspectives also view Cognitive Science Perspectives
development as a series of stages, thereby emphasizing pat- Late in the twentieth century, the cognitive science perspective
terns of apparent qualitative change. The process of mov- on studying the mind emerged in universities and research
ing through those stages could also give rise to unresolved centers. This approach to developmental psychology
internal conflicts. In this view, if a child fails to make a draws on methods and models from several disciplines—
complete transition from one developmental stage to the psychology, computer science, philosophy, neuroscience,
next, he can remain partially “trapped” in a psychological and linguistics—to ask how specific skills or kinds of knowl-
stage that conflicts with other, more mature aspects of edge emerge and change. These perspectives involve more
himself. than just embracing different fields’ approaches, however.
Many aspects of psychoanalytic perspectives have been In particular, cognitive science perspectives focus on questions
criticized in recent years, including psychoanalytic accounts of about how our ways of representing and using information

20 CHAPTER 1 APPROACHING PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

 NEW DIRECTIONS IN DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH

Measuring Infants’ Brain Function:

Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (NIRS)

A
cross fields of psychology, researchers are studying critical questions about early changes in brain functions and
brain activity to shed light on the processes underly- psychological processes (Minagawa-Kawai et al., 2011; Wilcox
ing thought and action. One commonly used set of et al., 2005).
techniques, called functional neuroimaging, involves One interesting use of NIRS has been to explore whether
taking precise measurements of neuronal activity and repre- infants’ brains have regions specialized for processing numbers
senting them as images that show different levels of activation long before the child can speak. Researchers monitored infants’
in specific brain regions. In studies of older children or adults, brain activity with NIRS as the infants repeatedly viewed groups
a technique known as functional magnetic resonance imaging of objects. Most of these groupings had 16 items, but occasion-
(fMRI) has become the dominant method of brain imaging. This ally the infants saw an “oddball” array with a different number.
method takes advantage of the finding that when neurons in Intriguingly, 6-month-olds reliably showed increased activation
a specific area of the brain are active, the amount of oxygen- of a particular region of the brain’s right hemisphere when a
ated blood flowing to that area increases. Thus, fMRI scanners deviant number appeared in the display (Hyde et al., 2010).
work on the principle that at a molecular level, oxygenated blood Further research will be needed to determine whether this pat-
reacts differently in a magnetic field than deoxygenated blood. tern of results is specific to observing a change in number. By
By measuring this difference in the brain of a volunteer while helping researchers to address questions like this and to make
he performs a particular mental task, researchers are able to inferences about the mental capacities of preverbal infants,
see which brain areas receive greater blood flow—and to infer NIRS is likely to be an especially useful tool for studying early
that those areas are the most active. This kind of neuroimag- brain development.
ing can capture detailed images of activity in particular brain
areas, but it requires that the participant be very still inside a
scanner, usually for 15 minutes or longer. During the scan, the
machine’s powerful magnets also cause sudden, loud pulsing
noises. For these reasons, the technique is difficult to use with
young infants.
Recently, a new silent brain-scanning technique known as
near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) has been developed that can
tolerate substantial head movements without compromising the
resulting images, and it seems to be safe for use with infants
(see Figure 1.19). NIRS involves shining a low-energy band of
near-infrared light through the infant’s scalp and skull and mea-
suring the infrared light that is reflected back. Based on the
reflection patterns, researchers can determine blood oxygen-
ation levels in different areas of the brain (Aslin & Mehler, 2005;
Hoshi, 2007; Meek, 2002; Sakatani et al., 1999; Villringer & FIGURE 1.19 Near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) and brain
Chance, 1997). Thus, like fMRI, NIRS is a way of measuring activity. This infant’s brain activity is being measured with NIRS.
which brain regions are more active based on the increased Low-energy near-infrared pulses of light are transmitted through
the scalp and skull onto brain regions, then reflected back onto
flow of oxygenated blood to those areas. Using precise sensors,
sensors near the light transmission points. This procedure,
these measurements can be taken with relatively low levels of which is as harmless as a few minutes of bright sunlight, allows
infrared light, comparable to a few minutes of bright sunlight. researchers to measure blood flow changes in various parts of the
This technique offers an important new way of addressing infant’s brain.

PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT 21
 Studying Psychological
Psychology
Development
Not surprisingly, it takes a wide range of approaches to study
topics as diverse as a newborn infant’s ability to see color and
an adolescent’s ways of relating to her peers. Throughout
Computer
Linguistics this book, we will encounter various methods of investigat-
science
Cognitive
science
ing particular questions about development. At the outset,
it is useful to survey the range of research techniques that
we’ll encounter to provide a methodological road map and
to explain some key terms.

Philosophy Neuroscience

Observational Studies
FIGURE 1.20 Cognitive science perspectives. Cognitive science
The oldest, and seemingly simplest, method of research
perspectives often ask about how people represent and use informa- is the observational study, in which children are simply
tion. Cognitive scientists draw on the theories and methods of several observed in a natural setting and their behaviors are carefully
disciplines to see how each one offers unique insights into common recorded (see Figure 1.21). These records may take the form
questions. of trained observers’ written notes or collections of audio or
video recordings. But this method is not always as simple
change over the course of development (see Figure 1.20). To as it sounds. Suppose you are interested in researching how
fully address these questions, they seek to integrate many children’s personalities develop between ages 3 and 5. Per-
ways of studying information processing, including formal haps you plan to observe a classroom of 20 preschoolers to
computation (computer science), biological bases (neurosci- test some ideas about how the traits of shyness, aggression,
ence), logical consistency (philosophy), expression in language and leadership develop and how they relate to the child’s pre-
(linguistics), and the way these different types of informa- school experiences. (For example, shy children may seek out
tion processing take place in a real organism in real time different environments within the classroom than extroverted
(psychology). children.) What observational data would you collect? You
In practice, a cognitive science researcher may focus could potentially measure thousands of different variables:
within one discipline, but will nonetheless consider how the number of seconds between each conversation for each
the progress in other relevant disciplines informs her work. child, the direction and duration of each eye gaze, a vast array
For example, a cognitive scientist interested in how lan- of facial expressions or body postures, the objects a child
guage is acquired might conduct experiments on language
acquisition in children (psychology), but when designing
experiments, she might also look at formal descriptions of
language capacity (linguistics), conceptual analyses of the
relationship between language and thought (philosophy),
models of language acquisition in computer systems (com-
puter science), and relations between brain development
and language development (neuroscience). In the study of
development, questions about the origins of thought and
knowledge and about the ways that skills and abilities
change over time naturally lead to considerations of what
kinds of information processing the developing organism
is doing.
We will frequently consider the cognitive science approach
in this book—not only in areas of development traditionally
associated with it, such as visual perception and logical rea-
soning, but also in areas such as social and emotional devel- FIGURE 1.21 Observational studies. Videos of children in
opment. In almost all areas of psychology, it is useful to everyday settings offer rich opportunities for data collection, but
consider how people represent and use relevant information. coding and interpreting the footage also create challenges.

22 CHAPTER 1 APPROACHING PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

holds, the size of the group a child is in, each child’s proxim- research, and observational studies can suggest many new
ity to the teacher, and so on. possibilities to pursue.
To focus on their research questions and keep from being One intrinsic limitation to observational studies is that
overwhelmed by information, observational researchers they uncover correlational patterns, not causal ones. This
must decide which variables to measure among a vast set of limitation is important to keep in mind because the goal of
possibilities and how frequently to measure them. Suppose, most scientific research is to identify causal relationships.
for example, that a theory of emerging friendships suggests For example, if a researcher wants to know whether children
that shy children take longer to establish friendships than play more aggressively after watching violent cartoons, she
outgoing children because the shy children make less eye is asking whether the cartoon violence somehow causes the
contact with peers whom they have just met. A researcher kids to treat each other more aggressively. An observational
might measure durations of eye contact every 5 minutes study might show a strong correlation between these behav-
after some shy children and some outgoing children first iors, such that children who watch more violent shows also
meet other new children. Later on, when analyzing the favor more aggressive play. But these observations would not
data, the researcher would see whether the amount of early help the researcher determine whether one of these behav-
eye contact was systematically related to later measurements iors caused the other. It might be true that watching violent
of the time required for a friendship to develop. In addition, cartoons makes children more likely to play rough, but the
the observational setting itself may be critical. Perhaps a key correlation could also be driven by a different causal rela-
aspect of personality must be examined across several situ- tionship. One possibility is that children who are aggressive
ations to be understood. Thus, the researcher must decide choose to watch more violent cartoons. In that case, being
whether to observe the children in the preschool classroom, aggressive would cause the television watching, rather than
in the home (at a particular time or day of the week), or in the other way around. Another possibility is that a third vari-
a less familiar setting, such as a new mall. Observational able, such as lack of parental control, could cause children
studies require a specific model or theory to help guide these to both behave aggressively and watch more violent televi-
decisions, specifying which variables should be of interest sion. In this case, aggression and viewing violent TV could
and why. be closely correlated, even without being directly linked.
New observational technologies open exciting possi- Some scientists use complex statistical techniques to try
bilities for observational research, but these developments to infer causality from observational data (MacKinnon,
may also muddy the research issues at stake. When tape 2006). While such approaches can strengthen a particular
recorders became commonplace, they were soon used in causal interpretation of the data, it remains difficult to rule
many studies. Video recording represented the next major out the possibility of other influences on the data (Pearl,
change, and soon researchers were collecting thousands of 2010). We will see, in contrast, that well-designed experi-
hours of videos of children in a wide range of situations. mental studies can clearly demonstrate specific causal rela-
Today, the decreasing cost of digital video and increasing tions. This is just one example of the tradeoffs involved in
computational abilities to automatically search video frames choosing between research methods. Observational studies
will likely contribute in important ways to developmental may often yield exciting new ideas, but they typically do not
research. Another exciting technological innovation allows produce firm conclusions about cause and effect.
some aspects of video scenes to be automatically coded
based on researchers’ specifications, making it quicker and
easier to analyze very large data sets of children’s behaviors Q: What are some strengths of observational
in natural settings (Roy et al., 2009). But these technolo- studies?
gies are valuable only when researchers use them carefully
and strategically to zero in on critical variables. Researchers
must decide which recorded behaviors to observe and how
to categorize and quantify them.
Observational studies play an indispensable role in devel- Experimental Studies
opmental research despite their limitations. In many situ- To answer developmental questions about cause and effect—
ations, they allow researchers to assess children’s behavior such as whether watching violent cartoons causes aggressive
under natural, normal circumstances—without the distor- behavior or whether participating in after-school programs
tions caused by bringing children into a lab to study their causes better academic performance—researchers often
behavior under carefully controlled conditions. In addition, design an experimental study. The goal of these studies is to
observational studies allow for the possibility of unexpected manipulate a single variable while holding all other aspects
discoveries outside the immediate research question. Such of the experimental situation constant. By changing only one
surprises are a common source of inspiration in scientific variable at a time in the course of an experiment, researchers

STUDYING PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 23

are better able to pinpoint exactly which change caused any problems would make it impossible to tell for sure whether
differences they observe in the experiment’s outcome. a child is using transitive reasoning to solve them.
To return to our earlier example, if a researcher wanted to But when an experimenter poses carefully designed, age-
determine whether watching violent cartoons causes aggres- appropriate questions that require transitive reasoning, he
sive behavior, she might recruit two groups of children for a is able to assess the children’s abilities more clearly. In the
study in which she would manipulate the amount of time context of an experiment, the researcher could present tran-
the children spent watching violent cartoons. She would be sitive reasoning problems of various difficulty that deal with
careful to randomly assign children to each group to ensure some topics familiar to kindergartners (such as comparing
there were no initial differences between the groups. If the the heights of children) and some topics that are unfamil-
children who watched the cartoons for many more hours iar to them (such as comparing the costs of hotel rooms).
subsequently showed an increase in aggression while the Those systematic manipulations would help the researcher
other children did not, this would support the claim that determine whether young children failed at certain transi-
watching violent television can cause children to behave tive reasoning tasks primarily because of a difficulty with
more aggressively. this type of reasoning or whether their failures were actu-
In most developmental psychology experiments, a ally due to other factors (such as difficulty remembering all
researcher presents some sort of stimulus or event to a partici- the components of the problems or unfamiliarity with the
pant (usually a child or nonhuman animal) and then measures material used in the problems).
the participant’s pattern of behavior. It is common to speak of Of course, experimental approaches also have their limita-
the independent variable, which is the variable manipulated tions. Perhaps the biggest challenge is ecological validity—
by the experimenter, and the dependent variable, which is whether a study faithfully captures a pattern of behavior that
the variable being measured to see whether or how it changed would occur in the normal circumstances of childhood. An
in response to manipulation of the independent variable. For experiment that lacks ecological validity may be elegantly
example, in an experiment designed to test children’s verbal designed and carefully controlled, but its results may be irrel-
memory, you might be interested in finding out how the evant to the real world. To take an extreme case, imagine
child’s age (the independent variable) affects the percentage that you wanted to experimentally examine the develop-
of words from a list the child can recall correctly (the depen- ment of sharing in children between the ages of 5 and 10.
dent variable). In this scenario, age would be the independent In your experiment, a group of children are brought to the
variable because you are interested in the way differences in lab—where digital cameras and note-taking researchers will
age affect another measure (memory). In this case, you would record how often they share—and put in pairs. One child
“manipulate” age by presenting the memory task to children in each pair is shown a basket of several types of candy and
of different age groups. To be sure that any differences in per- asked to point out her favorite. An assistant then gives many
formance were due to the children’s ages and not to some other pieces of that same candy to the other child in the pair, who
aspect of the testing situation, it would be crucial to carefully is sitting across the table. As the cameras record and the
control, or hold constant, all other variables. Thus, you would experimenters take notes, the children with candy almost
want to make sure that all the children were tested in equally always share it with the other child, regardless of their age.
quiet environments that were free of distractions, and at the You could hastily conclude that there are no developmental
same time of day so that they would be equally alert. Finally, changes in sharing between ages 5 and 10, but there would
you would want to ensure that all the children were simi- be clear problems with this conclusion. Surrounded by adult
lar to each other in terms of socioeconomic status, cultural observers and confronted with a blatantly unfair distribution
background, and other possible differences and that they of candy, almost any child would be compelled to share. In a
were drawn from the same broader group, or population, that more natural setting, children might behave very differently,
you wish to study, such as middle-class elementary school depending on their age. Although the problems are clear in
students. this example, similar issues lurk in most experimental stud-
One advantage of experiments is that they allow researchers ies. The more a study departs from everyday situations, the
to examine highly specific effects of stimuli and events on par- more it risks failing to measure variables of real interest. Yet,
ticipants. For example, suppose a researcher wanted to know such departures from real-life circumstances can also con-
if kindergartners were able to use transitive reasoning—that fer great advantages by allowing researchers to elicit specific
is, if stick A is longer than stick B, and if stick B is longer behaviors and closely control their measurements.
than stick C, do kindergartners realize that stick A must More broadly, experimental research requires certain
be longer than stick C? It is unlikely that kindergartners idealizations from real-world settings (Strevens, 2009). All
do much observable transitive reasoning in their daily lives. scientists try to isolate the phenomena they study—which
Some aspects of everyday situations may involve this kind of is why physicists think about “frictionless” inclined planes
thought, but all the complexity and variety of these real-life and “ideal” gases and biologists think about hypothetical,

24 CHAPTER 1 APPROACHING PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL P OLICY

What Kinds of Experimental

Research Are Justified?

E
xperimental techniques are invaluable in developmental Another critical issue in the IRB’s review, and one that is
research, but unlike observational studies, experiments especially important in studies involving infants or children, is
bring children and infants into environments they would the participants’ ability to consent to take part. Before they con-
not otherwise encounter. How do researchers justify sent, potential participants should be told as much about the
manipulating children’s experience? experimental procedures and goals as possible without com-
Clearly, not all experiments are justified. Few would approve promising the research. The researcher must also be sure that
of an experiment that caused children to feel intense shame and all participants understand that they are free to discontinue the
discomfort in order to study their coping strategies. It strikes study at any time and are under no obligation to finish a session
us as simply wrong to purposely upset children or make them or a task. In the United States, a child under age 18 is not con-
uncomfortable, regardless of the value of the scientific insights sidered fully capable of consenting to participate in research.
that such an experiment might yield. But what about a more Along with the child’s own consent, a parent or legal guardian
benign experiment in which an infant stares at a stimulus for must give written consent as well. In addition, researchers who
10 minutes until he is bored? And is it acceptable to pay a work with children must watch them carefully throughout the
6-year-old a large sum of money to participate in an extremely experiment for any signs that they would like to discontinue the
tedious task? Researchers must carefully consider the risks and study, and their wishes must be honored. During and after a
benefits for participants in their studies—especially when work- study, researchers typically are also obligated to protect partici-
ing with children and infants, since they are much less able to pants’ privacy, and the records are usually coded to make sure
advocate for themselves than are most adults. The researcher’s no one reading about the research can identify the participants.
goal, as in all research on humans, is to minimize any risks to Because experiments involve studying people outside of
participants and to directly benefit both society at large and the normal daily circumstances, they often raise the clearest ques-
participants themselves to the greatest extent possible. tions about potential risks, but concerns about costs and ben-
In most countries with large-scale human research programs, efits to participants are also relevant to observational studies.
every university, hospital, or other institution that undertakes such Many observational studies risk intruding in children’s lives, as
research is legally required to have an institutional review board, the observers may be in plain view, unintentionally influencing
commonly called an IRB. An IRB typically consists of research- the children just by being present. Even so, most researchers
ers from a wide range of fields who are engaged in studies of assume that children who have (with parental approval) con-
humans, and it often also includes members of the community sented to participate will fairly quickly become accustomed to
outside the research institution. On behalf of the research institu- being observed and will behave normally. Concerns about confi-
tion, IRB members scrutinize all research proposals that involve dentiality are as important in observational studies as they are in
human subjects to ensure that the planned studies do not pose experimental studies—maybe more so, since the natural behav-
unreasonable or unnecessary risks for those who participate. ior being observed may be more revealing of the child’s true
Ideally, researchers should always analyze the costs and ben- nature. A child who cheats in a contrived laboratory card game
efits of their own studies and strive to ensure that their benefits may not be nearly as stigmatized as one observed cheating in
outweigh their potential risks. Risks to participants might range the classroom. For all these reasons, observational studies usu-
from discomfort in doing an experimental task to self-esteem ally require participants’ consent, but researchers may opt not
problems if a child finds out that her peers outperformed her. to reveal the focus of their research until after the observation is
On the other hand, participants can also benefit from taking complete to avoid influencing children’s behavior.
part; in fact, some tasks might be intensely engaging for young Many important research questions in developmental psy-
participants. More broadly, a study’s benefits to society include chology, such as how children deal with failure, are particularly
any information the research yields that furthers understanding difficult to study because of ethical concerns. Children are an
of development, so as to better inform decisions about chil- especially vulnerable group, so it is only reasonable that devel-
dren’s education, care, and welfare. opmental research should be conducted extremely carefully.

STUDYING PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 25

simplified ecological systems. Likewise, psychologists some- One appealing way to learn about a developmental pattern
times focus on individuals without accounting for all the is to study a single group of children repeatedly, over a time
social influences that affect each person. But does the effect period that includes the aspects of development you wish
of isolation from a normal, social context undermine con- to research. This method of measuring the same children’s
clusions about the individual? This question—how much abilities or behavior on a regular basis over time is known as
are you influencing the processes you’re researching just by a longitudinal approach. For example, you might want to
isolating them?—is important to keep in mind for all psy- study how children come to understand the concept of frac-
chological research, but many contend that it is especially tions by looking at how their ability to solve various fraction-
relevant to questions of development. based math problems changes from ages 5 to 15. Taking a
There are certainly tradeoffs between focusing on the longitudinal approach to this study would involve tracking
developing organism outside the context in which develop- the progress of the same group of children over this 10-year
ment takes place, as experiments typically do, and account- period, perhaps assessing each child’s understanding of frac-
ing for the developing child’s many complex interactions tions at the beginning of every school year (see Figure 1.22A).
with other people and the broader culture. Developmen- Longitudinal approaches are well suited to uncovering
tal researchers think carefully when designing their stud- developmental differences between individuals. By taking
ies about which emphasis is best for the question they repeated measures of each individual child over time, the
are addressing. In some cases, often in the initial stages researcher essentially documents each participant’s specific
of exploring a topic, observational studies may be more developmental trajectory—which can then be compared
appropriate. In other cases, such as pinning down cause- with those of other participants. Thus, if some children
and-effect relationships more precisely, experimental first understand fractions by visualizing sections of a figure,
designs may provide more insight. Experimental research- while others begin to learn about them by following steps
ers therefore constantly attempt to simplify the situations in a calculation, a longitudinal study might reveal how these
that they study in ways that allow them to understand what different patterns unfold. Longitudinal studies can also help
is going on without distorting the circumstances too much researchers ensure that many of the variables that could influ-
from everyday experiences. Psychologists continue to wres- ence their results are held constant. There is no need to worry
tle with questions about which aspects of psychological about whether separate groups of participants are truly com-
development can be studied with relatively little attention parable, since the same set of participants is studied over the
to such contextual issues and which ones are inextricably course of developmental change; whatever is distinctive about
linked to those issues. a child at one age will tend to remain distinctive at later ages.
Finally, longitudinal studies allow a special kind of research
known as microgenetic analysis, in which the researchers
assess participants every few days or weeks rather than every
Q: What are some of the tradeoffs between few years (Cheshire et al., 2007; Siegler, 1995). This approach
naturalistic-observational methods and documents the details of developmental transitions at a scale
experimental methods when asking research much closer to real-time change in skill or cognitive struc-
questions about psychological development? ture. For example, one might do a microgenetic analysis of a
child overcoming an error in mathematical calculation.
Longitudinal studies also have several drawbacks. A
major limitation is that they often require an enormous
commitment of time and expense. Some studies can take
Longitudinal Approaches 15 to 20 years to complete. If, for example, you wanted to
In choosing between observational and experimental stud- test a theory about whether the strength of infants’ bonds
ies, all research psychologists must consider their available with their mothers predicted their romantic relationship
resources, their research questions, and the advantages and styles as adults, you would have to wait for the infants to
drawbacks of different types of study. When developmen- reach young adulthood. Such long time frames cause addi-
tal researchers are interested in how children change over tional problems beyond the research team’s extended com-
time, they typically must decide between two different mitment to a single study. Because of the need to maintain
approaches to studying change over time—namely, lon- consistency throughout the study, a researcher can get stuck
gitudinal and cross-sectional approaches. Each of these asking participants the same questions in the same way for
approaches has its own strengths and weaknesses, and many years, even if advances in the field suggest new, pref-
each can be used in designing either an observational or an erable approaches. Likewise, in long-term longitudinal stud-
experimental study. ies, researchers run the risk that their measures may seem

26 CHAPTER 1 APPROACHING PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

 FIGURE 1.22 Longitudinal
versus cross-sectional
approaches. (A) In a longitudinal
study, the same group of people is
studied at various time intervals.
(B) In a cross-sectional study, a
different group of people is studied
A
at each age of interest to the
researchers.

outdated or flawed by the time the study is over. Retaining to experimental studies. Unlike the longitudinal approach,
a large enough group of participants over time is also chal- which requires the same participants to repeat the experimen-
lenging, as families move or no longer want to participate. tal tasks at different ages, the cross-sectional approach involves
Finally, a subtle problem can confound the more experi- studying a different group of children in each age group. As
mental longitudinal studies. Suppose you assessed under- a result, each child is assessed only once, and there is no need
standing of fractions by repeatedly presenting children to worry about the experimental tasks accidentally becoming
with a series of problems to answer. If you do this every a form of training. Most of the experimental studies discussed
6 months for 6 years, the experimental assessments them- in the chapters that follow will be cross-sectional.
selves can become a form of training that affects how the The largest drawback of cross-sectional studies concerns
participants’ understanding of fractions develops. In this their inability to follow specific individuals’ development over
case, you would be studying the effects of participating in the time, which makes them much less sensitive than longitudi-
experiment rather than the natural course of development. nal studies to individual differences in developmental paths.
For that reason, experimental longitudinal studies are often For that reason, psychologists who are interested in how indi-
used to study the effects of training on the development of vidual differences develop over time, such as how personality
particular skills or capacities. traits emerge, tend to use longitudinal approaches. Nonethe-
less, cross-sectional studies can shed light on other kinds of
individual differences, such as how a behavior manifests at
Q: What are some drawbacks of longitudinal particular points in development. For example, a researcher
studies? might be interested in how shy children cope with large
groups at the ages of 5, 10, and 15. A cross-sectional obser-
vational study could enroll 20 shy children at each of these
ages and then observe the children’s interactions within large
groups to see how the behaviors of each age group differed.
Cross-Sectional Approaches By comparing the coping methods of the 5-year-olds, the
A study that examines developmental change by compar- 10-year-olds, and the 15-year-olds, the researchers could learn
ing groups of children at different ages is known as a cross- how those behaviors varied with age.
sectional approach (Figure 1.22B). To use this approach to Aside from these specific strengths and weaknesses, a dif-
study how children learn fractions, you might select six groups ferent sort of factor related to broad historical patterns can
of 20 children each, taking a group of kindergartners, a group also influence whether a researcher uses a cross-sectional
of second-graders, and so on, through a group of tenth- or longitudinal design. If the changes within a culture over
graders, and then test each group’s abilities to solve prob- time significantly alter children’s experiences, research that
lems using fractions. With sufficient research staff, the entire compares children of different ages can be subject to cohort
study could be conducted in just a few weeks, rather than the effects, in which a given age group (or cohort) might dif-
10 years that a longitudinal design would require. The cross- fer in important ways from people in the same culture who
sectional approach provides another advantage when it comes are somewhat older or younger. Suppose you were interested

STUDYING PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 27

in how and when children first become aware of their peers’ Throughout this book, we will see how converging meth-
interests and activities. If you simply used a cross-sectional ods can give rise to new insights into specific developmen-
design to examine four different groups of children, in grades 4, tal questions. For example, researchers who study infants’
6, 8, and 10, you would likely get distorted results. With the understanding of physical objects use a number of different
rapid rise of online social networks, today’s fourth-graders methods to figure out what is happening in babies’ minds.
probably know more details about the daily activities of dis- Some measure how infants react when their expectations
tant acquaintances than their older siblings did at the same are violated; others examine infants’ reaching patterns in
age. This cohort effect might suggest another approach and response to different objects; and still others study the details
a slightly different research question—perhaps a longitudinal of infants’ eye movements as they examine an object or event.
study of how the increasing availability of social networking When these different methods all tend to tell the same story,
sites influences what children know about their peers over the their separate measures tend to support one another. On the
course of childhood and adolescence. other hand, when various methods tell very different stories,
this raises important questions for researchers about how to
interpret each measure.

Q: What are some drawbacks of cross-

sectional studies? Q: What is the value of using converging
methods?

Converging Methods
Developmental psychologists, like other psychologists, often
use several different ways to explore a particular problem. As
Designing a Sound Study
we have seen, each method has its own advantages and limita- Beyond the tradeoffs involved in different types of devel-
tions. As researchers apply more methods to the same prob- opmental studies, several concerns about research methods
lem, the different approaches tend to complement each other apply to almost all psychological studies. These concerns
in ways that create a more accurate overall picture. This pro- are relevant regardless of whether the research participants
cess is known as using converging methods. As researchers are adults or children. At the most general level, researchers
use various approaches to probe a phenomenon from different need to make sure their findings are as reliable, valid, and
vantage points, the results of the different types of studies tend replicable as possible.
to converge on a more accurate, objective answer than any
single method could produce. For example, we might observe Reliability and Validity The issue of reliability refers to
that certain forms of parent-child interactions are correlated whether researchers would obtain consistent results if they
with the children having earlier autobiographical memories or others repeated the research study in the future using
when they grow up. But to be more confident that the interac- the same types of participants. More precisely, researchers
tion is having a causal effect on earliest memories, we might often talk about the reliability of a specific way of measur-
also conduct an experimental study in which we taught ran- ing behavior, such as a test or an experimental task, rather
domly assigned parents to interact in a particular way with than the study as a whole. A highly reliable measure will
their young children and then later asked those children if consistently yield the same pattern of results, as long as
they had earlier memories than those of the children in a con- investigators have controlled for other possible influences.
trol group whose parents had not been taught to interact in Such a measure is analogous to a tool that works the same
this particular way. Similarly, if we perform a cross-sectional way every time rather than working only sometimes.
study of children between the ages of 2 and 7 who are sam- Suppose researchers are testing a theory that young chil-
pled 1 year apart and observe that the correlation emerges at dren remember events they see in videos more accurately
around age 7, we might then do a longitudinal study to see how than events described in words. The researchers develop a
early parent training has to occur to have a maximal effect. way of testing both kinds of memory, and they design a
Consider, therefore, the ways in which the advantages and study using this memory test at several different ages. The
disadvantages of observational and experimental studies and measure has reliability problems if it yields different results
longitudinal and cross-sectional approaches overlap. Table 1.1 when repeatedly used with children in the same age group
illustrates the main strengths and weaknesses of each and how who have the same demographic characteristics.
they intersect in different types of studies. These tradeoffs There are two forms of reliability: test-retest reliability
illustrate the importance of using converging methods. and interrater reliability. Test-retest reliability is an indica-

28 CHAPTER 1 APPROACHING PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

 Longitudinal Approaches Cross-Sectional Approaches

+ Document individuals’ + Easier to ensure that the same number

developmental transitions. of participants take part at all ages.
− Participants may drop out as study − Do not track individuals’
progresses. developmental trajectories.

Observational + Rich data may allow for + May uncover long-term patterns of + Reveal distinctive patterns for each
Studies unanticipated insights. change in individuals. age group.
− Support correlational arguments − Require a long time commitment − Questions about individual
but cannot determine causal from research staff. differences are more difficult to
relationships. address.
− Behaviors of interest may not
appear without experimenter
intervention.

Experimental + Allow exploration of cause-and- + Good for studying long-term effects + Enable quick assessment of
Studies effect relationships. of training. hypothesized differences between age
+ Researchers can design focused − Repeated assessments may groups.
assessments of specific variables. become an unwanted form of − May miss key transitions as well as
− Create possibilities of ecologically training. individual developmental patterns.
invalid measures.

TABLE 1.1 Tradeoffs of different developmental research methods. The advantages (+) and disadvantages (−) of each kind of study
and each kind of approach are shown here, as well as the advantages (+) and disadvantages (−) of using converging methods—longitudinal
observational studies, cross-sectional observational studies, longitudinal experimental studies, and cross-sectional experimental studies.

tion of how consistently a measure yields the same result of children’s verbal and visual memories could easily get
when it is used by the same researcher. If a given researcher consistent results, which would also closely resemble the
finds large variability in results when repeatedly measuring results obtained from using the same methods with new
the quality of children’s memories, that would be a case of groups of similar children. Nonetheless, these highly reli-
low test-retest reliability. Interrater reliability describes how able measures may be assessing something very different
consistently two different researchers get the same results from what the investigators intended to measure—if the
when they use the same measure with the same child. To measures themselves are flawed. That is, children’s mem-
have high interrater reliability on a test of children’s memo- ory scores may not really reflect their ability to recall the
ries of videos and verbal descriptions, it would be impor- videos and verbal descriptions. Perhaps the younger chil-
tant for the test to provide scoring guidelines describing dren are more easily distracted, which causes them to
how much detail is required to consider a child’s recall fully underperform unless they are tested in an especially quiet,
“accurate.” Otherwise, individual researchers could make focused setting. In this case, this particular memory mea-
different judgments of what constitutes an “accurate” mem- sure would consistently suggest that young children have
ory. In a well-designed study, the measures should show poorer memories than they actually do. The study would
both test-retest reliability and interrater reliability. have reliability, but it would not be valid for the skill that
Reliability is a necessary part of research in developmen- the researchers intended to measure.
tal psychology, but reliability alone is not enough to con- Like reliability, validity comes in different forms: internal
clude that research findings are sound. Even highly reliable validity and external validity. Internal validity is especially
measurements can be misleading if it turns out that you relevant to experimental studies. It concerns whether the
are not really measuring what you intended to measure. changes observed in the dependent variable are really due to
The criterion of validity refers to whether measurements the experimenter’s manipulation of the independent variable
accurately reflect what a researcher means to study. Return- or whether the changes are caused by other extraneous influ-
ing to the example that compared visual and verbal memory, ences. If, for example, a young child performed poorly on a
suppose the researcher develops a set of measures showing memory test because she was distracted (rather than due to an
very high test-retest and interrater reliability. Thus, differ- inability to remember), the study would lack internal valid-
ent researchers using these methods to test the accuracy ity. External validity refers to whether the research findings

STUDYING PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 29

are truly generalizable, or broadly relevant, to a wide range Both kinds of designs involve tradeoffs that must be
of situations. Perhaps children from particular backgrounds taken into account when choosing which one to use in a
or cultures are more accustomed to remembering events seen specific study. Within-subjects designs have the benefit
on video and therefore are better able to recall them. If so, of requiring fewer children, since each child takes part in
this would represent a limit on the study’s external validity. all experimental conditions. On the other hand, between-
Issues related to validity can be subtle and complex, but they subjects designs have the strong advantage of ruling out
are extremely important to consider. any unintentional effects of assessing each child more than
We will see that the most compelling and exciting studies once. For example, if children become more skeptical about
are those that carefully consider both internal and external unusual facts the more often they hear them, a within-
validity while also achieving high reliability. Studies with subjects design might not be well suited to the study just
reliable and valid measures also tend to have high replica- described. The children might give a harsher judgment of
bility, which is simply the ability for others to easily repro- whichever video they viewed second. (This effect can be
duce the study and find the same results. Replicability is partially controlled by showing half the children the video
ultimately the hallmark of all good studies. Even if a study of the adult relaying the fact first, while the other half sees
uncovers an interesting developmental phenomenon, if its the video of the child relaying the fact first, but it would
measures are too difficult or intricate for most researchers still be a concern.) In addition, being presented with the
to use, the usefulness of the research might be quite limited. two different videos and asked to evaluate each one could
Scientists want their pioneering studies to be easily repli- subtly suggest to participants that they should rate the
cated in other laboratories so that the findings can serve as facts differently, even if they seem about equally believable.
a solid foundation for follow-up studies. In designing a study, an experimenter needs to keep these
kinds of concerns in mind. In the spirit of using converging
methods, some investigators will examine a single research
question using a series of studies that includes both within-
Q: How can a study have high reliability but and between-subjects designs in an attempt to benefit from
low validity? the strengths of both.
In summary, developmental psychology uses a wide
array of methods to highlight many aspects of how peo-
Within-Subjects and Between-Subjects Designs In ple’s minds and their behavior change over time. Choos-
designing a developmental study, researchers must make one ing the best methods for investigating a particular problem
last major decision: whether to assess all children in a study requires careful consideration, and throughout this book
in the same way or whether to divide children into groups we’ll see how these issues play out in many areas of develop-
and assess each group in a different way. In studies that use a mental research. Moreover, when it comes to studying cer-
within-subjects design, each child participates in all experi- tain kinds of abilities, the specific methods that researchers
mental conditions, and therefore all children are assessed in choose can affect how capable children seem to be, creat-
the same manner. This design allows researchers to compare ing controversies about how to interpret the measurements
the same subjects’ responses to each experimental condition. (Cohen & Cashon, 2003). Taken together, however, the
For example, suppose you wanted to know whether children wide variety of methods now available allows researchers to
are more likely to believe a new piece of surprising informa- discover and verify fascinating developmental patterns that
tion when they hear it from an adult or when it comes from a would have been impossible to study even a few decades
peer. In a within-subjects design, you might show each child earlier.
in the study two videos: one in which a child of their same
age describes a remarkable fact (for example, “Did you know
that kangaroos can’t walk backward?”) and another in which
an adult relays another equally remarkable fact (for example,
Conclusions
“Did you know that some fish can live for more than 200 A full explanation of the child’s developing mind easily
years?”). Each child would then be asked to rate the likeli- rivals the complexity and beauty of the cellular machin-
hood that each piece of information was true, perhaps on a ery explored by molecular biologists or the origins of the
5-point scale. In contrast to this setup, a between-subjects universe investigated by astrophysicists. Developmental
design would involve assessing a different group of children researchers strive to build coherent models and theories of
in each experimental condition. You might divide the chil- psychological development and then test them in rigorous
dren into two equivalent groups. One group would watch the ways, using both experimental and observational studies.
video of the child and then rate its truthfulness, while the Together, these theories and research methods enhance our
other group would do the same with the video of the adult. understanding of the growing and changing mind.

30 CHAPTER 1 APPROACHING PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

 Some of psychology’s most challenging and fascinating ment of perception, cognition, and social skills are among the
problems focus on development—and their answers promise most complex in the natural sciences, and the details of these
deep insights into who we are. Questions about the nature of processes are often breathtaking in their elegance and beauty.
developmental change have fascinated laypeople and research- The study of developmental psychology becomes ever more
ers alike for thousands of years. In the last few decades, fascinating as research continues to reveal richer interrelations
developmental psychologists have begun to address these between the theories and the evidence. Just like reading an
millennia-old questions in a much more focused manner, as intricate mystery novel or appreciating a beautiful piece of
new methods and techniques have given researchers clearer art, studying development helps us all appreciate the wonder
insights into what develops and how. Patterns in the develop- of what it means to become fully human.

STU DY AN D REVI EW

SUMMARY ● Empiricist and nativist perspectives propose different mod-

els of how the mind processes information once that infor-
Why Study Development? mation has passed through our sensory and perceptual
● Developmental psychology is a complex, elegant, and intrin- systems. Empiricist views emphasize the idea that a general
sically fascinating scientific study of how children’s minds system for learning associations based on experience is pres-
and behaviors grow over time. ent at birth. Nativist views emphasize the idea that various
● Studying development offers insights into psychological learning systems are present at birth and that each system
structures and processes in adults by describing how those acquires particular kinds of information more readily than
processes originate and take shape. others.
● An understanding of psychological development is critically ● Evolutionary and comparative perspectives start with the
relevant to many decisions about social policy, ranging from premise that many organisms other than humans confront
changes to local elementary schools to questions concerning similar challenges in development. These perspectives use
children’s legal rights. cross-species comparisons, as well as long-term historical
considerations, to ask about how and why humans develop
The Nature of Development as they do.
● In considering the nature of developmental change, we want ● Cross-cultural perspectives compare patterns of developmen-
to know whether a developmental change is stage-like or tal change across several different cultures; they ask which
continuous and whether change occurs globally or in a more aspects of development remain relatively consistent across
local manner. cultures and which ones vary dramatically.
● Nature and nurture always work together to shape develop- ● Neuroscience perspectives ask how brain development guides
ment. In looking more closely at interactions between nature or constrains psychological development.
and nurture, we can consider which kinds of development ● Behaviorist perspectives focus on observable behaviors and
are more heavily influenced by nature and which are more ask how they are shaped by reinforcement over the course of
influenced by nurture. development.
● Psychoanalytic perspectives are concerned with internal
Perspectives on Development states and processes and their influences on behavior. They
● The various perspectives employed by researchers in devel- also focus on early experiences and unresolved conflicts and
opmental psychology function much like different lenses their effects later in life.
on development: each one brings certain issues and ques- ● Cognitive science perspectives consider how developmental
tions into sharp focus and de-emphasizes or even ignores changes in the mind relate to ways of acquiring, represent-
others. ing, and using information. These perspectives draw on

STUDY AND REVIEW 31

 several different disciplines, including psychology, linguis- same set of tasks to compare individual participants’ perfor-
tics, philosophy, computer science, and neuroscience. mance across the different tasks.
Studying Psychological Development
THOUGHT QUESTIONS
● Developmental psychologists take advantage of a rich array
of research methods, each of which has advantages and 1. It has been argued that just as people need to take driving
drawbacks. Collectively, these methods can be used to gain lessons before learning how to drive a car, future parents
objective views of what develops and how. should be required to take courses in developmental psychol-
● In observational studies, researchers track developmental ogy so that they might be better equipped to make decisions
patterns over time by documenting various aspects of behav- about raising their children. Discuss the appropriateness and
ior, often in a naturalistic setting. In experimental studies, feasibility of such a view.
researchers manipulate variables to see how those changes 2. Design a study to explore the effects of violent video games
affect specific behaviors. on children’s behavior, using three distinct converging meth-
● Longitudinal and cross-sectional approaches are two ways ods. Discuss the tradeoffs of each method and how, in the
of studying developmental change over time. Using a lon- aggregate, they offer insights that go beyond the benefits of
gitudinal approach involves studying the same children at any one study.
repeated intervals over the course of their development.
Using a cross-sectional approach involves studying sepa-
rate groups of children at different ages—for example, a KEY TERMS
group of 7-year-olds, a group of 9-year-olds, and a group of
11-year-olds. between-subjects design local change (p. 11)
● Reliability measures the degree to which a pattern of results (p. 30) longitudinal approach
would be consistently found when the same assessments are cohort effect (p. 27) (p. 26)
done in the same way with similar participants. converging methods (p. 28) microgenetic analysis (p. 26)
● Validity refers to the extent to which a set of measures actu-
cross-sectional approach nativism (p. 15)
ally reflects what the researcher is interested in studying and (p. 27) observational study (p. 22)
the extent to which that measure will continue to reflect that
dependent variable (p. 24) qualitative change (p. 9)
phenomenon in other settings.
● Replicability refers to the ability for other researchers to ecological validity (p. 24) quantitative change (p. 10)
reproduce a previously documented pattern of results when empiricism (p. 15) reliability (p. 28)
they perform the same study with similar participants. ethology (p. 18) replicability (p. 30)
● In between-subjects designs, researchers assign separate (but
experimental study (p. 23) stages of development (p. 10)
equivalent) groups of children to different experimental con-
global change (p. 11) validity (p. 29)
ditions to compare the effects of the different conditions. In
within-subjects designs, researchers assign all children to the independent variable (p. 24) within-subjects design (p. 30)

32 CHAPTER 1 APPROACHING PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

 2
The Biology of Development
The Basis of Development • Why Does Anatomical Development • Experience and Brain Development
• Inputs to the Biological System Progress As It Does? • Puberty and Brain Development
• Constraints on Development • Diversity out of Uniformity
• Sexual Differentiation
Behavioral Genetics
The Beginnings of Development • Adverse Influences on the Developing • Heritability
• Meiosis and Fertilization Embryo and Fetus • Behavioral Genomics
• The First Patterns of Differentiation Conclusions
Brain Development
Anatomical Development • Major Changes to Brain Structures Summary
• Structures and Systems in the Embryo • Neurons and Neurotransmitters
and Fetus • Development of Neurons
• Preterm Births
 n 1989, a girl named Madeline Mann was born severely for fetuses in times of famine or other stresses that might

I premature. Her gestational age was only 27 weeks, and she

weighed only 280 grams (9.9 ounces); at that time, she
was the smallest baby ever to survive a premature birth.
There are only 110 recorded cases of newborns who weigh
less than 400 grams, and the vast majority of these have seri-
ous medical complications. In fact, of all the newborns born
weighing less than 500 grams, fewer than 1 percent reached
impair maternal nutrient support (Hales & Barker, 2001).
When those stressors are removed, the newborn baby can
display rapid “catch up” in terms of physical and behav-
ioral growth, apparently because of some genetic signaling
that accelerates rates of growth once the child is in a more
benign environment. In addition, whatever damage Mad-
eline’s young body did suffer early on, it was able to recover
18 months without some kind of complication, often quite from those early insults, showing an important flexibility to
serious brain impairment (Muraskas et al., 2012). Yet, because the developmental process.
of extraordinary medical care and some unique biological fea- As impressive as our technology is in many areas of
tures relating to her situation, 22 years later, in 2012, Mad- biology, it is remarkable how difficult it is to mimic the
eline was a senior honors student in a liberal arts college. natural support of a mother’s womb. Despite heroic tech-
As seen in Figure 2.1, an almost impossibly small baby nological efforts, the vast majority of extremely premature
became an accomplished adult. These two photos vividly infants experience complications. Thus, the wonder of all
illustrate the biology of development and the extraordinary development starts with biological development, which will
changes that occur. They also illustrate how normal devel- illustrate several important themes for understanding psy-
opment is a complex interplay of biological programming chological development.
and environmental support. Just a decade earlier, Madeline In this chapter, we will consider how biological changes,
would have been very unlikely to survive. She had to be including genetic and environmental influences, prenatal
mechanically ventilated for 65 days and could not leave the development, and brain development, bear on the study of
hospital until 122 days after her birth. She had some bleed- developmental psychology. We will survey the biology of
ing in the ventricles of her brain and immune system development, looking for principles and patterns that will
problems, both of which could have caused massive com- help us understand psychological development—for exam-
plications or death without constant vigilance and superb ple, how orderly patterns of change, involving precise tim-
medical attention. Madeline may also have done so well ing and sequencing, are necessary for normal adult forms.
because of a phenomenon in which the fetus, when it senses A closer look at development from the moment of con-
environmental stresses and drops in nutrition (as happened ception onward reveals breathtaking patterns of change.
in Madeline’s case), is sometimes able to slow down the rate From an initial cluster of seemingly identical cells, there
of growth until the stresses are removed. This “thrifty phe- emerges an organism with thousands of different cell types.
notype hypothesis” may be a form of evolved adaptation From that initial ball of cells, a rich array of structures devel-

A B
FIGURE 2.1 Extreme premature birth and development. (A) Madeline Mann was born at 27 weeks and had an extremely low birth weight
because of complications of her mother’s pregnancy. After her birth, she was hooked up to a breathing tube and kept alive through extraordi-
nary measures. (B) Madeline survived and today is a college student without the physical or neurological impairments suffered by most infants
born at extremely low birth weights.

34 CHAPTER 2 THE BIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT

ops, forming the organs and the general body shape. Limbs avoid dangerous ledges to keep from falling long before they
sprout and continue to grow for years; bodily structures can tell whether an object is balanced. Thus, development
change their size, shape, and proportions. All these changes at any level of analysis, from individual cells to cognitive
must occur in an ordered sequence and at appropriate times processes, shows some common patterns. This chapter offers
for normal development to take place. just a brief glimpse into the rich fields of developmental biol-
This chapter has two goals. First, it aims to examine the ogy and neurobiological development, but even this brief
biological underpinnings of psychological development. How glimpse will yield powerful insights in later chapters.
are developmental changes in the brain and other body sys-
tems related to psychological changes? Are children’s brains
physically immature in ways that limit their capacities to per-
ceive, think, or feel? How do physiological changes, such as
those that occur during puberty, influence thoughts and feel-
The Basis of Development
ings? This chapter explores these issues by considering bio- Virtually every complex organism begins life as a single
logical development both in the womb and after birth. fertilized egg and develops into a creature with interacting
We will consider how relatively unspecialized cells anatomical systems and a broad range of behaviors. Starting
develop into brain cells prenatally—that is, before birth— before birth and continuing over the lifespan, the organism’s
and how these cells grow and interconnect, giving rise to environment exerts a critical influence on the way that it
the brain’s major anatomical structures. In studying post- develops. At the same time, environmental influences inter-
natal development—that is, development that occurs after act continuously with the organism’s biological makeup. As
birth—we will focus on how aspects of the environment the organism matures, these interactions must allow it to
(such as various forms of deprivation) and major physiologi- progress toward the adult state in a way that supports its
cal changes (such as those that happen during puberty) exert survival at every point in its development.
distinct influences on brain function. Examining some key To understand how these complex processes take place, it
anatomical and physiological changes to the brain helps is useful to think about development as a systems problem in
us see how neural development supports the psychological the sense that developmental changes to the biological system
changes described in later chapters. must interact and build on one another in a way that supports
We will end by discussing a different kind of link between the organism’s needs at every stage. Imagine for a moment
biology and behavior, that of behavioral genetics. Rather what the adult members of a new species would look like,
than asking how brain maturation influences psychologi- but also the processes that would give rise to all their proper-
cal functioning and behavior, behavioral genetics asks how ties over the course of the lifespan. There would need to be
differences in the genes relate to variations in behavior. a sequence of emerging structures and processes to yield the
Researchers are beginning to understand how variations in largest number of healthy, mature members of the species.
genetic information are linked to differences in brain struc- Examining an organism’s needs in its environment
ture and function and how those neurological features are and the developmental challenges it faces often suggests
in turn linked to behavior. why that organism’s development unfolds as it does. For
The second goal of this chapter is to characterize some example, newborn kangaroos, which are born blind, would
of the patterns common to both biological and psychologi- have little use for functional eyes during the first days in
cal development. For example, both types of development the mother’s pouch. But to get from the birth canal to the
involve critical periods, time frames in which certain kinds pouch, where its physical development continues, it needs
of experiences are essential for normal development. At the forelimbs strong enough to crawl up its mother’s belly on
biological level, for example, a fetus develops normal sex its own. Similarly, it is far more important for human new-
organs only if it is exposed to particular hormones at a spe- borns to have a functional sucking system for nursing than
cific point in prenatal development. Similarly, at the psycho- to be skilled at recognizing faces. Development proceeds as
logical level, which is grounded in biological mechanisms, an ordered sequence of interdependent events, in which the
an infant’s early visual experiences are crucial to developing more complex aspects of an organism depend on the essen-
the mental ability to fuse the separate images seen by each tial, simpler systems that emerge earlier.
eye into one integrated visual experience. Considering the process as a systems problem leads us to
Another developmental pattern in both the body and the focus on two main influences on development: the inputs
mind is the tendency for vital systems to develop earlier than that influence the process and the constraints that both
those that are less important for survival. In biological terms, limit and channel how development occurs (Newell, 1986).
the organs necessary for breathing and eating are functional The inputs consist of an organism’s genes, its environment,
at birth, whereas those supporting reproduction are not and the resulting patterns of gene-environment interactions.
functional until puberty. Psychologically, infants learn to The constraints consist of the need for viability throughout

THE BASIS OF DEVELOPMENT 35

development, the need for specialized cells to serve particu-
lar functions in the body, and the need for certain sequen-
tial processes to occur at just the right times.

Inputs to the Biological System Base pairs

The interacting influences of genes and environment vary Adenine Thymine

considerably across different kinds of organisms. Some
animals are able to function in a nearly mature way from Cytosine Guanine
the moment they are born, while others mature gradually,
developing systems that depend heavily on environmen-
tal inputs after birth. Such variations can happen even
between relatively similar organisms. Thus, Australian
brush turkeys are completely functional and self-sufficient
right after birth, while many kinds of songbirds are born
Sugar–phosphate
with closed eyes, without feathers or down, and lacking backbone
the ability to eat on their own. These sorts of differences
arise because of the different local environments, or envi-
ronmental niches, into which these birds are born and for
which these birds have evolved special adaptations. Brush FIGURE 2.2 The double helix. The genetic material of all animals
shares the same fundamental structure, a sequence of pairs of four
turkeys are born on the ground and must immediately fend
chemical bases: adenine paired with thymine, and guanine paired
for themselves, while songbirds are born in nests in trees with cytosine. These pairs are linked in a twisting structure called
and can safely remain helpless for quite some time after a double helix. The order in which these pairs occur on the double
birth. These variations reflect the ways in which the differ- helix is the basis for all genetic differences between animals.
ent species’ genetic codes were modified through natural
selection, resulting in organisms adapted to their particular
environmental niches. saliva. Adjacent to the structural sequence, most genes also
have a regulatory sequence that acts like a switch to determine
The Genes Genes are the inherited instructions for produc- whether (and how much) the protein-coding genes will be
ing the proteins that make up cells or for regulating whether active. Entire genes can also serve a regulatory function by
other genes will be turned on or off. A gene is made up of coding for a type of protein that can “flip the switch” in
a section of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid), a long, double- the regulatory sequence that adjusts another gene’s activity
stranded molecule consisting of specific sequences of just level. It is estimated that well over 95 percent of human
four different chemical bases (adenine, thymine, guanine, DNA sequences is nonstructural and probably regulatory.
and cytosine—abbreviated as A, T, G, and C) that encode Sometimes, news reports or magazine articles describe
the specific instructions for cellular construction and devel- genes “for” language, leadership, or aggression, suggesting
opment. The molecular structure of these four chemicals that there is a single biological unit of information that
allows them to link up as base pairs (A with T, and C with G) directly and specifically produces these traits or behav-
to attach the two strands of the DNA molecule together iors. The reality is more complex and far more interesting.
in a twisting structure called a double helix, much like the Instead of a simple link from one gene to a single trait or
way the rungs of a ladder link the two sides of the frame behavior, a complex web of interactions take place between
(see Figure 2.2). Because of these base-pairing rules, every multiple genes and environmental factors that together give
occurrence of C on one strand of DNA corresponds to the rise to traits and behaviors.
site of a G on the other strand, and every A corresponds to In most organisms, the long DNA molecules are stored in
a T. Thus, the two strands are said to be complementary. the cell nucleus as tightly wound, highly compact chromo-
Molecular biologists refer to the sequence of bases that somes. In this form, roughly 3 billion DNA base pairs can
makes up a gene as having two main parts. The structural fit inside a cell nucleus only 6 millionths of a meter across.
sequence directs the assembly of particular proteins (or parts The entire set of chromosomes in an individual organism is
of proteins), which can then give rise to traits in several sometimes known as its genome. But the term can also be
ways. For example, the proteins may become body struc- used to describe the typical genetic profile for a species or
tures, such as muscle, or they may become enzymes that subspecies. Estimates of the precise number of genes in the
trigger chemical reactions, like the digestive chemicals in human genome vary considerably, but at least 20,000 genes

36 CHAPTER 2 THE BIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT

are packed inside our 46 chromosomes (Pennisi, 2007). while males have an X and a Y chromosome. Females can
Some have argued that this relatively low number means therefore contribute only X chromosomes to their offspring,
that most human brain structures, which involve trillions while males can contribute either an X or a Y chromosome.
of cells, are too complex to be specified by genes. But this Thus, in humans, the sex chromosome contributed by the
argument overlooks the power of gene interactions and the father determines the sex of the child.
ways in which the interplay of a relatively smaller number
of genes can yield many distinct proteins (Marcus, 2004). The Environment Along with genes, the other main
Chromosomes normally occur in pairs, with each of the inputs to the biological system are the influences of all the
individual’s parents contributing one chromosome in each environments in which an organism develops. Here, too,
pair. The two chromosomes in each pair contain corre- a seemingly simple concept can be examined at many levels.
sponding genetic information about the same overall bodily We often think of the environment as the physical world
structures or functions, but each chromosome may contain in which an organism develops, and although this is an
different variants of those genes, depending on the genes important source of environmental influences, there are
of the contributing parent. Biologists use the term alleles many other components of the environment to consider. In
to talk about all the variations of a particular gene that can the first moments after conception, for example, the fertil-
exist at a particular location on a chromosome. Thus, a sin- ized egg is bathed in a rich mixture of chemicals, including
gle gene is said to be associated with a set of alleles. hormones secreted by the mother and, before long, addi-
For example, in humans, the ABO gene for blood type tional hormones produced by the developing fetus. A male
has several different alleles—for blood types A, B, AB, and fetus experiences a very different hormonal environment
O. Each individual receives two alleles for blood type—one than a female fetus, largely due to the fetus’s own geneti-
from each parent—and the relations between those alleles cally triggered biochemical outputs. This sort of interaction
then determine the child’s blood type. When both parents of genetic and environmental influences—in this case, a
contribute the same allele of a particular gene, the individ- genetic influence on the prenatal environment, which then
ual is said to be homozygous for that gene. If both parents triggers additional interactions—illustrates a complex rela-
contribute a type A allele, the child is homozygous (AA) and tionship between genes and the environment.
will have type A blood. The prenatal environment is also influenced by the
When each parent contributes a different allele of a par- mother’s external environment, as it includes chemicals
ticular gene, the individual is considered heterozygous for that the mother has ingested and passed on to the develop-
the gene. In these cases, the interactions between the alleles ing fetus. These might include chemicals that the mother
determine the outcome. Often one allele in a heterozygous has intentionally consumed, such as nutrients, caffeine, or
pair is dominant over the other, meaning that its proper- alcohol, as well as chemicals that have entered her body
ties will be expressed preferentially over the properties of without her knowledge, such as food additives or con-
the other allele. For example, if a woman inherited one taminants, air pollution, or compounds that contact her
allele for type A and one allele for type O (AO), she would skin. Other aspects of the biological environment within
have type A blood because the allele for type A is dominant. the mother’s body can also affect the fertilized egg. For
The allele that is not expressed is known as the recessive allele. example, when the mother contracts an illness that causes
In this case, O is the recessive allele. (Recessive alleles are not a high fever, her increased body temperature has the poten-
expressed unless the individual is homozygous recessive, having tial to cause birth defects (Czeizel et al., 2007; Hashmi et
received the recessive allele of that gene from both parents.) al., 2010). As we will see later in this chapter, the effects
In other heterozygous cases, the alleles may be codominant, of each of these kinds of environmental influences also
in which case both alleles are expressed simultaneously. This depend on the point in the developmental timeline when
is the case when a person inherits one allele for type A and the fetus is exposed to them.
one for type B (AB), resulting in type AB blood. Blood type As the developing fetus approaches birth, other envi-
provides an unusually straightforward example of how traits ronmental factors can have an influence as well. These
are inherited, but most traits result from the interactions of can include sounds in the outside world, as well as tactile
multiple genes, contributing to the complex patterns of inher- sensations created when the mother’s abdomen is touched.
itance we see between parents and offspring. After birth, environmental influences proliferate as the baby
Although most chromosomes come in pairs that con- experiences the world through all the senses, through the
tain matching genes, one important exception concerns nutritional content of new foods, and through early social
the sex chromosomes, a special pair of chromosomes that interactions. Through their behavior, babies also shape cer-
determines the sex of many animals. In most mammals, tain environmental influences. Thus, a baby who frequently
there are two types of sex chromosomes: X chromosomes cries and shows distress receives different environmental
and Y chromosomes. Females have two X chromosomes, inputs, in terms of parental behavior, than a calm baby.

THE BASIS OF DEVELOPMENT 37

Interactions between Genes and Environment We Environmental Gene A
have seen that genes and the environment constantly inter- trigger A
act in complex ways, such that it rarely makes sense to con-
sider them as completely separate inputs to the biological
system. At the broadest level, environmental influences help
us understand why differences may arise between the geno- Environmental Gene B Gene C Gene D
repressor B
type of an organism and its phenotype. The genotype is
the genetic information encoded as particular alleles in an
organism’s DNA (in contrast, the term genome is more often
used for the genetic information that typifies a whole spe- Gene E Gene F Gene G Gene H
cies). The organism’s phenotype refers to the ways that the
genetic information is expressed or manifested in an organ-
ism, including its anatomical structures, its biochemical
processes, and its behaviors.
Environmental influences are an important clue to
FIGURE 2.3 Regulatory cascades. This simplified diagram illus-
explain differences between genotype and phenotype
trates how genes can interact in complex patterns, where turning on
because a particular allele’s unique characteristics may one gene creates the products that turn on several other genes in
only be expressed in certain contexts. For example, a child a cascade. Environmental factors can also affect these cascades by
might inherit a genotype that predisposes him toward obe- turning genes on or off. (Real gene regulatory cascades involve many
sity, but he may only become overweight if he grows up more interactions between intermediate stages and higher stages and
in an environment with abundant food. Likewise, certain between genes and their products.)
genetic variations related to lighter skin pigmentation can
make an individual more vulnerable to skin cancer—but
this increased susceptibility would be dangerous only in rel- several other genes, which in turn can influence many more
atively sunny climates. Thus, a person with this genetic vul- genes (see Figure 2.3). At the same time, these genes con-
nerability who grows up in cloudy Astoria, Oregon, might tinue to be subject to environmental influences—from the
not be any more likely to get skin cancer than other people biochemical surroundings of a particular cell to the features
from Astoria. But growing up in the desert sun of Tucson, of the organism’s external world.
Arizona, may make that same person much more likely to
get skin cancer than other people in Tucson.
Other genes that have harmful effects in most environ-
ments can be rendered harmless in highly specialized envi- Constraints on Development
ronments. For example, some children are born with an We have seen how genes, the environment, and their inter-
allele that makes them unable to break down the amino actions act as inputs that influence development. Develop-
acid phenylalanine, which is found in artificial sweeteners ment is also shaped by three key constraints: the viability
and other foods. If these children eat foods that contain of the developing organism, the differentiation of cell types
phenylalanine, they will develop phenylketonuria (PKU), a and anatomical structures, and the timing and sequencing of
condition in which phenylalanine builds up in their blood- developmental events. These factors interact in crucial ways
stream, causing severe brain damage if left untreated. But if during biological development. Here we consider each factor
the same children grow up on a special diet without phenyl- in turn.
alanine, they develop normally.
Different environments not only influence phenotypic Viability From the moment an egg is fertilized until the
features; they can also affect the activity levels of genes. It baby is born, that rapidly growing and changing mass of
became clear only about 50 years ago that aspects of the cells must stay alive by metabolizing nutrients and eliminat-
environment could change genes’ activities in this way ing wastes. It must have some way of circulating nutrients,
(Jacob & Monod, 1961). Since that discovery, researchers and to do so, it needs muscle activity, such as the heartbeat.
have found that much of the information in the human By contrast, a complex machine like a passenger jet might
genome is regulatory—that is, affecting when other genes not have a functional engine system until other critical
are expressed and which genes can be activated by environ- control mechanisms are installed, moments before comple-
mental factors such as hormones. Moreover, genes’ intricate tion. Thus, the need for viability in living organisms places
interaction patterns can form elaborate branching chains constraints on development, requiring that certain essential
known as regulatory cascades. In these series of interac- structures and functions develop before others, but such
tions, small changes in the activity of one gene can influence constraints do not necessarily apply to nonliving entities.

38 CHAPTER 2 THE BIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT

 What does the constraint of viability require of the devel- rolling down a surface with ever-deepening valleys and
oping organism? The answer depends on the environment ridges, which represent different cell outcomes. As the
in which the organism must survive. Thus, a fetus receiving valleys deepen and the ridges grow higher, the likelihood
oxygen via its umbilical cord is a very different being from of the ball “jumping” to another valley diminishes. Like-
the breathing newborn it becomes. This remarkable trans- wise, after a cell begins a particular developmental path,
formation occurs by means of an intricate set of triggers, it will be increasingly difficult for it to change course and
including constricted blood flow in the umbilical cord, the become a completely different cell type. Several research-
physical pressures of contraction during birth, and chang- ers have used this concept of canalization to describe how
ing maternal hormones. These events empty the baby’s behaviors and abilities develop (Bishop, 2009; Gottlieb,
lungs of fluid before birth, changing the circulatory path 2007). Some scholars focus on the initial possibilities of
of blood flow to take in oxygen from the lungs (rather than many alternative developmental paths, while others focus
via the placenta) and activating the breathing reflex (Wyllie, on the valleys and ridges that represent increasingly limit-
2006). Despite the complexity of this near-instantaneous ing constraints on what develops.
transition, only a small percentage of newborns need resus- These complementary views of the developmental pro-
citation. Thus, over the course of development, both prena- cess emerge frequently in later chapters as we consider
tally and postnatally, the constraint of viability can impose aspects of behavioral and cognitive development. When we
radically different requirements. examine perceptual development in Chapter 3, we will see
how certain cells become attuned to receiving simultaneous
Differentiation of Cells and Structures The fertilized visual input from both eyes and how after starting down
egg splits into two cells, then each of those cells divides, that path, it is ever more difficult to reverse course and
yielding four, then those four become eight. Though the become responsive to input from only one eye. When we
eight cells seem identical, each will become specialized for consider social development in Chapter 6, we will see how
a different function. What controls this differentiation into children’s early parental attachments become ever deeper
cell types, and what patterns does the process follow? Many and stronger, making these attachments difficult to extin-
researchers have devoted their careers to these questions, guish even in abusive situations. This pattern of increasing
since cell differentiation is the key to understanding how commitment to a particular developmental path pervades
the complexity of an organism emerges. biological and psychological development.
The biologist Conrad Waddington (1957) vividly Cell differentiation is controlled by an intricate set of
depicted the process of specialization during develop- genetic interactions that specify how and when cells special-
ment using the visual representation of a landscape (see ize. One striking process involves epigenetic regulation,
Figure 2.4). He described changing cells undergoing a which leads to changes in gene expression without changes
process of canalization through which they get com- to DNA sequences (Dolinoy, 2007). Epigenetic regulation
mitted to becoming certain types (Salathia & Queitsch, occurs when a particular cell type has some genes turned off
2007). He compared the differentiating cell to a ball and others turned on by its surrounding chemical environ-
ment and then “freezes” that pattern of on-and-off genes.
When the cell divides, the genes of all the cells that it cre-
ates have the same on-and-off pattern. Thus, environmen-
tal influences can fix cells to be of a certain type, so that
when they divide, they will produce cells of that same type.
One of the most common mechanisms for epigenetic regula-
tion involves methylation, in which methyl groups (specific
carbon-hydrogen configurations) become attached to certain
DNA base pairs, usually with the result of turning off the
activity level of a gene or affecting other genes that follow that
gene in a regulatory sequence.
Even the kinds of foods that a pregnant woman eats may
influence the activity of the fetus’s genes and in turn affect
the way its cells differentiate. This phenomenon is the focus
of a rapidly growing field known as nutrigenomics (Ross,
FIGURE 2.4 The landscape of canalization. Conrad Waddington
envisioned the canalization process as a terrain with ever-deepening
2010; Waterland & Jirtle, 2004). It is thought that certain
valleys and ridges. Like a ball rolling down this landscape, a develop- effects of dietary variation in the pregnant woman are linked
ing cell becomes ever more entrenched in a certain fate. Adapted to high levels of certain maternal hormones in the womb,
from Waddington (1957). causing changes in gene regulation that may contribute to

THE BASIS OF DEVELOPMENT 39

diabetes (Drake et al., 2005). Low-protein diets during preg- Slack, 2002; Hada et al., 2010; Pasquinelli & Ruvkun, 2002).
nancy have also been associated with changes in fetal gene In humans, errors in the timing of when specific genes turn on
regulation that may lead to diabetes later in life (Burdge et and off may result in anatomical defects, such as the abdominal
al., 2007; Langley-Evans, 2007; Lillycrop & Burdge, 2011). cavity being unable to enclose the internal organs (Brewer &
As one researcher put it, it now appears that “you are not Williams, 2004). During normal development, the thin film of
only what you eat, but what your mother and grandparents cells that initially covers the abdominal cavity is later replaced
ate as well” (Dolinoy, 2007, p. 7). by thicker layers of skin and muscle cells. If this secondary set
of layers doesn’t develop at the right time, the organs may push
Timing and Sequencing In biological systems, changes out of the cavity, stretching the thin film into a large bulge.
in timing can have major effects on what develops. We If the secondary layers of skin and muscle then start growing
have seen that genes turn on and off in response to regula- in after this delay, some of the organs may be trapped outside
tory signals; in addition, some genes are active only during the body (Beckett & Baylies, 2007; Rochlin et al., 2010; Sun
certain periods in an organism’s development. How does et al., 2007).
the timing of gene activation influence development? More Closely related to timing is the issue of the sequence in
generally, when the timing of an important event—like which structural developments take place. For example, to
activating a gene or forming an anatomical structure— build a house, some structures, like the foundation, must be
changes, how does the change influence other developing completed before others, such as the walls—and those, in
structures and patterns of genetic regulation? turn, must precede the roof. For other structures, sequenc-
It appears that the timing of major anatomical devel- ing is less important: the wiring can go in either before or
opments is governed by the same set of genes in all species. after the plumbing. In a developing person, some structures
They are known as heterochronic genes, and they seem to or processes sequentially depend on others, and some can
operate by regulating the activity of other genes (Banerjee & proceed independently. We will see several cases where cor-

SCIENTIFIC METHOD: Diet and Methylation

Hypothesis:
Sex:
Paternal diets in mice can cause epigenetic changes, via
methylation, that are inherited. Low
Diet: Control Control Control
protein
Method:
1. Male mice were fed control (20 percent protein) or low-protein X X
(11 percent protein) diets, with the remaining mass of food made
up of sucrose, from weaning until sexual maturity.
2. Mice on either diet were then mated with females reared on
the control diet.
3. Twenty-six pairs of offspring (an offspring of a control mother
and a control father paired with an offspring of a control
mother and a low-protein father) were reared with their No increase in Marked increase
mothers until 3 weeks, when their livers were analyzed for activation levels in activation levels
gene expression. of genes involved of genes involved
in cholesterol in cholesterol
4. DNA microarrays were used to explore global gene expression synthesis. synthesis.
differences in the offspring from the two kinds of matings.

Results:
There was an extensive increase in activation levels of genes levels of activity of cholesterol synthesis genes, which might
related to cholesterol synthesis in the offspring of males fed possibly be related to increases in heart disease.
a low-protein diet. In general, there was more methylation of
many genes in the low-protein groups, especially of a gene Conclusion:
that regulated fatty acid synthesis. When methylation led this Feeding males a low-protein diet from birth to maturity can
gene to be turned off, it may in turn have led to the increased result in gene-regulated metabolic changes in their offspring.
Source study: Carone et al. (2010).

40 CHAPTER 2 THE BIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT

rect sequencing is vital. In the developing brain, for exam- reproduction and follow those cells from conception to
ple, some kinds of nerve cells can develop only within a the beginnings of differentiation.
framework of other kinds of cells. These framework cells
emit chemical signals that guide the growing nerve cells to
their correct locations.
Meiosis and Fertilization
Every human being starts with the fusion of two cells. The
mother’s egg and the father’s sperm combine physically and
The Beginnings of genetically to create the new individual. We therefore start
our discussion with meiosis, the unique process of cell divi-
Development sion that produces the egg and sperm cells (see Figure 2.5A).
We’ll also see how meiosis differs from another type of cell
Considering development in detail reveals how the division called mitosis, which gives rise to other kinds of
main inputs (genes and the environment) and the key cells throughout the body.
constraints (viability, differentiation, and timing) inter-
act throughout the process. In this section, we start Meiosis and Mitosis In adults, most cells have two of
with the processes that generate egg and sperm cells for each type of chromosome, with one chromosome in each

Meiosis Mitosis

Maternal Paternal
Chromosome 1 Chromosome 2
chromosome chromosome

DNA replication

Duplicated
DNA replication
chromosomes

Pairing of maternal and

paternal chromosomes

Crossing–over
Duplicated
chromosomes

Segregation
of crossed–over
pairs of chromosomes
Segregation into
single chromosomes

Further segregation
into single
chromosomes

A B
FIGURE 2.5 Meiosis and mitosis. (A) Meiosis is a special kind of cell division that prepares cells for sexual recombination. Normal
human cells have 23 pairs of chromosomes. One chromosome of each parent goes to the sperm and egg cells that will be part of reproduction.
(B) Mitosis is the process in which cell division occurs, but the chromosomes from both parents are copied and appear in all the new cells.

THE BEGINNINGS OF DEVELOPMENT 41

pair contributed by each parent. (The exception is the sex ents. This diversity is advantageous, as it increases the odds
chromosomes: recall that males have an X and a Y chromo- that the offspring’s genotypes will make them well suited
some, and females have two X chromosomes.) Typically for new environmental challenges.
when a cell divides, all of its genetic material—two copies Yet, meiosis may not proceed correctly; imperfect crossing-
of each type of chromosome—is reproduced in the new cells over may result in genetic disorders, including a genetic
through the process of mitosis (see Figure 2.5B). However, condition known as trisomy 21. A child with trisomy 21
the specialized sperm cells of the father and the egg cells of has three chromosomes rather than two in what is normally
the mother are produced by meiosis. These specialized cells, the twenty-first chromosome pair (see Figure 2.6A). This
known as gametes, have only one of each type of chromo- anomaly is easy to see when a biologist constructs a karyotype
some, or half the genetic material contained in the body’s in which all the chromosomes in an individual’s genotype
other cells. As a result, when the egg and sperm fuse during are stained with dye and the chromosome pairs are aligned
fertilization, the new cell has the normal, complete number of and photographed through a microscope. When it isn’t
chromosomes—half from the egg and half from the sperm. lethal, trisomy 21 leads to the most common form of Down
syndrome, a disorder whose effects include delays in cogni-
tive functioning and motor skills. In addition, people with
Q: How is meiosis different from mitosis? What Down syndrome tend to have distinctive facial features (see
functional role does meiosis serve? Figure 2.6B) and are at high risk for certain heart defects.
The problems that occur in cases of trisomy 21 reveal the
subtleties of both genetic and environmental effects on devel-
The process of meiosis also serves the valuable function opment. In terms of genetic effects, it is striking that an extra
of greatly increasing the genetic diversity of offspring. Dur- chromosome at the twenty-first location can have such dra-
ing an early stage of meiosis, complementary pairs of chro- matic and widespread effects on development. At the same
mosomes are next to each other and can swap parts of their time, Down syndrome also illustrates how the environment
genetic material, as shown in the mixing of the “blue” and can influence a phenotype. In recent years, improvements
“red” elements in Figure 2.5A. As a result of this crossing- in special education for children with Down syndrome have
over, each gamete is genetically unique, and offspring can resulted in impressive gains, with some children with Down
have a sequence of alleles that differs from that seen in either syndrome growing up to be college graduates with successful
the mother or the father. Thus, crossing-over creates more careers. Such outcomes are rare even in the best environments,
genetic diversity in offspring than was present in the par- but researchers are now realizing that some environments

A B
FIGURE 2.6 Trisomy 21 and Down syndrome. (A) A normal karyotype and a trisomy 21 karyotype. The upper panel shows a karyotype in
which there is a pair for each of the 23 chromosomes. The lower panel shows a karyotype leading to Down syndrome, in which there are three
copies of chromosome 21. (B) People with Down syndrome often have characteristic facial features that make them visually identifiable. A small
amount of extra genetic material in part of the twenty-first chromosome causes a large set of effects, ranging from these facial features to heart
defects and a variety of cognitive problems.

42 CHAPTER 2 THE BIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT

clearly can improve the future of such children far more than
was thought possible a few decades ago (Pueschel, 2001).
Other errors during meiosis may result in extra or miss-
ing sex chromosomes. These anomalies can cause a number
of problems involving sex-specific characteristics, such as
breasts or facial hair, as well as other problems unrelated to
sex differences. For example, women with Turner syndrome,
which occurs in roughly 1 in 3,000 live births, have only
one X chromosome (a condition known as monosomy X),
and they are infertile. In addition to having reduced (or
absent) female sex characteristics, individuals with Turner
syndrome often are quite short, and they have webbed skin at
the neck and drooping eyelids. Men with the rare condition
of Klinefelter syndrome (roughly 1 in 1,000 live births) have
an extra X chromosome (XXY). In addition to reduced male
sex characteristics, they may also have abnormally long legs
and show language impairments and excessive shyness.

Q: What are some examples of the effects of FIGURE 2.7 Fertilization. In the process of fertilization, 50 to
100 sperm, out of an original group of millions, finally reach the egg.
having extra or missing genetic material in the The thread-like projections are the tails of sperm trying to enter the
human genome? large, spherical egg.

Fertilization During sexual intercourse, many millions of and eggs, they are only as genetically similar as any two
sperm are released and swim in search of an egg to fertil- siblings—that is, they have half their genes in common.
ize. Out of the millions that start the journey, only 50 to
100 sperm reach the egg and attempt to penetrate it (see
Figure 2.7). When one sperm finally penetrates the egg,
it triggers a series of chemical events that prevent all other The First Patterns of Differentiation
sperm from entering, as well as allowing the penetrating Around 2 hours after fertilization, the zygote makes the
sperm to move farther into the egg and fuse with the egg’s first of many cell divisions. Initially, as the cells divide rap-
genetic material (Gilbert, 2010). At this point, the fertilized idly by mitosis, they get smaller with each division, such
egg is known as the zygote. If the zygote has an X chromo- that the overall mass of the zygote does not increase. When
some and a Y chromosome, a male is created; if the zygote the cell divisions result in a 16-cell body at day 4, this com-
has two X chromosomes, a female is created. pact, solid ball of cells is known as a morula, and it shows
Conception can result in twins or other kinds of multiple the first signs of cell differentiation: its outer cells are larger
births. If the fertilized egg splits into two separate cells, each than its inner ones. At around day 5, the larger outer cells
of which continues to develop into individuals, identical of the morula become clearly distinct from the inner ones.
twins result. They are also known as monozygotic (MZ) These outer cells (the trophoblast) will eventually become
twins because the two babies came from the same zygote, part of the placenta (an organ that will make possible
which is also the reason for their nearly identical genotypes. the transfer of nutrients and oxygen from the mother and
Biologists used to think that MZ twins had exactly the same wastes and carbon dioxide from the fetus). The encircling
genotype, but it turns out that subtle epigenetic effects can outer cells trigger a group of the smaller inner cells to clus-
arise during in utero development and affect one or more ter in a ball-like structure, which eventually will become
sections of DNA, which can cause differences in the twins’ the embryo (see Figure 2.8). This overall structure—the
susceptibility to certain diseases or subtle physical differences outer ring of cells and the inner cell mass—is known as the
(Bruder et al., 2008; Ollikainen & Craig, 2011). By contrast, blastocyst.
when two different sperm fertilize two different eggs, dizy- In humans, about 16 days after fertilization, the blasto-
gotic (DZ) twins (or twins from two zygotes; also called cyst’s inner cell mass undergoes an important cell differen-
fraternal twins) result. Because DZ twins develop from two tiation process known as gastrulation, which is oriented
separate conceptions involving genetically different sperm relative to the point where the sperm entered the egg. During

THE BEGINNINGS OF DEVELOPMENT 43

 12–15 hours 24–30 hours same kind of functional transformation happens if an inner
cell is relocated to an external position (Hillman et al., 1972).

Anatomical Development
A 2–cell stage B 4–cell stage C 8–cell stage So far, we have focused on changes at the cellular level, many
of which are visible only with a microscope. Within just a
Inner cell few weeks after conception, however, noticeable anatomical
mass
features start to appear, and they change very rapidly in the
following months.

Trophoblast
D Morula E Early blastocyst F Late blastocyst Structures and Systems in
FIGURE 2.8 The formation of the blastocyst. In the earliest the Embryo and Fetus
stages of growth, the fertilized egg progresses from apparently undif-
ferentiated cells to the beginnings of specialization. After fertilization and cell divisions that make the zygote into
a multicelled organism, rudimentary nervous and circulatory
systems and body structures appear and grow rapidly, becom-
gastrulation, a cascade of changes in chemical concentrations ing specialized for particular functions (see Table 2.1). We
relative to this orientation point soon leads to bilateral sym- will briefly discuss the development of systems and structures
metry, a hallmark of most complex organisms. An organism from 2 to 8 weeks after conception (during the embryonic
that shows bilateral symmetry has identical structures on period) and from 9 to 36 weeks after conception (during the
both sides of a center line (right and left kidneys, arms, legs, fetal period).
eyes, ears, and so on).
In the process of gastrulation, cells and cell clusters move The Embryonic Period At about 2 weeks after concep-
within the blastocyst to form three distinct layers (see Fig- tion, the fertilized egg attaches to the uterine wall (see
ure 2.9). The outermost layer of cells, the ectoderm, even- Figure 2.10). After this implantation, it becomes more com-
tually forms the skin and, perhaps more surprisingly, the mon to refer to the fertilized egg as an embryo (the embry-
nervous system. The middle layer, the mesoderm, becomes onic period lasts from the middle of the second week until
internal tissues, such as the skeleton, internal organs, and the end of the eighth week after conception). The first signs
muscles. And the blastocyst’s innermost cell layer, the endo- of legs and arms are visible at about the third week. The heart
derm, develops into some of the glands, such as the thy- starts to beat at around 18 days, pumping blood around a rap-
roid, and the specialized tissues lining organs such as the idly expanding circulatory system. Limb buds appear as small
lungs. A matrix of fine fibers within the blastocyst directs bumps in the arm region, and similar buds emerge later in
the cells’ migrations, much like a set of guide rails along the leg region, following the head-to-toe principle of develop-
which the cells move. A great deal is happening during ment in which structures tend to develop earlier in the more
these migrations. Specific sequences of genes become acti- anterior regions of the embryo (situated toward the head or
vated and deactivated as cells in the different layers start to front). Development in which the more anterior structures of
develop specialized features. The identities of these cells soon an organism mature earlier than structures in the posterior
become nearly irreversible (Cyranoski, 2007; Jackson et al., sections is known as cephalocaudal development (cephalo =
2010; Verfaillie, 2002). head, caudal = tail).
How do the cells on the inside of the blastocyst, which In humans and all other mammals, as well as birds and
eventually become parts of the embryo, differentiate from the other reptiles, the key event in gastrulation, during which
blastocyst’s external cells, which will form the placenta? The the blastocyst starts to develop distinct layers of cells,
relative positions of these cells in the blastocyst seem to trigger is the formation of the primitive streak, which occurs at
different sets of genes within them, leading the cells to special- the end of week 2 in humans. The primitive streak is a
ize for different functions. Presumably, the cells in the inner ridge on one side of the blastocyst through which cells
layer and outer layer receive different kinds of chemical signals pass to become the mesoderm and endoderm. Where and
(Surani et al., 2007; Thomas et al., 2004). If an outer-layer cell when they pass through the streak influences whether the
is moved to an inner position at an early enough point, it will cells in each layer will become part of the head, the gut,
genetically and functionally develop like an inner-layer cell, or the tail (if the species has a tail). Cells within the streak
becoming part of the embryo rather than the placenta. The itself appear to produce chemical signals that guide other

44 CHAPTER 2 THE BIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT

 Undifferentiated cell FIGURE 2.9 Cell differentiation. Cells differ-
entiate in a pattern of hierarchical specialization,
starting with cells that can become any sort of cell
at all. Once a cell has progressed far enough down
embryonic cell placental cell one path, it becomes extremely difficult to go back
and revert to a less differentiated state.

ectoderm mesoderm endoderm

skin nerve tissue muscle organs skeleton

lining of spinal heart smooth muscles

mouth hair brain cord muscle of viscera liver kidneys

cells to migrate toward the streak (Alev et al., 2010; Keller, head (see Figure 2.11). This head-to-toe progression is a
2005; Spagnoli & Hemmati-Brivanlou, 2008). Early- powerful organizing principle of embryonic development.
entering cells migrate toward one end of the streak, which Some cells that migrate into the streak end up forming the
may produce stronger signals, and become the head. Later- notochord, which signals ectodermal cells above it to form
entering cells, as well as those that pass through the streak the neural plate, which lengthens and drops down into the
farther down, become other types of structures. Thus, the surface to form a neural groove (at around day 18 in humans)
streak, which is one of the first signs of bilateral symmetry, with ridges on the sides. Eventually, these grooves fold in
also triggers a very early bias toward development in the toward each other, join, and form a hollow neural tube.

Weeks after conception Size (inches) Weight Hallmarks

2 0.01 < 0.25 oz Embryo is soundly implanted on uterine wall.

4 0.125 < 0.25 oz Limb buds appear; heart starts to beat.
6 0.5 < 0.25 oz Fingers start to appear; some neural activity occurs; four-chambered
heart is present.
8 1 0.5 oz First elements of most body parts—for example, ears, fingers, toes—
are present.
10 2.5 1.5 oz Some movement occurs; fingernails appear.
12 3.5 2 oz Kidneys start to make urine; blood is now made in bone marrow.
14 4.5 4 oz Fetus may suck thumb; begins to make larger movements.
16 5.25 6 oz Mother feels movements; some hair may be present.
20 10 1 lb Fetus may hear sounds.
24 12 2 lb If born at this time, 50 percent of babies survive with intensive care.
28 15 3 lb Lungs can breathe air; eyes are open.
32 17 4.5 lb Sleep and waking states are observed.
36 19 6.5 lb Lungs are fully mature.
38 20 7.5 lb Baby is full term.

TABLE 2.1 Milestones of prenatal development. The timetable of gross anatomical and physiological development of the human embryo
and fetus is highly regular in normal cases. Although many structures are present in the first 5 months, not until well into the sixth month are
babies at all likely to survive birth.

ANATOMICAL DEVELOPMENT 45
 After 3 weeks, the embryo’s cells begin to differentiate.
Cells that have identical genetic material take on different
roles that support the development of a well-formed body.
How can cells with the same genetic sequence become fin-
gers, kidneys, brain cells, and muscles?
One key principle is that of successive differentiation.
As specific cells develop, they narrow down their func-
tional specialization in a step-by-step fashion, as shown in
Figure 2.9. Thus, certain cells might first differentiate into
three general groups: cells that can form muscles, organs, or
the skeleton (bones). At first, the cells in the muscle group
can become any kind of muscle, but at a later stage, most of
those cells further differentiate into one of two main types
of muscle. At an even later point, they specialize to form
FIGURE 2.10 Implantation of the embryo. At 6 days, the blasto-
particular parts of specific muscles.
cyst starts to implant on the uterine wall, as shown in this image. By
2 weeks, it is fully implanted and is about 0.01 inch long and is now
Dramatic changes in body structure occur between
known as the embryo. 4 and 8 weeks. At 4 weeks, the embryo is about 3 milli-
meters (about 0.125 inch) long. By the end of week 8, the
embryo is well over 25 millimeters (about 1 inch) long. Even
This process of initial brain formation, called neurulation, though it is only a little over an inch long, it already can be
is completed in week 4. The neural tube eventually becomes clearly seen as having human form.
both the brain and the spinal cord. The notochord acts as a
guiding framework for the spinal cord, with its cells eventu- The Fetal Period From the ninth week until birth, the
ally becoming parts of the vertebrae of the spinal column in growing human organism is referred to as the fetus. Over
humans. If the neural tube does not close properly, however, the next several weeks, the fetus changes dramatically (see
neural tube defects (for example, spina bifida, in which part Figure 2.12). It shows increasingly well-articulated fingers
of the spinal cord protrudes) will result. and toes. At 9 weeks, its four-chambered heart is clearly seen

A B C
FIGURE 2.11 The embryonic period. (A) A 3-week-old embryo. The embryo’s anterior structures, such as the head, tend to develop sooner
than the posterior areas. (B) A 4-week-old embryo. By 4 weeks of age, the human embryo has a visible beating heart and the beginnings of
limb buds, as well as a distinct head region. The heartbeat can be detected through ultrasound. (C) A 6-week-old embryo. The principle that
structures near the head develop before those near the tail is complemented by the principle that structures near the body’s midline tend to
develop before those farther out to the sides.

46 CHAPTER 2 THE BIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT

 8 weeks 10 weeks 12 weeks

16 weeks 20 weeks 36 weeks

FIGURE 2.12 Prenatal development from 8 weeks to 36 weeks. From 8 weeks, both external and internal anatomical structures become
further differentiated and more human in appearance. Development typically occurs earlier in the head region than in regions closer to the toes.

in ultrasound, as are visible facial features. Some of its neu- At 36 weeks, the baby weighs about 6.5 pounds and is
ral connections are functioning, allowing it to show some nearly full term. At this point, its movement in the womb
reflexes. is restricted because the baby is so tightly packed into the
By 12 weeks, it is quite easy to see most of the same ana- space. After its birth at 38 weeks of development, a newborn
tomical features in the fetus that are visible in newborns. baby immediately breathes, cries, shows a range of behaviors
The fetus at this point is physiologically much more sophis- and reflexes . . . and starts to learn about the world.
ticated than it was as an embryo, and most of its major
bodily systems are partially functional. The fetus swallows,
its muscles cause joint movements, and its kidneys now
make urine. After 16 weeks, the fetus weighs 6 ounces and Preterm Births
its external body parts are much more distinct. At 20 weeks, A significant number of babies are born less than 38 weeks
the fetus weighs about 1 pound, its hair is more evident, and after conception. When babies are born 3 or more weeks
its heartbeat can be detected with a stethoscope. early, they are known as preterm (or premature) infants and
At 22 weeks, the fetus weighs about 1.25 pounds; this is typically weigh less than 5.5 pounds, or 2.5 kilograms (see
the earliest stage at which a small number of premature new- Figure 2.13). In the United States, roughly 12.5 percent of
borns may survive birth, although this is possible only with births are preterm, while in Europe, the rate is approximately
the intensive medical care available at major hospitals, and the 7 percent (Goldenberg et al., 2008). About 5 percent of pre-
child is still likely to face many long-term disabilities. At 28 term births occur before 28 weeks gestational age and are
weeks, the fetus weighs close to 3 pounds. Its lungs typically known as extremely preterm births.
have developed enough to be able to breathe air if birth is Several forms of physical and psychological stress can
premature. By 6 months, the fetus is sufficiently well formed increase the likelihood of a preterm birth. One major cause
and physiologically mature that roughly 50 percent of infants appears to be infections in either the mother or the fetus,
born at that stage will survive if given intensive medical care. which can indirectly cause either the onset of early labor or
By 8 months, most infants will survive birth without major breaks in the membranes protecting the fetus (Goldenberg
medical interventions. Once the fetus can survive on its own et al., 2008). Even infections far removed from the uterus,
in the outside world, it is often called a baby. such as dental and gum infections, can increase the chances

ANATOMICAL DEVELOPMENT 47
 (Volpe, 2009). The many mechanisms of damage are not well
understood, making it difficult for physicians to reduce the
rate of complications associated with extreme preterm births,
even as infants are increasingly able to survive them.
Preterm births are also associated with a range of cogni-
tive difficulties in memory, attention, and language skills, as
well as with mental retardation in very severe cases (Allen,
2008; Anderson & Doyle, 2008; Rijken et al., 2007). These
problems can persist long after infancy. School-age children
who were born extremely preterm show a higher incidence of
mild or severe cognitive impairments (Anderson & Doyle,
2008). Even among adults, those born extremely preterm
show, on average, lower rates of school completion, lower
levels of employment, and greater difficulty living indepen-
FIGURE 2.13 Extremely premature infant. Recent medical dently (Allen, 2008; Moster et al., 2008).
advances have made it possible for premature infants to survive at
How can the negative effects associated with preterm births
ages considered impossible a few decades ago. As younger and
younger babies are able to survive, however, the incidence of severe,
be reduced? Interventions can aim to either reduce the rate of
lifelong complications rises. preterm births or minimize their negative effects. Reducing
the preterm birthrate turns out to be a challenge. As doctors
become better able to recognize the need to induce early labor,
of a premature birth (Jeffcoat et al., 2001). Smoking, alco- preterm birthrates are rising. Technologies such as in vitro fer-
hol, and illicit drugs also increase the chances, and in com- tilization for couples with fertility problems can also increase
bination they raise the odds still further (Dew et al., 2007). the odds of multiple fetuses and preterm births (Goldenberg
In addition to possible toxic effects, smoking, drinking, and et al., 2008). Nonetheless, medical advances are enabling doc-
drug abuse may put infants more at risk simply by exposing tors to prolong the gestational period without harming the
them to the increased odds of being born very early. Along mother or the fetus. Such interventions can range from con-
the same lines as these physical stressors, mothers who expe- vincing mothers to stop smoking, to screening for and treating
rience intense stress and hardship are more likely to have infections promptly, to careful monitoring of the mother’s diet
preterm infants. Psychological stress may cause inflam- and nutritional supplements (Iams et al., 2008).
mation and immune responses, which in turn increase the Even with the most attentive prenatal care, however, pre-
odds of preterm birth (Wadhwa et al., 2001). term births still occur, and so the second form of interven-
Preterm infants, and especially those that are extremely tion aims to help children who are born preterm. Studies
premature, are a cause of concern for physicians and psychol- suggest that among these children, those who experience
ogists because these infants are at increased risk for a host of more parental involvement and stimulating, active play in
complications later in development. As we consider the con- infancy and educational support in the early school years
sequences of preterm birth, however, it is critical to keep in show cognitive and motor improvements (de Kieviet et al.,
mind that these problems take the form of increased risks— 2009; Koldewijn et al., 2010). Preterm infants and preschool
not certainties. Preterm infants may have no negative medi- children have also shown early benefits from additional
cal or psychological conditions at any point in their lives, as practice with motor skills and supportive educational pro-
we saw in the unusual case we described at the beginning of grams, but these gains do not seem to be sustained through
the chapter, but the closer to full term an infant is at birth, elementary school (Orton et al., 2009). Health care profes-
the smaller the chances of these kinds of problems occurring. sionals, teachers, and psychologists still have much to learn
The more immature the preterm infant is at birth, the about what kinds of interventions can provide long-term
higher the risk of medical and psychological problems, not benefits for children born preterm. At this point, improving
just in infancy but also in childhood and beyond (Korven- prenatal care to reduce the number of extremely preterm
ranta et al., 2010). At the level of neuroanatomy, preterm births is likely to be the most effective form of intervention.
birth is associated with greater risk of a number of irregu-
larities in brain development (Allen, 2008; Chuang et al.,
2007; Volpe, 2009). This damage appears to happen in two
ways: (1) premature birth seems to disrupt patterns of neural Q: What difficulties reduce survival, and what
growth that normally occur in the last few months before long-term complications are likely when a fetus
birth, and (2) the problem that may have triggered a prema- is born preterm?
ture birth, such as an infection, can damage the brain directly

48 CHAPTER 2 THE BIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT

Why Does Anatomical Development mental constraint of viability. Some of the earliest evolv-
ing structures were those necessary for an organism’s basic
Progress As It Does? functioning. These same necessary structures and pro-
What determines which body parts develop first? One cesses are likely to emerge early in development to ensure
nineteenth-century hypothesis suggested that the devel- that the organism is viable. The systems that support
opment of an embryo followed the same course as the spe- the most basic survival functions must emerge early in
cies’ evolutionary history. This idea is summed up in the development—both in an individual organism’s lifespan
phrase “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny,” where ontogeny and in a species’ evolution. In later chapters, we will see that
refers to the development of an organism and phylogeny this same principle applies to many aspects of cognitive and
refers to the evolutionary lineage of a species (Haeckel, social development as well.
1874; see also Gilbert, 2006; Gould, 1977). Researchers
have cited some striking patterns in human embryonic
development that seem to support the hypothesis. For
example, structures vaguely resembling gills emerge early Diversity out of Uniformity
on, only to transform later into facial muscles, middle ear In considering how such a diversity of anatomical structures
bones, and other structures. Later, a tail-like structure eventually develops from the zygote’s undifferentiated cells,
emerges that is then reabsorbed into the body. we have already seen how certain early developing features,
Despite these observations, however, the idea that a such as the primitive streak, guide cells’ specialization. In
species’ embryonic development follows its evolutionary addition, some general patterns of body development are
history is based on a misconception about evolution. In common to a wide range of species. These patterns can shed
truth, evolution does not proceed in a straightforward more light on the mechanisms of cell differentiation that
path that starts with the simplest one-celled organisms support the formation of specific parts of the body (Larsen
and, over time, yields increasingly complex creatures. et al., 2001; Moore & Persaud, 2003). For example, how
Species evolved not through a direct, linear progression does the genetic material in the zygote’s cells give rise to a
but in branching patterns, such that organisms on dif- developing hand or an ear? How do these structures emerge
ferent branches each acquired their own properties that in the right place on the body? And what directs more
differed substantially from the features of earlier species detailed developmental patterns, such as the development
(see Figure 2.14). of a five-fingered human hand instead of one with four or
Keeping that important caution in mind, the hypoth- six fingers?
esis that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny” still has some Much mystery still surrounds these questions. None-
value when you consider how it relates to the develop- theless, recent discoveries have dramatically changed our

Lampreys
Rays
Sharks (regenerating teeth)
Ray–finned fishes
Coelacanths
Lungfishes
Caecilians
Salamanders
Frogs
Platypi
Elephants (trunk)
FIGURE 2.14 Evolution as
Bats (echolocation)
a branching tree. At each
Wolves
Cows branch in an evolutionary tree, a
Mice and rats species acquires distinctive new
Lemurs traits, as shown in this small
Chimpanzees section of the evolutionary tree
Humans covering many vertebrates. As
Turtles (hard shell) the branching structure shows,
Snakes and lizards human development does not
Crocodiles and alligators involve a progression through
Birds (hollow bones) the properties of so-called
“lower species.” Adapted from
C. Loeb, Macalester College.

ANATOMICAL DEVELOPMENT 49
understanding of how the body’s overall structure devel-
ops, as well as how specific features, like limbs, emerge Anterior Posterior
(Gilbert, 2010; Marcus, 2004; Mark et al., 1997). Special
kinds of ordered clusters of master-switch genes known as Fruit fly embryo Fruit fly
homeobox genes activate or repress gene expression and
bod,
thereby play an important role in defining the body plan. Fruit fly lab pb zen Dfd Scr ftz Antp Ubx abd-A Abd-B
These homeobox genes contain the homeobox, a 180-base- chromosome
pair sequence in the DNA of many different species of
animals—from fruit flies to mice to humans. The homeo-
box encodes homeodomain proteins, which regulate genetic Hypothetical Hox1 Hox2 Hox3 Hox4 Hox5 Hox6 (central) Hox7 (posterior)
ancestral
switches affecting the general structure and organization chromosome
of certain body sections. First, the homeobox genes regu-
late the processes that lead to the formation of the ante-
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A9 A10 A11 A13
rior (front) and posterior (rear) sections of the organism’s HOXA

Human chromosome
body (see Figure 2.15). Then, acting as switches at the top B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B13
of large gene regulation cascades, they interact with other HOXB
genes to code for species-specific appendages and other fea- C4 C5 C6 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13
HOXC
tures. More specifically, when a homeobox gene is switched
D1 D3 D4 D8 D9 D10 D11 D12 D13
on, it sends chemical signals that reach many sections of HOXD
the developing body. In response to these signals, genes
throughout the body turn on or off as necessary to direct
the growth of species-specific body parts, such as legs. The
homeobox genes that govern the body plan in vertebrates
are often called Hox genes.

Anterior Posterior
Q: What are homeobox genes? In what ways
are their functions similar across a wide range of
organisms?
Human embryo

Once the body’s sections and major parts have been

Adult human
specified, how do the genes specify the fine-grained pat-
terns of development, such as the appropriate number of FIGURE 2.15 Homeobox genes. Homeobox genes are ordered
clusters of genes that turn on and off genes that affect the general
fingers on a human hand? There is no gene sequence that body plan in many species. In this drawing, squares of the same
codes for five fingers. Instead, various genetic influences color indicate genes of the same type. Thus, the homeobox genes in
trigger an intricate interaction of several chemicals. At crit- the fruit fly also appear in humans, arranged in the same order. For
ical points in development, these chemicals diffuse across example, genes of the same color code for comparable structures
the tissues from which the limbs later develop. The expo- at the front (anterior) of the body across species, even though the
sure of these tissues to specific concentrations of chemi- particular types of structures differ radically. Adapted from Veraksa
cals seems to trigger the appropriate number of fingers to et al. (2000).
develop (see Figure 2.16). The Hox genes also play a role
in this process. Chemical signals turn these genes on and in a broad range of species as different as insects and mam-
off in patterns that trigger limb growth in the appropriate mals. Apparently, very early in evolutionary history, survival
region of the body. depended on body parts developing in the right sequence (for
The story of genes and body development involves both example, heads before front legs, front legs before hind legs)
remarkable specificity and extraordinary generality. Each and in the right number (just one head, please!). The solu-
species’ genome, interacting with a normal range of environ- tion that emerged in the genes that encode the general body
ments, results in that species’ unique characteristics—and plan was so effective and reliable that these genes remained
individuals’ genes also cause clear differences within a species. an active part of the genome in most later-evolving species,
Yet, the same basic genetic framework guides development with relatively little change in their function.

50 CHAPTER 2 THE BIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT

 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL P OLICY

Visiting Nurses, Prenatal Care,

and Child Development

T
he city of Elmira, New York, sits near the Pennsylva- nurse visits and others in similar circumstances in the same
nia border in a region that has been economically area receive no visits. By randomly assigning mothers in com-
depressed for decades, as its manufacturing economy parable situations to either participate in the visiting nurse pro-
has withered. Elmira’s economic peak was in the late gram or not, it is possible to compare outcomes between the
1940s and early 1950s. Today, its population is half of what it groups to see whether the visits are effective. (Without random
was 60 years ago, and almost one-third of Elmira’s children under assignment, there would be no way to know whether group
18 live in poverty. In the 1970s, David Olds, a graduate student differences were due to the nurses’ visits or to other factors,
at nearby Cornell University, set out to make a difference in the such as higher levels of motivation among mothers who seek
lives of Elmira’s children, who at that time had the highest rates the nurses’ help.) In general, these careful studies often show
of abuse and child neglect in the state (Boo, 2006). Olds started positive effects for newborn infants. The effects are not always
the Nurse-Family Partnership Program, a program in which large, but the number of successes has encouraged agencies
nurses visited disadvantaged pregnant women to advise them throughout the country to fund such programs.
during their pregnancy and then after the birth of their child. Since Several studies have shown that nurse-visited mothers, espe-
that time, Olds’s program has been extended to sites throughout cially the youngest mothers, have fewer medical complications
the United States. during pregnancy and are less likely to have premature babies
Nurses in the program visit first-time mothers in their homes, (Baldwin et al., 1998; Olds, 2006). In one study, the babies of
beginning during pregnancy and continuing through their child’s nurse-visited mothers were almost a full pound heavier than the
second birthday. During their visits, they offer guidance about babies delivered by mothers in the control group, who were not
prenatal health and infant care in a nonthreatening, nonjudg- visited by nurses (Olds et al., 1986). Nurse-visited mothers also
mental way. They provide information about prenatal nutrition, tended to have fewer episodes of high blood pressure while
explain the threats that smoking and alcohol pose to the fetus, pregnant and lower rates of cigarette smoking (Olds, 2006).
and convey to the mothers the importance of avoiding behaviors Given the negative effects of fetal nicotine exposure on later
that could compromise their own health or harm their infant brain development (Ernst et al., 2001; Thomas et al., 2000),
(Olds, 2006; Olds et al., 2007). They often emphasize the these changes in the mothers’ behavior represent an important
immense promise and potential of the child—if only he or she medical treatment for the growing fetus.
receives the right kind of care and support (Boo, 2006). The benefits of these programs extend far beyond the direct
The nurse’s job can be extremely challenging. Members impact on brain growth. Nurse-visited mothers interact with
of the household, sometimes including the mother, may be their babies in a host of more positive ways and are less likely
hostile about taking an outsider’s advice. One account of so- to abuse their children (Olds et al., 2007). After working with a
called “swamp nurses” who visited pregnant mothers in rural nurse named Luwana, a mother named Alexis observed of her
Louisiana discussed the challenges of an African-American new son Daigan, “He’s not as cranky as he was. And one thing
nurse visiting white teenage mothers who often faced a host I learned already is how he cries different when he’s hungry
of problems, ranging from drug addiction to sexual abuse (Boo, than when he’s wet.” As Luwana explains to Alexis, “Making
2006). To work well with these mothers, the nurses had to that distinction is important. . . . You’re listening to him, and in
have an extraordinary combination of compassion, sensitivity, his own way he’s explaining what he needs” (Boo, 2006). Chil-
and firmness. dren of nurse-visited mothers show continuing benefits on into
The Nurse-Family Partnership Program is evaluated repeat- adolescence (Fisch, 2005; Kitzman et al., 2010; Olds, 2006).
edly to make sure it is effective. Wherever possible, Olds has In many cases, these effects arise from a continuing pattern
used randomized assignment designs, meaning that some of positive interactions between mother and child (Leckman &
mothers in a particular area are randomly selected to receive Mayes, 2007).

ANATOMICAL DEVELOPMENT 51
 the cells have begun to differentiate along female lines,
that embryo can acquire many aspects of male anatomy,
including sex-specific brain differences. The same kind of
effect happens when undifferentiated embryonic males are
exposed to higher levels of estrogen.
One example of early sexual differentiation can be
seen in Figure 2.17. Initially, the human embryo has both
Wolffian ducts and Müllerian ducts in the lower abdomen,
as well as bipotential gonads (gonads that could develop
into female or male structures). At this point, either male
or female urogenital structures could emerge, but this
changes as soon as the tissues are exposed to higher lev-
els of a particular sex hormone. High testosterone and low
estrogen cause the Wolffian ducts and testes to grow into
a male urogenital system and cause the Müllerian ducts to
wither away. High estrogen and low testosterone cause the
Müllerian ducts and follicle cells in the ovary to grow into
FIGURE 2.16 Finger number. Although infants are occasionally the female urogenital system and cause the Wolffian ducts
born with extra toes or fingers, as shown here, it is impressive how
to degenerate (see Table 2.2).
often the gene sequence results in the standard number. There is no
specific part of the genome that codes for five digits per hand and The adults of some species retain the capacity to change
foot. Instead, interactions between many genes result in overlapping their phenotypic sex as a function of social dominance.
chemical gradients that, together, usually result in this number.

Before 8 weeks gestational age

Sexual Differentiation Gonad

So far, we have examined normal developmental processes Male duct

common to all humans. But humans and many other ani-
Female duct
mals also show different development patterns, depending
on their sex. Differences between males and females are
complex and occur not only in major anatomical structures,
but also in physiological systems and, to some extent, in the Urogenital
brain (Austin & Edwards, 1981; McCarthy et al., 2009; sinus
Parker et al., 1999). Initially, the cells of the embryo do High estrogen/ High testosterone/
not show sex differences, but sexual differentiation starts low testosterone low estrogen
very early, most likely in the first few weeks after concep-
tion. External sexual differentiation—the development of After 8 weeks gestational age
genitalia—occurs earlier in males than in females.
Although sexual differentiation is controlled by the X Gonad
and Y sex chromosomes, genes do not directly code for Gonad
sexual differentiation. Instead, these differences are con- Female Male duct
duct
trolled by exposure to particular sex-specific combinations
of hormones, which are triggered and regulated through Bladder
complex interactions between genes (McCarthy et al.,
2009; Park & Jameson, 2005). If these genetic interactions Bladder Seminal
Uterus
vesicle
trigger the embryo to produce higher levels of the male
sex hormone testosterone, the cells exposed to testosterone Vagina Prostate
will specialize to form structures with male characteris- Female Male
tics. Likewise, if the embryo produces higher levels of the
FIGURE 2.17 The emergence of biological sex differences.
female sex hormone estrogen, this will trigger differentia- The early embryo has both the Müllerian ducts and Wolffian ducts.
tion into cells that form structures with female character- The urogenital system that develops from these ducts depends on
istics. If an embryo with two X chromosomes (genetically which sex hormones contact the relevant tissues. Adapted from
female) is exposed to higher levels of testosterone before Matzuk & Lamb (2008).

52 CHAPTER 2 THE BIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT

 Weeks after conception Males Females

6 or less No anatomical differences; embryo is sexually No anatomical differences; embryo is sexually

bipotential. bipotential.
7 Testes start to form. Ovaries start to form and develop functional
subunits.
8 No obvious external differences; testosterone No obvious external differences; estrogen triggers
triggers growth of Wolffian ducts and withering of growth of Müllerian ducts and withering of Wolffian
Müllerian ducts. ducts.
10 All internal sexual structures are present. All internal sexual structures are present.
12 External sexual differences are visible. External sexual differences are visible.

TABLE 2.2 Changes in sexual characteristics in early prenatal development. The presence of higher levels of testosterone or estrogen
affects the development of sexual structures in males and females.

This phenomenon is most prevalent among reptiles, male characteristics. This theory suggests that the moth-
amphibians, and fish. There may be only one phenotypic er’s immune response builds over the course of multiple
male in the group whose role is stimulating ovulation in pregnancies with male children, so that later sons would
the phenotypic females. When that male dies, the dom- more likely be affected than earlier sons. Yet, since many
inant female undergoes a variety of changes that make firstborns can be homosexual and many lastborns are not,
her a phenotypic male, both behaviorally and anatomi- this pattern is only a small part of any account of how
cally. In these cases of environmental sex determination, homosexual and heterosexual choices emerge in develop-
all group members usually have the same genotype, and ment. Much more research remains to be done before we
the specific male or female gene pathways are triggered can have a clear sense of the many factors contributing to
by changes in the social environment (Francis & Barlow, homosexuality.
1993; Fricke & Fricke, 1977; Godwin, 2009; Robertson, Sexual differentiation continues well after birth and on
1972; Ross, 1990). into puberty, and changing concentrations of hormones
In humans, social context may cause much more subtle continuously influence the process. During this process,
changes in hormonal balances, and if these changes occur genes also interact with many kinds of environments, rang-
during pregnancy, they could potentially have long-term ing from the hormones in the womb to the child’s experi-
effects on the fetus. For example, many studies of prena- ences after birth. All along, interactions between genes and
tal development have demonstrated that during pregnancy, the environment contribute to the ways that biological and
maternal stress levels can affect the timing of the fetus’s behavioral traits emerge.
exposure to different levels of testosterone. One potential
effect of these shifts in timing is to cause less sexual differ-
entiation of the male brain; indeed, some researchers have Adverse Influences on the
claimed that this effect may be a biological basis of homo-
sexuality (LeVay, 1993), although these claims remain con- Developing Embryo and Fetus
troversial. The extent to which maternal hormones and the Given the complexity of development, it is remarkable that
prenatal environment influence human sexual orientation all of the body’s structures form and grow normally and at
remains unclear (Gooren, 2006). appropriate times in the vast majority of cases. But some-
A different aspect of the environment—namely, the times problems do appear, often because of harmful envi-
number of older male siblings a male has—also seems ronmental influences. Between 1957 and 1962, thousands
to influence the frequency of homosexuality among of pregnant women in Europe and North America were
men (Gooren, 2006; Puts et al., 2006). One controver- given what appeared to be a new wonder drug for morning
sial theory hypothesizes that the more older brothers a sickness: thalidomide. The drug has since become infa-
male child has, the greater the probability that child will mous for its adverse effects on developing fetuses. Its most
develop homosexual attractions (Dawood et al., 2009). obvious effects involved severely stunted limb growth and
Because this effect only holds for older siblings with the sometimes an absence of limbs (see Figure 2.18). It also
same mother, not stepchildren or adopted children, it may caused serious defects in internal organs, genitalia, and
be due to an immune response in the mother against some the nervous system. More recent research suggests that
aspect of the Y chromosome or the hormones that trigger thalidomide probably interfered with the activity of genes

ANATOMICAL DEVELOPMENT 53
 lowed by the heart, then the limbs, the eyes, and finally
the external genitalia, which do not seem to be influenced
until after 6 weeks.
Thalidomide was a new, poorly understood drug when
it was widely prescribed to pregnant women, as was dieth-
ylstilbestrol (DES), which was used to prevent miscarriage
and led to increased risk for cancer in adolescents and adults
who had been exposed to DES in the womb. In addition,
some common drugs can also act as teratogens. For example,
several anti-acne medicines are part of a family of chemical
compounds known as retinoids. If a pregnant woman takes
even a small amount of these medications, a wide range of
birth defects become more likely. Depending on when in
her pregnancy she takes the medication and for how long, it
can cause hydrocephaly (swelling of the fluid-filled areas of
the brain), microcephaly (undersized brain), heart defects,
ear and eye defects, and cleft lip and palate (Durston et al.,
1989; Maden, 2000). Vitamin A in its various forms is also
FIGURE 2.18 Thalidomide and pregnancy. The tragedy of the a retinoid, and high doses of vitamin A during pregnancy
babies whose mothers were prescribed thalidomide led to increased can cause comparable defects—even though low doses are
sensitivity to the dangers of teratogens and how the timing of expo- essential for normal development (Collins & Mao, 1999).
sure influences their effects. A different drug, valproic acid, which is used to treat con-
vulsive disorders (and sometimes bipolar disorder), can also
cause birth defects ranging from neural problems to facial,
that code for normal limb growth or perhaps with the Hox heart, and skeletal malformation (Duncan, 2007; Finnell &
genes’ timing signals (Marcil et al., 2003; Wolpert, 1999; Burn, 2001; Finnell et al., 2002). Even some drugs with
Zeller, 2010). minimal or no apparent side effects in adults can endanger
Since the thalidomide disaster, doctors and the public a fetus.
have become more aware of possible negative influences on
embryos and fetuses and better able to guard against them.
Called teratogens, these hazardous internal or external
environmental factors can potentially cause problems with
Q: How does the timing of exposure to a
development during the prenatal period. They can be clas- teratogen affect its consequences for the
sified into the categories shown in Table 2.3. developing fetus?
Teratogens illustrate a developmental theme discussed
earlier: the importance of timing and sequencing in the
developmental process. Specific teratogens tend to have Teratogens are not limited to drugs; they can be part of
especially strong harmful effects during specific times the mother’s diet as well. It is well known that drinking
in prenatal development (see Figure 2.19). Thalidomide, alcohol during pregnancy can be hazardous to the fetus,
for example, usually had its disastrous effects from 2 to and its effects can be extensive. Depending on the age
8 weeks after conception. Because of the sequence of of the fetus, alcohol can cause smaller brain volume (see
anatomical development, the specific effects of thalido- Figure 2.20) and impaired development of neurons and
mide depend on the point during pregnancy when it is supporting cells (Archibald et al., 2001; Riley & McGee,
used. Using it only during a brief, early period in prena- 2005; Sowell et al., 2008; Spadoni et al., 2007).
tal development, say at 3 to 6 weeks, might have impacts Hazards posed by foods are often less obvious than the
mostly on the arms and other anterior structures, whereas risks of drugs and alcohol. In some cases, foods can be
using it at a later period, say at 7 to 8 weeks, would more contaminated with a trace amount of a teratogen that,
likely impair growth of the legs and more posterior struc- while mildly harmful in adults, might be devastating
tures. Generally, teratogens have the worst effects dur- for prenatal development. Many fish that are high in the
ing the embryonic period, from about 2 to 8 weeks after food chain, such as swordfish and tuna, retain relatively
conception, when the most dramatic qualitative changes high concentrations of mercury in their tissues from eat-
take place. The central nervous system tends to be most ing mercury-contaminated fish lower in the food chain.
vulnerable in the first few weeks after fertilization, fol- Because mercury can have strong teratogenic effects,

54 CHAPTER 2 THE BIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT

 Teratogen type Examples Effects

Prescription drugs Thalidomide Underdeveloped limbs and organ problems

DES (synthetic hormone) Increased risk of various cancers in daughters
Streptomycin (antibiotic) Auditory impairment
Retinoids (often prescribed for acne) Brain defects, heart defects, eye and ear defects
Illegal drugs Cocaine/crack Stunted growth, microcephaly
Heroin Reduced neuron populations, memory deficits
Normally ingested Alcohol Fetal alcohol syndrome (mental retardation, microcephaly,
substances anatomical defects in head and face)
Nicotine Anatomical defects, structural and functional impairments of the
nervous system
Aspirin Amplifies effects of alcohol, bleeding problems
Environmental Lead Central nervous system damage
toxins (can enter
via mother’s diet) PCB (industrial chemical) Skin discoloration
DDT (insecticide) Impaired learning, neurotoxicity
Petroleum distillates Internal and skeletal malformations
Malnutrition Iron deficiency Impaired physical and cognitive growth
Protein deficiency, insufficient calories Increases negative effects of many teratogens
Infectious Rubella (German measles) Deafness, blindness, heart defects, microcephaly, growth
diseases retardation, mental retardation
Toxoplasmosis Blindness, hydrocephaly, mental retardation
AIDS Possible growth retardation, microcephaly
Herpes Microcephaly, seizures
Syphilis Mental deficiency, hydrocephalus, deafness, blindness, bone
malformations
Physiological Blood incompatibilities Neurodevelopmental disorders, possibly schizophrenia
disorders
and immune Diabetes Congenital heart defects, neural tube defects, limb defects
incompatibilities PKU (an inability to use an amino acid) Mental retardation, heart defects
Hypothyroidism (underactive thyroid gland) Heart defects, reduced brain and body growth

TABLE 2.3 Teratogens and development. Teratogens are internal or external hazardous environmental factors that can affect the develop-
ing organism in utero and can result in birth defects. They are diverse both in kind and effects. Some of the effects can be remarkably specific,
while others can be more global.

expectant mothers should limit their consumption of fish. Garza, 2006; Tamashiro & Moran, 2010). Once again,
Even more subtly, under some conditions, prenatal diets genetic and environmental influences interact to produce
free of known teratogens can still have harmful effects developmental outcomes.
on some fetuses. For example, during pregnancy, diabetic Although this book focuses on developmental psychol-
mothers must manage their blood level of insulin even ogy, a brief survey of biological development of the body
more carefully than usual. Abnormally high or low blood as a whole has brought to light many principles that also
insulin levels may lead to a kind of misprogramming of pertain to neuropsychological development, ranging from
the fetal systems that regulate weight and metabolism canalization to the importance of when an organism
(Plagemann, 2006). In addition, some maternal alleles encounters particular environments or events. We have also
appear to increase the risk of miscarriage or birth defects seen how prenatal development can affect postnatal func-
unless the expectant mother takes a certain dietary supple- tions and development, a theme we will carry forward in
ment, such as vitamin B12, to offset the problem (Stover & our discussion of brain development as well.

ANATOMICAL DEVELOPMENT 55
 Dividing Embryonic period Fetal period
zygote/implantation (weeks) (weeks)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 16 32 38
CNS Eyes Ears Palate Ears Brain

Heart
Arms

Heart Legs Teeth Palate External genitalia

CNS
Morula Heart
Embryonic
disc Arms
Blastocyst
Legs
Amnion
Upper lip
Ears
Eyes
Embryonic Teeth
Common sites of action of teratogens
disc
Highly sensitive period Palate
Not susceptible
to teratogens Less sensitive period External genitalia

Prenatal Major anatomical Functional defects and

death abnormalities anatomical abnormalities

FIGURE 2.19 Timing and teratogens’ influences. This chart shows the periods in which different body systems and organs are most
susceptible to teratogens and other external influences, as well as the periods when they are less sensitive but when exposure to teratogens
can still cause damage. Adapted from Moore et al. (2013).

development tends to follow the “ontogeny recapitulates

Brain Development phylogeny” pattern. That is, brain structures that are evo-
The development of the brain is an intricate process in which lutionarily older tend to mature earlier than regions that
many structures develop in a tightly choreographed man- evolved more recently (Turner, 1950). The same pattern
ner. During the prenatal period, some early-developing
brain structures provide necessary frameworks for later
ones, and spatial relations between these structures guide Discriminating features Associated features
further development. Furthermore, the brain continues to
grow and change dramatically after birth: the adult brain Microcephaly Epicanthal folds
is roughly four times larger than the newborn brain. As we (small head)
consider how the brain develops, it helps to keep in mind Low nasal bridge
Small eyelid
four themes that describe what is happening and why. openings
The first of these themes is a familiar developmental
principle: vital structures and systems develop first. In Small, widely Minor ear
spaced eyes abnormalities
the body, the heart is one of the first organs to function;
indeed, the circulation of nutrients through the blood- Missing ridges
stream is necessary for an organism’s survival. In the under nose
brain, structures that support such life-critical functions Small jaw
Thin upper lip
as heartbeat, breathing, digestion, and blood pressure
emerge very early. Similarly, structures that enable basic
motion and sensing of stimuli tend to develop earlier than
those that involve more complex coordination of actions
FIGURE 2.20 The effects of high alcohol consumption during
or interpretation of information. The last structures to pregnancy. The child with fetal alcohol syndrome is born with low
develop tend to be those involved in reasoning about birth weight, microcephaly (abnormal smallness of the head), a low
choices and different patterns of information. Likewise, nasal bridge, a thin upper lip, and small but widely spaced eyes.
brain structures mature at very different rates, and brain Adapted from Riley & McGee (2005).

56 CHAPTER 2 THE BIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT

described earlier also holds in the brain: the structures Motor Somatosensory
cortex cortex
and systems most essential for an organism’s survival tend
to appear earlier, both in evolution and in an individual’s
development.
PARIETAL
The second important theme of brain development is that FRONTAL
LOBE
Prefrontal LOBE
the later-developing brain structures tend to inhibit earlier- Corpus
cortex
developing ones. In this case, inhibition is not simply a new CEREBRUM
callosum
system blocking the activity of an earlier one. Rather, as a Olfactory
OCCIPITAL
LOBE Visual
new system develops, it tends to bring the existing systems bulb
TEMPORAL cortex
under more refined and nuanced control. In later chapters, LOBE
Basal ganglia
we will encounter various ways in which this pattern in brain
development affects behavior; for example, some reflexes that CEREBELLUM
are strong in newborns disappear as older infants become Auditory cortex
BRAIN STEM
increasingly able to control and direct their movements (see
Chapter 4). Similarly, we will see how development in the Hippocampus
frontal areas of the brain during childhood underlies chil- Medulla Spinal cord
dren’s ability to inhibit a first impulse in favor of a more
FIGURE 2.21 Basic structure of the human brain. The brain has
considered and effective response (see Chapter 13).
three major parts and four lobes. Brain structures mature at different
Third, sometimes “less is more” in brain development. times and rates. Evolutionarily old structures required for survival,
That is, in contrast to most other body systems, several brain such as the spinal cord, medulla, and basal ganglia, mature early.
regions mature and become more sophisticated through pro- Areas of the cortex that process sensory information, such as the
cesses of trimming away rather than proliferation and growth. visual cortex and the somatosensory cortex, mature earlier than the
Just as a gardener prunes a fruit tree to create a structure areas that process abstract information, such as the prefrontal cortex.
that is better suited to bearing fruit, brain regions undergo
a pruning process to create more streamlined structures for
the growing child or adolescent. Pruning brain regions may has three major parts. The brainstem is concerned with
cause psychological changes in which a previously malleable regulating heart rate, breathing, swallowing, blood pressure,
behavior becomes less varied and more ingrained. digestion, and other automatic nonvoluntary processes in
Fourth, the speed and amount of communication the body and is evolutionarily very old. The cerebellum is
between different brain regions increases over the course involved in coordination of voluntary movement and inte-
of development. Many of the main thoroughfares of nerve gration of some sensory information with action. The third
cell communication can show as much as 100-fold increases and largest part, the cerebrum, includes the basal ganglia
in speed between birth and adulthood. These increases in (involved in both voluntary and involuntary movement), the
speed and capacity allow different psychological systems to olfactory bulb (which processes information about smell),
work together more efficiently. and the cerebral cortex.
As we look closely at brain development, we will also The cerebral cortex is the most recently evolved region
consider how environmental factors, including the prena- of the brain; it is most developed in humans and other pri-
tal maternal environment and the variety of environmental mates and is usually associated with high-level thought. The
influences the child encounters, affect the developing brain. cerebral cortex is divided into right and left hemispheres,
Does an extremely enriched or deprived environment affect which communicate with each other largely through a cen-
an infant’s brain? If an organism fails to have an experi- tral pathway known as the corpus callosum.
ence before a certain age, what happens to the brain region Each hemisphere is further divided into four lobes that
responsible for processing that kind of experience? While are primarily responsible for different functions. In general
it is obvious that brain development would influence our terms, the frontal lobe is involved in planning, problem
psychology, we will also see that psychological development solving, and regulating thoughts and emotion. The posterior
influences the brain. parts of the frontal lobe are also involved in aspects of motor
activity and understanding the grammar of languages. The
parietal lobe has several functions, including processing
and interpreting touch sensations, integrating visual and
Major Changes to Brain Structures spatial information, and processing some aspects of the
The mature human brain has several distinct regions with meanings of words. The temporal lobe processes audi-
specific functions. Most important for our developmental tory information and other aspects of language meaning,
discussion are the regions shown in Figure 2.21. The brain and it supports crucial components of memory. Finally, the

BRAIN DEVELOPMENT 57
occipital lobe processes visual information. These descrip- form a groove, which will become the neural tube. By the
tions of the different functions of the lobes are approximate; time the ectoderm starts to close into a tube at 4 weeks, the
in fact, the lobes interact extensively with one another and structure has three distinct bumps: the forebrain, the mid-
with other brain regions. brain, and the hindbrain, also known as cerebral vesicles. At
Brain structures and the pathways between regions 5 weeks, the forebrain and hindbrain vesicles split and form
mature at different times and rates. As we have seen, evo- several distinct brain regions. Three of the most important
lutionarily more ancient structures that are required for regions are the telencephalon, the diencephalon and mid-
basic survival, such as the spinal cord, medulla, and basal brain, and the brainstem.
ganglia, tend to mature earliest because they support such The telencephalon eventually becomes the cerebral hemi-
activities as breathing, heart rate, and appetite. Areas of the spheres, the areas that support the highest levels of psycho-
cortex that process sensory information, such as the visual logical functioning. The diencephalon and midbrain give rise
cortex and the somatosensory cortex, mature somewhat to the basal ganglia and other structures that reside between
later and continue to mature for some time after birth as the cerebral hemispheres and above the brainstem. These
higher and higher levels of processing become more refined. include structures that integrate sensory information, as well
Finally, areas that process more abstract information and as the cerebellum. By 10 weeks after conception, most of the
regulate other areas, such as the prefrontal cortex, tend to brain’s major regions are visible without use of a microscope.
mature last. This sequence is only a crude characterization At 20 weeks, the cerebral hemispheres are clearly visible,
of a much more complex interplay between brain regions but they are smooth rather than fissured. This begins to
over the course of development, an interplay that also helps change at around 24 weeks. At that point, the cortical surface
drive development. Thus, a circuit of mutual interactions develops the folds and fissures that are essential for supporting
between two areas may foster development of both. the complex processing of the human brain. These changes
Thinking about the brain in terms of regions with spe- are summarized in Table 2.4 and Figure 2.22.
cific functions is helpful for understanding some aspects of As noted earlier, the infant’s brain grows quite a bit after
its structure and capacities. But when it comes to under- birth. Weighing roughly 350 to 400 grams at birth, the
standing brain development, it is important to keep in mind brain’s weight more than doubles in the first year of life,
that the brain is a highly interactive system in which each and it weighs about 1,250 grams (a little under 3 pounds)
area depends on inputs from the others. When you recall by 5 years. These large increases in brain mass in the first
the flowers at your cousin’s wedding, you access and inte- 5 years of life are assumed to increase its processing capac-
grate memory traces from many different parts of the cere- ity. After age 5, brain volume stays relatively constant until
bral cortex. In this process, you use each of the four lobes some shrinkage begins in old age.
in operations such as knowing where the wedding was held,
constructing a mental image of the bouquets, remembering
their sweet smell, visualizing how they were displayed, and
knowing the names of roses, lilies, and orchids. Neurons and Neurotransmitters
How does the embryo develop this rich array of brain Along with these large-scale changes, the brain also
structures and abilities? As mentioned earlier, in the first changes dramatically at the microscopic level, both before
few weeks after conception, part of the ectoderm starts to and after birth. Since much of the change centers around

Weeks after conception Event

3 Neural tube starts to form.

4 Three brain regions are now distinct: forebrain, midbrain, hindbrain; neural tube is almost completely closed.
5 Cerebral vesicles are now present.
10 Major central nervous system structures are now visible.
20 Brain weighs about 100 grams; cortical surface appears smooth.
24 Programmed cell death (apoptosis) begins.
28 Cortical surface has clear folds.
38 weeks–birth Brain weighs 350 to 400 grams.

TABLE 2.4 Timetable of prenatal brain development. Major neural changes occur in a regular sequence of steps representing an extraor-
dinary amount of change in a short period of time.

58 CHAPTER 2 THE BIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT

 dendritic spines, which also house receptors. Each neuron
also has an axon, a tube-like projection that, in adults,
can range from over a meter long (more than 3 feet) to
25 35 40 50 100 less than a centimeter (under half an inch). Neurons typi-
days days days days days
cally have many dendrites and only one axon, although
the axon may have several branches. Each branch ends in
axon terminals, which have small bulbs at the tips that
contain chemical neurotransmitters, which transmit sig-
nals across gaps between neurons.
5 months
Communication between neurons occurs at synapses,
which are the small gaps between the axon terminals of
6 months
one neuron and the dendrites of another. Neurons can be
chained together in elaborate networks, with each neuron’s
axon terminals ending in synapses that separate them from
the dendrites of other neurons—whose axon terminals, in
turn, end in synapses that separate them from yet other neu-
7 months
rons’ dendrites. When the small bulbs at the end of an axon
of the presynaptic neuron (the neuron sending the signal)
release neurotransmitters into the synapse, these chemical
Motor cortex 8 months signals cross the synapse and are received by the receptors at
the ends of the adjacent dendrites on the postsynaptic neu-
Frontal Parietal lobe
lobe ron (the neuron receiving the signal). There are several types
Occipital lobe of neurotransmitters, and each neuron’s receptors respond
Somatosensory to particular types. These chemical signals can cause the
cortex
Cerebellum receiving neuron to “fire,” creating an electrical signal called
Temporal an action potential. When the neuron fires, the action
lobe Spinal cord potential travels down the axon to the ends of the axon ter-
9 months minals. There, the resulting electrochemical changes trigger
FIGURE 2.22 Brain growth in the embryonic and fetal the ends of the terminals to release neurotransmitters into
stages. The brain structures are shown from 25 days through 9 the synapse.
months. The size of the developing brain from 25 days to 100 days
is enlarged to show the details that would not be apparent at the
actual sizes (which are indicated below the enlarged depictions). Dendrites
Note the relatively late appearance of cerebral fissures and the
relatively late maturation of the frontal lobe. Adapted from Cowan
Cell body
(1979).

the brain cells known as neurons, we will briefly review

what neurons are and how they work before considering
how they develop and form connections. Like the body’s Nucleus
other cells, each neuron is surrounded by a membrane that Axon
partitions the cell interior from its surrounding environ- Myelin sheath

ment. As in other cells, the neuron’s cell body contains

the structures that support its basic functions as well
as the nucleus, which contains its genetic material (see
Figure 2.23). Neurons differ from other cells, however,
in the specialized structures that enable them to trans- Axon
terminals
mit information to one another. Branching out from the
neuron’s cell body are the dendrites, which have recep-
FIGURE 2.23 The structure of the nerve cell. Although nerve
tors that receive chemical signals from other neurons. The cell structures vary, most nerve cells have a cell body with a nucleus,
number of receptors on a single neuron varies widely and dendrites, an axon, and axon terminals. The axon of many nerve cells
can be as high as several hundred thousand. Many den- is covered with a myelin sheath, which speeds transmission of the
drites are also covered with small protrusions known as electrical impulse along the axon.

BRAIN DEVELOPMENT 59
 The speed with which the action potential travels down has not yet been shown definitively in the human cortex,
the axon partly depends on whether the axon is wrapped some positive reports suggest that with better measures it
with myelin, a fatty substance that acts somewhat like the may be demonstrated there as well (Gould, 2007).
rubber insulation that directs electrical conduction along
a wire. Myelination occurs when the axons are enclosed
in a myelin sheath, which speeds the movement of the
action potential along the axon. Myelin is produced by Q: Is there growth of new neurons after birth?
glial cells, which, generally speaking, serve to support
the neurons by providing nutrients, producing myelin,
and providing other kinds of structural support. The glial Migration and Synaptogenesis New nerve cells
cells’ importance and number are often underappreciated. develop near the center of the brain and then move through
In the human brain, there are roughly 100 times as many older nerve cells to the outermost layers of the growing
glial cells as neurons. neural network, where they will ultimately become parts
Although electrical signals play a key role in communica- of various brain structures (see Figure 2.24A). Most of this
tion between neurons, it is important to remember that the migration is thought to happen either before birth or around
action potential is not the same as an electrical current passing the time of birth, but some migration is also thought to occur
through a wire, which can travel at 300 million meters per in adult human brains (Cayre et al., 2009; Ghashghaei et al.,
second. In contrast, the action potential involves a series of 2007). Nerve cells appear to migrate by following the paths
electrochemical charges that travel down the axon much more laid down by certain radial glial cells that serve as guides
slowly, ranging from 100 meters per second to a relatively (Hatten, 1990, 1999; Rakic, 1972, 1981, 1988). Chemical
sedate 1 meter per second. In development, neurons gradually signals in the brain also guide nerve cell migration by pro-
become myelinated at different times and rates. As we will see viding different “instructions” for different cell groups about
shortly, the myelination process is thought to play a significant where in the brain to go and when to stop (Dodd & Jessell,
role in the development of various psychological capacities. 1988; Ghashghaei et al., 2007; Tessier-Lavigne & Goodman,
1996; Tessier-Lavigne & Placzek, 1991). Indeed, researchers
can predict where axons will grow within tissue clusters based
on which tissues are present and which chemicals they emit
Development of Neurons (Heffner et al., 1990).
The four main processes involved in the development of After a nerve cell migrates toward the brain’s outermost
neurons are proliferation, migration, consolidation, and level, its axon starts to grow and interconnect with other
myelination. Proliferation involves the creation of nerve cells neurons. As the axon grows, it finds its way to its appro-
and dendritic branches at different times of development. priate destination, which can be more than a meter away.
Migration refers to the remarkable ways that developing The end of the growing axon has a growth cone, which
neurons move through brain tissue to their final positions. enables it to push its way through other tissues and track
Consolidation refers to reducing the number of connections chemical signals that tell it in which directions to move
between neurons as a way of fine-tuning their structure and (see Figure 2.24B and C).
function. Finally, myelination helps speed up the transmis- When the branching ends of the axon arrive at their des-
sion of information along the axonal shaft of a neuron. tination, they form the bulb-like structures that release neu-
rotransmitters across the synaptic gaps between cells. The
Proliferation During the prenatal period, the produc- neuron also grows thousands of smaller dendritic branches
tion of new neurons, or neurogenesis, occurs on a massive from its cell body. This is where the brain’s intricate intercon-
scale. After the neural tube forms, roughly 250,000 new nectedness becomes clear. Each dendritic branch can make
nerve cells are produced every minute until 100 billion are synaptic connections with different neurons, so that just a
present. For many years, researchers thought that no new few neurons can make hundreds of thousands of connec-
neurons were produced after birth, but postnatal neurogen- tions in a very small space. Across the entire human brain,
esis has been documented in several brain areas, including the total number of connections is truly massive, somewhere
the hippocampus, which is involved in memory and spa- around 1015 (that’s 1,000 trillion, or a quadrillion!).
tial knowledge (Abrous et al., 2005; Gould, 2007; Pujadas
et al., 2010; Rakic, 2002; Richardson et al., 2007; Zhao et
al., 2008). Although many fewer neurons are produced after
birth than during the prenatal period, the neurons gener- Q: What factors influence the direction in which
ated after birth can become fully integrated into existing individual neurons grow?
circuitry (Zhao et al., 2008). While postnatal neurogenesis

60 CHAPTER 2 THE BIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT

 Outer layer of brain

Cortical cell layers Guide cell b

3
Nucleus Repel
Migrating Nucleus
neuron Attract Attract

1
2

Axon
Radial
glial cell
Neuron Growth Guide Guide Target
Inner layer of brain cone cell a cell c tissues
A B C

FIGURE 2.24 Nerve cell migration and axonal guidance toward target cells. (A) New nerve cells migrate from the inner layer of the
brain through other layers of the cortex toward the outermost layer of the brain, traveling along radial glial cells that act as guides. Adapted
from Rakic (1972, 1990). (B) Once a nerve cell reaches the outermost layer, it extends its axon by producing growth cones that are guided
toward the target cell by chemical signals. These signals, made up of proteins, come from guide cells. Some proteins spur the axon to grow
toward them by emitting attractant chemicals (as shown by guide cells a and c); other proteins repel the axon by emitting chemicals that trigger
the axon to grow in the other direction (as shown by guide cell b). These signals affect the growing axon, causing the growth cone to twist and
turn toward its target. (C) This series of three photomicrographs shows the path of a single axon as its growth cone moves toward the circular
guide cell, reaches it, and then moves beyond it.

Synaptogenesis, the process of forming new synapses, pruning, a process that reduces the number of neurons and
creates the vast number of connections between neurons; synaptic connections. Early on in childhood, the human brain
each of our 100 billion neurons is associated with 10,000 has approximately 100 billion (1010) nerve cells and as many
synapses. In contrast to neurogenesis, which mostly takes as 1,000 trillion (1015) synapses, but through the pruning pro-
place in the prenatal period, synaptogenesis remains an cess, both numbers decrease after childhood. This develop-
important process throughout the lifespan. Functionally, mental pattern of an early excess of connections is sometimes
synaptogenesis seems to be involved in fine-tuning neural called “initial overexuberance.”
networks during learning. It creates new synapses in the Neural structures can be pruned through programmed
course of certain experiences and eliminates synapses in the cell death, or apoptosis. In apoptosis, cells do not simply
course of others (Waites et al., 2005), and it can be quite sen- die randomly; instead, they die in highly specific patterns
sitive to variations in experience and environment (Flavell & that help shape the resulting neural circuits. This type of
Greenberg, 2008). In other mammals, such as rats, just a few cell death is first observed at around 24 weeks after con-
days of experience can create new synaptic connections (Ge ception. Cell death is a natural pattern of development in
et al., 2007; He et al., 2010; Waites et al., 2005). which neurons are pruned out of a system as a consequence
Although newborns do have neurons and synapses, their of less use, less environmental stimulation, or less internal
neurons are simpler in structure and make far fewer inter- stimulation or because a maturational instruction shuts
connections. In addition, around the time of birth, some down cell function. When a neuron undergoes apoptosis, it
neurons’ growth cones are still seeking their target locations necessarily eliminates all of that cell’s synaptic connections.
within the brain. Newborns’ neurons are also much less But another, more fine-grained form of synaptic pruning is
myelinated than adult neurons (see Figure 2.25A). In fact, also possible. In this case, the neuron stays alive, but some of
myelination continues well into adulthood in some areas of its synapses are selectively eliminated. Both forms of prun-
the brain. Development therefore proceeds both at the cel- ing seem to be completed by adolescence (Huttenlocher,
lular level of individual neurons and in terms of their inter- 1979, 2002). It is not yet clear whether these two forms—
connections with other neurons (see Figure 2.25B and C). apoptosis and synaptic pruning—serve different functions.
It seems plausible, though, that apoptosis is associated with
Consolidation During development, the number of syn- larger-scale changes in neural circuits, while synaptic prun-
aptic connections does not steadily increase. Instead, both ing may be more specifically localized and more sensitive to
prenatally and postnatally, there are periods of considerable environmental factors.

BRAIN DEVELOPMENT 61
 Dendrites

Cell body

6 months 1 year
Cell body
Axon B

Myelin sheath
Axon

Axon terminal
Growth
cone

Newborn Adult 6 months 1 year

A C
FIGURE 2.25 Increasing neuronal complexity. (A) Individual neurons become more complex and increasingly intercon-
nected during the period after birth, as shown in these examples of a newborn and mature neuron in the cerebral cortex.
Using growth cones, the newborn neuron is still growing toward target cells, where it will form axon terminals to communi-
cate with other neurons, and it is not yet myelinated. (B) Between 6 months of age and 1 year of age, complexity of synaptic
connections increases significantly, as does (C) the size of the brain. Adapted from Conel & Le (1941, 1967).

Genetic influences can also cause cells to die or con-

Q: How do connections between neurons nections to disappear, but the reasons for these kinds of
change after birth? pruning are less clear (Fox et al., 2010; Jacobson et al.,
1997; Pettmann & Henderson, 1998). One possible expla-
nation may be that an initial excess of neurons and syn-
apses, which is followed by pruning, simply may be the
Both environmental and genetic factors influence the com- most efficient growth mechanism early in brain develop-
plex processes that govern which cells and synapses get pruned ment. As an analogy, consider the way to build a snow
(Blakemore, 2008; Hill et al., 2010; Thomas & Johnson, sculpture: First you make large balls of snow because it
2008). One classic study of how vision develops in newborn is the easiest and fastest way to get started and perhaps
cats dramatically showed the effects of the environment—and the mass helps link the balls together. Then you carve out
specific experiences—on pruning. When the cats had one of the desired form from the large mass. Similarly, it may be
their eyes covered up, and thus deprived of visual input, dur- especially efficient for the brain to grow large networks
ing the first 2 weeks after birth, the researchers observed strik- of neurons and interconnections as rapidly as possible at
ing changes in the cats’ brains. The neurons that normally fire first and then to eliminate the excess cells and connec-
only when they receive visual input from both eyes at once tions, resulting in a network shaped by both experience
actually died off (Wiesel & Hubel, 1963). As a consequence, and genetic instructions.
while the kittens could see well with each eye independently,
they lost the ability to mentally fuse the images seen by both Myelination Another remarkable pattern of postnatal
eyes, a process that considerably enhances depth perception. neural development is myelination, the process of enclosing

62 CHAPTER 2 THE BIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT

axons in the fatty material called myelin, which provides Experience and Brain Development
an insulating cover (Yakovlev & Lecours, 1967; see Fig-
ure 2.26A). As we have said, the myelin sheath increases the As we have seen, the environment influences developmen-
speed at which nerve impulses travel along the axon, mak- tal processes at multiple levels, ranging from its effects on
ing the process up to 100 times faster. Heavily myelinated cells and gene regulation to influences on larger bodily sys-
bundles of axons in the brain are commonly called white tems. Now let’s consider environmental influences on the
matter, while the brain tissue that consists of unmyelinated brain in more detail. We have already seen that depriving
cell bodies and dendrites is called gray matter. White mat- the brain of visual input from one eye affects the devel-
ter often forms the connections between clusters of gray opment of vision by causing pruning of nerve cells and
matter, where the more intricate circuits exist. The process synapses designed to receive input from both eyes. Simi-
of myelination begins before birth and continues well into larly, research suggests that rats that develop in a deprived
middle age (Bartzokis et al., 2003; Westlye et al., 2009). The environment will have fewer and less complex neurons
earliest structures to be myelinated are the spinal cord and than rats that experience a normal environment (Black &
lower brain structures. Myelination then proceeds toward Greenough, 1986).
the higher structures of the cortex and from the back of the These examples show that neurons deprived of a specific
brain toward the front. type of input may die off or show stunted development—
Figure 2.26B shows how different brain regions become but sometimes, they can thrive on a new type of input.
myelinated at different ages. Areas that process sensory Compensation plasticity refers to the capacity for an
information tend to be myelinated before birth and shortly area of the brain that is deprived of its normal inputs and
thereafter. Areas that direct motor activity start being processing routines to become devoted to other functions
myelinated shortly before birth, and then myelination of instead. In some cases, this change results in a heightening
these regions continues through the first year of life. Finally, of the remaining abilities to help the organism compensate
myelination supporting integration of cortical association for the loss. Thus, if a child is born deaf, the brain area typi-
areas begins after birth and continues all the way into adult- cally devoted to the processing of auditory information may
hood. In the cortex, myelination tends to slowly progress be repurposed to process visual information. As a result, the
forward so that the last steps of myelination occur in the child’s visual perception may be unusually acute and compen-
frontal cortex. Some researchers argue that the relatively late sate for the auditory loss (Bavelier & Neville, 2002; Bavelier
myelination of the frontal lobes in the mid-20s helps explain et al., 2006). In fact, on tasks that require sensitive peripheral
why some adolescents and young adults are especially prone vision, adults who were born deaf show distinct advantages
to recklessness and risk taking (Casey et al., 2008; Kelley over those with normal hearing (Dye et al., 2009). Evidence
et al., 2004; Steinberg, 2010). of compensation plasticity seems especially apparent in the

Gestation First year Years 1−10 Years 10−30

Sensory systems
“Jellyrolled” cells Optic nerve
make up an axon’s
Initial stages of
myelin sheath
sensory processing
Motor systems
Cerebellum
Major motor neuron
Axon tracts
Integrative systems
Connections
between midbrain
and cortex
Cortical association
Unsheathed areas
node
A B

FIGURE 2.26 Myelination. (A) The wrapping of a fatty substance known as myelin several times around an axon is a critical developmental
process that speeds up the conduction of nerve impulses along the axon. (B) The myelination process continues into early adulthood. Sensory
areas are myelinated before birth. Myelination of the motor systems also starts before birth and continues past the first year of life. Finally, the
integrative systems show little myelination until after birth, and the process continues into adulthood.

BRAIN DEVELOPMENT 63
brain’s association areas (Amedi et al., 2005; Merabet & be malleable, or “plastic,” and physically change as a result
Pascual-Leone, 2010; Röder et al., 2002). of experience (Greenough et al., 1987).
We have considered the effects of a specific type of depri- In humans, it is not possible to directly measure experience-
vation, such as loss of vision, in an otherwise normal envi- dependent changes in the number of dendritic branches or
ronment. What happens at the neural level when a child synapses. Indirect measures using neuroimaging suggest
grows up in a much more problematic environment with that these changes may occur during the process of acquir-
massive deprivation of all forms of inputs? Several studies ing and honing a skill. For example, when people learn to
have looked at orphans and abandoned children who grew juggle, there is an increase in gray matter (where most neu-
up in deprived and highly stressful conditions—similar in ral interconnections occur) in the brain region associated
some respects to conditions that inhibit neurogenesis and with the visual processing of motion (Draganski et al., 2004).
synaptogenesis in animals (Chu & Lieberman, 2010; Gun- Similarly, years of intensive music performance training is
nar, 2001; Gunnar & Quevedo, 2007). A variety of mea- associated with increased myelination of the relevant motor
sures suggest that such deprivation can cause changes in neuron pathways (Bengtsson et al., 2005; Hyde et al., 2009).
brain development. The deprived children showed differ- Finally, compared with other adults, veteran taxi drivers
ences in overall brain size and physiological activity (Nel- have been shown to have enlarged hippocampal regions—
son, 2007) as well as indications of lesser myelination of areas involved in spatial reasoning and maintaining mental
the connections between major brain regions (Eluvathingal maps (Maguire et al., 2000). Together the findings from
et al., 2006). Some scholars have suggested that extremely human and nonhuman animal studies strongly suggest that
deprived children may experience excessive pruning and the brain restructures itself as a result of focused activity
have less organized synaptic connections (Nelson, 2007). As (Dayan & Cohen, 2011; Johansen-Berg, 2007). It remains
noninvasive measures of brain structure improve, it should controversial, however, whether commercial infant enrich-
be possible to document these differences more precisely ment programs are any more beneficial than normal (non-
and to determine whether they are sometimes irreversible. deprived) infant experience.
Since deprivation can cause apoptosis and pruning of syn-
apses, many have wondered whether an enhanced environ-
ment could have the opposite effect on brain development.
Could engaging stimulation lead to more complex synaptic
connections and dendritic branches? Many eager parents Puberty and Brain Development
have attempted to accelerate their baby’s brain development As children enter puberty, their behavior often changes sig-
through such environmental “enhancements” as classical nificantly. Even the ancients took note. According to the
music, visually challenging mobiles, and intensive language Greek philosopher Aristotle, “Youth are heated by Nature as
exposure. In a broad sense, this question remains open, but drunken men by wine” (Dahl, 2004, p. 8). His observation
it cannot be addressed experimentally in humans given the is borne out by statistics concerning reckless driving, unpro-
obvious ethical problems of assigning infants to “deprived,” tected sex, substance abuse, and a host of other dangerous
“normal,” or “enriched” environments. behaviors carried out by adolescents (Steinberg, 2007).
By posing more focused questions, however, researchers Besides risk taking, adolescents show a variety of behavioral
have found some effects of enrichment (Kempermann et al., changes, including a surge of interest in sex and romantic
1997), many of which result from the learning experiences relationships, changed sleep patterns, and increased appe-
that take place in an enriched environment. Of course, when tite. Several kinds of psychopathology are also much more
an organism learns, the brain changes. If rats are required to common among adolescents than among younger children.
learn a new skilled task, that challenging experience will cause Many of these changes will be discussed in the book’s final
them to grow new synapses in the cerebellum (Black et al., chapters. Here we focus on some of the changes in the brain
1990). Similarly, when monkeys are taught to use a new tool, that relate to the upheaval of adolescence.
their neurons in the brain region involved in grasping and tool As mentioned in Chapter 1, puberty is a time of pro-
use become more interconnected (Hihara et al., 2006). nounced qualitative biological change. Males develop
Aside from growing new synapses, another subtle but facial hair and broader shoulders, and females develop
important effect of learning is the strengthening or weaken- breasts and wider hips. Male voices become lower pitched,
ing of existing synaptic connections, a process that happens a phenomenon that led some overzealous medieval choir
continuously in adult organisms. As we have already begun directors to castrate choirboys shortly before puberty, pre-
to see, experience can also affect the number of synapses, serving their ability to hit very high notes (Rosselli, 1988).
the neuronal patterns of connection, and the birth or death Given these dramatic bodily changes, it is natural to ask
of neurons. These kinds of changes demonstrate the brain’s about corresponding changes in the brain—especially
experience-dependent plasticity, the ability of the brain to since brain signals trigger puberty’s hormone surges (Dahl,

64 CHAPTER 2 THE BIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT

2004). Growth hormones increase height and size; adre- lescents were better informed about the true nature of risks,
nal hormones lead to pubic hair, acne, and other changes; their behavior would improve. But despite decades of driv-
still other complexes of hormones cause the sex organs to er’s education courses, sexual education courses, and media
mature. Brain signals set off these anatomical changes, but campaigns about drug abuse, none of these approaches have
what about the brain itself? Do changes in brain structure worked very well in reducing risky behavior. At the same
occur during puberty? time, other studies have shown that adolescents are just as
In fact, a number of dramatic changes in the brain occur late good as adults at estimating risks when asked to do so in
in childhood and during the teenage years (see Figure 2.27). judgment tasks (Steinberg, 2007). Why, then, do they still
Some of the most remarkable, well-documented changes take take more risks?
place in the frontal lobes. This brain region, which is associ- One clue comes from the finding that among adolescents,
ated with planning, problem solving, and regulating thoughts risk taking is much more likely in groups. Some researchers
and emotions, undergoes significant pruning of synaptic con- suggest that the social nature of this behavior relates to spe-
nections during adolescence. It shows a 40 percent drop in cific changes that take place during puberty in the connec-
the total number of synapses from late childhood to adult- tions between limbic system structures (the amygdala and
hood (Andersen, 2003; Huttenlocher, 1979). This decrease is nucleus accumbens, which regulate emotions), the striatum
thought to streamline the region’s neural circuits to support (which is concerned with rewards and motivation), and parts
faster and more efficient performance. At the same time, of the frontal lobe (the prefrontal cortex, which is concerned
the amount of white matter in the frontal lobes substantially with planning and control) (Somerville et al., 2011). One
increases, perhaps supporting better communication and result may be that during adolescence, the emotional arousal
integration between the frontal lobes and other brain regions system is especially active during social interactions with
(Casey et al., 2008; Somerville et al., 2011; Yurgelun-Todd, peers and overrides the control system of the still maturing
2007). In general, the section of the frontal lobes called the prefrontal cortex. At the same time, the emotional arousal
prefrontal cortex, which lies below the forehead at the front system seems to undergo neural changes during puberty
of the brain, matures the latest. It shows growth into the 20s. that make adolescents prone to pursuing greater immediate
One possible explanation for increased risk taking in rewards, even when it means taking bigger risks. One theory
adolescence involves interactions between systems in the suggests that these changes may actually help adolescents to
frontal lobes and another group of brain structures called take the risks associated with achieving independence from
the limbic system (Somerville & Casey, 2010; Steinberg, their parents (Casey et al., 2008). It may also be that the lure
2007). The limbic system is concerned with emotion and of rewards (detected in the striatum) tends to exert much
memory, among other functions, and it is closely related greater influence on teenagers’ planning and self-control sys-
to a structure called the striatum, which is involved in the tems (in the prefrontal cortex) and that only after adoles-
detection of and response to rewards. For years, adolescents’ cence do the prefrontal systems develop a stronger influence
risk taking was attributed to flaws in their reasoning about on regulating the brain’s reward systems (see Figure 2.28).
risks and consequences. Many experts believed that if ado- As adolescents mature, the emotional arousal system
becomes more regulated and less likely to overwhelm the
brain’s planning and self-control systems in the frontal
and parietal lobes. The increasing myelination of these
frontal and parietal regions may allow them to commu-
nicate more effectively with the emotional arousal and
reward areas. At the same time, the pruning of neuronal

FIGURE 2.27 Changes in gray matter from early childhood

through puberty and young adulthood. This set of computer
images of right lateral and top views of the brain shows the changes in
the distribution of gray matter in the cortex between ages 5 and 20.
Red areas indicate high gray matter volume, whereas blue and purple
areas indicate striking gray matter loss. Gray matter volume increases
in areas associated with sensory and motor functions at earlier ages,
but it decreases in these areas as the child grows older. Loss of gray
matter volume in areas associated with integrating information and
planning begins in late childhood and accelerates during adoles-
cence. The loss of gray matter volume during adolescence may
reflect a form of synaptic pruning. From Gogtay et al. (2004).

BRAIN DEVELOPMENT 65
 NEW DIRECTION S IN DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH

Repairing Brain Damage Later in Life?

M
any of us know someone who has suffered the why some glial cells promote nerve cell regeneration and others
effects of brain damage as an adult. The damage can block it (Muir, 2010).
range from a shrapnel wound that impairs speech, a An especially effective way to repair nerve cell damage
stroke that hampers vision, or the more widespread would be to have a population of cells in the adult brain that
neuronal death that causes the motor problems involved in could differentiate into particular kinds of neurons. They could
Parkinson’s disease. For many years, research suggested that then take over functions that were disrupted by the death of
humans couldn’t develop new nerve cells after birth, so these other nerve cells. Such cells are known as adult stem cells.
conditions were considered incurable. In the last decade or It was previously thought that the adult brain did not contain
so, however, considerable evidence has shown that even adult stem cells and that the only means of nerve regeneration was
brains sometimes generate new nerve cells (Arvidsson et al., to regrow parts of existing neurons. Recently, however, it has
2002; Bjorklund & Lindvall, 2000; Muir, 2010). It appears that become clear that the brain does have adult stem cells capable
the different types of myelin cells that ensheathe many axons of becoming new, functional nerve cells, especially when they
play a critical role in either inhibiting or promoting regrowth are surrounded by an appropriate scaffold of cells that doesn’t
of nerve cells, depending on the type of myelin involved. In inhibit nerve growth (Ma et al., 2009; Teixeira et al., 2007; Teng
rats, the myelin cells that normally ensheathe the optic nerve et al., 2002).
inhibit nerve cell regrowth. But in one study, researchers cut Moreover, some investigators have suggested that the brain’s
the optic nerves of adult rats and then ensheathed the sev- stem cells are part of an inherent developmental program that
ered optic nerve cells with myelin cells transplanted from the allows the brain to adapt to injury (Imitola et al., 2004). This
olfactory bulb, because they were thought to promote nerve capacity seems to diminish with age, however, which is why
regrowth (Li et al., 2003; Raisman & Li, 2007). Indeed, the children tend to recover from brain damage more easily than
transplanted myelin cells promoted the growth of new cells in adults do (Sun & He, 2010). Nonetheless, adults with brain
the severed optic nerves. Researchers have not yet managed to damage can experience some recovery and neural adaptation,
bring about enough nerve regrowth to restore the rats’ vision, and adult stem cells may be part of this process.
but that eventual outcome seems likely. In similar experiments Along similar lines, animal research into many neurodegen-
aimed at regrowing motor neurons that have been cut, research- erative diseases, including Parkinson’s disease, Lou Gehrig’s
ers are making progress restoring the cut nerves’ functionality. disease (amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, or ALS), and multiple
Myelin appears to affect nerve regrowth in interesting sclerosis (Rice et al., 2003; Silani & Corbo, 2004; Singec et
ways. In the central nervous system, the glial cells that pro- al., 2007), has demonstrated that neural stem cells can repair
duce myelin also produce three distinct proteins that become brain damage and sometimes restore function (Akerud et al.,
embedded in myelin and then directly inhibit nerve growth. 2001; Arenas, 2010; Isacson et al., 2003; Redmond, 2002).
These growth-inhibiting proteins may help set normal limits on Of course, many questions about these processes remain unan-
healthy nerves’ growth—but they also block regeneration when swered, and adapting these treatments for use in humans poses
nerves are damaged (Woolf & Bloechlinger, 2002). Changing significant risks. Even so, the possibility that neural stem cells
the material that ensheathes nerve cells by transplanting glial could be used to repair brain damage that was long consid-
cells from olfactory nerves that have growth-promoting proteins ered irreversible has generated enormous interest. In this case,
could become a valuable method of repairing nerve damage in a deeper understanding of developmental processes is yielding
adults. Researchers are actively trying to understand how and valuable progress on addressing problems in adults.

66 CHAPTER 2 THE BIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT

 Children FIGURE 2.28 Changes in reward and control circuits. One key change in adoles-
cence may concern the extent to which the prefrontal cortex (PFC) feeds back on the
circuits related to rewards (the striatum). In children, reward circuits from the striatum
and control circuits from the PFC are both immature (as shown by the light-colored
PFC structures and dashed circuit lines). In adolescents, there is increased sensitivity to
Striatum reward cues from the striatum (shown by the darker structure and the solid line for the
Nucleus
accumbens circuit), which overrides control circuits from the PFC, which has not yet fully matured.
Amygdala In adults, both structures and circuits are mature, and the PFC is better able to control
the striatum. Adapted from Somerville & Casey (2010).

Adolescents
differences in behavior relate to genetic differences between
individuals or populations. Because this kind of research
PFC predated our fairly detailed biochemical understanding of
Striatum DNA, behavioral geneticists have historically used statis-
Nucleus
accumbens tical techniques to infer the degree to which individuals
Amygdala are related genetically—that is, the proportion of their
genes that are the same. Researchers can then compare and
correlate this level of genetic similarity with variations in
Adults behavior.
One of the most common research techniques in behav-
ioral genetics involves studying monozygotic (MZ) and
dizygotic (DZ) twins. Studying twins allows researchers to
PFC
keep either the participants’ genes (in the case of MZ twins)
Striatum
Nucleus or their environment (twins raised together) relatively con-
accumbens
stant across experimental conditions. Because monozygotic
Amygdala
twins have nearly identical genetic material, many research-
ers have studied MZ twins who were raised apart in attempts
to examine the effects of experiences or environment while
holding genes as constant as possible. Dizygotic twins, on
connections in all of these areas may allow more precise the other hand, are only as genetically similar as any two
regulation of emotions (Steinberg, 2007). Thus, changes siblings. Researchers have often studied DZ twins raised in
at the neural level may result in better integration of the the same household as a way to minimize environmental
cognitive control system, reward system, and emotional differences in the children’s experiences while examining
arousal system. the effects of their genetic differences.

Q: What are some patterns of brain change

that seem to occur in childhood, puberty, and Heritability
young adulthood? Behavioral geneticists often talk about the heritability of
a trait as a way of describing the extent to which variations
in that trait, within a particular population, are due to
genetic differences rather than environmental differences.
If, in a particular group, all of the individual variations in
Behavioral Genetics a given trait were due to differences in individuals’ genes,
that trait would have a heritability of 1 for that popula-
The influence of genes on emerging neural structures and tion and environment. Likewise, if all individual differ-
subsequent behaviors is a major theme of this chapter. ences in a trait were due to environmental variations, the
Much of the research beginning to explain these genetic trait would have a heritability of 0. Of course, genetic and
influences has been conducted in the past decade, and environmental influences constantly interact, so no trait
research relating gene expression to changes in the brain has perfect heritability. But the closer a trait’s heritabil-
and behavior promises to remain one of the most active ity comes to 1, the more that trait’s variations—within the
areas of neuroscience. But a line of work with a much lon- group and environment in question—are caused by genetic
ger history, known as behavioral genetics, examines how influences.

BEHAVIORAL GENETICS 67
 When heritability measures are applied to behavior, This point is often overlooked and can lead to false and
they are used to describe the degree to which behavioral inflammatory claims about the genetic bases for differences
differences among individuals in a population, such as among groups. As we will see in several later chapters, the
variations in the traits of shyness or excitability, are due behavioral genetics approach has helped researchers under-
to those individuals’ genetic differences. As an example stand the relative contributions of genetic and environ-
of a trait with low heritability, consider the particular mental factors to a wide range of traits, although complex
language that individuals speak. Our native tongue is gene-environment interactions can often make interpreta-
solely a consequence of the language (or languages) we tions difficult.
are exposed to while growing up, not the genes inher-
ited from our biological parents. On the other hand, a
trait with a very high heritability in most environments is
height, which runs strongly in biological families. Still, it Behavioral Genomics
is critical to remember that heritability measures pertain Behavioral genetics still has a role in helping us understand
only to populations, not to individuals. A heritability of .9 individual differences (Plomin et al., 2000). But the field
for height does not indicate that 90 percent of a specific is rapidly changing in light of new knowledge about vari-
person’s height is caused by his or her genes. Rather, it ous species’ genomes and increasingly sophisticated ways of
means that across the whole population being measured, measuring differences in phenotype (Haworth & Plomin,
the differences in height are 90 percent attributable to 2010; Kendler & Greenspan, 2006; Plomin & McGuffin,
genetic variations between that population’s members. 2003; Toga & Thompson, 2005; Visscher et al., 2008). This
A single person’s height reflects a complex interaction new perspective is sometimes called behavioral genomics
between his genotype and many environmental factors, to emphasize the role of understanding a species’ genome
including diet, exercise, and even stress. It doesn’t make and its effects at the molecular level.
sense to try to describe “how much” of a single person’s One way to understand this change in methodology is to
height is attributable to genes. A heritability measure is see the shift that has occurred historically, starting with the
meaningful only in describing a population. early approach to human differences (Galton, 1883), when
Heritabilities depend not only on the range of genotypes researchers could only compare the behaviors they saw with
in a population but also on the environment in which a pop- the levels of genetic variation they inferred by comparing
ulation is studied. In certain environments, heritabilities twins, siblings, and other individuals. In the 1960s, this
can be greatly reduced. For example, some forms of diabe- approach to research had shifted only modestly. Research-
tes have substantial heritabilities, but if a population tends ers knew that differences in DNA were responsible for all
toward a diet that minimizes sugars and carbohydrates, it variances in genotype, but they did not understand how the
is likely that fewer people in that population will become DNA molecule gave rise to particular physical features, let
diabetic. Thus, in that population, the heritability for the alone its mechanisms for affecting behaviors. Over the next
disease would be correspondingly lower, reflecting a stron- few decades, researchers began to understand how genes
ger environmental influence. direct the production of proteins and how multiple genes
The environment’s influence on heritabilities has sig- can interact. Finally, in the last 10 years or so, an extraordi-
nificant consequences when it comes to interpreting or nary surge of technology has made it possible to construct
comparing these measures. Even when the heritability of a gene expression profiles in which a gene’s expression (whether
trait is high for two separate populations, each in its own it is turned on or off) can be measured in thousands of tis-
environment, it’s important not to assume that differences sue samples at various times and under different conditions.
between the two populations are also due to genetic influ- In addition, researchers can investigate how one gene’s
ences. Suppose, for example, that height is highly heritable expression influences other genes. It is now also possible to
in two groups of children, one in suburban New York and study how changes in gene regulation affect the proteins
another in a famine-stricken area of the Sudan. Even if that cells make.
height has a heritability of .9 in both groups, this does not Taken together, these molecular approaches have begun
mean that differences in height between the two popula- to suggest mechanisms for linking genetic variation to
tions are largely genetic. The Sudanese group would likely behaviors (Plomin & McGuffin, 2003). For example, when
be shorter than the New Yorkers on average for reasons a certain gene is expressed, or “turned on,” it may direct
having nothing to do with genetics. Instead, malnutrition cells to create a protein that causes another gene to be
due to famine would likely decrease heights in the entire expressed at several locations in the brain. That second gene
Sudanese population—even though, as a heritability of .9 may then direct the assembly of proteins that form recep-
tells us—differences in height within that group mostly tors for neurotransmitters. Some of the neural circuits that
could be explained by its members’ genetic differences. influence human emotions may work in this way. Thus,

68 CHAPTER 2 THE BIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT

regulatory interactions between several genes may make
the receptors for certain neurotransmitters more sensitive, BEHAVIOR
resulting in better emotional regulation. On the other hand,
if some alleles of the initial gene don’t fully “turn on” the SENSORY Patterned
cascade of regulatory interactions, individuals with those STIMU- neural activity
LATION
alleles may find it harder to regulate their emotions under
stress (Schloesser et al., 2008). Environmental factors can
also affect these complex processes of gene regulation. High Neural Non-neural
connectivity structures
levels of stress during development may change the activity
levels of the genes that trigger whole sets of genetic interac- Individual
tions. The stress-induced changes could result in different nerve cell Neural Non-neural
activity growth growth
patterns of synaptic connections within emotion-related
brain areas (Champagne, 2010; Isles & Wilkinson, 2008;
Schloesser et al., 2008). Extracellular
Cell membrane
Figure 2.29 illustrates a simplified model of how such biochemistry
networked effects might work. As this figure clearly shows,
the effects of genes on behavior are quite indirect. They Intracellular
biochemistry
involve changes in cell membranes, nerve growth, neural
circuits, large-scale physiological systems, and interactions Protein PHYSICAL
among all of these. Moreover, the behaviors themselves can synthesis INFLUENCES
“feed back” on these systems and affect neural processes
and structures. A particular genetic change does not “cause” GENETIC
ACTIVITY
a behavior as much as it is part of a rich network of causal
interactions involving events within the organism and in its
FIGURE 2.29 A model of gene effects. The new behavioral
external environment. genetics, or “behavioral genomics,” is not limited to inferring the dif-
As researchers develop more sophisticated ways of under- ferences between genotypes based on familial relatedness. Instead,
standing the effects of gene variation at the cellular level, they researchers study the effects of gene expression both within cells
are also developing more powerful ways to study how those and across cells. This diagram shows one model of how genes’
variations give rise to different features and traits (Visscher et actions can be linked to brain activity and how experiences can also
al., 2008). One new method combines the older twin study influence brain and gene activity. From Johnson & Edwards (2002).
approach with neuroimaging that allows researchers to mea-
sure the size of specific brain regions. Researchers measure gene affects the activities of many others. Another way for
corresponding structures in both twins’ brains and compare a gene to affect multiple traits is in the way it is expressed
the similarities in the structures’ size with the proportion of differently within various tissues because of interactions
genes the twins share. The researchers can then calculate heri- with other tissue-specific genes. The opposite of pleiotropy
tabilities of different brain regions’ sizes by looking at patterns (one gene affecting many traits) is evident when a single
of variation across a large sample of twins (Peper et al., 2007; trait is polygenic, or affected by multiple genes. When
Toga & Thompson, 2005). Of particular interest is the gray different genes exert an overlapping influence in shaping
matter in the cerebral cortex, where much of the most sophis- a particular trait, that trait is considered polygenic. Both
ticated processing of information is thought to occur. As types of genetic influence are common in discussions of
Figure 2.30 shows, some brain regions, such as frontal areas behavior, and they are also closely related. If a gene affects
of the cortex, seem to have much higher heritabilities for gray many different traits rather than just one, it is more likely
matter than posterior regions. This, in turn, suggests that cog- that this pleiotropic gene’s influences will “overlap” with
nitive functions associated with the frontal cortex, such as deci- the influences of other genes. For example, the same “gen-
sion making and regulating conflicting thoughts, might also eralist genes” may affect several different cognitive abili-
have high heritabilities. Comparable studies have also shown ties (Kovas & Plomin, 2006).
high heritabilities for some regions of white matter, suggesting A pleiotropic gene can affect several traits through quite
that the degree of connectivity between certain brain regions different mechanisms. Figure 2.31 shows three possible
may also be heavily influenced by genes. mechanisms for how a gene might influence three separate
In behavioral genetics, many genes are highly pleiotro- cognitive functions. In the simplest case, the gene influ-
pic, meaning that one gene affects many traits. One way ences one brain region and consequently (in this simplified
that genes can have these pleiotropic effects is through the version) one cognitive function, such as improving an aspect
kind of regulatory cascades discussed earlier, in which one of memory. Changes in that cognitive function would, in

BEHAVIORAL GENETICS 69
 closely linked than ever before. While a great deal of work
remains to be done, researchers have already uncovered pat-
terns in the way structure and function develop. These pat-
terns of change are informative at one level as the necessary
underpinnings for behavioral and psychological changes.
At another level, they illustrate how developmental systems
emerge while simultaneously, and continuously, solving
problems of growth and form.
Perhaps the fundamental principle of the biology of
development is that the most basic functions for survival
tend to mature first. Initially, this means that the growing
embryo must be able to receive nourishment and eliminate
waste. Before long, though, the emerging organism needs
more structure and function to survive, including a basic
circulatory system and early segmentation of the body into
FIGURE 2.30 Heritabilities of gray matter. As neuroscientists compartments, which promotes further cellular differen-
develop more precise ways of studying the brain, they can ask how tiation. More broadly, the different tissues must be able
individuals’ differences in gray matter relate to their genetic differ- to communicate so that cell migration, specialization, and
ences. As this computer-generated image shows, the proportion of other patterns of change can proceed. As we have seen, these
gray matter in the frontal cortex (shown on the right) has a much
lines of communication are set up by chemical changes trig-
higher heritability (indicated by pink and red shading) than the
proportion of gray matter in posterior regions (shown on the left and
gered by the cells themselves.
indicated in blue). From Toga & Thompson (2005). The clearest pattern in biological development is the
hierarchical nature of cell differentiation by which cells
that are initially similar can become different kinds of
turn, influence related functions, such as attention and rea- specialized cells at later stages. The pattern is clearly
soning: with better memory, the outputs of attention and sequential; cells pass through stages that are mostly, but
reasoning systems could be held in mind longer. In the perhaps not strictly, irreversible. Very early in the blastula
most complex cases, a pleiotropic gene affects several differ- stage, cells show considerable flexibility in terms of their
ent brain regions, and these regions also interact with each function; when certain cell groups are moved at an early
other. Most researchers who examine relations between stage, the organism can adjust to continue normal devel-
genes and behavior think that the most complex case is also opment. Thus, a cell’s final fate is not prespecified in its
the most common (Visscher et al., 2008). first few steps of differentiation. Instead, specializations
In short, researchers are working “bottom-up,” starting emerge later, as a function of the cell’s surrounding ana-
from the molecular level, and “top-down,” starting from tomical and physiological context.
the behavioral level, to go beyond correlating genotypic These patterns in biological development suggest some
variations directly with behavioral variations. Their goal is similar principles for how psychological processes develop
to eventually explain all the specific interactions between and differentiate. As you will see in later chapters, simpler
genes and behaviors and the results of those interactions. emotions, such as joy, fear, anxiety, and anger, are thought
Rather than simply asking which genes are “responsible for” to provide a necessary context for the development of more
particular behaviors, researchers are exploring the richly complex emotions, such as guilt and pride. Similarly, some
interconnected system of relationships between genes, pro- argue that a child’s early emerging understanding of her
teins, various neural structures, and many facets of cogni- physical and social worlds influences the way she later
tion, perception, and emotion—as well as their interactions comes to understand the biological world.
with a wide range of environmental factors, from diet to As researchers seek to understand the origins of psycho-
visual stimulation. logical systems, they must confront questions about the
different kinds of influences that shape those systems. The
powerful influences of “nature” and “nurture” have been
discussed for millennia, and in the past few decades, the
Conclusions “either/or” arguments about them have given way to an
account of their interactions. Genes are one component of
Developmental biology is one of the most exciting and rap- interrelated biological processes that are also subject to envi-
idly changing areas of research in the life sciences. Genetic ronmental influences at many levels. The local environment
mechanisms and anatomical structures are being more of a particular cell in the body, for example, might activate a

70 CHAPTER 2 THE BIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT

 FIGURE 2.31 Three ways for a
Cognitive Mechanism 1 pleiotropic gene to affect behav-
function 1 iors. In mechanism 1, a gene might
A gene influences
1 influence one brain region, which in
one area of the brain,
Cognitive which influences turn would influence three different
Gene 1 2 different cognitive cognitive functions. In mechanism 2,
function 2
processes. a gene might influence three different
3
brain regions, each of which would
Cognitive influence one cognitive function. In
function 3 mechanism 3, a gene might influence
three different brain regions, each of
which would influence three different
cognitive functions. The most complex
Cognitive Mechanism 2 case, mechanism 3, is also consid-
function 1 ered the most common. Adapted from
A gene influences
1 Kovas & Plomin (2006).
several areas of the
brain, and each area
Gene 2
Cognitive
2 affects a specific
function 2
cognitive process.
3

Cognitive
function 3

Cognitive Mechanism 3
function 1
A gene influences
1
several areas of the
brain, and each area
Gene 3
Cognitive
2 affects several
function 2
cognitive processes.
3

Cognitive
function 3

gene in that cell, causing it to produce a new protein. When length of a critical period can determine whether a neck like
the new protein becomes part of the cellular environment, a giraffe’s or a neck like an antelope’s will result. Likewise,
it can cause chemical changes that subsequently turn other the effects of a teratogen depend on when it is introduced
genes on or off. In this manner, one gene can interact with into the prenatal environment.
many others. A more global environmental factor, such as Sequencing, which is intimately related to timing,
a toxin in drinking water, might also affect gene activities, also exerts its own powerful influences. If, for example,
often causing harm. Likewise, a deprived environment or the sequence of development of the basic body plan
one that is especially stimulating may affect brain growth specified by homeobox genes is disrupted, we can see a
through gene regulation pathways. proliferation of incoherent structures in the first most
In all of these interactions, timing—as they say in anterior compartment. The sequence of development is
vaudeville—is everything. We have seen how timing influ- also crucial when particular structures, such as the neu-
ences many patterns of development. During the blastula ral plate, must serve as the foundation or the scaffold for
stage, even the timing of an individual cell’s migration later-developing structures. The earlier structures guide
through the primitive streak influences its differentiation growth of what comes later and even influence patterns
and development. During embryonic development, the of cell specialization.

CONCLUSIONS 71
 STU DY AN D REVI EW

SUMMARY however—about 4 days in humans—the apparent spherical

symmetry disappears as parts of the sphere fold in on itself,
The Basis of Development becoming the morula, and then, at day 5, becoming the blas-
● All living organisms go through systematic changes in ana-
tocyst, which has an outer and inner ring of cells.
● Through a process called gastrulation, cells and cell clusters
tomical and physiological systems across the course of devel-
opment from conception to maturity. In recent years, major form three distinct layers—the ectoderm, the mesoderm, and
advances have been made in understanding the mechanisms the endoderm—that ultimately lead to formation of inner
that underlie these changes and how there are biological organs and structures, including the brain and skeleton.
● Cells that are initially undifferentiated become ever more
underpinnings of psychological development.
● Biological and psychological development both are charac-
specialized as sets of genes are turned on and off as a func-
terized by common patterns, including critical periods and tion of the local environment of surrounding cells.
the tendency for vital systems to develop earlier than systems
that are less important for survival. Anatomical Development
● The inputs to the biological system are the genes, which con- ● The embryonic period is from 2½ weeks to the end of 8
tain the inherited instructions in the form of DNA for pro- weeks after conception; the fetal period is from 9 weeks after
ducing proteins and regulating expression of other genes, and conception until birth. From about 4 weeks after concep-
the environment, which influences gene expression. The gen- tion, the human embryo has features, such as a head and
otype is the full set of genes of an organism, while the pheno- limb buds, which begin to visually resemble their adult
type is the expression of anatomical structures, biochemical counterparts.
processes, traits, and behaviors. Genes and environment con- ● Initial brain formation is called neurulation and is completed
stantly interact in complex ways to produce the phenotype. in the fourth week after conception. There is a very early bias
● DNA is stored in the organism’s chromosomes, which are toward development in the head; embryonic development
found in the cell nucleus. In humans, chromosomes nor- follows a head-to-toe progression known as cephalocaudal
mally occur in pairs, with each parent contributing one chro- development.
mosome containing gene variants known as alleles. If the ● When babies are born 3 or more weeks early, they are
offspring inherits the same allele from both parents, the child known as preterm (or premature) infants, and they may be
is homozygous for the gene; if the offspring inherits different at increased risk for medical or psychological problems. The
alleles from the two parents, the child is heterozygous for the likelihood of preterm birth can be increased by infection in
gene. A dominant allele is expressed when both alleles are either the mother or the fetus or by smoking, drinking, or
dominant or when the other allele is recessive; the recessive drug abuse by the mother.
allele is only expressed when both alleles are recessive. ● During the prenatal period, it is tempting to see development
● There are three constraints on development: the continuous as obeying the principle of ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny.
need for viability of the developing organism, the differentia- A closer examination, however, reveals the fallacies in this argu-
tion of cell types and anatomical structures as development pro- ment and shows that it is better understood as the idea that
gresses, and the timing of when genes are switched on or off to functionally important systems tend to emerge earlier both in
produce developing cells and structures in particular sequences. development and in the evolutionary history of organisms.
● At a very broad level concerned with the order in which large
The Beginnings of Development body segments develop, there is a strikingly universal genetic
● The first stages of development are quite similar across most code made up of clusters of genes known as homeobox genes
sexually reproducing organisms and involve formation of (Hox genes in vertebrates) and shared by a wide variety of
specialized cells called gametes for reproduction by meiosis, species. Within this framework, however, cascades of regu-
followed by fertilization of the female egg by the male sperm latory genes determine when genes are switched on or off,
to produce the zygote. which provides for the enormous variations seen within and,
● Once fertilized, the zygote makes a series of splits by mito- most importantly, across species.
sis. The first cell divisions initially produce what looks like ● Sexual differentiation is controlled by the X and Y chromo-
an ever more fine-grained bumpy sphere. At a critical point, somes and by exposure to sex-specific combinations of hor-

72 CHAPTER 2 THE BIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT

 mones. Higher concentrations of testosterone in male fetuses asks about the extent to which variations in phenotype are
and higher concentrations of estrogen in female fetuses result related to variations in genotype.
in different genital structures in males and females and sex- ● The more recent field of behavioral genomics examines
specific traits and brain differences. variations in individuals’ genomes and the ways that those
● The order in which body segments develop helps explain variations relate to gene interaction and protein synthesis,
why hazardous compounds cause highly specific effects at physiology, neuroanatomy, and ultimately behavior.
certain times in development. When a particular segment
is in its most active period of formation, internal or exter-
nal hazardous environmental factors known as teratogens THOUGHT QUESTIONS
are most influential. Another body segment, usually farther 1. What constitutes an enriched environment? We have seen
away from the head, might not be as vulnerable until several that severely impoverished environments, such as those
weeks or months later. caused by sensory deprivation or extreme stress, can psycho-
logically affect a developing infant or child and even influ-
Brain Development ence brain development. Some have argued that the reverse
● Brain development is dramatic during the prenatal period, might also be true: that extremely enriched environments
when brain structures most essential for an organism’s sur- might accelerate and enhance brain development. If you
vival appear earlier than other brain structures and when wanted to test this possibility, what would the maximally
later-developing brain structures inhibit earlier-developing enriched environment look like, and why?
brain structures. Extensive change occurs both in anatomi- 2. Although the nineteenth-century notion that “ontogeny
cal terms and in terms of patterns of cell growth. recapitulates phylogeny” is no longer accepted, what kernel
● Brain cell growth includes not only the production of new
of truth to this idea still has value today?
nerve cells (neurogenesis), but also the tremendous elabo- 3. Should parents be allowed to “design” their babies? As
ration of connections, wherein new synapses are formed researchers are increasingly able to link specific human genes
between neurons (synaptogenesis). In addition, later prun- to developmental outcomes, it may soon become possible
ing of connections, or synaptic pruning, and forms of pro- for parents to specify, in cases of in vitro fertilization, which
grammed cell death, or apoptosis, seem to be used to sculpt
sperm should be allowed to fertilize which egg. How much
efficient neural pathways in response to patterns of experi-
control should parents have over specifying the kind of baby
ence and neural firing. Myelination, the enclosing of axons
they want?
with myelin, speeds the conduction of the nerve impulse.
● New nerve cells develop near the center of the brain and
migrate to outer layers of the brain. Individual neurons “find corpus callosum (p. 57)
KEY TERMS
their way” to remote locations in the brain using chemical
gradients that guide them to their targets. When the grow- action potential (p. 59) critical period (p. 35)
ing neuron reaches its destination, chemical gradients trigger allele (p. 37) crossing-over (p. 42)
the growth cone at the end of the axon to interconnect with apoptosis (p. 61) dendrite (p. 59)
other neurons. dizygotic (DZ) twins (p. 43)
axons (p. 59)
● Brain structure changes considerably after birth, primar-
base pair (p. 36) DNA (p. 36)
ily from the formation of new neuronal connections rather
than from the production of new neurons. Moreover, neu- behavioral genetics (p. 67) dominant (p. 37)
rons deprived of specific input may die off, but compensation behavioral genomics (p. 68) ectoderm (p. 44)
plasticity may lead a brain deprived of normal inputs and bilateral symmetry (p. 44) egg cell (p. 42)
processing routines to form new connections and become embryo (p. 44)
brainstem (p. 57)
devoted to other functions instead. endoderm (p. 44)
● Puberty is a period distinguished by changes not just in the
canalization (p. 39)
anatomy and physiology of the body as a whole, but also in cephalocaudal development environmental niche (p. 36)
the brain in particular. Neural circuits involving emotions, (p. 44) epigenetic regulation (p. 39)
reward systems, and cognitive control become interconnected cerebellum (p. 57) experience-dependent
in ways that shift the degree to which adolescents and young cerebral cortex (p. 57) plasticity (p. 64)
adults engage in a range of behaviors, such as taking risks. fetus (p. 46)
cerebrum (p. 57)
chromosome (p. 36) frontal lobe (p. 57)
Behavioral Genetics
● A classic technique for studying links between genes and codominant (p. 37) gamete (p. 42)
behavior, behavioral genetics typically uses twins with dif- compensation plasticity gastrulation (p. 43)
ferent degrees of genetic relatedness (MZ and DZ twins) and (p. 63) gene (p. 36)

STUDY AND REVIEW 73

genome (p. 36) mesoderm (p. 44) neurulation (p. 46) sexual differentiation
genotype (p. 38) methylation (p. 39) occipital lobe (p. 58) (p. 52)
glial cells (p. 60) migration (p. 60) parietal lobe (p. 57) sperm cell (p. 42)
growth cone (p. 60) mitosis (p. 42) phenotype (p. 38) stem cell (p. 66)
heritability (p. 67) monozygotic (MZ) twins placenta (p. 43) synapse (p. 59)
heterochronic gene (p. 40) (p. 43) pleiotropic (p. 69) synaptic pruning
heterozygous (p. 37) myelin (p. 60) polygenic (p. 69) (p. 61)
homeobox (p. 50) myelination (p. 60) preterm infant (p. 47) synaptogenesis (p. 61)
homeobox genes (p. 50) neural tube (p. 45) primitive streak (p. 44) temporal lobe (p. 57)
homozygous (p. 37) neurogenesis (p. 60) radial glial cell (p. 60) teratogen (p. 54)
Hox genes (p. 50) neuron (p. 59) recessive (p. 37) trisomy 21 (p. 42)
meiosis (p. 41) neurotransmitter (p. 59) regulatory cascade (p. 38) zygote (p. 43)

74 CHAPTER 2 THE BIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT

PA R T I I
Origins
 3
Coming to Perceive the World
Vision Hearing Intermodal Perception
• Perceiving Differences in Brightness • Noticing and Remembering Sounds
and Acuity Conclusions
• Locating Sounds
• Color • Perceiving Complex Sound Patterns Summary
• Depth Perception
• Perceiving Patterns and Recognizing The Chemical Senses:
Objects Taste and Smell
• Face Perception • Taste
• Smell
 n the northwest coast of India, outside the city Although her ability to see fine details seemed permanently

O of Ahmadabad, there is a small village. Many

of its inhabitants live in extreme poverty with
minimal access to health care. In one family
that lived together in a 10-by-12-foot room,
a baby girl was born with dense cataracts in the lenses of
both eyes, which prevented her from seeing patterns of light;
instead, she could see only the kind of diffuse light and shad-
degraded and she made more face recognition errors than
normal viewers would, the consensus was that she had made
a striking recovery. Moreover, she seemed to have acquired
these perceptual skills gradually, learning ways of seeing
shapes and patterns.
Her experience raises some central questions about per-
ceptual development. How does the newborn perceive the
owy forms that might be visible through a dirty, frosted win- world, and how do perceptual capacities change in the first
dowpane. From her birth in 1972 until the age of 12, she years of life? How much of perceptual development is based
lived as a blind person who could tell only general differences on learning from experience, and how much depends on the
in dark and light. She needed a guide to help her walk about biological maturation of perceptual systems? Does vision or
or to identify objects. When she was 12, her parents received any other sense have a critical period, such that certain kinds
a government subsidy that allowed doctors to remove the cat- of perceptual experiences must happen during a particular
aracts and provide her with glasses, which allowed her eyes to time frame for the perceptual ability to mature normally?
receive patterned light for the first time. How does information from different modalities, such as
The critical question was whether, at age 12, she would vision and hearing, interact in the course of development?
still be able to learn to see. Would she come to recognize These questions, along with others raised later in this chap-
faces, places, and objects that she had never experienced ter, frame the study of perceptual development.
visually? Could she use vision to find her way around in the Recall the newborn that we discussed at the beginning
world? For vision, is there a critical period in which certain of Chapter 1. Remember the perceptual challenges that he
kinds of experiences are necessary for normal visual devel- was faced with during his first week of life—blinking lights,
opment? Some 20 years after her surgery, researchers visited loud noises, people looming over him. Remember his appar-
the woman and addressed these questions in great detail ent helplessness when he was assailed by sounds and sights
(Ostrovsky et al., 2006; see Figure 3.1). as he was moved from the hospital nursery, put into a car,
The researchers discovered that it is possible to be able and driven home by his parents. Yet, despite their seeming
to learn to see surprisingly normally, even after spending helplessness, newborns actually come prepared to recognize
the first 12 years of life essentially blind. The woman now some visual patterns and voices and tastes. In this chap-
used her vision to recognize faces and facial expressions, and ter, we will see that infants are not like formless clay, wait-
she perceived depth well enough to judge objects’ locations. ing to let experience leave its mark on them. Nor are they
fully mature perceptual creatures. A great deal of perceptual
development and learning occur in the first year of life. The
mechanisms of developmental change often involve feed-
back loops between the infant and the environment, in
which an experience causes a change in the infant’s state,
which in turn influences how the infant’s next experiences
are processed. For example, early experience with visual pat-
terns helps foster growth of areas of the visual cortex that
support pattern perception. Growth in the cortex supports
higher-resolution pattern perception, which in turn causes
further development in the visual cortex. This constant
interplay between organism and environment is an essential
theme throughout this book.
In addition, we will see that a fundamental developmen-
tal challenge is to be able to categorize different stimuli into
FIGURE 3.1 Restored vision and ability to see. The 32-year-old groups, whether it is a color category, such as red, or an
woman seated at the computer is being tested for her visual skills object category, such as dogs. That essential ability to cat-
by researchers who are studying whether there is a critical period egorize makes perception and cognition more efficient by
to learn to see. The woman was born with severe cataracts that pre-
allowing us to apply some of what we learn to whole cat-
vented her from seeing more than light and dark as a child. After she
had an operation to remove her cataracts at age 12, she was able egories of things, rather than having to learn about each
to acquire the perceptual visual skills that enabled her to recognize instance separately. In this chapter, we will see that several
shapes and faces and to judge depth, although she did have some kinds of categorization play fundamental roles in perceptual
subtle deficits in facial processing. development.

COMING TO PERCEIVE THE WORLD 77

 Lens

Pupil
Optic
Iris
nerve

FIGURE 3.2 Innate specializations in the eye. More than

300 years ago, it was obvious that the eye contained specializations
at birth for the kind of information (light) that it processed. Long
before the invention of the camera, people were aware that the eye
was “designed” to project images of light on the retina in such a
manner that it could be “read” by the mind within. Such specializa-
tions included a lens and cornea to focus the light, an iris to control Fovea
the amount of light, a ciliary muscle to adjust the focal length of the
lens, a retina for receiving the focused light, a fovea for processing
the most important information, and an optic nerve for transmitting Retina Cornea
information to the brain. All these specializations were clearly pres-
ent at birth and were tailored for information in light, as opposed to
sounds or smells. Ciliary muscle

We begin our discussion of perceptual development with tem consists of two eyes, each with a cornea, a lens, an iris,
vision, often thought to be the most complex perceptual sys- a retina with a two-dimensional, light-sensitive surface, and
tem in development. Vision also nicely illustrates the con- an optic nerve that seems to carry visual information from
trast between sensation and perception. Sensation involves the retina to the brain (see Figure 3.2). In short, they realized
registering sensory information as it is initially taken in— that the visual system has extensive anatomical specializa-
for example, by the retina of the eye, the hair cells of the tions tailored to receiving information in the form of light.
auditory system, or the taste buds of the tongue. Perception Given the easily observable structures and specializations
involves interpreting sensory input, such as understanding of the eye, an empiricist would argue that these are simply
that certain shapes and contours make up a face, knowing sensory constraints that affect the initial processing of visual
that one object appears farther away than another, or recog- information. In this view, these sensory specializations are
nizing particular sound patterns as a voice. We will examine largely separate from the more impressive perceptual abilities—
such topics as the sharpness of vision, color vision, depth such as seeing objects in depth, differentiating colors, and
perception, and face perception. recognizing patterns and objects—which are thought to arise
From vision we move on to hearing, asking how infants from an all-purpose associative learning system. By contrast,
notice and locate sounds and how they pick up on more the nativist would argue that specializations similar to the
complex patterns, such as those of speech. We then consider eye’s facility for processing light might well occur at every level
the chemical senses of taste and smell, asking whether new- of perceptual processing—from the most peripheral sensory
borns seem to distinguish different tastes using the same receptors in the eye all the way “upward” to the highest-level
categories that adults do and whether smells help them conscious impressions of visual perception. Over the centu-
respond more effectively to the world. Finally, we consider ries, both points of view flourished and attracted many adher-
how infants integrate information across these different ents, largely because there was no experimental evidence that
avenues of perception—for example, how a baby links his seemed to strongly favor one view over the other.
sister’s voice with her face. In all these explorations, we will Starting in the 1960s, however, a rapidly growing body of
return to the questions raised earlier about the blind girl research on young infants’ capabilities started to reveal the
whose sight was restored and the newborn arriving home. extent to which visual perception requires specialized process-
ing capacities. One way to approach the current state of this
research is to consider the sensory and perceptual capacities
of the young infant as we move “upstream” from the most
Vision peripheral, basic, and sensory visual input to more central,
complex, and perceptual visual experiences. For example,
Thinkers in several fields have long been interested in our at a peripheral, sensory level, much of the ability to register
understanding of the visual world and how it develops from light at different levels of brightness involves processing that
infancy. In fact, seventeenth-century scholars already had a takes place in the retina, at the back of the eye. The more
fairly detailed understanding of the anatomy of the visual “midstream” level of visual processing, which involves much
system. They knew that from birth, the human visual sys- of the processing of color, happens in midbrain structures.

78 CHAPTER 3 COMING TO PERCEIVE THE WORLD

Finally, the highest levels of visual perception, which include
processing patterns, such as faces and distinctive shapes, heav-
ily involve the brain’s visual cortex. Nativists and empiricists
agree that specialized processing is crucial at the peripheral,
A B
sensory level; but as we move “upstream” from sensation to
perception, specific research findings are needed to help us FIGURE 3.3 Brightness perception in infants. (A) Although
determine whether higher-level visual processing is based on young infants can see differences in brightness levels, (B) they may
not be able to see the subtle differences that adults can see.
a general learning system or specialized processing capabili-
ties. We will therefore start by considering some of the ear-
liest, “downstream” visual capacities that involve perceptual Visual Acuity The ability to distinguish levels of bright-
understanding: the ability to see differences in brightness and ness within a field of view is typically not enough to know
the ability to see the contrasts between light and dark that rep- what that visual field looks like. Even when you can discern
resent lines and edges. Working our way “upstream,” we will subtle differences in brightness through a frosted window-
then explore more complex aspects of visual perception, such pane, you still may be completely unable to discriminate
as the ability to perceive colors, depth, and finally patterns. any patterns or to tell what kind of thing you are seeing.
Thus, a crucial precursor to higher-level pattern perception
must be visual acuity, the sharpness of vision based on the
Perceiving Differences in ability to see the contrasts in the world that represent lines,
shapes, and shadows. Does the newborn view the world as if
Brightness and Acuity through a frosted window, seeing nothing more than blurs
Virtually all theorists would grant that the newborn’s ability of varying levels of brightness? Such a world of undifferenti-
to detect different levels of brightness provides an impor- ated dark and light blotches would severely limit the infant’s
tant foundation for more sophisticated perceptual activities, visual experiences and, at least in the realm of vision, would
such as understanding patterns. If newborn infants couldn’t strongly resemble William James’s “blooming, buzzing
even distinguish between different levels of brightness—to confusion.”
perceive, for example, a dark line on a light background—it Since infants aren’t able to report what they see, research-
is difficult to imagine how they could learn anything else ers have devised indirect methods for investigating their
about the visual world. For this reason, asking about the visual and perceptual abilities. One of the oldest of these
different levels of brightness that an infant can perceive techniques is called the preferential looking method. The
serves as a common point of departure for researchers with idea behind this method is that infants might prefer look-
different views, rather than a source of controversy. ing at some displays (for example, striped patterns) more
Over an enormous range of brightness levels, a typical than others. When infants are presented with two types of
adult can perceive changes in brightness of as little as 1 per- displays at once and they reliably prefer to look at one rather
cent. Young infants do not consistently perceive this full range than the other, this suggests that they can detect a differ-
of differences, but even newborns have brightness discrimina- ence between the two. Researchers have used this technique
tion abilities that are sufficient to form a basis for higher-level to explore whether infants see only undifferentiated areas of
perceptual skills (Aslin, 1987). For example, infants as young light and dark or more detailed patterns and whether they
as 2 days old perceive differences between lamps of different have expectations about certain events.
brightness (Hershenson, 1964). Even more impressively, by at To measure an infant’s visual acuity using the preferen-
least 4 months of age, infants can judge relative levels of bright- tial looking method, a researcher could place two circles—
ness in an image by comparing two adjacent areas (Chien et one with wide black and white stripes and the other entirely
al., 2003; see Figure 3.3). Perceiving such relationships is a gray—side by side where the infant can see them and then
critical part of figuring out the actual brightness of an object monitor the infant’s eye- or head-turning patterns (see
seen under different lighting conditions. Thus, if you see a Figure 3.4). If the infant sees the difference and prefers to
pure white square in low light, it may appear darker than a look at, say, the circle with stripes, the experimenter might
gray square lit with bright light. But if you see the white square then replace that circle with another that has thinner stripes
next to the gray one and compare them, the white one clearly and therefore requires greater visual acuity to distinguish it
looks brighter, even under different levels of illumination. from the gray circle. As long as the infant continues to show
a preference for the circle with stripes, the experimenter con-
tinues to substitute new patterns of finer and finer stripes to
Q: Do young infants see differences in show along with the gray circle, until the infant shows no
brightness? preferential looking. At that point, the researcher assumes
that the infant can no longer detect a difference between the

VISION 79
 Video camera

Young infant Adult

A B
FIGURE 3.4 Testing visual acuity in infants. (A) This setup for assessing visual acuity has a rectangular panel containing a square with grat-
ings (thick or thin stripes) and a gray square (indicated by the dots) that cannot be distinguished from the background. To assess whether the
infant can detect the square with the stripes, researchers monitor where the infant prefers to look, as indicated by fixation of his gaze. Adapted
from Courage & Adams (1990). (B) Ever finer gratings are used until the infant is not able to discriminate between the horizontal lines and a
gray square that is matched for the same overall level of brightness. At some point, all of us can no longer tell the difference between a very fine
set of lines and gray; for newborns that point seems to come quite a bit sooner. Although newborns certainly do not see a formless blur, their
visual world is considerably less sharp, and a 1-month-old’s acuity is far below the adult level of performance. From Teller & Bornstein (1986).

circles. If this procedure were repeated with many infants in essence, creates preferences. Most of us become bored if
of a particular age, the aggregated results would suggest a we see the same thing again and again. The habituation
threshold for visual acuity at that age, which could be com- method purposely creates this kind of boredom as a way to
pared with the threshold values for adults. create a preference for a new stimulus. At first, a gray panel
As simple as it sounds, there are several challenges in might be interesting enough to an infant that she would
making this technique work reliably. Researchers must be look at it for some time. But if it is shown and removed
vigilant that some other factor besides acuity isn’t causing repeatedly, even an infant reaches a point when she would
infants to look at one pattern more than another. For exam- rather look at almost anything else. When the infant seems
ple, researchers must ensure that the panels differ only in the completely bored with the panel, so that she hardly looks
acuity level required to see a difference between them, and at it when it is presented, she is said to experience habitua-
not in other ways, such as overall brightness. In addition, if tion to that stimulus. Habituation is used to study not just
the infant sits in a parent’s lap (which is common) and the vision, but also audition, olfaction, and taste.
parent can see the stimuli, the parent might unknowingly The experimenter then starts the critical second phase of
hold the infant a bit differently when the infant looks at the habituation method by introducing a second panel and
the gray panel. (This can be overcome by blindfolding the watching to see whether the infant shows dishabituation—
adult.) Moreover, the researchers collecting the data must be that is, renewed interest in response to the new panel. In a
“blind” to the experimental condition—that is, they should study of infants’ visual acuity, this new panel might have very
be unaware of which panel the infant is viewing. Other- fine-grained black and white stripes. If the infant doesn’t per-
wise, their own biases might influence the process. Finally, ceive the new panel as different from the original gray one,
a challenge involved in interpreting data from preferential then she should not dishabituate—that is, her looking time
looking paradigms is the possibility that an infant who can should not increase in response to the new panel. But if the
easily tell two displays apart visually might not always show infant does see a difference, she should initially look much
a preference for one over the other. longer when the new panel is presented, followed by a gradual
A second approach to measuring infants’ visual acuity decline in looking at the panel as she becomes bored with
involves the habituation method. Rather than hoping that it. To find a threshold measure of acuity, an experimenter
infants’ preferences will be strong enough to provide evi- might start with the second panel with the finest-grained pat-
dence that they can discriminate between stimuli, as the tern and then gradually substitute panels with more coarse-
preferential looking method does, the habituation method, grained patterns until dishabituation occurs. Changes in

80 CHAPTER 3 COMING TO PERCEIVE THE WORLD

 FIGURE 3.5 Idealized example of
If new striped panel is habituation and dishabituation. The
First exposure to a sufficiently coarse so as to be
graph shows habituation as measured
gray panel attracts seen as not gray but striped, it
will appear different and cause by decreases in looking time. The infant
some interest
dishabituation response fixates on a new stimulus and continues
to look at it until she grows bored and
Looking habituates. When a new stimulus appears
Sufficiently different
time that is clearly different from the original
(percent) stimulus, the infant will dishabituate and
fixate on that stimulus.

Upon repeated Too similar

exposures, becomes If new striped panel is
less interesting Number of trials 15 too fine grained to be
seen as striped and still
appears gray, it will
seem the same and
infant will continue to be
uninterested

looking times at a stimulus in a standard habituation/disha- In young infants, VEP measurements reveal sharper
bituation sequence are shown in Figure 3.5. levels of acuity than preferential looking or habituation
A third way of testing acuity is by the optokinetic nys- methods do. This discrepancy raises a fascinating question:
tagmus method. Optokinetic nystagmus is the jumping of Do some parts of the infant’s visual system start to detect
the eyes as they track a continuous succession of objects that fine-grained patterns before the infant is able to act on such
stream by, such as watching telephone poles stream by while information? That is, the infant’s brain may be registering
looking out of a moving train. In this method, researchers a certain level of acuity during initial perceptual process-
drag a panel of vertical stripes from right to left in front of ing, but it may not be able to translate that information
an infant to determine how fine-grained the stripe pattern into actually “seeing” at that level of acuity and using it as
must be before the infants’ eyes stop jumping from stripe to a basis for action. It may take time for those initial stages
stripe and behave as if it were one homogeneous gray pat- of perceptual processing to become fully integrated with
tern moving from right to left. higher levels of perception. The difference between VEP
Finally, acuity can be tested by measuring the electrical measures of acuity and those from habituation or preferen-
activity in the infant’s brain that is evoked by visual displays. tial looking highlights an important point about studying
This method, known as the visually evoked potential preverbal infants. Older children and adults can describe
(VEP) method, involves attaching electrodes to the baby’s how they are experiencing a visual display, but even with
scalp to measure brain activity and to determine at what careful, well-designed measurement techniques, it is still
point the changing striped patterns that the infant is watch- much more difficult to know exactly what preverbal infants
ing on a screen no longer cause corresponding changes in are experiencing.
the brain’s electrical activity. Thus, as an infant watches the Even if we assume that measures based on habituation
screen, the researcher might present a sequence of patterns, and preferential looking are the best indicators of what very
alternating between the same all-gray screen and different young infants actually see, they still show that infants have
black and white striped patterns, while monitoring the elec- enough acuity to perceive some lines, edges, and outlines.
trical activity in the infant’s brain. At the beginning of the Over the first year of life, acuity improves considerably
sequence, the striped pattern would be coarse-grained with (Norcia et al., 2005). Figure 3.6 summarizes the changes in
a few wide stripes. As the sequence progressed, the infant acuity in the first 3 years, based on average measurements
would be shown finer and finer-grained stripes. Initially, from visually evoked potentials, optokinetic nystagmus, and
every time the image on the screen switched from gray to preferential looking techniques (Courage & Adams, 1990;
striped, the researcher would measure a related change in Kellman & Banks, 1998; Teller & Movshon, 1986). Averag-
brain activity. But when the striped pattern became too ing across these measures, by age 6 months, the infant has
fine-grained for the infant to tell it apart from the solid gray nearly 20:100 vision, meaning she can see patterns at a dis-
pattern, the brain activity corresponding to the switch to tance of 20 feet about as well as an adult with normal vision
the striped pattern would not occur. could see the same patterns at 100 feet. Many nearsighted

VISION 81
 50
Visual acuity (cycles/deg)
VEP
10 OKN
FPL
5

20/20
1
20/25

Visual acuity
20/50
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Age (in weeks) 20/100
A
20/200
FIGURE 3.6 Changing visual acuity in infants. 20/400
Acuity clearly improves in the first 3 years of 20/800
life regardless of the particular measure used.
(A) Here increased visual acuity is shown using 0 3 6 9 12 24 36
visually evoked potentials (VEP), optokinetic Age (in months)
nystagmus (OKN), and (forced choice) preferential
looking (FPL) methods. By 6 months or so, the
infant’s acuity is sharp enough that it would
rarely limit other perceptual tasks. Adapted from
Kellman & Arterberry (2006). (B) The same photo
is superimposed on a preferential looking methods
curve to show how it would look to the infant at
different ages as acuity increases. B

adults without glasses cope with this kind of modest differ- These changes in the eye’s shape do not happen auto-
ence in acuity throughout their lives. matically according to a timetable of biological matu-
ration. Instead, the eye’s growth depends on whether it
receives focused input—that is, whether the light patterns
falling on the retina are sharply focused by the lens of the
Q: What are three different ways of measuring eye. If the light patterns on the retina are out of focus,
visual acuity in the human infant? the eye continues to grow until the patterns become more
focused (see Figure 3.7). Apparently, the eye “assumes”
that if the pattern is out of focus, it is because the eye is
Many other acuity-related factors also change during too small and the image is falling behind the retina, so
the first year of life, especially astigmatism. In astigma- the eye grows to adjust. This is generally true; a newborn’s
tism, stimuli at different orientations are perceived with eyes are almost always too small to project images opti-
different levels of acuity. Thus, a vertical line might be mally on the retina.
in sharp focus while an otherwise similar horizontal line Humans are not the only species in which the growth of
would be blurry. The perceptual differences caused by the eyes depends in part on how sharply the retinal images
astigmatism are dramatic in very young infants, but only are focused. Researchers have found that manipulating the
minor in most 1-year-olds and adults (Mutti et al., 2004). degree of focused input to the retinas of newly hatched
When adults experience astigmatism, it is typically due chicks affects the growth of the chicks’ eyes. If, from birth,
to distortions in the lens of the eye or the cornea, but in a baby chick wears contact lenses that keep its retinal images
young infants astigmatism is normal. It happens because blurry, its eyeball and retina will continue to grow far larger
the eyeball is irregularly shaped in early infancy, and than normal as the visual system keeps trying to expand to
consequently, the retinal surface is irregular as well. As the size that will properly focus the image. Conversely, if the
a result, only a small portion of the light that reaches the chicks experience sharply focused light on large regions of
retina can be in focus at one time. As the infant matures, the retina unusually early in their development, the eyeball
the eyeball grows and develops a more spherical form, and retina will stop growing at a smaller size than normal.
which reduces the astigmatism. Soon after the infant These environmental effects on the growth of the chicks’
is 1 year old, his eyeball has become roughly spherical, eyes start to happen almost immediately after the image
such that the light passing through the lens now lands, in on the retina goes either out of or into focus (Judge, 1990;
focus, on the whole retina. Wallman et al., 1987; Zhu et al., 2005). Of course, there are

82 CHAPTER 3 COMING TO PERCEIVE THE WORLD

 Retina Lens the information received from the retina. If you think of the
visual system as a video camera, its optical acuity would be
a function of how well the lenses focus the incoming light;
its processing acuity would depend on the sophistication
A B of the software—namely, how well it is able to process and
integrate the information from incoming light to assemble
a complete image. The development of processing acuity
in infants is not a simple maturational matter in which the
relevant neural networks develop on a set schedule regard-
less of visual inputs. Instead, similar to the development
C
of the eyeball and retina, the infant’s visual cortex also
FIGURE 3.7 Growing the eye into focus. (A) In the more imma-
requires increasingly focused input to develop the elabo-
ture eye, the focused image would fall behind the retina. (B) The
defocused image that falls on the retina causes the eye to grow until
rate neural connections that enable higher and higher levels
the image gets closer to the retina. (C) When the image is finally of acuity.
focused on the retina, feedback from that focused input tells the eye When the optical acuity of the eye itself is impaired,
to stop growing. This pattern of eye growth is yet another illustration it sends degraded inputs to the visual cortex, which can
of the feedback loops that exist between structures in the organism directly lead to impairments in processing acuity as well.
and the ways in which the organism interacts with its environment, in This is why, in many species, including humans, depriv-
this case with the surprising result of sensation influencing anatomy. ing the visual cortex of focused input inhibits the devel-
Adapted from Zhu et al. (2005).
opment of processing acuity in the brain, even when the
eye’s optical acuity is restored later. As described earlier
in the case of the girl in India, people born with cataracts
many important differences between the visual systems of
who receive corrective surgery after childhood never seem
chickens and humans, but the similar findings in monkeys
to regain full acuity (Ostrovsky et al., 2006). Regions of
(Hung et al., 1995; Smith et al., 2009; Troilo et al., 2000;
the brain require “practice” with certain kinds of visual
Wiesel & Raviola, 1977) make it seem likely that such an
experience and input to develop their normal processing
effect would also be found in humans.
capacity.
These findings in the visual system, in which biologi-
The effects of experience on acuity vividly illustrate the
cal maturation and environmental experience complement
concept of critical periods, those developmental “windows
each other, also illustrate how development can advance
of opportunity” during which specific sorts of inputs can
by way of a feedback loop. If incoming visual informa-
profoundly affect the organism in ways that are largely
tion from the environment is being processed at a low level
irreversible after the period is over. Thus, if the visual cor-
of acuity, the brain directs the eyeball and retina to keep
tex doesn’t receive appropriately focused input in the first
growing. When the eyeball and retina get large enough
few years of life, no compensating experiences later—even
to properly focus the incoming light, the brain senses an
20 years of wearing perfect corrective lenses—can fully
adequate level of acuity in its visual perception and directs
restore some forms of processing acuity in the visual cortex
the eye to slow its growth. Thus, environmental experi-
(Lewis & Mauer, 2005, 2009). At the same time, processes
ence modifies the internal system, which then modifies the
of biological maturation are also crucial to processing acu-
organism’s experience.
ity and the ability to benefit from the necessary kinds of
visual stimuli and experience. For example, preterm babies
show some early developmental delays in visual acuity com-
Q: How can different environmental experiences pared with full-term babies, even when they have the same
change the structure of the eye? amount of visual experience (Dobkins et al., 2009). The
preterm babies’ visual systems simply need some time to
mature before the babies can fully benefit from their visual
Visual Experience and Brain Development Both the experience.
eye itself and the visual processing areas of the brain grow
in ways that depend not only on biological maturation
but also on input in the form of visual experience. These
two levels of growth can be best understood by consider- Q: What sorts of critical-period effects are
ing the distinction between optical acuity, the sharpness of found in cases of deprivation of early visual
the image on the retina, and processing acuity, how well the experience?
brain’s visual cortex (near the back of the brain) processes

VISION 83
Color
Color is a vivid part of most people’s lives and may have
important uses in all cultures, such as picking out a brightly
colored object from a cluttered background, determining
the ripeness or poisonousness of various fruits, and perceiv-
ing changes in the weather. Newborn infants have quite
impressive color vision. They not only are able to tell apart A
different wavelengths of light (called hue), but also can
cluster wavelengths into categories very much like the ones
that adults use. Although it might seem that hue is simply
a formal word for color, it actually refers only to the aspect B
of color that depends on wavelengths of light. Our impres- FIGURE 3.8 Light categories and continua. (A) The light coming
sions of color are also influenced by the ratio of color to out of a prism (or rainbow), which is a smoothly varying continuum of
white light (saturation) and the display’s overall brightness. light frequency, appears to have “bands” corresponding to such easily
labeled colors as “red,” “blue,” and “green”; these bands are the con-
For the most part, when researchers discuss color vision in
sequence of the categorical perception of color. (B) By contrast, light
infants, they are talking about hue. intensity for continuously varying shades of gray varies in a smooth,
gradual manner from dark to light with no obvious “bands.”
Perceiving Hue and the Clustering of Hues Early on,
researchers used the techniques of preferential looking and
habituation to test infants’ color vision. In many of these
experiments, the investigators showed the infants pairs to cluster stimuli that vary along a continuum into discrete
of different-colored panels of equal brightness and then categories. Even though the stimuli differ only in small,
observed whether infants could distinguish between them. consistent increments, those that are grouped together in a
The studies suggested that infants have color vision very category seem highly similar to each other, while those in
early and that it improves significantly in the first 4 weeks of different categories seem markedly different (Goldstone &
life as infants develop the ability to distinguish ever-smaller Hendrickson, 2010; Harnad, 1987).
differences in hue (Peeples & Teller, 1975; Teller, 1998). Figure 3.9 illustrates the process of categorical percep-
These improvements are thought to result from increases in tion of color. The difference between the wavelengths of
the processing abilities of the whole visual system, not just blue 1 and blue 2 is the same magnitude as the difference
from parts specialized for color (Kellman & Banks, 1998). between the wavelengths of blue 2 and green 1. Yet, blue
Perceiving differences between hues is one thing; cluster- 2 and green 1 appear much more distinct from each other
ing sets of hues into color categories is quite another. When than do blue 1 and blue 2. The same pattern holds for other
you look at Figure 3.8A, it seems to have red bands, yellow color boundaries, such as green/yellow and yellow/red. Even
bands, and green bands, among others—but these bands when we’re looking at identical differences in physical wave-
of color are actually psychological constructs. The light lengths of light, we don’t always perceive the same degree of
pattern depicted in the figure, like the patterns created by difference between hues. Across most of the continuum of
prisms and rainbows, is actually a smooth continuum of wavelengths, a difference of 35 nanometers between hues
hues that runs from reds (with wavelengths of approximately is hardly noticeable. But at certain critical boundaries—
700 nanometers, or 0.0000007 meter) to blue-purples (with compare 470 and 505 nanometers—the 35-nanometer inter-
wavelengths of about 400 nanometers). All the colors of the val appears to separate quite different shades of blue and green
rainbow are situated at different points along this contin- (Boynton, 1979; Wandell, 1985).
uum of wavelengths. As observers, however, we do not expe- These differences in our discrimination abilities sim-
rience a world of gradually shifting colors; instead, we tend ply mean that we cluster groups of light wavelengths into
to see classes of colors that seem to have distinct boundar- classes, which we know as familiar colors such as red, green,
ies. This is in marked contrast to how we see a continuum blue, and yellow. One benefit of this perceptual tendency to
of different levels of brightness, as in the panel shown in categorize is that it simplifies our interactions with the world
Figure 3.8B. If shades of gray were perceived in the same and with others. Communicating the color of an object is
manner as hue, we would see bands reflecting different much easier if a relatively large range of wavelengths can
classes of grayness from white to black. be treated as roughly equivalent—as members of the same
This process of clustering wavelengths of light into class. Consider how much simpler it is to convey a color
familiar colors is one aspect of categorical perception. In than a specific shade of gray on the smooth continuum
its broadest sense, categorical perception refers to a tendency between black and white.

84 CHAPTER 3 COMING TO PERCEIVE THE WORLD

 Blue Green egories we perceive are not just the result of experience
35 nm 35 nm 35 nm and cultural exposure.
B1 B2 G1 G2
Studies of color perception across cultures further
support the idea that we do not learn color categories
400 450 500 550 solely from older members of our society but are instead
Light wavelength
endowed with perceptual color categories long before
FIGURE 3.9 Categorical perception of color. This section of culture has had much influence. It is true, however, that
the light spectrum shows the transition between blue and green different languages can help create the categories we per-
light. There is a constant continuum of increasing wavelength from
ceive. Older children and adults sometimes show patterns
400 nanometers to 550 nanometers. B1, B2, G1, and G2 represent
particular wavelengths of light along the continuum. Categorical of categorical perception that are closely linked to the
perception occurs because B1 and B2 are put in the same category color categories of their primary language (Reiger & Kay,
and are seen as quite similar to each other, as are G1 and G2, while 2009). Nonetheless, multiple studies have also found some
B2 and G1 are seen as more different, even though the difference in cross-cultural commonalities. For example, people from a
wavelength between each of the pairs is the same (35 nanometers). diverse range of cultures and linguistic backgrounds tend
These subjective differences in similarity create the bands that we see to select the same hues as the “best” examples of color
in a rainbow. The critical developmental question is whether these cat-
categories (for example, “the reddest red”; Berlin & Kay,
egories emerge as a consequence of visual experience and possibly
exposure to language or whether they are part of how infants see the
1969; Goldstone & Hendrickson, 2010; Heider & Olivier,
world right from the start. Adapted from Boynton (1979). 1972; Reiger & Kay, 2009).
How is it possible that preverbal infants tend to categori-
cally perceive colors in the same way, but older children and
Categorical Perception of Color Where do our color adults tend to intermix such cross-cultural consistencies with
categories come from? Do we come into the world with per- differences linked to language and culture? It now appears
ceptual capacities that lead us to group hues into certain that there may be two systems that influence the categori-
color categories, or do we learn color boundaries from our cal perception of color. The first one, in the brain’s right
elders through language and experience? Could repeatedly hemisphere, seems to be largely language free, is present in
hearing “red” in reference to a certain range of wavelengths early infancy, and probably develops largely through a pro-
instill in the child a sense of how to perceptually group dif- cess of biological maturation. The other is housed in the left
ferent reds together? In fact, no such experience seems to be hemisphere, where language is typically most active, and it
necessary. tends to emerge during the preschool years (Franklin et al.,
Using the habituation method introduced earlier, 2008a). In fact, toddlers will categorically perceive colors
researchers have shown that even 4-month-olds perceive that they don’t yet have words for with their right hemi-
color in categories. The infants are first habituated to a cer- sphere, but they will categorically perceive colors that they
tain wavelength of light projected on a screen. Once habitu- can name with their left hemisphere (Franklin et al., 2008b).
ated, the infants are tested to see how they respond to two In most contexts, if language-based color categories conflict
other hues of light, which are equidistant from the first in with preverbal ones from infancy, the language-based cat-
terms of wavelength. The crucial difference between the two egorical perceptions will tend to dominate. These findings
new hues is that one falls within the same color category as suggest that infants initially experience universal, common
the first (habituated) hue, and one falls outside this color color categories that are shaped and constrained by the early
boundary. For example, the infants might be habituated to development of the first, preverbal system. Within a few
an intermediate blue (blue 2 in Figure 3.9) and then tested years, the second system’s language-derived categories gain
to see whether they dishabituate more to green (green 1) or a predominant influence. Even adults can learn new, arti-
to a different blue (blue 1), both of which are 35 nanometers ficial color names for categories not represented in their
away from blue 2 on the spectrum. own language—and when they do, categorical perception
These studies have found that the infants dishabitu- of these colors is lateralized in the left hemisphere (Kwok
ate more strongly to wavelengths that fall outside the et al., 2011; Zhou et al., 2010). Some scholars think that
color boundary of the hue to which they were habitu- the left hemisphere may have a broader ability to acquire
ated (Bornstein, 1975; Bornstein et al., 1976; Franklin & new color categories and categorically perceive them such
Davies, 2004). Evidence for categorical perception of that it can do so even when the process is not mediated by
color in infants younger than 4 months of age is some- language (Holmes & Wolff, 2012). There are still clearly
what controversial, but some studies suggest that even two systems, with the right hemisphere being more mat-
newborns show categorical perception (Jones-Molfese, uration driven and the left hemisphere more experience
1977). Demonstrations of categorical color perception in driven, but language may be only one way of gaining such
young infants provide strong evidence that the color cat- experiences.

VISION 85
 ing closer. When infants as young as 1 month observe such
Q: What evidence supports the claims that expanding patterns, their reactions indicate that they perceive
very young infants can see color and that they depth. For example, if the looming object appears to be on a
trajectory to collide with them, they will pull their heads back.
perceive colors categorically? Alternatively, if the looming object is a doorway-like open-
ing, they will not try to move out of its path but instead will
seem to anticipate moving through the opening (Carroll &
An important principle emerges here that will extend Gibson, 1981; Schmuckler & Li, 1998; Yonas, 1981). Thus,
to our later discussions of cognitive development as well: not only are very young infants able to use looming as a depth
the ability to perceive and understand the world requires clue, they are also able to interpret looming objects differently
categorization. There is simply too much raw information from similarly sized looming openings.
for any organism to master unless it simplifies and treats Another type of dynamic cue, called motion paral-
the members of some large classes of stimuli, such as colors lax, tracks the different ways that near objects and far
or shapes, as equivalent for certain purposes. The ability objects appear to move relative to the motion of the eye. As
to categorize is one of the most important ways in which Figure 3.10 shows, when an observer sees an object, an image
infants and young children gain early footholds in percep- of the object falls on the observer’s retina. When the observ-
tual and cognitive development. er’s eyes move, the images of those objects on the retina move

Depth Perception
When a mountain goat is born in an especially steep area
of the Sierra Nevada Mountains, it needs to be able to tell
the difference between a small step down and a deep abyss
as soon as it can walk. Likewise, it is highly uncommon
for a baby squirrel to leap too far and miss the next branch
in its sights or for a puppy to fail to catch the ball you’ve
tossed. Animals that move about on their own would not
survive long if they could not sense the distance to objects
and surfaces. As adults, we use depth information whenever
we reach out and grasp something and whenever we move
through the world; we use it to drive, walk through crowds,
and avoid dangerous drop-offs. But despite the obvious evi-
dence that mature members of most visual species can per-
ceive depth, the question of whether human infants can do
so proved difficult to answer.

Cues to Depth Adults perceive depth with the help of three

types of cues: dynamic cues, binocular cues, and pictorial cues.
Researchers have explored the question of whether infants Eye changes position
have depth perception by designing experiments that test
whether infants perceive each of these kinds of depth cues. C1 C1 C2
Dynamic cues to depth are most active when either the
observer or the observed objects are moving, and they work B1 B1 B2
equally well when seen with just one eye or with both eyes. Position 1 Position 2
They do not require much acuity to be effective, which is one FIGURE 3.10 Motion parallax. Dynamic cues to depth work when
reason they can work so well even in low light or in a visually either the observer, aspects of the scene, or both are in motion.
cluttered scene, such as when glimpsing objects through the Motion parallax cues to depth are based on the relative movement
(or apparent movement) of objects based on their distance from
branches of a tree. Dynamic cues seem to be the first depth
the observer. When an observer moves, near objects and far objects
cues that infants can use; even newborns use them to some move at different rates. Here, the near object (the cow) seems to
extent. They are also clearly used by other species. move the longer distance (from C1 to C2), while the far object (the
One of the simplest dynamic cues seems to be looming— barn) appears to move the shorter distance (from B1 to B2). These
namely, the perception that a rapidly expanding object is mov- differences can be used to infer the relative distances of the objects.

86 CHAPTER 3 COMING TO PERCEIVE THE WORLD

at different rates, depending on how close up or far away the Binocular parallax
objects are. In this particular example, the near object is ini-
tially seen to the right of the far object. As the observer moves
from left to right, the near object appears to shift to the left of
the far object. These differences in relative rate of movement
allow us to perceive the relative distances of the two objects.
Motion parallax can be difficult to measure in young Pyramid
infants because it requires that they continuously track the viewed by
both eyes
motions of multiple objects while also keeping track of their
own movements. Nonetheless, at least by age 3½ months,
infants do seem to use motion parallax to perceive depth.
By this age, they dishabituate when they view a screen in What the left What the right
which depth relations between two objects appear to change A eye sees eye sees
in ways that would be highly unexpected or impossible look- Convergence
ing to someone using motion parallax cues (Nawrot et al.,
2009). At about the same age, they show a tendency to pref-
erentially reach for objects that motion parallax cues indicate
Eyes viewing α Eyes viewing β
are closer (von Hofsten et al., 1992). Other researchers have
inferred the use of motion parallax even in newborns. For
example, when newborn infants have one eye covered and
are presented with side-by-side stimuli consisting of a three-
dimensional display and a two-dimensional photograph of α β
that display, they will prefer to look at the three-dimensional
version (Slater et al., 1984). The researchers argued that with
one eye covered, the only major depth cue the infants can α>β
use is motion parallax. B
In short, infants begin using dynamic cues to perceive
FIGURE 3.11 Binocular cues to depth. Binocular cues to depth
depth as early as the first moments after birth and begin
require both a three-dimensional world and a viewer with two eyes.
using them to guide their actions as early as 1 month of age. Distance is based on (A) binocular parallax, which is the disparity
Experimental evidence suggests that they may not use some between two images (shown here as two different top views of the
dynamic cues, such as motion parallax, across the full range same pyramid), or on (B) the sensation of convergence of the eyes
of settings until somewhat later, possibly not until the third as they become less and less parallel for closer and closer objects
month of life. However, given that a wide range of species (angle α is greater than angle β). These cues tend to lose their
use motion parallax cues in their earliest moments, includ- effectiveness for objects that are not nearby, as the relative difference
ing many insects that move their heads from side to side between the eyes becomes negligible for faraway objects.
to gauge how far to jump toward an object (Kral, 2003), it
seems plausible that some early versions of motion parallax and the perceptual system interprets that disparity as infor-
cues may be present at birth in humans as well. mation about distance. The process of using these binocular
Binocular cues rely on subtle differences between the parallax cues to perceive depth is called stereopsis, which
two eyes to gauge how far away an object is. Two kinds involves fusing two images into one image with depth.
of binocular cues are most important to consider: binocu- The second binocular cue, convergence, is similar to
lar parallax and convergence. Binocular parallax (also binocular parallax, but rather than using the disparity
known as binocular disparity) refers to the slight disparity between the two eyes’ retinal images, convergence relies on
between the two eyes’ views of any object. As Figure 3.11 the way the two eyes move—becoming increasingly cross-
shows, the right and left eyes always view any object from eyed in order to focus on closer and closer objects. If you
slightly different vantage points, and the difference between focus both eyes on your finger while holding it very close to
their views can be used to predict how close the object is to your nose, you can feel a sensation of muscle strain; this is
the eyes. The greater the disparity between the two retinal also illustrated in Figure 3.11. Convergence cues allow us to
images, the closer the object is. The effect of binocular par- estimate the distance of an object by using the sensations of
allax is easy to observe by simply moving your fist closer and muscle tension in our eyes that correspond to pulling them
closer to your face while alternately viewing it through just into various angles of convergence.
one eye, then the other. As your fist gets closer, the differ- The seventeenth-century empiricist George Berkeley
ence between the images that each eye sees becomes larger, proposed that convergence cues are a key component of

VISION 87
the way infants learn to perceive objects in depth (Berkeley, the inability to fuse the right and left eyes’ images becomes
1709/1901; Pastore, 1965). More specifically, Berkeley sug- irreversible, even if the problem with the eye muscles is later
gested that the infant is born with only two simple depth- surgically corrected (Fawcett et al., 2005). Thus, a child as
related sensations—the convergence feedback from the eye young as 6 years old who has surgery to correct a cross-eyed
muscles when focusing on the object and the sensation of condition is unlikely to fully recover stereopsis, even after
the degree of reaching or movement required to touch the several years of normal visual experience. In such cases,
object—and an ability to associate these two sensations. the child often comes to rely on one eye much more than
Simply put, infants would begin to associate a strong sense the other to avoid seeing double. This critical-period effect
of binocular convergence with a near reach and weaker feel- is thought to apply to stereopsis in particular, and not to
ings of convergence with longer reaches. convergence, because children with misaligned eyes might
Berkeley’s empiricist model of learning to perceive depth still register the muscle sensations associated with eye move-
makes some general predictions. First, if this model is cor- ments toward greater or lesser degrees of convergence.
rect, the very young infant should simply be unable to per-
ceive depth, since she has not had time to learn the sensory
associations that Berkeley describes. Second, depth percep-
tion should emerge gradually, based on the amounts and Q: What is some evidence for a critical period
kinds of visual experiences the infant has had. The biggest for binocular vision in humans?
problem with Berkeley’s view is the evidence that many spe-
cies, including humans, have excellent depth perception
abilities in the absence of any learning experiences. Infants’ The critical period for developing binocular depth percep-
eyes will converge automatically to fixate on a close object tion has been documented more precisely in monkeys and
as early as 1 month (Hainline & Riddell, 1996), and infants cats. Like humans, monkeys and cats have certain neurons in
between 5 and 8 months old can use convergence informa- the visual cortex that fire only when both eyes receive input
tion as a cue to depth. simultaneously. These cells seem to be involved in comput-
It is more difficult to tell whether infants use binocular ing the disparity between the two images and fusing them
parallax to perceive depth with normal objects because this into one image. In a newborn kitten or monkey, however,
ability involves a precise mental comparison of the tiny dif- these binocularly driven cells tend to be less responsive than
ferences in the images that the two eyes see. But it is possible they are in older animals. They become more fine-tuned only
to artificially generate images that can only be seen when with considerable experience. If the animal wears eye patches
they are fused by the two eyes using parallax cues. (With on alternating sides to prevent that experience, the number
each eye individually, the viewer sees only a seemingly ran- of binocularly driven cells starts to diminish and eventually
dom pattern of dots.) To see whether infants use binocular die off (Freeman & Ohzawa, 1992). When this happens, no
parallax cues, researchers present such images to infants on amount of binocular visual experience later on can resurrect
a computer screen. When the images are set in motion on them (Crawford et al., 1996). This level of neural analysis
the screen, the researchers monitor whether the infant’s eyes concretely illustrates how critical-period effects are manifested
track the images’ movements. This technique has suggested in the nervous system. It shows how some neural circuits are
that stereopsis emerges in about the fourth month of life attuned to certain stimuli during a critical period and then
and becomes increasingly sophisticated over the next few become much less changeable, allowing them to operate more
months (Fox et al., 1980; Granrud, 1986; Wattam-Bell, efficiently (Hensch, 2004; Wang et al., 2010).
2003). One possible reason that younger infants do not use Pictorial cues can convey depth even in two-
stereopsis is that it may require greater visual acuity than dimensional scenes like paintings and photographs and can
they have yet developed (Brown & Lindsey, 2009). If young do so even when seen with only one eye. Figure 3.12 illus-
infants can’t see patterns below a certain level of resolution, trates three different types of pictorial cues: interposition,
as shown in the blurriest images in Figure 3.6B, they may texture gradients, and convergence in the distance. Interpo-
not be able to detect disparities in highly similar images. sition occurs when one shape overlaps another, suggesting
The development of stereopsis presents another example that it must be in front of the other. Texture gradients serve
of a critical-period effect. Some children are born with eye as cues to depth when a repeating pattern on a surface,
muscles that make their eyes excessively converge or diverge, such as the rough grid of a brick path, gets smaller and
resulting in either a “cross-eyed” or “wall-eyed” condition. smaller the farther away the surface is. Convergence in the
As a result, the separate images that their right and left eyes distance describes the way parallel lines, such as straight
see are too different for the brain to fuse them into a single railroad tracks, seem to meet as they extend toward the
image or to use the disparity between the images to provide horizon and thus show linear perspective, or the appear-
depth information. If this situation persists for several years, ance of distance as the lines converge. Adults in all cultures

88 CHAPTER 3 COMING TO PERCEIVE THE WORLD

A Interposition B Texture gradients C Convergence in the distance D Perspective illusion
FIGURE 3.12 Pictorial cues to depth. Pictorial cues to depth are those that indicate distance from the viewer by means of patterns on a
two-dimensional surface or picture. They work equally well with one or two eyes. (A) Some, such as interposition, in which one object covers
part of another object, appear in some of the earliest drawings in history. (B) Others, such as texture gradients, in which objects are depicted
as smaller as they become more distant, appeared later in art history. (C) Still others, such as convergence in the distance, which provides linear
perspective, appeared relatively late in the history of art and represented a major revolution in how to depict depth in paintings and drawings.
Pictorial cues require fairly high levels of acuity to be effective and also have the potential to be misleading, as shown in (D), where the cylinder
farthest to the right appears much bigger than the one farthest to the left, even though they are the same size. The apparent difference in size
is caused by pictorial cues to depth that suggest that the rightmost cylinder is farther away than the leftmost one.

can use these pictorial depth cues, but infants younger et al., 2002). These findings suggest that at around 6 months
than about 6 months do not seem to use them (Kellman & of age, a capacity emerges for using and integrating different
Banks, 1998). Thus, only humans older than 6 months are kinds of pictorial cues. It is interesting that in some tasks,
likely to be fooled by the illusion in Figure 3.12D, in which 5-month-old infants can readily see depth with two eyes
identical-size cylinders in fact look very different in size by using binocular cues, but they cannot see it with one
because of surrounding pictorial cues. eye when only pictorial cues are available (Hemker et al.,
One technique that researchers have used extensively to 2010). This pattern of results does not necessarily mean that
investigate when infants use pictorial depth cues relies on the ability develops solely as a consequence of maturation;
the simple fact that when young infants are presented with
two objects, they consistently reach for the nearer one. A
clever experimenter can use this reaching preference to find
the conditions under which the infant sees a difference in
depth. In one study, researchers showed 5- and 7-month-old
infants a “window” like the one in Figure 3.13, which con-
tained several pictorial cues to depth (Yonas et al., 1978).
They then observed whether the infants more often reached
toward the side of the window that would appear closer
if the infants were relying on pictorial depth cues. The
5-month-olds showed no preferential reaching for the edge
that would seem nearer based on pictorial cues. Instead, A B
they responded to the surface as if it had no patterns on it FIGURE 3.13 Sensitivity to pictorial depth. (A) A simple trap-
at all, reaching for various parts seemingly at random. In ezoid conveys an illusion of depth, but it is not as compelling as
contrast, the 7-month-olds consistently reached for the edge (B) the illusion conveyed by an Ames window, where the right side
that would have looked closer to someone using pictorial seems farther away because of pictorial cues to depth. These cues
cues. Recall from the visual acuity studies discussed earlier are convergence in the distance (the top and bottom lines of the
that 5-month-olds could easily see the lines and shadows window become closer to each other) and texture gradients (the
that serve as the pictorial cues. Nonetheless, they did not window panes become smaller in the distance). Young infants who
cannot use pictorial cues to depth will reach equally for the right and
use them to see depth.
left sides of the Ames window or in the middle, while older infants
Studies of many other pictorial depth cues have found will reach more for the left side, thinking it is closer. This is one case
this same time frame to be significant: 5-month-olds typi- where younger infants are more accurate; they are not misled by
cally do not use pictorial cues effectively, but 7-month-olds an illusion of pictorial depth. Adapted from Ames (1951) and
do (Hemker et al., 2010; Kellman & Banks, 1998; Yonas Yonas et al. (1978).

VISION 89
learning experiences could be important as well. It is not yet
clear why the ability to use pictorial cues develops later in
infancy than the ability to use dynamic cues or binocular
cues. One possible reason is that getting depth information
from pictorial cues may require more learning or cognitive
interpretation than the other types of cues. Another possi-
bility is that pictorial cues may require more advanced levels
of visual acuity.

Which Depth Cues Predominate? Gibson’s Visual

Cliff Studies Several research projects have also shown
which kinds of depth cues dominate when different types
are pitted against each other. Generally, the earlier-emerging FIGURE 3.14 The visual cliff. Despite attempts by his mother to
cues tend to trump those that develop later. The best- induce him to cross the visual cliff, this infant is clearly hesitant. The
known research techniques to explore these questions were glass that covers the deep side of the cliff is nonreflective and illumi-
developed by Eleanor J. Gibson, the twentieth century’s nated such that the infant sees only the sudden drop-off.
most influential researcher in perceptual development. Gib-
son had an extraordinary talent for devising ways of study-
ing infant behavior that could yield remarkable insights smiling and enticing the baby with a favorite toy (Gibson &
into their perceptual development. She developed numer- Walk, 1960).
ous experiments that explored infants’ perceptual abilities How do we know which kind of depth cues the infants
in circumstances that resembled their natural interactions primarily used to avoid the “deep” side of the cliff? To check
with the world. for use of pictorial cues, Gibson and her associates compared
In the 1950s, while studying perception in newborn goats, infants’ performance on the two cliff setups shown in Fig-
Gibson was inspired to create a new experimental technique ure 3.15. Cliff A was carefully designed so that the drop-
for studying infants’ depth perception. She noticed that the off could not be seen by using pictorial cues to depth. On
busy handlers in the lab often had trouble keeping track of the deeper side of the cliff, the size of the checkered pattern
the baby goats, since even the newborns were able to wander was larger than the pattern on the shallow side. The pattern
around. The handlers solved this problem by placing restless sizes differed by precisely the right amount to project identi-
baby goats on a raised surface, such as a stool or countertop. cally sized squares on the retinas of infants crawling across
At the edges of these surfaces, the young goats would freeze, the glass surface; based on pictorial cues alone, the whole
apparently because they immediately perceived the differ-
ence in depth and feared falling. Gibson realized that the
newborn goats perceived depth without any prior experi-
ence. She devised the visual cliff technique to explore this
phenomenon systematically in several species, including
humans.
Figure 3.14 shows the visual cliff that Gibson developed.
It consists of a large, transparent, and nonreflective pane of
glass with two similar checker-patterned displays below it. A B
One-half of the glass pane had a checkered pattern directly
FIGURE 3.15 Dynamic clues to depth and performance on the
beneath it, so that the surface appeared solid. The other half of visual cliff. Infants were tested on visual cliffs in which there were
the glass pane had the same checkered pattern roughly 3 feet (A) motion parallax cues (dynamic cues produced by the different
below, giving the impression of a sudden drop-off, or “visual rates at which the two surfaces were seen to move when the infant
cliff.” A wooden plank across the pane’s surface divided the moved his head) without pictorial cues to depth (larger squares
two halves. The studies performed with this apparatus usually below appeared on the infant’s retina as the same size as the smaller
began with placing a 6-month-old on the wooden “bridge” squares above) or (B) pictorial cues (smaller squares on the left
between the two sides of the glass surface and observing where grid making it appear as if these squares were farther away than
the larger squares on the right grid) without motion parallax cues to
the infant crawled. Gibson and her team were especially inter-
depth (no differences in perceived rates of movement, since both
ested in how the infants would respond to the “cliff” side of grids were on the same surface). The infants resisted crossing the
the pane. Their findings were clear and dramatic. The infants visual cliff when dynamic cues indicated that there was a drop-off but
were quite reluctant to move onto the glass above the apparent not when pictorial cues indicated a drop-off. Adapted from Gibson &
drop-off, even when the infant’s mother was on the other side Walk (1960).

90 CHAPTER 3 COMING TO PERCEIVE THE WORLD

surface would appear level. Based on dynamic depth cues Age (in months)
induced by motion, especially motion parallax produced by 10
the different rates at which the upper and lower surfaces were
seen to move when the infants moved their heads, the visual
9
cliff would be obvious. The results were clear. The infants
fearfully stopped at the “edge” even when the pictorial cues
8
indicated a level surface, suggesting that they were relying
on dynamic cues. This finding gained further support when
the experimenters altered the visual cliff setup so that picto- 7
rial cues indicated a drop-off while dynamic cues indicated a
level surface. In this case, the infants happily crawled across 6
(Gibson, 1969; Gibson & Walk, 1960). To rule out use of
binocular cues, researchers have conducted similar studies in 5
which the infants wore an eye patch over one eye. In these
cases, infants using only monocular cues were just as likely 4
to avoid the cliff’s edge, indicating again that they were very Pictorial cues
likely relying on motion parallax cues (Walk, 1968). (e.g., perspective lines)
3

2
Q: In what ways does depth perception in
young infants differ from depth perception in 1
Binocular cues
older children and adults? (e.g., disparity)
0
Dynamic cues
(e.g., motion parallax)
Functional Significance of the Depth Perception Sys-
tem As we have seen, the development of depth perception FIGURE 3.16 Three different sets of cues specify depth for
reveals a consistent pattern (see Figure 3.16): The use of the infant. Dynamic cues such as motion parallax appear to be
dynamic cues emerges possibly as early as the first month used first, probably right at birth. Binocular cues start to emerge as
partially effective at around 1 month (as depicted by the dashed
of life. Then the effective use of binocular cues develops
lines), becoming much more effective at 4 months. Pictorial cues are
around 4 months, followed by the effective use of pictorial not effectively used until around 6 months of age, although some
cues around 6 months. From an evolutionary perspective, sensitivity to pictorial relations may appear as early as 4 months
what might account for this sequence? (as depicted by the dashed lines).
One important advantage for the early emergence
of dynamic cues such as motion parallax is that they are
almost always reliable in the natural world. By contrast,
later-developing pictorial cues can be misleading in many pretations of developmental patterns. Ideally, they also help
optical illusions that show contradictory representations predict new patterns and motivate new research.
of depth (see Figure 3.17). In addition, dynamic cues do
not require good visual acuity, but both pictorial cues and
binocular cues do. Under blurred conditions and with Q: Why might infants be able to use dynamic
only one eye, it is still possible to use dynamic cues such
as motion parallax or looming to infer depth relationships,
cues to depth before binocular and pictorial
even while it is not possible to use the other sorts of cues. cues?
Thus, dynamic cues are most useful to infants who initially
have poor acuity and who have to judge depth in conditions
of reduced acuity, such as in low light or with tears in the
eyes. The key point is that natural selection favors the most Perceiving Patterns and
robust and reliable early system for depth perception, the
dynamic cues, and these are the dominant cues in young Recognizing Objects
infants of most species. We will see that these sorts of evo- Do infants perceive meaningful patterns in the same ways
lutionary considerations, especially in comparative research that adults do? Do they, for example, devote more attention
across several species, can often provide meaningful inter- to human faces than to other recurring patterns in their

VISION 91
 to yield all the more complex outcomes. A purely empiri-
cist account of using visual primitives to perceive patterns
would claim that no prior biases influence the ways we form
associations between primitives. Instead, the only factor
determining which primitives become most closely linked
in the mind would be the frequency with which we see them
together in the environment. Thus, if an infant more often
A B
encountered two dots stacked vertically and enclosed by an
oval shape rather than two dots side by side within an oval,
that infant should become more attentive to vertical-dot
ovals than to pattern configurations that resemble human
faces. Alternatively, if infants do have a built-in bias to pre-
fer face-like stimuli, they would prefer to look at patterns
that resemble faces, even if they encountered those patterns
less frequently than other patterns.

C Pattern Perception in Other Species To understand

FIGURE 3.17 Misleading pictorial cues. These “impossible” how pattern perception develops in human infants, it is use-
figures only look impossible to perceivers who use pictorial cues to ful to consider some other species that can be more easily
depth. Pictured here are (A) the Penrose triangle, (B) the devil’s tun- tested to determine whether pattern perception is possible
ing fork, and (C) the Penrose stairs. The ability to identify impossible without learning from experience. If pattern perception
figures may not be present in infants until at least 4 months of age.
must develop from learned associations between basic visual
Adapted from Shuwairi et al. (2007).
elements, organisms would never enter the world with pre-
dispositions to perceive certain patterns. To challenge this
environment? Are their perceptions of other more novel view, we would have to study either newborn animals or
things, such as a new kind of toy, completely unorganized, those deprived of visual experience from birth to determine
or do they seem able to interpret and understand unfamiliar if there are some species that can perceive patterns even
things to some extent? without any experience. In fact, we don’t have to look very
A strict empiricist account would hold that the new- hard; many species are born with such abilities.
born does not have any perceptual capacities along these Consider, for example, the barnyard chicken, which
lines. But we have seen that Berkeley’s early empiricist view must keep watch for predatory birds such as hawks. Since
that infants have to learn depth perception from experi- hawks have a highly characteristic silhouette, as shown in
ence is incorrect. Not only do newborns of other species see Figure 3.18, it might seem that the chicken’s simplest pat-
objects in depth, but even human newborns rapidly develop tern perception ability would simply trigger a reaction to
depth perception on a reliable, regular time frame. These a hawk’s silhouette. Unfortunately, many chicks’ environ-
observations don’t fit well with the empiricist account of ments are also populated by harmless geese with quite
having to learn the various ways of perceiving depth. Fur- similar silhouettes—except for one critical difference. The
thermore, it makes sense that components of depth percep- hawk’s head and the goose’s head are on opposite sides of
tion would not require learning through experience, since the same overall shape. Because the chicks need to recognize
the ability to perceive depth allows organisms the basic, the dangerous hawk silhouette from too great a distance to
necessary capacity to move through the world. But is it pos- make out the details of the head, they are endowed with an
sible that infants’ innate propensities might stop at the level elegant solution: the chicks’ “hawk detector” only signals
of depth perception and that they need experience to learn danger when the silhouette moves in a direction compatible
more complex, “higher-level” types of perception, such as with the hawk’s head placement (see Figure 3.18).
recognizing patterns and objects? This very early pattern perception ability has been dem-
The idea that humans may come into the world with onstrated experimentally by towing silhouettes overhead
propensities to see only the simplest visual elements, such across large yards of chicks or ducks. They scatter and seek
as angles, dots, and lines, which the brain then unites into cover only when the smaller bump on the silhouette is on
more elaborate patterns through general laws of associa- the leading edge of its movement (Canty & Gould, 1995;
tion, is a very old one (Helmholtz, 1866/1962). This idea Tinbergen, 1951). Chicks will show this behavior without
resembles a method often used in the physical sciences, any prior exposure to hawks, geese, or any other predatory
which involves reducing complex phenomena to a small set birds (which share a similar silhouette). Thus, the chicks
of “primitives,” or basic components that can be combined have an innate ability to perceive not just a pattern but a

92 CHAPTER 3 COMING TO PERCEIVE THE WORLD

 Goose ceive or do, an evolutionary perspective on development can
help us understand the organism’s tendencies to more easily
perceive or behave in certain ways.
Finally, consider the complex perceptual problem that
some species of frogs need to solve to survive. They must
identify nearby bugs fast enough to snatch them out of
the air with the sticky end of their projectile-like tongue.
We know that these frogs are able to identify edible bugs
without prior experience, and we have a good grasp of the
neural anatomy that enables them to do so. More than
50 years ago, neurobiologists showed that clusters of cells in
Hawk
the frog’s retina fire when a small, bug-shaped object makes
A
jerky, bug-like movements in the frog’s field of view (Lett-
vin et al., 1959). Thus, even before the visual information
reaches the frog’s modest brain, the retina itself detects a
“bug” in the environment and initiates the sequence that
leads the tongue to dart out. In this case, “pattern percep-
tion” is achieved without full processing by the central ner-
vous system, thus illustrating how pattern recognition can
occur without the support of any of the systems that nor-
B C
mally support learning in vertebrates.
FIGURE 3.18 Innate pattern perception and avoidance of
predators. (A) The silhouette appears as a hawk when towed to
the right and as a goose when towed to the left. Barnyard chickens
recognize this dynamic combination of a pattern and path of move- Q: Give examples of visual pattern recognition
ment when they see (B) a goose in flight and (C) a hawk in flight.
Silhouette adapted from Tinbergen (1951).
abilities in nonhuman species that are present
from birth.

pattern moving in a certain direction relative to its shape. It might seem as if this wide array of built-in mechanisms
This remarkably sophisticated ability shows that not all pat- for picking out specific environmental patterns would pro-
tern perception requires learning from experience. vide powerful evidence against empiricist accounts of the
A simpler example in the same species has to do with development of pattern perception. But the empiricists have
the way chicks peck at their food. Newborn chicks will not a strong reply when it comes to using these kinds of findings
peck the same amount at all seed-size objects; their pecking about nonhuman animals to theorize about pattern percep-
rate strongly depends on the object’s shape. In general, they tion in humans. Consider again the frog’s bug detector.
peck more at rounded objects than at those with straight Although it is marvelously efficient, it has one potentially
edges and sharp angles (Fantz, 1957; see Figure 3.19). This devastating drawback for organisms that live in varied and
preference makes sense, given how rarely natural foods— changing environments. It is so “hard-wired” in the frog’s
or other things in the natural world—have straight, angu- visual system that it is inflexible and unable to deal with
lar contours. This might seem strange, since chicks didn’t environmental changes. When a new type of bug that is
evolve in an environment that would have required them much easier to catch and more nutritious enters the environ-
to distinguish natural from human-made objects. But their ment, the frog can only benefit if this new food source has
perceptual bias is better understood not as a tendency to the right properties to trigger the bug detector. Some species
avoid non-natural things, but as a tendency to better per-
ceive and act on natural ones. These built-in preferences are
not for specific foods. Rather, these broad predispositions
provide a “head start” in perceptual learning about natural
foods that makes the learning process easier. Later work has
suggested that, beyond foods, newborn chicks have quite A B
general perceptual preferences toward displays that are FIGURE 3.19 Perceptual bias for natural shapes. Newborn
physically possible as opposed to impossible (Regolin et al., chicks prefer to peck at objects like those shown in (A) as opposed
2011). As we will see in later chapters as well, rather than to those in (B). In this way, they show built-in constraints on pattern
placing limits on what the developing organism can per- perception. Adapted from Fantz (1957).

VISION 93
of frogs will starve in a cage full of nutritious, anesthetized see that this plasticity initially develops within a set of per-
bugs just like those they normally catch in the wild because ceptual constraints that are critical for the earliest pattern
the bugs are not moving and the frogs don’t recognize them perception.
as food. Thus, as remarkable as these early emerging exam-
ples of pattern recognition are in other species, we need to
look beyond these fixed and inflexible pattern recognition Q: What are the tradeoffs between a pattern
abilities to fully understand the development of pattern recognition ability that is fully functional at
perception in humans. Like many animals, humans have birth and one that requires considerable
the capacity to learn to recognize many novel patterns after
having some exposure to them. environmental input?

Plasticity in Perceptual Development When consider-

Perceptually Grouping the World Right from the start,
ing capabilities and behavioral tendencies from an evolu-
our highly plastic perceptual abilities are guided by con-
tionary perspective, it can be helpful to think of the process
straints that do not require prior learning. These perceptual
of evolution by natural selection interacting with two devel-
frameworks help guide the growth of our more flexible,
opmental challenges that compete with each other: (1) The
adaptive abilities to perceive patterns. These interactions
organism needs to be viable from birth onward, which
between broad, foundational constraints and more plastic
requires that a number of systems must be immediately and
perceptual abilities are evident in the way that an infant
continuously available, such as those that recognize food.
comes to perceive an object’s different parts as components
(2) The organism needs to be able to flexibly respond to new
of a single, unified whole based on Gestalt principles,
challenges and opportunities. Thus, there is a critical trade-
which provide ways of distinguishing one whole object from
off between highly efficient but inflexible abilities (like the
another. Consider the objects shown in Figure 3.20, part of a
frog’s bug detector) and more adaptive, flexible abilities that
series of studies that explored the infant’s ability to infer the
may be less efficient at first but that enable the organism
shape of an object partly hidden behind a barrier (Kellman &
to adjust to environmental changes later in development.
Spelke, 1983; Kellman et al., 1986). It turns out that infants
Abilities that enable an organism to adjust to environmen-
show no preferences for the solid rod over the broken rod
tal changes are often described as “plastic,” and the poten-
when the entire display is standing still. When the rod moves
tial advantages of such plasticity are enormous. Plastic
behind the barrier, however, the infant clearly expects it to
perceptual skills also enable the organism to adjust to its
be one object. This pattern is related to the classic Gestalt
own changing states over the course of development. For
principle of common fate, whereby elements that move
example, in many growing organisms, the distance between
together are likely to be perceived as part of the same
the eyes can change dramatically. In other cases, an organ-
object (Koffka, 1935; Palmer, 1999; Wertheimer, 1958). For
ism may suffer damage to an eye that degrades the quality
infants, common fate seems to provide a weaker cue than
of visual input. A plastic perceptual ability could adjust to
it does for adults about whether distinct parts make up a
these kinds of changes as well.
single object. If the two parts’ edges are misaligned (so that
The benefits of plasticity make clear a powerful tension
the lines appear to be offset), then 4-month-olds have much
between two different paths for perceptual development,
each of which confers different advantages for the organism.
One developmental course favors a newborn who is imme-
diately able to negotiate his world, and the other course
favors a developing organism who is less capable early on
but becomes able to adjust flexibly to a changing world and
his own changing needs. The process of natural selection
has yielded different kinds of resolutions to this tension
in different organisms. Some are born with powerful but A B C

inflexible systems of behavior, while others come into the FIGURE 3.20 Perceiving object unity and common fate. When
world with fewer initial competencies but with considerable 4-month-old infants see two rod segments moving behind an occlud-
plasticity. More complex organisms usually develop more ing box (A), they infer that one unbroken rod is present (B) and not
two fragments (C), even though the fragments are in some respects
plasticity. For example, mammals seem able to respond to
more similar to the original display. When the initial display is static,
their environments with much more plasticity than insects the same infants tend to prefer the broken rod display. Younger
can. We will see that human infants show great plasticity infants prefer the broken rod even in the dynamic condition. Newborn
in the ways they learn to perceive not only visual patterns, chicks, however, prefer the unbroken rod in the moving condition.
but auditory patterns as well. At the same time, we will also Adapted from Kellman & Spelke (1983).

94 CHAPTER 3 COMING TO PERCEIVE THE WORLD

weaker expectations than adults do about the two parts of a human face. Are humans born with a neural circuit that
being connected (Smith et al., 2003). Edge alignment is one is specialized to be sensitive to face-like configurations?
form of another Gestalt principle known as continuation— Before testing whether infants can recognize particular
that is, perceiving smoothly continuous or aligned edges as faces or emotional expressions, researchers first sought to
bound objects (Palmer, 1999). Young infants use both com- determine whether infants recognized the distinct con-
mon fate and edge alignment, which reinforce each other, to figuration of human facial features. In particular, they
yield a perception of a unified object, whereas older children tested whether infants responded differently to the normal
and adults can easily make the same inference based on just arrangement of facial features than they did to a “face” in
one of those cues. which all the standard features were present but their place-
Thus, infants’ depth perception and pattern perception ment was scrambled (see Figure 3.21). Only if infants are
have an important feature in common: both are greatly able to distinguish between normal faces and scrambled
enhanced when the infant is looking at a dynamic, mov- ones does it make sense to take the next step and investigate
ing scene. It might seem that still images would be simpler whether they can detect differences between facial expres-
to perceive, and in fact, some researchers suggest that new- sions or tell individuals apart.
borns initially are sensitive to the static properties and need Do newborns prefer to look at normal faces over scram-
a few weeks to learn the dynamic relationships between bled ones? It is surprisingly difficult to find such a pref-
those properties, which then override the static ones (John- erence consistently, but research increasingly suggests that
son, 2004; Slater et al., 1990, 1994, 1996). Some early theo- when their responses are measured with sufficiently sensi-
rists suggested that infants are innately endowed with the tive experimental methods, infants do prefer normal faces
ability to use the full set of Gestalt principles, such as com- (Pascalis & Kelly, 2009; Quinn & Slater, 2003). Even when
mon fate and continuation, to group their perceptions in the scrambled features are arranged symmetrically around
meaningful ways (Bower, 1971, 1974, 1979). More recent a vertical centerline, like normal faces are (see Figure 3.22),
investigations of those principles have revealed two things: newborns prefer to look at the normal face (Easterbrook
First, in some circumstances, young infants can use per- et al., 1999).
ceptual principles similar to the classic Gestalt principles to When newborns show a preference for normal faces over
make sense of visual patterns and configurations. Second, scrambled ones, does this preference suggest that they have
early on they are much more prone to benefit from such a perceptual system specialized for faces? Such claims are
visual information when it is presented in moving and/or tempting, given that monkey cortex cells are tuned to mon-
three-dimensional contexts (Bertin & Bhatt, 2001; John- key faces and sheep cortex cells to sheep faces (Kendrick &
son, 2001; Kellman & Banks, 1998; Valenza & Bulf, 2011). Baldwin, 1987; Perrett et al., 1992). Furthermore, monkeys
Young infants use a diverse set of perceptual strategies to without any prior experience with faces can recognize other
perceive objects in the world around them. individual monkeys’ faces (Sugita, 2008), and they prefer
faces over non-face stimuli (Sugita, 2009). The young infants
in the scrambled face studies are clearly picking up on some
information that distinguishes the normal faces, but some
Q: What are some perceptual features or researchers argue that the infants’ face preference is actually
principles that infants can use to perceive objects rooted in a much broader perceptual bias: newborns prefer
as bounded wholes?

Face Perception
As infants use various perceptual principles and strategies
to begin to perceive and understand distinct objects, one of
the objects they encounter earliest and most frequently is the
human face. The ability to recognize a caregiver’s face enables A B
an infant to know where to direct his efforts for comfort or
FIGURE 3.21 Normal versus scrambled faces. From 3 months
protection. The ability to tell a happy face from an angry
on, humans immediately see a dramatic difference between faces in
face enables an infant to know when to approach or avoid which features are normally configured (A) as opposed to scrambled
another person. The salience of human faces in infants’ lives (B). Although it is much more difficult to show such preferences in
has led researchers to ask whether young infants, and per- newborn infants, most researchers today would agree that such pref-
haps even newborns, are predisposed to process the features erences are present at birth. Adapted from Bhatt et al. (2005).

VISION 95
 sions from fearful ones, showing a preference for happy faces
(Farroni et al., 2007). They also prefer face-like stimuli over
other kinds of stimuli when the face’s eyes and mouth are
dark relative to the background (as is true of humans from
all backgrounds), but they do not show this preference when
the eyes and mouth are lighter than the background (Far-
A B
roni et al., 2005). As we will see shortly, they also show
preferences for attractive faces over unattractive ones (Slater
FIGURE 3.22 Scrambled but symmetrical faces. Even when
scrambled faces are symmetrical around a vertical centerline (the et al., 1998, 2000a).
way normal faces are), infants prefer (A) normal faces to (B) scram- Despite newborns’ impressive face perception abilities,
bled but symmetrical faces. Adapted from Easterbrook et al. (1999). more subtle analyses of faces seem to take a few months to
develop (Lee et al., 2013). For example, although newborns
prefer normal faces to scrambled ones, they do not show
to look at ovals with “top-heavy” patterns—that is, arrange- a preference for normal faces over highly distorted faces
ments with more dark features in the upper half of the in which the eyes are much too far apart, looking almost
oval—rather than “bottom-heavy” ovals (Macchi Cassia et rabbit-like. In contrast, 3-month-olds clearly prefer normal
al., 2004; Turati, 2004). Thus, even when the stimuli look faces over the faces that have extreme distortions (Bhatt et
nothing like a face, infants prefer patterns with more fea- al., 2005). These findings suggest that newborns may have
tures packed into the top half of the figure than the bottom some sense of how facial features are laid out, but they have
half. The top-heavy bias cannot account for all the ways in not yet developed a sensitivity to the normal spatial relations
which newborns and young infants prefer faces (Farroni et between those features, a factor that may also explain why
al., 2007), but it does raise an important caution. The stud- they initially show no preference for human faces over mon-
ies of other species are not definitive for humans. It remains key faces. Visual experience in infancy and early childhood
a possibility that human infants are unique among primates also seems to be important to developing some of the more
in the extent to which they must learn about faces dur- subtle sensitivities involved in normal face perception. The
ing the first few months of life. In addition, the preference beginning of the chapter described the remarkable recovery
for faces by human newborns does not seem to just be for of a girl who had minimal visual experience before having
human faces. Thus, newborn infants show no preference for congenital cataracts removed. Studies of face perception
human faces over monkey faces while nonetheless being able in adults who had similar minimal visual experiences in
to tell them apart (Di Giorgio et al., 2012). In addition, they infancy and childhood suggest that these individuals do not
prefer to look at upright monkey faces over inverted faces, show some of the heightened responsiveness to facial con-
just as they prefer upright human faces. Taken together, figurations that is typical of people with normal vision in
these findings suggest a quite general face preference system infancy and childhood. These adults can learn to recognize
that is somewhat abstract in nature; initially it doesn’t even faces (Ostrovsky et al., 2006), but they may show perma-
involve a preference for human faces but instead emphasizes nent, subtle deficits in face-specific aspects of processing,
a more schematic face-like pattern. suggesting that there may be an early critical period for
Although they show a preference for faces over many developing these nuanced perceptual abilities (Le Grande et
other stimuli, newborns probably perceive faces quite differ- al., 2004; Putzar et al., 2010).
ently from the way older children and adults do. Moreover, Another way in which newborns differ from 3-month-
they likely do a great deal of learning about faces in the first olds relates to biases toward faces of their culture. Newborns
few months of life (Balas et al., 2010). Some of this learning show no preferences for faces of their own race. But by
is especially early and rapid. For example, within hours of 3 months of age, Caucasian infants prefer to look at Cau-
birth, newborns start to show a visual preference for their casian faces, African-American infants prefer to look at
mother’s face compared with the faces of other women African-American faces, and 3-month-olds of other racial
(Bushnell et al., 1989; Pascalis et al., 1995). Remarkably, groups also show an own-race preference (Kelly et al., 2005,
they can recognize their mother’s face from its outer features 2007a, 2009). Apparently, in their first few months, infants
(hairstyle and head shape) without the inner features (facial are learning to recognize the patterns of facial features that
expression) and also from the inner features without the they see most often. These familiar patterns seem to provide
outer ones (Turati et al., 2006, 2008). These abilities must them with a kind of race-specific template for interpreting
be based on learning because newborns couldn’t possibly faces and facial expressions, one that works especially well
know before birth how their mothers would look. for novel faces of a familiar racial group.
Beyond their ability to distinguish scrambled faces from This process of becoming attuned to same-race faces is
normal ones, newborns can also discriminate happy expres- part of a more general pattern of developmental change.

96 CHAPTER 3 COMING TO PERCEIVE THE WORLD

Through perceptual narrowing, infants increase their pro- to feature configurations that resemble an upside-down tri-
cessing ability and precision in a narrow category, but often angle, with two dots for eyes and one dot for the mouth
at the expense of processing outside that category. Thus, (Johnson & Morton, 1991; Morton & Johnson, 1991). Ac-
older infants can have more difficulty than younger infants cording to this view, the first rudimentary face perception
at telling other-race faces apart (Kelly et al., 2007b, 2009). system sends information to a second system that gradually
Similarly, while young infants can tell apart both individual emerges in the first few months of life and becomes fully
human faces and individual monkey faces, perceptual nar- functional at around 6 months. The second, more sophis-
rowing causes older infants to show a decline in the ability ticated face perception system is able to learn much more
to tell monkey faces apart but an improvement at distin- about particular facial patterns and telling individual faces
guishing between human faces (Pascalis et al., 2002). apart. If the first system is especially activated by moving,
The same-race processing bias also interacts in an inter- normal faces, this could also explain why newborns show
esting way with another face bias that infants show. By a strong preference for normal faces over scrambled ones
3 months of age, infants prefer to look at photos of female
rather than male faces, presumably because most infants see
female faces more frequently, so female faces become a more
familiar category (Quinn et al., 2002). Intriguingly, this
face-based bias toward the primary caregiver’s gender seems
to apply only to same-race faces. When Caucasian 3-month-
olds were shown male and female Asian faces, they did not
show the preference for female faces that they showed for
female faces of their own race (Quinn et al., 2008a). The
effects of perceptual narrowing can interact across catego-
ries such as race and gender. But narrowing is also continu-
ously malleable. For example, brief daily exposure to Asian
female faces can reverse the normal perceptual narrowing
for Asian faces that occurs in older Caucasian infants, such
that 8- to 10-month-old Caucasian infants can discriminate
between different Asian faces (Anzures et al., 2012).

Development of Face Perception: A Two-System

Model We have seen that newborns have a perceptual bias
to process faces, but this bias is supplemented in important
ways by learning in the first several months of life. One
model of the early development of face perception suggests
that there are initially two face perception systems develop-
A
ing simultaneously. This notion is partly based on the ways
in which newborns seem especially sensitive to faces that
are moving (see Figure 3.23). Even at less than 1 hour old,
newborns use head and eye movements to track a moving
picture of a face more than they will track a comparable pic-
ture of a scrambled face (Goren et al., 1975; Johnson et al.,
1991). But surprisingly, after 1 month of age, infants seem to
have more difficulty tracking the normal face than they had Face Scrambled Blank
earlier, and this pattern of decline continues until around B
4 months of age, at which point performance sharply rises. FIGURE 3.23 Tracking moving faces. (A) Newborn infants fol-
This pattern—an initial ability that declines and then sud- lowed a moving normal face more than either a scrambled face or
denly improves—raises the possibility that two distinct face a blank surface as they will an inverted triangle of three dots
perception systems are developing (Johnson & Morton, (shown here). This ability declines after a month or so and then
reemerges a few months later. Johnson and his colleagues interpreted
1991; Morton & Johnson, 1991).
this pattern as evidence for two face perception systems in devel-
This two-system theory suggests that the first system opment in which the earlier system is largely sensitive to a simple
helps the newborn orient toward moving, face-like stimuli triangle configuration consisting of two eye dots with a lower mouth
but is too crude to support more sophisticated recognition dot. (B) Stimuli showing a normal face, a scrambled face, and a blank
of individual faces. For example, it may only be sensitive surface. Adapted from Johnson et al. (1991).

VISION 97
when the faces are moving, but show a weaker preference
when they are still.
The distinctive pattern of infants’ face-tracking abilities
is one of the earliest examples in development of a U-shaped
developmental curve. In this developmental pattern, X

which we will revisit in several other domains, an early abil-

ity is supported by a rudimentary and relatively crude sys-
tem. The initial ability then declines as this rudimentary
system is replaced by a new system, which will eventually
become more sophisticated than the first. As the new sys-
tem matures and takes over the task, performance improves,
so that the graph showing the changes in performance over Region of brain that receives
input only from ovals with
this period of time forms a U shape (see Figure 3.24). inverted triangles
The two-system developmental model of face perception
offers one explanation for a particular brain region becom- A
ing exclusively devoted to processing a particular kind of
information, such as faces, even if that region has no innate
face-processing biases. It is possible that the only innate com-
ponent of an infant’s ability to perceive faces is a rudimen-
tary, crude face detection system that sends all face-related X
information to a particular region of the brain. This region
could house a second perceptual system, which becomes spe-
cialized for processing faces because of the face-related input
it receives, even though it did not initially have any neural
circuits specialized for processing faces (see Figure 3.25). In
this way, it is possible for an empiricist-leaning researcher to
grant a very basic face detection system as “built in,” but still Inverted triangle bias causes brain
consider the brain’s more complex and sophisticated capaci- region to receive only face-like
input, and the region gradually
ties, including the specialized functions of particular brain becomes specialized for faces
regions, to be a result of experience (Elman et al., 1996). The
B
nativist alternative to this view argues that a much richer
FIGURE 3.25 The emergence of a face area in the brain.
(A) In the Morton and Johnson theory, there is no piece of neural tis-
sue early on that has a specialized face-processing system. Instead,
there is an undifferentiated area of neural tissue that receives inputs
only from objects on which the dominant pattern is an inverted tri-
angle in the shape normally created by the eyes and the mouth.
System 2 (B) As those objects are almost always faces, over time that region of
neural tissue receives only face-related information, and it gradually
Task performance

System 1 becomes specialized for processing faces. Damage to that region in

adults might then cause a specific deficit in recognizing faces.

Transition between
degree of specialization for processing faces is present in
systems the newborn’s brain from the start, perhaps in both face-
processing systems.
It is not yet clear exactly what is present in the initial
Increasing age
“rough and ready” face-processing system. As we will see
FIGURE 3.24 U-shaped curves. U-shaped developmental curves again in Chapter 4, there seems to be more at work than
often suggest to researchers the operation of two systems. The first
simply a detector for upside-down triangles or top-heavy
may be cruder but easier to initially employ. Then during the transition
to the second more complex system, there is a temporary drop in per- patterns, but the two-system model still provides a use-
formance before an even higher level is achieved. Although suggestive ful developmental account of the way a brain region could
of two systems, it is important to note that some models can create become specialized for one kind of information without
U-shaped patterns without having to invoke two different systems. having such a bias from the start. Regardless of the details

98 CHAPTER 3 COMING TO PERCEIVE THE WORLD

of the final account, however, researchers from the different which makes sense given that adults’ judgments of attractive-
camps agree that even newborns have some perceptual biases ness are based on a complex interplay of features. The infants’
that lead to a preference for faces and that by 3 months, they preferences also remain constant across faces from different
are able to recognize specific people’s faces and to engage in racial groups and for faces of both adults and other infants
sophisticated processing of facial expressions. (Langlois et al., 1991). In many cases, even infants who have
never seen either an adult member or a baby from another eth-
nic group prefer faces from these unfamiliar groups that corre-
spond to those that adults consider attractive. This pattern of
Q: What is a U-shaped developmental curve, broad agreement in judgments of facial attractiveness between
and why does this pattern suggest a two-system adults and infants, including newborns and those without
model for the development of face perception? prior exposure to particular groups, also fits with another sur-
prising finding: judgments of facial attractiveness do not vary
much across cultures (Maret, 1983; Maret & Harling, 1985).
Facial Attractiveness Before leaving our discussion of How could this be?
faces, it is important to consider one bias that is present Almost paradoxically, studies have shown that adults find
in newborns and that increases in the first few months a face with features that are uniformly average in size and
of life—a preference for attractive faces. This preference arrangement—generated by mathematically averaging many
suggests a high level of perceptual sophistication early in digital images of individual faces—much more attractive
infancy. Adults in a community usually agree on what than a real “average-looking” face (Langlois & Roggman,
makes a face attractive. For many years, this consensus was 1990; Langlois et al., 1990, 1991; Rubenstein et al., 1999).
thought to reflect specific cultural norms rather than innate, This is because few faces have all features and relations at
universal biases. Consequently, researchers believed that the average level. There may also be a related preference
infants—who had not yet absorbed the beauty standards for faces that are more symmetrical around the vertical
of their culture—would show no preferences between the axis (Rhodes et al., 1998; Thornhill & Moller, 1997). The
faces that Western adults judged most and least attractive. infant’s special endowment for perceiving faces may include
Quite surprisingly, however, when infants were shown pairs an approximation of the arrangement of facial features and
of college yearbook photos, with each pair including one face their likely proportions, and this rough facial “sketch” may
that adults had judged as unattractive and one face that adults give rise to infants’ apparent aesthetic preference. If this
had considered attractive, the infants looked longer at the attrac- is the case, infants must somehow adapt or normalize the
tive faces (Langlois et al., 1987, 1990, 1991). Even newborns sketch for different groups, since an average, or attractive,
show this preference (Slater et al., 1998, 2000a). Figure 3.26 infant face is, of course, very different from an average adult
shows some computer-synthesized examples of the sorts of one. In fact, 3-month-olds can even normalize nonhuman
faces that the infants found more and less attractive. The faces faces, preferring the cat and tiger faces that adults judge
they preferred do not seem to share any common feature, more “attractive” as well (Quinn et al., 2008b).

COMPOSITES CREATED BY AVERAGING MULTIPLE FACES

FIGURE 3.26 Facial attractiveness. Most adults agree that some of these faces are more attractive than others. These particular faces are
computer-synthesized images that blend together attributes of the faces of many individuals. The computer generation of images allows for
systematic manipulation of facial properties. When these sorts of faces are shown to infants as young as 6 months of age, the infants show
preference patterns comparable to those of adults. One property of the images that predicts preference is the degree to which all facial features
and distances between them approach an average for all faces. A face that is average in all respects turns out not to be “average-looking” at all
but very attractive, even for infants. In this illustration, the most average faces are those constructed from the largest number of faces (32-face
composites).

VISION 99
 This provocative work on attractiveness may tie into make sense of an extraordinary flux of auditory informa-
deeper issues about the origins of face perception in general. tion. Not every splash or bark should be a totally novel
If infants have an innate preference for particular feature rela- auditory event. At some point, infants need to recognize a
tions and proportions, it must be abstract enough to apply to sound as an instance of a broader category of similar sounds
faces of all ages and backgrounds. The preference for symme- that share a common meaning. Before considering sound
try and average features fits the evolutionary argument that categorization, however, we must establish how and when
members of a species should be more attracted to potential infants notice and remember sounds.
mates who appear especially healthy and therefore more likely
to produce healthy offspring. According to this argument,
individuals with average, symmetrical bodies and faces are Noticing and Remembering Sounds
more attractive because they appear to be less likely to have Just as with vision, newborns appear ready and eager to
biological problems (Thornhill & Moller, 1997). Related notice the sounds they hear and to try to make sense of
processes may also motivate parents to be more attracted to them. As already mentioned, their sound perception abilities
healthy-looking newborns. Several studies show that adults are already at work before birth. The sounds a fetus hears
tend to interact more positively with attractive infants (Hil- while in the mother’s uterus can instill auditory preferences
debrandt & Fitzgerald, 1983; Langlois et al., 1995; Sternglanz that are manifested after birth (DeCasper & Fifer, 1980;
et al., 1977). At the same time, there is now some evidence DeCasper & Spence, 1986; Kisilevsky et al., 2009). For this
that relevant experiences with unusual faces may fine-tune reason, newborns already prefer their own mother’s voice
attractiveness preferences, even in adults (Principe & Lang- over the voice of a stranger, and they prefer a story that
lois, 2012). Thus, even when there is an innate set of biases to their mother read aloud during the last weeks of pregnancy
favor certain patterns, those biases still may be modified by over an unfamiliar story. Newborns probably recognize the
experience or result in multiple sets of preferences. distinctive patterns of low-pitched sounds in the story that
they heard before birth, since low-pitched sounds penetrate
most effectively into the uterus. In fact, while still in the
womb, fetuses show different heart rate patterns in response
Q: Why might “average” faces be more to nursery rhymes that they have heard their mother read
attractive, in evolutionary terms? aloud repeatedly as opposed to unfamiliar nursery rhymes
(DeCasper et al., 1994).
In the womb, the fetus may also start to become attuned to
some of the distinctive properties of the mother’s language. For
example, if French newborns hear two recordings of a woman
Hearing speaking, one in French and the other in Russian, they can
tell the two recordings apart. A newborn whose mother speaks
A young infant is exposed to an enormous array of sounds neither French nor Russian cannot make the same discrimi-
as well as sights. From the first moments of life, babies hear nation and apparently has not yet learned to hear a difference
the excited voices of parents and the calmer voices of medical (Mehler et al., 1988; see also Kisilevsky et al., 2009).
professionals. Recall the newborn baby’s first trip home from This ability to detect contrasts between languages may
the hospital that was described at the beginning of Chapter arise from an evolutionarily ancient ability to detect differ-
1. In the next few weeks, this infant will hear the voices of ent rhythmic patterns in sounds. Thus, Dutch and English
adults, the cries of other babies, water splashing, music play- have very similar rhythmic patterns, while Japanese, Polish,
ing, and dogs barking, among thousands of other sounds, and English are all quite different from each other. Young
often several at once. Although the study of vision has dom- infants have difficulty distinguishing languages with similar
inated research on infant perception, we also have a good rhythmic patterns and find it easier to tell apart those with
understanding of the early development of the other senses, different rhythms (Ramus, 2002). This skill might seem to
especially hearing. In fact, infants start perceiving with the be uniquely human, since it relates to the human capacity
other senses, including hearing, while still in the womb, giv- for language, but cotton-top tamarins, a relatively primitive
ing these modalities a sensory head start over vision. primate, show the same ability to distinguish between lan-
Even more important, the senses show some strikingly guages with different rhythmic patterns and the same ten-
similar developmental patterns. Hearing offers some of the dency to confuse languages with similar rhythms (Ramus et
most interesting parallels with vision because using these al., 2000; Tincoff et al., 2005). Apparently, as the language
two senses requires confronting similar kinds of perceptual capacity evolved, it incorporated this more general audi-
problems. Just as we saw with visual information, infants tory skill to help organize linguistic patterns. In addition,
must learn to categorize sounds into groups in order to infants also show early abilities to learn rhythmic patterns

100 CHAPTER 3 COMING TO PERCEIVE THE WORLD

unrelated to language, such as preferring the musical meter of sounds automatically and effortlessly, this is actually a
that is typical of their own culture (Soley & Hannon, 2010). complex task, especially given the great speed at which it is
Of course, infants, like the rest of us, do not pay equal atten- carried out. Such a skill takes considerable time and experi-
tion to all the sounds they hear. Certain classes of sounds seem ence to develop. As we saw with face perception, infants may
to stand out, even if they are not any more dramatic in terms of develop two systems to support sound localization: a crude
their physical properties. In particular, very young infants and early system and a more sophisticated later-developing sys-
even newborns seem to be especially attentive to human speech tem that provides a richer sense of auditory space (Muir &
(Minagawa-Kawai et al., 2011; Vouloumanos & Werker, 2004, Clifton, 1985).
2007). But here, too, a form of perceptual narrowing takes Newborns show some capacity for sound localization
place early in infancy. Newborns are more attentive to monkey (Braddick & Atkinson, 1988; Muir & Clifton, 1985; Muir &
sounds than to synthetic sounds created to resemble speech. In Field, 1979; Wertheimer, 1963), but this early ability seems
contrast, 3-month-olds do not show this preference; they only to be based on a fairly crude mechanism in the brainstem
prefer human speech sounds over the synthetic sounds (Vou- that does not provide a sense of objects’ locations in an audi-
loumanos et al., 2010). tory space. Instead, newborns seem to rely on a simple system
In addition, infants are maximally attentive not just that registers differences in sound intensity between the two
to any speech, but especially to the sort most likely to be ears and then causes a reflex-like turn of the head toward
directed at them. Researchers previously used the term the more intense sound. In this response, the infant does not
“motherese” for the style of communication that people seem to have a higher-level, perceptual expectation of find-
typically use with babies and young children (Newport ing an object near the location of the sound, and he does not
et al., 1977), although it is also used by fathers and just seem surprised if he finds nothing there. At around 2 months
about anyone else talking to an infant or young child. Such of age, the head-turning response to sounds disappears, only
child-directed speech (more widely known as “baby talk”) to reappear at around 4 months. But at this point, the local-
usually involves a higher-pitched voice, rising intonations at ization response has a different character. It becomes more
the ends of phrases, and longer pauses between sentences, accurate and precisely directed toward the sound’s source
among other properties. This kind of speech seems somehow rather than simply turning the head toward the correct side.
more appropriate for interacting with infants—and research Sound localization abilities, then, present another
confirms this. Four-month-olds prefer to hear an unfamil- instance of a U-shaped developmental curve. The infant
iar adult’s child-directed speech rather than the same per- shows a crude initial ability to localize sounds, which seems
son’s normal adult speech pattern (Fernald, 1985), and this to decline briefly before reemerging in a more sophisticated
preference may be present as early as the first month of life form (Muir & Hains, 2004; Muir et al., 1989). Unlike the
(Cooper & Aslin, 1990; Cooper et al., 1997). Additional newborn, when the 4-month-old localizes a sound, he seems
research suggests that child-directed speech helps infants to have a clear expectation that something is “out there” in
detect boundaries between words by making them more a particular location in space (Muir & Clifton, 1985). The
salient (Thiessen et al., 2005). development of this second, more accurate system depends
Infants as young as 6 months are also able to pick up not only on maturation of the relevant structures in the
on some universal properties of communication; they can infant’s brain but also on experience. Over time, feedback
discriminate intonation patterns that indicate approval from touch and vision helps the infant to fine-tune the pro-
from those that indicate disapproval, regardless of the lan- cessing of incoming information about sounds’ locations.
guage of the speaker. Furthermore, they seem to be some- Compared with the first system, the second system offers
what aware of the emotional meanings of the intonations, the benefit of increased accuracy and more explicit aware-
smiling more when the tone indicates approval and less in ness; its costs include the additional time and experience it
response to disapproval (Fernald, 1993). These findings requires to become more accurate.
show that infants not only attend to the speech around Both sound localization systems develop in close connec-
them, but also extract important meaning from it. tion with infants’ other perceptual abilities. In newborns,
even simple, reflex-driven localization provides tremendous
help in gathering information about the world. By triggering
an immediate look in the general direction of a sound, this
Locating Sounds rudimentary ability enables even the youngest baby to begin
When we hear a sound, we often know its approximate learning which sights go with which sounds even before the
location immediately, even when we are in the dark with- system is fine-tuned by experience. Thus, right from the start,
out visual clues. Only when a sound is extremely muffled, the infant starts to learn about objects by using several senses
very low pitched, or heavily echoed do we become unable to at once to achieve a unified perceptual experience, rather
locate its source. Even though we typically locate the source than focusing on one sense at a time. As we will see shortly,

HEARING 101
 NEW DIRECTION S IN DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH

Cochlear Implants and the Question of

Critical Periods for Auditory Processing

A
lthough it has been known for some time that aspects auditory perception. This critical-period effect may be largely
of the visual system show critical-period effects, it caused by the brain’s compensation plasticity (see Chapter 2).
has been more difficult to document such effects in Recall that in blind people, areas of the cortex used for visual
hearing. Thanks to improving technology, research- processing can become devoted to other sensory processes
ers are now making advances in understanding critical-period instead, resulting in more acute sensation in other modalities
effects on hearing. At the forefront of this research is work (such as hearing) to help compensate for the loss of vision. Or
involving cochlear implants for very young children. the visual cortex will show activation when subjects who were
In response to incoming sound, the organ of corti within the blind from birth or who became blind at a very early age read
inner ear stimulates the nerve cells that initially process auditory Braille by touching their finger to the letters (Gizewski et al.,
information. In most cases of total deafness, the organ of corti 2003). Similarly, if the auditory cortex does not receive auditory
has been damaged. Cochlear implants are electronic devices input, it can be “colonized” by other sensory functions, such as
that can be implanted in the ears to bypass the damaged organ vision and touch, which help compensate for the hearing loss.
of corti and cause stimulation of the auditory nerve fibers. The By providing a different route for auditory input to reach the
implant creates a form of hearing, the nature of which varies, brain, cochlear implants may preserve the function of the audi-
depending on the age of the recipient. tory cortex for processing sounds (Teoh et al., 2004b).
As implants have been approved for younger and younger Evidence is accumulating that the earlier the patient receives
individuals, researchers have begun to ask whether there is a the cochlear implants, the more normal will be both her abil-
critical period for developing the ability to interpret the firing pat- ity to distinguish between various speech sounds and her abil-
terns of neurons as meaningful auditory input. Older recipients ity to articulate clearly; in fact, some neural circuits may show
of implants are able to detect sounds through those implants, permanent declines in auditory and speech-processing abili-
but can they learn to interpret those sounds in as sophisticated ties if implants are not present before roughly 4 years of age
a manner as younger recipients? Or, analogous to the case of (Eisenberg et al., 2012; Kral & Sharma, 2012). (This connection
the girl whose vision was restored following cataract surgery, between speech perception and articulation illustrates the kind
when the ability to receive auditory input is restored after early of link between perception and action that we will see in more
deafness, are there permanent effects of being deprived of detail in Chapter 4.) Two concerns remain, however. First, the
auditory experience early in life? incidence of medical complications rises with implant surgery in
In studies of cats that were born deaf, cats that received younger and younger babies (Johr et al., 2008). Second, some
cochlear implants early in development showed better results members of the deaf community feel that any increased risk
than those that received implants when they were older. Those associated with the surgery is unacceptable, given that there is
that got early implants gained higher levels of functioning in the a rich and vibrant deaf culture that offers an alternative devel-
auditory cortex, the brain area that processes sounds (Kral et opmental path to many deaf children (Sparrow, 2010). Thus,
al., 2002). Similarly, people who get cochlear implants in the even as the technology evolves and the critical-period effects
first years of life can better distinguish between sounds than are better documented, not all parents choose surgery for their
those who get the implants several years later. infants.
Children who receive cochlear implants at younger ages usu- Even adults who receive cochlear implants show some
ally have better outcomes (Pulsifer et al., 2003; Teoh et al., improvements that suggest an expansion of neural function-
2004a). “Younger” initially meant around 2 years of age, but ing in the auditory cortex. This pattern has been found both in
more recent studies of children who get implants before age 1 adult cats (Klinke et al., 1999) and in adult humans (Teoh et al.,
suggest even better results than with 2-year-olds (Colletti et al., 2004a). Thus, although it remains ideal to receive the implants
2005; Dettman & Dowell, 2010; Niparko et al., 2010), sug- as early in development as possible, they can still confer ben-
gesting a critical period in the development of some aspects of efits to adults.

102 CHAPTER 3 COMING TO PERCEIVE THE WORLD

uniting the perceptual experiences from different senses may vision and audition. This is the case even at the level of
be one of the most basic ways that even the youngest infants neurons; specific cells can respond to both auditory and
begin making sense of the world. It is also intriguing that visual inputs.
the second, higher-level localization system emerges around The fine-tuning process also demonstrates the impor-
the same time that the infant becomes better able to visually tance of plasticity in the young owl’s localization system. If
perceive depth using stereopsis. As the visual ability to locate the baby owl’s visual or auditory experiences are distorted,
objects in depth improves, the auditory localization system either by plugging one of its ears or by placing prisms over
seems to undergo a comparable shift. its eyes that shift the visual world to one side (see Figure 3.27),
the owl will gradually adapt and start localizing correctly
again despite the distortion. When the earplugs or eye
Q: How is the sound localization ability of the prisms are removed within a certain critical period, the owl
will then initially turn its head in the wrong direction before
newborn different from that of the 5-month-old readapting to its undistorted perceptions. By allowing the
infant? owl to adjust to perceptual problems or injuries, a plastic
localization system offers real advantages over one that is
fully hardwired and less responsive to feedback from the
To fully understand how sound localization systems environment.
become fine-tuned with experience, researchers need to The research on barn owls has shown that there are
systematically manipulate those experiences and measure sensitive periods for calibrating the system (Knudsen &
the effects on a young organism’s behavior and neural Knudsen, 1990). If an owl younger than 60 days of age
functioning. For ethical reasons, these sorts of experiments has one ear plugged, it will adapt and adjust the localiza-
are not possible with human infants, which is why some tion system. If the owl is still young when the earplug is
of the most revealing work on the development of sound removed, it will initially localize incorrectly but then grad-
localization has been done in other organisms. For exam- ually readjust, as previously described. But if the plug is
ple, by studying barn owls, which are excellent at precisely not removed until the owl is 200 days old, the owl’s system
locating sounds, researchers have constructed a detailed will become permanently inaccurate and unable to readjust.
biopsychological model of the development of sound local- Interestingly, the sensitive-period during which the owl is
ization (Bergan & Knudsen, 2009; Knudsen, 1988, 2004). able to adjust to distorted sound perceptions ends much ear-
These owls localize sounds more accurately as they grow lier than the critical period in which the owl can readjust to
older, but even the youngest owls turn their heads in a its own unaltered perceptions. At the age of 60 days, the owl
roughly appropriate direction. This early ability suggests loses the ability to adjust to distorted inputs, but it can still
that they have an innate ability to infer the approximate recover from those distorted inputs for another 140 days.
visual location that corresponds to the sound’s source. As Readjustment becomes impossible only after around 200
we have seen in a number of systems, these innate abilities days of distorted perception. The difference in these peri-
act as frameworks within which extensive fine-tuning of ods reflects a default bias toward the owl’s unaltered per-
the skill occurs. For the owls, fine-tuning the sound local- ceptual experience. Owls show comparable sensitive-period
ization system requires simultaneous experience in both effects in adjusting their visual perceptions to distortions
from prisms, except that the ability to adjust to visual devia-
tions declines more gradually than the ability to adjust to
auditory distortions.

FIGURE 3.27 Effects of visual distortion on sound localization

in owls. The owl uses vision to interpret auditory cues and adjusts
its perception of where a sound is coming from based on what it
sees. This baby barn owl is wearing prisms that make the world seem
20 degrees to the right of where it really is. If the owl wears these
prisms beyond a critical period of roughly 200 days, it will have
permanently “retuned” its localization of sounds based on the dis-
tortions caused by the prisms. If the prisms are then removed, the
owl will forever mislocalize by 20 degrees. Because the barn owl’s
localization has been studied in great detail and has been linked to
underlying changes in neural responses, it offers an excellent model
of developmental change within a constraining framework.

HEARING 103
 Blue Green
Q: How does the development of auditory 35 nm 35 nm 35 nm

localization in the barn owl demonstrate B1 B2 G1 G2

both constraints on the development of this 400 450 500 550
perceptual skill and its plasticity? A
Light wavelength

“ba” “pa”
30 msec 30 msec 30 msec

B1 B2 P1 P2
Perceiving Complex Sound Patterns ⫺0.05 0.0 ⫹0.05 ⫹0.10 ⫹0.15
Some sounds, such as a bell or a snap of a finger, are relatively Voice onset time (time between lip release and voicing)
simple in acoustic terms. Others, such as human speech, are B
remarkably complex. A simple empiricist view of auditory FIGURE 3.28 Categorical perception of speech. The categorical
development might propose that babies learn to perceive perception of speech can be understood the same way as the cat-
egorical perception of color (A), except that, in this case, the physical
the sounds that are acoustically simplest first. If this were
continuum for perceiving speech (B) is the amount of time delay
true, then to young infants, all speech sounds would ini- between lip release and voicing, called the voice onset time (VOT).
tially sound the same: just an overwhelming confusion of Equal intervals of 30 milliseconds along this auditory physical
sound components. Several decades ago, however, research- continuum are not seen as the same psychologically. B1 and B2, both
ers learned that young infants seem to perceive quite a large in the “ba” category, and P1 and P2, both in the “pa” category, are
amount of structure in speech sounds. Most dramatically, seen as much more similar to each other than B2 and P1, since they
infants do not treat every different nuanced speech sound straddle the “ba” and “pa” categories. Even though physical distances
as unique. Instead, they tend to perceive discrete categories are the same, the psychological distances are much shorter when they
stay within categories rather than cross them. Even newborn infants
of sounds. Even though sounds’ physical properties vary
show these categorical effects in their perception of speech.’
smoothly along a continuum, infants regard all the sounds
within a category as very similar to each other and very
different from the sounds in different categories. In short,
infants are capable of categorical perception of speech.
Many elements of speech primarily differ from one
another in terms of their values on a single dimension. For
Q: How does the categorization of speech
example, the sounds “ba” and “pa” only differ in terms sounds help infants to perceive speech?
of voice onset time (VOT), which describes the time lag
between releasing your lips to define the sound and the
beginning, or onset, of voicing the sound. A speaker saying Studies of infants of all ages have attempted to under-
“ba” voices the “ah” sound almost immediately after releas- stand more clearly how categorical perception of sound
ing the lips, but for “pa” there is a longer delay before voic- emerges and changes over the course of infant develop-
ing occurs. The average VOTs for “ba” and “pa” are shown ment. The first breakthrough study on the topic repeat-
in Figure 3.28, which also shows the similar wavelength edly presented the infants with an artificially synthesized
continuum for color vision that we considered earlier. “ba” sound (with a consistent VOT) whenever they sucked
The VOTs range along a continuum—from negative hard enough on a special pacifier that measured sucking
VOTs, with voicing before lip release, to positive VOTs, intensity (Eimas et al., 1971). Over time, their sucking for
which occur as much as 0.2 second after lip release—but that particular “ba” sound declined, presumably because
psychologically, we do not perceive these sounds as varying they had become habituated to it. The infants would then
gradually. Instead, we group similar sounds into categories hear one of two artificially synthesized sounds that were
and treat the sounds within each category as basically the identical to the original “ba” sound except for differences
same. This means that to differentiate between “ba” and in VOT. The two sounds differed from the original “ba”
“pa,” we hear a fairly large range of VOTs as “ba” and then, by an equal amount of VOT, but in opposite directions as
past a certain point on the continuum, we hear a large range shown in Figure 3.28. To adults, the sound with a shorter
as “pa.” As Figure 3.28 shows, sounds that are within the VOT would still sound like “ba,” while the sound with
“ba” region sound very similar despite having voice onset the longer VOT would sound like “pa” because it falls on
times 30 milliseconds apart. Yet, if two sounds on opposite the other side of the category boundary. If infants had no
sides of the “ba”/“pa” boundary are 30 milliseconds apart, preexisting biases to categorically perceive speech sounds,
they sound very different, at least to adults. then both would sound equally distinct from the original

104 CHAPTER 3 COMING TO PERCEIVE THE WORLD

“ba” and they would dishabituate equally to either of the In general, experience in a given language fine-tunes the
new stimuli. But if the infants perceived speech sounds auditory perception system, so that the particular boundar-
categorically, they would perceive the new, short-VOT ies and categories that are meaningful within that language
sound as a second “ba,” essentially the same as the first, become most salient (Eimas et al., 1987; Gervain & Mehler,
and they would show little dishabituation to it. In contrast, 2010; Werker & Tees, 2005; Werker et al., 2007). In many
they would perceive the new, long-VOT sound as “pa,” and ways, this pattern is similar to the fine-tuning that we have
they would dishabituate more strongly. In fact, they tended seen in the development of abilities to recognize visual pat-
to dishabituate, suggesting that very young infants do tend terns and to localize sounds. The infant is not born with a
to cluster together speech sounds into categories, just as fixed and unalterable set of categories and ways of process-
adults do (Eimas et al., 1987). They do not simply take ing them, but rather is endowed with a set of biases that are
in sensory data; they actively interpret sensory experience selectively fine-tuned by experience.
and group similar perceptions into classes, treating similar Above and beyond these biases, there may also be a
perceptions as essentially equivalent. Like adults, infants component of speech perception that accords with a very
categorically perceive various sounds in the speech stream, general tendency to learn associations between stimuli
including contrasts such as “d” versus “t” and “b” versus that frequently occur together. For example, a critical
“g,” as well as differences between vowels. accomplishment in the first year of life is to be able to pick
These studies were initially interpreted as indicating an out and recognize specific words in the speech stream.
innate language-processing capacity, since the infants cat- To see how difficult this is for the untrained ear, sim-
egorically perceived speech sounds in particular. But two ply listen to a native speaker of a completely unfamiliar
other lines of work soon expanded on these findings. First, language; it is nearly impossible to count the number of
researchers showed that infants also categorically perceive words in any utterance. Yet, one line of work shows that
nonspeech sounds (Jusczyk et al., 1980, 1983). Second, by at least 8 months of age, infants start to pick out words
researchers found that other species, such as chinchillas and from the speech stream solely on the basis of how often
macaque monkeys, also categorically perceive human speech, certain syllables occur together in the same order (Saffran
even though they obviously don’t have brain structures spe- et al., 1996a, 1996b, 2006). In these studies, infants listen
cialized for it (Kuhl & Miller, 1978; Kuhl & Padden, 1982). to a steady stream of nonsense syllables separated by con-
The debate over how to interpret these findings is ongoing sistent time intervals and without stresses or larger sound
(Aslin et al., 1998; Gerken & Aslin, 2005; Goldstone & patterns to emphasize syllable clusters. They nonetheless
Hendrickson, 2010). Some researchers have proposed that seem to perceive “words” in that stream if certain triads
infants’ categorical perception of speech results from gen- of syllables (for example, “bidaku”) repeatedly occur in
eral properties characterizing most species’ hearing systems the same order (“bidakubidakubidakubidaku”). Quite
(Kuhl, 1986, 2004; Samuels, 2012). Others have suggested remarkably, it only takes a few minutes of listening to
that additional aspects of human infant speech perception such patterns for an infant to start picking out the three-
support the argument for an innate speech-processing mech- syllable regularities. Moreover, they show the same ability
anism in humans, such as a special sensitivity to perceiv- to pick up on the syllable sequences that make up actual
ing certain contrasts that are found only in human speech words in a real, but unfamiliar natural language (Pelucchi
(Eimas et al., 1987). et al., 2009).
It is clear that infants’ early experience with a particular More broadly, we can see three distinct developmental
language heavily influences the way their categorical per- patterns in the development of speech perception: (1) infants
ception of speech develops. Initially, very young infants learn sensory patterns, (2) they develop universal aspects of
will categorically perceive a wide array of distinctions speech perception, and (3) they develop language-specific
between sounds in all languages. Typically by around age elements of speech perception, starting at around 6 months
8 months, however, they lose the ability to make most of (Kuhl, 2004). All infants start with the same general frame-
the sound discriminations that are not considered mean- work for interpreting speech, one that imposes considerable
ingful in their own native language (Kuhl, 2004; Werker, structure on the information in the speech stream. But soon
1989). English-speaking infants, for example, lose the abil- they modify this original structure in ways that reflect the
ity they once had to distinguish two different versions of properties of their native language.
“d” sounds that are meaningful in Hindi, while infants in Categorical perception is not an oddity of perceptual
Hindi-speaking cultures further sharpen that perceptual development; instead, it may be the mind’s normal way of
skill. Intriguingly, not all abilities to distinguish contrasts handling an otherwise overwhelming amount of information.
in unfamiliar languages disappear; the reason that some Even though our sensory receptors filter out vast amounts of
remain is a topic of active research and discussion (Aslin information about the physical world, the information we do
et al., 1998). pick up varies in an extraordinary number of ways. Without

HEARING 105
 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL P OLICY

Legislating Early Stimulation

I
n 1998, following Governor Zell Miller’s enthusiastic recom- music (Rideout et al., 1998), even though pop music does not
mendation, Georgia’s state legislature voted to supply a free seem to share the rich mathematical structure that supposedly
recording of classical music to every child born in the state boosts aspects of reasoning. Even worse, other researchers’
(Sack, 1998). The policy aimed to improve children’s intellec- attempts to replicate the initial findings of a “Mozart effect” gen-
tual development through early stimulation. Miller was respond- erally have not succeeded (Chabris, 1999; McCutcheon, 2000;
ing to research findings interpreted as showing that exposing McKelvie & Low, 2002; Nantais & Schellenberg, 1999; Steele
infants to Mozart’s music increased their intelligence and cogni- et al., 1999). These simple failures to replicate the findings, as
tive functioning (Rauscher et al., 1993, 1995). As other states well as demonstrations of a number of problems with the initial
took an interest in adopting similar programs, it became clear studies’ experimental procedures, have repeatedly raised ques-
that these programs offered suppliers of the recordings sub- tions about whether the effect ever existed at all (Pietschnig et
stantial opportunities to profit. As a result, several companies al., 2010; Schellenberg, 2005).
sprang up offering musical recordings allegedly designed to Although several U.S. states and some other countries pro-
enhance an infant’s or toddler’s intelligence with repeated lis- posed programs of distributing free classical music to newborns
tening. One enterprising company even trademarked the name (see Figure 3.29), the proposals were rarely implemented, and
“The Mozart Effect”—a reference to the research that inspired Zell Miller’s vision seems to no longer be part of Georgia’s offi-
the trend—in an attempt to dominate the market. cial activities. Yet, sales of music and videos touting the Mozart
The so-called Mozart effect had considerable intuitive appeal. effect remain brisk, and many people firmly believe in the phe-
It seemed appropriate that classical music, which most people nomenon. It might seem harmless, but from a public policy point
view as cultured and sophisticated, would actually be good for of view, such misunderstandings incur real costs. Funds used to
the developing brain. Proponents of the effect even offered an provide these materials to infants and toddlers might be better
explanation for the mechanism of improvement. Mozart’s pieces spent on more proven ways to improve their health. In addi-
had a rich mathematical structure (Hetland, 2000; Rauscher tion, attempts to improve children’s abilities through such “quick
et al., 1993, 1995), and hearing the music’s complex rhythms fixes” tend to give short shrift to educational problems that actu-
and patterns “exercised” brain circuits associated with spatial ally require much more long-term, structural support (Jones &
reasoning during a critical period of brain development. If these Zigler, 2002).
theories were correct, parents who deprived their children of
such rich perceptual stimulation might be impairing their chil-
dren’s cognitive development, while parents and states that
supplied Mozart recordings to all infants might have noticeably
smarter children in later years. Even many years later, a cursory
Internet search turns up all sorts of products making claims
along these lines.
It might sound like a developmental psychologist’s dream to
see a policy designed and implemented in accord with develop-
mental research. This research, however, was far less convinc-
ing than its advocates claimed. If listening to classical music has
any effect on infants’ cognition, it is small and short-lived, and it
likely works through simply increasing the infant’s alertness and
attention—a property shared by lots of other stimuli, musical
FIGURE 3.29 Newborns and music. Newborns listened to
and otherwise. In fact, the claim that classical music, especially
classical music over headphones as researchers tested whether
Mozart’s, was unusually effective at enhancing intelligence was hearing music would stimulate the newborns’ cognitive develop-
undercut by enthusiastic supporters of the effect. They claimed ment. But early exposure to classical music did not lead to a
to find it even after exposing infants to sentimental popular significant increase in cognitive abilities.

106 CHAPTER 3 COMING TO PERCEIVE THE WORLD

sorting stimuli into groups that allow us to treat some inputs 1980), but infants may be less richly endowed. The ability
as roughly equivalent, we would never be able to general- to perceive all four of these basic tastes may take time and
ize based on limited experience, recognize new but familiar experience to develop. To assess taste perception in infants,
instances, or otherwise process information effectively. Our researchers have adopted several strategies, which seem to
perceptual systems have evolved to impose certain types of converge on the finding that sweet substances play an espe-
clustering that help the developing person notice important cially important role in the life of the young infant.
real-world differences. Newborns and infants show a clear preference for sweet
substances—not only sugar but also synthetic sweeteners
such as saccharin—over other flavors. Infants can learn
to suck in response to a sweet taste (Bartoshuk & Beau-
Q: Why are young infants able to distinguish champ, 1994), and sugar has a strong calming effect on very
between some speech sounds that adults young infants, even acting as a kind of painkiller. Indeed,
cannot? in the Jewish faith, it is common to have the infant suck on
a rag soaked in sweet grape wine as a way of calming him
during the ritual of circumcision. The practice dates back
thousands of years and may reflect folk awareness of sugar’s
soothing effect (Blass & Hoppmeyer, 1991). As infants get
The Chemical Senses: to be about 1 month old, the effects of a sweet taste are
amplified if the person providing the nutrition also makes
Taste and Smell eye contact with the infant (Zeifman et al., 1996). Since
breast milk is quite sweet, this pattern suggests that infants’
Although the visual and auditory senses dominate our preference for sweet substances is closely linked to behaviors
perceptual world (as well as dominating the attention of that calm them while nursing, which are obviously of great
researchers on infant perception), the chemical senses of adaptive value.
taste and smell are also important to the way that infants Some assessments of early taste perception rely on corre-
perceive the world. Taste and smell are among the earliest lations between facial expressions and sets of tastes. Adults
emerging senses in the history of life, and in humans they clearly show distinct responses to sour, sweet, salty, and bit-
may be functional even before birth. ter (Steiner, 1979), and some evidence suggests that very
young infants respond similarly (see Figure 3.30). Although
we cannot know what these infants are experiencing, the
relations between the substances they have tasted and their
Taste facial expressions imply that their experiences may resemble
Studies of the neuroanatomy and neurophysiology of fetuses those of adults. Infants’ facial responses to the four basic
in the womb suggest that taste perception functions well tastes also seem to emerge at different points in develop-
before birth (Beauchamp & Mennella, 2011). These studies, ment. In line with the findings mentioned earlier, adults
some of which involve physiological measures of the nerve find it easier to identify newborns’ responses to sweet sub-
bundles arising out of taste receptors, show that the fetus stances than to bitter or sour substances (Rosenstein &
tastes the mother’s amniotic fluid. The functional value that Oster, 1988). It is not yet known whether newborns’ less
this ability serves is less clear, although it might be a way of distinct responses to bitter and sour tastes reflect less ability
starting to learn some distinctive things about that culture’s to discriminate between these tastes or whether the infants
diet, since fairly large taste-related molecules can pass from fully sense the difference but respond with less taste-specific
the mother’s digestive system to the amniotic fluid. Thus, expressions.
in some cases, the compounds that a fetus is exposed to in The links between facial expressions and specific tastes may
utero may make certain tastes more acceptable after birth. be evolutionarily quite old. When a wide range of primates are
One study showed that newborn rats were more accepting of presented with sweet, sour, and bitter substances, they show
alcohol-laced liquids and other bitter compounds if their facial responses similar to those shown by human infants
mothers were fed ethanol while pregnant (Youngentob & (Steiner et al., 2001). It would be noteworthy enough if the
Glendinning, 2009). Thus, human infants whose moth- great apes showed such expressions, but it is far more impressive
ers abuse alcohol may be more willing to ingest harmful that primates much more distantly related to humans, such
compounds. as tamarins, also do. Primates more closely related to humans
Adults are often said to have at least four basic taste cat- show more similarity to humans in their facial responses, but
egories: sweet, sour, salty, and bitter (Erickson & Covey, the overall pattern of resemblance is unmistakable.

THE CHEMICAL SENSES: TASTE AND SMELL 107

A B C
FIGURE 3.30 Facial responses to different tastes. Newborn facial responses to (A) bitter, (B) sour, and (C) sweet liquids. From Rosenstein
& Oster (1988).

Even in the context of these evolutionary similarities, fed more fruits early on show much more tolerance for sour
however, newborns’ different facial responses to tastes juices in their second year (Blossfeld et al., 2007). Above
should not be interpreted as evidence that links between and beyond experience, babies also have some genetic dis-
tastes and expressions are fixed from infancy. Young infants positions either to tolerate or to reject some bitter substances
can acquire new tastes just as adults can after experienc- such as alcohol or quinine. These dispositions interact with
ing new flavors. Thus, infants who drink a bitter form of experience and may also be reflected in some cultural dif-
synthetic formula in the first few months of life are likely ferences in diet (Mennella et al., 2005). Once again, now in
to show a normal facial expression when they drink it at the realm of taste, the complex interactions between initial
7½ months. By contrast, infants who encounter that for- genetic predispositions and the environment are essential to
mula for the first time at 7½ months show a strong bitter understanding development.
reaction (Mennella et al., 2004; see Figure 3.31). Babies’
ability to acquire new tastes from early experiences also
suggests one possible consequence of feeding infants syn-
thetic formulas. These formulas tend to have only one dis- Q: To which of the basic tastes do infants
tinct taste, while breast milk has many tastes. As a result, seem especially responsive? Why might this
formula-fed babies may become far less tolerant of alterna- preference have adaptive value?
tive tastes (Mennella et al., 2004). Similarly, babies who are

A B
FIGURE 3.31 Acquired tastes. Quite young babies can come to have acquired tastes through early exposure. Beginning when they were
2 weeks old, infants were fed either a bitter-tasting synthetic protein formula or a milk-based formula. They were both given the bitter-tasting
formula in a test procedure when they were 7 months old and had clearly different reactions. (A) The infant who had been fed the bitter-tasting
formula over 7 months accepted the bottle without a problem. (B) The infant who was encountering the bitter formula for the first time made a
face and pushed the bottle away.

108 CHAPTER 3 COMING TO PERCEIVE THE WORLD

Smell environments (Hill & Mistretta, 1990). The findings in
perceptual research in other modalities also suggest some
Because there are many thousands of distinct smells, sys- likely directions for future research in this area. With fur-
tematically studying infants’ olfaction is much more diffi- ther study, categorical perception effects on early abilities
cult than studying their taste perception. Nonetheless, very to perceive tastes and smells are likely to be found. As we
young infants do seem to show clear sets of olfactory pref- will see shortly with other senses, integration across sensory
erences (Porter & Winberg, 1999; Schaal, 1988). Within modalities, including taste and smell, is also likely to be
minutes after birth, newborns are particularly attracted found to emerge early.
to odors associated with their lactating mother’s breasts
(Porter & Winberg, 1999). Newborns also prefer the odor of
breast milk to that of formula, and they show the preference
by orienting more strongly to the breast milk (Marlier &
Schall, 2005). Infants younger than 3 days old also clearly
Intermodal Perception
habituate to a wide variety of odors. One common method Much like the ability to visually locate a sound’s source, the
of studying infants’ ability to differentiate smells looks at interactions of taste and olfaction in eating and drinking
changes in their breathing patterns when they smell a novel raise the more general question of how we come to perceive
odor and the reversion to a normal breathing pattern with an object as the same thing regardless of which senses we
habituation. Other studies have used near infrared spectros- use. When we simultaneously see and touch a hairbrush,
copy (NIRS) to show that the newborn’s olfactory cortex, a how do we know we are acting on the same thing with both
brain region that processes odors, is more active when the senses?
newborn smells an odor such as vanilla than when it is pre- The empiricists’ classic, associationist accounts would say
sented with an odorless liquid (Bartocci et al., 2000). that we gradually learn specific links, or associations, across
Taste and smell also interact powerfully during eating the sensory modalities through experience (Helmholtz,
and drinking. For example, even though cherry Kool-Aid 1884/1968; Spelke, 1987). According to this view, we would
clearly seems to taste like cherry, it becomes indistinguish- have to learn how the textures and contours associated with
able from sugar water when its odor is blocked. Clearly, touching sharp-edged or flexible objects correlate with their
the integration of taste and smell is so automatic that it visual features. The ability to use several senses to perceive
is common to misattribute the source of sensory informa- a single, enduring object would take time and learning to
tion (Enns & Hornung, 1985). Research on the ways that develop—and until it did, the infant’s experience of seeing
taste and olfaction work together in infants is not yet far an object would have no relation to the experience of touch-
enough along to confirm the strong expectation that even ing that object. The feel of the hairbrush bristles would not
newborns would seamlessly integrate information from lead the infant to expect a bristly appearance. By contrast,
these two senses. One intriguing study, however, potentially a nativist would embrace the idea that right from the start,
lends support to this idea. In adults, it is not only sweet infants might have specialized abilities to link up inputs
tastes that have a painkilling effect; it turns out that sweet from multiple senses to create integrated mental representa-
smells do also. The evidence that sweet smells have a similar tions of objects.
analgesic effect on infants raises the possibility that infants It now seems that nativist views are more accurate and that
also perceive sweetness with both taste and smell and, like intermodal perception, which fuses and integrates informa-
adults, experience increased tolerance for pain in both cases tion across sensory modalities, may be as basic as perception
(Prescott & Wilkie, 2007). These effects of sweet smells itself. A newborn who turns his head to look at a novel sound
have yet to be studied directly in infants, however. is engaged in the simplest form of intermodal exploration.
It seems likely that with further research, the sensory sys- His response relies on neural circuits that are simultaneously
tems of taste and smell, which evolved long before vision tuned to visual and auditory inputs specifying location. A
and audition, will show many of the same powerful themes more dramatic demonstration of intermodal perception
of perceptual development. First, the role of very early expe- involves experiencing an object in one sense modality and
rience cannot be overlooked. Several investigators suggest then recognizing it using a different modality. After seeing
that prenatal experiences with tastes and odors in the womb a hairbrush among other objects on a dresser, you could eas-
may heavily influence preferences at birth (Beauchamp & ily pick out the brush from the other objects, even in total
Mennella, 2011; Mennella & Beauchamp, 1997; Mennella darkness. Since newborns do not tend to explore objects with
et al., 2001; Youngentob & Glendinning, 2009). Further- their hands, they might seem likely to fail on this sort of
more, as with localization of sounds, increasing evidence at task (Spelke, 1987). In fact, infants seem to integrate touch
the neurophysiological level shows that experiences early in and vision quite well—even though they use their mouths as
infancy serve to fine-tune taste and olfaction to different their primary means of touch-based exploration.

INTERMODAL PERCEPTION 109

 and sponge-like. The researchers then showed the infants
dynamic displays of two objects side by side, one moving
without bending and the other flexibly deforming. Infants
as young as 1 month looked longer at the object whose
movement contrasted with the one they had explored ear-
lier tactilely (Gibson & Walker, 1984). Note that unlike the
study involving textured spheres, infants in this experiment
looked longer at the novel object than at the familiar one.
We will see that these sorts of shifts—infants sometimes
looking longer at the novel object versus favoring the famil-
iar one—are common in research on infants. Though they
are curious, the infants’ particular preference turns out to
FIGURE 3.32 Integrating touch and vision. Newborn infants be less important than the finding of a clear, reliable rela-
who mouth a particular object without seeing it, such as a nubby as tionship between the first experience and the preferential
opposed to a smooth pacifier, will then prefer to look at the same looking. This study also demonstrates that young infants
object they had previously mouthed when they see it for the first
can understand objects’ different dynamic properties, such
time. Adapted from Meltzoff & Borton (1979).
as rigidity or flexibility, even when their shape and texture
visually appear identical.
Anyone who has spent time with infants knows how Auditory-visual intermodal perception also has been
quickly objects disappear into their mouths, a behavior explored extensively (see Scientific Research box). Many
that requires constant vigilance from parents and caregiv- studies rely on infants’ tendency to respond to a sound by
ers. This tendency may also serve as the basis of the infant’s looking at an object associated with that sound, even when
earliest intermodal perceptions. Researchers tested this pos- the sound is actually coming from somewhere else. (Adults
sibility by having newborns suck on two textured spheres also do this; ventriloquism exploits this property of percep-
with pacifier-like handles (Figure 3.32). One sphere was tion.) Infants turn out to be surprisingly sensitive to whether
smooth and the other was covered with bumps. Newborns the sound they are hearing, such as a rattling sound, could
were given one of these spheres or the other to suck on for a plausibly be coming from the object they can see, such as a
few minutes, but they were not allowed to see them. When shaking glass with marbles in it. This is no small achieve-
researchers showed the objects to the infants and moni- ment considering the possible ways in which an event can be
tored their preferential looking, the infants looked longer construed (Spelke, 1987).
at the object that they had previously explored with their The correspondence between sounds and their sources is
mouth (Meltzoff & Borton, 1979). There are even some not the only sound-vision relationship that interests infants.
indications that despite their crude grasping abilities, new- When they are as young as 5 months, infants look longer
borns can integrate the feelings of objects in their hands at happy faces than sad ones when a happy sound track is
with how those objects look (Streri & Gentaz, 2003). playing, and they look longer at sad faces while hearing sad
Interestingly, though, they may be more capable of visually sounds. This tendency is intimately related to sophisticated
recognizing an object that they previously held than of rec- face perception; if the faces are inverted so the infants can’t
ognizing an object by touch that they previously saw (Sann interpret the expressions, the infants no longer show the pref-
& Streri, 2007). It takes several months before infants can erence (Walker, 1982). Infants also seem to associate sounds
“translate” accurately in both directions between touch with particular kinds of objects. When infants as young as
and vision. 3 months were shown two clear cylinders side by side
(Figure 3.33), they were able to link each one with the appro-
priate sound—the cylinder with one object making a “clunk-
ing” sound and the cylinder with multiple objects making
Q: Give an example of how infants use a “clattering” sound—even though the cylinders were both
intermodal perception. turned at the same rate (Bahrick, 1988). Similarly, when
infants as young as 5 months hear two qualitatively different
sounds coming from behind a barrier, they expect to see two
Using an experimental setup similar to the one with tex- distinct objects; but when they hear two identical sounds,
tured spheres, researchers found that when infants orally they have no clear expectations about one versus two objects
explore objects, they also develop expectations about how (Brower & Wilcox, 2012). More subtle intermodal integra-
those objects move. In this case, the infants were allowed tions, such as pairing a “clacking” with two wooden blocks
to suck and chew on disks that were either rigid or flexible banging together and a “splishing” with two sponges slapping

110 CHAPTER 3 COMING TO PERCEIVE THE WORLD

 SCIENTIFIC METHOD: Intersensory Perception at Birth
Hypothesis: Coo Grunt
Newborn infants can integrate sights and sounds for stimuli that they would not
naturally encounter.

Method:
1. Newborn infants (1 to 3 days old) sat on an experimenter’s lap and watched
two videos of monkey faces without sound.
2. Infants then saw each of the videos with either the sound made by the monkey
in that video (sound matched the video) or the sound made by the monkey in
the other video. The sound came from a speaker between the two videos.
3. Experimenters recorded the infants’ looking preferences when looking at the 0.8

Mean proportion of looking at matching video

silent videos and when looking at the videos with one or the other monkey’s
vocalization patterns. 0.7

Results: 0.6
In experiment 1, newborn infants showed no significant looking preferences for
either video without sound. But with sound, they looked longer at the video that 0.5
matched the sound they heard. In experiment 2, they heard artificial sounds that
0.4
were in synchrony with the facial expressions of one monkey and matched those
as well.
0.3
Conclusion:
0.2
From the moment of birth, infants are able to map facial expressions onto sounds
made by those expressions, even when they are nonhuman, suggesting a very
0.1
general mechanism for matching visual events to sounds.
Source study: Lewkowicz et al. (2010). 0
Experiment 1 Experiment 2

No sound With sound

together, take much longer to develop. They often do not expectations about how objects’ properties go together and
appear until near the end of the first year of life (Bahrick, how an object perceived in one modality should seem when
1983). With more meaningful stimuli, however, such as the it is perceived in another. This initial integration ability also
mother’s face and voice, even newborns seem to engage in provides an essential foundation for learning more complex
intermodal perception. Thus, when a mother’s voice accom- relations across senses. By the time they are 6 months old,
panies her own face as opposed to the face of an unfamiliar for example, infants seem to know which kinds of noises an
female, after just a few minutes of seeing and hearing the face, aggressive-looking dog might make as opposed to a nonag-
an infant will orient more to the image in which the mother’s gressive dog (Flom et al., 2009). In some ways, newborns
face and voice match (Sai, 2005). do understand and use aspects of the intricate relationships
between touch and sight or between sight and sound, yet
they clearly cannot perceive all of these relationships. A key
question for future research is to specify the range of these
Q: When do infants first seem to be able earliest abilities more precisely and to learn how they are
to link emotional expressions in faces to the amplified and extended during early development.
corresponding emotional sounds?

From the broad range of examples given here, we see that Q: What is the value of intermodal perception
even newborns integrate information across sense modali- in newborns?
ties. Based on the information they receive, they form

INTERMODAL PERCEPTION 111

 Speaker at birth. Rather, infants do a great deal of learning in order
to perceive the world more accurately. One way to think
about early perceptual development is that the newborn
has a “head start” on understanding the informational pat-
terns that exist in the world. This head start seems to affect
all levels of processing, from experiencing sensory inputs
to interpreting and integrating those experiences; but that
innate capacity is not the same as having prior knowledge
of the sorts of things we perceive. We are not like chickens
with built-in hawk detectors, but neither are we blank slates.
A basic, skeletal set of perceptual expectations guides fur-
ther learning and development.
Perhaps the simplest way to characterize early perceptual
development is to imagine that vision, hearing, taste, and the
other perceptual systems function like curious individuals
who first encounter the world with general hunches about
what it is like. Since they recognize that their hunches are
fallible, they initially hold only vague, sketchy expectations,
and they constantly test those expectations to see how well
they fit with aspects of the world. As time goes by, they adapt
their hunches if they turn out to be incorrect, but they still
FIGURE 3.33 Integrating sound and vision. Even when both show a bias to revert back to those hunches if information is
cylinders are turned back and forth at the same rate, 3-month-
unclear. Finally, the initial hunches are not infinitely flexible.
old infants know which one corresponds to a certain sound track.
Adapted from Bahrick (1988).
They can be adapted to accord better with experiences of the
world, but they cannot be changed in every way, shape, and
form. For that reason, we and other animals are fortunate
that the initial hunches capture enough of what is real about
Conclusions the world that they can become workable and useful. This
metaphor of imagining perceptual systems as active agents
We have consistently seen that infants have innate spe- helps us realize that from adults down to the tiniest infants,
cializations within the different senses for perceiving pat- we are not passive perceivers of the world but active explor-
terns in the world, including those that integrate across the ers. In the next chapter, we will look more directly at how
senses. These specializations do not emerge fully developed the infant physically explores and interacts with the world.

STU DY AN D REVI EW

SUMMARY tual processing, such as for perceiving facial patterns, there is

more support for nativist positions.
Vision ● To be able to explore questions about perception in prever-
● Debates between nativists and empiricists in the realm of bal infants, several important techniques must be used, most
perceptual development can be understood in terms of the notably looking preferences and habituation/dishabituation
degree to which there are innate specializations for informa- paradigms.
tion beyond the processing of perceptual primitives such ● Even newborns have brightness discrimination abilities that
as brightness differences and lines and edges in the case of serve as a foundation for higher-level perceptual skills. Their
vision. Where specializations exist for more complex percep- visual acuity is poor at birth, but it improves with age as the

112 CHAPTER 3 COMING TO PERCEIVE THE WORLD

 eye grows and focuses light on the retina and as the brain ● Newborns show preferences for certain smells, especially the
areas’ processing acuity become more sophisticated. odor of their mother’s breast milk.
● Newborn infants have a “head start” at developing complex
visual perceptual skills, such as perceiving color in terms of Intermodal Perception
categories and perceiving objects in depth. This is because ● Right from the start, infants are able to integrate informa-
infants are born with a preverbal system that matures quickly tion across the senses. They seem to know how something
to enable them to perceive universal, common color catego- that looks a certain way, such as bumpy, will feel. They
ries. They also are born with the ability to use some dynamic also have been found to integrate sights and sounds. These
cues—for example, motion parallax—to perceive depth in the findings provide strong evidence against extreme empiricist
first month of life. accounts of perceptual development because even very young
● As the early stages of depth perception illustrate, newborns infants show capacities for intermodal perception before they
undergo a great deal of developmental change as their per- could have formed associations between specific sensory
ceptual abilities become more sophisticated. They begin to experiences.
use binocular cues and then pictorial cues to more accurately
perceive depth. Much of this development involves feedback
loops between the developing organism and its environment. THOUGHT QUESTIONS
Flexible systems show plasticity and enable the organism to 1. What is the function of critical periods? Why should there be
respond to its environment and to its own changing state critical periods at all rather than continuous environmental
over the course of development. sensitivity? Are there any functional advantages conferred on
● Among the different types of perceptual development, the the developing organism, or are they incidental consequences
perception of visual patterns is perhaps the most complex, of other aspects of development?
requiring a great deal of learning. At the same time, even 2. How does being born blind versus being born deaf affect a
newborns seem to have some basic expectations about cer- developing child? How do the developmental implications
tain visual patterns, especially the human face. A U-shaped and challenges of being born blind differ from those involved
developmental curve characterizes infants’ face-tracking
in being born deaf? Compare both the immediate and long-
abilities. Some see this as evidence for an early rudimentary
term implications for the developing child.
system of face perception in newborns that declines and then
3. What is the basis for a preference for attractive faces? Why
is replaced by a more sophisticated system.
●
might newborn infants have a preference for faces that adults
Infants prefer certain faces because they perceive them as
more attractive than others, a behavior that may reflect a regard as more attractive? What does such a finding tell us
genetically predisposed awareness of average facial values. about how face perception develops?

Hearing
● Development of the ability to perceive sounds has many
parallels to vision. Very young infants do not start out per- KEY TERMS
ceiving only the simplest, most basic auditory “primitives” astigmatism (p. 82) optokinetic nystagmus
and then combining them to perceive complex patterns, method (p. 81)
binocular cues (p. 87)
such as speech. Rather, infants can process complex speech
binocular disparity (p. 87) perceptual narrowing (p. 97)
sounds from the start, and their perceptual abilities become
increasingly attuned to the types of sounds they typically binocular parallax (p. 87) pictorial cues (p. 88)
hear. categorical perception (p. 84) plasticity (p. 94)
● At birth, infants also have a crude system for localizing the
convergence (p. 87) preferential looking
sounds they perceive. This rudimentary early system is later method (p. 79)
dishabituation (p. 80)
supplanted by a much more precise system in yet another sensitive period (p. 103)
instance of U-shaped developmental changes. dynamic cues (p. 86)
stereopsis (p. 87)
feedback loop (p. 77)
The Chemical Senses: Taste and Smell U-shaped developmental
Gestalt principles (p. 94)
● Young infants can clearly distinguish between various tastes
curve (p. 98)
habituation (p. 80)
and odors, but the research in these areas has been less exten- visual acuity (p. 79)
habituation method (p. 80)
sive than for vision or hearing. visual cliff (p. 90)
● Taste perception begins in the womb and may affect infants’
hue (p. 84)
visually evoked potential
preference for certain tastes after birth. Newborns and intermodal perception (VEP) method (p. 81)
infants show a clear preference for sweet substances, which (p. 109)
calm them and can have painkilling effects. motion parallax (p. 86)

STUDY AND REVIEW 113

 4
The Emergence of Action
Foundations of Motor Development Learning to Engage in Specific Conclusions
• Reflexes in Infancy Actions
Summary
• Theories of Motor Development • Early Imitation
Perception and Action • Imprinting, Action, and Critical Periods
• Conditioning
• Coordination in Changing Bodies
• Reaching
• Navigating Space
 here has been a surge of attention to the prevalence biological maturation and learning in infancy support the

T of obesity not only in children but also in infants. In

2010, U.S. First Lady Michelle Obama launched a
national campaign to address what has been called
an epidemic of childhood obesity. Around this time,
the government of China also began voicing concerns about
rising rates of childhood obesity. And in Europe, high obe-
sity rates in infants and preschool children in some locales
development of the fluid, effortless actions typical of older
children and adults? In what ways are infants sensitive to
feedback from the environment and from their own bodies
as they attempt to act on the world? How do infants adjust
their actions in response to feedback, and how do these
adjustments occur within a set of guiding constraints? We
will also see how changes in the body, such as the weight of
highlighted the large disparities among countries. Spain, for the arms and legs, affect the emergence and coordination of
example, reported that up to 16 percent of 2-year-olds were motor skills. The intricate interactions between these factors
severely overweight, while in Sweden, the rate was closer to enable infants to begin organizing their actions right from
2 percent (Cattaneo et al., 2010). the start. And yet, just as we saw in the previous chapter,
There are many health problems linked to early childhood these rudimentary capacities are flexible enough to allow for
obesity. For example, overweight infants are more likely to fine-tuning, so that infants can develop their motor skills
eventually have diabetes, gallstones, fatty liver disease, sleep based on how their changing bodies are able to respond to
apnea, bone and joint problems, as well as a whole range of what is happening in the world around them.
psychosocial problems (Lee, 2009). Most of these effects, As we discuss each approach to the development of
however, gradually accumulate over many years and are not action, we will see that familiar themes emerge. We will
manifested until adulthood. It was not normally thought to consider the tradeoffs between specialization and plastic-
be a problem if a baby was overweight; in fact, it was often ity, we will examine the extent to which different aspects of
seen as a sign of good health. motor development depend on both innate maturation and
In one somewhat surprising way, however, researchers external environmental influences, and we will discuss how
have found that obesity can influence an important aspect feedback loops are central to the fine-tuning of behaviors.
of infants’ lives directly and quite dramatically—namely,
their motor development. In one study of children between
3 and 18 months who were in the 90th percentile in terms
of being overweight, researchers tested the infants’ motor
skills at frequent intervals. The overweight babies were
Foundations of Motor
almost two times as likely to show motor delays compared
with normal-weight infants (Slining et al., 2010). For exam-
Development
ple, overweight babies tended to first walk at later ages than Even before birth, babies engage in clear and unmistakable
normal-weight babies, and the overweight babies had other actions. Virtually every mother feels her unborn child kick
delays in motor skills and coordination continuing for sev- and move about, sometimes so dramatically that the move-
eral months thereafter. ments are visible simply by looking at the mother’s abdo-
How could something as seemingly trivial as a little extra men. At birth, an infant’s behaviors are already quite rich
body fat cause substantial motor delays? Motor development and varied. A newborn can cry in a variety of ways that seem
is not simply a matter of a central motor control program to suggest different levels of distress. He can also nurse from
maturing; instead, it involves interactions between central a nipple or bottle, albeit initially a bit clumsily. As we saw in
control patterns, physical properties of the limbs, and learn- Chapter 3, he can turn his head toward a sound and blink in
ing experiences. And as we will see, cyclical patterns and response to a bright light, as well as show a variety of facial
feedback loops play a critical role in these developmental reactions to different tastes and smells. He can also imi-
processes. tate others’ facial expressions, an ability explored in depth
In this chapter, we will explore the foundations on which later in this chapter. At the same time, a newborn human
early motor abilities are built, discussing such topics as infant is strikingly helpless compared with the newborns
reflexes, coordination of perception and action, imitation, of many more precocious species. Whereas many newborn
critical periods, and conditioning. We will ask how infants animals can walk immediately after birth, human infants
progress from involuntary, reflexive actions to increasingly cannot walk until they are around 1 year old. A human
controlled and voluntary actions—for example, examin- newborn cannot even roll over or lift up his head when lying
ing how infants become increasingly adept at reaching for on his stomach. How does a newborn progress from such an
objects and navigating space. We will explore how percep- apparently helpless state to become an active toddler? What
tion and action become increasingly integrated, asking such are the foundations of motor development? To begin with,
questions as: How do even the simplest acts of coordination infants are born with reflexes that enable them to react
develop in the infant, and how does the interplay between before they are capable of more directed action.

116 CHAPTER 4 THE EMERGENCE OF ACTION

 the development of the rhythmic alternation of the limbs for
Reflexes in Infancy walking, not just in humans but also in species that walk on
Some of the most noticeable actions performed by the young all four limbs. The Moro reflex is one of the newborn’s more
infant are built-in reflexes, which are automatic responses complex reflexes. One well-known way of eliciting it involves
to particular forms of stimulation (see Figure 4.1). Normal initially holding the newborn firmly with one hand under the
infants exhibit these reflexes so reliably that physicians rou- center of his back and the other hand under his head, then
tinely use them to monitor the development in the baby’s dropping the hand under the baby’s head. When the hand
nervous system and to diagnose possible problems. Some of under the baby’s head is abruptly dropped downward (but
the most common reflexes are the patellar reflex, or “knee only a small drop so as not to injure the baby), the baby’s arms
jerk reflex,” in which tapping a tendon below the kneecap fly out to each side and then return to the centerline of his
causes the lower leg to kick; the rooting reflex, in which body. A common interpretation of this action is that it causes
brushing an object against the face causes a newborn to the infant to reflexively grasp his caregiver if he feels himself
move his mouth toward the object and attempt sucking; suddenly falling. Although some reflexes may be just vestiges
the grasp reflex, in which touching the newborn’s palm of responses that were adaptive to our evolutionary ancestors,
causes him to grasp tightly; the stepping reflex, in which most still serve important functions.
gently lowering the baby feet-first to a surface triggers auto- A distinctive feature of many reflexes in newborns, such as
matic stepping movements; and finally the Moro reflex, in the Moro reflex and the stepping reflex, is that they gradually
which experiencing a lack of support causes a baby’s arms disappear in the first few months of life. In the first half of
to move out to the sides (Moro, 1918). the twentieth century, some researchers interpreted this dis-
These reflexes make adaptive sense for getting infants appearance of inborn reflexes as evidence that key aspects of
through their first year or so of life. The patellar reflex is motor development depend entirely on changes in the brain.
thought to be essential for maintaining balance and posture They proposed that as specific regions of the cortex mature,
by triggering a quick response when a tendon is suddenly these regions increasingly inhibit the activity of lower-level
stretched. When the doctor’s tap—or more naturalistically, brain structures, which they believed are responsible for early
a quick change in leg angle—suddenly stretches the tendon, reflexes. In support of this view, they cited evidence that the
the leg muscles compensate for the stretch by contracting. The brain grows considerably larger and its neuronal branch-
elbow and other joints show the same kind of reflex, which ing becomes more complex over the first year of life (Conel,
is common to most vertebrates. The rooting reflex helps the 1939–1959). In particular, growth in the brain’s frontal cor-
newborn “home in” on his mother’s nipples and is widely tex and the increasing interconnectedness of regions such as
shared among mammals. Without rooting and sucking the motor cortex and other structures related to reflexes were
reflexes, a newborn would have difficulty eating and surviv- all cited as evidence that motor development is a matter of
ing. The grasp reflex triggers newborns to wrap their fingers increased inhibition and greater control of reflexes.
around an object after sensing contact, and many infants’ But does motor development in infants actually consist
grip is strong enough to support their own weight. This of little more than bundles of reflexes waiting to come
reflex is found early on in many mammals for which such a under the control of higher-level mental functions? There
holding action is important to survival. In human infants, it are several reasons to believe that this is not the case. As
disappears after a few months. The stepping reflex supports we will see in more detail in the next section, the reasons

A B C D E
FIGURE 4.1 Reflexes in newborns. Healthy young infants show a wide range of reflexes. Some of these reflexes appear to vanish after the
first few months of life, but in many cases they are still present in altered forms that are the result of changing anatomy. (A) Patellar reflex. (B)
Rooting reflex. (C) Grasp reflex. (D) Stepping reflex. (E) Moro reflex.

FOUNDATIONS OF MOTOR DEVELOPMENT 117

that many early reflexes disappear have less to do with cen-
tralized developments in the brain and more to do with
peripheral or bodily factors, like muscle strength or the size
of the limbs, and the environment in which the infant is
functioning. Furthermore, some reflexes may only seem to
disappear, when they actually are still present but are being
manifested in a different way, as we will see when we con-
sider the effects of the changing weight of an infant’s limbs
as he matures. For example, researcher Esther Thelen dem-
onstrated that contrary to the long-held belief that the step-
ping reflex ceases to exist, it actually becomes manifested in
a different form as a “kicking reflex.” By careful analyses of
videotapes and measures of muscle actions in kicking and
stepping by infants, she showed that they are essentially the
same actions and that the movements change as a function
of changes in the muscles and bones in the legs (Thelen &
Fisher, 1982). We now turn to a discussion of theories of
motor development to see more on how different research-
ers explain how infants become capable of various kinds of
FIGURE 4.2 Emerging motor skills. The infant’s first steps are
directed movement.
a highly precarious enterprise with failure and discomfort from falls
being commonplace. That babies continue to try to walk suggests
a powerful underlying motivation that overrides immediate negative
Q: Describe three reflexes that are present at consequences.

birth, and explain how they change over the first

few months of development. Shirley, 1931). More recent descriptions take care to show
the age range in which particular motor skills normally
appear in order to provide a sense of the typical variations,
as well as the mean ages of these motor milestones (see
Theories of Motor Development Figure 4.3). They also recognize that not all motor devel-
opments necessarily unfold on the same, set timeline. A
Imagine a 13-month-old toddling about her parents’ house, relatively late walker might not be a relatively late grasper
carrying various objects—sometimes alarmingly heavy and of objects, because different factors, such as overall body
fragile ones (see Figure 4.2). Two weeks earlier she couldn’t weight (as noted in the opening to the chapter), might cause
take a single unsupported step. This dramatic change may delays in development in walking but not in grasping.
appear to resemble a tadpole-to-frog metamorphosis in the
sense that it seems to be driven by an internal timetable
of maturation that is relatively uninfluenced by practice or
experience. In reality, however, this classic view is largely Q: What is the normal sequence of motor
incorrect. milestones in the first 18 months of life?
One of the earliest endeavors in developmental psychol-
ogy was to construct charts and tables showing the average
ages at which children meet common motor development The Maturational Account Even the early studies of
milestones, such as sitting up, crawling, and walking (Bay- motor development in the late nineteenth century showed
ley, 1935; Dennis & Dennis, 1940; Gesell & Ilg, 1949; that experience has relatively little effect on when motor
McGraw, 1943; Shirley, 1931). Traditional charts showed skills first appear; certain skills always seem to emerge at
the sequence of milestones as pretty much the same across all around the same points in development. At that time, the
children. Thus, they indicated that almost all children are explanation for this consistency closely resembled the brain-
able to roll over before they can sit up, and sit up before they based interpretation of infants’ “disappearing” reflexes.
can walk. They also showed all children as reaching each That is, the highly reliable timing of particular motor
milestone at roughly the same average ages (for example, milestones suggested that motor development depends
sitting with support at 4 months, sitting alone at 7 months, entirely on the increasing sophistication of the cortex and
creeping at 10 months, and walking alone at 15 months; its ability to orchestrate the timing and intensity of muscle

118 CHAPTER 4 THE EMERGENCE OF ACTION

 FIGURE 4.3 Motor mile-
Walks on own stones. Recent depictions of motor
milestones show normal ranges
Stands unsupported within which each behavior appears.
Each bar begins with the age at
Walks along furniture
which the behavior has appeared in
25 percent of infants and ends with
the age at which the behavior has
Pulls self to stand
appeared in 90 percent of infants;
the vertical bar indicates the age at
Stands with help which the behavior has appeared
in 50 percent of infants. In contrast
Sits on own to earlier views, these ranges reveal
considerable variation in when a
Rolls over skill, such as walking alone, first
appears. Adapted from Frankenburg
et al. (1981).
On stomach, can raise chest with arms

On stomach, can lift head up 90˚

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Age (in months)

movements. The first report along these lines was made by extensive training before a child was “ready” had little or no
William Preyer, who, like many overeager parents, spent a effect. These sorts of findings led many researchers in the 1930s
great deal of time trying to teach his own son to walk before and 1940s to assume that motor development was largely a
his son was a year old. Unlike most parents who have made preprogrammed affair governed by maturational timetables
similar attempts, Preyer wrote up the results of his labors, and unaffected by experience.
sadly reporting that not only did his son not walk any earlier
than normal, but his final date of walking was actually a bit
later than that of most other children (Preyer, 1888).
The proponents of the maturational account of motor Q: What was the conclusion drawn from
development generally held that motor development depends Gesell’s stair climbing studies with infants?
on the increasing sophistication of the brain’s motor pro-
grams for guiding more and more complex actions. They
argued that a baby cannot walk before 1 year of age because Additional evidence for the maturational account came from
the brain structures involved in guiding motor action are observational studies of infants who showed relatively normal
still too immature to coordinate the movements that enable motor development despite their motor deprivation—that
walking. Training supposedly doesn’t have much of an is, their limited motor experience. One well-known study
effect before a certain age because it has no functional corti- examined motor development in Hopi infants who were
cal circuits to rely on. bound to a cradleboard for parts of the day, especially when
The most influential advocate of the maturational they were asleep (Dennis & Dennis, 1940; see Figure 4.5).
account was Arnold Gesell. His landmark study involved Although these infants had less motor experience than oth-
the emergence of stair climbing ability in identical twin girls ers, they showed almost no motor development delays. Sub-
(Gesell & Thompson, 1929; see Figure 4.4). At the age of sequent to those studies, researchers have found that truly
46 weeks (about 11 months), one twin began daily practice devastating environments, such as understaffed orphanages
at climbing five stairs. She made little progress for the first where infants are left lying in cribs all day (see Chapter 6),
few weeks, but at around 50 weeks she quickly became able can cause extensive delays in motor development (Dennis &
to climb the stairs, and by 52 weeks she could do it in less Najarian, 1957), but even these early impairments are typi-
than half a minute. During this same period, the other twin cally reversible. In fact, there are some indications that tightly
had no practice. She was introduced to stairs for the first swaddling infants, a practice found across an enormous range
time at the end of 52 weeks—at which point she immedi- of cultures over the course of history, may help them to sleep
ately climbed the stairs unaided, almost as rapidly as her sis- and protect them from the cold without negatively affecting
ter. Similar studies on other early motor skills showed that motor development (van Sleuwen et al., 2007).

FOUNDATIONS OF MOTOR DEVELOPMENT 119

 FIGURE 4.5 Motor deprivation and motor development. Native
American infants were believed to spend much of their early lives
FIGURE 4.4 Learning to climb stairs. Gesell’s twin studies sug- immobilized on “cradleboards,” raising questions about the importance
gested that the age at which children learn a new motor skill, such of experience to motor development. Although they were immobilized
as climbing stairs, is mostly a consequence of maturation rather than during parts of the day, they were actually not immobilized most of the
learning. time and did not experience delays in their motor development.

Dynamic Systems Theory Since the 1970s, a new wave joints work, and how different parts move together. In this
of research has largely replaced the maturational account. account, the changes that occur in the shift from walking to
The new research was partly inspired by two new perspec- running involve more than just implementing a different set
tives on movement. The first of these was developed by of instructions from the brain. Instead, Bernstein argued,
Eleanor Gibson (whose visual cliff studies were discussed in as the limbs move faster, the pattern of movements used to
Chapter 3) and her husband, James Gibson. The Gibsons walk becomes unstable while the pattern of movements in
emphasized the constant interplay between perception and a typical run becomes stable. There are strong constraints
movement and the importance of this link for carrying out on the nature and organization of limb motion and on
real-world actions. Thus, they believed that perception pro- the speeds at which particular kinds of motions can stably
vides a context and a goal for an action, and the action then occur. Notice, for example, the difficulty of running very
leads to the modification of a perception. You perceive your slowly or walking very fast.
environment and then walk with the goal of maneuvering These two perspectives on movement led to a series of
through that environment, so negotiating the environment innovative experiments designed to explore how percep-
is the action to be explained, not simply walking for the sake tion and action might be interwoven into one “dynamic
of walking. Similarly, you perceive a person who is running, system,” in which each continues to affect the other, and
and whether you are fleeing or pursuing that person signifi- how the parts of the body itself physically constrain and
cantly affects your own running. The Gibsons put motor organize actions. Some developmental psychologists have
development into the larger context of related changes in therefore come to embrace what is known as dynamic
perception, attention, and the physical body, which work systems theory, the idea that the development of complex
together to support more sophisticated actions. behaviors should be understood in terms of the interactions
The second perspective that helped launch the new wave among all the changing components involved in execut-
of research arose from the work of the Russian researcher ing the behaviors, and not just as sets of instructions sent
Nikolai Bernstein (Bernstein, 1967). Bernstein suggested from the cortex and carried out by the body. Thus, we need
that our actions are complex and orderly not just because to take into account anatomy at the levels of individual
of the brain’s well-calibrated control of the body, but also muscles and bones, limbs, and the body as a whole, as well
because of the physical properties of our body parts and their as the involvement of the peripheral and central nervous
interactions, including the size of the limbs, the way the systems, and finally the broader context in which an action

120 CHAPTER 4 THE EMERGENCE OF ACTION

is occurring, such as whether an infant is wearing bulky approximating the additional weight of the limbs of older
clothes, is lifting a heavy object, or has a particular goal. infants who lose the stepping reflex—these infants lost
Taken together, all these components make up a dynamic the reflex as well. This finding suggested that the reflex
system, which can result in seemingly rapid and qualitative normally disappears as a result of changes in the physi-
changes in behaviors as small components of the overall cal dynamics of the limb, not because of changes in brain
system change. development. More specifically, Thelen discovered that
One set of studies by Esther Thelen had a particularly the legs of older infants gained weight in fat without cor-
dramatic effect on the view that emerging central motor responding muscle increases. This line of research also
programs are the prime determinants of walking (Thelen, explains the finding mentioned at the beginning of this
1995, 2001; Thelen & Fisher, 1982; Thelen et al., 1984). chapter that obese infants walk considerably later than
As mentioned earlier, Thelen focused on the disappearance infants of normal weight. Even though the additional
of the stepping reflex a few weeks after birth. Tradition- weight may seem inconsequential, an infant’s motor devel-
ally, this disappearance had been attributed entirely to brain opment depends on just the right proportions of muscles
development. Recall that earlier researchers theorized that and joint weights, so a little extra baby fat can cause sub-
the reflex is governed by a simple, lower-level motor pro- stantial delays in walking.
gram and that as more complex, higher-level brain struc- Thelen analyzed the infants’ dynamic patterns of leg
tures develop, they inhibit the initial reflex. Then, as the movements, both during the stepping reflex and when they
higher-level cortical structures become more sophisticated, kicked their legs while lying on their back. In both cases,
they reorganize the stepping reflex and cause it to reemerge the timing and pattern of movements across muscle groups
later as a component of normal walking. were nearly identical, suggesting that these two actions
In line with dynamic systems theory, Thelen wondered if emerge from a common motor system, rather than granting
physical properties of the limbs themselves also contribute the reflex a separate status.
to the reflex’s apparent disappearance and whether the step-
ping reflex might actually have a connection with later, vol-
untary stepping. To see how the weight of the limbs might Q: How does the weight of the limbs influence
affect infants’ stepping reflex, she conducted several studies
that involved changing the weight of the limbs. One study the development of motor skills?
involved 1-month-old infants, whose stepping reflex had
disappeared. When the infants were gently supported in a
walking position in a small tank of lukewarm water (see Fig- Thelen’s studies demonstrated that a complex action can
ure 4.6), the buoyancy supported the weight of their legs, be made to appear or disappear at many different times in
and they made reflexive stepping motions. infancy by simply changing the weight of the limbs. This
In addition, when younger babies who still showed the finding makes the earlier maturational account—that an
stepping reflex had tiny weights attached to their legs— early reflex is inhibited by higher-level cortical develop-
ments only to reemerge when it is incorporated into a corti-
cally controlled action—less plausible.
Following Nikolai Bernstein’s thinking, Thelen felt that
central motor programs are less important for explaining
developmental change than the growth of the body parts
that perform the actions (the bones, joints, and muscles)
and their stable, coordinated patterns of motion. Thelen
argued that babies incorporate particular motions into
their voluntary actions if and when the timing pattern of
the components is especially stable for a limb and its joints
A B (Thelen, 1995). Just as it is difficult to run very slowly,
FIGURE 4.6 Physical constraints and motor skills. (A) When Thelen argued that it is difficult to add certain motions
1-month-old infants whose stepping reflex had disappeared were put to one’s repertoire of voluntary actions until the various
in an empty tank and supported in an upright position, they did not muscles are the right strength, the limb parts are the right
make stepping movements. (B) When these same infants were sup-
weight, and the pattern of the movement is at the right
ported in a tank of water, the buoyancy of the water lightened their
limbs, and stepping and walking actions appeared spontaneously.
speed.
These results suggest that physical constraints of the limbs, rather Of course, Thelen’s studies and others like them don’t
than central motor programs, may be a primary factor in the develop- do away with the need for cortical structures that help
mental changes of many motor skills. guide actions. They just broaden the focus to include the

FOUNDATIONS OF MOTOR DEVELOPMENT 121

developing body as well as the brain within a larger dynamic Coordination in Changing Bodies
system. More generally, dynamic systems theory emphasizes
the development of motor skills as a result of different inter- The squirrel jumping from branch to branch in a tree, the
acting constraints: brain-based motor programs, physical frog capturing a fly in midair with its tongue, and the child
properties of the body, features of the environment, and catching a ball in one hand have all developed a rapid, effort-
goals of the task at hand (Bertenthal & Clifton, 1998; Spen- less coordination between vision and action (see Figure 4.7).
cer et al., 2011; Thelen & Smith, 1998). In the development All of them have developed these systems in bodies whose
of action, the coordinated movements of muscles comprise dimensions have changed dramatically over the course of
just one part of a larger, integrated system. their development. Consider a typical 13-month-old boy.
He has yet to master many aspects of motor coordination,
but he can quickly touch objects that he sees, no matter how
his head is oriented or his body is turned. When he sees
Perception and Action an object that is straight ahead of him, he moves his arms
directly out in front of his body to touch it. When he looks
We have seen how the development of increasingly sophis- over his right shoulder and spots another object, he does not
ticated motor routines involves the integration of several move his arms in front of his body, but instead naturally and
components involving both the brain and the body. In most without hesitation reaches to his side and slightly behind his
cases, such actions are also integrated with perception of the back to touch it. Infants engage with the world this way so
environment and of oneself in that environment. An infant often that we hardly stop to think about it. Yet, it involves
has to coordinate her actions with what she sees. Ultimately, coordination of the position of the eyes in the head, the
she will become quite accurate at, for example, quickly put- head on the torso, and the torso with respect to the rest of
ting her finger on a small object that she sees. Action and the body. Meanwhile, all body parts must constantly update
perception are intimately interwoven, and the infant has their locations with respect to the other body parts, and that
to learn to guide her voluntary actions by her perceptions information must be coordinated with information about
and then to modify her perceptions based on her actions. objects’ locations in space.
Striking achievements in perceptual-motor development, Infants successfully face the challenge of using their
which requires coordinating actions with perceptual infor- vision to rapidly locate objects in space and then use that
mation, depend on sophisticated systems to address complex information to direct motor actions at those objects. But
developmental challenges. Perceptual-motor skills develop infants accomplish an even more daunting feat: they coor-
from the earliest moments of infancy and may continue to dinate vision and action while all their body parts con-
be refined to the highest levels of expertise, as in the dex- tinuously change. Think back to your clumsiest moments
terity of a concert pianist. Development and refinement of as a growing teenager. The challenge of coordination for
motor skills always involve feedback loops between actions infants is many times worse. Figure 4.8 shows how the
and perception. You perform an action, perceive the result, proportions of the human body change from before birth
and adjust your next action accordingly. Through this cycle, to maturity. The adult’s legs are three times longer than
the action is refined and tuned. Even a single action, such as the newborn’s. At the same time, the size and position
picking up a squirming puppy, can involve cycling feedback of the head change considerably. A vast array of devel-
loops, as you adjust your hand position and arm motion to oping organisms must integrate perception with action
keep hold of the puppy. under such changing conditions; very few, if any, main-

A B C
FIGURE 4.7 Perceptual-motor coordination. (A) A squirrel jumping from branch to branch in a tree, (B) a frog catching a fly with its tongue,
and (C) a toddler catching a ball are all examples of perceptual-motor coordination.

122 CHAPTER 4 THE EMERGENCE OF ACTION

 FIGURE 4.8 Changing bodily proportions. The relative lengths
of body parts change dramatically with increasing age. An adult
human’s legs are one-half of the total body length, while a newborn’s
legs are about one-third of the total body length. A newborn human’s
head is more than twice as big relative to its body as is the adult
head. In other animals, even more dramatic ratio changes can occur.
Adapted from Robbins et al. (1928).

account would suggest that the infant starts out with no

such coordination and develops it by learning from experi-
2 mo 5 mo Newborn 2 yr 6 yr 12 yr 25 yr ence. In this view, infants would initially move their limbs
(fetal) (fetal)
without regard to what they saw. Then, gradually, learn-
ing through trial and error, infants would come to associ-
ate certain sensations in the muscles and joints with certain
tain constant body proportions throughout development. patterns of visual input and would start to be able to move
To further examine the perceptual-motor system and the their hands toward what they saw. This same idea under-
changing body, we now turn to a discussion of reaching lies Berkeley’s (1709/1901) account of depth perception
and the development of eye-limb coordination. described in Chapter 3, in which he proposed that infants
learn to see depth by forming associations between differ-
ent sensations of eye convergence and the particular muscle
Q: Describe the changes in relative size of body and limb sensations required to touch objects at different
parts from before birth to adulthood. distances.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, if you casually
observe a young infant, the empiricists would seem to be right.
The infant’s limbs seem to move completely independently of
what she sees, and coordination seems to emerge gradually
Reaching as if she were learning associations between perceptions and
Many newborns do not touch much besides their own bod- actions. But a closer look reveals subtle ways in which innate
ies, their clothes, and the bodies and clothes of their caregiv- constraints influence perceptual-motor development.
ers. Most of the time, both in experiments and in daily life,
newborns fail to touch the objects they are trying to reach. Constraints on Links between Eye and Limb Although
These mostly failed attempts to touch objects are sometimes the limitations on infants’ early actions make their arm and
called prereaching. For example, infants younger than 2 hand movements appear haphazard, there may be some
months have trouble moving a hand horizontally across the structure to the seeming randomness. Researcher Claus von
front of their body (for example, moving the left hand to Hofsten has conducted some of the most elegant explora-
the body’s right side). Researchers used to think that infants tions of infant reaching by painstakingly observing infants’
could not reach across the middle of the body because of an hand movements toward objects (von Hofsten, 1980, 1983,
immature central nervous system or spinal cord (Provine & 1984, 2004; see also Chen et al., 2010). He found that
Westerman, 1979). But closer examination of infants who infants’ hand and arm movements are sometimes quite slow
were reaching for objects with both hands suggested that rather than the rapid jerks that we are prone to notice. Some
infants start to reach across the middle of the body when they of his experiments used a standard fishing lure—without
begin using both hands to try to hold onto larger objects, the hooks of course!—which the infants found especially
not because of a change in brain systems (Savelsbergh et al., attractive. The lure was moved slowly back and forth in
2003). That is, the goal of holding objects with both hands front of the infant, and the infant’s hand movements were
may provide a context for practicing and improving reaches videotaped and carefully coded.
across the body. Only at around 17 weeks are infants able When researchers interpreted these experiments with
to easily grasp an object with both hands at once. By 18 infants’ early coordination difficulties in mind, they
months, however, they are favoring one hand over another found that infants as young as 4 or 5 months, and pos-
as they reach for objects based on genetic handedness biases sibly younger, moved their hands to track and often antic-
(see Scientific Method box). ipated the paths of moving objects (von Hofsten, 1980,
1984, 2004; see also Robin et al., 1996). Thus, 4-month-
Empiricist View of Eye-Limb Coordination How do old infants clearly anticipate the path of a lure as they
infants develop eye-limb coordination? The empiricist reach out to catch it on arrival (von Hofsten, 1980; see

PERCEPTION AND ACTION 123

 SCIENTIFIC METHOD: The Genetics of Early Handedness
Hypothesis:
Genetic influences on handedness can be seen at 18 months of
age. Open side
Object
Method: 16.5
cm
1. Nineteen pairs of 18-month-old twins participated. Five twin
pairs were MZ, six were DZ same sex, and eight were DZ
opposite sex.
2. Infants were invited to retrieve attractive objects (A) from a A B
tube (B) that encouraged use of just one hand.
3. Three different tube positions (C) were used relative to the
infant’s body: left, middle, and right.
4. Researchers recorded which hand was used.

Results:
C
Although there was a preponderance of right-handed reaching
in all three groups, there was also some left-handed reaching,
TABLE 1 Correlations between members of MZ and
especially for tubes in the left and middle locations. Significantly
DZ twin pairs and handedness biases
higher correlations for the use of the same hand were found
between MZ twins than between DZ twins in either same-sex
or opposite-sex groups, especially when the tube was in the All
middle position (see Table 1). Left Middle Right Positions

MZ .17 .66* −.07 .64*

Conclusion:
Handedness biases that are influenced by genetic factors can Same-sex DZ −.54 −.45 .14 −.38
be found at 18 months of age, at which point more closely Opposite-sex DZ −.41 −.15 −.22 −.18
genetically related infants show higher correlations in the use
of the same hand in a reaching task. MZ, monozygotic twin; DZ, dizygotic twin.
*significant correlations

Source study: Suzuki et al. (2009).

Figure 4.9). In reaching for stationary objects, even new- If even newborns are able to guide their limbs toward
borns seem to have a sense of where to move their hands. the objects they perceive, then simple empiricist accounts
They reach in roughly the right direction, although they appear to be in trouble. These very early abilities suggest
very rarely touch the object and are not able to easily grasp that links between eye and limb that are already present
it (Bertenthal & Clifton, 1998). at birth serve as a framework that guides learning during
While newborn infants may have difficulty grasp- perceptual-motor development (von Hofsten, 1980, 2004).
ing objects, they nonetheless can guide their arms in an The critical question concerns how those links are influ-
intended direction. In one study, researchers passed a beam enced by experience.
of light in front of infants in a darkened room. The light
source was arranged so that each infant could see the beam
only if her hand passed in front of the light, revealing a well- Q: To what extent are newborns capable of
illuminated hand (van der Meer, 1997). The infants initially guiding their limbs toward a desired object?
moved their hands into the ray of light at random, but they How does that ability change in the first few
quickly learned to adjust the direction and speed of their
hand movements to bring their hands into the light and
months of life?
keep them there. Similarly, newborns will move their arms
toward objects they find appealing, even if they cannot grab Within a perceptual-motor framework that is present
them (von Hofsten, 1984). from birth, one powerful way that human infants show

124 CHAPTER 4 THE EMERGENCE OF ACTION

 Video camera 1
View from
video
Video camera 1
camera 2

View from
video
camera 2

05:57:91 05:58:11 05:58:31 05:58:51

A B
FIGURE 4.9 Reaching in young infants. (A) The setup in which an infant sits in a chair as an attractive object on a rod swings back and
forth in front of him. Video cameras from above and straight ahead record the infant’s reaching patterns, as well as his gaze and head move-
ments. (B) Views of the infant recorded over time from above and from straight ahead as he reaches for the object when it moves in front of
him. In this example, the infant is reaching in anticipation of making contact with the moving object. Adapted from von Hofsten & Lindhagen
(1979) and von Hofsten (1980).

learning involves coming to understand that objects beyond Later, we will see that these kinds of peripheral limb-based
a certain distance are not worth reaching for. Infants seem constraints, so called because they involve bodily features
to understand this by the time they are at least 4 months rather than instructions to the body by the brain, may be
old, as they are less likely to reach for more distant objects especially prominent in learning to crawl and walk.
(Yonas & Granud, 1985). By 5 months of age, infants also
modify the shapes of their hands to fit best with the shapes
or orientations of objects that they are about to grasp (von
Hofsten & Fazel-Zandy, 1984; see Figure 4.10). The pur- Navigating Space
pose of reaching—to retrieve an object—is therefore inte- Parents are often surprised at just how fast an infant can
grated into an infant’s perception and action from an early move, especially, it seems, when they look away for a moment.
age. Another link between reaching and perception of As infants grow older, they become increasingly adept at get-
distance also occurs with hearing. By 6 months, infants ting around, usually progressing from creeping to crawling
will reach less for objects they hear (in the dark) that are to various stages of walking. During this progression, just as
too far away (Clifton et al., 1991). Even more impressively, in the development of reaching, their movements are con-
10-month-old infants will adjust how they move their
hands toward an object, depending on what they plan to
do with it. Thus, they will reach faster to grasp a ball they
want to throw than a ball they are going to stuff into a
tube. Presumably the difference arises because the stuff-
ing requires more dexterity and a more precise initial grip
(Claxton et al., 2003).
Developmental improvements in reaching clearly are
related to two kinds of changes in the brain: (1) changes
to the neural circuits that directly enable action to become
more sophisticated as the circuits mature, and (2) changes
to the brain in response to learning new forms of actions.
In addition, changes outside the brain are also important. In
some cases, the infant’s own body and posture may impose
limitations, a pattern that fits with the tenets of dynamic
systems theory. For example, 5-month-olds, who are not
able to sit on their own, also seem to be quite poor at FIGURE 4.10 Reaching in older infants. This 8-month-old has
reaching for objects. But when these infants are propped become quite adept at both anticipating the trajectory of this rapidly
up carefully with cushions, suddenly their reaching abili- moving object and also at adjusting her hand orientation and grasp
ties become more sophisticated (Rochat & Goubet, 1995). width in such a way as to make effective contact with the object.

PERCEPTION AND ACTION 125

stantly guided by perceptual feedback. It is also important and both groups were treated identically when in the dark.
to note that not all infants go through the same sequence They saw an illuminated world only for the few hours each
of learning to move around. Some never do much crawling day that they spent in a special environment—a cylindrical
and instead go from creeping to holding themselves up and chamber with identically spaced vertical lines on the wall. In
moving about upright. It may be that medical recommenda- this environment, the passive kittens were placed in a “gon-
tions for infants to sleep on their backs (so as to reduce the dola,” a small container that carried them just a few centime-
chances of sudden infant death syndrome) give them less of ters above the ground. The active kittens were always placed
an opportunity to learn how to crawl on their stomachs. in the harness that controlled the gondola. The mechanical
linkages between the harness and the gondola were such that
Active versus Passive Visual Experience and Action the passive kitten experienced the active kitten’s every move.
In learning a new action, how important is it to produce Thus, if the active kitten moved rapidly, both it and its pas-
the action alone, as opposed to having someone else guide sive partner would see the vertical lines on the chamber’s walls
your movements? When a young baseball player learns to rushing by at the same speed. When the active kitten stopped
hit, how important is it for her to keep attempting to con- or turned, the passive kitten would also stop or turn, so that
nect with the ball, rather than resting her hands on a bat both kittens’ visual experience would change in the same way.
swung by a coach? In both cases, she sees the ball moving In short, the combination of this special environment and
toward the bat, then feels her arms move through space. Is the gondola arrangement eliminated all the differences in
the initiation of the action that important? To understand the perceptual-motor experiences of the two groups of kit-
how perceptual-motor skills are best acquired, it is impor- tens except for one. The passive kitten’s visual experiences
tant to understand the different roles of active and passive were never a consequence of its own self-produced motion;
visual motor experience and which kind of feedback most instead, they resulted from the motions of the active kitten.
effectively supports the development of action. Only then After experiencing these conditions for 3 hours a day
can we make informed decisions about the kinds of activi- over the course of 2 months, the two groups of kittens were
ties that most benefit infants and young children. tested with several different tasks to see if being an active as
An elegant approach to studying the role of feedback in opposed to a passive participant had any effect on percep-
perceptual-motor development was designed by Richard Held tion or action. The researchers tested whether the kittens
and Alan Hein (Held & Hein, 1963; see Figure 4.11). The would put their paws out to land on a table as they were
researchers divided newborn kittens into two groups, active lowered toward it, as normal kittens do. As experimenters
and passive. Both groups spent most of their time in dark- lowered the active kittens, they would put out their paws to
ness, where they were free to wander about as they pleased, meet the table’s surface at just the right time. By contrast,
the passive kittens were unable to link their perception of
the approaching table to their own actions; they did not
stretch out their forelegs to meet the surface. Instead, they
usually let their forelegs hang until their paws grazed the
surface, and then they would step up on the table, just as
they normally did in the dark.

A Q: How did the passively and actively reared

kittens in the Held and Hein studies differ?
P

Passive kittens also seemed less sensitive to depth rela-

tions in other situations. When an object rapidly approached
their faces, they were much less likely to blink, which was
the active kittens’ (and normal kittens’) automatic response.
FIGURE 4.11 Active versus passive experience. The active (A) The researchers also observed the kittens on a visual cliff
and passive (P) kittens in the Held and Hein study. The two kittens
like the one Eleanor Gibson used to test infants’ depth per-
had nearly identical visual experiences due to the yoking of the pas-
sive kitten’s gondola to the movements of the active kitten. Nonethe-
ception (see Chapter 3). The passive kittens would wander
less, perceiving movement that is not the result of one’s own actions off onto the deep side of the visual cliff, showing no abil-
resulted in many perceptual motor deficits for the passive kitten. ity to avoid the apparent drop-off (see Figure 4.12). Indeed,
Adapted from Held & Hein (1963). Held and Hein noted that if a passive kitten was placed on a

126 CHAPTER 4 THE EMERGENCE OF ACTION

 not experiencing visual feedback from his own actions.
When both participants were later tested, the active person
showed an adaptation to the prisms, while the passive per-
son was relatively unaffected (Held, 1965). There are many
other studies showing these results. For example, it is pos-
sible to learn to trace the path through a maze using only a
mirror image for visual feedback, but only if you yourself do
the drawing. Passively following the maze with your hand
while someone else draws has little or no effect (Bedford,
1989; Held, 1965).
One study with human infants has interesting parallels
to Held and Hein’s (1963) study. Infants between 2 and
3 months of age were outfitted with mittens, some of which
had Velcro that stuck to toys and some of which did not
have Velcro and so did not stick to toys. The infants with
Velcro mittens would touch the toys, which would stick to
their mittens, and then transport them about as shown in
FIGURE 4.12 The visual cliff and active experience in kittens.
Unlike this kitten, passively transported kittens in the Held and Hein
Figure 4.13A. The infants with mittens that did not have
studies were much more likely to wander off on the deep side of the Velcro watched as a parent moved the toys around in a
visual cliff. manner that followed the infants’ arm movements, without
allowing them to actively transport the toys themselves (see
Figure 4.13B). These two groups of infants had the same
lab table for a moment, they would often have to rush over experiences for just a few minutes a day for 2 weeks.
and catch it as it blithely walked off an edge. It is not clear Over subsequent weeks, researchers measured how much
whether the passive kittens were completely insensitive to time the infants spent spontaneously grasping and reach-
these “cliffs” or whether they realized that a drop-off was ing, both in the laboratory and at home. As Figure 4.13C
imminent but did not know how to coordinate their actions shows, the active infants did much more grasping and
with what they saw. reaching, suggesting that their early experience in short ses-
These studies and similar studies with other species, sions of actively reaching and manipulating objects helped
such as monkeys, show that it is not enough for the devel- jump-start their learning about these motions (Libertus &
oping organism to have both unrestricted movement and Needham, 2010).
unobstructed vision. The two must occur simultaneously More broadly, these studies suggest that organisms can
so that the developing organism immediately sees the best learn about their environments in active, exploratory
actions it produces and receives concurrent visual feedback; ways. They learn very little when they are forced to pas-
passive mimicry is not sufficient to support full-fledged sively receive a stream of information. Even when the pas-
perceptual-motor development. In the previous chapter, we sive experience involves nearly equivalent information, an
saw that there seemed to be critical periods for the acquisi- active, self-initiated experience seems to have a dramatically
tion of some aspects of pattern recognition and auditory- different effect on both the level of motor activity and on
visual localization. In contrast, there is no obvious critical the ability to use vision to guide action. In later chapters, we
period for establishing links between motion and vision. will examine just how broad the benefits of active experience
When the passive kittens were allowed to freely explore a are. For example, most theories of education conclude that
normal, illuminated world, they quickly came to respond students learn more effectively when they actively practice
like the active kittens. new skills rather than being passively guided by teachers.
For obvious ethical reasons, no one has conducted a
study like Held and Hein’s with infants or children. But
the importance of self-produced movement and concurrent Q: How has active and passive experience
visual feedback has been demonstrated in adults. In a ver- been shown to differentially influence
sion of Held and Hein’s kitten study, an active participant perceptual-motor coordination in humans?
and a passive participant both wore prisms, but only the
active participant’s visual experiences were directly cor-
related with self-produced movements. The passive par- Walking and Seeing Like most other motor activities—
ticipant rode along in a stand-up cart, seeing the same such as reaching and grasping—walking has important links
prism-distorted visual input as the active participant, but to perception. Blind children who are otherwise healthy in

PERCEPTION AND ACTION 127

FIGURE 4.13 Active versus passive
reaching and grasping. (A) Young 2-
to 3-month-old infants who were given
“active training” wore sticky mittens with
Velcro and were able to “grasp” and
transport toys. (B) Young 2- to 3-month-
old infants who were given “passive
training” wore mittens without Velcro and A
A
could not grasp or transport toys, but
could only observe their parents doing so.
(C) Infants given active training showed
marked improvements in later weeks in
time spent grasping and reaching, both
in the lab and in the home, while infants
given passive training did not show such
B
improvements. Adapted from Libertus &
Needham (2010). 40
35 Active Training
Passive Training
Percent of duration

30
(max 60 sec)

25
20
15
10
5
0
Lab 1 Home 1 Home 2 Home 3 Home 4 Lab 2

CC Visit

all respects tend to start walking several months later than by them, as assessed by having wireless eye-tracking sys-
their sighted peers. Interestingly, the blind children’s devel- tems attached to their heads as they walk and run about
opment of other motor behaviors before walking, includ- (Franchak & Adolph, 2010). We are normally not aware
ing the ability to crawl, is not nearly as delayed (Adelson & of using this visual support while walking, but it quickly
Fraiberg, 1974). This suggests that vision is even more impor- becomes obvious when we walk with our eyes closed. A
tant to walking than to other motor activities. series of studies vividly illustrated the extent to which tod-
dlers depend on information from the visual flow field to
maintain balance. In the studies, an unsuspecting new
Q: Why might blind children be delayed in walker was placed in a room and allowed to stand for a few
moments, at which point, even though the floor remained
walking? stationary, all the walls started to move in one direction as
shown in Figure 4.14. Quite remarkably, even though the
One important way in which vision helps us walk is by infant himself did not move, slow movements of the walls
providing us with information about how our body is mov- could “knock” the infants over by disrupting the coordi-
ing through the environment. When we walk at different nation between their actions and their visual information
speeds, we come to expect certain visual patterns known (Bertenthal & Bai, 1989; Lee & Aronson, 1974; Stoffregen
as visual flow fields to stream past at appropriate speeds, et al., 1987). Thus, if the wall was moving toward them,
and we use this visual feedback to adopt a well-balanced they felt as if they were moving toward the wall, tried to
posture. Vision, in particular the visual flow fields around compensate by leaning backward, and lost their balance,
us, provides us with what amounts to visual “hand rails” rather than literally being knocked over by the walls. The
that make it easier to get about in a steady and sure-footed same effect can be produced if an infant is walking instead
manner. These flow fields can work even when children of just standing still and the surrounding walls start to move
and adults do not fixate on any objects in particular and in a manner no longer concordant with the walking. (Older
just observe the overall stream of the environment passing children and adults are susceptible to these effects, too.)

128 CHAPTER 4 THE EMERGENCE OF ACTION

 and her colleagues tested how readily infants would tra-
verse novel surfaces (Gibson et al., 1987). The researchers
arranged an experimental setup similar to the visual cliff
in which infants were placed on a starting platform and
encouraged to cross the surface in front of them (see Fig-
ure 4.16). The researchers tested responses in two condi-
tions. In the first condition, the surface was a rigid plywood
plank covered with black velvet. In the second condition,
the surface was a soft water bed, also covered in black velvet.
Young infants who could crawl but not yet walk were
about equally likely to venture out on both surfaces. They
certainly perceived the differences in rigidity, but because
they were already down on the surface and wouldn’t be risk-
ing a fall, the consequences were relatively unimportant. In
FIGURE 4.14 Visual flow fields and balance. Toddlers can be contrast, infants who were just learning to walk were much
easily “knocked over” if the room around them moves in such a way more reluctant to step out onto the water bed than onto the
as to suggest that they are moving when they are not. They rely wooden plank. One common response was to explore the
on appropriate correlations between visual flow patterns in the surface tentatively with one hand, and upon confirming that
environment and their own movements to help them balance. Here it was not rigid, to stay put. Even before having any direct
the walls are shown as moving toward the toddler, who feels as if he
experience, the young toddlers held back from crossing the
is moving toward the wall because of the visual flow patterns and
compensates by leaning backward and falling over. Adapted from
water bed. If the experimenters dropped a ball on its surface
Bertenthal et al. (1997). or tapped it lightly to show that it was not rigid, this informa-
tion was more than adequate to inhibit these early walkers.
Thus, young infants perceive the affordances, or pos-
sibilities for action based on the properties of the objects
These studies demonstrate that visual information is not
or surfaces on which the action will be performed. A non-
just a helpful support for walking. Rather, it is an intrin-
rigid surface does not inhibit all kinds of movement across
sic part of maintaining balance and therefore tremendously
helpful in beginning to walk. Quite remarkably, this ability
to use visual flow fields to control balance and posture is
present in babies long before they have much capacity to
use it. A newborn’s head posture is responsive to the visual
flow changes around her as early as three days after birth,
even though her head still has to be carefully supported
(Jouen et al., 1993; see Figure 4.15), and it becomes ever
more responsive to small changes as the child grows older
(Baumberger et al., 2004).
Besides guiding posture and balance, visual information
is also critical for navigating the environment—and not just
for avoiding large objects. Subtle changes in the visual flow
allow us to adjust to dips and bumps in the walking surface
(Vishton & Cutting, 1995; Warren et al., 1986). Watching
a new walker manage to pick up on and adapt to irregular
terrain makes it clear that visual information is used from
the moment the toddler first starts to walk.

FIGURE 4.15 Infants’ responses to visual flow changes. Babies

Q: How does the visual world we move will subtly move various parts of their bodies (for example, changing
the position of their head and lower back) to compensate for move-
through function as virtual hand rails? ments in their environment. In this study, the room around the baby
oscillated back and forth at different rates (based on movements of
the side walls), and the 9-month-old baby showed corresponding
A final way in which moving through the world is linked back-and-forth oscillations of his body. Adapted from Bertenthal et al.
to perception is evident in studies in which Eleanor Gibson (2000).

PERCEPTION AND ACTION 129

 erated and shared resources, those who could more easily
stand upright and use their hands to carry tools or gather
larger amounts of food may have had a selective advantage
(Lovejoy, 1981). Although still controversial, the notion that
the infant first attempts to walk because it makes carrying
things easier has considerable appeal. As I watched our own
toddlers walk about, I was struck by how often they carried
things from place to place with great delight. Shortly before
taking their first steps, they attempted to carry things in
their mouths, but this rather uncomfortable technique often
failed. Walking upright, even in the earliest stages, enabled
FIGURE 4.16 Perception and traversing novel surfaces. Gibson them to carry much heavier things much greater distances.
used a variant of the visual cliff to see how infants assessed travers- Indeed, within his first few days of walking, our young-
ability of a surface as a function of whether they were walkers or
est son was discovered lugging a 5-pound jug of laundry
crawlers. The infant started down a ramp and then moved onto the
main surface, which was either rigid or undulated like a water bed
detergent!
(as shown here). Crawlers happily ventured out on either surface, Infants are often able to carry or move objects even when
while walkers avoided the water bed. Adapted from Gibson et al. crawling; for example, crawlers will support themselves with
(1987). one hand while carrying an object with another, will use their
mouth, or will slide an object along (see Figure 4.17). When
they finally start to walk, however, their carrying behavior
it, only those that require maintaining upright balance to expands in important ways; they can more easily move large
avoid falling. This is just one more way that the interaction objects about and tend to do so more often and with greater
between perception and action allows infants to respond speed (Karasik et al., 2012).
flexibly to changes in their environment. Further studies
have shown that infants are remarkably adept at adjusting
their manner of locomotion, depending on the surface that
they seek to traverse and taking into account the environ- Q: Why should infants ever want to walk, given
ment in many more ways than whether a surface is rigid how uncomfortable and slow it is compared with
or undulating. For example, if infants are put at the top their ability to crawl?
of a downward-sloping ramp, the crawlers will proceed
down it in much the same manner as they would cross a
level surface, whereas young walkers will change their pat-
tern of movement, often switching from walking to sliding
(Adolph et al., 1993, 2003). More broadly, infants adapt
their locomotion in highly flexible ways that are exquisitely
sensitive to the particular environment in which they are
put and to the ways that the environment poses specific
biomechanical constraints on their actions, constraints
that change as the toddler grows (Adolph, 2008; Adolph &
Kretch, 2012).
These studies also highlight the finding that walking ini-
tially poses more risks and challenges than crawling. Given
that walking is initially much slower and more difficult,
what motivates expert crawlers to want to do it? After all,
new walkers often drop to all fours when they need to move
quickly. In addition, many fall frequently from the stand-
ing position, accumulating lots of bruises and bumps in the
process of learning to walk. If walking is both slower and
more painful at first, what motivates it?
FIGURE 4.17 Carrying objects while crawling. Even before they
One possibility is related to speculations about how walk- can walk, infants have a strong drive to move things about and do so
ing evolved in the human species. Some theories suggest that through several methods. When they start to walk, however, they tend
the driving factor may have been the need to carry objects. to carry larger objects and do so with greater frequency. Adapted
As early hominins formed social groups in which they coop- from Karasi et al. (2012).

130 CHAPTER 4 THE EMERGENCE OF ACTION

 Overall, early perceptual-motor development clearly 1997). As we will see, even newborns can imitate simple
illustrates that perception and action are part of an inte- facial expressions. Young toddlers often imitate older chil-
grated system that enables infants to act on and get around dren and adults and, as many parents will admit, not always
in their world. Right from the start, there is a rough cor- in desirable ways. Imitation is a part of all our lives, but its
respondence between what a newborn sees and hears and earliest manifestations in development were, until relatively
how she acts, and the integration of perception and action recently, a mystery.
becomes much more refined in the months and years that
follow. These refinements arise from several factors: the The Process of Imitation Much like reaching or walking,
development of increasingly sophisticated neural circuitry, imitation might seem simple, but it is actually an intricate
the growth and change in the size and proportions of the perceptual-motor achievement. To imitate a facial expression
body, and the infant’s ability to perceive the consequences of of another person involves perceiving the complex, dynamic
her own actions. This last factor is an excellent demonstra- patterns of facial movement, interpreting those movements in
tion of the importance of feedback loops to the development terms of your own facial muscles, remembering the pattern of
of action. All these factors must be taken into account to facial changes after the model has stopped, and finally reen-
understand how perceptual-motor skills develop. acting the neuromuscular event. Considering all these require-
ments, it is all the more remarkable that infants younger than
1 hour old can imitate the facial expressions of others.
Although researchers long believed that older infants
Learning to Engage could imitate facial expressions (Piaget, 1962), in 1977
Andrew Meltzoff and Keith Moore demonstrated the abil-
in Specific Actions ity in newborns. The experimenters repeatedly made several
different faces at newborns, in some cases within the first
Up to this point, we have considered perceptual-motor skills hour after birth, and videotaped the infants’ facial responses.
such as walking, reaching, and grasping. These skills enable Observers then watched the videotapes, without know-
an infant to respond quickly to his environment and to ing which expression the experimenter had been showing,
begin navigating within it. Other kinds of actions require and described the infant’s expression. One of the acts the
more specific and precise patterns of motion. These action infants imitated most clearly was sticking out the tongue.
sequences may require considerable learning, either by As Figure 4.18 shows, the infants also imitated several of the
observing recurrent patterns in the environment or by expe- experimenter’s other acts, including opening the mouth in
riencing environmental contingencies in response to one’s
own behavior. These sequences can range from an infant
imitating a sequence of facial expressions to a dog learning
a series of tricks.
The many ways of mastering such specific sequences illus-
trate the impressive range that organisms have for learning
about the world while remaining subject to strong constraints
and embedded in various feedback loops. We have already
seen how cycles of action, perception, and adjusted reaction
create the feedback loops that guide perceptual-motor coor-
dination. Alternatively, an organism can learn about the con-
sequences of its actions through feedback that involves being
rewarded or punished. In the next sections, we will consider
how these feedback systems, along with constraints on learn-
ing, guide the development of specific behavior patterns. To
do this, we will examine three ways of learning specific action
patterns: imitation, imprinting, and conditioning.

Early Imitation FIGURE 4.18 Imitation by infants. Infants between 2 and 3 weeks
of age will imitate particular facial expressions (tongue protrusion,
Imitating others seems to come naturally—sometimes even mouth opening, and lip protrusion) of an adult model. Normally, the
unintentionally—whether it is imitating someone’s ges- adult must repeat the expression several times in succession with
tures or even their manner of speaking (Pardo & Fowler, clear pauses between each display. From Meltzoff & Moore (1977).

LEARNING TO ENGAGE IN SPECIFIC ACTIONS 131

a wide O shape and puckering the lips (Meltzoff & Moore,
1977).
These results were so remarkable that they were ini-
tially met with skepticism by those who thought that the
accounts were exaggerated or perhaps had actually involved
older infants. How could a newborn, who appears to be so
helpless and, more specifically, so limited in terms of per-
ceptual and motor abilities, possibly engage in something as
sophisticated as imitating a facial expression? Although not
all newborns imitate expressions consistently (or at all), and
the imitation can often be subtle, their ability to imitate has
since been confirmed in many carefully controlled studies
(Abravenel & Sigafoos, 1984; Field et al., 1982; Meltzoff &
Moore, 1989; Reissland, 1988; Vinter, 1986).

FIGURE 4.19 Brain activity and reaching in human infants.

Q: What is necessary for infants to be able to Infants show similar brain activation patterns when they are reach-
ing for an object and when they observe others reach for an object.
imitate facial expressions? Southgate et al. (2009).

The fact that imitation is possible almost immediately to associate imitative actions with particular individuals.
after birth naturally raises questions as to its underlying In one study, infants imitated an action by a specific adult
mechanisms. Meltzoff and Moore suggest that for many whom they had seen performing that action 24 hours earlier.
human actions, including both facial expressions and hand They readily imitated the familiar model, but were much
gestures, the ability to perceive the action and the ability less likely to imitate a new model. This is quite remarkable,
to produce it might be mentally represented in the same given some claims that infants cannot recognize individual
neural code. Thus, when an infant perceives an action, the faces at that age. It also displays an impressive memory skill,
code for the related motor sequence is activated as well. which extends to several weeks in older infants (Meltzoff &
Although this specific proposal is still being investigated Moore, 1994).
(see New Directions in Developmental Research box), it is Newborns’ ability to imitate facial expressions and actions is
clear that from a very early age, infants have a strong link not uniquely human. Rather, imitation has a long evolutionary
between their perceptions and their ability to reproduce cer- history in primates as a way of interacting that tends to bring
tain kinds of actions. This has been shown in studies that individuals into similar emotional states (for example, feel-
measure brain activity while infants are reaching and while ing afraid). Thus, like human mothers, mothers of newborn
perceiving others reaching for an object (see Figure 4.19). macaques engage in making and imitating facial expressions
Early imitation is not restricted to things that infants see, with their infants (Ferrari et al., 2009a). This mother-infant
of course. They also frequently imitate sounds, in some cases facial feedback loop may help regulate their emotions so they
as early as 10 weeks of age (Kuhl & Meltzoff, 1996). More- can experience a shared emotional state and thus sense what
over, imitation is a form of social activity; 5- to 8-week-old the other is feeling. As Figure 4.20 shows, newborn macaque
infants are much more likely to imitate humans than inani- monkeys can also imitate human facial expressions, such as
mate objects (Legerstee, 1991). For example, infants are sticking out the tongue or showing a wide open mouth (Fer-
more likely to imitate an adult sticking out her tongue than rari et al., 2006). This result is striking, given that the macaque
a long red object moving out of a white tube. Meltzoff and newborns must be perceiving a representation of the human
Moore (1994, 1999) argue that the various forms of imita- face that is generalized and abstract enough that they can use
tion may also help infants recognize people, as if by imitat- it to know which of their own facial muscles to move. Other
ing the other person the infant is saying, “I know you. You studies of rhesus macaque newborns have shown that those
are the person who does this” (that is, sticks out his tongue that imitate most often also tend to develop more sophisti-
or wiggles his arm a certain way). Indeed, infants will reen- cated motor skills later, such as those involved in grasping and
act an imitated action shown by a specific model when reaching (Ferrari et al., 2009b). Mirror neurons are neurons
encountering that model in the future or when exposed to a in the brain that are activated both when performing actions
cue (for example, hearing the model) that reminds them of and when perceiving them being performed by others. They
the model (Meltzoff, 2005). Even 6-week-old infants seem are thought to support imitation and may be involved in the

132 CHAPTER 4 THE EMERGENCE OF ACTION

A1
Mouth Opening
B1
Tongue Protrusion tiful vocalization patterns, using the songs to demarcate
territory, attract mates, and identify themselves. But none
sing full-fledged songs from birth, raising the question of
how they develop these abilities. The answers have come
from ethologists in the fields and meadows of the world and
from neurophysiologists in their laboratories. Their findings
illustrate some of the many different ways in which complex
motor behaviors develop.
A2 B2
Among different types of songbirds, there are several dif-
ferent developmental pathways for learning to sing. Most
birds imitate songs sung by older birds of their species. They
hear a song, remember the patterns, and reproduce them. In
addition, juvenile birds frequently are in a phase of overpro-
duction of song components (somewhat like human infants’
FIGURE 4.20 Imitation of facial expressions in newborns of babbling), producing more “syllables” of songs than they will
other species. Newborn macaque monkeys will imitate the facial ever show as adults; they limit the components of their songs
expressions of humans. From Ferrari et al. (2006). as they learn from older models. But songbirds also tend to
be somewhat inventive and improvisational. They don’t sim-
ply copy models’ songs; they improvise in the specific style
process of learning new actions right from birth onward in of the song they have heard. In most species, hearing good
monkeys (Ferrari et al., 2012). model songs enhances the quality of the songs that develop.
For centuries, birdsong lovers in Japan would pay to have
their young birds “tutored” by older prize-winning singers
Q: How have infant imitation studies influenced (Konishi, 1985; see Figure 4.21).
views of infant memory? In some species, songs will emerge in relatively full form,
even if the birds are reared in isolation, but the songs will
typically be less rich and less tightly structured than those
One of the most puzzling questions about the develop- of birds reared in the company of older singing birds. Other
ment of imitation concerns the boundaries that define what species of birds, such as swamp sparrows, do much worse
kinds of behaviors infants are likely to imitate. Even if we when they are reared in isolation. Although these birds do
narrow the focus to actions made by human agents, infants not simply stay silent, they only are able to develop a skeletal
clearly do not imitate everything they see. Part of what drives song that has the overall structure of the normal songs but
their imitative tendencies may be whether they perceive an that lacks details, including those that normally distinguish
action as intentional. They seem to require several repeti- local groups of birds (Marler, 1991a, 1991b). Moreover, even
tions of an action to want to imitate it—not because they fail more than listening to older singers, young songbirds must
to notice it, but perhaps because they need to know it was be able to listen to themselves. In general, if birds are deaf-
not simply an accidental action, like a sneeze. No one thinks ened after they are born, their songs usually degenerate ter-
that young infants fully understand others’ intentions, but ribly. The feedback gained through hearing their own songs
infants may find some aspects of intentional behavior espe- seems essential.
cially salient, a topic we will return to in Chapter 5. Finally, some songbirds, such as the zebra finch, show an
innate bias to learn the songs of their own species, but if they
The Development of Birdsong: Variations on the are only exposed to the songs of a related species, they are
Imitation Theme Humans and other primates are not also able to learn those songs. Nonetheless, learning another
the only creatures that attend to others’ actions in order to species’ song tends to take longer than learning their own.
reproduce them. In fact, the imitative feats of developing In this way, the acquisition of birdsong by the zebra finch
songbirds seem to exceed the imitative capacities of human illustrates both learning within a set of guiding constraints
infants. There can be large lags between when a bird first (the framework songs of their own species) and also a flex-
hears a song and when the bird first reproduces it. Unlike ibility in the learning process that allows them to transcend
human verbal memory, immediate rehearsal is not neces- those constraints when the environment demands it (that is,
sary for birds to remember what they have heard. For exam- when only other species’ songs are available). This kind of
ple, starlings will sometimes reproduce for the first time pattern is often described as guidance by “soft constraints,”
songs that they have not heard for over 15 months (Chaiken which are said to provide a default bias toward a certain
et al., 1994). Many birds come to sing complex and beau- developmental pathway.

LEARNING TO ENGAGE IN SPECIFIC ACTIONS 133

 NEW DIRECTION S IN DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH

Mirror Neurons and Early Imitation

T
he remarkable ability of even newborns to imitate a variety of noninvasive measures of brain activity, ranging from
the actions of others has led many researchers to electroencephalograms (EEGs; Altschuler et al., 1997) to func-
investigate the mechanisms that could support these tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; Grèzes et al., 2003),
surprisingly sophisticated behaviors. A recent series suggests that the same brain regions responsible for object-
of findings in neuroscience on mirror neurons has resulted in directed actions are also active when people observe similar
some provocative suggestions about the neural basis of imita- actions being performed by others. Studies involving people
tion (Lyons et al., 2006; Meltzoff & Prinz, 2002; Nakahara & with intractable epilepsy have also offered more direct confirma-
Miyashita, 2005; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Some of the tion. These individuals already had deep electrodes implanted in
most intriguing findings initially came from studies of the neural regions of their cortex to help guide neurosurgeons attempting
basis of imitation in monkeys. Neuroscientists implanted elec- to treat the epilepsy. They were shown to have mirror neurons
trodes in the monkeys’ premotor cortex, the brain area involved in several locations, some of which were analogous to the brain
in guiding actions, to monitor the firing of individual neurons. areas where they have been found in monkeys (Keysers & Gaz-
They recorded the firing patterns of premotor neurons, both zola, 2010). Other studies with 9-month-old infants used a net
when monkeys performed object-directed actions (including of scalp electrodes to detect mirror neuron–like processes in
grasping, placing, and manipulating objects with their hands) the motor control regions of the brain. These areas show similar
and when they observed other monkeys performing similar electrical activity patterns when infants grasp an object them-
actions. In several cases, the same neuron fired both when a selves and when they anticipate that someone else’s hand is
monkey was performing a specific action on an object, such as about to grasp the object (Southgate et al., 2009, 2010). Thus,
grasping a block on a table, and when the monkey was watch- the motor region is activated when thinking about another’s goal
ing another monkey engaging in the same action (Gallese et al., of grasping, not just by observing actual grasping.
1996, 2004). The neurons that fired when the monkey grasped It has been argued that the sort of imitation found in humans
the block did not fire when the monkey saw the block when it and higher primates is unique and that it represents a highly
was not being grasped by a hand or when the monkey watched advanced evolutionary achievement (Rizzolatti & Craighero,
the experimenter simulate grasping the block when it was not 2004). Mimicry in other sorts of animals is argued to involve
present. Because these same neurons fired when the monkey different kinds of processing and no mirror neurons. If this
either performed or observed a particular action on an object, claim is correct, it raises the question of whether newborns’
they came to be called mirror neurons. ability to imitate might arise from the presence of functional
Interestingly, while the mirror neurons associated with a par- mirror neurons at birth. This question can only be answered
ticular object-directed action did not fire when the action was with a detailed understanding of mirror neuron function, which
performed in the absence of the object, they did fire when the can then be contrasted with other systems that might support
monkey watched a robot perform the action. This suggests that mimicry. The more precise functions of mirror neurons remain
the activity of mirror neurons is associated with the overall goal a topic of considerable debate. Besides their role in imitation
of the action rather than with the necessary limb movements (Jeannerod, 1994), they may contribute significantly to attending
(Gazzola et al., 2007; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). There may to the details of others’ actions (Wilson & Knoblich, 2005), to
be a common code both for perceiving and for performing many understanding the meanings of those actions (Gallese et al.,
kinds of actions. Researchers have documented what seem to be 2004), and to social understanding and empathy (Baird
different populations of mirror neurons for hand movements, for et al., 2011; Meltzoff & Decety, 2003). It remains unclear, how-
facial movements, and for eating (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). ever, whether the activity of mirror neurons provides a basis for
It is relatively easy to document the activity of mirror neu- inferring others’ thoughts, feelings, and intentions by neurally
rons in monkeys, but it is far more difficult to do so in humans, “simulating” their actions (Saxe, 2005). Thus, imitation may be
because implanting electrodes in human brains solely for the the mirror neurons’ core purpose or only a kind of side effect
purpose of experiments is unethical. Nonetheless, evidence from of their activity.

134 CHAPTER 4 THE EMERGENCE OF ACTION

 ods for learning the skill from their elders. Perceptual-motor
feedback is also essential, as most species will develop inad-
equate songs if they cannot hear their own efforts. In addi-
tion, a framework of biases toward learning and producing
species-typical song elements, such as certain patterns of
vocalization and repetition, is usually present at birth and
guides further inputs. Moreover, the more complex the spe-
cies’ song patterns are, the more likely that the birds will
depend heavily on input received from others and not just on
a set of rote singing routines. Many of these same patterns
also characterize imprinting, another behavior in young
birds that has revealed important developmental principles.

Q: What are some different patterns of

birdsong development and what do they tell
us about different ways of learning to imitate
others?

Imprinting, Action, and Critical Periods

Young organisms sometimes learn in a powerful and seem-
ingly irreversible manner known as imprinting. Imprint-
FIGURE 4.21 Imitation of birdsong. For centuries, songbirds
ing is most common in birds, such as chickens, ducks, and
have been prized in Japan, and juveniles were often exposed to
“expert” adults for “tutoring” in the nuances of particular songs. geese, and its main function seems to be to ensure that
young birds learn to stay close to their mothers. Newly
hatched chicks will initially approach a wide range of
objects. If they repeatedly encounter a particular object
The zebra finches also illustrate an intriguing interaction during the appropriate critical period, normally during the
between critical periods and environmental input. Most first few days after birth (Nakamori et al., 2010), however,
songbirds have a critical period in which they are best able they will continue to approach and follow it eagerly, often
to learn from listening to older singers. These periods can for the rest of their lives. In the natural world, this object
vary in length from a few months to over a year, depending is almost always their mother, but in the laboratory, young
on the species (Hensch, 2004). The start and stop times of birds have imprinted on a host of other objects and even on
the periods can also be environmentally influenced. Thus, the researchers themselves (see Figure 4.22).
if zebra finches do not hear good model songs during the A key aspect of imprinting is that the size, shape, and
normal developmental time frame for this period, they are contrast of the object, as well as the manner of movement
able to postpone the critical period’s onset by several weeks. and many other factors, all influence the ease with which
Then, if an appropriate model comes along a bit later, they the chick will imprint on it (Honey & Bateson, 1996;
can learn just as easily. The length of the critical period for Horn, 1990; Sluckin, 1972). Thus, as one researcher put
this species does not change; its start and stop dates sim- it, the chick’s brain is not “a tabula rasa on which experi-
ply seem to get postponed in the absence of a good model ence makes it mark” (Horn, 1990). Outside the lab, where
(Mooney, 1999). a newborn chick would likely encounter other chicks and
The development of birdsong illustrates that there are perhaps the chicken coop itself during the critical period for
many developmental paths for learning complex motor imprinting, these innate biases greatly improve the chances
behaviors from models. Among songbirds, the particular that it will still imprint on its mother. A second feature of
role that songs play for a given species likely influences which this kind of learning is that even when the chick simultane-
developmental course is favored (Slater, 1989). The develop- ously encounters two objects that are equally likely to cause
ment of birdsong also draws together many of the themes imprinting, the chick will not imprint to both; instead, it
of this book. Most songbirds show critical or sensitive peri- will come to follow only one. The imprinting system does

LEARNING TO ENGAGE IN SPECIFIC ACTIONS 135

 ing during a critical period spanning the first few days after
birth, is where the phenomena of imprinting occurs. It can
support imprinting on an enormous range of objects and
individuals, including many that do not look like chickens.
Yet, in the natural environment, the coordination between
this system and the other, earlier-emerging chicken detec-
tor system almost inevitably results in the chick imprint-
ing on its mother (Bateson & Horn, 1994). We see here
yet another example of the coordination of perception
and action in development. The chicken-detecting-and-
following system influences the chick’s imprinting system
and greatly increases the odds that the chick will imprint on
the appropriate target.
As we saw in Chapter 3, this two-system model has inspired
a similar model of infant face perception. In that model, the ini-
FIGURE 4.22 Imprinting. A group of goslings swimming in a tial system orients the infant toward human faces as a general
pond with ethologist Konrad Lorenz. Ducklings and goslings can category. Then the experience the infant gains by attending
imprint on a person (or on some part of the person, such as his to faces helps get the second system—the one for recognizing
boots) and will follow that individual as if he were a parent. These individuals—up and running. Imprinting in chicks and face
unusual imprintings require unusual environments in which the real perception in human infants demonstrate how the challenge
mother is not present or only minimally so. The human would never
of learning to attach to a specific individual might be solved in
win out over the real mother if they were both amply present in the
environment, reflecting a natural bias to imprint on the mother, all
strikingly similar ways in two very different species. They also
things being equal. illustrate how the ability to recognize a general category and
the ability to recognize a single individual both play important
roles and can work together.
not seem to allow imprinting on two distinct objects. This Imprinting is a highly constrained learning process
feature of the system also makes excellent sense for survival. involving a sequence of actions and perceptual discrimina-
Since no wild chick would need to imprint on two mothers, tions that almost always emerges in the same way within a
a double imprinting could become dangerously confusing set time frame. In contrast, conditioning is a more flexible
for a young bird. form of learning that can result in a variety of complex and
In the chick’s brain, imprinting seems to occur in a region variable behaviors. We will see, however, that these dra-
known as the intermediate medial hyperstriatum ventrale matic variations in conditioned learning still occur within a
(IMHV), which is in the chick’s forebrain. If the IMHV is framework of constraints.
lesioned before imprinting occurs, the chick will be unable
to imprint. Moreover, lesioning this area after imprinting
will erase what was learned with the imprinting. The same
lesion will not block forms of learning unrelated to imprint- Q: What is the evidence for two distinct
ing (Horn, 1990). And yet, while an IMHV-lesioned chick systems in the development of imprinting?
can no longer imprint on an artificial object such as a mov-
ing block, it will still follow a chicken about. How can we
resolve this contradiction?
It turns out that in chicks, two independent systems are
involved in behaviors like following, imprinting, and rec- Conditioning
ognition. One system, which is present throughout the life- Two of the most powerful and best-studied ways to elicit
span and does not involve the IMHV, consists of a general actions in infants involve classical and operant condition-
tendency to notice and follow other chickens. This system ing. The general theory of conditioning attempts to explain
does not allow the chick to recognize another chicken as an how organisms learn to respond to environmental events. In
individual. Rather, it is more like a general chicken detector this theory, learning involves three components: awareness
that tends to make the chick orient toward others of its spe- of stimuli, awareness of the environment, and awareness of
cies and follow them. consequences of actions. In the simplest kind of learning,
The second system, which is in the IMHV region, gov- the organism becomes aware of a stimulus. This is typically
erns the ability to recognize specific individuals rather than observed in instances of habituation and dishabituation (see
categories. This system, which is most receptive to learn- Chapter 3). In the next level of learning, the organism must

136 CHAPTER 4 THE EMERGENCE OF ACTION

 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL P OLICY

Can a Toddler’s Motor

Development Be Accelerated?

S
ome affluent parents worry about how to give their the Power Toddler program could really provide long-lasting
children a competitive edge at the earliest age. In benefits. Based on the information in this chapter, what does
response to these kinds of concerns, enrichment pro- research on the development of action suggest about whether
grams for preschoolers, including programs to boost Power Toddler is using false advertising?
motor skills, have become commonplace in many cities and In considering this question, think back to Gesell’s classic
towns. But can these programs really deliver on their promises? studies, such as the 11-month-old twin sisters who learned to
Imagine that a nationwide chain called Power Toddler claims climb stairs. These experiments involved younger children and
that its 2-year program enhances the athletic skills of children far shorter durations of training than Power Toddler’s 2-year pro-
aged 1 to 3 years old through early practice with motor skills. gram, but their findings suggested that extra training made no
For a hefty fee, retired gymnasts, basketball players, and other difference—all that seemed to matter was maturation (Gesell &
athletes coach the toddlers for 2 hours each day, training the Thompson, 1929). Here the question is: Do findings like Gesell’s
children to balance on beams, perform simple gymnastic move- extend to later ages and longer periods of training?
ments, catch and throw balls, and do a variety of other simple Also consider how the evidence cited in Power Toddler’s
athletic activities. Power Toddler’s brochure says that perceptual- brochure relates to its promises of lifelong athletic benefits.
motor development largely depends on prior experience and While those studies and others—including the one described
that by enriching this experience for its students early on, its earlier that utilized Velcro mittens to accelerate infants’ grasping
program confers a lifelong athletic advantage. It even cites some and reaching (Libertus & Needham, 2010)—may well show
studies in which perceptual-motor skills seemed to be influenced how specific perceptual-motor experiences can improve early
by training (Boucher & Doescher, 1991; Laszlo & Sainsbury, motor skills, this is not the same as providing evidence of more
1993). The brochure goes on to refer to studies in Kenya that general, long-term benefits. Perhaps Power Toddler’s program
suggest that certain kinds of parenting practices might boost temporarily speeds up the development of perceptual-motor
children’s early motor development (Super, 1976). It even men- abilities but then other children catch up within a few months.
tions some research arising from Esther Thelen’s studies that Or perhaps Power Toddler’s students regress back to normal
shows that changes in muscles and other physical properties of levels when the program of constant practice ends.
the limbs can bring dramatic changes in motor abilities (Thelen, This imaginary case is not far from real ones, and it illustrates
1995; Vereijken & Thelen, 1997). On this basis, Power Toddler how research on motor development might influence legal deci-
argues that through early exercise, toddlers can strengthen their sions about certain advertisements. In the hypothetical case of
muscles, which will enable them to achieve impressive new lev- Power Toddler, the value of the program for physical prowess is
els of motor activity. probably quite modest. As long as young children have ample
As Power Toddler centers spring up across your state, the opportunities to engage in a variety of gross and fine motor
Consumer Protection Agency becomes concerned that the activities, it is unlikely that special programs provide any addi-
chain may be fraudulently promising parents more than it can tional and lasting athletic advantage. Participating in group activi-
deliver. The agency then turns to developmental psycholo- ties with other children may confer some social benefits, but as
gists for advice about the effects of intensive perceptual-motor a general rule, there is no evidence that toddlers who receive
instruction for children aged 1 to 3. It wants to know whether professional coaching are more likely to become skilled athletes.

LEARNING TO ENGAGE IN SPECIFIC ACTIONS 137

FIGURE 4.23 Classical condition- 1
Control
ing in sleeping newborns. New- Experimental
borns can be classically conditioned 0.8
to associate a tone with a puff of

Probability of EMR
air to their eyes. They soon learn
0.6
to blink when they hear the tone
alone. (A) By monitoring sleeping
infants’ eye movement responses 0.4
(EMRs) during this kind of classical
conditioning, (B) researchers have 0.2
found that sleeping infants who were
conditioned show more EMRs than
0
infants who were not conditioned.
0 1 2 3 4 5
Those who experienced the classical
Trial block
conditioning also showed more brain A B
activity suggestive of learning the
association compared to infants in
the control group. Adapted from Fifer
et al. (2010).

learn how stimuli are related; this level of learning is seen Interestingly, infants can learn from classical condition-
in classical conditioning (or Pavlovian conditioning). In the ing even when they are asleep. (It is not uncommon for
final level of learning, the organism learns about the con- newborns to sleep 18 hours a day, which would leave less
sequences of its actions, where the stimulus usually takes than 6 hours for learning if the infant needed to be wide
on the role of a positive or negative reinforcer. This level of awake to learn.) When a tone is consistently paired with an
learning is known as operant conditioning. Let us now turn air puff delivered to sleeping newborns (see Figure 4.23),
to classical and operant conditioning in more detail. they will soon show more eye movement in response to the
tone than other newborns who hear tones at random that
Classical Conditioning For over 100 years, since Pavlov’s are not paired with air puffs. In addition, only the infants
groundbreaking studies on dogs, it has been known that who experience the air puff–tone pairings show increases in
an enormous range of organisms can be classically condi- cortical activity that suggest that they are processing new
tioned. In classical conditioning, an initially neutral stim- memories (Fifer et al., 2010). The ability of infants to be
ulus that does not normally elicit a response comes to do so classically conditioned whether they are awake or asleep
through the repeated pairing of the neutral stimulus with a enables them to learn as much as possible about important
stimulus that would naturally elicit the response. To begin patterns in their world. In contrast, sleeping adults are not
with, an unconditioned stimulus (UCS) has a preexist- thought to be capable of classical conditioning. The ability
ing relationship to an unconditioned response (UCR). In to learn this way while sleeping may be a special adapta-
Pavlov’s dogs, meat powder (UCS) led to salivation (UCR). tion of infancy because of the enormous amount of time
In a young infant, a puff of air to the face (UCS) will elicit infants spend asleep. Forming associations through classical
an eyeblink (UCR) without any prior learning. If a tone conditioning is one way that infants begin adapting to their
is repeatedly paired with the puff of air, infants as young environments right from birth.
as 10 days will learn to blink (conditioned response, or
CR) when they hear the tone by itself (conditioned stimu-
lus, or CS), having learned the association between the two
stimuli through classical conditioning (Little et al., 1984). Q: What are some examples of classical
Similarly, when infants are given a sweet solution (UCS), conditioning in infants?
they will automatically show increased sucking (UCR). If
a gentle stroking of the forehead, the conditioned stimu-
lus (CS), is repeatedly paired with a sweet solution, even Early in the study of classical conditioning in infancy,
newborns will soon start to engage in anticipatory suck- J. B. Watson and his associates conducted a dramatic demon-
ing (CR) in response to stroking alone (Blass et al., 1984), stration of this form of learning (Watson & Raynor, 1920).
just as Pavlov’s dogs came to salivate (CR) at the sound of a A 9-month-old infant referred to as “Little Albert” was
bell (CS) alone after the bell had previously been repeatedly brought into the laboratory, where he eagerly approached
paired with the meat powder (UCS). furry animals, such as rabbits. The child was then shown

138 CHAPTER 4 THE EMERGENCE OF ACTION

 adaptive and, in a sense, purposeful, rather than being lim-
ited to a simple association of a conditioned stimulus with
an unconditioned one. Classical conditioning also relies on
developing aspects of memory (Rovee-Collier, 1986) and on
emerging expectations about future events (Fagan, 1993).
As we saw in Chapter 1, behaviorism is the notion that
all behaviors can be instilled through conditioning, using
combinations of punishments and rewards in association
with sets of stimuli. Such conditioning makes certain actions
more likely and others less likely. For many years, behavior-
ism and different forms of conditioning were thought to be
FIGURE 4.24 The Little Albert study. The demonstration of clas- the only scientific way to discuss learning, both in adults and
sical conditioning in a child with the pseudonym “Little Albert” was throughout development. Behaviorists believed that infants
used by James Watson to argue for an entire program of child rear- come into the world as a tabula rasa, or blank slate, with
ing. Here Watson is pictured wearing a mask to see if Albert’s fear of little or no innate associations, and that any association can
rats would generalize to a person wearing a furry mask. be conditioned through experience. Because they focused on
the overt behaviors—that is, the actions—that resulted from
the conditioning of these associations, behaviorists viewed
a white lab rat. Initially, he seemed interested and unafraid most variations in behavior as a consequence of differences
as he reached toward it. In later trials conducted over in the ways individuals were conditioned to act.
2 months, just as Albert touched the rat, a researcher behind Classical conditioning models of learning were the first
him hit a steel bar with a hammer to make a sharp, loud wave of behaviorism, with Watson being one of the stron-
noise (the UCS), which startled Albert and made him cry gest proponents of this point of view. The second wave arose
(UCR). After Albert had experienced several pairings of the with B. F. Skinner, a dominant figure in psychology in the
rat with the noise, the researchers found that the rat alone mid-twentieth century. Skinner worked out the details of
(CS) could elicit a fearful response (CR). Whenever Albert another way of modifying behavior known as operant con-
saw it, he crawled away from it. This fearful response was ditioning (Skinner, 1938).
then shown to generalize to other furry objects, such as rab-
bits (see Figure 4.24). Clearly, the current ethical restric- Operant Conditioning Compared with classical con-
tions would forbid this sort of study on infants or young ditioning, operant conditioning (also known as instru-
children. The study has also raised considerable controversy mental conditioning) is more directly concerned with the
over the years among those who disagree not only with its way an organism learns to operate on its environment in
ethics but also with its methods (Paul & Blumenthal, 1989). response to either positive reinforcements that reward that
In addition, it appears that contrary to Watson’s claims that behavior or negative reinforcements that punish that behav-
Albert was a normal healthy infant, he in fact had neuro- ior. Skinner developed highly efficient methods for getting
logical impairments that raise questions about the extent to a wide range of species to exhibit specific behaviors. In one
which the specific findings would extend to healthy infants of the processes he used, called shaping, the researcher
(Fridlund et al., 2012). begins by rewarding spontaneous actions that resemble the
The conditioning of fear, as in Albert’s case, is interesting desired behavior and then continues rewarding only behav-
because it starts to illustrate some of the hidden complexity iors that are increasingly similar to the desired response.
of classical conditioning (Rescorla, 1988). In the traditional As a result, the responses gradually change to become the
view of classical conditioning, the conditioned response and desired behavior.
the unconditioned response are supposed to be quite simi- This technique was often used on pigeons in tightly
lar, with the conditioned response perhaps a bit weaker—for controlled learning environments known as Skinner boxes
example, less salivation (CR) when the bell rings (CS) in the (see Figure 4.25). Suppose an experimenter wanted the
case of Pavlov’s dogs, or not quite so active sucking (CR) by a pigeon to peck a certain button whenever a green light in
human infant when her forehead is stroked (CS). But in the the box was illuminated. She might carefully observe the
case of conditioned fear, the conditioned response is quite pigeon in the box and provide a reward, such as food pel-
different from the unconditioned response (LeDoux, 1998). lets, whenever the pigeon happened to be facing toward the
After Albert had been conditioned to fear the rat, he didn’t button while the green light was illuminated. After several
startle and cry when he saw it as he had in response to the trials, she would up the ante and only reward the pigeon
loud noise. Instead, he tried to avoid the rat in anticipation of when it was both oriented toward the button and standing
hearing the loud noise. The conditioned behavior was clearly near it while the green light was lit. When the pigeon had

LEARNING TO ENGAGE IN SPECIFIC ACTIONS 139

 rences of unpleasant events (Sajwaj et al., 1974), though
for obvious ethical reasons, there have been more studies
of positive reinforcement of human infants than negative
reinforcement.
Yet, most contemporary infant researchers have not used
operant conditioning to shape desired infant responses. Instead,
they have taken an easy, well-established infant action, such
as sucking, and taught infants to associate it with a stimu-
lus, such as a visual pattern, through operant conditioning.
The researchers can then measure the infant’s operant suck-
ing response to see whether he can discriminate between
the learned visual pattern and another one. (This technique
is similar to the use of sucking as a measure of habituation,
which was discussed in Chapter 3.)
Hundreds of studies have now shown that from birth
on, infant behavior can be modified through both classical
conditioning and operant conditioning. Infants can come
to associate some stimuli with other stimuli, and they can
alter their actions as a result. They also can be shown to
change their actions as a result of positive and negative rein-
FIGURE 4.25 Skinner boxes and pigeons. A “Skinner box” in
forcements. But those capacities do not necessarily support
which a pigeon’s behavior is shaped through operant conditioning.
Many researchers saw the Skinner box as promising a technological the behaviorists’ key contentions about development: (1)
revolution in behavior modification—a revolution that was thought to that the infant comes into the world with few or no pre-
ultimately provide a full explanation of human behavior as well. formed associations, (2) that any pattern of associations can
be learned from experience, and (3) that actions are simply
learned responses to environmental contingencies. While
learned this response, the reward might become contingent learning and environmental influences clearly matter in
on actually touching the button while the green light was infant development, several lines of research have greatly
on—and so on, until the pigeon learned that it could earn refined our understanding of both their contributions to
a reward only by pecking the button while the green light development and their key limitations.
was on.
What role does operant conditioning play in infant
development? It can be a useful way for infants to learn to Q: What are some examples of operant
adapt to changes in their environment. It can be as simple as conditioning in infants?
learning to change lip movements while nursing in response
to positive reinforcement from the improved flow of milk.
Likewise, 3-month-olds can learn to vocalize more in Constraints on Learning It has now become abundantly
response to parents’ smiles and other positive cues (Rhein- clear that neither humans nor other animals associate all
gold et al., 1959; Weisberg, 1963). Other studies have shown stimuli equally easily and that some stimuli can become
how infants at 6 weeks and older can learn to smile more associated in particular contexts but not in others. Thus,
often and more intensely through operant conditioning if a rat repeatedly sees a light and hears a noise at the same
(Brossard & Decarie, 1968; Zelazo, 1971) and how infants time prior to receiving a shock, it will respond fearfully
who are at least 2 months old can be operantly conditioned to either the light or the noise. If a rat is repeatedly pre-
to kick their legs more often when it causes a mobile (loosely sented with a light prior to a shock and then later the noise
tethered to the baby’s leg) to move, providing a rewarding is added, however, the noise alone will not cause a fearful
visual stimulus (Rovee & Fagan, 1976; Rovee-Collier & response (Rescorla, 1988). Intuitively, it seems obvious how
Giles, 2010; Watson & Ramey, 1972). In all these cases, this blocking of the noise-to-shock association occurs; the
the infants learn to adjust their actions to make a pleas- formation of the first association interferes with the forma-
ant event occur more often. The infants are more likely to tion of the second association. The rat that has received
repeat these learned actions later in contexts highly similar light alone first has learned that the light is the critical
to the ones in which they originally learned them (that is, determinant of the shock and therefore regards the subse-
in situations with the same stimuli and in the same setting). quent noise when paired with the shock as redundant and
Infants will also make similar adjustments to reduce occur- uninformative. In effect, a decision is made about the likely

140 CHAPTER 4 THE EMERGENCE OF ACTION

informative value of the noise. The rat seems to engage in avoid shock (see Figure 4.26). But trying to shape it to per-
some form of cognition that goes beyond association. form the opposite associations—pecking to avoid a shock or
Studies of human infants suggest that they experience flapping its wings to get food—will try the patience of even
similar blocking effects as early as 6 months of age (Sobel & the most dedicated experimenter.
Kirkham, 2006, 2007). The first association can be con- The pigeon and rat examples offer intuitive examples
strued as a form of context that then influences the learn- of why associations aren’t formed in an unbiased manner.
ing of a second association. Infants learned to look at either Many behaviors, especially those that appear earliest in an
sequences of visual events in certain locations or visual organism’s life, are organized in ways that make functional
events followed by sounds in specific locations. When the sense for an organism in its normal environment. Thus,
researchers measured infants’ anticipatory eye movements pigeons have evolved a set of escape behaviors that involve
to each location in response to these series of patterns, they flapping their wings when they are in unpleasant or painful
found that the initial associations influenced the infants’ situations. Likewise, they have evolved a set of behaviors in
later associative learning in ways that the classical laws of seeking food that involve pecking at the ground (Wood-
association could not explain, but which were quite similar ruff & Williams, 1976). An animal’s behavior is therefore
to blocking phenomena found in other species. intimately related to its typical environment, resulting in
A second important constraint on conditioned learning behaviors that are adapted to that environment, just as
is that for particular species, some associations are easier physical adaptations, like an animal’s fur or webbed feet,
to form than others. That is, considerable evidence across are adapted to that environment. Thus, action is rarely arbi-
many species shows that organisms are prepared (through trary, but rather is directed by an organism toward solving
natural selection) to learn some associations and not pre- certain problems in a particular environment.
pared to learn others (Seligman, 1970). In Pavlovian con- We will see in Chapter 7 that the development of fears
ditioning, this can be seen where an animal will tend to in human infants fits the idea of having prepared responses
associate some stimuli more strongly with certain outcomes to certain stimuli. Human infants seem predisposed to
than with others. Thus, a rat can more readily be classically develop a fear of snakes and spiders, but not of flowers or
conditioned to associate a sound (or a visual stimulus) with frogs (DeLoache & LoBue, 2009; Rakison & Derringer,
the pain of a shock than to associate a particular flavor with 2008). These fears can form rapidly in infants who have
a painful shock. On the other hand, the rat is prepared to never had negative experiences with snakes or spiders. In
associate feelings of nausea with a prior flavor rather than addition, monkeys reared in controlled settings where they
with a certain sight or sound that preceded the feeling. The never saw any snakes show a similarly strong bias to learn
likelihood of associating nausea with a flavor tasted ear- to fear them. In short, human infants seem very much like
lier remains high even when the rat experienced the taste other primates in the ways they are prepared to associate
several hours before feeling ill and the sound directly pre- some creatures with fear.
ceded the nausea (Garcia et al., 1974, 1985; Rozin & Kalat, These constraints on conditioning—on both the context
1971). The effects of preparedness on learning can be just in which conditioning takes place and the ease or difficulty
as striking in operant conditioning. Thus, it is easy to train of forming particular associations—serve as a reminder that
a pigeon to peck a button to get food or to flap its wings to all actions, even those motivated by negative and positive

FIGURE 4.26 Prepared learn-

ing. Pigeons’ tendencies to flap their
wings and to peck are “prepared” to be
associated much more strongly to some
classes of events than others. It is much
easier to train pigeons to flap their wings
(and attempt to flee) to avoid shock than
it is to get food, while the opposite is true
for pecking.

LEARNING TO ENGAGE IN SPECIFIC ACTIONS 141

reinforcements, develop within a framework of constraints. perception in ways that are critically dependent on the
Those constraints do not necessarily specify which actions simultaneous feedback of self-produced movement. The
will develop. But they do make some kinds of associations, feedback loop between a developing organism and its envi-
and therefore some kinds of behavioral responses, far easier ronment is an essential part of the developmental process
to learn than others. and perhaps most easily seen and understood in cases of
the development of action. As we saw in the discussion of
perception and neural development in Chapter 3 and as we
Q: How are both classical and operant will see in later chapters, infants, children, and other devel-
oping organisms are often best understood in terms of their
conditioning constrained such that not all continuous cycles of interaction with their environment.
associations are treated as equal? We have also seen that an animal’s actions are tailored for
particular interactions with its specific environment, as in
the linking of pigeon pecking to food-acquiring behavior.
We have begun to think about constraints on development,
Conclusions leading to the idea that human infants (and infants in other
species) are often endowed with preexisting frameworks
Action does not develop in infancy either as a purely inter- that make certain actions more likely but do not predeter-
nal set of motor control programs or as a passive reflection mine them. This was particularly vivid in the development
of the pushes and pulls of various environmental contingen- of birdsong, but it applies to many other cases as well. In
cies. Instead, it arises from an interplay between dynamic Chapter 3, we saw some signs of preexisting frameworks
properties of the body, the environment, and some elements in perceptual development, such as a schema for perceiv-
of motor planning. The physical properties of a baby’s limbs ing faces, but in this chapter we have gone beyond the per-
interact with specific environments, such as a tank of water ception of information to see how behavior itself conforms
or a ramp, in ways that become more than the sum of the to different types of constraints. In later chapters, we will
individual elements. More broadly, action is an example of broaden this idea further to look at constraints on cognitive
how much of development consists of dynamic interactions structures, on language, and on social behavior and emo-
between distinct subsystems, whether they are perceptual tions. In general, this chapter paints a picture of the infant
and motor systems or different forms of information, such as a dynamic, exploring, willful agent who is trying to make
as spatial layout and number. sense of and gain mastery over the world, much as we saw in
Across a wide range of approaches and topics, we have Chapter 3. In Chapter 5, we turn to closely related questions
seen that the infant is constantly coordinating action with about how the infant tries to make sense of that world.

142 CHAPTER 4 THE EMERGENCE OF ACTION

 STU DY AN D REVI EW

SUMMARY perceive the consequences of their self-produced actions in

real time. If they are made to be passive observers of actions
Foundations of Motor Development made by others, they will not learn to fine-tune their actions.
● Newborn infants are endowed with many reflexes right This effect has been well documented in kittens and increas-
from birth, including the patellar reflex, the rooting reflex, ingly in human infants.
the grasp reflex, the stepping reflex, and the Moro reflex. ● Walking might seem to be a skill that develops merely
Some of these reflexes disappear in the first few months of because of increasingly sophisticated signals coming from
life. This is no longer thought to be solely a consequence of the brain. It is instead dependent on visual feedback of how
their inhibition by higher-level cognitive control, but rather the world is flowing by and on feedback from the infant’s
is thought to reflect the changing properties of infants’ mus- muscles and touch receptors. It also depends on the proper-
cles and limbs and the features of the environment in which ties of the limbs, such that heavy babies take longer to walk
they act. because the walking system is so fragile that a little extra
● Psychologists have long documented various milestones in baby fat is enough to interfere with early walking.
motor development, such as a sequence that proceeds from
rolling over, to sitting, to crawling, to standing, and finally Learning to Engage in Specific Actions
to walking, regardless of experience. It used to be thought
● One of the most dramatic early actions is imitation. New-
that these sequences were merely consequences of increasing
born infants will imitate several different facial expressions,
brain maturation. This view is now replaced by a view that
as will newborn monkeys. Remarkably, the monkeys will
emphasizes ranges and variation as to when normal behav-
imitate faces of another species, namely humans. Imitation
iors appear, based on dynamic systems.
● Dynamic systems theory emphasizes the interactions
requires a sophisticated mapping between perception, mem-
ory, and action, and it may involve a special set of neurons
between many components involved in executing behaviors
known as mirror neurons.
and not just instructions being sent as one-way messages
● The development of birdsong showcases several important
from the brain. Feedback loops are a central part of such
patterns pertaining to the development of action. The vari-
an approach. The components include the physical envi-
ation across different species of birds shows that there are
ronment, the physical properties of the body (especially the
many possible developmental pathways for learning complex
limbs), the properties of the brain and nervous system, and
motor behaviors from models. Birdsong development illus-
how the environment is being perceived.
● Dynamic systems theory has been supported by stud-
trates critical periods and the great importance of perceptual-
motor feedback in learning songs. The different patterns of
ies showing that minor changes in the limbs (for example,
birdsong development also illustrate how a framework of
small weights attached to the limbs) or in the environment
innate biases guides learning species-specific song elements.
(for example, a ramp or a tank of water) can cause radical
● Imprinting is learning that seems to occur during a special
changes in motor behavior in the developing infant.
time period, after which it becomes irreversible. It is most
notable in many birds that normally imprint on their moth-
Perception and Action ers but can be tricked into imprinting on a wide variety of
● Action is often linked to perception, as in the case of reach- other moving objects. It seems to involve an initial tracking
ing for an object. There are considerable challenges here, as system that makes moving objects of roughly maternal size
the infant’s body is undergoing dramatic changes while she the most salient, and an independent system known as the
is learning to guide her hands to an object. IMHV that leads the chick to imprint onto a particular indi-
● Through careful video analysis, it is possible to show that vidual, usually its mother, during a critical period.
even newborn infants can crudely move their arms to reach ● In conditioning, organisms learn to produce actions in
in the direction of an appealing object or display. Their very response to environmental contingencies. Through classical
early abilities serve as a framework that guides learning dur- conditioning, an organism learns how stimuli are related;
ing perceptual-motor development. through operant conditioning, an organism learns the con-
● As infants grow older, they are able to use feedback from their sequences of its actions.
perception of their own actions to fine-tune their movements ● Classical conditioning consists of identifying a preexisting
to more and more accurate actions. But to do so, infants must stimulus-response relationship and then associating a new

STUDY AND REVIEW 143

 stimulus with the first stimulus, such that the new stimu- 3. Why are prepared associations useful? You have read how
lus now produces an action similar to the original response. rats and pigeons are “prepared” to make certain associations
Originally demonstrated in dogs by Pavlov, it has been dem- more than others and that humans may be “prepared” to
onstrated many times in infants from birth onward, and it associate certain organisms with fear. What other associa-
can occur even when infants are sleeping. John Watson used tions might humans also be more prepared to form?
the phenomenon of classical conditioning, as demonstrated 4. Can infants display early indications of exceptional motor
with Little Albert, to make broad claims about child rearing skills? In several countries that have strong government sup-
from the viewpoint of behaviorism. port of Olympic development programs, scouts try to find
● Operant conditioning is concerned with how organisms evidence of extraordinary motor skill at younger and younger
learn to operate on their environments in response to posi- ages. If you were such a scout, what evidence, if any, would
tive and negative reinforcements. Through the technique of you use to identify infants under 1 year of age who are gifted
shaping, in which the researchers reward spontaneous actions
with such extraordinary motor skills?
that come closer and closer to resembling a desired behavior,
it is possible to get animals to produce chained sequences of
novel behaviors, a technique that was greatly refined by B. F.
Skinner, another proponent of behaviorism.
● Both classical and operant conditioning occur within a KEY TERMS
framework of constraints that can sharply limit what associa- affordances (p. 129) motor deprivation (p. 119)
tions are learned and what behaviors are elicited in response behaviorism (p. 139) operant conditioning (p. 139)
to a stimulus. Organisms are prepared by natural selection blocking (p. 140) patellar reflex (p. 117)
to make certain associations and certain stimulus-response
pairings that have adaptive value for those organisms in their classical conditioning (p. 138) perceptual-motor
environmental and ecological niches. conditioned response (CR) development (p. 122)
(p. 138) prepared (p. 141)
conditioned stimulus (CS) prereaching (p. 123)
THOUGHT QUESTIONS (p. 138) reflex (p. 117)
1. How can imitation be related to empathy? Infant imitation dynamic systems theory rooting reflex (p. 117)
has often been described as a way of setting up feelings of (p. 120)
shaping (p. 139)
empathy with another. Empathy, however, can have sev- grasp reflex (p. 117)
stepping reflex (p. 117)
eral forms, ranging from simple emotions to understanding imprinting (p. 135)
another’s point of view. Consider what forms of empathy tabula rasa (p. 139)
instrumental conditioning
would and would not likely be facilitated by infant imitation. unconditioned response
(p. 139)
2. Why would imprinting behavior be selected for in the evolu- (UCR) (p. 138)
tion of some species but not others? How might a species’ maturational account (p. 119)
unconditioned stimulus
developmental growth patterns, its relations to other mem- mirror neuron (p. 132) (UCS) (p. 138)
bers of the same species, and its niche be relevant? Moro reflex (p. 117) visual flow fields (p. 128)

144 CHAPTER 4 THE EMERGENCE OF ACTION

 5
Coming to Understand the
Physical World
Piaget’s Approach • The Use of Number Conclusions
• Piaget’s Theory of Cognitive • Spatial Knowledge in Infants
Development • Categorization in Infants Summary
• The Sensorimotor Period in Infancy
Distinguishing the Physical World
• Key Aspects of Piaget’s Theory
from the Social World
• Examining the A-Not-B Error
• Action at a Distance and Social
Infant Knowledge and Contingency
Understanding • Goal and Belief Attribution
• Thinking about the Unseen
• Understanding Causation
 ell before the end of their first year of life, relationships between interacting objects, as well as how they

W each of our three sons had made many doz-

ens of trips to the lake near our house. By the
lake, we would throw stones that skipped
along the surface and then sank and disap-
peared. The small waves lapping at their feet, the bobbing
driftwood near the shore, the trees’ leaves fluttering in the
wind—all were objects of great fascination. What crossed
understand different numbers of objects. We will also look at
how infants think about physical space and how they come to
view objects as members of categories (for example, knowing
that a poodle is a dog and that a dog is an animal). Finally,
we will consider how infants distinguish social agents that
act (and react) on their own from inanimate objects.
Throughout the chapter, we will draw on some famil-
their minds as they watched the world so avidly? Did they iar developmental themes. We will investigate whether
think that the stones that disappeared under water ceased to infant cognition is just a simpler version of older children’s
exist? Did they have a sense that the lake water was anything or adults’ thinking or whether it is qualitatively different.
like the water in which they bathed? Did they understand Moreover, when infants show marked cognitive change,
why the leaves fluttered or that they even needed a cause to does that change seem to occur globally, affecting all kinds
move? When they saw a duck out on the water or waddling of thought and understanding, or does it seem limited to
on the bank, did they think of it as a living being with differ- one kind of cognition, such as thinking about spatial rela-
ent capacities from an inanimate object? When they saw two tionships or understanding numbers? And in what ways is
pieces of wood drift under the dock, did they expect to see the infant’s mind adapted, or receptive from the start, to
two pieces emerge on the other side? More broadly, as young think about the world in particular ways?
infants, did they think about the world in qualitatively dif- We will begin by exploring the work of Jean Piaget, the
ferent ways than older infants or children think about it; or twentieth century’s most influential developmental psy-
was there much more continuity to their cognitive develop- chologist. In this chapter, we will discuss Piaget’s general
ment? These same kinds of questions pertain to the mental approach and his theory of infancy, along with the recent
lives of infants throughout the world. This chapter examines surge of research that suggests that infants have greater cog-
how developmental psychologists have explored such ques- nitive capacities than Piaget believed possible. In later chap-
tions scientifically. ters, we will consider Piaget’s theories of childhood.
In Chapters 3 and 4, we considered how the infant comes
to perceive and act on the world. Coming to understand
that world and hold specific beliefs about it is quite another
task, even as it intimately depends on perception and action.
In this chapter, we will consider infant cognition—that is,
Piaget’s Approach
the capacity of infants to think, reason, and use knowledge It is impossible to fully understand Jean Piaget’s approach to
about the world. We will see that considerable complexity development without knowing a little about who he was (see
lies beneath an infant’s cognitions. But because infants can’t Figure 5.1). Born in 1896 in Neuchâtel, Switzerland, Piaget
explain their thought processes to us, developmental ques- showed an early scientific bent and was particularly fasci-
tions about their minds often revolve around whether their nated by biology. His first publication came early—at the age
thoughts and knowledge are explicit or implicit. Explicit of 10—and was followed by more than 20 additional biologi-
cognition involves having an awareness of knowledge or of cal papers by the time he was 21. When this impressive record
a thought process, usually in a way that can be described in earned him an offer to become a curator at a Geneva museum,
words, such as knowing that Paris is the capital of France or he surprised the museum officials, who had assumed he was
knowing the rules for solving a crossword puzzle. Implicit much older, when he declined the job because he had not yet
cognition works outside of awareness and may be difficult finished school (Flavell, 1963; Piaget, 1952a).
to describe in words. It might include the thoughts underly- In the following years, Piaget became increasingly inter-
ing the sense that an animal is sick, even if you can’t say why, ested in psychology, always taking what he considered a bio-
or the knowledge that helps you ride a bicycle, even though logical perspective. He did not focus on the inner biological
you can’t fully explain the skill. We will see that recognizing mechanisms that lead to behavior but instead used biological
the difference between explicit and implicit cognition plays concepts such as adaptation to the environment, relationships
an important role in understanding early cognitive develop- between the structure and the function of particular adapta-
ment, often with the initial assumption that the cognition tions, and the developmental unfolding of structure over time
of young infants and other animals is mostly implicit. to explore cognitive development. When he was roughly 24,
We will explore cognition in several areas of infant devel- he began working in Paris in the laboratory of Alfred Binet,
opment. In particular, we will consider how infants under- a researcher whose studies of school-age children led him to
stand an object’s physical properties (for example, its solidity develop the first workable standardized intelligence test. In
or its continued presence when out of sight) and the causal Binet’s lab, Piaget began interviewing large groups of children

146 CHAPTER 5 COMING TO UNDERSTAND THE PHYSICAL WORLD

 and also the behaviors that arise from them. Children are con-
stantly engaging in a process of adaptation, by which the child
better fits her schemes with new experiences in the environ-
ment. The two most basic forms of adaptation through which
the child tries to achieve a better fit between her schemes and
the world are known as assimilation and accommodation.
Assimilation is the process in which the child inter-
prets something new and unfamiliar in terms of preex-
isting schemes—that is, behaviors and concepts that are
already familiar to her. The result can often be a distorted
or severely narrow view of that aspect of the world. Thus,
if a 1-year-old has talked to relatives on a cell phone, she
might first think that a television remote is somewhat like a
cell phone, and after pushing its buttons, she may try talk-
ing into it. She has assimilated the remote control into the
richer knowledge she already has about cell phones, but she
has distorted her understanding of the remote control in the
process. In contrast, accommodation occurs when the child
FIGURE 5.1 Piaget. Jean Piaget (1896–1980) is the undisputed
alters her schemes—that is, her behavior or understanding—
giant in the history of the study of cognitive development. His work to better fit something new she has encountered. If our
over a span of several decades revolutionized the study of the devel- 1-year-old adjusts her knowledge of cell phones and how to
oping mind. use them in a way that incorporates the differences between
the remote control and a cell phone, she has used accom-
and became fascinated with the kinds of mistakes on experi- modation. Through this process, she may realize that she
mental tasks that children commonly make at different ages. does not need to speak into the remote, but it does help to
To Piaget, these changes suggested a series of stages in normal point it at the television. As a result, she has differentiated
cognitive development. Piaget returned to Switzerland, where her understanding of the cell phone and the remote.
he held a variety of academic posts and remained actively Piaget suggested that we rarely see pure cases of accom-
engaged in research until his death in 1980. modation or assimilation; rather, the two almost always
The scope of Piaget’s work is breathtaking. He wrote work in concert to achieve the best fit between the child
more than two dozen major books and hundreds of articles and the environment. There may be cases where assimi-
on topics ranging from children’s understanding of time, lation dominates, but usually some small adjustments of
space, and number to topics in biology and philosophy, and behavior and knowledge are also needed. Similarly, there
he inspired an extraordinary range of studies in develop- may be cases where accommodation dominates, but in order
mental psychology. Especially in the 1960s and 1970s, as to relate the new scheme to the world as we know it, some
the influence of behaviorism declined and researchers began assimilation must also occur.
reincorporating the workings of the mind into their expla- This process in which both accommodation and assimi-
nations of behavior, there was a renewed interest in Piaget’s lation work together to foster a better cognitive fit with the
work. It offered a way to bring cognition back into develop- environment is known as equilibration (see Figure 5.2). We
mental psychology. Because his body of research is so vast, can think of equilibration as the child’s tendency to achieve
our goal here is to outline its most important trends and a dynamic balance between her schemes and her environ-
their place within developmental psychology. We will then ment. Piaget conceived of a continuous and active interplay
present some of the more recent research that has challenged between the child’s schemes and the phenomena in the
some of Piaget’s assumptions and explanations. world. In Piaget’s terms, equilibration describes the process
of achieving a closer correspondence between the environ-
ment and the child’s thoughts and behaviors. This corre-
spondence is never perfect, but for Piaget, improving it is
Piaget’s Theory of Cognitive Development the motivating force behind cognitive development. Thus,
Piaget’s theory describes several processes of cognitive develop- the 1-year-old girl who has never before seen a TV remote
ment. To characterize those processes, Piaget thought of the control has a mismatch between her existing cognitive
child’s knowledge and behavior in terms of schemes. A scheme structures and processes, or schemes, and how well they can
describes a child’s pattern of interacting with her environment; be used to understand the remote control—so she strives to
it includes the child’s internal knowledge and interpretations find a better match. This is equilibration.

PIAGET’S APPROACH 147

 Equilibration

As
sim
Ac

ilat
co

io
m

n
m
od
at
io
n

B C
FIGURE 5.2 Equilibration and its two components: assimilation and accommodation. (A) Equilibration is seen as composed of two
complementary processes of assimilation and accommodation. With assimilation, the child interprets new and unfamiliar things in terms of exist-
ing mental structures and concepts. With accommodation, the child adjusts her behaviors and concepts to better fit the environment. (B) When
an infant first encounters a TV remote control, she may cognitively assimilate it into the more developed mental representation that she has for
a wireless phone. (C) Somewhat later, she may accommodate her mental structures and behaviors for the remote control in ways that more
closely relate to the unique properties of the remote control.

to 12 years; and the formal operational period, from roughly

Q: What is equilibration? What are the two 12 years on. Table 5.1 outlines these four periods. We will
processes that make up equilibration? discuss each of these periods in the appropriate chapter.
Here we will discuss more general aspects of the stage the-
ory before exploring the sensorimotor period in depth.
By dividing cognitive development into four periods, Piaget
In Piaget’s view, infants and children use various schemes
was proposing distinct, qualitative changes in the child’s
to interact with their environment. Since these schemes are
thinking about the world. During each period, the child
never perfectly matched with the aspects of the environ-
acquires many new schemes—until she accumulates enough
ment that they seek to interpret, children use equilibration
new understanding to trigger a transformation in her thought
to bring their schemes into closer alignment with the world
processes, leading her into the next period. Piaget believed
they encounter, doing so through the complementary pro-
that each period operates in a domain-general way; that
cesses of assimilation and accommodation. As the schemes
is, during each period, the child uses certain characteristic
are adjusted through accommodation, their structure
ways of thinking to develop schemes about all aspects of
changes, perhaps modestly at first, but over time they may
the world—not just about one specific area, such as social
be completely reorganized.
agents. The only way to proceed from one period to the next
A distinctive aspect of Piaget’s theory is its emphasis
is to accumulate enough new knowledge from experience
on discrete periods and stages of development. Piaget is
to cause a reorganization of the schemes. Piaget observed
known as a stage theorist because he believed that assimila-
that the specific ages associated with each period vary from
tion and accommodation of many schemes lead to quali-
child to child. By contrast, he believed that the order of the
tative changes in cognition, which is evident in children’s
periods never changes, since each period provides a neces-
major leaps in understanding at certain points in develop-
sary foundation for the next one.
ment. In contrast, some approaches view development as a
more gradual process of continuous, incremental change—
quantitative change—as described in Chapter 1.
Piaget envisioned four periods of development across Q: Describe Piaget’s four periods of cognitive
the lifespan: the sensorimotor period, from birth to roughly development and the distinguishing features
2 years; the preoperational period, from roughly 2 years to of each.
7 years; the concrete operational period, from roughly 7 years

148 CHAPTER 5 COMING TO UNDERSTAND THE PHYSICAL WORLD

 Period of Cognitive
Development Age Hallmark

Sensorimotor period Birth–2 years Infants learn to distinguish their own bodies and actions from the external world
around them.
Preoperational period 2–7 years Children can use symbols to mentally represent objects, but they fail to use mental
operations that enable them to see the quasi-logical relations governing phenomena.
Concrete operational period 7–12 years Children can apply quasi-logical operations to concrete information, but they fail to
think abstractly or in hypothetical terms.
Formal operational period 12 years on Children are able to think logically about things that are not immediately present and
about abstract and hypothetical ideas.

TABLE 5.1 Piaget’s four periods of cognitive development. Each of Piaget’s four periods describes a qualitatively distinct way of
understanding the world. The associated ages provide rough guidelines and can vary considerably across children.

Where would Piaget fall along the nativist/empiricist sensorimotor period (Piaget, 1952b). His evidence for these
continuum? His view of infants and children as striving stages was especially personal, coming almost exclusively
to understand the world better through assimilation and from detailed observations of his own three children.
accommodation stresses an active, exploratory developmen- Piaget saw a great deal of activity going on in infants
tal process. While he clearly disagreed with the empiricist during each of the six sensorimotor stages. This overview
view of the infant as a passive vessel or blank slate, his empha- briefly characterizes each stage, focusing on the infant’s
sis on the domain generality of cognitive development and understanding of physical objects, a form of understanding
his notion that all knowledge is built up through experience that Piaget called the object concept, an idea central to his
made him an empiricist. Although he certainly was con- overall theory of the sensorimotor period. Piaget’s account of
cerned with the mind (unlike a behaviorist) and with com- the object concept focuses on object permanence—how the
plex cognitive structures (rather than the simple networks infant comes to think of objects as things that still exist even
of a classic associationist), he was nonetheless deeply at odds when they are out of sight and not being used or acted on.
with the nativists’ central tenets. Unlike the nativists, he
never proposed that the mind has any innate biases toward Stage 1 (Birth to 1 Month): Use of Reflexes Piaget
particular areas of thought. Thus, while Piaget believed in believed that the very young infant interacts with the envi-
innate schemes that work in ways that go beyond mere asso- ronment by means of relatively fixed, innate routines, or
ciations, he did not believe in the nativist view that there are reflexes, which Piaget viewed as the simplest early ver-
innate domain-specific constraints for understanding such sions of schemes. Among Piaget’s examples of these infant
areas of knowledge as spatial layout, number, or the proper- reflexes, the most commonly mentioned are those related to
ties of physical objects. To better understand the details of breastfeeding, such as the sucking reflex, which is present
Piaget’s approach to infancy, we will turn to his description from birth. In Piaget’s view, these reflexive behaviors are
of the sensorimotor period. not completely fixed, however. Rather, by interacting with
the world, infants learn—through the processes of assimila-
tion and accommodation—to modify the simple schemes
that influence their reflexive behaviors. For example, Piaget
Q: Is Piaget’s approach more compatible with repeatedly observed that his own children became increas-
nativism or empiricism? ingly proficient at finding their mother’s nipple and at
maintaining active sucking while nursing (thus modifying
the sucking reflex through accommodation). The suck-
ing reflex changed in ways that were directly related to the
object it acted on, the breast. Thus, the infant “fine-tuned”
The Sensorimotor Period in Infancy the preexisting sucking reflex to make it more optimal for
Piaget called the first 2 years of life the sensorimotor recovering milk from the breast. Similarly, one of our sons
period. As he did for each of the four periods of cogni- initially had trouble breathing while he was nursing, since
tive development, Piaget further divided the sensorimotor he would bury his face in the breast and cover up his nose
period into smaller stages that give it texture and depth. while sucking vigorously until he would come up for air. As
He proposed that there are six distinct stages within the the days passed, however, he began to show accommodation

PIAGET’S APPROACH 149

as he learned to breathe while nursing by turning his head Stage 2 (1 to 4 Months): Emergence of Primary Cir-
to the side and by not pressing so hard. Through these kinds cular Reactions In Sensorimotor Stage 1, infants begin
of modifications of schemes related to early reflexes, infants modifying their reflexes into more effective behaviors, or
are able to change their behaviors and eventually integrate motor schemes. In Sensorimotor Stage 2, Piaget saw infants
them into more sophisticated actions. In this way, according using and modifying their schemes in increasingly flexible
to Piaget, the infant’s reflexes form the building blocks for ways to get better at stimulating themselves. The hallmark
more complex behaviors. of this stage is the primary circular reaction, in which
Piaget believed that the infant experiences the world in a the infant discovers by chance that she can use her motor
radically different way than older children and adults do. In schemes from the first stage to interact with “new objects”—
Sensorimotor Stage 1, infants have no awareness of objects specifically, new parts of her own body (see Figure 5.4). If the
as being “out there,” independent of their own actions (see infant finds that new action pleasing, she will try to repro-
Figure 5.3). Instead, they understand objects only in the duce it. Then, as these attempts lead to small adjustments
context of their own ways of routinely interacting with the in the original behavior, she will accommodate her original
world. In the breastfeeding example, the infants are focused scheme to include the new body part and the new action.
on sucking and have little awareness that the breast itself is Since schemes cannot be changed completely, her original
a distinct object; if the infants saw the breast from another scheme partly shapes her understanding of the new behavior,
angle rather than the close-up nursing position, they would so assimilation also occurs.
not recognize it as the same object involved in nursing. Infants can also create new schemes through primary cir-
This concept of the infant’s experience is at odds with the cular reactions, but only schemes discovered accidentally and
research on intermodal perception described in Chapters 3 directed toward parts of their own bodies. Piaget offered an
and 4, in which infants showed very early abilities to inte- example in which his son, in the process of sucking, happened
grate information from different perceptual systems, such as to have his tongue protrude beyond his mouth and touch his
vision and touch. As we will see, Piaget’s view is also at odds lower lip. He discovered that this was a pleasing sensation
with the more recent research on infant cognition. and attempted to repeat it. As he gradually became better at
quickly licking his lower lip, he built a new scheme for lip-
licking. Accommodation occurs here because as the licking
Q: What role do reflexes play in Piaget’s first scheme develops, it changes in ways related to the sensations
sensorimotor stage? of the lip. Assimilation is also involved because the infant’s
understanding of his lip is heavily influenced by learning
about it through his lip-licking scheme.
The schemes developed by primary circular reactions are
Scheme A Scheme B therefore routines in which infants learn to stimulate them-
(mouthing scheme) (looking scheme) selves better and better. In this context, Piaget argued that
infants’ understanding of objects remains largely unchanged
from Sensorimotor Stage 1 to Stage 2. The infants still do
not understand objects (including parts of their own bod-
ies) as existing independently, but rather they see them
as embedded in particular behavioral schemes. Thus, as
infants in Stage 2 learn to interact with their own bodies in
new ways, they remember only the actions and the effects
they produced, not the objects that the actions involved.
Piaget recognized that even the most careful observations
of his own children were not enough to build a theory of the
sensorimotor period, so he developed predictions based on
his observations and set out to test whether they held true
for other infants. Some of his most interesting predictions
FIGURE 5.3 Multiple schemes and understanding objects. concerned the object concept. For instance, as we have seen,
According to Piaget, the young infant can have very different Piaget believed that infants in Stages 1 and 2 cannot repre-
impressions of the same object when understood through differ-
sent objects as existing independently and that the infants
ent schemes. In this case, looking at a cylinder from one particular
angle confers a distorted perspective, whereas mouthing the cylinder can only understand objects as parts of an ongoing scheme.
distorts it by focusing attention on its edge. According to Piaget, an The objects would vanish when the scheme was no longer
infant would not even realize that the same object was involved, but being used. Piaget thus predicted that infants in Stages 1
later research raised doubts about this notion. and 2 would not search for an object once it was out of

150 CHAPTER 5 COMING TO UNDERSTAND THE PHYSICAL WORLD

A B C
FIGURE 5.4 The developing object concept. As seen in these photos, young infants will scrutinize with apparent concentration many
objects, including parts of their own bodies. Researchers on infant cognition are trying to understand how the infant thinks about those objects,
such as whether he thinks that they are whole enduring entities that exist when out of sight.

sight. For example, if an infant playing with her favorite the infant’s own body. Although younger infants do act on
rattle accidentally dropped it between the folds of a blan- objects other than their own bodies, Piaget held that in Stage 3
ket, she would not search for it, since she would not real- they develop new schemes specifically for interacting with
ize that the rattle continued to exist when she lost sight of external objects. This is the first small step toward developing
it. For the same reason, Piaget believed that infants would limited notions of an external world. But at this point, infants
not understand that an object’s properties can change. For still recognize objects only in terms of the schemes in which
example, if an object is moving, the infant would watch it they are embedded, rather than viewing them independently.
with a “tracking scheme”; but if the object suddenly stopped Like the primary circular reactions, secondary circular
moving, the infant would continue tracking along the path reactions initially happen by chance; then, if the behavior is
the object would have taken if it had continued to move. pleasing, the infant reproduces it. The key advance in Stage 3
Piaget based this prediction on the idea that because a mov- is that the infant acts on something other than his own body
ing object and a stationary object require different schemes, (see Figure 5.5). He might shake a rattle and find the noise
the infant is unaware that the stationary object is the same interesting, then shake it again to repeat the sound. Over
one that was moving a moment before. time, he would become more efficient at making the sound,
producing a new rattle-shaking scheme. All three of Piaget’s
children showed secondary circular reactions to mobiles sus-
pended over their bassinets. Each one discovered by chance
Q: According to Piaget, how do infants in that leg movements caused the mobile to move. As they
Sensorimotor Stage 2 understand objects? sought to repeat this effect, they became increasingly efficient
at integrating schemes: moving their legs while simultane-
ously watching the mobile. With time, such schemes become
Stage 3 (4 to 9 Months): Appearance of Secondary increasingly sophisticated. For example, an infant might
Circular Reactions In Sensorimotor Stage 3, the infant fur- modify the scheme of the mobile by performing an abbrevi-
ther expands and modifies his set of schemes, most notably ated and simplified version of the full scheme as a kind of
through the process of secondary circular reactions. Sec- shorthand way of recognizing it. Thus, an infant might give
ondary circular reactions represent a major advance over the a brief perfunctory leg shake on recognizing a mobile, a leg
primary circular reactions of the previous stage because they shake that is a shortened and smaller version of the original
involve applying new schemes to external objects, not just to that actually moved the mobile and made it exciting.

PIAGET’S APPROACH 151

 Stage 4 (9 to 12 Months): Coordination of Second-
ary Circular Reactions Stage 4 is perhaps when the most
significant transitions in the sensorimotor period occur.
Although there are no new behavioral hallmarks, such as the
circular reactions, the infant is now integrating his vast array
of relatively independent schemes into a smaller number of
more complex and flexible schemes (see Figure 5.6). A key
process for the infant in Stage 4 is interacting with the same
object in various ways or, in Piaget’s terms, applying multiple
schemes to the same object. Through this process, the infant

Scheme A Scheme B Scheme C Scheme D Scheme E

A B (mouthing (shaking (kicking (splashing (hearing
scheme) scheme) scheme) scheme) scheme)
FIGURE 5.5 Secondary circular reactions and interactions with
external objects. Infants in the 4- to 9-month-old age range start
to explore objects, such as (A) the rattle and (B) the mobile, with
ever more attention to the objects’ unique properties. The infant in
Sensorimotor Stage 3 initially discovers the sound of the rattle or the
movement of the mobile by chance and then uses secondary circular
reactions (shaking the rattle, setting the mobile in motion) to act
purposefully on the object.

Q: How can a Sensorimotor Stage 3 infant

develop actions tailored for an object but not
really know that the object exists in its own right? Stage 4
Give an example. Transition

Scheme A Scheme B Scheme C Scheme D Scheme E

(mouthing (shaking (kicking (splashing (hearing
As he did for Stages 1 and 2, Piaget tested predictions scheme) scheme) scheme) scheme) scheme)
about how Stage 3 infants would respond to particular ways
of manipulating objects. For example, he predicted that
in Stage 3, objects completely out of sight are still “out of
mind.” But he thought that infants in Stage 3 would some-
times retrieve an object that had been partially covered,
because their schemes were sophisticated enough to act on
just part of an object, such as a rattle’s handle. Piaget also
Integrated Representation
predicted that if a blanket were placed in front of a Stage 3
infant’s face, she would push it aside to reach for an object,
but if the same blanket directly covered an object that she
wanted, she would not remove it. Piaget maintained that the
infant would move the blanket away from her face not to FIGURE 5.6 Integration of secondary schemes. As infants
get at an object that she couldn’t see, but rather to allow enter Sensorimotor Stage 4, they transition from seeing each
object differently, depending on their schemes for using it, to a
the looking scheme to operate. Once the looking scheme
more integrated set of schemes that can support a more objective,
could again operate, seeing the object would then trigger a scheme-independent understanding of the object. Thus, in Stage 3,
reaching scheme, and the infant would reach for the object. each scheme involves a different representation of the object. After
On the other hand, when the blanket covered an object, the the transition to Stage 4, the schemes are unified into an integrated
infant could still use her looking scheme, but there would be representation, and the infant’s understanding of the object is no
no object visible to elicit it. longer “embedded” in any one scheme.

152 CHAPTER 5 COMING TO UNDERSTAND THE PHYSICAL WORLD

begins to get a sense that the object has enduring properties
and that it exists independently of his actions. “Viewing” the
same object from the contrasting vantage points of several
different schemes starts to bring the objective qualities of
the object into relief. Consider again the infant’s rattle. If
an infant starts to put together the rattle-shaking scheme
with a rattle-mouthing scheme, a rattle-hearing scheme, and
a rattle-splashing scheme, she will start to understand that A B A B
certain properties of the rattle persist across these different
schemes. These properties start to emerge as ways of charac- A B
terizing the rattle independently from any particular scheme.
FIGURE 5.7 The A-not-B error. The Stage 4 infant searches for
Thus, infants in Stage 4 undergo a dramatic transition as the hidden object under cover A, where it was initially hidden and
they start to integrate schemes and come closer to realizing recovered several times, even though it was last hidden in location B.
that distinct objects exist “out there” in the world. (In the actual experiment, the hidden object is not at all visible.)
Even though infants at Stage 4 are beginning to use more
integrated schemes to understand objects, they still do not
truly appreciate objects existing apart from schemes. Infants cases where his children would experiment with differ-
in this stage will now retrieve a fully hidden object, but ent ways of acting on objects. For the first time, a baby
according to Piaget, they will not fully represent the object might play with a bath toy by looking for the effects that
when it is out of sight (see Figure 5.7). In support of this dropping has on the object rather than focusing on the
idea, Piaget showed that although infants at this stage will dropping action itself. Thus, while a Stage 4 baby might
retrieve a fully hidden object, they tend to make a particular release the toy after holding it in the air and focus on the
type of mistake in their searching, known as the A-not-B releasing action, the Stage 5 baby would drop the toy so
error, or the place error. Infants make this error when an as to make the biggest splash or to make it sink. Piaget
object has been repeatedly hidden for them to discover in referred to this as “the discovery of new means through
the same spot (place A), but then the object is hidden in a active experimentation”(Piaget, 1952b), meaning that the
new spot (place B) while the infant watches. Infants making child is constantly and intentionally discovering new ways
the A-not-B error will again search for the object in place A, of learning about objects.
where it was previously hidden, even when other cues, such There is, however, one critical way in which Stage 5
as a bulging cover, strongly suggest the new location. Piaget infants still have an immature object concept. Although
believed that by repeatedly finding the object hidden in the they no longer commit the A-not-B error (they can find
same spot, Stage 4 infants develop a particular scheme for objects that were hidden while they were watching), they
retrieving that object at a particular location. He interpreted are unable to think about the objects as changing location
the A-not-B error as a consequence of the infant’s inability while out of sight. This inability comes to light in their
to apply a new scheme to the object in its new location, since failure to understand invisible displacement, in which a
the object is still embedded within the older scheme. hidden object is moved to a new hiding spot. In the sim-
plest kind of invisible displacement, commonly known as a
“shell game” (see Figure 5.8), an infant is shown an object
Q: What is the A-not-B error, and why is it also being put under a cover, which is next to another cover of
the same type. The two covers are then moved very slowly,
known as the place error? in full view of the infant, so that they trade places. When
the infant is asked to find the hidden object, she will usu-
ally reach for the cover at the location where the object was
Stage 5 (12 to 18 Months): Appearance of Ter- originally hidden. Apparently, she is unable to mentally
tiary Circular Reactions An important new milestone keep track of the object’s movement while it is hidden.
in Stage 5 is the appearance of tertiary circular reac-
tions, in which infants use schemes intentionally. In this
stage, infants begin intentionally coordinating their use of
schemes in innovative and creative ways to actively explore Q: What are invisible displacements, and
the world. And unlike infants in earlier stages, infants in why doesn’t the infant in Sensorimotor Stage 5
Stage 5 finally understand objects as existing indepen- understand them?
dently from their schemes. Piaget commented on several

PIAGET’S APPROACH 153

 period. Most notable is the emergence of language, which
Piaget took to be the most easily observable manifestations
of a new competence in symbolic thinking—namely, the
ability to use structured sounds (words) and relations (sen-
tences) to stand for real-world things. For Piaget, language
B A B A
does not emerge as an independent skill following its own
developmental course; it is inextricably linked to the ability
to think symbolically, which also signals the transition out of
the sensorimotor period.
Table 5.2 summarizes the six stages of the sensorimotor
FIGURE 5.8 Invisible displacements. The error of invisible period and the significant developments found at each stage.
displacements occurs when an infant watches an adult hide an object As with Piaget’s broader stages, the ages can vary across chil-
under a cover and then watches the adult move the cover so that it dren. But Piaget believed that the stages themselves emerge
slowly changes places with another cover. The infant searches where
only in one order. The significant developments focus on
the object was initially hidden (place A) rather than at its new location
(place B). (In the actual experiment, the hidden object is not at all
the object concept, which is where Piaget put his primary
visible.) emphasis and where the most empirical support for his ideas
is found.

Stage 6 (18 Months to 2 Years): Invention of New

Means through Mental Combinations In Stage 6 of the Key Aspects of Piaget’s Theory
sensorimotor period, the child can flexibly use schemes and Piaget’s theory of cognitive development in infancy is an
can more powerfully represent objects and their relations. extraordinary account for several reasons. First, it offers a
She knows that objects continue to exist apart from schemes dramatic view of infants as experiencing a very different
and regardless of whether they are hidden or moved. And she world from the rest of us. In this view, younger infants can-
can solve invisible displacements because she not only can not differentiate between objects and the actions they per-
represent an object in her mind, but can also manipulate her form on those objects, and thus they do not understand that
mental representation. The emphasis on more powerful cog- there is an external world separate from themselves. Quite
nitive representations and thought processes is also linked unlike adults, young infants have no awareness beyond the
to a much broader array of changes in children during this schemes they are currently using.

Sensorimotor Stage Age Significant Developments

1. Use of reflexes Birth–1 month The infant’s actions are mostly reflexive, but even at this stage, the infant
learns to modify actions that began as reflexes.
2. Emergence of primary 1–4 months The infant discovers by chance the application of motor schemes to self and
circular reactions modifies schemes. The first acquired adaptations appear.
3. Appearance of secondary 4–9 months The infant now applies schemes more directly to other objects and modifies
circular reactions schemes accordingly. The infant discovers procedures designed to make
interesting sights last.
4. Coordination of secondary 9–12 months The infant now links schemes together and starts to get a more objective
circular reactions sense of objects, but still interprets objects in terms of each specific scheme
and not as objects per se. The infant now applies schemes to new situations.
5. Appearance of tertiary 12–18 months The infant now uses schemes intentionally to actively explore the world, and
circular reactions schemes are now truly subordinate to objects. The infant discovers new ways
of acting on objects through active experimentation.
6. Invention of new means 18 months–2 years The child can symbolically represent objects and their relations.
through mental combinations

TABLE 5.2 Piaget’s six stages of the sensorimotor period. Piaget’s theory of six sensorimotor stages forms an essential backdrop for all
later research in infant cognitive development. His ideas motivated many studies on infant cognition, the majority of which focused on infants’
understanding of objects, and much of that work eventually challenged Piaget’s theory.

154 CHAPTER 5 COMING TO UNDERSTAND THE PHYSICAL WORLD

 Second, this view offers a detailed model of development The A-not-B error is one observation that has been
that was one of the first to explain the mental states and explained differently in more recent research. Recall that
processes underlying behavioral changes. Piaget theorized infants make this error when, after repeatedly finding an
that higher-level cognition develops out of an inevitable pro- object hidden in the same place, they then watch it being
gression of structures. Starting with reflexes, infants begin hidden in a new place but still search for it where they had
modifying those behaviors, allowing them to develop even found it before. Piaget considered this a failure to apply
more flexible schemes. These schemes are used first in self- a new scheme to the object. But some researchers believe
directed actions, then applied to external objects, then grad- that infants’ diligent searching for the unseen object may
ually integrated into increasingly complex schemes that help be evidence that infants are indeed mentally representing
the child gain an objective sense of what is “out there.” This the object, in spite of their failure to correctly locate it
is a more sophisticated empiricist account than the early (Ruffman et al., 2005). In one study, experimenters used
ones described in Chapter 3, in which infants begin life the standard procedure, repeatedly hiding an object at
with only basic sensory capabilities and the ability to form place A, then obviously moving it to place B. But instead
associations. In Piaget’s view, infants also have modifiable of using the infants’ reaching to assess their understand-
reflexes through which they begin learning about the world. ing, experimenters observed the infants’ reactions when
Third, this view stresses domain generality, in which they saw the object that had clearly been hidden in place B
stage changes affect everything that the infant does and retrieved either from A, the “impossible” location, or from
thinks about. Thus, regardless of the cognitive domain, place B. They found that even infants who reached for
the transition to a new stage influences thinking and rea- the object at place A were more surprised when the object
soning on all tasks in which a child is engaged. Whether was found there, indicating that, despite their reach, they
the domain is number, spatial representations, or language, had expected to find it at place B (Ahmed & Ruffman,
changes in a stage will fundamentally change how a child 1998). In other studies that used more hiding places, a
thinks in each case. similar pattern of results emerged: although they reached
Finally, Piaget left us with lots of observational and exper- for the object at the wrong location (A), infants would
imental data. Much of his data revolved around the infant’s also look at the correct location (B) more than at another
object concept, which Piaget used to illustrate many aspects location (C) (Cummings & Bjork, 1983; Diamond et al.,
of his theory of sensorimotor development. Piaget’s studies 1994). These studies pointed out difficulties with Piaget’s
suggested that young infants can think about objects only account, but they still did not fully explain what causes
in terms of currently active schemes and not as objects in the errors.
their own right. Only by gradually elaborating and integrat- Studies in both humans and other primates suggest a
ing schemes can infants finally become able to understand different account of the place error, one that suggests that
independent objects well after the first year of life. infants can understand an enduring external world but
Piaget’s account of infancy is so comprehensive and are not yet fully competent in certain cognitive and motor
compelling that it was considered mostly correct for many skills to act successfully on the external world. As we have
decades, and his work continues to motivate many stud- seen, Piaget believed that infants make this error because
ies. Since Piaget’s time, however, researchers have come they cannot fully mentally represent unseen objects. The
to question significant aspects of his theory, and clever most prominent alternative account focuses instead on
experiments have revealed new insights about how infants the reaching action involved in retrieving the hidden
think. Building on our exploration of Piaget’s sensorimotor object. As discussed in Chapter 4, several of the earliest
theory, we next turn to more current views of how infants reflexes appear to be more robust in younger infants. Two
understand the world, beginning with a new look at the of these, the grasp reflex and the avoidance reflex (a ten-
object concept. dency to pull a limb back from sharp objects or edges),
may interfere with retrieval when the object is hidden
next to a barrier or anything else that could brush against
the infant’s hand. Even brief contact can trigger the infant
Examining the A-Not-B Error to either reflexively grasp the barrier itself or to withdraw
Many studies have challenged Piaget’s idea of the object his hand (Diamond, 1985, 1991). Frame-by-frame video
concept. As early as 1971, researchers asked whether there analyses suggest that these reflexive actions, triggered by
were alternative explanations for the errors that Piaget a barrier, typically prevent the infant from retrieving the
observed young infants making. They hypothesized that object from its new hiding place. If the object is instead
infants might be aware of objects’ independent existence placed to reduce the infant’s likelihood of accidentally
but have other cognitive limitations that cause the errors touching a barrier, the infant is much more likely to suc-
(Bower, 1971, 1974). ceed (Diamond, 1991).

PIAGET’S APPROACH 155

 These findings suggest that younger infants may know to repeat past actions, may also be at work, since 40 percent
that the concealed object exists, but they may only be able of the infants in the noncommunicative condition still com-
to engage in successful retrieval actions for some object- mit the error, but these tendencies may not be the primary
barrier configurations. Thus, at this point in their develop- reason infants look in location A in the normal task.
ment, their ability to retrieve hidden objects may depend Performance on the A-not-B task depends not only on
on the specific object-barrier configuration. Put differently, the infant’s ability to inhibit his reflexive actions, but also
covers and barriers pose obstacles to the goal of retrieving on his memory. Although infants may stop making the
an object. Younger infants have difficulty overcoming these A-not-B error as early as 8 months, when there is no delay at
obstacles without being distracted by them. But by around all, their ability to do so depends on the length of the delay
8 months of age, infants start to be able to inhibit these between when the object is hidden and when the infant is
reflexes and to control their actions more voluntarily. allowed to retrieve it. After a delay of several extra seconds,
Another contributor to the A-not-B error seems to be infants who normally pass the A-not-B task will fail. Many
infants’ tendency to try to make sense of what they see as studies have also found that the more times infants find the
if it involved intentional acts of communication. In all the object at location A, the more likely they are to make the
traditional versions of this task, the experimenters look at error (Markovitch & Zelazo, 1999).
the infant and clearly indicate that they are demonstrating
something to the infant. That intentional, communicative
component may have a strong influence on the infant’s rea-
soning. In one series of studies, 10-month-olds saw either an Q: What is an alternative way of understanding
agent deliberately communicating with them while cover- the A-not-B error?
ing and uncovering the object, an agent who performed the
same actions while clearly not communicating, or an inani-
mate object that performed the actions (Topál et al., 2008; It seems as if infants have difficulty “letting go” of the
see Figure 5.9). In the communicative condition, the dem- practiced action of searching in place A, which interferes
onstrator established eye contact, talked to the baby (“Hello, with, and can even overwhelm, competing actions (Munak-
baby, look here!”), and then hid the object in location A while ata et al., 1997). This observation suggests that younger
looking back and forth from the object to the baby to clearly infants may simply be less mature in the brain regions nec-
draw the baby into shared attention to the object. When essary to inhibit the practiced action, specifically the dorso-
the adult provides these rich communicative cues, roughly lateral prefrontal cortex (see Figure 5.10). Support for this
80 percent of 10-month-olds commit the search error, while idea comes from several sources. First, anatomical studies
only about 40 percent make the error in the other two con- of human infants demonstrate relative immaturity of the
ditions. The authors suggest that younger infants may inter- dorsolateral prefrontal cortex compared with more posterior
pret the communicative cues as a way of teaching, as if the brain regions. Second, adults with damage to this brain area
adult is trying to convey that “this is the hiding place for this exhibit similar errors. Even after correctly indicating which
object.” The infants may then internalize that message in a card they should select from a group, they may be unable to
way that usually overrules the fact that the object was hidden select it by reaching (Diamond, 1991; Milner, 1964). Finally,
elsewhere on the last trial. Some tendencies to perseverate, or adult monkeys with lesions in the dorsolateral prefrontal

FIGURE 5.9 Pragmatic factors

and the A-not-B error. Many
infants who normally fail the A-not-
B task in the communicative version
pass it in the noncommunicative
and nonsocial versions. This may
be because in the communicative
version, the infants believe that the
adult is intentionally communicating
to them that they should look for
the hidden object in the location on
the right. From Topál et al. (2008). Communicative Noncommunicative Nonsocial

156 CHAPTER 5 COMING TO UNDERSTAND THE PHYSICAL WORLD

 and universal physical laws. In the rest of this chapter, we
Dorsolateral will consider what infants know about the physical world.
prefrontal cortex Along the way, we will ask whether infants’ impressive per-
formance on many experimental tasks is evidence of high-
level cognition or whether their seemingly sophisticated
responses may be merely rigid, automatic behaviors, simi-
lar to the reflexes considered in Chapter 4. Do very young
infants have intuitive belief-like theories that allow them
to think flexibly about the physical world? What kinds of
FIGURE 5.10 Inhibition of practiced actions. This view of a
mental structures are minimally necessary to explain their
human brain (showing mostly the left side) shows the dorsolateral behavior?
prefrontal cortex area that seems to be involved in inhibiting the By way of framing the problem, consider the seemingly
tendency to produce previously practiced actions. This area is unlikely example of the kingfisher (Boden, 1989), which
especially immature in infants relative to other brain regions and, fishes for its underwater prey by diving toward it from the
when lesioned in adult monkeys, causes the monkeys to commit air. The kingfisher must strike at an angle to compensate
the A-not-B error. for the distortion caused by looking down at its prey
through the water, as shown in Figure 5.11. Although each
dive can be described in terms of intricate geometric rela-
cortex behave in precisely the same way on the A-not-B task tions between the bird and its prey, kingfishers obviously do
as most 8-month-old infants and search in the wrong loca- not “know” geometry. Instead, they automatically invoke a
tion, whereas adult monkeys with intact brains do not make much more rigid and inflexible routine, outside of aware-
the A-not-B error (Diamond & Goldman-Rakic, 1989). ness, as they dive for fish. If a region of the kingfisher’s
It is quite remarkable that roughly 50 years and several brain computes geometric relations, it surely operates more
hundred experimental studies after Piaget described the like a “black box” module, giving the user access to its out-
A-not-B error, researchers are still investigating its ultimate puts but not to a conscious process of computing angles and
basis. The reflex inhibition accounts cannot fully explain why distances (Dennett, 1991; Nagel, 1979). In considering the
infants make the error when they merely observe the hiding research that follows, it is helpful to keep the kingfisher in
and don’t act; the memory-based accounts cannot explain mind. Is the infant’s performance simply an execution of
why the infant looks at a second correct location more than automatic behaviors, or is a flexible understanding of the
at an incorrect alternative. Both motor control and memory world truly present?
are likely involved, and indeed we can imagine situations in In observing infants’ responses, it is difficult to tell
which we, as adults, have acted similarly. Who hasn’t lost their whether we are witnessing flexible understanding or automatic
car keys, failed to find them where they normally are, and
then after looking in several other spots, been unthinkingly
“pulled” back to their usual spot to look there again? We don’t
do this because we cannot mentally represent hidden objects;
we are merely defaulting to the most successful strategy. In
short, recent research suggests that the A-not-B error has its ϴ2
Snell’s law: n2
basis in several cognitive differences between younger and n1 sinϴ1 = n2 sinϴ2
older infants. No one specific difference may fully explain n1 ϴ1
how infants understand the properties of hidden objects.

Infant Knowledge and

Understanding
FIGURE 5.11 Inferring mental states underlying behaviors.
As we have seen, recent research has challenged Piaget’s
Does the kingfisher deliberately and consciously calculate trigonome-
belief that infants have little or no awareness of objects and try in order to know how to dive after the fish? Clearly not, even if its
the broader world around them. It is now clear that infants behavior implies that such trigonometric calculations must be occur-
are aware of the external world from a very early age, and ring. The same dilemma arises in trying to infer the mental states of a
they have some basic understanding of its highly regular preverbal infant. Adapted from Boden (1989).

INFANT KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING 157

behaviors, and we often have to rely on intuitions about
what sorts of behaviors seem to reflect something more than
automatic routines (Bernal, 2005). We will see that some of
the best evidence comes from the patterns in infants’ errors
as their understanding of physical objects develops. Some
error patterns strongly imply a flexible, deliberative system
rather than a preprogrammed “black box” response. A Habituation event

Possible
event
Q: How might a preverbal infant’s behavior be
understood either in terms of a sophisticated
internal set of theory-like beliefs or in terms of
interactions “below” the level of beliefs?
Impossible
event

Thinking about the Unseen

One way that researchers have tried to determine whether
infants show flexible understanding has been to observe
how they react to events that occur out of view. There are B Test events
now several studies illustrating that infants as young as FIGURE 5.12 Understanding permanence and solidity by
4 months not only know that objects continue to exist 4-month-old infants. (A) In a habituation event, an infant sees a
while out of sight, but also seem able to think about unseen screen swing through 180 degrees several times. (B) An object is
objects interacting in ways that conform to simple physics. placed on the surface while the screen is down. The infant then observes
the screen either moving through a smaller angle (a 112-degree arc)
that would correspond to its stopping on top of the object (a possible
Studies of Object Permanence and Solidity Two event) or moving the full 180 degrees (an “impossible” event made
properties of common physical objects are extremely reli- possible by a hidden trap door through which the object moves while
able: permanence and solidity. Object permanence simply out of sight of the infant). Infants dishabituate more strongly to the
means that objects continue to exist over time. They don’t 180-degree arc, even though the arc itself is much more familiar
exist for a while, blink out of existence, and then reap- (due to the habituation event) than the movement through the smaller
pear. Object solidity means that rigid or hard objects can- angle. Adapted from Baillargeon (1987).
not pass through other rigid or hard objects because they
cohere (stick together) as single entities. Billiard balls, for
example, bounce off each other; they don’t pass through in the path of the screen’s arc. In one experimental condi-
each other. Researchers have explored infants’ knowledge of tion, the infant watched the screen swing back and forth
these two properties as a way of understanding how infants again, but only part of the way. The screen stopped where
think about physical objects in general. One pioneering it touched the box, and at that point it also blocked the box
study on infants’ understanding of solidity was conducted from the infant’s view. This is a perceptually novel event,
by Renee Baillargeon and her colleagues and is depicted in but it is consistent with the law of object solidity (and so it
Figure 5.12. The experimental setup involved a solid screen is a possible event), and the infant showed only mild dis-
attached with a hinge to the surface of a table. This study habituation. In a different experimental condition, the box
is typically described as “the drawbridge study” because the was placed in the screen’s path, but the infant then watched
authors noted a similarity between the screen rotating back the screen swing through the full 180-degree arc, as in the
and forth over the surface and the action of a drawbridge. original habituation trials. Because the screen should hit
During the experiment, infants watched the screen swing the box, this event is incompatible with object solidity. (The
back and forth several times through a full 180-degree box dropped through a hidden opening in the table’s surface
arc, naturally stopping as it hit the table on either side to create the impossible event.)
(Baillargeon, 1987; Baillargeon et al., 1985). Infants as Even at 3½ months of age, infants dishabituated much
young as 3½ months soon habituated and lost interest in more strongly to the impossible 180-degree arc than to the
the event. Researchers then introduced a new object, plac- partial arc that occurred when the screen was presumably
ing a large box on the far side of the screen from the infant blocked by the box. This response pattern seems to require

158 CHAPTER 5 COMING TO UNDERSTAND THE PHYSICAL WORLD

the infants to understand some principles about object particular, can they reason about the physical interactions
solidity and to apply them even to objects they cannot see between multiple objects while the objects are out of sight?
(once the box is placed on the flat surface, the screen blocks After the drawbridge experiments, Baillargeon conducted
it from view): (1) the infants must understand that both the a second series of studies that is perhaps the most remark-
screen and the box are solid objects; (2) they must know able exploration to date of infants’ capacity for sophisti-
that both are rigid and do not change shape; (3) they must cated reasoning about concealed objects (Baillargeon, 1986;
expect that solid objects cannot pass through one another; Baillargeon & DeVos, 1991). In these studies, infants as
(4) they must assume that an object, even when it is out of young as 3 months watched a screen come down on a center
sight, will stay where it was last seen unless something is seen section of a scene where there were no objects. They then
to move it; and (5) they must assume that these properties watched a toy car roll down a ramp, continue on a marked
remain consistent over time. It appears that infants as young roadway, go behind the screen, and emerge from behind the
as 3½ months are simultaneously using five or more prin- screen and continue rolling until it rolled “offstage” on the
ciples to think about the objects around them and interre- same path (see Figure 5.13A). After these habituation trials,
lating these principles to make reliable, correct predictions. the infants observed one of two new events involving a third
As they get older, infants learn to apply these principles in object: a box or a small toy Mickey Mouse. In one condition,
more sophisticated ways. Thus, younger infants only notice the box was placed behind the path before the screen came
significant mismatches between the screen’s action and the down (see Figure 5.13B). In the other condition, the box was
box, whereas older infants can anticipate more subtle ways placed directly in the car’s path before the screen came down
in which the size of the box should stop the screen at a cer- (see Figure 5.13C). In both conditions, the infants saw the
tain angle (Baillargeon, 1995). car appear on the opposite side of the box at a time consistent
Before speculating on the details of how this knowledge with its previous speed of rolling.
might be represented and used, we need to explore in more Infants showed strong dishabituation only when the car
detail the abilities of infants to make inferences about possi- seemed to have “passed through” the block placed directly
ble and impossible interactions between physical objects. In in its path, an event that was physically impossible unless

A Habituation event

B Possible event

C Impossible event
FIGURE 5.13 Thinking about interactions between objects that are out of sight. (A) In the habitu-
ation event, a screen is placed in front of a track and then is raised to show that there is nothing behind it.
When a toy car is placed on the ramp, it rolls down the ramp and behind the screen until it emerges on the
other side of the screen. (B) In a possible event, a box is placed behind the track so that when a car is rolled
down the ramp, it is able to roll between the screen and the box and emerge on the other side of the screen.
(C) In an impossible event, a box is placed on top of the track, but it appears as if the car is still able to roll
to the other side of the screen. Yet even 3-month-old infants seem to understand that the car cannot pass
through a box that is on the track, and thus they dishabituate if it reappears on the opposite side of the
screen. They show much less dishabituation when the car reappears on the other side of the screen when
the box has been placed behind the path of the car. Adapted from Baillargeon (1986).

INFANT KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING 159

there was external intervention to move the block. A second
study showed that infants did not dishabituate longer when
the block was placed in front of the path, showing that the A Continuity B Solidity
effect was not simply caused when the block was closer. This
dishabituation response may involve even more assumptions Invisible
about objects’ interactions than the drawbridge studies; in force
addition to their assumptions about object solidity and
rigidity, infants appear to assume that an object traveling
C Contact D Gravity
in a straight line will continue unless something interrupts
it. Without this kind of assumption, they would not disha-
bituate so strongly, since the car could swerve around or hop
over the box and appear on the other side without violating
other assumptions about how objects interact. E Inertia
FIGURE 5.14 Intuitive physics. Depicted here are five principles
that govern the behavior of most physical objects: continuity, solidity
(cohesion), contact (“no action at a distance”), gravity, and inertia.
Q: In what ways do infants seem to reason The crossed-out drawing indicates a violation of the principle.
about the physical relations between unseen Adapted from Spelke (1991).
objects?
solidity. As an infant watches, a ball is held above a screen
and then dropped behind it. When the screen is raised,
Principles That Guide How Infants Understand Stud-
the infant sees one of several configurations. In the initial
ies of how infants understand object permanence and solid-
trials for habituation, the ball is resting on the lowest sur-
ity suggest that it might be possible to codify the principles
face. In the other two sets of trials, a new, higher surface is
that they use to think about physical objects, what some have
added to the display. When the screen is raised, the infant
called the “intuitive physics of the young infant.” Elizabeth
sees that the ball has either landed on the higher surface
Spelke has extensively investigated which key principles
(consistent with solidity and continuity) or underneath it
might guide infants’ understanding of objects’ interactions
(an impossible event that is inconsistent with solidity and
(Spelke, 1988a, 1988b, 1990, 1991). Spelke argues that young
continuity).
infants might use the five principles listed here to think
Spelke found that 4-month-old infants dishabituate more
about the physical world (see Figure 5.14):
strongly to the impossible event (measured in terms of looking
1. Continuity. Objects exist continuously and move on con- at it longer), which suggests that they are surprised by viola-
nected paths. They cannot jump from place to place tions of the principles of continuity and solidity. (To rule out
without occupying the intervening space. the possibility that infants looked longer at the ball resting in
2. Solidity. Physical objects are solid. Each object occupies a the impossible position simply because they preferred this dis-
unique part of space; objects cannot interpenetrate other play, the researchers also showed the infants the ball resting
objects because all their parts cohere. in both the possible and impossible positions in the display
3. Contact. Objects cannot influence other objects without without dropping it first—and they found no differences in
touching them; they must make contact; there is “no looking.) In extensive follow-up studies, Spelke and her col-
action at a distance.” leagues found that infants as young as 2½ months assume
4. Gravity. Unsupported objects will fall toward the ground. that objects will obey the continuity and solidity principles
5. Inertia. Objects do not change their motion abruptly unless and that infants apply these principles broadly, across many
they are acted on by another force. kinds of object configurations (Baillargeon, 2004; Spelke
et al., 1992).
Many of Spelke’s studies exploring how infants become
aware of these constraints involve an infant who watches
as an object moves out of view behind a screen. When the
screen is removed, the infant sees the object resting either
in a position consistent with the constraints on physical Q: What are five principles governing the
motion or in a position that violates one or more of those behavior of physical objects? Which ones do
constraints. Figure 5.15 shows how this technique has been infants seem to grasp first, and why?
used to explore infants’ assumptions about continuity and

160 CHAPTER 5 COMING TO UNDERSTAND THE PHYSICAL WORLD

 ciples that are extremely prevalent in the natural world, such
as gravity and inertia. They do, however, seem to have a very
early knowledge of the principles of continuity, cohesion
(solidity), and contact (“no action at a distance”). As a mne-
monic, it may be helpful to remember that young infants use
the three Cs to understand objects. Indeed, infants seem to
A Habituation event
be sensitive to these principles with little or no relevant expe-
rience. Why should infants’ understanding of some princi-
Possible event Impossible event ples, such as the three Cs, develop before others, like gravity
and inertia? One possibility is that the early-emerging prin-
ciples are more important to the young infant in anticipating
the behaviors of a wide range of objects. Alternatively, per-
or
haps inertia and gravity are best understood in a conceptual
framework that already includes concepts such as continu-
ity and solidity. This pattern fits with the hypothesis that
B Test events
earlier-emerging “core” beliefs may be more fixed and prede-
FIGURE 5.15 Testing principles pertaining to objects. (A) A termined components in the infant’s conceptual repertoire.
habituation event shows the ball dropped behind a screen and com- Other researchers have also questioned whether infants
ing to rest on a lower surface. (B) Test events show the ball being might be more proficient at using certain physical prin-
dropped behind the screen and either coming to rest on a higher sur- ciples, such as inertia, in their own actions than they are
face that has been added to the display, which is a possible event, or
coming to rest on the original lower surface, despite the addition of
while merely observing events. For example, infants who do
a higher surface above it, which is an impossible event. Spelke used not dishabituate to inertia-violating displays—such as when
this setup to explore whether infants dishabituated more to an impos- an object goes behind a barrier at one angle and emerges
sible event in which the ball would have had to pass through another at another—show patterns of reaching toward objects in
solid object, the higher surface. Adapted from Spelke et al. (1992). motion that clearly honor the principle of inertia (von Hof-
sten et al., 1998). Cognition linked to action may differ
from cognition linked only to observation (Goodale & Mil-
By contrast, infants develop assumptions about the ner, 1992). We saw in Chapter 4 that perception and action
gravity and inertia principles somewhat later. For example, are intimately linked in an infant’s attempts to learn about
4-month-olds do not seem to fully understand the gravita- the world. In this case of thinking about objects, cognition
tional relationship between a dropped object and a support- and action may also be linked.
ing surface that stops its fall. In some settings, 4-month-olds Finally, this pattern of results again raises challenges for
will not look longer at an object that stops moving in mid- the empiricist. By most accounts, the principles of inertia
air (an impossible event) than at an object that falls until and gravity are just as salient in the young infant’s life as
it touches a surface (a possible event). Although other stud- principles of solidity and continuity. If infants simply built
ies suggest that young infants may have some inklings of up associations through experience that eventually led to
the importance of gravity—the tendency for unsupported knowledge of physical laws, we would expect their under-
objects to fall downward (Baillargeon & Hanko-Summers, standing of different physical principles to develop at about
1990), these concepts are not sufficiently developed to make the same time. There are some common exceptions to the
fully accurate predictions (Kim & Spelke, 1992). Concepts later-developing principles of gravity and inertia, such as
of inertia—the tendency of objects to continue the same balloons that float and papers fluttering in the wind that
motion unless acted on by another force—also take longer change direction. But there are also exceptions to the
than the first several months to fully develop. There may be earlier-emerging beliefs: clouds and liquids appear to vio-
an early assumption that a moving object continues along late solidity, and shadows seem to violate both solidity and
the same path when unseen, as was found in Baillargeon’s continuity. The patterns that the young infant encounters
rolling car study, but if infants see a display indicating that do not seem to support learning about principles like solid-
a moving object must have abruptly changed direction ity and continuity any more strongly than learning about
while concealed behind a barrier, they will not look longer gravity and inertia.
at this violation of the inertia principle until they are about Even though the evidence doesn’t seem to support a strong
8 months old (Kim & Spelke, 1999). empiricist view, neither does it strongly support a strong nativ-
Clearly, young infants are not fully aware of all the princi- ist view in which a mature knowledge of physical objects and
ples governing physical objects’ interactions—not even prin- their behaviors is present at birth. It would be misleading to

INFANT KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING 161

suggest that the young infant thoroughly understands the In addition to thinking about the properties of solid
principles governing the physical world. Not only do some objects, young infants also start to understand the differ-
principles take longer for infants to understand; there are ences between solid objects and amorphous materials such
also extensive developmental changes to infants’ use of the as liquids. In one study, 5-month-old infants habituated to
earliest-emerging principles within the first year of life. For either a tilting glass in which the solid contents tilt as well
example, although quite young infants seem to understand or a glass in which the liquid contents stay horizontal as the
continuity and solidity in tasks that involve an object hidden glass tilts. Researchers then tested the infants’ responses to
behind a barrier, they take considerably longer to understand other manipulations of the materials, using their patterns of
the same principles in tasks that involve an object contained dishabituation to determine whether they thought they had
inside of another. Baillargeon proposes that while solidity been watching a solid or a liquid (Hespos et al., 2009). Those
and continuity may be foundational principles that develop who habituated to the liquid version dishabituated when the
very early, it may take many months to learn how to apply contents were emptied out and behaved like a solid block.
those principles to different kinds of events, such as objects On the other hand, those who habituated to the solid ver-
containing or covering one another (Baillargeon, 2004). sion dishabituated when the contents were then poured out
One way of thinking about the developmental changes like a liquid (see Figure 5.17). Taking these findings together
is in terms of the principle of persistence, which states that with the other studies of solid object perception, it is possible
objects do not change without a cause (Wang & Baillar- that infants first master the properties of solid objects by as
geon, 2008). From a very early age, infants seem to assume early as 2 months, but then take somewhat longer to start to
that objects cannot (on their own) appear or disappear, understand the distinguishing properties of nonsolids.
break apart or assemble, or change their size, shape, or
color spontaneously. For infants to be able to detect such Comparative Considerations When we study infants, it
impossible changes, they would have to be able to mentally is natural to interpret much of their behavior by attributing
represent the object’s properties and remember them, abili- to them adult-like beliefs and goals. Yet, as the kingfisher
ties that develop considerably during the first year of life. example showed, sophisticated behavior does not always
Figure 5.16 shows two simple events that a 2½-month-old require complex beliefs or knowledge. The experimental
can detect as impossible because they violate the principle of tasks investigating infants’ reasoning about unseen objects
persistence (Wang & Baillargeon, 2008). As the configura- seem to require sophisticated cognitions that we think of
tions of objects’ properties and their changes become more as human. But before we can make such statements with
complex, however, even 12-month-olds fail to detect some any confidence, we need to consider whether other species
violations of the principle. behave similarly (Weiss & Santos, 2006). If other species

FIGURE 5.16 Early understanding of object properties. (A) A hand raises a cover to reveal a duck
and then lowers the cover over the duck and slides it to the right. When the cover is lifted on the right, the
duck has magically disappeared. (B) After lifting a cover to reveal a duck and then lowering the cover over
the duck, a hand slides the duck behind a screen that is taller than the duck, lifts the cover when it is behind
the screen (presumably leaving the duck behind), and then slides the cover out from behind the screen.
When the cover is lifted, a duck has magically appeared. Infants as young as 2½ months are surprised at
both event outcomes because of their assumptions about how objects interact with other objects. In particu-
lar, these event outcomes violate the principle of persistence. Adapted from Wang & Baillargeon (2008).

162 CHAPTER 5 COMING TO UNDERSTAND THE PHYSICAL WORLD

 Habituation to Liquid Habituation to Solid FIGURE 5.17 Properties of solids and
liquids. Five-month-old infants who habituate
to a substance as a liquid that stays horizontal
dishabituate when it comes out of the glass as
a solid. Conversely, those who habituate to a
substance as a solid that tilts with its container
dishabituate when it comes out as a liquid.
From Hespos et al. (2009).
Test trials
Solid

Liquid

act in the same ways on hidden objects, then we may need understand invisible displacements. Although the basis
to deflate the level of cognitive sophistication that we attri- for this difference has yet to be fully explained, primates
bute to human infants. We do not yet have a thorough, sys- may share a particular way of encoding and remembering
tematic comparison of how primates and other mammals actions that differs from the way other species encode and
perform on all the tasks previously used to assess reasoning remember actions and which, early on, causes the A-not-B
about physical objects in young human infants, but some error. Another factor that may differ across species is the
researchers have done comparative studies of related tasks. influence of intentional communication (see p. 156). While
Their results are critical to understanding what sorts of many great apes, such as gorillas and chimpanzees, are able
beliefs about the physical world guide infants’ behaviors— to understand when others direct their attention to an object
and if they should even be thought of as beliefs at all. (Pitman & Shumaker, 2009), humans may be the only spe-
Consider the A-not-B task, which requires an under- cies with a well-developed sense of when another person is
standing of object permanence. It turns out that a wide explicitly demonstrating an action (Gergely, 2011). That is,
range of species can find the hidden object in the A-not-B when a person demonstrates an action to a human infant,
task, and some, such as dogs and cats, never commit the the infant may automatically encode the action as some-
A-not-B error. Figure 5.18 shows the age at which different thing important that the other person wants to teach. That
species first pass the A-not-B task, as well as the age at which interpretation may cause human infants to fail the A-not-
gorillas and humans pass the invisible displacements (“shell B task more often than other primates, despite being their
game”) task (the other species never pass it). All the primates cognitive equals or superiors in other respects.
initially fail the A-not-B task but then later pass it. In con- Moreover, when we consider tasks like Baillargeon’s and
trast, dogs and cats always pass the A-not-B task but never Spelke’s for assessing knowledge of solidity, it seems that

Pass invisible
displacements task Gorilla
Macaque Human FIGURE 5.18 The object concept across species. Most primates
Dog
Pass A-not-B task fail the A-not-B task in early infancy and then pass it later. Members
of the ape family also later come to pass the invisible displacements
task. Dogs, cats, and some other animals always pass the A-not-B
Fail A-not-B task
task and never pass the invisible displacements task. These results
suggest that dogs, cats, and other nonprimate animals may be solv-
ing the A-not-B task in ways that don’t create a foundation for being
4 8 12 16 able to later solve the invisible displacements task. Adapted from
Age (in months) Gomez (2005).

INFANT KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING 163

organisms quite distant from primates can take solidity think that infants’ responses in these experiments are based
into account. Consider, for example, a task devised for dogs on conscious, explicit, adult-like beliefs about objects.
that resembles Baillargeon’s rolling car studies and Spelke’s The ability to reason about unseen events may be an
dropped ball studies mentioned earlier. Dogs watched a important distinction between humans (and perhaps a few
treat slide down a transparent tube and then were allowed apes) and other animals. A monkey who passes the A-not-B
to retrieve it from one of two doors (Kundey et al., 2010). task shows that it can think about an unseen object, but this
In one condition, a highly visible wall was inserted between task does not involve thinking about a dynamic event, such
the two doors (see Figure 5.19). In the other condition, there as two objects interacting. Even the invisible displacements
was no wall. Dogs of many breeds and mixes seemed to be task, which only humans and a few apes can pass, involves
aware of solidity, searching for the treat in the “near door” the simplest possible event: one object moving. By contrast,
when they could see the wall was present, but searching in Spelke, Baillargeon, and other infant cognition researchers
the “far door” when there was no wall. This study illustrates study events that involve reasoning about two objects’ inter-
that some aspects of the baby’s understanding of physical actions while both are out of view. Very few studies have
objects, such as solidity, may have quite ancient evolution- explored nonhumans’ performance on such tasks, and only
ary roots, since humans’ common ancestor with dogs is systematic studies comparing several species will help clar-
evolutionarily much older than humans’ common ances- ify whether human infants have a uniquely sophisticated
tor with primates. It also shows that nonprimates can solve capacity to think about the physical world. Given that only
solidity problems that are clearly different from those they humans and the great apes (chimpanzees, bonobos, goril-
would encounter in their natural environments, suggesting las, and orangutans) can follow invisible displacements,
a quite general appreciation of solidity. including some intricate ones (Albiach-Serrano et al., 2010),
Research with nonhuman primates, as well as with some some aspects of reasoning about objects’ motions while out
nonprimates, suggests that many species have some sense of of sight may require certain higher-order cognitive abili-
the solidity and continuity of novel objects as well as some ties. Nonetheless, much of the object concept seems to fall
competence at object permanence tasks (Deppe et al., 2009; within the abilities of a broader range of species.
Gomez, 2005; Hall-Haro et al., 2008; Neiworth et al.,
2003; Santos, 2004). They seem able to make inferences
about the properties of objects that are out of sight, which Q: How has comparative work with other
take them far beyond the ways that much simpler organ- species changed our views of the human infant’s
isms, such as insects, avoid collisions with objects or land on developing object concept?
solid surfaces. Given that several of the species that manage
to use these principles have brains of very modest size and
complexity, we must be cautious about interpreting simi-
lar behavior in human infants as evidence of rich, sophisti-
cated cognition. Further studies may demonstrate that the Understanding Causation
nuances of human infant responses are evidence of sophis- When infants react to “impossible” physical events with dis-
ticated thinking. But without that evidence, it is risky to habituation, it is difficult not to assume that they are reason-

A Wall trial B No wall trial

FIGURE 5.19 Dogs and object solidity. In a task with striking similarities to the studies assessing concepts of solidity in human infants, dogs
from a wide range of breeds preferred the “near” door when the wall was inserted (A) and the “far” door when it was not (B). Success on such
tasks by nonprimates suggests that human-like cognitive abilities may not be required to solve such tasks. Adapted from Kundey et al. (2010).

164 CHAPTER 5 COMING TO UNDERSTAND THE PHYSICAL WORLD

ing about what they have seen in terms of cause and effect.
We see them as being surprised that their causal expecta-
tions have been violated. If we, as adults, put ourselves in A
their shoes, we explain the problems with the impossible R G R G
events in causal terms. The drawbridge should have stopped
because the box would have prevented it from swinging all
B
the way. The car could not have rolled all the way down the
path because it would have had to pass through the block. FIGURE 5.20 Perception of causality by 7-month-olds.
(A) The red block seems to push the green block on some trials,
Our understanding of everyday objects is saturated with
and the green block seems to push the red block on other trials.
causal thinking. (B) The same block changes color, first from red to green, then from
As we have seen, infant responses to events that seem green to red. Adapted from Leslie (1984).
to violate physical laws strongly suggest that infants, too,
are thinking in terms of causal relations. Nonetheless, to
investigate infants’ understanding of cause and effect in the green block to move to one in which the green block
its own right, it is helpful to examine studies that directly “caused” the red block to move. Does this dishabituation
address this centuries-old issue. Some have argued that mean that they understand that the two events are show-
causal ideas are as crucial for infants as for adults and that ing different causal relationships? On its own, it does not.
causality is a primitive conceptual building block that the Infants could simply be habituating to something like “red
infant needs from the first moments of awareness (Fodor, event” then “green event” and dishabituating when their order
1981). Others have maintained that an understanding was reversed.
of causality can develop only gradually through learn- Another pair of conditions examined whether the infants
ing from experience, either from repeated association of were making causal interpretations rather than just temporal
events that regularly occur together over time and space associations. These conditions used two films, each showing
(Hume, 1748/1910) or through active experience initially only one block that traveled at the same speed as the blocks
produced by the infant’s own actions (Piaget, 1955). in the first films. This time the block changed its color at
One line of work tried to distinguish whether infants the same time and place where one block previously seemed
who observed simple events actually understood the causal to push the other (see Figure 5.20B). As before, the films
relationship between them or whether they were merely then showed the same actions reversed. In one, a red block
noticing and remembering how often the two events changed into a green block, and in the other, a green block
(such as movement of a green object and movement of a became a red block. This second pair of films was used to test
red object) co-occurred in space and time—referred to whether the infants would regard the mere change of color
as spatial contiguity and temporal contiguity (Leslie, 1982, as an apparent case of physical causation. If they were merely
1984). The researchers set up experiments to investigate encoding “red event” followed by “green event,” they might
whether infants actually encoded that one event caused dishabituate just as strongly when the order of these events
the other, such as movement of one object launching the was reversed. In fact, they showed much less dishabituation
other’s movement through a collision. For example, in one between the two single-block color change films than they
set of studies, infants watched a film of events like those in did between the two films of two-block “launches,” where
Figure 5.20A, depicting movement of a green block and a one block seemed to collide with the other block, appar-
red block. In one condition, they saw the red block move ently causing it to move. They showed much more aware-
across the screen until it stopped next to the green block, ness when the order of cause-and-effect relations changed in
at which point the green block started moving. In another the “launching” films, and found a mere shift in the order
condition, the direction of movement was reversed: the of color changes much less surprising. Several other follow-
green block moved first, and when it stopped next to the up experiments helped to rule out other interpretations and
red block, the red block began to move. To adults, the first strongly indicate that 7-month-olds see causation that goes
condition would convey the impression that the red block beyond mere temporal and spatial contiguity (Leslie, 1984;
caused the green block to move, while the second condition Leslie & Keeble, 1987).
would suggest that the green block caused the red block’s It is difficult to tell whether younger infants think in
movement. These events were exactly the same except for terms of causality or whether they merely react to causal pat-
the direction of movement and the order of the two blocks’ terns without explicitly coding one event as causing another
movement. To notice that the two events are different, an (Carey, 2009; Goodman et al., 2011; White, 2009). Some
infant would have to notice at least one of these features. researchers argue that infants need to learn the notion of cau-
Seven-month-old infants showed clear dishabituation when sality in their first several months of life (Cohen & Amsel,
the event shifted from one in which the red block “caused” 1998; Cohen & Oakes, 1993; Haith & Benson, 1998).

INFANT KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING 165

According to this view, the notion of causality gradually ferent. In our culture, we count ages, minutes, days, years,
emerges out of noticing spatial and temporal contingencies. money, and just about everything else of importance that
Those contingencies might be made especially salient by can be quantified. Is this tendency specific to technologi-
the infant’s own actions. Indeed, one study found that hav- cally advanced cultures, or is it a universal aspect of human
ing 4½-month-old infants wear sticky Velcro mittens that nature? If number concepts are universally used across all
enabled them to pick up balls gave them experience with cultures, that universality raises the question of whether such
causal action. These infants later dishabituated to reversed concepts are present in the young infant’s mind. Although
causal events (that is, events in which the agent and recipient universal concepts are not necessarily present in infancy—
of an action were reversed from what the infants had previ- they can arise from culturally universal experiences, such as
ously observed) 1½ months earlier than infants who were the experience of going through puberty or being elderly—a
not supplied with such mittens. This result was argued to concept’s universality leads us to consider whether it might
support the claim that causality is learned through actions have very early developmental origins.
that facilitate attention to and encoding of relevant parts of Older accounts of number concepts claimed that children
physical events (Rakison & Krogh, 2012; see also Libertus & and “primitive” peoples could not think about number con-
Needham, 2010, as described in Chapter 4). ceptually and could only think about differences in quantity
An alternative view argues that there is a primitive per- using configurations of objects (knowing, for example, that a
ceptually driven way of detecting some forms of causality group of three objects usually forms a triangle). More recently,
that does not need to be learned or built up through experi- however, researchers have found that every culture that is
ence. In this view, infants may come into the world with a carefully studied does use number concepts (Lave, 1977; Pica
mental “module” that directly responds to certain percep- et al., 2004; Saxe & Posner, 1983; Zaslavsky, 1973). More-
tual sequences with an impression of causation (Scholl & over, even other species show increasingly clear evidence of
Nakayama, 2002, 2004; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000). The numerical competence, suggesting that number concepts do
idea of a module refers to an innate biological structure that not depend on humans’ language skills and the ability to use
responds automatically to specific inputs (Fodor, 1983). If number words (Gallistel, 1990). The developmental question,
this second view is correct—if impressions of simple physi- then, is how these universal number concepts emerge. Are
cal causality are the output of a module—then we should be young infants predisposed to understand number concepts?
able to see awareness of causality even in very young infants. Several studies strongly suggest that they might be.
In this view, infants may come into the world with a module We have seen that developmental psychologists have a
that responds automatically to certain perceptual configu- relatively limited set of ways of studying infants’ mental
rations, such as collisions, with a sense of causation. It may states, most of which revolve around habituation/disha-
still take many months, however, for infants to be able to bituation paradigms. This limitation poses a challenge
think about cause conceptually in situations that are not when it comes to exploring whether infants show numeri-
like those perceptual cases. cal competency. The most successful technique involves
One piece of evidence for a module that detects physical habituating an infant to a small number of stimuli, such
causality comes from studies showing that 7-month-old as three, and then seeing if he dishabituates when he is
infants see physical causality under almost exactly the same exposed to a different number of stimuli. The difficulty is
perceptual conditions as adults (Newman et al., 2008a). to control all the other variables that could influence the
The temporal and spatial relations that convey a sense that infant’s response. For example, a visual display of three
one object has launched another (as opposed to their move- objects normally forms a larger, more complex visual pat-
ments being causally unrelated) are so similar and unre- tern than a display of two objects. As a result, many kinds
lated to actual experience observing such launchings that of perceptual contrasts between the displays, including
it is very hard to see how they could be learned. Yet, even their different contours or configurations or the differ-
if there is a core module for perceiving physical causal- ing amounts of visual space they take up, could cause the
ity under certain simple collision conditions, it may take infant to dishabituate. If an infant who has habituated to
months or years before all the forms of perceptual and con- a display of three objects shows renewed interest when he
ceptual causality are easily understood by young children. sees a display of two, any of these perceptual factors, rather
than a conceptual awareness of the difference in number,
could be the reason. In early experiments, when research-
ers attempted to control for these perceptual influences,
The Use of Number their results suggested that infants were sensing number
The infant’s ability to appreciate physical causality is impres- (Antell & Keating, 1983; Starkey & Cooper, 1980). None-
sive, and it seems to relate to specific patterns in the world. theless, concerns remained about whether the infants were
The ability to think about number, however, seems quite dif- truly aware of abstract numerical differences as opposed

166 CHAPTER 5 COMING TO UNDERSTAND THE PHYSICAL WORLD

to perceptual contrasts, such as the geometric patterns be held in memory apart from the actual stimuli. Research-
formed by specific numbers of objects. ers habituated infants to visual displays of either two or
One way that researchers attempted to determine three objects; then, after turning off the visual display, they
whether the infants’ responses were based more on numeri- played a stream of randomly ordered two- and three-beat
cal concepts or perceptual contrasts was to see whether they drum sequences. Infants as young as 6 months looked lon-
would dishabituate to differences in number even when ger at the source of the sounds when the number of drum-
these differences depended on widely varying perceptual beats matched the number of objects to which they had just
experiences, such as sights and sounds presented in a cross- been visually habituated (Starkey et al., 1983, 1990). This
modal (across two sense modalities) study (Starkey et al., effect has been found repeatedly using a variety of methods
1990). In one study, infants viewed two displays side by (Jordan & Brannon, 2006; Kobayashi et al., 2005).
side, one showing two objects and the other showing three It is useful to try to understand what these experiments
objects (see Figure 5.21). At the same time, a speaker hid- reveal about infants’ subjective experiences. It appears that
den between the displays repeatedly played sets of either even infants experience a world in which number is an
two or three drumbeats. In this paradigm, the researcher important and meaningful concept and that they may do
presented the visual and auditory patterns simultaneously so in some cases right from birth. They appear to be aware
to determine whether infants would match the number of of abstract quantities and to be able to recognize simi-
individual elements across the two sense modalities. Infants larities in “three-ness” or “two-ness” between stimuli that
as young as 6 months reliably looked longer at the display differ in virtually every other respect. Moreover, the experi-
showing the number of objects that matched the simultane- ments that presented visual and auditory stimuli separately
ously presented drumbeats (Starkey et al., 1990). The effect suggest that infants can remember these number concepts
can even be found in newborn infants, who can recognize and use them across modalities. The infants seemed to
differences between such numbers as 4 and 12, as depicted know that “three-ness” was repeatedly being presented in
by discrete sounds and visual dots (Izard et al., 2009). the visual display, they habituated accordingly, and then
Other studies examined whether infants would show they showed a renewed interest when they recognized that
such cross-modal number concepts if the sounds and sights familiar number in the drumbeats. Infants have also rec-
were not presented together. These studies therefore asked ognized number in similar cross-modal studies involving
if a representation of number could emerge from a stimu- touch and vision (Feron et al., 2002), further demonstrat-
lus set, be held in mind when the stimulus was removed, ing that their notion of number transcends any particular
and then be applied to a new stimulus set in a different modality.
modality. This would mean that a number concept could These studies on infant number concepts are only the
beginning of our understanding of the early roots of the
number concept in infancy. Major questions remain unan-
swered, especially those concerning what, if anything,
Boom infants do with this ability to infer number from the physi-
Boom Boom
cal world. Do they use it, as other animals apparently do,
to guide their actions even in infancy? Other animals use
number to keep track of their young or of caches of food,
yet comparable behaviors in infants are not obvious. Alter-
natively, is it simply a necessary building block in the later-
developing structure of mathematical knowledge? No matter
how (or whether) it is used from the start, even very young
infants appear to have some abstract concept of number.

Q: What is the evidence that infants less than

6 months of age have a concept of number?
FIGURE 5.21 Intermodal sensing of number. When 6-month-old
infants hear three bursts of sound (for example, a sequence of
three drumbeats) from a speaker hidden between two photographic
One use of early number concepts may be to support
displays—one showing two objects and the other showing three a crude form of arithmetic. Indeed, infants can use their
objects—they typically look toward the display of three objects, concept of number to understand changes in quantity, even
which matches what they have heard. doing simple subtraction and addition. In a seminal series of

INFANT KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING 167

studies, 5-month-old infants were habituated to a toy mouse Uller et al., 1999). But she may simply be comparing the
placed on a stage (Wynn, 1992). A screen then blocked set of objects she remembers with the set of objects she sees
the mouse, and the infant watched the experimenter take and noticing the mismatch. This process would not require
another, identical toy mouse and move it behind the screen. any specific numerical concepts or operations such as addi-
When the screen was removed, the infant saw either one or tion and subtraction. Other studies, however, suggest that
two mice on the stage (see Figure 5.22). In this “addition” infants can add and subtract with displays of numbers that
test, infants looked longer when they saw only one mouse are too large for the number of objects that infants can
on the stage, despite the fact that they had just been habitu- normally represent in their minds (McCrink & Wynn,
ated to a single mouse, since this violated their expectation 2004). Moreover, infants can add and subtract number
of what the outcome should be after another mouse was of events, which are not tracked by remembering specific
added behind the screen. In another version of the experi- objects (Wynn, 1996). Thus, while object representations
ment, the display started with two toy mice. The screen may be used on some occasions to guide inferences about
then concealed them, and the infant saw a hand emerge addition and subtraction, they cannot be the sole basis for
and remove one mouse from behind the screen. When the such abilities.
screen was lifted, the infants looked longer when the display Hence, it seems that numerical abilities, including some
showed two mice, because it violated the perceived “subtrac- basic arithmetic operations, may be present very early in
tion.” These results have been replicated by other scientists life, long before the infant acquires language. This preverbal
in studies that rule out possible perceptual and conceptual ability raises questions about the use of number concepts in
confounds (Simon et al., 1995; Slater et al., 2010). other species. It was traditionally assumed that other spe-
The meaning of these findings, which seem to show cies did not understand number in the sense of different
“subtraction” and “addition” by infants, has been actively quantities of countable objects, but these assumptions have
debated. Do the infants’ responses indicate an ability to since been challenged (Gallistel, 1990). One of the most
manipulate numbers, or could infants be “solving” the task dramatic demonstrations of numerical competence in other
on other grounds? One proposal suggests that infants are species involved testing monkeys in replications of the stud-
simply remembering the individual objects they have seen. ies involving adding or taking away objects. It now seems
When the set of objects an infant remembers doesn’t match clear that not just the great apes, but a variety of monkeys
the set of objects she perceives, she will appear surprised not only are aware of number but also have some notion of
and look as if she had arrived at an expected result using subtraction and addition (Flombaum et al., 2005; Hauser
addition or subtraction (Feigenson et al., 2002a, 2002b; et al., 1996; Mahajan et al., 2009). Even pigeons seem

Sequence of events 1 + 1 = 1 or 2
1. Object placed on stage 2. Screen comes up 3. Second object added 4. Hand leaves empty

Possible outcome Impossible outcome

5. Screen drops 6. Screen drops
revealing 2 objects revealing 1 object

FIGURE 5.22 Addition in infants. A toy mouse is placed on a stage. The mouse is then blocked by a screen, and a second toy mouse is
placed behind the screen. The screen drops to reveal either one or two toy mice. Five-month-old infants dishabituated when they saw just one
mouse display but not when they saw two mice. Adapted from Wynn (1992).

168 CHAPTER 5 COMING TO UNDERSTAND THE PHYSICAL WORLD

to engage in simple forms of subtraction (Brannon et al., largely independently of each other. Over time, and pos-
2001), as do newborn chicks (Rugani et al., 2009). sibly through language-based processes, these components
become integrated and help create a more unified sense of
number and arithmetic, although carefully designed tasks
Q: In what sense do infants have the ability to can reveal developmental vestiges of these distinct compo-
add and subtract? nents (Dehaene, 2009).

Number awareness and mathematical skills in infants Q: How is the preverbal infant’s numerical
may not all arise from the same cognitive ability. There
is growing evidence that numerical abilities depend on
ability different from that of a 5-year-old? How
several distinct cognitive systems. One striking finding does comparative research across species shed
along these lines is that the ability to estimate differences light on this question?
in quantity involves separate areas of the brain from the
areas of the brain involved in the ability to perform numer-
ical calculations. In particular, estimation heavily involves
the parietal regions of the brain, while calculations involve
more frontal regions as well as areas that are also associ- Spatial Knowledge in Infants
ated with language abilities (Cohen et al., 2000; Dehaene, Throughout this book, we have seen that infants are more
2009; Stanescu-Cosson et al., 2000). Different regions likely to be proficient at skills that are needed early on.
may be responsible for these abilities because the parietal These skills include perceiving depth, perceiving faces, cat-
regions emerged earlier in the course of evolution than the egorizing color, and tracking quantities. Another central
frontal regions, so that the abilities associated with earlier- skill involves knowing where one is. This ability requires
emerging regions may be more common across species and creating mental maps of different environments, retain-
more developmentally primitive. Thus, the estimation abil- ing them outside those environments, and being able to
ity is thought to be evolutionarily very old, early to develop use those maps later to find one’s way or to find an object.
in the infant, and common to many species, whereas the Spatial knowledge involves spatial representation—that is,
calculation ability is possibly specific to humans, later to knowing where objects are in relation to other objects or to
develop, and dependent on language (Cohen et al., 2000; the self and knowing where landmarks are so as to be able
Dehaene, 2009; Dehaene et al., 2004; Stanescu-Cosson to find objects or to navigate from one place to another. For
et al., 2000). Considerable debate remains on just how spatial knowledge to be used successfully, spatial represen-
important language is to the emergence of numerical skills tations must be abstract and flexible, going beyond simple
(Brannon, 2005; Carey, 2001; Gelman & Butterworth, storage of past action patterns.
2005; Wynn et al., 2002; Xu et al., 2005b). The ability to use spatial knowledge might seem too com-
In addition to an early estimation system, there is also plex and sophisticated for infants, and indeed a number of
evidence for an early-emerging system for processing dis- early researchers, including Piaget, proposed that children
crete small numbers. When infants compare amounts such younger than about 1 year had no such abilities. Nevertheless,
as two versus four, they may be using a distinct cognitive Piaget acknowledged that children younger than 2 could suc-
ability arising from a different brain region from that used ceed at some spatial tasks. But recall that in his view, infants’
for estimation. When electrical signals known as event- spatial skills were based entirely on sensorimotor knowledge,
related potentials (ERPs) are measured on 6-month-old which could only be used in motor schemes for performing
infants’ scalps, distinct electrical patterns suggest that large- simple actions (Piaget, 1952b, 1954; Piaget & Inhelder, 1967).
number estimations occur in different regions of the cortex One way to understand the limitations that Piaget attributed
from those associated with small-number operations such as to infants revolves around how infants encode objects in rela-
addition and subtraction (Hyde & Spelke, 2011). This more tion to themselves and to other objects.
primitive addition and subtraction ability, possibly one that Spatial relations can be encoded egocentrically or allo-
involves mentally representing objects, does not involve lan- centrically. An egocentric representation simply notes
guage and may be shared with other species. where things are relative to one’s own body. A baby might
As one leading researcher in the field put it, “Our arith- remember that a chair last appeared on her right. An allo-
metic intuition consists of a complex web of knowledge” centric representation notes where things are relative to
(Dehaene, 2009, p. 254). Several distinct components to other landmarks in the world. You might remember that
this intuition are present well before the first year of life and a chair was just below the right-hand corner of a window.
before the emergence of language, and they may function Egocentric representations might seem simpler, but they are

INFANT KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING 169

not reliable if the observer moves or turns her body. Perhaps between the tasks on which they respond egocentrically and
young infants, who mostly sit still, can only encode spatial the A-not-B task (Acredolo, 1990; Kaufman & Needham,
relations egocentrically until they have had ample experi- 2011; Twyman & Newcombe, 2010). Remember that one
ence in freely getting around on their own in the world. explanation of the A-not-B error is that infants tend to get
Some early studies suggested that infants younger than “stuck” repeating the same retrieval action that they have
1 year are primarily egocentric, a finding that would be com- performed several times before, even when they know that
patible with Piaget’s theory that infants tend to encode the the object is located elsewhere. In a similar way, some of the
world in terms of sensorimotor representations (Acredolo, 1978, tasks that assess infants’ representations of where objects are
1990; Acredolo & Evans, 1980). But other evidence indicates located train them to repeatedly turn their head to one side
that even fairly young infants may have considerably more to look at an interesting sight. When the infants are then
objective ways of representing spatial layout. By age 6 months, rotated in the same setting, they may have difficulty sup-
infants can keep track of changes in their own body position pressing that earlier action, even if they don’t really expect
while making judgments about where objects are, even in fea- the interesting sight to be there. Of course, it is possible that
tureless round environments (Tyler & McKenzie, 1990). They infants’ repeated actions are linked to their sense that the
also seem to be able to track some geometric properties of their event or object really is where they are looking, but other
environment (for example, shapes and angles in the environ- evidence clearly indicates that they can also represent loca-
ment) and to use the angles as well as distances from land- tions allocentrically. Thus, infants may have a single allocen-
marks to locate objects (Newcombe et al., 1998, 2005). One tric spatial representation that does not always correspond
experimental technique involves hiding an object in a sandbox. to their physical response bias, or they may have competing
The experimenter then retrieves it, either from the location allocentric and egocentric spatial representations. Careful
where it disappeared or from a novel location. Infants as young studies will be required to tease apart these two alternatives.
as 5 months look longer when the object reappears in a new When young infants represent locations in an allocentric
location (Newcombe et al., 1999, 2005). The infants’ surprise manner, what cues are they using? Among the distinct types
when the object reappears in a novel location can then be used of cues that infants could use, three especially prominent
to test whether their perceptions are egocentric or allocentric. ones are beacons, landmarks, and the geometric shape of
To determine whether infants are using egocentric or their environment. Using beacons seems to be the simplest
allocentric representation to locate an object, experimenters technique, which simply involves noticing that an object is
habituated infants to a scene and then moved the infants to located directly under or right next to another salient and
new locations or moved the object and observed where the presumably permanent object (the beacon). Using land-
infants expected the object to be. In one study, 4½-month- marks involves somewhat more relational representations; it
olds habituated to a pig puppet rotating in a wooden cage involves being able to use distance and direction from salient
on one side of a table (Kaufman & Needham, 2011). The objects (the landmarks) to determine where another object
infant’s view of the table was then blocked with a screen while is located, such as knowing that an object is located halfway
the infant was moved, either to another side of the table or between two landmarks. Thus, an infant might notice that
around the table and back to his original position. While the a toy is halfway between a chair and a television. Finally,
infant’s view of the table was screened off, the puppet and using geometric cues involves noticing that the environment
cage were left in the same place or moved to a new position, has a particular shape—say, that it is an L-shaped room and
diagonal to its original location. (In its new location, it was in that the object is located at the inner corner of the L.
the same position relative to the infant who had been moved It might seem that infants should first use beacons, then
to the other side of the table.) The key question was whether landmarks, then finally geometric cues, following our intu-
the infant would look longer at the puppet when it occupied itions about the cues’ complexity. But this conjecture should
its same location but stood in a new position relative to the be tempered by the wealth of animal studies showing that
infant himself, or whether the infant would be more surprised an enormous variety of species use all three kinds of cues,
to find the puppet in a new location but occupying a constant sometimes without any apparent experience. Birds, rats,
position relative to his own body. In fact, the infants tended fish, and ants can, in some circumstances, use beacons
to look longer when the puppet changed its real, or allocen- and landmarks to find desired objects (Gray et al., 2005;
tric, location rather than when it changed its position relative Vallortigara et al., 2009), and they can also use geomet-
to themselves, or their egocentric location. ric information (Brown et al., 2007; Cheng & Newcombe,
The finding that infants are capable of allocentric spatial 2005; Sovrano et al., 2007; Tommasi et al., 2012; Wall
representations well before age 6 months still leaves unan- et al., 2004; Wystrach & Beugnon, 2009). In addition, some
swered the question of why much older infants respond ego- species reared in environments that lack unique geometric
centrically in some tasks. The answer may lie in similarities cues (for example, fish in a circular tank) will nonetheless

170 CHAPTER 5 COMING TO UNDERSTAND THE PHYSICAL WORLD

use geometric information the first time they encounter it Categorization in Infants
(for example, fish in a new rectangular tank) (Brown et al.,
2007; Lee & Spelke, 2010). Thus, in at least some cases, the In earlier chapters, we saw that infants categorically per-
type of allocentric representation that seems most complex ceive color, speech, and possibly other kinds of stimuli, but
also seems to emerge without any prior experience. such behavior is only the beginning of categorization. Going
Indeed, for animals and older children, geometric cues beyond perceptual categorization, infants also categorize
often trump landmark or beacon information when these objects, events, animals, and people—grouping them into
cues are in conflict (Lee & Spelke, 2010; Spelke et al., classes based on shared features and later into classes based
2010). There is no clear consensus on whether young chil- on shared functions or meaning. These more conceptual
dren similarly prioritize geometric representations, let alone categories are internally processed by mental representations
whether young infants do (Cheng, 2008; Twyman & New- that are typically called “concepts” of those categories or
combe, 2010). Still, most researchers agree that infants seem of the objects that make up those categories. They enable
to have access to all three allocentric representations by 6 an infant to both appreciate the category as a whole and to
months, and what may change with development is which distinguish or individuate members within that category.
ones serve as the default systems in specific contexts. Consider the mental representations involved in learning the
The simplest ways of measuring spatial knowledge, via categories “dog,” “friend,” or “truck,” much less “Pokémon.”
locomotion, are difficult to use with babies, since they are so How do infants come to understand categories of things that
relatively immobile. But once a child can walk, the measures go beyond immediate perception (see Figure 5.23)?
are easier and the evidence can be convincing. For example, The empiricists have a straightforward answer to this
although young children often get lost in strange places, question: infants learn these categories by being exposed to
they also show surprisingly impressive levels of performance. many examples of objects and discovering the objects’ shared
When one of our sons was barely a year old, he surprised us properties through experience. As infants see more and more
by very purposefully navigating a novel path through an dogs, they will notice the features that these animals typi-
unfamiliar shopping mall to return to a pet store that had cally share, such as fur, barking, and particular body shapes.
fascinated him when we passed it a short while before. We Over the course of many learning experiences, these com-
had initially rushed our son past the pet store, and after car- mon properties come to stand for the category of “dog” and
rying him through several turns, we had arrived at an ice enable children to recognize new dogs. In the empiricists’
cream shop in the mall. Upon being set down, he ignored view, this learning process consists of strengthening the
the usually irresistible ice cream and immediately set off on associations between certain categories and their properties
a path for the pet store. We followed him in fascination as through repeated experiences in which they occur together.
he wove through the crowds, taking a different path from By contrast, nativists hold that infants have predetermined
the one on which he had been carried, until more than 100
yards later, he ended up with his face pressed against the
window of the pet store. Considering that he had been walk-
ing for only a few weeks and that the mall was crowded with
adults who frequently obscured his view, this navigational
skill was extraordinary—and unlikely to have just emerged
in his first few weeks of walking. Exactly how it developed,
however, remains mostly unknown, a mystery for clever and
creative future research. Infants may be endowed with an
ability to use beacons, landmarks, and geometry, but with
limitations on each and interference between them, as well
as intrusions from egocentric responding, it may take sev-
eral years after infancy to fully integrate all these cues into
one coherent navigation system.
FIGURE 5.23 Categorization in infancy. When a 1-year-old
plays with a truck, what sort of categorization is also at work?
Q: Describe three different ways of knowing Does the infant realize that the truck is a kind of vehicle that is made
by people? How is the 1-year-old’s categorization different from
one’s location in space. How are those different that of a 9-month-old or a 2-year-old? Researchers hold various
sorts of information used in development? views of infant categorization and of the influence of language on
categorization.

INFANT KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING 171

 NEW DIRECTION S IN DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH

Advances in Infant Eye-Tracking Methods

F
or many years, researchers have been measuring eye suggestions about what he is thinking. Eye-tracking evidence
gaze as a means of making inferences about infant suggests that when infants as young as 4 months old watch an
perception and cognition (Salapatek & Kessen, 1966). object move for a few seconds, then disappear behind a screen,
Major changes in the technology of tracking eye move- they actually visualize the unseen object moving behind the
ments have provided important new ways of conducting such screen, as shown by their anticipatory eye movements toward
studies with infants (Aslin & McMurray, 2004). Sophisticated where the object will reemerge (von Hofsten et al., 2007). Sub-
eye tracking has been performed on adults for quite some time, tle factors may influence when infants can successfully show
but eye tracking in infants presents special challenges. In many predictive eye movements that anticipate an object’s reappear-
cases, the tracking requires adults to sit still and keep their head ance, and here, too, eye tracking may help reveal how young
immobile, resting their chin on a support and holding their fore- infants’ prior experiences—for example, repeated viewing of
head against a brace. Other systems allow somewhat freer head the object as it moves along a path before the screen is put in
movements, but larger head and body movements will compro- place to hide the moving object—facilitate this ability (Johnson &
mise accuracy. In addition, calibrating most adult eye-tracking Shuwairib, 2009). By the time they are 6 months old, infants can
systems requires the participant to look at a number of spe- accurately envision the object moving behind the screen and
cific objects. Because infants can’t be told to sit still or to focus can even seem to envision one object hitting another behind a
intently on command, measuring infant eye tracking requires a screen and this second object then moving out from behind the
way of compensating for frequent head movements. screen (Woods et al., 2010).
Technological improvements and advanced software now Eye tracking can go beyond exploring infants’ understand-
make it quite easy to calibrate eye-tracking systems in preverbal ing of objects’ motions to probing their thinking about objects’
infants and to compensate for some degree of head movement. functional properties—that is, knowing what an object can be
In addition, some eye-tracking systems simply consist of hav- used for. Infants usually do not show consistent, correct motor
ing an infant wear special glasses that contain both a camera uses of simple everyday objects, such as hairbrushes, cups,
that records what she sees and infrared sensors that constantly and phones, until well after they are 12 months old. But do they
track where she is looking within that scene. The systems are encode objects’ functional uses at an earlier age, before they
often calibrated by showing the infant bright dots that become are able to act them out? To measure this early ability, we can
larger at various locations on a screen. The dots naturally attract track infants’ eye movements while they watch brief video clips
the infant’s attention, so no explicit training is needed. of actors using objects either correctly or incorrectly. One study
Eye tracking is increasingly being used to explore how infants focused on infants at ages 6, 8, 12, 14, and 16 months while
think about objects and their properties. For example, when an they watched adult actors use a brush, or a telephone, or a cup
infant sees an object go behind a barrier, eye tracking provides either correctly or incorrectly (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010). For

biases to think about some categories—biases that can We know from the research on number that infants are
range from simply understanding a particular concept from surprised when number changes. But what about when
the start to more abstract constraints on classes of concepts. object properties change? Since infants base categories on
For example, a nativist might claim that there is a bias to their recognition of objects’ shared properties, the stability
favor functional features (an object serves as a container) of those properties is an important part of categorization.
over perceptual ones (an object is a cylinder) when both If a toy cat disappears behind a barrier and immediately
are equally salient and in competition with each other. In thereafter a toy dog appears at the other end of the bar-
Chapter 7, we will consider some special categories to which rier, adults will assume that two objects are involved because
young infants seem to have fear responses, and in Chapter 9, they believe that objects’ properties are stable and cannot
we will consider in more detail how older children come to change while moving briefly behind a barrier. Do young
understand concepts, but we will begin here with a discus- infants have similar ideas about what properties, such as
sion of some work on young infants’ abilities to think about size, shape, and color, remain stable over time (Xu, 2003;
categories. Xu & Carey, 1996)?

172 CHAPTER 5 COMING TO UNDERSTAND THE PHYSICAL WORLD

 FIGURE 5.24 Eye tracking as a window into functional understanding. Infants as young as 6 months have strong
expectations about the motor actions and targets associated with specific objects. Here infants look ahead to a person’s mouth
when she lifts a cup, even when the cup is moved to a location that would be more appropriate for a phone. The dot indicates
where the infant is looking. From Hunnius & Bekkering (2010).

example, when the adult used the cup correctly, infants at all These results show that by 6 months of age, well before
ages would look “ahead” from the moment the adult grasped most infants show consistent use of such objects, infants have
the cup until it reached the adult’s mouth, anticipating correctly developed expectations about specific motor actions associ-
that the cup would soon be at the adult’s mouth. When the adult ated with these objects. These anticipations may not constitute
moved the cup to her ear instead, as if to use it as a phone, a full functional understanding, but they are at least an impor-
infants of all ages still looked expectantly at the mouth, having tant precursor. To be sure, eye-tracking systems, no matter how
trouble anticipating this atypical action even as they saw the sophisticated, are only one window on infant cognition. The
adult’s hand continue to move toward her ear (see Figure 5.24). largest benefits of the new technology will lie in how information
In contrast, adults quickly readjusted and tracked the object as gathered from eye-tracking studies converges with data from
it moved to an atypical location. other methods.

In one study that examined this question, 9-month-olds These results suggest that 9-month-olds do not realize
watched as a toy truck disappeared behind one side of a bar- that objects, like the truck and the duck, keep most of their
rier, then saw a toy duck emerge soon after from the other properties over time. Some researchers have suggested that
side before going back behind the barrier. When the bar- as children’s early language skills emerge (at about 1 year),
rier was lifted to reveal only one object, the infants did not their way of representing category knowledge changes,
dishabituate. But when the raised barrier revealed both a resulting in properties being more stably attached to objects
truck and a duck, the infants dishabituated; they appeared (Xu, 2002; Xu et al., 2005a). The labels provided by
surprised to see two objects. In another experimental con- words may help infants direct their attention to an object’s
dition, the infants saw both the truck and the duck at the properties so as to know how a category contrasts with other
same time on either side of the barrier before both disap- categories. An alternative interpretation is that younger chil-
peared behind it. In this condition, the infants seemed to dren’s memories of properties may fade more quickly in cer-
expect to see both objects when the screen was raised (Xu & tain kinds of tasks, but that with categories that have more
Carey, 1996). memorable properties or tasks that reduce the demands on

INFANT KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING 173

memory (such as briefer disappearances behind the barrier),
children might view the properties as being preserved over
time (Baillargeon & Wang, 2002; Wilcox & Baillargeon,
1998; Wilcox & Chapa, 2004).
One piece of evidence supporting this second view is the
finding that when researchers demonstrate a different function
for each of two objects in advance (for example, pulling a han-
dle on one object makes a light flash, while turning a knob on
the other object makes a short melody occur), the 10-month-
olds pass the task as easily as 12-month-olds, expecting that
there are two objects (Futo et al., 2010). Further support has
come from studies in which infants observe a self-moving,
seemingly animate object (a moving toy caterpillar) go behind
one side of the screen and an inanimate, inert object (a red
cup) go behind the other side. When they are presented with
such a large distinction between animate and inanimate cat- FIGURE 5.25 Levels of categorization. Despite very high
egories, 10-month-olds again pass the task (Surian & Caldi, perceptual similarity between the birds and the airplanes, infants as
2010; see also Bonatti et al., 2002). But younger infants may young as 9 months recognize the two categories as distinct in sort-
need more powerful indicators of distinctive object proper- ing and imitation tasks. These results have been taken to show that
ties to remember them across different parts of the screening preverbal infants form categories on conceptual bases as well as on
event (Baillargeon et al., 2012). Taken together, these studies perceptual ones. From Mandler (2004a).
illustrate that infants have some early sense of object types,
but the studies also illustrate the great challenge of knowing other, such as all vehicles, are seen by the infant as belonging
how infants categorize the world before they can speak and to the same category. The same high-level categories have
whether their early categories are anything like the ones we been found with other techniques involving imitations of
associate with names like “dog,” “cat,” and “truck.” taught properties about categories. Thus, if an infant sees
an experimenter say “vroom vroom” while moving a truck,
she will then make the same motion and sound not just
Q: How do 9-month-olds and 12-month-olds with other trucks but also with other vehicles, such as cars
and planes (Mandler & McDonough, 1996). Infants may
differ in their abilities to track objects and their not always categorize at the higher level, and researchers can
properties when the objects are out of sight? prime them to categorize at lower levels by showing them
How have these developmental differences multiple lower-level examples earlier (Mareschal & Tan,
been explained? 2007), but the key point is that infants do not need to begin
categorizing at a lower, “more concrete” level. Other studies
suggest that infants as young as 6 months can form abstract
In addition to exploring infants’ use of categories by categories such as “vehicle” and “animal.” In those studies,
studying their understanding of objects’ stable, physical after infants habituate to many members of a broad cat-
properties, developmental researchers have also investigated egory, such as vehicles, they then dishabituate more to novel
the level of abstraction (that is, the generality) at which items that are not vehicles than to novel members of the
categories are first represented in the infant’s mind. Some habituated category (Bornstein et al., 2010).
studies strongly suggest that infants as young as 10 months Infants expect members of the same categories to have the
old tend to categorize at surprisingly abstract levels, using same kinds of hidden features. Thus, when 9-month-olds
“vehicle” rather than “car,” or “animal” rather than “dog” are taught that a novel feature exists inside a kind of box,
(Mandler 2004a, 2004b, 2012; Mandler & McDonough, they expect all boxes of that type to have the same feature
1993, 1998; see Figure 5.25). This may be because certain inside, but they do not expect that other types of boxes will
general properties (for example, being a self-moving entity) have that feature inside (Dewar & Xu, 2010). Even more
are easier to recognize than more specific properties (for dramatically, infants develop hunches about which proper-
example, number of legs or kind of tail). One method of ties are essential to a category and which are more inciden-
studying the categories that infants use involves looking at tal. For example, we tend to think that inside properties of
the order in which infants touch a group of objects arrayed animals are more likely to indicate their category than sur-
in front of them (Mareschal & Tan, 2007; Ricciuti, 1965). face, outside properties like a collar. Some have argued that
Researchers infer that objects touched one right after the this psychological bias toward inside, usually unobservable

174 CHAPTER 5 COMING TO UNDERSTAND THE PHYSICAL WORLD

features is a human universal and is found in all children of color (since this is what they expected). But they did disha-
early preschool age (Gelman, 2003; Keil, 1989). In fact, the bituate, and look longer, when the cat moved like the cat
bias may emerge even earlier. In one study, 14-month-old- that shared only its hat color (Newman et al., 2008b; see
infants watched two animated cats that each moved in their Figure 5.26). The infants seemed to find the inner property of
own way: one swayed side to side and the other jumped up stomach color more important for categorizing and forming
and down. Each cat had either a red hat and a red stomach expectations than the surface feature of hat color. Thus, not
(indicated by a translucent image beneath the skin) or a blue all features are treated equally in categorization, and infants
hat and a blue stomach. Then, a new cat with a mismatched favor some of the same ones that adults consider essential.
hat and stomach (either a red hat and a blue stomach or a
blue hat and a red stomach) appeared and began to move
like one of the original cats. The infants did not dishabituate Q: What is the evidence that children under 1 year
when the new cat moved like the cat that shared its stomach of age sometimes more easily grasp higher-level
categories than lower-level ones?
Blue cat moves side to side Red cat jumps up and down

Distinguishing the Physical

World from the Social World
Much of the infant’s understanding of the physical world
A Habituation events involves having a clear sense that social agents behave in
Stomach congruent Hat congruent radically different ways from inanimate things. We have
(internal match) (external match) already seen that the difference between social and nonso-
cial categories may be one of the most fundamental concep-
tual distinctions that infants make. They do far more than
make the distinction, however; they reason about social
agents and nonsocial things in very different ways. For the
most part, social agents are other people, but they can also
be animals. Social agents have many observable properties
that distinguish them from inanimate things (see Table 5.3).
Stomach congruent Hat congruent
Social agents typically can move on their own, whereas
(internal match) (external match) inanimate objects need external agents to set them on their
way. Social agents can change their own trajectories, whereas

Social Agents
(People and Animals) Inanimate Things

Can move on their own. Require an external force to move.

Can change the direction of Only an external force can
B Test events
their own movement midpath change their direction of
FIGURE 5.26 Categorization and essential features. One study without external influence. movement midpath.
sought to determine whether infants use internal or external infor- Causal reactions can be Causal reactions tend to be
mation to categorize animated objects. (A) In a habituation event, immediate or delayed. immediate.
animated cats with a blue hat and blue stomach moved side to side,
while animated cats with a red hat and red stomach moved up and Influence from afar (“action Influence almost always requires
at distance”) is common. direct contact.
down. (B) In test events, the stomach color and hat color were mis-
matched, and the cat’s movement either matched the motion of the
cat with the same stomach color or with the same hat color. Infants TABLE 5.3 Some easily perceivable properties that distinguish
expected the motion to be the same as that of the cat with the same animates and inanimates. There are several properties relating to
stomach color (internal feature), and they dishabituated when it the behaviors of social agents that are markedly different from those
was the same as that of the cat with the same hat color (external relating to the behaviors of inanimate things and that appear to be
feature). Adapted from Newman et al. (2008b). known to young infants.

DISTINGUISHING THE PHYSICAL WORLD FROM THE SOCIAL WORLD 175

inanimate objects will continue on the same path of motion toward cylinder B and stopped near it, without touching
unless an external object or obstruction intervenes. Inani- it. After a moment, cylinder B then moved away. In the
mate things and social agents also respond differently to second video, which showed a “launching” event, cylin-
causal influences. For inanimate objects, consequences tend der A moved toward cylinder B, but the cylinders made
to be immediate. Hit one ball with another, and it instantly direct contact before cylinder B immediately moved away.
responds to the collision. By contrast, a social agent might Infants as young as 7 months showed different reactions
take some time to respond. A child who is pushed may not when watching similar events that involved either social or
react at all, but after several pushes may erupt in a rage. nonsocial pairs of objects (Spelke et al., 1995). When the
In addition, inanimate objects cannot be influenced from moving objects were simple cylinders, infants dishabitu-
a distance; they require direct contact. By contrast, social ated more strongly to the action-at-a-distance event than
agents can be influenced from afar, a concept that can be they did to the launching event, since they did not expect
described as “action at a distance.” For example, a person that one cylinder could cause another to move without
can react to something she hears or sees from far away (Gel- touching it. Even at age 7 months, however, infants reacted
man & Spelke, 1981). Moreover, social beings are believed quite differently when, instead of cylinders, the videos
to have goals and intentions for their actions, whereas the showed two people interacting in these same ways. Infants
movements of inanimate objects are not believed to be no longer dishabituated more strongly to the action at a
intentional. Many organisms pick up on these cues to divide distance than to the launching. It is as if they knew that
the world into social and nonsocial categories. Even when social beings don’t require direct contact to influence each
newborn chicks are presented with two kinds of objects, other (Schlottmann & Surian, 1999; Schlottmann et al.,
one that moves on its own and one that moves only when 2009; see also Luo et al., 2009, for related findings with
it comes into contact with another object, the chicks prefer 5-month-olds).
to associate with self-propelled objects, presumably because In somewhat older infants, various cues that there
self-propulsion is a reliable cue indicating animate mothers is a social agent present will trigger inferences that the
and not inanimate objects (Mascalzoni et al., 2010). agent is perceiving and attending to information. One
study asked if cues that there is contingent responding
(where responses from one person or object are depen-
Action at a Distance and dent on the responses from another) were sufficient to
elicit expectations of a perceiving and attending agent. In
Social Contingency that study, 12-month-old infants saw a featureless furry
Infants can be quite sensitive to the ways that social agents, object in front of them on a table (see Figure 5.28). The
and not inanimate objects, can influence each other from a object seemed to make beeping sounds contingent on the
distance. In a study that investigated infants’ expectations infant’s own sounds (Johnson et al., 1998). (In fact, an
about “action-at-a-distance” causality, the infants watched experimenter was covertly pressing a button to make a
animated videos of two 6-foot-high cylinders “interacting” sound each time the infant made one.) Even though the
in different ways (see Figure 5.27). In the first interac- beeps did not sound human, the way the furry object’s
tion, which showed action at a distance, cylinder A moved “responses” seemed to depend on the infant’s sounds gave

Action–at–a–distance event

FIGURE 5.27 Action at a dis-

tance. When infants saw cylinder A
stop without touching cylinder B and
A B A B A B
then saw B move off on its own, they
dishabituated more strongly than when
they observed cylinder A make contact
with cylinder B. When cylinders A and
Launching event
B were replaced with people, infants
did not show stronger dishabituation
to the action-at-a-distance event. They
seemed to expect inanimate objects to
act on each other through direct colli- A B A B A B
sions but allowed for animate beings
to act on each other at a distance.
Adapted from Spelke et al. (1995).

176 CHAPTER 5 COMING TO UNDERSTAND THE PHYSICAL WORLD

 diately that a person reaching for a door handle intends to
grasp it or that a person or animal that chases another may
have negative intentions. Infants, like adults, seem driven to
interpret the behaviors of social agents in terms of goals.
One line of research asked if infants tend to encode events
in terms of goals as opposed to simpler physical attributes.
In one study, 5-month-olds and 9-month-olds saw a small
stage-like setup with one object—say, a ball—on the left and
another object—say, a teddy bear—on the right (Woodward,
1998; see Figure 5.29). They then saw something move in
from “backstage”—a hand in one experimental condition or
a stick in the other condition—and remove the ball. Next,
a screen came down to block their view of the stage, and
FIGURE 5.28 Perceiving social contingency. When confronted when it was raised, the infants saw that the teddy bear and
with a featureless furry object that made sounds contingent on their the ball had switched locations—the teddy bear was now on
own sounds, 12-month-old infants seemed to regard the object as a the left and the ball was on the right. Once again, they saw
social being. They even turned when the furry object turned in order either a hand or a stick “enter” from backstage and remove
to look where the object seemed to be “looking.” From Johnson et al.
one of the objects. The question was whether infants would
(1998).

the infant a strong sense that he was interacting with a

social agent rather than with something inanimate. This
sense was powerful enough that when the furry object
then turned 90 degrees, the infant also turned to look
where the object appeared to be “looking” (Johnson et al.,
1998, 2007, 2008; Shimizu & Johnson, 2004). Moreover,
infants appeared to infer that if an object interacts contin-
gently with a person, seemingly responding to his actions, A Habituation event

then the object’s attention-gathering side faces the per-

son during the interaction (Movellan & Watson, 2002).
Knowing that an entity is social leads to this kind of
inference about the motives for its actions. In fact, adults
respond similarly; in interactions with a robot that clearly
looks mechanical but is programmed to respond contin-
gently to them, adults also tend to overestimate its mental
capacities (Scassellati, 2002). B Same reach

Goal and Belief Attribution

We have seen that quite young infants can distinguish social
agents from inanimate objects based on the social agents’
capacity to respond to action at a distance and contingency
information and that infants use this information to make C Same goal

inferences about what other social beings are perceiving and FIGURE 5.29 Interpreting actions in terms of goals. After
where they are directing their attention. Beyond the directly watching a hand reach for an object (A), infants as young as 5 months
observable differences between social agents and inanimate are more surprised to see the hand move to the same location to
objects, some of the most profound differences concern social retrieve a different object (B) than they are when the hand moves to a
different location to retrieve the same object as before (C). Apparently,
agents’ intentions, goals, and beliefs. Although these distinc-
they interpret the hand as having the goal of obtaining a specific object.
tions are not measurable the way a change in trajectory is, By contrast, after seeing a stick “reach” for an object, the infant appears
adults and older children can infer them immediately—and surprised to see the stick go to a new location to retrieve the same
we often make inferences automatically about another per- object. They appear to view the stick as simply moving to a set location
son’s goals and intentions. We seem to understand imme- without having a particular goal. Adapted from Woodward (1998).

DISTINGUISHING THE PHYSICAL WORLD FROM THE SOCIAL WORLD 177

assume that a person (represented by the hand) would have of the child’s spontaneous responses, such as the child’s reac-
a goal related to a particular object, but a stick would not. tion to a violation of expectations, then quite remarkably,
Researchers would answer this based on how the infants infants as young as 13 months seem able to take false beliefs
reacted to where the hand or the stick moved after the objects into account in interpreting others’ actions.
changed location. If for all events the infants simply encoded In these studies, an infant might observe an actor watch-
the physical actions in front of them, they should be more ing a toy being moved from one container to another. Then
likely to dishabituate when the action changed and the hand a screen comes up, blocking only the actor’s view of the
or stick went to a new location. If, however, they selectively containers. The infant watches as the toy is moved to the
encoded the hand in terms of the goal of its inferred actor, other container while the actor’s view is still blocked. When
they might be more likely to notice when the hand reached the screen comes down, the infant observes the actor either
for a new kind of object, even if it was in the same location. reaching for the container where the toy was originally hid-
By contrast, even if infants did encode goals for hands, they den or reaching for the container into which it was moved
should not encode any goals for the stick and should show while out of sight (see Figure 5.30). Infants look longer
stronger dishabituation when it went to a new location. when the actor reaches toward the toy’s new location,
The results were clear. When infants had originally even though it is where the toy really is (Onishi & Bail-
seen a hand remove the ball, both the 5-month-olds and largeon, 2005; Surian et al., 2007). They seem to expect
the 9-month-olds dishabituated more strongly if the hand the actor to look for the toy at the original location, based
went to the ball’s old location (on the left) and removed on the assumption that the actor has a false belief that it is
the teddy bear than if the hand once again found the ball, still there. If the same experiment is performed without a
even though it was in a new place (on the right). By con- screen, the infants look longer when the actor reaches for
trast, if they had originally seen a stick remove the ball, the toy at its original location, because they assume that the
they dishabituated more strongly if the stick went to the actor watched as the toy was moved and formed new beliefs
ball in its new location (on the right) than if it went to about where it is.
the ball’s old location (on the left) and ended up with the Infants appear to be surprisingly sensitive to the cues that
teddy bear instead (Woodward, 1998). The opposite pat- indicate the particular goals of a social agent. If infants watch
terns of results in the two conditions neatly demonstrate an animation in which a triangle moves around a screen in a
that the infants interpreted the actions of the hand as inten- way that suggests it is “chasing” a square, they will dishabitu-
tional but did not attribute intentions to the stick. The ate when the shapes reverse their roles and the chaser switches
infants in these studies certainly seemed to think about from chasing to fleeing, indicating that the infants recognize
social agents as being embedded in different patterns of that each now has a different goal (Rochat et al., 2004). These
causation than inanimate objects, and in some cases these studies shed new light on decades-old research showing that
results were even found in infants as young as 3 months adults also attribute goals to simple geometric figures. The
(Luo, 2011; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005). Nonetheless, we infant studies clarified that these attributions were not a grad-
must be careful in attributing adult-like beliefs to infants. ually acquired cultural convention but a foundational way of
More conservatively, we can say that the infants’ responses seeing social agents (Heider & Simmel, 1944).
make good sense to our adult intuitions. Young infants even appear to understand social agents’
For many years, it was assumed that infants, as well as goals in ways that lead to inferences about the agents’ dis-
young toddlers, might be able to think about others’ goals positions and future behaviors. In one study, 12-month-old
and desires but not about their beliefs. This assumption infants watched an animation in which one shape (a triangle)
arose from the ways in which children younger than about “helped” another (a ball) to move up a hill while a different
3½ years old fail at certain kinds of laboratory tasks that shape (a square) “hindered” the ball. Researchers then asked if
require understanding that a person may have false beliefs— the infants would make inferences about how the shapes would
for example, a person’s false belief that an object that was interact in a new task. Specifically, would the infants assume
moved when she was not present is still in its original loca- that the ball would more likely approach the shape that previ-
tion (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). We will look at these false- ously had helped it move up the hill rather than the shape that
belief tasks in more detail in Chapter 13, but the key point had hindered it (Kuhlmeier et al., 2003; see Chapter 7)? The
here is that these tasks that are failed by young children results indicated that in a new context (one without a hill to
require the children to answer an explicit question about an climb), the infants looked longer when the ball approached the
individual’s false belief—for example, they are asked where helping shape. They may have looked longer because they saw
the person will look for the object that was moved in the approaching the helper as the more coherent ongoing event
person’s absence (Baillargeon et al., 2010). But if a child’s and therefore wanted to keep monitoring it. (Although infants
understanding of false beliefs is instead measured in terms sometimes look longer at unexpected events, in other cases,

178 CHAPTER 5 COMING TO UNDERSTAND THE PHYSICAL WORLD

 Yellow-box event

Green-box event

A Belief–induction trial B Test trial

FIGURE 5.30 Understanding false beliefs. (A) In the belief-induction trial, infants observe the actor watching the toy being moved from the
green box to the yellow box, and then the infants observe the toy being moved from the yellow box to the green box while the actor is out of
sight and her view is blocked. (B) In the test trial, the infants watch the actor reach for the toy either in the yellow box or in the green box, and
researchers measure the infants’ reaction (based on looking time) to where the actor searches for the toy. Infants as young as 13 months look
longer when an actor reaches for the object in the green box if it was surreptitiously moved from the yellow box while a screen blocked the
actor’s view. Adapted from Onishi and Baillargeon (2005).

such as this one, they look longer at expected events. The key
finding is that they showed a clear difference in looking time Q: How do studies on infant imitation reveal
between events in which the ball approached helpers versus differences in how infants see social and
when it approached hinderers.) Remarkable as this finding is
with 12-month-olds, it was then replicated in an even more nonsocial agents and their actions?
striking way with 6-month-olds (Hamlin et al., 2007). In this
version of the task, infants watched as a display of real three-
dimensional objects either helped or hindered another object’s What is it about watching social agents’ actions that
path up a ramp. The infants were then allowed to choose triggers infants to attribute goals to them? Are human-
(indicated by reaching) which object they wanted to hold, the like features, such as a face or a hand, essential? That view,
helper or the hinderer. They consistently preferred the object although long popular, seems unlikely, given that infants
that helped. Attributing goals to social agents therefore leads will attribute goals to simple geometric shapes after watch-
infants to make further inferences about how those same ing them chasing and fleeing. In fact, just the appearance
agents will behave in the future and whether it is desirable to of self-propelled motion in any sort of object can trigger
be in close proximity to them. infants to attribute goals to the object.
By 18 months, infants understand human actions in In a study similar to one discussed earlier, in which a
very different terms from those of objects, and they become hand or a stick retrieved a teddy bear or a ball (Woodward,
increasingly able to differentiate between a true social agent 1998), when 5-month-olds saw a small block seemingly
with intentions and goals and an object that is merely behav- move on its own toward an object, they assumed that it
ing like one. For example, if infants watch someone repeat- had a goal. Much as infants in the earlier study assumed
edly attempting an action, such as putting a ring on a hook that a hand moving an object was a social agent and that
or pulling the cap off one side of a bar, and failing, they will it had a goal, the infants in the second study assumed that
not imitate the failed action they repeatedly observed but the self-propelled block was also a social agent and that it
instead will imitate the action they assume was intended would have the goal of “seeking out” and approaching the
(Meltzoff, 1995; see Figure 5.31; see also Johnson, 2000). same object, even when that object was moved to a new
By contrast, after watching an inanimate object produce the location. In contrast, if the block had a long handle that
same “failed action,” the infants do not infer a goal—they seemed to be manipulated by something out of view, the
simply reproduce the action they saw. infants inferred that it was an inanimate object and that it

DISTINGUISHING THE PHYSICAL WORLD FROM THE SOCIAL WORLD 179

 A

B
FIGURE 5.31 Imitation of intended goal. (A) When a social agent is viewed as engaging in an action,
18-month-old infants imitate the intended action (even if the agent is not able to achieve the goal) rather
than the real action, inferring a goal to act on. In this case, the human actor is repeatedly trying to pull
the cap off a small bar. The infant imitates actually taking the cap off instead of the failure to take it off.
(B) When the same action is performed by a machine (which also is not able to pull the cap off the end of
the bar), the infant does not imitate the goal. Adapted from Meltzoff (1995).

would return repeatedly to the same location, even when a perceptual cues of apparent self-directed movement (see
different object was located there, since they assumed that also Luo, 2011). The more cues there are indicating that
an inanimate object would not have a goal (Luo & Baillar- something is a social agent, such as action at a distance,
geon, 2005; see Figure 5.32). Thus, even before their first contingent responding, and self-propelled movement, the
6 months of life, infants attribute goals based on simple easier it is for younger infants to infer that a social agent,

Short-handle condition Long-handle condition

A Familiarization event Familiarization event

B Test events: approaching a novel object at the old object’s previous location

FIGURE 5.32 Context and goal attribution. When infants saw a block with a small handle as moving by itself, they attributed goals to it. Dur-
ing the familiarization event, the infants observed the block with the short handle contact the cone (and since it seemed to be self-propelled, they
perceived the cone as its goal). When the location of the cone and cylinder were switched, the infants expected the block to contact the cone at its
new location, and they dishabituated when the block seemed to have a new goal (approaching a new object—the cylinder—at the previous location
of the cone). When they saw the block being moved by an off-screen agent holding a longer handle, they no longer attributed goals to the box and
did not dishabituate when the box approached the cylinder at the previous location of the cone. Adapted from Luo & Baillargeon (2005).

180 CHAPTER 5 COMING TO UNDERSTAND THE PHYSICAL WORLD

 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL P OLICY

The Myth of the First 3 Years

D
o children’s experiences in the first 3 years of life have it, “neuroscience cannot currently tell us much about whether
an especially powerful impact on the development of we can, let alone how to, influence brain development” during
brain structures and functions that then has long-term the first few years (Bruer, 1999). Bruer has also pointed out
consequences for psychological abilities long after several reasons to be cautious about neuroscience-based claims
that period is over? Both proponents of early education and about critical learning periods: (1) Bruer says that most criti-
intervention programs and purveyors of products like “educa- cal-period effects that have been clearly demonstrated pertain
tional toys” that are said to maximize early learning experiences to quite focused abilities, such as binocular fusion of the eyes’
in infants frequently refer to neuroscientific evidence, such as the separate images or the ability to see with high acuity. He states
formation of an especially large number of synaptic connections that there is no evidence for broad, general critical-period effects
in the first few years of life, to suggest that children must develop on perception and cognition. Even the critical periods for visual
cognitive skills when these new neural circuits are forming or risk development can happen at different times, depending on the
having insufficient neural growth later on to support rapid learn- visual task involved. (2) Bruer points out that most of the pat-
ing. These changes are described as evidence for developmental terns of synaptic overexuberance and pruning in the brains of
“windows,” or critical periods, during which essential learning infants and young children may be largely determined by genes
must take place if it is to happen at all. Other discussions refer to in a way that is not influenced very much by the normal range of
the pruning of synaptic connections, which starts to occur in tod- environmental experiences, even if there may be effects in cases
dlers, arguing that this process shapes the brain’s architecture in of more extreme deprivation. (3) He argues that the detailed
particular ways. Certain forms of pruning are said to occur only in timing of major early brain developments, even in the areas of
early development, so that if a young child misses out on certain neural tissue that would be most relevant for such abilities as
early experiences, optimal pruning will not occur. executive processes in memory and reasoning, doesn’t closely
These neurodevelopmental patterns are used to argue that coincide with the time frames or critical periods considered most
early intervention programs for disadvantaged children are espe- important for psychological change (Bruer, 1999, 2002).
cially important because early childhood is a time when environ- Clearly, popular claims about development can have a huge
mental inputs sculpt the brain. Others outside of psychology, effect on public policy. To evaluate these kinds of claims, we
such as economists, have used these claims to support argu- need to have a detailed understanding of early cognitive devel-
ments for targeting most funding for disadvantaged children to opment and how its patterns relate to what is known about early
the first few years because they believe it will have the greatest brain development, including experimental studies showing how
impact at that time (Doyle et al., 2009; Heckman, 2006). experience might be related to changes in cognition and the
Accepting such claims is tempting, given the many signifi- brain. The kind of interesting, stimulating environments that Early
cant brain changes that occur during the first few years. But Head Start and similar programs promote surely do provide
even though the patterns of brain change in early childhood are experiences that are valuable for children’s cognitive develop-
remarkable and widespread, anatomical development doesn’t ment. The problem lies in the policy choices that parents and
provide supporting evidence for benefits from a specific kind of politicians make when they are convinced that the first few years
early intervention program. are all that really matters (Heckman, 2006). If all of cognitive
John Bruer, a philosopher of science with expertise in neu- development was constrained by such a powerful, fixed critical
roscience, has examined how well the neuroscience data on period, then communities would devote all of their resources and
development support the popular claims that there are critical energies to infants and toddlers, leaving little or no resources
learning periods in early development. It is especially important for the later years. When bad science causes even modest
to put these claims to the test, as they are used to justify social changes in spending along these lines, older children may suffer.
policies that allocate vast resources for enriched experiences Advances in cognitive neuroscience are shaping how we under-
in the first 3 years of life (Bruer, 1999, 2006, 2008). In short, stand cognitive development in infancy and early childhood. It is
the strong neuroscientific claims about critical learning periods important to keep these exciting findings from being distorted in
before age 3 do not hold up (with the important exception of ways that might hurt rather than help most children (Goswami,
cases in which children are severely neglected). As Bruer puts 2006; Munakata et al., 2004).

DISTINGUISHING THE PHYSICAL WORLD FROM THE SOCIAL WORLD 181

rather than an inanimate object, is present (Biro & Leslie, that this is the only reasonable way to behave, in light of the
2007). Older infants and children will easily make such shape’s apparent goal (Gergely et al., 1995).
inferences with just one cue (see Scientific Method box). Given that young chimpanzees have similar reactions to
The behavior of somewhat older, but still preverbal, infants these kinds of animated scenes (Uller, 2004), any interpreta-
shows that their inferences about social agents can be com- tions we can make about human infants’ social understand-
plex: they assume not only that agents have goals and beliefs, ing based on these findings may also apply to some of the
but that they will act reasonably. For example, if infants as great apes as well. Thus, chimpanzees are believed to under-
young as 9 months old have been habituated to an animation stand that social agents have goals and intentions. They
of a shape hopping over a barrier to move next to another may differ from human infants, however, when it comes to
object, they will dishabituate if they see the shape perform the understanding false beliefs. Despite many attempts, it has
same hop when the barrier is gone. They will not dishabitu- not been possible to show that apes, such as chimpanzees,
ate, however, when, in the absence of the barrier, the shape can consistently take into account false beliefs, even when
simply moves along the ground straight toward the object. using the spontaneous response methods that have revealed
Even though the shape takes a different path from the one such abilities in human infants as young as 13 months old
they saw during habituation, the infants apparently recognize (Call & Tomasello, 2008; Krachun et al., 2010).

SCIENTIFIC METHOD: Agents and Order

Hypothesis: Ball disorder
Before they have language, infants will understand that only intentional
agents are likely to create order out of disorder.

Method:
Ball order
1. Twenty-four 12-month-old infants watched either a video of a disordering
event, in which the blocks went from order to disorder, or a video of an
ordering event, in which a randomly arranged group of blocks became
neatly ordered.
2. For both kinds of events, infants saw (a) the blocks in the initial state, (b) Agent disorder
a screen in front of the blocks, and (c) the blocks in the end state after
the screen had been removed.
3. After the screen was in place, either an animated, self-moving object or
an inanimate object went behind the screen and stayed there after the
screen was removed. Agent order

4. Researchers recorded infants’ looking times at the end state.

Results:
Infants looked longer at an ordering event that was accompanied by an 10.0
inanimate agent than they did at a disordering event that was accompanied
by an inanimate agent. They did not show a looking time difference between
Mean looking time (in sec)

disordering and ordering events for animate objects. 8.0

Conclusion:
By 1 year of age, infants expect only animate agents to be capable of 6.0
producing order from disorder. They expect that both animate and inanimate
entities can produce disorder from order.
4.0
Source study: Newman et al. (2010).

2.0 Disordering
event
Ordering
event
0.0
Agent Ball
12-month-olds

182 CHAPTER 5 COMING TO UNDERSTAND THE PHYSICAL WORLD

 Finally, older infants start to infer that only social agents this is primarily known through their reactions to possible
acting intentionally can cause certain kinds of changes, and impossible events. Based on fairly recent advances in
such as imposing order on a disordered scene. One study developmental research, we have also come to see that infants
set up different conditions to observe infants’ reactions to in the first few weeks of life can use abstract principles—for
changes in the orderliness of a display. In one condition, a example, that solid objects cannot interpenetrate—to reason
set of blocks formed a neat array (an ordered grouping of about unseen events. And we have seen that years before they
the blocks), which was briefly obscured by a screen. When learn to count, infants can distinguish various quantities on
the screen was lifted, the blocks were seen to have been scat- the basis of number. In addition, we have seen that infants
tered. In this condition, it is easy to imagine that either an can recognize that there is a profound difference between
intentional agent or an inanimate object, such as a rolling animate and inanimate entities, a contrast that will be an
ball, could have caused the change. In a second condition, important building block for the development of social rela-
a disordered set of blocks was momentarily concealed by tions. More broadly, infants may come into the world with
a screen. When the screen was removed, the blocks were evolutionarily quite old foundations of “core knowledge”
seen to have been neatly ordered. In this condition, only that they can use early on to make rudimentary sense of
an intentional agent could have caused the change. When areas such as physical mechanics, social agency, number,
12-month-olds are shown similar events, they look lon- and spatial layout (Carey, 2009; Carey & Spelke, 1996; Keil,
ger when an inanimate object seems to have created order 1981; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). The challenge lies in trying
from disorder, as this violates their expectations about what to better understand how this early knowledge is mentally
inanimate objects can do (Newman et al., 2010; see Sci- represented and how it changes in the years that follow.
entific Method box). In contrast, once infants determine Because research on infant cognition is one of the fast-
that something is a social agent, they understand that it est growing areas of psychology, it is especially important
can cause specific kinds of changes that follow from having to take a step back and consider how the exciting advances
goals, such as imposing order. Similarly, infants as young in this area fit into the larger picture of our understanding
as 9 months expect a hand, but not a claw, to be able to of development. In recent years, researchers have repeatedly
select two colors of balls out of a transparent container in a shown that infants previously considered essentially precog-
nonrandom manner and to put them in a display where the nitive were capable of remarkably precocious performance
colors show a precisely repeating pattern (Ma & Xu, 2013). on tasks that seemed to require impressive cognitive abilities.
In short, well before the end of the first year of life, infants There were numerous strengths in this approach, especially
view inanimate objects as dramatically different from ani- to counter the many years of mistaken views that infants
mate creatures. We will see in Chapter 6 that these expecta- could only understand the physical world in terms of basic
tions about the social world and the capabilities of social perceptions and actions. But the intense focus on infants’
agents form a critical foundation for developing the earliest surprisingly sophisticated capacities has come with a cost
social relationships: attachments to caregivers. as well, for we may sometimes forget that infancy is a time
of enormous developmental changes that also affect cogni-
tive capacities. A full story of infant cognitive development
Conclusions will have to explain how infants come to understand new
concepts and how simple understandings can become more
Infants are clearly able to think about the world in ways complex and richly connected. Answers to these questions,
that go far beyond merely having perceptions and engaging along with careful characterizations of infant capacities
in actions. It seems likely that even at birth, infants have throughout the first year of life, are needed for a full account
certain expectations about the properties and behaviors of of how infants’ understanding of the physical world emerges.
physical objects and are surprised when their expectations We also see an important message in this chapter that will
are violated. We have seen that these expectations seem to be reappear in later chapters. Development doesn’t just consist
linked together as a coherent set of principles. These expecta- of perceptual skills feeding into cognitive ones. Advances in
tions also seem to involve a clear understanding of causation, cognitive development, such as learning about categories,
although perhaps only the causes reflected in simple physical can also feed back on performance of more perceptual tasks,
interactions. As a result, it is tempting to attribute to infants such as recognizing distinct objects. These two domains of
an intuitive grasp of basic physical mechanics even though development are intricately linked and often interdependent.

CONCLUSIONS 183
 STU DY AN D REVIEW

● Quite young infants also have notions of causation that are

SUMMARY
not simply the result of associations of elements over time
Piaget’s Approach and space. They seem to be able to perceive physical causality
in simple collision situations and show surprise when their
● Jean Piaget, the undisputed giant of developmental psychol-
causal expectations about such physical events are violated.
ogy, characterized a child’s knowledge and behavior in terms ● Infants are not only able to differentiate different quantities
of schemes, or patterns of perceiving, thinking, and interact-
of objects in terms of their number, but are also able to inter-
ing with the world. He described how these schemes were
pret events representing addition and subtraction. They do
constantly adapting to the environment through the pro-
all of this without any spoken language, raising provocative
cesses of accommodation and assimilation.
questions about how their numerical knowledge might differ
● Piaget argued that there is a distinct stage of development
from that of older verbal children.
in infancy known as the sensorimotor period, which in turn ● Infants also have spatial knowledge of the world. They are
consists of six substages. The main focus of this period is the
able to construct representations of the layout of the world
developing object concept.
around them and then can use those representations to
● Piaget did not view infants as really capable of seeing a world
remember the locations of objects. From an early age, they
out there that is independent of their actions until after the
may be able to use several distinct cues to spatial layout,
first year of life.
including beacons, landmarks, and geometric properties of
● Piaget believed that for younger infants, out of sight is truly
the environment, relying on different cues, depending on the
out of mind; he was convinced that they can only think
context to locate objects.
about objects when they are acting on them and that their ● Perhaps the highest level of cognition is the use of abstract
concepts of the objects are subordinated to those patterns of
concepts that stand for classes and relations that go far
action.
beyond perception. Infants are often able to use quite broad
● Piaget examined infants’ developing object concept by test-
categories, and the category-related knowledge does not
ing how they respond to manipulations of objects. One task,
invariably proceed developmentally from the most specific
known as the A-not-B task, which involves hiding an object
categories on upward to the most abstract, general categories.
and seeing where the infant will search for it, was thought
to be a litmus test for whether infants can really represent
Distinguishing the Physical World from the Social
objects in their own right and as enduring while out of sight.
Infants fail this task until roughly 1 year of age. World
● Infants develop sharply contrasting expectations about the
Infant Knowledge and Understanding behaviors of animate creatures and inanimate objects. They
● The last three decades have seen a revolution in the study of recognize that social agents can move on their own and can
infancy, based in large part on studies using dishabituation be influenced from afar (action at a distance), whereas inani-
or other violation-of-expectation paradigms. This research mate objects need an external force to move them or change
suggests very different developmental patterns and much their direction through direct contact.
earlier forms of understanding than Piaget had proposed. ● They see different patterns of contingent responding, differ-

● Even the youngest infants seem to know there is a world “out ent principles governing interactions, and are heavily influ-
there” that is independent of their actions. enced by inferences about goals when they believe that an
● Young infants also appear to have several interlinked expec- entity is animate.
tations about the nature of physical objects and how they ● There is increasing evidence that infants can also attribute

behave. These expectations suggest that infants may have false beliefs to social agents and use those attributions to
an intuitive theory of the mechanics of bounded physical anticipate different kinds of behaviors.
objects, but there is a great deal of uncertainty as to what it
means for an infant to have such a theory.
● Studies seem to suggest that young infants understand
THOUGHT QUESTIONS
that there is object permanence or continuity, that objects 1. While chimpanzees and other great apes often appear quite
are solid and cannot interpenetrate other objects, and that close to human infants in how they reason about physical
objects must make contact to influence other objects. mechanical relations, there appears to be a major contrast

184 CHAPTER 5 COMING TO UNDERSTAND THE PHYSICAL WORLD

 concerning their ability to think about false beliefs. Human ing another? What experiments might distinguish these
infants as young as 13 months are able to take false beliefs possibilities?
into account, but adult great apes are unable to do so. What, 5. Dogs seem to pass the A-not-B task very early, but they never
specifically, is likely to be the cognitive difference between pass the invisible displacements task. What sort of cognitive
these two groups that can explain this difference? or perceptual process might enable them to be more pre-
2. What kinds of experiences might be most valuable to empha- cocious than human infants in the A-not-B task but much
size for a young infant’s cognitive development, and what worse at invisible displacements?
kinds of experiences might be least valuable? What are the
social policy implications?
3. Preverbal infants seem to have very distinct expectations
KEY TERMS
about the properties and behaviors of social agents and inan-
imate physical objects. Consider whether preverbal infants A-not-B error (p. 153) object concept (p. 149)
also have systematic distinct expectations about other con- accommodation (p. 147) object permanence (p. 149)
trasting categories, such as between naturally occurring and adaptation (p. 147) object solidity (p. 158)
human-made objects, between living and nonliving objects, allocentric representation place error (p. 153)
and between edible and inedible things. How might we test (p. 169) primary circular reaction
for whether preverbal infants do have different expectations assimilation (p. 147) (p. 150)
about such objects?
egocentric representation scheme (p. 147)
4. Preverbal infants seem to appreciate physical causality in
(p. 169) secondary circular
a collision and social causality in a situation in which one
equilibration (p. 147) reactions (p. 151)
agent seems to frighten another. Is there a common con-
cept of “cause” being evoked in both cases, or is each com- explicit cognition (p. 146) sensorimotor period (p. 149)
pletely distinct in the mind of the infant, with no awareness implicit cognition (p. 146) tertiary circular reactions
that both instances can be described as one thing caus- invisible displacement (p. 153) (p. 153)

STUDYCONCLUSIONS
AND REVIEW 185
 6
Connecting with the Social World
Developing Bonds between Infants Individual Differences in
and Caregivers Attachment Style • Deprivation Studies in Nonhuman
Primates
• Studying Attachment Styles in the
Early Perspectives on Infants’ Strange Situation • Critical-Period Effects?
Bonds with Others • Causes of Different Attachment Styles Conclusions
• Psychoanalytic Approaches to Infant- • Consequences of Different Attachment
Parent Bonds Styles Summary
• Learning Theory Approaches • Cross-Cultural Differences in Attachment
• Bowlby’s Ethological Approach Styles
The Underpinnings of Attachment Effects of Early Social Deprivation
• Components of Attachment • Social Deprivation in Humans
• Bases of Social Interactions
 nna Mae He was born in Memphis, Tennessee, Moving beyond the complexities of this particular case, it is

A in 1999. Her parents were Chinese immigrants

who had recently fallen on hard times and had
very limited income. Because of complications
during the pregnancy, the hospital bill was quite
large, and Anna’s parents began looking for a way out of their
financial crisis. When Anna was 27 days old, her biological
parents put her into what they thought would be temporary
easy to see how the broader issues it raises relate to all chil-
dren and their families. How and why are bonds formed
between children and their parents, and what are the costs
of breaking those bonds? Do newborns bond with specific
caregivers in the first few weeks of life, or do those bonds
form later, when the infant is more psychologically sophis-
ticated? Is the period of infancy and early toddlerhood
foster care with another couple. especially important for establishing these relationships?
Anna’s parents visited her once a week until her second How do early bonds with caregivers differ among children,
birthday, when they had an altercation with Anna’s foster and how do these differences arise? Do those social patterns
parents. This incident resulted in a court order preventing established in infancy have irreversible effects on interper-
Anna’s biological parents from seeing her and terminating sonal relations later in life?
their parental rights. After a long series of subsequent court Building on Chapter 5’s discussion of how infants seem
battles over custody, the original court ruling was finally over- to think differently about social beings than they do about
turned in 2007, and Anna was returned to her biological par- inanimate objects, this chapter focuses on the earliest social
ents 8 years after she had been placed with her foster parents. bonds in infancy, especially those between parents and their
Anna’s foster parents adored her, and Anna’s feelings toward children. We will first consider how these bonds typically
them seemed equally positive. But the judge who overturned develop and how they were explained by early theorists,
the case ruled that any harm that might come to Anna by providing a context for the more detailed examinations that
being removed from her foster parents was outweighed by follow. We will consider some early perspectives on parent-
the rights of her biological parents (see Figure 6.1). child bonds, starting with the work of Sigmund Freud,
The custody battle over Anna Mae He drew intense whose ideas continue to have reverberations today. We
interest in the national press because it seemed to pit two will then discuss learning theory approaches, which domi-
very powerful human impulses against each other. On the nated the American psychological landscape for much of
one hand, the rights of the biological parents should not be the twentieth century, yet were ultimately undermined by
permanently terminated unless the parents pose a risk to both theoretical and empirical considerations. We will then
the child. On the other hand, a child who has been raised, turn to the ethological approach, pioneered by the British
practically from birth, by loving foster parents should not researcher John Bowlby and one of his North American
be removed from the only family she knows and loves. colleagues, Mary Ainsworth. This approach underlies most
current theories of bonding and is the dominant frame-
work for the study of attachment—the strong and endur-
ing emotional bond between a child and a significant other
and the processes that create and maintain this long-lasting
social relationship.
We will look at the underpinnings of attachment, focus-
ing on the behaviors that facilitate and maintain attachments
for a species. In humans, we will see that smiling, cuddling,
clinging, following, and “cuteness” may play particularly
important roles. We will also look at analogous behaviors in
other species to better understand the implications of these
attachment behaviors that fit with the ethological approach.
We will then examine two social and cognitive skills that
help give human attachment its unique nature: social refer-
encing and joint attention.
Not all attachments happen in the same way, however.
There are pronounced individual differences in the ways
FIGURE 6.1 Anna Mae He case. For 8 years, Anna Mae He grew that infants and young children relate to their parents. We
up in the United States with foster parents. But after a lengthy court
will consider how researchers measure these differences and
battle, she was returned to her biological parents, who took her back
to China. The case highlighted a tension between two competing ask why they occur, examining the roles of parenting, chil-
principles: the rights of biological parents and the rights of those dren’s temperaments, environmental stressors, and genetic
who bring up a child from early infancy. In addition, the rights of the factors. We will also ask whether particular attachment
child must also be taken into account. styles are associated with certain ways of relating to others

188 CHAPTER 6 CONNECTING WITH THE SOCIAL WORLD

later in life. For example, if a young toddler seems to show
great insecurity in his attachments, does that behavior pre- Age Behaviors That Set Up and Maintain Bonds
between Caregivers and Infants
dict anything about how he will form intimate relations in
college? We will also consider the important contributions Newborn Infants show a preference for looking at faces
of cross-cultural studies and ask if particular attachment over other stimuli and attend to human voices,
styles and behaviors found in other cultures mean the same but they do not show clear bonds to specific
people.
thing in terms of underlying attachments as they do when
they are found in North American cultures. 3 months Infants smile at people more, but they still do
Finally, we will focus on the ways that extreme social not show specific bonds to particular individuals.
deprivation affects attachment. Its devastating consequences 6 months Infants have now formed bonds to specific
raise questions about how these effects develop and how individuals and smile most in their presence.
long they persist after the children’s circumstances improve. 8 months Most infants show separation distress when the
The ethological perspective, which underlies a variety of individuals with whom they have formed specific
bonds leave.
comparative studies of attachment in other species, has
proved particularly useful for understanding the impact of TABLE 6.1 Development of early bonds. Four behaviors related
deprivation. At the end of the chapter, we will return to the to forming and maintaining specific bonds between caregivers and
familiar theme of critical-period effects to ask whether there offspring and the approximate ages at which they first appear in
infancy. This is the most typical developmental sequence in humans
is a critical period for the formation of normal attachments. from birth to approximately 8 months.

Developing Bonds between tating and often lasting effects. The first such bond is gen-
erally between parent and infant, but infants also develop
Infants and Caregivers strong bonds with others, including siblings and other
family members and caregivers. Nonetheless, much of the
Virtually all human infants, like the young of many other theory and research we will explore in this chapter involves
species, form bonds to those who take care of them. These the infant-parent bond and especially the infant-mother
bonds are difficult to measure in their own right, but they bond. The most typical sequence for developing bonds is
can be inferred through certain sets of behaviors that serve summarized in Table 6.1.
to set up and maintain proximity between human care- A newborn does not seem to have specific bonds—that
givers and their children (see Figure 6.2). Disrupting these is, bonds to particular individuals. As we have seen in ear-
bonds or preventing them from forming can lead to devas- lier chapters, this does not mean that newborns aren’t sensi-
tive to social stimuli as being somehow different, but they
show no evidence of a strong desire to be around particular
people. Even though very young infants may be able to rec-
ognize their parents through sound, smell, and sight and
may find that recognition pleasing, they do not show dis-
tress if a parent is not there. Infants’ lack of specific bonds
early on has been a cornerstone assumption of adoption
agencies for centuries. Those agencies typically would like
an adoption to occur as early in the infant’s life as possible
to avoid separation pains in both the infant and the bio-
logical parents.
Infants first show specific bonds at around 6 or 7 months.
Prior to that age, they may well prefer to interact with their
parents over others, but this is largely because the parents
know best what makes the baby happy. A socially adroit
stranger can usually be just as effective. At 6 months, infants
become more skilled at being social partners and seem to
FIGURE 6.2 The origins of attachment. Both parent and child
display behaviors that any observer would recognize as the begin-
shift from being junior partners to full partners in the social
nings of an attachment. Here, for example, a Mongolian mother coos interaction. As such, they are more sensitive to others’ social
to her very young baby. But can a newborn infant have a specific and emotional states and are more adept at influencing and
attachment to her mother? responding to those states.

DEVELOPING BONDS BETWEEN INFANTS AND CAREGIVERS 189

 tions and at inferring exactly when a separation is likely
Q: When do specific bonds first seem to form, to be brief or long lasting. In short, even though infants
may recognize their parents very early in development,
and why do they form at this age?
that recognition does not directly translate into specific
bonds. Only after several months of life do infants seem
to have strong bonds to particular people and show dis-
Developing social skills may well be involved in building a tress when those individuals are not near. We now turn
foundation for bonds between children and caregivers. Such to theories of how those bonds emerge over the course of
social skills include recognition of and interactions with development.
specific individuals and communication of distress when a
caregiver leaves (see Figure 6.3). An infant younger than
approximately 7 months might show distress when someone
she is interacting with leaves, but this distress doesn’t indi- Q: How is separation distress related to the
cate a specific bond to that person because another person
can reengage the infant and stop the distress. By contrast,
emergence of behaviors to maintain proximity?
true separation distress, which typically emerges at about
8 months and is also known as separation anxiety, does
indicate a specific bond. In this case, the infant cannot be
consoled by a stranger, no matter how skillful; the infant
wants a particular person to come back, not just any social
Early Perspectives on Infants’
partner. This general sequence of developing specific bonds Bonds with Others
is seen in all cultures throughout the world and has been
noted since the beginning of written history. Many theories have been proposed to explain the bonds that
As infants develop over the first 2 years, a wider range infants form with others, but most research has occurred in
of behaviors reflects the bonds between infants and oth- the context of three major approaches: psychoanalytic the-
ers. These include crawling to maintain proximity to the ory, learning theory, and the ethological perspective. Today,
caregiver and increasingly rich communication skills. the ethological perspective is the dominant view in the field,
The infant also gets better at coping with brief separa- but it is important to understand that perspective in terms
of other approaches that preceded it.

Psychoanalytic Approaches
to Infant-Parent Bonds
Early in the twentieth century, Sigmund Freud changed how
we view our mental lives. Freud is best known for his theories
of mental illness and the unconscious and for launching the
discipline of psychoanalysis, but some of his most important
contributions concern the emergence of social relationships
and personality (Freud, 1905/1976, 1925/1976).
Freud’s theory of bonds between infants and parents
emerged out of a broader account of psychosexual devel-
opment, a proposed series of stages of development related
to drives, instincts, and sources of pleasure, with a partic-
ular focus on sexual desire. According to Freud, all boys
and girls progress through these stages in ways that are
intimately related to the kinds of bonds they form to oth-
ers. Freud placed an extraordinary emphasis on the unique
FIGURE 6.3 Separation distress. At 6 months of age, babies nature of the early mother-infant bond, which he believed
begin to form specific attachments to their primary caregivers and stems from breastfeeding, a source of oral gratification that
within a month or two typically show distress at separation, often becomes associated with the mother. Although Freud’s
clinging to an attachment figure who is about to depart. focus on breastfeeding has been criticized by later writers, it

190 CHAPTER 6 CONNECTING WITH THE SOCIAL WORLD

is important to remember that in Freud’s time, breastfeed- ments, as opposed to the more basic drives for affiliation
ing was so widespread in all social groups that any other seen in other animals. All of these issues were examined by
form of infant feeding would have seemed abnormal. Freud Freud and his psychoanalytic successors and, as you will see
considered nursing to be the earliest and most basic pleasur- shortly, are still actively researched today.
able act for the infant. He believed that in performing that
act, the infant forms a profound attachment to the mother
(and to her breast). Freud maintained that the mother- Learning Theory Approaches
infant relation is the prototype around which all later close
relationships revolve. Learning theory approaches to infant-parent bonds were
Yet, Freud overemphasized the pivotal role of the mother- defined by an attempt to focus exclusively on the infant’s
infant bond. Many studies have shown that given the right behaviors and the ways in which the environment reinforces
opportunities, father-infant bonds can be equally intense and them. Learning theorists believed that the drives of oral
important to the infant (Lamb, 2004, 2010; Parke, 1996). gratification and pleasure seeking are not well defined and
Thus, the amount of time spent with the infant is a much therefore not easy to study and measure. They attempted
better predictor of the strength and quality of attachment to restate drives in terms of more clear-cut physiological
than the sex of the caregiver (Clarke-Stewart, 1989). Simi- constructs, such as thirst, hunger, and physical discom-
larly, the special place of breastfeeding comes under ques- fort (Sears et al., 1957), which can be responded to by any
tion, given that no differences in later attachment behaviors caregiver. Learning theorists believed that bonds emerge
have been found between bottle-fed and breastfed babies. by being associated with positively reinforcing stimuli. Ini-
Although there may be some behavioral differences in breast- tially, the stimulus might be the breast or bottle, but soon
feeding versus bottle-feeding mothers, with the breastfeeding it would become the mother herself (or any other care-
mothers sometimes reporting closer feelings to the infant, giver) because of her close association with breastfeeding
those differences do not seem to translate into differences in or bottle-feeding. Learning theory tried to avoid all talk
how infants bond to their mothers (Lawrence, 1994). Some of an infant’s internal mental states and tried to posit the
of these errors in Freud’s approach may have arisen because simplest biological drives as motivating forces. The focus
he never really engaged in any direct observations of chil- on behavior and positive and negative reinforcements led
dren; his accounts relied much too much on adults’ reports to assumptions that feeding schedules, the form of feed-
of their childhoods. ing (bottle versus breast), and the age of weaning might
all heavily influence the nature of attachment (Gewirtz,
1961). After all, if bonds are forged by caregivers being
associated with reinforcing stimuli, the schedule of rein-
Q: Why, in Freudian theory, might bottle-feeding forcement and its delivery system should matter greatly.
Learning theory views of attachment enjoyed a period of
and breastfeeding have different consequences great popularity, especially in the 1950s and early 1960s,
for the infant? when learning theory dominated many areas of psychol-
ogy. These views promised a simple and perhaps even
quantifiable set of rules for understanding how and when
Freud’s views were followed by several other psychoana- attachments occur.
lytic approaches that collectively contributed to recurring The stark simplicity of learning theories, however, made
themes that have survived to this day. One issue that Freud it easy to see where the theories fell short in their abil-
considered was how children develop relationships to their ity to explain the formation and maintenance of infants’
parents that are linked both to their own sexuality and to and children’s bonds as they exist in the real world. One
the sex of the parent. Today, the question is whether fathers problem with learning theory approaches was that they
and mothers behave differently with children of different neglected any cognitive components in the development
sexes, even when they are carefully trying to be evenhanded, of bonds. For example, if it is important to the develop-
and whether such differences affect gender roles and influ- ment of bonds that infants understand that their mothers
ence the nature of attachment itself. A second major issue are unique beings who continue to exist when they are out
concerns whether early relations between parents and the of sight, learning theory has no way of taking into account
young child become powerful touchstones for all later rela- an infant’s or child’s thoughts and how they relate to the
tionships and whether anything like a critical period effect formation of bonds. Similarly, if an infant’s thoughts about
occurs. Finally, there is the question of how much the a caregiver’s intentions and goals are relevant to the nature
human infant’s cognitions and beliefs come to shape attach- of the bonds that are formed, learning theory is of no help

EARLY PERSPECTIVES ON INFANTS’ BONDS WITH OTHERS 191

in understanding how bonds might vary with differences come to dominate contemporary research on how infants
in those thoughts. and young children (and even adults) form bonds to oth-
Another major flaw of learning theories was their dif- ers. Although the term attachment had long been used in
ficulty in explaining how an infant’s bond could endure literature to describe close social bonds (White, 1916), it
in the face of repeated and consistently negative interac- was not commonly used for the processes of forming and
tions with a parent or caregiver. Normal learning theory sustaining these social bonds until Bowlby made it central
would predict that abuse would lead to the “extinction” to his theory. In developmental psychology, the term has
of a bond, but this is often not the case. In many cases, now come to have a specific set of meanings arising from
an abused child still desperately wants to be close to the Bowlby’s body of work. Bowlby emphasized the behav-
abusive parent, even though the closer the child is, the iors that created and maintained attachment, leading
more likely it is that painful interactions will occur. It is some to describe his view of attachment as “the infant’s
in these situations, where an infant is being repeatedly ability to seek proximity to a specific caregiver” (Pipp &
abused both verbally and physically, that the bonds can be Harmon, 1987).
most surprising. In discussions of human attachment, affection and emo-
tion are often mentioned. For example, Ainsworth defined
attachment as “an affectional tie that one person or ani-
mal forms between himself and another specific one—a tie
Q: What are some limitations of learning theory that binds them together in space and endures over time”
approaches to attachment? (Ainsworth & Bell, 1970, p. 50). But if we take a com-
parative approach and consider attachment across a wide
range of species, a more conservative definition focuses on
the behaviors that set up and maintain bonds between off-
Bowlby’s Ethological Approach spring and parents (see Figure 6.5). It is difficult to know
what emotions to attribute to other animals when they
The study of bonds between offspring and their par- show attachment to their mothers by acting to keep the
ents underwent a dramatic shift largely because of the mother close, such as chicks peeping and following. In
pioneering work of John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth (see these cases, it is much easier to infer the attachment bond
Figure 6.4). Bowlby described the bond between children based on the behaviors that maintain contact between par-
and their caregivers as an attachment, and that term has ents and offspring.
Along these lines, the ethological approach to attach-
ment has become the dominant perspective in the field. It
approaches the bond between offspring and parents from an
evolutionary and comparative perspective, asking about its
functional role in the development of organisms and groups
of organisms. Ethology largely developed in Europe in the
1930s, when such major figures as Konrad Lorenz and Niko
Tinbergen studied animals’ social behavior in naturalistic
contexts (Lorenz, 1965; Tinbergen, 1951). These stud-
ies gave rise to the notion that animals have repertoires of
actions that are assembled into larger-scale behaviors. Ethol-
ogists paid special attention to animals’ signaling systems
and the species-specific “conventions” used to communicate
threats, sexual availability, and the like. And they studied
how these systems are then assembled into the more com-
plex behaviors that govern mating, territoriality, and caring
A B
for offspring.
FIGURE 6.4 John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth. (A) John
In this ethological context, Bowlby began studying
Bowlby’s studies on attachment and separation transformed how the
psychological community thought about the bonds formed between
attachment in human infants (Bowlby, 1969). Bowlby’s
child and parent. (B) Mary Ainsworth began working with Bowlby in major contribution was to describe attachment in evolu-
the early 1950s, making many important advances in the study of tionary and comparative terms, focusing on the similarities
attachment from an ethological perspective. and differences in the ways that various species’ offspring

192 CHAPTER 6 CONNECTING WITH THE SOCIAL WORLD

FIGURE 6.5 Attachment in different species. Many organisms form attachments to their parents, as seen in these examples across several
species. The ethological approach stresses the functional role not only of attachment itself but also of the component attachment behaviors that
set up and maintain attachments.

attach to caregivers. He saw complex attachment behaviors a particular person by using more effective signals (such
as being built up out of specific behavioral elements, such as protesting if a particular person leaves) and by behav-
as smiling, crying, and clinging. Across species, the par- iors to maintain contact with that person (such as crawling
ticular combinations of these elements varies considerably; toward her and clinging to her). Infants use the caregiver
what species have in common is the way they integrate as a secure base for exploration.
these elements into coordinated behaviors that set up and ● Reciprocal relationships phase (18 months–2 years and
maintain attachments. One of Bowlby’s most important older). During this final phase, children are better able
contributions was to focus attention on these attachment to take into account the parent’s needs and adjust their
behaviors as an essential means of binding the caregiver behavior accordingly, such as being able to wait for the
to the infant—thereby creating attachment itself. For any parent to return without protesting. Thus, the child and
species whose young are relatively helpless early on, attach- the parent become more like partners solving a problem to
ment is a crucial way to make sure that parents take care help them get to a common goal.
of their infants. For Bowlby, attachment has the evolution-
ary function of protecting infants from threats to their But Bowlby may have underestimated how even new-
survival, ranging from predators to physical hazards to borns can quickly recognize their mother based on her smell
starvation. Across a wide variety of organisms, it is adap- and can use that information to have specific kinds of inter-
tive for vulnerable offspring to engage in behaviors that actions with her. Newborns may not really be attached, but
increase the odds of staying in proximity to parents, and it they may begin tailoring interactions with specific people
is adaptive for parents (in terms of passing on their genes) right from the start (Winberg, 2005).
to be responsive to those behaviors in ways that maintain Bowlby stressed that although attachment behaviors
proximity to the offspring. As such, caregivers become safe are crucial for creating and maintaining attachment, they
havens in situations that are threatening or frightening, should not be equated with attachment itself. He believed
thereby offering a secure base from which the young off- that careful analysis of attachment behaviors could yield
spring can explore. insights into the nature of the underlying attachment but
As noted earlier, the young infant does not appear to have that assuming a simple linkage between attachment and
a unique bond to a specific caregiver. Bowlby built on the attachment behaviors could be misleading. For example,
observations of many others by noting four phases in the he insisted that the strength of an attachment behavior
development of attachment (Bowlby, 1969; see also Ains- does not necessarily indicate the strength of the attach-
worth et al., 1978): ment itself. Some of the strongest and healthiest attach-
ments provide infants with such trust in their caregiver
● Preattachment phase (birth to 6 weeks). Infants in this that they have no need to cling to the person constantly
phase display attachment-related behaviors but do not to guarantee that they will not be separated. If a child is
seem to target them to particular individuals. anxious about whether the mother will always be there,
● Attachment-in-the-making phase (6 weeks to 6–8 months). however, he might show extremely strong attachment
During this phase, infants start to use signals such as smil- behaviors, such as clinging, crying, and following, in an
ing and crying to focus on specific people. attempt to stay near the mother at all times. The strength
● Clear-cut attachment phase (6–8 months to 18 months– of attachment behaviors can also depend on the particular
2 years). During this phase, infants more actively stay near situation, whereas the nature of the underlying attachment

EARLY PERSPECTIVES ON INFANTS’ BONDS WITH OTHERS 193

does not. A child who shows very strong attachment behav- tion of many other psychological processes, such as those
iors in frightening or alarming situations may show very involving emotions, social interactions, cognitions, and
low levels of the same behaviors in safe situations, such as motivations. It is best understood as an approach or perspec-
being at home among well-known people, even though the tive rather than a precise theory, since its large reach allows
strength of the attachment itself remains constant across for many different interpretations of the details. Because
both situations. comparative studies of behavior have shown a resurgence in
recent years, its relevance remains strong.

Q: Why is it important to distinguish attachment

from attachment behaviors?
The Underpinnings
Bowlby also wanted to distinguish attachment from depen-
dency, which is reliance on another person for basic physi-
of Attachment
ological needs, such as food and shelter, and for protection Infants as young as 1 month are social beings and partici-
from perceived or real threats. Although most early attach- pate in one-on-one social interactions much of the time that
ment relationships between infants and parents involve the they are awake. Soon after birth, infants engage in behaviors
infant’s high level of dependency on the parents, it is mis- that initiate and maintain social interactions (Stern, 1985).
leading to equate dependency with attachment. Dependency Bowlby focused on these behaviors and how they contribute
is not necessary for strong attachment, nor do all dependen- to the formation and maintenance of social bonds. Both in
cies lead to attachment. Dependency also implies a passivity human infants and in infants of other species, components
on the part of the infant that Bowlby felt underestimates the of attachment, such as smiling, clinging, and touch, as well
infant’s capacities, as he instead saw the infant as actively as baby-like features, help form and maintain attachment so
engaging in behaviors that help create attachment. that parents will care for their helpless offspring. The ability
Sometimes strong attachment develops between an infant to form human attachments builds on other abilities as well,
and those who play relatively minor roles in satisfying the including particular kinds of social skills and understand-
infant’s most immediate needs for nutrition and comfort. ing. The more recent cognitive approach says that for infants
Some infants whose parents have intense work demands to develop bonds with others, they must also have some
may spend 50 hours a week in day care and have a caregiver grasp of the special tempo of interactions with others and
at night who helps feed them and put them to bed. Those the kinds of information that such interactions can convey.
children may interact playfully with their parents only a Without these underpinnings, the special nature of human
few hours a day, yet they still seem to form strong attach- attachments would not be possible. These underpinnings
ments to them, often the strongest of all their attachments help support a large array of activities beyond attachment,
(Clarke-Stewart, 1989; Harvey, 1999). including communication, feelings of empathy, and threat
Although Bowlby was influenced by psychoanalytic detection. But here we focus on the ways they contribute to
approaches, he disagreed with psychoanalytic views that the formation and maintenance of attachment.
linked attachment to the infant’s feelings of gratification
while breastfeeding or to some form of sexual drive. In the
end, he rejected many details of the psychoanalytic perspec-
tives on attachment, even though, in a broader sense, he Components of Attachment
was influenced by their emphasis on the importance of early We have seen that attachment behaviors bind caregivers and
bonds and the ways that disrupting those bonds could cause infants together, and for many developmental psychologists,
long-term problems in relationships (Bretherton, 1992). He these behaviors are the basis for inferring attachment itself.
also advanced the idea that infants develop cognitive mod- Nonetheless, the role of the particular components of the
els of their early attachments, which guide their interpreta- attachment complex, the set of behaviors and mental states
tions of future interactions with caregivers (Bowlby, 1958). that, when taken together, are responsible for setting up
Although this notion has not been explored until quite and maintaining attachment, can vary considerably across
recently (Johnson et al., 2010) it is, in many ways, a natural different species. These commonalities and differences are
outgrowth of earlier psychoanalytic approaches. nicely illustrated by smiling and clinging and by their dif-
The ethological approach has become the dominant per- ferent roles in humans and monkeys. They also are seen in
spective for understanding attachment because of its clear the juvenile features that make up “cuteness,” which serves
continuity across species and because it allows for integra- to trigger caregiving responses by adults toward infants.

194 CHAPTER 6 CONNECTING WITH THE SOCIAL WORLD

 Mom

Smiling at internal Smiling at tactile Smiling at external Smiling at external Smiling at faces Smile of
states stimulation visual stimuli auditory stimuli recognition
Birth 6 months
FIGURE 6.6 Stimuli that elicit smiles. In Wolff’s classic account, stimuli that elicit an infant’s smile progress from internal states to external
stimulation to social stimulation and finally to unique individuals. Today we regard the young infant as having greater sensitivity to social entities,
but Wolff’s general pattern does capture changes in smiling in the first months of life.

Smiling Infants’ smiles are among their most endearing feel that they can withstand anything their adorable bundle
behaviors. The first smile clearly meant for a specific par- throws at them.
ent brings great pleasure. But smiling does not emerge as a The smile is a classic example of an attachment behavior
mature behavior in the newborn (see Figure 6.6). Indeed, that serves a signaling function in a feedback loop between
most parents quickly realize that they are very ineffective at parent and infant (see Figure 6.7). The mother rocks the
making their newborn smile, no matter how many silly faces baby gently, causing the infant to give a small smile. This
and sounds they make. It is not that newborns are incapable
of smiling, but what makes them smile may be quite dif-
ferent than at later ages. The first researcher to study these
developmental changes systematically was Peter Wolff, who
investigated which stimuli elicit smiles most effectively
at different ages in infancy (Wolff, 1963). He found that
as infants get older, they increasingly prefer auditory and
visual social stimuli.
The infant initially appears to smile in response to her
own internal state, such as just after a feeding or after a
particularly good burp. A little later, the best stimuli to elicit Mother smiles
and rocks baby
a smile are likely to be external, primarily those involving
touch and motion, such as hugging and rocking—which
give way to other kinds of external stimuli, such as inter-
esting sights and sounds. Then, the most pleasing stimuli
become specifically social, as the infant smiles at the sound
of a person’s voice or on seeing her face. Finally, at about
Baby’s smile produces Mother’s smile and
6 months of age, the best elicitor of a smile is the face of a more smiling and rocking produces
particular known individual, producing the “smile of rec- rocking in mother larger smile in baby
ognition.” Countless parents would agree that at around
5 or 6 months, something changes: the infant starts to clearly
look into your eyes and smile at you because she knows and
likes you and not simply because some other stimulus has
made her feel good. Those endearing first smiles of recogni-
tion often seem to appear just in the nick of time for parents Baby smiles
who have been lurching through months of sleepless nights.
FIGURE 6.7 Contingent responding. The infant and the mother
In fact, this smile of recognition might serve an important often become partners in a positive-feedback loop in which smiling
adaptive function for the human infant. Just when caregiv- and rocking on the mother’s part produces more smiling in the baby,
ers feel completely overwhelmed and exhausted, the smile of which in turn produces more smiling in the mother. Through such a
recognition appears, and the invigorated parents suddenly loop, close bonds are developed and maintained between the two.

THE UNDERPINNINGS OF ATTACHMENT 195

smile pleases the mother, causing her to smile back at the than smiles or other facial expressions to keep close to their
infant and continue rocking, which in turn causes the infant mothers. Infant monkeys do show expressions similar to
to smile more, and so on, until each partner is fully engaged smiles that may reflect roughly similar internal states, but
with the other. This is an example of a positive-feedback these expressions do not appear to be as closely linked to
loop, a system in which the actions of each component serve the mother’s behavior as human infant expressions are. In
to escalate the actions of the other, so that the system quickly contrast, clinging is essential to the welfare of infant mon-
reaches a maximum level and remains there for as long as keys. They will often hang on to their mothers for hours
the system components can work without fatigue. In this (see Figure 6.8). Clinging not only helps keep them near
case, the behaviors of the infant and the mother continue the mother and moving with her, it also seems to serve a
to escalate as each responds to the other until, eventually, signaling function, building a bond of attachment between
either the infant or the mother gets tired and breaks off the the two. In humans, clinging may be less essential in its
encounter. Just watching a mother attending to her smil- own right, because it is just one of several ways to help form
ing infant can reveal the intensity of these interactions. The attachments. Thus, human infants born with tiny or non-
mother is often leaning forward and actively engaging the existent limbs form perfectly normal attachments to their
infant, while both mother and baby appear to completely parents (Decarie, 1969); monkeys with similar afflictions
ignore the rest of the world. And if the mother breaks out may not fare nearly as well. For humans, touching between
of this feedback loop too abruptly, the infant becomes dis- the caregiver and the infant is still important in the devel-
tressed. These feedback loops become more and more effec- opment of attachment, but this contact seems less crucial as
tive in the first year of life as infant and caregiver become a signaling behavior on the human infant’s part, compared
more sophisticated and perceive and produce effects in the with its function in other species.
other through their smiles and other signals of positive emo- One way to understand the species differences in cling-
tions (Mendes et al., 2009). ing and related behaviors comes from a model of how
In short, an infant’s smile prolongs the interaction with clinging emerged and changed over the course of evolution
the target of the smile (Csibra, 2010), increasing the amount (Matsuzawa, 2006). Clinging first emerged in primates
of time spent in close proximity to the caregiver. The infant’s about 50 million years ago, as primates had a unique abil-
smile actively produces positive emotions in the caregiver ity to grab fur with their hands. In its initial form, still
(Fogel et al., 2000; Symons & Moran, 1994), motivating the seen in primates such as lemurs, the baby clung to the
caregiver to keep interacting with the infant. These effects can mother but she did not respond. Around 40 million years
be demonstrated at a physiological level as well. For example, ago, however, higher-level primates started to embrace their
when most mothers view their infant’s smile, the smile elic- offspring back, and a form of mutual clinging, or embrac-
its high levels of neural activity in the reward regions of the ing, emerged. The next major leap occurred about 5 million
mother’s brain, such as in the ventral striatum, as well as in an years ago, with the emergence of great apes. In contrast to
area of the hypothalamus associated with the production of other monkeys, who find direct gaze threatening, the great
oxytocin, a hormone found in higher concentrations in the apes started to hold each other stomach to stomach in ways
mother’s saliva as a consequence of seeing her infant’s smile that enabled mutual gazes. Those gazes were reinforcing,
(Strathearn et al., 2008). This effect is especially strong in especially when accompanied by smiles, which reflect posi-
mothers who are more sensitive to the moods and emotions tive relations in both humans and chimpanzees. Finally, in
of their infants (Strathearn et al., 2012). Oxytocin, in turn, humans a unique ability emerged to disengage more eas-
is known to produce increased feelings of trust and affection ily from direct clinging while maintaining contact through
toward others (Kosfeld et al., 2005), especially when they are facial expressions, vocalizations, and more intermittent
part of one’s “in-group” (De Dreu et al., 2010). touches. Humans, therefore, have an especially power-
ful set of behaviors for forming and maintaining attach-
ments without direct contact. Nonetheless, the decline in
Q: How does the smile function as an the necessity for direct physical contact does not indicate
attachment behavior? that clinging and other forms of touch are irrelevant to the
formation of human attachments.
Humans share with many other mammals a long com-
Clinging and Touching Infants often cling to their care- mon history of the positive effects of contact. For example,
givers while being held, and clinging may play a role some- there is an extensive literature on the effects of contact on
what comparable to that of the smile in the formation of rat pups, which shows that gentle stroking can calm stress
human attachments, namely, to maintain proximity. For responses and help develop positive bonds (Jutapakdeegul
monkeys, clinging may be considerably more important et al., 2003; Weller & Feldman, 2003). Touch can also

196 CHAPTER 6 CONNECTING WITH THE SOCIAL WORLD

FIGURE 6.8 Clinging in primates. Normal infant monkeys of many species cling to their mothers. This not only helps the infant monkey
hang on, but also seems to help the infant forge bonds with its mother and promote a feeling of security.

help pups learn whom to attach to. Touch of the sort nor- most richly with their caregivers through visual and auditory
mally received from a pup’s mother can set up a positive means, often several feet away from the target of affection.
bond with a smell that is experienced at the same time, By contrast, most primates other than the great apes (who
presumably a mechanism through which infant rats learn engage in direct eye contact as do humans) appear to need
to form bonds to their mother (Kojima & Alberts, 2011). more immediate physical contact to build and maintain
In human infants, too, gentle touching seems to reduce attachments. Thus, both of these systems help to develop
stress. Thus, when infants are put in a situation in which and maintain social interactions, working through different
their mothers do not respond to them, touching can reduce routes in humans and most other primates.
the infants’ typical physiological stress response to the situ-
ation (Feldman et al., 2010; Jean & Stack, 2009; Jean
et al., 2009; Moszkowski et al., 2009). Even in newborns, Q: Compare and contrast smiling and clinging
skin-to-skin contact has been shown to have an analge- in terms of their functions in setting up and
sic, or pain-reducing, effect (Gray et al., 2000). There are maintaining attachments.
also indications that human infants who sleep in physical
contact with their mothers breastfeed more often through
the night and may have lower rates of sudden infant death Cuteness Even “cuteness” seems to be a critical component
syndrome as well as lower stress levels (McKenna et al., of attachment across several species. The so-called “kewpie
2007). While this is not to suggest that this should be the doll” configuration of more rounded faces, larger eyes rela-
only sleep pattern for an infant, it is yet another indication tive to the face, and smaller noses, chins, and limbs is found
of the value of physical contact between mother and infant in the infants of an enormous range of species and is thought
(Waynforth, 2007). to evoke affection from mature members of the species. Bio-
An infant’s touch also helps to create responses in parents logical models of growth help to explain the developmen-
that strengthen the infant-parent bond. Much as infants’ tal patterns that give rise to these features, which have been
smiles lead to increases in oxytocin in their mothers, their shown to be extremely appealing to humans (Alley, 1988).
touching and stroking of the mother’s breast also increases Even 5-month-old infants prefer looking at infantilized faces
the mother’s oxytocin levels (Matthiesen et al., 2001). More- rather than looking at more mature faces (Van Duuren et al.,
over, it appears that affectionate contact between fathers 2003). Konrad Lorenz was one of the first ethologists to pro-
and infants can also cause the father’s oxytocin levels to rise pose such a pattern, as shown in Figure 6.9. He suggested
(Gordon et al., 2010). These findings suggest that there are that certain juvenile features automatically activate a kind
some common physiological pathways in both mothers and of “baby schema” in much the same way that other stimuli
fathers for forming and maintaining attachments. trigger responses.
Comparing the ways that humans and other primates use It is intriguing how often toy developers, cartoonists,
touch and facial expressions to develop early bonds illustrates and other kinds of artists greatly exaggerate baby-like fea-
both common themes and species-specific adaptations. As we tures in portraying older children to make the images more
have seen, various forms of tactile contact play an important appealing. Although the effects of cuteness have not been
role in many species, and clinging is often especially signifi- studied systematically in many species, it appears that at
cant among primates. Nonetheless, while touch remains very least some species may share the human predisposition to
important for human infants, they often come to interact respond positively toward members of their species with

THE UNDERPINNINGS OF ATTACHMENT 197

 system was. The authors suggested that this bias might be
an evolutionarily selected mechanism for eliciting mothers’
caregiving responses toward their young. Other evidence sug-
gests that women of reproductive age may be able to detect
more subtle differences in baby cuteness than older women or
men of any age, possibly because it is especially adaptive for
women in that group to have a strong response to cuteness
(Sprengelmeyer et al., 2009).
Although not yet studied systematically, it seems likely that
infants don’t just appear cute. They likely also behave in ways
that increase their cuteness to relevant adults. These behav-
iors could range from vocalizations and facial expressions to
body postures or motions that seem to elicit strong positive
responses from adults. The proposal that infants play a more
active role in displaying cuteness so as to maintain proximity
to adults would be very compatible with Bowlby’s perspective.

Q: How does cuteness play a role in etho-

logical views of attachment?
FIGURE 6.9 Baby features that lead to the perception of
cuteness. The ethologist Konrad Lorenz suggested that there might
be features shared by the young of many species that elicit a “cute-
ness” response in adult members of those species, a response that
inhibits aggression and encourages nurturance. Commercial artists
frequently attempt to enhance the cuteness of a child or an animal
in greeting cards by exaggerating the head and eye size. While
the artistic merit of such a style may be debatable, the ethological
manipulation of instilling “cuteness” tends to work on even the most
jaded viewers. Adapted from Lorenz (1971).

infant-like anatomical features. For example, adult female

rhesus monkeys are more likely to interact positively with
monkeys whose facial fur and skin have been dyed to match
the hues common in rhesus infants (Higley et al., 1987).
Human infant cuteness appears to arouse specific neu-
rophysiological patterns of responses in adults, often based
on quite subtle differences in perceived cuteness. One study
involved digitally altering photographs of babies’ faces to make
them appear either more or less cute, using algorithms that
subtly changed key facial features (Glocker et al., 2009; see Low Unmanipulated High
Figure 6.10). Adult participants viewed three versions of each
face: the unaltered face; the face that was artificially made Baby Schema
cuter by showing such high baby schema features as a round FIGURE 6.10 Variations in cuteness. Subtle variations in baby
face, high forehead, big eyes, and small nose and mouth; and schema features, as shown here, lead not only to different adult
the face that was made less cute by showing such low baby ratings of cuteness but also to different levels of activation of brain
schema features as a narrow face, low forehead, small eyes, regions associated with anticipation of reward. The photos were
altered to change the baby schema features to low baby schema
and big nose and mouth. In response to the images, the areas
features (narrow face, low forehead, small eyes, big nose and mouth)
of the adults’ brains typically associated with anticipating a or high baby schema features (round face, high forehead, big eyes,
reward showed activation levels corresponding to the degree small mouth and nose) or were unaltered, and then these photos of
of cuteness of the infant. The cuter the face (as validated by the same infant with low, unaltered, or high baby schema features
independent ratings), the more active the reward-anticipating were rated for cuteness. From Glocker et al. (2009).

198 CHAPTER 6 CONNECTING WITH THE SOCIAL WORLD

Bases of Social Interactions
For an infant to form attachments to people and not to
stray items of furniture, there must be something different
about social beings that the infant perceives as special. As
discussed in previous chapters, certain social stimuli, such
as the face, have a special status in the infant’s perceptual
development. We have also seen that young infants can
distinguish social beings from inanimate objects and that A
they think about social and nonsocial entities in very dif-
ferent ways, understanding, for example, the causes and
consequences of behaviors. With respect to attachment, we
will see that these abilities to distinguish social agents from
nonsocial objects also affect an infant’s social interactions.

Contingent Responding Infants anticipate the behaviors

of social beings and may experience quite powerful emo-
tional reactions when those expectations are violated. For B
example, infants expect their parents to attend to them and FIGURE 6.11 Infant’s reaction to the still face. (A) If an infant’s
respond in the rhythmic pattern of give-and-take that char- mother stops interacting with her and freezes her face into a “still
acterizes social interactions—that is, they expect contingent face” that she maintains for several seconds, the infant will start to
responding. If a parent looks at an infant with an impassive, disengage socially and will often show distress as well. (B) When the
straight face, known as a still face, infants as young as 1½ mother smiles and interacts with the infant, this will encourage the
months of age become distressed at the lack of response and infant to reengage in social interaction with the mother.
reciprocity in the social interaction (Adamson & Frick, 2003;
Bertin & Striano, 2006; Cohn & Tronick, 1988; Field,
1977; Tronick, 1989; see Figure 6.11). It is easy to empa- German mothers showed more visually oriented responses,
thize with the infants’ reactions; it is very rare and always such as gazing, using facial expressions (for example, smiles,
uncomfortable to attempt a face-to-face interaction with raised eyebrows, or wide open mouths), or pointing to an
someone who does not seem to react. Infants seem to share object roughly 2½ times more frequently than the Kumbo
the expectation that social overtures will cause a response mothers, while the Kumbo mothers showed 50 percent more
in the other person, and they show discomfort when there touch-oriented responses (for example, stroking, patting the
is no response. Reactions to a still-face task may also be infant’s body, or kissing his face) than did the German moth-
indicative of the quality of an infant’s future attachment to ers. Apparently, in just a couple of months, the parent-infant
the caregiver. One meta-analysis of many still-face studies pairs start to pick up these cultural norms. This key contrast
concluded that infants who showed fewer negative reactions in attachment behaviors—namely, behaviors that can occur
to their mother’s face during the task were more likely to at a distance versus those that require close contact—seems
show higher-quality attachments several months later (Mes- to be quite modifiable across cultures.
man et al., 2009).
Local cultures can influence patterns of contingent Social Referencing Another fundamental social behav-
responding between caregivers and infants early in the ior that emerges very early in development involves relying
infant’s life. For example, mothers’ responses to infant vocal- on the expressions and behavior of others for important
izations start to vary across cultures within the first few information about how to interpret various situations. For
months after birth. In one study, infants from northern Ger- example, in an unfamiliar and potentially dangerous cir-
many and from small villages near Kumbo, Cameroon, in cumstance, it makes sense to watch the facial expressions
West Africa, were observed several times between the first and actions of those who know more about the situation. If
and third month of life (Kärtner et al., 2010). At first, moth- they are panicking, your anxiety will likely increase as well.
ers in both cultures tended to respond to their infants’ vocal- This phenomenon is known as social referencing, and
izations in roughly the same manner. By 3 months, however, its development has been extensively studied (Campos &
the German mothers and the Kumbo mothers were respond- Stenberg, 1981; Feinman et al., 1992; Hornik & Gunnar,
ing quite differently, reflecting differences in the way that 1988). These studies suggest that infants as young as
older infants and mothers interact in each culture. The 7 months use the facial expressions of others as an important

THE UNDERPINNINGS OF ATTACHMENT 199

source of information about how to react to ambiguous with a new caregiver, the infant may pick up on that anxi-
situations. ety and thereby take longer to bond with the new caregiver.
Studies of infants’ reactions to the visual cliff situation, Conversely, if the parents show low anxiety and a welcom-
which we explored in Chapter 3, have shown that infants ing attitude toward a new caregiver, the infant is more likely
use social referencing as one source of information about to be receptive to the caregiver as well.
whether to cross the transparent surface over the visual cliff.
If the mother appears alarmed, the infant will be much more Joint Attention and Gaze Following In addition to social
likely to avoid the deep side of the cliff, while an encourag- referencing, infants show another crucial social behavior
ing mother can often coax the infant to cross the transparent known as joint attention, in which the infant and another
surface (Sorce et al., 1985). Similarly, older infants have been person simultaneously attend to the same object or event.
shown to use social referencing of their mothers’ reactions to When there is joint attention, both partners understand that
guide their walking on unfamiliar surfaces (Adolph et al., pointing or some other indication is meant to focus the two
2010). Moreover, a mother’s emotional reaction to a new toy of them on the same thing (Bruner, 1983, 1990; Scaife &
can influence whether her infant will choose to play with it; Bruner, 1975; see Figure 6.12). Joint attention is not only a
for example, an infant will carefully avoid playing with a toy social behavior; it is also intrinsically communicative, and
for which the mother shows marked distaste (Hornik et al., many have suggested that mastery of joint attention may be
1987; Mumme et al., 1996). Regardless of whether a mother critical for the foundation of language skills (Bruner, 1976;
shows her anxiety or some other reaction in her voice or in Carpenter et al., 1998; Tomasello et al., 2005).
her face, the emotion she expresses can strongly influence Some critical components of joint attention may be pres-
her infant’s behavior (Vaish & Striano, 2004). ent as early as moments after birth, as newborns have been
Social referencing can play a key role in the develop- shown to follow the gazes of others at above-chance levels
ment of specific attachments. If infants observe someone (Farroni et al., 2004). Gaze-following skill improves consid-
showing fear or anxiety while interacting with a stranger, erably in the following months, when infants become better
they are less likely to want to interact with that stranger. able to follow gazes to increasingly distant objects. After
This increased wariness toward certain strangers will slow 3 months or so, infants increasingly use their observations
the process of forming an attachment to those individuals, of others’ hands and eye gazes as indicators of where to look
which can have negative practical effects. For example, if an (Amano et al., 2004; Csibra & Gergely, 2005). Well before
infant’s parents are quite anxious about leaving their child age 1, they can interpret another person’s gaze as indicating

A B
FIGURE 6.12 Joint attention. (A) In joint attention, a triangle is set up between two individuals and a referent in the world. The two individu-
als look at each other and at the object in a reciprocal fashion that suggests that each wants to make sure that the other knows they are refer-
ring to the same object. (B) Pointing often accompanies these interactive looking behaviors, as it focuses attention on an object in a way that
is both a social act and a communicative one. Joint attention emerges at around 9 months of age and reflects a more sophisticated way for the
infant to link to the social world.

200 CHAPTER 6 CONNECTING WITH THE SOCIAL WORLD

that an object is behind a barrier (Csibra & Volein, 2008). may be based, in part, on the interests and experiences the
In general, gaze following is a fragile skill before 2 months infant shares with others. This dimension of shared interests
and then develops strongly between 2 and 8 months, at and experiences may well be uniquely human. Although a
which time infants reliably follow the gazes of others (Gre- great many other species show gaze following (often based
debäck et al., 2010). on head direction but sometimes also on eye direction), it is
possible that only humans use gaze following as a window
into others’ minds and a way of building a sense of shared
experiences (Rosati & Hare, 2009).
Q: How might gaze following help support the This discussion demonstrates that infants are sensitive
growth of human attachments? to the special ways in which social beings can interact and
the important information that those interactions provide
(Dykas et al., 2011). Their attachments to social beings start
quite early in development. Later in infancy, they develop
At about 9 months, gaze following seems to develop even richer expectations about social creatures, especially
into more full-fledged joint attention. Around this time, those to whom they have formed attachments. The develop-
infants begin looking at things that an adult is looking ment of attachments to parents, caregivers, and peers occurs
at, seemingly in an attempt to gather information about in a great variety of animals, but the nature of these attach-
what interests the adult (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984). In ments often differs from species to species. The differences
doing so, they may be more explicitly thinking of the other may largely arise from variations in the way different species
person as a being with goals and desires that are indicated perceive and understand social beings.
by direction of gaze. These joint-attentional behaviors
appear roughly at the same time as pointing and are used
to include both the other person and the pointed-at object.
Although younger infants may point to things, it seems
to simply reflect the infant’s own attention to an object,
Individual Differences
usually as a result of recently touching it, rather than
an understanding of a shared focus with another person
in Attachment Style
(Carpendale & Carpendale, 2010). At around 9 months, Our discussion of attachment so far has focused primarily
though, the infant starts to point to an object and then on developmental patterns that most children share. In par-
alternate her gaze between the object and the person, as ticular, we have considered how an ethological perspective
if trying to track whether the person is “following” her can illustrate the various component behaviors involved in
(Bates, 1976). Similarly, when someone else points at an forming and maintaining attachments. We have also noted
object, the infant is now much more prone to alternate her how different cultures may rely on different kinds of behav-
gaze between the indicated object and the person. These iors and have mentioned that some attachments seem to
tasks require the infant to attend to both the object and the be of higher quality than others. We now turn to the issue
other person simultaneously, with the clear intention that of individual differences in attachment style, which is the
the other person should likewise attend to both the object focus of most attachment studies.
and the infant. This process seems to require the ability to Individuals show significant differences in attachment
understand that others have minds with their own goals style—the pattern of relating to significant others that is
and desires (Trevarthen, 1979). based on expectations about how they will respond and that
affects perceptions, emotions, thoughts, and behaviors in
close relationships. In this section, we will explore some of
the profound questions about what these differences mean
Q: What is joint attention, and how is it relevant for infants’ relationships with others. We will examine some
to the young child’s understanding of social ways of measuring these variations in attachment and con-
sider the challenge of determining what factors are respon-
entities? sible for them. Finally, we will consider some implications
of different attachment styles: How should we understand
cultural differences in attachment patterns? And do early
Joint attention typically becomes fully functional within attachment styles have any implications for intimate rela-
2 to 3 months after infants form their first specific attach- tionships later in life? First, however, we need to discuss
ments, and it may be critical for elaborating those attach- ways of characterizing different attachment styles and mea-
ments into richer and more meaningful bonds. Those bonds suring them.

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN ATTACHMENT STYLE 201

Studying Attachment Styles of being left alone with a stranger (Ainsworth et al., 1978;
Ainsworth & Wittig, 1969). Typically, the infant’s behav-
in the Strange Situation ior in each episode is filmed, and judges who are unaware
Some infants and children tend to show high levels of trust of the infant’s responses in other episodes are asked to rate
and confidence that a parent will be reliably available for the behavior in a given episode according to a scale devel-
comfort, support, and protection, while others are more anx- oped by Ainsworth and her colleagues. On the basis of the
ious and insecure about whether this kind of support will infants’ behavior in the Strange Situation, infants’ attach-
be available. In developmental psychology, these kinds of ments were initially classified into three categories:
expectations about close relationships, as well as the asso- ● Type A infants showed an insecure/avoidant attach-
ciated emotions and behaviors, are the basis of attachment ment, typical of approximately 20 percent of middle-class
styles. Comparing attachment styles requires a standardized American children.
method that can objectively pick up indications of different ● Type B infants showed a secure attachment, typical
styles across a wide range of individuals. The oldest method, of approximately 70 percent of middle-class American
which is still the most prevalent one, was developed by Mary children.
Ainsworth (Ainsworth, 1979). Inspired by the ethologi- ● Type C infants showed an insecure/resistant attachment,
cal approach, Ainsworth became interested in developing a also known as an anxious attachment, typical of approxi-
method of measuring behaviors that reflect different attach- mately 10 percent of middle-class American children.
ment styles. Ainsworth’s method is commonly known as the
Strange Situation because it examines an infant’s reactions Type A infants, characterized as having insecure/avoid-
in certain unusual and mildly threatening situations, both ant attachments, tend to spontaneously explore more than
in the mother’s presence and when the mother has left the the other types do when they are in a room alone with the
room, as well as how the child responds when the mother mother. More important, they do not appear upset when
returns (see Figure 6.13). In the Strange Situation, different the mother leaves, and they show much less concern toward
children respond to the experience in different ways, but a strangers than other infants do. Most infants are at least
particular child continues to show the same response pattern cautious and watchful around unfamiliar people, and many
across repetitions of the same measure. This measure is most become strongly agitated. In contrast, Type A babies tend to
often used with infants between 1 and 2 years old. react less to strangers, sometimes even completely ignoring
or avoiding them. One of the most distinctive behaviors of
Type A babies occurs when the mother returns after a sepa-
ration. At her return, Type A infants usually actively avoid
Q: How is the Strange Situation used to contact with the mother by turning away or by appearing to
measure different attachment styles? ignore her. In some cases, it seems as if they blame the mother
for the stressful separation and try to reduce the pain by
withdrawing from her. Some Type A infants may simply be
The Strange Situation involves a sequence of eight episodes too preoccupied with play and unconcerned with whether
that vary in terms of the apparent level of “threat” to the the mother is there to notice when the mother returns after
infant, ranging from the mild unease of being in a strange a separation. Several behaviors of Type A infants tend to
room with the mother to the potentially greater discomfort cluster tightly together for members of that category. Thus,

A B C
FIGURE 6.13 The Strange Situation. In the Strange Situation, researchers assess the infant’s attachment to the mother by watching
(A) whether the infant plays with toys when the mother is in the room, (B) how the infant reacts to a stranger in the room, and (C) how the
infant reacts when the mother returns to the room after having left it for awhile.

202 CHAPTER 6 CONNECTING WITH THE SOCIAL WORLD

Type A babies are not only avoidant, but they also show less as preschoolers (Lyons-Ruth et al., 1993). Developmen-
visible anxiety in the absence of the mother. tal psychologists have been especially interested in Type D
Type B infants show secure attachments and actively babies because increasing evidence suggests that disorganized
explore novel environments when the mother is present, pre- attachment in infancy predicts psychopathology in adoles-
sumably because they know they can trust and rely on the cence (Atkinson & Zucker, 1997; Cicchetti & Toth, 2005).
mother’s help if the situation becomes frightening. These As you will see later in this chapter, there may also be
babies clearly show distress when the mother leaves and will another attachment style that is strongly associated with the
be quite apprehensive toward strangers when alone with severe deprivation that often occurs in institutions. Infants
them. When the mother returns after a separation, Type B with this indiscriminate attachment style can be as affec-
babies are delighted to see her. They clearly enjoy close physi- tionate and receptive to complete strangers as they are to
cal proximity with the mother and interact with her in posi- their primary caregivers (O’Connor et al., 2000; Tizard &
tive ways, such as hugging and smiling. These children also Ross, 1975; Zeanah et al., 2002). In many cases, they will
tend to be much friendlier to strangers when the mother is rush up and hug and cling to virtually any adult in the same
present, perhaps greeting a new person with a wave or smile manner. Researchers have suggested that an indiscriminate
or even approaching the stranger. They appear to be so confi- attachment style can be quite unrelated to the security of
dent in the mother that while she is present, they don’t seem attachment (Zeanah et al., 2005) and is therefore a differ-
to worry about getting into a difficult social situation. Look- ent dimension on which attachment can vary. Indiscriminate
ing more closely at the Type B group reveals several clear attachment may also be measured in the Strange Situation
subtypes, ranging from babies who reunite happily with the (Lyons-Ruth et al., 2009), which enables researchers to more
mother at a distance through smiles and gestures to those easily explore its occurrence in noninstitutionalized popula-
who need prolonged, close physical contact to reunite. tions as well.
Type C infants, who show insecure/resistant, or anxious,
attachments, somewhat resemble Type A infants in that
both types of infants have insecure attachments. A key dif-
ference in these types is that Type C infants are much more Q: What are the four attachment styles
likely to show their distress. They are less prone to explore associated with Type A, B, C, and D babies?
than the other types, even when the mother is present; when
the mother leaves, they show great distress, often more than
Type B babies. They can initially be more clingy to the
mother in unfamiliar situations. Yet, after a separation epi-
sode, they may appear angry with the mother, despite main- Causes of Different Attachment Styles
taining close proximity to her, unlike the Type A (avoidant) How do different attachment styles arise? To what extent are
babies. Type C infants are uncomfortable around strang- they influenced by an infant’s initial disposition? To what
ers, not only when left alone with them, but even when extent are they influenced by the way the parents and other
the mother is present. In short, they seem anxious about caregivers interact with the infant? Later in this chapter, we
whether they can rely on the mother, but rather than deal- will see that severe social deprivation can have dramatic,
ing with the problem by avoiding her, Type C babies show albeit often not irreversible, impacts on later attachments.
greater distress than normal when she leaves and continue Here the central question is whether the differences between
to indicate their unhappiness even after she returns. less extreme social environments can contribute to subtle
Researchers have disagreed about whether the three differences in attachment style. We will also consider how
types of attachment are the most appropriate categories and infants’ dispositions might foster certain kinds of social
whether they are robust outside of middle-class America interactions and hence certain kinds of attachments, creat-
(Lamb et al., 1984). Later researchers developed a fourth ing another example of how feedback loops can be so criti-
category, Type D infants, who show another form of inse- cal to understanding attachment. Researchers have been
cure attachment called disorganized attachment. Their especially interested in disentangling the causes of insecure
behaviors seem far less consistent than those of the other attachments because of concerns about how insecure attach-
types, and these infants appear to be insecure and unusu- ment in infancy might affect children’s later relationships
ally controlling with their parents at the same time (Barnett (see, however, Ein-Dor et al., 2010). For that reason, we will
et al., 1999; Cicchetti & Toth, 1995; Main & Solomon, focus primarily on the causes of insecure attachments.
1990; Solomon & George, 1999). Type D babies usually
represent fewer than 10 percent of infants, and they are more Parent Effects on Insecure Attachment Even with-
likely to come from homes in which they have been mal- out realizing it, parents can sometimes behave in ways
treated. They are also more likely to show aggressive behavior that might increase the chances of an insecure attachment.

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN ATTACHMENT STYLE 203

 NEW DIRECTIONS IN DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH

New Insights into the Role of the Father

U
ntil fairly recently, almost all attachment studies in central Africa, stay within an arm’s reach of their children
focused on mothers and infants, relegating fathers to roughly 50 percent of the time. In contrast, Kipsigis fathers,
a marginal or nonexistent role. Although the major- who are part of a pastoral culture in Kenya, spend very little
ity of attachment studies still focus on mother-infant direct time with their children until around the child’s fifth year
bonds, research on father-infant relations is providing a more (Hewlett, 1991; Hewlett & Macfarlan, 2010). More broadly,
comprehensive account of attachment and a better understand- fathers tend to be more involved in child rearing in hunter-
ing of how maternal and paternal roles often differ. gatherer cultures than in pastoral-agrarian cultures, although
Historically, fathers have been less involved in child rear- specific cultures deviate from this pattern (Gettler, 2010). This
ing than mothers (Barry & Paxson, 1971; Hewlett & Macfarlan, wide variation has led some researchers to argue that it is mis-
2010; Munroe & Munroe, 1992). The question of why this is so leading to focus on differences between mothers and fathers
has been considered extensively from an evolutionary perspec- as intrinsic and unchangeable (Lamb, 2004). Culture seems to
tive (Gettler, 2010; Munroe & Munroe, 1992). One evolution- have an enormous influence on how much time fathers spend
ary argument revolves around uncertainty about the paternity with their children and the kinds of activities that they engage
of a child—the notion that, unlike mothers, fathers can rarely in with their children.
be 100 percent sure that they are the child’s biological parent. Fathering may be associated with certain biological changes
This argument suggests that fathers are less invested in child in fathers, especially in those who spend more time with their
care because there is some doubt about whether their efforts infants and children. When they become fathers, males in many
would be promoting the survival of their own genes (Dawkins, species show a drop in testosterone. Testosterone is thought
1976). Along these lines, some have suggested that even to foster both mate seeking and competition between males
when fathers do devote time and care to their offspring, they for the best mate, while a reduction of testosterone may facili-
could be doing so to curry favor with the mother and thereby tate parenting, in that the males with lower testosterone levels
increase the odds of future mating and more offspring (Geary, may spend less time seeking mates and more time with their
2000; Gettler, 2010). Nonetheless, it is critical to remember offspring (Muller et al., 2009; Wingfield et al., 1990, 2000).
that human fathers tend to spend far more time taking care of Just being a father does not necessarily lead to sustained low
infants than the fathers in virtually any other primate species levels of testosterone; the kind of fathering matters as well. This
(Geary, 2000). was convincingly demonstrated in two groups living next to
Research suggests that the differences in how human each other in Tanzania who came from nearly identical biologi-
fathers and mothers bond with their children are primarily a cal backgrounds (Muller et al., 2009). One group, the Datoga,
consequence of dominant cultural practices rather than a result was pastoral and mostly made up of herders, whereas the other
of intrinsic differences between fathers and mothers (Lamb, group, the Hazda, consisted of foragers in the hunter-gatherer
2004; Russell & Saebel, 1997). In some cultural contexts, the tradition. Following the general correlation that we noted earlier,
differences can be very large. For example, while mothers and the Hazda fathers were much more involved parents who spent
infants sleep in the same bed across many cultures, father-infant more time than the Datoga fathers in close proximity to their
co-sleeping has never been a strong cultural tradition (Ball infants. When researchers measured testosterone levels in the
et al., 2000; Weisner, 2009). Yet, the more dramatic cross- fathers’ saliva, they found that the Hazda fathers had consis-
cultural finding is the enormous variation in the level of father tently lower levels of testosterone than did the Datoga fathers.
involvement with their children (Lamb, 2004). For example, In contrast, men in both groups who were not fathers showed
Aka fathers, who are part of a nomadic hunter-gatherer culture higher testosterone levels and no group difference. Thus, dif-

What causes those behaviors? Early on, Ainsworth and her can lead to more insecure attachments (Belsky, 2005;
colleagues proposed that some parents may have difficulty Braungart-Rieker et al., 2001).
understanding the infant’s needs (Ainsworth et al., 1978). One set of studies in this area examined mothers’ abil-
More recent research has supported the notion that par- ity to accurately perceive negative emotional states, not
ents’ problems in perceiving and responding to social cues only in their own 4-month-old infants, but also in their

204 CHAPTER 6 CONNECTING WITH THE SOCIAL WORLD

 ferent cultural roles for fathers can influence hormonal levels, sitivity to infants. Despite the common belief that mothers are
which in turn feed back to support more intense fathering roles. biologically better tuned to be sensitive to their infant’s cries
Similar feedback loops also seem to occur with prolactin and or facial expressions, empirical studies have not provided evi-
oxytocin, two hormones associated with nurturance and trust, dence for these differences (Field, 1978; Frodi et al., 1978).
both of which have been measured at higher levels in fathers Mothers respond physiologically to crying in ways that fathers
who are more in tune with their infant’s social and emotional cannot (such as increased lactation in nursing mothers), but
states (Gordon et al., 2010). It seems very likely that cultural these physiological differences do not necessarily correspond
differences will be found here as well. to psychological differences. When men and women behave
One difference between mothers and fathers in some West- comparably with their infants, the outcomes appear to be much
ern cultures concerns their role with respect to who is more play- the same as well. Having parents of either sex who are sensi-
ful and who is more authoritarian. Studies conducted in Mexico, tive and responsive to their infant’s needs, desires, thoughts,
the United States, and Australia have shown that fathers tend to and feelings is associated with more positive psychological out-
spend more time playing with their children, while mothers more comes in the children (Lamb & Lewis, 2010).
often act as the disciplinarian (Bronstein, 1999; Lamb, 2010;
Parke, 1996; Russell & Russell, 1987). This finding runs counter
to some stereotypes about parental roles, but it is important to
remember that when the father spends less time with the child,
it may be easier for him to ignore the child’s transgressions.
Fathers also tend to play in more physically active ways with
both boys and girls. Finally, while fathers tend to spend more
than twice as much of their time with children in play (see Fig-
ure 6.14), mothers have to divide their time between play and
many other activities in which fathers tend to be less involved,
such as feeding, bathing, and dressing.
Often, the differences in mothers’ and fathers’ relations with
the child seem more related to the amount of time each parent
spends with the child. Thus, fathers and mothers who are pri-
mary caregivers interact with their infants in similar ways, and
secondary caregivers of different sexes also show similar inter-
action patterns (Field, 1978). In the past, most Western infants
developed an attachment to the mother earlier than their attach-
ment to the father, but as fathers have become increasingly
involved in child rearing, differences as to when attachments
are formed are diminishing (Sayer et al., 2004). Moreover, as
more fathers become stay-at-home parents, it is likely that a FIGURE 6.14 Fathers and attachment. Although traditional
considerably more detailed account of attachment in general studies of parent-child bonds have focused on the mother, a more
will emerge, as well as a better understanding of how maternal recent line of work has examined fathers. Some behavioral differ-
ences do seem to exist in how mothers and fathers interact with
and paternal roles may differ.
their children, such as fathers being more playful and mothers
In contrast to popular stereotypes, when cultural practices more authoritarian, but the largest difference is still a much greater
and time spent with infants are factored out, mothers and amount of time that mothers typically spend interacting with their
fathers do not appear to be biologically different in their sen- children compared to fathers.

partners and their own parents before the babies were born. Thus, a mother’s ability to understand when another per-
The less accurate a mother-to-be was at perceiving distress- son is truly distressed, without being insensitive or over-
related emotions, the more likely her infant was to show sensitive, is related to developing an appropriate interactive
insecure attachments at age 12 months or older (Braungart- relationship with her infant. Although the precise mecha-
Rieker et al., 2001; De Wolff & Van IJzendoorn, 1997). nisms of the parent’s influence may be complex and indirect

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN ATTACHMENT STYLE 205

(Atkinson et al., 2005), the correlation between parental attachment outcomes, but these causal inferences require a
social perceptions and the quality of the child’s later rela- great deal of caution. A number of other factors may also
tionships is not surprising—especially in light of the essen- explain the correlation, such as parents’ and children’s
tial reciprocal give-and-take that characterizes even the shared genotypes for social skills. That is, biological par-
earliest infant-mother relations. ents and their children may share genes that contribute to
difficulties in perceiving or understanding social and emo-
tional information. For example, Asperger’s syndrome, an
autism spectrum disorder in which individuals have diffi-
Q: What is an example of how interaction culty understanding emotional and mental states of others,
patterns between parents might predict parent- co-occurs more often in people who are genetically related
child attachment relations? (Campbell, 2010). If a parent has Asperger’s, a child is more
likely to have it as well and may have greater difficulties
understanding social nuances in interactions, leading to
As a second example of parental influence on attachment, insecure attachment styles. Similarly, there have been sev-
high levels of maternal anxiety during the prenatal period eral arguments that genes may substantially affect individ-
can predict insecure attachments. Mothers who showed ual differences in emotional regulation (Hariri & Holmes,
higher levels of general anxiety during their pregnancy 2006; Posner et al., 2010; see Chapter 7). A mother who
with their first child had a higher incidence of insecurely has trouble regulating her emotions might be more likely
attached infants at 12 months of age (Del Carmen et al., to have a child with similar problems (because of the genes
1993; O’Connor et al., 2003). Other studies have shown they share), and those difficulties might lead both mother
that maternal depression before or during pregnancy is also and child to overreact to stressful situations, potentially
related to difficulties in parent-child attachment (Atkinson increasing the likelihood of insecure attachment. Direct
et al., 2005; Bagner et al., 2010; Carter et al., 2001; Field, comparisons between parents and children are challenging,
2000; Toth et al., 2009). however, because the behavioral and physical manifesta-
The fathers’ attitude toward the infant and his appropri- tions of the same genotype can vary with age and often look
ate role as parent may also affect whether the infant has quite different in a child and an adult. For example, the
secure or insecure attachments. Fathers’ views of infants phenotype for an Asperger’s genotype will look different in
and paternal roles, as measured when their infants were a 1-year-old than in an adult.
3 months old, partially predicted the qualities of interaction
in the Strange Situation at 12 months, as did patterns of
interaction with the infant at 3 months. Thus, fathers who Q: What are some ways in which father-child
described their infants in more positive terms, who saw
themselves as important in their infant’s development, and and mother-child interaction patterns differ?
who felt that time spent with their infant was an impor-
tant life priority were more likely to have securely attached
infants. Similarly, fathers who were more sensitive to their Child Effects on Insecure Attachment Children them-
infant’s states at 3 months, who were more animated in selves might contribute to the formation of insecure attach-
play, and who showed more reciprocal play were more ments. They may have traits that make them insecure, or
likely to have securely attached infants. But fathers who they may behave in ways that cause their parents to respond
had negative attitudes toward their infants and were not in ways that then influence the child’s attachment style,
sensitive to their infants’ needs when interacting with them leading to a feedback loop between the behavior of the child
at 3 months were more likely to have insecurely attached and that of the parents. These child effects on attachment
infants. On the other hand, mothers’ attitudes and views of are of great interest to parents who wonder if they, as par-
maternal roles did not predict attachment quality, although ents, are primarily responsible for their child’s attachment
interaction patterns at 3 months did. Part of the effect may style or whether the child is more responsible.
stem from the fact that maternal attitudes tend to be more Some researchers have investigated child effects on
similar across mothers, but the difference may also suggest attachment by examining whether infant temperament
that fathers’ roles are more influenced by their attitudes plays a role. As discussed more fully in Chapter 7, infant
(Cox et al., 1992). temperament describes how each infant tends to emo-
In general, parents’ social skills and other attributes— tionally respond to specific situations; for example, some
measured before their child is born—seem to correlate with babies are highly reactive and fussy to loud noises, while
the nature of infant-parent attachments. These correlations others are hardly perturbed. At this point, there is not a
seem to suggest that parents’ attributes can cause different clear consensus on precisely how much infant tempera-

206 CHAPTER 6 CONNECTING WITH THE SOCIAL WORLD

ment affects attachment style. Among the researchers how their parents react to them. Thus, irritable infants can
who suggest that it does not have an influence, some have cause some mothers to be less responsive, which in turn may
pointed out that because the same child can show differ- influence the quality of attachments (Crockenberg, 1981;
ent attachment styles with different caregivers, a child’s Gervai, 2009).
temperament does not invariably cause a particular style of For example, consider a “colicky” infant whose distressed
interaction (Sroufe, 1985; Sroufe & Waters, 1982; Sroufe crying wakes his parents every few hours, leaving them con-
et al., 2010). Moreover, in twin studies comparing mono- stantly sleep deprived. The exhausted parents, confronted
zygotic and dizygotic twins’ attachment styles, it has been with an infant who always seems upset, might be less sensi-
difficult to consistently demonstrate a higher level of con- tive to changes in the infant’s emotional states than the par-
cordance in monozygotic twins, even though tempera- ents of a child who shows distress only rarely, sleeps through
ments are more similar in monozygotic twins (Bokhorst the night, and regularly naps during the day. Children with
et al., 2003; O’Connor & Croft, 2001; Roisman & Fraley, respiratory illness or Down syndrome also more frequently
2006, 2008). It can therefore be difficult to find a consis- show insecure attachments, presumably reflecting ways in
tent association between a particular infant temperament which the baby’s illness and communication problems might
and later attachment style. decrease the parents’ ability to be sensitive to the infant’s emo-
Other research groups, however, have found some rela- tional states and needs (Cassibba et al., 2004; Sroufe, 1985).
tionship between early behaviors associated with tempera- While infants sometimes do have different attachment
ment and later attachment styles. For example, newborn styles with different parents, in studies of families with
infants who react more negatively to the interruption of two children and two parents, each child’s attachment
sucking are more likely to be classified later as Type C style typically stays constant across both parents instead
babies (Miyake et al., 1985), as are infants who cry longer, of each parent’s style staying constant across both chil-
more frequently, and more intensely than others (Calkins & dren. Thus, in those families, the children’s attachment
Fox, 1992, 2002; Crockenberg & Leerkes, 2003). Some styles are more consistent than those of the parents, sug-
researchers suggest that both infant temperament and par- gesting that the children themselves may be shaping the
ents’ behaviors contribute to attachment style but because styles they use more than their parents are (Schneider-
those components strongly interact with each other, it can Rosen & Burke, 1999). Furthermore, any parent of more
be difficult to consistently find simple temperament effects than one child will attest that even young infants show
(Mangelsdorf et al., 2000). distinct characteristics that inevitably color the parent’s
Infants may have traits like extreme arousability or irri- interactions with the baby. As we will see in greater detail
tability or impulsivity that affect their reactions to people in Chapter 7, these individual differences in how babies
and situations (see Figure 6.15). These reactions, which are interact with caregivers may predispose them to different
based on their ability to self-regulate, may in turn affect attachment styles.

A B C
FIGURE 6.15 Child effects on attachment. Some infants seem to be intrinsically less happy and more sensitive to adverse events than oth-
ers. These differences in temperaments may well lead to different social interaction patterns with parents and caregivers that in turn help create
different attachment styles. Parents are likely to react differently to (A) an irritated baby, (B) a neutral baby, and (C) a happy baby.

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN ATTACHMENT STYLE 207

Interactions of Parent Effects and Child Effects The Consequences of Different
development of more sophisticated ways of assessing child
effects has also helped clarify how interactions between Attachment Styles
child effects and parent effects shape attachments. Although Does an infant’s attachment style early in life have long-
there is an increasing belief that infant temperament does term consequences? And if it does, how stable are those
influence attachment, we must still look for feedback loops, effects? To address these questions, we turn to behav-
wherein parental behavior affects the child’s behavior, iors and other psychological variables that correlate with
which in turn affects parental behavior. Temperamental attachment styles in infancy. For example, researchers
differences may often interact with particular social dispo- have studied whether infants’ attachment styles affect such
sitions of the child’s caregivers (Kagan, 1998). These views broad abilities as negotiating the environment by finding
are supported by more recent work looking at links between one’s way successfully through toys and furniture, reach-
particular gene variants associated with infant tempera- ing for toys, and positioning oneself in a convenient posi-
ment and particular kinds of parenting. For example, if tion for interacting with those toys. Securely attached
caregivers communicate poorly with their infant, that dif- 18-month-olds show more skills in all these abilities than
ficulty can increase the infant’s risk of showing a disorga- do insecurely attached infants (Cassidy, 1986, 2001).
nized attachment style—but only among infants who have Securely attached infants therefore seem to have a more
a particular allele of the dopamine-related gene known as refined situational awareness and a better ability to ori-
DRD4. That particular allele of DRD4 may help create a ent themselves to those situations, even when they are not
temperament that is particularly susceptible to the effects of social. In the rest of this section, we will concentrate on
parental communication problems (Gervai et al., 2007). In the effects of attachment styles on later social interactions.
short, the effects of a certain temperament on attachment As always, we will also ask about possible causal relation-
style may depend on whether it co-occurs with a particular ships and the presence of possible feedback loops. A final
form of parenting. issue concerns the extent to which our later attachments
Interactional patterns may be greatly amplified by the are predetermined by what happens to us as infants—in
infant’s own beliefs about how caregivers are likely to behave. particular, whether there is a sensitive period in infancy
Bowlby clearly sensed this possibility when he proposed that that results in infant attachment styles that exert effects on
infants have an internal working model—namely, a mental later attachments (Sroufe, 1978).
representation of the self and others and how they might
interact in different circumstances (Bowlby, 1969, 1979).
Correlations between Infant Attachment Styles and
These models seemed plausible as ways of explaining how
Children’s Social Interactions In the past two decades,
infants with different attachment styles might have dif-
many studies have asked how different attachment styles
ferent expectations about and responses to caregivers. Yet,
influence an infant’s ability to negotiate the social world.
the models were difficult to verify in their own right until
In general, secure attachments of Type B infants seem to
studies directly looked for their presence using techniques
lead to more successful social abilities. In contrast to inse-
that have successfully explored social cognition in infants.
curely attached infants, securely attached infants engaged
As described more completely in the Scientific Methods
in more reciprocal interactions in peer play, had more posi-
box, securely attached infants expected other infants to seek
tive emotions, and were less withdrawn. Securely attached
comfort from caregivers and for the caregivers to respond
infants had smoother interactions with strangers when
accordingly. In contrast, insecure/resistant infants also
they were 3 years old, and they were rated more highly by
expected infants to seek comfort but thought that caregivers
teachers for competence in peer play (Lieberman, 1977;
would not provide it; and insecure/avoidant infants thought
Lutkenhaus et al., 1985; Waters et al., 1979). Similarly, tod-
not only that infants would avoid seeking comfort but also
dlers who were securely attached as infants were judged to
that caregivers would not provide it if requested (Johnson
be more sociable with peers and more attentive and inter-
et al., 2010). The infants’ expectations based on these mod-
ested in their playmates (Pastor, 1981). Many other stud-
els amplified the role of feedback, as the models might help
ies also suggest relations between infant attachment styles
to strengthen a particular kind of attachment style, which in
and later social skills in toddlerhood and preschool years
turn would reinforce a particular class of models.
(Granot & Mayseless, 2001). For example, infant attach-
ment styles seem to predict a 3-year-old’s attractiveness as a
potential playmate with peers. Children who were securely
Q: To what extent do infants’ temperament styles attached as infants were seen as more attractive to interact
influence later attachment styles? with than those who had been anxiously attached, suggest-
ing that lower interaction skills may be partly caused by

208 CHAPTER 6 CONNECTING WITH THE SOCIAL WORLD

 SCIENTIFIC METHOD: Internal Working Models and Attachment Styles
Hypothesis: Habituation event: Separation
p
Infants with different attachment styles have different mental representations
about how infants and caregivers will interact in situations involving seeking
and providing comfort.

Method: Test events:

p
Responsive g
caregiver p
Unresponsive g
caregiver
1. Thirty-three 13-month-old infants watched animations in which a “baby”
encountered difficulties and a “mother” responded.
2. Infants were habituated to a “separation” video in which the “mother”
left the “baby” and the “baby” pulsed slightly and emitted human infant
crying sounds (as indicated by the sound waves).
12
3. Infants then observed two test events in which the “mother” either

Average looking time (in seconds)

responded by moving next to the “baby” or responded by moving 10
farther away.
4. Researchers recorded infants’ looking times and related these to infants’ 8
classifications in the Strange Situation.
6

Results:
4
Secure infants looked longer when the “mother” moved away from the
distressed “baby,” while insecure infants looked longer when the “mother” 2
moved closer.
0
Conclusion: Secure Insecure

Infants’ cognitive models of how caregivers and infants interact vary Final Responsive Unresponsive
with their attachment styles, suggesting that the models may further entrench habituation caregiver caregiver
those styles, which in turn reinforce those models. Other
studies in this set show that infants also have different models of how babies
will respond to caregivers, further supporting the idea of a feedback loop.
Source study: Johnson et al. (2010).

others’ perception that children with insecure attachment socializing might share a common cause, arising out of
styles in infancy are less desirable (Jacobson & Wille, 1986). infant temperament.
Despite all the evidence of an association between A second interpretation for the link between infants’
infants’ attachment styles and their abilities and social attachment styles and the nature of their childhood rela-
tendencies as children, these studies do not unequivocally tionships suggests that certain environmental conditions
show that attachment style differences in infancy directly can foster insecure attachments and also affect later social
cause those later abilities and social tendencies. There are patterns. For example, if a family is under extreme stress—
two alternative ways of interpreting this evidence. First, say, from marital discord or poverty—the constant pressure
some infants’ temperamental features may elicit ineffective could lead to insecure attachments that could last for several
patterns of social interaction from others. These features years. The effects could work through both children and
might hamper the typical back-and-forth rhythms that parents. Stressed parents might be less able to fully engage
help build ways for two individuals to come into better with their infants and less sensitive to their needs, leading
emotional and social synchrony. In infancy, these prob- infants to see the parents as less reliable sources of comfort
lems might lead to insecure attachments, and later they and safety. Infants in stressful environments might be poorly
might cause more strained interactions with peers and nourished or sleep deprived and less adept at communicat-
other social difficulties. In this view, children’s social dif- ing their states to their caregivers, which could lead to both
ficulties are not caused by insecure attachment in infancy; less responsiveness from the caregivers and insecure attach-
instead, insecure attachment and later problems with ment in infants and older children.

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN ATTACHMENT STYLE 209

 One study examined attachment patterns in families in infants whose mothers are more sensitive caregivers might
East and West Germany shortly after the fall of the Berlin share with their mothers a genetic predisposition for inter-
Wall. This was a stressful time: as the country was being personal sensitivity that makes them less likely to be con-
reunited, many families were experiencing radical changes trolling as adults.
in their workplaces, homes, and networks of support. Although unusual interactional styles in infancy can
These social and political changes led to insecure attach- predict social problems in middle childhood, adolescence,
ments when parents had trouble adjusting to the changes and even adulthood (Brumariu & Kerns, 2010; Collins &
(Ahnert & Lamb, 2001). In such cases, insecure attach- Sroufe, 1999; Sroufe et al., 1999), these links may not
ment styles in infancy might be correlated with later social result specifically from events in infancy. Instead, they
problems because both factors might result from the same may grow out of a consistent and sustained pattern of
environmental stressors. Similar effects may occur when problematic interactions that started in infancy and con-
one parent in a military family is deployed abroad. If the tinued throughout much of childhood. Had the difficul-
parent who stays with the children does not have adequate ties stopped after infancy, the long-term effects might have
social support to handle the stress of the transition, the disappeared. Thus, problems in infancy do not necessar-
children may be at increased risk for insecure attachments ily cause problems in adulthood. Indeed, when struggling
(Posada et al., 2010). families manage to leave acute poverty after the infant’s
It is also likely that these two explanations—one first year, and when infants start to have much more
focused on the child’s temperament and the other on the rewarding interactions, they usually do not suffer negative
environment—interact to affect childhood patterns of long-term consequences. Unfortunately, effects can work
social interaction. An infant with a difficult temperament in the other direction as well. Those families that enter
can more easily trigger adverse behavior in most caregiv- poverty and its attendant chaos often show a rise of inse-
ers, which then exacerbates the infant’s difficult behav- cure attachments (Weinfield et al., 2000). It is thus quite
ior, and so on, in a downward-spiraling feedback loop. As difficult to support the notion that irrevocable patterns of
these alternatives show, there is still much to learn about relating to others are established during a specific sensitive
the development of insecure attachments and their effects period. In short, even if infants show some problematic
later in childhood (Sroufe, 2002). social behaviors, these interactional patterns can be modi-
fied to produce more fruitful and productive interpersonal
Long-Term Links between Infant Attachment Styles behaviors and relationships.
and Adult Relationship Styles Researchers have also
explored whether adult relationship styles are related to
infant attachment styles. While the connection is a complex
one, some links between childhood attachment style and Q: What are two possible explanations for the
later relationship style as adults have been revealed with the
help of sophisticated analytical models and methods (Cassidy,
correlations between infant attachment styles
2000; Fraley, 2002; Fraley & Roberts, 2005; Fraley & Shaver, and later social behavioral patterns?
2000; Roisman, 2009). For example, one study revealed that
styles of interaction between parents and their 13-year-olds
were related to those children’s styles of romantic relation-
ships 8 years later, at age 21 (Roisman et al., 2001). Looking Cross-Cultural Differences
at infant attachment styles more directly, one longitudi-
nal study has shown that the interactional style between in Attachment Styles
a mother and her 18-month-old child does predict some Although Ainsworth conducted several studies of individ-
aspects of the child’s later relationship style with peers and ual differences in attachment styles in Uganda (Ainsworth,
partners (Zayas et al., 2011). In that study, researchers mea- 1967), most research on attachment styles has been con-
sured the mother’s behavior toward the infant, rather than ducted in Western countries, particularly on middle-class
the infant’s behavior in the Strange Situation, and found Americans. In this chapter, we have occasionally looked at
that the children whose mothers provided them with more effects in other countries and in other social classes, but it is
sensitive care in infancy were less controlling at age 22. They important to more directly consider how attachment styles
also had less anxiety about partners rejecting or abandon- and patterns of child care can vary across cultures. This
ing them and were less concerned about relying on those approach will enable us both to better understand what the
partners. Nonetheless, shared genotypes and environmental common research techniques, such as the Strange Situation,
influences likely contribute to these links between infant are measuring and to understand the individual differences
attachment style and adult relationship style. For example, themselves. One strategy that can help shed light on the

210 CHAPTER 6 CONNECTING WITH THE SOCIAL WORLD

meaning of differences in attachment is to see whether they proximity to their mothers for longer periods of time than
manifest similarly in different cultures. infants in other cultures. Similarly, some Israeli infants
Perhaps surprisingly, the relative incidence of different who live in a kibbutz community experience repeated con-
attachment styles, as measured using Ainsworth’s Strange tacts with familiar adults in the kibbutz and may hardly
Situation, varies dramatically across cultures (Thompson, ever see strangers. Despite the differences in these experi-
1998; Van IJzendoorn & Kroonenberg, 1988). Consider, ences, both groups might be expected to show an increase
for example, the substantial cultural differences shown in Type C responses in the Strange Situation because both
in Table 6.2. The majority of German infants studied Japanese and Israeli infants would develop expectations
were measured as insecurely attached (mostly avoidant, or that caregivers would always be immediately available and
Type A). Japanese infants showed no avoidant attachments responsive and therefore would show increased distress and
whatsoever, and they were almost three times as likely as anxiety when left alone with a stranger. On the other hand,
their American counterparts to show anxious (Type C) in some parts of Germany, child rearing often emphasizes
attachments. Finally, one group of Israeli children showed early independence from adults. If these children are more
almost 10 times as many anxious attachments as Swedish accustomed to separations and more frequently exposed to
children. Because the procedure used in the Strange Situ- strangers, those experiences could easily lead to a greater
ation is relatively straightforward, it does not seem that incidence of Type A responses.
these variations can be explained by simple methodologi- The problem, then, is that the Strange Situation con-
cal discrepancies in how the assessments were conducted veys very different levels of anxiety, depending on a cul-
(Harwood et al., 1995; Thompson, 1998; Van IJzendoorn & ture’s child-rearing practices. Ideally, a more consistent
Kroonenberg, 1988). At the same time, it makes little sense measure would involve exposing children from different
to conclude that entire cultures are rearing most of their chil- cultures to equivalent levels of subjective “strangeness”
dren in socially maladaptive ways. and then looking for differences in attachment style.
Perhaps there are subtle ways in which the Strange Situ- Although no perfect technique along these lines has yet
ation is inadequate as a measure of differences in attach- been developed, other evidence suggests that cultural dif-
ment style across cultures. One possibility is that differences ferences in attachment style have been exaggerated. In
in child rearing across cultures influence the degree of fact, the differences appear much smaller when the full
“strangeness” that children experience in the Strange Situ- Strange Situation method is not used. For example, one
ation. Consider, for example, that in most Japanese house- analysis focused on the infant’s initial reaction to the
holds, early separation of the mother from the child is Strange Situation before separation from and reunion
strongly discouraged. Japanese infants are usually in close with the mother occurred (Sagi et al., 1991). The research-
ers hypothesized that the ways that infants first size up a
novel situation might be less vulnerable to cultural dif-
ferences than their responses to separations. The initial
Type A Type B Type C reactions were thought to reveal, among other things, the
(Avoidant) (Secure) (Anxious) infant’s level of trust in the mother in a way that might be
robustly measured across cultures. When such an analysis
Sweden 22 75 4
was undertaken, cultural differences did indeed become
Israel 8 57 34 greatly reduced and often became nonexistent (Sagi et al.,
Great Britain 22 75 3 1991). In particular, when infants were coded in terms of
Japan 0 68 32 initial reactions only, it was still possible to code them into
clear attachment style categories; then when cross-cultural
Germany 49 33 12
comparisons were made between infants from Germany,
Netherlands 34 6 0 Holland, Israel, Japan, Sweden, and the United States,
United States 22 66 12 most of the typical differences across cultures disap-
peared, with only infants from Sweden and Israel having
TABLE 6.2 Attachment style across cultures. The percent- somewhat different frequencies of classifications from the
ages of infants with particular attachment styles, as measured by other groups. Of course, even the initial reactions might
the Strange Situation, vary dramatically across different cultures. not be perfect measures, as they, too, could be influenced
Those differences, however, may be less a reflection of differences
by prior cultural experiences and how unfamiliar those
in underlying attachments and more a reflection of differences in
the perceived “strangeness” of different situations. (Percentages do experiences made the initial situation seem.
not sum to 100 because some infants’ styles could not be reliably Cross-cultural comparisons using different methods for
coded, and some infants were coded as Type D.) Adapted from studying attachment therefore illustrate the problems that
Thompson (1998). can arise in applying an assessment technique to different

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN ATTACHMENT STYLE 211

 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL P OLICY

Day Care and Attachment

I
n many societies, the percentage of two-parent households in Some researchers argue that spending a lot of time in day
which both parents work outside the home increased greatly care, usually defined as being cared for by individuals other
in the last few decades of the twentieth century. In 1975, than the parents for 20 or more hours a week, poses some
39 percent of American mothers with children under 6 years risks for children even when the care is high quality. The most
of age worked outside the home. That percentage increased consistently negative research assessments of the effects of
continuously up to 59 percent in 1998, and in 2006 it was long hours in day care initially came from the Pennsylvania
roughly 65 percent (Coontz, 2010; Cotter et al., 2008). These Infant and Family Development Project (Belsky, 1986, 2001,
changes are coupled with other changes in Western families, 2005; Belsky & Rovine, 1987, 1988). In that project, research-
especially because grandparents and other relatives are less ers measured Strange Situation responses in 1-year-olds who
likely to live nearby and so are not available to take care of the spent large amounts of time in day care during their first year of
children when the parents go to work. In this context, day care life and found that 43 percent of the infants were classified as
can be viewed as either a liberating source of social support or insecurely attached to their mothers, as opposed to 28 percent
a necessary compromise for dealing with economic necessity. of infants who experienced little or no early day care. Other
Sometimes these views can coexist in the mind of a parent who studies in the 1980s reported similar effects (Barglow et al.,
is concerned about the impact of day care on his or her children. 1987; Gamble & Zigler, 1986).
It is important to understand that the range of day care set- These early studies treated day care as the same across
tings and programs is enormous. Day care providers differ in all of the studies and did not take into account other factors,
their philosophies, caregiver-to-child ratios, training methods such as the quality of the day care (for example, the ratio of
for staff, rates of staff turnover, and physical facilities. Given infants to caregivers and caregiver training) and the differences
this wide variety of forms of day care and given the general in the children (temperament and gender) and in their families
trend toward increasing use of some form of day care in many (for example, sensitivity and responsiveness of the parents to
cultures, the most pressing social policy questions revolve the child and stressors experienced by working parents). Some
around what kinds of day care are associated with the most researchers expressed concern that these other factors may
positive outcomes for children (see Figure 6.16). have also played a role in attachments between mothers and
their infants who were in day care (Clarke-Stewart, 1989).
Moreover, using the Strange Situation in these kinds of stud-
ies may have introduced problems similar to the ones intro-
duced in the cross-cultural studies. Children who have spent
much of their infancy in a day care center with strangers com-
ing and going might have quite different adaptations to what is
“strange” than infants who spent more time close to a parent.
Extensive day care can thus be thought of as a kind of “culture”
quite different from extensive home care, so it is important to
be cautious in interpreting these differences in Strange Situation
classifications, especially in light of later studies.
In the early 1990s, a massive U.S. study was launched to
look more systematically at how both the quality and amount of
nonmaternal child care related to many aspects of development.
That study, known as the NICHD Study of Early Child Care and
Youth Development, started with over 1,300 infants and contin-
FIGURE 6.16 Effects of day care. Many studies have
ued to study over 1,000 of those children well into adolescence
examined the effects of day care on attachment style. The most
investigated factors for links to attachment style are (1) the qual-
(NICHD, 2005). Although the results are complex and nuanced,
ity of the care itself, which can vary enormously across different several general patterns have been found consistently and rep-
day care settings, and (2) the amount of time spent in day care. licated in other countries.

212 CHAPTER 6 CONNECTING WITH THE SOCIAL WORLD

 The researchers looked at the possible effects of both quality who had been in poor-quality day care showed more behavioral
and amount of nonmaternal care in three areas: children’s attach- and social difficulties than those who had been cared for at home,
ment style, their broader social functioning, and their cognitive whereas those who had been in high-quality day care showed
and language development. They also asked if the effects varied no more difficulties than those cared for at home (Howes, 1990:
depending on children’s backgrounds. For example, would more Loeb et al., 2007). When children experienced poor-quality day
at-risk children be more influenced by quality of care? care only after infancy, it still predicted later adjustment problems.
In this study, it was difficult to systematically link differences It is also important to keep in mind that parents who seem least
in children’s attachment style to either the amount of time spent sensitive to their children’s needs are also more likely to be less
in day care or quality of care. Although low-quality care seemed attentive to differences in day care quality. Some studies, such
potentially associated with insecure attachments at 15 months, as the NICHD study, have tried to control for parent and child
the same link was not found at 36 months (NICHD, 2001). effects statistically, but there is still a strong possibility that these
Moreover, while children who were in day care at an early age factors, as well as shared genotypes and shared environments,
showed an initial advantage in self-confidence and social skills, continue to influence the associations between day care quality
these positive effects were relatively modest and tended to dis- and later outcomes. Without experimental studies that randomly
appear with increasing age (Lamb, 1998; NICHD, 1998, 2001, assign children to different levels of quality care—which would
2003). With respect to broader social functioning, the amount obviously be unethical—it is difficult to tell.
of time a child spends in day care is associated with more As noted earlier, the amount of time that mothers spend at
aggression, more disobedience, and more challenges of adults work does not predict attachment relations with their infants
in a child’s early school years, but it is not related to higher (Huston & Rosenkrantz Aronson, 2005). But the amount of
incidences of psychopathology. This finding makes sense, given available time a mother spends with her infant does predict the
that children who spend much of their time with peers and quality of the attachment relationship. Thus, when mothers have
away from their parents might well be less intimidated by adult the time, whether they work or not, the extent to which they
authorities. Even into the teenage years, 15-year-olds who had choose to use that time to interact in a high-quality manner with
been in more extensive day care as infants showed somewhat their child is related to the quality of the attachment. Even then,
higher levels of risk taking and impulsivity (Vandell et al., 2010). however, the causation appears to be that sensitive mothers
Nonetheless, these associations, while statistically signifi- who relate to their children well want to spend more time with
cant, are not massive. More specifically, the correlations between them, not that the time spent itself causes the relationship to be
amount of time spent in day care and variables like impulsivity better and makes the mother more sensitive.
levels or risk-taking tendencies are roughly at the 0.1 level. This A final question concerns whether the amount and quality of
means that the vast amount of variation across children is due to day care show different developmental associations for children
factors other than the amount of time they spent in day care. While from disadvantaged backgrounds. It now appears that these
any statistically significant correlations are of interest, it is impor- children benefit more than other children from high-quality
tant to keep their small size in mind (McCartney et al., 2010). care and large amounts of it and that they suffer more from
The effects of day care quality might seem to be easier to lower-quality care (Anderson et al., 2003; Caughy et al., 1994;
demonstrate, but they, too, can be hard to document consis- Dearing et al., 2009; Geoffroy et al., 2010). For these children,
tently, especially with respect to attachment security and social high-quality day care is most often related to higher levels of
behaviors. Better quality of care is, however, associated with cognitive and linguistic skills rather than social skills.
higher levels of cognitive and linguistic development among Overall, high-quality child care is rarely associated with
children and even among adolescents (NICHD, 2001; Vandell detectable long-term problems and is often associated with
et al., 2010). The higher the quality of care, the higher the chil- positive outcomes. These positive associations are especially
dren’s scores on assessments of cognition and language. More- strong for cognitive and linguistic development among children
over, children who spend more time in high-quality day care from disadvantaged backgrounds. The social policy implication
tend to score higher on cognitive and linguistic measures than seems clear. Poor families often have fewer options for child
do children who spend less time in such care. care, putting their children at higher risk for ending up in low-
Poor-quality day care has, unsurprisingly, been associated with quality care. These patterns suggest that it is especially impor-
more negative outcomes—but these relationships are not always tant to focus resources on making high-quality care available to
easy to interpret. Some studies have found that kindergartners the most disadvantaged children.

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN ATTACHMENT STYLE 213

groups without considering whether they all interpret the normal attachments and whether the effects of early social
technique in the same way. Failure to consider such culture- deprivation can be reversed.
specific differences may lead to the belief that cultures show
large differences in the incidence of different attachment
styles, whereas a more culturally sensitive analysis might
reveal deeper commonalities that suggest quite consistent Social Deprivation in Humans
ratios of the different styles across cultures. We should not When children are deprived of the opportunity to form
underestimate the influences of culture on many aspects of attachments, the effects can be devastating. These effects
a child’s behavior, but in making cross-cultural compari- have been discussed for many years (Bakwin, 1942; Durfee &
sons, we cannot assume that a particular measure means the Wolf, 1933; Lowrey, 1940; Provence & Lipton, 1962). René
same thing to all participants. Spitz’s research on infants in Latin America in the 1940s has
The cross-cultural comparisons also highlight some of been especially influential (Spitz, 1945, 1946). Spitz compared
the limitations of the Strange Situation. Over its long his- two groups of infants. One group lived in a foundling home
tory, it has produced many useful insights, but we must that had roughly one nurse for every eight infants. The infants
interpret it carefully, mindful of the setting. In addition rarely had the same caregiver for very long, both because of
to the problem of controlling for subjective impressions of rapid staff turnover and because the nurses frequently rotated
strangeness, the measure tends to categorize children into assignments. The babies could not see one another or the
one of three or four types, whereas many believe that differ- bustle of activities in the ward because bed sheets were hung
ences in styles should be thought of as varying along a con- on the railings all around the cribs to reduce drafts. Instead,
tinuous dimension (Lamb et al., 1984). Researchers have each infant saw a largely featureless, white world during most
developed other measures that try to avoid some of the limi- waking hours. As Spitz put it, “The result of this system is that
tations of the Strange Situation (Cassidy & Marvin, 1992; each baby lies in solitary confinement up to the time when he
Thompson, 1998), but even these newer measures can be is able to stand up in his bed” (Spitz, 1945, p. 63).
challenging to apply and interpret across all cultures. Varia- The infants in the second group that Spitz studied were
tions in attachment styles certainly continue to be a topic of raised in a nursery because their mothers had been impris-
great interest; the challenge for future research in this area is oned. These infants were able to see out of their cribs and
to develop new ways of assessing attachment styles that are interact freely with other infants and caregivers. The nurs-
robust across all cultures and settings. ery had a better caregiver-infant ratio, and there was less
staff turnover than in the foundling home. In addition,
the imprisoned mothers were allowed to interact with their
babies for roughly 20 hours each week. The infants in the
Q: What are some cautions to keep in mind prison nursery also had toys and more opportunities to
crawl about, but the nursery environment was not kept
when using the Strange Situation to study especially clean and there was not careful medical supervi-
attachment styles across cultures? sion. In short, foundling babies lived in an environment
that was sterile in every sense of the word (antiseptically
clean and devoid of any meaningful social activities and
objects; see Figure 6.17), whereas the babies in the prison nurs-
Effects of Early Social ery lived in a less clean but more stimulating environment.

Deprivation Deficits in Socially Deprived Infants In the first few

months of life, neither the foundling home nor the prison
As we have seen, different species form and maintain attach-
nursery environment seemed to make much of a difference
ments in similar ways, though many of the specific attach-
for the infants. After 4 months, however, dramatic differ-
ment behaviors differ. In this section, we will explore what
ences emerged: the prison nursery babies showed relatively
happens when human infants and other primate infants are
normal reactions, while the foundling home babies showed
prevented from forming normal attachments. Although lab-
massive deficits. Four classes of adverse effects were most
oratory experiments on humans would be unethical, experi-
frequently observed in the foundling babies:
mental studies on other primates have enabled researchers
to compare the effects of social deprivation on those pri- 1. The infants became progressively less likely to move
mates with human children’s developmental outcomes in about. Locomotion of all forms, including exploratory
several tragic real-world settings. We will consider which crawling, diminished, and the infants tended to sit or lie
aspects of social contact are most important for developing in one place for hours.

214 CHAPTER 6 CONNECTING WITH THE SOCIAL WORLD

 more susceptible to the illnesses. (This hypothesis antici-
pated the finding that intense stress can reduce the immune
system’s response, making stressed individuals more suscep-
tible to a variety of afflictions; Cohen et al., 2007; Gunnar &
Vazquez, 2006; Maes, 1997; Schleifer et al., 1999.) The cli-
ché that “man does not live by bread alone” never had a more
vivid and depressing demonstration.
In another study, institutionalized infants’ showed delays
in motor behavior and language, as well as failure to inter-
act with their peers or to seek out adults when in distress.
Those who were still institutionalized at 10 to 13 months
also showed impairments in deferring gratification, general-
izing, and problem solving (Provence & Lipton, 1962). In
short, deprivation is devastating, and its effects seem to be
FIGURE 6.17 Social deprivation. Infants and children who grow linked to deficient exposure to other individuals (see also
up in orphanages with severe social neglect (as in this Romanian
Goldfarb, 1943, 1945, for other early studies on the dev-
orphanage)often suffer devastating psychological and biological
consequences.
astating effects of early social deprivation). Nonetheless,
more detailed studies were needed to pin down the specific
causes. Further studies in humans, as well as companion
2. The infants developed bizarre reactions to strangers and studies with primates, have greatly helped narrow down the
unfamiliar things, exhibiting terrified faces and gestures, possibilities.
screams, and wild rages directed at the unknown person
or thing. The infants were extraordinarily unstable and
hyperfearful. Sometimes, if a stranger remained present,
the infants would suddenly frantically cling to the person. Q: What are some of the effects of long-term
3. The infants showed unusual, repetitive motor patterns, social deprivation in human infancy?
including incessantly rocking back and forth, biting or
gnawing at parts of their own body, and banging their head
against the crib. These sorts of behaviors are usually attrib-
uted to a need for stimulation, even at the cost of self-muti- Untangling Causation After the Second World War,
lation. Apparently, some situations can create such a need Freud’s daughter, Anna, a major figure in psychoanalytic
for stimulation that the obvious pain is not a deterrent. theory in her own right, and her colleague, Sophie Dann,
4. Many of the deprived infants had disconcertingly vacant, published a paper about a group of six children whose par-
expressionless faces. They had a faraway look in their ents had been killed in concentration camps during the war
eyes, seemed to look right through most people who (Freud & Dann, 1951). The six children had each arrived
approached, and seemed unaware of what was going on separately at a concentration camp in Terezin, Czechoslova-
in their immediate environment. kia, when they were between the ages of 6 months and 1 year.
It was unclear how much of an opportunity they had had
The most disturbing difference between the groups, how- to form specific attachments with their parents before arriv-
ever, was the mortality rate. Over 37 percent of the infants in ing at Terezin, given the chaos in their families’ lives shortly
the foundling home had died by the end of 2 years. By con- before they were sent to the concentration camps. The chil-
trast, not a single child out of the 122 who were in the prison dren remained at Terezin for almost 3 years and were cared
nursery died, even though the foundling home had better for by various fellow prisoners, but they never had an oppor-
sanitary conditions and more frequent professional medical tunity to become attached to any of the adults, as the adults
visits (Spitz, 1945, 1946). Thus, the foundling babies, whose were constantly being relocated or killed or dying of disease
physical needs of nutrition, physical warmth, and shelter and starvation at Terezin. The children survived through the
were all met, had a significant chance of dying, whereas chil- efforts of many adults, and upon liberation in the summer of
dren in the dirtier, less physically healthy prison environment 1945, they were taken to England. There they remained in
showed lower mortality rates. The foundling babies died of the care of Freud and her colleagues for approximately 1 year
a variety of causes, including a measles epidemic, but Spitz before being placed in foster homes (see Figure 6.18).
argued that since the prison nursery children were exposed Despite the horrors of the camp and the lack of attach-
to a similar range and frequency of diseases, the foundling ments to any adult figures, the children did form close
babies’ social deprivation must have somehow made them bonds to each other. In fact, they were extraordinarily close

EFFECTS OF EARLY SOCIAL DEPRIVATION 215

A B
FIGURE 6.18 The mediating factor of close peer bonds. Anna Freud and Sophie Dann’s studies of six children who had grown up in a
concentration camp revealed that bonds formed among the children were able to mitigate many of the deleterious effects of being deprived of
a constant set of caregivers. (A) Children behind barbed wire at a concentration camp in Auschwitz. (B) Children who had been separated from
their parents during the war and brought to England to live in war evacuation residences, as were the six children in the Freud and Dann study.

and showed great distress when one of the six was absent. opportunities for social give-and-take with willing partners.
They also were quite wary of adults and took a long time Although infants can attend to the special distinctive prop-
to trust adults and show any attachments to people outside erties of some social stimuli very early on, it seems to take
their group. Even with all their hardships, however, these time and practice to learn the nuances of those stimuli that
six children seemed considerably better off than children form the foundation for specific, focused attachments.
who underwent more complete social deprivation. They Unfortunately, children still suffer from social deprivation
were less withdrawn, did not show self-mutilation, and had throughout the world, and its effects remain as devastating
relatively normal social relations among themselves except as they were in Spitz’s time. In Romania, a large number of
for being extremely “clingy” with each other. Apparently, children were abandoned to state-run orphanages during a
the opportunity to interact and bond with peers was enough period when Nicolae Ceausescu headed the country. When
to protect these children from the intense emotional prob- he fell from power in 1990, foreign researchers started to
lems observed in more fully deprived infants. This study visit the orphanages and found horrendous conditions.
suggested that infants’ need for nourishment might not be There were often more than 10 children for each caregiver,
the most important factor motivating their attachments. It making meaningful interactions impossible. Children who
also showed that the role of nurturant older individuals in were younger than 2 were left lying in their cribs without
early social development is not as absolutely critical as most stimulation for up to 20 hours each day. In recent years, one
parents might think. group of Romanian infants has been studied extensively—
Later studies on deprivation have led researchers to sug- not to document deprivation effects, but to understand how
gest that in the first few months of life, interacting with any the children responded when they were removed from their
responsive social beings may be enough to put infants on harsh environment and adopted into loving families.
a normal trajectory for attachment. Only later, after about This group of severely deprived children showed the
6 months, does the infant seem to need to form specific same tendencies toward vacant expressions and rocking
attachments to individuals. Thus, children isolated from back and forth that were seen in the deprived children in
their parents early on show few or no deficits as long as other earlier studies. As American and Canadian families began
responsive caregivers fill in during the first few months adopting these children, researchers started to ask about
of life (Schaffer & Callender, 1959; Schaffer & Emerson, the developmental outcomes and adjustment of the chil-
1964). At that age, interacting with a variety of people is dren who had been adopted. One relevant study followed
as beneficial for the infant as the same level of interaction three groups of infants in British Columbia (Mainemer et
with one person. Even if very young infants are able to rec- al., 1998). One group had been in Romanian orphanages
ognize individuals and develop specific interaction patterns for at least 8 months before adoption. A second group had
with them, they may not need such interactions with the been adopted from Romanian orphanages at an earlier age,
same individuals at an early age. Instead, they simply need in the first 4 months of life. A third group, which served as

216 CHAPTER 6 CONNECTING WITH THE SOCIAL WORLD

a control group, consisted of Canadian-born, nonadopted 140
Community
children who were matched with the first group in terms of Institution
age and sex.

Cognitive Development Index

120
The researchers examined many aspects of the adopted
children’s development and their adjustment to their new
circumstances and found complex patterns of effects. But 100
one clear finding stood out. In most cases, the longer the
children had spent in Romanian orphanages, the worse
80
their outcomes. Even after 4 or more years in an adoptive
family, they were more likely to have difficulties forming
normal social relationships with their parents and others. 60
Nonetheless, some of the children who had been in Roma-
nian orphanages for more than a year seemed to recover
40
fully after a few years in adoptive homes. It is less clear, 0 10 20 30 40
however, whether these more fortunate outcomes were due Chronological age (in months)
to temperamental differences that made the children espe- FIGURE 6.19 Cognitive development and social deprivation.
cially resilient or to especially effective patterns of child Children who grew up in Romanian orphanages under conditions of
rearing in these adoptive homes or to both. severe social deprivation (labeled “Institution”) showed markedly lower
These studies also suggested that social deprivation can scores on tests of cognitive development than did children who grew
cause a general disengagement from the world that may up with their families in a nearby community (labeled “Community”).
also impede cognitive development. The Romanian chil- Thus, above and beyond the dramatic effects of social deprivation on
dren who had spent at least 8 months of infancy in orphan- social development and attachment, there is a strong effect on cogni-
tive development as well. The lines roughly indicate the nature of the
ages had considerably lower intelligence test scores than
correlation between age and cognitive development, with no relation-
Romanian children who had been adopted before they ship for the community children and a strong negative one for the
were 4 months of age. In one study, Romanian children children raised in the institution.
who grew up in Romania with their parents had cognitive
development scores averaging around 103 (on a scale where
the mean is 100), while children who were in the orphan- 2007). Disinhibited attachments appear to be closely related
ages for extended periods had scores averaging around 66 to indiscriminate attachments, mentioned earlier in the chap-
(Smyke et al., 2007; see Figure 6.19). The effects likely arose ter, in which children are overly friendly with all adults.
not only from less interaction of the children with their These effects have been replicated in other settings
environment, but also from the lack of engaged adult care- throughout the world. For example, in one large-scale study
givers to teach them and to support their ability to learn. of 342 children who had been in institutions in Russia,
But the cognitive differences may also have been related to children as old as 18 continued to show cognitive and social
differences in the kinds of children who grew up in families problems (Merz & McCall, 2010; St. Petersburg–USA
as opposed to those who were put in orphanages, as some Orphanage Research Team, 2008). A particularly striking
of the institutionalized children may have had preexisting feature about the Russian study was that the facility was
cognitive deficits. Nonetheless, the magnitude of the dif- unusually clean, and the staff made an effort to meet the
ference and its persistence across studies leaves little doubt children’s physical needs in terms of food, clothing, and
that social deprivation has serious effects, not only on social shelter. Social deprivation alone in an otherwise very posi-
skills, but on a range of cognitive skills as well (Kaler & tive environment was nonetheless associated with much
Freeman, 1994). worse developmental outcomes, especially among children
Subsequent studies on the same children suggested that who were in the institutions the longest.
even at age 17, some children who had been in orphanages
more than 8 months still showed residual cognitive effects,
often taking the form of inattention and hyperactivity
(Audet & Le Mare, 2011). Other groups of Romanian orphans Q: What factors are most relevant to the effects
adopted into British homes had similar arrays of problems of social deprivation on attachment?
related to the amount of time they had spent in institutions.
They sometimes showed “disinhibited” attachments, mean-
ing that they did not modulate their emotions well in social Failure to form normal attachments can also have measur-
interactions, sometimes being overly friendly with strangers, able biological consequences. One way of assessing stress is
other times being inappropriately unfriendly (Rutter et al., by measuring blood levels of the hormone cortisol, which is

EFFECTS OF EARLY SOCIAL DEPRIVATION 217

released by the adrenal glands in cyclical patterns over the Unfortunately, despite the clear negative effects of insti-
course of each day and is involved in regulating the body’s tutionalization in which there is marked social deprivation,
stress response. Unusually elevated cortisol levels generally it remains a reality for many thousands of children world-
indicate higher levels of stress. Studies of the relationship wide. Every time a family adopts a child from a part of the
between cortisol levels and infants’ stress response have world where poverty, political crises, or disease cause many
found that insecurely attached infants are more likely than parents to give up their children, there is a real chance that
securely attached infants to show elevated cortisol levels in the child may have spent much of his or her infancy in such
situations perceived as threatening (Gunnar, 2000; Gun- an institution (Hawk & McCall, 2010), potentially causing
nar & Vazquez, 2006). Secure attachments may therefore the child to have both social and cognitive problems and
protect infants from mobilizing a stress response too soon. atypical attachment styles. The good news is that, contrary
When children in Romanian orphanages were studied, to what might be expected, most children who have suf-
researchers found that their cortisol levels tended to peak fered badly in institutions make impressive recoveries when
during midday as opposed to peaking early in the morn- adopted or put into a foster care arrangement with warm,
ing as in normal children (Carlson & Earls, 1997). Lack- responsive caregivers (Van IJzendoorn & Juffer, 2006).
ing secure attachments, the Romanian children may have Nonetheless, some children do show lasting problems well
found their day-to-day routine much more stressful than into adolescence and adulthood (Kumsta et al., 2010; Rut-
other children do. ter et al., 2007; Smyke et al., 2012). This wide variation in
outcomes between children who show near-complete recov-
ery and others who continue to have major problems is of
great interest to researchers, who are seeking to identify the
Q: How might security of attachment be related most vulnerable children and devise interventions to give
to physiological responses to stress? them a better future.

Any observational studies on the effects of institutionaliza- Q: How has random assignment been used to
tion run the risk of confusing correlation with causation.
Thus, perhaps children who leave institutions early are
study the effects of social deprivation?
selected for adoption because they seem psychologically
healthier. Once again, researchers have tried to control for
such factors, but it is difficult to do so without an experi- Deprivation Studies
mental study using random assignment. It is notable, then,
that a series of studies that did use random assignment sup- in Nonhuman Primates
ported the earlier conclusions, reporting strong, unambig- The earliest work systematically exploring nonhuman
uous causal effects of institutionalization (Bos et al., 2010; attachments was conducted by Harry Harlow and his asso-
Nelson et al., 2007; Zeanah et al., 2009). In one study, ciates in the 1950s and 1960s (Harlow, 1958; Harlow &
researchers followed 136 infants who had all initially been Harlow, 1962, 1969; Harlow & Suomi, 1971; Harlow &
in an institution. At about 22 months of age, half of these Zimmerman, 1958). In his classic experiments, Harlow
infants were randomly assigned to home foster care and studied rhesus monkeys either in conditions that were
the other half stayed at the institution. The researchers analogous to human situations or in conditions that would
assessed all the children at around 22 months and then not be possible or ethical to study in humans. Many of his
again at 30, 42, and 54 months. Children who stayed in studies with monkeys involved controlled simulations of the
the institution showed higher than normal levels of some type of deprivation experienced by the Romanian orphans
disorders, such as high anxiety and depression, whereas chil- and by the infants Spitz had studied in the foundling home.
dren who were assigned to foster homes showed a dramatic The effects on Harlow’s monkeys were often so devastating
drop in levels of anxiety and depression, which continued that today it would be exceedingly difficult to justify fur-
to decrease toward normal levels over time (Zeanah et al., ther research that would inflict such suffering on individu-
2009). A more outward behavioral hallmark of institutional- als of any species.
ized children, random repetitive movements, remained high
in the institutionalized children, but dropped dramatically Tactile Stimulation and Physiological Needs Initially,
in children in the foster homes (Bos et al., 2010). Finally, Harlow simply wanted to know if severe deprivation had
children assigned to foster homes showed markedly better effects on monkeys analogous to those in humans, with the
cognitive outcomes than those who remained in the institu- obvious research advantage of being able to conduct true
tion (Nelson et al., 2007; Smyke et al., 2012). random-assignment experiments from birth. In several

218 CHAPTER 6 CONNECTING WITH THE SOCIAL WORLD

studies, Harlow put very young rhesus monkeys into empty social behavior with other monkeys, but they seemed to fare
wire cages. These monkeys were given all the food they could better than those reared without tactile stimulation.
eat, but they had no contact with any caregiver. After a few Moreover, these monkeys formed a real attachment to
months in this environment, the young monkeys began to the terry-cloth mother, which was evident in their responses
show behaviors similar to the behavior of deprived human when an unfamiliar object, such as a plastic, bug-like toy,
infants: indifference to others and expressionless stares; clutch- was put in the cage. The alarmed monkeys would imme-
ing their heads and bodies, rocking back and forth, and bang- diately retreat to the terry-cloth figure for comfort and
ing their heads; and going into wild rages when approached protection. Although the terry-cloth figure was, of course,
by strangers. The parallels between the socially deprived mon- unresponsive, Harlow noted that it was at least “infinitely
keys and the infants studied by Spitz and others are striking. patient” with the frightened infant.
In an attempt to narrow down the causes of these three Apparently, a key element in the attachment behaviors
classes of deviant behaviors, Harlow began to manipulate that enable the young monkey to form bonds involves
individual variables that might help the baby monkeys start the particular sensation of clinging and rubbing against a
to form attachments. In one of these manipulations, the furry surface. This tactile stimulation does not directly sat-
infant monkeys were given a choice between a wire-frame isfy the infant’s physiological needs, but the experience is
“mother” that was roughly the size and shape of an adult clearly of vital importance. This study illustrates the idea
monkey and a “mother” that was covered in furry terry of prepared attachment behaviors linked to attachment.
cloth. The monkeys invariably preferred the terry-cloth The infant monkeys looked to the terry-cloth mother for
mother and frequently rubbed their stomachs against the protection, even though they had never been protected by
front of the terry-cloth mother for tactile stimulation (see “her” and never could be. Yet, there was a link between the
Figure 6.20). Quite remarkably, the presence of the cloth- behavior of rubbing against the fur of a monkey-like object
covered mother had a significant positive effect. Relative to and a feeling that the object would provide security and
the monkeys reared in empty cages or restricted to the wire- protection. This association could not possibly have been
frame mother, those with a terry-cloth mother showed less learned. Instead, it represents a connection between two
extreme repetitive behavior and fewer rages, though they attachment-related behaviors as part of a larger attachment
still feared strangers. As adults, they did not show normal complex.

A B
FIGURE 6.20 Bonding with the terry-cloth mother. (A) Infant monkeys in the Harlow studies seemed to form strong bonds to inanimate
wire-frame mothers wrapped in a furry terry cloth. Harry Harlow’s studies on various deprivation conditions and their effects on attachment
behavior served to strongly support the ethological perspective. (B) Harry Harlow is pictured here with one of the infant monkeys on the terry-
cloth mother.

EFFECTS OF EARLY SOCIAL DEPRIVATION 219

 Harlow then tested the importance of tactile stimu- also show that these behaviors can affect attachment more
lation in a follow-up study by pitting the need for tactile profoundly than other behaviors that service fundamental
stimulation directly against the infant monkey’s need for nutritive needs.
nourishment. The infant monkeys in this experiment were
each reared in a cage with two surrogate mothers: the simple
wire-frame mother, which had a plastic tube on its front that
supplied milk, and a terry-cloth mother that supplied no Q: How are some attachment behavior
nutrition. The infant monkeys quickly learned to feed from complexes “triggered” by certain features of
the wire-frame model, but they regarded it solely as a food artificial primate mothers?
source. They spent most of their time clinging to the terry-
cloth figure, scampering to the wire model only when they
were hungry (see Figure 6.21). The monkeys clearly formed
an attachment to the terry-cloth mother, even though the Peer-Raised Infants In the natural world, infants typi-
wire-frame mother was the one that relieved their hunger cally form their earliest and strongest attachments to adult
and thirst. In separate scenarios in which both mothers pro- caregivers, which seems to imply that the adult’s protective,
vided milk, the baby monkeys used the cloth mother exclu- nurturing role is crucial. In fact, we may have an exagger-
sively (Harlow & Zimmerman, 1958). ated sense of its importance because alternative situations
These studies not only illustrate the central role of par- are so rare. As noted earlier in Freud and Dann’s study of
ticular behaviors in forming attachments, but also point out the group of six children who survived the concentration
problems with the traditional learning and psychoanalytic camp together, attachments to peers may provide much of
viewpoints described earlier in this chapter. The learning what is needed for normal social development early in life.
theorists attempted to account for attachment in terms of To test this idea, Harlow designed a monkey analog of the
patterns of positive and negative reinforcement, in which Freud and Dann study by raising monkeys in groups of six
receiving food should powerfully reinforce the bond with peers, with no older monkeys present (Harlow, 1969; see
the food provider; yet, in these studies, the monkeys formed Figure 6.22). They were deprived of social interactions with
no attachment to the wire-frame figure, even when it served adults but interacted freely with each other. These infants
as a food source. The psychoanalytic theorists emphasized developed relatively normally, showing few of the deficits
the act of nursing and the importance of oral gratification in that characterized more deprived monkeys and human
forming early attachments; yet, the infant monkeys attached infants. They did show some social problems, such as dif-
to the cloth figure that provided no oral gratification. ficulties in mothering new babies and fearfulness of strang-
Of course, leaping to conclusions about humans based ers, but overall, their development was surprisingly normal.
on animal studies poses risks. But Harlow’s monkey stud- Newer and more subtle analyses have illuminated some
ies clearly illustrate how some early behaviors might serve of the lingering problems in the peer-raised monkeys. These
to support and maintain contact with caregivers. They monkeys appear to have reduced levels of the neurotrans-

Fed on cloth mother Fed on wire mother

24 24

Cloth mother
Mean hours per day

Mean hours per day

18 18
Wire mother
Cloth mother
12 Wire mother 12

6 6

0 0
1–5 6–10 11–15 16–20 21–25 1–5 6–10 11–15 16–20 21–25
A B Age (in days) Age (in days)
FIGURE 6.21 Contact comfort. (A) When monkeys are given the choice between a wire-frame “mother” and one covered in terry cloth, they
not only show a strong preference for the terry-cloth “mom,” but also tend to be less devastated by the effects of deprivation. (B) The monkeys
went to the wire mother only to feed; they went to the terry-cloth mother, whether or not she provided them with milk, for the contact comfort
she provided.

220 CHAPTER 6 CONNECTING WITH THE SOCIAL WORLD

 5-HTT gene that a monkey had seemed to predict how
he would respond to this nonoptimal social environment
(Bethea et al., 2004). We see here one possible biological
basis for the individual differences in children’s responses
to stressful environments.
Of the many studies conducted with monkeys, rats, and
humans, the vast majority converge on a finding that the
5-HTT gene is involved in moderating or exacerbating the
effects of stress (Caspi et al., 2003, 2010; Wankerl et al.,
2010; but see also Risch et al., 2009). There are two kinds
of effects. First, regardless of allele type, severe and very
early deprivation leads to lasting differences in 5-HTT
gene expression, which can result in diminished serotonin
responses for regulating stress. In effect, these changes
can result in greater emotional reactivity to stress (Spinelli
et al., 2010). One route for this effect seems to be through
FIGURE 6.22 Peer-raised monkeys. Peer-raised monkeys who a pathway in which stress hormones increase methylation
had no contact with adults developed fairly normally and would play of DNA segments (the pairing of methyl groups to DNA;
and explore with each other.
see Chapter 2), which regulates gene expression and in this
case results in diminished serotonin activity (Champagne,
2013; Champagne & Curley, 2009; Ichise et al., 2006;
mitter serotonin in their brains compared with monkeys Murgatroyd et al., 2009). Second, in monkeys and humans
raised by adults. Low serotonin levels have been associated who have the short version of the 5-HTT allele, the effects
with several psychological problems, including aggression of stress are even more significant, including greater meth-
and impulsive behavior (Bennett et al., 2002; Higley & Lin- ylation and hence greater reduction in serotonin activity.
noila, 1997). Researchers theorize that the effects of early Even in somewhat less stressful environments, those with
deprivation may arise largely from changes in two biological the short version may experience epigenetic changes (envi-
systems: a stress-buffering system related to cortisol levels ronmentally induced changes in gene expression that in
and an impulse control system related to serotonin levels. this case lead to reduced serotonin levels) and greater emo-
Cortisol is part of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis tional reactivity, while those with the longer version may
(HPA), which regulates the body’s response to stress as well not be affected at all. We see here a biological example of
as regulating other body functions. The neurotransmitter a feedback loop in a gene-environment interaction. If an
serotonin is involved both in the activation and feedback organism has a short version of the 5-HTT gene, the effects
control of the HPA. Serotonin is thought to play a role in of a stressful environment can be amplified, which in turn
early socialization and attachment by helping to regulate causes a higher stress response. This physiological response
levels of anxiety in stressful social situations, such as separa- then causes an even more severe decline in the activity of the
tions from caregivers, so that the stress response is neither relevant gene, leading to even more stress reactivity, and so
too extreme nor absent completely. on, in a downward-cycling feedback loop.
Perhaps most interesting is the discovery of how indi- A final interesting twist on the persistence of both short
vidual biological differences interact with environmental and long versions of the 5-HTT gene is that the short ver-
experiences. The gene known as 5-HTT, which regulates sion may have evolutionary adaptive value in some circum-
serotonin levels, seems to have two alleles: a “long” form stances, which may be why it has remained in the general
and a “short” form. Monkeys who were raised by their population. In a dangerous environment where high levels
mothers showed normal serotonin levels, regardless of of vigilance and anxiety may enhance survival, organisms
which version of the allele they had. But monkeys who with short versions of the gene will more likely experience
were raised by peers—and thus lived in a more stressful enduring epigenetic changes that make them more sensi-
environment than the one experienced by monkeys raised tive responders to potential dangers (Heiming & Sachser,
by their mothers—had different serotonin levels based on 2010). The short version of the 5-HTT gene may therefore
which version of the allele they had. Those with the long lead to increased survival in some contexts, though it is
version of 5-HTT fared pretty well when raised by peers, now maladaptive for many human infants who are exposed
but those with the short version tended to show lower sero- to high levels of stress early in life. As is so often the case
tonin levels and more impulse control problems, includ- with genetic effects, the 5-HTT gene is likely to be only
ing more aggression (Suomi, 1999). Thus, the form of the a small part of the overall genetic story, with comparable

EFFECTS OF EARLY SOCIAL DEPRIVATION 221

gene-environment interactions occurring for several other recent evidence seems to point toward some reversible out-
quite distinct genes (Bogdan et al., 2012). comes, although the amount of evidence is not extensive.
One longitudinal study of children reared in a socially
impoverished institution from birth until 2 years of age
or older suggested that having appropriately affectionate
Critical-Period Effects? adoptive parents could sometimes undo the children’s
Many early researchers assumed that there was a critical early social problems (Hodges & Tizard, 1989; Tizard,
period during which social interactions had to be experi- 1977). This is not to minimize the negative effects of
enced. Researchers believed that if there was complete social an infancy spent in institutions that deprive infants of
deprivation during this period, the effects were irreversible. normal social contact and interactions; the children did
Certainly, many of Harlow’s monkeys continued to exhibit appear to be at greater risk for problems. Still, many of
bizarre behaviors into adulthood and as parents. This view the difficulties associated with institutionalization can be
was accepted until one of Harlow’s associates, Stephen reversed, providing that the children are then placed with
Suomi, looked more closely at possible ways of “rehabilitat- caregivers who can give them the time, attention, and
ing” the monkeys reared in isolation. Using younger mon- affection they need (Schaffer, 1990).
keys as “therapists,” Suomi found that the isolated monkeys At the biological level, there may be an early critical period
could gradually achieve almost full recovery by being taught in utero and during infancy when methylation occurring in
how to be social (Suomi & Harlow, 1972; see Figure 6.23). response to stress may lead to effects that may be irreversible
In particular, Suomi selected juvenile monkeys that would after infancy (Murgatroyd et al., 2009). Researchers are still
interact freely with the isolated monkeys without hurting asking whether the right kinds of supportive environments
them and that would cling to them gently. Within a few could possibly reverse these early effects, perhaps through
weeks, the isolated monkeys began responding to these demethylation (a process through which a methyl group
overtures by clinging back and approaching the juveniles to attached to a segment of DNA is removed, thereby often
interact with them. As they reciprocated in these ways, the restoring a function). But given that some forms of early
symptoms of their deprivation started to disappear. methylation in utero have been argued to be irreversible
This successful rehabilitation accords nicely with a (Le Bouc et al., 2010), there may in fact be a critical period
major change in views concerning critical-period effects at the biological level. Early changes in 5-HTT pathways
in human infancy. Following Freud’s lead, many early could set a developmental course for certain neural circuits
theorists were convinced that a child deprived of attach- related to emotional regulation. Even so, the existence of
ments in the first 2 to 3 years of life was doomed to an a critical period does not mean that an attachment style is
“affectionless” life of failing to connect with others or fixed. Instead, it means that a child might be at risk for
form meaningful relationships (Bowlby, 1951). More being more emotionally reactive. This might increase the
odds of some forms of insecure attachment, but it does not
predestine them.
There is intense interest in those cases in which the
effects of early deprivation may not be fully reversible even
in the most supportive later environments. Thus, while sup-
portive environments do seem to be able to largely reverse
withdrawn forms of attachments resulting from adverse
early experiences, it seems much more difficult to reverse
disinhibited forms of attachment (Smyke et al., 2012). The
reasons for this difference are not well understood, but it is
possible that the disinhibited cases set up a type of reward
circuitry that becomes fixed in the child’s brain. One impor-
tant implication of irreversible effects is that rehabilitation
efforts might be more effective if they focused on helping
children (and eventually adults with the same problems)
learn to better understand how to read and respond to social
FIGURE 6.23 Monkey therapists. Younger monkeys would com- cues that can lead them into inappropriate behavior rather
fort monkeys who had been reared in isolation and teach them how than trying to eliminate disinhibited social behavior itself
to play and be social. (Smyke et al., 2012).

222 CHAPTER 6 CONNECTING WITH THE SOCIAL WORLD

 The neurobiological foundations of critical-period effects the formation and maintenance of attachments to specific
for attachment styles and other social behaviors are not well individuals.
understood, partly because the effects themselves are still The ethological perspective, with its emphasis on the
being uncovered. Researchers suggest, however, that such differences and commonalities between humans and other
effects may result from either incomplete genetic coding or species and the adaptive functions of those differences and
miswiring of particular circuits supporting social behavior commonalities, has repeatedly proved to be the most suc-
(Nelson et al., 2011). In the Romanian random-assignment cessful way of understanding the origins of social bonds.
study mentioned earlier, children who were institutional- Looking at specific social behaviors and their functional
ized had smaller gray matter cortical volumes (which are roles has revealed that many species’ young must solve
thought to reflect the degree of interconnectiveness of den- similar problems, such as signaling a caregiver, maintaining
drites) than those who were not institutionalized. While an interaction, and perceiving danger by watching others.
the same study did suggest that white matter volume might These common developmental challenges have fostered dif-
be increased by shifts to more socially supportive environ- ferent solutions across species. Despite the considerable dif-
ments, the declines in gray matter volume may be more ferences in the details, however, the ethological perspective
irreversible and the possible locus of critical-period effects has yielded important insights about the functional simi-
(Sheridan et al., 2012). larities that underlie different species’ attachment behaviors.
As we have seen, a better understanding of where critical Forming attachments is not only an aspect of cognitive
or sensitive period effects might occur for attachment and and social growth, it is essential to normal development.
related behaviors does not lead to “giving up” on a child When infants and children are deprived of the opportunity
who is so identified. Instead, such findings might lead to to form attachments, the effects can be devastating for their
alternative and more effective ways of helping the child mental and even physical health. While there are different
learn to develop strategies for avoiding situations that might attachment styles, which are often stable over time and seem
result in socially dysfunctional behaviors. Or it may be pos- to emerge out of a complex set of interactions between the
sible to teach the child to develop compensatory strategies child’s own temperament, the ways in which parents and
that would allow him to thrive in just those situations that others relate to the child, and even how the culture views
normally might pose substantial risks. appropriate forms of intimacy at different points in devel-
opment, there is still a large amount of common ground
shared by all infants that enables them to form attachments.
All infants, regardless of their attachment style, set up and
Q: What has recent research suggested about maintain those bonds through an attachment complex con-
the view that there is a critical period for the sisting of signaling behaviors and proximity behaviors. All
formation of normal attachments? infants also have implicit linkages between different attach-
ment components, such as inferring that a highly social and
responsive caregiver will be a protector in times of threat.
In the next chapter, we turn to a deeper discussion of several
Conclusions topics touched on in this chapter that relate to attachment and
early social relations. As we consider the development of emo-
Infants construe the social world differently from the way tions, temperament, and personality, we will ask whether the
they see the inanimate world. Beyond simply preferring themes that have emerged from our discussion of the infant’s
social stimuli, infants expect certain patterns of interactions social world, such as evolutionary adaptations, feedback loops,
with other social beings, and their expectations undergird and gene-environment interactions, apply there as well.

CONCLUSIONS 223
 STU DY AN D REVIEW

SUMMARY ing, and merely being cute. They can also include actions,
such as following or clinging or touching.
Developing Bonds between Infants and Caregivers ● All the attachment behaviors are embedded in loops of inter-
● Human infants and the infants of other species form bonds
actions between caregivers and infants that serve to bring
to those who take care of them and behave in ways that set them into close proximity and then maintain that proximity.
● Several cognitive systems seem to undergird the ability to
up and maintain proximity to their caregivers.
● Bonds between infants and caregivers develop out of an
form attachments. One particularly important ability is a
ability to pick out and partially understand social beings, sensitivity and preference for contingent responding, with
with human infants normally developing specific bonds to parents and children in different cultures having different
particular individuals soon after the sixth or seventh month response routines.
● Social referencing, the use of others’ expressions and behav-
of life.
● Shortly after infants seem to have a bond to specific individ-
iors to make inferences about how to behave in a situation,
uals, they also show marked separation distress (also called is an important way to build bonds between infants and
separation anxiety) when one of those individuals leaves caregivers.
● Joint attention and gaze following, in which a child and
them alone or with a stranger.
another person simultaneously attend to and follow the same
object or event, are critical mechanisms for developing a set
Early Perspectives on Infants’ Bonds with Others
of shared experiences between children and caregivers, which
● Psychoanalytic views of infant bonds overemphasized the
in turn helps each partner better understand and empathize
importance of breastfeeding and the centrality of the infant’s with the other.
bond with the mother as opposed to bonds that the infant
forms with others. Freud’s theory of these bonds emerged out Individual Differences in Attachment Style
of his account of psychosexual development based on drives, ● There are striking individual differences in attachment style
instincts, and sources of pleasure. While many of Freud’s between infants and their parents that are based on how they
specific theories have not held up, he and other psychoana- relate to each other and on expectations about how they will
lytic theorists did raise enduring questions about the impor- respond to each other in particular situations. Mary Ains-
tance of early experiences, sex differences, and the relevance worth developed a method known as the Strange Situation
of an infant’s beliefs about others. for measuring differences in attachment style. Four types of
● Learning theory approaches to parent-child bonds focused
attachment styles are most commonly discussed: Type A, or
on how environmental contingencies reinforced or dis- insecure/avoidant attachment; Type B, or secure attachment;
couraged certain behaviors and how infants formed bonds Type C, or insecure/resistant (or anxious) attachment; and
to positively reinforcing stimuli. They neglected possible Type D, or disorganized attachment.
roles of infants’ mental states and beliefs and had difficulty ● There are several possible causes of different attachment
explaining how bonds endured when children are in abusive styles. These include parental behaviors, children’s effects on
families. parents, interactions between parent and child effects in vari-
● John Bowlby’s ethological approach has become the domi-
ous forms of feedback loops, and genetic influences.
nant perspective for studying how infants form bonds with ● Early attachment styles may have long-term consequences
others. It considers such bonds as part of an attachment for a child’s development. There are associations between
complex and focuses on the attachment behaviors that set early attachment styles and both social and cognitive abili-
up and maintain bonds between offspring and caregivers. It ties and tendencies in childhood and adolescence, but the
also considers analogous systems at work in many other spe- causal account is difficult to untangle. The child’s own tem-
cies and examines the similarities and differences in the ways perament may elicit certain kinds of responses in others, a
that offspring in other species attach to their caregivers. constant stressful environment may cause problems at mul-
tiple ages, and temperament and environment may interact
The Underpinnings of Attachment to amplify or reduce effects.
● Attachment behaviors ensure that infants and parents ● There are substantial cross-cultural differences in attachment

become linked together through strong affectional bonds. style as measured by the Strange Situation, but it is difficult
They can include signaling behaviors, such as smiling, cry- to know whether these differences translate directly into dif-

224 CHAPTER 6 CONNECTING WITH THE SOCIAL WORLD

 ferences in attachment quality. Interpreting these differences any circumstances in which it would be appropriate for a
is complex because what is considered a “strange” situation court to order that children be taken away from biological
by parents and infants in one culture may be perceived very parents who are not abusive but who are providing grossly
differently in another culture. inadequate social environments for their children? If so,
when would this be justified? If not, why not?
Effects of Early Social Deprivation
2. Suppose that a pediatrician is concerned about a 1-year-old
● Early deprivation of normal social interactions can have
because the child exhibits a high level of insecure/resistant
a devastating impact on both humans and other animals, (anxious) attachment. The pediatrician consults with you as
resulting in repetitive motor behaviors and maladaptive pat- an expert in developmental psychology. What sort of inter-
terns of interaction with others. The lack of social interac- ventions might you devise with respect to modifying paren-
tions early on can result in high mortality rates in infants in tal behavior, the child’s environment, and the child’s own
settings where such social deprivations are the norm, even if
temperament so as to reduce the level of insecure attachment
those settings are clean and provide ample food and shelter.
behavior?
● The effects of deprivation are associated with physiological
3. Some have argued that males in general are less sophisticated
measures, such as high levels of cortisol and low levels of
in social cognition than females. How much might such a
serotonin. In addition, certain infants may be genetically at
risk and particularly devastated by such environments. difference influence the development of attachments in boys
● There may be mediating effects in situations of deprivation, and girls?
however, including the presence of a close group of peers among 4. Imagine that you and your partner both have jobs with mini-
human infants or “monkey therapists” and tactile stimulation mal parental leave policies and that you have to put your
among rhesus monkeys. Although many effects of depriva- 2-week-old infant in full-time day care. Design a plan for
tion can be reversed when children are shifted to more socially evaluating the 16 day care centers in your community that
rich forms of care, concerns remain about potential long-term would enable you to choose the one that offers the best
effects in at least some children, effects that may be mediated opportunity for the social development of your child.
through epigenetic changes in stress regulation systems.
● In some cases, there may be critical-period effects in humans
in which severe deprivation may lead to attachment styles KEY TERMS
and related social deficits that may not be fully reversible in anxious attachment (p. 202) joint attention (p. 200)
later life, no matter how supportive the environment. attachment (p. 188) oxytocin (p. 196)
attachment complex (p. 194) psychosexual development
THOUGHT QUESTIONS attachment style (p. 201) (p. 190)
1. Difficult life circumstances or more intrinsic personality avoidant attachment (p. 211) resistant attachment (p. 202)
issues can make some biological parents less able to effec- dependency (p. 194) secure attachment (p. 202)
tively interact with their children than foster parents. In one disorganized attachment secure base (p. 193)
series of studies, children were placed in institutions before (p. 203) separation anxiety (p. 190)
they were 4 months of age and were then returned to either
indiscriminate attachment separation distress (p. 190)
their original parents or to adoptive parents (Tizard & Hodges,
(p. 203) social referencing (p. 199)
1978; Tizard & Rees, 1974; Tizard & Tizard, 1971). Both
groups showed signs of institutionalization when they first internal working model specific bonds (p. 189)
were adopted or reunited, but over the next few years, the (p. 208) still face (p. 199)
adopted children seemed to fare better than those returned insecure/avoidant attachment Strange Situation (p. 202)
to their natural parents. Loving caregivers seemed to undo (p. 202)
the effects of deprivation more effectively than biological insecure/resistant attachment
parents whose lives were otherwise more stressed. Are there (p. 202)

STUDYCONCLUSIONS
AND REVIEW 225
 7
The Origins of Emotion,
Temperament, and Personality
Emotional Development Temperament and the Origins of Conclusions
• Approaches to Emotional Development Personality
Summary
• Differentiation of Emotions in Infancy • Temperament-Based Components of
• Perceiving and Thinking about Emotions Personality and Early Development
• Emotional Regulation in Infancy • Determining Differences in Temperament
• Evolutionary Preparedness and • Child-Environment Interactions and
Emotional Development Goodness of Fit
 ot long ago, in a supermarket on a busy Satur- how the infant’s ability to shift attention and the tendency

N day morning, I noticed two infants who were

showing very different emotions and patterns of
interaction with their mothers. Both infants were
about 12 months old and were being wheeled
about in shopping carts by their mothers. The first infant,
a girl, seemed delighted by the visit to the supermarket. As
her mother occasionally handed her an item to drop into the
to be inhibited or uninhibited are related to biological bases
for temperament. We will also consider how “goodness of
fit” between an infant’s temperament and the environment
affects the child’s development and personality.
This chapter revisits several major themes and intro-
duces some new variations. We will see, for example, how
feedback loops often help create and sustain patterns of
cart, she received each one with a smile. She often laughed emotional responding—within the individual, between
or looked happily at her mother, and her mother responded the individual and the inanimate environment, and
positively in return. Likewise, she readily smiled at strang- between two individuals. On a related note, we will see
ers. The second infant, a boy, seemed angry and upset about once again how deeply intertwined cognitive and social/
being in the supermarket. Scowling at his mother, he either emotional development are and how a full understanding
angrily rejected items she handed him or insisted on holding of psychological development requires an understanding
on to them, even though his mother wanted him to put them of their constant interactions. This chapter also returns to
into the cart or back on the shelves. He avoided strangers’ the contrast between the traditional empiricist and nativist
looks and yet also seemed fearful of them. Meanwhile, the views of the developing mind. We will consider the extent
boy’s older brother, who was around 7 years old, was clearly to which the newborn infant already possesses character-
embarrassed by his sibling’s behavior. istic emotions and other components of a full personality
Simple interactions like these are repeated countless times and the extent to which emotions and other aspects of per-
a day in different venues around the world and illustrate sonality emerge through experience.
several phenomena that this chapter explores. Most notably,
we will see that young infants show a variety of emotional
states as well as individual differences in their emotional
responses to the same situation. Looking at infants’ early
emotional states, as well as the variability in their emotional
Emotional Development
responses, will help us address the question of how a child’s Anyone who has spent time around a newborn has observed
emotional repertoire develops over time. We will also see what appear to be displays of emotion, but exactly which
that there seem to be intrinsic differences in how differ- emotions do newborns feel? To tackle this question, we need
ent infants respond and behave in particular settings. Such to define emotions precisely—which is a notoriously diffi-
individual differences in disposition are known as tempera- cult task, even though everyone has a sense of what emo-
ment and tend to be quite stable in infancy. Moreover, we tions are (Izard, 2009). Here we will consider emotions to
will see that when an infant comes to perceive and under- be transient states that correspond to physiological and cog-
stand the social world, some of the most salient aspects of nitive processes associated with distinct internal sensations,
that world concern the emotions and personalities possessed or feelings.
by social beings, attributes that make each person a unique The physiological, cognitive, and behavioral compo-
individual, distinct from all others. Infants themselves are nents of emotions can take several forms. For example,
social creatures, and it is of great interest to know how their physiological processes may correspond to the effects of
emotions and personalities develop. hormones on bodily states as well as to changes in the activ-
We will start by considering how an infant’s emotions ity of specific neural circuits. Thus, rapid increases in heart
develop in the first couple of years of life, focusing first on rate may be associated with certain emotions, and higher
the nonverbal measurements of emotions that researchers use levels of the hormone oxytocin in the brain may be associ-
with infants. We will ask how many distinct emotions seem ated with increased feelings of trust and affection. Cogni-
to be present shortly after birth and how both the number tive processes can range from how an individual appraises
of emotions and the complexity of emotions increase over a present situation to the influences of memories of past
time. We will examine how infants learn to perceive and experiences. Behavioral processes can include tendencies
think about emotions in others, how they learn to regulate to engage in particular actions in particular contexts (for
their own emotions, and how emotions might have evolved. example, cringing when called on in a meeting or crying at
We will then turn to differences in temperament and con- weddings). These components can be further subdivided
sider how those early differences relate to later differences and elaborated, but this brief list is sufficient to illustrate
in personality. We will look at how behavior patterns in how emotions emerge from a confluence of several com-
infancy, such as emotionality, activity level, and sociability, ponents of quite different types. As always, interactions
may contribute to later personality traits. And we will see between all these components also occur frequently. Thus,

228 CHAPTER 7 THE ORIGINS OF EMOTION, TEMPERAMENT, AND PERSONALITY

bodily arousal may influence cognitive appraisals, and cog- use for studying emotions in infants and young children,
nitive appraisals may influence bodily arousal. We will see and they have often been supported with other methods,
that this complex web of interactions is often at the heart of such as observing body posture. There is now a vast body
understanding specific emotions. of research on the use of facial expressions to infer emo-
tional states in both infants and older individuals. Studies
of adults have provided a great deal of converging evidence
that it is often possible to infer a person’s emotional states
Approaches to Emotional Development based on judgments about that person’s facial expressions
Because infants cannot tell us in words what they are expe- (Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Izard, 1979). The correspon-
riencing, we must find ways to infer what they are feel- dence between expression and emotion is not perfect; some
ing and thinking. For the most part, researchers have used expressions are difficult to interpret, and some people can
infants’ facial expressions to infer their emotional states. mask their emotions more effectively than others. But on
Charles Darwin pioneered this method in the late nine- the whole, we rely heavily on others’ facial expressions to
teenth century through careful observations of his own son infer how they feel (Ekman, 1973). These inferences seem
(Darwin, 1877; see Figure 7.1). Darwin assumed that facial to work the same way in adults, schoolchildren, or toddlers,
expressions were good indicators of underlying emotional so most researchers have assumed that infants’ facial expres-
states and that when combined with contextual cues and sions signify similar emotional states. Although it can be
other infant behaviors, facial expressions could be used to more difficult to tell one emotion from another in young
identify several distinct emotions from the beginning of infants, examining infants’ facial expressions and the con-
life. Darwin was also deeply committed to the idea that texts in which they occur (for example, frightening versus
in both humans and other animals, displays of one’s own comforting situations) can help researchers develop theories
emotions and perceptions of emotions in others serve as about which emotions are present early on and how they
adaptations that regulate social interactions. Thus, if a per- change with development.
son displayed anger toward someone else, the other person To study infants’ facial expressions, researchers have
might know to avoid a confrontation that could end up developed coding systems for scoring the different expres-
hurting both of them. sions and assigning them to categories of emotions. Using
While emotional displays may include body posture and such coding systems, which are based on analyzing the
vocalizations, Darwin focused heavily on facial expressions, muscular and anatomical components that vary across facial
as have most researchers on emotion who came after him. expressions, they are able to achieve quite high levels of reli-
Methods that measure facial expressions are the easiest to ability for identifying expressions (Ekman & Friesen, 1978).
But it is always a leap to know for sure that the expressions
people agree on really do correspond to particular underly-
ing emotional states. Nonetheless, most researchers believe
that, combined with other cues, such as the context and
infants’ vocalizations, these kinds of inferences about
infants’ specific emotions are warranted.
Based on these observations, infants’ emotions appear
to show a general pattern of differentiation that progresses
from birth onward. One way to describe this differentiation
is to classify infants’ emotions as either positive or negative
and then ask about further divisions into more nuanced
emotions within each of those categories. But researchers
disagree about the extent to which newborns display par-
ticular emotions that go beyond general positivity and neg-
ativity. Some maintain that early on, infants simply haven’t
learned enough about how to use their emotions to guide
their expression in more channeled ways (Witherington
et al., 2010). This argument is based on the notion that
FIGURE 7.1 Darwin and infant facial expressions. Charles
emotions are a kind of communication system that helps
Darwin took careful observations of the facial expressions of his son regulate interactions with others. In this view, infants’
William (nicknamed Doddy). This 1842 daguerrotype shows Darwin emotional communications are shaped through develop-
(age 33) with Doddy (age 3). This is the only known photograph of ment as their expressive skills and their needs become
Darwin with a family member. more refined.

EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 229

 Others see infants as endowed, largely from the start, behavior—for example, leading the caregiver to pick up the
with a set of distinct emotions, each of which was selected infant and carry him away or to hold him protectively—
for through evolution to serve a certain role, such as fear which will enable the infant to avoid the perceived danger.
guiding us to avoid danger and joy drawing us to approach Thus, it is highly adaptive for infants to have a repertoire
something desirable (Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1994). Although of emotions to communicate in different settings, enabling
it might be difficult to discern different facial expressions for them to involve others in helping them achieve their goals.
a full set of emotions right at birth, scholars from this tradi- In this way, infant displays of emotion can be seen as having
tion still hold that the different emotions emerge largely as a strong functional or evolutionary roles.
function of physiological maturation rather than primarily
through learning. This approach leaves open the questions
of whether infants’ expressions directly indicate the full
variety of emotions they feel and whether expressions that Differentiation of Emotions in Infancy
emerge later are nonetheless largely innate (Izard, 1994). Most theorists see the newborn as having undifferentiated
Though emotions are usually thought to arise without emotions, perhaps only having global positive and negative
conscious effort, they can be thought of as ways of mobi- emotional states (Bridges, 1932; Lewis, 2008). Out of this
lizing ourselves to take action toward a goal (Campos rudimentary distinction, more mature emotion categories
et al., 2003; Saarni et al., 1998). This is the functionalist gradually differentiate. Figure 7.2 shows one suggested
approach to emotion, and it stresses the function of emo- sequence of differentiation (Lewis, 2008). The earliest emo-
tional responses. Table 7.1 describes four emotions. Each tions present at birth may be little more than contentment,
involves particular kinds of dynamics that elicit the emo- interest, and distress. By around 3 months, these become
tion and maintain it. Each emotion serves clear functions, joy, surprise, and distress. At around 4 months, distress
both for our own internal regulation and for regulating and becomes further differentiated to include anger, and then at
managing social situations. Feeling anger, for example, can 6 months, fear emerges.
get you to channel your resources in a different direction as
well as warn others not to get in the way. Sadness conserves Basic Emotions By the time they are 6 months old,
energy and encourages nurturance from others. In this view, infants show at least six basic emotions (sometimes referred
emotions are elicited not by an event itself but by our own to as primary emotions)—joy, sadness, disgust, surprise,
“appreciation” of how the event relates to our personal goals anger, and fear (Campos et al., 1983; Campos & Barrett,
(Campos et al., 2003; Saarni et al., 1998). 1984; Izard, 2007; Izard & Malatesta, 1987; Lewis, 2008;
One important way that emotions help us achieve goals Saarni et al., 1998). These emotions are considered “basic”
is by signaling information—that is, communicating—to for two main reasons: (1) they appear very early in develop-
others. Thus, we tend to treat people who appear to be angry ment, and (2) they are considered human universals, in part
quite differently from the way we treat those who seem to because people in an extraordinary range of cultures are able
be sad. This signaling function can enable infants to achieve to infer these emotions consistently from facial expressions
goals that would otherwise be unattainable given their lim- (Ekman, 1973, 1994). These basic emotions are considered
ited physical abilities and restricted mobility. An infant who the foundational components from which the other emo-
is afraid of another person and wants to avoid him can con- tions later emerge (see Figure 7.3).
vey fear through facial expressions and body postures. In Parents can usually tell if their infant is in a positive or
many cases, that conveyed emotion will affect a caregiver’s negative emotional state. Infants often indicate their posi-

Emotion Goal Action

Disgust Avoid contamination or illness Prevent substances from entering the body or coming into close
contact with the body.
Fear Maintain integrity of self Engage in behaviors (flight or withdrawal) that enable us to avoid
danger, monitor danger, or escape from danger.
Anger Any end state that the child wants Communicate desires or display power or dominance.
Sadness Any end state that the child wants Conserve energy by disengaging or withdrawing.

TABLE 7.1 Emotions and goals. Emotions can be thought of as ways of mobilizing ourselves to achieve certain goals. Here four basic
emotions—disgust, fear, anger, and sadness—are described in terms of the kinds of goals and actions involved when we feel each emotion.
Adapted from Saarni et al. (1998).

230 CHAPTER 7 THE ORIGINS OF EMOTION, TEMPERAMENT, AND PERSONALITY

 3 years FIGURE 7.2 The differentiation of emotions in the first 3 years
Complex Embarrassment
Pride Incorporation of of life. According to one model of development, very young infants
Shame rules and norms may start out with little more than the emotions of contentment,
Guilt interest, and distress. Sadness and disgust may emerge at around
2½ years
COMPLEX EMOTIONS 3 months, followed by anger at around 4 months, and fear at about
6 months. Other more complex emotions emerge in the following
2½ years. Embarrassment takes an extended time to develop, with
2 years
simpler versions based on self-consciousness emerging earlier than
Simple Embarrassment
Self-conscious more complex versions based on violation of rules. Adapted from
Envy
thought Lewis (2008).
Empathy
1½ years
COMPLEX EMOTIONS

6 months
Fear
Anger

Joy Surprise Sadness, Disgust

Contentment Interest Distress

Birth
PRIMARY EMOTIONS

tive states through smiles, which can be interpreted as hap- something more like general negative emotion (Camras
piness, contentment, or satisfaction with the current state et al., 1993, 2007; Oster et al., 1992). If a newborn receives
of affairs. As we will see, very early smiles may relate most a shot from a doctor, becomes uncomfortably tangled up in
often to internal states, such as feeling full, warm, and com- bedding, or is simply hungry, a negative facial expression,
fortable. As mentioned in Chapter 6, the stimuli that elicit often accompanied by crying and postural cues to discom-
the most smiles change with development, from mostly fort, is an unmistakable sign of distress. Caregivers usually
internal cues in newborns, to general social stimulation in feel strongly compelled to respond, and in that sense, even
the first few months, to the smile of recognition of specific a general, undifferentiated negative emotional state fulfills
individuals at around 6 months. a signaling function.
Infants’ positive emotions can vary from gentle content- By age 2 months or so, general negative emotions start to
ment to exuberant joy. These emotions can be expressed differentiate into at least the categories of sadness and anger
when an infant achieves a simple form of mastery, like (Izard et al., 1995). Sometimes the same situation may elicit
shaking a rattle to make a sound, or engages intensely with different emotions in different infants. One infant who is
another person, leading to a rapt state of focused attention. frustrated may display anger and may attempt to change the
In each of these situations, the infant’s smile may show sub- environment to attain her goal, whereas another infant may
tle variations, such as an open or closed mouth and a strong show sadness and give up. As infants encounter more and
or weak raising of the cheeks (Messinger, 2002), so consis- more situations in which they have goals and desires that
tently coding each of these variations of smiles and linking are not instantly met, they come to show both sadness and
them to particular forms of happiness is a challenge for even anger responses more frequently. An infant can also oscillate
the most careful researchers. Even in adults, different forms quickly between sadness and anger in the same situation or
of happiness seem to fade gradually into each other rather may show ambiguous negative states that are hard to tell
than being sharply defined. In contrast, negative emotions apart (Camras & Shutter, 2010).
are often seen as more clearly distinct from each other in Fear, which will be discussed more extensively later
adults, but less differentiated in infants. in this chapter, does not seem to be clearly evident until
Just as it is usually obvious when an infant is in a positive around the sixth month of life, typically several months
emotional state, it is also clear when an infant experiences after sadness and anger (Izard, 2007). Infants around 6 or
negative emotions. Initially, however, it is difficult to distin- 7 months old most often show fear in response to strangers,
guish specific negative emotions, as all negative emotions in and it can be quite a shock for parents to find their infant
infancy seem to be variations of distress (Camras & Shut- suddenly terrified when someone unfamiliar drops by.
ter, 2010; Matias & Cohn, 1993). In fact, some research- Infants at this age also typically show fear when faced with
ers argue that negative emotions, such as fear, sadness, and other kinds of unknown things, such as an unusual zoo
anger, cannot truly be distinguished in newborns and very animal or even an unfamiliar toy (Bronson, 1972). They
young infants because these infants actually experience may also begin to display fear in laboratory settings, such

EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 231

 A B C

D E F
FIGURE 7.3 Facial expressions of basic emotions in infants. Facial coding systems have identified emotions based on infants’ facial
muscular movements and the positioning of their forehead, eyebrows, eyes, cheeks, and mouth as they are experiencing particular emo-
tions. Facial expressions are social signals to others that enable infants to communicate what they are feeling. Pictured here are infants
showing (A) joy (indicated by narrowed eyes and widened mouth with corners raised), (B) anger (indicated by brows drawn together and
lowered and wide-open square mouth), (C) sadness (indicated by brows raised and angular, narrowed eyes, downturned mouth, and pro-
truding lower lip), (D) disgust (indicated by gaping mouth and lower lip and flattened protruding tongue), (E) surprise (indicated by raised
and prominently arched brows, widened eyes, and gaping mouth in an O shape), and (F) fear (indicated by raised and straightened brows,
widened eyes with tense lower eyelids, and horizontally retracted lips).

as when they are on the visual cliff, although this usually arousal, or apprehension, which can be seen as an initial
emerges at somewhat older ages (Campos et al., 1978; Hiatt emerging divide between the positive and negative emo-
et al., 1979; see Chapter 6). tions (Nesse, 2004). From this point, the positive emo-
Why would fear appear later than anger and sadness? tions, or those based on desire, differentiate into narrower
The answer is not yet clear. One possibility is that figuring categories, such as physical pleasure and acquisitive plea-
out that a situation is potentially threatening may require sure derived from material gains, as well as love, friendship,
more complicated mental representations compared with and pride. The negative emotions, or those based on fear,
simply noticing feelings of discomfort or recognizing that a similarly differentiate into pain, sadness, grief, anger, and
goal is being blocked. Assessing the threat level that a situa- shame. Although these are not precisely the same catego-
tion poses may involve interpreting it in some detail, which ries of emotion normally identified in infants, and their
may be beyond the ability of a very young infant. order of emergence is a bit different from the developmen-
Interestingly, the developmental sequence in which the tal sequence in infants (fear may have appeared earlier than
basic emotions appear in infancy roughly corresponds to anger and sadness in evolutionary history), the broad paral-
the order in which these emotions are thought to have lel between development and evolutionary history is clear.
evolved. Thus, using the terms in Figure 7.4, the most When a developmental progression corresponds to the
primitive kind of emotion might simply be arousal that is course of evolution in this way, the common sequence is
neither positive nor negative. Even the emotions of human often explained by considering how the earliest-emerging
newborns do not seem to be this undifferentiated, but some components are necessary for the organism’s survival.
very simple organisms, such as insects, might just be expe- This kind of explanation can easily be applied to both
riencing different levels of arousal. Figure 7.4 then shows a the development of basic emotions at the individual level
split between positive arousal, or excitement, and negative and to the evolution of these emotions at the level of a

232 CHAPTER 7 THE ORIGINS OF EMOTION, TEMPERAMENT, AND PERSONALITY

 at oneself for doing so and some degree of fear about the
consequences. Complex emotions develop later than the
Friendship Anger, guilt
basic emotions because they involve more complex kinds of
Pride goals, such as maintaining a level of standing among peers.
Kin love Allies
Allies Such goals are at least partly socialized and vary across cul-
Status
Shame Grief tures more than basic emotions do. It may seem implausible
that six basic emotions could give rise to the full emotional
Love Kin
Status Kin Grief, range. But all the possible combinations of those six basic
Social jealousy
Mate Social Mate emotions, each of which can be felt at different intensities,
Reproduction Reproduction can yield thousands of complex emotions. Thus, this theory
Acquisitive
has the power to describe the course of emotional develop-
pleasure Hope Anxiety Sadness ment, from a small set of basic emotions in infancy to the
Material
Loss
rich emotional experience of adults.
Physical One key difference between basic and complex emotions
pleasure
Physical Desire Fear Damage
Pain is that many complex emotions are also self-conscious emo-
tions, meaning that the emotional experience itself requires
some degree of self-awareness (Lewis, 1993). Guilt, shame,
Opportunity Threat
(Promotion) (Prevention) embarrassment, and pride are all self-conscious emotions,
Excitement Apprehension
as are jealousy, envy, and empathy. In each case, the emotion
Arousal seems to require a sense of self in relation to others, whether
it involves feeling superior to others (pride), feeling that
FIGURE 7.4 Evolution and development of emotions. Depicted something private about us has been exposed to others
here is one researcher’s phylogeny of emotions. The emotions that (embarrassment), or feeling that others are more fortunate
appear first in development may have been those that were function- than we are (envy). Young children first show self-conscious
ally the most important in evolution and therefore the most conserved emotions at around age 1½ or 2, at around the same time
across species. From Nesse (2004).
they are developing other aspects of a more sophisticated
self-awareness. Around this same age, children first begin
whole species. Even the simplest organisms need to know to sense that they should abide by certain social standards,
when to seek out opportunities through positive, explor- and they begin to become aware of others’ mental states and
atory behavior and when to avoid threats through more concerned about what others think of them (Lagattuta &
wary, guarded behavior. Perhaps these two fundamental Thompson, 2007). The emergence of self-conscious emo-
responses then differentiate into more nuanced types of tions is closely related to this increasingly elaborate sense
emotions in more sophisticated organisms. The basic ten- of self. Complex emotions may also use different neural
dency toward apprehension and caution gives rise to fear, circuitry from basic emotions. Basic emotions seem to be
pain, and sadness, while the basic tendency toward excite- more closely linked to the amygdala, a brain structure that,
ment and approach differentiates into different forms of among other functions, is known to be involved in forming
desire and pleasure. Over the course of this process, as memories of emotional events. Complex emotions seem to
emotions become more subtle and specific, they become involve other brain regions in interaction with the amygdala
increasingly useful in guiding behaviors toward desired (LeDoux, 1996).
goals and away from feared threats. For complex organ- It is useful to consider some complex emotions in more
isms that interact in sophisticated social systems, more detail so as to understand how they differ from each other and
elaborate emotions such as guilt and pride help maintain can reflect the particular culture in which a child develops.
stable relationships and therefore help promote the organ- Consider, for example, shame, the feeling of wanting to hide
ism’s survival and reproduction. from others’ view, or to be invisible. Shame can be intensely
painful and uncomfortable, and it primarily leads to inactive
Complex Emotions Emotions that build on and occur behaviors aimed at being less noticeable (Lewis, 1993).
developmentally later than the basic emotions are known Guilt, in contrast, is a more specific feeling of having
as complex emotions. They emerge from various combi- failed and wanting to remedy the situation (Lewis, 1993).
nations of basic emotions and through the introduction of We might regret having carelessly broken someone else’s toy
more complex supporting cognitions about a situation. For or having been cruel to a vulnerable friend. It is an emotion
example, the complex emotion of shame involves sadness at that tends to lead to actions to try to reduce the guilt—
losing the respect of another, combined perhaps with anger perhaps trying to compensate someone who was wronged

EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 233

(being especially nice to a recent victim) or deciding to act (Campos et al., 2003; Griffiths, 2003). Thus, Machiavel-
in a more upright way to demonstrate our good character to lian emotions can serve as “shortcuts” that don’t require the
ourselves and others after causing harm. It has been argued infant to actually have a particular feeling in combination
for some time that some cultures tend to socialize children with certain cognitions about the self and others. Instead,
primarily through feelings of shame, while others do so the infant might merely need to know that a certain facial
through feelings of guilt (De Vos, 1973). One such proposal expression or posture has brought positive results in certain
argued that Japan was a “shame culture” and that many kinds of situations, such as those that seem threatening. The
Western cultures were “guilt cultures” (Benedict, 1946), but infant may need to have some sense of the emotion’s func-
such a simple dichotomy is now viewed as an oversimplifica- tion in terms of what it can elicit or accomplish, but per-
tion. People in both kinds of cultures invariably feel both haps not the complex interplay between a basic emotion and
shame and guilt in different situations (Creighton, 1990). various cognitions. Many dog owners will confess to being
Nonetheless, the general point is that cultures may bias easily manipulated by a certain posture and a baleful look,
their members over the course of development to interpret even though the dog may not really be having the thoughts
situations in ways that lead to a preponderance of one emo- and feelings that seem to be present.
tional response over another (Tang et al., 2008). Other researchers argue that several complex emotions,
As a final example of a complex emotion, consider including shyness, coyness, shame, and jealousy, may be
embarrassment, an emotion that typically occurs when we present in rudimentary forms surprisingly early in infancy
realize that we stand out because we have violated a social (Campos et al., 2010; Draghi-Lorenz et al., 2001; Hart &
convention or simply are receiving unwanted attention. It Carrington, 2002; Reddy, 2000; see also Hart, 2010; Hart
may often be expressed in an attempt to restore social rela- et al., 1998, 2004). Consider the case of jealousy. In one
tions after violating a norm or in an attempt to reduce the study, infants as young as 5 months seemed to show distinct
unwanted attention (Keltner & Anderson, 2000). Embar- jealousy. The infants in the study watched their mother
rassment may be one of the earliest complex emotions to expressing great affection either to another infant or to an
emerge (Lewis, 1993), and, in contrast to shame, it is not adult. On seeing their mother attending to another infant,
always negative. Thus, excessive praise can evoke embar- more than half the infants in the study showed marked
rassment even though the situation is far from shameful. distress; yet when their mother expressed affection to an
Embarrassment has been experimentally induced in this adult, only 10 percent became upset (Draghi-Lorenz, 2000).
way in children as young as 2 years old by “overcompliment- Similarly, and perhaps even more surprisingly, 6-month-old
ing” them on their appearance or abilities, and presumably infants showed greater negative responses when they saw
it is felt because the children feel that they are receiving their mother pay positive attention to a lifelike baby doll
unwanted and perhaps undeserved levels of attention (Lewis than when their mother showed the same attention to a
et al., 1989). In addition, at about the age at which children book (Hart & Carrington, 2002; see also Hart et al., 1998,
first seem to understand that mirror reflections are repre- 2004).
sentations of themselves rather than of a separate individual How can we explain these very early displays of such
(see Chapter 13), they are also easily induced into embar- a complex emotion as jealousy? One possibility is that
rassment. This suggests that the developing ability to think although infants do not have a complex understanding of
about the self might relate to the emergence of this emotion. social roles, they may still make the simpler distinction
While full-fledged complex emotions seem to develop between interactions that only involve adults and those
from combinations of basic emotions, intriguing precursors that take place between adults and infants—and view the
to some complex emotions may appear in young infants. latter as a threat to their own goals of social interaction
Thus, some early “emotions” may reflect evolutionarily pre- (Draghi-Lorenz et al., 2001). Thus, the infants’ expressions
pared ways of influencing others (for example, a coy smile of jealousy may mostly reflect anger that someone else is
eliciting interaction), while not necessarily meaning that the getting a resource (adult attention) that they desire. Another
infant is experiencing the emotion as an adult might. These possibility is that jealousy is a less complex emotion than
early emotions may be present early on and serve certain it initially seemed, since it serves the adaptive function of
functional roles but may not yet have the supporting cogni- ensuring that babies are not deprived of the adult affection
tive structures found in older infants and children. and other resources that they need.
Adults often express Machiavellian emotions, which The accounts of emotional development described so far
are meant to influence others and not simply to reflect an tend to omit the role of social and cultural contexts in fur-
internal state. It may be that young infants are evolution- ther differentiating and shaping emotions, for even if those
arily prepared to display certain Machiavellian emotions to accounts advocate a great deal of predetermined structure,
caregivers so as to elicit a response from an adult, even if they must also recognize significant experiential effects as
the infants are not really feeling what seems to be expressed well (Camras et al., 1990, 1991, 2007; Malatesta et al.,

234 CHAPTER 7 THE ORIGINS OF EMOTION, TEMPERAMENT, AND PERSONALITY

1989). Infants appear to gradually become “tuned” to the same as mature moral reasoning and judgment. Still, this
general sets of emotions they see most often around them— research suggests that preverbal infants may have some
for example, in their parents’ expressions and actions. We intuitive sense of right and wrong—that some core moral
have all seen remarkable similarities between infants (or intuitions may emerge very early, guided by emotional
older children) and their parents and caregivers, not only in likes and dislikes toward social agents (Hamlin & Wynn,
their expressions but also in their particular ways of expe- 2011; Hamlin et al., 2011).
riencing emotions. Thinking of this process as a tuning of It appears that infants react to “mean” and “nice” social
a preexisting system to particular sets of inputs is one way agents in much the same way as older children and adults.
of capturing the important social and cultural influences. One study that investigated these capacities built on the
These processes can continue throughout the lifespan. One classic study described in Chapter 5, in which infants
particularly intriguing case is whether certain types of per- watched a cartoon showing a triangle that “helped” a ball
sonal failings are experienced in terms of shame versus guilt, move up a hill while a square “hindered” its attempts
depending on the culture. As we noted earlier, members (see Figure 7.5). The researchers then measured the infants’
of Western cultures may be more likely to react to certain reactions to other cartoons in which the ball approached
experiences by feeling guilt, whereas those in some Eastern either the triangle (the helper) or the square (the hinderer;
cultures may be more likely to feel shame in comparable Heider & Simmel, 1944). When the ball approached the
situations. This difference might well reflect how a common hinderer, infants as young as 10 months looked signifi-
and shared shame/guilt complex becomes tuned to partic- cantly longer (Hamlin et al., 2007; Kuhlmeier et al., 2003).
ular cultural and social expectations (Crystal et al., 2001; This response suggests that the infants were surprised to see
Wong & Tsai, 2007). the ball approach the shape that had been “mean” to it as
opposed to the one that had been “nice.”
Moral Emotions? Psychologists used to think that When the task was changed so that infants watched an
the ability to judge right from wrong developed fairly enactment on a display stage of the cartoon event with
late in childhood as a preschooler or young elementary small geometric solids (with eyes attached to make them
school student became immersed in the values of his or look more animate) and then were allowed to choose to
her culture. Such cultural factors are certainly important play with either the triangle helper or the square hinderer,
(we will consider them when we look closely at moral even 6-month-olds more often chose the helper. By repeat-
development in Chapter 12), but recent studies suggest ing the experiment with different shapes in the various
that some facets of morality may emerge as part of an roles, the researchers determined that infants seemed to
infant’s emotional repertoire. The idea that emotions are like the helper more than the hinderer based solely on their
part of moral judgments is actually an old one (Hume, actions, not their appearance (Hamlin et al., 2007). Ongo-
1739–1740/2000) that has seen a major rebirth in recent ing research is asking if infants have comparable emotional
years (Haidt, 2003). These studies are part of a new wave reactions to “friends” and “punishers” of mean and nice
of research on the “moral lives of babies” (Bloom, 2010; agents and whether infants seem to extend these reactions
Wynn, 2008). Scholars in this area are quick to cau- to members of the social groups to which the agents belong
tion that these “moral emotions” in infants are not the (Bloom, 2010).

Triangle helps

1 2 3

Square hinders FIGURE 7.5 Helping and hindering. When

video clips were shown in which geomet-
ric shapes either helped or hindered another
geometric shape (here, a ball) climb up a ramp,
12-month-old infants looked longer when a later
video clip showed a ball “choosing” to approach
the hinderer (here, the square) rather than
1 2 3 the helper (here, the triangle). Adapted from
Kuhlmeier et al. (2003).

EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 235

 pronounced. In these circumstances, infants show a strong
Q: Provide an example of how different cultural tendency to respond more powerfully and consistently to neg-
experiences might affect a particular emotion. ative emotions than to positive ones, a phenomenon called
the negativity bias (Vaish et al., 2008). The negativity bias
may occur because there is a larger cost to ignoring or misin-
terpreting negative emotions than positive ones. If someone
misses another person’s expression of anger or fear, there is
Perceiving and Thinking about Emotions a good chance of experiencing harm, whereas the stakes are
We have seen that within the first few months of life, infants lower for overlooking an expression of joy or pleasure. This
display several distinct emotions and that many more emo- bias may be seen as an early-developing aspect of the human
tions emerge in the next couple of years. From very early in tendency to be risk averse (Rozin & Royzman, 2001).
life, emotions also play an important role in social interac- It is not hard to spot young children actively using social
tions, and infants not only have and display emotions, but referencing to look for clues from a parent about how to inter-
they soon become able to perceive and think about emo- pret an unfamiliar scenario. I was keenly aware of this behav-
tions in others. These abilities are critical to infants’ and ior in one of my children when we were riding a gondola up
young children’s social and cognitive development as well as the hill at a ski area when he was an infant. As the swinging
to their capacity to regulate their own emotions. gondola rocked and bumped, he looked mildly anxious, but
he frequently glanced at my face and calmed when he saw
that I was relaxed. Then the gondola stopped unexpectedly
Recognizing Emotions in Others In many ways, even for a long period, and the ski area staff warned that because
young infants seem sensitive to others’ emotions, and they of an equipment breakdown, we might have to be lowered
often respond to expressions of emotion in appropriate from the gondola to the ground by emergency rope. In the
ways. Long before being able to understand a parent’s middle of that conversation, the gondola slightly lurched and
sentences, infants seem to understand the emotions con- I jerked; my son instantly began crying inconsolably. Infants
veyed in her tone of voice. Thus, certain intonations of and young children can be extremely sensitive to the smallest
alarm in a mother’s voice will make an infant more cau- of cues. (Fortunately, they fixed the gondola, but it felt like a
tious (Fernald, 1992). Using both visual and auditory cues very long trip up and down the mountain.)
together, infants as young as 4 months are able to respond By the age of 9 months, infants not only use others’ emo-
differently to several different emotions, such as happi- tional states to gauge whether they themselves should be cau-
ness, sadness, and surprise (Walker-Andrews, 2008). Even tious in a particular situation, they also use this information
when listening to unfamiliar languages, infants as young as to make inferences about other people’s future behaviors. In
5 months will respond differently, depending on the tone of one study, infants observed a person gazing unhappily at an
voice (Fernald, 1993). By 7 months, infants’ brains respond unfamiliar object in one experimental condition, and they
more strongly in the right inferior frontal cortex when they saw another person gazing happily at the same object in
hear a happy intonation than when they hear a neutral tone another experimental condition. They then saw a person’s
(Grossmann et al., 2010). Around this same age, infants are hand holding the object, but the face was obscured so the
also able to distinguish between others’ expressions of sev- infants couldn’t tell which person it was. Finally, the per-
eral basic emotions, such as happiness, sadness, anger, and son’s face was revealed, and the infants looked longer when
fear (Hoehl & Striano, 2010; Leppänen & Nelson, 2006). the person they saw was the one who had previously been
Infants can also use visual and auditory signs of others’ unhappily gazing at the object (Barna & Legerstee, 2005).
emotions to guide their own behavior (Hertenstein & Thus, by 9 months, infants use the emotional states of oth-
Campos, 2004). If a 1-year-old infant at the edge of a visual ers to infer how they will likely interact with novel objects.
cliff notices alarm in his parent’s voice or face, the infant will When they saw the person with an obscured face holding
be less likely to venture out on the cliff (Sorce et al., 1985). the object, they assumed it must be the person who had the
Similarly, if an infant is shown a novel toy and his parent, happy expression, and they were surprised when the person
or even a stranger, reacts with fear, an infant as young as with the unhappy expression was revealed instead.
10 months will clearly avoid the toy (Mumme et al., 1996; These examples illustrate that infants can clearly per-
Mumme & Fernald, 2003). As described in Chapter 6, ceive the difference between a generally positive or negative
watching the expressions and actions of others who know emotional reaction. But it is not yet known whether they
more about an unfamiliar or potentially dangerous circum- can perceive the subtle nuances that emotional expressions
stance is called social referencing. Infants use their parents’ communicate, such as distinguishing disgust from fear, or
reactions as cues to interpret ambiguous situations, and the curiosity from fondness. Yet, just as in the case of interpret-
effect of social referencing in these situations can be quite ing ambiguous situations, it appears that at least around

236 CHAPTER 7 THE ORIGINS OF EMOTION, TEMPERAMENT, AND PERSONALITY

the first year of life, infants more heavily weigh negative est ways in which emotional contagion spreads from one
information in making attributions and inferences about person to another. The act of making a facial expression
others (Vaish et al., 2008). For example, when infants see may be closely related to the emotions associated with that
adults show either positive or negative reactions to toys, expression (Niedenthal et al., 2010). Several researchers
their choice of toys to play with is driven much more by have suggested that this process may be mediated by mirror
negative reactions than by positive reactions (Hertenstein & neurons. Recall that these neurons fire when an individual
Campos, 2004). Nonetheless, when prior attention to an either engages in a particular action or observes someone
object is pitted against having shown a negative emotion else performing that action, as described in Chapter 4.
to an object, 14-month-olds will often assume that the Mirror neurons may play a role in emotional contagion by
actor will still act on the object that had been attended to linking action and perception such that the same neurons
even though it was accompanied by a negative reaction (see fire when a person either expresses an emotion or observes
Scientific Method box). Thus, inferring actions engaged that emotion in others. Thus, when someone perceives a
in by others from their emotions can be difficult for older particular facial expression—say, an expression of sad-
infants when attentional cues are also involved. When an ness—mirror neurons may be activated that enable the per-
infant expects that an actor will act on an object that the ceiver to immediately express that emotion as well and, in
actor had both attended to and regarded positively, that doing so, potentially convey that emotion to yet another
task is easier since both cues work in the same direction. individual. Nonetheless, there is considerable controversy
When they are in conflict, prior attention seems to drive about exactly what cognitive and emotional processes cor-
expectations. respond to mirror neuron activity in humans and whether
they actually support the processes involved in emotional
Emotional Contagion Perceiving what others are feel- contagion (Decety, 2010).
ing often influences the observer’s own emotional states, in
some cases involving the transmission of the same emotion
to the observer. One of the most basic forms of this trans-
mission of emotions is known as emotional contagion Q: What is emotional contagion, and how
(Hatfield et al., 1994), and it takes place when someone might it first emerge in development?
around us feels a particular emotion and we subsequently
seem to “pick it up” and feel the same way ourselves. By
6 months of age, infants, too, seem to pick up emotional
states from others and show those emotions at a similar level
of intensity (Haviland & Lelwica, 1987; Hay et al., 1981). Emotional Regulation in Infancy
The cliché is that “laughter is contagious,” but emotions We all have done or said something in a heated moment
such as happiness, sadness, and fear can all be contagious. that we later regret. Anger, sadness, fear, and many other
Perhaps because of the negativity bias, infants seem espe- emotions can seem to “take over,” and if unchecked, they
cially sensitive to distress, both in adults and other infants. can cause great difficulties. In their daily lives, most adults
Even newborns show distress at hearing other newborns manage to keep the swings of their emotions within a fairly
in distress, with distress continuing to be especially conta- moderate range, but infants and young children are far less
gious throughout the first year of life (Geangu et al., 2010). adept at avoiding outbursts or getting their surging emo-
In fact, infants’ early ability to notice and understand oth- tions under control. Infants can work themselves into a
ers’ emotional states may be closely tied to this ability to state of uncontrollable distress that seems to feed on itself
“catch” others’ emotions. until they eventually cease crying from pure exhaustion.
Although we do not fully understand the mechanisms Children may fly into tantrums or become inconsolably
underlying emotional contagion, it may be related to empa- sad. What is different about infants and young children
thy, which is a sensitivity to the emotional states of others. that makes it more difficult for them to regulate their
Andrew Meltzoff and Keith Moore (1998) speculated that emotions, and how does the ability to regulate emotions
social imitation in newborns may be a critical component develop?
of learning how to sense the emotional states in others. Through processes of emotional regulation, we influence
In Chapter 4, we considered studies (including pioneer- the emotions we experience, when and how we experience
ing work by Meltzoff and Moore) showing that newborns them, and how we reveal our emotions to others (Gross, 1998).
who are only a few weeks old are surprisingly capable of Emotional regulation includes conscious processes, such as
imitating facial expressions. These abilities to imitate not actively and deliberately suppressing emotions, as well as
only require remarkable perceptual-motor integration, as unconscious processes, such as automatic actions or habits
described earlier, but may also reflect some of the earli- that reduce the intensity of an emotional experience. We

EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 237

 SCIENTIFIC METHOD: Inferring Actions from Emotions
Hypothesis:
Preverbal infants can use the emotional states of others to infer their
actions.

Method:
1. In a familiarization trial, 14-month-old infants sat on their mother’s
lap and watched an actor repeatedly show either a joyous reaction
or a disgust reaction to one of two cups.
2. Infants then saw the actor with a neutral face either reach into the
cup (attended cup) the actor had looked at on prior trials or reach
into the other cup (unattended cup) he had not looked at before.
3. Experimenters recorded how long infants looked at the events when
the actor’s hand went into the attended cup and when it went into
the unattended cup.

Results:

Duration of looks (sec)

20
Infants looked longer whenever the actor reached into the cup that was
not attended to before, regardless of whether the actor showed a joy- 15

ous reaction or a disgust reaction. 10

Conclusion: 5

Even older infants seem to have difficulty inferring actions of others from 0
their emotional states and instead seem to assume that people will act on Reach into Reach into
attended cup unattended cup
things that they have previously attended to, even if they showed nega-
Type of test event seen first
tive emotions while attending. (happy condition)

Last familiarization trial

First test trial
Duration of looks (sec)

20

15

10

0
Reach into Reach into
attended cup unattended cup
Type of test event seen first
Source study: Vaish & Woodward (2010). (disgust condition)

regulate positive emotions as well as negative ones. You developmental perspective, three aspects of emotional regu-
might, for example, attempt to dampen your joy at win- lation are especially important in infants: situational fac-
ning a contest when you realize that your best friend lost tors, attentional deployment, and response modification. In
and is terribly disappointed. Finally, emotional regulation addition, for younger infants, the parents play an especially
can involve external factors, such as a parent soothing an important role in regulating infants’ emotions, as infants
infant, or internal factors, such as an infant purposely shift- under 6 months have a relatively limited repertoire of ways
ing his attention away from a frightening image (Eisen- to regulate their own emotions.
berg et al., 2010; Fox & Calkins, 2003; Thompson, 1994).
These facets of emotional regulation, among others, have Situational Factors One way of regulating infants’ emo-
been explored extensively in adults (Gross, 1998). From a tions is to change the situation in which they are immersed,

238 CHAPTER 7 THE ORIGINS OF EMOTION, TEMPERAMENT, AND PERSONALITY

a method called situation modification. The change may apparently in an effort to keep it from making them feel
be caused by a parent or other caregiver, and early in devel- unhappy (Mesman et al., 2009; Striano & Liszkowski,
opment, these adult-driven modifications will usually 2005). Twelve-month-olds use similar attentional strat-
predominate in soothing the infant, such as when a par- egies to regulate their emotions in the Strange Situation
ent removes a frightening toy or takes the infant out of her (Braungart & Stifter, 1991).
crib. Even young infants, however, can modify a situation Following from the infant’s rudimentary skill of look-
themselves. Once infants are able to move about, they can ing away in contexts like the still-face procedure, the ability
sometimes modify a situation by moving away from some- to regulate emotions by redirecting attention develops sig-
thing they find unpleasant—perhaps crawling away from nificantly throughout infancy and early childhood, result-
the deep side of the visual cliff. They can also modify a ing in an increasing ability to avoid overexposure to negative
situation with a facial expression, vocalization, or gesture. If stimuli and to achieve an optimum amount of exposure to
an infant is frightened by a loud stranger, she might show positive stimuli. For example, a preschooler might become
an alarmed face, causing the stranger to become quieter and more skilled at not just looking away from a troubling sight,
more soothing, thereby changing the nature of the situa- but also at purposely focusing on something else to more
tion. An infant who is distressed at being unable to reach actively distract himself (Zelazo & Cunningham, 2007). As
a desired object may also modify the situation by gesturing we will see in Chapter 17, attentional deployment strategies
to a caregiver, who then makes the object attainable. Young continue to be used throughout the lifespan.
infants, too, may elicit parental help through crying, but
this situation is somewhat different from the others, as the Response Modification Another method of emotional
infants may be unable to calm themselves without parental regulation is response modification, which involves
intervention (Kopp & Neufeld, 2003). managing an emotional reaction by directly influencing
Early on, infants are usually better able to modify the the physiological response itself—for example, relaxing
situation they find themselves in than to select the situa- muscles or slowing the heartbeat—or by engaging in an
tion they prefer, as they are very often plopped into a set- activity that indirectly leads to a change in the expression
ting by their caregivers with little chance of escape. In the of an emotion. The conscious use of strategies to manipu-
early years, a responsive adult is more likely to notice an late the bodily state may be relatively late emerging, but
infant’s negative reaction to a situation and then select a self-soothing behaviors, such as thumb-sucking, can begin
different situation on the infant’s behalf. Once they can quite early (Stifter & Braungart, 1995; see Figure 7.7B).
crawl, infants may be able to select a situation themselves, Later in infancy, at around 1 year, infants start to learn to
perhaps moving from one room to another to stay close to inhibit motor movements associated with either extreme
their mother or to avoid a frightening dog. Over the course distress or overexcitement (Fox & Calkins, 2003). Over
of development, the situation selection method of regulat- time, children learn increasingly subtle response modifica-
ing emotions becomes increasingly important as the infant tion techniques to handle strong emotions, such as count-
becomes able to take actions that enable her to approach ing to 10, taking a deep breath, or eating a favorite snack.
pleasant situations or avoid unpleasant ones. As with attentional deployment, our response modifica-
tion strategies continue to develop over the lifespan as we
Attentional Deployment Our attentional skills are learn how to engage in behaviors that either reduce anxiety
closely related to our emotional experiences. Someone who or increase arousal.
finds it difficult to disengage from upsetting stimuli may One form of response modification, namely the sup-
become increasingly distressed and unable to regulate that pression of certain emotions, seems to be heavily influ-
emotion. When we use attentional deployment to regulate enced by culture. Many studies have shown how adults
our emotions, we direct our thoughts in a way that makes socialize children not to display certain emotions even
a situation feel less emotionally charged. This is generally when they are feeling them strongly, and these display
done through distraction, focusing our attention on a less rules governing what kinds of emotional expressions a
adverse aspect of a situation or thinking about something particular group considers appropriate can vary dramati-
else completely (see Figure 7.7A). Among all the methods cally across cultures (Hofer & Eisenberg, 2008; Thomp-
of regulating emotions, infants are thought to use atten- son, 2011). For example, Iranian children are socialized
tional deployment most actively. For example, they will to suppress their emotions more than Dutch children,
sometimes change the focus of their attention by looking especially when in the presence of family members.
away from an unpleasant stimulus to a more neutral one. On the other hand, when Dutch children do suppress
In the still-face procedure discussed in Chapter 6, infants their emotions, they tend to do so more in the pres-
will sometimes look away from the mother’s impassive face, ence of peers (Novin et al., 2009). As another example,

EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 239

 NEW DIRECTION S IN DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH

The Effect of Parenting on Emotion

Processing in Children

E
arly interactions between parents and their children may eyebrows, which are typical expressions of anger) than did non-
have a major influence on how children interpret what abusive mothers when they were angry. Even more important,
others are feeling. Important recent research is investi- the children of abusive mothers showed corresponding deficits
gating whether growing up with abusive or emotionally in their ability to process their mother’s angry expressions, hav-
inappropriate parents influences children’s ability to perceive and ing more difficulty in sensing their mother’s anger. Moreover,
interpret the emotions of others. One study examined the abil- the children of abusive mothers were more likely to be anx-
ity of 9-year-olds to detect emotional facial expressions, com- ious, depressed, and aggressive than were the children of
paring the emotional sensitivity of children of abusive parents nonabusive mothers, possibly because of the greater uncer-
with that of children whose parents were not abusive. To test tainty about their mother’s emotional state. Other scholars
the children’s sensitivity to even the earliest traces of particular have likewise found relationships between mothers who are
expressions, the researchers showed them a digitally altered chronically depressed and their children’s abilities to identify
series of images of the same face, with the images gradually and describe the emotions of others (Raikes & Thompson,
transforming from a face with a neutral expression to a face with 2006). Measures of children’s neural activity associated with
a strong emotion, such as extreme anger (Pollak et al., 2009). interpreting emotion also show differences related to their
When viewing the photo series that progressed from neutral early experiences. In one study, infants and toddlers who
to angry faces (see Figure 7.6), children of abusive parents had been institutionalized in orphanages in Romania viewed
identified anger at an earlier point in the series than the children emotional faces while researchers monitored the electrophysi-
whose parents were not abusive. But the abused children and ological activity in their brains. Compared with children who
those in the control group were equally sensitive to sad, fear- grew up in normal homes, they showed much less response
ful, happy, and surprised expressions. These findings suggest in a component of electrical waves called P1 (Moulson et al.,
that abused children are especially prone to identifying ambigu- 2009). It also appeared that leaving the institution and spend-
ous expressions as angry ones and therefore are more likely to ing time in foster care could gradually lessen these effects (see
interpret other people’s expressions as being angry in real-life Chapter 6). Several researchers are now documenting a diverse
situations. set of such biomarkers (ranging from electrophysiological to
In another study, researchers looked at the kinds of facial hormonal measures) that are associated with particular social
and vocal emotional expressions produced by mothers who experiences with caregivers and the ability to process emotions
were either abusive or nonabusive (Shackman et al., 2010). (Strang et al., 2012).
When researchers rated their expressions, the abusive mothers As in so many other cases, it is difficult to be sure if abusive
showed facial expressions that were less typical of anger (for or depressed parents actually cause the changes in how chil-
example, showing less intensity in lowering and contracting their dren perceive and think about emotions. An alternative expla-

contrast the emotional expressions of children who grow general suppression of negative emotions, may begin to
up in agrarian farming families in the Nso culture in be instilled during infancy in many cultures, the more
northwest Cameroon with those of urban, middle-class nuanced ways of following cultural display rules in
children growing up in northern Germany. In the Nso specific contexts continue to develop well into middle
culture, children are socialized early to suppress any signs childhood.
of negative emotions. By comparison, German children Thus, well before the first year of life, situational selec-
are socialized to express emotions readily, especially tion, attentional deployment, and response modification
positive emotions that may be seen as markers of their each play a role in regulating infants’ emotions. All three
autonomy and individuality (Keller & Otto, 2009). Yet, processes are present early on, and they become more
while some forms of response modification, such as a sophisticated in the months and years that follow. In addi-

240 CHAPTER 7 THE ORIGINS OF EMOTION, TEMPERAMENT, AND PERSONALITY

 nation is that some of the same factors that cause parents to sensitive to negative emotions suggests that these children
be abusive or depressed may also affect their children’s abili- have fairly complex differences in emotional processing, rather
ties to perceive and understand emotions. For example, some than simple deficits.
abusive parents may have genetically predisposed biases in It is critical that we learn how early such emotional pro-
how they perceive and understand emotions that contribute to cessing differences appear in these children’s behavior in order
their abusive behavior. If so, their children may inherit these to understand whether interacting with emotionally dysfunc-
predispositions and show similar problems perceiving and tional parents is a root cause. That research, in turn, will help
interpreting what others feel. Another possibility is that some researchers determine when negative effects of abusive par-
kinds of environments are so stressful that they can cause enting first appear. Taken together, these future research find-
both parents and children to perceive and understand emo- ings will help guide practitioners in their decisions concerning
tions differently. Such alternatives need to be explored more how to better intervene and help children who grow up in such
fully, but the finding that abused children are sometimes more environments.

1
0.8 Fear

Judges (%)
0.6

0.4

0.2
0
1
Sadness
0.8

Judges (%)
0.6

0.4

0.2
0
1
Happiness
0.8

Judges (%)
0.6

0.4

0.2
0
1
Surprise

Judges (%)
0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2
0
1
Anger
0.8

Judges (%)
0.6

0.4

0.2 Control
Abused
0
0 20 40 60 80 100
Image (%)

A B

FIGURE 7.6 Abused children and emotion perception. (A) The faces shown here range from neutral to more and more emotional for
fear, sadness, happiness, surprise, and anger. (B) The accompanying graphs show when control children and abused children recognized
emotional expressions. Abused children tended to see anger earlier, as expressions varied from neutral to angry faces (bottom panel), but
they showed no higher sensitivity for fearful, sad, happy, or surprised expressions (top four panels). Adapted from Pollak et al. (2009).

tion, these processes interact from a very early age. An or reappraisal (Gross, 1998), which consists of rethinking
infant may modify a response in a way that also deploys a situation to interpret its negative aspects in less upset-
her attention in a different manner and that consequently ting or more positive ways. There is not yet any evidence
modifies her situation. As each of these processes becomes that infants are able to use this kind of cognitive reframing,
more sophisticated and interacts with the others, they col- but such a process may yet be shown to have precursors in
lectively offer many ways for cultures to exert their own infancy. Interestingly, the neural circuits involved in distrac-
influences and create culturally unique patterns of emo- tion and reappraisal during emotional regulation have several
tional modulation that go beyond these early forms. Finally, distinct components, which may help explain why these two
as children grow older, they develop new emotional regula- forms of regulation have different developmental trajectories
tion processes. One example involves cognitive reframing (McRae et al., 2010).

EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 241

A B
FIGURE 7.7 Emotional regulation. All infants learn to regulate both unpleasant and pleasant emotions, a process that involves several
components that can take many years to fully develop. (A) Infants can use attentional deployment and learn to redirect their attention elsewhere
if an aversive event (for example, a competitor with a toy) is troubling them. (B) Infants can also use response modification. For example, self-
soothing, by putting a hand or a thumb in one’s mouth, can be a surprisingly effective technique for some infants.

or situations. Some people have quite distressing and dis-

Q: In what ways are infants less able to regulate ruptive phobias of such things as going outdoors, flying in
their emotions than older children and adults? airplanes, or eating food cooked by others, but it is a mis-
take to think of all phobias as maladaptive. All humans and
some other species may share fears of particular kinds of
events and objects, and for good reason. This chapter does
not consider the development of clearly irrational and mal-
Evolutionary Preparedness and adaptive phobias, which are forms of psychopathology. The
Emotional Development focus here is on the ways in which some fears are influenced
by prepared learning.
In some cases, the developmental paths of emotions may An upsetting experience is much more likely to become
be strongly constrained because the child is prepared, in associated with the fear of some objects than with the fear of
the evolutionary sense, to experience distinctive emotions others. A clinical observation of a 4-year-old girl who saw a
in certain well-defined situations. As described in Chap- snake in a park while she was on an outing with her family
ter 4, many species learn some associations more readily nicely illustrates this aspect of prepared learning of phobias
than others because they involve behaviors that are espe- (Marks, 1977). On seeing the snake, the girl had examined
cially important to the species’ survival in its natural envi- it with interest but no apparent fear. Then, a little later, she
ronment. Likewise, humans might be prepared, even in accidentally hurt her hand on the door of her family’s car. If
infancy, to more quickly learn to feel disgust toward cer- she was to develop any phobia following this outing, it seems
tain things and fear toward other things because of the likely that she would come to fear car doors or perhaps cars.
ways that certain responses promoted our ancient ances- Instead, she developed a lifelong fear of snakes. She strongly
tors’ survival. For example, it is much easier to develop a associated the experience of pain and trauma with the snake
fear of snakes or spiders—which posed real threats to our she had recently encountered, even though she had seen the
forebears—than a fear of rocks or fish. To see why some snake before the car door accident. Learning to associate a
emotional responses are thought to be prepared in this painful or unpleasant experience with something encoun-
way, we will look more closely at fear and disgust responses tered much earlier runs counter to the principles of classical
and then briefly turn to other possible cases of prepared conditioning, which predicts stronger learned associations
emotions. between events that happen closer together in space and
time. But a more evolutionary or ethological perspective
Preparedness for Acquiring Certain Fears One kind easily explains the girl’s experience and the resulting pho-
of fearful reaction that is especially salient involves phobias, bia. Instead of focusing on whether her experience with the
which are extreme, often irrational fears of specific things snake and her injury happened very close together in time,

242 CHAPTER 7 THE ORIGINS OF EMOTION, TEMPERAMENT, AND PERSONALITY

these approaches emphasize the adaptive survival value of Like the rhesus monkeys, young children often show
being highly sensitive to learning fears of natural dangers, a strong prepared fear of snakes before they have had any
such as snakes (Seligman, 1971). negative experiences with them—or any experiences with
If humans are indeed prepared to learn certain fears, it them at all. In one set of studies, children between the ages
should be possible to show these biases in young children and of 3 and 5 years were asked either to find a picture of a
perhaps even in infants. Just as infants have biases for more snake among eight “distractor” pictures of harmless objects,
easily learning about human speech and human faces, infants such as flowers, or to find a flower picture among eight
may also have biases for quickly learning about evolutionarily snake pictures (see Figure 7.9). Similar studies used pictures
threatening stimuli in the environment, such as snakes and of frogs or caterpillars for distractors, both of which have
spiders (LoBue et al., 2010; Rakison & Derringer, 2008). some snakelike features. In all cases, even the 3-year-olds
If humans are prepared to develop fears of snakes and spi- identified the snake picture among the distractors much
ders, it might make adaptive sense for these fears to emerge faster than they could find another object among pictures
very early and to become easily associated with threatening of snakes (LoBue & DeLoache, 2008). Equally important,
stimuli (see Figure 7.8). the children who had no prior experience with snakes were
The most compelling argument that prepared fears have just as likely as those with substantial experience to detect
a strong genetic component (rather than developing mostly snakes more quickly. Apparently, even without any direct
through experience) comes from studies in which the develop- experience with snakes, young children are much more vigi-
ing organism is afraid of particular “naturally” feared objects lant for snakes than for other objects and notice them much
without having been previously exposed to them, either more quickly (LoBue, 2013).
directly or culturally. Because such studies require subjects to Further evidence shows that young children not only
be socially and culturally isolated, they are not ethical to do notice snakes especially quickly, but also are prepared to
with humans, but they can be done with rhesus monkeys. In learn to fear them. In a second line of studies, research-
one study, researchers showed monkeys who had been raised ers showed infants as young as 7 months a short video,
in isolation videotapes of other rhesus monkeys exhibiting either of snakes or some other exotic animal, while
extreme fear to different sorts of stimuli (Cook & Mineka, the infants listened to either a fearful voice or a happy
1989). Through clever editing of the tapes, some monkeys voice (DeLoache & LoBue, 2009; see Figure 7.10).
saw videos that seemed to depict model monkeys showing Even 7-month-olds looked longer at the snakes when
fearful reactions to harmless items, such as flowers or a toy the snakes were paired with the fearful voice, indicat-
rabbit, while other monkeys saw videos of model monkeys ing that they were especially prepared to associate fear
showing fear of a toy snake or a toy crocodile. Although the with snakes. Nonetheless, they did not look longer at
monkeys who watched the videos had not seen any of the the snakes when there was no sound accompanying the
feared objects before or had any opportunity to learn about videos or when still pictures were used. Apparently, in
them, they nonetheless developed a strong fear of snakes and young infants, one trigger for the fear of snakes involves
crocodiles and no fear of rabbits or flowers. Thus, without associating the fear with an animated display. Infants also
any experience of the kinds of fearful events they watched, seem to show a similar prepared fear of spiders in the first
they developed fears in response to certain prepared stimuli 6 months of life. Infants as young as 5 months show a
simply by seeing others respond to them fearfully. preference to visually track spider stimuli over other

FIGURE 7.8 Prepared

fears. The preparedness model
suggests that a toddler will be
much more prone to develop a
fear of snakes than to develop a
fear of neutral objects.

EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 243

 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL P OLICY

The Causes and Consequences of

Problems in Emotional Regulation

S
ome young children seem to lose control of their emo- difficult time regulating their emotions seem to be more likely
tions whenever they get upset, spiraling into fits of than other children to experience behavioral problems later in
despair, anger, or both. These children are not just life, including having greater anxiety, depression, and difficulty
touchy or easily distressed; instead, their emotions interacting with peers.
seem to run away from them. Nonetheless, not all children with emotional regulation prob-
Some children who have difficulty regulating their emotions lems go on to have these difficulties. Rather, the level of stress
seem to have problems in the domain of emotional intelligence. in the child’s environment seems to influence the outcome. We
That is, they have difficulty inferring others’ emotional states have seen this kind of interaction between a child’s own ten-
from their expressions and behavior, and they do not seem to dencies and his environment in other domains of development
understand how specific situations are likely to lead to certain as well; this is another instance in which a group of infants or
emotions (Salovey & Sluyter, 1997; see also Chapter 11). These children are not predetermined to have a particular kind of prob-
difficulties also seem to extend to their perceptions of them- lem, but are at risk for doing so if they also have certain kinds of
selves. They have difficulty recognizing and understanding their experiences. For example, one study compared two groups of
own emotions (Shields et al., 2001). As a result, they may have children who were determined to be genetically at risk for emo-
trouble keeping their feelings in check as a highly emotional sit- tional regulation problems but had experienced different kinds
uation starts to ramp up. A child with low emotional intelligence of parenting styles. One group of at-risk children who had a
may fail to notice his own emotional response early enough to short form of a serotonin-related gene (see Chapter 6) grew up
regulate it effectively. with parents who were not fully responsive and sensitive to their
Difficulties with emotional regulation can begin to cause needs, and these children did indeed develop poor emotional
other problems for these children quite early. Thus, young chil- regulation skills (Kochanska et al., 2009b). The other group
dren who have trouble keeping their own emotions in check or of at-risk children had the same genetic allele associated with
understanding their own emotions and those of others tend to emotional regulation problems, but the children in this second
have more difficulty than their peers adjusting to the first year group had more responsive parents. Interestingly, the children
of preschool (Shields et al., 2001). Despite the challenge of in this second group did not develop any more emotional prob-
precisely defining and measuring emotional regulation problems lems than children who showed no genetic risks.
(Cole et al., 2004; Eisenberg & Spinrad, 2004), research sug- Much as in our discussion of parenting styles and attachment
gests that toddlers and young children who have an unusually in Chapter 6, we should not assume that parenting styles directly

objects such as flowers, suggesting an early-emerging bias where snakes are presented so briefly that we are not even
to monitor certain kinds of potential threats (Rakison & aware of them (Mineka & Ohman, 2002b; Ohman &
Derringer, 2008). Finally, at least one study suggests that Mineka, 2003). These patterns of fear conditioning follow
female infants may be more predisposed than male infants some of the usual laws of associative learning, but they
to associate fear with snakes and spiders, a pattern that is also go beyond them in ways that reflect strong preparedness
also found in adults (Rakison, 2009) and that raises ques- effects (Mineka & Ohman, 2002a). In short, many spe-
tions about origins of sex differences in some phobias. cies seem to share evolutionarily ancient predispositions
The evolutionary roots of phobias serve to remind us to develop fears of snakes, spiders, and even heights and
that although the same situation can elicit different emo- other categories of stimuli (Barrett, 2005).
tions in different people, the relation between situations
and emotions is not arbitrary (Ohman & Mineka, 2001). Preparedness and the Development of Disgust We
We easily learn to fear potentially dangerous natural stim- have seen that some fears are rooted in prepared learning
uli like snakes, and we find it hard to extinguish those and do not depend purely on experience. Is the development
fears. Moreover, we can even acquire those fears in cases of other emotions also influenced by adaptive prepared-

244 CHAPTER 7 THE ORIGINS OF EMOTION, TEMPERAMENT, AND PERSONALITY

 caused emotional regulation problems in the first group of chil- stronger need to remain engaged with their mothers, who are
dren, since many other genetic and environmental factors were often nonresponsive. Rather than looking away, even though the
also involved. But such a study does offer a plausible account of still face was upsetting, they kept looking at their mothers and
how one aspect of a child’s environment (parenting style) poten- tried to comfort themselves in other ways.
tially might interact with emotional regulation problems and influ- Children’s emotional regulation problems raise a number
ence the child’s emotional development. Similarly, another study of difficult questions. First and foremost, what can be done to
showed how insecurely attached children and coercive parents help these children with their emotional struggles? One com-
could get into vicious negative-feedback loops in which the par- mon therapeutic approach is to focus on specific behaviors,
ents’ increased coercive behaviors seemed to exacerbate poor such as tantrums associated with excessive anger. In this case,
emotional regulation skills in their children, which in turn led to a therapist might work with a child and his parents to develop
more coercive behaviors by the parents (Kochanska et al., 2009a). strategies for modifying the child’s tendency to throw tantrums
More generally, researchers may refer to “emotional availability” (Kazdin, 1997). The therapist might teach the child an alterna-
in parent-child relationships, where emotional availability includes tive behavior that more effectively regulates anger, such as deep
effective emotional communication between parent and child, breathing, and show him how it is more rewarding in the long
mutual emotional understanding, and emotional accessibility of run than throwing a tantrum.
each partner in an interaction. High levels of emotional availability A different approach attempts to expand on the child’s abil-
in parent-child relationships are associated with good emotional ity to understand his own emotional states and those of oth-
regulation skills in infants (Bornstein et al., 2012). ers, assuming that such an increased awareness will lead to
One way that parental influence can work is by affecting enhanced abilities to arrest an emotional surge before it gets
the strategies that children develop for coping with emotional out of control (Slaby et al., 1995). In addition, because parents
regulation. For example, infants of depressed mothers seem to of children with emotional regulation problems often discour-
cope with their distress differently than infants whose moth- age talk about emotions, developing strategies for having more
ers are not depressed. Researchers examined the reactions extensive discussions between parent and child about emo-
of two groups of 5-month-olds—those whose mothers were tional states may also be a way to give children some insight
depressed and those whose mothers were not—to the still-face into how to manage their emotions (Suveg et al., 2005). With
procedure, in which the mother shows the infant a frozen, unre- these approaches and a number of others, many children who
sponsive, neutral expression. Infants whose mothers were clini- have trouble regulating their emotions may be able to develop
cally depressed were more likely to deal with the still face by appropriate skills and see real, long-term improvements. Ide-
using behaviors such as thumb-sucking to soothe themselves. ally, we would like to intervene earlier in infancy, when these
In contrast, infants of nondepressed mothers were more likely problems may start to emerge, but the challenge is to design
to use attentional deployment strategies, such as looking away effective interventions for infants. Training parents to be more
from the still face (Manian & Bornstein, 2009). One interpreta- responsive and less coercive to their infants may well be the
tion of these results is that infants of depressed mothers felt a best strategy with younger infants.

ness? Disgust may well be another emotion that occurs to a disgusting substance), even when there is no way the
in response to particular stimuli within the constraints of physical connection could contaminate the food. Similarly,
prepared learning. This idea dates back to Charles Darwin if an object has previously come into contact with offensive
(1872/1975), who noted that disgust seems to consist of the material, such as feces, people often react to that object with
specific emotion and facial expression that relate to poten- disgust, as if it has been contaminated, even if there is no
tially ingesting something offensive (see Figure 7.11). Emo- rational way that any contamination could survive.
tional responses that are universal to humans are the ones Although disgust, like some fears, shows evidence of
most likely to have roots in evolutionarily prepared reac- preparedness, its development shows different patterns of
tions. In the case of disgust, prepared reactions seem most change and cross-cultural variability than we saw with pre-
likely in response to ingesting either living things or their pared fears. For example, disgust toward feces appears to
by-products (hair, body excretions, and the like). In addi- be universal to adults in all cultures (Rozin et al., 1986,
tion, there is a universal bias toward reactions of disgust 2000, 2008), but it is not usually present in toddlers in any
to food that is physically connected with something offen- culture, at least not until the children are toilet trained.
sive (for example, a long string connecting a plate of food Instead, it typically develops sometime between 3 and

EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 245

 of the body, such as death, wounds, bad hygiene, or sex.
These extensions of disgust beyond taste seem to be unique
to humans (Rozin et al., 1986, 2000, 2008).
Finally, all humans seem to develop culturally specific
extensions of disgust to strange or undesirable people and
to certain moral offenses, both of which pose potential
threats to the social order. This ability to rely on culture for
broadening the disgust category may have its roots in early
infancy. Thus, while infants may not show stable disgust
reactions to much beyond bitter tastes, by at least 11 months
they do take note of adults’ disgust reactions and avoid the
objects of those responses (Hertenstein & Campos, 2004).
Later in development, by at least 5 years of age, children are
able to extend disgust reactions to immoral actions (Dano-
FIGURE 7.9 Threat detection. Preschool children tend to more
vitch & Bloom, 2009).
quickly detect snakes than flowers. This may be because humans
have evolved a bias to see snakes, but not flowers, as threatening.
Disgust therefore develops differently from fear in
This boy is shown eight pictures of snakes and one picture of a the sense that an early, specific disgust reaction becomes
flower on a computer monitor and asked to touch the flower. It takes extended beyond a narrow range of stimuli to a much
him longer to identify the flower than it would to identify one snake in broader set of stimuli. Even in those extensions, however,
the midst of eight flowers. From LoBue & DeLoache (2008). humans show evidence of preparedness to associate dis-
gust with particular types of things and situations, such
7 years of age (Rozin et al., 1986, 2000). Disgust seems to as contaminants that threaten the integrity of the body or
develop from a response to a very narrow range of stimuli, that potentially cause disease (Oaten et al., 2009). That
such as disgusting tastes (typically bitter ones early on), to notion of disgust may then become extended to certain
a much broader range of stimuli. One view suggests that sexual practices or moral transgressions that may con-
humans’ earliest disgust reactions to bitter substances may taminate the social system either by reducing reproductive
be shared with many other species. As children grow older, success or by violating social norms (Tybur et al., 2009).
however, the emotion of disgust becomes more general, as Interestingly, even these broader extensions of disgust
it is applied to items that could cause disease, such as ani- may be evolutionarily constrained, such that adults show
mal body products. It then becomes further generalized to disgust pertaining to three major domains: disease con-
things and events that more broadly threaten the integrity tamination from invisible things, such as microbes; certain

2.5
Camera
Average looking time (in sec)

2.3

2.0

1.8

1.5

1.3

1.0
Snake Nonsnake

Fearful Happy
A B
FIGURE 7.10 Learning to associate snakes with fear. (A) In this experiment, infants sit on their mother’s lap and watch videos showing
hippos and snakes accompanied by fearful or happy voices. (B) Infants as young as 7 months will look longer at a brief video of a snake when
they hear a fearful voice, but not when they hear a happy voice. They look equally long at brief videos of hippos when they hear a happy voice
as when they hear a fearful voice (the nonsnake differences shown are not statistically significant). Adapted from DeLoache & LoBue (2009).

246 CHAPTER 7 THE ORIGINS OF EMOTION, TEMPERAMENT, AND PERSONALITY

FIGURE 7.11 Preparedness for disgust. As these photos illustrate, disgust reactions are easy to observe in people of all ages. One compo-
nent of the reaction seems to be a reflexive set of movements that serve to block any additional offending substances from entering the mouth.

types of immoral actions; and choice of sexual partners We have seen that certain kinds of emotions seem to be
and behaviors. One major remaining challenge is to under- linked, quite possibly through natural selection, to particu-
stand how and why people seem to develop a common lar kinds of stimuli and to certain response routines. Over
emotional reaction to offenses within these particular and above these deeply rooted linkages, emotional develop-
diverse domains. Other questions that are still being inves- ment involves constant refinement, fine-tuning, and exten-
tigated have to do with the reasons women tend to react sion of prepared emotions to broader classes of situations,
more strongly than men to most disgust-provoking stimuli resulting in more sophisticated and nuanced responses.
(Björklund & Hursti, 2004; Haidt et al., 1994; Marzillier & Ultimately, our understanding of these prepared emotional
Davey, 2004, 2005). systems needs to be integrated into broader accounts of how
all emotions and our ways of regulating them develop. In
addition, such an integration may bring new developmental
insights into the close relationship between emotions and
Q: How might irrational thought related to personality.
disgust be evidence for disgust as a biologically
prepared emotion?

Preparedness and the Development of Other Emo-

Temperament and the Origins
tions The idea of preparedness may explain some aspects
of the development of most emotions, but the details of
of Personality
these explanations await further work. For example, smiling Any parent who has more than one child quickly realizes
may be a prepared response to a particular set of situations, that different infants tend to react differently to similar situ-
which in turn helps give rise to feelings of joy. (The situ- ations. What frightens one infant might interest another.
ation may give rise to joy itself, but the smiling response Some infants greet a challenge with anger, others respond
may enhance that feeling.) As mentioned earlier, the idea with sadness, and still others show renewed effort. An
that emotions are rooted in prepared, adaptive responses to infant’s tendency toward particular emotional and behav-
particular situations fits well with the view that emotions ioral responses to specific situations is known as tempera-
involve responding to situations in goal-directed ways. That ment. An individual’s temperament emerges early in life
is, certain emotions may be prepared to be associated with and remains relatively stable over time and can also involve
certain specific combinations of goals and situations. Thus, individual differences in self-regulation (Goldsmith &
you are much more likely to be angry when a goal is blocked Campos, 1982; Goldsmith et al., 2000; Rothbart & Bates,
intentionally by others than when the obstacle is caused 2006; Zentner & Bates, 2008).
by natural events. Anger is surely more effective when it Temperament describes, roughly, an infant’s personal-
is expressed to another being who can respond to it than ity. But most researchers use the term temperament when
when it is displayed to something inanimate. For that reason, describing an infant’s disposition because behavioral dif-
natural selection may have favored a prepared anger response ferences among infants are not the same as those that dis-
to obstacles purposely raised by others. tinguish older children or adults. Because temperament

TEMPERAMENT AND THE ORIGINS OF PERSONALITY 247

describes infants’ emotional tendencies, features of to aspects of personality (Allport, 1937; Goldberg, 1982)—
adult personality centering around emotions and moods emerge from far fewer critical components, such as fearful-
seem to be among the most likely aspects of personality ness and agreeableness. In this view, these few components
to have clear roots in infant temperament. But even in interact with one another and with other aspects of a per-
these domains, infants certainly do not show the rich- son and her experiences, yielding all the traits and types of
ness or complexity of personality that older children and personality (Cattell, 1978). Perhaps surprisingly, the four
adults do. Moreover, personality includes many other personality types that Hippocrates described resemble some
aspects of human variation, such as intelligence, creativ- of the categories presently described by researchers who study
ity, and self-monitoring ability, to name a few, that seem infant temperament and the development of personality.
highly implausible—or at least unmeasurable—in infants. Modern views of temperament integrate biological views
These considerations have led researchers to talk about with psychological processes. One influential line of work with
temperament as a more biologically rooted and hence a strong biological emphasis focused on the early emergence
earlier-emerging part of personality (Allport, 1937; Buss & of temperament and its high degree of heritability—that
Plomin, 1984). Hence, the vast majority of research on is, how much genes contribute to individual variation—as
the origins of personality in infancy has focused on study- its critical attributes (Buss & Plomin, 1984). These approaches
ing infant temperament. are sometimes called trait approaches for their emphasis
on behavior patterns as heritable traits. Over the years, this
view evolved into an account that focused on three funda-
Q: What is the difference between mental trait-like categories—emotionality, activity level, and
temperament and personality? How are they sociability—which were thought to make important contri-
related? butions to later personality traits. These three categories have
become prominent for several interrelated reasons. First, each
has been associated with significant heritabilities across a wide
As we will see, a major challenge arises in trying to under- range of studies, suggesting important influences of genetic
stand how differences in temperament among infants are pathways. Second, several neural circuits and structures are
part of the larger story of personality development. As part associated with these categories. For example, amygdala
of that challenge, we will ask how differences in tempera- activity is associated with both emotionality and sociability
ment that are present in infancy contribute to later patterns and more broadly with approach and withdrawal tendencies.
of personality and how certain types of social experiences The amygdala and its associations with temperament have
and cultural practices influence this process. also been linked to genetic variations. Thus, in young pri-
mates, a particular variation of the central amygdala gene Ce
has been linked to anxious temperaments through a path-
Temperament-Based Components of way that involves decreased receptor production and activity
in the central amygdala (Fox et al., 2012). The same gene
Personality and Early Development and its variants are present in humans. Other physiological
The notion that the richness and diversity of personality correlates of emotionality, sociability, and activity level can
might develop from different combinations of a relatively involve variations in heart rate, cortisol levels, and the degree
few biologically based values actually dates back thousands of involvement of the frontal lobes (Henderson & Wachs,
of years. The ancient Greek physician Hippocrates was the 2007; Zentner & Shiner, 2012). Finally, there seem to be
first to offer a detailed version of this theory (Arikha, 2007; analogous temperamental variations in a variety of social spe-
Smith, 1979). He believed that there are four different per- cies, including some primates and dogs, suggesting an adap-
sonality types, which reflect different balances of the body’s tive role for these dimensions of temperament that occurs
four humors (derived from the Latin umor, meaning “fluid”): robustly across several species.
blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile. For example, he As always, the involvement of both genetic and biologi-
thought that people who are social, outgoing, and optimistic cal influences should not be interpreted as genes and biol-
show those traits because they have a relatively large amount ogy predetermining an infant’s temperament. Instead, these
of blood, whereas melancholic, introspective, and morose factors interact with particular kinds of environments to
people have an abundance of black bile. create differences in temperament. These environmental
Although there is no physiological basis for Hippocrates’s influences include parent-child interaction patterns and the
theory, it shares some important elements with the mod- degree to which an infant’s environment is predictable and
ern understanding of both temperament and personality. nonthreatening.
For example, many researchers hold that the vast variety of Other researchers on temperament focus on individual
personality differences—over 10,000 terms in English refer differences in infants’ tendencies to express and regulate

248 CHAPTER 7 THE ORIGINS OF EMOTION, TEMPERAMENT, AND PERSONALITY

basic emotions (Goldsmith & Campos, 1982, 1986, 1990). Among its most important contributions, the New
Consider basic emotions such as sadness, happiness, anger, York Longitudinal Study suggested some patterns in the
surprise, and fear. Temperament would be interpreted here development of temperament that became a basis for later
as tendencies to show either high or low levels of such emo- research. Based on extensive interviews with the mothers at
tions. We can see how differences in emotionality, activity the beginning of the study in which each mother was asked
level, and sociability could all lead to different tendencies to provide a detailed description of her infant’s daily activi-
to express basic emotions. Hence, even though these two ties and routine rather than explicit information about
approaches to temperament seem quite different, they may the infant’s personality or temperament, the research-
both be related to regulation of emotions. Indeed, if emo- ers described nine dimensions of temperament: activity
tions are seen as having functional roles concerned with level, approach/withdrawal (from novel objects, people,
mobilizing oneself and eliciting reactions in others, emo- or situations), adaptability (ease of changing responses to
tional regulation can be seen as intrinsic to variations in the situational influences), mood (positive or negative feel-
tendency to express emotions. ings), threshold of responsiveness (when an infant starts to
respond to a stimulus), intensity of reaction, distractibility,
rhythmicity (regularity of biological functions), and atten-
tion span/persistence. Each baby was then scored and clas-
Determining Differences in Temperament sified into one of three categories: (1) Easy babies (roughly
To identify different characteristics of infant temperament, 40 percent of the group) were happy and adaptable, gener-
researchers have used reports by caregivers, observations ally showed a positive attitude, did not overreact to situa-
of infants in natural settings, and observations of infants tions, and had regular daily routines. (2) Difficult babies
in the laboratory. In the earliest studies on temperament, (roughly 10 percent of the group) were often unhappy, did
researchers used parents’ reports about their infants and not adjust well to new situations, had irregular eating and
then coded the behaviors into a set of general characteris- sleeping patterns, and tended to show intense reactions. (3)
tics. In all these approaches, stability of a temperamental “Slow to warm up” babies (roughly 15 percent of the group)
classification over time and a range of situations was an were initially negative in mood, less active, reacted with
important concern. Thus, a quick emotional reaction by an relatively low intensity, and adapted slowly to new situa-
infant to a threatening situation is interesting to the extent tions. The remaining 35 percent of the participants were
that it appears repeatedly in similar contexts. Researchers called average babies, and they tended to have intermediate
also had to find ways to distill from thousands of highly values on these scales.
specific observations of infant behaviors much broader Over the years, Thomas and Chess examined how these
characterizations of individual differences that enabled categories of infant temperament might relate to different
them to talk usefully about different temperamental types patterns of behavior in later life, and they suggested some lon-
and dimensions. Moreover, the entire approach was also ger-term relationships. For example, they believed that a dif-
mindful of the long-term goal of ultimately connecting ficult baby who is also highly reactive to situations and shows
these broader factors to personality types in older children a low attention span might be less likely to do well in highly
and adults. structured elementary school settings and more likely to have
hostile relations with peers (Rubin et al., 2003; Thomas et al.,
The New York Longitudinal Study A major milestone 1968). Moreover, children considered to be slow to warm up
in temperament research came in a large-scale longitudinal might tend to become more isolated from peers and would
study conducted by Alexander Thomas and Stella Chess rarely become central members of social groups.
(Thomas et al., 1963, 1968; Thomas & Chess, 1984). In several ways, the New York Longitudinal Study laid
Recall that a longitudinal study involves assessing each a crucial groundwork for later studies. First, it looked at
child repeatedly over an extended period of time to explore infant behaviors in their own right rather than conceiv-
what remains constant and what changes in the child. The ing of them as infant versions of adult behaviors and quali-
children in Thomas and Chess’s New York Longitudinal ties. Second, it suggested that infants’ behaviors could be
Study were studied from infancy to middle age. As seen in coded into temperament categories that might have some
Chapter 1, the central questions in this approach and in degree of developmental continuity, at least into the school
most other longitudinal studies on individual differences years. Finally, it started to reveal how the specific circum-
are whether what is measured at one age shows a similar stances of a child’s development could strongly modify a
value across all ages, observers, and situations (reliability) child’s temperamental disposition. Although the study has
and whether the measure predicts the more naturalistic and been criticized for failing to meet various criteria of reli-
intuitively compelling behaviors that are thought to under- ability and validity, this frequently happens for studies that
lie the temperamental measures (validity). develop the first systematic measures in an area (Rothbart &

TEMPERAMENT AND THE ORIGINS OF PERSONALITY 249

Bates, 2006). It usually takes time and considerable trial attention away from unpleasant aspects of a situation to
and error to work up optimal measures. Moreover, in lon- focus on more pleasing ones. As a result, they become better
gitudinal designs, it may be difficult to change a measure at able to inhibit and control their actions and perceptions (see
later ages, even when its shortcomings are fully realized, as Chapter 4; see Jackson, 1865/1958), which also significantly
a changed measure might prevent direct comparisons with influences their ability to regulate their emotions and other
results at earlier ages. aspects of their social development.
Because differences in attention play a role in early-
Modern Approaches to Studying Temperament emerging variations in temperament, researchers have
Researchers have now developed more sensitive and accu- started to ask whether variations in growth rates of the
rate ways of measuring infants’ temperament in terms brain’s attentional systems might help explain how some
of their behavior in particular settings. One especially temperamental differences unfold over time. In fact, chil-
promising measure, the Infant Behavior Questionnaire- dren appear to show different rates of maturation of these
Revised (IBQ-R) describes temperamental differences attentional systems, which may give rise to differences in
between infants in terms of three major dimensions: temperament (Morales et al., 2005; Posner & Rothbart,
surgency/extroversion (such as exuberance, sociability, 2009). A child who is less able to shift attention away from
and approach, as well as impulsivity), negative affectivity an unpleasant situation or thought might well develop a dif-
(such as sadness, fearfulness, and irritability), and orient- ferent kind of responsiveness to everyday situations (such
ing/regulation or effortful control (such as effective shift- as a crying younger sibling, an angry parent, or a frighten-
ing of attention, ability to focus on tasks, and behavioral ing dog) and might sometimes develop more serious prob-
inhibition). This questionnaire involves asking various lems controlling attention that could lead to anxiety and
caregivers specific, detailed questions about the infant’s depression (Racer & Dishion, 2012). Researchers are also
behavior. For example, where an older questionnaire might finding that the development of the different neural net-
ask parents to rate their agreement with the statement works that support specific attentional abilities—like pur-
“Child is very energetic” on a five-point scale (Buss & posefully shifting attention or ignoring distractions—seems
Plomin, 1984), the IBQ-R might ask, “When put in the to be influenced by different genetic pathways. Thus, one
bathwater, how often does the baby splash or kick?” and way that genes may contribute to variations in temperament
require caregivers to rate the frequency in the past week is by fostering different developmental patterns in specific
(Hwang & Rothbart, 2003). The second questionnaire attentional capacities (Posner et al., 2010).
leaves less room for different interpretations of what is
being asked and over what time period. Questionnaires
like this one, which ask about more focused, concrete Q: How can studying the development of
behaviors, produce more reliable and valid results. infants’ attentional systems help us understand
Thus, by focusing on specific behaviors and incorpo-
rating responses from several adults who regularly spend
their individual differences in temperament?
time with the infant, the IBQ-R helps reduce the influ-
ence of parents’ subjective judgments. As a result, there is Another approach to studying temperament focuses on
typically good agreement among an infant’s different care- the temperamental differences between infants who appear
givers (Gartstein & Rothbart, 2003). In addition to ques- inhibited and those who seem uninhibited (Kagan, 1994,
tionnaires on temperament and the kinds of interviews 2008). Inhibited infants and young children are more likely
with parents that Thomas and Chess used, researchers also to be fearful and tentative in novel surroundings, such as
observe children directly in their homes and in laboratory a trip to a new store or meeting new neighbors, whereas
settings (Rothbart & Goldsmith, 1985; Rothbart et al., uninhibited infants show more positive emotions and
2000). These converging methods help researchers focus exploratory behavior in these settings and enjoy the novelty.
on those aspects of temperament that are more consistently Distinguishing between inhibited and uninhibited behav-
found across many situations (Goldsmith et al., 1999). ior might seem to describe a single dimension of behavior,
Researchers are also examining how the development of related to how eagerly the infant engages with her world.
the brain’s networks that regulate attention may relate to the But a leading researcher in this area, Jerome Kagan, believes
emergence of individual differences in temperament (Pos- that infants’ inhibited behaviors actually have different
ner & Rothbart, 1981; Rothbart et al., 1995, 2008). As the biological bases than their uninhibited behaviors (Kagan,
brain systems underlying attention (for example, the pre- 2008). In addition, these two tendencies toward either wari-
frontal cortex and anterior cingulate gyrus) mature, infants ness (inhibited behavior) or ready engagement (uninhibited
and young children develop the ability to focus and shift behavior) can affect other aspects of temperament, because
their attention, becoming increasingly able to direct their these tendencies interact with the degree to which certain

250 CHAPTER 7 THE ORIGINS OF EMOTION, TEMPERAMENT, AND PERSONALITY

kinds of emotions are expressed. In particular, uninhibited the origins of human temperament. Because a wide range
infants are more likely to express positive emotions, such as of organisms with quite modest cognitive and attentional
happiness, and inhibited infants are more likely to express skills show genetic variations in behaviors such as boldness,
negative emotions, such as fear. wariness, and fearfulness, some facets of human tempera-
Kagan suggests that the development of inhibited and ment may also not require the kinds of sophisticated cog-
uninhibited behaviors in infancy shows some significant nitive appraisals and attentional processes that have been
patterns that seem to be human universals. For one, chil- invoked elsewhere. Thus, some of the oldest evolutionary
dren throughout the world show increasingly inhibited roots of human temperament may not depend on sophisti-
behaviors in response to unexpected or unfamiliar events cated information processing (Gosling, 2001).
during the first two years of life. Kagan has argued that Kagan argues that inhibition can have considerable
these kinds of inhibitions were important adaptive behav- value in protecting young children from the hazards of
iors that promoted safety and survival by inducing the the world, but only in moderation. Excessive inhibition,
child to pay attention to stimulus discrepancies and not to which can give rise to inappropriate levels of shyness, can
approach or get involved in unfamiliar events (McCall & cause problems for children if it leads them to be overly
Kagan, 1970). If a child was not old enough to know how fearful and avoidant of new people and situations. Kagan
to interpret the world’s real dangers, the best strategy might and his coworkers have found that children who were very
be to prefer what has been safe in the past and to be wary inhibited at age 2 continued to show high levels of inhibi-
of novelty. Infants’ tendency toward inhibition could also tion and shyness several years later, in elementary school
trigger distress sounds, like crying, that attracted caregivers’ (Kagan, 1994). Similarly, infants who showed notably
attention to potentially dangerous situations. uninhibited behavior remained more uninhibited and exu-
This wariness of novelty has also been documented berant into elementary school. More recent studies of these
in other species as an important behavioral strategy. For same children are finding that these patterns continue into
example, as some frustrated homeowners know, rats are adolescence and adulthood (Kagan et al., 2007; Schwartz
notoriously “bait shy”; they have an enormous aversion to et al., 1999, 2003).
switching from a familiar diet to a substance with a new
taste (Garcia et al., 1972). Similarly, one of the most pow-
erful ways to contrast breeds of dogs is in terms of their Q: What are some evolutionary arguments for
different, genetically rooted levels of inhibition, or fearful-
ness (Mahut, 1953; see Figure 7.12). Although these dif-
inhibited behaviors across species?
ferences might be influenced by the way owners interact
with their dogs, different breeds’ tendencies toward inhib- More than most approaches to temperament, the
ited (fearful) or uninhibited (bold) behaviors are robust research focusing on inhibition tries to tell a coherent story
enough to demonstrate that these temperament-like dif- of how an early trait becomes manifested in later personal-
ferences can have a strong genetic component (Jones & ity differences such as shyness. Indeed, this research has
Gosling, 2005; Saetre et al., 2006). More broadly, these documented reliable correlations between early behaviors in
comparative studies of genetic differences in animals’ infancy and behaviors that emerge over the course of later
temperament-like traits can shed light on how we view childhood and into young adulthood. Kagan developed

FIGURE 7.12 Temperaments in dog

breeds. Different dog breeds, such as
(A) the border collie and (B) the terrier,
tend to have different temperaments.
A shyness/boldness dimension is one of
A B the strongest contrasts among breeds.

TEMPERAMENT AND THE ORIGINS OF PERSONALITY 251

his approach from an evolutionary perspective, asking how these interactions might work, consider the per-
about the potential adaptive value of both inhibited and sonality trait of conscientiousness, which can refer to
uninhibited behavior, and he has repeatedly emphasized being meticulous and careful or to acting in accord with
the importance of cross-cultural data for showing that the one’s conscience. Conscientiousness is not present in
developmental courses of both inhibited and uninhibited infancy, as it develops out of the interaction of specific
behavior patterns are universal. Finally, he has advocated components of early temperament. Thus, as Figure 7.13
a move away from describing children by using traditional illustrates, this trait slowly develops as a result of the
emotion terms (“a fearful child”) toward describing how interplay between activity level and persistence/attention
they respond to specific situations (“a child who shows span. A highly conscientious individual needs relatively
inhibited behavior when encountering a stranger in a high levels of both attentional monitoring and activity to
store”). Studies of differences in inhibition therefore pro- remain vigilant as to her progress toward her goals and to
vide an excellent demonstration of how one facet of infant be able to act quickly and efficiently. An excess of either
temperament projects forward through childhood and vigilance or activity, however, could lead to distractibility
beyond. One major reason for the success of this approach and impulsivity, so the most conscientious people may be
may be that it focuses on an evolutionarily ancient and at the high, but not extreme, ends of these temperamental
foundational aspect of temperament that has an important dimensions. These interactions between aspects of tem-
adaptive role throughout development. We now turn to perament are also influenced by culture and social experi-
other aspects of temperament that are more richly inte- ences, so that infants with very similar temperaments can
grated with higher-level cognitive and attentional pro- develop remarkably different personalities. In the next
cesses and in which the links between infant temperament section, we will address how such environmental influ-
and personality are more subtle and complex. ences on temperament and personality take shape.

Linking Temperament to Personality Development

Ultimately, researchers who study infant tempera-
ment and those studying personality in older children Child-Environment Interactions
and adults want one smooth, integrated account show-
ing how temperament develops into personality from and Goodness of Fit
infancy to adulthood (Caspi, 1998). Though there is In thinking about the role of a child’s environment and expe-
not yet a single account of this process, we can say, in riences in the development of personality, we need to keep
broad terms, that initial aspects of temperament likely in mind that different sorts of environments, cultures, and
interact with each other, contributing in complex ways parents might “fit” much better with some sorts of infants
to the development of personality traits throughout child- than with others. Thomas and Chess, who conducted the
hood and adulthood (see Figure 7.13). For an example of New York Longitudinal Study discussed earlier, referred to

Aspects of Activity Positive affect Inhibition Negative affect Persistence

temperament (energy level) (pleasure, (shyness, (anger proneness, (attention span)
contentment) fearfulness) distress)

Personality Extroversion Agreeableness Conscientiousness Neuroticism Openness

traits to experience

Positive correlations Negative correlations

FIGURE 7.13 Linking infant temperament to personality. Linking measures of infant temperament to later personality
measures is difficult. This figure illustrates one proposal about how such linkages might be organized, where black lines repre-
sent positive correlations and dashed red lines represent negative correlations. The multiple effects and possible negative and
positive influences help illustrate why it is so difficult to translate infant measures into adult ones. Adapted from Caspi (1998).

252 CHAPTER 7 THE ORIGINS OF EMOTION, TEMPERAMENT, AND PERSONALITY

this idea in terms of the goodness of fit between the child (Devries & Sameroff, 1984). It is easy to imagine how a
and the environment. In essence, the notion of goodness of stressed, undernourished parent would find it difficult to
fit maintains that the same environment is not optimal for monitor whether all of her children were receiving equal
all children and that an environment that could devastate resources and instead might simply respond to the children
some children might have little or no negative effects on who appeared most distressed.
others. This idea also implies that most children can flour- Undoubtedly, difficult children also gain an advantage
ish if they experience an environment well suited to their in other kinds of environments of scarcity. For example,
temperament. we might predict that the worse the ratio of caregivers to
The idea of goodness of fit helped launch a major shift children in a day care setting, the more likely that difficult
in how we view infants and children, both within the study children will get a greater share of attention, as overbur-
of development and at large. Many earlier views of develop- dened caregivers are reduced to responding to the chil-
ment were based on the notion that children were passive dren who are most obviously upset. Similarly, children of
recipients of whatever the environment threw at them. In impoverished families, especially larger families in which
contrast, the idea of goodness of fit stresses the ways in which there is much competition among children for attention
children are active agents, whose interactions with caregivers and resources, might fare better by being difficult (Gar-
and with their environment help to shape their develop- mezy, 1993). The outcomes associated with being a diffi-
ment (Sameroff & Chandler 1975). The broad influence cult infant or child also differ cross-culturally. One source
of goodness of fit has changed our ideas about the forma- of these differences has to do with how parents in a partic-
tion of personality, differences in children’s learning styles in ular culture perceive the vulnerability of children and how
the classroom (Cronbach & Snow, 1977; Snow, 1989), and those perceptions interact with their own child’s tempera-
many other aspects of development. As a result, we now see ment. Thus, parents who view infants as vulnerable to the
children as actively seeking the best-fitting environment (for influences of evil spirits and other negative forces are likely
example, the environment best suited to their intellectual to be quite responsive to children who show high levels of
development; Scarr & McCartney, 1983) and parents and distress because they are likely to perceive the distress as a
others (such as gifted teachers) as altering the environment to sign of real danger. In contrast, parents from a culture that
better fit each child. In the strongest terms, this concept also views young children as less vulnerable might see the same
suggests that some environments might even have opposite kind of behavior as whining and try to discourage it (Cer-
effects on different types of children, helping some and hurt- vera & Mendez, 2006).
ing others. As we will see, there is now evidence to support
these claims.
Q: Under what conditions might difficult and
irritable temperaments in infants actually work to
Q: How does the idea of goodness of fit relate their advantage?
to the notion of infants and children as active
participants in their environment?
Parental Influences on Temperament In talking
about interactions between a child’s environment and her
Environments for “Squeaky Wheels” A little reflec- temperament, it is easy to overlook the ways that parents
tion on the different aspects of temperament discussed so themselves affect a child’s environment. In fact, even in
far suggests ways in which these features might enhance or identical settings, different parents can create very differ-
diminish outcomes, depending on the infant’s environment. ent experiences. For example, if a new mother is frequently
For example, the saying “the squeaky wheel gets the grease” distracted from what is going on around her because she
means that those who complain loudest fare better than is depressed, an “easy” baby might suffer from neglect
others. This adage also suggests how some babies’ tempera- because he would not call attention to his needs, whereas
ments might confer an advantage in environments involv- a more “difficult” baby who cried frequently for attention
ing competition for scarce resources. might receive adequate, if not cheerful, attention. In terms
In particular, we might expect “difficult” babies to show of goodness of fit, then, it seems unfortunate that children
better developmental outcomes than “easy” babies in impov- of depressed parents are often more inhibited than their
erished environments. A study of infants born in parts of peers (Kochanska, 1991). But as this example shows (and
East Africa during a drought confirmed that the “difficult” as we will continue to see), it is difficult to draw conclu-
infants, although certainly not thriving, had better health sions about causality based on these kinds of correlations
outcomes and lower mortality rates than the “easy” infants between parents’ and children’s behaviors. A correlation

TEMPERAMENT AND THE ORIGINS OF PERSONALITY 253

that seems to show a parent’s behavior affecting a child As a result of their own personalities, particular care-
may really be more strongly influenced by the genes that givers mesh better with some sorts of infants than with oth-
the parent and child share, manifesting in different ways ers, and the best matches, or “fits,” depend on both partners
in children and adults. Thus, we can ask: To what extent in the interaction. Recognizing that the development of
is the child of a depressed parent more inhibited because of early aspects of temperament are inherently interactive helps
the kind of parenting she experienced? And to what extent us understand why accurate measures of temperament are
are her inhibitions related to genetic factors that she has in very difficult to develop. The interaction patterns between
common with her depressed parent? an infant and a caregiver form a dynamic system that is
Because birth parents and their infants share genes that constantly changing based on the responses of both people
might put them both at risk for certain behaviors and inter- involved. Consider a baby who, early on, is difficult—often
action patterns, adoption studies look at adoptive parents, fretful or crying and rarely content—perhaps because of an
who do not share any genes with their children, to find a undetected earache. Some parents will find this difficult
way to ask about parental effects that are solely environ- behavior extremely hard to handle, and they may begin to
mental and that do not also arise from shared genotypes. think about the baby in ways that reduce affection, leading
For example, one study of adopted infants and their adop- to less patient behavior on the parents’ part and, in turn,
tive parents asked how the adoptive parents’ dispositions even more difficult behavior from the infant. The infant’s
(in this case, their tendency to be anxious or depressed) increase in difficult behavior then causes more negative
affected infants with different temperaments, despite the parental reactions, and the ensuing feedback loop can esca-
fact that the infants and adoptive parents did not share any late negative behaviors on both sides, as shown in Figure 7.14.
genes (Leve et al., 2010). In the study, 9-month-old infants Different parents might see the same early behaviors in a
were allowed to play with an attractive toy for a while and more positive light, interpreting them as an indication that
then were separated from the toy by a clear plexiglass bar- their child is strong-willed. Or perhaps the parents would
rier, which clearly induced frustration in the infants. The observe the infant’s behavior in other situations before
critical measure was how long the infants continued to drawing conclusions. In such cases, the initial behavior
stare at the barrier, the source of their frustration, rather might enter into a different feedback loop that channeled
than disengaging from the upsetting event. Infants con- both parental and infant behavior in a much more pleas-
sidered at genetic risk for emotional regulation problems ant direction, as shown in Figure 7.14. As we will see again
(because their biological parents had such problems) were in Chapter 16, clinicians may suggest that parents who are
more likely to stay fixated on the barrier when they also having difficulties with their children try to “reframe” how
had adoptive mothers who showed high levels of anxiety they construe the children’s behavior (and likewise that the
and depression. This study illustrates two closely related children reframe how they construe their parents’ behavior).
points. First, it shows the importance of gene-environment In some cases, such a change in interpretation can interrupt
interactions for developmental outcomes. At-risk infants a dysfunctional feedback loop and lead to a cycle of interac-
do not invariably become fixated on frustrating barriers; tions that gradually promotes more positive behaviors from
they only do so when they experience specific kinds of par- both parents and children.
enting. Similarly, infants who are not genetically at risk Several years ago, I came to know a family that used skill-
for emotional regulation problems may not develop such ful reframing to deal with a challenging child. From birth
problems, even when they experience parenting that might onward, this boy had exhibited many “difficult” character-
well promote these kinds of difficulties in at-risk infants. istics. He was extremely overreactive to change, flying into
Second, this study shows how research designs that help unpredictable rages even at minor problems. To most, these
to rule out particular influences can provide insight into behaviors were enough to label the child as impossible, and
development. Thus, the adoptive parents’ behaviors influ- he soon was setting records in his community for expulsions
enced their children’s temperament in ways independent of from preschools. One preschool director even went so far as
a shared genotype. to declare him a “juvenile delinquent” at the age of 3 (he
lasted a very short time in that preschool)! These problem
behaviors continued as he grew older, and by elementary
school, he seemed to spend more time in the principal’s
Q: How might a pair of monozygotic twins office than in the classroom. Despite these negative behav-
nonetheless develop different temperaments in iors, the boy’s mother never framed his temperament purely
in negative terms. She showed serious concern about her
infancy as a result of being reared by different son’s emotional problems and inappropriate behaviors, but
adoptive parents? rather than seeing him only as “unstable” or “impossible,”
she viewed these qualities as tradeoffs that come with a

254 CHAPTER 7 THE ORIGINS OF EMOTION, TEMPERAMENT, AND PERSONALITY

 Of course, not all behavior problems can be addressed by
reframing, and there are many dangers in seeing one’s chil-
dren as incapable of wrongdoing. But when parents can strike
a balance between taking behavior problems seriously and
creating a “best-fit” environment for the child, the results can
help to guide the child’s temperament toward a very positive
adult personality. To some extent, this influence undoubt-
Subjective pain edly involves helping the child to seek out environments and
situations in which his best traits can flourish. The degree to
which parents can influence or change a child’s personality
remains a controversial question, a topic to which we will
return in Chapter 14. Even if the child’s basic personality
Irritability structure is not subject to much direct parental influence,
however, parents may well influence the positive or negative
ways in which that personality is seen.

Parental detachment and

negative interactions

Conclusions
While the focus on the early development of emotions and
personalities may seem very different from the discussion in
previous chapters of how we perceive and think about the
world, strikingly similar themes emerge here as in earlier
chapters. Research on the development of emotions, tem-
Subjective pain perament, and personality is undergoing dramatic change.
Infants are increasingly viewed as active seekers and cre-
ators, not only of their environments, but also of their own
emotions, temperaments, and personalities. Rather than
simply responding emotionally to a particular event or hav-
Irritability ing features of temperament and personality impressed on
them from the outside, they are constantly interpreting the
world and using those interpretations to act on it. These
Increases subjective pain interpretations and actions give rise to emotions and also
Parental empathy and contribute to aspects of temperament and personality.
Reduces subjective pain
positive interactions
Emotions also have an adaptive value that allows infants
FIGURE 7.14 Interaction patterns. Two different parents might
have dramatically different interactions with an infant who has an ear-
to regulate their own responses and their interactions with
ache. A parent who finds the infant’s irritability aversive may withdraw others. Along these lines, different personalities and temper-
and react negatively, exacerbating the subjective pain of the earache, aments have different advantages and drawbacks, depending
which increases the infant’s irritability, causing even more negative on the environment. This has fostered the idea of goodness
reactions from the parent in a downward spiral. A different parent of fit—namely, that individual infants and children may
might react in a manner that reduces (dotted red line) the infant’s flourish optimally in quite different environments. There
subjective pain and the level of irritability. is no such thing as a standard, ideal environment in which
to raise children. The adaptive orientation has also led to
a shift toward describing infants’ behaviors, thoughts, and
“fiery” and “spirited” disposition. In countless subtle but emotions in terms of their goals and how they perceive their
important ways, she helped to channel these aspects of her ability to pursue those goals in specific situations, which is
son’s temperament into behaviors that were inspirational a key part of both the functional and evolutionary perspec-
and exciting rather than antagonistic—and that boy is now tives on emotions.
a successful, charismatic adult. The kinds of behavior that Emphasizing the adaptive value of early emotions and
caused such problems early on were turned into passion, traits also leads developmental researchers to consider the
enthusiasm, and, as his mother always saw it, “fiery” and extent to which emotions and temperamental styles might
“spirited” behavior. be targets of natural selection, preparing humans and other

CONCLUSIONS 255
species to link specific emotions to certain kinds of stimuli and attentional factors can help to explain why many facets
or situations. Similarly, some dimensions of temperament, of an individual’s early temperament do not translate directly
such as inhibition and wariness, may help infants learn the into later personality traits but instead interact with many
subtle tradeoffs between being cautious and exploring new developing cognitive and attentional skills that affect the
opportunities. individual’s developing personality.
There seem to be more and more suggestions that cogni- Finally, an understanding of how emotions and tempera-
tive and attentional factors play a central role in evoking and ment develop early in life offers the exciting possibility of
possibly even forming many emotions as well as qualities of uncovering relationships between various components of
temperament and personality. Along these lines, developmen- emotions and personality in adults. Developmental studies
tal changes in cognition and attention may help to explain can demonstrate how cognitive and attentional strategies
many aspects of the development of emotion, temperament, can powerfully influence emotions, and they may help us to
and personality. Exploring these cognitive and attentional understand how sophisticated processes of emotional regu-
contributions may bring insights into the distinctly human lation, such as reframing and reappraisal, work in adults.
aspects of temperament and personality, as opposed to those Similarly, developmental research that reveals the order in
shared across many species. They can also help us to under- which particular emotions emerge can also suggest what
stand how the more complex emotions might emerge from kinds of situations elicit the later- versus earlier-emerging
the basic ones present in early infancy. Moreover, cognitive emotions in adults.

STU DY AN D REVI EW

SUMMARY ● A full account of the development of emotions will likely

involve an integration of changes in cognitive development
Emotional Development and how those changes influence the appraisals of situations
● Emotions are transient states that correspond to physiologi- and thereby create more nuanced emotional states.
cal and cognitive processes associated with distinct internal ● Even young infants seem sensitive to others’ emotions and
sensations, or feelings. They have been studied in terms of can distinguish basic emotions based on tone of voice. They
facial expressions and evolutionary signaling, physiological are especially sensitive to negative emotions such as fear or
arousal, situational appraisal, and goals. anger, which helps them avoid danger.
● We all share the same range of emotions, even as we vary dra- ● In some social situations, one individual’s emotions can be
matically in the extent to which we express particular types readily transmitted to others. This phenomenon of emo-
of emotions. Young infants, even newborns, also seem to tional contagion seems to emerge very early in development
show distinct emotions, as indicated by their varying facial as an intrinsic part of human social interactions.
expressions and behaviors in different contexts. ● Through processes of emotional regulation, even infants
● Newborns initially experience positive and negative states can influence the emotions they experience and how they
that gradually differentiate into joy, surprise, and distress at experience them. Emotions can be regulated through
3 months, as well as anger at 4 months, and then fear at situation modification and selection, attentional deploy-
around 6 months. ment, and response modification. Initially, caregivers help
● Infants do not show the full range of emotions that older infants regulate their emotions, but over time, infants
children and adults do. One way of explaining this develop- begin to regulate their own emotions to a greater and
mental change is to consider how cognitive interpretations greater extent.
of goals, situations, and their resolutions combine with basic ● Some emotions, most notably phobias, seem evolutionarily
emotions to create more sophisticated emotions. prepared to be associated with certain stimuli. Fear of snakes
● Complex emotions include shame, guilt, embarrassment, is one such prepared association. Infants may have an early-
pride, jealousy, envy, and empathy, many of which are self- emerging bias to track potential threats like snakes and spi-
conscious emotions that require some degree of self-awareness. ders rather than flowers. Other emotions, such as disgust,
Social and cultural contexts play a role in differentiating and may be similarly linked to special situations and kinds of
shaping emotions, including the moral emotions. stimuli with major adaptive significance, although cultural

256 CHAPTER 7 THE ORIGINS OF EMOTION, TEMPERAMENT, AND PERSONALITY

 factors may also play an important role in channeling and influence a child to adopt a guilt versus a shame way of expe-
honing these prepared responses. This evolutionary perspec- riencing emotions? How might the cognitive components of
tive on the functional role of emotions may shed light on these emotions differ?
how emotions develop. 2. How might a child’s own actions make her a more active
partner in the construction of her personality? Think of
Temperament and the Origins of Personality some specific actions and how they might influence particu-
● Variations in emotions and other responses to stimuli con-
lar aspects of her personality.
tribute to differences in temperament among infants and 3. Would emotional contagion be more likely among those
young children. who are more like you—that is, members of your in-group?
● There is considerable evidence for temperamental differ-
Would children and even infants also show such in-group
ences among young infants, which gradually develop into effects?
personality differences. These developmental paths involve 4. How might certain forms of attentional training improve the
complex patterns of interactions between children and their
emotional regulation skills of children? Design such a train-
physical and social environments, in concert with their bio-
ing program and consider the feasibility of actually imple-
logical predispositions.
● The New York Longitudinal Study classified infants into
menting it.
5. The notion of goodness of fit argues that children with cer-
easy babies, difficult babies, and “slow to warm up” babies.
Later studies measured infants’ temperaments based on their tain temperaments and personality traits may thrive in very
behavior in particular settings and also found major dimen- specific environments and not in others. In what environ-
sions on which they differed, including surgency/extrover- ment might a painfully shy child show an advantage over
sion, negative affectivity, and orienting/regulation. other children?
● Researchers have studied brain structures and neural cir-
cuits to understand differences in temperament. They have
found that attentional structures and the ability to inhibit
and direct attention may play a role in temperamental differ- KEY TERMS
ences. Moreover, reactivity to novel situations may also play
amygdala (p. 233) Machiavellian emotions
an important role in temperamental differences between
attentional deployment (p. 234)
inhibited and uninhibited infants.
● Different kinds of parents, environments, and cultures may (p. 239) negativity bias (p. 236)
“fit” better with some infants than with others. This idea basic emotions (p. 230) phobias (p. 242)
of a goodness of fit between the child and the environment complex emotions (p. 233) response modification
stresses that children are active agents who help shape their display rules (p. 239) (p. 239)
own development. self-conscious emotions
emotional contagion (p. 237)
emotional regulation (p. 237) (p. 233)
THOUGHT QUESTIONS emotion (p. 228) situation modification
(p. 239)
1. In some cultures, people may be more prone to feel the emo- functionalist approach
(p. 230) situation selection (p. 239)
tion of guilt, while in other cultures, they may be more prone
to feel the emotion of shame. How might cultural practices goodness of fit (p. 253) temperament (p. 247)

STUDY AND REVIEW 257

 PA R T I I I
Developing Competencies
 8
Language Development
The Structure and Complexity of Discovering the Meanings of The Domain Specificity of
Language Words Language
• Components of Language • Linking Words to Concepts • Neural Dissociations
• Universal Constraints on Language • Constraints on Word Meanings • Species Specificity
• Developmental Changes in Word
Acquiring a First Language Meanings
Language and Thought
• Developmental Patterns • Linguistic Relativity and Linguistic
• Child-Directed Speech The Growth of Grammar Determinism
• Language as an Amplifier of Thought
Theories of Language Acquisition Effects of Age on Language
• Influences of Cognitive Development on
• Behaviorist Approaches Acquisition Language
• Connectionist Approaches • Acquiring Language after the Critical
• Statistical Learning Approaches Period Language and Communication
• Acquiring American Sign Language after
• Nativist Approaches
the Critical Period
Conclusions
• Inventing a New Language Summary
 few years ago, I spent a long train ride sit-

A ting behind a young toddler and his mother in

a nearly empty car, which made it quite easy
to hear the mother and her son talking. In the
course of those few hours, their communication
revealed many of the patterns and tendencies that drive one
of the most intricate and impressive developmental processes:
language acquisition.
Even without attending closely to what the mother and
child were saying, it was clear that a real conversation was
occurring. The mother would say a sentence or two and A
then the child would respond, so that their exchanges main-
tained a tempo with active turn-taking on both sides. The
child sometimes mislabeled things, such as calling a huge
office building a house, and he often constructed state-
ments in grammatically incorrect ways—for example, say-
ing “I seed boat!” or “No take nap!” The mother, in turn,
rarely pointed out these mistakes, although she sometimes
responded to the child by using the corrected form, saying,
for example, “I saw a boat, too.” In addition, the mother
spoke differently with the child than with the conductor,
using shorter sentences, a higher-pitched voice, and slower,
more careful pronunciation.
How did this child, at barely 2 years of age, become able
to utter systematic, meaningful streams of words, when a
year earlier he may have not been speaking at all? How can
we explain the error patterns in this early speech, which are
common and reliable, but are not the kinds of mistakes ever
made by mature speakers? And what role do parents and B
other adults play as young children’s guides to language FIGURE 8.1 Learning language versus learning to play chess.
learning? The rules and computational complexities underlying the language
Nearly all children proceed from showing no evidence of a preschooler far outstrip those of learning to play chess, and yet
of language use in the first year of life to producing and virtually all 3-year-olds seem to effortlessly learn language, while
comprehending complex constructions in their third year. only a small handful of preschoolers learn to play chess, and only
then with a large amount of explicit instruction and deliberate effort.
Few other patterns of developmental change are more clear
Indeed, many would regard this chess photo (A) as implausible
and dramatic. Language acquisition is not an intentional and probably staged, while seeing the chatting preschoolers (B) as
intellectual achievement, like learning to play chess; language perfectly natural.
is acquired automatically, and apparently effortlessly, by
almost all children in the first few years of life (see Figure 8.1).
A language that emerges in this way is known as a natural other complex tasks, humans are unmatched in the abil-
language, which typically refers to any language spoken ity to learn and use languages. For example, several chess-
on a daily basis by a community. It is so uncommon for playing computer programs that run on a standard personal
a child not to acquire any language (including sign lan- computer can beat all but a few thousand humans, but it is
guages, which are full-fledged languages like spoken lan- much more difficult for computers to learn the nuances of
guages) that most of us will never meet or hear of anyone language. There are a great many ways that a chess game
who is completely language free. Acquiring language is can unfold, and as with language processing, the chess-
an achievement that is so commonplace that it is easy playing program has to analyze complex, novel structures
to overlook the extraordinary complexity of language and patterns and interpret them to compute a response.
itself, which makes children’s language development so What makes chess so easy for computers, while language
impressive. learning and processing is so difficult?
One indication of the complexity of language acquisi- To begin to answer these questions, we will briefly con-
tion is the great difficulty this process poses for computers. sider some general properties of all languages before exam-
Even though computers far outperform humans at many ining how children acquire language. We will consider the

LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT 261

developmental changes in the kinds of things children say of the world’s languages. The related task for developmen-
as their language develops, as well as changes in how others tal psychologists is to explain how this mastery of language
speak to children as they grow older. We will consider sev- emerges in childhood.
eral theoretical models—behaviorist approaches, modern
connectionist approaches, statistical learning approaches,
and nativist approaches—each offering a different explana-
tion of how language acquisition takes place. Components of Language
We will then turn to how children decipher word mean- To get a clear picture of language acquisition, we need to
ings and how such meanings might change with develop- understand the main components that make up language’s
ment. We will discuss how children develop the ability to multilayered structure. The most common distinctions have
put together words in ways that follow the rules of a par- been between phonology, semantics, syntax (a major compo-
ticular language, asking in what ways the ability to acquire a nent of grammar), and pragmatics.
grammar might be constrained and whether children could Phonology is concerned with the sound patterns of a lan-
create a new grammatical language largely on their own. guage and the rules for combining sounds into words. Thus,
Building on these discussions, we will ask about the extent a phonological rule in a Boston dialect of English states that
to which linguistic abilities constitute a separate domain of “r” in the final syllable position should be omitted; hence,
cognitive development and whether these abilities seem to “Harvard” is pronounced “Harvad.” Similarly, in some dia-
be uniquely human. lects of African-American English, if a consonant is in an
The relationships between language and thought also unstressed syllable, it cannot be followed by either an “r” or an
raise a host of fascinating developmental questions, such “l”; hence, “protection” is pronounced “potection.” Within a
as whether specific languages guide thought in particu- language, the smallest units of sound that create differences
lar ways and whether language development amplifies the in meaning are called phonemes. For example, in the words
power of thought as the child matures. We will also ask how “pin” and “thin,” the differences are /p/ and /th/, and these
the child’s cognitive development might, in turn, influence sound units (or phonemes) change the meaning of the two
her language abilities. Finally, we will consider language as words. In normal speech, more than 800 distinct phonemes
part of a broader social, communicative system that involves are rushing by each minute. By age 3, most children can
phenomena such as metaphor and irony. Our first step is to track almost all of these phonemes. Most 3-year-olds can
get a better sense of the workings of language itself. also use phonetic rules to segment these sounds into words,
allowing them to easily identify most of the words they hear
in spontaneous speech. To understand the difficulty of this
task, listen to a burst of speech in an unfamiliar language
The Structure and Complexity and try to determine the number of words. Then compare
your guess with a native speaker’s tally. To most adults the
of Language task seems impossible on first exposure to a new language;
yet young children master it with apparent ease.
All languages allow us to constantly produce novel sentences Semantics tells us not only the meanings of individual
that were never uttered before. Using a relatively small num- words but also how words combine to convey larger mean-
ber of basic linguistic components and rules, we can create ings. Thus, semantic analysis tells us why the sentence
a boundless variety of unique expressions. This character- “Every arrow hit a target” has two potential meanings (each
istic of language, known as its generativity, is surprisingly arrow hit its own target or all the arrows hit the same tar-
powerful. By one calculation, the number of possible Eng- get). The set of words that a person knows is often called
lish sentences of 20 words or less is 1020—that’s 100 billion her lexicon. As children gain semantic knowledge, they
billion sentences (Pinker, 1994)! If it takes roughly 5 sec- develop more extensive and elaborate conceptual knowledge
onds to hear a sentence, it would take 100 trillion years to of categories (though it is also possible to understand some
hear all those sentences if you listened for 24 hours a day. conceptual categories without having words for them).
Using a finite system, our brain, we can comprehend In the context of language development, syntax tradi-
and produce an infinite set of utterances. It is likely that tionally refers to a set of rules concerning how words are
no sentence in this paragraph has ever appeared in print combined into sentences. Knowledge of syntax is some-
before, and yet, as you read these novel sentences, you can times equated with knowledge of a language’s grammar,
easily and automatically judge whether they make sense and but grammar also refers to knowledge of other rules beyond
are well formed. Researchers in linguistics aim to specify those governing relations between words, such as relations
the kind of human knowledge that allows us to make such between elements inside words (for example, how words
judgments and to make them in distinctive ways for each are constructed from roots). Because of the rules of English

262 CHAPTER 8 LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

syntax, “Venetian blind” means something quite different her attempts to figure out the particular grammatical rules
from “blind Venetian,” and saying that “surgeons are butch- of her language, she can use the universal constraints to nar-
ers” is different from saying “butchers are surgeons.” row down the possible rules quite dramatically, tacitly know-
Finally, pragmatics is concerned with how we use lan- ing that certain structures would never occur.
guage to convey our intended meaning within a particular
social context and how we figure out others’ intended mean-
ings. Pragmatics, for example, helps us understand if an
utterance is meant literally or sarcastically. Thus, pragmatics
involves taking into account the inferred goals and motiva-
Acquiring a First Language
tions of a speaker, the status of those involved in the speech Language acquisition reflects a wide range of develop-
act, and other nonlinguistic cues to intended meaning, such mental changes, from the growth of a child’s vocabulary
as situational constraints, gestures, and tone of voice. to mastering intricate sentence structures. As we begin to
Each of these aspects of language has an extraordinary explore language acquisition, it is useful to start with a
richness and complexity. Our ability to understand and use broad overview of some of the major developmental pat-
these components of language results in a single, unified terns that shape the process. Later in this chapter, we will
language competency. Here we will focus primarily on syn- look more closely at how those patterns occur. Through-
tax and semantics, largely because those are the two areas in out this chapter, we will keep in mind that there is more
which most of the experimental research has been conducted. than one way to measure and describe language abilities.
In general, children tend to be able to comprehend what
others say before they develop the ability to produce lan-
Q: What are some key components of guage themselves. Thus, while this chapter often describes
language? the emergence of a particular language skill in terms of
children’s speech production, it is important to be aware
that when this same skill is measured in terms of children’s
comprehension, it may appear earlier than their ability to
display that skill in production.
Universal Constraints on Language
One of the most interesting discoveries in the study of lan-
guage in recent decades is that all languages show some of
the same universal constraints on their structural patterns. Developmental Patterns
These constraints take the form of consistent rule patterns Although the age at which children show their first linguis-
across all languages, which result in specific structural fea- tic accomplishments varies considerably between individu-
tures that all languages share (Bouma et al., 2001; Crain & als, there are some general patterns for the emergence of
Lillo-Martin, 1999; Maratsos, 1998; Richards, 2001). Con- various aspects of language (see Brown, 1973; Clark, 2009;
sider one example. The sentence “Mary was amazed at how de Villiers & de Villers, 1978; Guasti, 2004; Pinker, 1995).
quickly she wrote the paper” has two possible meanings. Between the ages of 1 and 6, the average length of children’s
“Mary” and “she” could refer to the same person (if Mary utterances (roughly the number of words), their vocabulary,
was surprised by her own speedy writing), or they could refer the number of syntactic constructions (combinations of
to different people (if Mary was surprised by another wom- words to form primitive sentences), and their use of embed-
an’s quick work). Yet in the sentence “She was amazed at ded sentences (relative clauses within sentences) all increase
how quickly Mary wrote the paper,” “she” and “Mary” can- dramatically. But these different aspects of language often
not be the same person. This pattern of relating pronouns show their own distinct patterns of change. For example,
to noun phrases is not just a facet of English; it occurs in all the length of children’s utterances starts to increase rapidly
known languages, and it arises from a quite abstract con- around age 3, long before they show a sharp rise in their use
straint on how pronouns are structurally embedded within of embedded clauses, around age 5. In the following sec-
sentences. A rich repertoire of similar constraints applies to tions, we will see how these different patterns unfold over
all known languages, and the most fascinating thing about the course of acquiring a first language.
them is that everyone honors them without being told that
they should. Universal constraints may play a pivotal role in Prelinguistic Perception and Communication Long
guiding the acquisition of a first language. Thus, if a child before children start to say intelligible words, they are pay-
already “knows” such constraints or somehow learns them ing attention to and producing aspects of language. As we
very early on, she will be able to greatly narrow down the saw in Chapter 3, very young infants actually perceive a
possible meanings of sentences that she hears. In addition, in larger number of distinct speech sounds than adults do. But

ACQUIRING A FIRST LANGUAGE 263

with more exposure to their native language, infants stop As children start acquiring language, they also increas-
perceiving phonemic differences that are not meaningful in ingly show joint attention, the ability to interact with
their language. For example, the Japanese language does not another person about an object of common interest (see
require speakers to differentiate between “r” and “l” sounds. Chapter 6). Thus, as children begin acquiring words, they
Consequently, Japanese infants can distinguish between already are able to establish a shared point of focus with
those sounds more easily than Japanese adults. Long before another person and to know what a speaker is talking about.
they speak, infants learn which phonemes matter in their Joint attention may even be essential for normal language
own language and which ones they can ignore. This process acquisition (Bruner, 1995; Tomasello, 1999).
of learning to categorically perceive meaningful differences
between sounds helps infants to begin making sense of the One-Word Utterances At about age 1, most children
full range of speech sounds in their language. Clustering utter one word at a time, typically referring to concrete
sounds into categories (such as all “ba” sounds or all “pa” objects (for example, “doggie,” “teddy,” “Mommy”) but
sounds) allows many of the language’s nuanced, interme- also to actions (“up”) and properties (“hot”). The pre-
diate sounds to be treated as equivalent. As a result, these dominant one-word utterances are sometimes referred to
sound categories make it much easier to learn the language’s as holophrases. A holophrase can stand for a whole sen-
other rules for combining sounds. (Without categorical tence that the child has in mind as a linguistic entity but
perception, every minor variation on a speech sound could simply cannot produce (Bloom, 1970). By this account, a
seem to require its own rules.) child who raises both arms toward a parent and says “up”
Although infants produce a variety of prelinguistic doesn’t just mean the action but means for the word to
vocalizations in the first few months, ranging from lip stand for a sentence such as “I want you to pick me up”
smacking to cooing and squealing, consonant-like sounds (see Figure 8.2).
do not normally appear until infants begin babbling, some-
time after the fourth month of life. Babbling infants do not
appear to be trying to express word meanings; rather, they
are exploring the sounds in their language to get a feel for
Stick
them (Pinker, 1994). Deaf infants babble aloud at a later age
and with less frequency than do hearing babies, but if they
are exposed to a sign language, they soon begin “babbling”
with their hands, trying out the basic components of a sign
language much as hearing babies do with sounds (Petitto &
Marentette, 1991). Brain activity during babbling seems to
occur largely in the left hemisphere, the region that typi-
cally supports language abilities, which suggests that bab-
bling may be an important precursor of the brain’s language
system (Holowka & Petitto, 2002).
Babbling is also a way to start mastering a language’s A
phonemes, which, as we have said, are the smallest units
of sounds that cause contrasts in meanings (as in the ini-
Up
tial sounds of “bin” and “thin”). As infants learn to combine
phonemes in ways unique to each language, they begin to
build up their language’s morphemes, which are its small-
est units of meaning. Morphemes can be individual words
or parts of words that carry distinct meanings, such as pre-
fixes (for example, “anti-” or “re-”) or suffixes (like the “-s”
that indicates a plural). Throughout the first year, infants are
also mastering the rising and falling pitch patterns that are
central to identifying and using words in all languages. For
example, in English, a rising pitch at the end of a sentence B
can indicate a question. In tonal languages, such as Chinese,
FIGURE 8.2 One-word utterances. Even in complicated situations
the meaning of a word may depend on whether the speaker’s in which a young child clearly seems to be trying to describe an entire
tone rises or falls at the end. Well before they can say recog- event, such as (A) a dog chasing a stick or (B) wanting to be picked
nizable words, infants start to produce the pitch changes that up by her mother, she may only be able to utter one-word sentences
characterize their language (Davis et al., 2000). to describe what she means, such as saying “stick” or “up.”

264 CHAPTER 8 LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

Multiword Utterances At around 1½ years of age, many children at this stage very often express these relationships
children start to put together strings of words in utterances of using the same word order that is most common in the lan-
two or more words. Typically, these several-word sequences guage that they are trying to acquire (Braine, 1976; Brown,
take the form of rote, inflexible phrases. For example, at 1973). In English, for example, an agent who performs an
around this age, our youngest son began saying “time to go action (agent-action) is typically named before the action.
now,” but he didn’t leave words out (“time to go”) or insert After the two-word stage, children begin to vary their
new words (“time to go right now”) until several months later. sentence length, up to about 10 words. These long sentences
It is rare for children this young to combine words creatively. can appear as early as age 2, although there is usually a grad-
At this point in the language acquisition process, chil- ual lengthening of the average utterance length over sev-
dren show dramatic individual differences. Some seem to eral years. When children first start to combine words into
hold off any attempts at multiword constructions until they phrases, they usually drop out words that are less impor-
have reached a high level of proficiency. Though the story is tant to convey meaning, such as articles and prepositions.
likely an exaggeration, the British historian and author Lord Thus, instead of saying “The man picked up the brush,” a
Macaulay supposedly spoke his rather surprising first words child might say “Man pick brush,” a speech pattern called
to a party guest of his mother’s. After the guest apologized telegraphic speech. Like the senders of telegrams, who had
for spilling hot tea on him, the young Macaulay is said to to pay by the word, children seem to face huge processing
have responded, “Thank you, Madam, the agony is sensibly “expenses” associated with using many words in a single
abated” (Pinker & Bloom, 1990). Stories like this one help utterance—so they use only the words needed to communi-
illustrate that children’s ability to understand language can cate the gist of what they mean. In more modern-day par-
develop well before they begin using words in combination. lance, we might refer to this as “texting speech.”
The first words children speak may provide only a rough
indication of their underlying linguistic abilities.
Linguistic Rules Over the preschool years, children
undergo extraordinary changes in grammatical compe-
tence as they master many more levels of language’s com-
plexity (Pinker, 1994; see also Crain & Lillo-Martin, 1999;
Q: Describe three different aspects of language Ingram, 1989). These changes suggest that even very young
that change during the first few years of life. children’s use of language involves rich, abstract mental
rules. For example, many young children initially indicate
questions by simply making a statement with a different
tone of voice. Thus, a child might ask if he can ride a train
Children’s initial multiword utterances are typically two by simply saying “I ride train?” with the rising intonation
words long, which is why children at this point are said to pattern of a question. Later, he might ask a question by
be in the “two-word stage.” (This limit is not absolute, how- putting a “wh-” word at the beginning of a sentence, as in
ever; occasional three- and even four-word combinations “When I go home?” Only much later do children master
are also possible.) In the two-word stage, children’s utter- the more subtle nuances involved in forming correct ques-
ances show highly consistent patterns. They tend to convey tions (Klima & Bellugi, 1966). During the preschool years,
certain kinds of relationships, such as connecting an agent children also gradually master the ability to use a pronoun
with the object of an action (agent-object) or linking a pos- to refer to a proper name in a distant part of the same sen-
sessor with a possessed object (see Table 8.1). In addition, tence (for example, “John knew it was important to wash

Conceptual Relationship Word Orders Found Word Orders Not Found

Agent-object “Daddy book” “doggie sock” “book Daddy” “sock doggie”

Agent-action “Mommy read” “Daddy break” “fall Mommy”
TABLE 8.1 Early two-word
Action-object “eat dessert” “bounce ball” “dessert eat” utterances. Even though young
Possessor-possessed object “dog tail” “Mommy tea” “tea Mommy” children may rarely produce
utterances longer than two words,
Object-location “sweater chair” “man car” “chair sweater” “car man”
they still honor word orders that
Object-recurring “more cookies” “more juice” “milk more” “cookies more” conform to those that adults
normally use in their language.

ACQUIRING A FIRST LANGUAGE 265

himself before making dinner”) and to use complex sentence
structures, such as one sentence embedded within another
(for example, “Mary saw the dog that ran across the street
after the cat”). This is a wug.
In short, children learn the rules of their language even
though their understanding of those rules may be largely
tacit and based on abstract principles that they are not aware
of. This enables them to have reliable intuitions about novel
constructions, an ability that was vividly demonstrated in a
classic study by Jean Berko-Gleason (Berko-Gleason, 1958). Now there is another one.
Berko-Gleason examined three different English noun There are two of them.
There are two .
endings that make plurals: an “es”-sounding ending, as in
“glasses,” “matches,” and “patches”; a “z”-sounding ending,
as in “dogs,” “caves,” and “tubs”; and an “s” sound, as in
“books,” “hats,” and “caps.” A rule is considered generative
if it creates novel patterns never heard before but that still
honor the rule based on familiar patterns. Berko-Gleason’s This is a Tass.
clever insight was to ask children to complete sentences that
used novel, artificial words that nonetheless strongly obeyed
the three plural patterns. A child would be shown a pic-
ture of two creatures (see Figure 8.3) and would be told,
“This is a wug. Now there is another one. There are two
of them.” Then the researcher would say, “Now we have Now there is another one.
two____________” and look expectantly at the child. There are two of them.
There are two .
Most children immediately offered “wugs” as an answer.
Like adults, they automatically inferred that the ending FIGURE 8.3 Rules for plurals. In this classic Berko-Gleason task,
would be pronounced like a “z.” young children seem to know a productive rule of pluralization, as
This kind of generalization may seem obvious, but con- they quickly and effortlessly know which of several possible plural
forms go with novel words that they have never heard before. They
sider the minimal sort of knowledge a child would have
know that the plural of wug is wugs and that the plural of tas is
to possess to be able to consistently make such judgments. tasses. From Berko-Gleason (1958).
Since the child has never heard any of the words before,
she could not simply have memorized what plural endings
went with what specific words. Instead, she might be using a
more abstract principle concerning how certain consonants One other rule-related developmental phenomena is
are combined with other consonants and vowels to make repeatedly encountered in language acquisition studies and
plurals. One such rule would be roughly of the form: All is often called overregularization. Consider the ability to
nouns ending in unvoiced stop consonants are pluralized by form the past tense for English verbs. Children often go
adding an “s” sound. If the rule were precisely of this form, through three distinct stages in their acquisition of this abil-
the child would know an abstract rule that most adults are ity. Early on, they may make a number of mistakes but also
not consciously aware of. This rule would be immediately frequently show some apparent mastery of the past tense
available to the young child to guide judgments in the wug forms of both regular and irregular verbs. Thus, a 2-year-
task. Alternatively, a child might represent the regularities in old might be heard to say “kicked” and “liked” (regular past
a simpler way that only gives the appearance of having rules. tenses) as well as “went” and “saw” (irregular past tenses).
For example, she might remember a large array of words in One might therefore conclude that the child is well on her
both singular and plural forms and create networks of asso- way to mastering the subtle contrasts that adults use for past
ciations between the word forms she has already encountered tense forms of verbs. Then, however, a curious thing hap-
that allow her to generalize to novel cases without having an pens: older children sometimes start to make more mistakes.
explicit rule (Zapf & Smith, 2007). Perhaps simply noting They now take the regular form of the past tense (adding
how often certain forms occur and co-occur in speech for “-ed”) and use it for some irregular verbs. This incorrect
familiar words would be enough to use as a basis for gen- use of the regular form leads to such utterances as “John
eralizing to novel words. Later in this chapter, we will look goed home yesterday” or “I seed it.” These mistakes can per-
at different theoretical approaches that try to explain how sist for quite some time, even years, before the child once
young children are able to generalize word forms. again starts to use the correct past tense of irregular verbs.

266 CHAPTER 8 LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

 Percent correct use
discover the “-ed” rule, and even though it may occur in

of linguistic form
a minority of utterances, it is at least a clear rule. The dis-
covery of this rule apparently suggests a broader pattern of
use to the children than is seen in adult usage. Only with
time and new insights into exceptions to the rule are the
18 months 54 months
irregular forms once again mastered. The extent of the dip
FIGURE 8.4 An idealized U-shaped developmental curve. These
in this curve is often exaggerated, but even a small dip
are some of the most intriguing patterns found in the developing illustrates the classic developmental pattern.
child. They are often interpreted as reflecting the emergence of a When children as a group show a drop in performance,
new cognitive structure or a new rule that, in its initial stages, is used it is often taken as a strong sign of a developmental reorga-
too crudely, and then becomes more carefully tuned. In the case of nization and the emergence of a new psychological system.
past tense forms, the emergence of a general “past = verb + ed” We saw several clear cases in perceptual development; use
rule was thought to be initially overused with some irregular verbs of the past tense seems to be a case in language. This effect
and then gradually narrowed down to the right set. Later approaches
can occur in several other areas of language acquisition as
tried to argue that U-shaped patterns could be modeled in distributed
networks in which no specific rules were represented. Adapted from
well. The pattern is so compellingly explained by the notion
Marcus et al. (1992) and Marcus (1993). of discovery and initial overuse of a rule that it is difficult
to imagine that the children are not mentally representing
abstract categories such as verb and past in a rule-like man-
Figure 8.4 shows an idealized version of this pattern, which ner. As we will see later, however, this interpretation has
holds true for other forms as well, such as regularizing been challenged by theories of learning that try to avoid any
irregular plurals (for example, “foots,” “sheeps”; see Marcus, representations of abstract rules.
1995). This kind of U-shaped developmental curve is one of
the most intriguing and classic findings in developmental
psychology (see Chapter 3). Such patterns have launched
many debates about the underlying changes occurring in
Q: What have U-shaped developmental
the child’s mind (Strauss, 1982). patterns traditionally been assumed to
To understand this pattern, keep a few points in mind. represent?
First, the input does not change radically when children
start to overregularize. Children of all ages are hearing
essentially the same distributions of verbs and tenses. Sec-
ond, irregular verbs are among the most frequently used
in English, with the consequence that the majority of past Child-Directed Speech
tense verbs heard by children in normal speech are irregular Adults do not talk to young children in the same way
ones with idiosyncratic past tense forms. When they start to they speak to older children or adults. This special type of
overregularize the past tense “-ed” rule, they are therefore speech, which was previously called motherese (Newport
taking a pattern observed in a minority of instances and et al., 1977) and is now known as child-directed speech
applying it to a broader range of cases. Third, parents rarely or infant-directed speech, differs from other speech in
provide feedback to children about the correctness of such many ways. When talking to young children, parents tend
forms. They may laugh from time to time at the mistakes, to enunciate their words very clearly and to speak more
but parents are generally unlikely to correct ungrammati- slowly and at a higher pitch. These differences tend to
cal early utterances (Braine, 1971; Brown & Hanlon, 1970). accentuate the boundaries between individual words and
Fourth, children usually have never heard these incorrect between phrases. Child-directed speech also uses simpler
overregularizations in the speech of others, so they are pro- words and fewer words per sentence, and it tends to be
ducing novel, incorrect forms on their own. more grammatically correct (Snow & Ferguson, 1977; see
Given these considerations, this particular U-shaped also Golinkoff & Alioto, 1995). When speaking to chil-
curve has been said to represent children’s discovery of dren, parents more often repeat and expand on the child’s
the past tense “-ed” rule. Younger children may only be previous utterance, or respond by recasting, in which they
remembering individual verbs and their different forms paraphrase what the child has said (Bohannon & Stanow-
on a case-by-case basis. Children might hear verbs such as icz, 1988). In recasting, adults are unlikely to directly cor-
“go” and “went” and store them separately in their mental rect a child’s utterance by saying it is wrong, but will use
dictionary (Ullman, 1999; Ullman et al., 2005), perhaps the correct form of a verb or noun in their responses. In
even noting that “went” is used more in situations talk- general, child-directed speech is modified in many ways
ing about the past. As they grow older, however, children that highlight critical elements in the language.

ACQUIRING A FIRST LANGUAGE 267

 Infants in all cultures prefer to listen to speech that has the tapes to rate aspects of the mothers’ responsiveness,
the characteristics of child-directed speech (Fernald, 1985; such as their playfulness with their child or how often they
Werker et al., 1994; see Chapter 3). Yet, there is no evi- imitated their child’s utterances. Later, the children’s mile-
dence that children who hear more child-directed speech stones of language acquisition were tracked, including when
than others learn any language faster or better. Cultures each one spoke his first word, acquired his first 50 words,
vary considerably in the extent to which parents modify and first talked about the past. When the two types of mea-
their speech to young children, yet the course of language sures were compared, the children of more responsive moth-
acquisition does not seem to vary in a corresponding fash- ers tended to reach language development milestones at an
ion (Ingram, 1989). Child-directed speech probably helps earlier age (Tamis-LeMonda et al., 2001). Similarly, chil-
attract the child’s attention, and it may make some aspects dren whose mothers are more sensitive to their emotional
of language processing, such as word segmentation, easier states tend to achieve language milestones earlier (Nicely
(Thiessen et al., 2005; see also Fernald & Hurtado, 2006; et al., 1999). Parents’ interaction patterns may contribute
see Figure 8.5). Even accounting for these influences, how- to the considerable individual differences seen in the rate
ever, many intriguing questions remain about how children of language acquisition. As with the case of child-directed
learn their first language. speech, however, these influences cannot fully explain chil-
dren’s basic ability to learn language. Using the right kinds
of words can also have an apparent effect on vocabulary
growth above and beyond simply using a lot of words.
Q: How does child-directed speech differ from Even when controlling for socioeconomic levels and previ-
talk between adults? ous vocabulary levels, 3-year-old children who hear a more
diverse and sophisticated vocabulary from their parents
have larger vocabularies 1 year later (Rowe, 2012). Parental
Although differences in child-directed speech do not effects on language development may resemble the effects of
seem to affect how quickly children learn language, some fertilizer and water on plant growth; they are more helpful
other aspects of parent-child interactions may play a role. for explaining individual differences in growth rates than
In one longitudinal study, mothers were videotaped while for describing the basic developmental pathway.
freely playing with their child. Researchers then examined

Theories of Language
Acquisition
Over the years, there have been many competing models
offering starkly different accounts of how children acquire
language. Perhaps the most intuitively appealing model is
that children simply imitate the language that they hear. As
we saw in Chapter 4, even very young infants are capable
of imitation. But there are two reasons why language is not
simply learned through imitation. First, if what we mean
by imitation is reproducing bits of what we hear, as a par-
rot does, then imitation clearly will not work as a model.
Children are not at all like parrots or other animal mimics.
If they were, they would not show the common problem of
overregularization, and they would not be able to produce
sentences they had not already heard. In fact, they would
not be able to produce novel sentences at all if they simply
stored parts of utterances and played back the most appro-
priate ones later.
FIGURE 8.5 Child-directed speech. Parents adjust their speech in
Second, if we suggest that imitation is more flexible and
many ways when speaking to young children. These adjustments may that rather than imitating specific strings of words, infants
help make some aspects of language structure more apparent to the imitate intentions, goals, and perhaps even rules, this expla-
child, but they do not explain how the child acquires language. nation adds little to a model of language acquisition. If the

268 CHAPTER 8 LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

infant is not imitating the speaker’s actual spoken language of the twentieth century. The prominent behaviorist B. F.
but something much more abstract, such as underlying Skinner believed that the same laws of learning that apply
intentions or rules, then imitation only explains a general to rats and pigeons also apply to humans in their acquisi-
motivation. It leaves unexplained how a child discovers the tion of language (Skinner, 1957). Skinner argued that par-
rules or intentions that she imitates, since neither is directly ents and other caregivers gradually shape infants’ linguistic
observable. The question therefore remains how young chil- response patterns, which gradually become more like adult
dren can learn linguistic rules from what they hear. language. For example, a child’s babbling might initially
Moving beyond the superficially appealing but ulti- appear random. Parents and others then respond more
mately uninformative imitation account, we can con- positively to babbles that resemble adult speech sounds and
sider several more detailed proposals about how language more negatively to those that do not, guiding and shaping
acquisition occurs. One major contrast between some of the child’s speech to become more like a mature speaker’s.
the most influential models concerns whether children Moreover, it was thought that parents have the same effect
acquire language through general learning mechanisms on children’s use of grammatical rules, reacting more posi-
such as associations that work in essentially the same way tively as children utter strings of words that come closer
as for acquiring many other forms of information (such and closer to adult grammatical patterns. To behaviorists,
as spatial or numerical knowledge) or whether children language acquisition seems to consist of learning the appro-
acquire important aspects of language through a learning priate verbal “responses” in a variety of circumstances, mak-
mechanism specialized for linguistic information. This ing it a seemingly straightforward, easily measured object
theme regarding general versus specific learning systems of study. Moreover, behaviorists never required any analysis
occurs in other areas of cognitive development, but it is of what goes on inside the mind of an infant or child; to
especially salient in language acquisition. Here we will them, all that mattered were environmental contingencies
consider behaviorist models of language acquisition that (see Chapters 1 and 4).
favor the association-based general learning explanation At first glance, the behaviorist account seems plausible.
and then related, more recent views known as connec- Children clearly learn the languages they hear spoken by
tionism and statistical learning. We will then turn to the those around them, and child-directed speech can influ-
nativist accounts, which tend to favor specialized learn- ence patterns of acquisition. But a closer look at what
ing systems, often those with specializations for abstract is actually happening between adults and children dur-
rules. As proposed earlier, young children may not be ing language acquisition reveals major problems with the
able to acquire language unless their language learning behaviorist account. The most penetrating and influen-
system “knows” some structural regularities of all natu- tial criticisms of behaviorist models of language learn-
ral languages from the start. Understanding the nature of ing came from the linguist Noam Chomsky (Chomsky,
what is already known, or what kinds of linguistic pat- 1959). Among his critiques, Chomsky pointed out that
terns are favored from the start, is the most central ques- behaviorists assume that the learner needs direct, specific
tion of language acquisition. A child’s ability to imitate feedback, but he noted that parents rarely correct or com-
may help him fine-tune some speech sounds or practice pliment children’s grammar in early utterances. Instead,
complex constructions (Speidel & Nelson, 1989), but it parents devote most of their attention to the meaning that
cannot explain the truly creative abilities that all children the child conveys (Brown & Hanlon, 1970). Consider
show as they master their mother tongue. a 2½-year-old who toddles up to her mother and says,
“Mommy mostest pretty tonight.” Virtually all parents
would smile warmly—not explain to the child how her
sentence was grammatically incorrect. Likewise, most par-
Behaviorist Approaches ents would respond negatively to a rude, but grammati-
Some theories about how children acquire language are cally perfect, statement by a child.
based on broader accounts of learning that have been well Behaviorist approaches would also predict that acquiring
known to psychologists for many years. As described in two or three languages at once should take a child much
Chapters 1 and 4, these learning theories are meant to longer than learning just one language, since it would take
apply to all kinds of information. They are based on the more time for the child to experience enough positive and
idea that a few general principles, such as reinforcement negative reinforcements for their speech in each language.
to shape behaviors or the tendency to associate events that In fact, bilingual and even trilingual children tend to
occur together frequently, are meant to explain all forms acquire all their languages together at about the same rate
of knowledge and skill acquisition. Behaviorism, which as a monolingual child. They may experience minor early
stresses the ways that reinforcement shapes responses, delays, but these seem to disappear just a few months into
dominated much of psychological research for the first half the learning process (Petitto et al., 2001).

THEORIES OF LANGUAGE ACQUISITION 269

 tions typical of young children, without ever learning or
Connectionist Approaches explicitly representing the past tense “rule” anywhere in the
Behaviorist approaches rely on simple learned associa- system.
tions between reinforced behaviors, but such simple asso- These results were criticized for several reasons, however,
ciations have been insufficient to explain many aspects of including concerns that the strings of phonemes input into
language acquisition. In the 1980s, researchers introduced the computer models were unrealistic (they differed from
connectionism, a way of representing networks of associa- what a child hears) and that the computers were too power-
tions based on computer simulations with multiple levels ful to provide a good model of children’s language learn-
of associations. In at least some cases, the computer simu- ing (Pinker & Prince, 1988). Later studies tried to rectify
lations can mimic what looks like the use of a rule even these concerns (Plunkett & Marchman, 1991) but had other
though the rule was never explicitly stated in the simula- shortcomings (Marcus et al., 1995). Currently, there is no
tion. Connectionist approaches rely on associative mecha- consensus among language acquisition researchers about
nisms, but they are vastly more powerful than the early whether a connectionist model using a single associative
behaviorist explanations. Their power arises primarily from process provides a better representation of the child’s lan-
two innovative explanations of how language processing guage development than a dual-process model consisting of
occurs. First, connectionist approaches propose that lan- both rules and associations (Bandi-Rao & Murphy, 2007;
guage acquisition depends on the brain’s massive capac- Marshall & van der Lely, 2006; Takac et al., 2012).
ity for parallel processing—that is, handling many kinds
of information simultaneously. Second, connectionism
incorporates hidden layers of processing that go beyond
overt associations learned through reinforcement. More Q: What is the associative versus rule-based
broadly, connectionist approaches to language acquisition learning debate?
argue that the human brain operates like a computer. They
emphasize that the brain can process vast amounts of infor-
mation simultaneously and that it is made up of separate
processing units that share information across networks of
connections. Statistical Learning Approaches
Most connectionist approaches fall within the empiri- Language learning can also be examined in terms of
cist tradition. They assume that cognition is built up from statistical learning, which is learning based on the prob-
learned associations based on input from the environment ability of events occurring both at the same time and in
and experience. But unlike the behaviorist approaches, sequences over time. In recent years, researchers have given
which make this same assumption, connectionism also renewed attention to statistical learning to study the early
seeks to understand the mental processes, and even the roots of language development, using statistical learning to
neural structures, that underlie language acquisition. investigate the relative roles of linguistic rules and associa-
Thus, many connectionist theorists refer to brain anatomy tions in language acquisition in infants. Statistical learning
and patterns of neural functioning to support their views approaches are often allied with connectionist approaches,
(Rumelhart, 1989). which are computational models that rely on statisti-
The computer models that are built by connection- cal patterns of inputs. In statistical learning approaches,
ist researchers test language acquisition theories by simu- researchers have asked how infants can distinguish words
lating the language learning process. When the two key out of streams of continuous sounds. They have exam-
ideas of parallel processing and hidden layers are supple- ined whether infants can recognize the probability of
mented with some general learning algorithms and rules, sounds co-occurring within words (that is, the likelihood
these software-based systems can often engage in surpris- that one sound follows another within a word) or occur-
ing patterns of learning. They can, for example, represent ring at the end of one word and beginning of another. In
several developmental patterns described earlier, including one study, 8-month-olds listened to uninterrupted strings
overregularization and the appearance of learning “rules.” of phonemes in which particular sets of sound patterns
Thus, connectionist models have attempted to simulate the were repeated, suggesting words. For example, the string
child’s acquisition of past tense verb forms, including a pat- “bidakupadotigolabubidak . . .” would continue for sev-
tern of learning that follows a U-shaped curve. Rumelhart eral minutes, during which time the sound sequences
and McClelland (1986) decomposed words into strings of “bidaku” and “padoti” each occasionally repeated, inter-
phonemes and then presented them one at a time to a com- spersed with other phonemes. After listening for just a few
puter network. The computer was apparently able to learn minutes, infants seemed to learn which groups of sounds
the past tense, showing the same pattern of overregulariza- in this string reliably occurred together as “words.” When

270 CHAPTER 8 LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

the recording stopped and was replaced by either famil-
iar sound sequences (“bidaku” and “padoti”) or unfamiliar ABB pattern ABB pattern
ones (such as “dakupa”), the infants looked longer toward ti ga ga ti ga ga
the speakers when the novel sequences played (Saffran et
al., 1996). This result excited researchers because it seemed
to show that infants have a rapid, powerful statistical learn-
ing ability for acquiring language and learning other non-
linguistic sounds (Bates & Elman, 1996).
Subsequent research found that young infants could also
learn sequences of tones that recurred together within a
stream of other tones but that did not sound like any lan- A Training condition
guage (Aslin et al., 1998; Saffran et al., 1999). In addition,
after hearing particular sound sequences, such as “bidaku,”
recur within a stream of phonemes, children are more likely ABB pattern ABA pattern
to later learn word labels that use those same sound sequences fe wo wo wo fe wo
than they are to learn sequences using other sounds, such as
“dabiku” (Graf-Estes et al., 2007). Apparently, the brief expo-
sure to recurring sound patterns helps prime young children
to learn that such recurring sound sequences can represent
meaningful words that are associated with objects and cat-
egories (Lany & Saffran, 2010; Shukla et al., 2011). Statistical
learning theorists suggest that young infants’ ability to rap-
B Test condition
idly extract and use such complex recurring patterns from a
continuous stream of sounds reflects not a language-specific FIGURE 8.6 Learning abstract rules. In the Marcus et al. study,
7-month-old infants learned to recognize abstract rules such that a
system, but a much more general learning system that cal-
sound pattern that they had never heard before but that corresponded
culates conditional probabilities (that is, probabilities that a to an old rule was seen as familiar. The infants sat in a booth on their
given event will occur given the occurrence of another event). parents’ laps (their parents wore headphones so that they could not
Can infants go beyond recognizing language’s recurring influence their children) listening to sound patterns coming from side
sound patterns to learning its rules? To explore this ques- speakers. (A) During the training condition, after the center yellow light
tion, another research team (Marcus et al., 1999) presented flashed, the infant was familiarized with the sound pattern (here ABB)
infants with phoneme sequences much like those described coming from speakers behind red bulbs on both the right and left.
in the previous study (Saffran et al., 1996), except that the (B) During the test condition, the infant was presented with different
sound patterns coming from the speakers on the right and the left.
sequences that the infants heard taught them a rule rather A novel ABB sound pattern came out of one side speaker and a novel
than a relation between specific groups of sounds (see ABA pattern came out of the other side speaker. The researchers
Figure 8.6). Rather than simply repeating the same ele- found that the infants looked longer at the speaker emitting the new
ments in the same three-syllable order, the researchers pre- ABA pattern that at the new ABB pattern that resembled the one they
sented the infants with different elements that followed a had heard during training, indicating their recognition of the rule and
similar rule-based pattern. For example, to teach an ABA their surprise that it had been violated.
rule, the recording would repeat the same element before
and after an intervening one, so the infants might hear
“ga ti ga” or “li na li” and the like for about 2 minutes. when information is combined across sensory modalities.
In another condition that taught an ABB rule, infants When 5-month-old infants were presented with visual pat-
would hear sequences like “ti ga ga” or “na li li.” In the terns that were associated with each syllable they heard in
test phase, infants heard new sound sequences that either a speech stream, the infants looked longer at the shapes
followed the old rule (for example, “wo fe wo” for ABA) on the screen when they were presented with new syllables
or did not (for example, “fe wo wo”). In the test condi- that corresponded to a new rule as opposed to an old one
tion, the infants looked longer at the novel patterns that (Frank et al., 2009). Thus, with adequate support, well
violated the rule, indicating their awareness of the rule and before the first half year of life, infants can learn abstract
their surprise that the rule had not been followed. More- rules that are distinct from any specific sound sequences
over, infants who were only 7 months old (that is, 1 month (see also Frank & Tenenbaum, 2011).
younger than infants tested in the original study of pho- One challenge for statistical learning models concerns
neme sequences) recognized when a rule had been violated. cases in which the syllable strings that infants hear vary in
A later rule-learning study showed the extra power gained length from, say, one syllable to four. Can infants still learn

THEORIES OF LANGUAGE ACQUISITION 271

to segment these syllable strings into words? One study computers, you will not necessarily find anything about
found that neither 5- nor 8-month-olds could do so, even the more sophisticated one that is tailored for that soft-
though they could do it easily when “word” lengths were ware. More likely, it just has sufficient memory and a fast
the same (Johnson & Tyler, 2010). Even though the “words” enough processing speed to execute the intricacies of the
of different lengths recurred predictably, the infants could program without crashing.
not learn them. This finding is puzzling, because the real A different analogy is also possible, however. The two
words that infants hear clearly vary in length (for exam- computers might differ not only in size and power, but also
ple, “doggy,” “ball,” “banana”). It may be that infants need in their specific components. If the more powerful com-
both to hear certain falling and rising pitch patterns associ- puter is able to run the software because it has a set of chips
ated with some word beginnings and endings and to see dedicated to processing graphics, while the other computer
visual cues associated with objects to learn words of varying lacks such a device, then the first computer gains its unique
lengths. There may also be other statistical patterns, such as capabilities from a specialized system. This second case is
overall distributions of sound patterns, that are integrated more like the nativist view of language acquisition, which
together with conditional probabilities to help solve this we will turn to now.
learning problem (Thiessen et al., 2013). It is important to acknowledge, however, that statistical
Statistical learning approaches are becoming ever more learning approaches need not be squarely in the empiricist
diverse as researchers consider new patterns of frequencies, tradition. For example, a Bayesian learning model might
correlations, and contingencies in language learning, and grant that certain types of rules are so improbable that they
formal ways of processing that information. One powerful can virtually never be favored based on new evidence, while
technique is based on Bayes’s rule, which provides a formal other types of rules are so probable as to virtually never be
way of updating beliefs in light of new evidence. In terms of discounted based on new evidence. If those rules and their
language learning, it is a way of confirming that certain rules probabilities are relevant only to language, then they can be
hold. Based on new pieces of evidence, a child can become seen as language-specific learning constraints.
more or less certain of those rules, a process that is con-
tinuously repeated as the child encounters more and more
evidence (Griffiths et al., 2012). Bayesian learning models
provide ways of exploring how children of different ages, Nativist Approaches
even when presented with the same evidence, might adjust Nativist approaches emphasize the idea that humans
the strength of a rule to differing degrees because younger are endowed with a specific brain system specialized for
and older children bring different kinds of prior knowledge acquiring any natural language. That system would not
to that learning event. In contrast to most connectionist work well for learning about spatial layout, number, or
models, in which rules are only tacitly present in a network, moral principles. But it must be able to acquire all natu-
Bayesian learning models can apply statistical learning to the ral languages, even though those languages vary widely at
strength of explicit rules (Frank & Tenenbaum, 2011). the surface level in terms of their grammatical rules and
Before we close our discussion of behaviorist, connec- many other features. The nativists do not claim that the
tionist, and statistical learning approaches to language system specifies details, such as particular grammatical
acquisition, let’s consider again the question of empiri- rules. Instead, they say that it includes abstract principles
cism versus nativism. Empiricist systems are specialized that guide learning about the structural patterns common
to handle specific kinds of information only at the earli- to all languages. This specialized system, which is often
est parts of the learning process. As previously described, called the language acquisition device (Chomsky, 1965),
many statistical learning theorists view infants’ ability is thought to embody a great deal of implicit linguistic
to identify statistical patterns as evidence for a general knowledge about all languages. Thus, it must be special-
learning system rather than a language-specific one. Con- ized for learning the kinds of abstract grammatical pat-
nectionists have also noted that the basic features of a terns all languages share, while remaining flexible enough
connectionist system—neural networks capable of paral- to learn any particular language.
lel processing—make up almost all animals’ brains. Thus, Over the years, Noam Chomsky has made a number
connectionists argue that humans acquire language and of proposals about the nature of the language acquisition
other species do not mostly because humans have a big- device. For example, he pointed out that the linguistic infor-
ger, more powerful brain—not because the human brain mation that young children receive from other speakers is
is somehow tailored for the complexities of language. To full of false starts, interruptions, and unfinished sentences.
understand this view, consider that relatively simple com- (Listen to any casual conversation, and you’ll see how fre-
puters cannot run the complex software that runs easily quently sentences are interrupted or ill formed.) Because
on a more powerful computer. But if you look inside both young children hear imperfect speech, Chomsky argued that

272 CHAPTER 8 LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

what they hear is not a sufficient basis for learning language. apply the new word to various objects that correspond to
This view, known as the poverty of the stimulus argument, the concept at hand. For example, a child who learns the
holds that since children couldn’t possibly learn language word “doggy” doesn’t just learn that a particular sound
only by listening to others talk, they must already have some sequence is associated with the dog she has just encoun-
knowledge of the language’s structure. (Even though adults tered. Instead, she learns that “doggy” names a concept
often address young children with simplified, child-directed or class of things—roughly, furry, four-legged creatures
speech, the amount of this kind of speech that a child hears that bark. This process of linking sounds that form
does not seem to predict how easily he acquires language.) words onto concepts is known as mapping. Semantic
Nativists point out that in behaviorist theories of learning, development, or the emerging understanding of word
the learner’s incorrect responses must be corrected in order meanings and their interrelationships, requires linking
for the learner to make progress. But children receive only words to concepts, which in turn often correspond to
very rare, minimal feedback about their many early errors. real-world phenomena. (There is not always a correspon-
This small amount of negative feedback seems insufficient dence of words to real-world concepts, however, as we
to shape their many ungrammatical sentences into the cor- can learn words such as “unicorn” or “kryptonite” even
rect, mature use of the language. Nonetheless, while chil- though neither is real.) First, we will consider a few basic
dren make many mistakes early on (such as “goed” instead patterns concerning the growth of the child’s lexicon, or
of “went”), they still manage to correct themselves as they the set of words he knows.
get older. During the first year of life, many children speak no
More generally, nativist approaches about the nature of words at all and probably understand just a few. After about
the language acquisition device attempt to figure out how age 1, words start to enter the child’s productive vocabu-
such a system might learn language effectively from only a lary (that is, the words that the child can produce or say)
few relatively simple, minimal inputs. Along these lines, they at the gradually increasing rate shown in Figure 8.7. The
embrace the idea that the language acquisition device can child initially starts acquiring words at a slow rate, but then
use a few key bits of information, such as differences in into- that rate increases continuously over the next few years, hit-
nation, as richly meaningful cues to linguistic structures. ting a peak rate somewhere around 4 years of age. By age 5,
many children have vocabularies as large as 10,000 words
(Anglin, 1993; Bloom, 2000).
The contents of words also change with increasing age.
Discovering the Meanings Many children’s first words refer to concrete objects, although
this pattern is subject to large individual differences. Early
of Words
The speaking toddler seems like an utterly different creature 12,000
from the preverbal infant. As the child labels objects and
events, asks questions, and comments on situations, we gain 10,000
new insights into his mental life. How do children learn
Productive vocabulary

word meanings as they transition out of a preverbal state to 8,000

become more fluent users of language? How do children’s
language development and other emerging cognitive capaci-
6,000
ties influence each other? How do children learn to use lan-
guage to communicate in ways that go beyond the literal, as
4,000
in the use of metaphor or irony? Many researchers believe
that in trying to answer these questions, we can come
closer to understanding what makes us human. To begin 2,000

to address these issues, we examine how children begin to

learn word meanings. 0
9 15 21 27 33 39 45 51 57
Age (in months)
FIGURE 8.7 Vocabulary growth. The child’s vocabulary initially
Linking Words to Concepts grows at a slow rate, but then rapidly accelerates in later years. The
actual vocabulary size can vary considerably across children. This
When a child learns a new word, she doesn’t simply link example would be for a fairly precocious child. For most children, the
that word onto a single object in the world. Instead, she rate gradually increases with age with no sharp spurts. Adapted from
links the word onto a concept, which then enables her to Bloom (2000) and Ganger & Brent (2004).

DISCOVERING THE MEANINGS OF WORDS 273

words for actions, such as “up” (for being lifted up) or “open”
are also common. A child’s first words also tend to be at an
intermediate level of generality. Thus, a child is much more
likely to first learn “dog” than either “collie” or “mammal.”
Levels of generality are predicted from the frequencies with
which terms at the different levels are used by adults, and Gavagai
young children tend to linguistically encode the world at the
level most often used by adults (Anglin, 1977; Brown, 1958a,
1958b; Horton & Markman, 1980; Mervis & Crisafi, 1982;
Rosch et al., 1976).
Children do not require explicit training to increase
their vocabularies. Sometimes parents do correct a child’s
mistaken word usage or point to a novel object or event
and label it. But parents rarely provide children with full
definitions, such as “A dog is a mammal that has four legs,
a tail, and makes a barking noise. It is a social animal and
has litters of roughly six puppies.” For many words, such a
complete definition would involve words that are beyond
A
the young child’s comprehension. The extraordinary speed
with which young children seem to map words onto the
correct concepts, sometimes as fast as 500 new words a Rabbit

month, is often called fast mapping (Carey & Bartlett,

1978). Fast mapping is thought to be possible because out
of the universe of possible word meanings, children are
somehow biased to infer only a relatively small subset,
making the learning problem much easier, given the child’s
cognitive abilities.

Q: What sorts of words are more common in

the early stages of word learning? B
FIGURE 8.8 Riddle of reference. (A) Quine’s example of a person
from a radically different culture uttering “gavagai” while pointing to a
These developmental patterns are fascinating because rabbit illustrates the riddle of reference. There is no way to know for
they reveal an extraordinary ability to learn words without sure whether the person means rabbit, rabbit parts, or any number
any apparent explicit instruction. How is such a rapid and of other meanings that cannot be distinguished by merely pointing.
seemingly effortless process explained at the psychological (B) The young child also seems to face this problem every time she
level? To better understand this process, it is useful to first encounters a new word (here “rabbit” as spoken by her father) and
yet narrows down the set of possible meanings to a much smaller set
consider the nature of the challenge in more conceptual
that makes the learning of word meanings feasible.
terms.
To a large extent, all the patterns in the growth of vocab-
ulary revolve around the most central question: How is it
possible to acquire word meanings at all? The philosopher can you tell what the native is talking about—that is, how
Willard Quine (1960) posed a dilemma that can help illu- can you translate the word correctly?
minate the difficulty of the task children face as they learn We will refer to this dilemma as the riddle of refer-
to associate words with meanings. He described the follow- ence. It is impossible to tell whether “gavagai” applies
ing scenario: Suppose you were transported to a completely to rabbits, the set of connected rabbit parts, or a rabbit-
unfamiliar culture in an unexplored rain forest. You have related event or action. Quine argues that we assume that
been dropped off by helicopter and are standing alone in a “gavagai” means rabbit (and not rabbit event or parts) just
clearing when a native of this culture comes along. At the because we share with the other speaker a common way
same time, a rabbit hops into the clearing and the native of carving up the world into meaningful units. The sce-
gestures toward it and says “gavagai” (see Figure 8.8). How nario Quine describes is especially dramatic because no

274 CHAPTER 8 LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

amount of experience could ever make you certain that you system of constraints to help the child learn the meanings
had understood what “gavagai” means. The information intended by others, the child must share the same sets of
available from both the environment and experience is too constraints with the speakers around her.
ambiguous to ever distinguish between “set of connected
rabbit parts” and “whole rabbit.” Moreover, the learning
process is complex even when the environment does enable
you to clearly distinguish between meanings. If “gavagai” Q: Why are constraints on word meanings
means “rabbit head,” it would take a specific set of highly considered essential to explanations of word
unusual events with incomplete rabbits to figure this out. learning?
Similarly, recognizing the meaning of the words for “rab-
bit fur” or “hopping rabbit” would require quite particular
encounters. Perceptual Constraints The first kinds of constraints
The “gavagai” example bears directly on the challenge on word meanings are perceptual constraints, which are
facing a young child as she begins to connect words with biases toward certain interpretations of words that arise
meanings. The child resembles the traveler in the clearing, from the way our perceptual system naturally carves up
except that in some ways the child’s dilemma is more dif- the world into distinct objects and events. This process can
ficult. The traveler arrives with one language, which can involve all the senses, but most researchers have focused on
be used to attempt to translate the unfamiliar terms. In vision. One example of a perceptual tendency that con-
contrast, the young child has no other language, so her strains word meanings is the shape bias, according to
task involves both translating the sounds into concepts which objects of roughly the same shape are assumed to
and building new concepts to correspond with speakers’ have the same name (and objects with different shapes are
meanings. assumed to have different names). Toddlers show this bias
in the lab when, having learned the name of a novel object,
they are asked to pick something else with that same name
from a pair of unfamiliar objects. Children as young as
Q: How do theoretical problems with 18 months will choose the object with the same shape
language translation lead to questions about the as the first object, rather than choosing an object that
acquisition of word meaning? shares its same colors or textures. This attention to shape
over the object’s other properties suggests a bias to think
that things with the same shape will have the same label
(Landau et al., 1988).
Constraints on Word Meanings
The only solution to the riddle of reference is to assume
that the child’s choices among possible word meanings are
Q: How might an object’s shape help word
limited somehow. Many types of constraints on word learning?
meanings, or ways of limiting the number of possible
meanings that could be assigned to a given word, have
been proposed. Researchers suggest that infants and young Conceptual Constraints Our perceptual biases are
children have certain biases that guide them in determin- not the only influence on our choices of which things to
ing what a word is referring to (Markman, 1989, 1992). name. We are also guided by conceptual constraints that
Our purpose here is to consider how these different types make some kinds of categories or relationships seem more
of constraints help to solve the problem of connecting “natural” to label. Thus, even when there may be equally
words with meanings. As Quine’s dilemma illustrates, if compelling perceptual features, some conceptual slices of
a child entertained all possible meanings every time she the world are more easily mapped onto words (Arunacha-
encountered a new word, she would never be able to begin lam & Waxman, 2010a). For example, the whole-object
building a vocabulary. If, on the other hand, most pos- bias describes our preference for labeling whole, bounded
sible meanings are ruled out from the start, word learning objects—rather than objects’ parts or their relationships
becomes feasible. In this way, constraints on word mean- to other things (Macnamara, 1982; see Figure 8.9). For
ings do not really constrain the child; they liberate her by example, if 3-year-olds are presented with several unfamil-
reducing the number of possible meanings (Keil, 1979). We iar tools, and each has one very noticeable part, they will
will consider three types of constraints on word meaning: still assume that the labels associated with these tools apply
perceptual, conceptual, and pragmatic constraints. For this to the whole tool, not just to the part. More broadly, when

DISCOVERING THE MEANINGS OF WORDS 275

 young children encounter a label for an unfamiliar object,
they tend to assume that it applies to the object as a whole
Dog =
(Markman, 1989; Markman & Wachtel, 1988). This has
Dog = the potential to greatly simplify first guesses about the
Dog Dog = referents of novel terms. Infants also assume that a novel
Dog = word refers to a whole object as opposed to a property such
as color or texture.
Infants also appear to make taxonomic assumptions, such
that they prefer to attach labels to objects of the same kind
(for example, five dogs or five balls) and not to relation-
ships between objects (for example, five dogs chasing balls)
(Markman & Wachtel, 1988). Moreover, children may also
use Bayesian inference to acquire word meanings. Thus, it
has been argued that when a child hears an individual label
three dogs with the same label, she may infer that it is very
unlikely that the speaker meant “animal” with the label and
FIGURE 8.9 The whole-object bias. This bias assumes that novel not “dog” because it is implausible that the speaker would
words refer to whole bounded individuals and not to their parts, colors, have repeatedly picked just dogs and no other animals with
textures, or other component attributes. a label meaning “animal” (Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007).

SCIENTIFIC METHOD: Early Use of Syntax to Guide Learning New Words

Hypothesis:
Even very early in syntactic development, children are able to use
syntactic information to infer word meanings.

Method:
1. Seventy-two 19-month-olds were given practice watching videos
with background narrations and choosing videos in response to
questions.
2. In a test condition, children saw side-by-side videos in which an
actor performed a novel action while another person stood by
(intransitive action) or in which an actor performed some action
on another actor (transitive action).
3. While looking at the videos, children heard either a two-noun
sentence (“She is gorping her”), a one-noun sentence (“She is
gorping”), or a neutral sentence (“Look here”).
to the two-participant event
Proportion of looking time

4. Experimenters scored the proportion of looking time for the two-

participant event (transitive action).

Results:
Infants looked longer at the transitive video after hearing a sentence
with two nouns. They had no strong bias to prefer either
video in the neutral condition without nouns.

Conclusion:
Well before 2 years of age, infants will use the presence of one versus
Transitive Intransitive Neutral
two syntactic categories (nouns) in a sentence to infer the meanings of
novel verbs.

Source study: Yuan et al. (2012).

276 CHAPTER 8 LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

 Finally, the surrounding sentence frame can give concep-
tual clues to new word meanings. Thus, if a speaker says It’s a blicket!
“John flugged that Bill lives next door,” we can constrain
the meaning of “flug” to a class of verbs involving beliefs
and attitudes (for example, “thought,” “believed”), which
generally are not understood until relatively late in develop-
ment (Lidz et al., 2001). This is known as “syntactic boot-
strapping” (Chierchia, 1994), early versions of which may
be present when the infant is as young as 19 months (Yuan
et al., 2012; see Scientific Methods box), but which is clearly
evident by the time infants are 24 months (Arunachalam &
Waxman, 2010b).

Pragmatic Constraints Along with perceptual and con- FIGURE 8.11 Using the speaker’s gaze. Children younger than
ceptual constraints, the goals and beliefs attributed to a 18 months old know that the direction in which a speaker is looking
provides information about what she is speaking about. In this study,
speaker may guide a child’s understanding of what a word
the experimenter used a mirror to covertly watch where the child was
means. Such pragmatic constraints on word meaning come looking while the experimenter looked into a bucket and declared
into play when the child infers what the speaker is refer- “It’s a blicket.” Even though the child did not know she was being
ring to, thereby limiting where the child directs his atten- observed, she checked the direction of the speaker’s gaze to decide
tion (Tomasello, 2000). One pragmatic constraint, known what the person was calling a “blicket.”
as mutual exclusivity, refers to the assumption that each
object in a language has only one label (Clark, 1988; Mark-
man, 1989; Markman & Hutchinson, 1984; Markman & children as young as 2 years old tended to choose the
Wachtel, 1988; Merriman & Bowman, 1989). That is, if object whose name they did not already know. They appar-
something is called a “hammer,” then it is unlikely to be ently assumed that each object had only one label, so that
called by another name as well. To study how children use the new label did not refer to an object whose name they
this constraint, researchers presented children with two already knew.
objects—one that they were already able to name and one Other kinds of pragmatic cues also help children nar-
that they could not yet label (see Figure 8.10). While look- row down possible word meanings. For example, where
ing at both objects, the experimenter asked the child for parents look and the emotions they show influence how
an object by using an unfamiliar label. In this scenario, children interpret the things parents say (see Chapters 6
and 7). A series of elegant experiments examined how
children as young as 1 year use the direction of an adult’s
gaze to help them understand what is being talked about
(Baldwin, 1991, 1993). In one setup, at the same time that
Key =
Magnifier the child was looking at a toy, the experimenter would look
Key = Magnifier into a bucket and utter “It’s a blicket” (see Figure 8.11).
The child would often look away from the toy to focus on
Magnifier =
the adult to see where his gaze was directed. Later, when the
child was shown both the toy she had been looking at and
the object that was in the bucket and asked to “point to the
blicket,” she would point to the object that had been in the
bucket. These results argue strongly against the notion that
children merely associate the words they hear with what-
ever they are looking at. Instead, even the youngest children
took into account where the adult was looking. Children
also rely on a speaker’s mental and emotional state. Thus,
if a speaker says, “Let’s find the blicket” and frowns while
FIGURE 8.10 Mutual exclusivity. This bias associates new words
with objects that do not already have labels. If the child is con-
looking at and touching two objects, but smiles while
fronted with two objects and knows the name of only one (“key”), looking at and touching a third object, a 2-year-old will
she will assume that a new name (“magnifier”) applies to the other assume that the third object is the “blicket” (Tomasello &
object. Barton, 1994).

DISCOVERING THE MEANINGS OF WORDS 277

 damental ways over the course of development. Research-
Q: What are three examples of constraints on ers have investigated this process for more than a century,
exploring whether the changes in children’s mental represen-
word meaning that seem to operate early on?
tations of words occur gradually or in distinct, qualitatively
different stages.

The Nature of Constraints on Word Meanings We Overextensions and Underextensions The studies
have seen several examples of constraints on word meanings. of developmental changes in children’s understanding of
Although the nature of these constraints remains controver- word meanings have focused on two common patterns
sial, it appears that they may reflect broad cognitive biases that children show as they acquire new words. The first of
that extend beyond the process of word learning (Bloom, these tendencies, called overextension, involves applying
2000). Consider the whole-object bias, for example—children’s a word too broadly. For example, a toddler who calls any
strong preference to attach new words to whole objects rather large, four-legged animal a “cow” has extended this label
than to objects’ parts or properties (Woodward & Markman, far beyond its true boundaries. A child might happily use
1998). This same bias is also involved in tasks that have this label for horses, pigs, and large dogs, and on a trip to
nothing to do with word learning (Bloom, 2000). In count- the zoo might call zebras, elephants, and antelopes “cows”
ing, for example, children show a strong bias to count whole as well. This pattern is especially apparent in observational
objects as opposed to objects’ properties (Dehaene, 1997). studies in which caregivers or other observers write down
Like words, numbers are typically associated with whole children’s notable utterances each day. Those records often
objects. document overextensions because they are obvious and often
The mutual exclusivity bias may also have a much amusing—as when a toddler starts calling all men “Daddy.”
broader basis. We do tend to think that if one object already On the other hand, the related pattern of underextension,
has a label, then a new label must apply to something else. in which a child incorrectly applies a word too narrowly, is
But more broadly, when we are engaged in conversation, we much less noticeable, though also very common (Anglin,
assume that the speaker will indicate shifts in topic. Thus, 1970). A child who underextends the word “doggie” by
if the speaker introduces a new label rather than using a applying it only to dogs that look like the family pet might
familiar one, we tend to assume that the label must apply to say “doggie!” when he sees a Labrador retriever or another
an object not yet named and that the new label is serving as kind of large dog but might say nothing in the presence
a topic-shifting device (Clark, 1995). of small dogs (see Figure 8.12). This underextension would
Children could not learn word meanings without power- probably go undetected by his parents and others.
ful ways of limiting the number of possible meanings. Several
different combinations of constraints provide these limiting
guidelines, and they appear to apply not just to words but Q: Why might it seem that children mostly
to many aspects of cognition and communication. If there overextend word meanings when in fact they
is a language acquisition device, it does not seem to be spe-
cialized for learning most word meanings. Instead, children also underextend them?
usually acquire specific word meanings through using more
general learning strategies (Bloom, 2000).
Linking Features with Meanings One way to think
about semantic development focuses on the features associ-
Q: What is the evidence against the proposal ated with word meanings. In particular, most researchers
assume that people use certain perceptual and conceptual
that constraints on word meanings are active
features of objects and events to help link words to relevant
only in the context of word learning? objects and events. For example, the meaning of “dog” is
typically said to rely on both perceptual features of dogs,
such as certain sizes, textures, and shapes, as well as con-
ceptual features of dogs, such as being an animal, a living
Developmental Changes thing, and a physical object. Researchers who are studying
semantic development have investigated how these semantic
in Word Meanings links between features and words develop, and they have
Beyond the constraints that enable children to narrow asked: Are the developmental changes in children’s under-
down the vast number of possible word meanings, children’s standing of word meanings linked to changes in the way
understanding of word meanings seems to change in fun- they think about semantic features?

278 CHAPTER 8 LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

 FIGURE 8.12 Overextensions and under-
Doggie Doggie Look at that. extensions. While overextensions of word
meaning are often easier to notice (and were
more commonly recorded in early diary stud-
ies of children), underextensions also occur.
The child might comment on something with-
out realizing that a familiar name applies to it,
or the child might say nothing at all.

Overextension Underextension

One proposal suggests that the types of features chil- explain younger children’s greater use of over- and under-
dren use to represent word meanings change with devel- extensions of word meanings. If a younger child puts a
opment. For example, younger children may focus on greater emphasis on the characteristic features of the most
perceptual features, such as color, size, and surface texture, typical jails, she might call a well-fortified bank a “jail”
rather than functional or conceptual features, such as an (overextension), while not recognizing a more upscale jail
object’s use or whether it is dangerous. This view assumes as such (underextension).
that younger children are either unable to use some kinds In an experiment designed to discover whether children
of features or, at the least, have a strong bias against using considered characteristic or defining features more impor-
them (Gentner & Rattermann, 1991; Landau et al., 1998; tant to various word meanings, researchers told preschoolers
Nelson, 1973). and elementary school children several pairs of descrip-
A second view suggests that the ways that children inter- tive stories created to pit an object’s characteristic features
nally represent semantic features change. For example, against its defining features. For example, in one story, the
younger children might take note of as many features of children were told:
an object as possible to determine what its name means,
There is a beautiful building with columns. Mr. Johnson
whereas older children weigh only the few features they
lives there, but he has a big problem. There are these cracks
have determined are central to the meaning. To see how
in his floors and walls. So, he covers them with paintings
these theoretical approaches are translated into experimen-
and statues, and he never lets anyone see them. Could that
tal studies, we will take a closer look at an example of this
be a museum?
second type of proposal.
One way of envisioning how mental representations of This building has several characteristic features of a museum
word meanings develop is based on the idea that word (it is beautiful, has columns, and is filled with art), but it
meanings are made up of two kinds of features (Smith lacks an important defining feature: no one is allowed to
et al., 1974). Characteristic features are the properties see the art inside. In contrast, the second story in this pair
most typically associated with members of a category. describes a building with the defining features of a museum,
For example, characteristic features of jails include that but not its characteristic features:
they have bars on the windows and are highly secure.
There is this small wooden shack in the countryside. People
Defining features are the properties that pertain to what
come from all over and pay 50 cents to get inside and see the
the word really means and how adults would tell whether
interesting display of dirty shirts with rings around the col-
it applies in a particular case. Thus, a defining feature
lar and spots and stains. Could that be a museum?
of jails is that they are places where criminals are held.
Not all words’ characteristic and defining features can If younger children understand word meanings only in
be easily distinguished, but for those that can, a possible terms of characteristic features, they should identify the
developmental model emerges (Keil, 1989; Keil & Bat- first example as a museum, but not the second. And if older
terman, 1984). Perhaps younger children initially rely on children and adults base word meanings on defining fea-
characteristic features as the basis for word meanings, and tures, they should do the opposite.
then, as they get older, they shift to understanding word The results suggested that preschoolers more often base
meanings in terms of defining features. Thus, they may their notions of word meanings on characteristic features,
undergo a shift from relying on characteristic features to and elementary school children more often use defining fea-
emphasizing defining features for learning word mean- tures. Nonetheless, this characteristic-to-defining shift does
ings. This characteristic-to-defining shift could also help not occur for all words at the same time. Rather, depending

DISCOVERING THE MEANINGS OF WORDS 279

on the words involved, it can extend from the preschool years explicitly includes a subject or if it can be dropped and rep-
on into adulthood. Words in some domains, such as terms resented implicitly. Thus, while all languages share certain
for moral actions (lying, stealing, cheating) shift in the pre- kinds of grammatical categories—for example, subject,
school years, while words in other domains, such as terms for verb, object—individual languages differ in terms of other
kinship (uncle, aunt, grandmother) shift much later (Keil, factors that have to be set for each language—for example,
1989). Interestingly, the shift does not occur for each word how clauses are embedded within sentences or word order.
separately; instead, clusters of closely related words shift at By analogy, consider the process of installing a new
the same time, probably because the words have closely inter- scanner. All scanners share basic features and use similar
connected meanings. It is very hard, for example, to know methods for transferring data, but they differ in the details
the defining features of a husband without knowing those of their resolution settings, error-checking routines, and
of a wife. the like. To set up a new scanner, you have to make a num-
In short, children initially use characteristic features to ber of choices to make it compatible with your computer,
understand word meanings, and over the course of develop- printer, and perhaps other devices. Similarly, researchers
ment, they increasingly focus on defining features. Adults, following Chomsky hypothesized that the young child
too, show this pattern of semantic development as they does not have to “start from scratch” to figure out most
progress from novice to expert in a particular area (Chi aspects of language structure. Instead, she has to figure out
et al., 1981). a relatively small number of “settings” appropriate to her
own language.
One example of a language parameter is its branching
Q: Give an example of a characteristic-to- direction, which refers to the order in which ideas typically
occur in a sentence. English is a right-branching language,
defining shift in the development of word which is evident in the sentence “I saw the man who taught
meaning. the child who had a broken arm.” The embedded clauses in
this sentence (“who taught the child” and “who had a bro-
ken arm”) branch out after, or to the right of, the main verb
(“saw”). Japanese, by contrast, is a left-branching language,
so the ideas in this same sentence would typically occur in a
The Growth of Grammar different sequence, “Had a broken arm child taught man I
saw,” with clauses branching out before, or to the left of, the
We have seen that as children acquire word meanings, they main verb. Children seem to learn very early whether their
seem to draw on general learning strategies and constraints language is right or left branching and then “set” that param-
that extend far beyond the domain of language. Learning eter, which then guides additional learning about syntax.
grammar, however, may depend on much more specific Interestingly, the early-acquired parameter of branch-
mechanisms and constraints that are unique to language. ing direction has close connections with the rhythm
The grammar of a language principally contains the syn- ingrained in the sentences spoken to a child. Left- and
tactic rules for combining words, prefixes, and suffixes into right-branching languages are each associated with
well-structured sentences. In the first few years of life, the particular intonation patterns. As very young children
child’s syntactic abilities develop rapidly, which has drawn listen to their native language being spoken, they may
many researchers to explore how these impressive changes use these patterns to “set” the parameter for right or left
unfold. branching even before understanding much of the syn-
One theory that aims to explain how children come to tax (Mazuka, 1996, 1998). Thus, children may get their
use and understand syntax, known as the principles and earliest clues about grammatical forms from the prosody
parameters approach, was advanced by Noam Chomsky of the speech they hear—that is, its acoustic properties,
(Chomsky, 1975, 1981). This approach suggests that a com- such as intonation, rhythm, and pitch (Hirsh-Pasek &
mon set of principles governs the internal structure of all Golinkoff, 1996).
languages—for example, the principle that all sentences The branching direction of a language is just one of
must have a verb. In addition, because specific languages many possible parameters on which languages differ
also vary in many ways, this view also holds that early in and that need to be “set” by the young language learner
life, the child’s mind contains a large number of possible (Valian, 1994, 2009). In fact, one drawback of the principles
linguistic forms or alternative parameters that become fixed, and parameters approach is the difficulty of determining
or set, according to the specific language the child learns— how many parameters are involved in the world’s languages
for example, whether the language requires that a sentence and how many “settings” or variations are possible for each

280 CHAPTER 8 LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

language. This approach also leaves researchers with the sig- language for decades. Yet, young children who grow up in
nificant challenge of understanding precisely how param- bilingual communities become fluent (and accent-free) in
eters become set in the mind of a young language learner. both languages. This change in language learning ability
Nonetheless, the principles and parameters approach to syn- typically occurs during the onset of puberty. These critical-
tactic development is appealing in many ways. It describes period effects on language acquisition can show up clearly
how languages’ universals might occur in conjunction with in siblings who emigrate to a new country at the same
their many differences. It offers a theory about how chil- time—for example, at the ages of 8 and 16—and must learn
dren might learn syntactic structures and patterns that are its language. Even 40 years later, when the siblings are 48
specific to their own language by setting a parameter, rather and 56, the older one will probably still show traces of an
than having to start from scratch. accent, while the younger one will likely sound like a native
In short, learning syntax and grammar seems to require speaker. Although some especially talented or hardworking
rich mental capacities to support children’s ability to master individuals learn to speak new languages without an accent
the specific, elaborate rules of their native language using into adulthood, this is rare.
only the relatively simple cues that they hear. When it The language abilities of non-native speakers also differ
comes to finding clues to their language’s complex underly- in more subtle ways that reflect critical-period effects. Much
ing structures, children are good detectives, even if their like the issue of accents, our ability to learn the more com-
detective work occurs largely outside of awareness. plex aspects of a second language’s grammar partly depends
on the age at which we learn the new language. Researchers
had bilingual adults listen to sentences recorded in English
(their second language), then tested their ability to detect
Q: What is parameter setting and how is it subtle grammatical errors in these sentences. These studies
relevant to language acquisition? showed a gradual, continuous drop in the adults’ English
grammatical skills, depending on the age at which they began
learning the language (Newport, 1990; Figure 8.13). Adults
who had been introduced to English when they were under
5 showed grammatical abilities equivalent to native speak-
Effects of Age on Language ers, whereas those who learned English as older children or
as adults did not perform as well. Thus, someone exposed
Acquisition to English for 30 years, between the ages of 20 and 50,
might well show poorer command of subtle grammatical
In addition to the overall constraints on syntactic struc- forms than someone exposed to the language for only 10
tures that we have discussed, there are limitations on the years, from age 8 to 18.
periods during which syntax and phonology are acquired
with ease. We can understand these limits by considering
274
Average score on grammar judgments

several kinds of evidence for such critical periods, including 270

what happens when language acquisition occurs after such
260
periods. Many of us have noticed that young children seem
able to learn languages much more easily than adults. Such 250
a pattern suggests a critical period for language acquisition— 240
although, as we have seen, references to critical periods do
230
not usually imply that learning becomes impossible after a
certain point. Instead, critical-period effects usually refer to 220
the way that certain behaviors or types of information, such 210
as fusing visual information from the two eyes, singing a
species-specific birdsong, or following one’s parent rather
than another moving object, become more difficult to learn Native 3–7 8–10 11–15 17–39
after a certain point in development. Age of arrival in new country (in years)
Some of the strongest evidence for critical periods for
FIGURE 8.13 The critical-period effect for grammatical ability.
language acquisition concern our ability to learn a second When an average score is constructed for each person on a set of
language. Adults who move to a community where a lan- subtle grammar judgments in that person’s second language, there
guage that is new to them is spoken will often speak the is a clear decline in scores as the age of first arrival in the country of
new language with an accent, even after speaking only that their second language increases. Adapted from Newport (1990).

EFFECTS OF AGE ON LANGUAGE ACQUISITION 281

 language ability, and Itard eventually grew discouraged
Q: What aspects of language are likely to be (Itard, 1932/1962; Lane, 1976). It seemed as if there was
subject to critical-period effects? a critical period for language and that by the time he was
discovered in early adolescence, Victor had missed it.
More recently, another tragic case of a “wild” child
occurred in the United States, which yielded more specific
information about a possible critical period for language
Acquiring Language after development. In 1957, Genie was born to parents who
the Critical Period grossly maltreated her, at least partly because they regarded
The most striking demonstration of a critical-period effect her as defective. She was born with a dislocated hip that
on language development would involve complete depriva- required a cast (which her father prematurely removed), and
tion of exposure to any language until the critical period she was improperly diagnosed as retarded because of her
was over. This would enable researchers to find out whether slow performance in an early pediatric examination—while
language learning would still be possible beyond the criti- ill with a high fever. Genie spent most of her childhood
cal period. Of course, deliberately depriving a human child strapped to a potty or in a crib within an isolated room in
of language would be immoral, but over the years, some a large house. During those years, she never heard another
relevant cases have emerged from the enormous variety of human utter a word (her parents only grunted and growled
human childhood experiences. at her), and she was beaten for vocalizing any sounds
For centuries, there have been reports of feral children— (Curtiss, 1977; Rymer, 1992). When Genie was 13, her con-
that is, “wild” children who spent infancy and childhood out dition was discovered, and she was immediately moved to a
of contact with other humans. The first well-documented foster home, and psychologists, social workers, and linguists
case occurred in 1800, when a French doctor, Jean Marc worked to help her overcome her massive cognitive, social,
Gaspard Itard, began studying Victor, “the wild child of and linguistic deficits (see Figure 8.15A). Finally, it was
Aveyron,” who apparently had spent much of his youth decided that the benefits of a more private life outweighed
roaming the forests of southern France without any human those of continued instruction and assessment, so her treat-
contact (see Figure 8.14). When Victor was discovered at the ment was gradually discontinued.
age of 12, he was reported to possess no language. Reports of Genie’s language skills, compared with
Itard attempted to carefully document the child’s psy- her cognitive and social skills, revealed a specific lan-
chological development and particularly his abilities to guage learning difficulty. Even after 4 years of instruc-
learn new linguistic, cognitive, and social skills. Despite tion and care (Curtiss, 1977), Genie differed most from
Victor’s early promise, however, he never developed much other children with respect to language. While her non-
linguistic cognitive abilities had reached or surpassed the
levels expected for an 8-year-old, showing that she had
gone through rapid cognitive changes, her language skills
lagged far behind.
With respect to language, Genie readily acquired new
words, at least those for concrete objects, and her vocabu-
lary continued to expand throughout the time she was stud-
ied. Genie also could perform adequately when she could
rely on pragmatic cues to understand a speaker’s intentions.
For example, if someone in a room with her looked toward
the open window and asked, “Genie, would you please close
the window?” she would nod and go close it. (It is tempting
to conclude that she understood the request. But if the per-
son had instead looked toward the window and said, “Win-
dow” or “Don’t close the window,” Genie would likely have
responded in the same way, simply assuming that the other
person wanted the window to be changed somehow.)
FIGURE 8.14 Feral child and language. Jean Marc Gaspard Itard
Genie had much more trouble, however, when the
studied Victor, “the wild child of Aveyron,” a child who had lived in
the woods without human contact until he was about 12 years old. task required her to understand linguistic structure. She
When he was found, Victor could not communicate in words. Despite entered the two-word stage rather easily, but then her
progress in understanding language, Victor never acquired more than progress slowed enormously. Although she did quite well
a rudimentary ability to speak. at developing her vocabulary and in other areas of cogni-

282 CHAPTER 8 LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

 ronments in all other respects: congenitally deaf children
acquiring American Sign Language (ASL). About 90 percent
of deaf children are born to hearing parents, and the time of
these children’s first exposure to ASL varies widely, usually
occurring when the children enter a residential school that
teaches ASL as the main language. Being exposed to ASL at
an earlier age results in clear advantages at mastering some
aspects of its structure (Newport, 1990). Even decades of
immersion in ASL among congenitally deaf adults was not
enough to make up for starting to acquire it a few years later
than one’s peers (see Emmorey et al., 1995; Mayberry, 2010).
Many health agencies require regular screenings for deafness
starting at birth, and the evidence for critical-period effects
suggests that it is most beneficial to start ASL instruction as
soon as the child is identified as being deaf.
A B The most common explanation of such critical-period
FIGURE 8.15 Genie and language acquisition. (A) A photo of
effects is that an underlying capacity specific to language
Genie, who had been abused and not exposed to language until she learning declines with age (Borer & Wexler, 1987; Lenneberg,
was 13 years old. (B) After Genie was finally exposed to language, 1967). We saw in Chapter 4 that some critical-period effects
she rapidly learned many words but was never able to master syntax. in other species, such as songbirds and barn owls, are rooted
For example, when she was shown two sets of colored blocks like in the changes that take place in the brain as it matures. Simi-
the ones shown here and asked to either “give me the one that blue larly, in humans, there is evidence that critical-period effects
is on” or “give me the one that is on blue,” she had great difficulty on language learning are associated with brain maturation.
choosing correctly. This sort of task, which requires careful attention
People who learn another language later in life seem to rely
to syntax, was easy for much younger typically developing children.
on different brain regions for their second-language gram-
matical processing than do people who learn the additional
tive development, Genie had considerable difficulty mas- language early on (Bloom, 2000; Kuhl, 2010; Mayberry
tering aspects of syntax. For example, as a teenager, Genie et al., 2011; Wartenburger et al., 2003)—and comparable
did not perform as well as a typical 4-year-old at answering brain differences have been found for learners of ASL as a sec-
questions about the spatial relationships between two pairs ond language (Newman et al., 2002). Other explanations of
of colored blocks, despite having had much more explicit the critical-period effects on language development have not
instruction by that time than most 4-year-olds would have been fully ruled out, however. For example, rather than caus-
experienced (see Figure 8.15B). She also had not mastered ing a decline of a language-specific ability, maturation may
the structures of negations, questions, or embedded sen- cause a more general learning capacity to diminish, affect-
tences. Her grammatical development seemed far more ing language acquisition as well as other abilities (Greenfield,
impaired by her early experiences than other aspects of her 1991). Although some controversies remain about critical
cognition. periods for language (Birdsong & Molis, 2001; Hakuta
It therefore seems that, in those few well-documented et al., 2003), the effects have been found often enough to
cases, children who grow up without the benefit of suggest that they are real, even though they are not yet fully
human communication struggle to learn the grammati- understood (Clahsen & Felser, 2006).
cal structure of a first language at a later age. Domain
specificity is implicated because in many other areas of
knowledge acquisition they seem to progress rapidly and
often become indistinguishable from other children of
Inventing a New Language
the same age. Perhaps the strongest test of whether the child comes into
the world with a bias for a rich array of highly structured
abstract linguistic patterns would involve demonstrations
Acquiring American Sign Language that children could invent languages on their own that
honored the universal patterns of all languages. We have
after the Critical Period seen that this will not occur in cases where children are
A different line of work on learning a language after the criti- reared in total isolation, but perhaps the results would be
cal period has passed has looked at a group of people who different in settings where communicative partners are
experience relatively normal early cognitive and social envi- available.

EFFECTS OF AGE ON LANGUAGE ACQUISITION 283

 One dramatic case of language creation involves deaf
children. In some cultures that considered spoken language
intrinsically superior to signed language, deaf children were
never exposed to signs; they were only spoken to, with the
assumption that they eventually would acquire spoken lan-
guage through lip reading or other means (Neisser, 1990).
Tragically, very few of these children could easily use even
a dozen spoken words. Fewer still had much success with
lip reading, a medium in which many of language’s mean-
ingful distinctions (for example, the difference between the
sounds “pa” and “ba”) remain ambiguous. In these situa-
tions, deaf children have sometimes developed their own
unique signed languages, either with their speaking fam-
ily members or covertly with other deaf children if the sur- FIGURE 8.16 The creation of a new sign language. These
rounding culture discouraged signing. These invented sign children in Nicaragua are signing fluently in a language that deaf
languages clearly show the essential core features shared children created on their own. A social group seems necessary to
by all the world’s other languages (Feldman et al., 1978). trigger the language system, but not input from others who already
When these children created a new language, they seemed know a language.
to be implicitly guided by a set of universal principles shared
with all other known languages. They may have arbitrarily
chosen certain parameters to set because there were no clues 1998; Meir & Sandler, 2008; Senghas & Coppola, 2001).
from a surrounding language, but they were still guided by In addition, when parents of deaf children make a concerted
a skeletal set of universal constraints on syntactic forms. effort to use a standard sign language such as ASL, the rich-
Nicaraguan Sign Language is a recent, more detailed ness and complexity of the children’s ASL quickly surpass
example of a language created virtually from scratch by deaf that of their parents. Again, because children deprived of
children (Kegl, 2002; Kegl et al., 1999; Senghas, 2010). all language input are able to create languages from scratch
Because deafness was stigmatized in Nicaragua, most deaf when they grow up with peers, we see support for the idea
people there spent their time largely in their homes or those that hearing children bring to the task of learning their
of relatives. They had few opportunities to meet other deaf native tongue a tacit knowledge of those aspects of their lan-
people, and they rarely married or had children. Thus, over guage that are universally shared with all other languages.
many generations, deaf children typically had hearing par- It is presumably the same tacit knowledge that guides deaf
ents and grew up with no exposure to sign language and no children to create new languages despite not having any
peer group within which to develop it. external input.
Groups of deaf children were brought together for the
first time in Nicaragua when the government set up new
schools for the deaf in 1979. Initially, the children had no Q: Why is sign language repeatedly used as
common language, just their own individualized signs. But evidence for the creation of new languages?
they soon started to share their signs and adapt them into
shared ones (see Figure 8.16). Together, they invented new
signs, and their language developed a richer, more elaborate
structure. Researchers observed that younger children had
more complex and more fluent forms of the new language
than the older children (Kegl, 1994, 2002, 2008; Kegl
The Domain Specificity
et al., 1999), suggesting a possible critical-period effect in
which the ability to create a new language from scratch is
of Language
more powerful in younger children. The language, which To what extent do young children start language learning
is now called Idioma de Signos Nicaraguense (Nicaraguan already endowed with cognitive capacities that are tailored
Sign Language), was created entirely out of the minds of specifically for learning language? If those capacities are truly
the first deaf children in Nicaragua to be educated together. used only for the acquisition of language and nothing else,
As amazing as the story of Nicaraguan Sign Language is, then they would constitute strong evidence for the domain
it is not unique. Deaf children have repeatedly been shown specificity of a language acquisition device. As we saw in
to spontaneously create full-fledged languages of signs Chapter 1 and in our discussion of perceptual development
(Brentari & Coppola, 2013; Goldin-Meadow & Mylander, (Chapter 3), these questions about domain specificity are

284 CHAPTER 8 LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

closely linked to debates between empiricists and nativists. Aphasias In adults, the dissociation between language
In addition, the debates often focus on whether domain and other cognitive capacities has most often been studied
specificity occurs only at the initial stages of language pro- in aphasia, a type of neurological deficit in which local-
cessing or whether some higher-level thought processes are ized damage to the brain causes language impairments.
also language specific. Thus, many empiricists might argue In some cases, often in a region in the left inferior frontal
that some aspects of humans’ sensory or perceptual abili- gyrus known as Broca’s area, syntactic abilities are damaged
ties are especially sensitive to speech-like stimuli (domain while semantic skills remain more intact, often leading to
specific), but that more abstract representations, like a lan- especially salient deficiencies in producing language and
guage’s meaning or structure, depend on cognitive abilities labored speech. In other cases, often in a region in the pos-
that also contribute to other, nonlinguistic skills (domain terior part of the temporal lobe known as Wernicke’s area,
general). Nativists endorse domain-specific specializations semantic abilities are impaired and syntax seems to remain
at those more abstract levels as well. The most passionate largely intact, often resulting in problems understanding
debates about language focus on whether humans use a speech while still being able to produce rapid speech (even
language-specific ability to learn some aspects of grammati- though it is now made up of combinations of words that do
cal rules or whether they can fully learn grammatical rules not make sense). Moreover, other patterns of brain damage,
through a more general set of cognitive skills that enable such as those that severely impair spatial skills, often have
them to also learn other patterns beyond grammar. little impact on language skills (Goodglass, 1993; Swinney,
In this section, we will take two different approaches 1999). These patterns of deficits in adults may provide evi-
to these questions. One strategy for assessing whether lan- dence for built-in language-processing regions and circuits
guage is a domain-specific skill is to ask whether it can in the brain. But it is also possible that areas of neural tissue
be dissociated, or distinguished as separate, from other with no specializations for language in young infants could
cognitive functions. This approach involves looking closely nonetheless end up becoming specialized for language in
at neural dissociations between brain functions that sup- older children and adults because they become organized in
port language and those involved in other areas of cogni- that way over the course of learning.
tion. If brain damage or congenital disorders can selectively
affect aspects of language while sparing other functions Williams Syndrome A new wave of developmental stud-
(and vice versa), then those particular linguistic skills may ies with populations of children who, because of genetic
be domain specific. We then ask whether other species can anomalies, either have intact language with impaired cog-
acquire human-like languages and what such findings sug- nition or impaired cognition with intact language are of
gest about domain specificity. In particular, if other species great interest to researchers studying whether language is
that have never shown any use of human-like languages in domain general or domain specific. If these children show
the wild can nonetheless learn such languages with a rea- evidence for a dissociation of language from other cognitive
sonable level of competence in captivity, it would seem that skills at the earliest stages of language learning, this would
they must be using learning systems that are not special- provide compelling evidence for domain-specific language
ized for language. It would, after all, be quite mysterious specialization within the brain. Thus, researchers ask if cer-
for them to have a language-specific learning system if they tain unusual alleles enable some children to learn language
had never had to learn such languages in their evolutionary relatively well even if they are more generally learning dis-
history. abled and if other alleles enable different children to learn
nonlinguistic information well, but not language.
The genetic disorder known as Williams syndrome
may provide one example of the “compartmentalization” of
Neural Dissociations language relative to other cognitive abilities (Pinker, 1994).
To examine whether language learning is domain specific, Although Williams syndrome is rare, it affects approxi-
we will discuss neural dissociations in which language and mately 1 out of 10,000 children. It is caused by the deletion of
other cognitive skills are affected differently by strokes or a series of 26 genes from chromosome 7 and is characterized
other damage to specific brain regions and neural circuits. by an unusual set of physical and behavioral traits (Bellugi &
We will discuss a kind of brain damage in which language is Wang, 1998; Martens et al., 2008; Mervis & Velleman,
affected but other cognitive skills are not. We will also look 2011). Physically, these children are said to have similar
at genetic disorders in which language skills are preserved facial features, including small upturned noses, long upper
but other cognitive skills are not. Finally, we will examine lip lengths, full lips, and small chins (see Figure 8.17). They
specific language impairment in which there are specific are generally cheerful and extremely sociable. Overall, they
inherited syntactic deficits in language but not in other cog- score below normal on intelligence tests and especially on
nitive abilities. tests of visual-spatial and mathematical skills. Children

THE DOMAIN SPECIFICITY OF LANGUAGE 285

 Q: Which cognitive capacities seem most
affected in Williams syndrome and which ones
seem to be spared?

Specific Language Impairment (SLI) The best evidence

for dissociation of cognitive abilities comes in the form
of double dissociations. Establishing a double dissociation
between two cognitive abilities requires showing that either
ability can be impaired while the other one remains intact.
To show a double dissociation between language and other
kinds of cognition would require two types of evidence. In
addition to people who have broad cognitive problems and
relatively intact language abilities (like those with Williams
syndrome), you would also need to show the reverse—
people with largely intact cognition and impaired language.
Researchers seem to have discovered this second pattern in
FIGURE 8.17 Williams syndrome and language. Children with cases of specific language impairment.
Williams syndrome share a genetic disorder that seems to largely Specific language impairment (SLI) first came to light
spare language abilities while impairing other areas of cognition. The in a single family. Members of this family were generally
defect also results in a facial expression, as shown here, in which the bright and successful. Over several generations, however,
child has a small upturned nose, a long upper lip length, full lips, and
they showed highly specific problems using particular
a small chin.
syntactic structures, including noun-verb agreement, verb
tenses, and the proper use of articles (such as “a” and “the”)
with Williams syndrome may lag behind other children and prepositions (Gopnik, 1990a, 1990b, 1994; Gopnik &
in the earliest stages of language acquisition (Bates, 2004). Crago, 1991; van der Lely & Christian, 2000). Within
But by age 3, their expressive language skills seem relatively members of the family, these language problems showed
intact (Bellugi et al., 1993; Marini et al., 2010), and they a distinct pattern of inheritance that suggested that the
chatter away rapidly in relatively fluent sentences. As adults, deficits were genetic. Moreover, the problems seemed to be
they still speak quickly, using many idiomatic phrases and linked to a specific rare mutation of an allele on a gene that
an advanced vocabulary, but their speech often involves was associated with these particular aspects of linguistic
little meaningful content. performance; the rest of their cognitive skills seemed com-
Many questions remain about the abilities and deficits pletely unaffected.
of people with Williams syndrome. For example, those Later studies have examined whether SLI is truly spe-
with Williams syndrome have often been reported as being cific to these narrow linguistic deficits or whether it might
quite musical. Perhaps there is a specific ability that is reflect broader cognitive problems, such as difficulty per-
preserved in Williams syndrome, but it may not be as spe- ceiving rapid sequences of stimuli (Bates, 2004; Thomas &
cific as language. It could be a somewhat broader cognitive Karmiloff-Smith, 2005; Ullman & Pierpoint, 2005). Thus
ability based on differences in the volumes of particular far, SLI does seem to involve some language-specific defi-
brain regions and on dendritic connections (Eckert et al., cits. Although individuals with SLI struggle to process rapid
2006). As research in this area intensifies, it will likely speech sounds, they do not have this problem with rapid
provide a clearer account of the links between Williams visual stimuli (Archibald & Gathercole, 2006). It also now
syndrome and models of domain specificity. At present, appears that several genetic defects may contribute to SLI,
however, the dissociation seems likely and points toward including some that are language specific and others that
a separate language acquisition skill. In particular, the have broader, more domain-general effects (Bishop, 2006;
evidence suggests that children may have a special brain- Graham & Fisher, 2013; Newbury et al., 2011).
based ability to acquire aspects of language that can work Studies of language skills and deficits in special
relatively independently of other cognitive skills, such that populations—such as in people with aphasia, Williams syn-
a child with obvious deficits in general cognitive skills can drome, or SLI—are still in their early stages, but they prom-
still reach relatively high levels of linguistic proficiency ise exciting insights into whether, or to what extent, language
with little evident effort. skills are domain specific. Current evidence suggests that a

286 CHAPTER 8 LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

 NEW DIRECTIONS IN DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH

A Language Gene?

F
or some time, researchers have suspected that cer- site of the FOXP2 gene. Other studies have since found that
tain locations on the human genome might be closely other abnormalities in the FOXP2 gene are also associated with
and specifically related to language abilities. In fact, language deficits (Fisher & Scharff, 2009; MacDermot et al.,
many spoken and written language abilities seem to 2005; Peter et al., 2011; Zhao et al., 2010) and with abnormal
have genetic components. And different aspects of language, patterns of functioning in language-related brain areas (Lieg-
such as lexical versus syntactic abilities (that is, knowledge eois et al., 2003; Vernes & Fisher, 2011).
of words versus understanding of how to put words together Do these findings provide evidence for a “language gene”?
into meaningful sentences), seem to be associated with One critical question concerns whether the gene’s effects are
distinct genetic loci (Stromswold, 2001). The most power- language specific or whether its mutations actually affect a
ful evidence for genes related to language abilities comes broader range of cognitive functions. The affected members
from studies designed to pinpoint specific genes associated of the KE family scored below normal on intelligence tests,
with language deficits. The findings point to a gene known as but so did the unaffected members. This pattern suggests
FOXP2, which is located on chromosome 7 and produces a that the affected relatives’ genetic difference at the FOXP2
protein that affects the formation of brain regions and circuits site was not necessarily a factor in their low scores. Even so,
associated with motor control. In humans, it also affects brain testing all the family members to compare their performance
regions associated with planning and ordering in speech and on more linguistic and nonlinguistic tasks would help clarify
language. whether their deficit really is restricted to language-related
This finding emerged during a study of three generations learning and skills.
of the KE family in England (Fisher et al., 1998; Fisher & A second finding also relates to the question of whether
Scharff, 2009; Lai et al., 2001, 2003; Vernes & Fisher, 2011). FOXP2 specifically affects language. This same gene is found
Roughly half the family members showed significant spoken in many species as a regulatory gene that activates other genes
language difficulties, while the other half were unaffected. The involved in the formation of brain structures and circuits during
affected relatives had severe articulation problems, so that the embryonic period and in learning to sequence movements.
their speech seemed extremely effortful. They also had enor- The chimpanzee FOXP2 gene differs from the human version
mous difficulty producing ordered speech sounds and could in only 2 of the 715 amino acids it produces. The version in
barely be understood. Overall, these individuals seemed to mice differs by 3. Moreover, the best estimates of when in evo-
show severe disruptions of the planning processes and move- lution humans and chimpanzees diverged—that is, when the
ments necessary for clear speech. A closer look revealed that uniquely human gene emerged—point to between 120,000
the affected members also had difficulties interpreting some and 200,000 years ago (Enard et al., 2002). Thus, around
grammatical aspects of language. 10,000 generations ago, a very small mutation in FOXP2 may
It was clear that there was a genetic component to the KE have spread quickly and conferred a strong selective advan-
family’s language disorder, so the researchers started to look for tage on a human-like species, possibly leading to the ability to
a mutation that may have led to the disorder (Lai et al., 2000). rapidly articulate strings of speech-like sounds.
Because relatives share more of their genes than strangers do, Even if the FOXP2 gene in humans turns out to be involved
it was not easy to isolate the relevant gene that might have only in language abilities (and deficits), the mechanism under-
led to the mutation by comparing the family members’ genetic lying its effects still remains unclear, and the current evidence
sequences. A major advance occurred when researchers dis- in no way suggests a single “language gene” or even a single
covered a boy with highly similar language problems who was gene for a particular component of language (Marcus & Fisher,
unrelated to the KE family (Lai et al., 2001). When his genetic 2003; Vargha-Khadem et al., 2005). It remains to be seen
sequence was compared with that of the KEs, it corresponded whether FOXP2 is necessary for language, but it is clearly not
to the genetic sequence in every one of the affected family sufficient. A full account of how humans are able to acquire a
members—but not in the unaffected members—in a crucial natural language with all its astonishing complexity will depend
way. Like the genes of the affected KEs, his genes showed a on the interaction of many genes with an elaborate set of envi-
distortion of 1 amino acid out of the 715 produced at the ronmental inputs.

THE DOMAIN SPECIFICITY OF LANGUAGE 287

domain-specific language acquisition system is present from
the start, but more research will be needed before we can
say that there is definitely such a system. More broadly, it
is becoming clear that different aspects of language may
yield different answers to questions about domain specific-
ity. These answers in turn will inform questions about what
sorts of cognitive abilities all normal children use to learn
language and will help explain how such a complex body
of knowledge and skills emerges so quickly in the first few
years of life.

Q: What aspects of language seem to be FIGURE 8.18 Comparing language acquisition abilities. The
affected in the disorder known as specific chimpanzee Gua and the human child Donald were raised together as
language impairment? if they were sister and brother in one of the first naturalistic studies
comparing language acquisition in a human and a chimpanzee.

tive abilities, Gua often outperformed Donald. She could

skillfully manipulate objects, such as a door latch or a
Species Specificity spoon, at an earlier age, and she could solve more com-
Humans appear to be unique in their ability to acquire and plex spatial problems. Thus, Donald’s much greater suc-
use language, and yet researchers have wondered whether cess with language suggested a bias for language learning
other animals, especially our closest primate relatives, might that was specific to humans, given that he was not merely
learn language more successfully under carefully tailored a better learner than Gua in all respects. Because the
circumstances. If other species could acquire language, this Kelloggs’ study supported the notion that language is a
would have important implications for understanding how specifically human ability, it also lent support to the pos-
young children’s linguistic abilities develop. For example, if sibility that linguistic abilities show domain specificity.
chimpanzees were able to learn and use language, despite If primates perform well in nonlinguistic cognitive tasks,
never having shown such a rich communication system of then domain-general cognitive abilities are apparently not
their own, they would presumably have to rely on learning sufficient for learning language. Instead, some other cog-
mechanisms that were not innately tailored for language. If nitive component is needed that may be tuned to process
this achievement were possible, it would show that the capac- and learn linguistic information.
ity for language does not require language-specific brain areas
or cognitive abilities. Rather, it would suggest that more gen- Nonhuman Primates and Sign Language Several
eral systems, tailored for learning and using a broader variety decades later, researchers tried a different approach to teach-
of information, could be sufficient to acquire language. ing apes human language. Around this time, a new, land-
mark account of the evolution of linguistic abilities argued
Chimp as Child In the 1930s, psychologist Win- that humans’ unique specializations for language included
throp Kellogg and his wife Luella attempted to raise a not only mental capacities but also the structure of the
71/2 -month-old chimpanzee named Gua along with their anatomy that allows humans to articulate a wide variety of
own 10-month-old infant son, Donald, treating the two nuanced sounds (Lenneberg, 1967). Although the structure
very similarly in order to compare their development of the mouth, throat, vocal cords, and voice box in non-
(Kellogg & Kellogg, 1933/1967; see Figure 8.18). The human primates prevents them from speaking, researchers
Kelloggs called Gua by name and regularly encouraged wondered if chimps and great apes might be able to acquire
her to talk but did not try to tutor her. Instead, Gua expe- a nonspoken sign language. This idea that nonhuman pri-
rienced the same sort of environment in which human mates might be able to learn language using their hands
children acquire language. Although Gua and the Kel- converged with an increasing awareness that human sign
loggs bonded and did communicate in some ways, Gua languages were as natural and complex as spoken languages
soon lagged behind Donald in the ability to speak. When (Klima & Bellugi, 1979; Neisser, 1990).
the study ended, after about 9 months, Donald was already Initial studies in which researchers attempted to teach
outpacing Gua at acquiring language. Interestingly, when chimpanzees to use American Sign Language (ASL) seemed
the Kelloggs compared Gua and Donald’s other cogni- to show some success (Gardner & Gardner, 1969, 1980).

288 CHAPTER 8 LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

The chimps appeared to master using signs to refer to spe- ity to use joint attention to focus, along with a commu-
cific classes of things, as well as combining signs in ways nication partner, on the same thing in the environment
that suggested an understanding of syntax. These findings (Tomasello, 2005; Tomasello & Call, 1997). Primatolo-
were met with tremendous interest and raised many ques- gist Sue Savage-Rumbaugh and her colleagues (1998)
tions. If the chimpanzees could learn signs, why didn’t they sought to investigate whether bonobos, a rare species of
ever invent them on their own? Did the chimps’ “language,” primates that seems relatively more capable of joint atten-
which they mostly used to request things, really resemble tion than other nonhuman primates, would also do better
human language? And critically, how different were the than other primates at learning language. An opportunity
chimps’ conditions of language instruction from the experi- arose when, in the course of teaching a language system to
ence of a young child learning a language? an adult bonobo, the researchers noticed that her adopted
If the chimps’ manner of learning is quite different, we son, Kanzi, seemed to be picking up the language by
must be cautious in deciding whether the skill they have observing her lessons—and without direct training (see
learned (and the cognitive capacities it involves) truly resem- Figure 8.19).
bles that of humans. Consider the old observation that Kanzi’s spontaneous learning was impressive, and the
although a dog can learn to walk on its hind legs, dogs, unlike group quickly directed its efforts to him. He was paired
humans, do not have a predisposition to do so. The dog with a 2-year-old child, and both were exposed to spon-
requires continued, intentional instruction to maintain the taneous speech and simple geometric shapes called lexi-
behavior, whereas the child simply develops the skill without grams that were used to represent words. Kanzi’s ability
guidance or reinforcement. If other species can only acquire to understand syntax appeared to far surpass primates in
language in a manner that resembles the dog learning to walk earlier studies, but his ability to produce language lagged
on its hind legs, this shows a profound difference between considerably behind the ability of a human child. More
other species’ language capacities and those of humans. For generally, bonobos seem to be capable of learning some
nonhumans, the only path to learning and maintaining lan- relations between categories. But it is difficult to know
guage seems to be through intensive effort and continuous whether their learning is truly based on understanding
reinforcement. how syntax works (like the relation between a subject
Aside from the way they learned language, a closer look at and a verb) or whether they are relying on a more con-
other primates’ rudimentary language abilities is also reveal- crete, conceptual understanding (such as the relationship
ing (Seidenberg & Pettito, 1979; Terrace et al., 1979). Under between an agent and an action). Based on her studies,
scrutiny, the chimps trained to use ASL mostly seemed to Savage-Rumbaugh concluded that it may be more accu-
be imitating signs that humans modeled for them, rather rate to think in terms of a continuum when compar-
than spontaneously producing new phrases. More broadly, ing humans’ language acquisition skills with those of
other primates, whether gorillas or chimpanzees, did not other primates, rather than a sharp distinction (Savage-
appear to have the capacity to use language in a flexible, Rumbaugh et al., 1998).
generative way to form new, spontaneous expressions. There
is, after all, a large difference between memorizing symbol
sequences and being able to generate an indefinitely large
number of new, meaningful, and well-formed sequences.

Q: In what ways are chimpanzees most similar

and most dissimilar to the young child with
respect to the ability to acquire a first language?

Bonobos and Joint Attention Criticisms of the early

ASL studies with chimps bolstered the view that nonhu-
man primates’ linguistic abilities fell far short of those of
humans. But as the study of primate communication con-
tinued, researchers started to ask whether some primates
might show partial language abilities—and which spe- FIGURE 8.19 Communicating with nonhuman primates.
cific skills might be involved. As described in Chapter 5, Kanzi, a male bonobo, learned language using lexigram symbols and
one essential component of learning language is the abil- appeared to be able to produce genuinely novel structures.

THE DOMAIN SPECIFICITY OF LANGUAGE 289

 Indeed, it seems likely that the most sophisticated and view, all speakers of a language acquire a way of perceiv-
social primates may have some abilities that are impor- ing and understanding the world that is unique to that lan-
tant to learning language and that these abilities may guage and a direct consequence of special aspects of that
form the foundation on which our own abilities to acquire language (Whorf, 1956). Thus, the words of a language can
languages evolved. Evolutionary debates continue on the influence the categories that the speaker uses for objects and
extent to which humans evolved broad, cognitive abilities ideas, and the grammar of a language can affect how the
that supported changes in many domains, including lan- speaker perceives events. In this view, all prelinguistic chil-
guage (Hauser et al., 2002)—or whether the evolution of dren might think in terms of similar conceptual schemes,
a capacity for language was more domain specific (Bicker- but as each child acquires a specific language, their con-
ton, 2007; Fitch, 2011; Pinker & Jackendoff, 2005; Strom- ceptions of the same events would increasingly diverge (see
swold, 2010). Figure 8.20).
The Whorfian view is generally in line with empiri-
cist traditions. It assumes that prelinguistic children have
essentially no strong predispositions in how their minds
Language and Thought “carve up” the world—or that if they do have predispo-
sitions, such biases are easily overridden by the specifics
As language emerges in children, the question arises as to of each language. Yet, such an assumption seems increas-
how it interacts with other aspects of thought. Does lan- ingly questionable, given all that we have learned about
guage come to structure thought and knowledge in ways the highly structured ways in which infants perceive and
that would otherwise be impossible without language? Does understand their world. It is still possible, however, that
language make possible different kinds of cognitions? And language exerts many new cognitive influences beyond
do the particular properties of the specific language a child those present in infancy.
learns come to exert any unique guiding influences on the Some of the most famous claims for language structuring
way she thinks about the world? Conversely, do changes our thoughts involve different levels of nuanced meaning
in the child’s cognitive development influence the way she across languages. You may well have heard the claim that
uses language? Many strong claims, running in both direc- children growing up in the Arctic learn far more words for
tions, have been made about powerful influences between snow than other children do and that this rich vocabulary
thought and language. We will start with the question of allows them to perceive subtle differences between types of
how language might structure thought. snow that other speakers cannot see. Although this exam-
ple has become a classic, it is fraught with problems. First,
it illustrates the problem of disentangling experience and
Linguistic Relativity and language. If people living in the Arctic can discriminate
between more kinds of snow, perhaps it is simply because
Linguistic Determinism they have a great deal of experience with it and more oppor-
Are our ways of seeing and understanding the world framed tunities to see different types. Language would then simply
by the language we speak? This idea, that thoughts and per- mirror these conceptual distinctions rather than creating
ceptions are influenced by our native language, is termed them. Second, speakers of other languages might well be
linguistic relativity. The stronger version of this notion, able to make all the same distinctions by describing them
linguistic determinism, holds that the language we speak with compound nouns and phrases rather than single words.
actually determines the nature of our thoughts. Counter to Third, the analyses of Eskimo-Aleut languages that gave
both of these views, some argue that differences in commu- rise to the initial claim may have been inaccurate. Many
nication merely reflect cultural differences between groups languages’ grammar includes rules for adding chains of pre-
and that they can still exist even if the groups speak the fixes and suffixes to a single root word, such that a whole
same first language but have radically different cultures. complex sentence might appear to an outsider as one long
These issues have interested developmental researchers, who word (Baker, 1996). Thus, the many “words” for snow may
have sought to understand whether these linguistic influ- really be descriptive phrases, much like those that speak-
ences exist and how they might take shape as children come ers of many other languages would use (Woodbury, 1991).
to master their native tongue. In fact, the snow example itself may be little more than an
urban myth that was never actually proposed by a serious
The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis The idea that specific scholar (Pullum, 1991).
languages powerfully mold thought is known as the Sapir- In short, children who grow up in the Arctic are
Whorf hypothesis after the anthropologist and linguist undoubtedly familiar with more types of snow than those
Edward Sapir and his student Benjamin Lee Whorf. In this in the tropics, but this difference may be completely inde-

290 CHAPTER 8 LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

 Romance languages FIGURE 8.20 Linguistic relativity.
Onset of language According to Whorf, prior to the onset of
language (indicated at the vertical line),
Preverbal children from different cultures have very
Eskimo-Aleut similar conceptual schemes (indicated
languages by same-shaped ovals), but after they
become immersed in specific language
families, their conceptual schemes diverge
(indicated by different geometric shapes
Polynesian languages
and different locations in conceptual
Increasing age space).

pendent of the languages they speak, resulting instead show more mastery of the same color terms do so in the left
from varying experiences. It is clear that irrefutable sup- hemisphere (Franklin et al., 2008).
port for the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis will require more Even in adults, learning new terms for unfamiliar color
powerful and carefully collected evidence. More recent categories can quickly redirect which parts of the brain
research examining linguistic influences on thought has are dedicated to color processing, shifting the processing
focused on more subtle effects that are often only evident of the new categories from the right to the left hemisphere
in carefully controlled experimental settings. We now turn (Clifford et al., 2010; Zhou et al., 2010), but it is not yet
to a few such cases. understood how this change happens. Researchers are also
exploring whether learning the names of objects might exert
Color and Number If two languages’ color words divide comparable effects on the way the brain processes objects.
the spectrum of light differently, perhaps speakers of those Along these lines, one study found that when 1-year-olds
languages actually perceive different sets of color catego- view objects for which they have learned labels, they show
ries. Because infants show categorical perception of color increased levels of visual object processing than they do
many months before any language skills (see Chapter 3), while viewing equally familiar objects for which they do
we know that language is not necessary for categorical per- not have labels (Gliga et al., 2010). Certainly, not all cross-
ception effects. Nonetheless, color words might subtly tune language labeling differences directly affect object percep-
color perceptions in ways that resemble the effects of spoken tion and cognition (Barner et al., 2010), but there are some
language on categorical perception of speech sounds. Some indications that language can modulate and redirect the way
linguistic influences have indeed been found in languages children process some aspects of colors and perhaps objects.
that require two different color words for a category that Specific languages also appear to affect mathematical
has only one color word in English. For example, Russian thought, as demonstrated in one remarkable study of bilin-
speakers use different words for dark blue and light blue, gual children who spoke both Welsh and English fluently
while English speakers can simply use “blue” for both. (Ellis & Hennelly, 1980; see also Baddeley et al., 1975). The
Native Russian speakers do seem to show a subtle advantage researchers utilized the fact that there is a difference in the
over English speakers in the ability to discriminate between length of the words that each language uses for numbers.
blues that take different labels in Russian (Winawer et al., Welsh number words are longer, and as a result, they make
2007). Apparently, their need to constantly monitor differ- greater demands on memory and cause more difficulty in
ent hues of blue to know which label to use may sharpen timed calculations like those on intelligence tests. Thus,
perceptual processes related to the discrimination of those the researchers found that the same child who was fluent
colors. in both languages took longer to do some mathematical
Language development may also affect where in the brain calculations in Welsh than in English. Similar effects have
categorical perception of color is processed (Kay & Regier, been found when comparing mathematical calculations
2006; Regier & Kay, 2009). Preverbal infants are better at done in other languages with those done in English (Chan &
discriminating between color categories when the colors are Elliott, 2011; Pixner et al., 2011). Thus, a child’s specific
presented to the left visual field, and therefore processed language may modestly influence the development of her
primarily in the brain’s right hemisphere. In contrast, chil- mathematical thought. These effects may also be quite spe-
dren and adults show better color discrimination when the cific. For example, if Russian-English bilinguals learn to do
colors are presented to the right visual field, and processed a particular calculation in one language, they will later be
primarily in the left hemisphere. Moreover, toddlers who able to do that calculation more quickly in that language
are just beginning to learn color words seem to process color than in the other language in which they are equally fluent
category names in the right hemisphere, whereas those who (Spelke & Tsivkin, 2001b).

LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 291

 asked to reproduce the arrangement using a new, duplicate
Q: How did Whorf and Sapir think language set of objects. Tzeltal speakers will set up the objects in the
related to thought? What are some problems same orientation as the first set relative to external points of
reference (for example, placing the same object in the north-
with their account? ernmost part of the display). By contrast, Dutch speakers
will arrange the objects in the same orientation relative to
themselves (for example, placing the same object in the part
Other Influences of Language on Thought Another of the display closest to themselves). These and many other
possible influence of language on thought involves subtle spatial tasks illustrate that the spatial terms a speaker uses
differences in how categories are understood. For example, seem to cause different ways of representing spatial informa-
when a term is masculine in one language and feminine in tion (Levinson, 1997).
another, subtle differences may arise in how other proper- Developmentally, these influences of language on spatial
ties are associated with the object that the term refers to representations can occur quite early. For example, when
(Boroditsky et al., 2003). Thus, “key” is masculine in Ger- children who are around age 8 in the Netherlands (where
man and feminine in Spanish. German speakers tend to use self-referential terms are primarily used) and in Namibia
more stereotypically masculine terms to describe keys (for (where external referential terms are generally used) per-
example, jagged, hard, awkward), while Spanish speakers form a wide range of spatial reconstruction tasks, they show
tend to use more stereotypically feminine terms (for exam- differences very much like those found in adults (Haun
ple, shiny, intricate, yellow). Another study suggests that a et al., 2011). Their languages seem to have already set up
child’s native language may also affect how early the child strong default modes of spatial thought. Moreover, when
learns his or her own gender. When a language requires the experimenters prompted the children to switch to the
speakers to specify the gender of others extensively—as other type of spatial reasoning, the children found it very
Hebrew does, requiring gendered words for “you”—its difficult, suggesting that by age 8, if not earlier, these modes
young speakers seem to learn their own gender almost a year of spatial thought are quite entrenched.
earlier than children learning a language such as Finnish, With the current revival of more subtle versions of the
which has very sparse gender markings. Children learning Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, we cannot yet know the extent
English, which is in between Hebrew and Finnish in its gen- to which language variations might influence cognitive
der markings, learn their own gender about 6 months ear- development, but any such differences that have been docu-
lier than the Finnish speakers (as described in Boroditsky, mented in adults have strong developmental implications.
2011). Thus, constantly marking a particular contrast in In any areas where language exerts an influence on cogni-
words may accelerate children’s learning about it. tion, children can be expected to take different cognitive
Some of the most intriguing claims about linguistic rela- developmental paths from the time they begin learning a
tivity arise from studies of how languages encode orientation language, branching off in subtle ways from a common,
(Levinson, 1997; Majid et al., 2004). Some languages guide preverbal path.
their users to encode directions in terms of an external set of
reference points (for example, north, south, east, or west) or
particular geographical points (“It is in the down-mountain
direction”). Other languages, including English, guide their Language as an Amplifier of Thought
users to encode directions relative to the speaker (“It is to Even as controversies continue about whether differences in
the right of me”). Thus, Canadians and Europeans tend to language cause differences in thought, there is another way in
say, “The boy is to the right of me,” but speakers of Austra- which language might shape thought that is independent of the
lian languages of the Pama-Nyungan group say, “The boy is differences between languages. This view focuses on the uni-
north of the table” or “The boy is up-island from the table.” versal properties that all languages share as formal systems of
Similarly, the Tzeltal language in Mexico uses both absolute symbols. The key question is whether language acquisition in
terms of reference (“down mountain” or “across mountain”) general, regardless of the particular language acquired, might
and intrinsic terms (“at the front side of an object”), but it has have a dramatic influence on the nature of thought, making
no words for terms relative to the self, such as “left,” “right,” thought in the presence of language profoundly different from
and “behind.” thought in the absence of language. In fact, many suppose
These linguistic differences seem to affect cognitive sche- that human thought differs profoundly from thought in other
mas and performance on spatial reasoning tasks. Consider, animals precisely because of the way language amplifies and
for example, the two tasks shown in Figure 8.21. Adults structures thought. In this view, as children acquire language,
are shown several objects arranged on a table. The adults their thoughts are dramatically restructured through the com-
are then rotated 180 degrees, taken to another table, and mon properties shared by all languages.

292 CHAPTER 8 LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

 FIGURE 8.21 Spatial relative versus
spatial absolute languages. Speakers of
spatial relative languages (Dutch and Eng-
lish) and spatial absolute languages (Tzeltal)
seem to perform nonlinguistic spatial tasks
in different ways, re-creating displays in
sharply contrasting formats that correspond
to underlying spatial schemes. Adapted from
Tzeltal (Facing South) Tzeltal (Facing North) Levinson (1997).

Dutch (Facing South) Dutch (Facing North)

One of the most eloquent and forceful proposals thought. These general influences of language on thought
about how the emergence of language reshapes thought may be analogous to the influences of gesture on thought,
came from the Russian developmental psychologist Lev where nonverbal gestures often provide critical additional
Semyonovich Vygotsky (Vygotsky, 1934/1962, 1978). support to children to focus their memory and attention in
Vygotsky’s approach to development was wide-reaching complex tasks, boosting cognitive performance above levels
and influential, and we will consider other aspects of his found with language alone (Goldin-Meadow, 2011).
approach later in the book (see Chapters 9 and 11). In this Several scholars have converged on the idea that the
chapter, we will discuss his view of the influence of lan- emergence of language allows the child to bring together
guage on thought. Vygotsky believed that over the course different domains of thought and to combine them in
of early development, the child internalizes his own lan- novel ways (Carey, 2009; Carruthers, 2002, 2004; Gentner,
guage, making it a true vehicle or tool for thinking about 2003; Inagaki & Hatano, 2003; Mithen, 1996; Spelke,
the world. He held that before language is internalized, the 2003; Spelke & Tsivkin, 2001a). They argue that preverbal
child’s thoughts are entirely concrete and tied to the here children might understand concepts in separate domains
and now. Language, Vygotsky claimed, liberates the child’s but might need language to bring them together. Some
thoughts by making them more abstract and therefore a examples include using language to unite knowledge of
more powerful, principled way of understanding meanings an environment’s geometric features with its landmarks,
and categories. Vygotsky described phenomena very much to unite number estimations with more precise numerical
like the characteristic-to-defining shift that we discussed knowledge, and to unite the domains of plants and animals
earlier in the chapter, and he assumed that such shifts are into a common domain of living things. Language is con-
a consequence of internalizing language. He believed that sidered a domain-general common ground within which
language enables the child to formulate mental definitions to combine elements from separate domains. A key chal-
instead of mere associationistic impressions. Others have lenge for this proposal is to demonstrate that language is the
since argued that when children begin talking themselves dominant vehicle for these integrations, rather than just one
through difficult tasks, this is evidence that they have of many ways of uniting elements of thought (Atran, 2002;
internalized their language as a vehicle of thought (Soko- Hampton, 2002). To resolve this question, researchers are
lov, 1972). increasingly conducting experiments to carefully contrast
In Vygotsky’s view, language may facilitate thought in linguistic influences with those of other kinds of represen-
both children and adults. It can provide additional memory tations, such as symbols and pictures.
and attentional support for complex tasks and can sometimes In the end, some effect of emerging language use on
foster more analytical problem solving. Sometimes the effects thought seems inevitable, if only because speaking our
of language may result from the ways in which grammati- thoughts aloud so often brings new insights. But even after
cal structures and interpretations of words focus thought in years of intensive research on how verbalizing while thinking
particular domains like number (Carey, 2009) and theory of relates to basic cognitive skills, many aspects of the relation-
mind (Astington & Baird, 2005; de Villiers & de Villiers, ship are still not understood (Bloom & Keil, 2001). At pres-
2009). Other times language may help integrate domains of ent, we simply do not know how much of an effect language

LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 293

has on developing thought. It most likely does not cause a rock, and her tears made a stream which still runs today.
a global, stage-like shift, but it may well have interesting (Piaget, 1926/1959, p. 83)
effects on more focused aspects of thought and knowledge.
An 8-year-old’s version: Once upon a time, there was a lady
who had 12 boys and 12 girls, and then a fairy a boy and a
girl. And then Niobe wanted to have some more sons. Then
Q: What is some recent evidence that she was angry. She fastened her to a stone. He turned into a
language may facilitate specific aspects of rock, and then his tears made a stream which is still running
thought? today. (Piaget, 1926/1959, pp. 102–103)
Clearly something was lost in the repetition! Younger
children seemed to neglect whether the people they were
addressing would be able to make sense of their retelling.
By using personal references and unclear pronouns, they
Influences of Cognitive thoroughly confused listeners who did not already know
Development on Language the story. Rather than providing listeners with the rele-
vant background and details, it was as if the children were
We have considered ways in which acquiring particular
recounting the story to themselves or to someone else who
languages, as well as language in general, might influence
knew as much as they did. Their problems in retelling the
the way a child thinks. We can also turn the tables and
story are especially interesting because the children knew
ask if changes in a child’s cognitive development can influ-
perfectly well what had happened. They could answer Pia-
ence his language. There is surprisingly little evidence that
get’s specific, detailed questions about what took place, but
differences in cognitive development have a strong influ-
they apparently did not know how to communicate their
ence on the development of grammar (Snedeker et al.,
understanding.
2012), but cognition may have more of an influence on how
In a similar study by Piaget and his colleagues, a researcher
language is effectively used. Jean Piaget, whose theories of
told young children how a device worked, then asked them
infant cognition were described in Chapter 5, was especially
to explain it to others. The researchers did their best to
influential in this area. Recall that Piaget was a proponent
ensure that the children understood how the device—per-
of developmental stages; he claimed that children experi-
haps a syringe or steam engine—worked. Nonetheless, even
ence distinct, qualitative changes in their ways of thinking
children who seemed to fully understand the mechanism still
and understanding. In his view, language is just one part
regularly failed to explain it to someone else because they did
of a much larger system of thought, and a child’s progress
not take the other person’s viewpoint into account.
through the stages of cognitive development has profound
One of the most dramatic demonstrations of children’s
effects on his use of language (Piaget, 1926/1959).
egocentric speech uses a referential communications task
Piaget observed, for example, that in experimental stud-
(Krauss & Glucksberg, 1969), in which two children (or
ies, young children had trouble understanding the full range
a child and an adult) sit on opposite sides of a table, sepa-
of possible perspectives on a situation. More specifically, he
rated by a large vertical panel (see Figure 8.22). One child,
concluded that children younger than about 7 years old were
designated the “communicator,” is charged with telling the
unable to take more than one perspective on a scene or to free
other child, “the listener,” how to stack a sequence of pat-
themselves from their own viewpoint. He assumed that this
terned blocks. As the communicator takes each block out
egocentrism represented a general cognitive deficit that would
of a dispenser on his side of the panel, he instructs the lis-
also be manifested in young children’s language. To examine
tener to select the same block from her set, then put it on
how children’s egocentrism affected their ability to communi-
a stacking peg.
cate with others, Piaget set up an experiment in which children
There are two reasons why children younger than roughly
were told a story, then asked to repeat it to someone else. Here is
6 years of age often fail spectacularly as communicators in
one of the stories, followed by a typical repetition by an 8-year-
these tasks: (1) Their descriptions are often too vague. They
old child:
might say, for example, “Take the red one” when there is
Original version: Once upon a time, there was a lady who more than one red block. (2) Their descriptions often are
was called Niobe, and who had 12 sons and 12 daughters. too idiosyncratic and personal to be helpful to the listener.
She met a fairy who had only one son and no daughter. Then They might say, “Get the one that looks like Mommy’s
the lady laughed at the fairy because the fairy only had one favorite hat” or “Take the one that looks like the tree in
boy. Then the fairy was very angry and fastened the lady to a our yard” without understanding that these references are
rock. The lady cried for 10 years. In the end she turned into unfamiliar to their partner.

294 CHAPTER 8 LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

 But is the egocentric use of language really a devel- man, 1973). Moreover, the specific ways that they change
opmental stage, as Piaget supposed? Figuring this out their language suggests that they are not just imitating
requires addressing two questions: (1) Are there similar what adults do. They seem to recognize that the younger
tasks at which adults also fail? If so, the cognitive ability child needs to have things made simpler. One way of
in question may change in a slower, more incremental way understanding developmental change is to see children
over time, rather than showing a distinct shift into a new getting better and better at overcoming egocentrism as
stage. (2) Are there similar tasks at which much younger their executive functioning gradually increases and they
children succeed? If there are, this raises the possibility become more skilled at inhibiting their own point of view
that children may fail at particular versions of these tasks so they can more easily take into account other perspec-
because they require more advanced abilities for complet- tives. Thus, there is evidence that increasing executive
ing the particular tasks—perhaps in terms of memory or skills are related to increasing performance in referential
conceptual understanding—that are separate from the communication tasks (Nilsen & Graham, 2009).
overall cognitive ability being studied. In the case of the
egocentric use of language, the evidence suggests that the
answer to both questions is yes. Rather than a general
stage of cognitive development, egocentrism seems to be Q: What is egocentrism, and how does it relate
a view that people revert to in the midst of difficult com- to language development?
municative tasks.
Adults often communicate egocentrically in unfamil-
iar settings, such as while traveling abroad. In especially This kind of debate, about whether particular devel-
blatant instances, tourists assume that everyone living in opmental changes are stage-like or more continuous, is a
the foreign place they are visiting knows the tourist’s own classic one in developmental psychology. When evaluat-
language. In slightly more subtle cases, someone in the ing claims that there are stages of development character-
host country makes a polite, tentative attempt to speak ized by qualitative changes to a cognitive or social ability,
the tourist’s native language—and the tourist replies with consider the alternative. The ability may be manifested
a rapid barrage of speech, forgetting that this is clearly a along a continuum, in which even the youngest children
second language for the host. Egocentrism is therefore a can succeed at the easiest levels and even mature adults
factor in communication even in adult life (Keysar, 2008). might fail at the hardest levels. If this kind of pattern
But at the other end of the continuum, even very young emerges among adults and children, and if all the dif-
children are not always egocentric communicators. Inter- ferent levels of the task are indeed tapping into the same
estingly, very young children make the same adjustments basic ability, then the existence of developmental stages
to their vocabulary and speech patterns as adults do when becomes less likely.
they are talking to even younger children (Shatz & Gel-

Dispenser
Language and Communication
Opaque screen
Stacking peg As our discussion of egocentrism in communication shows,
Blocks the development of language skills goes beyond seman-
tics and grammar. Another important aspect of language
development involves the ability to convey and interpret
additional layers of meaning in an utterance, depending
on its context. That context can include the surrounding
sentences, the physical situation, and the listener’s infer-
ences about the speaker’s (and other listeners’) mental state.
Adults can use and understand metaphors, irony, and sar-
Communicator Listener casm (Gibbs, 1994, 1999). They can decide when to dis-
FIGURE 8.22 The referential communication task. Children fail to count a speaker’s credibility, and they can understand the
realize what the communicative common ground is and make highly
unstated norms of conversation. These pragmatic aspects of
idiosyncratic references to the blocks in front of them. These
references make it difficult or impossible for the listener to know
language—ways of using language to relay and infer mean-
which block the communicator is referring to. As a result, the listener ings within a particular context and to understand and use
is unable to pick out the blocks described by the communicator to indirect language—have roots early in the preschool years,
stack them on the peg. Adapted from Krauss & Glucksberg (1969). but they can take many years to fully master.

LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION 295

 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL P OLICY

The Cognitive Effects of Bilingualism

E
arly views of bilingualism seemed to suggest that chil- Lambert’s results were striking. The bilingual children per-
dren who faced the “chore” of learning two or more formed at least as well on intelligence tests and in academic
languages would certainly fare worse—in both linguis- settings as the monolingual children, and in several cases they
tic and cognitive skills—than their peers who learned performed better. Being immersed in two languages seemed to
just one language (Haugen, 1956). But these early studies help the bilingual children become more aware of language itself
almost always confounded the effects of bilingualism with as a system of arbitrary symbols. They developed this aware-
the effects of specific social disadvantages. They frequently ness earlier than the children who spoke just one language, and
involved the bilingual children of poor, immigrant families who it seemed to also make them more aware of their other cognitive
were often enrolled in inferior schools. Within a few decades, skills, such as their memory abilities. Since Lambert’s studies,
however, a series of landmark studies led to a major turning hundreds of other studies worldwide have documented a similar
point in our understanding of the effects of bilingualism on cog- pattern: speaking more than one language is associated with
nitive development. several possible cognitive advantages and no known deficits
Consider the situation in Montreal, Canada. Montreal is in (Bialystok & Barac, 2012; Diaz, 1983, 1985; Hakuta, 1986).
the province of Quebec, which is officially French speaking, but Bilingual and multilingual individuals consistently show
where many people are bilingual. For the first half of the twen- advantages in tasks that require a more objective understanding
tieth century, the city’s wealth and power were largely concen- of language and its structures. In one group of studies, monolin-
trated in certain English-speaking groups, such that those who gual and bilingual children were shown drawings of objects with
only spoke English often had an economic advantage over bilin- word labels below them. Although the children could not yet
gual speakers of both French and English. Not surprisingly, the read, some of them had a sense that words carried meaning. And
children from economically disadvantaged backgrounds, many when the labels were moved to accompany different pictures,
of whom were bilingual, often performed worse than monolin- these children also knew that the words retained their mean-
gual children on a variety of cognitive tasks. The breakthrough ings, despite being placed under different objects. The bilingual
on the effects of bilingualism occurred when Wallace Lambert children understood at much earlier ages than the monolingual
and his colleagues conducted much more careful studies of chil- children that words have fixed meanings and that words’ physi-
dren from Montreal, balancing the socioeconomic status of the cal characteristics are not linked directly to objects—that is, that
monolinguals and bilinguals (Lambert, 1975, 1985; Lambert & bigger words do not necessarily correspond to bigger objects
Tucker, 1972). (Bialystok, 1997). Moreover, the awareness of language as a

Some forms of indirect language (language that is be obvious to people familiar with the circumstances.
not literal, such as complicated metaphors, sarcastic or Examples like this make it clear that some aspects of indi-
ironic comments, or double entendres) may hinge criti- rect speech take years to understand and require that chil-
cally on cognitive capacities that develop during the dren become more knowledgeable about social situations
school years, such as the child’s understanding of the and the mental states that specific situations elicit in the
intricacies of others’ mental states. (We will look more people involved. Thus, while a young child may easily
closely at these abilities in the next few chapters.) For our understand metaphors such as “The car is hungry” (for a
purposes here, the key point is that preschool children car that needs gas) or “The dog is talking” (for a barking
may have difficulty going beyond a literal understand- dog) or “The house needs a new hat” (for a house that
ing of utterances that depend on a rich interpretation of needs a new roof ), that same child may have great dif-
the speaker’s beliefs and desires. Younger children might ficulty understanding a wry comment about someone’s
not have a sufficiently developed model of other people’s mental abilities when phrased as “not the sharpest tack
mental states and how they interact with situations to be in the box.” Understanding this metaphor requires know-
able to go beyond the literal. Moreover, even adults who ing what it means to be a “sharp tack in a box” as well as
are, for example, oblivious to the underlying hostility in inferences about relative mental states in others. Children
a situation may not notice sarcasm or irony that would are able to understand metaphors when they link domains

296 CHAPTER 8 LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

 system in itself (and not just as a means of communication), a major program in school districts across the country. The need
which bilingualism seems to foster, may also be critical to learn- for these programs quickly increased as the percentage of new
ing how to read. In comparisons of carefully matched groups of students who spoke little or no English rose rapidly in the 1990s
bilingual and monolingual children, the bilingual children often and in the first decade of the twenty-first century.
seem to master initial literacy skills earlier than the monolin- Despite the broad reach of bilingual education programs,
gual children (Bialystok, 1997). By fostering a more developed several reports comparing them with English-immersion pro-
awareness of how language works, bilingualism may indirectly grams have shown little or no advantage of bilingual programs
promote earlier literacy. (Glenn, 1997; Gersten et al., 1992; Rossell & Baker, 1996).
We began with the question of how learning more than one By the late 1990s, these problems led California business-
language early on might affect other cognitive abilities; it appears man Ron Unz to campaign for a new law to make English-only
that there are only benefits. But these issues are quite different immersion programs the default for California’s public schools
from the more often politicized questions about whether public and to offer bilingual public education only in specific districts
schools should offer bilingual education for children whose first where parents requested it. Interestingly, many members of
language is different from the region’s official language. When California’s Hispanic and Latino communities supported the
bilingual education initiatives were first introduced across the proposal, which was approved in 1998. Since that time, a
United States in the 1960s, they were hailed as a major advance series of studies have argued that when we take a longer-
in educational opportunities for children who were not native Eng- term perspective, there may well be benefits from bilingual
lish speakers. Although such initiatives came in several versions, education because it enables children to achieve more rapid
one of the most common proposals in the United States was to mastery of language and general-knowledge skills by initially
offer instruction in both Spanish and English, especially to chil- exposing them to instruction in their native tongue (Christian,
dren for whom only Spanish was spoken in the home. Advocates 2011; Collier & Thomas, 2007; Oades-Sese et al., 2011). But
argued that failing to provide bilingual education amounted to others ask if there may be delays in second-language devel-
discrimination against immigrants. They held that children should opment and whether those delays offset gains in other areas
learn to read and develop a knowledge base in their native tongue (Conger, 2010; Tong et al., 2008). The debate continues with
before learning English—so that they would not have to face great passion and emotion on both sides. We can only hope
learning to read in an unknown language. It also seemed that giv- that the next decade will resolve the debate as more long-
ing immigrant children the chance to initially learn in their native term and comprehensive studies on English-immersion and
language would boost their self-esteem, whereas having to learn bilingual programs are compared. Nonetheless, the cognitive
in an unknown language could cause a string of initial academic benefits of bilingualism still hold regardless of the way a sec-
failures. Supported by this reasoning, bilingual education became ond language is learned.

that they understand (for example, linking vehicles with said that he had lost (Mills & Keil, 2005). Apparently,
eating), but they don’t understand metaphors in which children take people’s intentions and motivations into
they don’t understand one of the domains (Keil, 1986). account when they are quite young as a way of judging
We also learn when to doubt what others say. We are, their truthfulness.
for example, often cynical about politicians’ seemingly
self-serving statements. More broadly, we are inclined to
doubt a statement when it seems that the speaker is mak-
ing it merely for personal gain. Although this cynicism Q: What are some reasons why indirect
seems like a fairly sophisticated interpretive skill, young speech might take longer to learn to understand
elementary school children actually seem to know when than direct speech?
to take a statement with a grain of salt. In one study, chil-
dren were told about a race in which two runners finished
so close to each other that it was hard to tell who won. A different aspect of the social uses of language involves
When children as young as 7 years old were told that one learning how to be a conversational partner—how to create
of the runners said he had won the race, they thought he a clear narrative and how to use and interpret the pragmatic
was less likely to be telling the truth than a runner who devices that enhance communication. Research suggests two

LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION 297

broad patterns in the development of these skills. First, even tive styles of information processing constraints. Instead,
the youngest speakers usually have some sensitivity to prag- they can evolve over the years to have their own form in
matic devices and other conversational practices. Second, each culture and then be passed down from generation to
full mastery of such devices and skills takes many years, and generation.
young children often miss the more subtle nuances of com- Politeness mechanisms also vary considerably between
municative practices (Thompson, 1997). We will consider languages and cultures; some languages, such as Japanese,
a few examples to illustrate children’s early but incomplete have subtle conventions of politeness that may take until
awareness of these conventions: turn-taking skills, collabora- adulthood to master (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Holtgraves,
tive repair, politeness mechanisms, and narrative skills. 2002; Watts, 2003). Politeness serves complex social func-
Turn-taking is a key aspect of learning to converse with tions, including acknowledging differences in status or
others. Each speaker must be able to sense when the other power, or softening the impact of a request (Clark &
has reached the end of a thought or a reasonable pause point. Schunk, 1980). Thus, when adults want someone else to do
Almost all children sometimes interrupt inappropriately, something, whether it is as simple as passing the salt or as
but these turn-taking failures, while very noticeable, seem onerous as jump-starting a car, they do not just issue direc-
to be fairly uncommon. Even the youngest children rarely tives. Instead, they embed the request in a frame of polite-
engage in simultaneous speech when someone is speaking to ness. They also tend to be more polite with strangers than
them (Garvey, 1984; Garvey & Berninger, 1981). In addi- with close friends or family. Learning all these subtleties of
tion, young children are sensitive to pragmatic cues, such politeness takes children several years. Early on, they often
as the length of a speaker’s pause, that serve as signals for use simple direct commands like “Pass the salt!” (Bates,
turn-taking (Miura, 1993). 1976). Not until age 7 or 8 do they begin to frequently make
In the course of speaking to conversational partners, mis- the kind of indirect requests that are culturally considered
communications may sometimes arise, necessitating collab- polite (“Could you pass the salt, please?”). By around age
orative repairs. The repair is completed when the speaker 9 or 10, children can easily recognize the inappropriateness
who was misunderstood realizes what was missing from the of direct requests made by others (Axia & Baroni, 1985;
unclear utterance and repairs it by providing the necessary Baroni & Axia, 1989).
details to her communicative partner. Even very young chil- Narrative skills involve the ability to describe an event
dren show some rudimentary forms of collaborative repair in a coherent, organized way that conveys its key themes.
in their play. In one observational study, a group of 2- and Fully developed narrative skills normally consist of devices
3-year-olds talking among themselves at nap time worked that convey the story’s structure, including a brief sum-
together to resolve miscommunications in very much the mary or “title” telling the listener what the story is about,
same way that adults do (Aviezer, 2003). Moreover, bilingual an introduction that is often quite conventional (such as
children as young as 2½ engaged in repairs while talking to “once upon a time . . .”), descriptions of the story’s time
someone who spoke only one of their languages. In these and place, its characters, and the problem or challenge
cases, if the listener asked the child to clarify a miscommu- they face, the resolution, and an ending that, like the
nication, the child would switch to the listener’s language introduction, is often stylized. In addition, narrative skills
(Comeau et al., 2007). On the other hand, despite their include a kind of interpretation of the story’s events, such
early, basic understanding of collaborative repairs, younger as signaling the speaker’s point of view through emphasis
children show a limited ability to monitor the context of a (Uchikoshi, 2005, see also Chang, 2004). Finally, narra-
conversation and understand when clarifications are needed tives should order a sequence of events clearly in time, leav-
(Loukusa et al., 2007). ing out unimportant details.
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that conversa- Although children as young as 3 years old have a sense
tional norms vary significantly across cultures—and even that events should be described in temporal order, children
among supposedly similar peoples. Thus, even though do not develop most narrative skills until they are about
the Swedes are considered quite reserved by international 6 years old. Younger children often omit key events from
standards, a cross-cultural comparison of mealtime con- their narratives, giving incomplete accounts in which the
versations revealed that they are chatterboxes compared events are not connected. Even 5-year-olds often end their
with the Finns (Tryggvason, 2006). Every mealtime was stories at the high point rather than continuing through to
an opportunity to instill in children this very noticeable the resolution (Peterson & McCabe, 1983). Thus, narrative
difference in conversational style. Thus, the tempo of con- skills develop and grow increasingly elaborate from the early
versational exchanges, the time intervals that are perceived preschool years into the first grade and beyond. In addition,
as “uncomfortable silences,” and the amount of time that there may be some gender differences, with girls starting
any one speaker talks before relinquishing control of the to use context and make evaluative comments earlier than
conversation are not simply reflections of general cogni- boys (Haden et al., 1997).

298 CHAPTER 8 LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

 Narrative skills do not develop in the same way the is assumed to be the basis behind universals in linguistic
world over. Their structure depends in important ways on structure throughout the world. Many cognitive and per-
the child’s culture, including, for example, the extent to ceptual universals might well arise from stable environ-
which the child experiences bedtime stories (Fivush et al., mental regularities, but such accounts are difficult to make
2006; Heath, 1986). In one study, when 5- and 6-year-olds in the case of language. Nonetheless, even with such an
engaged in reading experiences that encouraged dialogues endowment, a great deal else is required for successful lan-
about the content of a storybook, they showed a substan- guage acquisition. Thus, we might also have a much larger
tial increase in narrative skills compared with children who general learning ability than all other species that enables
received phoneme-awareness training, a common technique us to handle larger informational bundles much more eas-
for early literacy teaching (Lever & Sénéchal, 2011). Given ily and that supplements any language-specific mechanisms
that the development of narrative skills enhances some to make human language especially rich and complex. We
forms of memory and may help to foster some reading skills might also have distinctive cognitive skills that are essen-
(Fivush et al., 2006), it is impressive that narrative skills can tial not just to language acquisition but also to a range of
even be imparted by mass media in relatively simple ways. other cognitive activities that are distinctively human, such
For example, in one study, kindergarten children watched as joint attention, hierarchical embedding, and logical
one of two television shows regularly for 1 year: either a pro- thought. These skills might again support any language-
gram with a strong narrative structure or one that focused specific mechanisms in powerful ways.
on verbal skills and vocabulary. By the end of the year, the At the same time, it would be too strong an interpre-
group that had watched the show with a strong narrative tation to try to account for the human capacity for lan-
structure showed markedly better narrative skills than the guage solely in terms of general cognitive skill or in terms
other group (Uchikoshi, 2005). Even though certain ways of other nonlinguistic cognitive capacities. A child’s general
of describing events may seem obvious and automatic, it is cognitive abilities seem to have only a modest influence on
clear that children’s narrative skills improve when they are his language acquisition. In some areas of thought, mature
exposed to certain approaches to storytelling modeled in the primates approach the competence levels of a 3-year-old
broader culture. child; yet with respect to language, they seem vastly worse
This survey of conversational skills reveals that master- off. In addition, while it is certainly true that we have other
ing them takes more time than almost any other aspect of apparently distinctive capacities besides language, such as
language development. Very early on, children show aware- the production of art, those abilities do not seem to be obvi-
ness of turn-taking, collaborative repairs, politeness, and ously based on language. At present, there are no compel-
narrative skills. But in most cases, mastering these skills ling demonstrations of cognitive capacities that are larger in
depends on developing an ability to read the social and cul- scope than language and that can completely explain lan-
tural context of a conversation as it is unfolding, a skill that guage acquisition.
does not always come easily, even to adults. Yet, aspects of language acquisition still draw on other
domains of cognitive development as well. Thus, word
meanings do not seem to be acquired in the same manner
as the grammar of a language. Words are acquired through
Conclusions more general cognitive learning mechanisms, ones that are
especially sensitive to the intentions of speakers. A rich net-
Language is among humans’ most distinctive abilities. work of constraints is needed to explain how word learning
Almost all people share this capacity. By contrast, after years ever gets off the ground, but none of those constraints may
of intensive and sophisticated instruction, even the most be specific to language.
talented primates are far less linguistically competent than That all but the tiniest fraction of humans effort-
young children who receive no explicit language instruction lessly acquires natural languages with all their remarkable
at all. The capacity to acquire language is apparently so pow- complexity is one of the great wonders of cognitive science.
erful that children who learn two or even three languages It is all the more remarkable that this occurs without any
simultaneously do not seem to learn them more slowly than explicit instruction and usually without any explicit for-
those who acquire only one (Gleitman & Bloom, 1999). mulation of rules. We also see in language acquisition a
And regardless of the number of initial languages, no one reprise of many of the key themes that have appeared in
remembers trying to learn a language as a young child—it earlier chapters and that will appear again in later chapters.
just happens. These include the importance of constraints, of social and
We have seen substantial support for the view that we cultural context, of the interplay between both domain-
are endowed with a set of cognitive capacities that seem specific and domain-general faculties, and of the ways in
to be specifically tailored for language. That endowment which structures become fine-tuned through interactions

CONCLUSIONS 299
with the environment. Language is also an intrinsically Grammar, word meanings, and pragmatics each have their
social enterprise, and yet its acquisition depends on the own distinctive developmental stories and mechanisms,
cognitive and representational capacities of each individual and while they do intersect in interesting ways, it is clear
that make learning possible. Finally, we have seen that lan- that no one overall account of learning works for these
guage is not just one thing with one pattern of acquisition. areas collectively.

STU DY AN D REVIEW

SUMMARY Theories of Language Acquisition

The Structure and Complexity of Language ● Behavioral approaches maintain that language is learned

● Language has generativity, which means that an unlimited

through reinforcement and associations. But since parents
number of novel expressions can be created by combining rarely correct a child’s grammar, this does not seem the most
basic linguistic structures and by using basic rules. likely way that children learn to speak.
● Connectionist approaches use computer modeling of language
● The main components of language are phonology (the
sound patterns and rules for combining sounds into words), acquisition to argue that humans use parallel processing and
semantics (word meanings), grammar (including syntax— large multilayered networks of associations to learn to speak.
● Statistical learning approaches focus on language learning
the rules for the structural relations of words), and prag-
matics (how intended meaning is conveyed or understood based on the probability of sounds co-occurring or following
in context). after each other in the speech stream. They examine how
● Universal constraints on possible grammatical structures
infants recognize recurring sound sequences within words or
may apply to all languages. between words when they hear streams of sounds. Bayesian
approaches are one way of tabulating statistical patterns, and
they allow for straightforward integration of both statistical
Acquiring a First Language information and rules.
● Infants initially perceive more phonemic differences than the ● Nativist approaches claim that infants are born with a lan-
ones that they hear in the language spoken around them, but guage acquisition device (LAD) that enables them to recog-
they soon come to perceive only the phonemes (or sounds) nize patterns common to all languages but that is flexible
that are used in their native language. enough for the acquisition of particular words and con-
● Infants begin babbling at about 4 months old. They go on structions in specific languages. The LAD is dedicated to
to one-word utterances when they are about 1 year old and the learning of linguistic structures and not other forms of
then to multiword utterances when they are around 11/2 knowledge.
years old.
● Infants start to acquire language rules that are largely tacit Discovering the Meanings of Words
and can generalize from words that they know to plural ● Children link words to concepts, which enables them to
words and regular and irregular past tenses that they have apply the words to the corresponding objects, properties of
never encountered before and do not know. As they grow objects, or relations between objects. This linkage is a map-
older, however, they may overregularize plurals and past ping of the words to the concepts and occurs without spe-
tenses until they finally are able to again use both regu- cific training and so quickly that it is often referred to as fast
lar and irregular constructions, thus showing a U-shaped mapping.
developmental curve in language acquisition. ● Constraints on word meanings, based on biases for interpret-
● Adults often use child-directed speech when talking to infants, ing words, limit the number of possible meanings that can be
speaking slowly and loudly, using a high-pitched voice, and linked to a given word. There can be perceptual constraints
accentuating the boundaries between words. As children start (for example, the shape bias), conceptual constraints (for
to incorrectly put together words, adults will often respond example, the whole-object bias), and pragmatic constraints
with recastings of what the child has said to show the child a (for example, that each object has only one mutually exclu-
correct grammatical form without specifically indicating that sive label) that help children more easily learn what words
he was mistaken or giving him a rule for the correct form. stand for.

300 CHAPTER 8 LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

● As children grow older, their understanding of word mean- been taught to communicate with lexigrams, no nonhuman
ings changes. For example, they tend to both overextend primate has even approached the linguistic abilities of any
word meanings (broadly applying meanings to many words) normal human child.
and to underextend (applying meanings too narrowly). For
some kinds of words, there is also a shift from meanings Language and Thought
based primarily on characteristic features (properties typi-
● The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis held that language influ-
cally associated with members of a category) to defining fea-
ences thought. But this classic view of language as dra-
tures (properties that are necessary and specific to category
matically changing thought in ways that are strikingly
membership).
different across families of languages has not been shown
The Growth of Grammar to be true. In more subtle ways, however, specific lan-
● Common principles govern the internal structure of all lan-
guages do seem to influence the availability of certain
guages, all of which have such categories as subjects, verbs, cognitive schemas that can in turn cause differences in
and objects, and certain abstract structural relations among task performance.
● Researchers also doubt older views that languages in general
these categories when they occur in sentences, while at the
same time allowing for other structures that are unique to cause a new stage of cognitive development by dramatically
each language. amplifying the powers of thought. At the same time, there
● Different parameters apply to specific languages, including
are many smaller ways in which the emergence of language
the language’s branching direction, which is the way that lin- may foster the growth of cognitive skills.
guists describe different patterns of hierarchical embedding
of syntactic elements in a sentence. Language and Communication
● Children constantly refine their abilities to understand
Effects of Age on Language Acquisition the real meanings behind utterances. These abilities
● There may be a critical period for language acquisition, such start, in more limited ways, very early with young chil-
that a language’s grammar is more easily learned, as is its pro- dren showing some sense of metaphor and of the ways in
nunciation without an accent, before a certain age (approxi- which speakers’ motivations are relevant to the truth of
mately puberty). their utterances. Children also show marked increases in
● Feral children may never easily learn a language’s syntax if conversational and narrative skills during the preschool
they are returned to human contact after they reach puberty. and early school years.
● American Sign Language is more easily learned before
puberty, just as is spoken language.
● Children who are born deaf and not exposed to language
THOUGHT QUESTIONS
have been shown to invent their own sign language, com- 1. In what ways does bilingualism seem to confer cognitive
plete with a rich, elaborate syntactic structure. This inven- benefits? Would those benefits be reduced if the second lan-
tion process occurs before the critical-period window guage were acquired as an adult? Why or why not?
closes. 2. When we write out our ideas, we often find that we can cre-
ate more complex thoughts and arguments than when we
The Domain Specificity of Language merely try to do so orally. In what ways might the cognitive
● Aspects of language may be domain specific, with cognitive benefits of writing be analogous to the cognitive benefits that
capacities tailored specifically for language, or domain gen- oral language confers on nonverbal thought? In what ways
eral, with general cognitive abilities leading to language skills are those benefits different?
as well as to other cognitive achievements. 3. Given that the vast majority of children rapidly acquire their
● Neural dissociations, such as aphasias, Williams syndrome, first language without any explicit instruction, some argue
and specific language impairment, seem to indicate that that it is odd to grade language courses in college in the
some aspects of language are domain specific. Some cog- same manner used to grade other types of coursework. They
nitive structures used for the acquisition of syntax, but believe that language competency in college should instead
not semantics, may be specific to the domain of language. be treated more like passing a swimming test. Consider the
Despite intriguing genetic markers of language processing pros and cons of this position and state your own view.
difficulty, the precise nature of these domain-specific struc- 4. How is the acquisition of birdsong, as described in Chapter 4,
tures remains a matter of active debate. similar to the acquisition of human language? How is it
● Humans seem to have a special ability to acquire languages
different?
that is not shared with any other primates. Although chim-
panzees have been taught sign language and bonobos have

STUDY AND REVIEW 301

KEY TERMS
aphasia (p. 285) holophrase (p. 264) phonology (p. 262) semantic development
babbling (p. 264) language acquisition device poverty of the stimulus (p. 273)
branching direction (p. 280) (LAD) (p. 272) argument (p. 273) semantics (p. 262)
characteristic feature (p. 279) lexicon (p. 262) pragmatics (p. 263) shape bias (p. 275)
child-directed speech (p. 267) linguistic determinism prelinguistic vocalization specific language impairment
connectionism (p. 270) (p. 290) (p. 264) (SLI) (p. 286)
constraints on word meanings linguistic relativity (p. 290) principles and parameters statistical learning (p. 270)
(p. 275) morpheme (p. 264) approach (p. 280) syntax (p. 262)
defining feature (p. 279) motherese (p. 267) prosody (p. 280) telegraphic speech (p. 265)
egocentrism (p. 294) mutual exclusivity (p. 277) recasting (p. 267) underextension (p. 278)
fast mapping (p. 274) natural language (p. 261) referential communications universal constraints
overextension (p. 278) task (p. 294) (p. 263)
feral child (p. 282)
overregularization (p. 266) riddle of reference (p. 274) whole-object bias (p. 275)
generativity (p. 262)
phoneme (p. 262) Sapir-Whorf hypothesis Williams syndrome (p. 285)
grammar (p. 262)
(p. 290)

302 CHAPTER 8 LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

 9
The Growth of Knowledge
Dimensions of Cognitive • The Concrete Operational Period Sociocultural Views of the
Development • The Formal Operational Period Development of Knowledge
• Qualitative versus Quantitative • Alternative Explanations of Piaget’s • Vygotsky’s Views
Development Theory and Results
• Global versus Local Patterns of Conclusions
Domains of Knowledge
Development Summary
• Spatial Relations
• Foundational versus Emergent
Constraints • Number
• Biology
A Closer Look at Piaget’s Theory • Other Domains of Thought
• The Preoperational Period
 or over a century, researchers have interviewed chil- development. These theories have captivated professionals

F dren at different ages to see how they conceptualize

and talk about the world around them. As children
age, their understanding of the world changes. These
changes seem apparent even if the vocabulary they
use is not different. Something about their thought patterns
themselves seems to change with development. Consider
two brothers, ages 5 and 9 years old, overhearing adults dis-
in many fields who work with children, affecting many
aspects of their work, from school curriculum designs to
psychotherapy techniques.
This chapter also explores some of the differences
between the best-known theories of the growth of children’s
knowledge. We will consider how these approaches differ
on each of three dimensions used to describe developmental
cussing various family relationships, including siblings and changes: (1) Are changes considered qualitative or quantita-
parent-child relations, between people that the children do tive? (2) Are developments viewed as global or local? (3) Is
not know. At one point, the 9-year-old interrupts to say that the process of change limited and directed by foundational
one person must be another’s uncle. The adults nod in agree- constraints, which are present from the start (often allied
ment, while the 5-year-old looks surprised, then confused. with “nature” views), or by emergent constraints, which
“How did you know that?” he asks his brother. Just such a arise over the course of development and reflect the influ-
conversation happened between two of our sons when they ences of experience (often allied with “nurture” views)?
were young, and it illustrates a clear contrast in how they The first theorist we will discuss is the highly influential
drew inferences from what was said in the overheard con- Jean Piaget. Then, as we have in other chapters, we will
versation. Our older son understood kinship terms in such a consider the research that has followed from his work and
way as to realize that one must be an uncle. Our younger son challenged many of his ideas. As we will see, many decades
could not grasp that such a relationship was logically implied after Piaget’s initial studies, researchers continue to test chil-
by what was said. dren with variations on his experimental tasks, and many of
When children talk about the world, you can quickly the phenomena he uncovered remain topics of intense inter-
guess their approximate age, even when the vocabulary they est. Along the lines of the recent work on infant cognition,
use at different ages is about the same. At a deeper level which we discussed in Chapter 5, this more recent research
than word choice, their thought patterns seem to mature on childhood cognition suggests that young children are far
with development. As a result, children of different ages more capable than Piaget thought possible. Much as was
sometimes interpret the same conversation in quite dispa- the case with infant cognition, apparent failures by young
rate ways. children on some Piagetian tasks have been reinterpreted in
This chapter explores how age differences affect the way ways that reveal that young children actually have a range
that children think about and understand the world. Our of impressive cognitive abilities that serve as building blocks
goal here is to characterize the changes in cognition that for later conceptual growth.
occur with age. We will see right away that these changes do We will then turn to how children develop basic knowl-
not just affect children’s language. Instead, they take place at edge and understanding within several broad nonsocial
the level of children’s conceptual knowledge, which is then domains that are relevant to life in all cultures, such as spa-
reflected in their language. We will want to understand how tial relations, number, and the biological world. By looking
the changes in children’s knowledge and thoughts are mani- into these culturally universal domains, we will be focusing
fested in the things children say and do. To this end, we will on intuitive forms of knowledge and taking the perspective
look at how they reason about simple real-world situations, of the child trying to understand the structure of the world
ranging from pouring liquids into containers, to animals’ around her.
life cycles, to the occurrence of day and night. We will then Finally, we will consider the broad social and cultural
see how researchers use that information to infer what is contexts within which cognitive development occurs. Chil-
changing in the child’s mind. dren do not develop as isolated individuals trying to make
In all these cases, we will ask how a child’s understanding sense of the world alone. Instead, they grow up in particu-
of the world changes with age. Does the older child simply lar cultural and social settings, which are critical compo-
know more facts about the world? Is the older child sim- nents in understanding their cognitive development. We
ply faster or endowed with a larger memory that somehow will see that something as basic as living in a rural setting
makes him see events and relations differently? Does the versus an urban setting can strongly influence how children
older child have certain ways of thinking, such as an under- think about the living world and that a culture’s emphasis
standing of certain logical relationships, that are unavail- on individualism as opposed to collectivism can influence
able to the younger child? Studying the ways that children how children interpret simple events. We will consider the
come to know and understand the world has yielded some sociocultural perspective put forth by the Russian psycholo-
extremely ambitious, broad theories about psychological gist Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky, who believed that children

304 CHAPTER 9 THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE

are guided by the frameworks of knowledge and ways of
thinking that prevail in their own culture and that they

Qualitative vs. Quantitative

eventually come to internalize them. More generally, we
will consider how parents and teachers can provide support
that enables children to perform at much higher cognitive
levels than they otherwise would.
In the next chapter, we will look at the child from a dif-
ferent perspective, one that focuses on specific cognitive l l
ba a
skills like memory, attention, and reasoning, which enable lo Loc
G .
the child to process information and negotiate the world. vs
Foundational vs. Emergent
There, we will also examine a few specific skills—reading,
arithmetic reasoning, and using symbolic representations— FIGURE 9.1 Three dimensions describing theories of cognitive
in which individuals’ levels of accomplishment can differ development. Developmental theories place different amounts of
emphasis on issues of qualitative versus quantitative change, global
significantly. The perspectives on cognitive development versus local change, and foundational versus emergent constraints.
discussed in these two chapters are closely related, and treat- These three contrasts can be imagined as the dimensions of a cube
ing them separately runs the risk of setting them artificially that contains the full range of developmental theories. As illustrated
apart. Although they represent different aspects of cognitive in this chapter, most spaces within the cube are occupied by different
development, the three dimensions of change that begin theories, and each one’s location within the cube depends on which
this chapter (qualitative versus quantitative change, global dimensions and values it emphasizes.
versus local development, and foundational versus emergent
constraints) will be relevant to both discussions.
would suggest a wholly new process or structure. Quali-
tative development, on the other hand, involves distinct
and dramatic changes in structure. In cases of qualitative
Dimensions of Cognitive development in cognitive ability, the child has an entirely
different kind of understanding or mental capacity than
Development before. Although the differences between quantitative and
qualitative development seem fairly straightforward, these
One of the greatest challenges in developmental psychol- contrasts can be difficult to apply to actual developmental
ogy is to specify how a young child’s mind differs from the changes. As an analogy, consider the problem of describ-
minds of older children and adults. No one doubts that a ing the change that occurs between day and night. While
10-year-old knows different things about the world than there are obvious qualitative differences between daytime
a 5-year-old does. The difficulties arise in trying to care- and nighttime, the shift between these two states happens
fully specify the nature of those differences. Three themes continuously and gradually. Each moment in which the
that have recurred throughout this book can provide some light changes slightly seems extremely similar to the previ-
helpful bases for comparing and contrasting theories of ous one.
cognitive development (see Figure 9.1). Each of these three Likewise, over the course of development, small incre-
dimensions can help refine our questions regarding what it mental changes can create large qualitative differences.
is about the child’s conceptual thought and understanding Viewed from another angle, this means that most quali-
that changes and why. tative changes can be broken down into a series of tiny
steps—which can make the change look much more con-
tinuous and quantitative. These problems have led some
Qualitative versus Quantitative developmental psychologists to abandon any attempts to
distinguish between qualitative and quantitative changes.
Development But to deny this contrast runs the risk of overlooking every-
One of the oldest and most persistent issues in developmen- day intuitions about how children’s knowledge of the world
tal psychology concerns whether particular patterns of cog- changes—as well as key differences between the theories
nitive change that affect the way children mentally represent that seek to explain these changes.
or process information are best described as qualitative or Given that qualitative changes can often be viewed as a
quantitative. At first, the distinction seems easy enough. series of many tiny quantitative changes, what does it really
Recall that quantitative development involves smooth, con- mean to call a cognitive change “qualitative”? A qualitative
tinuous changes without the kind of abrupt transitions that change in a child’s way of thinking often means that his

DIMENSIONS OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 305

thinking changes dramatically. For example, imagine show- kinds of thinking. Thus, when this kind of domain-general
ing a child a bouquet of red carnations mixed with white cognitive capacity improves, it should lead to advancements
carnations and asking, “Which is larger—the number of in each and every domain of knowledge. For example, imag-
red carnations or the number of carnations?” If 4-year-olds ine that humans’ cognitive capacity to reason about all kinds
seem unable to reason that there must be more carnations of cause-and-effect relationships is a single, broad, global
overall than red carnations, while 8-year-olds understand ability. If this were the case, then a young child who does
this logic immediately, we can say that a qualitative change not understand that causes must precede effects would make
in logical reasoning happens between the ages of 4 and 8. errors in understanding the sequence of all sorts of events—
By contrast, if 4-year-olds can understand this kind of logic including biological events (for example, claiming that hav-
in the context of a simpler task, and if 8-year-olds fail to ing an infection could cause you to get germs), physics (for
grasp the reasoning in an even more complex version of the example, claiming that thunder could cause lightning),
task, we might say that there is a quantitative change in social interactions (for example, claiming that scolding the
logical reasoning between these ages. In this scenario, the class caused the teacher to be displeased), and events in other
change would be considered more continuous and incre- domains. In contrast, in accounts of local, domain-specific
mental because children’s success would depend largely on cognitive development, children are seen as going through a
the task’s level of complexity rather than on the develop- series of changes in knowledge and reasoning that are unique
ment of a completely new reasoning capacity sometime after to each domain. In this view, a child’s ability to reason about
age 4. As we consider the theories that aim to explain how causes and effects in the biological world would progress
knowledge develops over the course of childhood, this dis- largely independently from her causal reasoning about physi-
tinction between quantitative and qualitative change will cal mechanics or social interactions.
remain important. Several questions about the growth of knowledge directly
pertain to the contrast between global and local cognitive
development. A recurring issue focuses on whether the
learning processes that adults use to acquire specialized
Global versus Local Patterns skills differ substantially from the ways that young children
of Development acquire general knowledge about the world. One differ-
Developmental changes in knowledge can occur either glob- ence between children and adults may revolve around the
ally, across all domains of knowledge, or locally, on a domain- idea that children are universal novices, while adults are
specific basis (Wellman & Gelman, 1998; see Figure 9.2). only novices in more restricted areas (Brown & Campione,
Accounts of global cognitive development describe changes 1994). We will want to keep these issues in mind as we con-
to broad mental capacities that are thought to be used in all sider the development of thought in different domains and
how conceptual development in children might be different
from adult conceptual learning.

Q: What sorts of domains have most often

been invoked in accounts of domain specificity
in cognitive development?

Foundational versus
Emergent Constraints
As we have seen, development always involves interactions
between genetic and environmental factors. Keeping this
perspective in mind, however, it is also increasingly clear
FIGURE 9.2 Global versus local patterns of change. When that the role that each of these factors plays varies greatly
young children like those at this fountain undergo a change in their
between different aspects of development. One way to
concepts about animals, do their other concepts—such as how to
count the number of ducks or boats in the water or the way the stick
think about these influences is in terms of how and when
they are holding can act as a lever—also change in roughly the same the developmental path is narrowed, or constrained, toward
ways? Or does their intuitive understanding of biology, number, and a particular outcome (see Figure 9.3). Thus, some kinds of
physics each show distinct developmental patterns? knowledge seem to emerge in ways that are innately con-

306 CHAPTER 9 THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE

 to encode different kinds of symbols for sounds, they must
also adopt the practice of reading from right to left. This
pattern can become so deeply ingrained that it also affects
their automatic visual scanning patterns and can change
the way dyslexia, a language-based learning disability, is
manifested (Ziegler & Goswami, 2005).
In light of the understanding that genetic and envi-
ronmental influences together contribute to all aspects of
development, it remains valuable to consider their relative
contributions to particular developmental paths. In doing
so, we can contrast the cases in which foundational con-
straints dominate with the cases in which emergent con-
straints are more central. Couching this contrast in terms
of foundational versus emergent constraints (rather than
as a contrast between “nature” and “nurture” or between
“innate” and “learned” behaviors) captures the interactional
nature of development while also representing the contrast
between biologically determined learning frameworks and
FIGURE 9.3 Foundational versus emergent constraints. When those that arise through experience.
a young child starts to understand how solid objects collide with one In many areas of cognitive development, psycholo-
another and cause movement, is that understanding largely guided gists continue to debate the relative roles of foundational
by intuitions about physical mechanics that are present in infancy
constraints (arising from genetic factors) and emergent
(foundational constraints) or by the knowledge the child gains from
experience, such as watching billiard balls smacking together, then
constraints (arising from environmental factors). Consider,
rolling away (emergent constraints)? for example, the vigorous debates presented in Chapter
8 about how children come to know a language. Some
theorists believe that the language learning process must
strained to follow roughly the same developmental path be supported by powerful foundational constraints. They
across a wide range of environments. For example, as we argue that young children’s experiences with language are
saw in Chapter 3 in the perceptual realm, binocular vision insufficient to explain how children learn complex systems
develops in much the same way in the vast majority of chil- of grammar and that the process must be guided by a rich
dren. Only in extreme cases of visual deprivation or brain set of foundational constraints. In contrast, other theorists
damage do children fail to develop the ability to mentally contend that there are few foundational or genetic con-
integrate the visual information from both eyes. The out- straints on language learning. They propose that the child
comes of these developmental paths (within a wide range is able to extract rich information about language from
of normally experienced environments) are limited from the environment, using a more general (less foundation-
the outset by foundational constraints, which are usually ally constrained) learning system that is highly attuned to
thought of as genetically rooted. sound patterns and correlations. In this view, as the child
Other forms of knowledge can show more variation in gradually acquires linguistic knowledge, this knowledge
their developmental paths in response to environmental establishes the emergent constraints that guide further
influences. We will refer to the limitations on these kinds learning.
of developments as emergent constraints because of the Most major theories of cognitive development can be
way their effects emerge—and come to shape thought and understood in terms of where they lie along each of the three
behavior—as a result of specific experiences. One cog- dimensions we have considered: qualitative versus quantitative
nitive skill that is significantly influenced by emergent development, global versus local change, and foundational
constraints is the ability to recognize the symbols of a versus emergent constraints on development. As we explore
particular writing system. This ability requires extensive how children’s knowledge and understanding change, we will
exposure to a specific set of symbols, and cultures vary want to keep these dimensions in mind. Each can provide
greatly both in their uses of writing symbols and in which a useful way of clarifying what kinds of changes are taking
of those symbols children learn. A child’s experiences with place and how they are occurring. We will focus initially on
her own culture’s writing system gives rise to the emergent Piaget’s theory of cognitive development from the toddler
constraints that guide the processes of learning to read and years into early adolescence, referring back to these dimen-
write in a particular language. For example, when children sions to better understand how Piaget’s theory contrasts with
learn to read Hebrew or Arabic they must not only learn other theories (see Figure 9.4).

DIMENSIONS OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 307

 sitive reasoning (also known as transitive inference) involves
reasoning about known relationships of stimuli to infer
a relationship between the stimuli that were not initially
directly related to each other (for example, if A is taller than
B, and B is taller than C, then A must be taller than C). As
a result, children who can use transitive reasoning perform
qualitatively differently from children who cannot on many
tasks that involve comparing unequal sizes or amounts. In
Piaget’s view, children develop a whole new cognitive abil-
ity or structure; the child’s learning experiences foster the
development of the new cognitive structure, but it is the
new structure itself that, once it reaches a certain degree
of complexity, launches the development of the next new
structure or cognitive ability.
Piaget’s theory posits four major periods of cognitive
FIGURE 9.4 Piaget and young children. Piaget is best known for development: the sensorimotor period, the preoperational
his work on cognitive development that occurs as preschoolers, who period, the concrete operational period, and the formal opera-
are in the preoperational stage, develop into school-age children and
tional period (see Table 9.1). The discussion in Chapter 5
enter the stage of concrete operations.
focused on the sensorimotor period, which, in Piaget’s view,
makes up the first 2 years of cognitive development. This
chapter focuses on the next two periods: the preoperational
A Closer Look at Piaget’s and concrete operational periods, and particularly on the
shift from preoperational to concrete operational thought.
Theory Piaget believed that during these two periods, children ini-
tially grasp the structure of the world and begin to substan-
Jean Piaget is as central to the study of children’s cogni- tially elaborate and flesh out that understanding over time.
tive development as he is to the study of infant cognition
(see Chapter 5). Although his theory has been challenged
and reevaluated in many ways, it has remained a founda-
tional point of reference for many researchers. As described Q: Where along each of the three dimensions
in Chapter 5, Piaget believed that the child is born with a of cognitive development would Piaget’s theory
bundle of built-in sensorimotor reflexes. As the infant learns be situated?
about the world from experience, these reflexes are modified
and transformed into new schemes, which, as we have seen
in our discussion of infant cognition, are patterns of under-
standing and interacting with the world. These schemes are The Preoperational Period
the basic building blocks in Piaget’s theory of the young According to Piaget’s theory, children emerge from the
child’s mental life. As the child gains more experience, his sensorimotor period at about age 2, having gained a crude
schemes combine, interact, and grow more elaborate. For ability to think in terms of simple symbols, which Piaget
Piaget, these changes in the schemes’ structure and com- believed enables them to mentally represent ideas that are
plexity explained the child’s progress through later periods not completely driven by action and perception. The emer-
of cognitive development. gence of language is the most obvious hallmark of this new
In this view, the child’s acquired knowledge exerts a ability. They then enter the preoperational period (approx-
broad influence on future learning. When the child mas- imately ages 2 to 7), during which they lack the capacity
ters certain knowledge, this change enables him to make to think about the world abstractly. Instead, Piaget held
a qualitative transition into a new way of thinking and of that preoperational children, while having learned symbols
understanding the world. Piaget also viewed these transi- such as the words of their language, are unable to use those
tions largely as domain general, affecting all domains of symbols in flexible ways that help them to break down a
knowledge. For example, Piaget argued that when the pre- task into its critical components and represent it as a set of
schooler develops a sufficient understanding of the concepts lawfully interacting elements. Thus, a preoperational child
of “greater than” and “less than,” this enables the emergence might remark that a ball of dough gets wider under a rolling
of a new form of logic known as transitive reasoning. Tran- pin. However, Piaget found that the same child could not

308 CHAPTER 9 THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE

 Period of Cognitive
Development Age Characteristics Relevant Cognitive Skills

Sensorimotor Birth–2 years The infant represents the world in terms of her own sensations Object permanence
and reflexes.
Preoperational 2–7 years The child is egocentric, ignores all but one aspect of a problem, Symbolic representations
fails to use basic operators such as compensation, reversibility,
and identity.
Concrete operational 7–12 years The child can apply operators to concrete information, but fails Classification, conservation,
to apply them to abstract or hypothetical information. seriation, transitive
reasoning
Formal operational 12 years on The child is able to think logically about things that are not Scientific reasoning tasks
immediately present and can engage in hypothetico-deductive
reasoning.

TABLE 9.1 Piaget’s four periods of cognitive development. According to Piaget’s theory, transitions between these periods involve
sweeping, across-the-board transformations in the nature of thought. Although children show reliable patterns of failures and successes on the
experimental tasks that Piaget devised, psychologists are still debating how accurate he was in interpreting what kinds of cognitive changes
underlie these patterns.

isolate the relationship between the ball’s width and its other with each row having the same number of coins with equal
physical properties. Thus, the child could not understand spaces between them. The experimenter then asks the child
that the increase in its width must be accompanied by a cor- whether both rows have the same number of coins or if one
responding decrease in its height. More generally, because row has more coins. When the child responds that they
the preoperational child lacks the ability to think about rela- have the same number of coins, the experimenter asks the
tions between concrete properties such as height and width, child to watch carefully, then spreads out one row so that
he cannot see how a change in one property might necessar- the coins in that row now form a much longer line. Again,
ily imply a change in another property. By contrast, older the experimenter asks the child whether one row has more
children realize that the ball must logically become shorter coins or if they both have the same number. Many pre-
in a way that compensates for its increasing width. schoolers will now answer that the longer row has more
Piaget’s theory predicted that children in each period coins.
except the last one are largely unable to grasp the kinds Part of Piaget’s genius lay in his ability to devise simi-
of concepts and problems that require cognitive abilities lar tasks to test children’s understanding of conservation
developed only in the next period. In his research, Piaget with many different kinds of quantities, such as number,
observed how children of different ages fared on specific liquid volume, mass, and length (see Figure 9.6). Piaget
types of tasks, and he made strong claims about their abili- argued that children fail at conservation tasks because they
ties based on their performance on these tasks. The most lack the critical mental operators, or formal mental tools,
famous and best studied of these tasks are the conservation needed to consider the relations between sets of properties.
tasks, in which children are asked to judge whether certain Operators are therefore logical, rule-based ways of compar-
physical properties of an object, such as its size or amount, ing mental representations of situations before and after
are “conserved” (remain unchanged) when the object is transformations.
transformed along different sorts of dimensions. Our ball In particular, Piaget believed that preoperational children
of dough is one such example—that is, an increase in width lack the logical operators of compensation, reversibility, and
must be associated with a decrease in height because the identity. The operator of compensation involves noting that
amount of dough remains the same. a change in one dimension compensates for a change in
To make the concept of conservation more explicit, con- another dimension. In the example of the two rows of coins,
sider one of the tasks used to test whether children have the children notice that one row is longer than the other
mastered the conservation of number. In this type of con- after the experimenter spreads out one of the rows of coins.
servation task, an experimenter shows the child two rows But if they lack the operator of compensation, they do not
of objects: let’s assume they are coins. Initially, as shown understand that the increase in length is due to an increase
in Figure 9.5, the coins are arranged in two identical rows, in the space between the coins. The operator of reversibility

A CLOSER LOOK AT PIAGET’S THEORY 309

 Are there the same number
focus excessively on one dimension of a transformation (for
of pennies in both rows or example, length) while ignoring other relevant dimensions
does one have more? (for example, density), a phenomenon called centration.
But he said that once children gain new mental computa-
The same.
tional and representational tools that enable them to solve
one conservation task, they begin gradually learning to use
these operators on a wider range of conservation tasks.

A Q: Provide three specific examples of different

conservation tasks.
Now watch what I do.

Piaget expanded his theory to explain the difficulties

that preoperational children have with many other kinds of
tasks besides conservation. One such task is the seriation
of objects, the ability to order objects according to a shared
property, such as length or size. A seriation task might
involve taking a pile of sticks of different lengths and put-
ting them in order from longest to shortest. This ability
B requires an understanding of the transitive ordering relation-
ships among the objects on a particular dimension, such as
Are there the same number
of pennies in both rows or
length—for example, if A is greater than B, and B is greater
does one have more? than C, then A must be greater than C on that dimension.
Piaget also applied his theory to children’s performance on
This one has more. classification tasks, which involve sorting objects accord-
ing to a consistent criteria, such as color, shape, or size.
Most relevant to this chapter, however, are the ways
in which Piaget used the same fundamental principles to

C
FIGURE 9.5 Piaget’s number conservation task. Children in the Task Transformation Question
preoperational stage seem to see the change in the length of a row Number ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ Are they the
of coins as relevant to the number of coins in the display, therefore same number?
failing to “conserve” number.
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢

Liquid Do they have

volume the same
involves noting that a change can be reversed or “run back- amount
of liquid?
ward” to return things to their initial condition. Thus, chil-
dren who lack the operator of reversibility fail to notice that
Mass Do they have
the longer row—which they believe has more coins—can the same
easily be transformed back to the length of the shorter row amount
of clay?
without removing any coins. The operator of identity involves
noting that values on a dimension are the same. In the case
of the rows of coins, this means noting that the critical Length Are they the
dimension of numerical value does not change—it remains same length
constant despite the other changes. But children lacking the of rope?

operator of identity do not realize that the number of coins

FIGURE 9.6 Conservation tasks. Piaget found that children in the
remains the same. Piaget argued that in the preoperational preoperational stage (about age 2 to 7) seemed to fail to conserve
period, children do not have these operators and, as a result, across many kinds of changes. These examples show some of the
are unable to conserve in any area. He also believed that pre- transformations Piaget used to test children’s ability to conserve
operational children’s lack of mental operators lead them to number, liquid volume, mass, and length.

310 CHAPTER 9 THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE

explain how preoperational children understand concepts in
such diverse domains as number, space, time, biology, and
physical mechanics. He believed that there are no a priori
mental processes or structures that are specifically suited for
particular domains. In his view, a child’s success in under-
standing each domain of knowledge follows directly from
how well she can pick up on that domain’s important pat-
terns using broad, general cognitive capacities. As the child
gains knowledge, her cognitive structures modify themselves
somewhat to fit what she has learned about the environ-
ment (see the discussion of accommodation in Chapter 5).
But these changes are constrained in important ways by the
child’s stage, or period, of cognitive development.

The Concrete Operational Period

According to Piaget, at roughly age 7, most children enter
the concrete operational period. The child moves into this
FIGURE 9.7 Concrete operations. Recycling objects by sorting
period by acquiring the same mental operators that he previ-
them into different types is a form of classification activity. Piaget
ously lacked, such as reversibility, identity, and compensation. argued that only in concrete operations do children fully understand
During the concrete operational period, from about age 7 to how to consistently classify objects and understand the relationships
12, children gradually expand their use of these mental oper- among classes, such as superordinate-subordinate relations.
ators by applying them to a broader range of problems (see
Figure 9.7). As a result, concrete operational children start to
respond correctly on conservation, seriation, and classifica-
tions of each one. Piaget held that this kind of thinking
tion tasks. It may take several years, however, before they can
requires a set of more abstract mental operators that the
smoothly use identity, compensation, and reversibility across
child acquires only in the final stage: formal operations.
all tasks and situations.
The mechanism of change that enables a child to prog-
ress from preoperational thought to concrete operations is
one of the less clearly explained aspects of Piaget’s theory. The Formal Operational Period
In general terms, Piaget suggested that the knowledge Formal operational thought has not been studied as much
structures of one stage, such as preoperational thought, as preoperational and concrete operational thought, and we
become progressively elaborated to a critical point, where will discuss it only briefly here. The formal operational
they become a launching platform for the next stage. The period was thought to emerge around age 12, and its hall-
child’s mental structures at the end of one stage start to mark was the ability to engage in hypothetico-deductive
lay the groundwork for the structures of the next stage, reasoning, the ability to think systematically about differ-
and through accommodation and assimilation, there is a ent possibilities that might depart from the current reality
qualitative restructuring of the child’s thought. Concrete (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). According to Piaget, this form of
operational thought, however, is not the final stage for reasoning is supported by new mental operators that enable
most children, for this period also has significant limita- adolescents to propose hypotheses, mentally explore their log-
tions that bind children to the here and now. Although ical consequences, and rule out alternative hypotheses. Thus,
concrete operational children use concepts such as com- an important aspect of a child’s advancement into the formal
pensation and transitivity to reason about concrete situ- operational period is the ability to reason logically without
ations, Piaget argued that they cannot reason about what reference to the immediate surroundings (which constitute
would happen if a situation were different from the way the concrete world of the concrete operational child). Tests of
it is. For example, they might have difficulty reasoning formal operations have often involved giving a child a physi-
about how the United States would be different if it were cal system, such as a set of pulleys, and seeing whether he can
a mirror image of itself (with San Francisco on the East figure out how the system works by systematically testing dif-
Coast and New York on the West Coast). Such reason- ferent hypotheses. Piaget believed that a younger child would
ing about hypotheticals was said to require an ability to try to learn how the system works by trial and error, often
generate a range of hypotheses and explore the implica- failing to explore critical components of the system.

A CLOSER LOOK AT PIAGET’S THEORY 311

 The child’s achievements during the formal operational
period were often thought to represent the emergence of
“scientific thinking skills,” the ability to plan and perform
experiments by isolating individual variables and seeing
how they change when they are systematically manipulated
one at a time (Klahr, 2000; Kuhn & Angelev, 1976; Kuhn &
Brannock, 1977; Kuhn et al., 2009). In contrast, children
who are not yet in the formal operational period would
simply tinker with different possibilities rather than think-
ing them through and applying them one by one. Indeed,
one group of researchers has described the developmental
transition from the concrete operational period to the for-
mal operational period as going from an engineering model
(how can I get this to work?) to a scientific model (how
does this work, and what are its critical causal features?)
(Schauble et al., 1991).
Piaget and Inhelder’s best-known studies of the develop-
ment of formal operations focused on a task in which chil-
dren had to figure out how to change the length of time
it takes a small pendulum to swing back and forth. The
children could vary the length of the pendulum’s string, the
weight of the pendulum bob, and the height from which
they dropped the bob to see what would cause the pendu-
lum to swing back and forth more quickly (see Figure 9.8).
Children in the concrete operational period often failed
FIGURE 9.8 Formal operations. In Piaget’s pendulum task,
to carefully test the effects of changing a single variable
children try to figure out what variables (length of the string,
while holding everything else constant. For example, these weight of the ball, or height from which the ball is dropped)
younger children typically did not compare the effects of determine the rate of swing. In the diagram, the boy is timing
using different bob weights with the same string length how long it takes for each ball to go through one complete
and drop height, or using different string lengths with the swing cycle. Piaget argued that children must be in the formal
same bob weight and drop height. These younger children operations stage to be able to systematically control variables
rarely realized that the string length was critical and that so as to unambiguously isolate length as the only critical variable
influencing periodicity.
the bob weight and drop height did not matter. Younger
children also failed on a number of other tasks that required
making systematic changes to a system to isolate the critical
variables.
The formal operational period differs from earlier peri- embraced this view of cognitive development. For example,
ods in Piaget’s theory in the sense that not all children we will see that Vygotsky’s (1978, 1986) sociocultural view
achieve it. During normal development, the vast majority of of cognitive development also proposed broad, sweep-
children eventually progress well into concrete operational ing changes in children’s modes of thought, even though
thought, but Piaget and Inhelder maintained that a sig- Vygotsky hypothesized quite different mechanisms of
nificant number of people never attain formal operations, change. As we evaluate Piaget’s theory, we should keep in
even in adulthood. In addition, there seems to be consid- mind that some criticisms of the domain-general patterns
erable cultural variation in the proportion of a population of change he proposed may extend to other domain-general
that achieves formal operations (Dasen, 1977). These varia- theories of development as well.
tions raise questions about whether formal operations really
represents a natural period of cognitive development that
emerges when concrete operational thought is sufficiently
developed. Q: What are some cognitive operations that,
Piaget was not unique in proposing that the major pat- according to Piaget’s theory, are common to
terns of developmental change involve across-the-board success in conservation tasks during the period
reorganizations of children’s internal representational of concrete operations?
and computational capacities. Several other thinkers also

312 CHAPTER 9 THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE

Alternative Explanations of
Piaget’s Theory and Results
Piaget’s theory of cognitive development covers an extraordi-
narily broad range of phenomena, including language, space,
number, time, causality, logic, and dreams (for overviews, see
Brainerd, 1978; Flavell, 1963; Ginsburg & Opper, 1988). This
breadth arises naturally from his theory of domain-general
qualitative changes in the ways that children represent infor-
mation. According to Piaget, these global changes should have
predictable effects on almost any cognitive domain, including
children’s thinking about physical, social, and abstract phe-
nomena. In addition, Piaget was extraordinarily creative in
designing empirical studies that would uncover ways in which
FIGURE 9.9 Why do young children fail on Piaget’s conserva-
younger children’s thinking differs from that of older children. tion tasks? Following Piaget’s early studies in which children failed
If Piaget’s account were even roughly correct, it would offer on conservation tasks like this one examining conservation of liquid
a truly unified theory of cognitive development—and the in different-sized glasses, researchers have proposed alternative
vast majority of his many studies and observations do yield reasons for why children fail on these tasks, raising questions about
essentially the same results when they are repeated today. The Piaget’s theory of cognitive developmental stages.
more controversial question, however, is whether these stud-
ies truly provide an accurate test of his claims. Researchers
have subjected his work to intense scrutiny over the past few how to encode it, however, they would do fine. (4) If some
decades (Brainerd, 1978; Fischer & Bidell, 1998; Gelman & aspect of the task seems to imply a particular kind of response,
Baillargeon, 1983). New studies have raised many questions the children might be responding based partly on how they
about Piaget’s account and have also revealed new patterns of believe the experimenter wants them to answer. Piaget’s theory
evidence, leading to the emergence of important new theories would be supported only if the children consistently fail on the
about children’s cognitive development. conservation task for the first of these reasons.
One way to test a theory like Piaget’s is to assess it experi- Another way to empirically assess alternative explanations
mentally using carefully designed variations of his tasks to for Piaget’s results would be to conduct a similar set of stud-
determine whether alternative explanations for children’s ies with adults. In such studies, the experimenter could slowly
task performance might be more plausible than Piaget’s increase the task’s demands on encoding, attention, and mem-
account. In doing so, researchers follow a method simi- ory to make it more difficult. The experimenter could also
lar to the one discussed in Chapter 8 for testing whether set up the tasks to subtly imply that a particular (incorrect)
egocentrism affects early language development. They ask response is desired. The alternative explanations for Piaget’s
whether much younger children can succeed at simpler findings would gain support if the adults fail at the more dif-
versions of the task that still tap into the specific ability ficult or unclear versions of the tasks in ways that resemble
of interest—and whether even older children fail at more young children’s failures. Since most adults would be consid-
sophisticated versions of the tasks. ered cognitively mature in Piaget’s view, their failures would
Researchers set up studies with variations on Piaget’s tasks help clarify how factors other than those that Piaget aimed to
to examine the bases for children’s failure or success on the test could influence performance on the tasks he designed.
tasks (see Figure 9.9). For example, 5-year-old children might As we consider specific Piagetian tasks in detail, we will
fail a conservation task for any of the following reasons: (1) As see several studies in which children seem to fail at Piaget’s
Piaget proposed, they might lack the critical cognitive struc- tasks for reasons 2 through 4. This evidence seems to
tures or abilities. (2) Even if they are capable of the type of undermine Piaget’s own explanation for the children’s fail-
reasoning or understanding that the task is designed to test, a ures (reason 1). Other studies have shown that, contrary to
particular version of the task might require other kinds of cog- Piaget’s theory, much younger children can sometimes show
nitive skills that are beyond the reach of most 5-year-olds. For elements of formal operations, the most advanced level of
example, the task might require remembering more informa- cognitive development in his theory (Klahr, 2000; Klahr
tion than most 5-year-olds can, or it might impose demands on et al., 1993; Zimmerman, 2000). In addition, when the tasks
attention that make it too difficult for 5-year-olds. (3) When are very complex in ways that tax memory and attention,
the children are presented with the task, they might not realize even adults frequently make errors in formal operational
which aspects are most important to keep in mind and so they thinking, such as failing to explore all the necessary manip-
might fail to encode the problem correctly. If they were shown ulations of variables in a scientific experiment. All of these

A CLOSER LOOK AT PIAGET’S THEORY 313

 Initial setup requires careful attention to the way each rod’s length relates
to the others. If you can remember all those relationships, you
will quickly know that if rod A is longer than rod B, and rod
B is longer than rod C, then rod A is also longer than rod C.
You must also remember to look at both ends of the rods and
not be swayed by what looks like constant length increases
along the tops if the bottoms are also changing relative to
Younger child (preoperational) Older child each other.
(concrete operational The key question about Piaget’s seriation task is whether
and beyond) children younger than around 7 fail because they are inca-
pable of transitive reasoning or because of other elements
or of the task. For example, younger children may have trou-
ble remembering how the length of each rod relates to the
lengths of the others. If so, perhaps solving the memory
problem would make transitive reasoning easy for them.
FIGURE 9.10 Seriation. In Piaget’s seriation task, the child is
Peter Bryant and Tom Trabasso conducted an elegant
asked to arrange a set of rods in order from shortest to longest.
Preoperational children fail at this task. They often line up the rods as
study to figure out whether young children might be fail-
increasing in length at one end, but ignore the other end, or they cor- ing at seriation tasks because of the tasks’ memory demands
rectly order a few rods at a time but are unable to arrange the whole (Bryant & Trabasso, 1971). This study clearly illustrates
set continuously. Piaget thought that children younger than about how carefully designed experiments can tease apart the rea-
7 typically fail at this task because they lack the mental operator that sons that children fail at Piagetian tasks.
supports transitive reasoning. Using the setup shown in Figure 9.11, Bryant and Tra-
basso extensively trained young children to compare pairs of
patterns of behavior lend support to the alternative explana- colored rods to determine which was longer. The children
tions for Piaget’s results. learned the length relationships for pairs of rods by associ-
In the studies designed to test the alternative explanations ating the lengths with the color of the rods and memoriz-
for the patterns of failures and successes on Piaget’s tasks, ing the inequalities in the lengths of these different-colored
young children typically still make errors. But in many cases,
their performance also vastly improves in ways that would be
difficult to explain if the children truly lacked certain cogni-
tive structures, as Piaget suggested. Consider, for example, the
cases of seriation, thinking about classes, and conservation. Which is greater, B or D?

I know that E>D, D>C,

Seriation Piaget developed classic seriation tasks, in which C>B, B>A, so D must
a group of objects must be ordered according to a shared be greater than B.
property, such as size or height. One of these tasks is to order A B C D E
rods according to their length, which is difficult for children
younger than roughly 7 years of age (see Figure 9.10). Their
failures at these tasks have often been cited as clear evidence
that they lack the ability to use transitive reasoning to under-
stand the relationships between several pairs of inequalities
FIGURE 9.11 Memory and transitive reasoning. In Bryant
(for example, to understand that if Adam is taller than Bill, and Trabasso’s study, researchers trained children by pulling pairs
and Bill is taller than Chris, then Adam also must be taller of colored rods out of a holder and showing the children the size
than Chris). Piaget claimed that preoperational children’s cog- differences between the rods. The children memorized the length
nitive structures do not allow them to use transitive reasoning inequality relationships (E>D, D>C, C>B, B>A) so that they were
when they attempt seriation tasks (Halford et al., 1998). able to correctly report size inequalities when just looking at the
If the younger child truly lacks the ability to use transitive rods inserted in the box. They were then asked about several new
reasoning, then it should be possible to show clear differences inequalities, which they could only determine through transitive
reasoning (for example, D>B). In this scenario, in which they were
between younger and older children on any task that requires
trained on the memory component of the task separately, preopera-
this skill. But consider for a moment how Piaget’s classic tional children could use transitive reasoning to figure out the novel
seriation tasks actually test a child’s transitive reasoning. inequalities. This finding suggests that young children had failed at
A child is shown a series of rods of different lengths and asked Piaget’s original seriation task because of problems with memory or
to order them from shortest to longest. Doing so correctly attention, not because they were incapable of transitive reasoning.

314 CHAPTER 9 THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE

rod pairs. They then were presented with pairs of rods that narrower, subordinate categories. These operators include
they had never directly seen side by side. To determine those transitivity (recognizing that supersets contain categories
length relationships, the children had to use transitive rea- directly subordinate to them as well as objects that are sub-
soning. The memory training had striking effects on the sets to those subordinate categories) and equivalences (real-
children’s performance. Once the younger children had dem- izing that two things are the same in some critical respect
onstrated reliable memories for the length relationships they even as they vary in another respect). For example, a child
were taught, they could easily make judgments about the new who has these operators would understand that if toy poodles
inequalities, presumably by using transitive reasoning (for are a subset of the category poodles, and poodles are a subset
example, recognizing that if rod D is longer than rod B, and of the category dogs, then toy poodles must also be a subset
B is longer than A, then D also must be longer than A). The of dogs. Similarly, a child would understand equivalence in
transitive reasoning component of the task did not seem to a case where a set of blue and red triangles forms a class that
cause them any problems. is distinct from one formed by a set of blue and red squares.
Bryant and Trabasso’s study suggests that by devising the In Piaget’s view, the limitations on preoperational children’s
right experimental task, such as training children to mem- understanding of these kinds of relationships keep them
orize a set of length inequalities before using those inequal- from realizing how hierarchically arranged categories relate
ities in transitive reasoning, researchers can disentangle to each other (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, 1964).
transitive reasoning skills from memory capacity. Moreover, In line with his theory, Piaget documented preschool
their findings suggest that children younger than about 7, children’s striking failures to understand classification. In
whom Piaget considered preoperational, may not have one of Piaget’s tasks, a preschooler was shown a bouquet of
problems with transitive reasoning itself. Rather, they are flowers consisting of nine daffodils and three daisies and
more likely to fail at transitive reasoning tasks because then was asked whether there were more daffodils or more
those tasks make larger memory demands than young flowers (see Figure 9.12). Many preschoolers responded that
children can manage (see Chapter 10). To defend Piaget’s there were more daffodils—which was logically impossible.
account, you would have to show that the new version of Of course, even if there are more daffodils than any other
the task is too different from the original one to serve as kind of flower, the daffodils still must be a subset within the
a true test of transitive reasoning (Halford, 1993). Such set of all flowers. Piaget interpreted this failure in reasoning
accounts would have to show that reducing the children’s about class-inclusion relations as evidence that the children
memory load by training them to remember some inequal- lacked the appropriate mental operators to infer transitivity
ities somehow does away with their need to use real transi- and hierarchical relations between classes.
tive reasoning to determine the novel length relationships.
(This is not an easy thing to show about Bryant and Tra-
basso’s study.)
Are there more daffodils
or more flowers?

Q: Why might children who actually There are more

daffodils.
understand transitive reasoning fail on most
transitive reasoning tasks?

Thinking about Classes Seriation is just one of many tasks

that Piaget used to support his theory. He also considered
how children reason about classes when they are thinking
about categories of objects. Because Piaget’s model was based
on domain-general (global) changes, he believed that all of
a child’s mental processes, including her understanding of FIGURE 9.12 Classification in preschool children. When asked,
classes, are limited in similar ways by the child’s stage of cog- “Are there more daffodils or more flowers?” in a mixed bouquet of
nine daffodils and three daisies, a preoperational child may say that
nitive development. Thus, he held that a preoperational child
there are more daffodils. Piaget argued that preoperational children
lacks the logical operators necessary to understand certain cannot reason about two classes at different levels (in this case,
kinds of relationships, including class-inclusion relations— daffodils and flowers). In his view, this limitation explains why they
that is, how different classes in a hierarchy relate to each seem to mistake the fact that there are more daffodils than daisies for
other and how broad superordinate categories can encompass evidence that there are more daffodils than flowers.

A CLOSER LOOK AT PIAGET’S THEORY 315

 Piaget also believed that preoperational children have of the experimental situation or the experimenter’s intentions.
difficulty understanding how classes are defined. He Consider, for example, how children’s performance on classi-
argued that they do not recognize that once a class is fication tasks changes when the classes are made less arbitrary
set up and defined by a set of properties, such as all red and more meaningful (Rosch et al., 1976).
things, that criteria have to remain constant throughout The basic level of categorization falls at an intermediate
all subsequent uses of the class. Rather, Piaget found that level of specificity. It is narrower than the very general, super-
when sorting things into classes, preschoolers frequently ordinate categories, such as animals, furniture, and clothing,
abandon one criterion and switch to another. A 4-year-old but broader than highly specific subordinate categories, such
might begin sorting things into a class based on the cri- as collies, kitchen chairs, and T-shirts. As Figure 9.13 shows,
terion of color and, before finishing, end up switching to the basic level corresponds to such things as horses, dogs,
the criterion of texture. Piaget also noted that instead of tables, chairs, pants, and shirts. At the basic level, all cat-
grouping objects based on a single criterion, such as hav- egory members are both maximally similar to each other and
ing four legs, preschoolers sometimes sort objects based maximally distinct from members of other categories. At the
on their thematic relationships. For example, imagine an superordinate level, such as the category animals, members
exercise in which a child is shown pictures of three barn- need to have only a few common features to belong to the
yard animals (a cow, a horse, and a sheepdog), three ani- category. On the other hand, within a basic-level category
mal areas (stables, a dairy barn, and a doghouse), and like horses, there are few obvious differences between mem-
three kinds of animal food (oats, hay, and dog food). bers, such as Arabian horses and quarter horses. Children’s
A researcher then asks the child to “put the ones together earliest word labels also tend to fall at the basic level of cat-
that go together.” A 4-year-old might put the horse, the sta- egorization, and these words tend to be among the short-
bles, and the oats together; might group the cow, the barn, est and most frequently used words in a language (Murphy,
and the hay; and then might put together the dog, the dog- 2002; Murphy & Lassaline, 1997; Rosch et al., 1976).
house, and the dog food. Because there are no logical com- There are many distinctive features of basic-level catego-
mon criteria uniting the items in each group, the groups are ries that reinforce the idea that this is the most cognitively
not true classes in the logical sense. In contrast, at around natural level of categorization and perhaps therefore the
7 years of age, a child would form true class-based clusters easiest to think about (Murphy, 2002; Murphy & Lassa-
of animals, dwellings, and foods. Piaget believed that the line, 1997; Rosch et al., 1976). The question therefore arises:
younger child fails because he does not yet have the men- Could young children reason about classification more
tal operators necessary to understand the logical bases of easily using basic-level categories? Eleanor Rosch and her
classes. colleagues explored this possibility by asking young children
The developmental changes that Piaget described for rea- to sort or group together items that resembled each other at
soning about classes have been subject to the same concerns either the basic level of categorization or the superordinate
as his accounts of transitive reasoning and seriation: Could level (Rosch et al., 1976). Thus, a child might be given four
factors other than the ones Piaget proposed be responsible for kinds of toy vehicles and four different kinds of clothing and
these changes in performance? Apart from Piaget’s view that asked to group the items that go together (superordinate
domain-general limits constrain children’s reasoning abilities, categories), or they might be given four kinds of toy cars
other possible factors include the tasks’ demands on memory and four kinds of shirts to sort (basic-level categories). The
and attention, the arbitrariness and meaninglessness of the same preschoolers who failed to sort based on superordinate
tasks for younger children, and potential misunderstandings categories showed no problems sorting based on basic-level

clothing furniture animals Superordinate

categories

Basic-level
shirts pants tables chairs horses dogs
categories

Subordinate
T-shirts ski pants coffee tables kitchen chairs Arabians collies categories

FIGURE 9.13 Basic-level categories. The basic level is an intermediate level of categorization that seems to be especially salient, psycho-
logically natural, and easy to think about. Preschoolers are much better at sorting objects into basic-level categories than they are at using other
category levels. This finding suggests that young children’s failures at class-inclusion reasoning may have more to do with their difficulties think-
ing about the relevant categories than with missing the mental operators pertaining to classification.

316 CHAPTER 9 THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE

categories; they easily put all the shirts together and all the but we only need to examine a few studies to see that some
cars together. Thus, younger children are capable of the of the findings deeply challenge Piaget’s theory.
kind of feature-based, logical classifications that they fail at Consider, for example, preschool children’s apparent
in Piaget’s sorting tasks. inability to conserve number. In the number conservation
If their mental abilities only allowed them to sort items task, children are asked to compare the number of coins
thematically, preoperational children would be unable to in each of two equal lines and then to compare them
sort by class regardless of the categories. Their much better again after the experimenter has spread the coins in one
performance with basic-level categories raises the serious line farther apart. Does the child fail, as Piaget supposed,
possibility that they fail to sort by superordinate catego- because she cannot think in terms of principles such as
ries either because it requires processing larger amounts of reversibility (what would happen if the spread-out coins
information than the children can keep in mind at once or were moved closer together again) and identity (no coins
because the categories themselves are unfamiliar or arbi- were added or removed in the transformation, so there
trary. In fact, Rosch’s studies were just the start of a line must be the same number before and after it)? Alterna-
of research showing that young children can think about tively, does she have all the cognitive capacities necessary
categories in surprisingly sophisticated ways, especially at to answer correctly, but simply misunderstands what the
the basic level. If young children have a good understand- researcher is asking?
ing of how a category relates to other familiar information, A pioneering series of studies by Margaret Donaldson
this knowledge also seems to help them reason about the and her colleagues raised serious questions about how chil-
category. dren in the preoperational age range (about 2 to 7 years
Children also seem to be more capable of class-inclusion old) interpret Piaget’s number conservation tasks. As we
reasoning than Piaget thought. For example, if preschoolers saw in Chapter 8, in interactions with others, even very
are shown a group of five “boy” frogs and two “girl” frogs young children take into account pragmatic factors, such as
and then asked whether there are more boy frogs or more others’ actions and intentions as well as aspects of the social
frogs, they will make the usual class-inclusion mistake— context, to infer meaning and to guide their interpretations
claiming that there are more boy frogs. But if they are asked of what is wanted in a task. Perhaps these factors can also
instead if there are more boy frogs or more in the “family” influence young children’s performance on conservation
of frogs, then they will correctly say that there are more in tasks.
the family (Markman & Siebert, 1976). The label “family” Donaldson and her colleagues suggested that the tra-
may help the child solve this problem by drawing her atten- ditional number conservation task is confusing for chil-
tion to relationships organizing the whole “collection.” This dren because it is so pragmatically unusual (Donaldson,
pattern of findings raises questions about Piaget’s original 1978, 1983; McGarrigle & Donaldson, 1974). How often
account, given that such a small change in the question can does someone ask how many things there are in a display,
significantly change children’s performance (McGarrigle & then purposely manipulate those things and ask about the
Donaldson, 1974). More broadly, researchers have found number again—unless the questioner thinks it likely that
that young children are able to think about categories in the number of things has changed? Repeating the same
ways that suggest not only an appreciation of class inclu- question may suggest to the child that the experimenter
sion but also the advantages of learning about categories as is asking again because she has changed the number. To
a whole as opposed to merely learning about the individuals explore this possibility, Donaldson modified the task in a
that make up those categories (Cimpian & Park, 2013; see simple way that significantly changed the pragmatics of the
Scientific Method box). interaction—that is, the intentions that the child attributed
to the experimenter.
In one of Donaldson’s variations, which we will call the
“clumsy experimenter” variation, the experimenter pretends
Q: What are some ways of making to slip and accidentally change the length of one row of
classification tasks easier for preschoolers? objects, so that it becomes either longer or shorter than the
other row. In a different variation, the child sees a “naughty
teddy bear” mess up the display, making one of the rows
either shorter or longer than the other, before being scolded
Conservation Hundreds of studies have reexamined and sent away. In both of these variations on number con-
Piaget’s conservation tasks from different perspectives to see servation tasks, preschoolers succeed much more often than
whether his explanations for children’s failure to conserve they do in Piaget’s original version. In these variations, they
hold up under scrutiny. The full story of this research is frequently say that the number of objects has not changed,
complex (see Brainerd, 1978; Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983), despite the change in the row’s length.

A CLOSER LOOK AT PIAGET’S THEORY 317

 SCIENTIFIC METHOD: Early Motivation to Learn about Kinds over Individuals
Hypothesis: Knowledgeable adult
Young children are motivated to learn about kinds (or categories) I know lots of things
of objects from reliable sources and prefer to learn new information about the pangolin
about kinds of objects than to learn new information about particular in this picture and
instances, even though the instances are more concrete. lots of things about
pangolins.
Method:
1. There were 48 children having an average age of 4 years 9 months
who participated in the study.
2. There were 24 children in the knowledgeable-adult condition and
24 children in the ignorant-adult condition.
3. In the knowledgeable-adult condition, the experimenter told the Ignorant adult
child that she knew a great deal about a set of four pictures and, for I don’t know anything
each picture, invited the child to choose whether he wanted to learn about the pangolin
from the experimenter about an individual novel animal (“the one in this picture, and
pangolin in this picture”) or the kind of animal (“this kind of animal, I don’t know anything
about pangolins.
pangolins”).
4. In the ignorant-adult condition, the experimenter told the child that
she knew nothing about the set of pictures and invited the child to
choose whether he wanted the experimenter to guess something
about “the one pangolin in this picture” or about “this kind of ani-
mal, pangolins.”
80

Results: With the knowledgeable adult, children strongly preferred to

Percent choices of kinds
70
learn about the kind of animal. With the ignorant adult, children showed
no significant preferences but some tendency to prefer guesses about 60
the individual animal. The preference for learning about kinds with
knowledgeable adults therefore is not simply because children generally 50
prefer to hear information about kinds; they do so only when they think
that the information is likely to be of high quality. 40

Conclusion: Even though young children might be thought to prefer 30

to first learn about single concrete instances of categories, in fact they
0
prefer to learn high-quality information about entire kinds at a more Knowledgeable Ignorant
abstract level. adult adult

Source study: Cimpian & Park (2013).

It seems that in Piaget’s original task, the child might be task variation. In this variation, the younger children often
thinking, “I just told him the number of coins in each row answer correctly when the question about number is asked
is the same. Why is he asking me the same question again? only once, which avoids any pragmatic confusion (Rose &
He must have changed the number somehow, and he wants Blank, 1974; Samuel & Bryant, 1984).
to see if I can tell. Since one row is longer than it was before, Donaldson’s critique of pragmatically odd components in
I guess he must have added something and that’s why he is Piaget’s number conservation task that might mislead young
asking.” In Donaldson’s pragmatically different variations, children can also be extended to Piaget’s other conserva-
however, the experimenter never intentionally changes the tion tasks (Donaldson, 1985; Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983).
rows of objects and seems to be asking the question a sec- All of the classic versions of these tasks, whether they test
ond time simply to make sure nothing has changed (see conservation of number, weight, liquid volume, or another
Figure 9.14). Donaldson’s claim that young children often property, involve the odd practice of asking a child the same
fail at the original task because they misinterpret the experi- question twice, before and after intentionally manipulating
menter’s intentions gained further support from another the materials. Donaldson’s studies show that young children

318 CHAPTER 9 THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE

 that a child fails a conservation of number task because
Are there the same number the task uses numbers that are too large for the child
of pennies in both rows or
does one have more? to track. After all, if an adult observed two equal-sized
piles of 324 coins and then saw an experimenter move
The same. one pile around so that it took up more space, even the
adult might fail to conserve—responding to the question
A
“Which has more coins?” by simply picking the pile that
B seemed larger. To test whether this kind of complexity
is a factor in children’s conservation task performance,
researchers can simplify the tasks by using fewer objects.
A
For example, a child might be asked to compare a row
of three objects with a row of two objects. In addition,
Uh-oh! That naughty teddy the question “Which has more?” may be ambiguous. The
bear is messing up the child may think that this is a question about which over-
rows of pennies.
all size or length is greater, rather than a reference to the
number of objects. To avoid this problem, an experimenter
could teach the child that the “winner” of two displays is
A the one with more objects and then ask, “Which is the
B winner?” With these changes to the number conserva-
tion tasks, even preschoolers often succeed on the tasks
B
(R. Gelman, 1969, 1972).
Children still do not perform perfectly on these modi-
Now, are there the same fied tasks, however, which raises questions about where the
number of pennies in both additional difficulties lie. Given the substantial improve-
rows or does one have more?
ments that young children achieve on the simplified tasks,
The same number.
it is likely that their remaining problems have to do with
the tasks’ demands on memory and attention, and the need
to interpret the pragmatics of the experimental situation,
A rather than with the kind of global, qualitative differences
B
in reasoning that Piaget theorized.
Although children’s mental abilities are not strictly limited
C across-the-board by the constraints that Piaget described,
FIGURE 9.14 Changing pragmatics and conservation of children may still undergo some global developmental shifts
number. In variations on Piaget’s number conservation task, either in the biases and strategies that guide their thinking. That
a clumsy experimenter or a “naughty teddy bear” seem to acciden- is, when younger children take stock of a problem, they may
tally change the length of one row. Because the child does not see focus on different kinds of information than older children
the experimenter intentionally change one row and then ask about do. This difference in focus may lead younger children to
number a second time, the pragmatics of the task are changed answer incorrectly, even though they are capable of using
dramatically. In these altered tasks, preoperational children become
the kind of logic required to solve the problem. For example,
much more likely to conserve number. Adapted from McGarrigle &
Donaldson (1974).
younger children might focus on compelling perceptual fea-
tures of displays and discount recent history. Thus, when
they are asked whether the volume of water in a display has
do not have the kind of central cognitive deficits for under- changed when it is poured from a short container into a tall
standing conservation that Piaget proposed. Nonetheless, one, they might focus on the tall beaker’s height and disre-
even in the modified tasks that reduce pragmatic demands, gard the fact that the same water was recently in a shorter,
younger children still make more mistakes than older chil- wider beaker. This failure appears similar to the one Piaget
dren. This pattern suggests that the odd pragmatic cues in described, but it may actually reflect a lapse in attention or
the original tasks do not fully explain young children’s fail- memory of the sort that even adults sometimes show, rather
ures. What other sorts of factors might be at work? than an inability to use certain logical operators. In a related
One type of influence on children’s performance has to vein, younger children might remember the last piece of
do with complexities of the task that make it more diffi- information they received (for example, that the water is now
cult, even though they are irrelevant to the type of reason- in the tall beaker) and weigh that information more heav-
ing that the task is designed to test. Suppose, for example, ily than their knowledge of what happened earlier. Either of

A CLOSER LOOK AT PIAGET’S THEORY 319

these biases could explain many of children’s conservation children certainly differ in what they know and what they
errors. can do, but describing those differences as qualitatively dif-
These mistakes are easier to understand if you consider ferent stages of general cognitive development has proved
that even adults are susceptible to perceptual illusions about quite difficult.
quantity. Most adults will assume that a tall, thin glass
holds more than a shorter, fatter one unless they see the
liquid poured from one glass into the other. Adults also
tend to underestimate the volumes of spheres and cubes and Q: How might pragmatic factors make a
overestimate the volumes of elongated shapes. (This bias is child who understands conservation fail on
common knowledge in retail sales: candy bars, cereal boxes, conservation tasks?
and shampoo bottles are often elongated to give an illusion
of larger volume.) Children are subject to the same percep-
tual biases. Now suppose that they also tend to find the
end state of a transformation much more salient than the
past states before the transformation. In this case, children
would be taken in by the perceptual illusion that the taller
Domains of Knowledge
container, where the liquid ends up, seems to have a larger One consequence of the research that challenges Piaget’s
volume than the prior, shorter container. They would fail domain-general theory has been a surge of interest in how
the conservation task, but not necessarily because they lack development proceeds in specific domains of knowledge.
the necessary mental operators. It appears that the domains of psychology, physics, spatial
Piaget was aware of many of these possible pitfalls in layout, number, and biology each show distinctive patterns
his theory. He acknowledged that young children seem to of cognitive development guided by their own domain-
focus excessively on beginning and ending states and ignore specific constraints. The nature of those constraints—
the transformations themselves, especially their reversibil- whether they are largely foundational and innate or
ity and how one dimension compensates for another. He emergent and developing over time within each of these
also relied on the notion of centration, arguing that young domains—is more open to debate. Thus, children may
children have great difficulty focusing on more than one approach the world with core cognitive systems that are
dimension of a task, such as both height and width in the constrained from the start for learning about specific kinds
case of liquid volume. But he assumed that this happens of input, such as spatial relationships, number, or biologi-
because younger children lack the mental operators that cal patterns. Alternatively, children may start with more
enable them to understand transformations. More recent general, all-purpose learning systems in which they take
findings indicate that younger children do not seem to show in and begin to interrelate bits of information about the
qualitative differences from older children in terms of their world over time, putting this information together into
ability to understand and reason about seriation, classifica- larger structures of knowledge that start to take on a life of
tion, and conservation. Instead, researchers have found that their own and exert emergent constraints that are unique
younger children sometimes seem to be overloaded by the to that domain. When scholars envision a domain as being
tasks’ demands on memory and attention, and they tend constrained by foundational and innate constraints, they
to focus on different aspects of the problems than older often refer to such domains as core domains, suggesting
children. that these are basic universal cognitive components shared
Beyond his research on seriation, classification, and con- by all infants throughout the world and which then become
servation, Piaget also studied children’s understanding of elaborated on and combined in more powerful ways over the
many real-world concepts, including their thoughts about course of development (Carey & Spelke, 1996; R. Gelman,
dreams, living things, aging, spatial relations, and causal- 2009; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007).
ity. In all of these areas of knowledge, he tried to explain As is so often the case in development, this distinction
children’s errors in terms of qualitative differences in chil- between the roles of foundational and emergent constraints
dren’s cognitive capacities at different ages. In each of these is not an either/or situation. Both types of constraints always
cases, challenges to Piaget’s explanations have been raised work together, even as one type may constrain the develop-
that resemble the critiques of his theories about seriation, mental process to a greater degree at particular times. For
classification, and conservation. Although younger children example, domain-specific foundational constraints may pro-
do fail at Piaget’s experimental tasks, follow-up studies have vide a necessary “foothold” for initial learning in a given area.
shown how difficult it is to point to global, qualitative dif- Then, as the child learns more, this new knowledge may con-
ferences in the ways that preschoolers and elementary school tribute to emergent constraints that guide later learning and
children mentally represent information. Younger and older the knowledge structures that are created. In each of these

320 CHAPTER 9 THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE

domains, we will see how the child’s knowledge emerges in with this idea, Piaget found that young children responded
ways that challenge the older views of global, stage-based egocentrically in several tasks testing spatial orientation.
change, favoring instead the idea of domain-specific knowl- In one of Piaget’s best-known tasks, the three mountains
edge “journeys” that are quite distinct to each area of knowl- task, he constructed a scene made out of three papier-mâché
edge. Thus, we will see how children’s understanding of mountains, each with distinctive colors and landmarks. The
space, number, and biology each takes on a life of its own three mountains were placed on a board in clear and unam-
with unique developmental patterns. biguous spatial relation to each other (see Figure 9.15). Chil-
dren were asked to describe what a doll who was sitting at a
different spot than the child would see and to choose what
the doll would see from among pictures of four different
Spatial Relations vantage points of the scene. The researcher then asked the
We saw in Chapter 5 that infants can track an object’s loca- child to reconstruct the scene from each of the four points
tion in a small space and that, on a larger scale, young tod- of view by placing the three mountains on an empty surface
dlers can sometimes find their way back to a starting point and then putting a doll in such a position that the doll would
in a novel setting. Mentally representing the spatial layout see that view. In each case, children younger than about 7
of an environment, however, is a more complex task. This years old responded in a manner that was interpreted as
ability becomes increasingly important in the preschool and spatially egocentric. Thus, they often thought that the doll
elementary school years, as children come to navigate more (who was in a different position than they were) would still
extensive environments independently. This more complex see just what they saw, and they had enormous difficulty
ability raises similar issues to those that we considered in understanding how the scene would look from a point of
the earlier discussion of infants’ spatial abilities: How do view other than their own. Piaget concluded that younger
children know where they are relative to where they started, children are unable to take more than one perspective on
and how do they keep track of desired objects? a scene and are unable to free themselves from their own
As a child’s increased mobility allows her access to larger particular point of view. He assumed that this behavior rep-
and more cluttered environments, it becomes more difficult resents a very general cognitive deficit that reflects being in
for her to see all the terrain she has covered at once. A child the preoperational stage.
must internally represent the space to keep track of where In other tasks related to the child’s sense of object loca-
she is and where she wants to go. If a child loses track of her tion, if a young child initially learned that an object was
location, she needs to be able to reorient herself using famil- in a corner of the room that was to her left, she would still
iar aspects of the environment and their relationships to look to her left for the object later, even if she had turned
each other. For many years, psychologists have known that around so that the object was now to her right. Older chil-
humans and other animals use cognitive maps by which dren would not make this mistake, since they would use the
they mentally represent the spatial layout of their environ- object’s relationships to other features of the environment
ment to infer distance, direction, and ways of navigating to guide their search, rather than the object’s relationship to
(Tolman, 1948). But the research tradition examining how their own body orientation.
nonhuman animals learn the layout of an environment has Other studies suggested, however, that even young chil-
only recently merged with the study of humans’ spatial dren could sometimes think about spatial relationships in
and navigational skills to explore how humans develop an less egocentric ways. For example, consider what happened
understanding of spatial layout. Taken together, these lines when children were instructed to place a doll where it could
of research are suggesting new ways of addressing some of “hide” from a policeman. In this situation, even 3-year-old
the phenomena that Piaget examined.
Piaget made a number of proposals about how children
develop the ability to mentally represent the layout of an
environment and other spatial relationships (see Chapter 5
for the discussion of Piaget’s views about infants’ spatial
knowledge). One of Piaget’s ideas that was especially relevant
to cognitive maps was his notion that young children can
think about and remember spatial layouts and relations only
in terms of their own point of view (that is, egocentrically)
and not in terms of independent coordinates, like the longi-
tude and latitude on a map (Piaget, 1936/1953, 1954). (This FIGURE 9.15 Piaget’s three mountains task. A classic demon-
idea is closely tied to Piaget’s theories that young children use stration of apparent egocentrism in young children. Egocentrism was
language egocentrically, as described in Chapter 8.) In line thought to influence the child’s understanding of spatial relations.

DOMAINS OF KNOWLEDGE 321

children were more successful at overcoming their egocen-
tric perspective to take the doll’s “viewpoint,” presumably
because the task seemed more familiar and accessible to
them (Hughes, 1975). Given the conflicting findings about
whether young children think about spatial relations ego-
centrically, researchers began to wonder if egocentrism is
really a consequence of being in a preoperational period of
cognitive development. Another possibility, as we saw in
Chapter 8’s discussion of egocentric language, is that many
children, and even adults, may resort to egocentric thinking
when cognitive tasks become very challenging.
A separate line of animal research gave rise to a new per- FIGURE 9.16 Navigating with contour information. The asym-
spective on spatial cognition that had strong implications for metrical terrain in natural environments creates contours that allow an
humans (Gallistel, 1990; see also Pick, 1983). The animal organism to identify its unique location within that environment. This
research helped clarify two crucial points about spatial cog- sense of place, which occurs largely outside of awareness, appears
nition: (1) An organism can use many kinds of information to be one of the earliest-emerging capabilities in humans and one
to track its spatial location, and (2) the type of spatial infor- that is shared with many other animals. The orange line illustrates
mation that an organism relies on depends partly on the how this location has a kind of shape, or contour, that is defined by
the larger surfaces on the perimeter of the clearing.
particular task and setting. Thus, the animal might draw on
one kind of information in one context and another kind in
a second context. These animal studies also suggested why overall shape can become a powerful means of knowing our
young children perform so differently on various types of location. This way of representing location works well even
spatial tasks. For example, a small enclosure may be men- when local landmarks or other small features of the landscape
tally represented differently from the way a large room is change. It can also work well in low light or with limited
represented, which in turn may be represented differently visual acuity (Gallistel, 1990).
from the way a village is represented (Acredolo, 1990; Lear- Using geometric information only fails in perfectly
month et al., 2002). Additional cognitive abilities may be symmetrical artificial environments. For example, in a
involved in grasping the spatial relations in maps and scale rectangular room, geometric information will always be
models and determining how they correspond to their real- ambiguous. Because the enclosure is symmetrical, every
world counterparts (DeLoache, 1987, 1989). Yet another set point in the room corresponds to a second point where
of spatial abilities may be involved in manipulating small the available geometric information is exactly the same.
objects such as tools (Newcombe et al., 2013; Spelke et al., Imagine yourself in the room shown in Figure 9.17. Based
2010). To understand how humans’ spatial knowledge devel-
ops, we first need to consider a few of the many ways in B C
which an organism keeps track of its location.
Landmarks can provide one source of spatial infor-
mation by serving as consistent reference points (see
Chapter 5). Both people and other animals can navigate
by estimating distance and direction in relation to these
salient objects in the environment. Of course, for land-
marks to be useful, we must note how they appear from
different angles. Then, based on our viewpoint, we can
figure out an approximate sense of direction and location
relative to the landmark. If we also know the landmark’s A D
actual size, then its perceived size can convey an approxi- FIGURE 9.17 Ambiguous contour information in an artificial
mate sense of how far away it is. environment. What would happen if you were located at the star
A second method of locating ourselves in space is highly and used only contour information to remember this location? You
reliable but involves little attention to local landmarks. This would recall facing the corner with a long wall on your left and a
short wall on your right. In this kind of artificial, symmetrical environ-
method makes use of the geometric information in an envi-
ment, however, this set of contour information also matches a second
ronment. That is, we construct a mental representation of location: corner C. Rats, young children, and even adults (if they are
the environment’s overall shape. Most natural scenes have kept from using landmark information) will incorrectly choose C about
an asymmetrical outline (see Figure 9.16). Recognizing this as often as they correctly recall A, even if there is a vivid distinguish-
outline and knowing where we are relative to its edges and ing landmark at A.

322 CHAPTER 9 THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE

on geometric information, you recall that when you are perfectly symmetrical. In natural environments, the shape
facing the walls, an object in the room is near the cor- of an area can almost always serve as a unique guide to loca-
ner where a long wall on your left meets a short wall on tion (Lee et al., 2012).
your right—but that relation specifies two locations in As suggested earlier, the type of spatial information that
the room, not just one. Researchers have made use of this is used depends in part on the setting. Children and other
potential problem, which applies specifically to using geo- animals seem to rely on geometric information in small
metric information in symmetrical environments, to test rooms (say, 4 feet by 6 feet). In considerably bigger rooms,
whether subjects are using this geometric information to however, both children and animals rely less on geometric
recall locations. They may ask subjects to return to a par- cues and may use landmark information along with simple
ticular spot in a symmetrical room and pay attention to spatial relations, remembering, for example, that the object
the types of errors they make. If the subjects choose both is a bit to the left of one side of a landmark (Burgess, 2006;
of the corresponding locations equally often, even when Learmonth, et al., 2002; Lourenco & Huttenlocher, 2007).
other available information specifies the one correct loca- They may use geometric information less often in large
tion, then it can be inferred that they are primarily using rooms because it is harder to see the whole room at once
geometric information (the contours of their environment) to determine its shape (Lavenex & Banta Lavanex, 2006).
to remember where objects are. Other studies have shown that even in small enclosed spaces
where geometric cues are uninformative, such as square
rooms, children can still reorient themselves if the cues are
Q: What are two different ways of navigating not wall colors or landmarks, but surface textures such as
through space? gradients of raised dots that vary in density (Lourenco et al.,
2009; Nardini et al., 2008).
As children grow older, they become increasingly able
When rats’ spatial abilities are tested in artificial rectan- to use other sources of information, such as landmarks, to
gular enclosures, they show errors suggesting that they often orient themselves and to find hidden objects. They usually
rely heavily on geometric information and ignore other start successfully using landmarks at about age 5, which is
forms of information on location (Cheng, 1986; Cheng & also the age at which they increasingly refer to objects in
Gallistel, 1984). Imagine that a rat is put into a rectangular terms of relative spatial locations (for example, “to the left
box, where it discovers food in a particular location. The rat of”). Some researchers argue that language helps children to
is then briefly moved to another enclosure, where it is spun integrate different forms of spatial information, such as land-
around in the dark so that it is fully disoriented. When it is marks and layout, into one coherent representation of space
put back into the first box, it correctly locates the spot where (Shusterman et al., 2011; Spelke, 2003; Spelke & Lee, 2012).
it previously found food only half of the time, even when Others counter that although children begin using
there are unique landmarks in the box that correspond to more spatial language at the same time that they become
where the food is hidden. The rat’s error during the other increasingly able to use multiple sources of spatial infor-
half of the trials reveals its use of geometric information. It mation, these linguistic changes do not actually cause
mistakenly chooses the mirror-image location that corre- new spatial abilities to emerge (Newcombe et al., 2013;
sponds to the original location of the food. Thus, the rat Sovrano et al., 2002; Twyman & Newcombe, 2010). This
seems to learn the location in terms of the overall shape of question is still being debated. Either way, the earlier,
the environment. Piagetian view of younger children’s spatial knowledge
The animal research raised the question of whether, in as being purely egocentric has not held up, as newer evi-
some circumstances, young children might show the same dence has shown how and in what circumstances chil-
pattern of mistakes. Remarkably, when young preschoolers dren use different types of spatial information (Acredolo,
were disoriented and put in small, symmetrical enclosures, 1978, 1990; Hughes, 1975).
they behaved very much like the rats (Hermer & Spelke, We have seen that younger children rely more on geo-
1994, 1996). They seemed to rely exclusively on geomet- metric information in smaller environments, while older
ric information, and roughly 50 percent of their searches children can more easily integrate other kinds of spatial
incorrectly led to the second, mirror-image location sug- information. Nonetheless, the development of navigational
gested by geometric relations. Like the rats, they made these skills is not a matter of replacing one way of mentally repre-
mistakes despite the salient landmarks that pointed to the senting layout with another way. Older children and adults
correct location. Nonetheless, even though this strategy of certainly still use geometric information as a guide to loca-
orienting by geometric information leads to errors when it tion. In some circumstances when adults are distracted,
is used in symmetrical enclosures, it is an excellent strategy they will even favor geometric information over other kinds
in the natural world, where environments are almost never of spatial information, even ignoring landmarks and other

DOMAINS OF KNOWLEDGE 323

local cues. Similarly, in some kinds of simplified naviga-
tion tasks, younger children and even infants as young as
6 months can be guided to increase their use of landmark
information and other local cues (Learmonth et al., 2002;
Lew et al., 2004; Newcombe, 2002).
Taken together, the evidence from research suggests
that, at all ages, people can use a navigational system that
keeps track of geometric information as a source of spatial
knowledge. But recent studies suggest that they do not use
all the available geometric information and instead tend to
encode such things as “long wall to the left of the short
wall” rather than precise angles between walls (Hupbach &
Nadel, 2005; Spelke et al., 2010). As children grow older,
they become better able to flexibly use and integrate many
FIGURE 9.18 Understanding counting. Knowing how to count
different sources of spatial information and to use more of
requires understanding what sorts of things are sensible to count as
the available geometric information, such as angles. They one group. In this market scene, we might choose to count indi-
also become better at coordinating geometric cues with vidual food items, types of foods, people, males or females, sellers
other forms of information, such as landmarks, for orient- or buyers, or human-made versus natural things, among many other
ing or locating objects. choices. These choices require a grasp of meaningful categories and
It is not yet clear just how distinct the brain systems of which kinds of things are countable, an understanding available
that use geometric information are from those that use even to very young children but not to any computer.
other forms of spatial information (Cheng & Newcombe,
2005; Lew, 2011). But there is an emerging consensus that
navigation, orientation, and object manipulation ultimately to groups of things, and how numbers relate to each other.
involve a complex interplay of several different forms of (We will look at aspects of school-based instruction of math-
information. Many of these appear to have roots or simpler ematics in Chapters 10 and 11.)
forms that are evident even in infancy but that can take We saw in Chapter 5 that infants seem to have some sense
years to become fully integrated into an efficient and flex- of numerosity of small displays and some intuitive arithmeti-
ible system of spatial cognition. cal skills that give them a sense of what changes when small
amounts are added or subtracted. But even with all their
impressive achievements, infants’ understanding of num-
Q: What facets of geometric information are ber is very different from that of preschoolers, who in turn
differ from older children in this area of knowledge. Take,
not fully grasped by younger children and infants? for example, the case of counting aloud. Because preverbal
infants obviously cannot count this way, researchers can
only infer that they can somehow extract information about
quantities from small displays. For example, one study found
that 18-month-olds, but not 15-month-olds, look longer
Number at a video in which a hand points successively to each of six
Along with spatial and navigational skills, another area of objects while a voice in their own language counts up to
intuitive knowledge that young children acquire through 6 than they look at a video in which the hand moves back
experience is their understanding of number. Every culture and forth between the same two objects while the voice
uses some system of mathematics in everyday life. Most adults counts to 6 (Slaughter et al., 2011). They do not show any
are able to count groups of items and use addition and sub- difference in looking, however, if the voice counts in another
traction to compute changes to those groups. As described in language or if they hear different beeps instead of spoken
Chapter 5, even young infants seem to be sensitive to number. numbers.
In this chapter, we focus on the intuitive knowledge of num- Researchers have hypothesized that preschool children
ber that seems to be spontaneously acquired in the real world have implicit knowledge of the counting principles of one-
in early childhood, outside formal instruction in school. For to-one correspondence (one number label per object), sta-
example, some of the most important aspects of quantifying ble order (numbers are always counted in the same order),
the world involve identifying what sorts of things to count in cardinality (the last number counted is the total number of
the same set or class (see Figure 9.18), how to assign numbers objects in a group), abstraction (anything can be counted),

324 CHAPTER 9 THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE

and order irrelevance (it doesn’t matter which object is
counted first or in which order), although the young chil- Can you count these? One, two, three, four,
five, six, seven.
dren do not always count accurately (Gelman & Gallis-
tel, 1978). Toddlers show their first attempts at counting
at about age 2, and their early attempts at counting show
strikingly consistent patterns. Children around this age
seem to know that counting always involves using the same
labels in the same order (“1, 2, 3 . . .”), even if the labels
they use are idiosyncratic. Thus, a 2-year-old might consis-
tently count, “1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 11” (Gelman & Gallistel, 1978).
Good. How many Three???
Toddlers also seem to know that counting involves using hearts are there?
just one label per object. By age 3½, children can easily tell
when others violate this one-to-one correspondence princi-
ple (Gelman & Meck, 1983). Knowledge of these counting
principles suggests that preschool children have a relatively
sophisticated understanding of numbers and how they are
used. As we have seen, some inkling of the one-to-one cor-
respondence principle may emerge even before children are FIGURE 9.19 Limitations on counting by preschoolers. Although
able to count. young children seem to master counting routines quite well early on,
Yet, in other ways, very young children have been they often do not realize the relation between the last number of the
found to show some serious limitations in their under- count and the number of objects counted.
standing of numbers. Even though they understand that
they can begin to count with any one of the objects, they
do not usually understand—sometimes until as late as age include only “one,” “two,” and “many,” seem unable to
10—that a count can proceed in any order whatsoever— count or to use any of the counting principles (Gordon,
for example, from left to right or right to left (Kamawar 2004). According to this view, the counting principles
et al., 2010). More significantly, for a young child, the cannot emerge as basic insights without significant sup-
counting routine often does not serve as a way of figuring port from language.
out how many things there are. A 3-year-old might cor- The supporters of an alternative view argue that the devel-
rectly count a group of seven objects aloud, but still not opment of counting skills and early mathematical knowledge
realize that this means that there are seven objects present does not depend so much on language for their growth and
(see Figure 9.19). Early on, counting is simply a verbal elaboration. Instead, they hold that numerical knowledge is
routine performed with objects, but it may be somewhat largely separate from language, both in terms of the brain
disconnected from mathematical understanding (Wynn, areas that support these two types of knowledge and the
1990, 1992). ways they develop (Gelman & Butterworth, 2005). These
researchers point out that cultures with few number terms
actually show much greater numerical competencies when
Q: Which counting principles are typically they are examined more closely. Other support for this
mastered by preschool children, and which second view comes from studies of children with specific
counting principles take longer to develop? language impairment (SLI), a condition described in Chap-
ter 8. Children with SLI show significant delays in language
development, which also affect their counting-out-loud rou-
Researchers disagree on how young children’s count- tines. Nonetheless, they seem able to learn basic principles
ing routines become integrated with other aspects of their of arithmetic in ways that are independent of their struggles
mathematical knowledge during the preschool and early with language (Donlan et al, 2007). Thus, this second view
elementary school years. Some psychologists argue that considers young children’s counting routines to be based on
children’s numerical knowledge is closely linked to the an implicit, domain-specific understanding of number and to
quantity of number labels in their language (Le Corre develop without major influences from the particular language
et al., 2006). Supporters of this view point to early evi- that a child speaks (see Figure 9.20). In addition, young chil-
dence that languages with very few number labels may dren’s nonlinguistic abilities to estimate quantities may relate
deprive speakers of counting ability. For example, the to the development of an understanding that the last number
Piraha, a small Amazon tribe whose terms for numbers counted indicates the quantity of items in the set. Preschoolers

DOMAINS OF KNOWLEDGE 325

FIGURE 9.20 Counting across cultures. Children all over the world engage in counting but vary considerably in their counting patterns and
how they link counting to other forms of mathematical knowledge.

who are especially good at estimating gain that insight about them to see more complex and systematic numerical rela-
counting at an earlier age (Wagner & Johnson, 2011). tionships (Carey, 2001, 2009). Somehow, children with
A more nuanced perspective arises from work on the “number-rich” languages manage to learn that numbers
understanding of number by Nicaraguan home-signers, above 3 continue to each have a discrete value (Huang
deaf people who use systems of invented hand gestures to et al., 2010). In addition, the more parents talk to their chil-
communicate with hearing friends and relatives (see Chap- dren about number-related topics in these languages, the
ter 8). They grow up in a culture where number is clearly earlier the children make the transition to understanding
important, but their home-created language has no number that the number 4 corresponds to exactly four things, even
symbols, and they have difficulty thinking about precise when socioeconomic factors and other aspects of parents’
number values much higher than 3 (Spaepen et al., 2011). language use are controlled (Levine et al., 2010). Children
Thus, even though they know numbers are important and may achieve this insight by noticing patterns in the way
understand discrete numbers up to 3, they tend to switch to small numbers are used in their language, and then see-
a more approximate estimation system when they encounter ing how those patterns apply to larger numbers as well. In
even modestly large numbers. Above and beyond the debate this form of learning, which is often called bootstrapping,
about how much language contributes to understanding children appear to build on their early insights about small
number, however, it is clear that preschoolers’ numerical abili- numbers, using these patterns as a foundation for under-
ties surpass what Piaget envisioned, since he argued that real standing new and quite different kinds of number con-
numerical understanding was not present until the transition cepts (Carey, 2009; Negen & Sarnecka, 2012; Slusser &
to concrete operational thought around age 7 (Piaget, 1952). Sarnecka, 2011).
As with spatial knowledge, research on the development
Developmental research on number skills has also raised
of mathematical thought suggests several important themes
questions about how children’s intuitive concepts of num-
about how this area of knowledge begins to take shape in
ber change between infancy and middle childhood (Carey,
childhood. Three of these themes are most prominent:
2009; Wynn, 1995, 1998). Older children develop a new
system that is responsible for more sophisticated math- 1. The principles that govern our ways of thinking about
ematical thought and complex computations, and as the numbers and mathematical relations share some com-
study of the Nicaraguan home-signers suggests, language mon properties across all cultures. In particular, almost
may be central to this second system. A child may take every culture’s number system shares fundamental
several years, from age 3 to roughly 7, to fully benefit from assumptions about what numbers are, how they are con-
the subtle but powerful clues that language can provide nected to countable objects, and what sorts of operations
about more sophisticated aspects of mathematics. This gap can be performed on the numbers derived from counting
of several years between the point when a child can first representations.
use number terms to count and the time she is able to talk 2. The development of mathematical thought involves
about mathematical relationships may help explain why changes in several kinds of knowledge systems, includ-
early counting often doesn’t result in knowing how many ing a system for estimating large numbers and a system
things there are. for precise operations on small number values, such as
One line of research suggests that children’s increasing 1 and 2. Some forms are nonverbal and relatively inflex-
understanding of number words and plural forms helps ible, like the information handled by the estimation sys-

326 CHAPTER 9 THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE

 tem. Other forms can be easily stated in language, such as
mathematical rules and principles. This language-related Q: How is linguistic input related to the
type of mathematical knowledge creates a foundation for emergence of mathematical thought?
more powerful and abstract mathematical thought and
helps transform the very concept of number.
3. A final pattern concerns the distinction between know-
ing how to do something and being able to succeed at
it consistently at all levels of complexity. One group
of mathematics researchers has related competence to Biology
mathematical skills by describing three components of Young children seem to develop naive, or intuitive, theories
competence and applying them to the progression of about broad slices of the natural world that we might loosely
mathematical development (Gelman & Greeno, 1989; associate with domains such as biology, physics, and psy-
Greeno et al., 1984). They distinguish between know- chology. Their collections of beliefs are thought to resemble
ing abstract mathematical principles, like the principles theories because they are about abstract causal patterns in the
of counting mentioned earlier (conceptual compe- world, have some degree of connectedness or coherence, serve
tence), knowing how to perform the behaviors that fit as a basis for making predictions, and seem to evolve over
with particular principles (procedural competence), time (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994, 2012). They are not like
and being able to figure out which principles to use scientific theories in that they are often very sparse in terms of
for a particular task (utilizational competence). These details (Keil, 2012), but they do reflect ways in which children
researchers argue that competence with the principles and adults develop intuitive beliefs about areas of the natural
comes first, but that being able to apply the principles world that they may never have learned about through formal
to real problems requires both of the other facets of instruction. These intuitive areas are often known by such
competence in order to plan and perform mathemati- labels as folk physics, folk psychology, and folk biology. We
cal operations. In this view, young children can keep start here with a discussion of the development of folk biol-
the counting principles in mind fairly easily, but using ogy, which is an intuitive understanding of living things and
them is more difficult and requires further mathemati- biological processes that occur in the natural world. We will
cal development. The principles become more applica- be asking whether young children start off very early with
ble to the real world as the child develops performance an understanding of the living world as a distinct realm or
skills and an increasing awareness of which skills to use whether folk biology only emerges as a distinct form of intui-
for specific tasks. tive theory several years later in development.
Over the course of childhood, we develop a great
Which dimensions of cognitive development best char- many beliefs about the biological world, many of which
acterize the emergence of intuitive mathematical thought? we come to take for granted. These include ideas about
In terms of the three dimensions introduced at the begin- birth, growth, death, and the inheritance of traits in plants
ning of this chapter, number exhibits a rich interplay of and animals. They also include ideas about disease, con-
several distinct processes. Early number skills during the tagion, and healing, as well as a host of beliefs about how
preschool years may draw heavily on local, number-specific living things function and how they are adapted to their
forms of cognition that are guided strongly by founda- environments.
tional constraints, such as estimation skills and possibly Cross-cultural research suggests that several aspects of
some counting principles. During this period, change may intuitive biological thought are universal (Atran & Medin,
be largely quantitative. Then, a qualitative shift in number 2008). For example, people in all cultures share the fol-
concepts seems to take place, when numerical skills seem to lowing biological beliefs: (1) Groups of animals and plants
become subject to more emergent constraints. This change can be organized taxonomically—that is, systematically in
may be facilitated by experience with a number-rich lan- hierarchical categories based on how they naturally relate
guage. As we will see in Chapter 10, more domain-general to each other. (2) Animal and plant types have distinct
cognitive skills like memory and attention become criti- essences—that is, their observable properties arise from
cal as we consider higher levels of mathematical reasoning crucial, defining, deeply rooted qualities. (3) Organisms
and computation. Across the full sweep of development, have properties that are adapted to their needs within their
numerical cognition draws on all the different dimensions niches—that is, the physical environments they inhabit
that describe cognitive development. Thus, it illustrates (Atran, 1995, 1999; Berlin, 1992; Medin & Atran, 1999).
how a developing system can have many interacting com- For example, people throughout the world believe that a
ponents, which make developmental change quite different local bird is (1) part of a hierarchy of different kinds of ani-
at various ages. mals, (2) a member of its category because it shares essential

DOMAINS OF KNOWLEDGE 327

 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL P OLICY

Sputnik and Intuitive Science

O
n October 5, 1957, U.S. citizens were shocked to learn
that the Soviet Union had launched Sputnik, the world’s
first artificial satellite (see Figure 9.21). In response to
this achievement, the United States undertook an all-
out effort to make its children more scientifically literate. Large
resources were devoted to enhancing science education at all lev-
els, from elementary school to graduate school, with the National
Science Foundation playing a particularly central role (Atkinson,
1999). The program succeeded in some respects; technological
and scientific innovation in the United States continues to outpace
that of many other countries. Yet, on tests of scientific knowledge
and reasoning, U.S. children continue to be outperformed by chil-
dren in other countries. In the late 1990s, the Third International
Math and Science Study revealed that after the fourth grade, chil- FIGURE 9.21 Sputnik. The launching of the world’s first artifi-
dren in the United States started to fall dismally behind students cial satellite by the Soviet Union in 1957 set off a wave of initia-
in other industrialized countries (Schmidt et al., 1997, 1999). In tives focused on improving science education in the United States.
response to these findings, congressional hearings examined
the weaknesses in U.S. science education, and President Clinton 2009). But it is not clear what the U.S. students’ persistently
vowed to address the crisis head-on. Yet, a similar 2009 study by poor performance on science-related standardized tests really
the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) showed means for the future of science education and innovation in the
that U.S. students ranked no higher than 17th in the world in their country. In short, we don’t know which aspects of science educa-
knowledge of science (National Center for Education Statistics, tion matter most for increasing the number of leading scientists

properties with all the category members, and (3) particularly

suited for the environment in which it lives. All adults there-
fore come to appreciate many of the distinctive properties
and relations that distinguish living things from everything
else. Thus, their biological thought comes to have its own
special properties that make it distinct from other domains
of knowledge (Hull & Ruse, 1998; Sterelny & Griffiths,
1999). Furthermore, because these core biological beliefs
seem to be universal, all children must come to know them
at some point in development (see Figure 9.22).
In addition to these core principles, children learn a host
of more specific ways that the living world differs from the
nonliving world, as well as many biological distinctions, such
as that between plants and animals. They learn that living
things reproduce, grow, and die, and that living things must
ingest food and water to be able to grow and reproduce.
FIGURE 9.22 The living world. As fancifully depicted in the paint-
They learn that members of the same plant or animal cat- ing Tropical Forest with Apes and Snakes (1910), by Henri Rousseau,
egory can change their shape and appearance radically over the living world includes a fantastically diverse array of organisms.
the course of development: a baby becomes an adult, a tad- How do children come to understand that all these organisms are in
pole becomes a frog, and a caterpillar becomes a butterfly. the domain of biology?

328 CHAPTER 9 THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE

 in a country. Although the average citizen has only a rudimentary As we have seen, children’s intuitions in these domains
understanding of many natural phenomena, such as the changing are sometimes mistaken, but their early knowledge can still
seasons, it is not clear whether this broad lack of knowledge influ- serve as a foundation for future learning rather than being dis-
ences how scientists are trained in universities or how children missed as a useless bunch of misconceptions. Unfortunately,
end up choosing a scientific career path. There is a clear need to past instructional programs have too often focused primarily
link public policy questions about investment in science education on children’s failings and ignored their powerful ways of track-
to studies of whether such investments really make a difference ing the important relations they encounter in the world. As
for the state of science in a country. researchers uncover more details about how children’s intui-
Over the past few decades, research in cognitive develop- tive understanding of privileged domains emerges, science
ment has started to influence beliefs about how to teach sci- education will be able to build on this understanding in pow-
ence. For example, a report issued by the National Research erful ways that make sense to students.
Council called Taking Science to School emphasized two themes This new approach emphasizes continuities over time
that should underlie the instruction of science in the schools rather than stages and limitations in both cognitive devel-
(National Research Council, 2007). First, science instruction opment and science education. It will, however, require
should focus on the gradual growth and accumulation of knowl- major efforts from schools and teachers to develop coher-
edge that builds on earlier knowledge learned over several years, ent instructional programs in science in which each year’s
as opposed to providing snapshots of unrelated topics over vari- coursework systematically revisits core ideas in deeper and
ous years. Second, children bring to elementary school some deeper ways, building on what was taught in prior years. Ide-
basic intuitions about domains such as space, number, biology, ally such an approach could be adopted across many schools,
and physical mechanics. Because these areas of scientific inquiry, so that children who change schools would still share their
called privileged domains of science, have roots in children’s very classmates’ scientific knowledge base, which their teacher
early intuitions about the world, science teachers can build on could continue to build on. To achieve such an integrated
students’ rudimentary understanding in these areas, rather than science curriculum across schools and districts, however, will
seeing students as limited by Piagetian stages in which certain require a team effort among schools, government officials,
kinds of reasoning and knowledge are impossible. and citizens.

How do children develop these biological beliefs, and what actions between objects. Applying these ideas to children’s
mistakes do they make as they acquire adult knowledge? biological knowledge, proponents mostly assume that chil-
dren explain animal properties in psychological terms and
explain plant properties in simple physical terms (Carey,
Q: What are some universal core biological 1985, 1995). According to these views, as children develop,
beliefs? they come to realize that neither the psychological nor
the physical system of explanation is fully adequate for
explaining the properties of living things, and they begin to
Here we will consider in detail two different sets of pro- develop a new, specifically biological system of explanation.
posals that describe how children learn about living things. This biological explanatory system is based on the idea that
The first set of views, which we will refer to as late-emerging living things are systems made up of smaller systems, such
biology views, assumes that even very young children’s as the muscles and the digestive system. Their biological
impressions of living things are embedded within larger thinking also takes into account the ways that these smaller
explanatory systems that provide them with a sense of why systems serve specific functional roles that help an organism
those things are the way they are. In these views, children survive in its environment.
use a theory for explaining the social world called naive The second set of views, which we will call early compe-
psychology and a theory for explaining the physical world tence accounts, holds that even very young children think
called naive physical mechanics. Thus, these views propose of biological things as different from other kinds of things
that young children can interpret and explain things only and accordingly explain their properties and actions as dis-
in psychological terms or in terms of simple physical inter- tinctive, too. According to these views, most developmental

DOMAINS OF KNOWLEDGE 329

change in biological thinking consists of becoming more reasoning in physical, causal, and mechanical ways (Bullock
capable of applying biological explanations to specific phe- et al., 1982; Koslowski, 1996; Shultz & Kestenbaum, 1985).
nomena and different kinds of situations and gaining more One of the most extensive critiques of Piaget’s interpretation
detailed knowledge of biological mechanisms (Hatano & came in a series of studies by Susan Carey, who sought to
Inagaki, 1999; Inagaki & Hatano, 2002, 2004, 2006; Kalish, reconcile the findings about preschoolers’ capabilities with
1997; Keil, 1992; Keil et al., 1999). These views are often Piaget’s earlier observations (Carey, 1985). After examining
blends of views that emphasize enrichment of core domains, the young children’s responses in Piaget’s animism studies,
increasing access to these domains for more and more tasks, Carey argued that these children were not really mixing
and shifting biases in terms of which kind of explanatory sys- psychological explanations with physical, mechanical ones,
tem first comes to mind. They all share the idea that living as Piaget had claimed. Instead, she interpreted the animism
things have so many distinctive features that very young chil- data as showing that young children tend to use psychologi-
dren start to see the living world as a distinct domain long cal interpretations too broadly, especially in applying them
before they understand how biological systems work. to living things. The children’s occasional uses of psycho-
As we did in the discussions of spatial navigation and logical explanations for occurrences in the inanimate physi-
number sense, we will use Piaget’s views as a point of depar- cal world does not, in Carey’s view, undercut the wealth of
ture here. Piaget documented several ways in which pre- evidence that preschoolers can reason easily about physical
schoolers seem to use animism—the tendency to imbue causality.
inanimate things with psychological motivations such To test her view, Carey developed several methods for
as desires and beliefs—to explain the physical mechanics studying how children attribute biological properties to
of objects, the movements of the sun and clouds, and the animals and nonliving things. To compare how children’s
behavior of plants in intentional terms. For example, young prior knowledge influences their thinking about biological
children may think that the sun moves because “it wants questions, Carey asked children questions about whether
to” and that the bridge broke because “it was angry” at the some familiar biological terms, such as heart, and some
person on it. Piaget argued that young children are inca- unfamiliar terms, such as omentum (a tissue covering the
pable of reasoning in purely physical, causal, and mechani- intestines), could apply to various living and nonliving
cal ways. He saw young children as having great difficulty things. For example, she might tell a child that humans
disentangling explanations about animate things from more have an omentum and ask the child if dogs have an omen-
mechanical, inanimate explanations—that is, they seemed tum. If the child believed that dogs are living beings, he
unable to separate the world of the mind from the world of would say that dogs do have an omentum. Thus, in such
the physical (Piaget, 1926/2007). a property induction task, the child would induce which
Some of Piaget’s other notions about young children’s other entities have a property based on a known example.
cognitive limitations also strongly suggest constraints on This property attribution method assumes that the kinds
early biological thought. According to Piaget, a young of guesses a child makes about what properties apply to
child, who is presumably egocentric, would likely assume living things can reveal the underlying conceptual system
that other animals think as she does. Thus, she might freely that the child is using to think about living things.
apply human mental states to other animals. In Piaget’s Consider another example from Carey’s research.
view, children in the preoperational period, who presum- A 4-year-old might be asked whether the following biological
ably have difficulties with conservation, would therefore properties apply to humans: Do people eat? Do people sleep?
also have great difficulty understanding biological processes Do people breathe? Do people have babies? Do people have
like digestion that involve any kind of physical transforma- bones? Most 4-year-olds will answer “yes” to each question
tion. In some ways, Piaget’s account sounds very much like about humans. The interesting part of the task concerns
the late-emerging biology view in which much of early bio- how young children answer similar questions about other
logical thought is believed to be embedded within a naive animals and about nonliving things. Here, children’s errors
psychology. Unlike that view, however, Piaget suggested are sometimes dramatic and surprising. Consider this inter-
that young children very often confuse psychological and change with a 4-year-old:
physical thought, rather than using each of them as a dis-
Interviewer: Do worms eat?
tinct explanatory system.
Child: No.
As we have seen in other domains, the patterns in chil-
Interviewer: Do they have babies?
dren’s responses that Piaget documented have been replicated
Child: No, they just have little worms.
in other studies, but later researchers have interpreted those
patterns in new ways and drawn different conclusions about Like this child, preschoolers are often reluctant to attri-
children’s understanding of biology. In addition, research- bute many basic biological properties to simpler animals
ers have clearly shown that preschoolers are fully capable of such as worms and insects. How can this be? How can a

330 CHAPTER 9 THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE

child have roughly the correct idea about what biological This late-emerging biology view suggests that early on,
properties like eating and having babies mean and fail to children understand biological ideas only in psychological
apply them to virtually all animals? If a child has even the terms. Then, over time, they experience a major concep-
crudest idea of the real biological purposes of such proper- tual revolution in the way they attribute properties to living
ties, surely she would realize how essential they are to all things. They replace the early psychological interpretations
living things. with a distinct set of biological explanations. These new
This pattern was so compelling that Carey concluded ideas allow the child to see for the first time that eating
that younger children must not really understand those serves a general biological function—it allows all animals
properties in a true biological sense. That is, they do not to get the nutrients they need to move, function, and grow.
understand the essential functions that these properties Carey’s model differs from a Piagetian approach in impor-
serve. Carey proposed that this lack of understanding tant ways. For one, Carey described a local, or domain-
arises because the children have no broader biological specific, revolution in conceptual understanding. This
system of explanation within which to embed these spe- change reflects the emergence of a specific theory of biology,
cific properties. The children in Carey’s study were not rather than the kind of underlying global change in cogni-
responding to the questions randomly, however. Instead, tive structures that Piaget proposed. In addition, the more
they were interpreting those basic biological properties by detailed patterns of reasoning that Carey documented are
embedding them within a psychological mode of explana- quite different from what Piaget might have predicted. Young
tion. In such a psychological explanatory mode, we sleep children’s reluctance to attribute psychologically interpreted
“because we feel tired and want to rest”; we eat “because properties to simpler animals, for example, runs contrary to
we feel hungry and know that food will taste good and the animism that Piaget interpreted in children’s responses.
make us feel full”; we have babies “so that we can cuddle Carey’s late-emerging biology model is not the only way
them and take care of them.” Thus, Carey’s approach to explain this pattern of results, however. Indeed, another
suggests a “biology-out-of-psychology” view of the devel- line of research suggests an alternative account that stresses
opment of biological understanding, in which biology children’s early competence in biological knowledge. This
emerges relatively late as an independent theory. Children alternative view becomes apparent upon a closer inspection
seem to interpret basic biological properties entirely in of Carey’s property attribution method. Are preschoolers
terms of the human psychological motivations that are completely unable to interpret properties in a biological
associated with them. sense and therefore limited to explanations that fall within
If children understand these biological properties only a psychological explanatory system? Or could they simply
in a psychological way, it makes sense that they would not be misunderstanding which of their several explanatory
apply them to simple animals that do not have mental states systems is relevant to the task? As adults, we often shift
like ours. Young children believe that since worms do not between different kinds of interpretations. For example, if
have rich thoughts and desires, they do not eat, sleep, or I hear that someone has a “big brain,” I might interpret that
have babies in the psychological sense in which children seem either as a figurative statement about intelligence or a literal
to think about these properties. Thus, in deciding whether one about a biological organ, drawing very different infer-
these properties apply to other animals, children largely ences in each case. Perhaps children can also shift between
focus on the extent to which the animals seem behaviorally different types of interpretations.
and psychologically similar to humans (see Figure 9.23). To test this possibility, researchers can try to pose the
Because dogs show some psychological sophistication, young questions about biological properties in a way that signals
children believe that they are much more likely to have these which explanatory system is relevant without providing
basic biological properties than are “simpler” animals. any details about it. For example, the researcher might tell

100

Percent of
children 9-year-olds
saying an
animal-related
50
property FIGURE 9.23 Attributing biological properties. In
pertained Carey’s original studies, younger children seemed to decide
to the 5-year-olds whether animal-related biological properties pertained to
object different categories of living and nonliving things based
on the extent to which those things seemed behaviorally
0
Human Dog Mouse Bird Worm Flower Chair similar to humans.

DOMAINS OF KNOWLEDGE 331

a child, “When I ask about whether worms eat, I am ask- processes (Erickson et al., 2010). All of these studies seem
ing about eating in the sense that it helps the body move to indicate that preschoolers show an early competence with
and grow.” If the child then correctly attributes eating to biological thought. They understand the category of living
worms, this could indicate that she understood the concept things to which both animals and plants belong, and they
all along, but didn’t know the researcher was asking about have a cluster of beliefs about how living things differ from
that particular concept. Another approach is to engage the other sorts of things.
child in a brief, general conversation about how animals can
be like machines in some ways, with inside parts that serve
specific functions for the animals. After having this discus- Q: How do late-emerging biology views of the
sion, the researcher then asks the child the same questions development of biological thought differ from
about applying biological properties. The same younger early competence accounts?
children who made many errors in the original property
attribution task may now respond much like the older chil-
dren in Figure 9.23 (Gutheil et al., 1998). If even young children show some early competence with
These studies raise the strong possibility that even young biological reasoning, how does their thinking about biology
preschoolers may not lack biological thought. Instead, the develop over the course of childhood? The evidence suggests
broader context seems to strongly influence whether they that children do not build up biological knowledge by first
choose biological explanations over psychological ones. In learning specific, concrete bits of information, then eventu-
some contexts, even young children will use biological expla- ally progressing to abstract rules and principles. Instead, they
nations and apply them in generalized ways that indicate a seem to learn some initial, abstract patterns and then gradu-
far-reaching application of biological ideas. Cross-cultural ally fill in all the concrete details and mechanisms that fit
research has provided evidence for this early competence with those patterns. This “abstract-to-concrete shift” in chil-
view. One study focused on Mayan children living in tradi- dren’s mastery of biological concepts has been documented
tional agricultural communities in Mexico’s Yucatán Penin- in several cases. One example is the way children come to
sula. Even very young children showed no tendency to apply understand the concept of “insides.” Preschoolers expect ani-
biological traits exclusively to humans and animals that mals to have insides, and they think that insides play a critical
were psychologically similar to humans. Instead, the chil- role in influencing the animals’ outsides as well as affecting
dren applied biological properties to all animals in general- their behavior (R. Gelman, 1990; S. Gelman, 2003). They
ized ways that reflected a true naive biology, rather than the also think about animal insides differently from the way they
absorption of biology into psychology (Atran et al., 2001). think about machine insides: animal insides help the animal
It may be that the human-centered bias emerges only in survive, whereas machine insides help meet the needs of the
certain cultures, around age 5. One study showed that in machines’ users (Keil, 1995). In this case, preschoolers show
a wide range of cultures, 3-year-olds do not show a bias to a relatively abstract causal understanding about what insides
apply biological traits only to humans. This tendency only are for—but this conceptual understanding is not necessarily
seems to emerge in 5-year-olds when they are raised in urban based on any knowledge of specific, concrete details. In fact,
environments, which apparently stress a human-centered preschoolers may know little or nothing about what insides
view of nature (Herrmann et al., 2010). Related studies also actually look like (see Figure 9.25).
show that the human-centered view is not a universal fea- Any description of how biological knowledge develops
ture of children’s biological reasoning. It depends on several will have to explain how children’s understanding of abstract
aspects of culture, including the kinds of conversations par- patterns and causal relationships can emerge before they
ents have with their children about the living world (Medin know anything about the relevant concrete details. Young
et al., 2010). Thus, in cultures in which people live closer to children seem to be able to extract some rough sense of what
nature, young children may have a much earlier bias toward makes living things different from nonliving things with-
relying on biological explanations. out needing a fully worked-out theory (Au & Romo, 1999).
The same theme arises in several other lines of research on This learning process suggests that the popular metaphor of
the development of biological thought. Psychologists have children as “little scientists” testing specific theories about
studied children’s beliefs about how properties are passed the world may be flawed. At least in the biological domain,
down to offspring (Hirschfeld, 1996; Springer & Keil; children often seem to have powerful hunches, but no more
1989; Waxman et al., 2007), about disease and contagion than a vague knowledge of the details.
(Keil et al., 1999), about how biological things adapt to By at least age 3, children seem to be aware of some
their environments (Greif et al., 2006), about the kinds of of the distinctive patterns that characterize the biological
essences inside living things (S. Gelman, 2003), and about world, especially its more abstract principles and causal
the coherence of causal mechanisms underlying biological relationships. They can use this early knowledge to begin

332 CHAPTER 9 THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE

 NEW DIRECTIONS IN DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH

Biological Knowledge and Exposure to Nature

M
ost developmental studies assume that the out- Different amounts of exposure to nature may play a role,
come or “end state” of development is the level as may the different ways that members of a culture talk about
of knowledge common among college students or humans and other living things (Anggoro et al., 2010; Taverna
other adults in mostly urban, technological societ- et al., 2012). Cultures may also differ in how they expose children
ies. But what happens when that end state is neither the normal to animals, both in real life or indirectly through various media.
state of mature knowledge nor especially sophisticated? This is When children from urban, rural, and Native American communi-
arguably the case with the development of biological knowledge ties were asked to name all the animals they could, urban chil-
(Wolff et al., 1999). After all, the most salient living things that dren more often named exotic animals they had learned about
the average city dweller encounters are probably other humans. from picture books and other media (such as lions, tigers, and
By contrast, an inhabitant of a rural area experiences a much elephants) than common examples from their urban environ-
broader range of biological forms (see Figure 9.24). In the ments (such as squirrels and pigeons). Rural children, and to a
realm of naive biological thought, people who grow up in urban greater extent Native American children, named more local ani-
cultures may have a relatively impoverished understanding. mals (Winkler-Rhoades et al., 2010). Thus, while young children
Work with children in “biology-deprived” environments and often benefit from learning through others (S. Gelman, 2009;
with children in “biology-enriched” environments suggests that Keil et al., 2008), direct experience is also important.
lack of experience with nature affects biological understand- Because urban adults may have such limited knowledge of
ing (Atran et al., 2001, 2004; Herrmann et al., 2010; Medin & biology, examining urban adults to learn about the develop-
Waxman, 2007; Ross et al., 2003). Compared with adults who ment of biological knowledge may produce a skewed account.
regularly encounter many diverse forms of nature, adults in In most cultures, the normal developmental path may lead to
biology-deprived environments show greater difficulty attributing the early emergence of rich biological knowledge. Younger chil-
biological properties, categorize the living world at less specific dren in urban or suburban areas may tend to interpret biologi-
levels, reason in less sophisticated ways about biological prob- cal properties in psychological ways because they have grown
lems, and think about biological essences differently. Their chil- up in a biology-deprived culture. More broadly, the study of
dren also show comparable difficulties (Atran et al., 2004). The how knowledge develops in any domain risks telling a distorted
influence of specific cultures on this domain of thought seems story if the mature state of knowledge is measured according
to emerge around age 5, suggesting a more universal, common to cultural norms that do not represent most cultures (Medin
framework in younger children (Herrmann et al., 2010). et al., 2010; Waxman et al., 2007).

FIGURE 9.24 Developing biological thought in urban and rural youth. It now appears that urban children may have a different
and simpler set of beliefs about biological properties than children raised in rural environments.

DOMAINS OF KNOWLEDGE 333

 for” more often than they would ask this question about the
parts of nonliving natural objects, such as rocks (Greif et al.,
2006; Keil, 1992). They use functional explanations more
broadly than older children by extending them more often
to nonliving natural objects (Kelemen, 1999). Yet, adopt-
ing functional explanations more strongly toward the living
world early on may help children begin to understand its
distinctive nature. Interestingly, preschoolers also seem to
know that while it makes sense to ask what the parts of
FIGURE 9.25 Ignorance of insides. Children younger than 5 an animal are for (for example, the claws, the stripes, the
frequently confuse what sorts of “insides” belong in machines and fangs), it makes less sense to ask what the animal as a whole
animals. Thus, many young children will not be able to choose which is for—even though it would be a reasonable question to ask
kind of insides shown here goes with a lamb or with a car. Yet, at a
about a tool (Greif et al., 2006).
more abstract level, the same children have a reliable understand-
ing of differences between the categories of machines and animals.
Adapted from Simons & Keil (1995).

Q: What are vitalism and essentialism, and what

reasoning about living things—so, in that sense, they do roles do they play in early biological thought?
have a distinct biological knowledge. At the same time,
they do not know much about the specific mechanisms of
how living things work. In this area, children show dra-
matic developmental changes during the preschool and
elementary school years.
Other Domains of Thought
Young children may adopt certain broad assumptions We have examined how children’s intuitive knowledge
about the living world that enable them to see some of its develops in the domains of spatial layout, number, and biol-
distinctive patterns without knowing the details. One such ogy. Here we will briefly consider how early understanding
assumption may be vitalism, the belief that living things emerges in a few other domains: physical mechanics, sub-
are distinctive because of a vital force inside them that is stance beliefs, and cosmology. Comparing the ways that
responsible for growth and movement (Inagaki & Hatano, knowledge develops across all of these domains reveals an
2002, 2004). Vitalism is in fact a very old idea that dates interesting commonality: in the preschool years, children
at least as far back as ancient Greece. It seems vague and start to develop some structured hunches about patterns in
unscientific to most adults in industrial cultures today, but the world. Over the course of childhood, they develop more
it helps us understand something about children’s early bio- detailed beliefs about the specific mechanisms that give rise
logical thought. to these patterns in each of the domains.
Figure 9.26 shows the child’s vitalist beliefs. Some young
children hold the view that food and water instill a force
in animals that enables them to move and be active (with- Food and/or water
out this force, the animals become increasingly inactive and
tired). They believe that if there is a surplus of this vital V I T A L P O W E R
force beyond these needs, the surplus is used for growth
and health. Younger children do not always understand the
direct link from food and water to growth and health, but Maintain
older children come to see food and water as having a more Move and
Grow and recover
be active
direct influence. Along with vitalism, children also show a health
naive essentialism, in which they assume that living things
have inner essences that are responsible for their surface FIGURE 9.26 Vitalism in young children. As captured in the
properties (S. Gelman, 2003). Together, the general theories diagram, young children believe that food and water provide a vital
of vitalism and essentialism may be the most critical compo- force that enables animals to become active (as indicated by the
thick arrow). When there is a surplus of this vital force, it acts as an
nents of early biological thought.
impetus for growth and for maintaining and recovering health (as
A final feature of children’s biological thought seems to indicated by the dashed arrows). As children grow older, the direct
be a tendency to interpret animals’ and plants’ properties links between food and growth and health are more clearly under-
in terms of the functions they serve. Thus, children may stood (as indicated by the thinner arrows). Adapted from Inagaki &
want to know what the parts of animals and plants “are Hatano (2004).

334 CHAPTER 9 THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE

Beliefs about Physical Mechanics The domain of phys- Though children show many early capabilities in under-
ical mechanics concerns beliefs about solid objects’ behav- standing physical mechanics, they do hold some mis-
iors, such as trajectories and collisions (Riner et al., 2000). conceptions, as do infants (see Chapter 5). For example,
In Chapter 5, we saw that infants seem to be aware of a younger children tend to adopt oversimplified rules that
few mechanical principles: (1) They seem to understand can lead them astray. Thus, shortly after infancy, they
continuity—the idea that objects exist continuously and seem to use a gravity rule that unsupported things must
move on connected paths and are unable to jump from fall straight down regardless of how the support is removed
one place to another without occupying the intervening (Hood et al., 2006). They predict that an object that rolls
space. (2) They appear aware of the principle of solidity— off a table will continue moving straight out from the edge
the idea that solid objects cohere as bounded wholes and for a moment, then drop straight down in a cartoon-like
cannot interpenetrate. (3) They seem to understand the con- way. By the time children are 5 or 6 years old, they start
tact principle—the idea that objects cannot influence other to understand that an object rolling off a table will fall in
objects without touching them; they must make contact. a curved path, but they still make errors—which persist
Infants also develop very different expectations about how into adulthood—about the paths of objects dropped from
inanimate objects behave compared with social beings. moving carriers.
We can think of this early intuitive understanding about When children who are younger than about 3½ years
physical objects as the beginnings of “naive physics,” or folk old see a ball dropped into a curved tube, as shown in
physics. As children leave infancy and enter the toddler and Figure 9.27, the “straight-down” rule is so strong that it
preschool years, they refine and elaborate on these broad often seems to cause them to see the ball come out of the
patterns. wrong tube, the one whose bottom is directly below the
Many early childhood beliefs about physical objects dropping point (Hood, 1995). When children are made
are the legacy of these intuitions from infancy. Preschool- more familiar with the tubes, they predict more correctly
ers know that unsupported things must fall and that where the ball will emerge (Bascandziev & Harris, 2011),
even supported objects will fall over when set off-balance but their initial mistakes indicate their difficulty inhibit-
(Baillargeon, 2002; Dan et al., 2000; Keil, 1979). They pay ing the “straight-down” rule without such training (Hood
more attention to patterns that conform with underlying et al., 2006).
mechanistic notions, assuming, for example, that a certain The more salient finding, however, is the extent to which
configuration of blocks is likely, but not certain, to fall over some traces of these early ways of thinking about physical
(Griffiths et al., 2004). Preschoolers also show further elab- objects persist into adulthood. Thus, the belief sometimes
orations on intuitions from infancy about how inanimate persists even when the physical constraints of the task make
objects differ from animate or social beings. When they are such a straight-down path impossible (Caramazza et al.,
asked to explain the behaviors of simple devices, such as a 1981; Krist, 2000; White, 2012).
box with levers, they clearly prefer mechanical causal expla- In addition, both children and adults make incorrect
nations over social or biological explanations (Bullock et al., predictions about trajectories, movements after collisions,
1982; Gelman & Lucariello, 2002). Similarly, they explain and the natures of forces on objects (Bertamini et al., 2004;
violations of physical norms (such as an object floating in Clement, 1993; Espinoza, 2005; Proffitt & Gilden, 1989:
the air) in very different causal terms from moral violations White, 2012). Many aspects of physical mechanics remain
(such as stealing) and from transgressions of social conven-
tions (such as driving on the wrong side of the road; Lock-
hart, 1981).
During the elementary school years, children begin
to understand in more detail how physical mechanics
works. For example, while younger children think of
physical forces as intrinsic characteristics of objects, older
children come to see forces as “acquired properties” that
affect objects because of the ways they interact with other
objects, such as by being given a push—that is, objects
A B C
have no forces until they acquire them by being influ-
FIGURE 9.27 The straight-down rule. Until about age 31⁄2,
enced by other objects (Ioannides & Vosniadou, 2002).
children often assume that an object dropped in a solid tube must
Elementary school children also come to understand how emerge from the tube directly below where it was dropped. Older
an object’s length and weight can affect its balance, which children and adults clearly expect the ball to emerge from the bottom
is part of the general process of realizing how levers work of the tube into which it was dropped. Adapted from Hood et al.
(Siegler, 1981). (2006).

DOMAINS OF KNOWLEDGE 335

difficult to understand throughout adult life, perhaps as a
legacy of the strong biases that emerge in infancy and early
childhood.

Beliefs about Substance Children’s beliefs about

substance concern what things are made of, how differ-
ent substances combine, and how they change over time
(Nakhleh & Samarapungavan, 1999). Even young pre-
schoolers understand that certain phrases, such as “some
blicket,” refer to the stuff that something is made of while
others, such as “a blicket,” refer to the whole bounded
object (Imai & Gentner, 1997). They also know that a
small part of a pile of a certain substance is likely to be
made of the same stuff as all other parts of the pile (Au,
1994). Similarly, they know that destroying a chair by
grinding it into small pieces does not change the sub-
stance that makes up the chair (Smith et al., 1985). After FIGURE 9.28 Cosmological beliefs. Shown here is a 6-year-old’s
preschool, there are considerable, but more subtle, devel- drawing of the earth and heavens. This child includes the idea of
opments in children’s understanding of substances. Only a sphere but has the people, stars, and sun all dwelling inside the
after age 10 or so do children start to understand the sphere—quite different from scientific depictions. From Siegal et al.
relations between weight, density, and volume, and their (2011).
implications for the nature of substances (Lehrer et al.,
2001; Smith et al., 2004).
domains, since the scientific view of the earth as a sphere
Beliefs about Cosmology Cosmology concerns beliefs is counterintuitive to what the children observe. Children
about the earth, moon, and stars, including their ori- pick up scientific knowledge of the earth and sun and stars
gins, relationships to each other, and phenomena such from many separate sources, such as their parents, school,
as day and night and the seasons. Young children some- and the media, rather than from their own observations,
times view their world as flat, and they think of the earth and as such the fragmentary ideas that they acquire can be
as being more like everyday objects, such as trees, tables, heavily influenced by local cultural practices (Panagiotaki
and rocks, rather than resembling planets, moons, and et al., 2006; Siegal et al., 2011).
stars (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992; Vosniadou et al., 2004; Across all these domains, children’s structured hunches
Vosniadou & Skopeliti, 2005). about patterns seem to develop before more detailed beliefs
In one sense, the development of beliefs about cosmol- about mechanisms. Over the course of development,
ogy forms an important contrast with the development of children seem to blend domain-general ways of learning
knowledge in core domains such as physics, psychology, about the world with an early awareness of the patterns
and biology. Beyond very general beliefs about the cosmos specific to each domain. In addition, a modest number
that come from physical mechanics, there seem to be few, of core domains may provide the early, basic foundations
if any, cosmological beliefs that all young children share. of thought across all cultures. These foundational or core
Instead, cosmology is a domain in which cultural variations domains of knowledge likely include space, number, biol-
can result in dramatic variations in beliefs. Some of these ogy, psychology, physical mechanics, and substance. Other
differences may arise from the degree to which a particular more secondary domains of knowledge might arise either
culture sees the earth in ways that are unlike the proper- as a subset of a single core domain or as a combination
ties of everyday objects (see Figure 9.28). Thus, one report of several domains. This view suggests that there are a
suggests that Australian children may come to understand small number of core domains, and that our intuitions
aspects of cosmology earlier than British children, perhaps about these core areas of knowledge—in combination with
because most maps and globes depict Australia as “under- general laws of learning—enable us to grasp most of the
neath” the rest of the world, such that people and things patterns around us (Wellman & Inagaki, 1997). Research-
would “fall off” if the earth were an everyday object like a ers interested in this possibility have developed computer
table (Siegal et al., 2004). In addition, children’s cosmologi- models to simulate the ways in which abstract knowledge
cal beliefs may be more fragmentary and internally incon- of a specific domain might develop before more concrete,
sistent than knowledge from more foundational or core specific knowledge (Kemp et al., 2007).

336 CHAPTER 9 THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE

Sociocultural Views of the logical means, American Indian children particularly stress
blood as the biological essence that likely mediates inheri-
Development of Knowledge tance. This belief seems to follow from their particular com-
munity’s frequent references to blood when talking about
Above and beyond all the patterns of development dis- biological phenomena (Waxman et al., 2007). In short, cul-
cussed in this chapter, one other set of factors must be tures set up strong biases toward certain kinds of biological
taken into account: sociocultural influences. Sociocultural perspectives and interpretations. At the same time, cultures
influences involve the ways in which social interactions also suggest ways that highly specific and concrete biological
and the broader cultural context provide a framework for mechanisms fit within those frameworks (Atran & Medin,
information and guide children’s learning processes. Socio- 2008).
cultural views of the growth of knowledge are not in oppo- The idea that cognitive development must be considered
sition to other theories of cognitive development. Instead, within broader sociocultural influences has a long history in
they provide insight into an additional overlay of processes developmental psychology and can be seen as mostly distinct
that contribute to the growth of a child’s knowledge and from views held by Piaget, who tended to focus on the child
cognitive skills. as an autonomous individual. In Piaget’s work, the devel-
To see how these influences work, consider again how opment of knowledge was mostly described in terms of the
early biological thought emerges in children of different child’s discoveries about the world through direct experience,
cultures. Differences arising from cultural practices affect much like a completely isolated scientist conducting experi-
early biological thought in a variety of ways—even among ments. But a little reflection reveals that this view could not
different North American cultures. Broadly speaking, possibly tell the whole story of the growth of knowledge
American Indian children are more often taught that they (S. Gelman, 2009; Harris, 2002; Keil et al., 2008). All mem-
are part of nature, whereas European-American children bers of a culture must expand on their own understanding by
are more often taught that they are separate from nature. relying on knowledge that exists in the culture at large.
American Indians talk more about how each person must
play a role within the natural world, while European Amer-
icans talk more about protecting nature as its caretaker
(Bang et al., 2007). Vygotsky’s Views
These differences lead to different kinds of causal sche- Lev Vygotsky, whose views of language were discussed
mas dominating interpretations of biology, such that the in Chapter 8, was among the earliest proponents of the
children in these cultures develop different ways of under- sociocultural view of cognitive development. In the early
standing and interpreting biology. European-American chil- twentieth century, Vygotsky developed a theory of how
dren who grow up in urban cultures tend to reason about social and cultural factors influence cognition. He argued
biological properties in more superficial ways and tend not that a child’s cultural context and social interactions often
to see commonalities between humans and other animals. mediate her interactions with the world (Vygotsky, 1978,
Rural European-American children and rural American 1986). Thus, the child is not an isolated individual learn-
Indian children living on a reservation have more complex ing about the world independently. Rather, she is part of
beliefs about biology than urban children do, but even these a community, which plays a crucial role in packaging and
groups differ in their specific explanations. Rural American presenting information. Her direct experience is greatly
Indian children tend to make attributions about biological supplemented by these more indirect, mediated presenta-
properties to organisms that are very attentive to ecological tions, so she has to learn how to rely on the information
relations, such as predator-prey patterns. In contrast, rural that others present (Harris & Corriveau, 2011; Keil et al.,
European-American children tend to make attributions that 2008). Vygotsky concluded that children’s social inter-
are more centered around traditional taxonomies (for exam- actions, both through language and through the influ-
ple, mammals, birds, insects) as well as goals (for example, ences of large cultural institutions, profoundly influence
good for eating; Ross et al., 2003). their cognitive growth (Rowe & Wertsch, 2007; Wertsch,
Along with these broad, conceptual differences, cultures 1991, 1998).
can also instill in children different beliefs about detailed Vygotsky saw the child as absorbing many aspects of
biological mechanisms. For example, children may adopt culture through language and other cultural practices.
different ways of thinking about essences based on their cul- The child comes to think like other members of a culture
ture’s views of the body. Thus, while both American Indian by internalizing higher-level, culturally specific aspects of
and European-American children believe that offspring cognition. Vygotsky believed that over the course of devel-
inherit certain properties from their parents through bio- opment, these internalized aspects of the child’s culture

SOCIOCULTURAL VIEWS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 337

becomes a fundamental part of the child’s way of think- ment, and then carefully craft a lesson to support the child’s
ing. Vygotsky’s views were likely influenced by his strong transition to a new level of understanding. To fall within
support of the Russian Revolution and the transition to the zone of proximal development, the lesson must be more
a new classless, socialist society (Vygotsky, 1930/1994). advanced than the child could achieve on his own, and yet
In Vygotsky’s lifetime, Russia and the subsequent Soviet close enough to his current abilities (that is, “proximal”) to
Union underwent extraordinary changes in the structure of be attainable with the teacher’s help.
its society while also trying to unite many vastly different In the process of supporting and guiding the child’s
cultures spread over 11 time zones into one society. In that learning, adults and older children are often described as
sociocultural context, it is not surprising that a young scien- scaffolding the child’s cognitive development (Bruner,
tist might focus on the ways in which culture can transform 1975). Much as an apprentice is trained by master craftsper-
thought. sons (Rogoff, 1990), children participating in a scaffolded
We have seen that in infancy, cultural factors already learning experience receive guidance that enables them to
affect the ways that infants and caregivers communicate take part in more advanced tasks than they could perform
through social referencing, joint attention, imitation, and alone (see Figure 9.29). These experiences often increase
emotional contagion. More sophisticated cultural influ- the child’s performance and feelings of mastery without
ences tend to become evident after infancy. Two concepts making him aware of all the supportive scaffolding that
figure prominently in accounts of sociocultural influences made his achievements possible.
on children’s cognitive development: zones of proximal devel- Consider, for example, an adult teaching a child how to
opment and scaffolding. make a bed. Rather than giving the child a list of explicit
A child at a particular level of cognitive skill might stay verbal instructions, an adult might scaffold the task by lay-
at that level for a long time without an adult’s help. Accord- ing out all the materials in the order in which the child
ing to Vygotsky, the adult provides guidance that can would need them, thus guiding the child through the pro-
make it easier for the child to transition into the zone of cess while giving him the sense of working independently.
proximal development, which is the next level of skill or The mattress pad and bottom sheet could be set on the bed,
understanding that a child can achieve in cognitive devel- with the mattress pad partially unfolded and around one
opment. Vygotsky and many of his followers suggest that corner of the bed. When the child finishes with them, the
having some sense of those zones is a major part of success- adult might casually provide the top sheet and the blan-
ful teaching. Thus, a gifted teacher might first get to know ket in a similar way. Finally, the adult could set out the
the student enough to assess his level of cognitive develop- bedspread, pillows, and pillowcases in a similar way that

FIGURE 9.29 Scaffolding. Parents, teachers, and other adults often help children to attain new skill levels by providing support in subtle
ways that help give the child a sense of achievement, a process called scaffolding. In some cases, adults can provide scaffolding without giving
the child verbal instructions.

338 CHAPTER 9 THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE

guides the child. A child who can easily make the bed with developed the ability to precisely explain their knowledge.
this subtle help might be confused or overwhelmed if all On the other hand, extreme nativist views that see the child
the bedding was laid out in an unstructured manner. One as knowing everything and simply recognizing instances
advantage of this kind of scaffolding is that the child may of things they already know do not fare well either. Real
be largely unaware of just how much support he is receiving. developmental change occurs during the preschool and
It is clear that social interactions and cultural differences elementary school years, and this change gives rise to the
do exert significant influences on the processes of cognitive dramatically different response patterns that children show
development. Sociocultural views of development can also in many tasks as they get older.
be instrumental to understanding how the cross-cultural The development of biological thought illustrates that
psychological differences we see in adults emerge and take there are other ways of explaining these significant changes
shape over the course of childhood and beyond. In the next in children’s responses besides the kinds of complete con-
chapter, we will turn from the growth of intuitive knowl- ceptual revolutions that Piaget supported. Instead, children
edge of the world to the development of cognitive skills such seem to draw on several distinct explanatory systems from
as memory, attention, reasoning, and several academic abili- an early age, including mechanical, psychological, and bio-
ties. There we will see a different facet of the sociocultural logical systems. Young children differ from older children
view—namely, the social and cultural factors that affect and adults, however, in terms of which kinds of explana-
which sorts of cognitive skills are most important to access- tions are most readily available to them in specific contexts.
ing information in one’s culture. Thus, the child’s cogni- They may also differ from older children and adults in how
tive development helps her more effectively learn in specific well elaborated each of those explanatory systems is. In some
ways from the culture around her just as her engagement cases, a developmental shift in the kind of explanations a
with the broader culture spurs and supports her cognitive child gives may reflect that the child has come to view a
development. Each process reinforces the other. different explanatory system as most relevant to the task at
hand, rather than the emergence of a totally new system.
When faced with more recent evidence, the old view
of development as proceeding from the concrete to the
Conclusions abstract is hard to sustain. Children seem to be sensitive
from the start to information of all types, not just basic
Even young preschoolers are remarkably good at compre- physical features or other concrete particulars. Nonetheless,
hending many aspects of the world around them. Although it is probably also wrong to assume that the development
there is not, at present, a single correct account of how of domain-specific knowledge consistently proceeds from
knowledge develops in core domains, we have seen that a general, abstract patterns to more concrete, detailed knowl-
number of themes emerge from the research in this area. edge. Instead, children seem to extract all levels and kinds
There is little evidence of the kind of global, across-the- of information from the world in parallel. As a result, the
board shifts in the ways children represent the world that development of intuitive knowledge of these basic domains
Piaget proposed. In case after case, claims for this kind of seems to consist of mastering each of these levels of informa-
developmental process have been superseded by other more tion—from the abstract to the concrete—with increasingly
compelling explanations. Contrary to earlier views, preschool precise understanding, and integrating them. This process
children do not merely recognize surface similarities or simply may require a blend of cognitive systems, including not
notice things that are most frequent or typical. They grasp only the awareness of frequencies and correlations that sup-
cause-and-effect relationships and other sorts of relations in ports associative learning but also a grasp of rule-like rela-
various domains, and they can use their understanding to tions that guide and constrain learning. In addition, such
make inferences in these domains that go beyond the obvious. blended views will also have to take into account the socio-
In light of these capabilities, the empiricist views of cultural contexts in which such knowledge growth occurs.
knowledge development do not fare well. These views tend Research into the growth of knowledge may seem remote
to see the child as gradually building up his knowledge in a from the everyday concerns of parents, teachers, and other
bottom-up manner, starting from concrete sensory details. care providers who work with children. In fact, the links
In fact, children can often sense complex, domain-specific between these domains of cognitive development and many
patterns in the world without being able to explicitly of the ways we interact with children are quite direct and
describe them. Young children apprehend patterns that are important. Curriculum design in the schools, pediatricians’
unique to each domain, including the spatial contours of an explanations of illnesses, and techniques of child psychother-
environment, the distinctive causal relations associated with apy are all informed by studies of how children understand
living things, and some of the properties of numbers, long the world as young preschoolers and how their understand-
before they have mastered the details of these domains or ing changes over the elementary and middle school years.

CONCLUSIONS 339
 STU DY AN D REVIEW

SUMMARY that is, from their own point of view. But later studies showed
that in familiar and accessible tasks, children are able to
Dimensions of Cognitive Development overcome the egocentric perspective. Even young children
● Most of the theories of children’s knowledge of the world can
might use a method that involves noticing the contour of
be contrasted in terms of where they stand on three dimen- the environment, an ability that emerges early and that can
sions: qualitative versus quantitative development, global override other spatial information, such as landmarks.
● The child’s understanding of number undergoes considerable
versus local patterns of development, and foundational ver-
sus emergent constraints on development. change in preschool and middle childhood. The systems that
enable infants to detect number and engage in some forms
A Closer Look at Piaget’s Theory of subtraction and addition remain in place, but they are
● Jean Piaget’s theory of cognitive development argued for
supplemented over time with new systems that enable more
global, qualitative changes in cognitive structure that have complex computations and a deeper understanding of num-
sweeping influences on all areas of cognition. Piaget’s view bers and their manipulations. Studies of children’s counting
was dominant for much of the second half of the twentieth behaviors have been especially revealing in this area.
● In the case of biology, one of the major patterns of change
century, and its influence has only recently diminished.
● Piaget believed that preoperational children (ages 2 to 7) lack
may be from abstract senses of how biology is distinct from
the ability to think about the world flexibly. He tested their psychology and physical mechanics to more mechanistic
cognitive understanding by observing how they performed understandings of how biological processes work. Researchers
on conservation tasks. He believed that they failed on these have asked whether young children come to initially under-
tasks because they lack the mental operators of compensa- stand the living world based on intuitive psychology or if a
tion, reversibility, and identity. Moreover, he said that they distinct intuitive biology emerges early on in a manner that
focus excessively on one dimension of a transformation (cen- is more independent of intuitive psychology.
● Several other domains have also been investigated. These
tration) and ignore relevant other dimensions.
● According to Piaget, children in the concrete operational
include children’s understanding of physical mechanics, their
period (ages 7 to 12) can reason about objects that are in notions of substance and material transformation, and their
their immediate surroundings. They acquire the mental sense of cosmology (beliefs about the earth, sun, and stars).
operators of compensation, reversibility, and identity. They In all cases, preschoolers’ intuitions in these domains repre-
are able to use transitive reasoning and begin to succeed on sent an advance over infancy. But this early knowledge will
conservation, seriation, and classification tasks. still undergo considerable growth and change in later child-
● Piaget believed that the formal operational period emerges
hood. Moreover, some domains, such as physical mechanics,
when children are about 12 years old. During this period, may have a more common core set of beliefs across cultural
they can think logically about objects or ideas that are not groups than other domains, such as cosmology.
physically present or are contrary to fact.
● Later research has suggested that the difficulty that younger Sociocultural Views of the Development of
children have in conservation tasks may not really reflect a Knowledge
qualitatively different cognitive structure but rather differ- ● Vygotsky’s theory of sociocultural development emphasized
ent ways of understanding task demands and the influences the ways in which a child’s immersion in a larger culture has
of cognitive factors (for example, memory or attention) not important supporting influences on cognitive development.
central to the task at hand. ● All development occurs in specific sociocultural contexts
that enable the child to make cognitive progressions that
Domains of Knowledge might otherwise not be possible. Social interactions between
● Recent studies have focused more directly on development of parents and their children, as well as between other mentors
cognition in specific domains, such as spatial layout, num- and children, help children get over some cognitive develop-
ber, and biology. In each of these domains, younger children ment hurdles more easily.
seem to recognize some fairly abstract, domain-specific pat- ● Adult mentors enable children to move into zones of proxi-
terns even before gaining detailed knowledge of the domains. mal development, which are new levels of cognitive compe-
● In the case of spatial layout, there are several ways in which a tence that are just beyond a child’s current abilities. This is
child can know her location in space. Piaget believed that young often achieved when adults engage in scaffolding, providing
children can only think of spatial layouts egocentrically— supporting environments that ease a child’s cognitive load.

340 CHAPTER 9 THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE

THOUGHT QUESTIONS concrete operational period hypothetico-deductive
1. Imagine that you are designing a large amusement park and (p. 311) reasoning (p. 311)
are instructed that you should lay out the buildings, paths, conservation task (p. 309) identity (p. 310)
and other terrain features to optimize the chances that pre- core domain (p. 320) landmark (p. 322)
schoolers will be able to find their way back to their parents in domain general (p. 306) operator (p. 309)
case they get lost. How would you structure the environment? domain specific (p. 306) preoperational period (p. 308)
2. Children often have a particularly hard time learning about property attribution (p. 330)
emergent constraint (p. 307)
the number zero. Given what we know about the development
essentialism (p. 334) reversibility (p. 309)
of counting and other number concepts, why should zero
pose a special challenge? formal operational period scaffolding (p. 338)
3. Suppose you want to accelerate children’s ability to under- (p. 311) seriation (p. 310)
stand the common biological properties of plants and ani- foundational constraint transitive reasoning (p. 308)
mals. How might you structure the daily lives of children in (p. 307) vitalism (p. 334)
a naturalistic manner so as to foster an earlier awareness of geometric information zone of proximal development
what is common between these two types of living things? (p. 322) (p. 338)
4. Scaffolding by parents and other mentors can often foster
conceptual growth and skill development in various areas
and often occurs in ways that the child is largely unaware of.
What might be some of the costs and benefits of making a
child explicitly aware of scaffolding as it occurs?

KEY TERMS
animism (p. 330) classification (p. 310)
basic level of categorization class-inclusion relations
(p. 316) (p. 315)
bootstrapping (p. 326) cognitive map (p. 321)
centration (p. 310) compensation (p. 309)

STUDY AND REVIEW 341

 10
The Growth of Cognitive Skills
Memory Attention • Scientific Reasoning
• Components of Memory • Attention as an Active Exploratory • Metacognition and Accessing Knowledge
• Types of Long-Term Memory System Three Specific Skills
• Memory Strategies • Three Components of Attention
• Reading
• Development of Metamemory • A Developmental Disorder in Attention:
• Mathematical Reasoning
• Memory and Expertise ADHD
• Using Symbolic Representations
• Infantile and Early Childhood Amnesia Reasoning and Thinking about
• Emergence of Long-Term Knowledge Conclusions
Autobiographical Memory • Analogical Reasoning Summary
 arents are often perplexed by what their children can Next, we will consider the development of several kinds

P remember and pay attention to. A concerned mother

carefully repeats the family’s phone number to her
kindergartner before his first day of school, only to
discover that he remembers, at best, three digits. Yet,
the same child can rattle off the names and superpowers of
each of his 24 action figures. In this case, his memory for
details far surpasses that of the parent who sits down with
of reasoning that seem very different in adults and children.
These include the varieties of reasoning that support draw-
ing analogies, thinking scientifically, and thinking about
and evaluating knowledge itself. In this chapter, we will try
to characterize the differences—and some similarities—
between these kinds of reasoning in children and adults.
We will explore whether some of the differences arise from
him to learn about his collection. How can a child show such problems in the ability to conceive of certain kinds of rela-
an impressive memory in some situations and only minimal tions, such as analogies, or whether they arise from difficul-
capabilities in others? This question falls within a larger set ties in managing and keeping track of different pieces of
of questions about the development of cognitive skills. The information at the same time or in quick succession. We
same child who shows such intriguing variations in memory will also ask whether even very young children might show
abilities will also show comparable variations in attention. some early roots of each of these skills when the experimen-
In one situation, he might seem to be distracted and unable tal tasks are relevant and familiar to them.
to focus on his parent’s explanation of how a new television Finally, we will examine three specific cognitive skills:
works, while in another he may become so totally fixated reading, mathematical reasoning, and the ability to use
on a video game as to tune out the rest of his environment, maps and models. Young children lack these skills; yet,
including repeated calls to come to dinner. aspects of each of them can become entirely automatic for
Our challenge in this chapter is to better understand most adults. Do these emergent skills develop in a funda-
several aspects of cognitive development that can help mentally different way from those that are present even in
explain these apparent inconsistencies. Chapter 9 focused infancy? How do these skills, which seem so laborious at
on the growth of children’s knowledge about the world first, become almost effortless? We start by considering one
around them. In this chapter, we focus on the development of the most basic cognitive skills: memory.
of cognitive skills that enable children to process and use
information.
First, we will examine the growth of memory. We will dis-
cuss how children encode, store, and retrieve memories and
how the maturation of various brain regions affects memory.
Memory
We will consider whether a person’s level of expertise in an Our mind and brain change with every experience. Some
area can be a more powerful influence on memory perfor- aspect of each experience leaves a trace in both our thoughts
mance than his age. That is, can a 5-year-old obsessed with and our neural structures. This much is shared not only by
action figures develop a better memory for action figures than humans of all ages, but by almost all creatures, whether they
an adult? More generally, we will see how and why young are simple animals with modest neural circuits or primates
children’s memory abilities differ from those of older children closely related to us. Examining memory from a develop-
and adults and how they change during childhood. We will mental perspective involves asking two basic questions
also consider several explanations for infantile amnesia, the about how memory changes with age: How do our abili-
strikingly consistent lack of memory in older children and ties to process and store information change? And how do
adults for their experiences before about age 2½. the neural structures that support these processes change?
We will then turn to attention and the ways in which an Answering these questions offers insights into memory
individual is able to focus on information that is relevant development and can also help us understand the nature of
to a task while remaining vigilant about other potentially memory at any age.
useful information, such as hearing when someone calls her Any pattern of habituation, any modification of an
name. We will ask why young children seem to have more action based on experience, and any recognition or imita-
attentional challenges than older children and adults. For tion requires memory. Infants are even able to build new
example, why do children sometimes seem unable to con- memories based on their prenatal experiences, as described
centrate on a task for an extended period? And why do these in our earlier discussion of learning from sounds heard
same children sometimes become so absorbed in an activ- while in the womb (see Chapter 3). Yet, it seems obvious
ity that they miss critical incoming information, such as a that younger children often have less effective memory
parent’s warning? We will also see how children’s executive skills than adults. Young children can be notoriously poor
skills, the cognitive abilities that allow them to monitor and at remembering phone numbers, homework assignments, or
direct their thoughts and perceptions, influence the devel- who gave them which birthday presents. Children seem to
opment of their attentional strategies. have more difficulty than adults at encoding and storing

344 CHAPTER 10 THE GROWTH OF COGNITIVE SKILLS

information, as well as retrieving it later, but these seem- Prefrontal cortex: Posterior cortex: Develops mostly
ingly simple differences can have a wide variety of causes. Develops relatively before prefrontal cortex and after
late; critical to hippocampus; many functions related
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, young children can demon- strategy use and to memory, including storage of
strate a surprisingly good memory in some circumstances. metamemorial context-independent information
knowledge. such as semantic facts.
A child might long remember that a parent promised to do
something, that a sibling was given preferential treatment,
or that a favorite cartoon character acquired a new magi-
FRONTAL
cal power. To better understand what aspects of memory LOBE
change with development and why the same child often
shows dramatic differences in memory, it is useful to first Hippocampus:
consider some basic memory processes and the parts of the Develops relatively
early; consolidates
brain that support them. memories and
helps set up
retrieval system for
TEMPORAL keeping track of
Q: What are some examples of the existence of LOBE and integrating
memory abilities in young infants? memory traces that
are distributed
throughout the
cerebral cortex.

FIGURE 10.1 Memory and brain regions. Several distinct

Components of Memory components of the brain interact to create a fully functioning adult
memory capacity. Many of these areas and their connections develop
Successful remembering depends on several processes. First, throughout childhood. Three of the most prominent systems are the
the information must be represented in the mind in a sys- prefrontal cortex, the posterior cortex, and the hippocampus.
tematic, structured manner. Encoding is the process of
turning information into a mentally useful representational
format. Then the information must be stored in that form not associated with specific learning experiences, such as
for an extended period of time. Storage is the process of knowing that dogs have four legs.
preserving information in memory over time. Finally, the Some aspects of memory development are likely to relate
memory must be retrieved when it is needed. Retrieval is to patterns of brain development. Because memories involve
the process of finding a memory in storage and bringing it interactions of all the brain areas just discussed as well as
to mind for use, usually in a conscious manner. some other regions, any description of how the maturation
Each of these three basic memory processes is thought to of a specific brain region supports some aspect of memory
involve many interconnected brain regions (see Figure 10.1). development must also take into account how that region
Most important for developmental considerations are interacts with other parts of the brain. To better under-
structures within the temporal lobes, the frontal lobes, and stand the development of specific facets of memory and the
the posterior cortex (Munakata, 2004). The temporal lobes associated brain functions, it is helpful to consider some of
of the cortex are located on the right and left sides of the the different forms of memory and their associated brain
brain, starting near the temples and extending toward the structures.
back of the head. Deep within these lobes is a set of struc- Different forms of memory known as sensory memory,
tures that seem to be critical for storing new, conscious working memory, and long-term memory can be distinguished
memories of experiences. One such structure, the hippo- roughly in terms of when they occur in the course of pro-
campus, plays an especially important role in forming and cessing new information. As information comes in through
consolidating memories. More specifically, it is involved in the senses, it first briefly registers in sensory memory, even
integrating information from the many memory traces that when the information is not consciously noticed. Sensory
are stored throughout different regions of the cerebral cor- memory for visual information, or iconic memory, is thought
tex. If it is damaged, there may be difficulty in consciously to last roughly half a second before it decays, whereas sen-
accessing new memories. The frontal lobes are also involved sory memory for sounds, or echoic memory, can last up
in many aspects of memory, including both memory stor- to a few seconds. Sensory memories are first encoded in
age and retrieval, and they contribute significantly to the the same brain regions that handle preliminary and inter-
use of various memory strategies. The front-most region of mediate processing of sensory information. For example,
the frontal lobes, known as the prefrontal cortex, is often the visual cortex near the back of the brain is thought
most heavily involved. Finally, posterior regions of the cor- to be responsible for iconic memory (Hollingworth &
tex tend to be involved in remembering knowledge that is Luck, 2008).

MEMORY 345
 Working memory, which is sometimes called short- Hippocampal damage can block the ability to transfer
term memory, involves specifically attending to and pro- information from short-lived working memory into more
cessing the incoming information from sensory memory. permanent long-term memory (Squire, 1987). An adult with
Working memory has a limited capacity, which was clas- substantial hippocampal damage might seem to perceive
sically described as seven pieces of information, plus or and experience the world normally, but much of what he
minus two (Miller, 1956). More recent accounts suggest experiences will not be transferred out of working memory.
that the typical capacity may be smaller and that seemingly He might, for example, introduce himself to someone,
larger working memory capacities are achieved by chunk- shake his hand, learn his name and repeat it back, but then
ing (Cowan, 2001), or linking together separate pieces of 20 minutes later, he might repeat the exact same sequence,
information into a larger unit that can be treated as one as if he had never met the other person at all (Scoville &
item in memory. (Think of remembering 2, 4, and 0 in a Milner, 1957). If, as some have argued, very young children
phone number as “240” to make three pieces of informa- have especially immature hippocampal structures, they may
tion into one chunk.) Information in working memory show some similar memory problems.
tends to last about 15 seconds before it either decays or is
“pushed out” of working memory by new, incoming infor-
mation, or processed and transferred into long-term mem-
ory. We can maintain information in working memory for Types of Long-Term Memory
much longer by consciously attending to it and perhaps by Understanding long-term memory is critical to under-
repeating or verbally rehearsing it, as we all do when try- standing current proposals about how memory develops.
ing to keep a phone number or an address in mind. These Three distinctions are typically discussed: explicit versus
working memory processes involve complex interactions implicit memory, procedural versus declarative memory,
between several brain regions (D’Esposito, 2007). Most and semantic versus episodic memory. These distinctions
notably, the prefrontal cortex helps to actively manage do not represent rigid boundaries, as the different ways
what information is attended to and the way it is main- of characterizing memory often overlap. As we will see, a
tained in working memory. Verbal rehearsal, for example, single memory can be explicit, declarative, and semantic.
involves interactions between the prefrontal cortex and But each of these different aspects of long-term memory
language-related brain areas. Similarly, for visual images, contributes somewhat differently to understanding how
a complex cortical network that includes frontal and tem- memory develops.
poral areas maintains mental images in visual working
memory by sustaining neural activity until the images Explicit Memory versus Implicit Memory One way
can be processed into long-term memory (Palva et al., to distinguish between types of long-term memory is to
2010). Working memory is often characterized as the consider the difference between explicit and implicit mem-
“bottleneck” of the memory process, where information ory. Explicit memory is memory for information that is
capacity is severely constrained before information passes consciously recalled and can often be stated verbally, like
through to long-term memory. a new acquaintance’s name or a historical fact. Implicit
Long-term memory has a vast capacity and can last a memory, on the other hand, may influence behavior but
lifetime. In contrast to working memory, in which informa- is usually outside of conscious awareness (see Figure 10.2).
tion’s sensory qualities predominate, information in long- Some patients with hippocampal damage who cannot form
term memory tends to be organized in terms of its meaning. new explicit memories still seem to be able to form implicit
Thus, the sound similarities between words often seem memories. Thus, even though a patient might introduce
most prominent in working memory, whereas similarities in himself to you repeatedly as if you were meeting for the
meanings are more salient in long-term memory. Long-term first time, he might retain some memory traces about you
memories seem to take some time to consolidate before they in other implicit ways. If, for example, you shook hands
are robustly stored. They can therefore be quite fragile at first with him once while hiding a pin in your hand, he might
and easily lost when events such as a severe concussion occur. later avoid shaking your hand. He might remain unaware
Unlike information in working memory, which remains of having met you and of having been pricked, but none-
in conscious awareness, much information in long-term theless behave in a way that showed that he had retained
memory can exist outside of awareness until it is accessed. some information (Milner et al., 1968). As we will see,
Long-term memory storage is distributed throughout many given that explicit memories are often recalled verbally and
regions of the cortex and involves other brain regions, such given that implicit memories can be demonstrated outside
as the thalamus. Most critically, it involves the hippocam- of awareness and without language, some researchers sus-
pus, which is responsible for helping to transfer information pect that very young, preverbal children may rely more on
from working memory to long-term memory. implicit forms of memory. In addition, as described later

346 CHAPTER 10 THE GROWTH OF COGNITIVE SKILLS

 A B
FIGURE 10.2 Explicit and implicit memory. (A) A child uses explicit memory when she consciously recalls a specific
event, such as a visit to the zoo. (B) She uses implicit memory when her behavior mostly occurs outside of awareness,
as when she automatically ducks when entering or exiting a familiar playhouse.

in this chapter, some have suggested that we cannot recall between forms of memory. Overall, however, there is a sig-
memories from very early in life because these memories nificant overlap between explicit and declarative memories
may be stored implicitly. and between procedural and implicit memories.
Some theorists have suggested that the ability to form
procedural memories develops before the capacity to form
Q: How are explicit and implicit memories declarative memories (Mandler, 1998, Nelson, 1995).
different? Infants and young children can clearly learn to carry out
simple processes that certainly involve procedural memory.
It is less clear whether preverbal children have declarative
Procedural Memory versus Declarative Memory memories, and earlier researchers often assumed that these
Closely related to the contrast between implicit versus memories were linked to the onset of language. Many cur-
explicit memory is the contrast between declarative and rent researchers, however, tend to think that children can
procedural memory. Declarative memory can be described form declarative memories well before the onset of language,
as “knowing that” memory, as in knowing that an event has and some have investigated this possibility using elicited
occurred or that a particular fact is true. In contrast, proce- imitation tasks. In these tasks, a child is taught an ordered
dural memory involves “knowing how” to perform actions series of actions that involves manipulating objects—such
or procedures, such as tying your shoes or riding a bike. as turning a knob, pulling a lever, and sliding a latch to
As a rule of thumb, declarative memories typically involve open a door—then asked to reproduce it after a substan-
information that can easily be verbalized (or “declared”), tial delay. Six-month-olds have great trouble recalling the
though this is not a requirement. Procedural memories, on actions in the correct order, but 20-month-olds can do so
the other hand, are often implicit, like a sense of how to ride effortlessly. This ability has been interpreted as indicat-
a bike. Despite their overlaps, though, these two pairs of ing that by 20 months, children can form a declarative
categories (explicit/implicit and declarative/procedural) are (and explicit) memory for their actions (Bauer, 2002a, 2005,
not precisely the same. Thus, a procedural memory can be 2006, 2007; Mandler, 2004; McDonough et al., 1995).
explicit—for example, you can be quite consciously aware of It may seem that recalling and reproducing the sequence
remembering the procedure for baking a cake. And a declar- of actions would draw on procedural memory, but the need
ative memory can be implicit—for example, if you read a to recall the actions in the correct order is key to the argu-
passage in which a certain word is consistently misspelled, ment that these tasks require declarative memory as well.
you may implicitly remember that misspelling later by Reproducing each action relies on procedural memory,
being more accepting of it (Jacoby & Hollingshead, 1990). which is available to younger infants, but recalling the order
These unusual examples illustrate the nuanced distinctions of the sequence is thought to be declarative. If that logic

MEMORY 347
is correct, there is evidence for declarative memory well touched the water may still have a memory of experienc-
before the first year of life (Bauer, 2005; Hartshorn & ing the pool, but because she remembers using a differ-
Rovee-Collier, 1997). Using related tasks and similar lines ent sense, she is likely to confuse the memory with other
of reasoning, some have argued that young infants also have memories about water. Thus, the specific episodic memory
explicit memories (Rovee-Collier, 1997). Indeed, it may of the experience will become fragile in contrast to a stron-
be that rudimentary versions of both declarative and pro- ger semantic memory of the typical temperature of pools of
cedural memory (and of explicit and implicit memory) are water. Young children have greater difficulty with source
present quite early in infancy and develop in parallel, rather monitoring, often remembering only the event itself and
than implicit and procedural memory serving as the precur- much less about their own experience of acquiring particu-
sor for explicit and declarative memory (Bauer et al., 2010; lar knowledge (Roberts, 2002; Roberts & Blades, 2000).
Howe & Courage, 1993). Evidence also suggests that the late-developing prefrontal
cortex is intimately involved in source monitoring (Mitch-
Semantic Memory versus Episodic Memory Mem- ell et al., 2004). Since this area of the brain continues to
ory researchers also distinguish between two facets of develop well into adolescence (Casey et al., 2005; Gogtay
declarative memory. The first, semantic memory, refers et al., 2004; Huttenlocher & Dabholkar, 1997), it is not
to knowledge of facts about the world, without necessarily surprising that it has been implicated in childhood diffi-
remembering how or when the information was learned. culties with source monitoring.
The second, episodic memory, refers to memories of Children’s limited source monitoring abilities also affect
specific events that have been experienced at a particular experimental tasks that involve remembering experiences
time and place (Tulving, 1972). For example, after attend- over long intervals. In one study, children ranging from
ing a birthday party, a child might recall, as a semantic 3 to 8 years of age participated in some hands-on demonstra-
memory, that birthday parties have lots of presents and a tions with an adult called “Mr. Science” (Poole & Lindsay,
cake. Recalling the party as an episodic memory, she may 2001). When the children were asked to recall aspects of the
remember that the party happened on a rainy day, that she demonstrations immediately afterward, they did very well.
played particular games there, and that she ate too much Then, 3 months later, the researchers had the parents read
cake. Many episodic memories are also autobiographical the children a book about Mr. Science on 3 consecutive days.
memories—memories of one’s own specific experiences as The book described two real events that had occurred when
a participant in an event. the children participated in Mr. Science’s demonstrations, as
Many scholars believe that children’s semantic memory well as two fictitious events. After listening to the descrip-
emerges earlier than their episodic memory (Nelson, 2001; tions, the children were later asked about what had really
Perner, 2001). Thus, a preverbal child who has been to sev- happened, and 35 percent of them reported that the ficti-
eral birthday parties may have developed a strong semantic tious events had really happened. Finally, the children were
sense of what birthday parties involve while remembering reminded of all the stories read from the book and were told
relatively little about the specific birthday parties she has that only some of the events had actually occurred. They
attended, perhaps blending several parties together. Simi- were instructed to think about what had really happened,
larly, a toddler may have trouble recalling a specific visit to as opposed to things in the stories that were made up. These
the zoo despite being able to describe the zoo in great detail. instructions considerably improved accuracy for the older
Episodic memory may have evolved relatively recently, and children but not for the 3- and 4-year-olds (Poole & Lindsay,
some researchers argue that it exists only in humans (Tulv- 2002). These younger children seemed unable to access their
ing, 1985, 2001; Wheeler et al., 1997). memories in a way that identified the sources and allowed
Early episodic memories are typically fragile, as evi- them to evaluate their accuracy. Children who are 3 and
denced in the ways that children often mistake how 4 years old also easily confuse events they have actually seen
they learned a piece of information. Rather than keeping with televised versions of similar events, while older children
track of where the new information comes from, a pro- are more able to distinguish these two kinds of information
cess known as source monitoring (Johnson et al., 1993; (Roberts & Blades, 1999).
Mitchell & Johnson, 2000; see also Atance & O’Neill, Thus, source monitoring is an important cognitive pro-
2005), they often fail to notice its source. After touching a cess that supports the development of episodic memory. In
pool of water to determine its temperature, for example, a addition, source monitoring helps to bind features to specific
child may claim to have learned this information by smell- memories (for example, a child might bind the facts that the
ing the water (O’Neill & Chong, 2001). Source monitoring day was warm and noisy to a particular birthday party) and
is necessary to build up episodic memories, which include a contributes to skills that guide information flow and manage-
great deal of source-specific information about experiences ment (Raj & Bell, 2010; Shing & Lindenberger, 2011). In turn,
and situations (Johnson, 2005). For example, the child who such skills can enhance source monitoring, and ultimately epi-

348 CHAPTER 10 THE GROWTH OF COGNITIVE SKILLS

sodic memory, by shifting focus to certain kinds of informa- items several times out loud. Finally, you might try to boost
tion. For example, when 4-year-olds were instructed to focus retrieval of memories by thinking of categories of items
on how a speaker was feeling, that focus on emotional features you might need for different kinds of activities planned for
enhanced source monitoring of the event (Crawley et al., 2010). the trip, such as hiking equipment, reading materials, for-
More generally, source monitoring ability in early childhood is mal wear, and swimming gear. Strategies like these can be
related to the abilities to shift attention, maintain elements in remarkably effective tools for enhancing memory, yet most
working memory, and inhibit incorrect responses, what we will children under 7 rarely use them. What changes between
later describe as executive functioning (Rajan et al., 2013). early childhood and adolescence that enables children to use
memory strategies? To understand the problem, it helps to
look at a classic memory pattern known to researchers for
Q: How is source monitoring related to over 100 years.
episodic memory development? Imagine that a researcher reads you a list of 15 random
numbers at a rate of, say, 2 numbers per second and then
immediately asks you to recall them. Which numbers would
Aside from source monitoring, episodic memories may you most likely remember? Despite some minor individual
also depend on an ability that emerges during the preschool variations, the pattern that adults show in this kind of task is
years to step back, think about ourselves in a past environ- among the most replicated in psychology, with the best recall
ment, and recall how we experienced a particular event. for items at the beginning and the end of the sequence and
Indeed, a well-developed episodic memory may require a drop in recall for items in the middle (Glanzer & Cunitz,
an ability to think about our own mind and have a sense 1966). The serial position curve is the graph that describes
of how we acquire and act on information (Perner et al., this pattern of recall by plotting how often each list item
2007). That kind of full-fledged episodic memory may is successfully recalled against its “serial position”—that
not really be present until at least age 4 (De Haan et al., is, its order in the series. As Figure 10.3 shows, results for
2006; Fivush, 2011; Sluzenski et al., 2004; Tulving, 2002; fifth-graders track a typical, U-shaped serial position curve
Wheeler et al., 1997). (Sarver et al., 1976).
Even though several forms of memory seem to be present Adults do well in the first part of the curve largely because
early in development, they may be much more fragile early they can use various strategies to store information. One
on and susceptible to degradation and decay. Thus, pre- common strategy is rehearsal—that is, simply repeating to
schoolers and young children clearly have episodic memories oneself the information to be remembered. Rehearsing the
and source memories, but those memories are not nearly as information a few times apparently helps to transfer it from
robust as they are in children a decade older. Later-developing working memory to long-term memory (Baddeley, 1985).
brain regions, such as the prefrontal cortex and parts of the
hippocampus, may be responsible for integrating diverse 100
forms of information and for storing that information in 90 Fifth-graders
Percent correctly recalled

more robust forms as the brain regions become more mature 80

Third-graders
(Nelson, 1997; Serres, 2001). During the elementary school First-graders
70
years, when these structures mature considerably, children 60
also show improvements in the complexity and amount of 50
information they can recall and in the accuracy of their 40
recall over longer delays (Bauer, 2006; Howe & Courage, 30
2003; Howe et al., 2009; Ofen et al., 2012). 20
10

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Memory Strategies Serial digit position
By early adolescence, we have acquired many ways of FIGURE 10.3 Serial position curves and age. These curves rep-
improving the power of memory. Memory strategies are resent children’s typical recall patterns for a sequence of seven ran-
explicit techniques we use to enhance the encoding, storage, dom numbers. Older children recall the first few items well (primacy
effect) and the last few items well (recency effect). Primacy effects
or retrieval of information. For example, if you are trying to
reflect the spontaneous use of strategies, such as verbal rehearsal,
remember a set of objects to take on a trip, you might try to while recency effects reflect the last contents of working memory.
enhance your encoding by carefully examining each item Younger children do not show strong primacy effects, presumably
and noticing its distinctive features. You could also try to because they do not spontaneously use memory strategies. Adapted
improve storage of memories by repeating the names of the from Sarver et al. (1976).

MEMORY 349
The higher recall rate for items early in the series, shown What happens when younger children are shown how
at the front of the curve, is known as the primacy effect, to use a memory strategy and told to use it in a particular
and it is largely caused by the use of memory strategies. As task? In most cases, younger children’s performance does not
the numbers keep coming at a pace of two per second, your improve much until they have used the strategy on several
rehearsal falls behind. It becomes impossible to keep rehears- occasions (Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 1987; Miller et al.,
ing the first numbers while incorporating later numbers. As 1994). This initial lack of benefit from a new strategy, known
a result, these later numbers tend to get “bumped” out of as a utilization deficit, tends to occur only in children
working memory and displaced before they can be encoded younger than about age 7, whereas older children often show
and stored. This “bumping” explains the drop in memory more immediate benefits (Coyle & Bjorklund, 1996). Inter-
performance around the middle of the serial position curve. estingly, even when younger children have benefited from
The end of the curve shows that recall improves for the using a particular strategy, they typically will not employ it
last few items on the list, a pattern known as the recency later when they are asked to do the task on their own. This
effect. This effect occurs because the last few items to be pattern of results struck early researchers as almost paradoxi-
remembered remain in working memory when the list is cal. Why wouldn’t younger children use the strategies when
finished. Because there are no later items to displace the they had been trained to do so and when doing so made them
items at the end of the list, people can retrieve them from perform better? It wasn’t a motivational problem; the children
working memory directly. Preventing adults from rehears- clearly wanted to do well, and sometimes there was even a
ing while the list is presented reveals the contrast between large reward at stake. Rather, the children did not seem to
the primacy effect and the recency effect. Without rehearsal, understand when it was appropriate to use the strategy.
performance on the first part of the curve drops to the same
level as the middle section, while performance at the end of
the curve remains high.
If younger children are less likely to use strategies like Development of Metamemory
rehearsal, we might expect them to perform worse at the A closer look at young children’s failures to use strategies sug-
beginning of the serial position curve, which is shown in gests that one important cause of the problem is that they do
the results for first-graders and third-graders in Figure 10.3 not really understand what memory is or have a sense of how
(Sarver et al., 1976). The clearest pattern in these graphs is that their own memory functions (Flavell 1987; Flavell & Well-
the younger children show only a very limited primacy effect, man, 1977). This awareness of our own memory processes,
although they show a recency effect similar to that shown by abilities, and limitations is known as metamemory, and it is
older children and adults. This pattern suggests that, before one facet of metacognition, the broad ability to think about
age 7, children not only remember less, they seem to use strat- our own mind and thoughts, a topic that we will examine
egies less, leading to qualitatively different patterns of recall. later in the chapter. The two aspects of metamemory are:
Children’s spontaneous use of other memory strategies, (1) knowing roughly how memory works—that is, how infor-
such as clustering items in meaningful ways, associating mation is encoded, stored, and retrieved, and (2) monitoring
items with images, and relating the items to one another, how effectively these processes are working to know when to
shows similar age-related changes (Shin et al., 2007). A rely on strategies. The two facets of metamemory are inter-
large body of research has demonstrated that children linked: monitoring the effectiveness of memory processes
under about age 7 do not spontaneously draw on a variety requires a basic sense of what memory is and how it works.
of strategies that might help them encode, store, and recall Many studies have shown that younger children have
information (Camos & Barrouillet, 2011). Such a failure to weak metamemory skills. Consider, for example, how a
spontaneously use strategies to improve memory has been 4-year-old might approach an experimental task in which
called a production deficit (Kail, 1990; Schneider, 1999). she has to estimate how many picture cards she will be able
Young children sometimes do show signs of using simple to remember (see Figure 10.4). At first, researchers show the
strategies, such as putting an item they need to remem- child a paper strip that has just one card with one picture on
ber in a prominent position, but they generally do not use it, and they ask the child whether she thinks she will be able
memory strategies nearly as effectively as older children. to remember it when it is covered. Then researchers present
the child with a new paper strip that has two cards, and they
ask the child whether she thinks she will be able to remember
Q: Why do younger children tend to show both pictures when they are covered. As this process contin-
robust recency effects but only small primacy ues, each new strip shows a larger number of pictures, and
effects in the serial position curve? the child is again asked whether she thinks she will be able to
remember all the pictures when they are covered. Children in

350 CHAPTER 10 THE GROWTH OF COGNITIVE SKILLS

 Could you remember this Yes.
card with the cover down?
Yes.

Could you remember these Yes.

cards with the cover down?
Yes.

How about all of these? I think so.

Yes.

How about all of these? No.

Yes.

OK. Name the pictures. Uh . . . a car, a

dog . . . I forget!

FIGURE 10.4 Failure of metamemory in young children. Through the early elementary school years, children
are often quite poor at estimating how much they can remember. They usually are overconfident and think they can
remember far more than they can. This mismatch is thought to be caused by a failure to examine their own memory
processes, a failure of metamemory. Adapted from Yussen & Levy (1975).

MEMORY 351
the later elementary school years, like adults, tend to say that these cases, their expertise seems to enhance their memory
their memory capacities have been reached at about five or six abilities not only within their knowledge base but in other
pictures, but younger children seem much less aware of the areas as well. To investigate how and why expertise affects
limits of their memory. Many 4-year-olds happily predict that memory development, researchers studied child experts by
they will remember as many as ten pictures. Yet, when they redesigning some classic experiments that had been used to
are asked to recall the pictures later, they typically remember test adult expertise and memory.
only two or three (Flavell et al., 1970; Yussen & Levy, 1975). The original studies of adults tested the assumption that
Given that younger children more often think that they the superior chess skills of grandmasters were based on their
will be able to remember without any help, they may not exceptional memory capacities (De Groot, 1965). Research-
realize when they would benefit from strategies like verbal ers hypothesized that grandmasters excelled at chess because
rehearsal. Furthermore, if they try to use strategies but still they had a general ability to store far more information
fail to remember, they may disregard the strategies with- than other players. The studies tested both grandmasters
out realizing that they can become more beneficial with and novices in their ability to remember configurations of
repeated use. Thus, children younger than about age 7 chess pieces after a brief glimpse at the board. When the
may show a production deficit partly because of a failure of pieces were arranged as they would be in the middle of a
metamemory—that is, a lack of understanding that many game, the assumption seemed to hold. Grandmasters often
strategies yield more benefits with practice. remembered perfectly the positions of 20 pieces after only
Following the pattern we have seen in many other aspects a few seconds of viewing, whereas novices and intermediate
of cognition, young children do not completely lack the abil- players usually made more than a dozen mistakes. But the
ity to use memory strategies or an awareness of what they can crucial experimental manipulation involved testing both
remember. Some studies have found that even 2- and 3-year- groups’ memories for chess pieces arranged at random, so
olds have some capability to use strategies and some basic that the positions had no possible relation to an ongoing
sense of their own memory functions, but children become game. In these cases, the grandmasters hardly did better
far more knowledgeable and effective in these areas as they get than the novices at remembering the positions of the chess
older (Bjorklund & Douglas, 1997; Joyner & Kurtz-Costes, pieces (De Groot, 1965; see also Chase & Simon, 1973).
1997; Kail, 1990; Miller et al., 1994). What develops seems to Thus, grandmasters performed well in the first task
be a group of related abilities, including an understanding of because they could use their rich knowledge of chess and
the idea of memory, familiarity with relevant memory strate- of familiar game patterns to store many positions in terms
gies, and an awareness that practicing these strategies helps of the meaningful relations between pieces—that is, they
make them more effective. In addition, the capacity to form could use chunking to remember where the chess pieces
richer memories with more details and internal structure may would be in a typical game. When the pieces were arranged
help foster metamemory in its own right by providing cues randomly, the grandmasters could not exploit their back-
to the quality of the memory and how it was acquired (Ceci ground knowledge, and they performed much like novices.
et al., 2010). Finally, as discussed next, expertise in a specific These findings revealed that grandmasters’ skills are not
knowledge area can strongly influence memory as well. based on broadly superior memory capacities but on their
deep knowledge base, which helps them store information
relevant to their area of expertise much more efficiently.
This finding raised the question of whether very young
Q: How is the development of metamemory children who are chess experts, some of whom have
related to the development of memory played over 1,000 hours of chess by age 5 or 6, would
strategies? show similar memory skills within their area of expertise
(see Figure 10.5). A series of studies used memory tasks to
compare the memory skills of these precocious chess players
with those of other children their age (Chi, 1977, 1978). In
Memory and Expertise fact, the child experts differed from child novices in the
While young children typically perform worse than adults same way that adult grandmasters differed from adult nov-
in experimental tasks that require remembering arbitrary ices. Child experts significantly outperformed their peers
lists, they may have less difficulty learning and remem- at remembering arrangements of chess pieces that would be
bering information that they find more meaningful and meaningful in a game, but they did the same as child nov-
interesting. With practice, some children can gain truly ices when remembering randomly arranged pieces. They
impressive expertise in specific areas of knowledge such as also performed at novice level in memory tasks unrelated
chess. They may then become able to recognize patterns to chess, including remembering simple strings of num-
and contexts, which can greatly improve their memory. In bers or configurations of game pieces on unfamiliar board

352 CHAPTER 10 THE GROWTH OF COGNITIVE SKILLS

 Memory research on both adults and children has become
more focused on how we remember the kind of meaningful
and richly structured information that we actually encoun-
ter in the world (Neisser & Libby, 2000). In most real-
life experiences at any age, items are related to each other
through a variety of means, including narrative structures,
hierarchical structures, causal interactions, and spatial rela-
tions. Often, all of these interrelations may be involved at
the same time and may affect what is remembered or forgot-
ten. To appreciate the developmental insights that this more
naturalistic approach offers, it is useful to consider a fasci-
nating, long-standing developmental question: How can we
explain infantile amnesia?

FIGURE 10.5 Expertise and memory. When young children have

Q: How do areas of expertise in childhood
extensive practice in chess, their memory for configurations of chess influence memory?
pieces as they might look in the midst of a game can surpass that of
adults with little chess experience. If those same young experts are
asked to remember a random arrangement of pieces that could not
reflect a real game, they will likely perform worse than most adults.
Thus, expertise in a domain can produce precocious memory perfor- Infantile and Early Childhood Amnesia
mance within that area. One of the most dramatic developmental changes in mem-
ory is the phenomenon of infantile amnesia (Howe &
Courage, 1993), the inability later in life to recall any mem-
games (Chi, 1977, 1978). Thus, like adult grandmasters, ories of experiences prior to about 2½ years of age. If you
these children do not have a larger memory capacity in gen- think back through childhood, your recall probably seems
eral, just a better memory for meaningful configurations of rich and detailed until approximately the preschool years.
chess pieces based on their rich knowledge about chess. As At this point, the tapestry of memory fades into just a few
further evidence that expertise, not age, exerted the crucial isolated experiences. Even further back, before about age
influence on memory, the child chess experts even recalled 2½, there are either no reliable memories or very few. What
far more positions than the adult novices when the board does this forgetting of early life experiences suggest about
setup came from a real game (Chi, 1977, 1978; Schneider memory development?
et al., 1993). Moreover, young children who know a great The phenomenon of infantile amnesia has been remarked
deal about dinosaurs or cartoon characters similarly out- on for many years, but only recently has it become better
perform adults at memory tasks that draw on the children’s understood. There have been many hypotheses about the
area of expertise (Chi & Koeske, 1983; Lindberg, 1980). reasons for infantile amnesia, but three possible explana-
Expertise may also make it easier for young children to tions have figured most prominently: (1) The basic memory
know when to use memory strategies. If a child has extensive “code” or format may change with age in ways that make
experience with chess, perhaps it is easier for her to monitor early memories inaccessible later. (2) Early in life, immature
her knowledge and realize the need for strategies when trying brain regions may be unable to preserve memories. (3) Early
to keep track of moves in a complex game. It might also be memories may actually be present and potentially accessible
easier for her to use words to encode and rehearse the names later in life, but they may not be easily retrieved unless the
of pieces and configurations. In fact, expertise not only right kinds of cues are used.
facilitates the use of memory strategies within a person’s area Each of these hypotheses points to a different reason for
of knowledge (DeLoache et al., 1985), but it also facilitates infantile amnesia, and as we will see, all three of them seem
their use in other areas, bolstering memory in those other to play a role in explaining it. Both the immature brain
areas as well. Thus, to remember particular information, hypothesis and the cueing hypothesis describe changes in
having a strong knowledge base relevant to the information the way long-term memories of childhood experiences are
at hand may be more important than either age or the ability formed. They both seem to correctly describe aspects of
to use general memory strategies unrelated to content and developmental change, but they seem to pertain to different
meaning. (Such general strategies may be most helpful for types of memories and to changes taking place at separate
remembering arbitrary, meaningless information.) points in development. The hypothesis of a change in the

MEMORY 353
basic code or format of memory is more difficult to prove, Neural Change Hypothesis The second explanation for
but in a revised form, it may be critical to understanding why we lack memories for early experiences is the neural
infantile amnesia. change hypothesis. As described earlier, the hippocam-
pus plays a role in transferring information from working
memory into long-term memory, as well as helping set up a
Q: What are three different accounts of infantile system for retrieving and integrating memory traces distrib-
uted throughout the cerebral cortex. These processes occur
amnesia? even without explicitly using strategies, and they presum-
ably occur throughout our adult lives. The neural change
Memory Format Change Hypothesis The first hypoth- hypothesis suggests that some brain structures involved in
esis is the memory format change hypothesis, which says memory, including the hippocampus and certain frontal
that the memory format or code changes, so that memories lobe regions, must mature before they can set up and main-
formed very early in life become inaccessible to older children tain permanent memory stores, particularly those that sup-
and adults. This hypothesis seems to fit well with some of the port episodic memories. Especially in the first year of life,
classic stage theories of cognitive development. Recall that some hippocampal regions seem to be quite immature and
many of these stage theories held that a child’s way of think- perhaps unable to help form stable memories of conscious
ing undergoes a global shift during the preschool years—for experiences (Nelson, 1997; Serres, 2001). This may help
example, from preverbal visual imagery to thought processes explain why there is infantile amnesia for episodic memories
embedded in language. Imagine, for example, that a 2-year- before the hippocampus matures.
old represents the experience of a party in a purely image-like Frontal lobe development may continue to influence
way (for example, remembering a set of images of balloons memory functions in children well past the age of 2 because
and clowns and cake at a party) and then as a 4-year-old shifts frontal regions are involved in many strategic aspects of
to more sentence-like thoughts (for example, remembering memory, such as monitoring the contents of working
stories about what happened at a party) as her language skills memory and knowing when to use strategies. The prefron-
improve. If development follows this course, then when she tal regions and other areas of the frontal lobes continue to
is older, she may not be able to use her language-bound way mature during the elementary school years and even into
of thinking to recall her early image-based memories, since adolescence. The development of frontal regions during the
these images would be stored in a different format that she preschool years may help support source monitoring, narra-
would no longer be able to access. Indeed, if such a dramatic tive language skills, and the ability to focus on relevant cues
shift in thought and memory occurs, it could potentially in ways that create more robust episodic memories that can
explain amnesia for early experiences. As we have now seen overcome infantile amnesia.
in several chapters, however, children do not seem to undergo
the kind of across-the-board mental metamorphoses that ear-
lier theorists envisioned. Q: What role might the frontal lobes play in the
Nonetheless, the memory format change hypothesis may development of memory skills?
still be useful for understanding cases in which memory
encoding involves language. Some current theorists argue that
Cueing Hypothesis The third explanation, the cueing
language development might bring with it a new way of for-
hypothesis, emphasizes how the ability to cue, or trig-
matting knowledge and structuring recall and that these new
ger, memories changes with age in ways that may make
ways of thinking might make preverbal memories extremely
very early memories inaccessible. Effective cues often take
difficult to access (Fivush & Schwarzmueller, 1998; Nelson,
the same form as the memory itself: verbal memories are
1993). This language-based proposal is similar to the mem-
generally cued by words, phrases, and stories, while non-
ory format change hypothesis, but it does not suggest such an
verbal memories might be cued by a taste, a smell, or an
all-or-none shift in recall, especially given that language skills
image. There is ample evidence that young infants register
do not develop abruptly, as in a stage change, but become
memories of experiences in nonverbal forms and can recall
gradually more elaborated over time (Fivush, 2011).
these memories months later if the right cues are present.
In one study, researchers assessed infants’ long-term non-
verbal delayed recall through their deferred imitation of
Q: What is the main problem with the original actions they had observed in the past. In the study, 14- and
memory format change explanation of infantile 16-month-old infants observed an actor perform particular
amnesia? actions on four objects and then were presented with these
objects (the cues) after a 2-month or 4-month delay. After

354 CHAPTER 10 THE GROWTH OF COGNITIVE SKILLS

the delay, the infants spontaneously imitated the actions example, researchers might need to provide the child with
that the actors had previously performed on the objects more specific prompts and context. Thus, if a young child
(Meltzoff, 1995). Toddlers show striking abilities to remem- is asked in general terms about a visit 2 weeks earlier to a
ber more than a year later aspects of experiments that they petting zoo (“What happened at the zoo?”), the child may
had participated in as infants (Perris et al., 1990), but these provide almost no information. But if the questioner begins
memories are nonverbal and often implicit. The children to describe the petting zoo and perhaps shows the child pic-
do not act in a way that clearly indicates conscious recogni- tures of various scenes, the child may then start to blurt out
tion. Instead, they simply react differently to the stimulus words and phrases, clearly showing that she can recall more
than children who had not been exposed to it in infancy. information than what is elicited by the cues.
For example, children who had been in earlier experiments By around age 3, children become much more compe-
would be more likely to pick up and play with toys that were tent at verbally describing past experiences. Even so, their
in those experiments than would children who had not been recall remains somewhat fragmentary and patchy, requiring
in those experiments (Hayne et al., 2000; Myers et al., 1987; considerable cueing support until about age 5. The sparse-
Perris et al., 1990; Rovee-Collier & Shyi, 1992). ness of their early verbal recall seems to relate to not hav-
It used to be considered very difficult to recall memories ing well-developed ways of storing information that will aid
verbally that were initially acquired in a nonverbal manner, later retrieval. As children master the ability to talk about
but several studies have shown that such verbal recall of pre- past events, this verbal ability influences how they encode
verbal memories can occur. In one study, children who were the events they experience and how they cue memories of
roughly 2½ years old returned to a laboratory where they those events later (Fivush, 2011). In addition, since lan-
had been exposed to specific event sequences when they guage enables people to communicate what has happened,
were as young as 16 months old. After exposure to the same it becomes a way of embedding memories in a social con-
objects (the cues) used in the earlier event sequences, several text, which seems to improve recall (Nelson, 1993; Nelson &
of the children spontaneously talked about the earlier events, Fivush, 2004). Before around 18 months of age, however,
indicating verbal recall of preverbal experiences (Bauer children have much more difficulty talking in detail about
et al., 1998; see also Cheatham & Bauer, 2005). Detailed even recently experienced events. They do not yet have
analyses of these children’s responses suggested that their enough control of language to use it to structure or cue their
verbal ability to recall the earlier events was not simply a memories of experiences (Mandler, 2004).
result of unusual verbal skill. Rather, they seemed able to By considering the three models of infantile amnesia,
access memories that had initially been encoded without we have seen that two of them, the memory format change
any apparent verbalizations of those events at the time they hypothesis and the cueing hypothesis, view the emergence
were experienced. Although these questions are still being of a child’s language skills as crucial for developing acces-
debated, this pattern of results suggests that the emergence sible long-term memories of experiences. It seems that by
of language does not cause a radical change that renders allowing us to embed our experiences in coherent narra-
earlier, preverbal memories inaccessible. Instead, language tives, language may influence how we represent and cue
may provide additional cues to help recall those preverbal memories of those events. One way of examining the role of
memories (Cheatham & Bauer, 2005). Such results appear language development in memories of early experiences is to
to indicate that although there are important developmental see whether cultural differences in children’s early exposure
changes in the young child’s memory system, some aspects to language influence the development of infantile amnesia.
of memory remain the same across development. Thus, even
the youngest children seem to be sensitive to which events
typically occur together. This enables them to pick up on Q: What are three different explanations for
cues that indicate meaningful rather than arbitrary events. infantile amnesia?
In many cases, the toddlers in these studies were respond-
ing to nonverbal cues that triggered early memories. These
kinds of cues are most effective for very young children Culture, Gender, and Early Childhood Amnesia The
when they are highly similar to the original experience. For accounts of infantile amnesia that stress the influence of
example, if a young toddler is taught how to pop open a language skills on early memories suggest an intriguing
jack-in-the-box, one way to assess his memory is to give him question: Do children with earlier exposure to adults’ lan-
the toy again and see whether he pops open the box again on guage and narratives tend to have earlier first memories?
his own. In this case, the toy is thought to cue his memory Researchers investigated this question by comparing the
of the action. Compared with using nonverbal cues, verbal ages at which Koreans and Americans formed their earli-
cues are harder for toddlers to use to trigger early memories. est memories (Mullen, 1994; Mullen & Yi, 1995). Because
To cue verbal recall of past events by 18-month-olds, for Korean culture traditionally involves fewer parent-child

MEMORY 355
interactions focused on narrating experiences, the research- ing improvements in their recall of experiences that they had
ers predicted that Koreans would have later first memories several months earlier (Boland et al., 2003; McGuigan &
than Americans. The same study also tested predictions Salmon, 2004; Reese & Newcombe, 2007; see Scientific
about the effects of birth order and gender. The research- Method box). These experimental studies therefore strongly
ers predicted that firstborns, who receive more undivided support the idea that cultural differences in the ways par-
parental attention, would develop narrative skills earlier ents reminisce with their children contribute to differences
and thereby retain earlier first memories. Similarly, they in early recall.
expected that girls, who tend to have more verbal inter-
actions with parents, would have earlier first memories
than boys. The cross-cultural prediction was borne out— Q: How do early interactions with parents
Americans’ first memories tended to be earlier than those affect the development of long-term conscious
of Koreans—and there was some evidence for the expected memory for experiences?
birth order and gender differences as well. More recent
studies have also supported these cross-cultural and gender
differences in the age of earliest memories (Conway et al.,
2005; Fiske & Pillemer, 2006; MacDonald et al., 2000;
Wang, 2003, 2007; Wang et al., 2000, 2004, 2011). The Emergence of Long-Term
effects also hold when older children, rather than adults, Autobiographical Memory
are asked to recall their earliest memories. Here, too, North
Current researchers believe that explaining the emer-
American children report earlier memories than Chinese
gence of long-lasting episodic memories (and the dis-
children (Peterson et al., 2009), suggesting that the effects
appearance of infantile amnesia) requires taking into
of cultural differences do not arise from changes to early
account multiple factors (Nelson & Fivush, 2004). The
memories in adulthood.
best available evidence suggests that beyond the first year
Besides the tendency of American parents to talk with
of life, the brain is mature enough to avoid imposing
their children in detail about their experiences, a second,
absolute limits on episodic memory, rendering the neural
broader cross-cultural influence on early memories relates
systems hypothesis less important (Ceci et al., 2010;
to the ways children learn to see themselves. Western
Nelson, 1997). Starting at around age 1 and continu-
cultures tend to have an individualistic view of identity,
ing for several years, some closely related neural changes
emphasizing people’s individuality and autonomy more
support the emergence of long-lasting episodic memory
than their group membership. This tendency may make
by influencing the ability to encode and cue memories.
children in Western cultures more inclined to view them-
As long-lasting episodic memories emerge, they also
selves as autonomous early on and may lead them to pay
support stronger autobiographical memories, which
more attention to their own memory timelines, rather than
incorporate episodic memories of one’s journey through
thinking of themselves first and foremost as members of
life as well as linking those episodic memories to seman-
a larger collective with shared group memories (Cohen &
tic memories to make them more richly textured. Four
Gunz, 2002; Ross & Wang, 2010). Thus, the greater indi-
especially important influences on the emergence of epi-
vidualist tendencies in Western cultures may cause an
sodic memory and autobiographical memory need to be
earlier sensitivity to the autobiographical sense of self in
considered:
memory.
Correlational studies, like the one comparing Koreans 1. Explicit rehearsal of past events. Between the ages
and Americans, show that young children with more expo- of about 3 and 5, children become more inclined to
sure to adults’ narratives also tend to retain earlier long-term spontaneously recount past experiences, either to oth-
memories of experiences, but they cannot explain the reason ers or to themselves. Such rehearsals are less common
for the difference. Further evidence from experimental stud- in younger children. As children recount experiences
ies suggests that increased exposure to narrative structures more often, they show greatly improved memory for
can actually cause early improvements in memory. These the events they have talked about. In contrast, newly
causal effects have been demonstrated in studies that assign verbal children rarely engage in such rehearsals sponta-
young preschoolers’ mothers either to an experimental neously, and this lack could contribute significantly to
group, in which they are trained to elaborate on their recol- infantile amnesia.
lections of past events with their child, or to a control group, 2. Development of narrative skills. In the same time
in which they receive no training. Even when the mothers frame, between about ages 3 and 5, children’s narra-
receive only brief training, they spend more time talking tive skills also greatly improve. More specifically, chil-
about events with their young preschoolers, who show last- dren become increasingly attuned to the three aspects

356 CHAPTER 10 THE GROWTH OF COGNITIVE SKILLS

 SCIENTIFIC METHOD: Maternal Reminiscing and Children’s
Autobiographical Memories

Hypothesis: Tips for Talking about the Past

When parents are trained to engage in elaborative reminiscing with their young 1. Select one-time events to discuss.
2. Draw your child into the conversation with what, where,
children, that process will cause the children to have more detailed autobio- who, when questions.
3. Praise your child’s responses.
graphical memories a year or more later. 4. Follow up your child’s responses
with related questions.
5. If your child doesn’t respond,
Method: rephrase your
question with new
1. Researchers recruited 115 families with 19-month-old children. information.
2. Half the mothers were trained to talk more with their children in structured
ways that would help bind memories to situations and sources (see Tips
on the board). The other half were controls who conversed normally with
their children.
3. When the children were 32 months old and 44 months old, the experi-
menters visited the families’ homes and observed conversations between
mothers and their children.
4. Experimenters then asked mothers to have their children talk about past
events and to continue to probe for more details.
6

Mean utterances per event

Results: No training
5
Children whose mothers were trained to reminisce with them had more Training
detailed memories of events that they had experienced several months earlier 4
both in elaborations (C-ELAB) and in repetitions of key elements (C-REP).
3
Conclusion:
2
Correlations have been repeatedly noticed between parent-child conversational
patterns and the age at which autobiographical memories first appear. This 1
study helps make the case for a causal relationship between certain conversa-
0
tional styles and the facilitation of earlier autobiographical memories. C-ELAB C-REP

Source study: Reese & Newcombe (2007).

of narrative structure shown in Table 10.1 (Haden better narrative skills. Social skills for sharing memo-
et al., 1997; see also Fivush, 2011). They become bet- ries develop dramatically between the ages of 3 and 5 as
ter able to use orienting information to provide con- children become more adept at communicating ideas to
text, such as where an event happened or who was others.
present. They incorporate more referential detail, such 4. Development of a sense of self. A child’s emerging sense of
as information about the color or size of an object or self may provide important support for the development of
animal, to describe entities in the narrative. And they long-term episodic memories and the emergence of auto-
include more evaluative information that conveys their biographical memory. When children are able to think
own responses to events, such as mentioning that an about their own past as situated on a continuous time-
incident was funny or frightening. Using these narra- line, they can see how personal events along that timeline
tive features to recount an event soon after it happens relate to each other and to experiences shared with oth-
improves memory encoding, and it also aids retrieval ers. Nonetheless, a sense of self like this takes consider-
by providing a more elaborate, detailed framework for able time to develop over the course of the preschool and
later cueing. elementary school years. As we will see in Chapter 13,
3. Social sharing of memories. Talking about past events with the development of the self occurs on several interrelated
others makes those events easier to recall (Fivush, 2011; dimensions, rather than as one discrete achievement.
Nelson, 1993). Moreover, conversations create another
means of cueing, since others can now remind you These four influences together support a complex abil-
of the events and thereby trigger more rehearsals and ity: a narrative way of encoding and remembering. These

MEMORY 357
 Narrative Feature Function Elaborated Examples Unelaborated Versions

Orienting information Provides context for where an “I was in the hospital with my parents and “I saw my sister.”
event happened and who was my Uncle Bob and saw my sick sister.”
involved “I was at the zoo with my preschool group “I saw a monkey.”
in the morning and saw a monkey.”
Referential detail Describes physical properties of “It was a big black horse covered with “It was a horse.”
important entities in the narrative sweat.”
“He had a bright red shiny truck that made “He had a truck.”
a squeaking sound.”
Evaluative information Conveys the narrator’s own “We walked into a very scary and creepy “We were in a graveyard.”
response to an event graveyard.”
“I saw a very, very funny movie.” “I saw a movie.”

TABLE 10.1 Narrative skills and the development of episodic and autobiographical memories. Older children tend to elaborate much
more than younger children when describing their experiences. And when children elaborate, they tend to have much more accurate, detailed
recall of the events. Adapted from Haden et al. (1997) and Nelson & Fivush (2004).

and other related processes interact and converge to create

long-lasting episodic memories and a fully developed auto- Attention
biographical memory, as shown in Figure 10.6. The influ- Any organism that can learn requires not only a mem-
ences can be roughly divided into those that are internal to ory system but also an attentional system to focus on the
the child and those that reflect the external, sociocultural most useful information within an environment teeming
environment in which the child develops. with stimuli. Attentional skills for gathering information

Rehearsal and more Well-developed self-

Early language: elaborated language: concept and
Simple words, Wide range of language self-representation:
phrases, and structures and ways of Ability to think about
sentences referring, embedding, and own past as on continuous
describing timeline

Processes
internal to
the child
Semantic memory Episodic memory
Autobiographical
memory
Semantic memory Episodic memory
External
socio-
cultural
processes
Social sharing and
Narrative skills:
conversations about
Use of various techniques to
the past, present, and future:
describe the setting, provide
Initially are simple,
details about referents, and
unelaborated minimalist
offer evaluative information
descriptions that are hard
about aspects of an event
to elicit

Birth 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years

Approximate age at which features emerge
FIGURE 10.6 The development of autobiographical memory. This model shows the
approximate age at which various factors that influence the development of autobiographical
memories start to have an effect. Factors above the midline are largely internal, while those below
the midline are more external—that is, social and cultural. The blue boxes show the four main
influences. Adapted from Nelson & Fivush (2004).

358 CHAPTER 10 THE GROWTH OF COGNITIVE SKILLS

require coordination between several distinct components. sage delivered in a noisy context or pick out one type of
Here we consider the most common elements of attentional picture (for example, animals and not vehicles) from a set
processes: drawing attention to salient stimuli, anticipat- of images, seemed to support this notion. Thus, children
ing which patterns of these stimuli are about to occur, and showed large developmental improvements in the ability
regulating how attention is deployed. We then consider to notice relevant information and to ignore the irrelevant
individual differences in attention as well as developmental (Hagen & Hale, 1973).
disorders in attentional abilities. First, however, we need to Yet, younger children are not always more distractible
understand the behaviors involved in attentional tasks. than older children. One important developmental change
involves becoming better able to monitor our surroundings
and to disengage quickly from an absorbing stimulus, like
a favorite TV show, when appropriate (Anderson, 2002).
Attention as an Active Exploratory System Thus, the poor “filtering” and general distractibility that
Suppose you walk into a familiar restaurant where you these early studies highlighted may be less important to
are supposed to meet friends. The room you enter is full understanding young children’s attention than questions
of hundreds of voices in various conversations, an acous- about how children actively select and track meaningful
tic guitar is playing in the corner, a pinball machine is information in everyday tasks, including those that require
making noises and flashing lights in the background, monitoring several things at once. Along these lines, an
and unusual decorations are displayed on all the walls alternative model for understanding the development of
and at strategic points on the floor. It is raining outside, attention emphasizes the idea that children actively seek out
your best friend is talking to someone 10 feet to your certain information patterns to guide their thoughts and
left, and your worst enemy is talking to someone 10 feet actions.
to your right. Children can be seen as employing attentional schema
Two things are immediately obvious in this situation. suited for particular forms of important information
First, you cannot attend to everything at once, but you (Neisser, 1976). Attentional schemas are cognitive struc-
can somehow manage to focus on the most important tures that are learned through experience in response to
and immediately relevant information. Second, even as you a particular set of stimuli in a specific task and that form
focus on only some information, you can still at some level a framework for organizing information and responses
notice other potentially pertinent information. Thus, if to that information. Because those schemas are tuned to
you are talking with a friend but someone says your name noticing particular patterns of information, they will, in
10 feet away, you will likely notice it amid the other con- effect, “filter” out irrelevant information. In this view,
versations and track what is said next. A full attentional focusing on some stimuli and ignoring others is an active,
skill set requires the ability to notice novel information, exploratory process. Consider a child learning to play a
to be vigilant for particular patterns (such as one’s name), favorite video game in which the player’s character must
and to develop strategies for allocating attention in an avoid certain hazards that appear on-screen. If the haz-
optimal way. The dynamic interplay between these key ards tend to appear in certain ways, such as popping out
components frames most theories of attention (Duncan, from behind walls or vegetation, the child will start to
1996, 2006). develop an attentional schema tuned both to how the
Earlier theorists conceived of attention as a set of filters. hazards look and how they tend to pop up in the overall
The British psychologist Donald Broadbent hypothesized context of the game. As the child becomes good at notic-
that we erect perceptual filters that allow only certain kinds ing and reacting to hazards, she may also get better at fil-
of information to enter the main information processing tering out distractors that fly by on the screen. Children
channel of the mind (Broadbent, 1958). We can change have learned these same skills for millennia while grow-
which filters are used and even switch between filters fairly ing up in environments with familiar recurring patterns
rapidly, but the filters prevent some sort of information and sets of events.
from ever entering the mind. With respect to the develop-
ment of attention, it was normally assumed that younger
children (for example, those in kindergarten) have more
difficulty staying on task and not being distracted than do Three Components of Attention
older children (for example, those in fifth grade). Many Across the many studies on the development of attention,
assumed that as children get older, they become better able three distinct components of the attentional system show
to filter out irrelevant information. Classic studies of chil- their own developmental trajectories: the attentional networks
dren’s attention, in which they had to either track a mes- for orienting, alerting, and executive functioning (Mezzacappa,

ATTENTION 359
 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL P OLICY

Children as Witnesses

S
ome crimes involve children, either as victims or as 1993; Ceci et al., 1987; Goodman & Clarke-Stewart, 1991; Prin-
witnesses. In both cases, the child may have memories cipe & Schindewolf, 2012).
of the event that either the defense or the prosecution In one study, the way in which 5-year-olds were asked
may want to use to support their case. To what extent about their visit to the pediatrician for a tetanus shot led them
are these memories reliable? Are young children’s memory abili- to develop false memories of the encounter (Bruck et al.,
ties so different from those of older children and adults that they 1995). Children who were told that the shot hurt were more
should be prevented from testifying in court? These are high- likely to falsely remember experiencing pain and engaging in
stakes questions for anyone who takes part in legal proceedings actions that never actually occurred, such as crying after the
involving children (Ceci & Bruck, 1995; Klemfuss & Ceci, 2012). shot. Misleading information about what the pediatrician and
One crucial question concerns children’s suggestibility. How the office assistant did during the visit also resulted in false
easily can adults alter children’s memories or even implant false memories. Similar effects of suggestibility happen in more
ones? A child’s responses may be based on either compliance casual, everyday circumstances as well. Thus, as a group of
(when faced with an interviewer who engages in very directive preschoolers start to talk among themselves about a recent
or forceful questioning) or on the creation of false memories experience, their conversations may suggest false events that
(Fivush, 1994b). For example, in response to questions that lead to distorted memories (Principe & Ceci, 2002). Children
are directed toward eliciting particular answers, a child might ranging from preschool age to adolescence are therefore often
say something happened simply to please an interviewer with- quite susceptible to the implantation of false memories (Bruck
out having any new memories of what happened. Later, in a et al., 2002; Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Goodman & Melinder, 2007;
less stressful setting, the child might indicate that the story she Holliday et al., 2002). Interestingly, in at least some instances,
agreed to earlier was not what she really remembered. In con- memories created by suggestions can be more detailed and
trast, it is possible to implant truly novel false memories, so that elaborate than real memories (Bruck et al., 2002). Such dif-
a child believes that she has had an experience that she never ferences in detail, however, are only somewhat more likely for
actually had. false memories, so the amount of detail should not be used
In various studies, researchers have demonstrated this to discount or accept the validity of any particular memory in
implantation effect (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Ceci & Bruck, the courtroom.

2004; Rueda et al., 2004). These three networks show differ- ter acetylcholine. Developmentally, the orienting network
ent developmental patterns, are based in different parts of the is fully operational in infancy and changes little thereafter.
brain, tend to use different neurotransmitters, and are related
to different loci on the human genome (Fosella et al., 2002; Alerting Arousing the attentional system through a cue that
Rueda et al., 2004; see Figure 10.7). We will briefly consider both indicates that a target stimulus is about to occur and
orienting and alerting first, before looking in more detail at that gives some information about the target is known as
the complex developmental story of executive functioning. alerting. Alerting occurs, for example, when a child notices
that a changing traffic light predicts when and where cer-
Orienting Drawing attention to a particular region is called tain cars will start to move and then looks to that location in
orienting. Thus, orienting occurs when a baby moves her anticipation of the move at an appropriate time. The alert-
eyes and turns her head to look at a blinking light or stays ing network tends to be more prominent in the brain’s left
oriented in that direction in anticipation of another blink. hemisphere, especially in the frontal and parietal areas of the
Orienting appears to be the most primitive attentional net- cortex, and in the thalamus (Petersen & Posner, 2012). It is
work and the earliest to develop. The orienting network associated with the neurotransmitter norepinephrine.
involves a large number of brain regions at both the cortical The alerting system is present in infancy, but it under-
level (the superior parietal lobes and the frontal eye fields) goes considerable refinement during the early elementary
and the subcortical level (the superior colliculus and the school years, with corresponding improvements in a range
pulvinar nucleus). It is associated with the neurotransmit- of alerting tasks (Ahissar, 1999). In one study, children were

360 CHAPTER 10 THE GROWTH OF COGNITIVE SKILLS

 It might seem that younger children would be more suscep- mistakenly include other stringed instruments, such as a guitar,
tible than older children to suggestions that can implant false when recalling the list. If older children have an easier time than
memories or distort real ones. In reality, the situation is more younger children creating a strong gist for a particular category,
complex and depends on how the false memory is induced. Even and if their precise memory is not that strong, they can show
in young children, the effects vary depending on the nature of higher incidences of false memories (Brainerd et al., 2008). By
the suggestion and how it relates to the child’s prior knowledge. carefully manipulating the stimuli to change the strength of the
A child is much more likely to incorporate a false suggestion pre- gist memories in ways that favor either younger or older children,
sented in a context consistent with what she already knows. If the it is possible to make such developmental reversals appear and
context seems to contradict this knowledge, she is more likely to disappear (Holliday et al., 2011). Clearly, if younger children have
resist the suggestion (Roberts & Powell, 2006). Thus, if an inter- less familiarity with a category, they will be less able to extract a
viewer asks a child about a (false) trip to a relative’s house while gist and then less likely to infer a false member of that category.
providing details about the house that are at odds with what the Similarly, if children do not have a gist about what is likely to occur
child knows, the child will resist the suggestion much more than in a particular kind of event, they are less likely to insert a false
if the interviewer presents it along with accurate, familiar details. memory about that event.
In addition, not all young children are equally suggestible; they Developmental research on false memories has important impli-
show large variations that are correlated with personality traits cations for the courtroom. Researchers once believed that the
such as impulsivity. In particular, more impulsive children tend younger the child, the less reliable the memory and the more likely
to be more suggestible, whereas more reflective children tend that false memories might intrude. We now know that the pattern
to think more before accepting new information (Goodman & is more complex and that the courts should not assume that young
Melinder, 2007). children are less reliable witnesses than older children. The nature
In some cases, it is easier to implant false memories in older of giving testimony and the memories involved can sometimes
children (for example, those who are age 11) than in younger make young children’s memories less reliable, but in other cases
children (for example, those who are age 5). These seemingly older children’s memories are less reliable. Thus, no constant, age-
surprising developmental reversals in false memory are most often based rule of reliability applies (Brainerd et al., 2011). In practical
found in a type of study in which a participant hears a large list terms, lawyers and judges need to carefully monitor how children
of related words (for example, violin, cello, mandolin, banjo, viola, are interviewed, the content of the interview, and the ways in which
bass) and forms a strong “gist category” (in this case, stringed the content and method of the interview interact with basic devel-
instruments). Because of this sense of category, participants often opmental research on memory.

presented with a cue that indicated the location where a Executive Functioning In its broadest sense, execu-
target figure would appear. The researchers then measured tive functioning is defined as the collection of cognitive
children’s speed at detecting the object when it appeared. activities involved in goal-directed tasks and problem solv-
When there were valid cues indicating where a target would ing. Descriptions of executive functioning often emphasize
appear, such cues speeded up performance equally well in three component processes: inhibitory control, error correc-
both 8- and 10-year-olds. The ability to shift attention when tion/shifting, and working memory. All three work together
cued seemed to emerge during the early elementary years in the development of attention, but inhibitory control and
and to heavily involve the parietal cortex, which matures error correction/shifting are especially important. The exec-
relatively early in development (Goldberg et al., 2001). By utive functioning network tends to involve frontal areas and
the time children are 8 or older, the cueing system seems the middle of the brain, including such areas as the anterior
to be functioning very effectively, although the ability to cingulate cortex and the lateral prefrontal cortex, as well as
ignore distractors takes longer to develop. including the basal ganglia. The relatively late maturation
of the prefrontal cortex is thought to explain the later devel-
opment of executive functioning (Goldman-Rakic et al.,
Q: What are three distinct components to 1997). It is associated with the neurotransmitter dopamine.
attentional abilities that seem to show their own Executive functioning develops significantly during the
developmental trajectories? elementary and middle school years (Best & Miller, 2010;
Diamond, 2013; Garon et al., 2008; Klenberg et al., 2001,

ATTENTION 361
 Anterior Frontal
Frontal cingulate eye field
area gyrus
Superior
Prefrontal parietal lobe
cortex
Posterior
area

Alerting network

Thalamus
Temporoparietal
Pulvinar junction
Superior
colliculus

Alerting structures
Orienting network
Orienting structures
Executive structures

A
FIGURE 10.7 Three attentional networks in the brain. (A) The
anatomy of the orienting (red), alerting (blue), and executive
functioning (green) networks, as shown in a left view of the brain. (B)
These three networks show different developmental trajectories, dif-
ferent neurotransmitter usage, and different patterns of brain activa-
tion, as shown in these fMRI scans of the brain. Adapted from Posner Executive network
& Rothbart (2007) and Fan et al. (2005). B

Zelazo & Mueller, 2002). We can see the influence of execu- Younger children did not systematically search correspond-
tive functioning most clearly in studies on the development ing windows on the two displays, which made them much
of attentional strategies. For example, in tasks that require less efficient and more error-prone. Older children quickly
judging whether two complex visual patterns are identical, realized that it was best to look at one pair of corresponding
it is useful to divide each pattern into subregions and then windows at a time, and their eye movements revealed this
compare corresponding subregions sequentially. But some- strategy. This study provides interesting information about
times a strategy may be simple, such as turning our head the development of attention as well as the planning skills
so that a distracting display is no longer in view. As with that are often a key part of attention.
memory, using these strategies effectively partially depends These sorts of attentional tasks often show dramatic
on an increasing awareness of how our own mind works— developmental changes; indeed, younger children seem
in this case, learning what attention is and how it can be to have a much weaker understanding of what attention
overwhelmed. is and how to monitor it (Miller & Bigi, 1979; Miller &
In one classic study of the development of attentional Weiss, 1982; Miller & Zalenski, 1982). In contrast, older
strategies, Elianne Vurpillot asked children to compare two children and adults know that certain distracting environ-
pictures of houses and to say if they were identical (Vurpil- ments are poor places to do challenging work. They also
lot, 1968). The two houses had similar layouts, but they had can usually tell when their attentional capacities are being
different features in some windows. Vurpillot monitored the taxed too heavily and will change the task or use strategies,
children’s performance by tracking their eye movements. if possible, to reduce the load. With age, children develop
With development, children showed strong improvement a richer understanding of the aspects of their mind that
in both their speed and accuracy in performing the task. attention involves. As they gain this understanding, their
Most interesting, however, was the difference in children’s use of attentional strategies also advances (Welch-Ross &
use of planning strategies for examining the pictures. Miller, 2000).

362 CHAPTER 10 THE GROWTH OF COGNITIVE SKILLS

 Q: Name an attentional strategy that undergoes
developmental change.

Other attentional development studies ask children to

ignore a distractor while directing their attention toward a
target stimulus. In one such study, even 10-year-olds had FIGURE 10.8 Executive functioning at the street corner. Chil-
more trouble ignoring distractors than adults did (Gold- dren who score lower on tests of executive functioning also tend to
berg et al., 2001). One factor that may contribute to this show riskier behavior when crossing the street. In this study, a plexi-
difficulty is the relatively late development of certain fron- glass panel prevented them from actually crossing the street.
tal cortical regions, which may not fully mature until late
adolescence (Huttenlocher, 1979, 1990). When these brain
areas mature, they help the child to increasingly disengage All three components of executive functioning are
attention from stimuli that seem to capture their initial involved in attentional strategies. Inhibitory control helps
attention and then to redeploy their attention elsewhere. suppress tendencies to look at distracting stimuli; error cor-
In Chapter 7, we saw that this ability to disengage from a rection/shifting involves monitoring attention and learning
stimulus and change focus may also relate to developmental to allocate it effectively, as in Vurpillot’s picture scanning
and individual differences in temperament. For example, task; and working memory helps keep track of performance
some children may be more fussy and reactive than oth- and build links to metacognitive understanding. A large
ers because their prefrontal cortical regions are less mature, and growing amount of research on executive functioning
making the reactive children less able than calmer children has shown substantial developmental changes occurring not
to direct attention away from upsetting stimuli. only in infancy and the preschool years but through middle
The growth of more sophisticated executive functioning childhood and beyond (Miyake et al., 2000). In the later
can have very real consequences in children’s lives. Consider years, the largest changes occur in working memory, skill
the common and potentially dangerous activity of crossing shifting, and planning (Best et al., 2009; Diamond, 2013).
the street. Thousands of children are injured or killed each The three attentional networks of orienting, alerting, and
year because they apparently fail to notice an oncoming executive functioning also interact with each other through-
vehicle. Crossing safely makes multiple demands on atten- out development. Given that many tasks draw heavily on
tion, especially executive functioning. A pedestrian must all three networks, explanations of children’s performance
strategically shift attention to monitor traffic from all direc- will often involve understanding the complex interactions
tions, must maintain a working memory of the physical lay- between these networks as well as the developmental pat-
out and objects recently seen, and must inhibit any interest terns of each attentional network in its own right. As we
in distracting objects. will see shortly, these patterns of interaction create major
To investigate how developments in executive functioning challenges in trying to understand why some children have
might affect children’s behavior while crossing the street, one more attentional difficulties than other children at the
research team created clearly marked pretend crosswalks next same age.
to a real, active road and used a clear plastic partition to pre-
vent their young participants from actually entering the road
(Barton & Morrongiello, 2011). Children between ages 6 and Q: Describe how two different brain regions
9 were asked to monitor the traffic on the real road to decide might be involved in the development of
when to “cross” at the pretend crosswalk. The researchers attentional skills.
measured several aspects of executive functioning, including
inhibitory control, monitoring and shifting between skills,
and overall efficiency of handling this complex attentional
task. Children who showed higher levels of executive func- A Developmental Disorder
tioning, especially in the overall efficiency measures, showed
safer pedestrian behaviors. All areas of executive functioning in Attention: ADHD
seemed to contribute to street crossing and, in general, older In 1845, the German doctor and author Heinrich Hoff-
children showed considerably better executive functioning mann wrote “The Story of Fidgety Philip,” a poem about
and safer pedestrian behaviors (see Figure 10.8). a “naughty, restless child” who “won’t sit still.” The poem

ATTENTION 363
was later published and translated into many languages and cally has trouble doing well in class, even though teachers
is often regarded as the first published description of what may feel that he is quite bright. He seems unable to concen-
is now called attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder trate on the task at hand or to stop himself from looking
(ADHD). In Hoffmann’s poem, Philip ignores adults’ scold- elsewhere (American Psychiatric Association, 1999; Bark-
ing as he “wriggles and giggles” at the dinner table, “swings ley, 1990). Along with these difficulties in paying attention,
backwards and forwards and tilts up his chair” until it starts children with ADHD may also have trouble moderating
to fall over, then “catches at the cloth” and crashes to the or managing their attention. In some cases, a child who
floor, pulling the tablecloth and the glasses and dishes down usually has trouble focusing may become too obsessively
with him (Hoffmann, 1845/1995; see Figure 10.9). The focused on a task and may be unable to disengage to
uncanny resemblance of these behaviors to those observed respond to parents or teachers (Barkley, 1990; Neuwirth,
by modern clinicians suggests that ADHD may have a long 1994). ADHD is normally classified into three subtypes:
history, especially among young boys (Barkley, 1998b). Yet, inattention, hyperactivity, or combined—a combination
diagnoses of ADHD have greatly increased only recently, of symptoms of the first two types (Dalsgaard, 2013;
as has the use of drugs to treat it. Today in North America, Frick & Nigg, 2012). ADHD is diagnosed if the symptoms
ADHD is diagnosed more often than any other childhood are impairing and occur in two or more settings. Children
psychological problem, and by some accounts, more than need not have every possible symptom of inattention or
all other childhood psychological problems combined. In hyperactivity to be diagnosed into a subtype, but they must
some communities and groups, more than 20 percent of display a substantial and sustained set of symptoms (at least
children have this diagnosis (Carey, 2003). ADHD is most six out of nine possible symptoms) to be so classified. Many
often diagnosed as children progress through the early years studies have repeatedly found evidence for the two sub-
of schooling (ages 5 to 10), but it is also diagnosed in older types of inattention and hyperactivity, as well as evidence
children and adults. In fact, the College Board, which pre- that they are often correlated in a manner that suggests a
pares the SAT, reported that the number of high school common core deficit (Toplak et al., 2012; Wilcutt et al.,
students diagnosed with ADHD—who thereby qualified 2012). Distinct genetic pathways also seem to be associated
for extra time on standardized tests—doubled in one year with the two subtypes (Nikolas & Burt, 2010). Both boys
(Gross, 2002; Vatz & Weinberg, 1994). and girls are diagnosed with ADHD, but the core behaviors
ADHD is defined by several clusters of behaviors that and the diagnosis are more common in boys than in girls
may begin as early as infancy and can continue into adult- (Gershon, 2002; Rucklidge, 2010).
hood. The core symptoms are inattention, hyperactivity,
and impulsivity. The child is fidgety, often running around
the classroom, and seems to have poor impulse control. He Q: What are the typical characteristics of a
is more likely to speak without thinking and to interrupt child with ADHD?
others. Teachers often consider him to be problematic, very
messy, “all over the place,” and difficult to handle. He typi-
Researchers have described potential precursors of
ADHD, including links to some aspects of infant tempera-
ment (see Chapter 7). For example, it has been reported that
children with ADHD are more likely to have been “dif-
ficult” infants who had irregular daily routines and sleep
habits, strong emotional responses to events, and high lev-
els of activity (Nigg et al., 2004; Olson et al., 2002). The
neurological bases of this relationship are not yet clear,
although it has been noted that children with ADHD have
had higher instances of birth trauma and serious illnesses,
including high fevers, during their infancy (Banaschewski
et al., 2005; Coghill et al., 2005).
As toddlers, children with ADHD are highly distract-
ible and have difficulties with self-regulation, includ-
ing problems inhibiting impulsive behavior and related
problems with executive functioning (Barkley, 1997). But
FIGURE 10.9 An early illustration of ADHD. This drawing shows these behaviors are usually less problematic for the child
the consequences of Fidgety Philip’s hyperactivity, as described in in the less structured environment of home or day care
the poem by Heinrich Hoffmann. From Hoffmann (1845/1995). than they will become in the more structured setting of

364 CHAPTER 10 THE GROWTH OF COGNITIVE SKILLS

elementary school. Many people who are diagnosed with executive functioning deficits might cause problems with
ADHD as children seem to outgrow it by adulthood, but ignoring distractors while deficits in alerting might lead to
others continue to have difficulty accommodating to life’s challenges in anticipating a stimulus in a specific, expected
more structured demands (Lie, 1992; Weiss & Hechtman, location.
1993). This can be seen in the higher incidence of ADHD As mentioned earlier, ADHD is known to be highly her-
in people in prison populations (Eyestone & Howell, itable, but genetic research is now going beyond the well-
1994). It is also correlated with depression, schizophre- documented finding of a high heritability to show how
nia, other personality problems, dyslexia, asthma, and the differences in specific alleles may affect particular networks
symptoms of fetal alcohol syndrome (Cotugno, 1995). in the attentional system (Bellgrove et al., 2005; LaHoste
et al., 1996; Levy & Hay, 2001). For example, individual dif-
Biological Bases of ADHD What causes ADHD? Most ferences in alerting ability and in executive functioning seem
researchers in the field believe that its roots are biological, to be influenced by alleles associated with the activation
but they vigorously debate what the specific causes are. Some of neural networks involving two different neurotransmit-
researchers speculate that the deficit may arise from delayed ters (norepinephrine in alerting and dopamine in execu-
or impaired brain development, particularly in the frontal tive functioning; see Fan et al., 2003, 2005; Parasuraman
and prefrontal cortical regions that help regulate attention, et al., 2005; Posner, 2012; Posner & Rothbart, 2005; Posner
as well as in subcortical regions such as the nucleus accum- et al., 2007). This new line of research promises a more fine-
bens and the striatum. Others have proposed that deficits in grained analysis of the different cognitive deficits that may
neurotransmitters, especially dopamine, which affects neu- be bundled under the global heading of ADHD. Eventually,
ral circuits connecting those regions, may also be involved this more detailed understanding may allow clinicians work-
(Russell et al., 1995). Some researchers even suggest that ing with children who have ADHD to precisely target each
ADHD may be linked to deficits in the immune system child’s deficits and to train the child in cognitive skills likely
(Warren et al., 1995). to bring real improvements (Posner & Rothbart, 2005).
Evidence for ADHD’s biological bases has been found in
numerous studies. One of these studies used magnetic reso-
nance imaging to measure the brain volumes of 152 children Q: What attentional networks seem to be
with ADHD and 139 control children over a 10-year period involved in ADHD?
(Castellanos et al., 2002). Overall, the children with ADHD
had brain volumes about 3.5 percent smaller than those of
the control children, and this difference remained constant Drugs such as Ritalin (methylphenidate) are frequently
throughout the study. Among the children with ADHD, prescribed for children with ADHD, and they can have
smaller brain volumes were also correlated with stronger positive effects, such as making it easier for these children
symptoms. Although reduced brain volumes in children to stay on task. Because Ritalin can increase levels of the
with ADHD have been found in the prefrontal cortex, other neurotransmitter dopamine in neural circuits, some have
parts of the brain and circuits connecting brain regions are argued that low levels of dopamine cause ADHD, but this
also affected, making it difficult to pinpoint which specific evidence is not compelling. Ritalin, which has pharmaco-
regions are associated with specific deficits. logical similarities to amphetamines, not only helps many
In light of the complex interactions between the three people with ADHD to focus, but it can also improve how
attentional networks described earlier, it is not surprising people without ADHD perform on certain tasks. Simply
that researchers have not localized ADHD to a single brain showing that Ritalin enhances performance by influencing
area. It may be that numerous brain regions are involved certain neural pathways does not mean that those path-
and that there are actually multiple related disorders rather ways are different in people with ADHD. Only with more
than one single disorder. Analyses of brain networks and sophisticated analyses of Ritalin’s effects on attentional net-
their role in ADHD have indeed led some to call for a works will it be possible to learn whether it acts on the brain
return to a distinction between cases in which there is a regions that have been linked to ADHD.
proposed deficit in working memory and cases in which While some researchers feel that Ritalin is uniquely effec-
there is a deficit in response inhibition (Diamond, 2005). tive in treating ADHD (Sonuga-Barke et al., 2013), many
Moreover, researchers are now investigating which atten- other researchers have found very good results from pro-
tional networks are likely to be associated with specific fac- grams that focus on either parent behavioral change or on
ets of ADHD. For example, the orienting network has not direct behavior change in children (Hinshaw, 2009). Parent
been linked to ADHD, but both the alerting and execu- behavioral training usually takes the form of learning to pos-
tive functioning networks have been implicated in some itively reinforce prosocial behavior and negatively reinforce
cases (Johnson et al., 2008; Nigg & Casey, 2005). Thus, (through giving time-outs or taking away privileges) or ignore

ATTENTION 365
inappropriate behavior (Lee et al., 2012). Child behavioral children (those who were not diagnosed with ADHD) just as
training generally focuses on developing conflict manage- much as those diagnosed with ADHD (Lewandowski et al.,
ment skills and problem-solving skills (Webster-Stratlon 2007). This finding raises questions about whether granting
et al., 2011). The younger the child, the more effective behav- some students extra time really addresses their specific deficits
ioral interventions seem to be, whereas pharmacological inter- (Franek, 2006; Freedman, 2003; Leong, 2005; Lerner, 2004).
ventions often are not effective and increase the likelihood Research has also shown higher rates of diagnosis of ADHD
of adverse effects in younger children (Charach et al., 2013). and other learning disabilities in wealthy communities
compared with other communities (Allen, 2006; Getahun
Misdiagnosis of ADHD ADHD is not a single problem. et al., 2013; Leong, 2005; Lerner, 2004). These data are
Rather, this label is often applied to a number of related prob- cause for concern, especially considering that large-scale
lems that have different underlying causes (Weinberg & Brum- assessments of young children have not shown higher inci-
back, 1992). Some people diagnosed with ADHD may have dences of ADHD in the children of more affluent families.
smaller working memories; others may have trouble trans- In fact, the incidence of ADHD in younger children is usu-
ferring information from working memory into long-term ally higher in poor communities and among disadvantaged
memory; still others may have more limited metacognitive minorities (Biederman & Faraone, 2005).
skills, making them less efficient at using attentional strategies. The many potential causes for the misdiagnosis of ADHD
Each component of attention, including the subcomponents of should not be taken as arguments against the existence of
executive functioning, is a potential source of attentional diffi- real neurocognitive and attention-related deficits that make
culties. Moreover, when there is hyperactivity, it may arise from it much more difficult for some children to function effec-
a huge number of variables that lead to high levels of activity tively in cognitively challenging settings. And children with
and not just from ADHD. Thus, there is great potential for these deficits typically need quite different interventions
misdiagnosis of ADHD because some factors that really should than children who are having problems for other reasons.
not be considered part of an attentional deficit can cause prob- It is essential not to leap to one diagnosis, such as ADHD,
lems similar to those associated with ADHD. At the cognitive without closely examining the evidence and other possible
level, for example, a child may process information slowly, lead- causes. Interventions can then be tailored to be more sensi-
ing him to fall behind in class and then have trouble focusing tive to the needs of each child.
because he does not understand the material. Thus, even with
well-functioning attentional systems, he may still fail to attend
to information presented in class. Misdiagnosis of ADHD can
also arise from social and emotional factors. A child who is Reasoning and Thinking about
having problems at home may be preoccupied and distractible
in school. Any of these difficulties (and many others) can cause Knowledge
children to exhibit behaviors that may result in their being clas-
Improving at a particular cognitive task often depends on
sified as having ADHD.
mastering its unique features. Developing a chess strategy, for
A final reason that ADHD may be misdiagnosed is that
example, requires learning to apply the rules of the game in
a child with this diagnosis may qualify for special consider-
ways that help anticipate an opponent’s moves. Similarly, in
ations that would not be available if he were simply having
the development of reasoning and the ability to think about
academic problems (Horowitz et al., 1993; Reid & Katsiyan-
our own knowledge (that is, metacognition), domain-specific
nis, 1995). One such case involves special accommodations for
properties of the information involved can also have impor-
high-stakes tests. For example, between 1987 and 2001, there
tant cognitive effects. Nonetheless, there are some broad, gen-
was a 300 percent increase in the number of students who
eral principles that apply to the development of reasoning and
qualified for extra time on the SAT, even though the num-
thinking about knowledge in many different domains. We will
ber of students taking the test increased by only 18 percent
explore both the broad principles and some domain-specific
(Franek, 2006; Freedman, 2003). In many cases, the extra-
knowledge here, focusing on analogical reasoning, scientific
time requests were granted for learning disabilities far broader
reasoning, and judgments about the nature of knowledge.
in nature than ADHD, even though ADHD was most often
listed as the problem (Lerner, 2004). The extra time also
resulted in higher scores, especially on the mathematics part
of the test (Mandinach et al., 2005; Wainer et al., 2004). This Analogical Reasoning
makes sense, given that students with learning disabilities may Analogical reasoning is a way of comparing things
require extra time during testing to demonstrate their true that on the surface seem quite different in order to see
capabilities with the material. But receiving extra time on a deeper-level similarities between them. For example, anal-
large set of mathematics problems seems to benefit control ogies likening the atom to the solar system or the world

366 CHAPTER 10 THE GROWTH OF COGNITIVE SKILLS

economy to a marketplace can often reveal new corre- If this explanation is correct, then it should be easier for
spondences and relationships. Analogical reasoning, then, preschoolers to use analogies that describe relationships
can involve using information known about one domain between things they understand well and that rely on clear
to understand corresponding information about another structural similarities. In one study, researchers showed
domain. Analogies can reveal similarities between the 2- and 3-year-olds a picture of a tree with a knotty trunk and
two domains and can thereby shed light on patterns in asked, “If a tree had a knee, where would it be?” The chil-
the new domains that may have otherwise escaped notice. dren seemed to understand the tree-body correspondence,
Indeed, analogical reasoning has been described as making as they picked a protuberance on the tree that was roughly
“mental leaps” from one domain to another (Holyoak & on the bottom third of the trunk (Gentner, 1977). Another
Thagard, 1995). Young children often seem to lack this abil- study examined children’s understanding of analogies that
ity. They may fail to see analogies that older children and were based on actions such as burning, melting, and cut-
adults consider obvious. If you say that an animal doctor’s ting (Goswami & Brown, 1990). For example, researchers
relation to pets is like a mechanic’s relation to cars, most might show a child a ball of clay next to cut-up pieces of
adults immediately recognize that the analogy is based on clay and then show him an apple, followed by a question
both parties’ concern with proper functioning and repair. about what should go with the apple: cut-up apple pieces or
In contrast, a preschooler, even one who understands the various distractors (see Figure 10.10). The distractors were
words “animal doctor” and “mechanic,” might look at you designed to show the correct object with the wrong relation
blankly, wondering what the similarity could be. (for example, a bruised apple), an incorrect object with the
Piaget believed that young children fail to grasp such right relation (for example, sliced bread), an object that visu-
analogies because their minds lack certain logical opera- ally resembled the original apple (for example, a small red
tors. As discussed in Chapter 9, in Piaget’s theory of cogni- ball), and finally an object semantically associated with the
tive development, these operators serve as a kind of mental original object (for example, a banana; Goswami & Brown,
toolkit that makes it possible to think about certain kinds 1990; see also Goswami, 2001).
of properties and relationships. He argued that analogical Even 3-year-olds are capable of understanding analogies
reasoning requires several sophisticated logical operators about familiar objects and relationships and can pick up on
that most children do not acquire until early adolescence the correct causal relation with the correct object and can
(Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). But as we have seen in earlier ignore the more superficially similar object. When asked
chapters, recent research has cast strong doubts on Piaget’s which display went best with the whole apple in the study
claims that children are unable to think in certain ways. just described, 4- and 6-year-olds (and some 3-year-olds)
Research has indicated that younger children can, in didn’t simply find the display that was most similar to an
fact, use analogical reasoning under certain conditions in apple, but they looked for a display that showed a similar
both the laboratory and in the real world. Rather than lack- relation to that between the whole ball of clay and the cut-
ing certain logical operators or ways of reasoning, younger up pieces of clay—namely, a cut-up apple. These results
children may fail to understand some analogies simply were interpreted as evidence that, in familiar domains of
because they do not know enough about the relevant top- knowledge, very young children are able to think beyond
ics. For example, children may miss the higher-order simi- simple surface similarities to consider deeper causal rela-
larities between doctors and mechanics because they have tions. In laboratory experiments, even children as young
limited knowledge of what these jobs involve, making their as 20 months take knowledge they learned in one situa-
similarities much less obvious. tion and use it in another situation in a way that suggests

clay : cut-up clay :: apple ?

FIGURE 10.10 Analogical reasoning in

preschoolers. When shown a ball of clay next
Same Different Same Different Different to cut-up clay, even young preschoolers will
object, object, object, object, object,
same same different perceptual semantic
draw the correct analogy between the cut-up
causal causal causal match match clay and the cut-up apple by picking the cut-up
change change change apple from the choices shown here.

REASONING AND THINKING ABOUT KNOWLEDGE 367

analogical thought. For example, after being shown how to younger than about age 6 seem more likely to fall back on the
use a “pulling” tool to bring an attractive object to hand, clear perceptual similarities. Interestingly, in scenarios like the
the children would use that knowledge in a new setting to study just described, children seem to have more trouble see-
choose a new, similar “pulling” tool from a large set of pos- ing the correct relational similarity when the options include
sible tools (Brown & Kane, 1988). a distracting perceptually similar object. In a study designed
Children’s analogical reasoning ability is strongly influenced to examine this difficulty, researchers showed the children the
by their knowledge base, and they are much better able to draw pairs of pictures in Figure 10.11 and asked the children what
analogies in familiar domains and between different domains the pictures in each pair had in common. In pair A, the chil-
if both domains are familiar. Their analogical ability is also dren said that the dog was watching the cat chase the mouse,
influenced by the level of complexity and abstraction that the just like the mother was watching a girl chase a boy. But in
analogies involve. One proposal suggests that younger children pair B, when a stationary mouse like the one in the first pic-
can grasp familiar objects’ typical properties in a domain and ture was added to the second picture, many preschoolers were
the relationships between those properties, but they tend to distracted and no longer saw this relational similarity. Instead,
have trouble seeing how certain kinds of relationships corre- they focused on the obvious perceptual similarity, saying that
spond across different domains—that is, how relations in one both pictures had a mouse, whereas older children still saw the
domain resemble those in another (Rattermann & Gentner, relational similarity in pair B despite the distracting mouse
1998). Thus, younger children tend to pay more attention to (Richland et al., 2006). Thus, younger children can see rela-
simple, perceptual properties than to higher-order relationships tional similarities, but they seem to have more difficulty notic-
when both are in competition (Andrews & Halford, 2002; ing such similarities when they are in competition with obvious
Halford et al., 1998). For example, in the scenario modeled perceptual similarities.
in Figure 10.10, many 3-year-olds will choose an object that
is visually similar to the apple, like the red ball, rather than
choosing an object based on the relationship between the first Q: How might knowledge in the relevant
two objects, as older children and adults would choose. None- domains facilitate the emergence of analogical
theless, young children can sometimes see such relationships reasoning between them?
and make correct choices based on analogies, as was done by
some 3-year-olds in the study.
As this example shows, reasoning analogically about a less
familiar domain can involve pitting obvious perceptual simi- Scientific Reasoning
larities (for example, between the apple and the red ball) against Scientific reasoning can be thought of as the ability to
children’s still-developing knowledge of cause and effect and develop hypotheses about some aspect of the world and
other abstract relations. In many of these situations, children then efficiently test those hypotheses with relevant data.

FIGURE 10.11 Analogical reasoning in

the face of perceptual distractors. Younger A
children can see the relational similarity of an
observer watching a chase in the two panels
in pair A, but they have much more difficulty
recognizing this similarity when both panels in
pair B contain a prominent, perceptually similar
object—in this case, the mouse. Rather than
focusing on the structural similarity between
the events in pair B’s panels, young children
tend to focus on the perceptual commonality.
Adapted from Richland et al. (2006). B

368 CHAPTER 10 THE GROWTH OF COGNITIVE SKILLS

In the past, some researchers believed that in the course of Experimenter: Does the earth move?
normal experience, children approached the world much Child: Yes.
like scientists, using scientific reasoning to develop and test Experimenter: Show me how it moves.
hypotheses about how things work (Carey, 1985). Yet, much Child: It spins around. (She demonstrates by rotating the
more often, developmental researchers viewed children as hollow sphere she had selected as the best 3-D model of the
incapable of true scientific reasoning because they believed earth.)
that children did not have logical capacities (Inhelder & Experimenter: Does the sun move?
Piaget, 1958) or could not connect isolated pieces of knowl- Child: It moves from outer space into the sky and to space
edge into a systematic set of beliefs (diSessa, 1988). While again.
scientists’ reasoning processes were thought to be logical, Experimenter: Does the moon move?
consistent, objective, flexible, and open-minded, children’s Child: Yes.
reasoning was considered to be quite the opposite: illogi- Experimenter: Show me how it moves.
cal, inconsistent, subjective, rigid, and dogmatic (Brewer & Child: Just like the sun and the stars, too. They go where
Samarapungavan, 1991). Moreover, scientific theories were the moon is.
thought to be abstract, global, internally consistent, and Experimenter: (He hands the child the set of models she
universal, while children’s theories were thought to be con- previously selected.) Now, with your models of the earth,
crete, fragmentary, inconsistent, and context-bound. These sun, and moon, show me how it changes from day to
differences fit well with some theorists’ broader ideas about night for this little boy here on earth.
how children’s thinking differs from that of adults, includ- Child: See here is the sky half of the earth. (She cups her
ing Piagetian views of children as illogical, concrete, and hands in a dome over the sphere.) During the day the sun
inconsistent. comes down from far in outer space to the sky part and
As we have seen with some other aspects of cognitive we get light on earth. And then slowly the sun moves
development, however, comparing the thought patterns of back up into the outer space part and the moon and the
children and adults shows that it is difficult to find any stars come down from space into the sky part. . . . So it
of these differences consistently. For example, one line will be night for the boy. (She indicates that outer space is
of research examined children’s intuitive beliefs about a region above the sky dome that covers the earth.) (Brewer &
cosmology—that is, about the earth, sun, moon, and stars Samarapungavan, 1991)
and their relationship to each other (Brewer & Samara-
pungavan, 1991). Even children as young as 6 could give Without having been taught anything about cosmol-
explanations that were surprisingly abstract (rather than ogy, this child has constructed a set of intricate spatial and
perceptually bound) and internally consistent and could dynamic relations that work quite well to explain the day/
integrate and explain new information. Furthermore, when night cycle as well as many other celestial phenomena, an
researchers directly compared children’s and scientists’ instance of explanation application (Brewer et al., 2000).
reasoning, both children and scientists seemed to depart She also uses explanation expansion when the experimenter
from consistency and logic in similar ways—that is, neither asks how the earth moves, and she realizes the need to
group conformed to the stereotype of how scientists work demonstrate how spatial relations change over time. When
(Dunbar, 1999; Salmon, 1989). prompted for further information, she easily builds on her
Some researchers have argued that young children’s theo- first explanation. Other children construct different mod-
ries lack true explanatory power because they cannot inte- els that also capture many spatial and dynamic relations.
grate and explain new information, a capability that would Figure 10.12 shows the full range of models offered by
expand the reach of their theories. Yet, a closer look at chil- children.
dren’s theories reveals that two key explanatory processes are If children reason and construct theories about the world
quite common. The first process, explanation application, similarly to the way scientists do, why do people remain
refers to the ability to answer questions about how a thing so focused on the differences? Brewer and Samarapunga-
works or why it is the way it is by referring to relationships van suggest that one important reason actually has more
and dynamic patterns. The second process, explanation to do with misunderstanding science than underestimating
expansion, is the process of elaborating a simple explanation children’s reasoning abilities. They point out that people
into a more complex one in response to further queries. For have a tendency to confuse the institution of science with
example, after being given several three-dimensional models the way an individual scientist works. Individual scien-
of the earth and selecting a model in which the sun, moon, tists benefit from a large body of accumulated knowledge,
and stars can move in and out of a hollow sphere in which which allows them to far surpass what any isolated indi-
we live inside, a 7-year-old gave the following explanation of vidual engaged in scientific inquiry could do. In contrast,
the day/night cycle: the child can be considered a “universal novice” working

REASONING AND THINKING ABOUT KNOWLEDGE 369

 of children’s scientific reasoning show a degree of develop-
mental consistency across different scientific domains (Keil,
Sphere 2011). What, then, distinguishes adults’ scientific reason-
ing from children’s? One important change may involve the
ability to integrate information across different domains. For
example, consider how children reason about two related
domains: how model sailboats and model cars move best
(Kuhn et al., 1992). In repeated sessions over the course of
several weeks, children became better at isolating the critical
variables that improve a model boat’s mobility (for exam-
Flattened sphere ple, its hull size or weight). Interestingly, over the course
of the study, their reasoning about how model cars move
improved in parallel to their increased understanding of how
boats move. Each small insight in one domain (here, model
boats) increased the likelihood of a similar insight in another
Hollow sphere domain (here, model cars). The two domains were linked
by more general, higher-order insights, so that what initially
happened within one domain then generalized to the other
(a) (b) domain.
Moreover, gaining knowledge in each domain seemed
to foster general improvements in the children’s scientific
reasoning strategies. Such strategies include considering
Dual earth multiple causes and outcomes, determining which com-
parisons to include in an experiment, thinking of appro-
priate experimental controls, and recognizing when an
experiment’s outcome is indeterminate (Siegler & Jen-
kins, 1989; Sodian et al., 1991). By adopting more effi-
cient strategies, the children became increasingly skilled
Disc earth at generating hypotheses and testing their predictions.
And in doing so, children are not so different from adults.
Thus, domain-specific knowledge and causal understand-
ing play crucial roles in the development of more domain-
Rectangular earth general scientific reasoning strategies (Kuhn et al., 1992,
1995).
FIGURE 10.12 Children’s models of the earth. Children often
develop models of the shape of the earth that are quite different
from the standard adult model seen in developed cultures. All of the Q: How is a young child’s scientific reasoning
models shown here were selected as the best model of the earth by similar to and different from that of a scientist?
different children and were used as the basis of their explanations for
phenomena like the day/night cycle. One of the models depicted the
earth as a hollow sphere in which we live and which is covered by
a kind of sky dome in which the sun, moon, and stars move in and Metacognition and Accessing Knowledge
out. Versions of this hollow sphere model were surprisingly common
among young elementary school children. Adapted from Vosniadou & Another critical set of cognitive skills that develops in child-
Brewer (1992). hood concerns metacognition—that is, the ability to think
about our own mind and what we know and to think about
knowledge in terms of its quality, depth, and relevance.
largely on her own. The young child’s independent inquiry Metacognitive skills involve the ability to think about and
and her small knowledge base may better explain the many evaluate our own knowledge and to consider what others
developmental differences in scientific reasoning than do know (Schneider & Lockl, 2002). These capabilities are
the accounts that claim that there are intrinsic differences quite sophisticated, and they emerge only gradually during
in children’s and adults’ reasoning abilities. the elementary school years. A related set of skills involves
Even young schoolchildren show parallels in their think- evaluating others’ knowledge and learning various indirect
ing to the ways individual scientists reason, and these aspects pathways to knowledge.

370 CHAPTER 10 THE GROWTH OF COGNITIVE SKILLS

Illusions of Knowing As described earlier in the chapter, pattern of results suggests that younger children can be
children younger than around 6 years of age have limited guided to realizations that their understanding is incom-
metacognitive abilities; they fare poorly at evaluating their plete, but even when they have some insight into the limits
own capacity to memorize information or pay attention of their knowledge, they will likely remain overconfident
to a complex display. Young children also have difficulty about their level of understanding. This confidence may
assessing whether they have understood a paragraph they help them feel competent and motivate them to continue
have just read or a story they have just heard or whether they learning.
have learned how to do a task (Markman, 1979; Pressley
et al., 1987; Schneider et al., 2000). In all of these situa-
tions, young children tend to overestimate their abilities, Q: In what ways do both children and adults
often assuming they have learned far more than they really share certain biases about how they assess the
have. Although adults sometimes make similar misjudg- quality of their own understanding?
ments, younger children usually make more of these kinds
of errors.
To investigate how children become aware of the limits of Evaluating Others’ Knowledge In addition to evalu-
their own knowledge, researchers have focused on another ating their own knowledge, children need to learn to
aspect of metacognitive understanding: assessments of evaluate what others know and who the experts are on
knowledge acquired gradually through life experience and particular topics. These abilities to think about the knowl-
for which any specific learning episodes may long be forgot- edge in other people’s minds are crucial for figuring out
ten. For example, how well do you know how a can opener whom to believe and whom to consult, affecting children’s
works? You probably don’t recall learning this information, social interactions as well as their developing systems of
but you still may have a strong sense of your own under- knowledge. To some extent, even 3- and 4-year-olds can
standing. In fact, adults are often surprisingly inaccurate at evaluate other people’s knowledge to decide whether to
assessing their own knowledge of how things work. They trust what they say. Preschoolers are less likely to believe
are said to be under an “illusion of explanatory depth,” ini- an adult’s statements if they know that on prior occasions
tially thinking they have a fairly detailed understanding of that person has made mistakes in labeling familiar objects
how a device works but then downgrading their ratings of (Koenig et al., 2004). Children also evaluate a speaker’s
what they know after attempting an explanation and real- reliability in terms of whether he shows a consensus with
izing how little they do know (Rozenblit & Keil, 2002). others—that is, how compatible his views are with the
One developmental question this raises is whether asking views of experts in the dominant culture (Harris & Cor-
children to explain their knowledge will similarly help them riveau, 2011; Koenig, 2010). By the time they are 5 years
to recognize what they don’t know. This issue is important old, children take into account multiple factors, such as
for getting a better sense of how children know the limita- weighing both speakers’ intentions (good versus bad) and
tions of their own knowledge and decide when to seek out their prior performance in deciding whether to trust them
further information. (Liu et al., 2013).
One study examined the extent to which kindergart- In their preschool years, children start to understand
ners, second-graders, and fourth-graders could recognize the idea of expertise as a “division of cognitive labor”—
the limits of their explanatory knowledge (Mills & Keil, that is, they realize that particular people are likely to have
2004). While kindergartners seemed to have a fragile abil- in-depth knowledge about different areas (Lutz & Keil,
ity to recognize the limits of their knowledge, most second- 2002). When children of various ages were asked about
graders clearly recognized the mismatch between what they what kinds of things doctors and car mechanics would
thought they understood and what they really understood, understand, children as young as 4 years of age under-
and fourth-graders responded much like adults. In addi- stood that a mechanic would be more likely than a doctor
tion, even after attempting to explain how various devices to understand problems with simple devices, even those
worked, kindergartners still gave the highest average rat- unrelated to cars. Similarly, these children saw doctors
ings of how much detail they knew, followed by second- as more likely to understand biological phenomena, even
graders, who gave the next highest average ratings, then those not directly relevant to medicine (Erickson et al.,
by fourth-graders, whose ratings were lower still and more 2010; Lutz & Keil, 2002). Thus, even preschoolers have
like those of adults. Thus, younger children more signifi- some sense of how knowledge can be clustered in ways that
cantly overestimated what they knew, while actually know- roughly correspond to disciplines like physical mechanics
ing less. After attempting to provide explanations, they and biology.
realized their initial ratings were too high, but they did Early on, however, this sense is quite fragile and can be
not reduce them nearly as much as they should have. This overwhelmed by other ways of clustering knowledge, such

REASONING AND THINKING ABOUT KNOWLEDGE 371

as around common goals. For example, a shoe seller might for understanding symbolic representations such as maps,
amass expertise on everything that supports the goal of sell- models, and drawings. Detailed analyses of these specific
ing more shoes, including fashion trends, costs of different cognitive skills draw on several themes mentioned in prior
kinds of leather, and advertising rates in different media. sections—for example, the changes that come with increas-
Young children can find this type of goal-centered expertise ing expertise, the importance of cognitive strategies and
category more obvious and compelling than discipline-based their interactions with metacognitive awareness, and the
ways of clustering knowledge (for example, around physical interplay between explicit and implicit aspects of cognition.
mechanics, biological processes, or psychological processes). But there are also specific factors unique to each cognitive
That is, if both ways of sorting are available to young chil- skill. With this in mind, we will first consider the emer-
dren, they may find the goal-centered ones more salient, gence of reading and mathematical skills and then examine
even though they are also able to use discipline-based how symbolic representations come to be used.
categories—and this is especially true if the goals at hand
seem familiar and sensible. The discipline-based view of
fields of knowledge starts to more clearly dominate chil-
dren’s thinking only late in elementary school (Danovitch & Reading
Keil, 2004; Keil et al., 2008). Most of us remember learning to read early in elementary
Children also learn a great deal more about the nature of school. For the vast majority of children, learning this
knowledge during their elementary and middle school years skill requires some guidance from teachers and caregivers.
(Markman, 1979). For example, children come to under- Yet, for most literate adults, reading seems effortless. How
stand the uncertainty involved in acquiring new knowledge, does a cognitive skill progress from being a real challenge
and they realize that a central goal is to become more cer- in elementary school to being a skill seemingly as basic as
tain about whether something is true. It now appears that walking?
even preschoolers may have a crude sense of this uncertainty,
which becomes more elaborated and effective in later years Learning to Read Learning to read requires integrating
(Metz, 2004). School experiences can also foster (or hinder) several skills over an extended period from the late preschool
a child’s developing awareness of the nature of knowledge. years to early adolescence. At least five major component
Teaching children about the nature of evidence, certainty, skills are involved: (1) understanding the idea of the alpha-
and multiple perspectives can help them understand the bet and learning the letters; (2) developing an understand-
continuously evolving nature of knowledge (Smith et al., ing of how letter patterns correspond to sounds; (3) learning
2000). to read aloud fluently; (4) expanding vocabulary; and (5)
Many children in their early school years tend to have learning to extract meaning from a passage and compre-
a view of knowledge known as absolutism, in which they hend it (National Institute of Child Health and Human
think that there is only one true explanation or way of char- Development, 2000; Paris & Paris, 2006). Although these
acterizing a situation. As they enter middle childhood, they components can be considered separately, they also interact.
often become relativists, thinking that any explanation or Thus, a child with a larger vocabulary and better compre-
theory is just as likely to be true as any other. Finally, they hension skills can often use those skills to infer words and
move toward an evaluativist perspective, in which they view thereby read aloud more fluently.
some explanations and theories as closer to the truth while Given these component skills, it is possible to broadly
still rejecting absolutist views (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). characterize the development of reading as a prereading
These shifts likely relate to their increasing understanding stage followed by a series of five reading stages (Chall,
of uncertainty, evidence, and ways of justifying beliefs or 1983). According to Jeanne Chall, children typically master
explanations (Kuhn, 2009). reading skills in the following way:
● Stage 0: Prereading (birth to approximately age 6). Children
begin to acquire foundational skills for reading during this
Three Specific Skills period. They start to get a sense that printed words relate
to sounds, and they begin to recognize a small number
In tackling the broad topics of memory, attention, reason- of words. They understand how a book represents a story
ing, and metacognitive skills, we have seen that develop- sequentially and can “read” picture books by turning the
ing expertise in specific domains of knowledge can affect pages while telling a corresponding story. Their spoken
how these broader domain-general skills are manifested in vocabulary at this point is many thousands of words.
each domain. In this section, we will consider the develop- ● Stage 1: Initial reading and decoding (usually ages 6 and 7).
ment of reading skills, mathematical skills, and the skills In this stage, children start to master the idea that each

372 CHAPTER 10 THE GROWTH OF COGNITIVE SKILLS

 letter has a sound and that letters can be combined to cre- These stages of learning to read involve perceptual identi-
ate all possible words. In addition, they learn that they can fication of letters, awareness of individual sounds, awareness
often figure out the sound of a word from the sounds of of syllables, familiarity with the layout of text, and a grasp
its letters and how they blend together. Taken together, of authors’ and readers’ intentions and goals, among many
this process is described as decoding—that is, learning to other components (Crowder & Wagner, 1992; Gibson &
convert strings of letters into sounds and words and then Levin, 1975; Rayner et al., 2001). To learn to read, a great
link those words to their stored meanings. Developing deal of practice is required, and some threshold levels of
decoding skills first requires learning the alphabetic prin- proficiency in all components must be met. Nevertheless,
ciple, which is simply knowing that words are built up out different children often show strikingly different ways of
of letters and letter combinations that stand for particular putting together and relying on these components. Children
sounds. Decoding skills then require gaining the ability to might stall in any one of the stages of learning to read, and
hear, recognize, and manipulate the smallest sound units when they do so for an extended period, especially in the
that can change a word’s meaning (such as recognizing early stages, they may be seen as having a reading disability
how “b” creates a different meaning for “bat” than “p” that needs corrective action. All of these factors come into
does for “pat”). Children in this stage are just starting to play in trying to understand the best ways to teach reading.
be able to read words, and their reading vocabulary may
be quite small, often less than 10 percent of their spoken
vocabulary. Q: What must a person learn to do to be able
● Stage 2: Confirmation and fluency (approximately ages 7 to read?
and 8). Children in this stage are “confirming” what they
have learned in stage 1 and becoming more rapid, fluent
readers. They also start to use the context of a sentence or Teaching Reading Two approaches to teaching reading
passage to help decode words. For example, if a child has have become widely used in many different contexts. Both
figured out that a sentence begins, “The cat said m . . . ,” have a long history and strong supporters and yet they differ
this context can make it much easier to read “meow.” Chil- enough to have sparked a heated controversy over which is
dren’s spoken vocabulary in this stage still far exceeds their best. The first one is often known as the whole language
reading vocabulary. approach. Rather than having children memorize letters
● Stage 3: Reading to learn (approximately ages 8 to 13). Chil- and then isolated words, this approach favors teaching them
dren now start to reap more benefits from reading and to comprehend and produce small stories in a variety of for-
come to see it as a valuable way to acquire new informa- mats (Crowder & Wagner, 1992). To do this, children are
tion. During this stage, reading also adds to the child’s exposed to sentences in the context of narratives, accom-
vocabulary, and the child’s oral and reading vocabular- panied by supporting pictures. Proponents of the whole
ies start to converge. Stage 3 children become more like language approach argue that reading has to be connected
adults in starting to heavily rely on the comprehension to broader communicative competencies so that it will be
component of reading, and they will use several compre- engaging and meaningful for the child. If reading-related
hension strategies to understand a text, such as predicting activities are made sufficiently engaging, they supposedly
typical story structure and anticipating how one event will will motivate children to develop the necessary component
likely follow from another. Having mastered more basic skills, such as decoding (Weaver, 2002).
reading skills, children can start to focus more directly on A second way of teaching reading, known as the
understanding what they have read and the broader narra- phonics approach, advocates teaching children about
tive structure of a set of sentences. phonics, the rules for combining the sounds of letters into
● Stage 4: Multiple viewpoints (approximately ages 14 to 18). words as a foundation for early reading skills. Since most
During this stage, adolescents acquire a complex reading languages have only about two dozen letters in their associ-
skill that involves interpreting text from different view- ated writing systems, learning to associate the letters with
points, such as thinking about how the author’s point of sounds and then put the sounds together seems to offer an
view differs from the reader’s or how the characters in a novel efficient way to begin to understand the written word. The
construe the same set of circumstances very differently. challenge in learning to read phonetically, however, is that
● Stage 5: Construction and reconstruction (approximately the sounds of each letter, when run together, often do not
age 18 and older). During this final stage, readers acquire sound much like the word they represent. As readers, we
the ability to evaluate and selectively read informa- somehow learn many complex patterns of correspondence
tion from many sources and to integrate it to create new between letter sequences and sounds. As a result, we can
insights, perhaps through their own writing. Most readers usually sound out novel words correctly, but not by simply
are not thought to attain this level of proficiency. blending the sounds of each letter (Gibson & Levin, 1975;

THREE SPECIFIC SKILLS 373

Rayner et al., 2001). When one of our sons was 5, he is phonological awareness, which refers to the child’s
objected vigorously to his teacher’s method of having the understanding of the sound units and structures of spo-
children say the sounds of each letter in a word, then hav- ken words. Thus, a phonologically aware child is able to
ing them repeat the sounds faster and faster together to discern the number of sound units in a spoken word and
read the word. As he insisted, no matter how fast he said compare sound units between words by engaging in pho-
“buh” “oh” “tuh” “tuh” “ull” “ee,” it did not sound like nological processing.
“bottle.” An additional complication is that in many lan- There are a wide variety of tests for phonological awareness
guages, there are a larger number of distinct sounds than (Anthony et al., 2002; Goswami & Bryant, 1990; McBride-
there are letters. For example, English has only 5 vowels but Chang, 1995). These include asking children whether pairs
over 12 distinct vowel sounds. Consider the sound of the of words rhyme or start or end with the same sounds and
“a” in “baby,” “bat,” “about,” “saw,” and “car.” Moreover, asking them how many distinct sound units a word has. In
two different vowels can also have the same sounds, like these tasks, children hear the questions aloud and answer
the “a” in “across” and the “u” in “circus.” the same way; there are no written words involved. Yet, in
Despite the complexities of mapping sound sequences many different languages, a child’s grasp of spoken words’
onto letter sequences, phonics approaches are critical to sound structures is a powerful predictor of how easily he
early reading. When phonics approaches are compared will learn to read (Anthony & Francis, 2005; Ehri et al.,
with those like the whole language approach, which 2001; Hulme & Snowling, 2013; Rayner et al., 2001).
downplays the memorization of letter sounds, there At the same time, some developmental differences in
seem to be clear drawbacks to omitting phonics instruc- children’s phonological awareness are related to the extent
tion (Adams, 1990; Hulme & Snowling, 2013; Rayner to which their language has correspondences between spell-
et al., 2001, 2002; Vellutino, 1991; Williams, 1980). At ing and sounds. Thus, exposure to writing in Spanish and
the same time, many students and teachers hate the rote- Dutch, which have much more regular correspondences
drill aspects of some phonics approaches. Whole language than English, helps advance children’s phonological aware-
approaches, which emphasize learning in context, tend ness more rapidly than does exposure to written English
to be much more fun. For that reason, it can be help- (De Jong & Van der Leij, 2003; Ziegler & Goswami, 2005).
ful to draw on some of the excitement and pleasure of In addition, among speakers of more phonologically regu-
whole language approaches while also teaching children lar languages, problems with phonological awareness tend
about letter combinations and sound patterns. Today, to disappear in adulthood, whereas for speakers of irregu-
most reading experts recognize the need for both basic lar languages like English, those problems often persist into
phonics instruction and comprehension strategies, since adulthood (Anthony & Francis, 2005; De Jong & Van der
they know that the many components of reading require Leij, 2003).
several different forms of instruction for optimal develop-
ment of reading skills. In addition, it is becoming increas-
ingly clear that the best teaching involves customizing Q: How is phonological awareness involved in
how much emphasis is placed on each reading skill based the development of reading?
on a particular child’s strengths and weaknesses. Individu-
alized instruction, in which first-graders with lower vocab-
ularies work more on phoneme decoding while those with When Reading Is a Challenge: Dyslexia Some children
more advanced vocabularies work more on comprehension have enormous difficulties learning to read, and in some
strategies, seems to result in greater improvement for both cases, reading difficulties can persist throughout adult-
groups (Connor et al., 2007, 2011). hood. One cause of these problems is dyslexia, a learning
In the process of learning to read, most children reach disability that typically involves a deficit in phonological
a point at which they seem to suddenly catch on and start processing despite normal intelligence, a good motivation
reading at a much higher level. These apparent surges in to learn to read, and ample early exposure to environments
reading skill have often been seen as evidence that chil- that normally foster reading (Shaywitz & Shaywitz, 2003).
dren learn to read by progressing through a series of A child with dyslexia may end up falling behind peers aca-
discrete stages, each of which corresponds to a particu- demically because the dyslexia causes the child to have much
lar strategy for decoding strings of letters (Gough et al., less experience practicing and mastering the art of reading by
1983). Others, however, have argued that decoding strate- actively decoding words and sentences. Most children spend
gies actually undergo more incremental changes, so that thousands of hours reading and becoming more efficient
reading develops smoothly, without stage-like transitions processors of text, but since children with dyslexia have such
(Perfetti, 1999). Theorists from both camps agree that one difficulties in phonological processing, they may read less
of the most critical developmental processes for reading and fail to build up expertise without very intensive tutoring

374 CHAPTER 10 THE GROWTH OF COGNITIVE SKILLS

 NEW DIRECTIONS IN DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH

The Genetics of Dyslexia

F
or over a century, it has been noted that dyslexia seems Meng et al., 2005; Schumacher et al., 2006). A second gene
to run in families (Smith et al., 1983). Twin studies known as KIAA0319 also seems to affect neural migration dur-
and other methods have found high heritability rates ing brain development (Fisher & Francks, 2006; Schumacher
(DeFries & Gillis, 1993). In addition, as children pro- et al., 2007). The story becomes more complicated, however,
gress from learning to read to increasingly using reading to learn, as the involvement of genes on several other chromosomes
shared genotypes are by far the strongest predictors of levels has also been suggested (Gayán et al., 1999; Giraud & Ramus,
of reading ability (Harlaar et al., 2007). With advances in our 2013; Grigorenko et al., 1997; Hannula-Jouppi et al., 2005;
understanding of the human genome, it has been possible to find Kere, 2011; Nopola-Hemmi et al., 2001; Scerri et al., 2010). It is
specific gene loci that are significantly correlated with dyslexia. too early to tell whether these different genetic loci correspond
The genetic studies clearly indicate that there is not a simple to different subtypes of dyslexia or whether different combina-
gene locus for dyslexia. As in almost all cases of genetic influ- tions of genetic loci produce the subtypes.
ences, several gene loci and their interactions seem to be impli- Of course, the involvement of specific genes in dyslexia does
cated. In general terms, the finding that multiple gene locations not mean that everyone with these genes has dyslexia; many
are involved in dyslexia offers some biological support for the do not. Nor does it mean that people with dyslexia cannot learn
idea that there are several distinct types of dyslexia, as well as to read well. With the right instruction, most people with dys-
several interacting biological components that support normal lexia can develop strategies that help make reading easier and
reading (Castles et al., 1999; Scerri et al., 2010; Shaywitz et more fluent (Shaywitz et al., 2003). Interestingly, many people
al., 2003; Shaywitz & Shaywitz, 2005). One key question is with dyslexia seem to recruit brain regions other than the ones
how closely various reading problems—such as problems with used by nondyslexic readers to compensate for their reading
phonological awareness, short-term verbal memory, or rapid difficulties. For example, reading processes and dyslexic defi-
naming of pictures, colors, and letters, among others—are cits usually occur in the left hemisphere, but in some people
associated with specific genetic signatures. with dyslexia, right hemisphere areas may be used during
In the search for genes associated with dyslexia, research- reading to compensate for the deficits (Gabrieli, 2009). Cer-
ers have found one especially prominent locus in a gene called tain approaches to reading instruction may help accelerate this
DCDC2 on chromosome 6. This gene seems to influence how neural compensation process (Shaywitz et al., 2003). Some
new neurons move to their target locations during brain devel- researchers hope that specific genetic signatures will corre-
opment. A DCDC2 variant that causes abnormal neuron migra- spond closely enough with particular reading difficulties that
tion in which neurons end up in inappropriate cortical locations these genetic differences may even provide guidelines for tailor-
is unusually common among people with dyslexia (Kere, 2011; ing individualized approaches to teaching reading.

and instruction. By one estimate, a fifth-grader who does guistic codes that correspond to letters and words (Snowl-
not have dyslexia may read outside of the classroom in 2 days ing, 2001; Ziegler & Goswami, 2005). Children and adults
as many words as a fifth-grader with dyslexia reads in a year who have such difficulties may have less-developed capaci-
(Gabrieli, 2009). ties in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. This region
A large proportion of children with dyslexia do espe- shows no increased activation in people with dyslexia
cially poorly on phonological awareness tasks (Snowling, when they engage in word rhyming tasks, while the same
2001; Ziegler & Goswami, 2005). Some people with dys- region does show more activation when typically develop-
lexia may have difficulty correctly perceiving sounds that ing children engage in the same tasks (Kovelman et al.,
occur close together in time, as they have deficits in detect- 2012). As the New Directions in Developmental Research
ing rapidly changing sensory stimuli (Tallal, 2000). But in box describes, genetic and neuropsychological models of
most cases, the problem on phonological awareness tasks dyslexia are starting to support the idea that there may
does not seem to be with initial perceptual processing of also be distinct types of dyslexia that arise from different
sounds, but with translating sounds into the efficient lin- mechanisms.

THREE SPECIFIC SKILLS 375

Mathematical Reasoning The third mathematical advancement during elementary
school affects children’s ability to solve problems strategi-
In earlier chapters, we examined two aspects of the develop- cally. These skills include the ability to set up a “story prob-
ment of children’s mathematical thought. First, we considered lem” appropriately and then solve it to attain a goal, such as
infants’ ability to sense numbers through estimations and per- figuring out how to divide bills and coins equally among
form simple “addition” and “subtraction” (see Chapter 5). Sec- friends. One key skill here is determining how to use the
ond, we saw how toddlers and preschoolers develop concepts available information to represent a question mathemati-
of number through counting and other means (see Chapter 9). cally rather than simply calculating with the first numbers
Here we will consider how more complex mathematical skills encountered. Consider a problem in which five friends sell
develop, especially those concerned with calculations. lemonade from 9:00 a.m. until 3:00 p.m. and make $24 in
bills and $12 in coins. How much money does each person
Growth of Mathematical Skills The late preschool and get if the earnings are divided equally? A child who fails to
elementary school years bring many advancements in chil- set up a careful model of the situation might start to inap-
dren’s mathematical skills. Three of the most important propriately do calculations on numbers that seem to go
changes concern an understanding of mathematical con- together, such as dividing five friends into a time. Children
cepts, skill in carrying out mathematical procedures, and who have good procedural fluency but lack strategic skills
the ability to solve math problems strategically (National will often rush through calculations that do not make sense
Research Council, 2001). in terms of what the problem is really asking (Clark et al.,
First, a child has to develop a conceptual understanding 2010; Geary, 2013; Van der Ven et al., 2012).
of mathematical concepts. In Chapter 9, we touched on
the child’s early, intuitive grasp of counting. As a child’s Teaching Mathematics Children need plenty of instruc-
broader mathematical abilities develop, her conceptual tion and practice in all three of these facets of mathematical
understanding can greatly amplify her mathematical skills. skill. Unfortunately, in the history of teaching mathemat-
For example, knowing that addition is commutative—that ics, educators have sometimes gone to extremes, stressing
numbers can be summed in any order without affecting one facet of instruction to the point of neglecting others
the answer—allows a child to know some arithmetic facts (Schoenfeld, 2004, 2007). Some schools may overemphasize
without having to be taught them. Thus, a child who learns procedural fluency to such an extent that children’s under-
that 2 + 5 = 7 and knows that addition is commutative, standing of what the problems mean (that is, conceptual
also knows that 5 + 2 = 7 without having to learn that sum understanding) and how to approach them (that is, stra-
separately. Similarly, a student who conceptually under- tegic knowledge) are neglected, making the children more
stands the number line will find it much easier to under- prone to applying procedures inappropriately. Other schools
stand fractions as intermediate values between the familiar may emphasize math concepts and some broad strategies
integers. but neglect procedural fluencies. Their students may have a
A second major development in children’s mathemati- better sense of what the problems are asking but may then
cal abilities during elementary school has to do with skill struggle with the computations. Perhaps considering the
in carrying out mathematical procedures, or procedural history of these opposing trends in math teaching will lead
fluency. This ability involves being able to perform calcu- future educators to favor a more balanced approach.
lations efficiently and appropriately. An important compo-
nent of procedural fluency is a highly practiced knowledge Developing Problem-Solving Strategies As children’s
of sums and “times tables,” usually for all pairs of numbers mathematical skills develop in middle childhood, they often
between 1 and 12. These memorized facts then form the choose different strategies to solve problems (Siegler, 2003).
basis for rapidly and accurately carrying out more sophis- These developmental changes in strategy choice are among
ticated procedural skills, such as subtracting or multiply- the most prominent changes in children’s mathematical
ing three-digit numbers. In some cases, while learning a thought during the elementary and middle school years.
procedure, a child may unwittingly acquire a mistaken Children might use several distinct strategies to perform
procedure that then has to be “unlearned.” Thus, a child arithmetic. For adding, children’s most common strategies
might assume that subtraction always involves subtracting include: (1) counting all, which means counting up all the
the smaller number from the larger. When the child moves numbers in the sequence to reach the total, often using the
on to subtracting two-digit numbers, she might errone- fingers; (2) counting on, which means knowing that in a sum
ously subtract the smaller digit in each place value from such as 7 + 5, the first number means you start with seven
the larger, such that 84  67 = 23 (instead of 17). Richer things and the second number means you count five more
conceptual understanding often helps children avoid such things, either mentally or vocally saying “8, 9, 10, 11, 12”; (3)
procedural errors. reconstructing the sum by comparing it with a known answer,

376 CHAPTER 10 THE GROWTH OF COGNITIVE SKILLS

such as knowing that 5 + 5 = 10 and then adding 2 to that This kind of research into strategy development has also
sum to solve 7 + 5; and finally, (4) simply retrieving the sum inspired new instruction methods that focus on teach-
from memory, the way many adults do for sums of single ing children multiple strategies to solve certain kinds of
digits. problems. The assumption is that if children have a larger
For multiplying, children use similar strategies, such as repertoire of strategies to choose from, they will be able to
(1) counting up by one of the numbers being multiplied, more easily and adaptively find the most efficient strate-
such as solving 3 × 7 by counting 7, 14, 21; (2) repeated gies for each problem (Torbeyns et al., 2005). Critics have
addition, such as solving 7 × 3 by adding 7 + 7 + 7; (3) pointed out that one disadvantage of these approaches is
reconstructing by comparing with a known answer, such as that they can sometimes neglect to foster children’s deeper
knowing that 5 × 3 = 15 and then adding two more 3s conceptual understanding. Children may simply learn to
to get 21; and finally, (4) retrieving a known product from associate some strategies, and not necessarily the most effi-
memory (Baroody & Ginsburg, 1986; Hopkins & Lawson, cient ones, with more success than others. In such cases,
2002; Miller & Paredes, 1990). children do not necessarily have to think about what their
How do children’s mathematical strategies change with strategies actually “mean” conceptually, so long as they
development? Broadly speaking, children use increasingly produce the right answer.
efficient strategies as they get older—although there are This associative view of strategy development also
also large individual differences, and even adults sometimes seems incomplete, which has caused others to ask pointed
use earlier strategies (Lemaire & Lecacheur, 2011; Lemaire questions about the developments in conceptual under-
& Siegler, 1995; Siegler, 1989, 1995). At most ages, chil- standing that underlie changes in strategy use. For exam-
dren know several strategies, and different ones emerge as ple, how do children begin using a new strategy in the
the most efficient at different points in development (see first place? And when will they abandon a successful
Figure 10.13). More broadly, this can be seen as part of a strategy for a new one that is conceptually more coherent?
larger effort to choose increasingly efficient strategies from In addition, the associative accounts of strategy develop-
among alternative solutions to a problem. ment have difficulty explaining broad changes that seem
To study the development of problem-solving strate- to involve reorganization of conceptual knowledge. For
gies, researchers often use microgenetic analysis of cogni- example, when children who have become proficient at
tive development. This is a method of repeatedly assessing adding start to multiply, the new multiplication strate-
children every few days or weeks rather than over mul- gies often temporarily disrupt the addition strategies,
tiyear intervals (see Chapter 1). This approach enables causing a drop in performance (Miller & Paredes, 1990).
researchers to document children’s shifts in strategy use The drop seems to happen because the acquisition of new
as they happen and to refine their models accordingly. knowledge causes a reorganization of older knowledge
rather than changing the strengths of associations to par-
Large
ticular strategies.
amount

Retrieving Q: How do children’s strategies tend to change

Use of strategies

strategies
Reconstructing
with development in the area of mathematical
strategies reasoning skills?
Counting-on
Counting-all strategies
strategies
As we have seen, the development of mathematical reason-
Small Age ing involves the emergence of several different component
amount skills, and the best math teachers must address all these com-
FIGURE 10.13 Mathematical strategies in development. As ponents at the same time. Even within a single component
a child develops mathematical problem-solving strategies, several skill, such as choosing between problem-solving strategies,
possible approaches to any given task are available in his repertoire. teachers can foster understanding at several levels, rang-
Here we see different strategies for addition problems. The child uses
ing from rote strategy performance to more sophisticated
a series of overlapping strategies on any given problem, but the ten-
dency to use particular approaches or strategies changes with age, conceptual understanding of the different approaches to
typically shifting toward more efficient strategies. Nonetheless, even a problem. Teaching math well is challenging, and there
adults sometimes use early-developing strategies, such as counting- are considerable variations in teacher effectiveness, not only
on strategies. Adapted from Hopkins & Lawson (2002). across schools, but also across countries.

THREE SPECIFIC SKILLS 377

 Over the past few decades, multiple studies have found correspondences between these representations and their
that students in the United States do not perform as well real-world counterparts may seem obvious, but interpreting
on math competency tests as children in many other coun- them is not at all easy for younger children. These relations
tries do (Beaton et al., 1996; Conway & Sloane, 2006; can even be difficult for adults to understand on less famil-
Kelly et al., 2000). Although scholars disagree on the best iar kinds of maps, such as topographic maps, which show
explanations for these differences, a few important reasons elevations along with other spatial information.
are widely acknowledged. First, mathematics instruction One important aspect of understanding maps and mod-
in countries where students have higher-ranking scores els involves learning which aspects of the representation cor-
often involves richer conceptual explanations together respond to which real-world counterparts. Colors are often
with more mathematical drills, while instruction of chil- irrelevant, for example, as are the materials that make up
dren in lower-scoring countries often involves less concep- the maps or models. Children have to learn which corre-
tual exposure and less practice with drills (Askew et al., spondences are relevant and how the relevant representa-
2010; Hiebert et al., 2003; Stigler et al., 2000). Second, tions map onto the real world (Flavell et al., 1990; Perner,
math teachers in high-scoring countries often have a 1991; Zaitchik, 1990). As we examine the developmental
deeper understanding of mathematics than U.S. math changes in children’s use of maps, models, and pictures of
teachers do, often because they have more mathematics the world, we can once again ask whether a special capacity
education (Conway & Sloane, 2006; Hiebert et al., 2003; for information processing emerges over the course of child-
Stigler et al., 1987). Finally, in many countries, such as hood, perhaps a spatial/geometric visualization ability. We
Japan, mathematical skill is viewed as the result of a stu- can also ask about the role of more domain-general develop-
dent’s efforts, whereas in the United States, it is common ments, such as the ability to conceive of different ways of
to think of being good at math as a kind of inborn ability representing the same physical systems in the real world.
(House, 2006). This cultural difference may lead students Some of the most provocative and intriguing studies in this
in Japan and in other countries that emphasize improve- area have investigated children’s abilities to understand and
ment through effort to be more persistent in the face of use small-scale models and pictures of scenes (DeLoache,
failure. It may also spur families to invest in more tutor- 2004). The developmental changes in these abilities can be
ing, based on the belief that with enough practice and quite large and can occur over very short intervals.
effort, most children can become quite skilled in math. Between ages 2 and 3, children go from low levels of
These cultural differences can have job-related conse- performance at using models and pictures to excellent per-
quences. As technology becomes more sophisticated, even formance. One way this change has been documented is by
economically powerful countries may find themselves at a testing young children’s understanding of the way a model
disadvantage if their workforce is less advanced in math- represents the world. This understanding involves an aware-
ematical skills. ness that models serve as dual representations in which they
can be both physical objects in their own right and also sym-
bols for other objects. In one series of tasks, an experimenter
shows a child a small model of a room, “hides” an object in
Using Symbolic Representations the model room while the child watches, and then asks the
Letters and numbers are some of the most common sym- child to find the object in a corresponding, full-size room.
bols used in advanced cultures, but the more ancient and For 2½-year-old children, such a task is extremely difficult
universal uses of symbols involve drawings, maps, and mod- and they often fail, but for 3-year-olds, the task is easy and
els. It takes children many years to become skilled users of they succeed admirably (DeLoache, 1987, 1989, 1991). The
these kinds of symbols. We will consider how children learn younger children can easily retrieve the hidden miniature
to interpret symbols made by others—namely, maps and object from the model room, showing that they do remember
models—and then how they create their own symbols its location. They just do not seem to spontaneously connect
through drawings. the model to the full-scale room in a meaningful way. They
also fail to realize how the scale sizes of some objects, such as
Using Maps and Models Almost all cultures use repre- chairs, require comparably scaled other objects, such as dolls
sentational systems to illustrate spatial relations in the world that sit in those chairs (Ware et al., 2006).
(Gladwin, 1970). Unlike in reading and mathematics, the Interestingly, when using pictures of rooms instead of
symbols in these representations are structured so that they small three-dimensional models, children show a shift in
directly correspond to spatial relations in the real world. their mapping ability at an earlier age, failing at 2 years old
On a road map, for example, the three-dimensional world but succeeding at 2½ years old (DeLoache, 1987). There
is transformed into a two-dimensional rendering in which are several possible explanations for children’s success in
spatial relations are reproduced in miniature. To adults, the mapping between pictures and the real world at an earlier

378 CHAPTER 10 THE GROWTH OF COGNITIVE SKILLS

age (DeLoache, 2004; DeLoache et al., 2003). One theory increase in their appreciation of increasingly subtle aspects of
speculates about difficulties with dual representations and maps and models. Moreover, using these kinds of representa-
keeping them separate (Leslie, 1987). The child is trying tions may help support other kinds of developments in spatial
not to confuse the model with reality and not to blend cognition, just as the broader developments in spatial cogni-
the real object and the model together. Perhaps the con- tion may help foster increased mapping and modeling skills
fusion occurs more often with three-dimensional models (Uttal, 2000).
than with pictures, where the differences are more obvious.
Another explanation may involve practice. In our culture,
at least, children have far more experience early on with pic- Q: How do young children differ from older
tures than with three-dimensional models of spatial layout children in their abilities to use models?
(Uttal, 2005).
What ultimately causes the shift in children’s understand-
ing of maps and models? One line of insight came from a Children’s Drawings Some time after children come
study in which the experimenter explained to the child that to understand symbolic representations such as maps and
the three-dimensional model was the “real” room but it had models, they develop the ability to create their own repre-
been shrunk by a magic “shrinking machine” (DeLoache sentations. The drawings that many parents save provide a
et al., 1997; see Figure 10.14). Then, after the child watched record of changes in a child’s symbolic skills from the early
the researcher hide the miniature object, the model was preschool years into elementary school. Regardless of an
removed and said to be “enlarged,” and the child was asked individual’s artistic talent, these drawings reveal some gen-
to find the object in the full-size room. In this case, 2½-year- eral patterns in the development of symbolic skills.
olds did much better at finding the hidden object in the real Before age 3, most children simply scribble, and each new
room. One likely reason that the children did so much better scribble looks very much like the last (Golomb, 2004). Yet,
in this case is that the “shrinking room” description provided even in these early drawings, children show some grasp of
a causal account of how to link the model to the full-scale the way the artist’s intentions link the artist, the drawing,
environment. It made clear what sort of relations between and the drawn object. In one study, 2-year-olds watched
the model and the real room were important and therefore an adult who was looking at a balloon make a simple
made much clearer how the model could be used as infor- drawing. When asked what the drawing was, the children
mation to guide a search. This research implies that strat- declared that it was of the balloon, even though it was
egy and knowledge are important components of children’s just a circle with a line coming down from it. If the adult
understanding of spatial relations (Liben, 1999). instead was drawing while looking at a lollipop, the chil-
Finally, the development of mapping and modeling skills dren described the same picture as a lollipop (Preissler &
is not an all-or-none affair in which children under a certain Bloom, 2008).
age simply cannot use a map or a model to guide their actions In their third year, children start to draw simple figures that
(Newcombe et al., 2013). Instead, children show a gradual crudely represent the objects that they see. Thus, they might

A B C
FIGURE 10.14 Studying model use with the “shrinking room.” (A) After observing an object being hidden in a small model of a room,
children younger than about 3 often have difficulty locating a corresponding object in the real room. When 3-year-old children are told that the
model is the real room after it was “shrunk” by (B) a “shrinking machine,” they can better understand the relation between the model and the
real room and locate the object in the real room (C).

THREE SPECIFIC SKILLS 379

depict a person as an oval with lines coming out of it. The
crudeness of these drawings stems from several factors. First,
their motor skills are limited and not precisely controlled. (As a
parallel, imagine how you would fare at drawing a figure with a
pencil between your toes.) Second, their understanding of how
to translate a three-dimensional object into a two-dimensional
picture may be limited, resulting in more distortions and simpli- 6-year-old boy 10-year-old boy 13-year-old girl
fications, such as not taking into account the effects of distance
on perceived size (Golomb, 2004). Third, their attention to the
properties of an object is limited, and so they may fail to depict
various features of an object or scene; as their knowledge of the
objects in the world grows more complex, however, they may use
that knowledge to make sure that their drawings have the right
features, such as five fingers on a hand and five toes on a foot
(Goodnow, 1977). Finally, children may not be aware of partic-
ular cultural conventions that affect the way they should portray
5-year-old girl 10-year-old boy 13-year-old boy
objects and their relations; as they learn these conventions, how-
FIGURE 10.15 Drawing skills and age. Children’s drawings
ever, their drawings will become more detailed (Cherney et al.,
improve greatly with age in terms of the accuracy, detail, and spatial
2006). For example, children in North America learn to draw layout of objects, as shown in these drawings of family and school
more smiles on people than Japanese children, who in turn learn by children of different ages. The children’s emerging skills represent
to draw more details on each person. Similarly, different groups a convergence of increasing motor skills, growing understanding of
may vary in whether they tend to draw aerial views of a scene drawing techniques, growing knowledge of objects and their proper-
such as a playground or a ground-level horizontal view, and this ties, and expanding awareness of cultural conventions for representa-
will affect how children in those cultures learn to depict a scene. tions. From Cherney et al. (2006).
Children seem to be especially fond of drawing human
figures and buildings. As a result, there have been many can remember more than adult novices. Expert-level reading
studies of their evolving skills in drawing these two kinds of involves automatic, effortless decoding of letters into mean-
objects. As shown in Figure 10.15, there is a clear elaboration ings, which requires enormous amounts of practice. Math-
of detail and accuracy as children grow older. In addition, the ematical skills, likewise, do not develop as flashes of insight
spatial arrangements of objects, such as family members or a but rather require surprisingly large amounts of practice.
group of buildings, become more accurate as children seem to In addition to these effects of expertise within specific
develop a sense of depicting a coherent scene rather than sim- domains, there are also some broader, cross-domain effects
ply a collection of individual objects. One fascinating aspect on the development of cognitive skills. For one, being a
of children’s drawing is that most children are strongly moti- “universal novice,” as most young children are, puts the
vated to draw, suggesting a drive to create pictorial representa- child in a very different state from an adult, who is a novice
tions that goes beyond parents’ and teachers’ encouragement. in some areas but an expert in others. To develop a new area
of knowledge, an adult can tap into other knowledge bases
for strategies, relationships, and metacognitive insights to
apply to the new learning. The child has far fewer resources
Conclusions of this sort and as a result is less able to apply previously suc-
cessful strategies, draw analogies, or step back and consider
There is no single story about how cognitive skills develop, what it means to have a high level of skill in a particular
but from the vast amounts of research in this area, some pow- area. Yet, as children gain understanding in several related
erful themes emerge. First and foremost is the extraordinary domains, as with the development of scientific reasoning
importance of expertise. When we consider abilities such as skills, they start to see relationships between these domains
memory and attention, the dramatic developmental changes and common higher-order patterns.
that occur with respect to those skills cannot be understood Children’s increasingly effective use of strategies—to
without considering the contributions of expertise itself, inde- improve memory, manage attention, and solve problems—
pendent of age. Having a thorough knowledge of a given topic is another theme that pervades many aspects of cognitive
improves people’s memory for information in that area to development. Although young preschoolers rarely use strat-
such an extent that expertise often influences memory perfor- egies spontaneously, they are capable of doing so, especially
mance more than age does. Within a given area, child experts for fairly simple tasks that draw on very familiar domains of

380 CHAPTER 10 THE GROWTH OF COGNITIVE SKILLS

knowledge. Moreover, like adults, young children are more gies. More sophisticated metacognition helps children see
likely to use strategies within their areas of expertise. For more clearly when and why they need to use particular
many kinds of tasks, children are often capable of using a strategies. In addition, increasing executive skills can build
huge array of strategies. In these cases, development con- on metacognitive awareness of such things as distracting
sists of choosing between strategies in increasingly efficient stimuli and the need to inhibit attention to those stimuli.
and effective ways. Careful microgenetic analysis of skill Finally, research on the development of cognitive skills has
development has shown the evolution of patterns of strategy uncovered important differences in the ways that children
choice, although it has been less successful in explaining apply cognitive skills to information they find meaningful
how strategies originate in the first place and why certain rather than arbitrary. Going forward, the most productive
ineffective strategies persevere. ways of studying the development of cognitive skills will
One important influence on children’s ability to use cog- invariably be concerned with how children remember, pay
nitive strategies is their developing understanding of how attention, reason, and perfect specific cognitive skills in the
the mind works. Children become increasingly competent real world, focusing on sensible goals and naturalistic bodies
at metacognition, learning more about what memory and of information. Such an ecological approach to the study of
attention are and how they are used in daily life. Their these cognitive skills has been increasingly championed in
metacognitive understanding is part of their emerging adult cognitive science, but its successes in developmental
theories of mind and is linked to their ability to use strate- research are even greater and more obvious.

STU DY AN D REVIEW

SUMMARY experienced at a particular time and place, including autobi-

ographical memories, which are memories of an individual’s
Memory own life journey.
● A major change in the development of memory involves
● Memory at all ages requires encoding, storage, and retrieval,
improvements in the use of strategies for storing and retriev-
and each process is associated with specific neural systems.
ing information. Developing metamemory, or having a
In addition, information is first represented in high-capacity,
sense of what memory is and how it works, seems to fos-
very rapid sensory memories, then in more limited capacity
ter the use of strategies. Expertise in a specific domain also
working memories, and finally in high-capacity long-term
improves memory performance for domain-relevant infor-
memories. Information held in working memory creates a
mation. Quite young children with expertise in a particular
temporary storage platform that can support reasoning,
local domain can far outperform adults on memory tasks in
problem solving, and many other cognitive tasks.
● The memory system can be broken down into various com-
that domain, while doing poorly relative to adults in other
domains.
ponents, most notably implicit and explicit memory. While
● Early episodic memories, which are usually autobiographi-
implicit memory, which is memory for information or behav-
cal in nature and consist of memories of discrete events that
ior that is outside of conscious awareness, may be evolution-
an individual experiences prior to 2½ years of age, seem to
arily more ancient and perhaps more dominant in the young
be inaccessible to older children and adults, a phenomenon
child, at least some explicit memories, which are memories
called infantile amnesia. People’s earliest accessible memo-
for information or behavior that is consciously recalled, may
ries are from their early preschool years, about the same time
also be from quite early in life and from well before the onset
when the ability to embed specific memories in larger narra-
of spoken language. There is also a contrast between declara-
tive structures significantly improves. The reasons for infantile
tive memory, which is the memory for events or facts, and
amnesia are still not fully understood, but they likely relate
procedural memory, which is the memory for how to per-
to changes in specific brain regions, changes in how memo-
form actions or procedures. And there is a contrast between
ries are encoded and linked to information about context, and
semantic memory, the memory for knowledge about the
changes in how children are able to use memory-triggering cues.
world, and episodic memory, the memory for specific events

STUDY AND REVIEW 381

Attention ● Scientific reasoning involves several related abilities, includ-
● Attention is an active exploratory system. Its development ing the ability to consider hypotheses and evaluate evidence
during the elementary school years involves the increasing for them and the ability to build coherent theories and mod-
ability to track information of interest and not be distracted els about the world. This kind of reasoning continues to
by irrelevant information. develop for much of the lifespan, but it is not completely
● Attention involves the interacting processes of orienting, outside the grasp of young children. When sufficiently
alerting, and executive functioning. Each of these processes simple, familiar domains are involved, and when the the-
tends to be associated with different neural systems, develop- ories and structures are simplified as well, young children
mental time courses, and genetic correlates. are able to make hypotheses, consider evidence, and show
● Executive functioning consists of the cognitive activities some coherence in their explanations for the patterns they
involved in goal-directed tasks and problem solving. Its three observe.
● Metacognition is the ability to think about cognition—to
major components are inhibitory control, error correction/
shifting, and working memory, which work together in an think about memory, attention, and the nature of knowl-
integrated fashion. Dramatic developmental changes in edge. Metacognitive skills develop considerably during the
executive functioning take place during the preschool and elementary school years, often more rapidly in areas where
elementary school years. children have high levels of expertise.
● Children get better at seeking out information and clos-
● Attention develops with considerable support from the
growth of strategies. These in turn are fostered by an increase ing the gaps in their own understanding and knowledge as
in metacognitive awareness—namely, the ability to under- they gain an understanding of what others know and who
stand a situation’s attentional demands and the ways of their culture’s experts are in particular domains. Even pre-
manipulating internal and external factors to facilitate atten- schoolers are sensitive to this “division of cognitive labor”
tion. Executive functioning also helps direct strategy choice in a community. Children become more inclined to think
and use. about fields of knowledge in terms of different disciplines
● Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) consists of during the elementary and middle school years. As they grow
behaviors involving inattention, hyperactivity, and impulsiv- older, they also tend to improve at estimating how much they
ity, and commonly includes difficulties with staying on task know, but even adults retain some illusions about what they
and/or disengaging appropriately from activities. Although know.
ADHD diagnoses have increased significantly in recent
years, the cognitive and biological bases for the deficit are Three Specific Skills
not yet well understood. There is no question that some chil- ● Learning to read depends on phonological awareness devel-

dren and adults have biologically based attention-related dis- oped through extensive exposure to the links between the
orders, but because of the many reasons that ADHD may be sound patterns of a language and the visual symbols that rep-
misdiagnosed, there may be considerably fewer people with resent those patterns.
the disorder than the number currently diagnosed and medi- ● Deficits in phonological processing, despite normal intelli-

cated for it. gence, good motivation to read, and early exposure to read-
ing, account for most cases of dyslexia. But many children
Reasoning and Thinking about Knowledge with dyslexia can learn to read well, even though they typi-
● Many kinds of reasoning abilities undergo important devel- cally find the process more difficult than do children who do
opmental changes during the elementary and middle school not have dyslexia.
years. These changes do not cause qualitative differences in ● The development of mathematical reasoning seems best

the types of reasoning children can use. Instead, develop- understood not as a series of stages of mathematical ability,
ment seems to proceed more on a domain-by-domain basis, but as the development of more flexible and adaptive ways of
as increasingly sophisticated knowledge in one area can then using mathematics-related strategies.
support more advanced forms of reasoning. ● The ability to use maps and models as representations of lay-
● Early views held that young children could not reason in out develops a great deal during the preschool and early ele-
terms of analogies, but later studies showed clear evidence mentary school years. Younger children seem to have trouble
of analogical reasoning skills in preschoolers when they were understanding how a small model of a room can represent
asked about areas in which they had well-developed knowl- the room and yet be different from it.
edge. In contrast, when children (or adults) know very little ● Children’s drawing ability also undergoes major changes

about a particular area, they will be unable to reason about during the preschool and elementary school years. Improve-
it by using analogies, a skill that depends on understand- ments depend on developments in children’s motor abilities,
ing important relationships between different domains and sense of how to represent three-dimensional images, detailed
using information about one domain to understand corre- knowledge about the things they draw, and sense of cultural
sponding information in another domain. norms.

382 CHAPTER 10 THE GROWTH OF COGNITIVE SKILLS

THOUGHT QUESTIONS KEY TERMS
1. Imagine that you are employed by the court system in a large alerting (p. 360) neural change hypothesis
city as an expert on child witnesses. Your task is to design analogical reasoning (p. 354)
interview techniques that are most likely to yield accurate (p. 366) orienting (p. 360)
information. Given what you know about the development of attentional schema (p. 359) phonics approach (p. 373)
memory, how might you design interviews for children who
attention-deficit/hyperactivity phonological awareness
are 3, 5, and 7 years old?
disorder (ADHD) (p. 374)
2. Two parents disagree about whether their 7-year-old son’s
(p. 364) prefrontal cortex (p. 345)
difficulties in school justify long-term usage of Ritalin, as
suggested by one pediatrician but not by another. What con- autobiographical memory primacy effect (p. 350)
siderations would be most helpful in attempting to resolve (p. 348) procedural memory
their disagreement? cueing hypothesis (p. 354) (p. 347)
3. Young children may be more prone to trust the testimony of declarative memory (p. 347) production deficit (p. 350)
others. In what ways might this higher level of trust make dual representations (p. 378) recency effect (p. 350)
sense for younger children? As children start to be more dyslexia (p. 374) rehearsal (p. 349)
discriminating in what and whom they trust, in what areas encoding (p. 345) retrieval (p. 345)
might this increased skepticism first appear?
episodic memory (p. 348) scientific reasoning
4. Many young children have extensive exposure to video games
in which they learn to navigate a virtual space and engage executive functioning (p. 368)
in various actions. Would this kind of experience help their (p. 361) semantic memory (p. 348)
developing ability to learn how to use maps and models to explicit memory (p. 346) sensory memory (p. 345)
represent the actual world, or would it be of no help and per- hippocampus (p. 345) serial position curve
haps even a hindrance? Consider concrete examples and rea- implicit memory (p. 346) (p. 349)
sons to support your view. infantile amnesia (p. 353) source monitoring (p. 348)
5. In Chapter 8, we considered theories of how the acquisition
long-term memory (p. 346) storage (p. 345)
of language might influence the nature of thought. Com-
parable arguments have been made for how the acquisition memory format change utilization deficit (p. 350)
of literacy influences the nature of thought. Consider some hypothesis (p. 354) whole language approach
ways in which emerging literacy might change the nature of metacognition (p. 370) (p. 373)
thought, and then evaluate their plausibility. metamemory (p. 350) working memory (p. 346)

STUDY AND REVIEW 383

 11
Intelligence and Schooling
What Is Intelligence? • Ethnic and “Racial” Differences Creativity
• The Psychometric Approach • Explaining Group Differences • Measures of Creativity
• Psychometric Theories of Intelligence • Group Differences over Time • The Development of Extraordinary
• Alternative Views of Intelligence Environmental Influences on Creativity

Origins of Intelligence Intelligence Test Scores Conclusions

• Infant Indicators of Intelligence Test • Enhancing Early Environmental
Influences: Head Start Programs Summary
Performance
• The Heritability of Intelligence Schooling
Group Differences and Intelligence • Characterizing Schools
Tests • What Schools Do
• Sex Differences • Schools and Thought
 eginning in 1944, the British government’s Eleven

B
Opposition to the Eleven Plus grew over time, and peo-
Plus exam provoked waves of anxiety in generations ple began to question whether it provided an equally accu-
of 11-year-olds until its widespread use was discon- rate measurement of the abilities of children from different
tinued in 1976. The Eleven Plus exam was a screen- socioeconomic classes and minority groups. Some also wor-
ing test used to determine what kind of school a ried that the test favored children who matured early over
child would attend thereafter (see Figure 11.1). Moreover, it those who did not hit their stride academically until their
was clearly meant to be a test of intelligence. One of its chief teen years. As a result of this opposition, the Eleven Plus
designers, the British educational psychologist Cyril L. Burt, was scrapped as a national test in the United Kingdom in
was obsessed with the idea of measuring intelligence to iden- 1976. Since then, the distinctions between types of British
tify people of different intellectual abilities. Burt was accused schools have become less rigid, and most British school sys-
of fabricating data to support his views that intelligence is tems now use a variety of measures to assess children over a
inherited (Gould, 1981; Kamin, 1974), an accusation that longer period.
was subsequently contested (Mackintosh, 1995). The Eleven Plus story is not over, however. The test is
The Eleven Plus worked much like a real-life version still used in several UK counties and in much of Northern
of the Sorting Hat used in Harry Potter books. The test Ireland. Many countries that were members of the British
could heavily influence a child’s future even before the child Commonwealth, such as those in the Caribbean, also still
entered middle school. Depending on test scores, children give most students a version of the Eleven Plus, often under
were “streamed” either into an elite educational track or different names, such as the Common Entrance Exami-
into tracks leading toward much less prestigious futures. nation. When members of those communities are polled
Children who scored in approximately the top 20 percent about whether the test should be discontinued, as it was in
on the Eleven Plus were sent to grammar school—the first the United Kingdom, many people favor its preservation.
step leading to a top university and a high-ranking profes- They argue that it helps identify talented children, regard-
sion. The other 80 percent of children soon came to be seen less of class or background, and guides them toward needed
as having “failed” the Eleven Plus, and from age 11 on, they educational resources (Times of London, 2005). The Eleven
were likely destined for blue-collar or other nonprofessional Plus story powerfully demonstrates how views of intelli-
jobs. Although it was possible for a child who “failed” the gence can be translated into public policies that influence
Eleven Plus but performed exceedingly well in school to be the education and intellectual development of millions of
moved up to the grammar school track after age 11, this children.
rarely happened. In several earlier chapters, we considered cognitive devel-
opment primarily in terms of common developmental pat-
terns, focusing on how all children come to understand and
think about the world. Similarly, in this chapter, we will con-
sider some common patterns that theorists have proposed
about how intelligence develops. Some of these ideas, like
the notion that children’s intelligence increases continuously
with age, often turn out to be misleading. Others, such as
ways of encouraging active learning in the classroom, seem
to yield impressive results. For much of this chapter, how-
ever, we will shift emphasis to the development of thought
and knowledge, with a focus on the differences between
individuals. Individual differences are central to the study of
intelligence, as the very notion of intelligence assumes that
people have different levels or kinds of intelligence. In devel-
opmental research, there are two ways to compare the intel-
ligence of different individuals. We can ask how age groups
as a whole differ in terms of facets of intelligence, and we
can ask how differences in intelligence between individuals
within any age group occur. We will consider both ques-
FIGURE 11.1 The Eleven Plus exam. For these young students tions but will tend to focus on the factors that are associated
in 1950, the Eleven Plus exam, which had many of the hallmarks of with differences among children in the same age group. This
intelligence tests, could have an enormous influence on their future focus, however, raises further questions about the develop-
school choices and careers. mental processes that lead to such differences, both within

386 CHAPTER 11 INTELLIGENCE AND SCHOOLING

the child and because of external influences. As we will
see, the study of intelligence is also intimately linked to the What Is Intelligence?
broader social context and culture. Although people routinely judge other people’s intelligence,
We will begin by examining the nature of intelligence there is no simple way to describe what intelligence is. Some
and some of the theories developed to explain it. Among people emphasize quantitative skills, others stress literacy,
these theories, the psychometric approach has been most while still others focus on creativity and the ability to deal
prominent. It focuses on designing ways to measure and with novelty. Even among academic psychologists, who
quantify forms of analytical intelligence closely related to might seem likely to show some consensus on the matter,
academic success. We will consider how some of these tra- definitions of intelligence vary as much as they do among
ditional measurements work, the kinds of developmental laypeople (Sternberg & Detterman, 1986).
outcomes that often correlate with test performance, and The definitions become even more diverse across a wider
some of the reasons behind these relationships. Alternative range of groups and cultures. One group favors speed of
views of intelligence highlight different facets of intellec- thinking while another favors accuracy. Still others favor
tual ability as well as the possibility of multiple types of cultivating extraordinary skill in one special area, while oth-
intelligence. ers value having a wide range of above-average abilities or
We will then consider some of the ways researchers have adeptly handling novel situations (Super, 1983). Definitions
attempted to measure intelligence in infancy and what their of intelligence may also stress different types of abilities, with
findings imply about the early origins of intelligence and one group emphasizing verbal skills and another emphasiz-
the extent to which there is a genetic basis for intelligence. ing spatial, artistic, or mathematical skills (Heath, 1983).
We will examine findings that certain infant measures cor- This range of views illustrates the need to develop ways of
relate strongly with intelligence test scores many years later measuring and quantifying intelligence to describe how it
and ask what such correlations might mean. We will also varies across individuals. In psychology, this has tradition-
look at the heritability of intelligence and how it changes ally been done by adopting the psychometric approach.
with age, with the seemingly surprising finding that herita-
bility can often rise in late childhood and adolescence rather
than drop, as might be predicted from simplistic views of
there being more environmental effects the older a child is The Psychometric Approach
and hence lower heritability. The psychometric approach emphasizes cognitive skills
Next we will explore the highly controversial area of pos- closely linked to success in school and focuses on developing
sible group differences in intelligence and what bases there quantitative measures of intelligence through such means
might be for such differences. We will see that group dif- as intelligence tests. Although the psychometric approach
ferences certainly do occur on intelligence tests, but that will occupy most of our discussion, researchers have also
such differences may mean something very different from proposed other views of intelligence.
intrinsic differences in intellectual abilities. A related topic Psychometric tests were originally designed at the begin-
concerns the nature of environmental influences on intel- ning of the twentieth century by the French psychologist
ligence. What sorts of environments, ranging from intellec- Alfred Binet. He designed his tests to distinguish mentally
tual experiences to social threats, seem to have an influence retarded children from other children of the same age,
on the development of intelligence? Moreover, what is the including those with other behavioral problems (Binet, 1903).
best explanation for the apparent dramatic rise in intelli- Schools considered the tests immensely valuable for figuring
gence test scores throughout the world for much of the sec- out which children to place in remedial education. Moreover,
ond half of the twentieth century? the tests seemed to work well in the sense that teachers and
In the context of intelligence research, we will turn to a parents felt that the tests were identifying roughly those chil-
discussion of the many ways that schooling affects children’s dren who were indeed in need of remedial education.
development. We will consider useful ways of characterizing Binet’s tests were based on the idea of quantifying chil-
the wide variety of school types, the roles that schools serve dren’s intelligence in terms of an intelligence quotient, or
in a society, and how the strengths and weaknesses of indi- IQ. The term originally referred to a test score based on
vidual students interact with specific kinds of teaching; the following calculation: a child’s intellectual abilities
this is an academic version of the idea of “goodness of fit” were tested to determine her “mental age,” and this score
between a child and his environment, previously encoun- was divided by her chronological age. The answer was then
tered in Chapter 7. Finally, we will consider how the highly multiplied by 100. Thus, a 10-year-old with a “mental age”
valued trait of creativity relates to the study of intelligence score that was average for 10-year-olds would have an IQ of
and cultural institutions such as schools. 100 (because 10/10 × 100 = 100), and a 10-year-old with a

WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE? 387

score that was average for 12-year-olds would have an IQ Matrix Reasoning
of 120 (12/10 × 100 = 120), and so on. This notion that
intelligence increases continuously with age proved to be a
very crude way of describing its development, and current
measures no longer divide mental age by chronological age.
The terms IQ and IQ test have persisted, however.

Q: For what purposes were psychometric tests

originally designed?

Today, the most common intelligence tests are the Wechsler

Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC), the Wechsler Adult 1. A B C D E 2. A B C D E
Intelligence Scale (WAIS), and the Stanford-Binet Intelli-
Number Series Analogies
gence Scales. Traditionally, the Stanford-Binet Intelligence 3. 2, 4, 6, 8, __, __ 7. brother: sister father: ___________
Scales were so broad that they could be used on populations 4. 3, 6, 3, 6, __, __ A. child B. mother C. cousin D. friend
5. 1, 5, 4, 2, 6, 5, __, __ 8. joke: humor law: ___________
ranging from 2-year-old children to adults. When the tests 6. 2, 4, 3, 9, 4, 16, __, __ A. lawyer B. mercy C. courts D. justice
were tailored for children, the children’s versions were quite
similar to the adult versions but contained obvious simpli- FIGURE 11.2 Psychometric tests. The examples shown here are
similar to the items used on standardized tests for analytical intel-
fications to make them appropriate for children. Table 11.1
ligence. From Gottfredson (1998).
illustrates the sorts of items used on children’s tests. The
sample questions in Figure 11.2 are similar to test items on
common intelligence tests. As these examples show, distinct items testing the ability to (1) complete missing details in
parts of the tests assess different kinds of intellectual abili- pictures, (2) arrange pictures to form a reasonable sequence
ties. Taken together, the scores on the various subtests are of events, and (3) use blocks to re-create abstract designs.
meant to provide an overall assessment of intelligence. The processing speed index measures how quickly a child
The latest version of the WISC, the WISC-IV, has four seems to process information in tasks ranging from time
major components: the verbal comprehension index (VCI), spent searching for a target shape among a much larger set of
the perceptual reasoning index (PRI), the processing speed shapes to tasks identifying all instances of a target image—
index (PSI), and the working memory index (WMI). The for example, an animal or a specific number—in a very clut-
verbal comprehension index measures both comprehension tered field of diverse objects. The working memory index
of language-based materials and the ability to solve problems assesses performance on tasks that draw on working memory.
posed in words. It includes questions designed to measure It includes doing simple arithmetic tasks and remembering
vocabulary, general knowledge about the world, and some strings of digits either backwards or forwards. These subtests
questions that require abstract reasoning about similarities. yield separate scores on components such as language, math-
The perceptual reasoning index uses pictures and other ematics, and visual/spatial ability. The subscores are used to
visual materials and largely avoids using language. It includes calculate an overall test score, colloquially known as the IQ.

Verbal Comprehension Perceptual Reasoning Processing Speed Working Memory

Index (VCI) Index (PRI) Index (PSI) Index (WMI)

What is a taxi What is wrong with this picture [of Look through these two pages Bill is 3 years older than Bob and
used for? a girl combing her hair with a comb with images of different objects 6 years younger than Fred. If Fred
that has no teeth]? and animals and tell me how is 12, how old is Bill?
many times you see a lion.
A shoe is to a foot Can you put these 4 pictures Here is a shape. Is there another Mary won 10% more marbles
as a glove is to [showing a person getting a flat tire shape [from a sheet with many than Sue. Sue won 30 marbles.
what? and fixing it ] in the correct order? different shapes] like this one? How many marbles did Mary win?

TABLE 11.1 Items like those on the WISC-IV test. These items are similar to items used to assess children’s performance on the four
components of the WISC-IV.

388 CHAPTER 11 INTELLIGENCE AND SCHOOLING

 then the whole curve will shift to the right 15 pounds for soph-
Q: What is the intelligence quotient, or IQ? omore men, resulting in a new mean of 173 pounds.
How does the modern measurement differ from In our example of freshman weights, as in any data set,
the standard deviation is a way of measuring how much the
the one invented by Alfred Binet? values tend to vary from the mean. On any normal curve,
68 percent of the scores fall within one standard deviation
above or below the mean, and 95 percent of the scores fall
Interpreting Test Scores Intelligence test scores are within two standard deviations of the mean. In the weight
often interpreted in terms of where they fall on a bell curve, example, the standard deviation is 21 pounds, but it could
or normal distribution curve, representing the range and be larger or smaller in a different population. For example,
distribution of scores in the population. Figure 11.3 (gold if the population was made up of male athletes ranging
numbers) shows a curve for intelligence test scores and how from divers to linebackers, the standard deviation might be
such scores would be ideally distributed in a large popula- larger—say, 30 pounds. If the population was limited to
tion. The highest part of the curve at the center represents divers, the standard deviation might be only 10 pounds.
the most common score in the population. Because the nor- Let us now look at standard deviations in the intelli-
mal curve illustrates the outcome with an ideal sample pop- gence test scores shown in Figure 11.3. The vertical lines
ulation, the most common score falls right in the middle, at correspond to the standard deviations; as you can see, these
the mean. Tails on the far ends of the curve represent the tests are designed to have a standard deviation of 15 points.
least common scores. Therefore, roughly 68 percent of people tested will have
To understand the normal curve, imagine a plot of the scores between 85 and 115 (within one standard deviation
weights of 1,000 male college freshmen (green numbers). of the mean), 95 percent will have scores between 70 and
The average (mean) weight in the group might be around 130 (within two standard deviations of the mean), and
158 pounds. But all men aren’t exactly the average weight. 99.7 percent will have scores between 55 and 145 (within
Their weights are distributed around the mean in a pattern three standard deviations of the mean). Put differently, a
that can be plotted as a bell-shaped curve. Most men in the score of 131 would put someone in the upper 2.5 percent of
group will weigh close to the mean, and as we move farther the population for which the test was designed.
from the mean, we will find an ever-declining number of
students. Approximately 68 percent of them (680 men) will
weigh between 137 pounds and 179 pounds. About 95 per-
cent of them (950 men) will have weights between 116 and Q: What percent of people have IQ scores
200 pounds. The downward sloping sides of the normal curve above three standard deviations?
represent the steady decline in the number of students at each
weight as we move away from the mean. Thus, in this distri-
bution, only 25 students out of 1,000 will weigh more than Correlates of Intelligence Test Scores Infant habitua-
200 pounds. If claims of gaining the “freshman 15” are true, tion scores partially predict later intelligence test scores, and
from age 5 on, intelligence test scores are increasingly good
at predicting later intelligence test scores. But if early test
scores correlated only with later ones, they would be of little
34% 34% importance. What other aspects of behavior are related to
these scores? In fact, intelligence test scores seem to correlate
Percent of population

68% with many other measures over the lifespan and in many
14% 14%
cases provide more accurate predictors than any other avail-
able measures. As always, “prediction” simply refers to a
population-wide correlation over time. It should not be con-
2% 2%
0.1% 95% 0.1% fused with cause, since many other variables are also at work.
One of the driving forces behind the development and
55 70 85 100 115 130 145 IQ scores
85 116 137 158 179 200 300 Weights
use of intelligence tests has been the desire to predict indi-
(in pounds) vidual success in school. Intelligence tests predict academic
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
Standard deviations success, measured in terms of grades, with a correlation
FIGURE 11.3 The normal distribution curve, or bell curve. The
of approximately .50 (McGrew & Knopik, 1993; Neisser
bell curve shown here is an idealized model showing standard devia- et al., 1996; Sternberg et al., 2001). Although this correlation
tions from a mean. The numbers in gold indicate IQ scores, and the is significant, it still means that most of the individual
numbers in green indicate the weights of a group of college freshman. variation in school grades is accounted for by factors—for

WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE? 389

example, degree of self-control (Duckworth et al., 2012). tests for these other kinds of abilities, it is not surprising that
Nonetheless, no other measure, such as assessments of no other strong predictors are yet available. This may well
students’ motivation or anxiety, is as strong a predictor of change as tests for these other abilities become more refined
school performance. At all ages, intelligence test scores and (Boyatzis et al., 2012; Rosete & Ciarrochi, 2005; Sternberg
academic performance are roughly correlated (Chamorro- et al., 2001).
Premuzic & Furnham, 2005; Frey & Detterman, 2004;
Richardson et al., 2012).
We all know of some glaring exceptions to these broad Q: What aspects of behavior are at least partially
patterns: the high school student with perfect SAT scores correlated with intelligence test performance?
who goes on to earn below-average college grades, or the
student with low SATs who excels in every college course.
Given the .50 correlation between scores and grades, the
differences in test scores can explain only about 25 per- Psychometric Theories of Intelligence
cent of the variance in grades, so such outcomes should not Is there one particular thing that makes people do well on
be surprising. Still, if you had to pick a single factor with intelligence tests, or is it a cluster of factors? To answer this
which to predict academic performance, you would be hard question, researchers have conducted many sophisticated
pressed to find a better one than intelligence tests. statistical analyses of overall scores and relations among
Closely related to their correlation with grades, intel- the subtest scores. Scores on more specialized tests, includ-
ligence tests also tend to predict the number of years of ing measures of vocabulary (Peabody), nonverbal reasoning
schooling that a child will receive. It makes sense that (Ravens Progressive Matrices), and spatial abilities (Leiter
students who do better in school are more likely to stay Performance Scales), have also been compared with per-
in school because they find it rewarding. The correlation formance on the broader, more common intelligence tests.
between IQ scores and years of schooling is normally about These analyses have revealed intriguing patterns of correla-
.55 (Neisser et al., 1996). Intelligence test scores are also tions. They have also fueled major controversies about how
statistically significant, though somewhat weaker, pre- to interpret these relationships and what the correlations
dictors of level of employment and wealth (Jencks, 1979; imply about how intelligence is organized.
Sternberg et al., 2001). In Western industrialized cultures,
however, some degree of relationship between intelligence Spearman’s Theory of General Intelligence After
test scores and level of employment should not be surpris- more than 50 years of intensive analysis, at least one reli-
ing. If those scores also correlate with grades and the num- able finding is a matter of consensus: no matter what pairs
ber of years of schooling, then better grades and more years of mental abilities we pick, they tend to be positively cor-
in school may more directly explain certain professional related. Thus, if a person is better than average at mental
achievements and associated higher income levels. In cul- rotation tasks, she typically will perform better than aver-
tures without such tight links between school performance age on vocabulary tasks as well. If another person is weaker
and high-paying jobs, intelligence test scores do not predict than average on rotation skills, he is also more likely to have
high-status jobs or wealth (Sternberg et al., 2001). a lower than average vocabulary score.
Finally, IQ scores also correlate with success in the The finding that individuals tend to show consistent pos-
workplace. Almost any positive measure of workplace per- itive correlations in their levels of different cognitive abilities
formance, whether it is peer or supervisor ratings or pro- does not fit with common intuitive ideas about mental abili-
ductivity, is correlated with IQ score (Hernstein & Murray, ties. Many believe that a person who is a wiz at math and
1994). In addition, those who score exceptionally well computer programming and loves playing with numbers
on IQ tests by age 13 (the top 1 out of 10,000) do have a and equations is likely to have below-average verbal skills.
higher tendency to have outstanding career achievements Although these intellectual stereotypes are widespread, they
30 years later (Kell et al., 2013). Many find this relation- do not hold true. Excelling at math does not necessarily
ship disconcerting, but the correlation does not mean that come at the expense of verbal skills, or vice versa.
IQ tests measure the most important factors in determin- Rather, some have argued that the pattern of positive
ing workplace success. Almost everyone who has studied correlations between different mental abilities supports the
the workplace is convinced that social and interpersonal existence of general intelligence, commonly known as g
skills are more important. These skills include leadership, (Gould, 1981; Spearman, 1927; Thurstone, 1938), although
conflict resolution, consensus building, risk assessment, it remains controversial among intelligence researchers who
and persistence, among many others. But with more than take a psychometric approach. Charles Spearman origi-
100 years of concerted efforts at constructing the best pos- nally put forth the theory of a general intelligence, or g,
sible intelligence tests and far fewer years spent developing in a hugely influential article that appeared in 1904. This

390 CHAPTER 11 INTELLIGENCE AND SCHOOLING

article is often seen as the seminal piece in the psychomet- in Figure 11.4, although the first level pictured here does
ric approach. Proponents of g believe that there is a single, not show all the possible abilities.
underlying essence to intelligence that affects all kinds of The key point behind Carroll’s approach, as well as a
intellectual performance (Spearman, 1904). Seeking precise broader family of approaches known as the Cattell-Horn-
ways to describe and measure g, they have tried to deter- Carroll (CHC) theory of cognitive abilities, is that factor
mine what basic aspect of the mind best accounts for most analysis reveals three levels, each of which makes important
of what we think of as intelligence. That search continues, contributions to understanding intelligence. According to
with researchers arguing for conceptions of g based on neu- this account, g is a real ability, but it is only part of the full
ral processing speed (Coyle et al., 2011; Jensen, 1993, 1997; explanation of how abilities vary across individuals. The
Reed & Jensen, 1992), working memory capacity (Cole second broad stratum contains equally important abilities
et al., 2012; Tuholski et al., 2001), and brain myelination relating to such skills as crystallized and fluid intelligence
(Miller, 1994), for example. Moreover, many proponents (discussed shortly), quantitative reasoning, reading and
of g have tended to view general intelligence as intrinsic to writing skills, memory skills, auditory and visual skills,
each individual and unchangeable. Later in this chapter, we and skills related to speed of processing. Finally, the first
will explore further whether anything like g is either intrin- stratum contains more specific abilities, such as distinct
sic or unchangeable. verbal skills in the broader area of verbal ability.
The concept of g continues to figure heavily in discussions In studies of children (Keith & Witta, 1997; Tucker-
of intelligence (Glascher et al., 2010; Jensen, 1998; Kaufman Drob, 2009) and adults (Alfonso et al., 2005; Schneider &
et al., 2011; Nisbett et al., 2012; Sternberg & Wagner, 1993). McGrew, 2012), the family of CHC theories have become
As noted earlier, those who favor it also tend to explain the dominant way of thinking about the abilities that cause
individual and group differences in intelligence in terms of differences in intelligence test scores. Scholars continue to
genetic and neurobiological differences. As a hypothetical debate whether g is real or whether it is a statistical side
example, if differences in intelligence were mostly accounted effect that does not represent a mental ability per se as much
for by differences in neural processing speed, these variations as the aggregation of lower-level abilities.
would influence each mental ability. On the other hand, For many years, researchers believed that g could simply be
researchers who discount g often focus more on how people the result of real-world tasks “sampling” different combina-
differ in their individual ranges of intellectual strengths tions of narrow abilities in a manner that made it look like
and weaknesses rather than on how their abilities might there was a common g factor, when in fact it was just the inter-
differ in general. The anti-g camp more often emphasizes section of these lower-level skills (Mackintosh, 1998; Stern-
the many ways in which individuals can excel intellectually. berg & Grigorenko, 2002; Thorndike et al., 1927). Thanks to
Such groups tend to discount straightforward biological and factor analysis, it is possible to create a “virtual g” when we can
genetic explanations of intelligence and instead emphasize be sure that a true g is not really present. Such factor analysis
the influences of culture, class, and experience. has been accomplished via computer simulations of a model
in which reciprocal positive causal interactions between lower-
level cognitive abilities—that is, elements causing positive
Q: What is g? What have proponents of this correlations with each other—created a higher-order g. This
g emerged over the course of simulated cognitive development
view of intelligence used as evidence to support rather than being a latent ability modeled to be present from
the theory? birth (van der Maas et al., 2006). Thus, it is possible in prin-
ciple to observe g through statistical factor analysis, even when
it is clear that there is no general intelligence component actu-
Carroll’s Three-Stratum Theory of Intelligence ally built into the model. This fact supports those researchers
Although a positive correlation between abilities is extremely who question the utility of g. The debate will continue until
robust across a wide range of studies, and although a statis- further studies are able to carefully isolate cognitive and neural
tical method known as factor analysis reliably yields a factor components that are uniquely associated with g and that do
corresponding to general intelligence, some argue that too not originate from narrower abilities.
much weight is assigned to g in terms of its role in account-
ing for intelligence. As an alternative, in 1993 John Carroll
proposed the “three-stratum theory.” In essence, this is a
hierarchical array of abilities with g as a single factor at the Q: What is the three-stratum (hierarchical)
apex, the third stratum. Nested within g is a second stratum model of intelligence? What is this model’s
of roughly 7 to 10 broad abilities, followed by a first stratum alternative explanation for general intelligence (g)?
of roughly 70 narrow abilities. One such example is shown

WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE? 391

 g Stratum III
(Higher Order “g” Factor)

Gv Gs Gm Gr Ga
Gc Gf
Broad Broad General Broad Broad Stratum II
Crystallized Fluid
visual cognitive memory and retrieval auditory (Broad Abilities)
intelligence intelligence
perception speediness learning ability perception
Lexical knowledge

Visual memory

Spatial relations

Sequential reasoning

Spatial scanning

Ideational fluency
Attention and general information

Naming facility

Perceptual speed

Memory span

Working memory

Associative memory

Speech-sound discrimination

Phonetic coding analysis

Stratum I
(Narrow Abilities)

FIGURE 11.4 Carroll’s three-stratum theory. In Carroll’s theory (CHC theory) and in related approaches, g is simply a part of a larger
system of three levels of abilities. Only part of the narrowest level is shown here. Adapted from Keith & Witta (1997).

Cattell’s Theory of Fluid and Crystallized Intelli- Fluid intelligence and crystallized intelligence reflect dis-
gence Cognitive abilities that make up intelligence can tinct types of abilities, but they are not completely indepen-
also be divided into the categories of fluid intelligence and dent. Someone with a high level of fluid intelligence is likely to
crystallized intelligence (Cattell, 1963). As originally pro- learn factual information rapidly and figure out fairly quickly
posed by the personality psychologist Raymond Cattell in how to do various tasks. Hence, he is also likely to have a
the early 1960s, fluid intelligence refers to the ability to high level of crystallized intelligence. This close relationship
think flexibly and solve novel problems. It is thought to between the two has led some to argue that the distinction is
be largely independent of acquired knowledge. In contrast, unnecessary (Johnson & Bouchard, 2005). But from a devel-
Cattell described crystallized intelligence as the ability to opmental perspective, it can be useful for describing how
use specific skills and knowledge gained through experi- intelligence changes over a person’s lifespan (Blair, 2006).
ence. Hierarchical models often treat both of these forms of Fluid intelligence is thought to develop earlier than crystal-
intelligence as parts of g. On traditional intelligence tests, lized intelligence, as the young child has not had enough
fluid intelligence is considered more closely related to test time to gain specific skills or acquire much knowledge. From
items such as novel math problems and puzzles (not simply about the late 20s onward, fluid intelligence starts to dimin-
memorized procedures or tables), while crystallized intel- ish, while crystallized intelligence continues to develop well
ligence relates more to vocabulary items and questions that into the sixth decade of life and often longer (Blair, 2006).
test general knowledge (Carroll, 1993). These changes are considered in more detail in Chapter 17.

392 CHAPTER 11 INTELLIGENCE AND SCHOOLING

Alternative Views of Intelligence into a different way of understanding distinct kinds of intel-
ligence (Gardner, 1983, 1993). We have all heard of musical
Although the psychometric approach to defining and mea- and mathematical prodigies whose extraordinary abilities in
suring intelligence predominates, several theorists have early childhood surpass those of most adults. Most of these
attempted to move away from this view. Many of these individuals go on to excel in their own area. Based on his
researchers believe that success in everyday life requires other study of early-achieving geniuses in various fields, Gardner
sorts of intelligence beyond those uncovered by traditional IQ developed his theory of multiple intelligences, a model that
tests. If we think of intelligence as a mental ability that allows divides intelligence into distinct modalities that often have
us to succeed in some arena, then we must take into account strong links to sensory or motor skills. This theory argues
the mental abilities that allow some people to outperform that people possess eight separate types of intelligence: lin-
others in an enormous range of situations. These mental abil- guistic, mathematical, musical, spatial, bodily/kinesthetic
ities include many interpersonal skills, including negotiating, (for example, easily picking up complicated dance moves),
managing groups, forming and maintaining friendships, and intrapersonal (self-understanding), naturalistic (a special
dealing with superiors of much greater power. Outside the grasp of animals, plants, and ecosystems), and interpersonal
interpersonal domain, these skills also include oral commu- (understanding others). Gardner also suggested that each of
nication (for example, giving a speech to a group), physical- these eight intelligences has its own unique developmental
mechanical tasks (for example, being able to fix devices), and path (Gardner, 1983; see Table 11.2).
spotting styles and trends (for example, recognizing which Gardner’s theory raises difficult questions. What do the
new electronic device will become the new must-have). All special abilities of child prodigies tell us about intelligence
of these abilities and many others that contribute to everyday and its development in all people? Do these domains truly
success are only now beginning to be considered. represent separate intelligences that all of us have to varying
degrees? Or do these areas of achievement actually draw on
Gardner’s Theory of Multiple Intelligences One way to a number of more fundamental skills? Along with his case
ask about the ways in which people cognitively excel focuses studies of geniuses, Gardner found other evidence for mul-
on areas of genius and precocity. Howard Gardner (1997) has tiple intelligences in the cognitive effects of brain damage.
argued that people of extraordinary talent can offer insights In some cases, patients’ impairments seemed to selectively

Form of intelligence Characteristics Best way to learn Related careers/activity

Linguistic Good with words, language Through verbal discussions, Author, trial lawyer, journalist
play, linguistic patterns reading and writing, debates
Mathematical Good with mathematics, logic, Through quantitative tasks, Accountant, scientist,
discovering formal patterns experiments, classification computer programmer
systems
Spatial Good with visualization, maps, Through diagrams, images, Architect, artist, cartographer,
3-D models maps filmmaker
Musical Good with melodies, rhythms, Through musical media, song Musician, singer, music critic
complex musical patterns
Bodily/kinesthetic Good with complex motor Through manipulating objects, Dancer, athlete, martial arts
skills, manipulating objects acting out relations physically, performer, stage performer
hands-on learning
Interpersonal Good at sensing others’ Through rich social Community organizer,
thoughts and feelings, interactions, cooperation, politician, manager,
resolving conflicts sharing information salesperson
Intrapersonal Good at recognizing own Through setting individual Therapist, author, philosopher
abilities and accomplishments, goals, pacing oneself, often
setting reasonable goals working alone

Naturalistic Good at understanding plants, Through situations involving Park ranger, biologist,
animals, ecological relations in living things, nature webs, conservationist
nature ecological systems

TABLE 11.2 Multiple intelligences. Gardner’s eight forms of intelligence. (Based on Gardner, 1983, 2006).

WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE? 393

affect particular types of intelligence, causing focused defi-
cits in language skills, musical skills, motor skills, or inter-
personal skills (Gardner, 1983).
The theory of multiple intelligences has been highly influ-
ential, especially in educational circles, where teachers see it as
supporting the idea of tailoring curricula to meet the distinct
aptitudes of different groups of children. In addition, if indi-
viduals can excel in different kinds of intelligence, there is less
of a tendency to rank people’s “intellectual worth” based on
a single scale, a practice that can be disheartening for those
at the lower levels of such scales. For the most part, however,
the argument for eight distinct intelligences is not based as
much on empirical evidence and experimental studies as it
is on intuitions about how people might differ (Waterhouse,
2006). While there may be distinct cognitive systems for FIGURE 11.5 Successful intelligence. Sternberg’s successful
intelligence is often characterized in terms of the ability to achieve
spatial reasoning, aspects of language, and face perception,
practical goals, usually in cooperation with others, where leader-
for example, it is not clear that these different areas would ship and interpersonal skills may be central. Even some quite young
easily map onto multiple intelligences or correspond to the children can excel in this area.
way we categorize people of exceptional intelligence. Simi-
larly, it is important to be careful in inferring that any early
area of exceptional performance represents a core mental and to adjust accordingly. The first category, analytical
ability. People show early and extraordinary ability not only abilities, closely resembles the kind of skills that traditional
in math, music, and other domains discussed by Gardner, intelligence tests measure, including comparing, comput-
but in many other areas as well. These are abilities that can ing, analyzing, and evaluating. The second category, cre-
arise from unusually enriched environmental experiences, ative abilities, includes the ability to invent, discover, and
motivational factors, or even limits on alternatives. But for an combine information in novel ways. The third category,
extraordinary skill in such an area to count as a separate kind practical abilities, includes the ability to use and act on
of intelligence, there must be evidence that the skill arises information. These skills often involve knowledge that is
from cognitive aptitudes linked specifically to that skill. difficult to articulate. Thus, someone could be strong both
Consider, for example, someone who shows outstand- analytically and creatively but so weak in practical skills as
ing skill at a particular video game. Is that excellence the to have great difficulty putting those strengths to use. Some
consequence of a blend of high kinesthetic and spatial proponents of multiple or alternative views of intelligence
intelligences—or is it a result of extraordinary social com- argue that intelligence tests focus too much on analytical
petitiveness plus a lack of opportunity to manifest competi- talent. Consequently, their neglect of creative and practical
tiveness in other areas, such as sports? People can achieve talents makes them only weakly able to predict success in
great levels of expertise relative to their peers for many rea- most real-life circumstances (Sternberg, 1996). There is a
sons, only some of which reflect intrinsic differences in cog- continued strong interest in developing new tests to assess
nitive skills. Thus, connecting case studies of extraordinary these other forms of intelligence and to provide a more well-
precocity and skill to general principles of intelligence is a rounded understanding of cognitive ability.
difficult task. It seems that there should be important rela- When these alternative measures of intellectual ability
tions, but without more detailed models of the cognitive are taken into account, the general pattern of positive cor-
bases for specific areas of genius, convergence between these relations between different kinds of cognitive skills can
two ways of studying individual differences is unlikely to start to break down. As noted earlier, all the skills that
occur. are part of analytical intelligence tend to be positively
correlated. In contrast, some researchers have found ana-
Sternberg’s Theory of Successful Intelligence A nar- lytical abilities to be negatively correlated with practical
rower view of multiple intelligences argues that three types and creative abilities. For example, in one study in Kenya,
of abilities are important to successful intelligence (Sternberg, children were tested both for their knowledge of the local
1996): analytical abilities, creative abilities, and practical environment, in terms of practical, adaptive skills, and
abilities (see Figure 11.5). This view holds that successful, for the more analytical abilities that intelligence tests nor-
intelligent people tend to have either a balance of all three mally measure (Sternberg et al., 2001). To measure the
of these abilities or the insight to recognize which of these children’s practical knowledge of the local environment,
abilities are their strengths and which are their weaknesses the researchers measured their informal knowledge of

394 CHAPTER 11 INTELLIGENCE AND SCHOOLING

 NEW DIRECTIONS IN DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH

A g for Emotional Intelligence?

A
s researchers look for intellectual abilities that are ability to perceive and identify emotions, (2) the ability to use
not measured by traditional intelligence tests, they emotions to aid thought processes, (3) the ability to understand
have shown great interest in emotional intelligence how conflicting emotions can lead to other emotions, and (4) the
(Brackett et al., 2013; Mayer et al., 2008; Salovey & ability to use emotions to achieve social goals. This description of
Mayer, 1990). Emotional intelligence is the ability to evaluate emotional intelligence carries with it a developmental hypothesis
both our own emotions and the emotions of others and to use that younger children have mastered only the less complex lev-
those evaluations to guide our thoughts and actions. Although els. In a broad sense, younger children do seem much less adept
emotional intelligence is a relatively recent concept, it has quite at understanding the nuances of social situations and knowing
old roots. In 1920, the American psychologist Edward Thorndike how to act appropriately. Nonetheless, controversy remains over
argued that a broad view of intelligence must include the notion of the best ways to break down the components of emotional intel-
social intelligence, the ability to smoothly manage social interac- ligence in children and over how to describe their developmental
tions (Thorndike, 1920). As Thorndike noticed, developing tests trajectories (Mathews et al., 2003; Zeidner et al., 2003).
for social intelligence was much more difficult than developing As noted earlier, for most individuals, intelligence test scores
tests for more analytical thinking (Thorndike, 1936; Thorndike & show a significant positive correlation between different analyti-
Stern, 1937). This difficulty has persisted (Kihlstrom & Cantor, cal abilities, which some have cited as support for the existence
2000), but there are now more attempts to develop reliable and of g, or general intelligence. This raises the question of whether
valid tests of both social and emotional intelligence. the distinctive abilities that make up emotional intelligence would
As with analytical intelligence, researchers have devised also be positively correlated. Is there a g factor for emotional intel-
different ways of subdividing emotional intelligence into more ligence analogous to that proposed for analytical intelligence?
specific abilities. In one prominent view, emotional intelligence One research project examined scores on a wide range of tasks
has five distinct components that fit into two larger catego- related to emotional intelligence, looking for positive correlations
ries of intrapersonal intelligence and interpersonal intel- (Mayer et al., 1999). These ranged from perceptual tasks, such
ligence (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Here are the components of as the ability to recognize emotions in faces, to cognitively com-
intrapersonal intelligence: plex tasks, such as the ability to think about how emotions com-
• Self-awareness. Keeping track of our own emotions and emo- bine and lead to new emotions. When the scores of hundreds of
tional states as they occur. adults and adolescents were analyzed, there was a clear positive
• Ability to manage emotions. Knowing how to handle our emo- correlation of all the abilities. This analysis also suggested that a
tional states in an appropriate manner and understanding the single underlying factor was responsible for most of the patterns
factors that give rise to our emotional states. in the data. This evidence suggests a g-like factor, raising the pos-
• Motivation. Using our emotional states to help achieve our sibility of an “essence” for emotional intelligence that manifests in
goals and deal with impulses; may involve knowing when to a wide range of tasks (Mayer et al., 2001, 2004).
delay gratification for larger, long-term gains. Just as in the case of analytical intelligence, controversies
Here are the components of interpersonal intelligence: remain about the extent to which these positive correlations
• Empathy. Having a sense of how others might feel in a situ- definitively indicate a single, general emotional intelligence
ation, especially when their feelings might be quite different (Goldenberg et al., 2006; Palmer et al., 2005; Pérez et al.,
from our own; requires the ability to put ourselves in their 2005; Roberts et al., 2010). Nonetheless, that possibility high-
shoes. lights a developmental story in which there could be powerful
• Ability to handle relationships. Understanding the emotional individual differences in emotional intelligence from an early
tenor of a social situation and being able to respond in a man- age, perhaps arising from a core skill like identifying emotional
ner that manages emotional states in others in an effective states, which then influences all other emotional intelligence
and useful manner. tasks in the course of development. The early roots of emo-
A second view subdivides emotional intelligence into four lev- tional intelligence, as well as the way it develops; are likely to
els of increasing complexity (Mayer & Salovey, 1997): (1) the be an exciting area of research in future years.

WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE? 395

the use of herbal medicines to fight infections. Although Infant Indicators of Intelligence
earlier studies had often found no significant correlations
between practical and analytical intelligence, in this case Test Performance
they showed a strong negative correlation. Overall, the Almost since the beginning of intelligence testing at the turn
higher a child scored on the practical intelligence test of of the twentieth century, researchers have been interested in
herbal medicines, the lower his score on the traditional whether measures of functioning in infancy might predict
intelligence tests. later intelligence test differences. Early assessments of infants’
A major cause of the negative correlation may be that capabilities showed large individual differences between
the two groups of Kenyan children had parents with very infants. These differences seemed to indicate infants’ capaci-
different values. Parents who encouraged their children to ties and abilities to engage in important behaviors, such as
develop practical intelligence through knowledge of local motor action or language use. Psychologist Nancy Bayley
customs and practices also tended to look down on analyti- developed the most widely used set of such scales, the Bay-
cal intelligence and more Western approaches to problem ley Scales of Infant Development (Bayley, 1949, 1969, 1993,
solving. Consequently, their children were rarely exposed 2005). These scales measured intelligence in terms of a wide
to analytical intelligence tasks. The other children’s parents range of infant and toddler behaviors, including motor skills,
favored analytical forms of thought while neglecting the perceptual and cognitive capacities, and early language.
practical forms. In this case, different parenting practices Bayley and many others were interested in whether the
and value systems seemed to nourish a high level of one infant measures could predict scores on later IQ tests. Bayley
kind of intelligence while discouraging the development herself conducted one such longitudinal study with children
of another kind. These findings raise intriguing questions who were first tested shortly after birth and then repeatedly
about the ways that many, if not all, cultures may implic- tested throughout childhood, until age 18 (Bayley, 1949, 1969,
itly encourage one kind of intelligence at the expense of 1993, 2005). She did not find significant correlations between
another. any of her measures and later intelligence test scores, nor have
later researchers (Bornstein, 1994a; Hack et al., 2005, Kopp &
McCall, 1990). The latest, revised version of Bayley's test
(2005) does contain some elements that are similar to more
Q: Describe some forms of intelligence other recent infant measures discussed below, and researchers are
than the analytical sort. What evidence is there asking if there might be stronger links to later intelligence test
scores (Luttikhuizen dos Santos et al., 2013).
for these other forms as distinct types? In more recent years, new measures of infant cognition
and perception have been devised that partially predict later
intelligence test scores. Rather than looking at motor tasks,
early language, and other sorts of measures used by the Bay-
Origins of Intelligence ley Scales, recent researchers have tried to assess an infant’s
ability to encode, remember, and respond to information at
How do differences in intelligence arise? Researchers have different levels of complexity. As described in Chapters 3,
debated the extent to which doing well on intelligence tests 4, and 5, habituation measures of infants provide a superb
results from schooling and exposure to a literate, technolog- way to study these abilities. But in this context, researchers
ical society and the extent to which it depends on an innate are not using habituation as a means of measuring aspects of
intelligence that remains fairly stable throughout develop- infant perception and cognition in general, such as whether
ment. To investigate these questions, many researchers have infants of a certain age can recognize faces or have certain
focused on how accurately assessments of intelligence in expectations about objects. Instead, these studies are focused
infancy can predict a person’s intelligence test performance on individual differences among infants in their patterns of
as they mature. If cumulative educational experiences are habituation. Thus, researchers assume that the more “intelli-
the sole predictors of intelligence test scores, then tests of gent” infants will habituate more quickly to stimuli; they will
infants are not likely to predict later test performance. The process the information more efficiently, such that it more
infants simply would not have been around long enough to rapidly becomes familiar and loses its appeal (see Figure 11.6).
benefit from experience. But if intelligence is an intrinsic Researchers have known for some time that children
ability that we always have and exhibit in any environment, who have brain damage likely to cause mental retardation
perhaps it can even be seen in the early months of life. Not take longer to habituate (Bornstein, 1994b). Building on
surprisingly, those who expect to find infant predictors this finding, researchers have investigated whether varia-
of intelligence have often also adopted some form of the tions in the habituation times of developmentally normal
g-based view of intelligence. infants would predict later ranges in their intelligence

396 CHAPTER 11 INTELLIGENCE AND SCHOOLING

 children typically enter formal schooling, at about 5 to 6
years of age. At this point, intelligence test scores do begin
to predict later scores—not perfectly, but increasingly well
as the child matures, rising from a correlation of about .85
(between 5- and 6-year-olds’ scores and 18-year-olds’ scores)
to .95 (between 11- and 12-year-olds’ scores and 18-year-
olds’ scores) (Neisser et al., 1996). Nonetheless, because
habituation measures partially predict future intelligence
test scores, this argues that important aspects of intelligence
may have a genetic component.

Q: What sorts of measures of preverbal

infants can partially predict scores on traditional
FIGURE 11.6 Habituation and intelligence. When an infant intelligence tests years later?
loses interest in a novel object, the speed at which she loses interest
predicts intelligence test scores several years later.

scores. Surprisingly, several research groups have found The Heritability of Intelligence
such relationships in longitudinal studies (Bornstein et al., Long before Alfred Binet began designing the first IQ
2006; Colombo, 1993, 2004; Colombo et al., 2004; Fagan, tests, people believed that differences in intelligence were
1990; McCall & Carriger, 1993; McCall & Mash, 1995; largely the result of innate differences in intellectual pow-
Rose & Feldman, 1995; Rose et al., 2009; Slater et al., ers, even if they had no idea how those innate differences
1989). In one line of work, children’s habituation measures were physically realized in the body. More recently, those
in infancy correlated significantly with their intelligence inborn differences have been attributed to genes. There are
test scores at age 11 (Rose & Feldman, 1995; Rose et al., many strands of support for the claim that genes are one
1997, 2005, 2012). A related finding showed that children source of the differences in intelligence. But it is critical
who were more inclined to explore and seek stimulation at to remember that environmental factors are also at work,
age 3 scored significantly higher on intelligence tests at age including a variety of prenatal and postnatal biological
11 (Raine et al., 2002). influences. Genes that influence intelligence do not deter-
These studies reported correlations ranging between mine a specific level of ability; instead, they can be thought
.35 and .50, which are statistically significant predictors, of as specifying a range of skill levels that vary as a function
although the relationship is not especially strong. In statisti- of the environment. As an analogy, consider that a child of
cal terms, a correlation of .50 between infant habituation short parents might grow to heights ranging from very
measures and IQ scores at age 11 means that the correlation short to average height, depending on his diet, exercise, and
with infant measures accounts for only about 25 percent of other factors, whereas a child of tall parents might have a
the variation in childhood IQ scores. This leaves 75 percent height ranging from average height to very tall, depending
of the variation to be explained by other factors. on the same set of environmental influences.
Correlations as high as .50 are certainly interesting and As described in Chapter 2, behavior geneticists talk of the
provocative. They suggest that some key parts of intelligence heritability of a trait as a way of describing the extent to which,
may be present in young infants. Nonetheless, it would be within a particular population, the variations in that trait are
a serious mistake to conclude from these correlations that due to genetic differences rather than environmental ones.
habituation rates in infancy predetermine later intelligence The more the variations in a particular trait among a group
test scores or that intelligence is largely unchangeable over of people can be accounted for by differences in their genes,
the course of development. In addition, while there are dif- the closer that trait’s heritability approaches 1 for that popula-
ferences in intelligence scores between ethnic, racial, and tion in that environment. On the other hand, the more the
socioeconomic groups of older children and adults (as dis- trait’s variations within the group are due to environmental
cussed shortly), no such differences are found in any of the variations, the closer its heritability approaches 0. Height, for
infant measures (Fagan, 2011). This suggests that those example, has a high heritability of roughly .80 in most popu-
group differences must arise from factors other than those lations and environments, while hair length has a heritability
that are present in infants. Interestingly, stronger corre- close to 0. Thus, individual variations in height tend to be
lations with later test scores appear around the age when closely linked to genetic variation, whereas differences in hair

ORIGINS OF INTELLIGENCE 397

length (excluding cases of baldness) are almost completely
linked to variations in the environment. The same sort of Q: What does heritability measure?
analysis can be applied to psychological traits such as intelli-
gence, shyness, or even knowledge of a particular city. Shyness
There are many ways of assessing heritability, and they
turns out to have a relatively high heritability, while individ-
all attempt to explore differences in the relative contribu-
ual variations in familiarity with a particular city would be
tions of genes and environments to trait variations within a
almost completely determined by experience.
specific population. With intelligence, the strongest demon-
Heritability is a measure of a population, not of an indi-
strations have involved studies of monozygotic (MZ) twins,
vidual. It intrinsically depends on how a trait varies across
who as you will remember have genes that are identical, and
members of a group. For that reason, it makes no sense to
dyzygotic (DZ), or fraternal, twins, who share roughly half
say that 80 percent of an individual’s height is caused by his
their genes, just like any pair of siblings (see Chapter 2).
genes, even though height might have a heritability of .80 in
Using complex analyses, researchers can compare the intel-
the population from which the individual is drawn. In addi-
ligence test scores of large groups of MZ twins with those of
tion, the heritability of a trait for a particular population
large groups of DZ twins (of the same sex) and use the dif-
can vary over time. As we will see shortly, the same group
ferences to calculate heritability scores. These analyses can
of people can have a different heritability value for intelli-
be influenced by many factors. Researchers, for example,
gence when they are children than when they are adults. To
have studied special groups of MZ twins reared apart (who
see how this can happen, suppose we wish to measure the
share their genes but grew up in different environments)
heritability of allergy to bee stings. Initially, the measured
and compared them with groups of unrelated children who
heritability is low, since people usually do not react strongly
were adopted and raised in the same family (who share their
to the first sting. Over time, however, as people experience
home environment but not their genes) to maximally con-
more stings, those who are likely to have allergies will show
trast environmental and genetic influences (Plomin et al.,
stronger and stronger responses, such that the heritability in
1997, 2001; van Soelen et al., 2011).
adults might be quite high. Similarly, the heritability of acne
Of course, all such studies have to be carefully scrutinized
or ulcers might vary considerably with age. In the same way,
for possible methodological problems. MZ twins in the same
a population’s heritability value for intelligence can change
families are often treated more similarly than DZ twins, and
over time, depending in part on the effects of environment
MZ twins reared apart are often not kept perfectly apart, or
and experience.
they are reared by closely related relatives in similar economic
Heritability also varies depending on the diversity of envi-
circumstances (Kamin, 1974). Nonetheless, across large
ronments in which the population of interest is studied. If all
numbers of these sorts of studies—and accounting for their
the members of a population grow up in a very similar envi-
methodological issues—consistent heritability estimates
ronment, such as an isolated village in which everyone lives
for intelligence have emerged (see Figure 11.7). For normal
in much the same way, the heritability of a given trait might
be quite high. But if this trait is then studied in a population
that experiences a huge range of environments, like the resi- 1
dents of a large city, who range from the homeless to the very
wealthy, the same trait’s heritability may be very small for .8
this population. The environment that the villagers experi-
Heritability value

ence does not vary enough to cause many differences among

them, but the range of environmental variations in a large .6

city would likely influence the expression of many physi-

cal and psychological traits. Heritabilities also vary across .4
population groups. Thus, the heritability of a trait might be
lower among a group that has intermarried for many genera- .2
tions than it would be among residents of a highly diverse
university.
For all of these reasons, finding a very high heritabil- 0
4 to 6 6 to 12 12 to 16 16 to 20 Adult
ity value for a trait does not provide evidence that the trait Age (in years)
depends on a particular gene. A high heritability simply
FIGURE 11.7 How the heritability of intelligence increases
means that in a given population and environment, some with age. Across several studies, there is a consistent pattern in
pattern of genetic variation, quite possibly involving many which the heritability of intelligence rises from roughly .45 in child-
genes and their interactions, accounts for most of the varia- hood to roughly .75 in late adolescence. Adapted from Bouchard &
tion in how a trait is expressed. McGue (2003).

398 CHAPTER 11 INTELLIGENCE AND SCHOOLING

Western children raised in a normal range of environments,
the heritability of intelligence averages around .45 and rises
to about .75 by late adolescence (Bouchard & McGue, 2003;
Deary et al., 2006; Neisser et al., 1996; Plomin et al., 2001;
van Soelen et al., 2011). As noted earlier, other groups and
environments might well show different heritability values
for intelligence.
It may seem odd that groups of adolescents and adults
show higher heritability values than children, since it would
seem that the longer a person is in an environment, the
more environmental effects could cause individual differ-
ences, reducing the heritability of intelligence. In fact, the
opposite seems to occur: heritabilities for intelligence are FIGURE 11.8 Heritability of brain volumes. Studies of mono-
almost always considerably higher in older populations than zygotic and dizygotic twins have shown substantial differences in
in younger ones. One possible explanation for this pattern heritability of brain volumes. Areas in the frontal lobe (the right-hand
is that as people age, they are increasingly able to seek out region in the view shown here of the right hemisphere) show espe-
the environments that best mesh with their own inher- cially high heritabilities, sometimes higher than .90. Differences in
ited mental characteristics. In many societies, children are brain volumes have in turn been linked to differences in intelligence
test scores, although the relationship is not particularly strong. From
treated much more similarly by educational systems than
Toga & Thompson (2005).
adults are in the careers they choose. Thus, by seeking out
certain environments to which they are well suited, perhaps
adults can express their genetic traits more fully. It may also influences of other factors besides brain volume on intel-
be that some later-developing aspects of intelligence, such ligence test scores.
as executive functioning, have stronger heritabilities that do Even when particular brain regions show high herita-
not appear until the cognitive trait is more fully expressed bility values for tissue volume, environmental factors may
(Deary et al., 2010; Miyake & Friedman, 2012; van Soelen also play a substantial role. Suppose, for example, that hav-
et al., 2011). ing larger frontal lobe regions makes complex choice tasks
somewhat easier and that, consequently, people with larger
frontal lobe volumes gravitate to those tasks more than
others would. Choosing to engage in those tasks more often
Q: How can a trait have a high heritability and could then provide experiences that foster further brain
yet not be strongly linked to a single gene? growth, making the tasks even easier. In this way, a mod-
est early advantage could become larger. Evidence for this
kind of developmental pattern comes from studies showing
that experience in some kinds of focused tasks, including
The study of genes and intelligence is likely to take on motor tasks, musical practice, or spatial navigation, can
new dimensions in the coming years. For example, many cause brain regions that support the task to increase in vol-
researchers have examined the tissue volumes in different ume. The effects can be quite closely linked to experience.
brain areas and the extent to which volume differences For example, taxi drivers have larger hippocampal volumes
within a population are attributable to genetic variation. (which are associated with spatial cognition) than do bus
Studies using MRI analyses of the brains of monozygotic drivers in the same city, presumably because the bus drivers
twins have found high heritabilities for the volume of some always take the same route. Moreover, the longer the taxi
regions in the frontal lobes and in the hippocampus, sug- driver has been working, the larger the hippocampal vol-
gesting links to executive functioning and memory skills. ume (Maguire et al., 2006). These sorts of studies clearly
In some areas of the frontal lobes, heritabilities higher illustrate that experience and some brain regions can inter-
than .90 have been reported (Peper et al., 2007; Toga & act in ways that would influence heritability (and alter the
Thompson, 2005; see Figure 11.8). Other, more posterior size of those brain regions).
regions tend to show lower but still significant heritabili- Notwithstanding the complexity of studying the
ties (Deary et al., 2010). Brain volume has been correlated genetic bases of intelligence, much of this research points
with intelligence test scores (Brans et al., 2010; Hulshoff to a simple conclusion. Genes contribute to intelligence
Pol et al., 2006; Peper et al., 2007; Taki et al., 2012; Toga & as they do to many other traits. Genes do not, however,
Thompson, 2005), although the correlations are suffi- account for anywhere near the full range of variation in
ciently low (for example, .3 to .4) as to allow for major intelligence. Even within the same family, there can be

ORIGINS OF INTELLIGENCE 399

large variations in intelligence. Across families, the differ- imagine how a group that is, on average, more apprehensive
ences are much larger. Yet, common family environments about tests may tend to do worse than a group that tends
and common social experiences make a huge contribu- to be more relaxed. Similarly, people who live in a noisy
tion to intelligence. Because of the complex interactions neighborhood or who get inadequate nutrition might well
between genes and environments, there is no easy way to be more fatigued than other test-takers.
state which influence usually dominates. Thus, no one Substantial group differences in intelligence test scores
can state that intelligence, at least as measured by intel- have been reproduced hundreds of times in very large sam-
ligence tests, is either strictly inherited or solely a product ples of subjects. The main groups compared in these studies
of experience. have been males and females and various ethnic groups—
Despite substantial heritabilities of intelligence (most usually African Americans, Asian Americans, Hispanic
often linked to g as opposed to cognitive subcomponents), Americans, and European Americans. Of course, many
it has not been possible to link intelligence strongly with ethnic groups outside America have been studied as well,
variation in any particular gene (Deary et al., 2009, 2010; but intelligence testing has certainly been most pervasive
Johnson et al., 2011). in North America, which has provided the largest data sets
In the first years of the twenty-first century, it was for study. We will begin by examining sex differences in test
thought that one outcome of the Human Genome Project scores.
would be the linking of variations in single genes to major
components of intelligence. But the actual genetic influ-
ence seems to work through a complex interaction of many
genes and their interplay with environmental factors over Sex Differences
extended developmental periods. Such a finding is not that
Between men and women, overall IQ scores are equal, a fact
unusual and extends far beyond behavioral traits. For exam-
that is difficult to interpret, since the tests have been stan-
ple, height has a very high heritability, usually above .80
dardized to achieve this result. The tests’ creators assumed
(Visscher et al., 2008), but no single gene has been found
that men and women should have the same overall level of
to be strongly associated with variations in height ( Johnson
intelligence, so even though men and women score differ-
et al., 2011; Visscher, 2012).
ently on specific subtests, the subtest scores are weighted in
Interestingly, height also has higher heritabilities with
a way that yields equivalent scores overall between the two
increasing age, which may be a general characteristic of traits
groups (Neisser et al., 1996). Still, it is useful to consider
that result from complex interactions of many genes over
the differences between the sexes in certain components of
time ( Johnson et al., 2011). It now seems clear that there is
intelligence tests.
no “intelligence gene” or even a few genes strongly linked to
Spatial skills are one component of intelligence tests
intelligence, even though genetic variation strongly contrib-
in which males and females show different patterns of
utes to variations in intelligence. As with height and many
performance (see Figure 11.9). Males tend to have higher
other human traits, new models are still needed to provide
scores on spatial tasks, especially those that involve perform-
detailed mechanisms for how large sets of genes and envi-
ing mental operations on visual/spatial images in memory.
ronments might interact to produce traits.
Such tasks include mental rotation (imagining how various
three-dimensional figures would look in another orienta-
tion), finding an embedded figure in a large display, and gen-
erating and maintaining an image in memory (Voyer et al.,
Group Differences 1995). At the same time, females fare better than males on
some tasks with spatial components, including remember-
and Intelligence Tests ing the locations of objects (Lawton, 2010; Lejbak et al.,
2009; McBurney et al., 1997). In other tasks involving
No area of psychological research is more controversial than working memory for spatial information, females have also
group differences in intelligence test scores. In the discus- performed better than males. Some researchers have sug-
sion that follows, it is critical to remember the difference gested that the differences may involve anatomical varia-
between these scores and real mental abilities. You only tions between the sexes in parts of the prefrontal cortex and
need to imagine taking an intelligence test on little sleep, the hippocampus (Colom et al., 2013; Duff & Hampson,
with the flu, or in a state of high anxiety to know that IQ 2001; Ecuyer-Dab & Robert, 2007). Males tend to perform
tests do not always reflect a person’s full intellectual capaci- at higher levels on many mathematics-related tasks. Some
ties. With respect to group differences, it is equally easy to have argued that sex differences in visual/spatial skills might

400 CHAPTER 11 INTELLIGENCE AND SCHOOLING

 FIGURE 11.9 Sex differences in
spatial skills. Although (A) males
may show higher mean levels of
performance on spatial tasks, such as
mental rotations and maze learning,
(B) females may show higher mean
levels of performance on tasks involving
memory of locations of objects, such
as remembering where certain toys can
be found.

A B

be at the root of this mathematics disparity, since men are the social influences on sex differences in intelligence
more likely to use visual/spatial strategies on complex math should not be underestimated (Hines, 2010a, 2011; Spelke,
tasks (Halpern & LaMay, 2000). 2005). Parents interact with girls and boys quite differently,
In other memory tasks, women tend to show consistent and parents, peers, and the surrounding culture generally
advantages, outperforming men at recalling lists of words, provide girls and boys with very different environments.
numbers, and faces, among many other items. Women Starting when their children are very young, parents tend
also tend to do better on language-based tasks, whether to offer them different kinds of toys depending on their
they involve fluency, spelling, or reading comprehension sex (see Figure 11.10). If a boy is more frequently offered a
(Halpern, 2004). In addition, girls tend to start speaking truck and a girl a doll, these choices create different kinds
earlier than boys and have larger vocabularies at comparable of play experiences. Parents also tend to approve of differ-
ages (Halpern & LaMay, 2000). ent kinds of play activities for boys and girls, encourag-
There is tremendous interest in trying to link brain ing boys to engage in sports and girls to engage in more
differences to cognitive differences between the sexes social activities that might develop verbal skills (Leaper &
(Hampson & Moffet, 2004). A number of biological dif- Friedman, 2006). Of course, parents and cultures can vary
ferences between male and female brains have been docu- considerably in the extent to which they treat boys and girls
mented, many of which appear in infancy and persist differently, a topic explored in more depth in Chapters 13,
throughout the lifespan (Hines, 2011). They include a higher 14, and 15, but there are clearly many social and cultural
rate of blood flow saturated with oxygen in females (Gur & influences that could contribute to sex differences in cogni-
Gur, 1990), overall larger brains in males, different ratios of tion (Lawton, 2010).
white and gray brain matter, larger orbitofrontal regions rela- In sum, sex differences on the various components of
tive to other brain regions in females (Gur et al., 2002), and intelligence tests are attributable to a wide range of causes
differences in the thickness of the cerebral cortex in specific (Halpern et al., 2007; Lawton, 2010). Biological factors may
regions (Sowell et al., 2007). play a role, but given the potential for abuse based on such
It is difficult to decipher the connection between these alleged differences, it is critical to remain skeptical and care-
sex-related differences in brain anatomy and differences in fully consider socialization explanations as well. That is,
brain function (Cosgrove et al., 2007; Halpern et al., 2007; even if some biological sex differences can be clearly linked
Lawton, 2010). More certain, however, is the existence of to cognitive differences, this tells us little about the effects
cognitive sex differences in their own right, several of which of different learning experiences. Even if girls devote less
have been reliably demonstrated across cultures. One broad, of a particular brain region than boys to, say, visual/spatial
well-supported difference lies in the distribution of test tasks, they may simply use other regions to support the
scores between the sexes. There tend to be more males at the same level of visual/spatial skills as boys, given comparable
extremes of performance, both at the highest and the lowest encouragement and instruction. We simply know far too lit-
levels (Halpern et al., 2007; Johnson et al., 2008; Strand tle about brain structure and function to make any stronger
et al., 2006). inferences.
The emergence of some cognitive differences between Finally, it is important to remember that the research
the sexes early in life has led several researchers to think shows sex differences between population averages, not
that these differences are partially influenced by hormones between individuals. The range of variation in cognitive
(Bull et al., 2010; Levine et al., 1999). At the same time, skills among women or among men is far larger than the

GROUP DIFFERENCES AND INTELLIGENCE TESTS 401

A B
FIGURE 11.10 Sex differences in experiences with specific kinds of toys. Sex differences in cognitive abilities in different domains may
occur because parents provide children of one sex with much more experience with a certain kind of toy. (A) Here we see a father and son
playing with toy construction equipment, and (B) a mother and daughter playing with a doll.

differences between men and women. Therefore, it is not it becomes clear that some alleles that are more common in
possible to make any statements about any individual’s cog- certain groups are related to a greater susceptibility to cer-
nitive skills based on his or her sex. tain diseases and different responses to specific treatments
(Bamshad, 2005; Bamshad at al., 2007; Helgadottir et al.,
2006; Mountain & Risch, 2004; Rotman, 2003).
Ethnic and “Racial” Differences
The bases of sex differences in intelligence subtest scores
are controversial, but this controversy pales next to the Explaining Group Differences
heated debate over ethnic differences in test scores. Never- What do group differences in test scores mean? Some people
theless, some facts are clear. There are large differences in simply deny the results, arguing that they are fabrications
average IQ scores across ethnic groups: as much as 15 points of racist testers and researchers. This criticism seems prob-
between some samples of European Americans and African lematic, since researchers from all political persuasions and
Americans, where European Americans may have a mean backgrounds tend to find similar results with the same tests.
centering around 100 and African Americans may have a Nonetheless, it is still possible that implicit racial attitudes
mean centering around 85. Despite above-average academic are influencing test construction and design. More detailed
performance, Asian Americans have only slightly higher criticisms focus on how well intelligence tests really measure
intelligence test scores than European Americans, a finding what we think of as intelligence and whether they provide
that runs contrary to some stereotypes. Finally, Hispanic equally accurate measurements for different groups. The
Americans perform roughly in between the European- issues are complex, and much more extensive treatments
American and African-American levels. can be found elsewhere (Ceci, 1990; Fish, 2002; Gould,
It is critical to use the term ethnic group and not race 1981; Hunt & Carlson, 2007; Nisbett, 1998, 2005; Nisbett
for groups such as European Americans, African Ameri- et al., 2012; Rushton & Jensen, 2005; Sternberg, 1994). In
cans, and Asian Americans. The reason is simple: the entire the main, there are four types of explanations for the sig-
notion of racial groups is biologically suspect (Hirschfeld, nificance of group differences in IQ scores: irrelevance, bio-
1996). For example, in many analyses, African-American logical differences, socioeconomic factors, and sociocultural
groups have been shown to be made up of heterogeneous stereotypes.
peoples with much larger genetic differences among them
than there are between them and European Americans Are Group Differences Irrelevant? One frequent argu-
(Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1994; Olson, 2001). Despite com- ment is that IQ tests are largely irrelevant and that the group
mon beliefs and prejudices, ethnic groups rarely map in a differences they uncover are not meaningful for any other
straightforward way onto biological groups of humans. At kind of setting. For example, perhaps members of economi-
the same time, as we learn more about the human genome, cally disadvantaged groups are less familiar with the content

402 CHAPTER 11 INTELLIGENCE AND SCHOOLING

of some test items that have little or no relationship to any differences in IQ scores. Even if intelligence had a herita-
other tasks or settings. If this were the only reason for group bility of .90 and one ethnic group reliably scored 15 points
differences, then IQ tests would not be useful predictors of lower than another, it does not mean that the group differ-
how members of disadvantaged groups would perform in ence in scores has any basis in genetics. High heritabilities
other contexts, such as the classroom. alone cannot explain differences between populations.
More specifically, if African Americans tended to When more objective studies have examined whether
achieve academically at a much higher level than their IQ there is a genetic basis for group differences in IQ, no reliable
scores predicted, then the IQ tests would be predictively group differences have been attributed to genes. Perhaps the
biased against African Americans. For example, perhaps most dramatic evidence comes from studies that have inves-
an African-American student with an IQ score of 100 tigated whether the degree of African ancestry among Amer-
performed in school at the level of a European American icans correlates with their intelligence test scores. Through
student with a score of 120. Although some people believe analyses of blood chemistries, it is possible to determine the
that such a bias exists, it does not—at least not in typical extent to which people share common ancestors. Studies
North American school settings. African-American chil- that examine the degree of African ancestry through blood
dren with IQ scores of 100 do about the same in school analysis find no relation between degree of African ancestry
as European-American children with IQ scores of 100 and IQ scores (Scarr et al., 1977). As noted earlier, the entire
(Reynolds & Brown, 1984). For an individual who grows notion of African ancestry is problematic as a category, given
up in a highly disadvantaged environment and suffers that the genetic diversity within Africans as a group is larger
from discrimination, a score of 100 might be a much more than that between those with African ancestry and other
impressive achievement than it would be for an individual groups, such as Europeans (see Figure 11.11).
who comes from a privileged upbringing. Nonetheless, that It seems that the “social” category of being an African
person’s academic achievement might also be heavily nega- American is a far stronger predictor of test scores and aca-
tively influenced by his disadvantaged background. demic performance than any biological category. In short,
there is no reliable evidence that genetic differences between
Genetic Factors For many years, some researchers have ethnic or racial groups account for any group differences in
argued that intelligence is largely an inherited trait. Based intelligence test scores. For that reason, it makes sense to
on that claim, they then argue that differences in IQ scores assume that some aspect of sociocultural factors is respon-
among ethnic groups are also caused by genetic differences. sible for the differences.
In fact, the two arguments are not connected, and the ten-
dency to link them is a widespread and dangerous fallacy Socioeconomic Factors Among the sociocultural factors
(Gould, 1981). that could be responsible for ethnic differences, one class of
To understand why they are not linked, consider again the explanation has focused on socioeconomic influences. Indeed,
example of height. The heritability of height may be high, say between ethnic groups in America, differences in IQ scores
.80, such that height differences in a population are mostly are dwarfed by differences in income levels, quality of employ-
accounted for by genetic variations. Thus, within a group ment, and quality of life. Could those large disparities in
of North American children, differences in height might be economic resources and opportunities affect intelligence test
highly predictable from their patterns of genetic variation. scores? They are certainly likely to be factors, but such simple
But now consider a second population of children from a economic effects seem implausible as the entire explanation,
famine-ravaged region of Somalia. In that group of children, since the ethnic differences still exist even when individuals
height could also have a heritability of .80, with genetic are matched for economic levels. Moreover, some researchers
variations again strongly predicting height differences. But argue that it is unlikely that the side effects of poor economic
when you compare the two populations, you find that the conditions, such as malnutrition and poor health care, inevi-
malnourished children are 3 inches shorter, on average, than tably cause large drops in IQ scores, given humans’ striking
the North American children at three different ages. Despite resilience in times of severe malnutrition (Lumey et al., 1993;
the similarly high heritability of height in both groups, there Stein et al., 1975). Nonetheless, members of impoverished
is no reason whatsoever to attribute the 3-inch difference in groups are more likely to be trapped in inferior schools with
average heights to genetic factors. This fallacy would become vastly fewer resources, and as we will see later in the chap-
especially obvious if food became plentiful in that region of ter, schooling can powerfully influence intelligence. But the
Somalia and subsequent generations showed no significant persistence of ethnic differences in IQ scores, even when
height difference with North American children. in matched economic situations, suggests that differences
Many of the same issues apply when people try to use gen- in school quality cannot be solely responsible for differences in
eral heritability estimates for intelligence to explain group scores between ethnic groups.

GROUP DIFFERENCES AND INTELLIGENCE TESTS 403

FIGURE 11.11 Genetic
diversity. People of African
descent show greater genetic
diversity among themselves
than between themselves and
other groups, such as Europe-
ans. These differences raise
doubts about claims of intrinsic
abilities of people from different
“racial groups.”

Sociocultural Stereotypes The most plausible expla- category. He contends that members of this third kind of
nations for ethnic group differences in IQ scores seem to minority group have little confidence that their academic
involve people’s views of their roles relative to the dominant efforts will be appropriately rewarded, and they may come
culture in which they live. The anthropologist John Ogbu to regard school as a futile waste of time. Perhaps the most
has offered a cross-cultural explanation emphasizing the revealing aspect of Ogbu’s analysis is that when precisely
ways that minority groups differ, not just from the majority the same racial group that constitutes this kind of trapped
group but also from each other. His theory describes three minority in one culture constitutes a more advantaged
distinct types of minority groups that tend to show sharply minority in another culture, the minority members’ aca-
different outcomes in both intelligence testing and school demic performance rises as well.
achievement (Ogbu, 1978; Ogbu & Stern, 2001). One type Social psychologists Claude Steele and Joel Aronson
of minority group chooses, on its own initiative and with- have made a related argument concerning how some groups
out economic or social penalties, to be distinct from the are influenced by their beliefs about society’s view of their
majority culture. American examples would include vari- intellectual capacities. Steele and Aronson refer to the phe-
ous religious groups, like the Amish, or those who live in nomenon of stereotype threat, in which the very fear of
communes. The second type of minority group seeks out confirming a negative stereotype leads to reduced perfor-
new opportunities through migration, despite temporarily mance on a task or test. They argue that African Americans
being at an economic disadvantage in the new culture. Such face powerful stereotypes about their not doing as well on
groups of immigrants tend to see themselves as better off for intellectual tasks. These stereotypes are not only entrenched
having decided to leave their home culture and join a new in the dominant European-American culture but well
one, in a subordinate status, with the goal of working their known to African Americans as well.
way up to affluence. In one series of studies, Steele and Aronson (1995) var-
Finally, there are minority groups whose members are ied the extent to which African-American students saw a
put in a subordinate, disadvantaged class without any challenging verbal test as truly indicative of intellectual
choice, usually from birth. They often have the feeling of ability and then compared their performance with that of
being trapped in that class. Ogbu argues that such groups European-American students with matching SAT scores.
include African Americans, lower caste members in India, Thus, some students were told that the test was a very reliable
the Maori of New Zealand, and any other groups with a measure of intellectual skills, whereas others were informed
similar sense of being forced against their will into a lower that it was simply a difficult verbal puzzle. Steele and Aronson

404 CHAPTER 11 INTELLIGENCE AND SCHOOLING

predicted that this manipulation would cause the first group 1
of subjects to fear that their performance might confirm a Stereotype threat

Daughters’ math performance

Control
negative stereotype about African Americans’ intellectual .5
abilities and that this stereotype threat could damage their
performance. In fact, they found that African-American
students performed worse than European-American students 0
only in the condition that imposed the stereotype threat.
The manipulation had no influence on European-American
−.5
students, since it did not impose a threat (Steele & Aronson,
1995). This pattern of results has been repeatedly found in
hundreds of studies of both ethnic and gender-related stereo- −1
types (Appel & Kronberger, 2012). −1 −.5 0 .5 1
Mothers’ gender stereotypes
This finding is an intriguing twist on the idea of
sociocultural influences on disadvantaged groups, and FIGURE 11.12 Stereotype threat and attitudes of mothers
toward the stereotype. When mothers express strong disagree-
its implications extend across a wide range of intellectual
ment with the stereotype of girls being bad at math (1 score), their
tasks. Steele argues that the most potent influence on how daughters do not show the effects of stereotype threat. When moth-
members of those groups perform on intellectual tasks is ers agree with the stereotype (+1 score), however, their daughters
how they perceive their culturally and socially expected do show an effect of the stereotype threat. In the stereotype threat
role in that task (Steele, 1997). Moreover, it is possible, condition, gender was made salient. In the control condition, it was
and even relatively simple, to reduce stereotype threat not. Adapted from Tomasetto et al. (2011).
and improve standardized test performance in threat-
ened minorities. This can be done by indicating before
the test that intellectual ability is malleable and not an
intrinsic property of an ethnic group (Good et al., 2003; effects of stereotype threat on math task performance. But
Inzlicht & Good, 2006). Stereotype threat can also be when the mothers did not reject the stereotypes, standard
reduced by focusing on those aspects of cognitive perfor- stereotype threat effects occurred (Tomasetto et al., 2011;
mance that are most affected. For example, math prob- see Figure 11.12). Of course, without random assignment
lems can impose high loads on working memory, which of girls to conditions where mothers make such statements
is easily impaired by stereotype threat. But by practicing and where they do not, we cannot be sure if this correla-
math techniques so that they become stored in long-term tion reflects maternal behavior directly countering stereo-
memory (rather than routines to be computed in working type threats. There may be other independent factors—for
memory), students become less susceptible to stereotype example, especially high math ability in those girls—that
threat (Beilock et al., 2007). both counter the threats and increase the mothers’ anti-
Other studies have shown that reframing a task can stereotype statements.
greatly reduce stereotype threat. For example, in one study, It appears that stereotype threat can affect children quite
researchers produced large stereotype threat effects in early in development. In one study, Asian-American girls in
African-American children taking a mathematics test by elementary and middle school engaged in one of two dif-
having the children report their race just before taking the ferent types of tasks before doing several math tasks. One
test. The researchers required the children in the control task was designed to make the girls think about their gen-
group to report their race after taking the test. Yet, when der: coloring a drawing of a girl playing with dolls. The
the same test was described as a challenge, the stereotype other task, coloring a picture of two Asian children eating
threat effect disappeared, and the children in the experi- with chopsticks, was intended to make their ethnic back-
mental group did as well as those in the control group (Alter ground salient (Ambady et al., 2001). When their gender
et al., 2010). The challenge framing was created by simply was made salient, the elementary school girls did much
having the experimenter describe the test as a useful learn- worse on math-related tasks than control children who
ing experience as opposed to a true measure of their ability. colored a landscape. When their ethnic background was
Stereotype threats can be countered in more informal made salient, their scores were markedly higher than the
ways as well, such as in attitudes conveyed by parents. In scores of the control children. Thus, by early in elementary
one study, researchers asked mothers of young elementary school, children can pick up on the stereotypes associated
school girls their opinions about claims that girls had less with various cognitive tasks. Moreover, thinking about
ability in math. When mothers strongly rejected stereotypes those stereotypes can influence their test performance in
of girls doing poorly in math, their daughters showed no different directions.

GROUP DIFFERENCES AND INTELLIGENCE TESTS 405

 1 When the threat was made salient, the stereotype’s nega-
Proportion aware of stereotypes
.9 Children from stigmatized groups tive effects were closely linked to the extent that children
.8 Children from nonstigmatized groups were aware of them, with children from stigmatized groups
.7 being more severely influenced (McKown & Strambler,
.6 2009). On average, the children moved from virtually no
.5 awareness of stereotypes at age 6 to a strong awareness of
.4 stereotypes at age 10. Notably, this awareness emerged ear-
.3 lier and strengthened continuously in children who belong
.2 to stigmatized groups.
.1
0
6 7 8 9 10
Age (in years)
Group Differences over Time
FIGURE 11.13 Stereotype awareness. From at least 6 years of Any analysis of IQ scores and group differences must also
age, children in stigmatized groups are more likely to be aware of take into account the surprising finding that IQ scores have
stereotypes relevant to themselves. This awareness aggravates the not remained constant over the past few decades (Neisser,
influence of stereotype threat. Adapted from McKown & Weinstein 1998). Because test designers often revise the tests so that
(2003). the mean scores for a population stay at 100, it might seem
that average IQ has always been around 100. But when we
statistically correct for the adjustments to maintain a mean
For stereotype threats to have an influence, children
score of 100, it turns out that there have been dramatic
need to be aware of the stereotypes held by the dominant
IQ gains over time in country after country throughout
culture, and the extent of their awareness should also be
the world (Flynn, 1984, 1987, 1999, 2007). Thus, scores
related to the strength of the effect. Such a relationship
have crept up over time, but this rise was masked by reg-
has been found in a study that looked at approximately
ular downward adjustments of the entire score distribu-
200 children between the ages of 6 and 10 who came from
tion so that the average would remain at 100. This rise
African-American, Latin-American, European-American,
in scores, known as the Flynn effect after its discoverer,
and Asian-American backgrounds. In the first of two tasks,
James Flynn, amounts to roughly a 15-point increase in IQ
the children were asked about various ethnic stereotypes for
over the last 60 years or so in many different ethnic groups
real-world groups and for imaginary groups who interacted
and cultures (see Figure 11.14). Thus, the average IQ test
in ways that involved prejudice. The children saw African
score of African Americans in the 1990s was the same as
Americans and Latin Americans as stigmatized with respect
that of European Americans in the 1940s. Intelligence test
to intellectual abilities, and the children’s sensitivity to ste-
scores throughout the world have shifted up almost a full
reotypes increased markedly as they grew older (McKown &
standard deviation in one generation.
Weinstein, 2003).
In these studies, children from stigmatized groups were
much more likely to be aware of stereotypes than were
children from nonstigmatized groups (McKown, 2004;
McKown & Weinstein, 2003; see Figure 11.13). For exam-
100
ple, African-American and Latin-American 7-year-olds
were twice as likely as their European-American or Asian- 95
American age-mates to be aware of the stereotypes. In
IQ Scores

contrast, the children showed no differences on tasks 90

Britain
involving the fictional groups’ stereotypes, leading the Netherlands
85
researchers to conclude that their awareness was related Israel
to experiencing real-world stereotypes and not to some 80 Norway
Belgium
more general stereotype sensitivity. The most striking find-
ing, however, concerned the effect of stereotype aware- 75

ness on cognitive task performance, when the relevant

70
stereotype threats were either made salient (for example, 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
“These problems tell us how good you really are at this”) FIGURE 11.14 The Flynn effect. The Flynn effect across several
or downplayed (for example, “These problems will help us different countries. Intelligence test scores rose dramatically from the
understand how children learn different kinds of things”). 1940s onward. Adapted from Flynn (1998).

406 CHAPTER 11 INTELLIGENCE AND SCHOOLING

 A gain of almost 3 IQ points per decade constitutes a strongest explanations of the effect. The size of the effect is
massive shift, and no one yet knows why it has occurred. comparable to that found in Europe and North America.
Note that genetic explanations of these differences are out There is some evidence that the Flynn effect may be reach-
of the question. No one seriously thinks that the genetic ing a plateau in Western technological societies. Perhaps this
makeup of Americans has changed so substantially in sev- indicates that the influences of modern technological culture
eral decades that it could account for a 15-point increase in on intelligence test scores have reached their limit (Sundet
IQ scores. Thus, the Flynn effect highlights the substan- et al., 2004; Teasdale & Owen, 2005). Some researchers
tial influence that little-understood environmental factors argue that this plateau may also help explain an apparent nar-
can have on intelligence test scores (Neisser, 1998). A better rowing of the gap between European-American and African-
understanding of the Flynn effect will surely also provide American test scores in recent years (Dickens & Flynn, 2006;
insights into other group differences. Fryer & Levitt, 2004; Nisbett, 2011). In such accounts, the
The Flynn effect has been attributed to many pos- Flynn effect may still be improving scores for some disadvan-
sible causes, ranging from better nutrition throughout the taged groups while having reached its limit for groups that
world to the increasingly advanced technological skills that have long had more advantages. Researchers on intelligence,
the modern world requires (Neisser, 1998). We know that however, do not all agree with this view. Some think it is pos-
the effect is strongest for those aspects of intelligence that are sible that IQ scores could still rise 3 points a decade for all
supposed to be the most independent of culture—skills like groups and that both the plateau and the narrowing of the
spatial ability and analogical reasoning, rather than vocabu- gap may not be a consistent finding (Weiss, 2010).
lary or literacy-based skills. These differences in the magnitude
of the Flynn effect illustrate the challenge researchers face in
explaining the potential environmental effects on IQ scores.
At present, the Flynn effect shows that environmental
effects can be huge and can occur in ways that defy our first
Environmental Influences on
intuitions. One proposal argues that increasingly complex
cultures make ever-larger demands on the kinds of analyti-
Intelligence Test Scores
cal skills that are important for IQ tests, giving people more The environment exerts both biological and social influ-
practice using those skills. An especially provocative view ences on IQ scores. There are a host of biological factors that
argues that television has become more cognitively complex can lower intelligence test scores, ranging from general mal-
in recent years, containing far more characters and inter- nutrition to specific vitamin deficiencies, lead poisoning,
weaving story lines and thereby creating a form of cognitive or a mother’s excessive alcohol consumption during preg-
enrichment (Johnson, 2005). Moreover, if decision makers nancy. Some of these factors were discussed more broadly in
in business and education are drawn from the ranks of high Chapter 2. It suffices to say that these biological effects are
scorers on analytical intelligence tests, they might naturally real, although they are often smaller than we might assume.
make the environments they manage even more intensely Hence, malnutrition has to be at a very substantial level to
geared toward fostering this kind of intelligence (Dickens & have marked effects on intellectual functioning (Pollitt et al.,
Flynn, 2001). This explanation, however, must also address 1993). The question of whether a highly enriched nutri-
the finding that the Flynn effect also occurs in rural societ- tional environment confers a biological advantage is much
ies with relatively little influence from industrialized cul- more difficult to answer. Part of the problem lies in deter-
tures. As shown in Table 11.3, rural Kenyan children with mining precisely what is meant by a highly enriched nutri-
an average age of 7 show a dramatic Flynn effect (Daley tional environment.
et al., 2003). In that study, parents’ literacy, family struc- In the social realm, deprived environments involving
ture, and children’s nutrition and health seemed to be the abuse or isolation clearly can lower intelligence test scores

TABLE 11.3 The Flynn effect in

rural Kenya. In a study with 7-year-old
Kenyan children, a large increase in test
Test 1984 study (n = 118) 1998 study (n = 537)
scores was found between 1984 and
1998 in a rural agricultural population
Raven’s Progressive 12.82 17.31
largely unaffected by the industrialization
Matrices
and technology of the developing world.
Verbal meaning 24.47 27.04 All differences between the two time peri-
ods are statistically significant. Adapted
Digit span 4.64 5.03
from Daley et al. (2003).

ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES ON INTELLIGENCE TEST SCORES 407

 In all of these cases, it is critical to keep in mind the
errors inherent in inferring causation from correlation. For
example, we know that education levels of parents are highly
correlated with their children’s IQ scores. But is their edu-
cational level directly influencing their children’s scores?
Certainly, being more educated might lead parents to spend
more time with their children on activities that develop skills
used in intelligence tests. The correlation, however, may also
arise from another factor, such as shared genotypes between
parents and children. To the extent that IQ is heritable, and
that IQ scores, in turn, predict level of education, we would
expect highly educated adults to have children with higher
IQ scores. Thus, a second factor (genetic relatedness) could
be behind the correlation between parents’ education level
FIGURE 11.15 Birth order and intelligence. In the population and children’s test scores. Researchers who study these kinds
as a whole, birth order is correlated with intelligence test scores,
of social influences have tried to show that these factors affect
with slight drops in scores for each later birth. The reasons for this
association are not well understood.
intelligence even when nonsocial influences, such as shared
genotypes, are taken into account. This work is still under
way, and the distinct paths of influence have not been fully
and academic achievement (Curtiss, 1977). Conversely, disentangled (Davis-Kean, 2005; Kirkpatrick et al., 2009).
particular social influences can have positive effects on IQ
scores and school performance. In many cases, positive par-
enting styles (discussed further in Chapter 14) have many
good outcomes, including positive impacts on intelligence Enhancing Early Environmental
test scores and school performance. These approaches to
parenting involve practices such as listening carefully to Influences: Head Start Programs
children and responding in ways that are sensitive to their One kind of influence deserves further discussion and
thoughts and feelings. Parents’ education levels have an is a natural lead-in to the topic of schooling. It concerns
impact as well, and parents may boost their children’s tests attempts to develop preschool programs that have a long-
scores and school performance by role modeling academic term positive impact on a child’s performance years later,
goals and mentoring their children (Williams, 1998). School- continuing into elementary school. Among these pro-
ing, which has the most obvious and often the most dramatic grams, the most widely known is Head Start (see Figure
effects on intelligence, is discussed in a separate section later 11.16), initiated in the United States in 1965 as part of the
in this chapter.
Many other factors can also influence intelligence, such as
the child’s home life and caregivers (see Chapter 14). Family
size may have an impact, as smaller families can devote more
resources to each child, providing more complex and engag-
ing intellectual experiences. For related reasons, children’s
birth order also has an influence (see Figure 11.15). On aver-
age, IQ scores tend to drop a little for each successive child,
perhaps because parents often have more time to devote to a
first-born child and less to later-born children (Belmont &
Marolla, 1973; Zajonc & Markus, 1975; Zajonc et al.,
1979). Of course, like the other group differences, these
birth order effects apply only at the population level, and
many later-born children score higher than their older
siblings. Considerable controversy remains about the true
source of birth order effects (Armor, 2001; Rodgers, 2001; FIGURE 11.16 Head Start. Head Start programs, such as this
Wichman et al., 2006; Zajonc, 2001; Zajonc & Sulloway, one in New Mexico, were designed to provide early educational expe-
2007), but the correlations are substantial and need to be riences that would counter the effects of disadvantaged environments
understood. on academic performance.

408 CHAPTER 11 INTELLIGENCE AND SCHOOLING

Johnson administration’s War on Poverty. The idea behind intelligence is perhaps best treated as a topic of its own
Head Start and similar programs is that the right kind of by looking more closely at the most obvious environ-
early experiences can have a profoundly positive long-term mental influence: schooling.
impact on a child’s intellectual functioning. The content of
individual Head Start interventions varies, but they share
the goal of helping children who are at risk for underper-
forming later in school. The programs usually include
nutritional support, health care, and day care support, as
Schooling
well as exposure to certain academic topics and modes The many kinds of schools in the United States represent only
of interaction, including reading to the children, playing a small fraction of the different schools throughout the world.
mentally challenging games with them, and exposing them Moreover, all kinds of schools have a wide variety of effects on
to arithmetic concepts. their students. Some effects, such as teaching children how to
Because these programs are partially funded by the fed- read and write and do arithmetic, are explicitly mentioned
eral government, it is not surprising that their claims to in the curriculum, but other equally important influences
benefit children should come under special scrutiny. Many are implicit in the local school culture. In this section, we
critics have charged that despite the funding that Head Start will focus on the different ways that schools affect children’s
programs receive, their students have shown no long-term thinking and intelligence. We will first consider the range
academic improvements. In reality, their benefits are real, of school types and then examine schools’ multiple roles,
but not always obvious at first glance. It is true that after including serving as socializing agents, cultural institutions,
several years in elementary school, children who had been in and conveyers of values. Finally, we will explore how schools
Head Start programs did not have better grades or test scores influence cognitive development, including intelligence.
than children from similar backgrounds who were not in the
programs. Nonetheless, the programs had other long-term
positive effects.
Head Start children were less likely to be held back or put Characterizing Schools
into remedial programs, and they were more likely to finish From age 5 until at least age 16, children in most coun-
high school (Anderson et al., 2003; Darlington, 1986; Dar- tries are in school 6 hours a day, 5 days a week, for almost
lington et al., 1980). It is interesting that IQ scores were not 40 weeks a year. In the United States, most children stay in
different, given these other differences. But the lack of IQ school until at least age 18. Thus, in many cultures, chil-
differences should not mask the clear positive outcomes that, dren spend more than 16,000 hours in schools before fin-
in many people’s eyes, more than justify these programs. It ishing their education. What is happening to them during
is important to note that participation in Head Start (as well all this time in school?
as in an earlier version called “Early Head Start”) is associ- The answers are complex, and they depend on the nature
ated with greater school readiness both in academic terms of the myriad classroom experiences. A classroom environ-
(math and reading readiness) and in social-emotional skills ment varies dramatically as a result of local culture, eco-
when children enter kindergarten (Lee et al., 2013). The dis- nomic resources, and time of the year. Even within the
appearance of those advantages 3 years later may reflect the same country, the variations across classrooms of children
challenges that some schools face in building on the early of the same age are enormous. One classroom may have
gains provided by those programs and not the inadequacies 16 children quietly and attentively hanging on a much-
of the programs themselves. loved teacher’s every word. In another classroom in the same
Head Start remains a fascinating laboratory in which school, the children may be anxious about interacting with
to investigate how planned interventions might facilitate a stern, punitive, and widely feared teacher. In a different
children’s intellectual development (Zigler, 2003; Zigler setting, often one of poverty, the classroom may have more
& Muenchow, 1992; Zigler & Styfco, 2004). Although than 30 children exuberantly interacting while a frustrated
long-lasting direct gains on such measures as analytical teacher tries to get their attention. In some of those classes,
intelligence may be difficult to document, they are not the teacher is passionately committed to trying to make a
the only measures of interest. Measures that are more difference, while in others the teacher watches the clock,
embedded in the social context in which the child devel- hoping for the day to end, just as many of the students do.
ops, such as rates of children being held back or being Across cultures the differences can be even more dra-
put in remedial programs, suggest important, lasting matic. Consider the Haqqania madrassa, a Pakistani school
effects of the Head Start program. Further discussion of 28,000 students who range in ages from 9 to 30 (see
of possible environmental factors that can influence Figure 11.17A). The school is open only to boys and men.

SCHOOLING 409
A B
FIGURE 11.17 Differences among schools. Schools throughout the world, such as (A) this madrassa in Pakistan and (B) this Montessori
school in London, can vary radically in their structure, curriculum, class size, and many other factors.

The younger boys’ instruction largely consists of hear- ments than schools in affluent suburbs. It is therefore
ing passages of the Koran read in Arabic, even though not surprising that many U.S. civil rights activists in the
the boys do not understand Arabic. Instead, they speak 1960s worked to implement forced busing, which allowed
Pashto, a local language in Pakistan. The curriculum underprivileged children access to schools in affluent
is meant to be absorbed without question by those who communities.
learn it (Goldberg, 2000). After several years, many of the
students can recall and recite long passages of the Koran Two Prominent Models of Education In the United
perfectly. States, two dramatically different models of education
By contrast, consider private Western schools such as emerged early in the twentieth century (Scribner, 1988).
the Montessori school shown here (see Figure 11.17B). The first came from the American philosopher, psycholo-
In such a school, teachers help children explore in more gist, and educator John Dewey. Expanding on a tradition
individualistic ways. Children are encouraged to question eloquently described by the French philosopher Jean-Jacques
everything, and they feel free to challenge every statement. Rousseau (Dewey, 1902/1991), Dewey’s approach to educa-
They are, in many ways, in charge of their own learning, tion was designed around the child’s natural mental abilities
with teachers serving as guides and facilitators of the stu- and interests and focused on material relevant to the child’s
dents’ curiosity. daily activities. Building on this “natural” foundation,
Finally, consider a school in one of the wealthiest suburbs teachers could introduce the basic concepts of mathematics,
of New York City. Even though it is an elementary school, literacy, geography, and science. Dewey’s emphasis was on
the school and the children’s parents are already thinking the student’s mind, not on the subjects to be taught, and
about which colleges will admit these students. The teachers he favored projects that require integrating many kinds of
test the children frequently with standardized tests to make knowledge. The Dewey model led to a child-centered form
sure the children are comfortable with that format. Exten- of instruction, one that viewed the child as a spontaneous,
sive homework is assigned that is geared toward improving active individual who brings many abilities and interests to
performance on those tests. So that students will stay ahead the learning situation. These abilities and interests would
of statewide norms, the school helps arrange for tutors to then serve as raw materials and points of departure for fur-
meet with their students outside the classroom. By the sec- ther education.
ond grade, students are already intensely competitive and see The second approach to schooling began with an Indiana
every activity as a way to succeed and surpass others—or to school superintendent, William Wirt, who in 1910 devel-
fail and fall behind. oped the idea of a platoon school. This was a school in
As these examples show, the nature of classroom expe- which every room was used to maximum efficiency, and
riences varies widely. Some of these variations correlate children moved from classroom to classroom to pick up
highly with the affluence of the neighborhoods in which different intellectual skills, such as reading or mathematics
the schools are located. On average, schools in impov- (Scribner, 1988). Similarities between Wirt’s approach
erished areas are much less effective learning environ- and the assembly-line model of industrial manufacturing

410 CHAPTER 11 INTELLIGENCE AND SCHOOLING

are difficult to ignore. As the psychologist and education
researcher Sylvia Scribner put it:

The educational program did not grow from the children,

however, as Dewey’s program did. Knowledge was attached to
children, somewhat as the parts of an automobile—bumper,
headlights, and so on—are attached to basic frames. The same
efficiency concepts that led to the development of the assembly
line, in fact, were at the heart of the platoon school movement.
(Scribner, 1988, p. 23)

The platoon school movement was linked to the rise of

behaviorism in America, with its focus on behavioral inputs
and outputs rather than on the mind (Scribner, 1988). In
FIGURE 11.18 Socialization in schools. In addition to the cur-
platoon schools, behaviorist concepts such as reinforcement
riculum, schools are socializing agents that can teach children how to
and repetition were used as guiding principles in the class- sit and listen quietly in groups for extended periods.
room. Teachers largely relied on external rewards and pun-
ishments to encourage maximally effective learning. The
platoon school approach came to heavily dominate Ameri- great deal from interacting with their peers, often acquir-
can education, and similar forms of education have become ing behaviors and beliefs from peers that were not intended
common throughout much of the developed world. by parents or teachers.
The nature of this socialization may also be changing.
For example, in many school districts in the United States,
Q: How does the platoon school approach to recesses have been eliminated or cut back for budgetary or
education contrast with Dewey’s approach? security reasons (Bornstein, 2011). This change in turn may
require children to sit quietly and be physically inactive for
much longer stretches of time. That requirement may pre-
sent large challenges to some children.
What Schools Do Schools as Cultural Institutions Schools also transmit to
Beyond the wide range of school types, there are some com- children many aspects of the culture of the dominant groups
mon effects produced by most schools, especially in coun- that organize, fund, and manage the schools. For children
tries such as the United States, where one kind of schooling growing up within these dominant groups, this process of
dominates. Our main focus in this section is on the effect enculturation, or cultural learning, may seem appropriate
of schools on children’s thought. But to understand these and helpful. For children from nondominant groups, how-
effects, it is essential to briefly consider the broader influ- ever, the same enculturation may conflict with the values and
ences that schools have as social and cultural institutions priorities conveyed by their families and communities. Some
and conveyers of values. cultures, for example, believe that men and women should
have different social roles and start to teach those differences
Schools as Socializing Agents Just as important as in the earliest stages of schooling. Boys and girls may receive
teaching knowledge and skills, schools teach students how different forms of instruction and be rewarded and punished
to cope, and perhaps even to thrive, in a highly regimented in different ways. A child whose family embraces these major
setting, surrounded by peers, where competition increases distinctions between gender roles would feel no conflict
each year. Both the active child and the bored child must between the cultures of home and school. Indeed, the school
learn to sit still and be quiet (see Figure 11.18). The impa- may help advance that child’s entrance into her parents’ soci-
tient child must learn to wait for feedback on work or ety. But for another child, whose family feels separate from
the answer to a question. All children must learn to work the dominant culture, school can be an alienating experience.
within a system of rewards and punishments designed to It has been argued that some aspects of African-American
shape their behavior, whether these are grades, awards, or culture are at odds with the implicit cultural teachings of
trips to the principal’s office. Children must also learn to most U.S. schools. The psychologist Wade Boykin (1994)
“read” teachers’ intentions, to know what teachers really and his colleagues argue that African-American culture
want, what materials they think are important to learn, tends to emphasize affect, communal action and interaction,
and what behaviors they expect. Finally, children learn a movement, interpersonal harmony, and oral interaction. In

SCHOOLING 411
contrast, the dominant U.S. culture, including the schools, ences are discussed more broadly, in contexts other than
tends to emphasize affect-free problem solving, individual schools, in the next few chapters.
effort, sitting still, competition, and written performance
and literacy. Thus, a child from the dominant culture enters
school with all the values from home dovetailing nicely with Q: What are some ways in which schools
the school’s structure, whereas some African-American chil- influence children besides educating them in the
dren enter school at odds with much of the implicit structure
(Boykin et al., 2005; Marryshow et al., 2005). curriculum?
This kind of conflict between schooling patterns of the
dominant culture and the values of local subcultures occurs
elsewhere in the world as well. For example, consider the
conflict between the Inuit community members of Baffin
Schools and Thought
Island, Arctic Bay, and the “southern” school systems of When we look to the more explicit influences that schools have
Canada (Douglas, 1994; McGregor, 2010). In many Inuit on thought and intelligence, there is little doubt that school-
communities, children are expected to help out during the ing increases intelligence in all the ways it is normally assessed.
day in such activities as taking care of younger children or A variety of studies have shown that the number of years of
helping to unload fish from a large catch. When a child schooling children receive seems to directly influence their
helps out in this way, however, the “southern schools” mark performance on intelligence tests (Ceci, 1991, 1999; Falch &
down the child as “truant.” This practice creates consider- Sandgren Massih, 2011; Teasdale & Owen, 2000; Winship &
able tension for the children both with their families and Korenman, 1997). Furthermore, between June and September,
their schools. In almost all such cases, children in the non- intelligence test results tend to drop for children who are on
dominant group become alienated from the schools and do summer vacation. Just 2½ months out of school seems to be
not perform as well. These effects are often related to schools enough to cause a decline in performance equivalent to roughly
that see the traditional culture as somehow deficient rather a month of progress (Cooper et al., 1996). One remarkable
than merely different. demonstration of these effects occurred when schools in parts
of Virginia were closed in the 1960s to avoid racial integra-
Schools as Vehicles of Values Finally, the idea that schools tion. Some children were deprived of school for a year or more.
teach children certain cultural values or, conversely, erode Compared with children whose schooling was not interrupted,
those values has become increasingly prominent in the United those unable to attend lost roughly 6 points on intelligence test
States. In this view, schools are seen as helping to instill a moral scores for each year of school they missed (Green et al., 1964;
sense or a moral compass. This can be seen in efforts to make Neisser et al., 1996).
children sensitive to the needs of others, to ethnic and group Besides imparting information, schools teach analytical
differences, and to certain ethics of work and self-discipline. skills, test-taking skills, and certain ways of thinking. In this
Whether schools should play such a role is highly controversial, respect, the effects of schooling on intelligence test scores
and many parents feel that in doing so, schools undermine the resemble the effects of practice and training on athletic skills.
parents’ own attempts to teach their children values. Although people’s athletic abilities differ, everyone can ben-
In the United States, this conflict has repeatedly emerged efit from good coaching, training, and practice. If you haven’t
in the controversy over whether prayer should be allowed in done the right exercises to develop your muscles, your per-
the public schools. The U.S. Constitution, which requires formance will suffer, and appearing “coordinated” in more
separation of religion and state, has been interpreted as complex motor tasks is as much a product of practice as it is
disallowing any religious practices in schools that are sup- of native abilities. Practice and training appear to be at least as
ported by public funds. But many religious parents feel that important for intelligence as they are for motor skills.
depriving children of exposure to prayer at school compro-
mises a parent’s ability to instill important religious values.
Thus, they see schools as central to instilling values in their Q: In what ways do schools have an influence
children. We will consider in much greater detail the ques- on intelligence test scores?
tion of moral values and their emergence in children in
Chapter 12.
All three types of influences—socialization, encultura- In addition to improving intelligence test performance,
tion, and the instillation of moral values—overlap and work schooling has broad effects on thought that differ from the
together; they are not easy to keep separate. Nonetheless, it effects of simply growing older. In one study of the ways
is useful to see them as three different, interrelated sources schooling and age each affect mathematics and numerical
of schools’ influence on children. All three types of influ- reasoning, researchers compared performance within three

412 CHAPTER 11 INTELLIGENCE AND SCHOOLING

groups of kindergarten and first grade students. In the first itive beliefs about the world that they have gradually built
group, students differed in age, but they had all experienced and consolidated over several years. It seems obvious that
the same amount of schooling. In the second group, stu- instruction will be most effective when teachers understand
dents were all the same age, but some had been in school for these intuitive beliefs and can take each child’s knowledge
longer than others. The students in the third group differed into account to optimize instruction for that child (Keil,
in both their age and their amount of schooling. 2011). Currently, most schools do not emphasize what each
The comparisons revealed that children improve at con- child brings to the classroom, nor do they encourage much
servation of number (see Chapter 9) as they got older, regard- individual exploration or interactive dialogues (National
less of how long they are in school. For mental arithmetic, Research Council, 2007). To a certain extent, these short-
on the other hand, schooling (and not age) correlates with comings are inevitable, given that many major discoveries
the most improvement (Bisanz et al., 1995). Other kinds of about cognitive development have been made relatively
cognitive skills show similar contrasts. For instance, school- recently (National Research Council, 2007). It takes time
ing seems to improve children’s memory for stories by teach- for this research to be incorporated into teaching methods.
ing them about narrative forms and styles (such as how to Thus, despite the evidence that children’s reasoning is not
introduce a story), which helps them to encode and retrieve constrained by Piaget’s global stages of cognitive develop-
narratives efficiently. By contrast, age seems more important ment (see Chapter 9), many elementary school teachers still
than schooling for improving children’s general memory cite these stages as a reliable way of determining what a
capacity, independent of the use of story formats (Varnhagen child can and cannot be taught at a given age.
et al., 1994). Schooling seems to contribute more than age
does to the development of transitive reasoning skills (as in Three Cognitive Science Themes for Education Some
the reasoning task about sticks’ relative lengths, discussed in of the most promising studies linking cognitive science
Chapter 9; Artman & Cahan, 1993), and it improves perfor- research to educational practice arise from careful task-based
mance on common tests of executive functioning (McCrea analyses of precisely what is involved in learning specific
et al., 1999). The type of schooling seems to matter as well. cognitive skills and how that process relates to other aspects
Children in more academic tracks of large school systems of cognitive functioning. The Community of Learners pro-
show larger intelligence test gains from schooling than chil- gram, developed by psychologists Ann Brown and Joseph
dren in vocational tracks (Gustafsson, 2001). Campione, provides a prime example of how cognitive sci-
The pattern that emerges is that the effects of schooling ence can be used in education and illustrates a few of the fac-
predominate for cognitive skills used more in the classroom tors that can make some schools more effective than others.
than in the child’s daily life outside school. In contrast, sim- Brown and Campione (1994) developed the Community
ply growing older provides more opportunities to develop of Learners program because they believed that three major
the skills commonly used in everyday life, so age effects findings from cognitive science research should change the
predominate over schooling effects in these cases. Because nature of educational practice. The first of these findings is
IQ tests tend to tap both sorts of cognitive skills, we would that learners actively build their own knowledge and under-
expect different effects of schooling on IQ subscores, which standing, rather than passively receiving information from
is the result normally found. Thus, math problems and others. The second is that metacognitive awareness, or an
reading skill are closely related to school experience, but understanding of our own cognitive states (see Chapters 9
some spatial tasks are less closely related. Overall, however, and 10), is extremely important to the learning process. The
there is at least some degree of influence on most subscores. third finding is that people are not simple, all-purpose learn-
In addition to teaching specific cognitive skills, school- ers, but organisms with propensities to learn some kinds of
ing also accustoms students to focusing on tasks taken out knowledge more easily than others. As we have seen, these
of their real-life contexts, which may also improve aspects of propensities arise both from our human biological pre-
intelligence test performance. In short, schools do enhance paredness for some forms of knowledge and, at an individ-
intelligence. It is true that children who are more intelligent ual level, from building expertise in specific domains. In the
for other reasons often stay in school longer and thereby reap classroom, Brown and Campione used these three findings
larger benefits. But even when others determine the length as the basis for many specific innovations, a few of which
of time children spend in school, the intelligence-enhancing are illustrated here.
effect remains (Ceci, 1999). Of course, not all schools are The first key idea that Brown and Campione empha-
equally effective, and many researchers are exploring why sized, active learning, leads to teaching techniques such
some schools work so much better than others. as “guided discovery,” in which children are urged to dis-
cover new ideas and relations through active, often hands-
Cognitive Science and Teaching As we have seen in on exploration. The researchers found, however, that an
several chapters, children have a rich, complex array of intu- insightful teacher must guide the discovery process, or else

SCHOOLING 413
 SCIENTIFIC METHOD: Direct versus Inquiry-Based Methods of Instruction

Hypothesis:
Although inquiry is thought to capture naturalistic ways of learning that lead to
deeper conceptual insights, in many situations direct instruction may be more
effective.

Method:
1. A total of 57 children (mean age 9 years) participated.
2. Children were randomly assigned to one of four groups: (a) high guidance
followed by high guidance (High + High), (b) high guidance followed by
low guidance (High + Low), (c) low guidance followed by high guidance
(Low + High), and (d) low guidance followed by low guidance (Low +
Low).
3. All children were pretested on their ability to design a simple physics
experiment.
4. Experimenters taught children with direct instruction and/or unguided
discovery in one of the four combinations.

Proportion control of variables strategy (CVS)

1
5. Transfer of ability to design good experiments was measured. .9

.8

Results: .7

High + High and High + Low guidance conditions were far more effective than .6

the other two conditions in instilling a deep conceptual insight into how to design .5

unconfounded experiments by using control of variables strategies (CVS). .4

.3

Conclusion: .2 High + High

High + Low
.1 Low + High
In at least some learning tasks, leaving children more on their own to discover Low + Low
0
the best ways to design experiments is less effective than providing more Phase 1:
Story pre-training

Phase 2: Ramps
pre-training

Phase 3:
Training 1

Phase 4:
Training 2

Phase 5:
Springs transfer

Phase 6:
Car transfer

Phase 8:Story
post-training

Phase 9:
Remote story

Phase 10:
Remote ramps
Phase 7: Ramps
post-training
direct instruction, even if the direct instruction involves only half as many
manipulations of physical systems. Direct instruction plus discovery was
almost as effective.
Source study: Matlen & Klahr (2013).

students will likely “discover” many falsehoods, especially Brown and Campione stressed that each child always has zones
in science education (Klahr & Nigam, 2004; Klahr, 2013; of proximal development in many different areas of learning.
Matlen & Klahr, 2013). For example, in guided discovery Good teachers try to make as many of them available as possible
activities about evolution, children often “discover” the so the child can actively choose her own route to knowledge.
misconception that organisms evolve in their own life- Active learning and zones of proximal development can
times, unless they are guided toward understanding how also influence children’s relationships with peers who are
natural selection happens over successive generations. In somewhat more competent. In many cases, student collabo-
learning how to design the best ways to understand simple rations can provide opportunities for active learning, since
physical mechanical systems, more explicit guidance not they give students with different strengths the chance to
only provides better learning with fewer trials, but also teach one another (Tudge, 1992). More broadly, Vygotsky
promotes deeper conceptual understanding (Matlen & saw these educational interactions with both adults and
Klahr, 2013; see Scientific Method box). peers as part of the process of internalizing the knowledge
Teaching methods that foster active learning are also linked and practices of the students’ own culture. Schools play an
to Vygotsky’s notion of the zone of proximal development important part in this process, both in terms of the skills
(Vygotsky, 1978), described in Chapter 9. The zone of proximal and information they teach and in terms of the cultural val-
development represents the next level of ability or understand- ues and norms they convey in less explicit ways (Davydov &
ing that a child can learn with appropriate, supportive teaching. Kerr, 1995).

414 CHAPTER 11 INTELLIGENCE AND SCHOOLING

 Brown and Campione’s second theme, fostering meta- that case, he should not yet be taught mathematics that
cognitive awareness, translates into classroom practice by relies on that concept (Bruer, 1997). Domain-specific
using methods that encourage students to pay attention to assessments of preparedness are crucial here, since a child
their own cognitive states. The method of “reciprocal teach- who is cognitively well prepared for learning may still need
ing” can foster this kind of awareness, as each member of more help understanding specific concepts within a par-
a group of roughly six children and a teacher takes turns ticular domain.
leading the discussion. By requiring each student to pre-
sent ideas, explain them, and answer questions about them,
this method encourages children’s awareness of the nature Q: How is the zone of proximal development
of their own knowledge. When children can develop their concept useful to education?
own areas of expertise, they can act as resources to the
whole community of learners. In some cases, students who
have trouble learning certain computational or reasoning Implementing Cognitive Science Ideas in the
skills when they are taken out of context can excel at learn- Classroom Cognitive science is offering many new
ing to apply these same skills within a particular domain approaches for teaching (Bruer, 1993a; Duit & Treagust,
or context. Each child can take pride in his own area of 2003; Klahr & Li, 2005; Klahr et al., 2011; Metcalfe &
expertise, and as the children learn to rely on each other, Kornell, 2007; Richland et al., 2005; Wieman, 2010), some
this distribution of knowledge fosters interactive learning of which are now making their way into the classroom.
and interdependence. To see how their results measure up, consider Figure 11.19,
Clearly, these techniques for improving metacognitive which compares test performance among three groups of
awareness are closely tied to Brown and Campione’s third students: those taught with the Community of Learners
theme, the importance of domain-specific learning. In addi- program methods for a full year, those exposed to these
tion to its metacognitive benefits, allowing students to methods for half a year and normal instruction for the
develop some individualized areas of expertise also allows other half, and those taught all year in a regular class-
teachers to observe how each child acquires knowledge in room. The Community of Learners methods had dra-
different domains at different rates. These insights can matic impacts on the amount of knowledge that students
help teachers carefully diagnose each student’s proficiency acquired and retained. As the second-semester graphs
in order to determine a zone of proximal development for show, the program’s impact increased over the months,
each child in a particular domain. Such domain-specific such that children immersed in it for a full year learned
assessments allow teachers to see, for example, that a child much more than children who learned the same material
has not yet mastered the concept of the number line. In in a more traditional format.

Knowledge Test, Unit 1 (First semester) Knowledge Test, Unit 2 (Second semester) Knowledge Test, Unit 3 (Second semester)
80 80 80
Pre Pre Pre
70 Post Post 70 Post
70
60 60
Test score

Test score

Test score

60
50 50

40 50 40

30 30
40
20 20

10 30 10
CLP all CLP half No CLP CLP all CLP half No CLP CLP all CLP half No CLP
year group year group group year group year group group year group year group group

A
A B C
FIGURE 11.19 Effects of the Community of Learners program of instruction. The first group (CLP all year) was exposed to the Com-
munity of Learners program methods for a full year. The second group (CLP half year) was taught with these methods during the first semester,
then switched to regular instruction for the second semester. The third group (no CLP) had regular classroom experience all year. The Commu-
nity of Learners program clearly enhanced student test performance. (A) Unit 1 test results during the first semester when both the CLP all year
group and the CLP half year group did research, but the no CLP group did not do research. (B) Unit 2 test results during the second semester
when only the CLP all year group did research. (C) Unit 3 test results during the second semester when again only the CLP all year group did
research. Adapted from Brown (1992).

SCHOOLING 415
 100 FIGURE 11.20 Teaching children how to
Master science teacher’s classroom
90 think about science. When sixth grade students
Regular science teacher’s classroom taught by a master science teacher were com-
80
pared with students taught by a regular science
Percent of sample

70
teacher, there were striking differences in the sorts
60
of questions the students asked in discussions
50 about science. For example, among the master
40 teacher’s students, metacognitive questions—
30 that is, questions about the thought processes
20 involved in doing science—were seven times
more common than they were among the regular
10
science teacher’s students (the comparison class-
0 room). By contrast, more descriptive questions
Doing Gathering Thinking Finding Testing Under- Developing
things information explanations ideas standing ideas were three times more common in the comparison
ideas classroom. Adapted from Smith et al. (2000).

a particular teaching method (the treatment) (Cronbach,

Q: How has cognitive science started to 1975; Cronbach & Snow, 1977). This reciprocal rela-
influence educational practice? tionship is known as aptitude-treatment interactions.
Aptitude-treatment interactions provide an educational
example of the idea of “goodness of fit” that we encountered
It is especially encouraging that teachers do not need in Chapter 7. There we considered how an infant’s tempera-
to be immersed in the latest cognitive science research to ment fits with that of his caregiver, affecting their interac-
implement many of its messages in the classroom. Mas- tions and thereby helping to shape development. Here the
ter teachers often use these principles on a daily basis. In idea of “fit” is narrower, focused on the interaction between
a small parochial school in Wisconsin, a teacher known a student and a particular manner of instruction.
as Sister Mary Gertrude Hennessey taught science to the Many studies have documented aptitude-treatment interac-
same group of children for most of their elementary and tions involving a broad range of cognitive factors, often called
middle school years (Smith et al., 2000). She used many “learner characteristics.” Some people learn better when they
of the principles that Brown and Campione advocate, and adopt holistic strategies, considering many aspects of a problem
her students’ progress was remarkable (see Figure 11.20). at once. Others may do better by using local strategies, breaking
Like many master teachers, Sister Gertrude also deeply down the problem into small, distinct components. Some peo-
understood her discipline. Moreover, she also had earned ple learn more effectively from visual imagery, while others may
a doctorate in philosophy, which she felt greatly enhanced do better with verbal approaches (Riding & Cheema, 1991).
her teaching of science. Her great success demonstrates that Still other studies show that some students benefit more from
after several years in an extraordinary teacher’s classroom, didactic forms of instruction (similar to lectures), while others
ordinary middle school students can show patterns of sci- learn better from more interactive kinds of instruction (Snow,
entific reasoning and conceptual understanding that typi- 1989, 1992). More broadly, teaching situations that are highly
cally do not emerge until late in high school or in college structured—in which teachers provide a great deal of control
(Smith et al., 2000). Stories of such exceptional teachers over student activities and give clear, direct instructions—work
provide more than encouragement; they also serve as criti- best with students of low ability, high anxiety, and/or poor orga-
cal cases for careful research. If master teachers can support nizational skills. But this approach can actually hinder highly
such high levels of achievement, it is important to help more capable students, who often do much better in less structured
instructors to incorporate their methods. environments that emphasize student exploration (Snow, 1989,
1992). Optimal student-teacher interactions clearly depend not
Aptitude-Treatment Interactions Not all students only on social and motivational factors, but also on both peo-
approach learning in the same way. Even when children ple’s cognitive aptitudes and how they relate.
have very similar levels of intelligence and background Aptitude-treatment interactions illustrate the importance
knowledge, their most effective ways of learning will vary. of recognizing that children are individuals with different
Therefore, the methods that a teacher uses to help one child cognitive strengths, since what works well for one child
blossom may not work well for another child. Looking at might be a disaster for another (Pakarinen et al., 2011). The
this relationship in the inverse: a learner’s specific strengths challenge, of course, is to develop more sensitive ways of
(her aptitudes) and weaknesses impact the effectiveness of assessing and understanding these differences and adjusting

416 CHAPTER 11 INTELLIGENCE AND SCHOOLING

instruction to take them into account. The concept of apti- ties or whether there are certain kinds of situations that
tude-treatment interactions may be particularly useful when make virtually anyone highly creative (Kasof, 1999). Both
devising instructional programs for children who have spe- kinds of influences on creativity are relevant, but here we
cial needs or who are especially gifted. As children depart will focus more on the internal, or dispositional, influ-
from cognitive norms, it becomes more likely that their ideal ences. In Chapter 13, we will see how socialization affects
learning environment will differ from that of most children. creativity.
For example, when developmentally delayed children experi-
ence different educational settings, the most delayed chil-
dren tend to benefit more from highly directive instruction, Measures of Creativity
whereas somewhat less delayed children benefit more from One classic approach to defining and measuring creativity
instruction that involves more interaction (Dale et al., 2005). is based on the idea of achieving a novel perspective on a
problem. People can often become trapped in a particular
perspective on a problem. Creative people seem more able
Q: Provide a specific example of how two to break that focus on the conventional way of looking at
groups of children might thrive optimally in quite a task to adopt a novel perspective (Eysenck, 1994). A vari-
different educational settings. ety of methods have been used to measure this aspect of
creativity:
● Nonverbal tests—for example, drawing lines to elaborate
on a simple shape (Torrance, 1974).
Creativity ● Category generation—for example, listing as many things
as possible that have gears or listing things that get smaller
Aptitude-treatment interactions demonstrate that people
over time (Wallach & Kogan, 1965).
vary cognitively in far more ways than IQ subscores can
● Generating consequences—for example, imagining what
measure (Riding & Cheema, 1991; Sternberg & Zhang,
would happen if all laws were abolished (Guilford, 1954).
2005). One widely described pattern of variation that
● Alternative meanings test—for example, writing as many
is distinct from intelligence is creativity, the ability to
meanings as possible for ambiguous words such as cut or
come up with novel insights and new ways of solving
duck (Getzels & Jackson, 1962).
problems. We all know of people with impressive ana-
● Alternative uses—for example, generating as many alterna-
lytical abilities and extensive practical knowledge, but
tive uses as possible for familiar objects such as bricks or
who never seem able to escape conventional ways of
paper clips (Getzels & Jackson, 1962; Guilford, 1962).
thinking. We also know of people who seem less ana-
lytical and informed, but who frequently devise power- Alternative uses have been studied extensively in over-
ful new ideas and solutions. Such creativity is valuable coming functional fixedness—that is, the bias to use an
and can lead to great advances in such fields as indus- object or tool in a conventional rather than a novel way to
try, medicine, and teaching. For these reasons, most solve a problem. Creative people are not as likely to stay
researchers believe that creativity varies independently “fixated” on an object’s standard function. For example,
from intelligence—that is, the two measures are only in a classic study by Karl Duncker (1945), participants
weakly correlated or not correlated at all (Furnham & were asked to attach a candle to a wall and were given a
Nederstrom, 2010; Kaufman, 2009; Runco, 2007). But box of matches, a box full of tacks, and a candle. The solu-
creativity is extremely difficult to measure. When you ask tion (see Figure 11.22) required a novel way of using the
people to define creativity in testable ways, they express tacks and the melted wax from the candle. It was thought
a wealth of opinions about the ability’s core nature. Does that only creative people could break out of the familiar
it primarily depend on the ability to draw new analogies, uses of each component and come up with the solution.
to defy conventions, to think “laterally” instead of “verti- All these ways of measuring creativity have allowed
cally,” or to break old patterns of thought and to be open researchers to investigate two closely related developmental
to new ones? Such questions have generated a great deal of questions: Can creativity be taught? And do people’s levels
research; several thousand studies of creativity have been of creativity remain stable as they age (for example, are kin-
published in the last 10 years alone. We will highlight dergartners who are considered creative more likely to also
several themes that have emerged from this work and con- be viewed as creative in adulthood)? These two questions are
sider a couple of common ways of assessing creativity. linked because, to the extent that creativity can be taught
One controversy about creative ability concerns whether (and thereby increase over time), it is likely to be less stable
people are creative largely because of their intrinsic quali- over the lifespan.

CREATIVITY 417
 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL P OLICY

Computers and e-Learning in the Schools

C
omputers have had a dramatic impact on many cul- cational goals (Roschelle et al., 2000). Rather than simply
tures. Many children in industrialized countries spend providing positive and negative reinforcements in automated
more time looking at computers or cell phone screens drills, computers can be used to improve students’ access to
than they do watching television (Taylor & Keeter, information, to further communication, and to provide some
2010). Using the Internet to search for information, play online domain-specific assessments of the child. Computers can be
games, or interact on social networks has become a common- most effective in the classroom when teachers have clear, spe-
place event. But before these uses became commonplace, chil- cific goals for incorporating them into lessons and evidence
dren were using computers in schools. Today, the vast majority that these goals are feasible. Too often, school districts buy
of schools in developed countries make Internet-linked comput- a large number of computers, set them up in the classrooms,
ers available to their students (see Figure 11.21).
and then are dismayed to find that they have little impact on
The use of computers in the schools on such a large scale
learning. But when computers have been used in the context
since the 1980s raises questions about how they affect educa-
of cognitive theories of learning, there have been some strik-
tion. Do they support more efficient learning? Are they more
ing successes (Sandholtz & Reilly, 2004; Tamim et al., 2011).
helpful in some academic disciplines than in others? Does
Brown and Campione’s Community of Learners program used
access to the wealth of information on the Internet contribute to
computers to help teachers hone in on students’ zones of
children’s conceptual growth, or does it overwhelm them with
proximal development (see Chapter 9). Software designed for
too much information, much of it dubious? Computer use in the
schools varies so widely that there are no easy answers to these classroom use can help teachers get more precise moment-to-
questions, and so controversy remains regarding their academic moment snapshots of a child’s progress on an academic task.
value (Cuban, 2001; Hew & Brush, 2011; Joshi et al., 2010; This can help teachers determine which new topics would be
Sandholtz & Reilly, 2004; Tamim et al., 2011). Nonetheless, challenging but still within the student’s capability.
some general messages are emerging about the most effective Computers and other modes of Internet access can also
ways of using computers to enhance learning. enhance education by supporting collaborative learning. With
The cognitive science approach to educational practice computer networks, students can collaborate over long dis-
has helped promote the use of computers to further edu- tances and large time frames by posting their work in a com-

FIGURE 11.21 Computers in the schools. Although computers are now used in virtually all schools in developed countries, contro-
versy remains concerning their usefulness as supplements to more traditional forms of education.

In fact, an individual’s performance on common creativity learning and practicing specific ways of thinking (Murdock,
tests remains fairly stable over time, but there is less consis- 2003; Sternberg et al., 2004). These techniques include using
tency on creativity tests than on intelligence tests (Simonton, mental images to explore new possibilities (Smith et al., 1995),
2000). To the extent that creativity test performance is less exploiting the power of analogies (Holyoak & Thagard,
stable than intelligence test performance, it supports the view 1995), and radically reframing problems (Polanyi, 1966). In
that anyone can become at least somewhat more creative by addition, simply focusing on developing task-relevant cogni-

418 CHAPTER 11 INTELLIGENCE AND SCHOOLING

munal space on a server or on a social networking site. Cognitive where with their smartphones, and some school districts are pro-
science researchers have shown considerable interest in trying viding all the students in a classroom with tablet computers. These
to understand the special nature of learning and thinking in devices enable children to have continuous portable access to
groups where intellectual resources are shared (Hutchins, 1996). the Internet and to simple computer programs (Hu, 2011). These
Internet access allows children in one classroom to develop col- changes may facilitate collaboration, information access and trans-
laborative working groups that span several continents. Web mission, and more rapid feedback. Before school districts rush to
2.0 software and supporting hardware enable children to cre- invest in such new technologies, however, they must take care not
ate content and evaluate content created by others (Kitsantas & to repeat the mistakes of prior failed computer implementations.
Dabbagh, 2010). Children may not always use social networking Large-scale pilot studies should be run to ascertain the potential
sites, wikis, and other Web 2.0 technologies in productive ways benefits and efficacy of smartphones and tablets, thereby avoid-
(Carr, 2010), but the potential for increased information access ing any unnecessary expense for information technology in the
and evaluation is there. At the same time, there may be some classroom (Hu, 2011). In making the decision as to whether to
unintended cognitive effects of having information easily acces- commit limited resources to purchasing tablets and other devices,
sible through search engines. Thus, when individuals bookmark school districts, especially poorer ones, will need to know how
search results, they are much more likely to forget those results this new generation of computers affects educational experiences.
than when they do not click on a bookmark (Sparrow et al., They will also need to ask hard questions about cognitive tradeoffs
2011). Thus, while search engines can greatly increase access to of Internet access. Some critics suggest that continuous Internet
knowledge, they may also sometimes result in individuals’ know- access can reduce attention span under the guise of “multitask-
ing less on their own. ing” and create what some call an “Internet-induced ADD” (Carr,
As computers become more powerful, flexible, and easier to 2010). Texting, Web surfing, and interacting with peers in an
use, they have the potential to become collaborative partners in unsupervised manner on social networking sites are not always
the learning process and not just passive tools (Linn & Hsi, 2000). positive educational experiences. Throughout the world, the issue
Advances in artificial intelligence already allow computers to inter- for schools will soon not be whether children have personal com-
act in increasingly conversation-like ways with students and to be puters in the form of smartphones (they almost all will, even in
sensitive to students’ cognitive and emotional states (Graesser the least developed countries); it will be when it is educationally
et al., 2007; Song et al., 2004). We do not understand how this effective for them to use those devices in the classroom.
kind of “collaboration” will enhance learning or which sorts of stu- E-learning in all of its forms is becoming a central part of the
dents are most likely to benefit, but many education researchers modern classroom. If designed efficiently, e-learning can save
are exploring the benefits of these forms of learning (Bransford money rather than increase expenses because it allows children
et al., 1999). An important component of the success of computer- to practice certain kinds of problems, such as math exercises or
supported collaborative learning seems to be the awareness of the vocabulary drills, with less direct teacher involvement. Indeed,
knowledge and areas of expertise of other group members and some charter schools have relied heavily on blending traditional
the presence of software tools to help optimize that awareness teaching with e-learning to meet their budgets (Abramson, 2011).
(Janssen & Bodemer, 2013). As computers get better at tracking each child’s individual
One recurring problem is that computers are often in special strengths and weaknesses, there is the potential for tailored
resource rooms and only used sporadically by students, sometimes instruction that may not always be possible in a traditional class-
as little as 1 hour a week (Cattagni & Ferris, 2001). That sort of room. Computers and their software programs are increasingly
limited access may largely thwart the most effective ways in which being designed as “pedagogical agents,” helping children to build
computers can be used. Those limitations, however, are rapidly on their skills in an optimal fashion (Graesser & McNamara, 2010;
changing. Many schoolchildren can now access the Web any- Graesser et al., 2012).

tive skills and heuristics can lead to more creative thought is an intrinsic component as well. Some researchers suggest
(Hennessey & Amabile, 2010). that because creativity appears to run in families, there may
These kinds of training do seem to improve certain even be a substantial genetic contribution (Eysenck, 1995).
aspects of creative thinking, but it is not clear whether simi- It is difficult, however, to disentangle genetic effects from
lar experience-dependent effects account for most people’s those that might occur from growing up in an environment
creativity. Certainly, many people like to think that there fostered by highly creative parents.

CREATIVITY 419
 out people who exemplified creativity in seven of the
Wall eight multiple intelligences he had defined in his earlier
research: linguistic, logical/math, musical, spatial, bodily/
kinesthetic, interpersonal, and intrapersonal intelligence.
As Table 11.4 shows, each kind of intelligence lends itself
A B to particular professions, and Gardner studied creative
FIGURE 11.22 Functional fixedness. In this classic problem stud- geniuses in each one.
ied by Karl Duncker in 1945, creativity was measured by the extent Gardner emphasized that most outstanding people spent
to which participants could avoid being fixated on (A) the standard many thousands of hours of practice or sustained effort in
functions of matches, candles, and thumbtacks and (B) come up with their chosen domain. Thus, creativity rarely just appeared
novel and creative uses. Adapted from Duncker (1945). without a passion to invest time and effort in a domain
(Ericsson, 1996). In each area, Gardner chose people who
had continually excelled in their domain by solving prob-
The Development of Extraordinary lems, fashioning products, or raising issues. Moreover, their
contributions had to be recognized as new and different and
Creativity yet be broadly accepted in a way that had dramatic influence
Howard Gardner (1994, 1997), whose theory of multiple intel- on the culture at large. Thus, the recognition of extraordi-
ligences was discussed earlier in the chapter, has advocated a nary creativity must always be seen as a social judgment rel-
different approach to studying creativity. Gardner argues evant to a particular cultural group. People are not creative
that the common psychometric approaches to defining and in isolation, but only in terms of how their accomplishments
measuring creativity have yielded several important insights, relate to the society in which they live (Csikszentmihalyi,
but they largely fail to truly identify the people who are most 1997; Harrington, 1990). This observation also resonates
creative in everyday life. Instead, Gardner advocates studying with Vygotsky’s ideas about how children come to internal-
extraordinarily creative people as a way to uncover creativity’s ize the sociocultural context in which they grow up. Simi-
critical components. larly, creativity emerges as an individual becomes embedded
Two approaches best capture Gardner’s proposals for within a set of cultural and social structures.
how to study creativity. The first of these, the idiographic Although Gardner’s sample of seven people is too small to
approach, involves studying case histories of highly cre- form strong conclusions about how creativity develops, he was
ative individuals to see whether they seem to cluster into nevertheless struck by the many ways in which these people’s
different types. The second method, known as the nomo- life experiences differed from what we might expect from
thetic approach, involves comparing the lives of especially a random sample of the population. Taking a nomothetic
creative individuals to look for common patterns or prin- approach, Gardner looked for similarities between their lives
ciples (Simonton, 2000). Thus, we might ask if extraordi- and began to uncover some common principles. The follow-
nary creativity typically emerges late in life, or we might ing patterns hold true for most, if not all, of the seven geniuses:
ask whether more highly creative people tend to live during
times of dramatic cultural change. 1. Most were born near great cultural centers or cities.
Gardner has often taken the idiographic approach, 2. Most came from middle-class backgrounds, rather than
studying in detail the lives of creative geniuses. He used from the intellectual elite, wealthy families, or poor
several criteria to choose these individuals. First, he sought families.

Kind of intelligence Profession Creative geniuses

Linguistic Poet, writer T. S. Eliot

TABLE 11.4 Creativity in different
domains. Gardner originally sug- Logical/mathematical Scientist, mathematician Albert Einstein
gested that there are seven separate Musical Composer, musician Igor Stravinsky
intelligences and that each one can
Spatial Sculptor, painter, sailor Pablo Picasso
result in its own form of creative
genius. (Naturalistic intelligence was Bodily/kinesthetic Dancer, athlete, choreographer Martha Graham
later added as an eighth kind of
Interpersonal Teacher, salesperson, leader Mahatma Gandhi
intelligence. Charles Darwin would
be a creative genius in naturalistic Intrapersonal Counselor, psychologist Sigmund Freud
intelligence.)

420 CHAPTER 11 INTELLIGENCE AND SCHOOLING

 3. Their families were usually intact and had strong work These parallels among the lives of some of the best-
ethics. known creative minds in recent history suggest many
4. Most experienced no pressure to achieve in a particular hypotheses about what creativity is and how it develops.
profession, just to work hard at whatever was chosen. We know that creativity is expressed in diverse domains,
5. Most had strong emotional ties to nonfamily members, from the symbolic worlds of literature, art, and mathematics
such as caregivers and early mentors. to the world of human understanding. Some masters, like
6. Most did not choose which profession to pursue until Mozart, exhaust an existing art form, making way for new
around the age of 20. Few were child prodigies. ones to emerge. Others, like Beethoven, invent a new style
7. At around age 20, most moved to major centers of or come up with other novel creations. But we are still left
culture. with the mystery of why one person becomes so much more
8. Most sought out like-minded people and immersed creative than another.
themselves in groups of literary companions, artists, One possibility is that these extraordinary people are
scientists, and so on. the way they are not from an excess of creativity but from
9. The older they got, the more their work became an all- other aspects of their character and experience. These other
consuming part of their lives. aspects may have helped them project their creativity far
10. Most had an unusual combination of intellectual tal- more than other, equally creative people. Thus, being a
ents, not just the one in their domain of endeavor. strong self-promoter, being able to tolerate catastrophic
interpersonal relations with intimates, and being able to
These common patterns are fascinating, but they do not
neglect all else in their lives except their creative pursuits
neatly coalesce into a sensible account of what makes a per-
may have set these people apart from countless others with
son creative. Gardner also uncovered other factors in these
as much creative spark.
people that seem to more directly relate to the manifesta-
tion of great creativity. For example, most of them went to
greater-than-average lengths to promote themselves and to
advance their own reputations. Even the most modest, Ein-
stein, was careful to make sure that others were aware of Conclusions
his work and that it was presented in the right way. They One key theme of this chapter is that intelligence is tightly
also tended to have difficult relationships with those close to intertwined with social and cultural contexts. Intelligence
them, ranging from Einstein’s near total disregard for oth- tests assess a particular kind of cultural adaptation, and test
ers to Picasso’s sadistic behavior. Gardner felt that to some performance is often closely linked to a person’s social class or
extent, all of these people sacrificed their relationships in status in a society. Moreover, intelligence tests seem to assess
service of their work. only a small subset of the cognitive abilities that allow some
people to thrive in school or at work. Social intelligence, cre-
ativity, and certain kinds of cognitive flexibility seem to be
Q: Describe two different approaches to the of equal importance. Even more broadly, we once again see
study of creativity and the merits and problems how cognitive abilities are intertwined with social domains
of each. and how factors such as social attributions, motivation, and
other emotions can interact with cognitive abilities. Because
we do not yet have well-developed measures for these other
Bringing similar approaches to bear on the developmen- sorts of cognitive abilities, intelligence tests remain the best
tal factors associated with creative genius, researchers have tool for predicting academic and workplace success. But this
repeatedly found that highly creative adults often have may change as new assessment tools become more refined
adverse childhoods. It appears that, in many cases, a dif- and standardized.
ficult childhood that runs against the normal social grain, The social aspects of intelligence are especially appar-
as well as a childhood experience persevering in the face of ent when we consider large group differences that have not
adversity, may be important (Simonton, 1994, 2000). But been well accounted for by other kinds of explanations, such
remember that these early experiences themselves do not as genetic explanations. In addition, birth order effects, in
necessarily enhance creativity (or do so alone). Even if these which IQ scores gradually drop for each later-born child, are
experiences are formative, the real cause may be genetic. likely to have social explanations. Similarly, the Flynn effect,
That is, parents of creative children may also be somewhat the gradual rise of IQ in many populations worldwide, is
rebellious individualists, likely to create nonstandard envi- likely to be almost fully explained by social and cultural
ronments for their children that pose unique challenges. effects. In the chapters that follow, we will examine some of

CONCLUSIONS 421
these social influences on the mind and behavior in much acquire knowledge. They rarely, if ever, were concerned
greater depth. with the kinds of individual differences that are a major
Schooling provides the most vivid example of how social focus of intelligence testing. (Unfortunately, the term nativ-
and environmental factors can influence intelligence. Not ist has sometimes been used to describe those who believe
only do children with high IQ scores tend to stay in school for that differences in intelligence have a strong genetic basis.
more years, but the longer children of various IQ levels stay This sense of the word, which focuses on how people differ
in school, the more their intelligence rises on a wide variety of from each other, is completely separate from the meaning
fronts, ranging from transitive reasoning to storytelling and we have been using in this book, which is instead concerned
comprehension skills. As schools bring children within the with what is common to all humans in comparison with
framework of the dominant culture, the effects on patterns of other species. The two meanings should not be confused.)
thought and cognitive performance can be profound. More commonly, controversies about how differences in
Schools need to be sensitive to the individual child intelligence develop are referred to as the nature/nurture
and the ways in which a child’s particular aptitude inter- debate, where differences among people are seen as largely
acts with instructional techniques. Consideration of such a consequence of their intrinsic natures or of how they are
“learner characteristics” also reinforces the view of devel- nurtured. By contrast, both sides of the nativist/empiricist
opment as an active exploratory process and not simply debate have classically focused on how to characterize pat-
one of the child acting as a passive recipient of experiences. terns of development that are common to all people.
More broadly, as the rate of technological change acceler- In several places in this chapter, we have discussed the
ates, schools must confront the problem of teaching only advantages of viewing developmental psychology as the
a fixed set of skills. Rather, students must hone the abil- study of emerging competencies and abilities rather than
ity to acquire new sets of skills as the world around them the gradual disappearance of cognitive deficits that plague
changes. If the curriculum becomes focused on training the younger child. Likewise, this perspective has been valu-
students for high-stakes standardized tests, teachers may able in thinking about intelligence in relation to models of
not have the chance to prepare students to be adaptive, education. It is far less helpful to ask what younger children
flexible learners. The problem is not with the tests them- are “missing” with respect to intelligence and creativity
selves, but with designing tests that go beyond simply than to explore the nature of the earliest roots of cognitive
assessing factual knowledge and that do not cause high abilities—roots that can stretch back to infancy. We have
levels of test anxiety. seen that schooling is more effective when it focuses on
Clearly, the research on the development of intelligence abilities that children bring to the classroom and works on
draws together several familiar developmental themes. With developing those abilities further while linking them to
respect to the nativist/empiricist debate, the links are more other skills in an integrated fashion. Fortunately, this kind
remote than they first appear. The classical nativists and of focus on early competencies is what the best teachers do
empiricists debated about human nature and how people naturally.

STU DY AN D REVIEW

SUMMARY ● Psychometric tests of intelligence reliably show a positive cor-

relation among their subtests, including those for language,
What Is Intelligence? mathematical, and visual/spatial abilities. Some researchers
● Despite frequent, widespread references to intelligence, there have argued that these correlations indicate that there is a
is relatively little consensus on what it really means to be single underlying factor, a general intelligence, or g, which
intelligent. Traditionally, researchers have focused on a psy- affects performance on all intellectual tasks.
chometric approach, using tests that attempt to quantify ● Other explanations for the positive correlations among com-
intelligence in terms of analytical intelligence, the ability to ponents of intelligence tests either do not require a g factor
engage in computations and abstract comparisons. or see it as only a part of overall intelligence. Carroll’s hier-

422 CHAPTER 11 INTELLIGENCE AND SCHOOLING

 archical three-stratum theory of intelligence is an influen- most intelligence tests. The sexes also differ in their distribu-
tial approach that describes how different cognitive abilities tions of scores. There are more men than women among the
might be distinct components of intelligence occurring at extremely high scorers and the extremely low scorers.
three levels: narrow abilities, broad abilities, and a part that ● There are large group differences in overall intelligence test
corresponds to g. However, through computer modeling, it is scores between ethnic groups, but no compelling evidence
possible to show enough simulated intersections of cognitive has emerged showing that those differences arise from bio-
abilities over time that a “virtual” g materializes in a cogni- logical factors, as opposed to social and cultural ones.
tive system where no real g component was originally present. ● Stereotype threats are a powerful sociocultural influence
Developmental cognitive neuroscience may help ascertain that affects some groups more than others. People do less
the degree of utility of g as it pertains to intelligence. well on tasks when they fear that their poor performance will
● Alternative approaches to intelligence consider how and confirm negative stereotypes about them. A strong awareness
why people excel at a wider range of contexts and situations. of stereotypes develops during the elementary school years.
These theories have been used to measure forms of intelli- Among children who perceive stereotypes about intellectual
gence quite different from those measured by IQ tests. Gard- ability as relevant to themselves, this awareness is linked to
ner’s theory of multiple intelligences and Sternberg’s theory declining performance.
of successful intelligence are two examples that do not map
neatly onto traditional notions of intelligence. Researchers Environmental Influences on Intelligence Test Scores
are also exploring broader notions, such as social and emo- ● A wide variety of environmental influences, ranging from
tional intelligence. malnutrition to parental involvement and birth order, can
● IQ tests tend to predict school performance and even job influence intelligence test scores. One of the most important
performance better than most other available measures, but influences is schooling, where time in school is clearly related
by no means with great accuracy. As new ways of assessing to performance on intelligence tests.
intelligence become more widespread, they may be better ● Preschool programs, especially Head Start, can have long-
predictors than traditional IQ tests in many settings. term positive effects on a child’s intelligence and prospects
in life.
Origins of Intelligence
● All forms of intelligence undergo dramatic changes dur- Schooling
ing childhood and adolescence. The speed at which infants ● Schools provide far more than the education that fosters ana-
habituate to novel displays partially predicts analytical intel- lytical intelligence. As socializing agents, schools teach chil-
ligence many years later, a finding that poses new challenges dren how to behave in large, controlled settings. As cultural
for accounts of how intelligence develops. institutions, they expose children to the dominant culture. As
● Intelligence test scores show a substantial heritability, mean- vehicles of values, schools often aim to instill self-discipline
ing that in most populations, a substantial proportion of the and encourage students to be sensitive to others’ needs.
individual differences in intelligence is due to genetic differ- Whether and how schools should explicitly teach particular
ences. At the same time, there is still a significant amount values has been a topic of controversy.
of variance that is due to environmental factors. Further- ● Cognitive science has made major advances in understand-
more, no matter how large the heritability is, it does not ing what kinds of educational practices help children learn.
mean that any differences between groups are due to genetic Studies have shown that focusing on students’ metacog-
factors. This is an important misconception that has led to nitive awareness and using Vygotsky’s theory of the zone
much confusion in the popular understanding of intelligence of proximal development to guide students’ progress can
research. The search for a gene or small number of genes that enhance their learning. But educators should be aware of
might represent the essence of intelligence has been fruit- aptitude-treatment interactions, the finding that differ-
less. It is now clear that despite a high heritability, genetic ent sorts of learners thrive in different sorts of teaching
causal pathways are likely to involve large numbers of genes environments.
in complicated nets of interactions with other genes and the
environment. In addition, any model of the genetic influ- Creativity
ences must explain why heritability increases quite dramati- ● Creativity, the ability to devise novel insights and solutions,
cally with age from young childhood well into adolescence. is one of the most valued human traits and one that can vary
greatly among people with similar levels of analytical and
Group Differences and Intelligence Tests practical intelligence. Although there is only a weak consen-
● On average, overall intelligence test scores are equal between sus on how best to measure creativity, most creativity tests
men and women, partially because the tests’ components attempt to measure the ability to take novel points of view
are weighted to equalize the overall scores across genders. or come up with novel solutions to familiar situations or
Nonetheless, there are reliable sex differences on sections of problems.

STUDY AND REVIEW 423

● Researchers using the idiographic approach to studying cre- 4. To address budget cutbacks, an elementary school principal
ativity have examined the lives of creative geniuses and tried proposes doing away with recesses, which require additional
to understand what made them different. This approach sug- supervisory staff and playground maintenance. A parent
gests that creativity may flower in different ways that cor- objects that this change will discriminate against boys and
respond to different kinds of intelligences. The nomothetic will cause an increase in ADHD diagnoses in boys in that
approach has explored broader principles concerning when school because some boys will simply not be able to sit still
and how creativity is likely to emerge in development. These in a classroom for an entire school day. State your reasons for
different approaches suggest some commonalities among agreeing or disagreeing with the parent.
highly creative people; perhaps the most surprising is that
they seem unusually likely to have experienced significant
adversities in childhood. KEY TERMS
aptitude-treatment interaction nomothetic approach
THOUGHT QUESTIONS (p. 416) (p. 420)
1. Some scholars have argued that the trend of rising intelligence bell curve (p. 389) normal distribution curve
test scores, or the Flynn effect, is starting to level off, while creativity (p. 417) (p. 389)
others think that it is still rising and will continue to rise for perceptual reasoning index
crystallized intelligence
several decades to come. Which view do you favor? Support (p. 388)
(p. 392)
your view by examining possible mechanisms underlying the
emotional intelligence platoon school (p. 410)
Flynn effect.
(p. 395) processing speed index
2. An early Head Start program in a small town proposes to
fluid intelligence (p. 392) (p. 388)
have all pediatricians conduct a standardized habituation
test of all infants in the town at age 10 months so as to iden- Flynn effect (p. 406) psychometric approach
tify those infants who might be most at risk for having lower functional fixedness (p. 417) (p. 387)
intelligence test scores later on. The goal is to then to be able general intelligence, g (p. 390) social intelligence (p. 395)
to intervene more effectively to help those infants early on. idiographic approach (p. 420) standard deviation (p. 389)
Do you consider this proposal to be a good idea? stereotype threat (p. 404)
intelligence quotient (IQ)
3. In an attempt to improve the quality of education in a school verbal comprehension index
(p. 387)
district, the school board is evaluating two proposals: to (p. 388)
lengthen the school year by 3 weeks or to lengthen the school interpersonal intelligence
(p. 395) working memory index
day by 2 hours. It can only afford to implement one of these
intrapersonal intelligence (p. 388)
two options. Which do you think would be more education-
ally effective? Do you think the best option might vary as a (p. 395)
function of the age of the child? multiple intelligences (p. 393)

424 CHAPTER 11 INTELLIGENCE AND SCHOOLING

 PA R T I V
The Self and Others
 12
Morality in Thought and Action
The Development of Moral Thought Kohlberg’s Theory of Moral The Development of Moral
• Debating the Origins of Moral Thought Reasoning Behavior
• Evolutionary and Cultural Psychology • Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Reasoning • Consistency of Moral Behavior
and Morality • Evaluating Kohlberg’s Theory • Antisocial and Prosocial Behavior
• Characterizing the Basis of Moral • Temperament, Personality, and Moral
Thought Alternative Theories of Moral Behavior
Development • Social Influences on Moral Behavior
Piaget’s Theory of Moral • Gilligan’s Theory of Moral Development
Development • A Pluralistic Approach to the Conclusions
• Piaget’s Stages of Moral Reasoning Development of Moral Thought
• Evaluating Piaget’s Account
Summary
 n April 11, 2013, Emil Kapaun was posthu- such a remarkable moral individual while other boys grow-

O mously awarded the U.S. military’s highest

honor, the Medal of Honor, even though he
never fired a shot or engaged in any form of
aggression toward others. Indeed, he showed
kindness and compassion to his enemies. During the Korean
War, Kapaun served as a chaplain in the army. When his bat-
talion was encircled by the Chinese army in a battle in North
ing up in highly similar environments and families end up
with very different moral convictions and behaviors? How
can a group of individuals all believe they are acting cor-
rectly and morally but nonetheless do very different things
in the same situations?
In this chapter, we will examine the origins of moral
thought, theories about moral development and moral
Korea, he dodged heavy enemy fire to drag many wounded reasoning, and the imperfect link between moral thought
and dying soldiers to safety. Although he could have retreated and moral action. With respect to moral thought, we will
with the army when combat conditions worsened, he chose explore whether young children have qualitatively different
to stay behind and care for the wounded soldiers. Kapaun ways of thinking about what is right and wrong, and we will
and others were captured and forcibly marched 87 miles to once again discuss Piaget as well as another classic scholar
a brutal prison camp under extremely harsh conditions. On in the field, Lawrence Kohlberg. We will then turn to more
the march and in the camp, many men died of starvation, recent views of moral judgment and ask about the extent to
extreme cold, lack of medical attention to their wounds, and which moral judgments should be thought of like the rest of
from disease. Throughout his incarceration, Kapaun engaged analytical cognition or whether they require more intrinsic
in repeated heroic acts of sacrifice for his fellow prisoners. He roles for emotion.
gave them his own clothes for warmth, he stole food from After examining moral judgment and reasoning, we
the guards to give to those who were starving, and he shared will discuss moral actions, asking about the ways in which
his own pitiful food rations with the other prisoners, even as moral thoughts might be related to tendencies to actu-
he himself was wasting away. He scavenged for rags to use ally act in good and bad ways. We will see that the links
as bandages to prevent infection from wounds and thereby between thought and action are far more complex than they
saved many soldiers from death. He stood between a cap- might appear to be at first. We will then consider actions
tor and a wounded fellow soldier who was about to be shot, more directly in their own right. We will ask whether there
saving the soldier’s life by carrying him away. Kapaun died are biological bases for individual differences in moral-
of pneumonia while he was still incarcerated, even as his last ity and will also discuss social and cultural influences on
known acts were attempts to help his fellow prisoners. In an moral behavior. In addition, we will look at different kinds
interview in April 2013, one of his fellow prisoners who sur- of punishment and modeling and will ask how they can
vived said: “People had lost a great deal of their civility. . . . affect moral behavior. Finally, we will consider the develop-
We were stacking the bodies outside where they were fro- ment of conscience and its possible relations to parent-child
zen like cordwood and here is this one man—in all of this interactions.
chaos—who has kept his principles.” (Robert Wood, quoted
in the Washington Post, April 11, 2013).
Kapaun grew up in modest conditions on a farm in
rural Kansas and had an unremarkable childhood. He was
known to be a good student and a polite but somewhat shy
The Development of Moral
child, but there are no records that indicate that he showed
the kind of extraordinary moral behavior that would come
Thought
to distinguish his later life. It is not known how a seemingly Examining the development of moral thought raises ques-
ordinary farm boy grew up to adhere to the highest moral tions about its origins, its evolutionary and psychological
principles while under conditions of extreme duress, nor is bases, and its degree of domain specificity. Do children
it known how those principles emerged in the course of his across the world develop some common moral principles,
development. or are cross-cultural differences so broad that there are no
Kapaun’s life illustrates the complexity of moral thought moral universals? What kinds of psychological processes
and behavior. We may all have strong intuitions about the contribute to moral thought, and how do these processes
morality of actions, yet we vary greatly in how those intu- change with age? And is moral reasoning truly a separate
itions become organized into larger systems of beliefs that realm of thought with its own special characteristics and
motivate us toward action. Where do those intuitions come developmental patterns? We will consider all of these ques-
from? On what basis do we make our judgments of moral- tions in this section, but first we need to take note of how
ity? How does the ability to make those judgments emerge in moral thought relates to moral actions.
childhood? How does it lead to actions? How can a boy who Having beliefs about what is right and wrong is quite
grows up having an apparently normal childhood become different from behaving well or badly. We all assume that

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL THOUGHT 427

moral thoughts are related to moral behavior, but as we will
see, the relations are intricate and often difficult to predict.
It is common to say that people often act against their better
judgment, which implies that a person can have a clear intu-
ition about how he should behave but not be able to do so
because of other impulses. This lack of a clear link between
moral thoughts and actions raises interesting developmental
questions. Is the link even more tenuous in younger chil-
dren because they have even less ability to formulate clear
moral judgments and then stick to them? In addition, are
even the most analytical moral judgments ever really free
of the influences of emotional impulses, and are such influ-
ences stronger in younger children?

Debating the Origins of Moral Thought FIGURE 12.1 Are children inherently antisocial? In his novel
For hundreds of years, philosophers and other scholars have Lord of the Flies, William Golding suggested a view of morality in
debated about the moral characteristics of young children which children, once removed from the constraints of society, develop
into cruel antisocial beings. Shown here is a film still from the 1963
and how morality develops. Two broad views have charac-
film based on the book.
terized much of that debate: (1) the idea that young children
have some kind of inherent moral nature, and (2) the con-
trasting notion that they have no inherent moral character- This account suggests that children are filled with base
istics and must learn about morality from their social and impulses that need to be controlled and suppressed by
cultural experiences. Within these views there can also be civilization.
strong variations. The other view of moral development sees no moral
Consider the view that the young child comes into the capacity and no inclination toward either good or bad in
world with certain moral propensities. The eighteenth- infants and young children. Many who hold this view
century French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for argue that very young children are no more moral than
example, proposed that young children are intrinsically animals because they lack the cognitive capability to have a
good. He believed that infants and young children are moral sense. They hypothesize that young children are ini-
pure in heart and mind and would always behave in mor- tially amoral and that they learn morality as a consequence
ally appropriate ways if not for the corrupting influences of of development. In general, proponents of this view believe
society. In this view, a primary goal of child rearing should that infants and young children are not cognitively and
be to shield children from society’s corrupting influences emotionally capable of moral thought, so they are not fit to
so that their intrinsic moral sense has time to mature and be judged as either good or bad. In this view, it makes no
become less vulnerable to such influences. The French phy- more sense to think of a young child as good or bad than it
sician Jean Marc Gaspard Itard undertook a dramatic and does to judge a tiger’s morality in its behavior toward prey.
disturbing “test” of this premise by administering random In short, there is a long history of thinking about chil-
beatings to Victor, the “wild child” discussed in Chapter 8. dren’s moral development as if they were primarily bad or
Itard wanted to see whether Victor would show outrage at good from the start, or as if they only gradually acquired
the abuse, even though he had spent much of his child- moral capabilities after being exposed to the values of their
hood alone and isolated from social rules and norms. When society. The views favoring an inherent moral nature did
Victor did show outrage, Itard reasoned that this response not ignore society’s effects; they just saw them as interacting
revealed the boy’s deep-seated, unlearned sense of justice. with preexisting moral natures. The views that saw children
Others who believed in an inherent moral nature took a as amoral held that society’s effects are largely responsible
darker perspective. They saw children as selfish creatures for children’s morality, much like the empiricists’ view of
who need to be civilized by society. The same negative view the child as a blank slate.
persists today in more subtle forms. For example, William More recently, these two types of views have been com-
Golding’s classic novel Lord of the Flies describes how a group plemented by perspectives arising from evolutionary and
of children stuck on a deserted island become unmoored cultural psychology. Although these modern perspectives
from society’s social and moral constraints and descend acknowledge many kinds of influences on the development
into antisocial and even violent actions (see Figure 12.1). of moral thought, they often disagree about which influences

428 CHAPTER 12 MORALITY IN THOUGHT AND ACTION

are most powerful, leading them to focus on different kinds Such behaviors, which may be related to moral behaviors
of research questions. labeled as hurtful or selfish, could also promote an individ-
ual’s survival and the ability to pass on his genes. Accord-
ing to this account, some aspects of morality are universal
Evolutionary and Cultural because all humans share the biologically based core morals
that have been selected over many generations.
Psychology and Morality Even though views based on evolutionary psychology
In recent years, morality and its development have been clearly favor inherent biological constraints on moral behav-
major areas of study in both evolutionary psychology ior, these views do not conclude that young children have
and cultural psychology. These two approaches share the inherent moral natures. These views see evolved constraints
assumption that children are not intrinsically good or bad. on moral thought as the basis for a survival function and not
But they differ in the extent to which they see biological as the basis for judging an agent as bad or good. Thus, views
constraints as shaping the nature of moral thought. from evolutionary psychology allow for mixtures of all sorts
Evolutionary psychology considers morality from the of basic moral components, including sharing, hoarding,
standpoint of how certain moral behaviors and patterns of deception, aggression, intimidation, and compassion. In
thought might have been selected in the course of evolution. addition to the idea that there must be a core morality that
This perspective is committed to the idea that humans have all people share, evolutionary psychologists also acknowl-
a certain moral sense because it has had adaptive value in the edge that learning and culture significantly influence these
emergence of the human species (Cosmides & Tooby, 2013; universal aspects of morality.
Levy, 2004; Pinker, 2002; Singer, 2005; Wright, 1994, 2010). By contrast, the field of cultural psychology approaches
Many evolutionary psychologists argue that emotional the study of moral thought and behavior by focusing on how
empathy and the tendency to consider fairness and sharing cultures instill ways of thinking and fostering certain behav-
conferred a selective advantage among our species’ ances- iors. This approach recognizes that there may be some basic
tors, as in cases where primates engage in mutual grooming universal moral concerns, but it argues for more powerful
(see Figure 12.2). Individuals with these traits may have had influences of culture on various aspects of morality. Richard
fewer enemies, more success finding mates, or a better abil- Shweder, for example, shows that different cultural groups
ity to work together in social groups (Haidt, 2007, 2008; have dramatically different patterns of moral reasoning, rul-
Hauser, 2006). As a result, they had more offspring—and ing out a single dominant moral belief system. He does, how-
more chances to pass on their genes. Similarly, a tendency ever, recognize three clusters of basic moral values related to
to ramp up aggressive or self-protective behavior in threat- justice, community, and spirituality within which specific
ening situations could also convey a selective advantage. moral rules in each culture fall (Shweder, 1982; Shweder
et al., 1987, 1997; Shweder & Haidt, 1993). Shweder offers
examples of moral judgments and behaviors in some Eastern
societies that, on the surface at least, seem almost incompre-
hensible to Westerners (see Figure 12.3). In U.S. history, the
explorers Lewis and Clark reported a comparable bewilder-
ment when they encountered Native Americans who held
very different views than their own about the nature of pos-
sessions and whether people were entitled to take something
that someone else was using (Ambrose, 1996).
The evolutionary and cultural perspectives on moral
development offer distinctive emphases and interpreta-
tions, illustrating just how different the current psycho-
logical views of morality can be, even when all sides have
access to the same data. Together these perspectives help
to frame a wide range of accounts of moral development
(Turiel, 1998) that seek to account for the influences of
culture and of universal, biological constraints (Miller,
FIGURE 12.2 Reciprocal altruism. Many primates, such as these
2006). Indeed, more recent accounts blend these two per-
Japanese macaques, engage in mutual grooming even when they spectives by arguing that evolution provided a basic set of
are not related. Evolutionary psychologists suggest that these kinds intuitive moral “building blocks” that then got combined
of cooperative behaviors may be related to prosocial behaviors in in different ways by cultural influences (Haidt, 2013;
humans. Haidt & Kesebir, 2010).

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL THOUGHT 429

 Figure 12.4). Emotions such as empathy, anger, shame, and
fear may often provide our most rapid moral intuitions, with
rational judgments coming into play only afterward (Haidt,
2003; Prinz, 2004, 2007; Singer, 2005). Historically, many
philosophers, such as the British empiricist David Hume
(1739/2007), have seen emotions as the basis for moral action.
Of course, emotions themselves may have cognitive compo-
nents (see Chapter 7), but the moral emotions view shifted
the focus from complicated moral deliberations about harm
and benefits to simpler and quicker emotion-driven intu-
itions. Variations of the view of emotions as the basis for moral
actions are very much in evidence today (Eisenberg, 2000;
Haidt, 2012; Hoffman, 2000; Kagan, 1994). Indeed, some
argue that deliberate, well-thought-out consideration of moral
situations is simply too slow and requires too much thought
to govern the daily rush of situations that call for action; they
FIGURE 12.3 Moral beliefs across cultures. In many areas of India, believe that we need faster, noncognitive means to respond
cows are revered and granted nearly unlimited rights to go where they “on the fly” (Haidt, 2001, 2003; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). We
wish and when they wish, as in this street scene. Many Westerners,
often act so quickly and impulsively that it is difficult to see
who do not understand the moral and religious beliefs leading to such
practices, can have great difficulty understanding them.
the basis of such actions as lying in well-thought-out moral
reasoning.
The claim that cognition about moral situations is slow,
however, assumes that we do all our moral computations
only after entering a situation and appraising it. Instead, we
Q: How do evolutionary and cultural views of may consider various types of situations in advance, building
morality differ in regard to the young child? up elaborate moral schemas ready to be enacted in an instant
response that requires little real-time thought. All of us have
entered situations to which we have given much thought in
advance and to which we can respond very rapidly based on
Characterizing the Basis of Moral Thought our prior cognition. For example, if your roommate repeat-
To reach a better understanding of how the development edly fails to take her turn doing the dishes, you may have a
of moral thought might fit with both evolutionary psychol- prepared, readily available response the next time she shirks
ogy and cultural psychology, it is useful to consider differ- the job. This view suggests that there is a constant dynamic
ent ways of characterizing the psychological basis of moral interaction between emotional and cognitive factors in the
thought. What sorts of psychological processes and struc- determination of most actions. Emotions may make certain
tures seem to lead to judgments of right and wrong? patterns of reasoning more salient or available, and patterns
One view argues that there is really no reason to con- of reasoning may trigger certain emotions. Thus, one type of
sider moral thought and that moral thoughts are largely moral thought does not necessarily cause the other; rather,
window dressings that come to bear long after we commit both types continuously elaborate and inform each other,
to an action, perhaps as a way of justifying or rationalizing especially in complex social situations (Dunn, 2006).
the action. According to this view, moral thought is a non- In addition, patterns of reasoning can help encode or
essential side effect rather than an important part of under- frame an action as being part of the moral realm or belong-
standing moral behavior. This view asserts that other forces, ing to a particular sphere of morality, such as a concern with
such as positive and negative reinforcements, give rise to purity (Cushman & Young, 2011). Some researchers talk
and control our actions, based on the tradeoffs between about a process of “moralization,” in which cultural beliefs
benefits and detriments (Skinner, 1971). Reinforcement- and customs and certain networks of causal beliefs can cause
based views, which are part of the classical learning tradi- a pattern of behaviors to enter the moral realm. The act of
tion, have largely disappeared in recent years as researchers smoking may be one such example of an action initially seen
have uncovered highly systematic and richly structured sets as a custom that became moralized in many areas of North
of moral intuitions, often about novel scenarios for which America (Rozin, 1999; see Figure 12.5). More broadly, cul-
we could never have experienced reinforcements. tures can expose children to certain schemas and causal
More recent views see emotions as intrinsically interwo- interpretations that can powerfully shape whether actions
ven with moral thought in a complex web of interactions (see even elicit moral emotions (Sachdeva et al., 2011).

430 CHAPTER 12 MORALITY IN THOUGHT AND ACTION

A

FIGURE 12.4 Cognitions versus emotions as the basis for moral judg-
ments. For centuries, scholars have disagreed as to whether moral judgments
are grounded in rational thought about principles, as in (A) Star Trek’s fictional
Spock, or in moral emotions, as in (B) the obvious empathy shown by St. Francis
of Assisi. Related questions ask about the relative roles of emotions and cogni-
tion at various points in a child’s development. B

Most of the foundational work on children’s moral develop- tions. These early views include stages of moral development
ment emphasizes the cognitive component of moral thought in which children’s thinking about rules and moral judgments
and the child’s growing understanding of rules and principles changes with age; they were first proposed by Jean Piaget in
for guiding moral reasoning. These views often carry the devel- his theory of moral development, followed by the stages pro-
opmental implication that moral judgment is the highest form posed by Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan. We will dis-
of morality and that the most virtuous people are those most cuss each of these theories in turn and ask how they differ.
able to rely on cognitive factors and not on other factors in Recent research has stressed a pluralistic approach in which
making judgments (Kohlberg, 1984). In these early theories, an individual draws on different forms of moral thought in
moral development consists of increasingly being able to act different contexts at all ages and may not pass through stages
on the basis of reasoned moral judgments, with the youngest as such. Moreover, today scholars have shown that emotions
children being most ruled by other factors, such as their emo- continue to have a central role throughout development.

Q: What are three different views of the

importance of emotions in moral thought?

Piaget’s Theory of Moral

Development
As in many other areas, we start by looking at Piaget’s work
on cognitive development. In considering the development
of moral thought, we encounter many familiar issues. For
FIGURE 12.5 Moralization. Certain behaviors, such as smoking, example, we consider whether children progress through qual-
can shift from being seen as merely unhealthy to entering the moral itatively distinct stages of moral reasoning, and if so, whether
sphere, as seen in this antismoking ad. those stages resemble the developmental stages proposed in

PIAGET’S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 431

other domains. We also ask whether moral thought should use a game’s rules. Based on their behaviors at play, Piaget
be considered as a single, unified domain or as a collection inferred links between children’s use of rules and the stages
of narrower domains with their own distinct properties and of moral reasoning they had attained. Piaget proposed three
developmental patterns. Finally, we consider some of the ways stages of moral development, roughly corresponding to his
that the development of moral thought varies across individ- stages of preoperational, concrete operational, and formal
uals and whether some core components of moral thought operational thought (see Table 12.1).
might be common to all cultures.
When Piaget devised his theory of moral development, Stage 0: Premoral Development Until around 4 years
he intended to incorporate it into his broad, comprehen- of age, children’s play seems to be simply for the fun of
sive theory of the stages of cognitive development (Piaget, the activity, without any apparent use of rules. Piaget saw
1932/1965). He argued that moral thought is not a sepa- the child in this stage as unaware that rules exist and
rate cognitive domain with its own patterns of reasoning treating games like any other social activity. A child in
and developmental course. Instead, he believed that moral the premoral stage might imitate older children playing
development shares the same broad features that he attrib- the same game, but without understanding that set guide-
uted to other areas of cognitive development, including the lines govern the way the game is played. Children at this
notion of stages. Thus, according to Piaget, some patterns age supposedly do not assess culpability or have intuitions
of moral reasoning are simply unavailable to children until about justice.
they reach the relevant stage of moral development.
Piaget studied moral development from several perspec- Stage 1: The Heteronomous Stage Piaget believed
tives. Most notably, he examined children’s understanding that children spend the years from about age 4 to 10, after
and use of rules, their judgments of culpability and guilt, toddlerhood and throughout the preoperational period and
and their understanding of justice. Each of these lines of much of the concrete operational period, in the heterono-
investigation has spurred extensive moral development mous stage. Heteronomous means governed by an external
research by others. set of laws or control, and in Piaget’s view, children in this
stage see rules as inviolate and unalterable and having a kind
of external reality like the laws of nature.
Q: How did Piaget’s broad theory of cognitive At the same time, Piaget observed that children in the
development relate to his perspective on moral heteronomous stage show evidence of egocentrism in their
use of rules. They attempt to use standard rules and think
development? that they are using them in consistent ways, but in fact,
their use of rules is often highly idiosyncratic. They often
modify or even make up rules, which they then assume
are the general rules of the game. Anyone with a younger
Piaget’s Stages of Moral Reasoning sibling can remember frustrating attempts to play a game
Piaget began his study of young children’s morality by with the younger brother or sister who adopted idiosyn-
observing how they play simple games. Specifically, he saw a cratic rules, often to his or her own advantage, while
close link between children’s moral beliefs and the way they seemingly remaining unaware that these rules differed

Stage Name of Stage Approximate Age Reasoning about Rules

0 Premoral development Up to 4 years There is no explicit awareness of rules, no use of moral principles
or notions of justice.
1 Heteronomous stage 4 to 10 years Rules are seen as unchanging and external, like physical laws.
Judgments of culpability are based on the act’s consequences
rather than the actor’s intentions. There is little sense of what
punishment is appropriate for what degree of transgression.
2 Autonomous stage 10 to 11 years and Rules are seen as human agreements that can be changed if all
older parties consent. Judgments of culpability are based in part on
intentions, and punishment should be appropriate to the severity
of the transgression.

TABLE 12.1 Piaget’s stages of moral reasoning. In Piaget’s theory of moral development, children progressed through three stages of
moral reasoning, with the first stage supposedly devoid of any awareness of moral rules, principles, or ideas of justice.

432 CHAPTER 12 MORALITY IN THOUGHT AND ACTION

from the standard ones. The heteronomous stage is par- when his mother was out he tried to get some jam out of
ticularly striking because the same 5-year-old child who the cupboard. He climbed up on to a chair and stretched
frequently breaks the rules or makes them up also believes out his arm. But the jam was too high up and he couldn’t
that the rules are immutable and fixed for all time. The reach it and have any. But while he was trying to get it,
combination of these features creates the central phenom- he knocked over a cup. The cup fell down and broke.
ena of Stage 1. (Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 118)
Piaget believed that the way children think about the
rules of a game resembles their thinking about moral Thus, in some stories a character’s good or neutral
principles, which could be construed as rules for behav- intentions had quite bad consequences, while in others a
ior. In some of his best-known studies of moral develop- character’s bad intentions brought only slight negative
ment, a researcher described a series of moral scenarios to consequences.
a child and asked the child to judge the culpability of the Most adults listening to Piaget’s stories focused on the
child in the story and to decide whether the main char- characters’ intentions and decided that the child with the
acter had acted badly. The most interesting manipulation most negative intentions was guiltiest, even though the con-
involved scenarios in which the character’s intentions did sequences of his behavior were much less severe. In contrast,
not match the magnitude of consequences resulting from children in the heteronomous stage seemed to ignore inten-
his actions. Consider the following pair of stories that Piaget tions and focus only on the consequences. They believed
used in his studies (see Figure 12.6): that the well-intentioned child who broke many cups was
guiltier and more deserving of punishment than the ill-
Neutral Intentions, Major Negative Consequences: A little boy intentioned child who broke only one cup.
who is called John is in his room. He is called to dinner. He Here, for example, are responses by a 6-year-old named
goes into the dining room. But behind the door there was a Geo to questions that were asked by an interviewer in that
chair, and on the chair there was a tray with fifteen cups on classic study:
it. John couldn’t have known that there was all this behind
the door. He goes in, the door knocks against the tray, Interviewer: What did the first boy do?
bang go the fifteen cups and they all get broken! (Piaget, Geo: He broke eleven cups.
1932/1965, p. 118) Interviewer: And the second one?
Geo: He broke a cup by moving roughly.
Negative Intentions, Minor Negative Consequences: Once Interviewer: Why did the first one break the cups?
there was a little boy whose name was Henry. One day Geo: Because the door knocked them.

A B
FIGURE 12.6 Scenarios used by Piaget to elicit children’s moral reasoning. In the heteronomous
stage, children tend to judge consequences as more important than intentions. Thus, they judge (A) a child
who accidentally causes 15 glasses to break as more guilty than (B) a child who accidentally causes 1
glass to break, despite the fact that the first child did not intend to do anything wrong, but the second child
did have a negative intention (reaching for jam that was deliberately placed out of his reach).

PIAGET’S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 433

Interviewer: And the second? uniform rules is central to that goal. Thus, they start to
Geo: He was clumsy. When he was getting the jam the honor standard rules and feel that others should as well. In
cup fell down. this transition period from Stage 1 to Stage 2, children also
Interviewer: Is one of the boys naughtier than the start to weigh intentions more in judging culpability, and
other? they become more aware of what is fair and how the sever-
Geo: The first is because he knocked over twelve cups. ity of a punishment should relate to the transgression. Even
Interviewer: If you were the daddy, which one would you so, their behavior in this period remains somewhat incon-
punish most? sistent. Piaget observed that they do not follow the rules
Geo: The one who broke twelve cups. perfectly, and their thinking still shows elements of Stage 1
Interviewer: Why did he break them? moral reasoning as well.
Geo: The door shut too hard and knocked them. He didn’t
do it on purpose. Stage 2: The Autonomous Stage Finally, when chil-
Interviewer: And why did the other boy break a cup? dren reach the autonomous stage at around age 10 or 11,
Geo: He wanted to get the jam. He moved too far. The they see rules as human conventions. Thus, children come
cup got broken. to understand that people create rules for the purpose of
Interviewer: Why did he want to get the jam? organizing an interaction and that people can change the
Geo: Because he was all alone. Because his mother wasn’t rules as well. According to Piaget, when children reach this
there. stage, they begin to realize that moral principles are not a set
Interviewer: Have you got a brother? of external laws. They come to understand that morals arise
Geo: No, a little sister. from group norms and from convictions based on individu-
Interviewer: Well, if it was you who had broken the twelve als’ beliefs and that intentions are central to judgments of
cups when you went into the room and your little sister culpability and consequences are of less importance. Piaget
who had broken one cup while she was trying to get the believed that by this stage, children have well-developed
jam, which of you would be punished most notions of fairness and appropriate justice. They understand
severely? that a punishment should be appropriate to a transgression,
Geo: Me, because I broke more than one cup. not arbitrarily harsh. Children’s belief in immanent justice
(Piaget, 1932/1965, pp. 120–121) also diminishes, as they realize that bad things happen to
good people (and vice versa) and that accidents should not
be interpreted as punishments or rewards from an external
Piaget further argued that children in this stage reason
agent.
the same way in making moral judgments about lies. Thus,
after hearing similar stories, the children judged making a
very false claim without intending to deceive (for example,
being mistaken) as worse than purposely telling a small lie Evaluating Piaget’s Account
to deceive. To Piaget, these patterns suggested that younger Piaget launched an important and highly active area of
children are unable to take into account intentions in eval- research on moral reasoning. In the process, he invented
uating the morality of actions, making them incapable of the influential technique of presenting children with moral
mature moral reasoning. situations and asking them to evaluate guilt. His account
Piaget was also concerned with younger children’s of moral development captures some of the important pat-
beliefs in immanent justice, a kind of magical thinking terns of change in children’s use and understanding of rules.
in the heteronomous stage in which accidents are seen as Research has shown that once children become aware of
cases of divine retribution. For example, a person steals rules, they often become excessively rigid in how they apply
an apple, and then while he is walking home a bridge col- them. In many studies, children at around 7 years of age
lapses beneath him. Piaget argued that younger children latch on to rules as inviolate and unchangeable, only to later
are much more likely to see the collapse of the bridge as a understand how and why they might be malleable. Some of
kind of justice caused by God or spirits, rather than as a Piaget’s observations about children’s moral judgments also
mere accident. pick up on real-world developmental phenomena. Younger
children do sometimes fail to take intentions into account
The Transition between Stage 1 and Stage 2 Piaget in their moral judgments, and they can have difficulty cali-
described a transition in children’s thinking about both brating the appropriate level of punishment for an action,
game rules and morality that occurs between the ages of but neither of these abilities is as limited in young children
about 7 and 11. He saw children as becoming more con- as Piaget thought. More generally, Piaget pioneered a truly
cerned with winning games and realizing that maintaining cognitive approach to the development of morality, and in

434 CHAPTER 12 MORALITY IN THOUGHT AND ACTION

doing so, he helped all later researchers explore the limits of Because game rules are largely arbitrary, they seem much
a purely cognitive approach uninfluenced by emotions. At closer to social conventions than to moral laws.
the same time, however, there are concerns about whether Interestingly, when researchers directly examined young
several of his studies were really focusing on the moral children’s ideas about social conventions, moral laws, and
domain and its unique properties. inviolable physical laws (like gravity), even preschoolers
seemed to understand the essential differences (Lockhart
Distinguishing Morality from Conventions One pos- et al., 1977). In one series of studies, preschoolers were told
sibility that corresponds to discussions in earlier chap- about situations in which a person violated either a social
ters is that young children have more difficulty thinking convention (drives on the wrong side of the road), a moral
about the kind of arbitrary patterns and rules typical of law (steals from others), or a physical law (floats in the air).
most games than they do about nonarbitrary functional Preschoolers tended to explain these transgressions in differ-
patterns such as putting on their socks before their shoes. ent ways, describing violators of social conventions as being
For example, whether card players deal from the deck “crazy,” violators of moral laws as being “bad,” and violators
clockwise or counterclockwise has no inherent meaning of physical laws as using “magic” (Lockhart, 1980). It there-
and little to do with which rules would be “most sensible”; fore seems that Piaget overinterpreted younger children’s
both alternatives work equally well. Even so, the chosen difficulties with arbitrary game rules by assuming that they
rules must be honored to make the game work. Learning reflected broad problems using rules, including moral laws.
such arbitrary rules may be more difficult for young chil- In fact, children understand the differences between differ-
dren, as the rules have little real-world significance to help ent kinds of rules at an early age, and they seem to have a
explain them. sense of how moral laws differ from arbitrary rules (Turiel,
But Piaget’s attempts to link children’s understanding 1983, 1998).
and use of game rules to morality also faces a deeper prob-
lem. Moral laws are very different from social conventions,
which are arbitrary rules jointly agreed to by a group or a Q: In what ways does children’s understanding
society to facilitate interaction and coordinate activity. The of game rules differ from their understanding of
philosopher David Lewis has pointed out that social con- social conventions?
ventions have a different structure from moral laws, includ-
ing the critical distinction that conventions are arbitrary
and moral laws are not (Lewis, 1969). Take the convention Accounting for Intentions Piaget may have underes-
of driving on the right side of the road in the United States, timated younger children’s ability to account for people’s
which is fully arbitrary; in other countries, such as Great Brit- intentions in evaluating actions. If, as Piaget claimed, chil-
ain, drivers get along fine on the left side (see Figure 12.7). dren younger than about 10 could not take intentions into
In contrast, the moral principle that people should be hon- account in their moral judgments, they would be unable
est is not arbitrary, and it would be difficult to do busi- to see the difference between an accidental harm and a
ness or even converse in a society where lies were the norm. deliberate injury. We have seen, however, that even preverbal

A B C
FIGURE 12.7 Social conventions versus moral laws. Driving on a particular side of the road is an arbitrary social convention established
by a society, as shown by (A) British drivers, who drive on the left side of the road, and (B) American drivers, who drive on the right side of the
road. (C) Prohibitions against stealing would be considered moral laws in all societies.

PIAGET’S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 435

infants seem acutely sensitive to others’ intentions and goals of moral judgments, this could be either intentions or con-
(see Chapter 5). It would therefore be surprising if young sequences), while older children are capable of integrating
children were so attentive to intentions early on, yet unable several dimensions at one time (both intentions and con-
to use them to evaluate malice and culpability. sequences in the case of moral judgments; Anderson, 1980;
A closer look suggests that the differences in the ways Anderson & Butzin, 1978).
that younger children and adults think about intentions Experimental tasks that involve manipulating several
may be more nuanced than Piaget believed. Researchers dimensions of moral judgment have supported this expla-
have thoroughly investigated the claim that younger chil- nation of how children become increasingly able to take
dren cannot take intentions into account, using a much intentions into account (Baird & Astington, 2004; Zelazo
wider range of stories and story formats than Piaget did. et al., 1996). Nonetheless, these predictions cannot apply
These studies have repeatedly uncovered cases where even to all sorts of thinking and reasoning because, as we saw in
preschoolers are fully capable of considering intentions, Chapters 9 and 10, younger children sometimes have diffi-
especially if intentions are described at the end of a story culty zeroing in on the critical dimension of a problem and
rather than at the beginning (Karniol, 1978; Keasey, 1978). instead will consider several at once. But at least in some
If children are told to pay attention to intentions or if inten- cases, the developmental effects of information integration
tions are stressed in some way, young children often take are evident, presumably in situations where the child has
them into account (Costanzo et al., 1973; Farnill, 1974; to weigh several dimensions against each other to reach an
Keasey, 1978; Nelson, 1980). These findings suggest that optimal decision.
varying the experiments might reveal circumstances in
which young children would consider intentions. If there
are no distracting differences in consequences, children Q: Why might young children have trouble
might base their judgments on which intentions are better. taking intentions into account in judging the
Similarly, if positive consequences are pitted against neu- culpability of others?
tral ones, the intentions might also become more salient.
Finally, if researchers use videotapes or cartoons that make
the differences in characters’ intentions clearer, young chil- Immanent Justice across Cultures Piaget’s claim that
dren might be more likely to factor them into their moral younger children are more inclined toward magical thinking
judgments (Chandler et al., 1973). Thus, an extensive lit- about rewards and punishments has also been challenged.
erature shows that in some situations, young children do Cross-cultural studies suggest that this may not be the best
have a clear awareness of intentions and their relation to characterization of how moral thought develops. For exam-
morality (Baird & Astington, 2004). ple, more than 70 years ago, the renowned anthropologist
Children may weigh consequences more than adults, Margaret Mead studied the development of magical think-
but it may not be because of a marked developmental dif- ing in traditional people in Papua New Guinea by asking
ference in moral understanding. Rather, younger children them about the reasons for natural events (Mead, 1932).
may be less skilled at discerning intentions or at keeping Contrary to some popular claims, younger children did not
several aspects of a story in mind at once. Nonetheless, these invoke more magical thinking than adults. Instead, they
differences do not mean that younger children reason about offered simple, concrete causal explanations, whereas adults
moral situations in fundamentally different ways than older tended to also invoke supernatural explanations involving
children and adults. There are parallels here to Piaget’s spirits and gods. For example, if asked why a canoe floated
claims as to why young children fail at conservation tasks. away, a child might explain that it was not properly tied to
As we saw in Chapter 9, rather than lacking certain logical a dock, while the elders might also say that certain spir-
reasoning skills that make conservation impossible, younger its caused it to happen. In fact, when the younger children
children simply may have more difficulty remembering the were offered metaphysical explanations instead of the more
entire sequence of events and may focus too much on the practical, mechanical ones, they rejected them. Sometimes
final components of a chain of events. it takes years of training in a culture’s belief system before
Although preschool-age children are sometimes able to an individual will readily offer causal explanations that go
consider intentions, the question remains as to why, with beyond the physical, mechanical ones.
increasing age, children can more easily take intentions into
account. One possible explanation is based on information
integration theory, which examines how children integrate Q: What is Piaget’s notion of immanent justice,
different dimensions of a problem to gain understanding and why has its developmental status been
and make decisions. This theory argues that younger chil- questioned?
dren often focus on one dimension of a problem (in the case

436 CHAPTER 12 MORALITY IN THOUGHT AND ACTION

 Building on his research on children’s use of rules, Piaget researchers had also used stories to pose moral questions
offered a general model of moral development that says and elicit children’s judgments, but Kohlberg’s key innova-
that younger children do not take intentions into account tion was to focus on the child’s pattern of reasoning about
in their moral judgments. Although his model no longer the situation rather than on the judgment itself. Kohlberg’s
seems tenable, the idea of stages of moral reasoning remains dilemmas also featured difficult situations about which
influential, especially as it pertains to the work of Lawrence morally sophisticated people could honestly disagree.
Kohlberg. The most famous dilemma concerns a sad figure named
Heinz, who had to decide whether to steal a drug to save his
wife’s life:

Kohlberg’s Theory of Moral In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of
cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might
Reasoning save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the
same town had recently discovered. The drug was expen-
Lawrence Kohlberg approached the study of moral devel- sive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what
opment with close attention to Piaget’s work. Kohlberg the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium
believed that one mistake that trapped both Freudians and and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick
behaviorists was to not think seriously about what morality woman’s husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to bor-
itself is. There was, for example, almost no attention from row the money, but he could only get together about $1,000
either of those camps to thousands of years of philosophical which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his
discourse as to what constitutes true virtue. For Kohlberg, wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay
beliefs about what is moral are not incidental, but rather later. But the druggist said: “No, I discovered the drug and
central to the proper study of moral development and how I’m going to make money from it.” So Heinz got desperate
children become moral thinkers—or what he called “moral and broke into the man’s store to steal the drug for his wife.
philosophers.” Should the husband have done that? (Kohlberg, 1963, p. 19)
Kohlberg believed that children construct morality by
developing a system of beliefs about concepts like justice For this dilemma, many arguments could support moral
and individual rights. He thought that it takes a long time approval or disapproval of Heinz’s action. According to
for children to develop accurate beliefs and reasoning pat- Kohlberg, certain kinds of arguments, both for and against
terns about morality and that early on, they confuse moral his choice, typify each stage of moral development.
issues with other issues, such as power, coercion, and author- In Kohlberg’s first level of moral reasoning, the precon-
ity. This process of discovering which issues are truly moral ventional level (Stages 1 and 2), a child believes that some-
formed the basis for Kohlberg’s model. one is virtuous if she is not punished much for her actions
or does not suffer much compared with her gains. Thus, a
child in Stage 1 might say that it is not appropriate to steal
the drug because Heinz will be punished harshly for theft.
Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Reasoning Another child in Stage 1 might say that it is appropriate to
Kohlberg initially proposed six stages of moral development steal the drug because Heinz will get a much worse punish-
to describe how children’s basic concept of virtue changes. ment if he lets his wife die. Both responses are considered
He then clustered these six stages into three larger levels of typical of Stage 1, regardless of the particular moral choice,
moral reasoning—preconventional, conventional, and post- because in both cases avoiding punishment is the key con-
conventional reasoning—which loosely resonate with the cern. Children in Stage 2 might say that it is acceptable to
stages of moral development that Piaget proposed. Both of steal the drug because it is worth spending some time in
their theories capture the idea of the child moving through jail to keep your wife alive. Or they might say that it is not
stages of being unaware of rules, of using rules too literally, acceptable to steal the drug because the jail time would not
and of engaging in more abstract thought. be worth it given that his wife is so sick that she might die
Kohlberg assessed children’s level of moral development anyway.
by using a method that he devised known as the moral To a child in the conventional level of moral reasoning
dilemma. Kohlberg’s moral dilemmas were short descrip- (Stages 3 and 4), being virtuous means doing what we are
tions of morally ambiguous situations in which a char- told or conforming to group norms. Children in Stage 3
acter must make a difficult moral choice. After hearing might say that it is acceptable to steal the drug because a
the dilemma, the study participant is asked which course nice person does not let his wife die, or they might say that
of action is morally superior and why. Piaget and earlier it is not acceptable because only bad people steal things.

KOHLBERG’S THEORY OF MORAL REASONING 437

Stage 4 involves reference to law and order. The Stage 4 Evaluating Kohlberg’s Theory
argument against stealing the drug is simply that Heinz is
wrong to break the law, whereas arguments in favor would Kohlberg’s theory has been extremely influential in the field
allude to following implicit, natural laws about not letting of moral development. His ideas served as the basis for hun-
others die. dreds of studies exploring how children and adults reason
People who reach the final, postconventional level (Stages 5 about complex moral problems. By considering people to
and 6) believe that being virtuous means adhering to a be “moral philosophers,” Kohlberg helped researchers focus
“higher” principle of justice or fairness than either soci- on the reasoning processes related to moral thought rather
ety or the individual’s own interests dictate. Stage 5 argu- than the specific moral choices. In addition, as research-
ments appeal to group norms, such as a group belief that it ers examined moral development across cultures, they often
is acceptable to steal to save a life—or a society’s belief that found support for the developmental patterns Kohlberg
theft cannot be tolerated, no matter the cost. Finally, Stage 6 proposed. Younger children do tend to focus on immedi-
reasoning refers to the individual’s own internal moral stan- ate consequences, such as punishment, while older children
dards. Thus, a Stage 6 reason for stealing the drug is that and adults tend to focus more on principles governing the
the individual will not be able to live with himself if he social interactions in a community, such as the Golden Rule
lets his wife die. And a Stage 6 argument against stealing (Gibbs et al., 2007).
the drug is that stealing violates the individual’s own beliefs As in Piaget’s theory, Kohlberg’s stages of moral develop-
about never stealing. Table 12.2 shows Kohlberg’s three lev- ment were supposed to be an invariant sequence in which
els of moral reasoning divided into six stages. each stage necessarily built on the one before. He contended

Level Stage Approximate Ages Moral Principle Kinds of Reasoning

I. Preconventional 1 2 to10 years Obedience and punishment Moral judgments are

morality: Arises orientation driven by a need to avoid
from basic needs and punishment.
drives.
2 2 to10 years Instrumental-relativist Moral judgments are driven
orientation by the desire to meet
personal needs.
II. Conventional 3 9 years and older “Good boy/good girl” Moral judgments are driven
morality: Arises orientation by a need to be accepted by
from conforming to others as a good person.
expected roles and
pleasing others.
4 9 years and older Law and order orientation Moral judgments are driven
by a desire to adhere to
the letter of the law or to
authorities.
III. Postconventional 5 12 years and older Social contract orientation Moral judgments arise from
morality: Arises adherence to laws that are set
from abstract up as social contracts for the
principles that common good.
transcend individual
circumstances and
local cultural contexts.
6 12 years and older Principled conscience- Moral judgments arise from
driven orientation adherence to personal
principles, such as the Golden
Rule.

TABLE 12.2 Kohlberg’s stages of moral development. Each of Kohlberg’s three levels of moral reasoning is divided into two stages.
Kohlberg argued that each of these six stages shows distinctive patterns of moral reasoning. Although Kohlberg later revised his theory to
add and later eliminate a stage, we present here his original six stages, which are the most widely known version of his theory. Adapted from
Kohlberg (1976).

438 CHAPTER 12 MORALITY IN THOUGHT AND ACTION

that a child has to progress through each stage to reach the tures show quite different proportions of the population
next one. Yet, if you look closely at the reasoning at each having reached the higher moral levels. For example, when
stage, it is not clear how each stage logically forms the basis researchers used Kohlberg’s model to evaluate moral devel-
for the next one. Why, for example, should a concern with opment in Turkey in the 1970s, the results seemed to sug-
avoiding punishment (Stage 1) lead to a concern with how gest that most of the Turkish adult population never moved
to meet personal needs (Stage 2)? These issues and several beyond Stages 1 and 2. According to the findings, only a
others have led to three types of criticisms of Kohlberg’s the- tiny percentage reached Stage 6 (Kurtines & Greif, 1974).
ory: unclear stages, cross-cultural variations, and possible Kohlberg never showed evidence of having a political
gender biases. agenda or other ulterior motives for raising some cultures
morally above others. Unfortunately, his scales seemed to
Unclear Stages The stages in Kohlberg’s model are less do this anyway in that people in Western developed cul-
clear-cut than they might initially seem. Kohlberg and his tures tended to show higher average scores than did people
associates developed a long, complex test manual and set up in non-Western cultures.
training sessions to teach other psychologists the nuances of There may also be a relationship between modes of moral
the scoring procedure. The indeterminacies in their scoring reasoning and the different roles that people occupy in a
system led to many controversies and even to some revisions culture. For example, in one classic study in a rural Afri-
to the theory. Kohlberg later added a new Stage 7 and a can community in western Kenya, two groups of men were
partial Stage 4.5, then still later combined Stages 5 and 6, studied who were similar in age, religion, education, and
reducing the total number of stages to five (Colby & Kohl- income but who differed in the extent to which they were
berg, 1987). The elaborate scoring system raised concerns called upon by their neighbors to settle disputes (Harkness
about the extent to which most researchers could reliably et al., 1981). Those who were often chosen to settle disputes
agree on assigning judgments to specific stages (Krebs & made more moral judgments at conventional levels, such as
Denton, 2005; Kurtines & Greif, 1974). the law and order level, whereas those who were not called
Researchers have also found that responses to moral upon to settle disputes tended to give more judgments at the
dilemmas vary more than Kohlberg’s model suggests. instrumental-relativist level. Thus, even when people are
According to his theory, a typical kindergartner can evaluate matched in age and a wide range of socioeconomic indica-
a moral choice only in terms of how much he might suffer for tors, they may give different moral judgments as a function
his actions. In fact, even the youngest children do not show of the social roles that they typically occupy. When cultures
these strict limitations and sometimes reason at the highest are more heterogeneous in terms of such roles, there is a
levels. In addition, it is not uncommon for a child to respond greater possibility of variation in kinds of moral judgments
to Kohlberg’s moral dilemmas with judgments that span sev- (Edwards, 1987).
eral stages. Because children’s answers do not consistently
fall into one or two of Kohlberg’s stages (Krebs & Denton,
2005), it is difficult to use his model to classify or compare Q: To what extent are the developmental
people’s levels of moral development. This problem would be patterns uncovered by Kohlberg found in other
easier to handle if most children’s responses clustered in one
stage despite a few responses from other stages, but in many
groups and cultures?
cases a child’s responses span four stages or more.
Kohlberg made an important advance by raising the pos- Possible Gender Biases When Kohlberg developed his
sibility of several different modes of moral reasoning and moral reasoning scales in the 1950s, he based the stages on
by asking how those modes might vary with development. data he collected from middle-class boys. At first no one
Subsequent studies suggest, however, that instead of a strict considered the consequences of not including data from
progression of stages, there may be a more diverse set of girls. Matters changed dramatically in 1977, however, when
moral reasoning styles even in quite young children that Carol Gilligan argued that different kinds of moral reason-
vary as a function of context and culture. There may still be ing might be more dominant in girls and women than in
developmental changes in terms of which forms of reason- boys and men (Gilligan, 1977). In contrast to Kohlberg’s
ing are most salient or cognitively accessible, but children stages, which emphasize justice, Gilligan believed that girls
do not seem to be trapped exclusively in one stage at a time. and women more commonly stress empathy and caring in
their moral judgments. By failing to consider this gender
Cross-Cultural Variations Kohlberg claimed that his difference, she argued, Kohlberg’s scales make females look
stages of moral development are universal across cultures less morally developed than males. Gilligan contended that
throughout the world. Yet, researchers who evaluated when this care-oriented dimension of morality is taken into
Kohlberg’s system were surprised to find that different cul- account, girls and women show much more sophistication

KOHLBERG’S THEORY OF MORAL REASONING 439

in their moral reasoning and males show less developed Gilligan believed that for women, moral rights and
moral thought (Gilligan, 1979, 1982). We now turn to a responsibilities occur in terms of relationships. Yet, despite
discussion of Gilligan’s theory of moral development to get her emphasis on care, concern, and empathy in women’s
a better sense of her views. moral thought, Gilligan did not put emotions at the cen-
ter of her theory. Rather, like Kohlberg, she believed that
there is a critical cognitive component to morality that is
related to thinking about moral principles. For Gilligan, the
fundamental organizing principle is that people should help
Alternative Theories of Moral others who are in need or distress, whereas for Kohlberg, the
Development central principle is that people should treat each other fairly.
Thus, both theories emphasize moral rules or laws that elicit
Concerns about Kohlberg’s theories led to two other a particular form of reasoning about many interconnected
approaches. One, based on Gilligan’s theory, preserved the principles.
idea of stages but shifted the focus away from justice and Like Kolhlberg’s system, Gilligan’s system has been scru-
rights to care. Another, arising from several researchers, tinized for evidence of consistent gender differences in moral
started to question the strength of stage effects and proposed development and for indications as to whether empathy or
that children of all ages might have multiple ways of constru- caring might be a more dominant mode of moral thinking
ing moral situations; we will call this the pluralistic approach. in some non-Western cultures. Despite Gilligan’s suggestion
of a major gender bias in Kohlberg’s work, in almost 90 per-
cent of roughly 100 studies of Kohlberg’s stages of moral
reasoning, no gender differences were found. In the remain-
Gilligan’s Theory of Moral Development ing studies, sometimes males scored higher on moral rea-
Gilligan proposed her own three-stage sequence of moral soning, and sometimes females did (Walker, 1991, 2006).
development in which females tend to progress more rap- The data on possible gender differences in the morality
idly than males. Children start in a preconventional stage in of caring is less clear, because few major studies of large
which their own personal welfare is all that matters. They samples have been conducted (Turiel, 1998). Over several
then move into a conventional stage in which empathy and studies, it appears that the vast majority of people use both
care for others motivates a belief that self-sacrifice is an care-oriented and justice-oriented forms of moral reason-
intrinsic good. Finally, in a postconventional stage, children ing, relying on them for different questions and in differ-
combine care about themselves and care for others into an ent contexts. The evidence suggests that on average, females
integrated moral reasoning system that takes into account tend to use care-oriented reasoning more often, and males
both factors (see Table 12.3). tend to use justice reasoning more often, and there are some
Here is how Gilligan described one of the main gender indications that females can switch between the two forms
differences underlying her model: of reasoning more easily (Haste & Baddeley, 1991; Jaffee &
Hyde, 2000). But such differences in the frequency of use
The moral imperative that emerges repeatedly in interviews are quite modest and do not seem to represent a fundamen-
with women is an injunction to care, a responsibility to dis- tal difference in males’ and females’ moral reasoning styles
cern and alleviate the “real and recognizable trouble” of this (Hyde, 2007).
world. For men, the moral imperative appears rather as an If most people show both kinds of reasoning, further ques-
injunction to respect the rights of others and thus to protect tions arise about how patterns of reasoning vary as a func-
from interference the rights to life and self-fulfillment. (Gil- tion of context. Perhaps males and females differ because
ligan, 1982, p. 100) they tend to be exposed to somewhat different types of situ-

Stage Form of Reasoning

Preconventional Individual survival is all that matters.

TABLE 12.3 Gilligan’s stages
of moral reasoning. Gilligan’s Conventional Self-sacrifice is good in its own right and is driven by care for
theory of moral development others.
endorsed the idea of stages but Postconventional Care about others and care about the self are integrated.
shifted the focus to care.

440 CHAPTER 12 MORALITY IN THOUGHT AND ACTION

ations. Almost all moral judgments require an appraisal of Funder, 1978; Mischel, 1968), which also affect moral think-
the situation. If someone commits a questionable action, ing. In personality psychology, person-situation interactions
it may matter greatly to know more about whether he was reveal that personality traits such as shyness can vary dramati-
compelled to do it, what others who were involved did, and cally as a function of the situation in which a person is embed-
so on. Even the same action, when interpreted by different ded. Various studies have shown that, like adults, children
people, can lead to contrasting judgments. switch between different styles of reasoning, depending on
Finally, just as Kohlberg has been criticized for collect- the context. In one study, for example, stressing interpersonal
ing data primarily from middle-class boys, Gilligan has been relationships caused more care-based reasoning as opposed
criticized for basing her theory on data collected from women to justice-based reasoning (Smetana et al., 1991). Thus, if
attending elite colleges such as Harvard University. Studies children heard stories in which a moral transgression was
that included women from a broader spectrum of socioeco- described as occurring between siblings, care-based reasoning
nomic groups, including women from various disadvantaged was more prominent than when the same transgression was
minorities, found much smaller differences between men described as occurring between more casual acquaintances.
and women in care-based and justice-oriented moral rea- The notion of group and individual differences in moral
soning than Gilligan did. In these studies, justice-oriented reasoning must therefore take into account theories of how
reasoning often dominated among both sexes (Stack, 1986, moral reasoning interacts with social contexts. Just as it has
1990). In addition, in some cultures, care-based reasoning become common to talk about how personality traits vary
seems to take on a quite different way of thinking from that across situations and contexts, styles of moral reasoning may
proposed by Gilligan. For example, in both Japan and India, be similarly linked to situations and contexts.
when children talk about care, they talk less about interper-
sonal feelings and more about duties arising from various Contributions from Cultural Psychology The modest
societal roles (Miller, 2006; Shimizu, 2001). Moreover, the differences in moral reasoning across sexes and the more
care focuses more on communities and groups than on indi- notable variations across cultures have led some researchers
viduals (Jensen, 2008). to suggest that, contrary to Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s theories,
moral universals may be exaggerated if they are understood
to be the same stepwise progression of moral reasoning in
all cultures. In some cases, moral systems may be culturally
A Pluralistic Approach to the specific in ways that outsiders find difficult to understand.
Thus, those who view moral development as more cultur-
Development of Moral Thought ally relative consider the highest levels of Kohlberg’s stages
One consistent theme has emerged from recent research on as too culture specific and simply irrelevant to many non-
moral development: the same person comes to rely on dif- Western cultures (Shweder, 1982).
ferent patterns of moral thought, depending on the context. One major cultural difference that can affect moral rea-
We will call this theme the “pluralistic approach,” mean- soning involves the way that cultures prioritize the rights
ing that each individual is not bound to one or two forms and well-being of individuals versus the rights and well-
of moral thought but instead may switch between several being of groups. In individualist cultures, the rights of
different forms as a function of the situation in which that the individual are supreme and favored over group rights,
person is embedded and how the situation is viewed. In this whereas in collectivist cultures, the rights of the group
pluralistic view, moral development is not a simple linear are central and the individual’s rights are subordinate to
progression through stages but rather an elaboration of sev- those of the group. In general, Western societies are con-
eral different modes of moral thought that are available at sidered more individualist, and American culture is often
a given age as well as shifts in which ones are dominant seen as the most extreme example. In contrast, non-Western
in certain situations. Thus, some possible modes of moral societies (and some Western societies with socialist politi-
thought might be reasoning about sharing, helping others, cal systems) are considered more collectivist (Bronfen-
modesty, defeat, or privacy (Smetana, 1997). This theme brenner, 1970; Shweder & Bourne, 1982). These differences
draws heavily on ideas in two subfields of psychology: in emphasis between, say, the United States and Japan or
personality psychology, which emphasizes how situations between Australia and China are not disputed, but their
influence behavior, and cultural psychology, which empha- implications for patterns of moral reasoning are less clear.
sizes the social construction of belief systems. Shweder and his colleagues argue that the contrast can lead
to cultural differences in morality: in individualist cultures,
Contributions from Personality Psychology One major morality is based on notions of individual rights; in col-
focus in modern-day personality psychology is the study of lectivist cultures, morality is based on duties to the larger
person-situation interactions (Bem & Allen, 1974; Bem & group (Shweder et al., 1987).

ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 441

 One systematic analysis of the development of moral rea- This view suggests that people in all cultures are capa-
soning in four countries, including two individualist cul- ble of the same general moral reasoning patterns, but each
tures (the United States and Canada) and two collectivist person expresses them according to his or her own culture-
cultures (China and India) suggests that the broad individu- bound contexts and ways of interpreting situations. For
alist versus collectivist contrast may not fully capture the example, Americans are thought to emphasize autonomy
cross-cultural variations in children’s and adolescents’ moral most heavily and to de-emphasize community and divinity,
reasoning (Neff & Helwig, 2002). When they were asked to whereas many groups in India seem to emphasize commu-
judge moral situations, the children and adolescents in these nity and divinity most heavily and de-emphasize autonomy.
four cultures did show cultural differences in their moral Nonetheless, each of these three aspects of morality can be
judgments. But they also took situational features into manifested in any culture, given the appropriate context
account, which affected the patterns of cultural variation. (Shweder et al., 1998). More generally, it is difficult to sup-
For example, Indian boys were more likely to judge a hus- port the claim that any particular culture completely lacks a
band’s actions in individualist terms and a wife’s actions in certain form of moral reasoning, as opposed to just using it
collectivist terms, while boys in other cultures showed less in fewer types of situations (Turiel, 1998).
of a gender bias. Yet, the Indian boys still made individual- The influence of social context on morality also bears on
ist interpretations for wives in some situations. In a differ- moral development. As Kohlberg’s early work showed, a spe-
ent context—moral decisions about the rights of children to cific child’s patterns of moral reasoning can span as many
have a say in their own course of academic instruction—the as five distinct stages (Kurtines & Greif, 1974). It has since
cultural differences went against the broad predictions of a become clear that children, like adults, take situational fac-
collectivist versus individualist account, with Chinese ado- tors into account as they choose from a wide range of rea-
lescents putting more weight on the individualist rights of soning patterns. But this is not to say that moral reasoning
students and Canadian adolescents putting more empha- does not change with development. Reasoning undoubtedly
sis on the larger system of education and the importance becomes more complex with age, and the higher stages typi-
of deferring to authority. Rather than an individualist/ cal of adolescents and adults often involve more complex rea-
collectivist contrast, the cultural differences in children’s soning than the early stages. Nonetheless, simple versions of
patterns of moral judgment supported a constructivist fairness and the “Golden Rule,” normally considered fairly
approach to moral reasoning, in which the child evaluates sophisticated moral reasoning (corresponding to Kohlberg’s
the situation and the actors and takes into account cultur- Stage 6), seem to be within the grasp of young children.
ally specific meanings in order to construct an interpreta-
tion specific to that context (Turiel, 2002).
This evidence suggests that, just as sex differences in Q: Describe how patterns of moral reasoning
moral reasoning seem better understood in terms of the might vary across different social contexts.
influences of social context, some cultural differences can
also be better understood in terms of situational influences.
Unfamiliar cultures may rely on similar underlying pat- Domain-Specific Moral Reasoning Piaget, Kohlberg,
terns of moral reasoning but express them in different ways, and Gilligan devised theories of moral development that
depending on the culture’s particular distribution of social generated enormous amounts of research. Still, their
contexts. approaches have not exhausted the range of developmental
Rather than there being no moral universals, it may be paths to mature moral reasoning. Each of their approaches
that we all share a universal set of moral reasoning patterns describes a progression of stages intended to apply to moral
that manifest in different ways, depending on cultural and thought in all kinds of situations. More recently, some theo-
social contexts. Indeed, in a revision of his theory, Shweder rists have suggested models of domain-specific moral rea-
suggested that all cultures may share three fundamental soning, in which moral reasoning is thought to occur in
moral values—autonomy, community, and divinity—with quite distinct modes that may be related to evolved systems
each culture placing a different emphasis on each. Auton- governing self-protection and interpersonal interactions.
omy refers to notions of harm, rights, and justice as they The domain-specific approach is also quite compatible with
bear on an individual’s ability to meet his or her own needs. the pluralistic perspective, in which different situations
Community refers to notions of duty, social hierarchy, and invoke different moral domains.
mutual dependency as they bear on an individual’s role and For example, William Damon believes that there may
standing in a community. Finally, divinity refers to notions be a specific moral domain for reasoning about sharing and
of natural and sacred orders, sanctity, sin and purity, and the justice of distributing resources to others and that it
how they bear on the ability of a person to maintain spiri- includes several stages that follow a developmental progres-
tual integrity. sion (Damon, 1980, 1990). Whether this progression really

442 CHAPTER 12 MORALITY IN THOUGHT AND ACTION

reflects a complete incompetence of younger children to factors than on the person’s age. In addition, prosocial rea-
think about sharing in certain ways or whether some kinds soning seems to develop quite independently from reason-
of reasoning tend to be more complicated and, when sim- ing about what is wrong (Eisenberg, 2000; Robinson et al.,
plified, might still have cores that are accessible to much 1994). We will revisit prosocial morality later in this chapter
younger children remains to be studied. But Damon suggests when we consider how emotions such as empathy can guide
that young children often neglect the extent to which one behaviors differently than moral reasoning alone.
person might be more deserving in judgments about sharing. There may not be any particular type or stage of moral
Above and beyond the details of the particular developmen- reasoning that is inherently so complex that it is fully unavail-
tal progression, Damon’s central idea is that development in able to preschoolers. In fact, even very young children are
the realm of sharing and resource distribution takes its own able to access and appropriately use advanced forms of moral
trajectory that is markedly different from the developmental reasoning when the scenario is sufficiently simple and heav-
path in other domains, such as those involving harm or lying. ily linked to familiar contexts. This ability suggests that chil-
Another domain-specific theory of moral reasoning dren may not actually undergo the kind of developmental
focuses on prosocial reasoning—that is, how children think progression through a series of moral stages that many theo-
about cases of altruism, where an individual acts for the rists of moral development have described. Instead, children
benefit of another at her own personal expense. Nancy may show early difficulties with some kinds of moral rea-
Eisenberg has proposed that children’s reasoning about soning because young children generally have more trouble
altruistic actions includes a set of developmental stages reasoning about complex ideas—not because they are unable
that are roughly analogous to Kohlberg’s (Eisenberg, 1986, to understand the concepts at stake in these “higher” levels
Eisenberg et al., 2005). Eisenberg’s stages of reasoning about of moral reasoning (Gibbs et al., 2007).
altruism consist of a concern with immediate self-interest, In addition to being influenced by social contexts, moral
seeking approval of others, and appealing to internalized thoughts of various forms are also linked to moral emotions,
principles. Yet, the stages are not presented as a rigid devel- to automatic nonconscious thought, to neuroscience, and to
opmental sequence, but rather as a collection of forms of primatology (Haidt, 2008). In many cases, moral intuitions
reasoning, most of which are available to an individual. In seem to bypass slow deliberative thought (see box on moral
this view, the form of reasoning an individual uses to decide dumbfounding). One version of these non-deliberative pro-
whether to act altruistically depends more on situational cesses is shown in Table 12.4 (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). In this

Moral Modules Harm/Care Fairness/ Ingroup/Loyalty Authority/ Purity/Sanctity

Reciprocity Respect

Adaptive Protecting and Reaping benefits Reaping benefits Negotiating Avoiding microbes
challenge caring for young, of mutual of group hierarchy, deferring and parasites
vulnerable, or cooperation with cooperation to authority
injured kin nonkin
Proper domain Suffering, distress, Cheating, Threat or challenge Signs of Waste products,
(adaptive triggers) or threat to kin cooperation, to group dominance and diseased people
deception submission
Actual domain Baby animals, Marital fidelity, Home sports Bosses, respected Taboo ideas
(commonly cartoon characters broken vending teams professionals (communism,
encountered machines racism)
triggers)
Characteristic Compassion Anger, gratitude, Group pride, Respect, fear Disgust
emotions guilt belongingness,
rage at traitors
Relevant virtues Caring, kindness Fairness, Loyalty, patriotism, Obedience, Temperance,
[and vices] [cruelty] justice, honesty, self-sacrifice deference chastity, piety,
trustworthiness [treason, [disobedience, cleanliness [lust,
[dishonesty] cowardice] uppitiness] intemperance]

TABLE 12.4 Moral modules. One way of presenting the pluralistic view of morality argues that humans have five distinct moral modules that
are shared with evolutionary ancestors. Human cultural and cognitive processes have elaborated on these basic modules, giving rise to moral
emotions and to our notions of virtues and vices. Adapted from Haidt & Joseph (2007).

ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 443

model, moral intuitions arise from moral modules, which Consistency of Moral Behavior
are forms of moral reasoning that have evolved to deal with
specific kinds of moral problems encountered by individuals If a child cheats regularly in the classroom, does he also
and groups. Separate modules give rise to harm/care con- cheat on the playground? If so, at least the behavior is
cerns, fairness/reciprocity issues, in-group/loyalty tensions, potentially consistent with an admittedly nonstandard set
authority/respect perceptions, and purity/sanctity problems. of beliefs about what is right. But if classroom cheaters are
Several kinds of primates show behavior consistent with rarely also playground cheaters, this discrepancy suggests a
these moral modules because of the ways they meet adap- weaker link between moral judgment and action and a sig-
tive challenges. Likewise, humans have applied these same nificant influence of situational factors.
modules to modern-day contexts and have elaborated on In the early twentieth century, researchers studying cheat-
them as the bases for moral virtues. This account of moral ing in the classroom and cheating on the playground were
thought and behavior blends together evolutionary psychol- surprised to find that cheating in one context did not seem
ogy, cultural influences, cognitive factors, and a clear sense to indicate cheating in another (Hartshorne & May, 1928;
of domain specificity. Domain specificity is indicated by Hartshorne et al., 1930). Children who were scrupulous
the idea that different forms of moral thought are elicited about classroom work might be the worst offenders at recess,
by specific kinds of situations or domains. Haidt’s approach and vice versa (see Figure 12.8). It appeared that, given the
also suggests a model of development in which the domains right range of contexts, almost any child could be observed to
for which the module was initially evolved become extended cheat, but hardly anyone cheated consistently in all situations.
into more culturally modern domains and become cultur- In addition, when these children were asked about right and
ally interpreted in terms of virtues. In Table 12.4, these are wrong behaviors, they usually disapproved of the same acts,
shown as a shift from “proper domains” that are triggered even as they violated these judgments in their actions.
because of evolutionary adaptations to “actual domains” that This classic study had two crucial implications: (1) it ruled
are triggered by more recent cultural factors as well. out simple accounts of moral development that linked moral
judgments directly to moral actions, and (2) it supported the
theory that all personality traits (including those related to
The Development of Moral moral choices) are situation specific. Although later reanaly-
ses of Hartshorne and May’s data suggested more consistency
Behavior than originally reported—especially when social conven-
tions were distinguished from moral principles (Grusec &
A full theory of how moral judgment develops is many years Lytton, 1988)—the general conclusion of some moral incon-
off, but even the present, partial theories make it clear that sistency for individuals across situations has endured. One
moral judgments do not lead directly to moral behaviors. scholar has argued that it is misleading to describe someone
We can all bring to mind things that we have done despite as brave or caring in general and that it makes much more
knowing they were wrong, and extensive evidence supports sense to describe a person as brave in certain circumstances
this intuitive sense that we do not always act as we think we (such as when a close friend is being threatened by someone
should (Tangney et al., 2007). Moral behaviors are deter- with a gun) or caring in specific contexts (such as when see-
mined by many other factors besides moral reasoning and ing someone in pain; Doris, 2002). In a different situation,
judgment. In this section, we will focus on the development that same person may not appear to be either brave or car-
of moral behavior in its own right and also consider its rela- ing. A particular type of person might well show a strong
tionship to moral thought. tendency to behave in a particular way in a certain well-
We start by considering whether individuals typically described set of situations, but would not always behave in
behave consistently in moral or immoral ways across situa- this way and would not show a completely consistent moral
tions. This discussion leads to a consideration of the extent character across all situations (Funder, 2006).
to which moral judgments predict moral behaviors. We then Another difficulty in predicting actions from judg-
consider some temperament and personality factors important ments is that several different patterns of judgments may
to moral development and reflect how they relate to the emer- lead to the same actions. This is especially evident in Kohl-
gence of antisocial and prosocial behavior. This discussion berg’s system, in which several different levels of moral
raises controversial questions about whether individual differ- reasoning can lead to each of the two possible choices
ences in morality may have biological bases. We then consider in a moral dilemma. A study of one of the first campus
social influences on moral development, including the role political actions of the turbulent 1960s, the Berkeley Free
of parents in the early development of conscience, and both Speech Movement, revealed this slippage between levels
the punishment and modeling approaches to guiding moral of reasoning and action among students confronted with
development. a real-life moral dilemma (Haan et al., 1968). In 1964, the

444 CHAPTER 12 MORALITY IN THOUGHT AND ACTION

A B
FIGURE 12.8 Consistency of cheating. A classic study by Hartshorne and May (1928) suggested that children who cheat in the classroom
(A) are not necessarily those who cheat on the playground (B).

university administration became unhappy that students Thus, many decisions and actions can be justified at vari-
were distributing leftist political pamphlets on-campus, ous levels of moral reasoning or in terms of several differ-
and it attempted to ban these materials, claiming that ent moral belief systems, making it quite difficult to use
the tables set up to distribute them were slowing cam- beliefs to predict behaviors (Keniston, 1970). People who
pus traffic. In response, the students conducted a traf- consciously want their moral beliefs to be consistent with
fic flow study documenting no such problems. When the their actions may show more consistency (Blasi, 1980), but
administration did not back down, the incensed students even this desire does not always result in consistency. Pre-
insisted that their civil rights had been violated and even- dicting moral behavior from beliefs may also be possible
tually held a sit-in at one of the university buildings—a in studies that set up situations in which certain forms of
highly provocative act in which participants risked not
only their academic standing but their future careers (see
Figure 12.9).
Was it possible to predict who engaged in the sit-in
based on their stages of moral reasoning? Haan and her
colleagues assessed many of the demonstrators, using
Kohlberg’s moral dilemmas to determine their levels of
moral reasoning. We might expect that only students
at the highest levels would have engaged in an action
that would put them at such risk solely on the basis of a
relatively abstract principle such as free speech. In fact,
students at several levels of moral reasoning were well
represented. Although there were proportionally more
protesters at Kohlberg’s two highest levels of moral rea-
soning (Stages 5 and 6) than in the student body at large,
there were also some protesters who were at Stage 2. Even
as some students were demonstrating as a way of honor-
ing principles, others were doing so apparently for purely
hedonistic reasons. These students saw the sit-in as great
fun, and their enjoyment outweighed the risks.
FIGURE 12.9 Moral judgments and moral actions. Although
students who participated in the Free Speech Movement on the
Q: Why might it be problematic to use Berkeley campus in the 1960s were more likely to show higher levels
of moral reasoning on Kohlberg’s stages, there were still many other
someone’s tested level of moral reasoning to protesters from lower stages and many who did not participate from
predict his moral behavior? higher stages, revealing that there is no simple mapping from levels
of moral reasoning to kinds of moral behaviors.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL BEHAVIOR 445

 NEW DIRECTION S IN DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH

Moral Dumbfounding: Judgment or Intuition?

T
he idea that moral intuitions might be rooted in emo- there is just one person who will be killed (see Figure 12.10). Is
tions is an old one, going back at least as far as the it right to throw the switch? Most people say it is, and they give
eighteenth century. Recently, researchers have pro- thoughtful explanations about sacrificing one person to save
posed a new view of the role that emotions play in five people. Now consider a second situation that is similar to
moral thought, spurred by the phenomenon of moral dumb- the first, except that instead of throwing a switch, you can shove
founding. This term refers to the finding that for some moral a large, curly-haired man with glasses from a footbridge onto
situations, people have strong convictions about what is right the tracks in front of the trolley, knowing that sacrificing this
and wrong but are unable to explain why. The phenomenon of one man’s life will save the other five people, as the large man’s
moral dumbfounding builds on an apparent disconnect between body will stop the trolley before it reaches the other five people.
having strong “gut feelings” about what is right and being able Most people find the second action unacceptable. But what
to justify those feelings with higher-order reasoning. The phe- is the difference? The first scenario describes an impersonal
nomenon does not exist for all moral situations, only for certain moral situation, one that is abstract and does not directly
ones that most people immediately consider wrong, although involve specific individuals. In this case, it is relatively easy to
they cannot explain why. distance yourself from the situation and consider the tradeoffs
In many cases, moral dumbfounding reactions fit within involved in either throwing the switch or not. The second sce-
an evolutionary psychology perspective. One such scenario nario describes a personal moral situation because it involves
describes an adult brother and sister who have consensual sex the individual in the situation in a direct, immediate way (Greene
(Haidt, 2003). The scenario painstakingly describes how the et al., 2001; Singer, 2005). Thus, in the switch-throwing (imper-
brother and sister decided to do it only once, used contracep- sonal) case, it is relatively easy to distance yourself from the situ-
tives, and had no adverse emotional reactions. The vast majority ation and consider the tradeoffs in abstract terms. In the shoving
of adults find the scenario shocking and instantly condemn it as (personal) case, it is impossible not to encode the effects of
wrong. Yet, when asked to explain why they think it is wrong, this action on a specific person (which is why the description
most adults either give incorrect reasons (for example, “the includes personal characteristics), and it is difficult not to be hor-
couple might have a child with genetic defects,” even though rified at the thought of harming an innocent person.
they know the couple used contraceptives) or say they don’t Moral intuitions in impersonal versus personal situations
know why. People judge quite a large number of scenarios in appear to show different patterns of activation in the brain
this way. For example, even if they are not religious, people (Cushman et al., 2010). In fMRI studies of increased blood
think it is wrong to use sacred articles to, say, clean out a toilet flow in brain regions that occurs while engaging in judgments
bowl, whether or not anyone else even knows about it, and yet about the two kinds of situations, different sets of brain regions
they are “dumbfounded” when asked to explain why (Haidt & become activated; for example, areas associated with emotional
Bjorklund, 2008; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). processing are significantly more activated in the personal moral
Moral judgments of this sort may be like judgments of aes- situations than in the impersonal moral situations (Greene et al.,
thetics. Most people who find a sunset beautiful would be hard 2001, 2004). In addition, people who suffer brain damage to the
pressed to explain why it is more beautiful than any other. Peo- prefrontal cortex, a key region associated with personal moral
ple seem to perceive the beauty directly. Similarly, some moral intuitions, tend to make “utilitarian” moral judgments in which
intuitions may be triggered by emotional reactions rather than they treat both trolley scenarios as a simple weighting of the
being a result of deliberative rational thought. These cases that total number of lives saved (Greene, 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007;
rely on gut feelings about what is right might be quite distinct Young & Koenigs, 2007).
from cases that require careful reasoning. Moral dumbfounding arises from powerful emotions; there is
One way researchers have studied these kinds of situations an immediate sense of knowing what is right and wrong without
is by presenting participants with two moral situations, only one reflection, based on a link between an emotion and a moral
of which draws on emotion-based intuitions. For example, imag- evaluation (Dwyer, 2009). The social intuitionist model of
ine that you are at a trolley stop, and you see that a runaway moral judgment suggests that in these cases, emotions like
trolley is about to kill five people on the track. You can pull a anger or contempt can be triggered automatically by perceived
switch that will send the trolley onto a different track on which violations of norms and rights. Thus, people can have moral

446 CHAPTER 12 MORALITY IN THOUGHT AND ACTION

intuitions about a scenario without considering abstract moral One criticism of the social intuitionist model of moral devel-
principles (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). opment is that it may overemphasize the role of emotions at
In this view, violations of the community’s ethical norms can the expense of cognition. As noted earlier, people can reason in
provoke contempt, violations of individual rights can provoke advance extensively about a type of moral situation, building up
anger, and violations of sacred relations can provoke disgust cognitive schemas that can guide rapid moral judgments when
(Rozin et al., 1999). According to the social intuitionist view, criti- the situation arises. Similarly, the effects of culture may be
cal cultural experiences during late childhood affect the ways that mediated by rich cognitive structures that lead to highly auto-
these basic moral emotions become associated with particular sit- matic and reflexive modes of responding, even if it took con-
uations. Thus, people in different cultures will sometimes have dif- siderable time to build up those routines. Even if the moment
ferent moral reactions to the same situation. More specifically, the of making a moral judgment does not involve extensive explicit
theory holds that children are especially sensitive to the way that reasoning, this kind of thought over the course of past expe-
expressions of anger, disgust, or contempt correlate with moral riences may have laid the groundwork for rapid responses
transgressions (of social norms, individual rights, or sacred rela- (Pizarro & Bloom, 2003). In addition, the phenomenon of feel-
tions) in their own cultures. Cultural psychologist Jonathan Haidt ing certain but being unable to explain why may not be unique
(2001) has suggested that there may be a sensitive period in to moral dumbfounding. People who are confident that they
late childhood during which time culture helps form links between know how common everyday items work are often shown to
basic emotions and certain kinds of culturally specific situations. be clueless (Rozenblit & Keil, 2002; see Chapter 10). Even
Early moral emotions may also help spur the development of moral with these concerns, however, the social intuitionist approach
reasoning in the more cognitive realm. Thus, children who suffer is charting an important new direction for moral development
brain lesions in a region critically associated with personal moral research by challenging researchers to consider precisely why
thought (which is often emotion linked) tend not to progress as far and when emotional reactions rather than explicit reasoning
in terms of Kohlberg’s stages (Young & Koenigs, 2007). guide moral judgments.

A B
FIGURE 12.10 Moral dumbfounding. (A) In the first scenario, there is a runaway trolley and five people are on one track and one per-
son is on another track. Participants are asked if they would throw a switch that would shift the trolley from the track on which five people
would be killed to the track on which one person would be killed. (B) In the second scenario, participants are asked if they would push
one person onto the track to save the five people on the track.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL BEHAVIOR 447

reasoning are likely to suggest specific kinds of responses. Antisocial and Prosocial Behavior
For example, in situations where respected authority figures
urge participants to do something morally questionable, To find out whether different types of moral and immoral
participants whose moral reasoning is more authority based behaviors show developmental patterns, we first need a way
are more likely to go along with the authority. You may have of classifying such behaviors. A good classification system
read about social psychologist Stanley Milgram’s study of should clearly distinguish moral acts from immoral ones,
obedience, in which subjects were urged to give increasingly and it should include subtypes within the category of
powerful shocks to a “learner” each time he made a mistake immoral and moral acts to help distinguish which ones, if
on an experimental task (Milgram, 1963). Although the any, show developmental changes. Any such classification
learner was actually a confederate of the experimenter and of moral and immoral behaviors is difficult. It raises prob-
no real shocks were administered, the participants in Mil- lems concerning differences in morality across cultures, as
gram’s study did not know this, and the majority of them well as difficulties in evaluating actions alone without full
followed the experimenter’s instructions, despite believing information about intentions.
that they were causing the learner great pain. In another Despite these complexities, research in moral develop-
version of this classic study, Kohlberg and Candee (1984) ment has focused on two broad categories of behavior: pro-
found that 75 percent of the people who were at Stage 6 social behavior and antisocial behavior. Prosocial behavior,
in Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning refused to increase or altruism, normally refers to actions performed for the
the amount of shock as the experimenter ordered, whereas benefit of others and at some cost to the person performing
only 13 percent of subjects at lower levels of moral reasoning the action. Antisocial behavior consists of acts that harm
refused. This finding has been interpreted as showing that another individual or a group. It includes not only physical
Stage 6 people are less inclined to make moral judgments violence, but also verbal assaults and attacks on society and
and take action based on appeals to authorities. They may norms, such as cheating and stealing. In considering anti-
feel less obligated to follow the instructions of authorities, or social behavior, we will sometimes use the term aggression
they may not view the experimenters as being authoritative, to describe hostile acts that are detrimental to others, rather
or they may not be as intimidated in general by the views than referring to the personality trait of an aggressive per-
of others. sonality. This distinction is important because some people
The conclusion from these sorts of studies is that may be seen as having highly aggressive personalities but
simply examining someone’s beliefs or judgments about not as behaving immorally.
what behavior is right in a given situation is not a reli-
able way to predict behavior. It is often possible to explain
the reasons for a behavior after the fact, but predicting Q: Describe several different examples of
behavior is much more difficult. In addition, there is no prosocial and antisocial behaviors.
evidence that the weak link between beliefs and behavior
is more (or less) straightforward among young children
(Hardy & Carlo, 2011; Kang & Glassman, 2010; Walker, Antisocial Behavior There are no obvious developmen-
2004). Nonetheless, this complexity does not indicate tal trends in the tendency to cheat. A surprising number
that beliefs are completely separate from behaviors. The (some say more than 50 percent) of elementary school chil-
links between them are likely to be both intricate and dren cheat at some time in their grade school days (see
powerful, but they are hard to predict because so many Figure 12.11). Interestingly, the incidence does not seem to
influences affect behavior and because many situations drop as they grow older. It continues in secondary school
are ambiguous. and beyond (Davis et al., 1992; Evans & Craig, 1990;
These features of moral behavior in older children and Houser, 1978; Jensen et al., 2002). Some estimates sug-
adults raise a central question about development: Do gest that as many as 75 percent of college students cheat
younger children tend to show more behaviors that are at one point or another. Moreover, cheating does not stop
considered immoral than older children and adults do? at the end of college. Estimates of people who cheat to
Do children gradually engage in more morally appro- some degree on their income tax returns run very high.
priate behaviors as they mature? To be sure, younger And there are many people who do not tell a cashier when
children may have more difficulties resisting some they are mistakenly undercharged. In short, there is no
temptations, may not always be as sensitive to how their evidence that people cheat less as they get older.
actions influence others, and may be less prone to shame Similarly, there is no evidence of developmental trends
and guilt. But for all these differences, their behaviors do for stealing, lying, and disloyalty. These behaviors may
not show a general trend toward becoming increasingly take a different form with age, as transgressions become
moral. increasingly sophisticated and subtle. Still, it is not clear

448 CHAPTER 12 MORALITY IN THOUGHT AND ACTION

 less, many transgressions are not based on an inability to
delay gratification.

Prosocial Behavior The same lack of a clear devel-

opmental trend occurs in analyses of cooperation and
competition. Although many Western cultures encour-
age competition, experimenters studying cooperation
and competition generally consider cooperative behavior
more morally desirable and reward cooperative behav-
ior much more strongly. Figure 12.12 shows a game that
has been used for studying cooperation and competition
among children in many cultures. First, a marble is put in
a container, which is in the middle of a table. Two chil-
dren sit on opposite sides of the table, and each one takes
one of the strings attached to the sides of the container. The
object of the game is to pull on the string to move the con-
tainer close enough to reach in and get the marble. The chil-
dren are told that they will receive a reward for every marble
FIGURE 12.11 Cheating by children in school. As shown in this each of them gets (Kagan & Madsen, 1972). Every time one
photo of rural schoolchildren in Tibet, cheating occurs throughout
child gets a marble, the container is put back in the middle
the world. Although cheating may become more subtle and sophisti-
cated, there is no evidence that cheating becomes less prevalent with of the table, and a new marble is put in it. The container is
increasing age. held together by magnets, and if both children pull hard on
the strings, the container will come apart and the marble
will roll away, so that neither child will get it. The only way
that once a child has reached toddlerhood, there is a devel- to get the marble is to agree to cooperate by taking turns,
opmental change in the prevalence of any of these types such that first one child pulls the container close enough to
of immoral acts. Of course, it can be difficult to compare take out the marble while the other child holds the string
and measure the immoral behavior of people at different lightly and does not pull, and then the other child pulls the
ages. But young children are typically much less capable container and takes out the marble.
than adults of inflicting harm, regardless of their inten- In practice, many children never seem to reach a level
tions, and adults are often much more capable of conceal- of mutual trust that allows them to cooperate by taking
ing antisocial behaviors or casting blame on others. Once turns, and therefore neither wins any marbles. Rather than
those factors are accounted for, it is much more difficult to finding a general developmental trend of increasing coop-
know whether the rates of purposeful antisocial behaviors eration in all children, this research points to individual dif-
change with age. ferences, with some children being much more cooperative
Most children do become better able to control their than others. These findings have held up across many kinds
impulses and delay gratification of their immediate desires of assessments of cooperation and competition, ranging
as they grow older. Hence, moral transgressions related to from observational studies of free play to more structured
such difficulties often occur less often with age. Nonethe- games and scenarios. Research in this area also shows strong

A B
FIGURE 12.12 Cooperation versus competition. Shown here is an apparatus used to measure cooperation and competition among
children. The goal is for each child to retrieve a marble from within the container. Competitive participants simply pull on the strings, causing the
breakup of the container (which is held together by magnets), and thereby causing the marble to roll away, so that neither child gets the marble.
Cooperative participants agree to let each other get a marble on successive terms. Adapted from Madsen & Connor (1973).

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL BEHAVIOR 449

cross-cultural differences. For example, in one classic study, Some studies have found gradual developmental increases
children in a small Mexican town cooperated considerably in prosocial behaviors such as sharing and helping (Eisenberg
more on the marble task than did children from an Ameri- & Mussen, 1989; Eisenberg et al., 2006). But it can be dif-
can town (Madsen, 1971). ficult to distinguish between a child’s emerging grasp of
socially approved behaviors (such as holding a door open
for others) and an increase in a genuine desire to engage
Q: Describe how cooperation and competition in more altruistic behaviors. Recent studies suggest, how-
might be measured in two children. ever, that if the situation is set up appropriately, very young
children can be strikingly altruistic and prosocial, both in

SCIENTIFIC METHOD: Instrumental Helping in Toddlers

Hypothesis:
When a situation clearly shows that a person is in need of help to achieve a
goal, even young toddlers will behave altruistically.

Method:
1. Twenty-four 14-month-old toddlers participated in the experiment.
2. All the children saw an experimenter (1) drop a clothespin while hanging
up clothes and then try to retrieve it, (2) drop a marker while making a
drawing and then try to retrieve it, and (3) try to pick up paper balls with
tongs when the balls were out of reach for the experimenter but not for
the child.
3. In a control condition, the experimenter intentionally threw away the
clothespin/marker or did not try to move the paper balls to a new spot.
4. The researchers recorded the incidence of instrumental helping by the
toddlers.

Results:
In all three tasks, but especially the paper ball task, toddlers helped more in
the experimental condition.

Conclusion:
In tasks that involve instrumental helping of another person to achieve a
goal, very young children will altruistically offer assistance at no benefit to
themselves.

100
Mean percentage of trials

Experimental condition
80
Control
60

40

20

0
Clothespin Marker Paper ball
Source study: Warneken & Tomasello (2007). Helping to reach out-of-reach objects

450 CHAPTER 12 MORALITY IN THOUGHT AND ACTION

terms of helping others and in terms of wanting to be fair personal cost (Warneken & Tomasello, 2009a). This is differ-
about the distribution of resources (Shaw & Olson, 2012; ent from prosocial behavior based on sharing or comforting,
Warneken et al., 2011). One line of work depicts adults both of which may appear somewhat later in development.
struggling to do some task in which assistance would help Slightly older children will help even when it costs them
them greatly (such as trying to open a cabinet while carrying the opportunity to play with extremely attractive toys. These
several things or trying to obtain an out-of-reach object; see children are clearly not motivated by rewards; indeed, they
Scientific Method box). Even infants as young as 14 months will help just as often when the person who needs the help
old will spontaneously act to help when they see someone does not reward them as when the person does. In fact, in
in need (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006, 2007). Younger some cases, external rewards can actually reduce the desire
children may have difficulty inferring complex goals and to help in the future for reasons discussed more extensively
coordinating helping actions, but when the task is as simple in Chapter 13.
as providing objects that another person is trying to reach, The evolutionary roots of instrumental helping seem quite
even 14-month-olds do offer to help when there is no obvi- old. Chimpanzees, whose common ancestors with humans
ous benefit to themselves or any expected reward from the go back several million years, will help caregivers who are try-
person they are helping. ing to reach for an object and will do so in situations where
This form of prosocial behavior is called instrumental no rewards are present (Warneken & Tomasello 2009a).
helping. It involves perceiving someone who is unable to Chimpanzees may not show helping in as wide a range of
achieve a goal and acting altruistically to help that person, situations as young humans, but there is clearly a common
even when there are no obvious benefits to the helper (see drive to help others in ways that reflect true altruism.
Figure 12.13). Thus, even when 18-month-olds are presented Recent research has also shown that young children can
with physical obstacles to climb over to help another, they be quite sophisticated and prosocial in their sharing behaviors
readily do so, suggesting a desire to act even at considerable as well. Although children may not seem to engage in much
sharing until around 5 or 6 years of age, some situations will
elicit genuine sharing at considerably earlier ages. For example,
Out-of-reach Physical Obstacle
when children engage in collaborative efforts, even 3-year-
olds will share fairly in the fruits of those efforts (Warneken
et al., 2011). They will also adjust their allocations so as to
provide more resources to those who work more productively
(Kanngiesser & Warneken, 2012).
One theory of the development of altruistic helping is that
younger children are more indiscriminately helpful in cases
where they clearly perceive a person in need of help. As they
get older, however, they start to be more selective in whom
they choose to help, and they become more influenced by
A person accidentally drops an object on A person wants to put a pile of books such factors as whether they see the individual as belonging to
the floor and unsuccessfully reaches for it. into a cabinet, but she cannot open the the same social group as themselves and whether they see the
closed doors because her hands are full.
person as worthy of help (Warneken & Tomasello, 2009b).
Wrong Result Wrong Means
Because of their lack of discrimination, younger children may
actually be more altruistic than older children.
Yet, in other contexts, young children may be less altru-
istic, at least in situations where their lack of fairness is
unlikely to be detected by others. Thus, young children
who are asked to allocate resources for another child who
is not yet present and who will not know of their actions
will often allocate more resources to themselves even when
older children and adults would think it only fair to allo-
cate them equally (Sheskin, 2013). Other studies show that
A book slips from a stack as a person An object drops through a hole into a box between roughly 6 and 11 years of age, children want to
attempts to place it on top of the stack. and the person unsuccessfully tries to
grasp it through the small hole, ignorant
appear to be fair in allocating resources when others will
of a flap on the side of the box. witness the allocation, but will still be more unfair when it
FIGURE 12.13 Early altruism. Children who are at least 18 months won’t be detected (Shaw et al., 2013). More generally, when
old will help adult strangers, even when there is no obvious benefit or considerable rewards are at stake and a salient audience
reward for helping. From Warneken & Tomasello (2009b). is not present, young children may have more difficulty

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL BEHAVIOR 451

behaving fairly and prosocially and may be less generous these two areas that most of the research on prosocial and
(Leimgruber et al., 2012). The cases of spontaneous helping antisocial behavior has occurred. This research tends to ask
by much younger children are not an exception to this pat- why some individuals show more (or less) of a behavior than
tern because there is no competing strong reward. Empathy do others, rather than seeking universal patterns of moral
for others who are in trouble may be very early emerging, development.
but fair allocation of rewards may be much more situation-
ally sensitive and often difficult for young children.
Above and beyond any possible development patterns,
there are huge differences among individuals. Even if Temperament, Personality,
people are not fully consistent across situations, individu- and Moral Behavior
als still show clear differences in the way they act in moral Most researchers who investigate individual differences
situations. Perhaps only 1 person out of 1,000 would dive in moral behavior do not consider some children to have
into the sea to save a drowning stranger 100 yards away inherently better or worse moral judgment than others.
(see Figure 12.14); only a handful of people would walk They do, however, ask whether particular psychological
past an old lady who has fallen in the street without offer- mechanisms could make some people more likely than
ing help; only a small number of people would try to ver- others to commit immoral acts. These mechanisms could
bally and physically intimidate others to gain material range from differences in impulse control to the degree of
resources. empathy someone experiences. Even when the right thing
These differences across individuals raise the compelling to do is clear, some people might find it easier than others
question of why some people act in more morally appropri- to resist temptation or to delay gratification. Similarly, people
ate ways than others. Situational factors can be enormously who have difficulty empathizing with another’s pain or
compelling, but how can we explain the clear individual need would likely have trouble using the Golden Rule or
differences that exist over and above situational influences? care-based forms of moral reasoning. It is critical to keep in
We have already seen that differences in moral judgments mind the difference between psychological processes that
are fairly poor predictors of differences in moral behavior, often lead to moral (or immoral) actions and the ability to
so what are other factors that might cause such individual make moral judgments.
differences? At the broadest level, two other factors lead to
individual differences in moral behavior—and by this point,
they will be familiar as sources of individual differences in
other areas of development as well: (1) temperament and Q: How are psychological processes that might
personality, and (2) differences in social influences. It is in help foster immoral behaviors different from
psychological processes that underlie moral
judgments?

Self-Regulation One of the most frequently discussed sets

of processes associated with prosocial and antisocial behav-
ior is self-regulation, the ability to control our impulses by
managing our emotional states and our reactions to others
and to situations and to delay gratification of desires rather
than always acting on them immediately (see Figure 12.15).
An impulsive person with poor self-regulation will not nec-
essarily engage in immoral behaviors, but he may engage
in actions that are considered morally inappropriate since
they often spring from an inability to suppress a desire or
impulse.
Studies examining differences in immoral behavior more
FIGURE 12.14 Altruistic behavior. Prosocial reasoning about often focus on adults than on how this kind of behavior
altruism—helping others at a possible expense to the helper (here
develops. One reason for this is that immoral behaviors are
a person is jumping into the water to save strangers who are
drowning)—may include stages in which there is a concern with
difficult to document until later in life, when infractions
self-interest, a desire to seek the approval of others, and an appeal such as school suspensions and criminal convictions make
to internalized principles. Researchers ask if reasoning about altruism this kind of behavior easier to identify and measure. For that
should be considered a distinct domain with its own trajectory. reason, the study of self-regulation in adults is closely con-

452 CHAPTER 12 MORALITY IN THOUGHT AND ACTION

 to hold off engaging in an action that will bring a desired
reward. Some individuals seem to need positive experiences
immediately and are unable to wait for what they want.
They might well choose to get a small reward for minimal
sacrifice over the option of working longer at an unpleas-
ant task to earn a much larger eventual reward. Despite the
common assumption that antisocial children and adults
have difficulty with impulse control and delay of gratifica-
tion, few studies convincingly show a biological predisposi-
tion for such difficulties.
Personality variables also seem to influence the extent
to which a particular environment leads to behav-
ior problems. One analysis of very low income families
asked which children in those families showed more
resilience—that is, the ability to adjust or recover from
adverse events or situations—in the harsh environment
(Buckner et al., 2003). Children with higher levels of
self-regulation, as measured by emotion management and
executive functioning skills, were also more resilient. It
should be noted, however, that these children also had
FIGURE 12.15 Self-regulation. A lack of self-regulation—such more actively involved parents, raising the possibility that
as drawing on the wall of a formal living room—can be interpreted both parental effects and common, genetically driven
as immoral behavior if the child is thought to be old enough to know
temperamental components contributed to their higher
better.
levels of self-regulation and resilience.
Problems with self-regulation and delay of gratifica-
nected to morality, while these topics have more often been tion have been suggested as a partial cause of extreme
studied separately in children. We will discuss the develop- antisocial behaviors that can lead to criminality. There
ment of self-regulation in more depth in Chapter 13, which have been repeated suggestions that criminality is higher
concerns the child’s awareness of the self and others. Here among individuals who are more closely related genetically
we discuss self-regulation more narrowly in the context of (Eysenck, 1996; Gabrielli & Mednick, 1983; Wilson &
its links to the study of moral behavior. Herrnstein, 1985). Several studies have found higher con-
Self-regulation in the broadest sense is concerned with cordance rates among MZ twins than among DZ twins,
modulating our emotions in ways that help us accomplish a but these findings on their own cannot easily rule out the
goal (Eisenberg et al., 2004). It can often involve inhibiting fact that MZ twins also experience more similar envi-
an impulse, but it can also involve initiating an emotional ronments (Joseph, 2001). More compelling are adoption
state, such as consciously working up our courage to do a studies in which environmental and genetic differences
difficult act. In all its forms, this kind of effortful control are more neatly separated. In one adoption study in Den-
of behavior is more difficult for young children, perhaps mark, adopted children whose genetic fathers had criminal
because the ability to self-regulate is heavily related to the records were twice as likely to have criminal records as
maturation of the prefrontal cortex. were adopted children whose genetic fathers did not have
Children with poor self-regulation or low impulse con- criminal records (Hutchings & Mednick, 1977; Mednick
trol may be unable to wait long enough before they act to et al., 1984). These findings have been criticized, however,
consider the consequences of their actions. Thus, they may on the grounds that the placement of adopted children
act on their impulses before they realize that their actions is not random, which means that environment as well
may hurt others or violate social rules (Dunn & Hughes, as genetic background could be influencing criminality
2001). Poor impulse control can also lead to a tendency to (Joseph, 2001). Nonetheless, the research in this area tends
give in to temptation, even while knowing that it is better to support a partial genetic basis for individual differences
to do otherwise. On the other hand, when a child has better in antisocial behavior (Rhee & Waldman, 2002; Viding,
impulse control, even a small delay before doing something 2004).
questionable may provide the child with enough time for In addition to being related to self-regulation, genetic
reason to exert an influence. factors may also help make a child especially resilient to
Self-regulation is also related to the ability to delay grati- environmental stressors (such as child neglect) or especially
fication. Delay of gratification simply refers to the ability vulnerable to those stressors. Thus, the strongest genetic

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL BEHAVIOR 453

influences are seen in particular kinds of environments and Arousal Level and Positive Emotionality Most people
their interactions with particular alleles (Moffit, 2005). have a similar range of typical arousal levels. This means that
Moreover, it seems that genetic factors are more likely to they are typically alert and moderately reactive to normal
influence the emergence of physical aggression than social stimuli. Arousal levels have been linked to moral behaviors
aggression, which includes such behaviors as malicious on the assumption that they influence emotional reactions
teasing, social exclusion from a group, and humiliation to stimuli and situations. Unusually low ranges of arousal
(Brendgen et al., 2005). have been of special interest. The notion of underarousal is
Early antisocial behavior also tends to predict similar widely invoked in explanations of adult criminality. For psy-
later behaviors. One way this connection has been docu- chopaths, who feel neither empathy nor remorse, the arousal
mented is that children with conduct disorders are more problem is largely emotional (see Chapter 16). Because they
likely to engage in criminal behavior as adults. Children do not feel normal levels of anxiety about committing trans-
who are diagnosed with a conduct disorder regularly trans- gressions, they cannot learn from negative emotional feed-
gress in ways that impinge on others’ rights or in ways that back (Eysenck, 1964). For individuals with ADHD, the
violate social norms. In most cases, children who routinely arousal problem is considered to be more attentional, leading
steal, bully others, or cheat would qualify for this diagnosis, to a decreased ability to maintain attention and to track what
as would those who show a callous insensitivity in social happens in their environment. This problem might include
interactions (Frick et al., 2003; Lahey et al., 2003). Chil- difficulty tracking various clues that an action is likely to be
dren who consistently show these behaviors tend to exhibit considered inappropriate or upsetting. Developmentally, each
them for extended periods, well into adulthood. As adults, of these arousal deficits can become especially evident when
they are more likely to be physically abusive toward both parents and society try to instill a system of morality. If a
intimates and others. They are also more likely to violate child is emotionally underaroused, parents will have greater
the law and become criminals (Kazdin, 1995; Lahey et al., difficulty teaching moral lessons or instilling feelings of guilt
2003; Loeber, 1996; Robins & Rutter, 1990; Zoccolillo about transgressions. If a child is attentionally underaroused,
et al., 1992). parents will have trouble ensuring that the child listens to
The strong link between childhood conduct disorders moral explanations and understands the reasons for not
and adult rates of antisocial and criminal behavior is not engaging in certain behaviors. In addition, underarousal may
necessarily evidence of a temperamental or personality basis be related to an inability to feel empathy, a correlation found
for antisocial behavior, however, since environmental influ- in children as young as 2 years old (Young et al., 1999).
ences are constantly at work as well. But the consistency In addition to general arousal level, a child’s tempera-
that individuals’ antisocial behavior patterns often show ment (see Chapter 7) is also related to prosocial behaviors.
over much of the lifespan, combined with such traits as Studies have repeatedly found that children with sunnier
emotional insensitivity, does make it somewhat more plausi- dispositions—those who are temperamentally predisposed
ble that underlying psychological differences may put some to show positive emotions—tend to have more frequent
children more at risk for such behaviors. and stronger feelings of empathy than less upbeat chil-
In addition, theories about the genetic bases of more dren, and children who show more positive emotions are
extreme immoral behavior, such as crime, may not fully more likely to engage in prosocial behaviors (Eisenberg
apply to people who are prone to more moderate or mun- et al., 2000). One possible explanation for this link is that
dane immoral actions. Most of the available statistics on positive emotions may make it easier to think more about
conduct disorders and their links to adult behaviors exam- others’ feelings rather than being more self-focused (see
ine only one extreme end of the continuum between moral Figure 12.16). Research on the development of empathy
and immoral behavior. But only a very small percentage of has examined these issues and others in more detail.
children are diagnosed with conduct disorders, and an even
smaller percentage of them commit crimes as adults. Empathy We saw earlier that empathy plays an important
At present, many researchers believe that less extreme role in Eisenberg’s theory of the development of prosocial
cases of antisocial behavior involve the same processes as behavior. Her theory claims a close link between reason-
cases of conduct disorder and criminality, but to lesser ing and behavior and emphasizes prosocial behaviors and
extents. Chapter 16, which deals with childhood psycho- empathy. Feelings of empathy are often thought to lead to
pathology, discusses the dangers of assuming continuity appropriate prosocial behavior (Hoffman, 1990). Consid-
between behavior associated with psychopathology and ering the wide range of individual differences in prosocial
similar behaviors that are more common and less detrimen- behavior, do some people simply have less capacity to feel
tal. Moreover, as we will see, genetic influences on crimi- empathy for others? Can someone with normal social and
nality may extend far beyond the processes of emotional cognitive abilities nonetheless be unable to feel empathy?
regulation and delay of gratification. This question leads back to psychopathological popula-

454 CHAPTER 12 MORALITY IN THOUGHT AND ACTION

 moral action, as other influences can also come into play.
For example, a child might witness a classmate’s humilia-
tion in front of a large group and fully feel her classmate’s
pain but be unable to intervene because she is too shy to act
in front of the group.
Of course, feeling empathy and acting on it can take
many forms. There are different levels of empathy that
correspond to different levels of cognitive, perceptual, and
emotional complexity. For example, empathy-related phe-
nomena across various species can range from simple agita-
tion that an animal may feel when a member of its species is
in pain, to imitation, to purposefully taking another’s point
of view (as do humans), to fully experiencing another’s suf-
fering (Preston & de Waal, 2002). In evolutionary terms,
the ability for groups with shared genotypes to cooperate
can provide members with a selective advantage, since this
can make them more likely to survive and reproduce, mak-
ing it more likely that they will pass on their genotype to
a new generation. This logic may help explain why many
organisms have developed behaviors that enable them to be
FIGURE 12.16 Empathy. Children differ in the extent to which
sensitive to the emotional states of others (Sober & Wilson,
they feel empathy and act on those feelings, in this case comforting 1998).
another child in distress. Young children who show high levels of Similar to the notion that there are different degrees of
empathy and empathy-motivated behaviors are more likely to show empathy and that empathy-related behaviors can take many
similar behaviors in later years. forms, psychologists often distinguish between emotional
empathy and cognitive empathy (Losoya & Eisenberg,
2001). Experiencing emotional empathy involves witness-
tions, particularly psychopaths, who rarely feel intense ing another’s emotional state and, in a relatively immediate
emotions of any kind. In the case of empathy, this defi- and direct way, feeling the same emotion. It appears to be
cit leads to an inability to emotionally put themselves in a more basic and earlier-emerging form of empathy. Cog-
another person’s shoes. In addition, there is some evidence nitive empathy, which involves understanding and repre-
that genes contribute to differences in the ability to feel senting the emotional and mental points of view of others,
empathy (Frick et al., 2003; Zahn-Waxler et al., 2001). requires social cognitive skills and the ability to take anoth-
Such a genetic contribution may help explain why young er’s perspective. Cognitive empathy is often thought to
children who show prosocial behaviors, such as sharing develop later than emotional empathy and to be evolution-
toys, are more likely to make substantial charitable contri- arily more recent. The finding that emotional empathy and
butions as adolescents or young adults (Eisenberg, 2005; cognitive empathy seem to activate different brain regions
Eisenberg et al., 1983, 1991, 2002). The strong, immediate has led some researchers to suggest that people with autism
empathy that leads a 3-year-old to share a favorite doll may, have a deficit in cognitive empathy but not emotional empa-
in a more mature form, lead her to make regular donations thy, while psychopaths may have the opposite deficit (Blair,
to a homeless shelter. 2005, 2008; Saxe, 2006; see Chapter 16). More broadly,
In their first year of life, children may share others’ dis- fMRI studies of children suggest that emotional empathy
tress mostly as a form of imitation. Shortly thereafter, their appears early in development and involves activation of the
imitation seems to become full-fledged empathy, leading amygdala and related regions and then later becomes inte-
children not only to feel another’s distress but in some cases grated with more frontal cortical areas that involve more
to try to alleviate it (Cole et al., 1992; Eisenberg, 2000; cognitive forms of empathy (Decety et al., 2011).
Meltzoff, 2002; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992). Empathy in A third form of empathy, called motor empathy, is usu-
young children also enables them to engage in moral actions ally described as being elicited either as part of the process of
without having to rely on moral reasoning. Thus, just seeing pure physical imitation or by simply observing and feeling
someone else’s distress may trigger a desire to comfort that an action that we might be able to reproduce. As discussed
person separate from forming a judgment about how that in Chapter 4, it may be mediated by mirror neurons, which
person has been treated. A strong sense of empathy alone, are the neurons in specific brain regions that fire either
however, does not guarantee that a child will engage in a when a specific action is performed or when we see another

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL BEHAVIOR 455

person engaging in that action (Blair, 2005; Decety & are potentially very large. We turn to those effects in the
Lamm, 2006). These three forms of empathy very often next section.
interact with each other. Thus, motor empathy may often
trigger emotional empathy, and emotional empathy in turn
requires at least some sense of cognitive empathy to under-
stand how “the other” relates to the self (Losoya & Eisen- Social Influences on Moral Behavior
berg, 2001). All children engage in inappropriate behaviors from time to
Empathy seems to be closely linked to emotional regu- time. Most children lie, cheat, or steal at least a few times
lation as well (Eisenberg, 2005; Eisenberg et al., 2006). If during their childhood. Moreover, it seems that parents,
a child is overwhelmed by negative emotions triggered by peers, and society at large all influence children’s tenden-
another child’s distress, that flood of emotions may lead cies to engage in antisocial and prosocial behaviors. In fact,
the child to focus on his own feelings rather than on those the vast majority of research on moral development in chil-
of the other child. To recognize emotional states in oth- dren has asked how various social factors influence moral
ers, children must be able to pull back and modulate their behavior. In this section, we will consider how such factors
own emotions. Thus, children who are found to have higher can influence both antisocial and prosocial behaviors; in
levels of emotional regulation seem to feel more emotional essence, we will begin examining how children are social-
and cognitive empathy for others. Across several studies that ized. In later chapters, we will more systematically consider
asked teachers and parents to rate elementary school stu- how families (see Chapter 14) and the community at large
dents’ emotional regulation skills, the children who were (see Chapter 15) socialize children. Here we will focus spe-
rated as having higher levels of emotional regulation were cifically on the social influences on moral behaviors.
found to also be more likely to show feelings of empathy for We would all like the next generation of children to be
others (Eisenberg, 2005). virtuous—to refrain from lying, cheating, stealing, and
Empathy is also influenced by the social context in which using physical and verbal aggression to intimidate and
an individual is immersed (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; unfairly gain resources from others. Antisocial behaviors
Dovidio et al., 2006; Lanzetta & Englis, 1989). For exam- can be learned in several ways, and there are several ways
ple, in situations that promote cooperative efforts, people to discourage such behaviors. Many of these types of social
are prone to feel empathy toward others in their group. But influences follow traditional theories of development.
in competitive situations, they may actually feel sadness A number of theories have set out to explain how social
at others’ happiness and joy at others’ misfortunes, a phe- influences affect children’s moral behavior. Learning theo-
nomenon that has been called counterempathy (Lanzetta & rists think in terms of positive and negative reinforcements,
Englis, 1989). The classical notion of schadenfreude, or using rewards and punishment to change children’s behav-
“pleasure from the misfortune of others,” may well predom- ior (Gershoff, 2002; Parke, 2002; Parke & Asher, 1983;
inate in situations when the other person is construed as a Parke & Walters, 1967). Another classic theory of socializa-
rival. Developmentally, we can see how differences in chil- tion, which is known as modeling theory, argues that people
dren’s cooperative and competitive tendencies could interact will reproduce behaviors that they see others performing.
with aspects of the situation that promote either feelings of Regarding the development of moral behavior, this theory
empathy or feelings of counterempathy. In some tasks, chil- argues that when children see adults acting in prosocial
dren show more joy in succeeding in a difficult task when ways, they are likely to curb antisocial behavior and engage
another child does worse and more envy and antagonism in prosocial behavior (Bandura, 1971; Bandura & Walters,
in failing when another child does better. This version of 1963). Many contemporary approaches take a more cog-
schadenfreude is stronger in younger children (age 7) than in nitive perspective on these social influences, asking how
older children (age 13) and may be related to reduced shar- parenting practices, among other influences, help to instill
ing behavior in younger children (Steinbeis & Singer, 2013). a conscience in the child. As we will see, these different
In summary, many factors related to temperament or approaches offer a set of tradeoffs, in which each approach
personality can influence moral behavior, but they do not partially explains how parents and society might help make
directly make a child behave morally or immorally. A child a child behave more morally, but no single approach pro-
can be impulsive or emotionally volatile without showing a vides a comprehensive account.
high incidence of immoral behaviors. Similarly, a child with
great empathy for others may still not act on those feelings Punishment and Learning Theories Learning theory
in prosocial ways especially in some competitive situations. accounts of moral development tended to focus on the
Even when we examine the strongest links between a tem- effects that positive and negative reinforcements, delivered
peramental factor and a moral behavior, the influences of in various patterns, have on children’s behavior. These
socialization and other environmental factors on behavior theories tended to dominate the psychological literature

456 CHAPTER 12 MORALITY IN THOUGHT AND ACTION

 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL P OLICY

At What Age Should an Offender

Be Treated as an Adult?

S
everal high-profile cases of prosecuting juveniles as How does research on the development of moral reasoning
adults have raised questions about the age at which and moral behavior bear on the question of trying a 13-year-old
children should be held morally responsible for their killer as an adult? Despite the thousands of studies on moral
actions. No one would think that a 4-year-old who development, the implications are unclear. Given the difficulties
kills an older sibling with his parent’s gun should be held as of demonstrating clear stages in the development of moral rea-
responsible as an adult, but what about an 11-year-old or a soning, it is not an easy matter to declare that children at a given
14-year-old? age simply lack a certain level of moral reasoning. Moreover,
Consider the case of Nathaniel Abraham, who in 1997, at even if it were possible to create a scale of moral maturity, it
the age of 11, shot and killed a stranger with a .22 caliber rifle. would be difficult to ensure that the courts applied it consis-
Nathaniel, who was 13 at the time of his trial, was prosecuted tently to all offenders. We know that a fair number of adults
in court as an adult. Many observers were shocked at the show moral reasoning patterns that seem to be more common
thought of a 13-year-old being treated as an adult, but the among children. Should those people, who are not necessarily
prosecutors insisted that Abraham was no ordinary 13-year- mentally deficient, be held less responsible for their actions than
old (see Figure 12.17). At the time of the crime, he had a other adults?
long history of problems with the police, many of them involv- A second issue concerns whether the justice system
ing violence against others (Bradshaw, 1999). Convicted of should be more concerned with protecting the safety of oth-
second-degree murder, he avoided imprisonment in an adult ers or with punishing wrongdoers. It would be possible to
facility only because the law grants judges the discretion of make the case that a child who has committed a violent crime
sentencing children younger than 14 to juvenile facilities. is likely to commit other violent acts in the future, but this
does not necessarily mean that the child should be punished
as an adult. In fact, imprisoning the child with adult criminals,
who may exert an even more antisocial influence on him, may
increase (rather than diminish) the chance that he will com-
mit future violent crimes when he is released from prison.
Instead of putting the child in prison, another approach might
be to find a way to monitor the child so as to minimize his risk
to others without treating him like an adult offender in other
respects.
At present, perhaps the most that developmental research
can offer is evidence for the wide variety of ways in which
moral reasoning and judgment develop. Even if there are no
clear moral stages, the many documented developmental differ-
ences in such areas as emotional regulation, forms of empathy,
and understanding of consequences all support arguments for
treating children differently from adults in the criminal justice
FIGURE 12.17 Treating youthful offenders as system (Whaley & Koenen, 2001). We all believe that young
adults. Nathaniel Abraham, shown here in court at age 13, children differ from adults in their abilities to appreciate the con-
was tried as an adult for murder. A recent surge of such trials in
sequences of their actions and to inhibit their impulses. Still, we
several countries raises profound questions about how scientific
research on the moral development of children should be used to need to better understand how these abilities emerge before
evaluate the appropriate age at which juveniles might be tried as developmental differences should be brought to bear on public
adults. policy decisions.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL BEHAVIOR 457

in the middle of the twentieth century and have become It might seem that the punishment delivered after the
less prominent in recent decades. They examined the effi- dog began to eat would be more effective than a punish-
cacy of punishment in instilling moral behavior in a child. ment delivered while the dog was merely initiating the
Among their findings, learning theorists documented that action. In fact, punishment delivered early was much more
it is not the severity of punishment alone that most clearly effective. Beagles punished early continued to avoid the
predicts internalization of moral values. Instead, many desired food, even when they were alone in the room with
factors interact with the way the punishment is delivered. no experimenter present. They would enter the room, cast
One of the strongest factors concerns the timing of the a seemingly forlorn look at the better food, and then unen-
punishment. thusiastically eat the inferior food. By contrast, beagles
Theories about the role of timing in delivering an effective punished later would sneak over to the favored food and
punishment were inspired by pioneering studies of the effec- eat it rapidly and nervously, sometimes seeming to look
tiveness of punishment with dogs (Solomon, 1964; Solomon apprehensively toward the door where the experimenter
et al., 1968). Imagine an experiment in which a hungry beagle might appear. In short, punishing early seemed to cause a
is led into a room that has two bowls of food: an attractive bowl lasting avoidance of the superior food, whereas punishing
of the tastiest, freshest dog food and a bowl of a clearly inferior late caused the dogs to be more furtive about eating the
dry product. An experimenter sits between the two bowls of superior food.
food with a rolled-up newspaper (see Figure 12.18). Naturally,
the beagle starts to approach the bowl of tastier food.
At this point, the situation breaks into two experimental Q: How does timing of punishment seem to
conditions. In one condition, the beagle is punished with interact with the internalization of a desired
a swat of the newspaper as soon as he merely touches the
fresher food with his nose. The dog is not punished for behavior?
touching the inferior food, however, and eventually, he eats
that food instead. In the second condition, the beagle is Because a beagle’s intelligence obviously differs mark-
allowed to begin eating the preferred food before he is pun- edly from that of a child, the punishment-induced inhibi-
ished, and he is then restricted to eating the inferior food. tion is not thought to involve a cognitively rich sense of
If the dog is later led into the room that has both bowls of guilt. Instead, it is assumed that with early punishment,
food, will he be more likely to continue to avoid the bowl the dog is conditioned to have a negative arousal so early
with the tasty food and eat the dry food in the other bowl? in the action that he changes his behavior. By contrast,
if the negative arousal is conditioned after starting the
behavior, it occurs too late to inhibit the behavior. Instead,
late punishment often results in behavior that is focused
on avoiding getting caught.
You might think that children, with their more sophisti-
cated levels of thought, might not show the same pattern of
responses to the timing of punishments. Yet, in a series of
studies modeled closely after the Solomon studies with dogs,
early punishment was shown to be much more effective for
children as well (Parke, 1969; Parke & Walters, 1967). In
this study, kindergartners were taken to a classroom where
there was an appealing toy (such as a bright red truck) and
an unattractive “toy” (such as some small drab toy dishes).
Children in the early punishment condition were scolded for
approaching the attractive toy, whereas children in the late
punishment condition were rebuked only after they began
A B
playing with it. The children were then left alone in the
FIGURE 12.18 Early and late punishment. In a classic study room with the toys while the experimenters watched them
with beagles, the experimenters either (A) punished the beagles covertly. Like the beagles, the children punished early reluc-
immediately upon detecting their intent to eat a preferred food (early
tantly trudged over to the unattractive toy and played with
punishment), or (B) punished them as they were eating some of
the desired food (late punishment). Although both groups of dogs it while looking wistfully at the attractive toy. By contrast,
learned to eat the inferior food in the immediate training task, the the children punished late were much more likely to play
delay of punishment had a very different effect on later behavior. with the attractive toy while watching the door anxiously in
Adapted from Solomon et al. (1968). case an adult appeared.

458 CHAPTER 12 MORALITY IN THOUGHT AND ACTION

 Children, of course, are much more complex creatures Parent: And do you remember how you thought it would
than dogs, which is evident in the many other factors that be funny to put the glue in Susie’s hat so that it would
interact with the timing of children’s punishment to make get all over her hair during recess?
it maximally effective. Social development researcher Ross Child: Yes.
Parke found that punishment is likely to be most effec- Parent: Do you remember thinking how Susie would look
tive if (1) it is delivered consistently, (2) it is delivered by a and how everyone would laugh at her?
person whom the child likes and sees as warm and caring, Child: Yes.
and (3) it is accompanied by a reasoned explanation. These Parent: Well, it was very wrong to want to do that to
three guidelines may seem easy to implement in theory, but Susie, and it was a terrible way to treat her. The glue
they can be surprisingly difficult to honor in reality. Most was painful to get out and made her feel embarrassed.
caregivers show at least some inconsistency in administering You should be ashamed of yourself [followed by more
punishment or they sometimes fail to provide full explana- scolding and revocation of privileges].
tions. For example, if a father is completely exhausted after
a rough day at work and his 4-year-old daughter is making In short, much is known about how to deliver effective
a fort in the yard with her bed linens, he may just sigh and punishments that can help children develop the internal
let it happen rather than going to the trouble of scolding ability to inhibit certain behaviors. The learning theorists’
the child, explaining why the behavior is wrong, and then work on punishments may not lead to a better understand-
dealing with the resulting tears and sadness. He may know ing of the nature of guilt and conscience, but it does provide
full well that it is important to be consistent and to explain an understanding of the cognitive repertoire that can be
precisely why the behavior is wrong and why punishment is used in punishing the child, including both the explana-
occurring, but it is not always easy to follow through with tions that should accompany punishments and the methods
that knowledge. for helping the child “relive” an experience so as to make the
The greater effectiveness of warm and caring punish- punishment coincide with things the child thought and felt
ers may seem surprising, given the folklore about children at the beginning of the misbehavior.
behaving like angels around the cold, heartless schoolmas- It is important to remember, however, that even when pun-
ter. But Parke’s findings suggest that such harsh taskmas- ishments are delivered in an ideal way, they can have nega-
ters may only be effective in ensuring compliance when tive side effects over time. Children may come to avoid the
they are present. Such strictness may not prompt children punishing adults, thus weakening emotional bonds with
to internalize the appropriate behavior so that they comply caregivers when they are most needed. Even worse, children
with it even when they are alone. This principle leads to an may start to imitate the patterns of punishment themselves,
important point: punishment should be used sparingly. If it using them aggressively and inappropriately on others. Cer-
occurs too frequently, the child may no longer perceive the tainly children who have experienced a great deal of excessive
adult as warm and caring, which is what makes the adult so physical punishment are much more likely to be physically
effective with the child. abusive as adults, both with their spouses and with their
Finally, in the real world, an adult cannot always be pres- children. Indeed, one extensive meta-analysis—statistical
ent when the child is just beginning an immoral action. analysis of the data from many studies—examined the rela-
But when punishment has to be administered long after a tionship between physical punishment and several other vari-
transgression, several cognitive techniques can be used to ables (Gershoff, 2002). Despite repeated claims that physical
help the child bring to mind the misbehavior that occurred punishment might have an important place in child rear-
hours earlier. One intriguing technique involves “reliving” ing, the meta-analysis revealed no positive effect beyond an
the act. For example, if a child put glue in a classmate’s win- association with higher rates of immediate compliance. In all
ter hat just before it was worn during recess, the parent can- other respects, physical punishment was consistently related to
not be there to impose punishment at the beginning of the negative outcomes, such as increased aggression against others
action. But that evening, the parent can remind the child of and a weaker internalization of moral values. Table 12.5 shows
what was happening at the time of the misbehavior, asking these patterns of associations with physical punishment.
him to think through his earlier motivations and actions,
and then administer the punishment. For example, a dia-
logue of the following sort might occur: Q: What are some of the negative side effects
of using physical punishment on children?
Parent: Johnny, do you remember when you snuck off
to the coatroom today with that jar of glue from Ms.
Stebbin’s desk? Not all studies paint a uniformly negative picture of
Child: Yes. physical punishment. For example, a light spanking,

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL BEHAVIOR 459

TABLE 12.5 Associations
between physical punishment Type of Effect Size of Association
and various measures in child-
hood and adulthood. Experienc- In childhood
ing more physical punishment is
associated with various kinds of More immediate compliance Large
effects during both childhood and Greater likelihood of suffering physical abuse Medium to large
adulthood. All of the associations
are statistically significant, but they More antisocial behavior Medium
vary in degree. A small association Poorer mental health Medium
means that physical punishment
has a significant but modest cor- More aggression Small to medium
relation with a measure, whereas Less internalization of morals Small
a large association means that the
correlation is quite high. Adapted In adulthood
from Gershoff (2002).
More aggression Medium
More antisocial behavior Small to medium
Poorer mental health Small
Greater likelihood of abusing one’s child or spouse Small

accompanied by both a reason and a genuine concern for ments have made prominent efforts to raise public aware-
the child’s welfare, may not have worse effects than non- ness of the effects of physical abuse on children (Gracia &
physical forms of punishment (Benjet & Kazdin, 2003; Herrero, 2008). Socioeconomic strain and the lack of
Larzelere & Kuhn, 2005). In addition, the negative effects social support structures can also cause very substantial
of physical punishment may vary across cultures and even variations in the prevalence of physical punishment within
among subgroups within a culture (MacKenzie et al., 2011). a culture (MacKenzie et al., 2011). For example, in the
The negative associations with physical punishment sum- state of Kentucky, physical punishment in the school is
marized in Table 12.5 tend to hold for European-American more prevalent in counties that have higher incidences of
families in the United States, but physical punishment does families living in poverty and lower incidences of involve-
not always show such undesirable associations in African- ment in community groups such as churches (McClure
American families. Indeed, careful, appropriate physical & May, 2008). In addition, males, single parents, and
punishment is more associated with positive outcomes than those associated with some fundamentalist religions are
with negative outcomes in certain cultures (Lansford et al., more likely to use physical punishment (Xu et al., 2000).
2004; Larzelere, 2000). These patterns of variation make it clear that social poli-
Examining punishment across a wider range of cultures, cies designed to ameliorate the negative effects of physical
including those of China, India, Italy, Kenya, the Philip- punishment must be very sensitive to the social contexts in
pines, and Thailand, reveals quite substantial variations in which it occurs.
the amount of physical punishment parents use (Lansford
et al., 2005). For example, parents in Thailand are much less Modeling Theory and Moral Behaviors We have so
likely to use physical punishment than parents in Kenya. far largely focused on the punishment of antisocial behav-
Moreover, in cultures where physical punishment is com- iors. It is more difficult and rare to punish a child for not
mon, it is not nearly as strongly related to childhood behav- being especially altruistic. There is, however, another form
ior problems as it is in cultures where physical punishment of social influence on morality that seems to apply equally
is less common (Lansford et al., 2005). to both antisocial and prosocial behaviors. Known as mod-
Even in relatively similar cultures, there are substantial eling theory (or social learning theory), it relies on the
variations in the acceptability of physical punishment. For likelihood that people tend to reproduce behaviors that they
example, its acceptability varies quite dramatically within see others performing (Bandura, 1971).
the countries of the European Union, and in general it Hundreds of studies have shown that both children and
is considered less acceptable in countries whose govern- adults become more likely to perform a wide variety of

460 CHAPTER 12 MORALITY IN THOUGHT AND ACTION

antisocial behaviors after seeing someone else engaging in in which modeling can be made more effective. A child is
the behavior. In the most famous studies of this phenome- more likely to copy the model’s behavior if she likes and
non, conducted by Albert Bandura and his associates, chil- respects the model, if the actions are clear and salient, and
dren observed an adult being physically aggressive toward if the model frequently performs actions that are easy to
an inflatable toy called a Bobo doll (Bandura et al., 1961). imitate. Anyone who masters the research on modeling can
The adult modeled a series of aggressive acts toward the use that knowledge to change children’s behavior. Yet, at
Bobo doll, including hitting, kicking, and sitting on it (see the same time, modeling theory has little to say about why
Figure 12.19). After the children patiently watched this children copy models. Instead, it often focuses on the vari-
rather strange adult behavior, they were left alone with ables that make children more likely to imitate them. To
the Bobo doll and were covertly observed by the experi- explain why children copy some people’s actions and not
menter to see what they would do. As Figure 12.19 shows, the actions of others, however, requires a broader theory
the children often copied the adult’s violent behavior with of identification, respect, and affiliation with others. To
frightening intensity and specificity. explain why children find some actions more salient than
Of course, the Bobo doll study presents children with a others requires an account of how children perceive and
bizarre experimental setting in which they may have thought encode social actions. The modeling approach has pro-
they were taking part in a game rather than really being vided a framework, but there is still a need for more com-
aggressive. But an extensive series of follow-up studies by both prehensive theories in each of these areas.
Bandura and others suggests that in real-life situations, too, In the realm of prosocial behavior, we have seen that
seeing others modeling aggressive and antisocial behaviors young children often engage in actions that suggest an intent
can increase the prevalence of similar behaviors in those who to benefit others rather than themselves. We have also seen
observe the aggressive behaviors (Bandura, 1971; Bandura & that children and adults vary a great deal in the extent to
Walters, 1963). Moreover, because the behavior that is imi- which they act prosocially. Many researchers have turned to
tated is often highly specific, it is difficult to explain the mod- modeling theory to explain these individual differences, in
eling effect as simply a general loosening of inhibitions. Even part because it offers a clear explanation of how caregivers
without any reinforcement, children become more likely to might encourage prosocial behavior. If you have a warm rela-
steal, cheat, lie, hit, or tease after observing models doing so. tionship with your child, and your child respects and identi-
At one level, modeling theory seems to offer a full fies with you, then the stage is set for effective modeling.
account of how both antisocial and prosocial behaviors When the child sees you engage in a prosocial behavior that
emerge, suggesting that children will reproduce either type she can easily understand and reproduce, she will more likely
of behavior after seeing it modeled by others. Moreover, reproduce the behavior. This pattern of influence has been
Bandura and his colleagues have shown numerous ways supported both in studies in which adults and children who

A B
FIGURE 12.19 Modeling aggressive behavior. Children have repeatedly been shown to reproduce quite specific behaviors modeled by
adults, whether it is the somewhat bizarre act of physically assaulting a Bobo doll or the verbal assault of younger, more helpless individuals.
From Bandura (1971).

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL BEHAVIOR 461

act altruistically are interviewed later and in experimental development. Just as older views of cognitive and percep-
studies examining the effects of prosocial modeling on chil- tual development saw the child as an empty vessel or a
dren (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Hoffman, 1977). blank slate that passively receives knowledge, so do many
views of moral socialization see the parents and society as
providing the child with the right sorts of values. Yet, there
is every reason to think that such a passive model of the
Q: What form of socialization seems to be most child works no better for morality than it does for cognitive
natural for prosocial behavior? and perceptual development in general. Indeed, it is impor-
tant for caregivers and developmental researchers alike to
be sensitive to the ways in which children actively con-
Parent-Child Interactions and the Development of struct their own moral sense and behaviors, and not always
Conscience Although it might seem that more cognitive by simply imitating those of adults (Grusec & Goodnow,
views of how parenting instills a sense of morality are quite 1994). As parents, especially, we must recognize that our
recent, the earliest version of this approach was proposed by children will not always reason morally as we do, nor will
Sigmund Freud (1923/1960). Like much of Freud’s work, this they always come to precisely the same conclusions that we
theory was based on Freud’s idea that the mind is composed do. But we can hope that they will become moral individu-
of three parts: the id, the ego, and superego. The id appears als in a rich, deep, and self-constructed sense. Moreover,
first in development and represents basic desires and drives. different children take very different pathways to achiev-
The ego appears next and enables the child to channel and ing a conscience, and the same style of parenting that is
direct the id. Finally, the superego appears last, when true effective with one child may be ineffective with another
morality is thought to emerge. According to Freud, younger (Kochanska, 1997).
children are unable to be truly moral because they are gov- The development of conscience is often linked to the
erned solely by the id, which responds only to impulses and emergence of feelings of shame and guilt (see Figure 12.20).
lacks any moderation or controls that make it possible to These feelings often motivate people to act on their con-
delay gratification. Only later, in toddlerhood, does the ego science. Young children show intriguing individual differ-
start to emerge as the regulator of the id’s instinctual pas- ences in their tendencies to react to problems with either
sions. But the ego merely keeps these passions in check until shame or guilt. In one study, children between 2 and 3 years
they can be satisfied. It has no sense of right or wrong. Only old were allowed to play with toys belonging to the experi-
the superego, which is not fully formed until around age 6, is menter, and during the play session, they were led to believe
capable of providing an internal moral sense. Freud believed that they had broken a toy (Barrett et al., 1993). The children
that before the superego develops, only external controls, were classified according to their reactions to the broken toy.
such as punishments and reinforcements from parents, can The “avoiders,” who seemed motivated by shame, avoided
guide a child toward moral behavior. the experimenter when she returned to the room. They also
Freud’s theory of moral development is marred by many did not tell the experimenter of the mishap and were very
problems. It emphasizes the growth of the superego out of slow to try to fix the situation. The “amenders,” who seemed
Oedipal and Electra conflicts, in which children subcon- motivated by guilt, did not avoid the experimenter and were
sciously resent their same-sex parent out of jealousy for the quick to tell her that the toy was broken and to try to repair
other parent’s affection. Freud’s ideas about these conflicts it themselves. Clearly, children with these different styles
led him to make a variety of predictions, including the erro- might respond very differently in similar real-life situations.
neous claim that women are less “moral” than men because Shame orientations generally seem to have more adverse
the resolution of the Oedipal conflict by boys more strongly psychological correlates, such as higher rates of depression,
promotes the development of the superego than does the in older children and adults (Kim et al., 2011; Tangney
resolution of the Electra conflict by girls. Moreover, Freud’s et al., 2007). Shame is considered more painful because it
claim that guilt and conscience do not develop until age 6 is negatively impacts the self more directly, creating feelings
suspect, given reports that children as young as 2 or 3 clearly of being helpless and worthless as well as exposing a per-
show guilt and remorse (Hoffman, 1982). And his more son’s flaws. In contrast, guilt is thought to focus a person’s
detailed predictions about the effects of various parental thoughts and feelings on a specific behavior rather than on
styles and dispositions on children’s emerging superegos also the core sense of self and is generally less painful and dev-
fail to hold true (Hoffman, 1970). Let us therefore consider astating to a person. The early emergence of individual dif-
more contemporary approaches to how parents and other ferences in the tendency to experience shame versus guilt
caregivers might socialize children to have a moral sense. raises important questions about the extent to which parents
Parents do not merely “instill” their values in the child. might be able to gently guide the child more toward a guilt
Rather, the child also plays a role in his or her own moral orientation, and indeed, there are suggestions that different

462 CHAPTER 12 MORALITY IN THOUGHT AND ACTION

A B
FIGURE 12.20 Guilt versus shame. (A) Children who are motivated by guilt often focus on a particular behavior rather than on core feelings
about themselves, whereas (B) children who feel shame often feel helpless and worthless.

parental interaction styles might lead to different self-con- also contribute to the correlation—instead of, or in addition
scious moral emotions (Lagattuta & Thompson, 2007). to, parents’ effects on their children. We will return to these
Parents can also influence how sensitive their children issues in more detail in Chapters 13 through 16.
are to different aspects of moral behaviors and their conse-
quences. One study examined these effects by asking moth-
ers of 4-year-olds to talk about their child’s good and bad
actions in the prior week. The researchers then analyzed the
mother’s comments to determine how often she referred to
Conclusions
the child’s feelings and intentions, rules, or the consequences Morality is a complex, multifaceted aspect of being human.
of the child’s actions. The extent to which the mother made We reason in moral ways that are distinct from reasoning
comments focusing on such themes predicted the child’s about such things as social conventions and physical laws,
conscience development, which was measured in terms of and these distinctive ways of reasoning seem to appear quite
compliance and internalization of certain values (Laible & early in development. Within the realm of morality itself,
Thompson, 2000). In other words, the way a mother talks there are further differences. When we are quite young, we
about her child’s actions, both to the child and to others, can empathize with others in need, and yet that empathy
may affect the way the child thinks about moral issues and relates only indirectly to altruistic reasoning and to proso-
acts on them (Grusec et al., 2000). More generally, parents cial actions. Similarly, aggressive feelings are related to anti-
who adopt a noncoercive, highly interactive, and sensi- social reasoning and behaviors, but they are not the same
tive parenting style that is infused with positive emotions thing. We can have hostile and aggressive feelings but not
and that uses very gentle discipline strategies tend to fos- necessarily act on them. Moreover, the reasoning associated
ter an earlier development of conscience in their children with such feelings may change over development with the
(Kochanska & Aksan, 2006). emergence of more sophisticated ways of understanding sit-
Developmental psychologists have learned a great deal uations and other agents. We can reason about many moral
about how patterns of child rearing and socialization can domains, including sharing resources, fairness and justice,
affect a child’s moral development (Bugental & Good- and care, in ways that show their own developmental trajec-
now, 1998; Eisenberg, 2000; Kochanska & Aksan, 2006; tories and that can be relatively compartmentalized (Killen,
Shweder et al., 1997). Much of that research is also closely 2007). Finally, all kinds of moral reasoning are linked in
connected to the broader issues of socialization discussed subtle and complex ways to behavior, although there is no
in Chapters 14 and 15, concerning how the child becomes easy, straightforward way of translating moral beliefs into
part of a family and society. Throughout these discussions, actions.
one important caution to keep in mind is that correlations Despite this pluralism and the rapid state of change in
between parenting styles and children’s behaviors are just research on moral development, some general themes in
that, correlations. Explaining these patterns requires a care- this area do emerge and reflect themes we have discussed
ful investigation of whether shared genetic factors, similar in earlier chapters. First, the idea that the child as an active
environments, and the children’s effects on their parents may constructor of morality rather than a passive recipient is

CONCLUSIONS 463
intrinsic to Kohlberg’s approach and to many other theories of everyone everywhere evaluating certain kinds of moral
of moral reasoning, such as Gilligan’s, Damon’s, and Eisen- dilemmas in the same way. At the same time, however,
berg’s. It is less intrinsic to many older theories of social- cultures do not differ so dramatically that we cannot find
ization and to current political arguments about instilling common ground with other groups. There may be a uni-
moral values in children. But most current, sophisticated versal collection of moral reasoning systems, and cultures
views of socialization do seem to recognize that the child is may emphasize (or downplay) different moral components,
an active participant in the socialization process. depending on which situations and social structures are
A second familiar theme is that patterns of moral rea- most pervasive in those cultures.
soning and behavior show less dramatic developmental Finally, as we look back to the two views of morality
shifts than were formerly assumed to be the case, and many introduced at the beginning of this chapter, it is now clear
aspects of moral development are significantly influenced that young children are not amoral in the manner we assume
by situational factors. Of course, in some situations, older holds for most animals. Within their first 2 years, children
children tend to use more complex patterns of moral reason- show compassion, selfishness, and a range of other behaviors
ing than do young children, but even younger children can indicating an early moral sense. It is also clear that young
grasp these patterns when they are carefully simplified and children are neither primarily moral nor immoral. At all
made relevant to them. ages, children show both prosocial and antisocial behaviors.
On a related note, cross-cultural research suggests that Children share with adults a tension between good and bad
there may not be universals of moral reasoning in the sense impulses.

STU DY AN D REVIEW

SUMMARY understand game rules. He proposed a series of three stages

of moral reasoning (premoral, heteronomous, and autono-
The Development of Moral Thought mous stages) based on the child’s developing concepts of
● One classical view of how children come to be moral beings
rules, of culpability, and of appropriate justice.
● As with much of cognitive development, a closer look at the
sees the young child as having an inherently moral nature,
sometimes of good, sometimes of evil. A different view sees evidence for stage theories has revealed serious problems.
the young child as essentially amoral and too immature to be Rather than an early inability to engage in certain kinds
considered capable of either moral judgment or culpability of moral thought, developmental differences in moral rea-
for actions. soning seem more related to a wide variety of variables not
● Evolutionary psychology and cultural psychology have each
directly linked to morality, such as social conventions and an
offered more recent views of the origins of moral thought. inability to remember an entire sequence of events. In addi-
The evolutionary perspective emphasizes moral universals tion, Piaget’s attempts to draw inferences about moral judg-
that are part of humans’ biological heritage, and cultural ment from studying children’s conceptions of game rules are
psychology focuses on the influence of culture on moral problematic because children’s understanding of social con-
values. ventions develops quite differently from their understanding
● Although moral thought and moral action are intimately
of morality.
● Lawrence Kohlberg’s work largely superseded Piaget’s theory.
related, it is clear that they are not the same thing and that
one does not always predict the other. For that reason, it has Kohlberg advocated a theory of moral development with six
been most natural as a research strategy to focus on either numbered stages divided into three levels (preconventional,
moral judgment in its own right or on factors that influence conventional, and postconventional). He used moral dilem-
the emergence of moral and immoral behaviors. mas to uncover forms of moral reasoning that he believed
● Piaget formulated his theory of the development of moral
revealed children’s beliefs about what morality really is. As
thought based on observations of how children come to later researchers more extensively probed Kohlberg’s stages,

464 CHAPTER 12 MORALITY IN THOUGHT AND ACTION

 however, it became clear that they do not represent an invari- behavioral problems later in life, which some have argued
ant sequence across cultures and genders. supports the notion that these behaviors have a genetic basis.
● Carol Gilligan proposed three stages of moral development ● Correlations between early behavioral problems and later
(preconventional, conventional, and postconventional) that ones may also be caused by a constant adverse environment
emphasize care, concern, and empathy. According to Gilli- or manner of parenting. Albert Bandura’s research into mod-
gan, females progress through the stages more quickly than eling theory showed that children will reproduce quite closely
males. Later research did not consistently find a gender dif- the actions of models like parents and other older individuals
ference, however, in moral reasoning. around them, including antisocial and immoral behaviors.
● Findings showing that the same individual can use several ● Some forms of punishment can cause long-term changes
distinct forms of moral reasoning, depending on the situ- in behavior, but the timing of the punishment is extremely
ation, gave rise to a pluralistic view of moral thought. In important, as is making sure the child understands the ratio-
this view, children and adults have several systems of moral nale for the punishment. Other forms of punishment can be
interpretation available to them. Different kinds of interpre- ineffective or cause negative side effects in many situations,
tations predominate among different people and groups, but as in the case of physical punishment.
all interpretations are potentially available to most groups, ● Children may develop moral consciences that are either
given the right context. Moral development looks less like a driven largely by guilt or shame. Children who feel guilt are
progression through stages of moral reasoning and more like more likely to try to repair a wrong in the presence of an
shifts in terms of what forms of reasoning are used in specific adult than those who feel shame.
situations. Younger children have trouble understanding ● It still remains to be seen whether differences in parenting
some complex moral situations, but these difficulties may be styles cause differences in children’s morality or whether, for
largely due to the complexity of the description rather than example, the similar genotypes and/or environments that
differences in moral reasoning ability. parents and children share are the true causes of any links
between parents’ and children’s behaviors.
The Development of Moral Behavior
● A different research tradition has focused more on the devel-
THOUGHT QUESTIONS
opment of moral behavior itself. Adults and children may not
be morally consistent across situations. A moral offender in 1. Adults will often rationalize a moral transgression after the
one situation may be a moral upholder in another. It is not at fact in an attempt to justify it or reduce its perceived severity.
all easy to reliably predict moral behaviors from moral rea- Discuss how the ability to engage in such rationalizations
soning patterns. People of any age may know what is right, might develop in childhood. Would it be possible for some
but still fail to do it. form of rationalization to be present even in preschoolers?
● Antisocial behavior does not show obvious developmental How might early emerging rationalizations differ from later
trends, and there is no evidence that people cheat, steal, or lie ones?
less as they age. Nonetheless, the particular forms of the anti- 2. Under what circumstances, if any, do you think it is accept-
social behaviors may change with age as the person becomes able to use physical punishment with a 7-year-old child?
more sophisticated. Prosocial behavior does seem to become How do you justify that choice in terms of the research
more common with age, although even very young children literature?
can show some forms of altruism, such as instrumental help- 3. Under what circumstances might rapid emotionally driven
ing. There are, however, powerful individual differences moral judgments result in more ethical decisions than slow,
among children (and adults) in the incidence of moral behav- deliberative, and more cognitively based ones? Are there use-
ior. Scholars have attempted to explain these differences both ful rules of thumb that emerge from your analysis? Are there
in terms of underlying differences in temperament and per- developmental implications?
sonality and in terms of social influences. 4. Some politicians have suggested that having children read
● Temperamental and personality differences in moral behavior
stories about historical figures who show great moral charac-
have focused not on morality itself but on psychological com- ter will lead to more moral children. Consider the feasibility
ponents that can influence immoral behavior. Problems with of such an approach and how it might have unanticipated
impulse control, difficulties delaying gratification, deficits in
consequences.
the ability to feel empathy, and low levels of arousal have all
been associated with the development of antisocial behaviors.
Some behavior problems have significant heritabilities, so KEY TERMS
there is some reason to believe that psychological components
may have some biological basis related to genetic variation. altruism (p. 443) cognitive empathy (p. 455)
Children who show very early behavioral problems in pre- antisocial behavior (p. 448) collectivist culture (p. 441)
school are also statistically more likely to have more serious autonomous stage (p. 434) conduct disorder (p. 454)

STUDY AND REVIEW 465

constructivist approach id (p. 462) modeling theory (p. 460) resilience (p. 453)
(p. 442) immanent justice (p. 434) moral dilemma (p. 437) self-regulation (p. 452)
cultural psychology (p. 429) impersonal moral situation moral dumbfounding social aggression (p. 454)
delay of gratification (p. 453) (p. 446) (p. 446) social convention (p. 435)
ego (p. 462) individualist culture (p. 441) moral modules (p. 444) social intuitionist model
emotional empathy (p. 455) information integration motor empathy (p. 455) (p. 446)
evolutionary psychology theory (p. 436) personal moral situation social learning theory
(p. 429) instrumental helping (p. 451) (p. 446) (p. 460)
heteronomous stage (p. 432) meta-analysis (p. 459) prosocial behavior (p. 448) superego (p. 462)

466 CHAPTER 12 MORALITY IN THOUGHT AND ACTION

 13
Knowing Ourselves,
Knowing Others
Self-Concepts and • Contextual Influences on Self-Regulation • Traits and Optimism
Self-Representations Developing a Theory of Mind • Attribution, Motivation, and Creativity
• Senses of Self • Early Aspects of Theory of Mind Conclusions
• The Mirror Test and Self-Concept • Comparative Perspectives on Theory of
• Gender Identity Mind
Summary
Developing a Sense of Self-Worth • Understanding False Beliefs
• Self-Esteem • A Theory of Mind Module?
• Self-Efficacy • Beyond False Beliefs

Self-Regulation Making Attributions about

• Brain Maturation and the Development
Ourselves and Others
of Self-Regulation • Emerging Explanations of Behavior
 hen you come across your baby pictures or We build on these ideas to discuss how children develop

W watch a video from your childhood, what

kind of connection do you feel to the per-
son in the pictures? If you have no memory
of these particular early experiences, the
images can evoke a sense of great distance from your younger
self, along with some feeling of being less connected to that
self. But when you see a recent photo of yourself or encoun-
an understanding of the minds of others and how they
come to have insight and control with respect to their own
mental and emotional states. People in all cultures think not
only about their own minds but also about other people’s
minds. This ability to think about other people’s beliefs and
desires and how those beliefs and desires predict and explain
behavior is referred to as theory of mind. It is critical to
ter your reflection, you almost always recognize and identify mature social interactions. We have seen in Chapters 5 and
with this self-image automatically. 6 that even infants are aware of social entities as being dis-
Many years ago, as we were looking through an old tinct from nonsocial ones, and by 18 months of age, these
album, our 3-year-old became fascinated with a series of children are clearly able to make inferences about a person’s
pictures showing him riding a pony in Yosemite National behavior in terms of his or her goals. But these social skills,
Park. Before we had even mentioned the pictures, he pointed impressive as they might be, are only a small part of what
to them and excitedly said, “That’s me! That’s me!” Some- comes to be a full-fledged theory of mind. Lastly, we will
how, either from contextual cues or from the resemblance consider how this understanding of the mind unfolds in
between the child in the photograph and himself, he rec- childhood, becoming ever more important in social interac-
ognized that the photo showed him and not another child. tions, and how individuals make attributions about them-
This seemingly simple act requires not just having a sense selves and others. The first place to start, however, concerns
of self, but also being able to use certain cues to recognize thoughts about the self.
our own image. These abilities are just the beginning of a
much richer awareness of the self, along with the ability to
think about our own mind and the minds of others and an
understanding of how people’s beliefs and traits are linked
to behaviors.
Self-Concepts and
A great deal of complex development occurs as children
come to understand themselves as well as the minds and
Self-Representations
emotions of others. In this chapter, we will consider how The developmental psychology of the self has several com-
children gain this social understanding of themselves and ponents, including the different ways of thinking about and
others and how this understanding relates to motivation being aware of who we are. It also involves an understand-
and actions. Chapter 14 considers how children, as socially ing of the ways in which external devices, such as mirrors,
aware individuals, become parts of families. Chapter 15 videos, or photographs, can represent us. Finally, it involves
broadens the discussion further to explain how children the linkage of larger sociocultural roles, such as being a boy
take part in ever larger social communities, from their peer or a girl, with knowledge of our own sex.
group to their whole culture.
We will begin this chapter by focusing on how children
develop concepts and representations of themselves. We will
see that there is no single sense of the self. Rather, there
Senses of Self
are several different senses that emerge at different times to One way to understand the development of the child’s ability
eventually create a more integrated mature sense of self in to think about minds and behavior is to look first at how the
middle childhood. Then we will turn to the classic “mirror child develops a sense of self—the various ways an individual
test,” in which the child recognizes that he is the person in thinks about himself and has distinct kinds of self-awareness.
the mirror, and we will ask how this ability to recognize It is tempting to think that the development of a sense of self
himself in a mirror relates to the various senses of self and is a single psychological event—something like consciously
their developmental courses. From there we will consider thinking, “I am different from others in a special way.” Look-
how children value and regulate themselves and their behav- ing more closely, however, it is apparent that people sense the
iors. Next we will see that the relation between self-esteem self in several ways that have their own developmental path-
and various developmental outcomes is more complex than ways, rather than forming one monolithic sense of self.
some popular accounts might suggest. We then consider the
relation between self-esteem and self-efficacy—namely, the Neisser’s Five Senses of Self The idea that people have
sense of having an influence on the world. While revisiting several senses of self has been around for some time. In 1890,
the topic of self-regulation, we will address broader ques- the great American psychologist and philosopher William
tions regarding senses of self and self-awareness. James described four senses of self: the physical self, the

468 CHAPTER 13 KNOWING OURSELVES, KNOWING OTHERS

mental self, the spiritual self, and the ego (Gallagher, 2000;
James, 1890/1950). One of the many researchers who have
elaborated on this view is the psychologist Ulric Neisser. His
perspective touches on many of the developmental studies
we have examined in earlier chapters. Neisser argued for five
senses of self: ecological, interpersonal, extended, private, and
conceptual (Neisser, 1988; Neisser & Fivush, 1994).
These different senses of self emerge at different points in
development, but it is important to realize that the sense of
self continues to develop over the years. Thus, earlier senses
of self are not simply serving as building blocks for later
ones, as we have seen in many stage theories. Rather, all the
different senses of self coexist in adults. We will consider
each of Neisser’s five senses of self in a bit more detail.
The ecological self is our sense of where we are as we FIGURE 13.2 The interpersonal self. When interacting with other
social agents, even infants appear to have a sense of the interper-
move through the world (see Figure 13.1). Humans and
sonal self.
many other species have this perceptual and motor sense
of self. The ecological self utilizes what our senses perceive,
calculating and responding to where we are relative to
objects in the external world. It is automatic, immediate, “I” and “you” that arises when we first encounter and inter-
and nonverbal. To use a term coined by the psychologist act with another. Humans share this sense of self with many
James J. Gibson, it is also “directly perceived,” meaning that other social species and it does not, in its early forms, require
the newborn has an ecological sense of self instantly, from the ability to think about how another person’s beliefs and
the first moment that she perceives the world. This sense of desires explain that person’s actions. It, too, may have its
self is evident when, for example, an infant flinches at the earliest origins shortly after birth (see Figure 13.2). We saw
approach of a looming object, clearly showing a sense of the evidence for an early emergence of the interpersonal self
self being threatened as the object approaches on a colli- in Chapter 6. Infants under 2 months of age become dis-
sion course (Ball & Tronick, 1971; Schmuckler & Li, 1998; tressed when their mothers do not interact in a manner that
see Chapter 3). The ecological self becomes more sophis- fits the natural timing of back-and-forth social interactions
ticated as the child’s motor and perceptual skills develop. (Adamson & Frick, 2003; Bertin & Striano, 2006; Cohn &
The interpersonal self is the sense of interacting with Tronick, 1988, 1989; Field, 1977; Gunning et al., 2013; Nadel
other intentional agents. It arises automatically and without et al., 1999; Tronick, 1989; Murray & Trevarthen, 1985).
reflection. This inherently social sense of self includes a sen- The extended self is our sense of ourselves as progressing
sitivity to the reciprocal nature and the timing parameters along an autobiographical timeline. We think of ourselves
of social interactions. It is roughly the immediate sense of as linked to the past (through memories) and to the future
(through beliefs about what will likely happen next). As we
saw in Chapter 10, the development of this sense of self in
the preschool years may be an important factor in explain-
ing the point at which infantile amnesia ends (Fivush &
Schwarzmueller, 1998; Nelson & Fivush, 2004).
The private self is our sense that we have certain privi-
leged experiences that no one else has access to unless we
choose to communicate those experiences to others. The pri-
vate self includes our dreams, the unique perspectives and
background knowledge that we bring to any situation, and
our unique knowledge of how it feels to move our body in a
certain way (see Figure 13.3). These different aspects of the
private self may not all develop at the same time, but they
typically emerge in the later preschool years. The emerging
FIGURE 13.1 The ecological self. When a child is moving through
private self may be seen when preschool children start to
her environment, such as traveling down a train track as the world appreciate that their own point of view may differ from those
flows by, she experiences a sense of self-presence and movement in of others. We have seen evidence of the development of this
the environment. sense of self in circumstances where children do not show

SELF-CONCEPTS AND SELF-REPRESENTATIONS 469

 parent or sibling), tribal or ethnic or national roles, or roles
as a person in contrast to other living creatures. This may
be the most sophisticated sense of self and the one most
influenced by other people and the surrounding culture. In
short, the conceptual self includes the various ways in which
high-level cognition helps articulate who we are relative to
others. In Chapter 14 and especially Chapter 15, we will
see several ways in which children begin learning these roles
in the preschool years and continue through elementary
school, adolescence, and young adulthood.
Neisser’s five senses of self, summarized in Table 13.1,
represent some of the different facets of the self that have
been uncovered by the large and diverse body of research
on perceptual and cognitive development. The same
FIGURE 13.3 The private self. At some point during the late developmental phenomena potentially could be more
preschool years, children start to understand that dreams are part of
finely divided into six senses or collapsed into four, and
the private self.
whether these particular senses of self are precisely the
right ones will continue to spur investigations for many
egocentrism, including the development of narrative skills years to come. (For alternative models, see Damon &
(see Chapter 8) and their understanding of spatial relations Hart, 1988; Harter, 1998.) The key point is that the sense
(see Chapter 9). We will see later in this chapter that chil- of self is not based on a single insight that children have
dren’s developing understanding of mental lives can include at some point in development, nor is it acquired by gradu-
a sense that different people will have different mental states ally developing one kind of understanding. Rather, there
and privileged experiences. are qualitatively different senses of self. Each one follows
The conceptual self includes our sense of the roles that its own developmental journey, even as it interacts with
we occupy in broader social and cultural contexts. It can other senses of self and contributes to an even higher-
include notions of gender roles, family roles (as a child or order self-concept.

Sense of Self Time of Emergence Characteristics

Ecological self Birth onward Sense of where we are as we move through the world
Perceptual and motor awareness
Automatic, immediate, nonverbal
Interpersonal self Shortly after birth onward Interacting with other intentional agents
Automatic, without reflection
Inherently social
Extended self Age 4 onward Autobiographical timeline
Understanding that we are linked to the past and having the ability to
think about the future
Private self Age 4 onward Understanding that we have privileged experiences no one else has
Knowledge, dreams, perspectives
Conceptual self Age 4–5 onward, with major growth in Most influenced by others and by ambient culture
middle childhood and beyond Social roles (gender roles, family roles)
Able to articulate who we are relative to others

TABLE 13.1 Neisser’s five senses of the self. Neisser (1988) argued that there are five distinct senses of the self rather than a single
unitary concept.

470 CHAPTER 13 KNOWING OURSELVES, KNOWING OTHERS

 make the same mark on the other dolphins. Those with the
Q: Describe five different senses of self, how visible marks spent much more time in front of the mirrors
they develop, and their implications for cognitive examining themselves than the dolphins whose marks were
invisible. They also seemed intent on turning and position-
and social development. ing themselves in front of the mirror to get the best views
(Reiss, 2011; Reiss & Marino, 2001).
Most children first pass the mirror test at around 18
months (see Figure 13.4C), but some children do not pass it
The Mirror Test and Self-Concept until age 2 (Anderson, 1984; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979;
One of the most studied aspects of the sense of self concerns Lewis et al., 1985). Before that time, they do not touch the
our ability to recognize ourselves in a mirror. Experimenters mark on their own foreheads when they see it in a mirror,
have tested this self-recognition ability in young children although they might touch the odd-looking mark on the
and various animals using a technique called the mirror “other child” in the mirror. Given that so few species pass
test. This method involves putting an artificial mark on the the mirror test and that most of those species are either
subject and testing whether, when faced with a mirror, the closely related to humans or otherwise thought to have
subject realizes that the mark seen in the mirror is actually high-level cognitive capacities, it is perhaps not surprising
on the self and not on another individual (Gallup, 1970). that creatures who pass the test have been credited with a
When this test was first used with chimpanzees, a bright red sophisticated self-concept—namely, a conscious sense of
mark was placed on a chimp’s forehead when it was under the self as an independent agent in the world. In addition,
anesthesia. The chimp was put in front of a mirror, and some researchers have argued that the psychological pro-
when it awoke, researchers observed whether the animal’s cesses that enable creatures to pass the mirror test are the
behavior suggested awareness that the mark it saw in the same processes that enable a creature to have empathy for
mirror was on its own head. others (Gallup, 1998).
Data from the mirror test have been vigorously debated,
but those debates tend to converge on some common con-
clusions (Anderson, 1984; Heyes, 1998). Even though many Q: What is the mirror test, and how is it related
animals can be taught to use mirrors to find hidden objects, to the developing sense of self?
only humans, some of the great apes (chimpanzees, bono-
bos, orangutans, and possibly gorillas; see Figure 13.4A),
elephants, and bottle-nosed dolphins have passed the mirror Variations on the Mirror Test It is difficult to say
test (Boyson & Himes, 1999; Plotnik et al., 2010). In one whether passing the mirror test reflects a full self-concept.
study, bottle-nosed dolphins that had already become accus- Instead, it may tap into a child’s more specialized ability
tomed to mirrors on one side of their tank clearly passed the to notice that a visual image moves in perfect synchrony
mirror test (see Figure 13.4B). The researchers used a water- with his own body and that the synchronized image cor-
proof marker to make a visible mark on the heads of some responds to himself. With this kind of sensitivity, which
of the dolphins, and as a control, they used invisible ink to has been called a kinesthetic self-concept, the child senses

A B C
FIGURE 13.4 The mirror test. In the mirror test, a visible mark is put on a participant’s face and is only visible in a mirror. When the partici-
pant sees the mark in the mirror, the critical question is whether he will touch the mark on the mirror or the mark on his own body. The relative
rarity of this behavior across species has led some to argue that it is evidence for a true concept of self as well as the ability to put oneself in
others’ shoes empathically (Gallup, 1998). But it may be that the ability to pass the mirror test is only one part of the full self-concept. Pictured
here are mirror tests with (A) a chimpanzee, (B) a bottle-nosed dolphin, and (C) an 18-month-old human infant.

SELF-CONCEPTS AND SELF-REPRESENTATIONS 471

a link between himself and the synchronous display with- The toddlers touched the leg stickers at the same age that
out a deeper understanding that the display shows an image they touched stickers on their faces.
of himself (Mitchell, 2002). The kinesthetic self-concept This line of research also showed that toddlers rapidly
resembles Neisser’s ecological self, concerned with percep- update their self-representations. When a new pair of pants
tual and motor awareness (Neisser, 1993). was attached to the high chair, such that the child could be
Studies that substituted a video display for the mirror slipped into them unknowingly, the child would not reach
have supported this more conservative speculation on what for the sticker when seeing his legs in the mirror (Nielsen
it means to pass the mirror test. The video display was either et al., 2006). In contrast, if the toddlers could see the new
synchronous with what the child was doing or there was pants as they were put into the high chair, they would touch
a delay—sometimes as brief as 2 seconds—between what the sticker on their leg after seeing it in the mirror. Appar-
the child was doing and what she saw in the video. When ently, when they did not realize they had on new pants, they
the display was synchronous, the children would sometimes thought that the legs might belong to another child; but
notice the dot in the video and then touch their own fore- with a brief cue that new pants were on their own legs, they
heads. But when the video was even slightly delayed, they passed the mirror test. Thus, when toddlers can pass the
did not touch their foreheads (Povinelli & Simon, 1998). mirror test, they can do so for all parts of their bodies, and
They noticed the “other” child and sometimes called it by they readily update their sense of what those parts look like.
their own name, but they did not seem to recognize it as These results of the various versions of the mirror test
their own image. Not until they were almost 4 years old reinforce the idea that the self-concept has many facets, each
did children respond to the dot in the delayed displays by with its own developmental journey. The facets may inter-
examining the same spot on their own bodies. relate and even form critical foundations for later-emerging
Based on these results, some have argued that the extended ones. Thus, the kinesthetic or ecological sense of self may be
sense of self must emerge toward the end of the third year, a necessary step for the child to develop the extended self,
allowing children to pass the delayed mirror test, and that even as all the facets persist and continue to develop.
passing the test in the synchronous condition shows only
the earlier, kinesthetic sense of self. Interestingly, no other
animals are known to pass the delayed mirror test (Povi- Q: What are the limitations of the mirror test for
nelli, 1998). Children who are 2 and 3 years old also fail providing a full account of the development of
the test much more often with the simultaneous video than the self-concept?
with mirrors (Suddendorf et al., 2007). This “video deficit”
remains even when the video image is life-size and reversed,
just as it would be in a mirror. For those reasons, the video
studies cannot offer conclusive evidence that toddlers who
pass the mirror test are relying on synchronicity alone. Gender Identity
Quite a few young children and many monkeys do seem One facet of the self that seems quite closely anchored to
to have some sense that mirror images of themselves are spe- the self-concept is gender identity, which means having a
cial, even though they may not know that the image is actu- clear sense of being either male or female. Children seem
ally of themselves. Thus, infants as young as 4 months old to first learn their own gender category, as well as some of
behave differently in front of mirror images of themselves the surface trappings of gender (clothing, hair, and so on)
than in front of images of others mimicking them (Rochat & at around 2 years of age. At about the same time, they also
Striano, 2002). Similarly, capuchin monkeys behave differ- start to learn about gender-typical activities (for example,
ently in front of mirror reflections than in front of images of shaving versus putting on makeup) and gender-typical toys
other monkeys (de Waal et al., 2005). Although neither the (for example, vehicles versus dolls; Halim & Ruble, 2010;
young infants nor the monkeys could pass the mirror test Poulin-Dubois et al., 2002; Serbin et al., 2001). Finally,
with the mark, they do have some rudimentary sense that a sense of a deeper essential nature of gender—that there
self-images are different. is something intrinsic and inside the body determining
Researchers have also found that passing the mirror test gender—starts to emerge at around 4 years of age (Gelman
does not simply require the child to be able to recognize an et al., 1986; Gelman & Taylor, 2000; Kohlberg, 1966).
anomaly on his face, a plausible possibility given the special Interestingly, 5- and 6-year-olds view gender-related prop-
salience of faces. In a variation on the mirror test, research- erties as just as intrinsic as animal species properties. In
ers covertly put a sticker on a toddler’s leg where the child contrast, between age 10 and adulthood, individuals start
could not directly see it. When the child was then put into to differentiate the two kinds of properties, seeing gender
a high chair in front of a mirror so he could see his legs identity as more influenced by the environment and social-
reflected, he would reach for the sticker on his own body. ization (Taylor et al., 2009).

472 CHAPTER 13 KNOWING OURSELVES, KNOWING OTHERS

 It seems obvious that at some point, children’s ideas about
gender are heavily influenced by noticing anatomical differ-
ences between their own sex and the other sex and then,
over time, adopting the culture’s views about how each gen-
der should act. Thus, gender identity (perceptions of the self
as a girl or a boy) and gender roles (how I should behave
as a girl or a boy) have often been assumed to develop as
one integrated complex. But this assumption is problematic,
because some individuals who have a clear sense of their
gender might still, for a variety of reasons, adopt nonstan-
dard gender roles (for example, men who identify as males
but dress as women). Despite these exceptions, however, it
was assumed until the last decade or so that children learned
both gender identity and gender roles by observing others in
their culture (Lytton & Romney, 1991). FIGURE 13.5 Gender identity. Gender identity was thought to be
completely a result of socialization practices, such as dressing girls
For that reason, for much of the twentieth century, if a
and boys in distinctive colors, which might encourage children to
genetically male infant was born with ambiguous or miss- feel similar to others of their own sex and different from those of the
ing genitalia, doctors and psychologists often advised par- opposite sex from a young age. But there are some indications that
ents to raise the child as a girl (Money, 1975). Based on the children have a biologically determined sense of their sex that may
idea that an individual’s gender identity and sense of gender overcome socialization practices.
roles developed simultaneously, researchers believed that the
child would assume that “her” anatomy was that of a girl girl (see Figure 13.6). Despite extreme efforts to socialize
and would therefore develop the gender identity of a girl. In Brenda as a girl, she rebelled against this socialization and
many cases, if the genitalia were atypical or missing, addi- was desperately unhappy (Colapinto, 2000). When she
tional surgery would be performed to make the infant appear was informed at age 14 that she was born a genetic male,
more like a girl, the assumption being that this would make she chose to reverse all feminizing medical procedures and
it even easier for the child to adopt a female gender identity. hormonal treatments and started living as a male called
One dramatic case involved identical twin boys, one David. David later married a woman and became the father
of whom, as an infant, had his penis accidentally sev- of several adopted children. Tragically, at the age of 38,
ered in a mishandled circumcision in 1966. John Money, David killed himself.
a psychologist and expert on gender identity and sexual The extent to which gender identity is biologically
reassignment at Johns Hopkins University, was presented determined has been studied more systematically in a large
with the case and argued that the boy with the missing
penis should be raised as a girl. This was reportedly the first
time that sex-reassignment surgery was done on a boy who
had neither genetic nor hormonal abnormalities. This case
was widely discussed for years as an example of how either
male or female gender identity could be imposed on geneti-
cally identical individuals based on how they were raised.
Because the two boys were identical twins, they not only
shared the same genomes, but also had experienced the
same intrauterine environment. The prevailing view at the
time was that a person’s gender identity merely reflects how
the person is labeled and how he or she is raised. Researchers
believed that if you give a genetic male a female name and
raise the child as a girl in all respects, the child will adopt
the gender identity of a girl (see Figure 13.5).
Over the years, however, the assumption that gender FIGURE 13.6 Biological sex and gender identity. Although
biologically male, Bruce Reimer was raised as a girl (and renamed
identity is entirely learned and completely malleable has
Brenda) after a botched circumcision. Despite major attempts to
been severely challenged—and strong evidence against the socialize Brenda as a girl, which also involved feminizing hormones,
original view came from this twin’s case. That individual, the child never felt comfortable with that gender identity. As an adult,
who was raised as Brenda and never informed of “her” she changed her name to David, had male reconstruction surgery,
genetic maleness, nonetheless resisted being raised as a and lived as a male, as shown here.

SELF-CONCEPTS AND SELF-REPRESENTATIONS 473

number of genetic males who, like Brenda, were raised as rizing oneself as a boy or a girl (gender identity) is usually
females—in these cases, because of atypical genitalia at birth associated with preferring activities and appearances that
(Reiner, 1997, 2005; Yang et al., 2010). Quite remarkably, a are correlated with that category (gender roles). In addition,
large majority of these genetic males, even after being raised sexual attraction to a particular gender category (gender
as girls for many years and not knowing their genetic sex, object choice) is also typically correlated with an attraction
stated that they felt themselves to be male. Other studies to the opposite gender category. But each of these aspects of
also support the idea that biological gender, as specified by gender can be independent of each other. A boy can strongly
X and Y chromosomes and the hormonal environments identify as a male, prefer typically feminine things, and be
they typically induce, has an important influence on gender attracted to girls. Every permutation is possible. For that
identity (Bao & Swaab, 2011; Savic et al., 2010). None- reason, the development of gender identity is discussed in
theless, as we will see in Chapters 14 and 15, socialization this chapter, while gender roles and attractions are discussed
can have a strong influence as well (Cohen-Kettenis, 2005; in Chapters 14 and 15, which deal more with social interac-
Meyer-Bahlburg, 2005). tions and influences.
The fascinating question that arises is how the genetic
and hormonal differences between males and females can
cause such cognitive differences. What physiological differ-
ences can lead a child who is told that “she” is a girl and is
Q: What are the differences between gender
made to look like a girl and act like a girl still feel comfort- identity, gender roles, and gender object
able only as a boy? Two possibilities arise. One is simply choice?
that the child prefers certain activities that are associated
with boys, despite his parents’ attempts to instill other pref-
erences. Perhaps the child is more aggressive and prefers
more rough-and-tumble activities. Perhaps the child prefers
focusing on physical objects, such as blocks and vehicles, Developing a Sense of
rather than on social interactions and conversations. The
child might then notice that boys prefer the same activities
Self-Worth
and come to identify with them. We could call this the Beyond simply having a sense of themselves as individuals,
similarity explanation. An alternative explanation is that children also develop feelings about their own worth and
aspects of the concept of being male or female are geneti- about their ability to accomplish goals. Over the course of
cally and hormonally predetermined. This second view may childhood, they also improve control over their impulses
seem implausible, but the first explanation has problems as and over the actions necessary to achieve their goals. During
well, since we all know of young girls or boys who prefer this time, children become more sophisticated interpreters
activities associated with the opposite gender and yet iden- of behavior, observing the effects of particular situations and
tify strongly with their own gender. In addition, the first individuals’ dispositions to make inferences about them-
explanation depends on actively debated assumptions that selves and others. This section explores these different facets
sex chromosomes do cause differences in such behaviors as of the self, which all bear on the question of how children’s
rough-and-tumble play or interest in social interactions. As developing views of themselves relate to their behavior.
is the case with so many developmental phenomena, gender
identity almost surely involves a rich interplay of biological
influences (genetic and hormonal) and socialization. Here
we have focused more heavily on the biological influences. Self-Esteem
In Chapters 14 and 15, we will focus more on socialization, The child’s self-concept and self-esteem are intricately inter-
although such socialization influences tend to involve gen- twined, and it is difficult to discuss one without the other
der roles as opposed to gender identity. (Damon & Hart, 1982, 1988). As a first approximation,
however, we can think of self-esteem as the value-related
aspect of thinking about ourselves (Blascovich & Tomaka,
Q: How have views changed about the role 1991; Harter, 1998). In particular, self-esteem involves an
of socialization in the emergence of gender assessment of our own worth and the emotions that accom-
identity? pany such an assessment. Self-concept, on the other hand, is
a somewhat broader term with two major aspects. One facet
of the self-concept is relatively judgment free and involves
It is important to keep in mind that gender identity is knowing facts about ourselves (I am a boy. I live in Spring-
not the same as gender role or gender object choice. Catego- field. I like peppermint ice cream.). The other facet evaluates

474 CHAPTER 13 KNOWING OURSELVES, KNOWING OTHERS

aspects of the self, often by comparing ourselves to others
(I am the best runner. I am very smart. I am handsome.).
We will therefore consider the development of self-esteem
in conjunction with the development of social comparison
skills. If the younger child has only limited social compari-
son skills, then the kinds of social comparisons he is able to
make should relate to the nature of his self-esteem.
Between the preschool years and adolescence, self-esteem
normally undergoes several significant changes, which fall
into roughly four periods (Harter, 1998). The first period,
during the preschool years, involves excessively positive
views of the self on all dimensions. These views are not only
unrealistic, but also comically extreme at times. Who hasn’t
heard a 3-year-old boast that she is the strongest, fastest, or
bravest person anywhere and that she can do anything? At FIGURE 13.7 Change in self-esteem. Younger children are more
likely to have high levels of self-esteem, which tends to drop with
these early ages, children ignore negative feedback that con- increasing age.
tradicts these inflated views of the self. This pattern seems
to be related to their excessive optimism, discussed later in
this chapter. It may be highly adaptive for the young child influence how the child values herself on various dimen-
to overestimate her abilities so that she is not discouraged by sions (Frey & Ruble, 1990). A child might observe, over
the inevitable failures involved in becoming a more mature, several episodes, that he does not do as well as others at cer-
skilled individual (Lockhart et al., 2002; Shin et al., 2007). tain activities (for example, sports that involve large body
In the second period, during the early school years, the movements such as running). Across these experiences, he
positive attitude remains but is not as extreme and unre- may conclude that he is uncoordinated and that this is a
alistic. Children around this age start to make social com- trait-like property in him.
parisons, mostly by comparing their current selves with the In the fourth period, during later periods of adoles-
way they were at earlier ages (Oosterwegel & Oppenheimer, cence and young adulthood, social comparisons become
1993; Ruble & Frey, 1991). Thus, a child might notice that more complex and context dependent. Adolescents learn
she is now taller, stronger, or faster than she used to be. Con- to more carefully decide whom to compare themselves to,
veniently, those comparisons to her younger self tend to rein- and their inferences about their own traits and dispositions
force a positive attitude about getting better and better (see become more refined. In addition, individual differences
Figure 13.7). Although some older accounts see the child as in interpreting social comparisons tend to become more
simply incapable of making other sorts of social comparisons pronounced during this period. Some now see their poor
in the early school years, the reality is more complex. At one performances as evidence of enduring, unchangeable faults,
level, preschoolers clearly make social comparisons, which whereas others view their weaknesses as areas where they
can be evident in their jealousy when a peer has the object need to devote more effort.
or approval they feel they deserve. But in the early school As Table 13.2 shows, self-esteem starts off unreasonably
years, these social comparisons may not significantly affect high and gradually becomes more realistic. As children enter
the way the child views himself. That is, they may not lead adolescence, however, some characteristic ways of interpreting
the child to consider himself intrinsically worse than another their own behavior (for example, believing that failure is due
child in some way—just deprived of something he deserves. to stable, internal factors that affect all aspects of the self) may
Thus, the conscious sense of being deficient in comparison lead to the opposite extreme, resulting in unrealistically nega-
with others may not emerge until later, although it may be tive views of the self and low self-esteem. Those individuals can
rooted in the same factors that induce jealousy. Similarly, be at risk for serious depression (Bos et al., 2010; Buhrmester
even though 3-year-olds show shame at failing an easy task et al., 2011; Crocker & Wolfe, 2001; Harter, 1999).
and pride in excelling at a hard one (Lewis et al., 1992), the As adolescents move into adulthood, self-esteem may
effects of those feelings are limited to the situation at hand, appear to drop more than it really does. Some research
not translated into a change in self-esteem. shows that as people get older, they get better at the art
In the third period, middle childhood, the child is able of false modesty; that is, they learn how to act modestly
to break down her self-image into many components and even while maintaining a very high self-image (Baumeis-
evaluate each separately. As a result, she has a larger num- ter & Ilko, 1995). This developing ability to manage public
ber of negative self-evaluations than in earlier years. Dur- image must also be factored into many studies that involve
ing this period, social comparisons seem to more directly changes in self-evaluations with age (Orth et al., 2011).

DEVELOPING A SENSE OF SELF-WORTH 475

 Period Time of Emergence Characteristics

1 Preschool years Extreme positive views of self-esteem on all dimensions

Related to preschoolers’ general tendency toward excessive optimism
Overestimates of abilities may serve an adaptive function by reducing discouragement when
failures occur
2 Early school years Still positive, but less extreme than in earlier years
Begins to make social comparisons, but only by comparing to himself at younger age
3 Middle childhood Begins to break down self-image into components
Sees clear negative attributes in self
Social comparisons begin to influence self-worth
4 Adolescence Social comparisons become more complex
Social comparisons depend more on context
Individual differences in ways of interpreting social comparisons become more pronounced

TABLE 13.2 Developmental changes in self-esteem. As children grow older and engage in more sophisticated social comparisons, their
level of self-esteem tends to drop from early overconfidence to a more realistic level, as well as becoming more intricately structured.

low self-efficacy. If, for example, someone who values

Q: How does the nature of children’s self- athleticism discovers after many painful failures that he
esteem change from the preschool years to is unlikely to ever excel in most sports, he might have
adolescence? very low self-efficacy in that domain. Yet, if he deval-
ues athleticism and comes to see it as irrelevant to his
ideal self, this appraisal might not have much impact on
self-esteem. Conversely, individuals trapped in a mire of
low self-esteem may discount their areas of competence.
Self-Efficacy Self-esteem tends to be global and domain general, while
Self-esteem is closely related to self-efficacy, a notion largely assessments of self-efficacy can be highly specific to tasks
developed by the social learning theorist Albert Bandura and contexts (see Figure 13.8).
(1977). Self-efficacy refers to people’s beliefs about how
capable they are of achieving their goals. It has a more
moment-to-moment quality than self-esteem, as a person
of stable, high self-esteem may, in some contexts, feel that
she has little self-efficacy. When visiting another culture,
for example, this person may realize how little she knows
about its social norms and, consequently, how ineffective
she would be at achieving immediate goals. Nonetheless,
she may maintain high self-esteem because she realizes that
this difficulty applies only to that local context. Similarly,
a person of low self-esteem may have feelings of high self-
efficacy in some circumstances, even if he does not act on his
relatively limited or fragile confidence. This person might
believe that he could easily play the lead in the school musi-
cal because he knows he can sing all the songs well, but he
might not even try out because he feels that “losers” like him
never get picked. FIGURE 13.8 Self-efficacy. Although feelings of self-efficacy
Self-esteem and self-efficacy are often tightly linked. can sometimes be exaggerated, such feelings are normally a more
One reason is the tendency to devalue or distance our- focused way of motivating behavior than much broader feelings of
selves from those aspects of the self in which we have self-esteem.

476 CHAPTER 13 KNOWING OURSELVES, KNOWING OTHERS

 This feature of self-efficacy has made it particularly should not be encouraged with broad statements about
interesting to clinical psychologists and educators. Because how wonderful they are. Specific praise is also likely to be
self-efficacy is more focused on specific situations, it has less effective than actual experiences of self-efficacy. Even
more potential for change than self-esteem, which tends to if praise can convince a child that he is highly talented in
remain fairly stable across situations. Many psychologists a specific area, that heightened self-esteem is fragile and
believe that our self-efficacy can be powerfully shifted by the can be shattered easily by experiencing a negative outcome.
outcomes that we experience (Bandura, 1986). Imagine two Instead, the most effective and beneficial way to intervene
individuals with the same initial appraisals of self-efficacy is to find a situation in which the child can experience a
in mathematics and the same level of math ability. They genuine, positive outcome and legitimately feel compe-
could end up with very different feelings of self-efficacy if tent. For a child just beginning to learn a new skill, this
the first person attempts a very difficult problem and fails, approach would involve starting with relatively easy tasks
while the second person takes on an easier mathematical in which success is likely (Bandura, 1997). This approach
task and succeeds. These results illustrate the usefulness of is similar to Vygotsky’s ideas about how adults’ support-
the concept of self-efficacy for teasing apart the related but ive scaffolding and attention to a child’s zones of proximal
distinct notions of self-esteem and true ability in particular development can provide rewarding, hands-on learning
areas. Only by realizing that self-esteem, self-efficacy, and experiences (see Chapter 9).
true ability can each function and affect the self indepen-
dently is it possible to account for behaviors.
One intriguing facet of self-efficacy is that it can change
even without a direct experience of failure. Following other
Q: Compare and contrast the notions of self-
work by Bandura (1977), researchers have shown that when efficacy and self-esteem.
children observe peers (acting as models) experience success
or failure, the peers’ experiences can affect the self-efficacy
of the observers (Schunk, 1987). This potential “contagious-
ness” of self-efficacy appraisals can be either unfortunate
or encouraging. Imagine, for example, a girl in a classroom
Self-Regulation
who observes two other girls whom she admires doing terri- Along with the value-driven facets of the self, our sense of self
bly on math tasks. If she identifies strongly with those girls, includes our emotional states together with self-regulation—
she might come away feeling low self-efficacy in math, even our ability to control our emotions and actions and behave
if she is very skilled in that area. If, however, she observes in ways that are appropriate for various circumstances. Most
those two girls doing better at math than the other students, parents and teachers would agree that young children do not
she might adopt related feelings of high self-efficacy. always have their emotions under full control. Young chil-
The links between self-efficacy beliefs and behaviors also dren also have difficulty delaying gratification, even when
seem to become stronger with development. Young school- doing so would pay off for them (see Figure 13.9). Older
children are more likely to have efficacy beliefs that do not
strongly predict actual behaviors. As we will see later in this
chapter, one reason for this disconnect arises from unreal-
istically high levels of optimism that young children often
have about their current and future abilities. In contrast,
older schoolchildren show a tighter relation between self-
efficacy beliefs and behaviors related to those beliefs, and
this holds across diverse domains. For example, compared
with younger children who hold similar beliefs, older chil-
dren who feel a higher efficacy about either their math abil-
ity or their ability to be aggressive are more likely to show
higher levels of math achievement or aggression (Davis-
Kean et al., 2008). Thus, programs designed to change
self-efficacy beliefs may have greater consequences in older
children.
In the end, the idea of self-efficacy is useful because it
suggests a different type of intervention from those focused FIGURE 13.9 Delay of gratification. Younger children have more
on self-esteem. The domain specificity of self-efficacy difficulty delaying gratification, often because they are unable to use
suggests that children who are doing poorly in one area strategies to divert their attention.

SELF-REGULATION 477
 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL P OLICY

Potential Drawbacks of Self-Esteem

T
he influence of self-esteem on behavior has become In retrospect, these findings should not be that surprising.
increasingly controversial in the realm of social policy Children tend to compare themselves with the peers they typi-
(Twenge, 2006). For years, the conventional wisdom cally encounter in order to build up norms on which to make a
was that the more self-esteem that could be instilled self-esteem judgment. Most African-American children are there-
or encouraged in children, the better. In addition, some argued fore going to compare themselves with other African-American
that children from some disadvantaged groups might not be children in the same situation. While far more African-American
doing as well in school and on standardized tests because of children live in poverty than European-American children (by
lower self-esteem. Many schools in inner-city neighborhoods some estimates the likelihood that an African-American child
put enormous efforts into treating self-esteem problems under lives in poverty is almost four times greater (U.S. Bureau of
the assumption that raising self-esteem would solve problems the Census, 2010), that difference would not affect self-esteem
of academic underachievement (Jackson, 2009). judgments nearly as much as how well-off each child perceives
Yet, the empirical data has not been so clear on the link between himself relative to his immediate peers.
belonging to a disadvantaged group and having low self-esteem. The strong influence of immediate peers is borne out by a
An extensive analysis of 261 studies, which included a combined related finding that wealthy African-American children who live
total of over half a million participants, concluded that self-esteem in upscale suburban communities, typically among even more
scores for African-American children were not lower, but actually affluent European-American children, do tend to show lower self-
slightly higher, than those for European-American children (Gray- esteem ratings than European-American children in the same
Little & Hafdahl, 2000). In particular, compared with their European- communities, presumably because they are comparing their situ-
American peers, African-American children under age 10 had ation to their even more affluent neighbors (Gray-Little & Hafdahl,
slightly lower scores, while those over age 10 had higher scores. 2000). The implications of this research are complex. Group
However, when children of all ages were taken together in a single identification seems to help minority children’s self-esteem when
comparison, the African-American children had higher self-esteem it focuses their comparisons on children living in similar circum-
scores than the European-American children. This difference has stances. However, it can hurt their self-esteem when their group
appeared in subsequent analyses as well (Eccleston et al., 2010) is juxtaposed with another group that is better off.
and raises questions about whether efforts to raise self-esteem Contrary to earlier ideas, low self-esteem may also not
would be effective ways to close academic achievement gaps be among the main reasons that some individuals transgress
between disadvantaged groups and more advantaged groups. against society. Low self-esteem was, for a time, a popular

children often prey on their younger siblings’ inability to developmental changes not only in cognition and attention
delay gratification by dangling in front of them an immedi- but also in the structure and functioning of the brain.
ately available toy or snack as an alternative to a much more Many studies have examined which factors influence the
desirable one that requires waiting. What 3-year-old can ability to self-regulate and thereby delay gratification. In
resist an older brother’s offer of a pretty good toy that is here one classic study, 4-year-olds were asked which snack food
now in exchange for a much better one due to arrive by mail they preferred: marshmallows or pretzels. The experiment-
in a few days? ers then told the children that they could have the less pre-
Self-regulation and the ability to delay gratification are ferred food immediately, or if they waited for a longer time
recurring topics in this book. We saw early elements of these (up to 15 minutes), they could receive the preferred food
processes in infants in Chapter 7, and we also considered (Mischel & Ebbeson, 1970; Mischel et al., 1972). Despite
them in Chapter 12 in the context of how they might con- the relatively short wait time, younger children clearly had
tribute to antisocial behavior. In this chapter, we want to great difficulty delaying gratification, opting instead for the
focus on how the processes of self-regulation and the abil- readily available, smaller gain.
ity to delay gratification change over the course of normal One variable influencing the ability to wait was whether
child development. We will address how they are related to the children were left alone during the 15-minute delay

478 CHAPTER 13 KNOWING OURSELVES, KNOWING OTHERS

explanation for why people “act out” against others; yet some
of the most antisocial individuals, whether they are members of
the Ku Klux Klan or violent killers, actually have unusually high
self-esteem (Baumeister et al., 1996). Similarly, it used to be
thought that bullies were driven by low self-esteem when in fact
their self-esteem is comparable to other children’s (Baumeister
et al., 2005; see Figure 13.10). Low self-esteem undoubtedly
has bad effects, but high self-esteem should not be considered
uniformly positive. Indeed, in some cross-cultural comparisons, a
high level of self-criticism, which would correspond to lower self-
esteem, is often regarded as a positive personality trait because
it encourages people to better themselves by addressing their
faults (Heine et al., 1999). A more critical self-appraisal may be
linked to an individual’s viewing his traits as more modifiable, FIGURE 13.10 Bullying. It has often been claimed that people
although the direction of influence here is unclear. who aggress against others, such as these school bullies, do so
Actively pursuing higher self-esteem also generally has nega- because they suffer from low self-esteem. But that claim seems to be
tive consequences. If people see certain aspects of themselves as mostly a myth, as such people often have higher levels of self-esteem.
crucial to their self-esteem and then try to ensure that they are
doing well in those areas, they are likely to become frustrated and might have been because the weak students, in an effort to maintain
unhappy. Even when they do well, there is always a higher-level or a or elevate self-esteem, actually reduced their academic effort.
new, more impressive group to compare themselves against. Focus- In short, how people value themselves is certainly central to
ing directly on raising their self-esteem may cause brief increases understanding behavior, mood, and motivation. Yet, the links
in happiness, but not sustained ones (Crocker & Knight, 2005; between self-esteem and these facets of the self are more com-
Crocker & Park, 2004). Simply enjoying the process of developing plex than previously thought. They involve the ever-growing abil-
an ability, without seeing it as essential to your worth, is much more ity to make social comparisons (both as an individual and as a
likely to bring satisfaction. In addition, efforts to raise self-esteem member of a group), to believe that personal traits are changeable,
to improve academic performance can backfire. In one study, col- and to use self-critical appraisals. The implications for social policy
lege students experiencing academic difficulty actually did worse are correspondingly complex, calling into question any seemingly
in their studies when their self-esteem was elevated (Forsyth et al., straightforward remedies based on raising self-esteem (Baumeis-
2007). The researchers suggested that this drop in performance ter et al., 2003).

with the reward in front of them, which made it harder to develop a wide range of strategies, from verbally reminding
resist immediate gratification than when the reward was not themselves of the long-term goal, to diverting their atten-
present. This result is not surprising; adults, too, are much tion, to changing their attitude toward the various reward
more tempted by visible rewards. A subtler finding is that factors (Mischel, 1996).
the ability to delay gratification may involve an attentional A common method of distancing ourselves from tempta-
component that changes over the course of development tion involves mentally replacing desired objects with symbols
(Mischel & Ebbeson, 1970; Mischel et al., 1972, 1973). for those objects. In one study of this strategy, researchers
As children grow older, they seem more able to direct their showed 3- and 4-year-olds two piles that contained differ-
attention to things other than the immediately appealing ent numbers of jelly beans: a pile of three and a pile of eight
object by focusing on either the other things in the room (Carlson et al., 2005). They were taught that if they pointed
or various things in memory as a purposeful distraction. at one pile, a puppet would get to take that pile, and they
As adults, we use these strategies so automatically that we would receive the other pile. Although they clearly under-
may not realize how common they are. (They are perhaps stood the instructions, the children had trouble learning to
more obvious in attempts to deal with pain.) To overcome inhibit pointing to the pile that they wanted. They often
immediate impulses in favor of longer-term gains, children pointed to the larger one and then unhappily received the

SELF-REGULATION 479
smaller one for themselves. However, when the piles were Brain Maturation and the
replaced with symbols for larger and smaller amounts (for
example, a picture of an elephant and a picture of a mouse) Development of Self-Regulation
and the researchers explained the relationships between the Along with the cognitive strategies for delaying gratification
symbols and jelly beans, the children could much more eas- that emerge with development, there are good reasons to
ily point to the mouse symbolizing the smaller amount in suspect that some patterns of brain maturation also con-
order to receive the larger pile. The symbols distanced the tribute to this ability. When a child chooses to eat pretzels
children from the temptation and allowed “cooler heads” to immediately rather than wait for the marshmallows she
prevail over the immediate desire (Garon & Moore, 2007). really wants, it may be because the child is unable to inhibit
The effects of symbols suggest that the abilities to inhibit the desire for the pretzels long enough to wait for the larger
responses and delay gratification are linked to both atten- reward. Whenever the notion of inhibition is raised, the
tional abilities and the ability to use mental representations brain’s frontal lobes are potentially involved. As discussed
to regulate behaviors (Garon et al., 2008). This complex in Chapter 2, the frontal lobes, which are part of the fron-
interplay of factors, some of which continue to develop tal cortex, lie behind the forehead at the front of the brain.
throughout childhood, helps explain why the ability to Among their many capacities, one key role involves execu-
delay gratification continues to improve gradually for many tive functions, the cognitive activities involved in goal-
years after the preschool period. directed tasks and problem solving. These abilities allow us
Children show substantial individual differences in the to optimize not just immediate payoffs but also long-term
ability to delay gratification. Some 4-year-olds could wait benefits (see Chapter 10).
much longer than others for the snack they badly wanted. One of the most famous cases in neuropsychology, which
Interestingly, when the researchers followed up with those involved massive frontal lobe damage, began to reveal these
same groups of children more than 10 years later, they structures’ crucial contributions to self-regulation, espe-
found that the ability to delay gratification at age 4 was cially emotional regulation. Phineas Gage, a 25-year-old
correlated with many later aspects of cognitive and social railroad worker, was a victim of an unfortunate accident
behavior, including SAT scores (Mischel et al., 1989). Some in 1848 in which a large iron rod entered his head at such
researchers have also argued that a strong ability to delay an angle that it caused massive damage to the frontal lobes
gratification, or exercise “effortful control,” as a toddler is (see Figure 13.11). Quite remarkably, Gage survived the
a personality trait that remains stable for several years, and trauma and lived for 12 more years, but his personality had
it manifests in such areas as having a stronger conscience changed dramatically. He no longer seemed to have much
(Kochanska & Knaack, 2003). control over his emotions; he had become impulsive and
more prone to unnecessary risks. The injury impaired his
ability to inhibit many aspects of his behavior. The rela-
Q: How can strategies influence the tionship between frontal lobe damage and difficulties in
development of self-regulation? self-regulation has been repeatedly documented for over
150 years (Heatherton, 2011).

FIGURE 13.11 Damage in the frontal lobes

and difficulties in self-regulation. (A) The metal
spike that went through Phineas Gage’s head is
shown vividly in this diagram. The damage to
Gage’s frontal cortical regions caused profound
changes in his ability to control his impulses. It has
been argued that young children, who have frontal
lobes that are less developed than the rest of their
brain regions, are in effect developmental versions
of Phineas Gage. They are subject to similar neu-
rological deficits that cause difficulties in delay of
gratification, impulse control, and planful behavior.
(B) A photo of Phineas Gage. A B

480 CHAPTER 13 KNOWING OURSELVES, KNOWING OTHERS

 In recent years, researchers have found intriguing evi- As we saw in Chapter 12, one way to think about moral
dence supporting a link between frontal lobe maturation reasoning is as a cognitive system that develops but may
and the development of self-regulation (Posner et al., 2012; not always be implemented because of difficulties in self-
Rothbart et al., 2011). One such study recorded event- regulation. Another possibility is that difficulties in self-
related potentials (ERPs) occurring in children’s brains as regulation could themselves influence the development of
they engaged in tasks requiring self-regulation (Lewis et al., moral reasoning. If someone with poor self-regulation is not
2006). (ERPs are electrophysiological patterns of brain motivated to feel and engage with moral dilemmas, she may
activity that can be monitored and recorded by electrodes spend little time even thinking about them and instead sim-
placed on the scalp. Over the years, researchers have learned ply act on her own desires. The two adults in this study also
that specific ERP patterns are closely correlated with cer- showed little empathy, a factor that would also limit their
tain psychological events and can be used to infer when tendency to rethink or inhibit their actions out of concern
those events occur.) In this study, certain frontal lobe ERP for the suffering they cause in others.
patterns associated with inhibition declined with increas-
ing age, decreasing in activation level in a manner that was
closely related to improvements in self-regulation. It seems
that older children become more efficient at inhibiting
Q: What are some biological factors that have
responses, allowing them to inhibit more effectively with been implicated in the development of self-
less effort. This finding fits the common observations of regulation?
experimenters and parents alike: Young children sometimes
grimace with great effort to resist temptation, as many did
in the pretzel-or-marshmallow task, but they often even-
tually succumb. Similarly, when children of the same age
group (for example, toddlers) were studied, differences in Contextual Influences on Self-Regulation
the degree of self-regulation among those children were Self-regulation in young children can be modulated by the
also correlated to measures of frontal lobe circuit activation surrounding context in ways that are also seen in adults. For
(Morasch & Bell, 2011). For our purposes, it is important to example, when a situation increases self-awareness, there
note that the frontal lobes, as well as other associated brain is a tendency to show higher levels of self-regulation. An
regions involved in regulation of the emotions, are among especially striking version of this effect occurs when people
the latest brain regions to mature (Heatherton, 2011; Sowell perform a behavior in front of a mirror. The mirror creates a
et al., 1999). As always, it is difficult to infer causal relations feeling of self-consciousness and increases self-regulation in
between behaviors and the many ways in which any brain adults (Diener & Wallbom, 1976). The same mirror effect
area matures. However, it seems likely that the develop- occurs in young children. For example, 3- and 4-year-olds
ing ability to regulate emotions and behaviors depends not showed higher levels of self-regulation (such as not looking
only on learning but also on an increasing capacity for this in a box) when behaving in front of a large mirror than when
kind of regulation as the frontal lobes and other brain areas the mirror was not present (Ross et al., 2011). Thus, contex-
mature (Garon et al., 2008; Posner et al., 2012; Rothbart tual factors can have a strong influence even on young chil-
et al., 2011). dren who may have much more difficulty regulating their
Another provocative example of how biological factors behaviors. Context is not a gradually “added on” modulator
are critical to the development of self-control comes from as development proceeds; rather, it is an important influ-
a study of two adults, both of whom had suffered substan- ence from an early age.
tial damage to the prefrontal cortex before they were 16 Context also bears on questions of school readiness and
months of age (Anderson et al., 1999). Both were raised cultural variation. In earlier chapters, we saw several chal-
by middle-class, college-educated, married parents who lenges to theories of cognitive development that argue for
seemed fully committed to supporting their children both qualitative changes in concepts or reasoning. These chal-
materially and emotionally. Yet, despite these advantages, lenges make such accounts difficult to use in arguments
both adults had a long history of poor self-regulation. They about school readiness. More plausible arguments may be
regularly lied and stole, and, typical of patients with frontal made about self-regulation skills needing to reach a certain
lobe damage, had little concern for the future. They did level of competence for children to thrive in schools (Blair,
not make plans or consider future events. Equally inter- 2002; Blair & Razza, 2007; McClelland & Cameron,
esting was their apparent deficit in the expression of guilt 2012). On average, it appears that at some point in the fifth
or regret. This sort of pattern suggests that the develop- or sixth year of life, most children have sufficient attentional
ment of self-regulation is linked to moral reasoning, not flexibility (both staying on tasks and shifting as needed) and
just moral behaviors. inhibitory control to be able to sit in a classroom and move

SELF-REGULATION 481
through various tasks as the school day unfolds. These skills Our discussion of self-regulation has focused on the
gradually improve to a threshold that is sufficient for success child’s cognitive and emotional states and the interactions
in the classroom and do not seem to represent a qualitative between them. These factors are critical for understanding
shift. Yet, children vary considerably in when they achieve how self-regulation develops, but it is in no way sufficient
such levels of self-regulation, with boys typically developing for a full understanding of self-control and moderation of
later than girls (Mathews et al., 2009). children’s behavior. Parents, peers, and the culture at large
There are many ways to measure the different dimen- also affect how children internalize norms, attitudes, and
sions of self-regulation, but one simple task, known as the ways of expressing emotions. These topics, however, are bet-
Head-Toes-Knees-Shoulders (HTKS) task, offers an inte- ter discussed in Chapters 14 and 15, which deal with the
grated assessment of many components of self-regulation, influences of the family and of the larger culture.
including attention, memory, executive skills, and impulse
control. The task involves having children initially touch
the body part mentioned with their hand. It then progresses
to asking the children to touch “the opposite” body part (for
example, the toes when the child hears “head” or the shoul-
Developing a Theory of Mind
ders when the child hears “knees”). This second part of In the course of a day of running errands, working, and
the task requires attention, working memory, and response interacting with family members, a typical adult makes
inhibition—all components of self-regulation (McClelland many inferences about his own mind and the minds of
& Cameron, 2012; Wanless et al., 2011). Moreover, the task others. Consider a middle-aged father arising at 6:00 a.m.
is easy to use in real-world settings and predicts success in As the alarm goes off, he wakes and momentarily consid-
the classroom. In addition, it has been used cross-culturally ers what a strange dream he was having. His wife starts to
and lends further support to findings of cross-cultural differ- stir, and he waits to ask her a question until she sits up in
ences in the development of self-regulation skills. Research bed. He then asks her if she should pick up pizza on the
using the HTKS task has shown repeatedly that children way home that evening. She replies that she will be com-
from Asian countries tend to have higher levels of self- ing home early that day and will have time to do some
regulation early on than children from Western countries, shopping. He nods. Eating breakfast, he hears a radio com-
such as the United States (Oh & Lewis, 2008; Sabbagh mentator railing against a politician he has not heard of
et al., 2006; Wanless et al., 2011; see Figure 13.12). The rea- before. He assumes that the criticism is probably suspect.
sons for the cross-cultural and gender differences are unclear, His teenage son sits down to breakfast and says, “Great,
but there are correlations with differences in socialization I love eating Brand X cornflakes five days in a row.” The
across the cultures. For example, teachers in Asian cultures father acknowledges that he has been too busy to go shop-
tend to give more instructions concerning behavioral regula- ping recently. Driving to work, the father notices a street
tion (Lan et al., 2009). Thus, a child’s local cultural context sign that was struck by a car the night before and is now
may help accelerate the development of self-regulation skills. pointing the wrong way. He realizes that drivers who do

A B
FIGURE 13.12 Cross-cultural differences in self-regulation. Numerous studies have reported that (A) 5-year-olds in Asian cultures have
higher average levels of self-regulation than (B) 5-year-olds in North American cultures. Such differences may arise from differences in socializa-
tion practices.

482 CHAPTER 13 KNOWING OURSELVES, KNOWING OTHERS

not know the area will be surprised when they do not arrive they often do quite well in situations that do not require
at the destinations they intended. At work, he notices a thinking about either their own minds or those of others.
coworker avoiding eye contact with the boss and assumes It is provocative to consider that both young children and
that person has just missed a deadline. autistic adults lack certain abilities to understand others’
This example covers only the first few hours of the minds. Whether they share this behavior for the same cog-
day, but this man has already revealed many facets of a nitive reasons remains unknown.
mature theory of mind. That is, he has a well-developed We now turn to the question of how children develop
set of untaught, intuitive beliefs about others’ mental a theory of mind. Building on topics from Chapters 5 and
states and processes and an understanding of how to use 6, we will start with a brief look at the early roots of theory
those beliefs to infer others’ goals to explain their actions. of mind in very young children’s inferences about social
He can distinguish real from internally generated men- beings. We will then consider when and how children come
tal events such as dreams. He understands the cognitive to understand the consequences of holding false beliefs.
differences between conscious and unconscious states. These findings can help us address the question of whether
He knows why someone—in this case, his wife—would theory of mind develops as a module (a relatively autono-
answer a question with a seemingly unrelated statement. mous, specialized cognitive system) or whether this ability
Hearing the radio commentator, he uses a theory about reflects the growth of a much broader cognitive skill, such
how strong emotions can cloud judgment. He understands as the ability to think about abstract representations of any
cues to irony or sarcasm and infers his son’s true message. kind. We will then consider the many ways in which the
He realizes how a misplaced sign can cause false beliefs, development of a full comprehensive theory of mind con-
with surprising results for those who act on them, and he tinues into late childhood and adolescence, involving forms
knows how individuals who have irritated or disappointed of social understanding that go far beyond those measured
someone typically act. by false-belief tasks.
We make inferences based on our theory of mind so
automatically that, much like our use of language, we often
take for granted its complexity and sophistication. It may
seem that there is no alternative to interpreting the social Q: How is an intuitive theory of mind important
world this way. But consider the same morning from the for getting by in everyday life? Provide examples.
perspective of someone who lacks a sound theory of mind.
He wakes up wondering how he has suddenly, seemingly by
magic, moved from being in a battle (his dream) to lying in
bed. He immediately starts speaking to his wife, who is still
groggy and misses most of what he says. When she awak- Early Aspects of Theory of Mind
ens, he repeats himself, telling her to get pizza (asking is too As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, even young infants treat
subtle a concept, as it requires expecting the other person to social beings differently from nonsocial ones. They attend to
consider the question and respond in a particular way). Her eye gazes from other people in the first few months of life
reply about coming home early mystifies him, because it is and become increasingly sophisticated at using eye gaze to
unrelated to pizza. Upon hearing the radio commentator, he infer another person’s goals, perceptions, and mental states.
assumes that the politician is bad. He is pleased to hear that For example, 9-month-old infants assume that eye gaze is an
his son likes Brand X cornflakes. He makes no inferences important cue to an object of interest. They will look longer
about the consequences of the reversed street sign, and he at objects in locations that are in the direction of an eye gaze
makes no assumptions about his coworker, whose behavior than at objects that are in the opposite direction from an eye
seems arbitrarily a bit different. gaze (Senju et al., 2008). They will even do so when the objects
This second man is almost completely unable to make appear and reappear such that the objects are never on the
inferences involving beliefs, desires, and other mental screen at the same time as the face depicting eye gaze. Thus,
events, not only in others’ minds but also in his own. This the infants seem to be making inferences about what an agent
scenario may seem far-fetched, yet some people with autism is interested in, and they maintain such inferences over time.
exhibit such cognitive deficits. And as mentioned in Chap- This ability in 9-month-olds appears to build on an earlier-
ter 6, some who have less extreme theory of mind deficits developing, specialized neural circuit that responds to object-
(among other differences) may be diagnosed with Asperg- directed gazes. The brain activity of 4-month-old infants
er’s syndrome, a related disorder on the autistic spectrum shows a distinctive pattern of event-related potentials (ERPs)
of developmental disorders (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, when they are looking at someone else’s object-directed gaze.
2004; Klin et al., 2000). These individuals have tremen- This ERP pattern differs from the pattern measured when
dous difficulties negotiating the social world, even though the infants are looking at a non-object-directed gaze (Hoehl

DEVELOPING A THEORY OF MIND 483

et al., 2008). These results fit with the finding that adults become able to infer an actor’s intention and imitate that
show unique brain responses to gazes toward objects versus goal rather than simply reproducing every action (Meltzoff,
people (Pelphrey et al., 2003, 2004). Remember also that 1995). However, if they see cues indicating that the actor
after 1-year-olds “interact” with a furry blob-shaped object purposely chose an unusual or inconvenient way of doing
that seems to respond to their vocalizations by beeping back something, such as turning on a light with his forehead even
at them, the infants will then make assumptions about gaze though his hands were free, they will imitate the precise
based on this semblance of a social interaction. When the action instead. If the actor’s hands were full, they will imi-
blob then rotates toward one side, the infants will turn their tate the goal (Gergely et al., 2002). The infants seem to infer
heads the same way to see what the blob is “gazing” at (John- that the hands-free actor must have chosen the more diffi-
son et al., 1998; see Chapter 5). cult action for a reason. (Chimpanzees also make this kind
Many researchers are now investigating the early com- of inference while watching human actors in a nearly iden-
ponents of our ability to use relatively simple perceptual tical task, suggesting that this facet of the theory of mind
cues to make social inferences. As described in Chapter 5, is not unique to humans; Buttelman et al., 2007.) These
by 10 months of age, children observing objects in motion are just a few of the various forms of evidence that indicate
interpret certain kinds of cues, such as self-propelled move- that well before age 1, infants make inferences that attribute
ment that seems to take into account changing conditions, rationality to social beings (see Chapters 5 and 6).
as strong indicators of social agents with goals (Meltzoff,
1995; Woodward, 1998). A key question in these studies
focuses on whether these early components form a critical
foundation for a later, more complex theory of mind. Comparative Perspectives
One proposal about the development of theory of mind on Theory of Mind
suggests that the first step involves learning to attribute Just how much does a creature need to understand about
goals to other social beings (Leslie, 1994; Leslie et al., 2004). the mind to be capable of rich social interactions? We know,
In this view, the learning process is driven by our interpre- for example, that many other species’ social interactions go
tations of various perceptual cues, most notably direction far beyond their mating and aggression rituals. Several pri-
of gaze (Baron-Cohen, 1995). In light of this possibility, it mate species, for example, maintain elaborate dominance
is interesting that humans are the only species whose eyes hierarchies, networks of social relations based on the rank-
have dark pupils and irises against a clearly visible, bright ing of group members. The structure of the hierarchy often
white background, which makes discerning the direction of involves a single powerful individual at the top and increas-
another’s gaze much easier (see Figure 13.13 and Scientific ingly large groups of subordinates as social status decreases.
Methods box). There may be some evolutionary cost if the These networks have powerful consequences for individuals
whites of human eyes are more visible to predators, but the and how they interact with one another (see Figure 13.14).
benefits for those who can more efficiently use gaze direc- More dominant members of a group usually have better
tion to infer others’ goals may well be worth it (Tomasello access to mates, food, and shelter. When new members join a
et al., 2007). primate group, they are remarkably adept at observing inter-
By 18 months or so, infants begin to master the second actions and inferring the whole hierarchy of relationships,
step toward developing a full-fledged theory of mind. They such that establishing dominance relations with just one or
two members allows them to know how they stand with
Mutual gaze Averted gaze
everyone else. In addition, subordinate monkeys sometimes
form coalitions that can change the group’s power relation-
ships, which implies a sophisticated understanding of rank
and power (Barrett et al., 2007).
Considerable controversy remains over the extent to
which the social reasoning skills of nonhuman primates
psychologically resemble those of humans (Penn & Povi-
nelli, 2007; Santos et al., 2007). Even the most sophisticated
nonhuman primates, such as chimpanzees, sometimes fail
spectacularly at tasks that seem to depend on social cogni-
FIGURE 13.13 Direction of gaze. When participants watched a
virtual person pass by who looked directly at them, they showed a
tion. For example, Japanese and rhesus macaque monkeys
different neural response than when the person’s eyes were averted. will alert their offspring to the presence of a predator even
These results suggest an early-emerging neural system specialized when the offspring clearly knows about the predator already
for processing gaze. Adapted from Pelphrey et al. (2004). and the alerting call will put the parents at risk (Cheney &

484 CHAPTER 13 KNOWING OURSELVES, KNOWING OTHERS

 SCIENTIFIC METHOD: Gaze Following in Human Infants and Great Apes
Hypothesis:
Because the whites of the eyes in humans are especially distinctive and
can thus be used to detect where someone is looking, human infants
will follow the direction of gaze as indicated by a person’s eyes. On the
other hand, great apes will rely more on the direction of the head as a
whole.

Method:
1. Twenty 12-month-old infants, twenty 18-month-old infants, and
nineteen great apes participated.
2. The experimenter “looked” at an object using only his eyes, his eyes
together with his head, or his head with his eyes closed, or various
controls.
3. The experimenter recorded the mean proportion of looks by the
participants to the target.
The whites of human eyes make eye gaze direction
Results: much easier to discern.

Human infants looked at the target mostly as a consequence of where Age Eyes
Yes No
the experimenter’s eyes looked, since the whites of human eyes make
Head Yes 12 0.20 0.06
eye gaze direction much easier to discern. Great apes were influenced 18 0.33 0.05
by both eyes and the head, but the head was more important.
No 12 0.09 0
18 0.24 0.08
Conclusion: Human infants use eye direction mostly.
Humans from at least 1 year of age are especially skilled at using eye Eyes
gaze direction to infer targets of mutual interest when in the company Yes No
of another person. In contrast, great apes rely more on the much Head Yes 0.53 0.35
cruder, and potentially misleading, cue of head direction. No 0.13 0.06
Great apes used head direction mostly.
Source study: Tomasello et al. (2007).

Seyfarth, 1990, 1991). Similarly, chimpanzees will ignore

gaze cues telling them where food is hidden, looking just as
long at a container that a human is not looking at as at one
that the human is staring at (Call et al., 2000).
But when primates are put into competitive situations,
such as competing for food, they seem to show much more
sophisticated forms of social cognition (Santos et al., 2007).
In a situation where a known competitor can see one cache
of food but not another, a chimpanzee will first get the food
from the concealed location (Tomasello et al., 2003). In
fact, across a wide range of competitive settings, several dif-
ferent classes of primates seem to take into account others’
knowledge, using inferences about what their competitors
are perceiving as a cue to what they know.
FIGURE 13.14 Social dominance and cognition. This juvenile Do these successes in competitive circumstances mean
rhesus monkey is showing a stereotypical expression of submission
that primates think about the social world in similar ways
to an approaching dominant male. Primates can be very sensitively
tuned to the social dominance relations that hold in quite large
to humans? It is far too early to tell, but many research-
groups, performing what seem to be complex computations about ers think that nonhuman primates’ social understanding
others; yet they also can show glaring deficiencies in other theory of is likely to be more limited (Call & Tomasello, 2008;
mind tasks. Tomasello et al., 2003). In particular, there may be some

DEVELOPING A THEORY OF MIND 485

 NEW DIRECTION S IN DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH

Theory of Mind in Dogs?

M
ost research comparing social cognition in humans
and other species has been with nonhuman primates,
such as chimpanzees, gorillas, and various species
of monkeys, since their genomes are most closely
related to that of humans (chimpanzee DNA shares 96 percent
of its sequence with human DNA). Yet, from an evolutionary per-
spective, it does not make sense as a research strategy. While
primates vary dramatically in their degree of sociability—some
species are loners and others are “groupies”—some nonpri-
mate species are also highly social, sometimes in ways that
are closely linked to human activities. It is especially interesting
to ask how these other species—which do not share as many
broad cognitive abilities with humans—might nonetheless have
sophisticated social cognitive skills. Such a focus starts to reveal
just how important general cognitive capacities might be to the
FIGURE 13.15 Dog social cognition. Recent evidence sug-
development of social skills in humans (as opposed to more
gests that dogs may have been selected for a set of specific
specific adaptations for social cognition). perceptual and cognitive skills for detecting social information
Few groups are more appropriate for such questions than and intentions in humans, often in ways that exceed those found
dogs (see Figure 13.15). Dogs started to differentiate from in great apes. These findings are important for understanding the
wolves roughly 15,000 years ago (Savolainen et al., 2002), and origins of our own species’ abilities to negotiate our social world.
certain traits were selected for as these animals adapted to a
special social niche with humans. Dogs may have been selected eye gaze and sensing human goals (Miklósi & Topál, 2012).
for their ability to partially perceive mental states in humans and The fascinating question revolves around how simple the “seed”
work with them cooperatively rather than competitively in ways social cognitive skills need to be in young dogs to enable them
that maximize mutual benefit (Hare & Tomasello, 2005), and to to later be such adept social companions to humans. Answering
excel at social as opposed to causal thinking (Brauer et al., 2006; this question will help us better understand what might be the
Miklósi & Topál, 2012). Thus, although dogs do far worse than minimal amount of social learning biases we might want to grant
chimpanzees at using nonsocial cues to find the location of hid- to human infants. It is impressive that higher-order social cogni-
den food, they do better than chimpanzees in locating food on the tive behaviors, such as the human tendency to “overimitate” the
basis of pointing gestures made by humans (Brauer et al., 2006). intentional acts of others (Lyons et al., 2011), are also found in
Developmental studies have been particularly informative as dogs but not in apes (Miklósi & Topál, 2012).
to how dogs might differ from wolves. When dogs and wolves Dogs and humans may also provide an example of conver-
are both hand reared in equivalent socially rich human envi- gent evolution of a set of social skills. Because dogs are in many
ronments, young puppies show more advanced social cogni- ways more socially skilled and socially perceptive than most
tion skills than young wolf pups. When hand-raised dogs and nonhuman primates, it seems that they developed these skills
wolves were given pointing tasks, older wolves could use point- long after any common mammalian ancestor to both dogs and
ing cues to find hidden food, but younger ones (4-month-olds) primates. Thus, they must have developed their social skills
could not, while 4-month-old puppies did just fine (Gácsi et al., independently from those adaptations that humans may have
2009). Young dogs actually prefer human companions to other acquired to be socially skilled. That convergence raises two
dogs, while young wolves do not (Morell, 2009). Dogs seem questions: Have dogs adapted to the social niche in subtly dif-
prepared to think more adeptly about social states, especially ferent ways than human infants? Do dogs use different mecha-
those in humans. Wolves can be gradually trained to be more nisms than humans in developing social skills, or is there only
social, but they do not seem to have the head start that dogs do. one straightforward way to build social skills, such that both
There is active debate on just how rich a theory of mind to species independently evolved essentially the same building
grant to dogs, but it does seem that they are adept at following blocks of social cognition and perception?

486 CHAPTER 13 KNOWING OURSELVES, KNOWING OTHERS

limitations to how nonhuman primates think about Understanding False Beliefs
beliefs. They may lack an ability to consider the beliefs
of others across a wide range of situations where there Normal adult functioning requires near-constant use of
are clear benefits to being aware of such beliefs, such as sophisticated capacities for thinking about other minds.
whether or not relatives are aware of predators; and they Yet, researchers have repeatedly argued that young chil-
may have particular difficulties with understanding when dren have specific problems in thinking about some aspects
others have beliefs that are not true reflections of reality. of other minds. The most studied method for examining
In more narrowly defined areas, such as competitive tasks, what children understand about others’ beliefs has come
we may need to grant primates some notion of beliefs to be known as the false-belief task. There are a number
(Santos et al., 2007). At the least, those who do not want of variations on the task, all of which aim to assess a per-
to grant beliefs to primates must come up with an alterna- son’s ability to understand how others might behave when
tive explanation of what mental processes make possible they hold inaccurate beliefs (Wellman, 1990; Wimmer &
their success in competitive tasks. Perner, 1983).
In comparison with other primates, humans’ more One of the most common false-belief tasks has been
sophisticated abilities to think about intentions can some- called the “Smarties task” (Perner et al., 1987), after a popu-
times lead young children astray. In one task, for example, lar British candy similar to M&M’s. The experimenter first
both chimpanzees and preschoolers were presented with shows the child a container with the familiar Smarties logo
transparent containers that they had to manipulate to get and asks what is inside. The child says it contains Smarties
at a desired object inside (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons candy—but when the researcher opens the container, the
et al., 2007, 2011). The containers had several movable child sees that it actually contains pencils. The researcher
knobs and handles, only some of which were mechanically then asks what is really in the container, and the child
useful. Both chimpanzees and children watched an adult replies, “Pencils.” Up to this point, all children answer the
manipulate all of the knobs and handles, including the same way, regardless of their age.
useless ones, before removing the object from its container. The child is then asked what another person seeing the
When the chimpanzees were then allowed to try to get container for the first time would think was inside of it.
the object out of the container, they omitted the unneces- This question elicits very different answers depending on
sary actions and efficiently removed the object, copying the child’s age. Children who are approximately 3½ years
only the model’s goals, not each action. In contrast, the and younger say that the new person would think there
children reproduced all the actions, including several bla- were pencils in the container. Children who are older than
tantly unnecessary ones. Other studies have revealed that about 3½ respond like adults do, saying that the new per-
children who see an adult act on an object to achieve a son will think that the container contains Smarties (see
goal assume that all the adult’s actions must be causally Figure 13.16). Younger children do not seem to understand
relevant (Lyons et al., 2007, 2011). Thus, the children’s that beliefs do not simply mirror reality; rather, they repre-
sensitivity to the usual relationship between intentions sent a person’s subjective understanding of reality (Cassidy,
and actions temporarily blinds them to the irrelevance of 1998; Perner et al., 1987). Consequently, they cannot see
some actions. Complex social intuitions are an important how someone could hold a belief contrary to what they,
part of understanding such cases where children “overimi- themselves, know to be true.
tate” (Over & Carpenter, 2013). The chimpanzees have no Hundreds of studies have documented younger children’s
such problem. apparent inability to understand the nature of false beliefs
In short, a rich body of evidence supports the idea that (Bloom & German, 2000; Flavell, 1999; Scholl & Leslie,
infants and young toddlers have some sense of the ways in 1999; Wellman et al., 2001). Some of them use tasks known
which the goals and perceptions of social agents can influ- as unexpected contents tasks, which closely resemble the Smart-
ence those agents’ actions. Furthermore, they seem to share ies task. Another type of false-belief task, sometimes known
many aspects of these abilities with other primates. Even as unexpected locations tasks or “Sally–Anne tasks,” after the
some social nonprimates, such as dogs, can show surprising best-known version, involves shifting objects to other loca-
sophistication in some of these abilities (see New Directions tions. In this task, the experimenter verbally describes and
box). Given this remarkable precocity, it is perhaps surpris- visually depicts a person (Sally) who puts an object in a cov-
ing that many researchers have also claimed that one cen- ered basket and then leaves the room. While Sally is gone,
tral aspect of theory of mind, the ability to understand how Anne enters, moves the object from the basket to a covered
beliefs influence behavior, may not be fully functional until box, and leaves the room. Sally then returns, and the child is
well into a child’s third year. These claims are based on a asked where Sally will look for the object (see Figure 13.17).
set of classic experimental tasks for investigating children’s Most children under age 3½ say that Sally will look in the
understanding of false beliefs. box. Most children over 4 years of age say that Sally will look

DEVELOPING A THEORY OF MIND 487

FIGURE 13.16 Understanding false
beliefs. The Smarties task is one of several
false-belief tasks in which children younger
What’s in the box? What’s in the box?
than between 3 years 6 months and 3 years
10 months tend to equate another person’s
Smarties Pencils
beliefs with what is true in the world and not
with their prior experiences and beliefs. The
upper panels show a child who is 3 years
4 months first looking at a closed box of
Smarties and then at an open box that says
Smarties but contains pencils. In the lower
panels, the child who is 3 years 4 months
now thinks that another child would believe
that pencils are in the closed box, but a child
who is 3 years 11 months would think that Step 1 Step 2
another child would believe that Smarties are
in the closed box.

Now we close the box Now we close the box

up again . . . and Billy up again . . . and Billy
looks at the box for the looks at the box for the
first time. What will Billy first time. What will Billy
think is in the box? think is in the box?

Pencils Smarties

Step 3 for a child at 3 years 4 months Step 3 for a child at 3 years 11 months

in the basket (Frith & Frith, 1999). Thus, across the different behavioral orientation toward reducing an uncomfortable
types of false-belief tasks, children younger than about 3½ physiological state or increasing a pleasant one. This kind of
fail to see how a person’s beliefs might cause them to act in drive or “desire” is much simpler and more immediate than
a way that is contrary to the facts. These younger children a goal-driven behavior. For example, a fly lands on sugary
seem to view human beliefs as if people were all-knowing soft drink residue because it “wants” to eat sweet things.
(Barrett & Driesenga, 2001). Of course, the sense of “want” that we attribute to the fly
is not the same as our understanding of what it means for
a 4-year-old to want another child’s toy. In the child’s case,
Q: Describe two different types of false-belief we rely on our own mature theory of mind and assume that
tasks. the child’s wanting is associated with a rich set of beliefs
about what the toy is like, who owns it, and what owning it
would be like. On the other hand, a child who has not yet
How, then, do younger children understand beliefs if passed the false-belief task may not have that level of insight
they are unable to see them as fallible? One proposal is that about the kinds of thoughts and feelings a playmate associ-
before about age 3½ children tend to think about beliefs as ates with wanting a toy and may see other people’s behaviors
if they were desires (Wellman, 1990). To understand this in ways that more closely resemble how we see the fly.
frame of mind, consider that when we observe simpler ani-
mals, explanations based on drives (internal physiological
states like hunger or thirst) are sometimes the most plausible
way of explaining their behaviors. We do not think of a fly Q: How might a 2-year-old’s theory of mind be
as having beliefs, but we can imagine it having something different from a 4-year-old’s theory of mind?
that might be construed as a desire in the sense of a drive or

488 CHAPTER 13 KNOWING OURSELVES, KNOWING OTHERS

 This is Sally. This is Anne. main criticisms of the tasks. First, succeeding at false-belief
tasks may require abilities that have little to do with the
theory of mind, such as a more general ability to inhibit
judgments driven by salient knowledge. Thus, in the Sally–
Anne task, children must inhibit their own knowledge of
the object’s true location and consider instead where the
object might seem to be to another person.
This kind of inhibition has been studied separately in
Sally puts her
ball in the basket.
experiments that can perhaps shed some light on findings
from false-belief studies. One example involves the false-
photograph task. In this task, a child is shown a camera
on a tripod with an object—say, a rubber duck—in front
of it on a stand. The experimenter presses a button on the
camera and declares that the camera has taken a picture.
The duck is then replaced with a different object—for
example, a teddy bear. The child is then asked what picture
Sally
goes away.
the camera took when the experimenter pressed the button.
Three-year-olds had difficulty saying that the camera had
taken a picture of the duck if the new object, the bear, was
in front of the camera when the researcher asked the ques-
tion (Zaitchik, 1990). Because reporting what happened
with the camera does not require thinking about others’
minds, this finding suggests that around age 3, children
show a more general difficulty inhibiting responses driven
by present displays. More precisely, young children’s strug-
Anne moves the
gles with the false-photograph task seem to indicate that
ball to her box. early on, it is difficult for them to inhibit a default response
in which beliefs correspond to what presently appears to
be true (Leslie, 2000; Leslie & Polizzi, 1998; Leslie et al.,
2005). In most real-world situations, this is a good default
strategy, since we usually think that our beliefs reflect real-
ity (Birch & Bloom, 2007).
Other evidence supports the possibility that young chil-
Where will Sally
look for her ball? dren fail false-belief tasks, at least in part, because of diffi-
culty inhibiting a default, present-oriented response. Older
children with autism can pass the false-photograph task, but
they fail the false-belief tasks intended to test for a theory of
mind (Leekam & Perner, 1991; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). Chil-
dren with autism, like typically developing children, develop
inhibitory skills that enable them to pass the false-photograph
task. However, autistic children continue to have a specific
FIGURE 13.17 The Sally–Anne task. Most children under 3½
years of age will say that Sally will look in the box. Most children over deficit in thinking about beliefs. This pattern suggests that
4 years of age will say that Sally will look in the basket. younger children without autism may fail false-belief tasks
not because they cannot think about beliefs, but because of
problems with inhibition common to all very young children.
Evaluating the False-Belief Task At first glance, it In sum, there are at least two possible explanations for young
seems that a failure to understand how false beliefs predict children’s failures on false belief tasks. They may have less
behaviors is an indication that a child has not yet devel- ability to inhibit a present-oriented response (a problem that
oped a theory of mind. But there are troubling aspects to is not specific to false beliefs), or they may have a problem
the false-belief tasks, leading some to suggest that it should thinking about others’ false beliefs in particular.
be abandoned as a measure of the theory of mind (Bloom & The studies on children with autism raise the possibil-
German, 2000). Proponents of this argument offer two ity that the developmental changes associated with passing

DEVELOPING A THEORY OF MIND 489

false-belief tasks may be more associated with inhibitory tasks less clear. One possibility is that the nonverbal viola-
abilities than with abilities to think about false beliefs per tion of expectations tasks draw on a more implicit, non-
se. In this regard, it is interesting that the elderly, who show verbal sense of the relationship between perception and
declines in executive functioning and inhibitory skills, can knowledge, while the classic false-belief tasks tap into a
also show increased errors in the false-belief task—even more explicit, verbal sense of how beliefs can be at odds with
though they clearly have not lost the ability to think about reality (Sodian, 2011; Sodian & Thoermer, 2008).
beliefs (German & Hehman, 2006). Other studies with Tracking of beliefs at a more implicit level has been found
children also support the idea that beyond issues related in infants as young as 7 months. For example, if infants see
to theory of mind, some combination of deficits in plan- an animated agent watch an object go behind a barrier, they
ning, working memory, action awareness, and inhibition seem to automatically encode the agent’s beliefs and, as a
contributes to young children’s failures on the false-belief result, look longer when the object reappears in a manner
task (Sabbagh et al., 2006a, 2006b). that violates that agent’s false beliefs (Kovács et al., 2010).
The second objection to using false-belief tasks to mea- Infants and adults alike seem unable to avoid encoding
sure theory of mind is closely tied to our earlier discussion belief states of others and having those belief states influ-
about the ways that very young children think about social ence their own responses to situations.
agents. In several respects, young children show at least Well before children pass classic false-belief tasks, in
some awareness and understanding of others’ mental lives. some cases as young as 18 months, they can also reason
In fact, there is some evidence that children may even show about others’ pretend play (Leslie, 1987b, 1992, 1994;
the ability to reason about false beliefs much earlier than Schwebel et al., 1999). The early emergence of this abil-
age 3½ if the social reasoning is not embedded in a task ity may seem surprising, since it, too, seems to involve
that relies on verbal descriptions. In one study described reasoning about mental states that are contrary to real-
more fully in Chapter 5, 15-month-olds saw an actor place ity. There is, however, a crucial difference between these
an object in one location and then saw the actor go behind a forms of play and false beliefs. Pretend play does not
screen, which blocked his view while the object was moved require deliberately suppressing a belief about something
to a new location. When the actor returned and looked for that is true; rather, the game often involves making it
the object in the new location, the infants looked longer clear to all players that the real object is not the same as
than when the actor looked for the object where he left it the object it represents. The child who pretends to use
(Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). In a similar study, research- a banana as a phone means for all to know that it is not
ers showed 13-month-old infants animated movies in which really a phone, just a pretend phone. The pretend “belief ”
a caterpillar-like creature either had visual information indi- does not directly conflict with reality like the false belief
cating the location of a hidden object or did not. When the does. Pretend play may therefore be one of the earliest
creature had a visual cue, infants expected it to be more ways in which children can think about alternative views
successful at finding the object (Surian et al., 2007). The of reality and be aware that those alternatives are mentally
nonverbal violation of the expected behaviors has also been created.
used to show success by 2½-year-olds in both unexpected
contents and unexpected locations tasks (He et al., 2011).
Even in verbal tasks very much like the classic false-belief Q: What are some limitations of the false-belief
task, it is possible to get many 2½-year-olds to succeed if the
experimenter looks up at the ceiling and seems to ask herself task as a measure of the child’s developing
where the protagonist will look (He et al., 2012). In the clas- theory of mind? What other factors might be
sic task, when the experimenter looks at the child and asks influencing performance on the task?
the same question, 2½-year-olds will fail. Directly eliciting
a response from the child seems to increase processing load
and result in failure. More generally, the development of
theory of mind and the ability to understand false beliefs
now appear to develop in a more continuous manner after A Theory of Mind Module?
infancy and not as a dramatic qualitative shift at around Several theory of mind researchers have concluded that
3½ years. the ability to reason about the mental states of others is
Further research is needed to know whether the infants a special cognitive adaptation that was selected for in the
are really thinking in terms of false beliefs or whether a sim- course of evolution. According to these views, theories of
pler kind of understanding enables them to pass these tasks mind do not simply arise from learning about the social
(Perner & Ruffman, 2005). Still, the fact that they can pass world; they get a powerful head start from a dedicated cog-
them at all makes the meaning of the original false-belief nitive system that is strongly influenced by our genes. This

490 CHAPTER 13 KNOWING OURSELVES, KNOWING OTHERS

type of specialized mental system for understanding the
beliefs and mental state processes of other people is some-
times described as a theory of mind module (TOMM). It
is based on the proposal of philosopher Jerry Fodor (1983)
that part of human cognitive makeup consists of special-
ized, autonomous systems for processing distinct kinds of
information, such as spatial layout, syntactic structure, and
number. Our abilities to reason about the minds of other
people may be a module in the same sense (Scholl & Leslie,
1999). Such modules need not be present in fully functional
forms at birth. They may take time to mature or may need
certain environmental experiences to trigger them (Scholl &
Leslie, 2001). In the debates about whether theory of mind
constitutes a module, different scholars’ meanings of “mod-
ule” vary somewhat (Butterfill, 2007; Coltheart, 1999),
creating challenges in comparing their claims. FIGURE 13.18 Autism and theory of mind. Although this child
The most prominent issues revolve around two main diagnosed with autism may show meticulous attention to objects
questions. First, does theory of mind constitute a separate and their relations, such as making this neat ordered progression of
cognitive domain—a cognitive system tailored for one kind ducks, the same child may have great difficulty thinking about the
of information? Second, do theory of mind abilities show mental states of other people, a deficit that some researchers con-
informational encapsulation—that is, is the module influ- strue as evidence for a theory of mind module.
enced only by other information that is processed within
the module (Fodor, 1983)? This latter question is based on
the idea that once a module begins to process information, for processing beliefs and other sophisticated aspects of men-
its operations are not influenced by other external informa- tal lives—processing that can be notably difficult for people
tion. Informational encapsulation is an appealing explana- with autism (Leslie, 1994; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). This claim
tion for optical illusions, in which, for example, you cannot is compelling to the extent that the difficulty with beliefs
help but see that one line is shorter than another despite is bounded (that is, confined to that one sphere) and most
knowing that they are identical in length. Some argue that evident in socially rich environments where other children
theory of mind functions similarly, as a domain-specific, would develop complex understandings of others’ minds.
informationally encapsulated module (Scholl & Leslie, The idea of a theory of mind module is controversial,
1999). One form of evidence for this possibility resembles however, and other scholars believe that it may be possible
the optical illusion example. If circles and triangles mov- to explain the sense of social agency in simple animations,
ing about on a screen appear to “interact” in certain ways, the autism findings, and related phenomena in other ways.
most people cannot help but interpret them as animate, In this view, there is no module for thinking about beliefs.
social agents, as if their movements trigger a theory of mind Instead, this ability emerges from a combination of lower-
module. We saw in Chapter 5 how even quite young infants level perceptual abilities and higher-level, domain-general
seem to have similar social agent inferences triggered by cognitive mechanisms (Stone & Gerrans, 2006). In particu-
simple geometric forms. lar, there may be dedicated neural systems for processing gaze,
The proposal that theory of mind abilities form a module processing vocal intonations, and recognizing emotions. All
is perhaps most dramatically illustrated by the specific defi- this perceptual information could then feed into a domain-
cits of some individuals who are diagnosed with autism (see general set of cognitive mechanisms. One frequently empha-
Figure 13.18). Autism is a developmental disorder marked sized domain-general skill known as meta-representation is
by language problems and extraordinary difficulties with concerned with the ability to understand and think about
social interactions. Yet, some autistic individuals also show the sense in which a representation—like a mental image or
normal proficiency or even exceptional skill in other cogni- an idea—stands for something else. Understanding repre-
tive domains, including math, music, drawing, or reason- sentations at this level is necessary for understanding beliefs.
ing about complex devices. Even so, the same person who A critical question for future research is whether theory of
excels at some cognitive tasks may still fail at false-belief mind tasks require the same meta-representational skill as
tasks (Baron-Cohen, 1995). By contrast, some individuals other kinds of tasks unrelated to thinking about beliefs.
without autism may not do as well on cognitive tasks but Finally, any discussion of the modularity of theory of
may pass false-belief tasks easily. This pattern is compatible mind must also consider the correlation between poor lan-
with the claim of a biologically determined distinct system guage skills and autism. The implications of this correlation

DEVELOPING A THEORY OF MIND 491

are unclear, in part because as a child develops language certainly not complete when the first explicit false-belief
skills and theory of mind, each ability can influence the task is solved. A host of other, later-emerging cognitive skills
other. That is, some aspects of language acquisition, such support more nuanced social inferences, and there are cor-
as the ability to learn words, may be intimately related to respondingly complex false-belief tasks that children solve
the ability to think about the mental states of other people only at later ages (Perner & Wimmer, 1985; Stone et al.,
(Bloom, 2000; see Chapter 8). At the same time, language 1998; Wellman & Liu, 2004). Later in this chapter, we will
development may help foster a more sophisticated theory of look more closely at some of these more advanced social
mind. For example, developmental changes in the ways that skills, such as the ability to make attributions about behav-
children use verbs about mental states, such as “think” and iors in others and in ourselves.
“know,” correlate with success on traditional false-belief Like false-belief tasks, certain kinds of humor—which
tasks (Astington, 1993, 1999; Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). do not necessarily involve false beliefs—can reveal the lim-
Children may have to master these verbs and the syntactic its of children’s abilities to make inferences about states
constructions they require in order to reason more explic- of mind. It is not uncommon to see a bright 10-year-old
itly about false beliefs (de Villiers & de Villiers, 2000). As staring at a cartoon or comic strip without understanding
research on both directions of influence are understood in why it is funny. To be sure, humor is sometimes based on
more detail, they will inform the debates about whether adult knowledge that the child simply has not acquired.
there is a theory of mind module. But sometimes the child is mystified because of missing
insight into the nuances of social interactions and others’
mental states. Consider the cartoons in Figure 13.19. The
idea of a “guilt trip” that a parent might put on a child
Beyond False Beliefs involves complex inferences about both parties’ beliefs,
Beyond the study of false beliefs, much remains to be goals, and conflicting internal states. Similarly, the silliness
understood about theory of mind development. As men- of the “precious gift of hindsight” is based on understand-
tioned earlier, it is clear from studies of infants and animals ing that it is always easier to speak authoritatively about
that both are capable of specialized reasoning about social the recent past than about the future. Humor, one of the
entities, and this reasoning occurs in infants long before least understood of human behaviors (Provine, 2000), very
they can succeed on the standard false-belief task. It is also often involves sophisticated reasoning about the mental
clear that much of this social reasoning may occur automat- states of others.
ically, which makes the “theory” part of “theory of mind” Theory of mind is also critical to sharing information.
a misnomer. (We do not describe the processes of object Almost all forms of communication are incomplete and
perception as requiring a “theory” of three-dimensional rely on the two parties’ assumptions about their common
objects.) Indeed, if theory of mind functions largely auto- ground of understanding (Clark, 1996). For example, when
matically, as an informationally encapsulated module, it I tell someone that there is a bathroom on the second floor,
becomes less theory-like. we both immediately assume a rich arena of unstated com-
At the more sophisticated end of the developmental mon knowledge (I mean the second floor of the building
continuum, the ability to reason about others’ minds is we are in; I mean a bathroom that is working; if we are in

FIGURE 13.19 Humor and

theory of mind. In both of these
cartoons, relatively subtle aspects
of our beliefs about other minds are
needed to see the intended humor.
These examples serve to illustrate
how theory of mind skills continue
to develop long past middle child-
hood and suggest that the devel-
opmental patterns seen in toddlers
should perhaps be seen as part of a
much longer continuum of develop-
mental change than as the a critical
period in which a mature theory of
mind emerges.

492 CHAPTER 13 KNOWING OURSELVES, KNOWING OTHERS

public, I mean different bathrooms for men and women). Emerging Explanations of Behavior
Likewise, using and appreciating human artifacts, whether
they are books, signs, or art, critically involve thinking Most people engage in particular actions either because
about the creator’s goals, beliefs, and desires. The simplest of some intrinsic fact about them (they love chocolate) or
acts of communication would be incredibly difficult with- because of some degree of environmental pressure (they
out a rich theory of mind that helps us to decide what the want to be like their friends who love chocolate). We can all
speaker likely knows already and what is new. Full mastery recognize both kinds of factors, but most Western cultures
of such communicative nuances takes many years to develop tend to overemphasize dispositional factors, those influ-
(Birch & Bloom, 2004; Matthews et al., 2007). ences on behavior that have to do with a person’s intrin-
sic nature, at the expense of equally important situational
factors, aspects of a situation that influence the way a per-
son acts. Thus, a researcher might be able to show empiri-
Making Attributions about cally that performance on a math test is influenced by both
situational variables (noise, anxiety, and fatigue) and dis-
Ourselves and Others positional variables (math ability, motivation, or speed of
processing). Nonetheless, when most Westerners observe
Closely linked to the ability to infer another person’s goals someone else doing poorly or well in math, they are much
is the ability to attribute or ascribe particular reasons for more likely to attribute the failure or success to internal,
behaviors. This, too, is a critical part of understanding dispositional variables than to situational ones. This bias in
people’s actions. If the person in front of you in line is observing others is known as the fundamental attribution
impatient with the cashier, is he generally a rude, incon- error (Ross, 1977; see Figure 13.20).
siderate person, or is he just running late? More gener- Interestingly, this bias does not occur to the same extent
ally, how and when do we interpret someone’s behavior as across cultures, occurring more frequently in individualist
evidence for what kind of person he is? We make similar cultures than in collectivist ones. (As described in Chapter 12,
attributions to explain past experiences and to predict how individualist cultures consider the rights and autonomy of
we and others might do on future tasks. Furthermore, the the individual to be paramount, whereas collectivist cul-
nature of those predictions changes over the course of our tures place more value on the rights of the group and the
development. In addition, our attributions about our own connections between people.) Members of individualist
behavior, including why we engage in certain activities, cultures more often attribute a person’s behavior to dispo-
seem to strongly influence how we go about them and how sitional factors—aspects of her personality or disposition.
much we enjoy them. On the other hand, members of collectivist cultures tend to

That That
person sure curb made
is clumsy. me trip.

A B
FIGURE 13.20 The fundamental attribution error. The fundamental attribution error leads people to (A) attribute negative behaviors in
others to internal trait-like dispositions but (B) the same behavior in themselves to situations. Researchers have asked how the relative empha-
ses on dispositions and situations change with development.

MAKING ATTRIBUTIONS ABOUT OURSELVES AND OTHERS 493

understand behaviors as arising from situational factors— The observation that young children can use trait infor-
aspects of the specific circumstances or situation (Brewer & mation to explain behavior raises the interesting question
Chen, 2006; Miller, 1984; Nisbett, 2003; Oyserman & Lee, of whether they use this information in the same way as
2008; Peng et al., 2001). Social psychologists refer to the older children and adults. Trait-based reasoning, which is
study of the theories people use to explain their own behav- more common at older ages, is a nuanced way of consider-
ior and that of others as attribution theory. Indeed, one of ing individual qualities or traits in relation to specific cir-
the originators of attribution theory, Fritz Heider, referred cumstances. For example, a good person’s trusting nature
to it as the study of “naive psychology” (Heider, 1958). may make him overly gullible, which could lead to reck-
How do these different aspects of attribution develop? less or harmful behavior in some situations. In this way of
Early researchers suggested that younger children tend to thinking, traits themselves are not necessarily good or bad;
take a situational view of behavior and only switch toward a the outcome depends on the situation. In contrast, research
dispositional view with increasing age (Higgins & Bryant, suggests that younger children are more likely than older
1982; Ruble et al., 1979). But these claims were made before ones to use evaluative reasoning, which involves viewing
the strong cross-cultural differences were known. It now a person as entirely good or bad, and predicting his future
seems much less plausible that a dispositional orientation behaviors based on that view (Alvarez et al., 2001). Some-
is the mature, adult state, since we know that the majority one who engages in evaluative reasoning may notice a spe-
of adults in the world do not end up with that orientation. cific trait, such as selfishness, and then evaluate the person
More recently, many studies have shown that children do as wholly good or bad based on it (see Figure 13.21). When
not uniformly use situational attributions. For example, in 5- and 6-year-olds were compared with 9- and 10-year-
one study, children ranging in age from 4 to 7 years of age olds, the younger children were much more likely to rely on
were told about an individual’s traits and asked to predict broad, evaluative judgments in predicting behaviors and to
that person’s behavior (for example, “Sally is really mean. be less attentive to trait-specific ones (Alvarez et al., 2001).
Will she share her cookies?”). By at least age 5, the children This tendency in young children may also shed light on the
could use the trait information as evidence to predict behav- earlier idea that they do not consider dispositional factors.
ior (Yuill & Pearson, 1998). We saw in Chapter 12 that Some traits, such as being shy or outgoing, are relatively
when children reason about moral decisions or guilt, they free of evaluative components. If a young child is primarily
sometimes focus exclusively on the situation and neglect the using evaluative reasoning, she might find it more difficult
mental states of others, especially if the scenario is described to use these neutral traits to predict behavior.
in a way that does not emphasize mental states. However, While evaluative and trait-based reasoning may seem
the tendency to neglect those internal or dispositional fac- like qualitatively different types of understanding, a more
tors in moral decisions unless they are made salient does not conservative interpretation is that simplified versions of
amount to an inability to think about them. trait-based reasoning may be as salient as evaluative ones.
In fact, even young children sometimes assume that other Young children may be most aware of the global, evalua-
people’s internal qualities help explain their behaviors (Gel- tive aspect of traits, and perhaps attend to it first, because
man, 1992, 2003; Gelman & Wellman, 1991). For example,
a child who repeatedly observes a friend’s room in disarray
might conclude that the friend is a messy person. That sort of
essentialist bias toward explaining a person’s behavior in terms
of his unchanging, inner essence seems to suggest that chil-
dren would rely too much on dispositional factors early on,
something that is also claimed to contribute to some forms
of prejudice. Thus, young children will sometimes assume
that if a person with a different skin color than her own does
something wrong, the tendency to do things wrong may be
intrinsic to everyone with that skin color (Hirschfeld, 1996).

Q: How do young children’s attributions

about others’ behavior differ from those of
FIGURE 13.21 Evaluative versus trait-based reasoning. When
older children and adults? How might these preschoolers make attributions and judgments about others, they
developmental patterns vary across cultures? may have a tendency to make more global evaluative judgments than
more trait-specific ones.

494 CHAPTER 13 KNOWING OURSELVES, KNOWING OTHERS

it suggests some very simple, useful behavioral guidelines, trait-to-behavior inferences. This ability may be supported
such as avoiding people with “bad” traits and interact- by the child’s language development as she improves at
ing with those who show “good” traits. Thus, develop- using labels for traits (Liu et al., 2007). It also seems that
mental changes may reflect more intrinsic complexity of when children are thinking about personal attributes in
some attributions than it does a qualitative shift. There areas where they are particularly well practiced (such as
are indeed subtle traits that lead to complex behavioral figuring out which adults are the most expert informants
predictions that may escape a young child, but there are about how to label things or which adults give the clear-
even subtler aspects of traits and their expressions in situ- est instructions), they can make quite focused attributions
ations that can similarly elude many adults. If you observe about reliable versus unreliable informants without extend-
someone behaving shyly on a date, you would be hard- ing such attributions in a more global, evaluative manner
pressed to predict whether he would be shy about giving a (Einav & Robinson, 2011; Fusaro et al., 2011; Jaswal et al.,
speech. Indeed, we may underestimate how often as adults, 2010; Lutz & Keil, 2002).
especially in times of stress, we gravitate toward the same
holistic, evaluative attributions. This tendency is related
to the fundamental attribution error, in that both involve Q: What is evaluative reasoning, and what is its
an essentialist bias. But they differ in that evaluative rea-
soning involves characterizing someone as entirely good or purported role in the development of the ability
bad based on a particular trait, whereas the fundamental to make attributions about others?
attribution error involves relying too much on dispositional
factors (which need not be especially positive or negative)
to explain behavior. Although recent evidence calls into question the ear-
If younger children are sometimes able to reason about lier claims that children simply describe behavior and
specific traits, why did the earlier studies suggest otherwise? neglect internal states, it is difficult to discern an over-
One possibility is that even though the children understood all developmental pattern in terms of when (and whether)
the traits, they may have struggled with the way that the children show a dispositional or a situational bias. Thus
traditional experimental tasks asked about links between far, researchers have used very different methods to exam-
traits and behaviors. In many older studies, the child would ine how children make attributions at different ages. As
hear a description or watch a video of an individual doing a result, it is difficult to generalize across studies to say
something. A researcher would then ask the child to choose whether children start with either a situational or a dispo-
which of two other behaviors was more likely for that per- sitional bias and how their attributions change depending
son based on the first one. For example, a child might watch on the culture around them. The most conservative inter-
a video of a boy sharing a toy (a trait-relevant behavior). pretation of the research at present is that at least by the
Then an experimenter would ask the child whether the boy age of 5, and possibly quite a bit earlier, children can take
was more likely to help a friend clean his room or not help into account both situational and dispositional factors in
and just stand by idly. In these studies, children often would their attributions. It is possible that infants and toddlers
not make correct inferences until age 8 or older (Rholes & show no early bias between the two styles before adopt-
Ruble, 1984). ing the one that prevails in the surrounding culture. To
These sorts of tasks, however, require a more complex see how attributional differences across cultures develop,
reasoning process than a single trait-based prediction of we need a more systematic set of studies that uses similar
behavior. The child has to make an inference from one methods but controls for possible age effects on how chil-
behavior to a trait (from sharing a toy to kindness) and dren make attributions.
then link that trait to a second behavior (helping clean a Beyond situational versus dispositional biases, children at
room). But what would happen if the task were broken into least as young as 5 years of age take into account how traits
two parts: one that requires making an inference from a emerge when they make inferences about traits and evalu-
behavior to a trait and another that involves making an ate individuals with those traits. For example, in one set of
inference from a trait to a behavior? And would children’s studies, children were told about traits that emerged in indi-
performance improve if the trait-behavior relationships viduals either naturally, through sustained effort, through
were made clearer and more salient, perhaps by providing extrinsic rewards, or through artificial medical enhance-
several example behaviors for each trait? With these meth- ment. Even though all traits were manifested to the same
odological changes, even 4-year-olds can easily reason about extent in the described individuals, children tended to see
specific traits (Liu et al., 2007). Therefore, what develops the naturally emerging traits as persisting over longer time
may not be an ability to think about specific traits as much periods and under more challenging conditions. In addition,
as an ability to combine behavior-to-trait inferences with they evaluated those who acquired traits naturally more

MAKING ATTRIBUTIONS ABOUT OURSELVES AND OTHERS 495

positively than those who acquired them through extrinsic
means or through some kind of medicine (Lockhart et al., Type of Negative Trait Examples
2013). This bias for naturally emerging traits therefore
appears early and persists into adulthood; and it represents Biological Missing finger
one way in which the causal story of a trait’s emergence Allergy
influences subsequent inferences and evaluations about that Blend of biological and Aggression
trait. Even young children do not simply evaluate a trait in psychological Attentional problems
terms of its current surface characteristics; they are strongly
Psychological Messy
influenced by information about how that trait originated.
Fearful

Traits and Optimism TABLE 13.3 Youthful optimism about negative traits. This
table shows the three types of negative traits that children and adults
Your view of yourself clearly influences your view of your were asked about in the study of children’s optimism about the
future. If you believe you are a powerful, competent per- future. The younger the child, the more likely he was to see negative
son, you are inclined to think the future bodes well for traits as likely to improve. Adapted from Lockhart et al. (2002).
you. If you see yourself as helpless and incompetent, you
will more likely believe that uncontrollable events are in
store and that you will not manage them well. Two key child was then asked what the child in the story would be
questions help frame these issues with respect to develop- like at various times in the future, up to young adulthood.
ment: (1) Are there any general patterns concerning how Even the youngest children expected more positive change in
children at different ages view the future? (2) What kinds psychological attributes than physical ones. But remarkably,
of individual differences develop among children in this they also expected that the physical traits, some as permanent
respect? as a missing finger, would dramatically improve in the future.
Regarding general developmental patterns, younger chil- This youthful optimism reflects a positive attitude
dren seem to be more optimistic about the future than older toward others’ traits and presumably toward their own,
ones (see Figure 13.22). In one set of studies, each child was since the protagonists were of the same age and sex as
told about another child of his or her same sex and age who the participants. Younger children’s optimism may help
had a negative attribute that was either physical (such as an protect them from getting discouraged by the inevitable
allergy) or psychological (such as being messy) or a blend failures that come from being unskilled in so many areas
of the two (such as being physically aggressive; Lockhart (Lockhart et al., 2002). Interestingly, a study comparing
et al., 2002). Table 13.3 shows several sample attributes. The young Japanese children’s and adults’ responses to the
same type of stories about children found the same general
pattern as in the original U.S. study: the Japanese chil-
dren showed much more optimism about improvement of
No change negative traits than did the adults (Lockhart et al., 2008).
.7 Average change However, the Japanese data suggested a somewhat differ-
Extreme change
.6
ent developmental trajectory, in which Japanese adults
tended to be more optimistic about some scenarios than
Percentage of responses

.5 were American adults.

This research reveals that young children can be quite
.4
sensitive to others’ traits and can differentiate between dif-
.3 ferent types of traits. They also tend to see negative traits
as more likely to eventually change for the better. As chil-
.2 dren grow older, this optimism starts to fade, and in mid-
.1
dle childhood, individual differences in attributional style
become more prominent. As we will see in Chapter 16, the
0
5–6 7–9 Adult
children who become most pessimistic may also struggle
Age group with depression in adolescence (Cole et al., 2008).
FIGURE 13.22 Younger children as more optimistic. There is Alongside these general developmental patterns, chil-
a dramatic developmental change between kindergarten and second dren’s individual differences in optimism and attributional
grade in the extent to which traits are seen as changing in a positive styles have become a major area of research in their own
direction with increasing age. Adapted from Lockhart et al. (2002). right. The most prominent view describes two contrasting

496 CHAPTER 13 KNOWING OURSELVES, KNOWING OTHERS

ways that children come to regard their own traits and con- all ages—can have intrinsic motivation and even creativity
sequently their prospects for future success. The first type of undermined based on attributions they make about them-
children, known as fixed-trait theorists, think of their traits selves. A set of landmark studies vividly demonstrated this
as unchangeable, or fixed, aspects of themselves. If they fail effect by showing how a previously enjoyable activity can
at something, they assume they must be permanently defi- come to seem like a chore (Condry & Chambers, 1978; Deci,
cient in that area. The other type of children, incremental 1971, 1972; Lepper et al., 1973; Lepper & Greene, 1975).
theorists, see their traits as changeable with enough work. At the outset of one study, all the children in a preschool
They therefore may have a more positive view of the future classroom were given some new play materials: a set of magic
and be more likely to sustain their efforts (Dweck, 1986, markers and some drawing paper (Lepper et al., 1973). The
2006, 2012; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Given the finding researchers pointed out the markers and paper to the chil-
that younger children are more optimistic than older ones dren and then measured how long each child spent playing
about traits improving in the future, we can view younger with the markers compared with the other available toys.
children as tending toward incremental theories and, in Children who showed some intrinsic interest in drawing by
some cases, developing fixed-trait theories in middle child- playing with the markers for more than a certain amount
hood. It seems likely that the children who shift toward of time were selected for the experiment. They were then
fixed-trait attributions do not change their attributions for randomly assigned to one of three conditions: the expected-
all traits across the board. However, the specificity of those reward condition, the unexpected-reward condition, or the
changes still needs further research. no-reward condition.
Each child was then taken individually to a separate
room. Children in the expected-reward group were shown
an ornate certificate called a “Good Player Award” and told
Q: How do young children differ from older that they would receive it if they helped the experimenters by
children in terms of their optimism about traits? drawing pictures for them. The children in the unexpected-
Why might such a difference exist? reward and the no-reward conditions were simply asked
to play with the materials and draw some pictures. In all
three conditions, the children were given the same amount
of time to draw. Children in the expected-reward condition
were all given the expected award for playing well. Children
Attribution, Motivation, and Creativity in the unexpected-reward group were told, after they had
Although children who develop a fixed-trait attribution spent their time drawing, that because they drew so well
style tend to be more pessimistic about the possibility of they were going to be given a “Good Player Award” (which
self-improvement, they do not necessarily maintain an unal- was identical to that in the expected-reward condition).
terable level of self-esteem. In fact, the nature of fixed-trait Finally, children in the no-reward group were returned to
attributions can be changed somewhat by valuing the traits their classroom without any mention of rewards. A week
differently. Thus, simply praising a group of schoolchildren or two after these one-on-one sessions, a new group of
for doing well on a task because of their intelligence, which researchers, who had no information about which experi-
emphasizes a fixed trait, instead of praising them for doing mental condition each child had experienced, observed
well because of their efforts, can reduce their intrinsic motiva- the children drawing with markers in the classroom, just
tion for the task. Emphasizing a fixed trait this way may make as they had when their intrinsic interest was first assessed.
the possibility of failure much more threatening—since fail- Figure 13.23A summarizes this procedure.
ure could then reflect a fixed lack of intelligence rather than This study’s findings, which are summarized in Figure
an easily addressed lack of effort. Such trait-oriented feed- 13.23B, are impressive. Children in either the unexpected-
back may unintentionally encourage children to choose rote, reward condition or the no-reward condition played with the
easy tasks in which success is virtually guaranteed (Dweck, materials more than they had at the outset. In contrast, the
2006; Mueller & Dweck, 1998). Moreover, if a child views children who drew pictures for the expected reward showed
a particular negative trait that he possesses as fixed, he may a marked drop in spontaneous play with the drawing materi-
give up on developing skills related to that trait. Such dif- als. This drop has been explained in terms of several factors
ferences in attributional style have been used to explain why that blend ideas about the self with attributions about a per-
some children give up when faced with failure, while others son’s own motivation. More specifically, after the children in
persevere (Dweck, 2012; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). the expected-reward condition heard about the “Good Player
A related effect involving attributions about motiva- Award,” they apparently came to attribute their own inter-
tion does not arise from individual differences; instead, it est in drawing to the expectation of being rewarded for it.
reflects ways in which all children—and, in fact, people of Attributing their behavior to that extrinsic factor (the reward)

MAKING ATTRIBUTIONS ABOUT OURSELVES AND OTHERS 497

 Children showing intrinsic interest in drawing
20

Percentage of free choice

16

12

Expected-reward Unexpected-reward No-reward 8

condition condition condition
4

0
Expected-reward Unexpected-reward No-reward
condition condition condition
B

Children’s interest in drawing measured a

second time
A
FIGURE 13.23 The effects of reward on intrinsic motivation. (A) The 1973 study by Lepper and colleagues assigned children to three
distinct groups and then used a common assessment to determine the percentage of time that children later chose to play with toys that they
had played with during the experimental session. (B) This bar graph shows the mean proportion of time that children chose to play with the
target activity in postexperimental sessions. Adapted from Lepper et al. (1973).

made them discount their earlier, intrinsic motivation for it, a for drawing were later asked to draw to earn a reward, they
phenomenon called the overjustification effect. After draw- tended to make a larger number of drawings that were of
ing to earn the certificate, they seemed to say to themselves, lower quality. Some children even set up little assembly lines
“I was doing this because I knew I’d get a reward, not because to churn out lots of drawings that were each much simpler
I liked doing it.” Thus, their self-concept mediated the way the than the ones they produced before being rewarded. This
reward influenced their behavior. new approach to the task fit their interpretation of working
Later studies have shown that if a child simply knows for the reward (Loveland & Olley, 1979).
that an adult is carefully watching her behavior, it can Nonetheless, some have argued that extrinsic rewards
be enough to reduce intrinsic motivation for the behav- need not undermine creativity if they are handled carefully.
ior (Lepper & Green, 1975). In at least some situations, a These researchers suggest that if you fine-tune the system
child who knows she is being monitored may reframe the to reward only high-quality work and explicitly convey this
situation in such a way that she believes that her behavior criterion, the rewards can enhance creativity (Eisenberger
is motivated by an external factor. Even the simple act of & Cameron, 1998). Yet, these manipulations can be subtle
praising a child’s actions can have a similar effect, under- and difficult to implement with young children. In the long
mining motivations for those actions (Henderlong & run, the rewards may still subtly undermine motivation
Lepper, 2002). Yet, not all praise has negative effects; prais- and creativity if they are removed. For example, one study
ing internal factors like effort, rather than actions, is less on educational video games that teach mathematical skills
likely to decrease motivation. found that games designed around intrinsic motivational
These kinds of interactions and individual responses are factors (such as embedding math problems in the most
cognitively complex. The child must assess her own mental exciting parts of the games) were seven times as likely to
and motivational states, take into account the context in be played in the future as those that were designed around
which she is acting, weigh the external conditions influenc- extrinsic factors (such as embedding math problems in tests
ing her actions, and then reassess the relationships between at the end of the game, where achieving a good score was the
the situational and dispositional factors that drive her behav- reward; Habgood & Ainsworth, 2011).
iors. Thus, the presence of the overjustification effect in pre- In research that rewarded children with stickers for eating
schoolers suggests that they clearly can take into account vegetables they disliked, the studies reported an increased
both situational and dispositional factors when interpreting preference for the rewarded vegetables more than 3 months
their own behaviors. later (Cooke et al., 2011). The success may be because the
One of the most insidious ways that extrinsic rewards can vegetables were initially strongly disliked, and by being
influence self-perception and motivation comes from how rewarded for eating them, the children learned that they
children change their approach to a task when the rewards were not so bad. On the other hand, if the children’s ini-
are still present. In the example of drawing with markers, if tial dislike for the vegetables had been mild, the result of
the children who initially expected (and received) a reward reinforcement could have been negligible. Thus, when there

498 CHAPTER 13 KNOWING OURSELVES, KNOWING OTHERS

is less of an initial negative bias, it may be harder to instill a
shift toward the more positive.
The findings that external rewards, mediated by chil-
dren’s self-perception, can undermine intrinsic motiva-
tion strike a clear blow to behaviorist models of learning.
According to the behaviorists, reinforcing a behavior in any
organism, whether it is a human or a rat, should increase the
propensity for the behavior. Yet, the drawing studies (and
many other studies that followed) showed the opposite pat-
tern. Although some have contended that this large set of
studies was flawed and have argued that the effect does not
exist (Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996), more recent, exten-
sive analyses strongly indicate that these overjustification
effects are real and substantial (Deci et al., 1999; Lepper et
al., 1999, 2005). These interactions may be far more com-
plex than originally envisioned, and it may be possible to FIGURE 13.24 Choice among rewards. When children are given
craft effective, beneficial patterns of external reinforcement a choice among rewards, the choice can reduce the degree to which
by attending carefully to the child’s mental states. Most intrinsic motivation is undermined.
interesting, however, is the evidence that the overjustifi-
cation effect provides rich social cognitions that influence
behavior, even in the preschool years. (Bao & Lam, 2008). For example, if Chinese children have
In practical terms, this research shows that extrin- strong social and emotional connections to those providing
sic rewards should be used with caution in educational rewards, their negative effects are somewhat reduced. How-
and other structured settings. Extrinsic awards extend ever, when there is no such close connection, the rewards
far beyond the classroom to include medals for athletic tend to decrease intrinsic motivation, just as they do in the
competitions, prizes for artists, and salary bonuses in the West (Bao & Lam, 2008). One interpretation of this find-
workplace. In a broader sense, the critical issue seems to be ing is that the Chinese children have internalized the goals
giving people the sense of having a choice in decisions about and needs of those to whom they are closely attached, such
their lives and daily activities, or what is sometimes called that the intrinsic motivation of someone like a parent is, by
self-determination (Ryan & Deci, 2000). If people feel extension, their own intrinsic motivation. This view suggests
that they have had an important role in determining their that children in the West might also be insulated from the
behaviors, they will be more motivated to engage in those negative effects of extrinsic rewards if they see the reward
behaviors. This effect seems even stronger in children, for givers as part of their own close-knit, supportive group, such
whom tangible rewards seem to have the most negative con- as a family with strong shared values and goals (Bao & Lam,
sequences (Patall et al., 2008). The importance of choice, 2008; Lepper et al., 2005).
however, also suggests ways to mitigate the negative effects
of rewards. For example, if people are given a choice among
several rewards, that element of choice can often reduce the Q: Describe how it is possible to turn play into
feeling of being coerced by the reward (Patall et al., 2008; work, even for preschoolers. What mechanism
see Figure 13.24). Thus, introducing a genuine opportu- seems to explain this transformation?
nity for choice and self-determination into a reward system,
such as allowing children in a task to use their “earnings”
to choose which of several rewards to purchase, can often
mitigate the negative effects of rewards and can sometimes
maintain their positive effects on immediate performance.
A second practical issue concerns whether the harmful
Conclusions
effects of extrinsic rewards might vary across cultures and The ability to understand our own mental states and those
groups. It has been reported, for example, that extrinsic of others is an essential part of being a mature person. Con-
motivations may be less detrimental in some non-Western trary to earlier views, it seems that young children and even
settings, such as China, where conformity to group norms is infants do have some sense of self, but it may be based largely
often valued more than autonomy (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999). on their perceptions and actions, without involving concep-
But a closer look suggests more commonalities than differ- tual or autobiographical ways of construing themselves. Each
ences in this respect between Western and Chinese children of these senses of self have early versions, or competencies,

CONCLUSIONS 499
that become more sophisticated over time, again support- false-belief tasks tell only part of the story of how theory of
ing a recurring theme in this book of the value of focusing mind develops. More recent research is beginning to link
on emerging abilities as opposed to disappearing deficits. In simple patterns of goal attribution in infancy to more com-
addition, the different facets of the self interact and support plex patterns of thought about second-order beliefs in late
growth in each other over the course of development. Thus, childhood. It is therefore misleading to think that there is
an increasing sense of the private self supports the develop- a particular age at which a child acquires a theory of mind.
ment of the extended self, and the conceptual self interacts Instead, it makes more sense to think of infants and young
with the autobiographical self. In fact, there are interactions children as using a rich array of cognitive and perceptual
between almost every pairing of the dimensions of self that tools to gain insight into the behaviors of social agents. Even
reinforce each other and that may ultimately help create a an understanding of false beliefs now seems to be within
more integrated sense of self. the conceptual reach of infants, at least at an implicit level.
In the development of self-esteem and self-efficacy, Again, emerging competencies is a powerful theme. Younger
which add an evaluative component to self-knowledge children and infants do not have as many of these tools, and
and understanding, we see once again how basic cognitive they use some of them in more limited ways. Nonetheless,
skills influence a child’s social interactions and emotional they are sensitive from a very early age to some special prop-
states. Contrary to popular accounts, however, low self- erties of social agents, and they benefit from ways in which
esteem may not be the prime cause of various acting-out all these tools work together to help them think about the
behaviors, and overly high self-esteem can pose its own set minds of others.
of problems. Thoughts about the self are also related to A critical part of thinking about others involves infer-
emotional intelligence and self-regulation. The ability to ences about dispositions and traits and how they might
regulate ourselves by deferring gratification may heavily vary or stay the same over time. Children, much more than
involve attentional skills that enable us to focus on other adults, tend to believe that negative traits in younger peo-
objects rather than the most salient goal. Self-regulation ple will improve and that positive traits will endure. This
ability is also influenced by context: whether those influ- youthful optimism may be a way of protecting themselves
ences are local, such as the presence of a mirror, or cultural, against the failures that younger children inevitably experi-
reflecting the way a culture values strong self-regulation ence as they mature. These attributions are critical, as well,
skills early on. In this way, we see that self-regulation can to understanding motivation and creativity in the young
be amplified or reduced by the environment in which a child. More broadly, these developmental patterns and the
child develops. related idea of self-determination reinforce the theme that
The child’s understanding of other people’s minds shows for optimal development, children need to be active agents
several major developmental changes. Based on the much- in their own developmental journeys and not just passive
studied false-belief tasks, earlier researchers believed that recipients of environmental inputs and contingencies. Of
children younger than about 3½ cannot think of others course, external inputs and encouragement are important,
as having false beliefs about a current situation. But more but they should always occur in ways that are sensitive to a
recent studies suggest that young children’s failures on child’s intrinsic interests and curiosities.

500 CHAPTER 13 KNOWING OURSELVES, KNOWING OTHERS

 STU DY AN D REVI EW

SUMMARY Even after young children come to explicitly appreciate that

others have beliefs (usually around 2 years of age), it isn’t
Self-Concepts and Self-Representations until about 3½ years of age that they stop having difficulty
● In the first few years of life, there are dramatic changes in
reasoning about other people having false beliefs. The ability
how children come to view themselves. These changes are to understand false beliefs is not the same as having a full-
best understood by realizing that there may be at least five fledged theory of mind, but it is an important component.
distinct senses of self that emerge at quite different times and At a more tacit level, however, and in tasks that pose lower
in different ways: the ecological self, the interpersonal self, loads on executive processing, even infants may have rudi-
the extended self, the private self, and the conceptual self. mentary senses of false beliefs.
● There is some evidence that nonhuman primates can grasp a
● An important dimension of knowing ourselves is gender
identity, a form of knowledge that may be far more subject to rudimentary sense of others’ false beliefs, although this kind
biological constraints than was originally thought. The sense of understanding may become uniquely rich and nuanced in
of gender identity, however, is quite distinct from culturally humans.
● These patterns raise questions about whether the child’s the-
provided sex roles, which can vary independently, as an indi-
vidual can firmly believe that he or she has a certain gender ory of mind develops as a cognitive module that is domain
while engaging in many roles typically associated with the specific, informationally encapsulated, and strongly deter-
other gender. mined by biological factors. Some proponents of a theory of
mind module have proposed that disruptions in the develop-
Developing a Sense of Self-Worth ment of theory of mind skills may underlie some forms of
● Self-esteem, a sense of our own value, changes dramatically autism.
during childhood, generally progressing from extremely
high views of the self to more realistic assessments based on Making Attributions about Ourselves and Others
increasingly complex social comparisons. ● The ability to make attributions that explain others’ behav-

● Self-efficacy, the belief about our capacity to achieve goals, iors is critical to functioning as a social individual. Younger
is a more focused kind of assessment often tied to a particu- children have rudimentary attributional skills, but they often
lar situation. Feelings of low self-efficacy are often easier to seem to miss the subtler connections between traits, situa-
change in a child than low self-esteem. tions, and behaviors. They may be more likely to use evalu-
ative reasoning, making global evaluations of others as good
Self-Regulation or bad and missing the more subtle aspects of how traits can
● Younger children are more likely to show difficulties in predict behaviors.
self-regulation and hence have problems in delaying grati- Younger children show greater optimism than older chil-
fication. Difficulties may frequently arise from inadequate dren and adults, leading them to believe that negative traits
strategies for diverting their attention from a desired object change for the better as people age. This optimism may have
or from an inability to think of ways to make the desired adaptive value if it shields the child from discouragement
object less salient or accessible. Some of these problems may when she faces failures associated with being young and
arise from relatively late maturation of regions of the frontal inexperienced.
lobes. Damage to these regions in adult brains can also cause ● Attributions about the self can powerfully influence motiva-

self-regulation problems. Self-regulation levels vary across tion and creativity. Even for preschool children, an intrinsi-
both genders and cultures. They seem to be influenced by cally interesting form of play can become much more like
surrounding cultural and local contexts as well as socializa- work if they perceive that they are doing it merely to earn
tion practices. external rewards.
● It is possible to motivate children without undermining
Developing a Theory of Mind intrinsic motivation. This can be done by reminding chil-
● Young children are certainly aware of the distinctive nature dren of the intrinsic values of their actions as well as enabling
of social beings, but at first they may understand other social feelings of choice and control when using more external
beings’ behavior only in terms of their goals and desires. forms of reinforcement.

STUDY AND REVIEW 501

THOUGHT QUESTIONS KEY TERMS
1. We have seen that people have at least five distinct senses of attribution theory (p. 494) kinesthetic self-concept
self that emerge at different times in the first few years of life. conceptual self (p. 470) (p. 471)
To what extent do you think these different senses of the self dispositional factor (p. 493) mirror test (p. 471)
start to become integrated into a more unitary sense of self module (p. 483)
dominance hierarchy (p. 484)
as a child grows older? If you do think such an integration
ecological self (p. 469) overjustification effect
occurs, speculate on how it might happen. If not, explain
evaluative reasoning (p. 494) (p. 498)
why you think the senses stay separate.
2. How might an extremely low level of self-esteem have very extended self (p. 469) private self (p. 469)
different consequences for a young child, a schoolchild, an false-belief task (p. 487) self-concept (p. 471)
adolescent, and an adult? false-photograph task self-determination (p. 499)
3. Describe a situation in which a typical 7-year-old would fail (p. 489) self-efficacy (p. 476)
to reason adequately about the mental states of others, but a fixed-trait theorist (p. 497) self-esteem (p. 474)
typical 16-year-old would succeed. What is different about the sense of self (p. 468)
fundamental attribution error
cognitive capacities of the two age groups that would explain
(p. 493) situational factor (p. 493)
the failure of the younger child and the success of the teenager?
4. An elementary school has been using extrinsic rewards in gender identity (p. 472) theory of mind (p. 468)
an attempt to motivate its students to achieve at higher lev- gender role (p. 473) theory of mind module
els in mathematics. The program is not working well, as the incremental theorist (p. 497) (TOMM) (p. 491)
students are starting to regard mathematics as unpleasant interpersonal self (p. 469) trait-based reasoning (p. 494)
work. The school is not willing to stop using the rewards
but asks you for advice on what else they might do to dimin-
ish the negative side effects of the rewards. What do you
recommend?

502 CHAPTER 13 KNOWING OURSELVES, KNOWING OTHERS

 14
Becoming Part of the Family
Parenting Siblings and Family Dynamics Child Abuse
• Parenting Styles • Birth Order Effects • Effects of Abuse
• Parenting Contexts • Sibling Relationships and Socialization • Explaining the Cycle of Abuse
• Interventions to Improve Parenting • Foster Care
Changes in the Family
• Parent Effects in Relation to Other
Influences • Changes in Parents’ Age Conclusions
• Changes in Family Size
• The Interactionist Approach to Family Summary
Dynamics • Working Parents and Child Care
• Gender Socialization in the Family: • Changes in Family Structures
A Web of Interacting Influences
 hen Bill Clinton rose to prominence on firstborn. Because there are many other possible sources of

W the American political stage, people natu-

rally wanted to know about his family
background. When attention turned to his
younger half-brother, Roger, it seemed that
Roger could not be more different from Bill (see Figure 14.1).
Roger had drifted from job to job, and his career as musician
never got off the ground. He became increasingly involved in
influence, we cannot know for sure whether the Clintons’
economic situation contributed significantly to the differ-
ences between Bill and Roger, but we do know that these
effects are much more common in less advantaged families.
As this chapter describes, the family is a site of numerous
interacting influences on development, from socioeconomic
and cultural factors, to the effects of parents and children
drug use, which in turn led to drug dealing. For these activi- on one another, to the consequences of sibling relations, to
ties, Roger served 2 years in prison. Meanwhile, his brother the importance of shared genetic predispositions.
Bill earned a scholarship to Georgetown University, then a For most of us, the most important social unit in our
prestigious Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford. He attended Yale lives is our family. We explain our preferences in relation
Law School before returning to his home state of Arkansas, to family traditions (either aligned with them or against
where he was elected governor at age 32, making him the them); we relate powerful, formative family experiences,
youngest governor in the country. After nearly 12 years from moments of shared understanding to horrific fights;
as governor, he was twice elected to the presidency of the and we refer to our family role, such as the scapegoat, the
United States. leader, the joker, or even the black sheep. We do these things
Given such dramatically different outcomes for these because we assume that many aspects of who we are can be
two boys born to the same mother, many people assumed understood in terms of what our family is like. In this chap-
that the sharp contrasts in their lives must have been caused ter, we will consider how the many facets of the family con-
by their different fathers, presumably because of different tribute to a child’s development. We will start with views of
genetic predispositions. Others pointed to birth order and parenting, then consider siblings, and finally explore how
argued that Bill Clinton, being the firstborn, was bound changes, conflict, and physical and psychological abuse in
to be less rebellious and more driven to achieve. In fact, the family might be understood in light of the wide range of
developmental studies that consider large numbers of fami- possible influences that can arise between the child and the
lies tell a more complicated and more interesting story other members of the family.
(Conley, 2004). For example, one major influence on chil- Studies on families employ an enormous range of meth-
dren appears to be the economic status of the family as a ods, many of them quite different from the experimental
whole. When a family is wealthy, siblings tend to turn out approaches encountered in earlier chapters. To study the
more alike. When a family is poor, as was the case with effects of parents on children, of children on parents, or
the Clintons, parents have to choose how to allocate their of siblings on each other, it is not often feasible to experi-
limited resources, often devoting most of them to the child mentally assign groups of children to different parenting
who shows the earliest promise, which is frequently the conditions. Instead, researchers usually have to examine
interactions in real families as they unfold. They then
infer causal patterns from the intricate networks of correla-
tions between family members’ behaviors, their personal-
ity traits, and many types of family environments. Striking
correlations often emerge, but it is difficult to uncover an
unambiguous causal pathway or cycle that explains those
correlations.
It is important to keep these methodological challenges
in mind as we address several questions about families.
First, we will focus on the parents and ask how different
kinds of parenting can influence a child’s development. For
example, does a rigid and overly controlling style of parent-
ing tend to affect children’s personality traits, perhaps by
making the children more submissive? We will also consider
how different contexts, whether cultural or socioeconomic,
can interact with the effects of different kinds of parenting
FIGURE 14.1 Sibling differences. Even though they grew up
in the same family and have a physical resemblance, Bill and Roger (see Figure 14.2). We will ask about other possible causes of
Clinton had markedly different life courses. Recent research is begin- correlations between parental behaviors and those in their
ning to offer explanations for why siblings turn out to be similar or children. In particular, we will discuss research regarding
very different. children’s effects on their parents, effects of shared genotypes

504 CHAPTER 14 BECOMING PART OF THE FAMILY

FIGURE 14.2 Parents and families. Throughout the world, families are considered the primary social unit of a child’s life and where many
of the strongest emotional bonds are formed. It is therefore not surprising that families, and parents in particular, have been thought to be the
primary agents behind a child’s personality and value system. That view, however, has become highly controversial, as other factors beyond the
family are shown to have influence as well.

between parents and their children, and the effects of dif- potential tradeoffs associated with placing children in foster
ferent environments on both children and their parents. We care as opposed to keeping them in their own problematic
will also explore how all of these factors interact in contrib- home setting?
uting to long-lasting characteristics in children. In all of these cases, it is important to carefully monitor
We will then consider the relations between siblings, the kinds of methods that researchers use and the extent
including whether a child’s position relative to other siblings to which these methods can support clear conclusions
has a systematic effect on development: Does birth order about causal patterns. We will also want to keep in mind
matter, and does it matter more in some kinds of families the cycles of interactions that can happen in a family and
than in others? We will also examine whether siblings try to the challenges of disentangling causes from effects. At the
differentiate themselves from one another. And we will con- broadest level, we will consider families in terms of two
sider the other social and cognitive effects that sibling rela- complex webs of interactions, one that occurs among family
tionships may have on the children themselves and within members and another that occurs between the family and
the family system. the larger culture in which it is situated. Our goal will be
We will then turn to the developmental consequences to discern some reliable patterns that hold across these two
of changing family demographics. In the United States webs of interactions.
and many other developed countries, the trends in recent
decades point toward older parents, smaller families, and
more families in which both parents work full-time out-
side the home. Each of these trends can change the family
dynamic, influencing both parents and children. We will Parenting
also consider some of the changes to family structure that
Parenting can take several forms that serve different func-
have become more prevalent in recent decades, including
tions for the child. One review described seven important
single-parent families, families with same-sex parents, and
components of parenting that guide a child’s development
families in which parents divorce and perhaps remarry,
(Brooks-Gunn & Markman, 2005). Each of these compo-
blending two previously separate families. There is now
nents forms a continuum with positive and negative forms
extensive research on what kinds of effects these different
of parental behaviors at opposite ends. The positive and
family structures have on children and how, in some cases,
negative behaviors show dramatic differences in their preva-
they seem to vary, depending on the children’s age and
lence and their effects across different socioeconomic and
gender.
cultural groups, and these patterns are correlated with dif-
Finally, we will consider the prevalence and effects of
ferent outcomes for children.
child abuse. Such cases can range from physical and verbal
abuse to incest. These tragedies raise significant concerns ● Nurturance involves showing children warmth and
about the long-term consequences for children. In addition, responding to their needs and changing emotions (see
they demonstrate potential effects across generations, as Chapter 6). When parents fail to nurture, they may be
abused children become abusive parents themselves, creat- either disengaged or inappropriately intrusive.
ing a “cycle of abuse.” We will also ask about the potential ● Discipline methods that attempt to explain the reason for
effects of foster care on children. For example, what are the a punishment are generally considered more effective than

PARENTING 505
 punishments that are coercive, physical, or insufficiently children and the level of parents’ demands or control. This
explained (see Chapter 12). theory holds that a parent can be either high or low on each
● Teaching a child ideally involves questioning a child care- dimension and that a parent’s particular combination of
fully to find out where she is coming from cognitively. warmth and control ends up setting the tone for most inter-
Parents who are less effective teachers may instead take actions between parent and child. Simplifying each of these
over the task for the child without considering the child’s dimensions into high and low values yields a two-by-two
own mental state, or they may not offer any help. table showing the four most commonly discussed parenting
● The language that parents use to engage the child can be styles (see Table 14.1).
adjusted to suit his age and situation, and it can include Table 14.1 reflects one of the most active areas of research
questions, expansions of the child’s utterances, and a rich on parenting (Maccoby & Martin, 1983). The authoritative,
narrative structure (see Chapter 8). Alternatively, a parent permissive, and authoritarian styles were originally proposed
may talk to the child only rarely or may talk “at the child” by developmental psychologist Diana Baumrind in 1966
without encouraging interaction. (Baumrind, 1966). (The fourth style, neglectful / uninvolved,
● The materials that parents provide to foster creative play— logically results from a low level of both warmth and con-
like books, toys, and games—enable a child to imagine, trol, but it was not a major component of Baumrind’s origi-
explore, and interact more fruitfully with others. Other nal account.) Although threads of these ideas extend back
parents may provide minimal support or prefer materials though earlier studies (Grusec, 2011; Hess & Shipman,
more useful for “managing” the child, such as sitting him 1965; Lewin, 1946; Sears et al., 1957), Baumrind initially
in front of a television for long periods. developed these categories after observing preschool and
● Monitoring includes being aware of a child’s activities school-age children in school, in lab settings, and interacting
throughout the day, such as where the child is and what with their parents at home. She also interviewed the parents
she is reading or playing with or watching on television. about how they interacted with their children. The parent-
A low-monitoring parent may be barely aware of a child’s ing styles that Baumrind proposed appeared quite distinct
activities and may not really have any sense of how a child and were associated with different behaviors and traits in the
spends her time. children.
● Parents manage their children’s time by arranging play Over several decades of research and analysis, Baumrind’s
dates or other recurring activities that give a child’s life parenting styles have endured remarkably well (Baumrind,
structure and regularity. Parents who fail to adequately 1991). Given that versions of these types do seem to exist, at
manage a child’s time might not plan for the days or weeks least among middle-class North American parents, the obvi-
ahead, leaving the child with no routines and no sense of ous question is whether they directly influence aspects of
what is coming next. the child. Researchers have frequently addressed this ques-
tion by looking for correlations between parenting styles
Across these seven dimensions of parental behavior, some
and aspects of children’s behavior and personalities (see
common aspects distinguish the more positive, balanced
Figure 14.3). Any significant correlations were then assumed
ways of interacting with children from the negative ways,
to result from the parenting style—the classic fallacy of
which can be either quite rigid or disengaged. In particular,
equating correlation with causation. This is an important
parents tend to vary in the level of warmth and responsive-
concern to keep in mind as we look at each parenting style
ness they show to their children and in the level of demands
and the patterns of correlation with developmental outcomes
or control they place on them. Variations in these broader
and consider what sorts of causal influences are suggested.
aspects of parental behavior form the foundation for one of
Our first examples are limited to middle-class, white, North
the most influential theories about parenting effects.
American children. They mostly pertain to children in early
and middle adolescence, as many researchers assume that
parenting effects may be the most dramatic after several
years of parenting.
Parenting Styles
For several decades, researchers have examined parenting
styles and the possible influences of such styles on children.
High Control Low Control
We define parenting styles as the ways in which parents
engage in behaviors and have attitudes toward their children High Warmth Authoritative Permissive
that create a particular parenting environment or climate.
Low Warmth Authoritarian Neglectful/uninvolved
As already noted, the most prominent theory of parenting
styles is based on two main ways that parental behaviors TABLE 14.1 Parenting styles. Each of the four parenting styles
vary: the warmth and responsiveness of parents toward their involves a different combination of warmth and control.

506 CHAPTER 14 BECOMING PART OF THE FAMILY

 is on helping to meet their children’s needs and desires rather
than on moderating their children’s actions. They are often
very sensitive to their children’s emotions and motivations
and try to respond to them without imposing any restric-
tions. They rarely discipline their children, and when they
do, it may be inconsistent: the same behavior is punished on
one occasion and tolerated on the next.
Children of permissive parents tend to seem more imma-
ture than their peers and to have trouble controlling their
impulses or setting limits on themselves. In Baumrind’s
A B
observations, they are less likely to accept responsibility for
FIGURE 14.3 Links between parenting styles and children’s their own actions. They also tend to act less independently
behavior. Parents can differ quite dramatically in their typical
than other children, which may seem surprising given that
patterns of interactions with their children, ranging from authori-
tarian parents to permissive ones. Such differences in parenting
they have had so few constraints. As adolescents they are
styles have been found to correlate with personality differences in more likely than their peers to exhibit problem behaviors.
children, suggesting to some that the styles cause the differences. However, they also show relatively high self-esteem, rela-
Other factors, however, such as shared genotypes and children’s tively low rates of depression, and better social skills.
effects on parents, may be equally if not more important in shaping Authoritative parents are high in both warmth and
personality types. control, but here it is important to take a more nuanced
view than the simple two-by-two table suggests. Authori-
tative parents’ “high control” is more balanced and less
Authoritarian parents are low in warmth and high in rigid and overbearing than that of authoritarian parents.
control and typically order their children around, expect- Authoritative parents set guidelines for their children’s
ing compliance with no questioning or discussion. Their behavior, but they are also flexible and will listen to chil-
parenting is often described as harsh, partly because they dren’s concerns and needs. They favor positive feedback
generally do not try to change a child’s behavior through and rewards as opposed to punishment or coercion. Disci-
discussion, positive remarks, or rewards. Instead, they tend pline is consistent, and the parent usually explains the rea-
to use punishment and coercion. In Baumrind’s initial sons for punishment, along with requesting that the child
description, many authoritarian parents believed they were make amends for the transgression. (If an older brother
enforcing behavioral standards based on fundamentalist takes a younger sibling’s toy, he might be asked to apolo-
religious doctrines (Baumrind, 1996). In public places, such gize, return the toy, and perhaps loan his brother one of
as playgrounds or supermarkets, authoritarian parents can his own toys for a while.) Authoritative parents are warm
sometimes be quite conspicuous—yelling at their children, and sensitive to children’s mental states, but they do not
spanking them, or refusing to put up with any of the chil- simply capitulate to their children’s desires. They encour-
dren’s comments. age their children’s autonomy while upholding guidelines
Children of authoritarian parents tend to be more depen- for appropriate behavior.
dent and to lack social competence in dealing with peers. Children of authoritative parents seem to fare best among
They often seem relatively withdrawn and passive and espe- Baumrind’s groups. They tend to be relatively independent
cially compliant to authority figures. In adolescence, they and self-reliant and have good self-control. They do well
tend to show lower self-esteem and to be more depressed than in high school relative to the other groups and often take
other children (Baumrind, 1991; Karavasilis et al., 2003). the initiative in various matters. Compared to their peers,
Relative to their peers, boys with authoritarian parents tend boys with authoritative parents tend to be more socially
to show more hostility, whereas girls tend to set lower goals responsible, while girls tend to be more independent. A
for achievement. Certainly, this constellation of traits gives child with authoritative parents seems to be his or her own
the impression that the parents’ demanding, overcontrol- person, having internalized standards of self-restraint and
ling approach created passive, withdrawn children who have achievement.
had little opportunity for independence, self-expression, or Like authoritarian parenting, authoritative parenting also
initiative. involves a form of control over children, but it is important
Quite the opposite of authoritarian parents, permissive to closely consider what kind of control. Several research-
parents are high in warmth and low in control. They make ers have stressed that psychological control differs in several
few demands of their children and rarely attempt to monitor ways from behavioral control (Barber, 1996, 2002; Barber
or control their behavior. Instead, they are highly tolerant of et al., 2005; Steinberg, 1990, 2005; Steinberg et al., 1989,
their children’s behaviors and desires. Their focus as parents 1994). Psychological control involves attempting to regulate

PARENTING 507
a child’s behavior by manipulating his feelings. These Children of neglectful/uninvolved parents tend to fare
manipulations can include withdrawing affection from the badly. One especially clear pattern is their tendency to
child or inducing guilt or shame. Psychological control can be especially susceptible to peer pressure and therefore to
include a parent’s intrusions into a child’s deeply personal engage more often in behaviors that do not conform to adult
domains, in which she feels she should have autonomy, espe- norms (Bednar & Fisher, 2003; Durbin et al., 1993; Shuck-
cially as an adolescent (Steinberg, 2005). Psychological con- smith et al., 1995). Some studies have suggested that girls
trol, which is more typical of authoritarian parents, is often with neglectful/uninvolved parents are more likely than
associated with more depressive and anxious symptoms in other girls to become involved in peer groups whose norms
children (Steinberg, 2005). Behavioral control, in contrast, are clearly different from those of the dominant adult cul-
involves attempting to regulate a child’s behavior by setting ture (Brown et al., 1993; Lamborn et al., 1991). Table 14.2
guidelines that follow the norms and values of the family summarizes the features of each parenting style and some of
or society—perhaps by requiring certain homework hours, the associated developmental outcomes.
a set bedtime, or appropriate ways to speak to older adults.
Compared with psychological control, behavioral control is
more common among authoritative parents and is generally Q: What are Baumrind’s three parenting styles,
associated with fewer negative outcomes in children.
Finally, while Baumrind’s initial focus was not on the and how are they associated with psychological
fourth cell, it is important to mention the neglectful / unin- differences in children? When and how is
volved parents, who seem to ignore and not care about their gender of the child relevant?
children. They do not interact much with their children,
which makes their style almost a form of nonparenting.
They might be oblivious to the child’s hopes, desires, and
fears and uninterested in monitoring the child’s behaviors.
This category is less discussed than the others, but may be Parenting Contexts
more likely among parents who struggle with many prob- Many of these differences among children seem to fit with
lems of their own, making them unable to function well causal explanations of how parents might influence their chil-
as parents. Imagine, for example, a single mother who is dren. But accounting for cross-cultural and social class differ-
deeply clinically depressed. She has little motivation to do ences inevitably complicates those causal stories because the
anything more than the bare minimum required to get associations between parenting styles and children’s behaviors
through the day. Her child is largely irrelevant to her. In differ across cultural and socioeconomic groups.
other cases, a parent may actually develop feelings of hos-
tility toward a child that consequently contribute to a ten- Parenting across Cultures Even when a parenting
dency to be neglectful and uninvolved. style appears to be the same across several cultures, it can

Parents All Children Boys Girls

Authoritarian Low warmth, high control Dependent, low social Hostile Set low goals
(overbearing, rigid, competency, look to
psychological control) authority

Permissive Low warmth, low control Immature, low impulse No obvious gender No obvious gender
control, not inclined to differences differences
take responsibility or act
independently
Authoritative High warmth, high control Self-reliant, self-controlled, Responsible Independent and socially
(balanced, flexible, behavioral willing to explore responsible
control)
Neglectful/ Low warmth, low control Strongly influenced by May show a greater
uninvolved peers tendency to join peer
groups that depart from
adult norms

TABLE 14.2 Effects of parenting styles Four different parenting styles have been consistently associated with particular kinds of behaviors
and traits in middle-class North American children.

508 CHAPTER 14 BECOMING PART OF THE FAMILY

nonetheless mean very different things—and be associated more positive feedback than parents from the most impov-
with different outcomes—depending on each culture’s erished groups (Hart & Risley, 1995). Similar patterns have
social norms. Contrast, for example, Chinese-American been found across many studies and a variety of cultural set-
children and European-American children. A parenting tings. Economic hardship and other life stressors are strongly
style with many authoritarian components is associated associated with a drop in both parental social responsiveness
with much better outcomes among Chinese-American and parents’ warmth and empathy toward their children
children than among American children of European (Huston & Bentley, 2010).
descent. Part of the explanation for this difference may These patterns can also shift as life circumstances change.
lie in the different meanings that highly similar parental Thus, mothers who leave welfare support and escape pov-
behaviors can have across cultures. Although Chinese- erty are less likely to use authoritarian child-rearing pat-
American parenting practices superficially resemble those terns than those who leave welfare but remain poor (Smith
of authoritarian parents in North America, many Chi- et al., 2001). Parenting styles can even vary from day to day,
nese parents are driven more by a philosophy of training depending on the parent’s stress level. In one study, air traf-
than one of domination and control (Chao, 1994, 2001). fic controllers who were monitored at work and at home
That attitude in turn is undoubtedly linked to cultural were less involved, less effective, and more negative as par-
differences in the extent to which people’s abilities are ents on days when their work was highly stressful (Repetti,
thought to result from training and hard work as opposed 1994). The same pattern holds for parents who have stress-
to being fixed and intrinsic. (Many Asian cultures regard ful days in other work settings (Crouter & Bumpus, 2001;
traits such as intelligence to be much more dependent on Repetti & Wood, 1997; Repetti et al., 2009).
training than North American cultures do.) Thus, many One interpretation of the relationship between hardship
East Asian children may interpret authoritarian-looking and certain forms of parenting suggests that more control-
parenting styles as concerned with training rather than as ling styles may be appropriate in times of risk and threat
overbearing or intrusive. (Fischer et al., 2010; Harrison et al., 1990). If a child’s
A specific culture may therefore provide a radically dif- safety is jeopardized by not obeying his parents, then the
ferent way of understanding an action than the way a child parents will need to be as firm as possible, especially in
from another background would understand it (Darling & a chaotic and distracting environment. Poverty can bring
Steinberg, 1993; Hatano & Wertsch, 2001). At the same enormous stresses for parents, as well as increased risks to
time, Chinese-American children do seem to sense a ten- children’s well-being, whether through higher crime rates,
sion between the typical levels of parental warmth and more hazardous home environments, or more competition
control of the broader culture and the warmth and con- for scarce resources. One study found that simply remind-
trol shown by their parents. They often have internalized ing parents of terrorist incidents resulted in more authori-
the norms of the broader culture and thereby see their tarian parenting behavior toward their children (Fischer
own parents as being less warm than normal (Wu & et al., 2010). In stressful, risky environments, it is possible
Chao, 2011). In this way, they have a different experience that an authoritarian parenting style would be adaptive.
from children in China, where that tension does not exist, Along similar lines, most parents become more authori-
while also having a different experience from European- tarian in moments of high stress and danger. You prob-
American children. More broadly, children acculturate in ably recall a time when, spurred by an immediate threat,
different ways and to different extents than their parents, a caregiver suddenly shifted from warm and interactive to
and those differences can be sources of tension in the urgent, dictatorial, and controlling. Indeed, the situational
family (Telzer, 2011). specificity of parenting styles is an important topic that
has received relatively little research attention.
Parenting across Socioeconomic Groups Parenting Although authoritarian styles might sometimes be more
styles not only differ across cultures, but they also differ adaptive and appropriate for groups at risk than for those
across socioeconomic groups within cultures. Thus, it has who are well-off, this is not always true. Sometimes the dif-
been repeatedly found that families of higher socioeconomic ferences do not benefit the child and instead merely reflect
status (SES) use authoritative parenting styles more often the demands of a difficult life. Imagine, for a moment, that
(and use authoritarian styles less often) than working-class you are a single parent with three young children. While
or poor families. The differences can be substantial. In one you work long hours in an exhausting, menial job, you
study, upper- or upper-middle-class parents talked with their have to leave your children in substandard day care because
children twice as much as those in the most impoverished there is no better alternative that you can afford. You live in
class. They also used only half as much language forbidding a crowded, rundown apartment building with only inter-
actions and used far less physical coercion. Perhaps most dra- mittent heat and electricity. You return from work with
matically, the high-SES parents gave their children six times the children in tow and have to cook dinner, change their

PARENTING 509
diapers (which were neglected at day care), and help the specifically targeting groups that are more likely to show
oldest child with his homework. It is hardly surprising that authoritarian or neglecting/uninvolved parenting styles
this parent would lack the energy to have rich, interactive (Cowan et al., 1997). These interventions are based on the
conversations with the children. It would be easier, at least belief that even in stress-ridden families, the authoritarian
at first, to give clear orders and back them up with threats style is still not best for either the children or the parents.
of punishment. In the short term, authoritarian parenting A number of these interventions have shown positive effects
styles can often produce quick behavioral changes more for both parents and children. The most compelling studies
easily. In the long term, however, those styles may become randomly assigned parents to either a group that received
less effective, resulting in the range of negative behaviors instruction on parenting skills or a control group that was
more commonly seen among children of authoritarian involved in an activity unrelated to parenting (Cowan &
parents. Cowan, 2002). This experimental approach enabled the
researchers to disentangle mere correlations from causal
The Ecological Systems Approach The influence influences. In several such studies, the children of parents
of context has been described in a broader sense as the who were coached to be less coercive and more interactive
ecological systems approach to families, which empha- showed corresponding improvements in behavior (Spoth
sizes that contextual factors, including culture and social et al., 2001). Training generally focused on creating
class, among others, are crucial to understanding the opportunities for positive family interactions, establishing
child’s development within a family (Bronfenbrenner, appropriate expectations about children and appropriate
1977, 1979, 1986). This approach, which was devised by monitoring and discipline, teaching parents how to coach
developmental psychologist Urie Bronfenbrenner, consid- their children to resist peers when needed, reducing and
ers the child’s environments at several scales, ranging from managing instances of family conflict, and emphasizing the
the family itself, to the school, to the larger culture. In addi- value of displaying positive emotions.
tion, other environments, such as the parents’ workplaces, The issue of parenting interventions becomes especially
may indirectly affect the child by limiting the parents’ important in the context of large-scale programs such as
time for interacting with the child or through the child’s Head Start. As described in Chapter 11, Head Start targets
experiences in day care. According to ecological systems millions of lower-income children throughout the United
accounts, attempts to characterize how families are impor- States in an effort to increase school readiness. A related
tant to a child’s development must consider the child’s program, Early Head Start, focuses on children between
role in each of these “social ecosystems” and how that role birth and 3 years. One facet of both programs is to teach
interacts with other participants in the systems. Ecologi- parenting skills to lower-income disadvantaged parents. It
cal approaches attempt to shed light on the influences of was assumed that such interventions might also promote
a child’s many social contexts by drawing parallels to the school readiness by fostering more learning-rich interac-
ways that organisms interact in biological systems. We will tions between young children and those around them.
return to Bronfenbrenner’s ecological systems approach in There have been many analyses of the outcomes of such
Chapter 15 as part of our consideration of children’s roles programs, and a consensus seems to be emerging that par-
in social systems outside the family. These other systems enting skills can be successfully taught in such large-scale
include peer relationships, social groups, the media, and programs (Brooks-Gunn & Markman, 2005; Zhai et al.,
the larger culture in which a child develops. 2011); and, in at least some cases, interventions in ran-
dom assignment studies have been linked to higher levels
of school readiness (Sheridan et al., 2011). Thus, parents
Q: How do different parenting contexts like can, with guidance, become more attentive, less coercive,
and more interactive with their children. Interestingly, the
culture and SES affect the associations between effectiveness of these interventions differs, depending in
parenting styles and children’s psychological part on the parents’ race. These interventions tend to have
outcomes? a large effect with African-American parents, but they
often show no effect with European-American parents
(Sheridan et al., 2011). The reasons for these group differ-
ences are not yet clear.
Will the parents who undergo training maintain a
Interventions to Improve Parenting warmer, more interactive parenting style in the face of con-
Over the past few decades, researchers in North America tinuing life stresses? And do the effects on children’s behavior
and elsewhere have offered courses in parenting skills, with their parents have a positive influence on relationships

510 CHAPTER 14 BECOMING PART OF THE FAMILY

with other adults or with peers? These questions are essen- interpreted. Rather than studying how parents affect their
tial to understanding whether the considerable public children’s behaviors and traits, they have largely focused
funds expended on programs to improve parenting skills on child effects—the ways that children influence their
are well spent. It may be that these interventions, focused parents’ behavior—as well as on genetic factors that could
on directly reaching the affected individuals, are the most influence parents and children similarly (Bell & Harper,
powerful approach, especially as they become more care- 1977; Harris, 1998; Rowe, 1994). While the correlations
fully tailored to specific groups of parents and children at between parenting styles and developmental outcomes
risk (Hutchings & Lane, 2005; Shonkoff & Meisels, 2000). are statistically significant, they are often relatively small,
Unfortunately, such approaches can also be the most labor making it easier to argue for these alternative accounts.
and skill intensive. Nonetheless, the evidence for child effects and common
More broadly, most studies have found modest, but genetic influences does not reduce or exclude parent
enduring positive effects of Head Start and Early Head Start effects. In many cases, these factors interact with patterns
interventions, especially with respect to measures such as of parenting.
grade repetition and behavioral problems in school (Dem-
ing, 2009; Joo, 2010; Ludgwig & Phillips, 2008; Sheridan Child Effects Whenever the child’s traits or behavior
et al., 2011; Zhai et al., 2011). However, test scores and causes the parents to act in a certain way in response, child
other academic measures tend to show diminishing effects effects are at work (see Figure 14.4). Consider, for example,
with increasing age, and some scholars have concluded that an inhibited, shy child whose parent tends to encourage him
long-term benefits in academic achievement are rare (Gibbs to be cautious. Does this correlation suggest that the parent
et al., 2011). If interventions involving parental training are is fostering the child’s timidity, or is the child’s timidity
one of the key routes to having a positive influence, it may eliciting more protective behavior from the parent? First
make sense that long-term benefits of such programs are impressions might suggest a dominant role for parents, but
more associated with broad behavioral measures than with the child can have major effects as well. In one study of
more narrowly defined academic outcomes. 125 U.S. 3-year-olds and 100 Korean 3-year-olds, research-
ers carefully coded videotapes of the more inhibited chil-
dren, recording whether parents encouraged the children
Parent Effects in Relation to approach or withdraw from novel threatening stimuli
and how often they discouraged the children’s tendencies
to Other Influences to withdraw (Belsky et al., 2000). In this case, the children
It is tempting to see parenting as the primary influence were largely driving their parents’ behaviors, especially that
on a child’s personality, but some scholars have argued of their mothers. In particular, the more inhibited children
that the correlations we have examined between parent- elicited a wider range of parental responses: the more a child
ing styles and children’s behaviors have been mistakenly withdrew from interactions, the more the parents tended to

A B
FIGURE 14.4 Child effects. Although researchers traditionally tended to emphasize the effects of parental behavior on children, the children
themselves may have a powerful influence on their parents. For example, (A) a child who repeatedly throws tantrums may elicit very different
behaviors in his parents than (B) a child who is excessively shy.

PARENTING 511
 NEW DIRECTION S IN DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH

Epigenetics and Families

A
s described in Chapter 2, epigenetic regulation is
one way that environmental influences can affect the
activity of genes. This kind of gene regulation occurs
when the chemicals surrounding a particular cell
type affect which of the cells’ genes are active or inactive, such
that when the cells divide, the genes of all the cells that they
create can have the same pattern of active and inactive genes.
As epigenetics becomes an increasingly important aspect of
the study of development, it is beginning to illuminate some of
the surprisingly strong ways that parents, children, and siblings
influence each other. FIGURE 14.5 Epigenetics and parental care. When rat mothers
For some time, researchers have been able to demonstrate lick their offspring more, that increased care can turn on gene
powerful epigenetic effects in animals, most notably in rats and pathways that produce more neurotransmitters involved in reducing
mice. For example, when a rat pup is frequently licked by its anxiety. Thus, a rat mother who is not stressed and who is able to
devote more extensive care to her offspring can cause the genes
mother, chemical changes to a certain gene related to hippo-
correlated with lower anxiety to switch on in her offspring.
campal function cause other genes to trigger the production
of higher levels of neurotransmitters, such as serotonin, in the
young rat (see Figure 14.5). That increase in neurotransmitter gene expression was “fixed” early in life. However, follow-up
levels in turn seems to bias the rat pup to be less fearful and studies have shown that these maternal effects on offspring’s
less reactive in stressful environments. Rat pups whose moth- genetic activity can be reversed through drug treatments in adult
ers lick them less often do not undergo these genetic changes, rats (Champagne et al., 2008; Weaver et al., 2005, 2006).
which results in lower levels of neurotransmitter production and It is, of course, a great leap from mother rats licking their pups
more fearful and reactive behavior (Caldji et al., 1998; Meaney, to the possibility of epigenetic effects of parenting in humans.
2001; Meaney & Szyf, 2005; Weaver et al., 2004). Thus, early But researchers in both animal systems and human develop-
maternal behavior can affect the activation or deactivation of a ment have drawn parallels, and work with nonhuman primates
particular set of genes, resulting in a long-term effect on the off- has strengthened those parallels. In some studies, an important
spring’s physiological and psychological responses to stresses. manipulation has been to compare peer-raised and mother-raised
This kind of effect initially was thought to be irreversible after monkeys (Suomi, 1997, 2005). As mentioned in Chapter 6,

either encourage approach and discourage withdrawal—or, In general, the same adult would much more likely slant
on other occasions, encourage the inhibition. The child’s toward an authoritarian style with a less cooperative child.
shyness affected the parents by making his interaction with A more naturalistic, longitudinal study of children with
(or withdrawal from) peers a more central issue in parent- conduct disorders found similar patterns: when difficult
child interactions (Rubin et al., 1998). children misbehave, that bout of misbehavior triggers more
The clearest way to study child effects is to set up an authoritarian behavior in parents, who then exercise more
interaction that can be repeated by many parent-child control and use more negative coercions (Dodge, 2002).
pairs. Researchers can experimentally “manipulate” the Other studies suggest that negative temperaments in chil-
child’s behavior by randomly assigning children to behave dren cause negative reactions in their parents, although
in particular ways and then compare the effects of the these studies are not experimental and depend on complex
child’s behavior on parents’ responses. In one study, chil- statistical analyses to infer child temperament effects on
dren were randomly assigned to be either compliant and parenting as opposed to effects in the opposite direction
cooperative or resistant and noncooperative while perform- (Ganiban et al., 2011; South et al., 2008). At least one study
ing a task with an adult stranger (Bugental et al., 1980). has shown that difficult temperament-related behavior in

512 CHAPTER 14 BECOMING PART OF THE FAMILY

 rhesus macaques raised in a peer group without adult macaques experiences during childhood could downregulate gene path-
do develop attachment bonds with their peers, but they are also ways, altering neurotransmitter levels and potentially making
more fearful than those raised by adults. More importantly for these individuals less sensitive as parents (Champagne &
the epigenetic hypothesis, the peer-raised macaques show neu- Curley, 2008; Ogren & Lombroso, 2008). Some of these
rological differences. They have less developed neural networks chemical changes involved in gene regulation could last a
using the neurotransmitter serotonin, especially in brain areas lifetime and even be passed on to offspring (Ogren & Lom-
related to inhibitory control and emotions (Ichise et al., 2006). broso, 2008), although, as noted earlier, such effects have
These similar patterns across monkeys and rats have led some been reversed in animal studies. It is not yet clear just how
researchers to suggest that a similar epigenetic effect may hold common such cases of transgenerational epigenetic inheri-
in humans as well (Branchi, 2009). tance are for psychological traits in humans (Grossniklaus
In humans, the activities of genes involved in producing the et al., 2013).
neurotransmitters oxytocin (discussed earlier in Chapter 6), It is too early to develop full-fledged epigenetic explanations
serotonin, and dopamine are related to feelings of interpersonal for the variations in interactions between parents and children,
trust and intimacy and behaviors associated with sensitive par- but there is a strong possibility that epigenetic influences are
enting (Bakermans-Kranenburg et al., 2003; van IJzendoorn significant (Szyf et al., 2008; van IJzendoorn et al., 2011). More
et al., 2011). When parents whose genes trigger lower levels of generally, the epigenetic perspective goes beyond analyses of
oxytocin, serotonin, or dopamine are exposed to stress or daily genetic effects to show how, even at a molecular level, geno-
hassles, they are more likely to show less sensitive parenting. types and environments continuously interact. Consider, for
That is, parents with certain genotypes seem to be at greater example, how one study has shown a link between human par-
risk than other parents to resort to insensitive parenting when enting and epigenetic changes in children (Essex et al., 2013).
they are put under stress. Parents were interviewed about the levels of stress in their
Building on these findings as well as the epigenetic own lives when their adolescent children were infants or young
studies in nonhuman animals, researchers are now ask- children. Reports of high levels of parental stress, especially in
ing whether experience-induced regulation of genetic mothers, were then related to increased levels of methylation
activity could also influence such behaviors as parent- of DNA in cells scraped from the inside of the cheeks of their
ing. Based on the animal work showing how stress- adolescent children. (Methylation is thought to be the primary
ful environments can alter gene pathways, and based on way in which specific genes are turned off and, less commonly,
the work showing how neurotransmitter levels in humans turned on.) Future research will have to demonstrate compara-
can influence behaviors related to parenting (Domes ble methylation effects on neurons and then link those changes
et al., 2007; Feldman et al., 2007; Kosfeld et al., 2005), it now to neurotransmitter levels and behavior. Such pathways of influ-
seems plausible that stressful social situations experienced ence seem increasingly likely in humans, especially given their
early in life could have far-reaching epigenetic effects. Stressful presence in other species.

children may have a causal influence on higher levels of

physical mistreatment and neglect by the parents (Schulz- Q: How is the study of child effects relevant to
Heik et al., 2009).
Other studies have shown that parents’ perceptions play the study of parenting?
as important a role in child effects as children’s behavior
does. When researchers experimentally manipulate parents’
perceptions of whether or not their children’s misbehavior Genetic Effects We have considered how parents influence
was intentional, those who perceive their children as acting children via parenting styles and how children influence par-
out on purpose respond with harsher, more intense disci- ents via child effects. But in some cases, correlations between
pline (Slep & O’Leary, 1998). Parents’ perceptions can also parents’ and children’s behavior may be best explained by
interact with child effects. For example, parents who per- a third factor—the genes that parents and children share.
ceive themselves as having little control over children tend Thanks to substantial advances in behavioral genetics,
to react more strongly and harshly when children are unco- researchers are beginning to disentangle some of the interac-
operative (Bugental et al., 1993, 1999, 2000). tions between genes and behaviors that pertain to parenting.

PARENTING 513
 Although some behavioral geneticists have focused on benefit some kinds of children much more than others, and
understanding genetic influences on either the parent’s for some it may even be detrimental. Similarly, some parent-
behavior or the child’s behavior, another approach offers ing effects may depend on aspects of the child that change
an account distinct from parental influences and child over the course of development, initially exerting little imme-
behavior. Instead of a one-way influence of the child on the diate sway, then strongly influencing the child for a period of
parent (or vice versa), the parent and a child might share a time before waning.
genetic disposition toward a particular trait, such as shyness Consider one example of how an interaction pattern
or irritability. That shared disposition could then cause a between parent and child might change with development
strong correlation between a particular style of parenting because of both parent and child effects. A parent who is
and a particular kind of behavior from the child. Likewise, prone to ordering children about might do so to a greater
if withdrawn parents tend to have withdrawn children, it extent with smaller and less vocal children who cannot
may not be the parents’ behavior or the children’s behav- respond adequately to this behavior. Thus, authoritarian
ior that causes the correlation, but the third factor of their parenting might wax and wane as a child develops. This
shared genotype. It is important to remember, however, case illustrates how more subtle differences in temperament
that even with shared genotypes, phenotypic expressions of and personality of children and parents can create quite
those genotypes may be quite different in young children intricate patterns of interaction. There are now “biopsycho-
and adults. Thus, a toddler who has a genotype that makes social” approaches that see certain combinations of biologi-
him irritable and therefore prone to crying fits and physical cal disposition, psychological tendencies, and sociocultural
tantrums when frustrated is not likely to have a parent who contexts as likely to either increase or decrease children’s
behaves in the same way, even if the genotype for their irri- risk of some adverse outcomes (such as becoming aggressive
tability is shared. That parent may be volatile and reactive toward others) early in life. These approaches also seek to
but is unlikely to plop down on the grocery store floor, burst account for ways that experiences with parents, peers, and
into tears, and have a physical tantrum. the broader social world either increase or reduce that risk
Behavioral genetic studies cover more than shared geno- (Dodge & Pettit, 2003). Figure 14.6 shows one model of the
type effects and accounts of how certain genotypes are related ways these interactions could contribute to conduct disor-
to child and parent effects. In animal studies, researchers der, which is a behavior pattern in children and adolescents
are also making headway in understanding the epigenetic that involves repeated incidents of actions that infringe on
mechanisms through which some parental behaviors can the rights of others. It is often called “antisocial behavior.”
affect genetic activity in offspring (see the New Directions The interactionist approach is valuable for its broad
in Developmental Research box). As more sophisticated yet nuanced view of the many influences affecting both
techniques emerge for studying the entire human genome parents and children, but its critics have cited one serious
and looking at complex interactions between sets of genes, a
much more diverse set of causal pathways between behaviors
and genes is likely to be part of any discussion of parenting.
Biological Biological
predisposition predisposition
Q: How can a behavioral genetic approach (genes) (prenatal environment)

explain correlations between parents’ and

Parenting
children’s behavior without primarily relying on Mental Conduct
either parent effects or child effects? processes disorder
Peers

Sociocultural Sociocultural
The Interactionist Approach context context

to Family Dynamics FIGURE 14.6 Interactionist models. As this sample interactionist

Genetic effects and child effects do not necessarily diminish model shows, interactionist views of parenting incorporate many
kinds of effects, including biological (both genetic and toxic prenatal
the effects of parenting on children. Instead, taken together,
environment), sociocultural, and peer influences, that may moder-
the three types of effects suggest a much more complex, inter- ate or exaggerate parents’ effects on children (here operationalized
actional way of understanding family dynamics (Dodge & as children with conduct disorders). These models, however, can be
Pettit, 2003; LaFreniere & MacDonald, 2013; Maccoby, frustrating to test because it is often unclear what kinds of outcomes
2000; Parke, 2004). A particular kind of parenting may they would predict. Adapted from Dodge & Petit (2003).

514 CHAPTER 14 BECOMING PART OF THE FAMILY

drawback: it is almost always possible to explain a set of Gender Socialization in the Family:
observations in terms of the many complex interactions that
likely influenced the outcome. It is much harder to use an A Web of Interacting Influences
interactionist model to predict such effects in advance and Boys and girls tend to behave differently on many dimen-
then test those predictions as a way of evaluating the model. sions, ranging from favorite activities to patterns of social
Moreover, these models are especially tough to test because interactions. These differences raise questions about the rela-
they depend on intricate webs of interactions in which it is tive contributions of parents, children, social/cultural con-
difficult to disentangle causal relationships from mere cor- text, peers, and genes in influencing those behaviors. We will
relations. The interactionist model is clearly a more com- see that the development of gender-typical behaviors vividly
prehensive approach to studying parenting and effects on illustrates the interactionist perspective in which all of these
children. At the same time, it highlights the challenges for factors influence each other rather than simply making
future researchers in developing more complex and sophis- independent contributions. The massive amount of research
ticated methods of accounting for the influences at work in on parenting and children’s gender supports the common
parent-child dynamics. sense intuition that parents treat children of the two sexes
Despite the clear merits of the interactionist view, there is differently (Leaper, 2002, 2011; Lundberg, 2005; Lytton &
also a need for further research documenting which paren- Romney, 1991; Raley & Bianchi, 2006). Parents tend to offer
tal behaviors contribute the most to these systems of inter- children sex-stereotyped toys, such as giving trucks to boys
actions. For example, a great deal of traditional research has and dolls to girls; and they tend to interact with their chil-
asked how parenting practices might affect a child’s per- dren in ways that reflect their notions of the differences in
sonality traits, but personality is invariably the result of a girls’ and boys’ behavior, inviting boys to be involved in more
host of interactions in which parenting is just one compo- physical activities and girls in more social and conversational
nent. Other aspects of the child, however, may relate more ones. Table 14.3 summarizes some of these differences. It is
indirectly to parents’ behavior. By choosing where a family important to keep in mind, however, that while these differ-
lives and what elementary school a child will attend, parents ences are reliable, they are usually surprisingly modest, espe-
greatly influence the pool of potential friends and teachers cially with children younger than 6 years of age (Maccoby,
that a child will have. Parents might affect a child’s hobbies 2003; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974; Russell & Saebel, 1997).
by simply exposing her to certain activities. Similarly, chil- One way of explaining gender socialization focuses on
dren’s knowledge of etiquette or specific cultural practices the ways that parents’ gender schemas affect children.
depends significantly on how their parents live. Gender schemas are cognitive systems for interpreting
A final point concerns the implications of the interac- gender-related activities and roles (Bem, 1981). They are
tionist model for parenting. If a wide variety of interacting shaped in parents by the norms and stereotypes that exist
influences are at work in all parent-child dynamics, the most for each gender in a parent’s culture. For example, when
effective parents would need to be sensitive to the child’s parents were asked to teach their grade school children how
nature and be able to adjust parenting strategies accord- to perform three tasks involving physical science, computer
ingly. Not all parents tailor their approach to their children programming, and hypothetical interpersonal dilemmas,
as individuals, instead tending toward one style for all their the language the parents used varied, depending on the
children. By acknowledging a wide variety of influences on sex of the child, the content the parent was teaching, and
family members, the interactionist approach suggests that the parent’s gender schema (Tenenbaum & Leaper, 2003).
parents and children who are able to respond to one another’s Fathers used more cognitively demanding speech when ask-
individual natures will have the most positive relationship ing questions about science problems with their sons than
(Grusec et al., 2000; Kochanska, 1997b, 1998). Indeed, the they did for similar problems for their daughters. Similarly,
long-term pattern of interactions between a particular child when children ask about why some natural phenomenon
and parent may be far more important for understanding occurs or how a device works, parents tend to offer more
parenting effects than a number of brief, specific parent-child complex and cognitively deeper explanations to boys than
interactions, since the same pattern of parental behavior may to girls (Crowley et al., 2001; Tennenbaum & Leaper, 2003;
be interpreted very differently at different times, depending Tennenbaum et al., 2005). One study found that parents
on the long-term context of the relationship. also are three times as likely to offer scientific explanations
to boys as to girls in everyday conversations, even though
both boys and girls ask for such explanations to roughly
equal degrees (Crowley et al., 2001). Parents can also influ-
Q: What are the strengths and weakness of the ence their children’s choices about courses of study in
interactionist approach to studying parenting? middle school, selecting more math and science courses for
their sons than for their daughters (Tenenbaum, 2009).

PARENTING 515
 Conversational Interactions Manner of Play Reactions to Emotions

Boys Both parents talk to boys somewhat Both parents play more roughly with boys Fathers react negatively to crying,
less and focus more on nonpersonal and offer them toy vehicles and sports fearfulness, or other expressions that
or intrapersonal topics. equipment to play with. could signify weakness in boys.

Girls Mothers talk to girls more overall and Both parents play more gently with girls Both parents are more tolerant of
specifically about emotions. and offer them dolls and props for playing displays of distress and fear-related
house. emotions in girls.

TABLE 14.3 Some differences in how parents socialize boys and girls. The effects of parental socialization vary as a function of the
gender of the parent and that of the child; usually, same-gender pairs have the strongest influence. Nonetheless, these differences are often
more modest than expected, especially when children are younger than 6 years of age. From Maccoby (2003).

Gender biases in adults also seem to be more tolerated in children, it is difficult to prove that parenting actually
by children than other forms of biases. Thus, in one study caused the differences in children. To understand why it is
in Denmark, when children were asked to make judgments so hard to show a causal effect, we will now consider some
about exclusion from activities based on gender as opposed to models of parenting influence.
ethnicity, they thought that exclusion based on ethnicity was Even though studies of parent effects have tended to
less acceptable and more morally inappropriate (Moller & dominate the research on parenting and gender, children’s
Tenenbaum, 2011). This pattern follows earlier studies in behaviors can also strongly influence their parents. For
the United States showing a greater willingness to tolerate example, girls and boys often have strong toy preferences
exclusion based on gender than on ethnicity (Killen, 2007). well before 2 years of age, before they experience gender-
Thus, parents may get less negative feedback or resistance stereotyped toys or related interactions with their parents
when they show gender bias as opposed to other forms of (Maccoby, 2003). That is, they bring to their early interac-
group biases. tions certain behavioral patterns that may lead the parent to
In general, even though parents interact differently conclude that the child prefers one kind of toy to another
with their sons and their daughters across a wide spec- and then offer what the child seems to want. This pattern
trum of behaviors and situations (see Figure 14.7), like so sometimes surprises parents who avoid gender-stereotyped
many other aspects of socialization, it is difficult to show toys so as not to impose gender roles on their children. More
how these gender-related differences in parenting actually formally, researchers have long known that even when we
affect the children. Even when there are strong associations factor out differences in parents’ behaviors in terms of the
between parents’ behaviors and gender-related differences types of toys they provide or offer to their sons and daugh-
ters, the children still show gender-based differences in toy
preferences (Calders et al., 1989). If parental socialization
cannot fully account for young children’s early gendered
preferences, what other explanations are possible?
One alternative approach suggests that children have bio-
logically determined biases that influence their preferences
in ways that are initially independent of socialization, biases
that may have counterparts in other primates. It may seem
implausible that a child’s biological sex might somehow
directly bias him or her toward gender-stereotyped toys, but
several studies have supported that possibility. For example,
the extent to which a female fetus is exposed to testosterone
seems to relate to the likelihood that she will later show a
tendency to like toys that boys normally prefer. This asso-
ciation has been shown in rare cases where a female fetus
has the inherited adrenal gland disorder known as congeni-
A B
tal adrenal hyperplasia (CAH). CAH results in exposure
FIGURE 14.7 Gender and parenting. There are modest but con-
to higher than normal levels of masculinizing hormones,
sistent differences in how parents of each sex interact with children such as testosterone, in utero. Girls born with CAH show
of each sex. The impact of these differences on the children is less increased preferences for playing with gender-atypical toys
clear. (Berenbaum & Beltz, 2011; Cohen-Bendahan et al., 2005;

516 CHAPTER 14 BECOMING PART OF THE FAMILY

 Boy-typical behaviors
Hines, 2013; Pasterski et al., 2005). Even when two girls
are born to the same family, the girl born with CAH shows 80
more of a preference for gender-atypical toys than her sister
born without CAH (Pasterski et al., 2005). Girls with CAH
also tend to show a higher preference as teenagers for future
60
occupations involving “things” (such as auto mechanic or jet
pilot) than those involving “people” (such as social worker
or teacher; Beltz et al., 2011).
Because girls with CAH often have more masculine 40
genitalia, it is possible that their parents notice these dif-
ferences and behave differently toward their two daugh-

Girl-typical behaviors
ters, influencing their toy preferences (Cohen-Bendahan
et al., 2005: Jordan-Young, 2011). Additional indirect effects 20
could occur through the intensive medical and psychiatric
attention that girls with CAH receive and expectations by
parents and others that their daughters will be “masculine”
(Jordan-Young, 2011). Such indirect effects, however, are
0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50
not likely to provide a full explanation for the different
Fetal testosterone level (nmol/L)
behaviors in girls who have higher prenatal levels of mascu-
FIGURE 14.8 Prenatal testosterone levels and sex-stereotyped
linizing hormones. In fact, when mothers of girls with CAH
behaviors. Higher levels of prenatal testosterone in girls are associ-
are studied, they do not treat their daughters in ways that ated with greater frequencies of childhood behaviors favored by
favor masculine behaviors and, if anything, show more of a boys. Adapted from Auyeung et al. (2009).
bias toward feminine behaviors (Hines, 2010).
Some researchers have examined testosterone levels
in the mother’s blood during pregnancy and then ana- (Hassett et al., 2008; Hines & Alexander, 2008; Williams &
lyzed their children’s behaviors, including toy pref- Pleil, 2008; see Figure 14.9). It is not yet known which
erences (Auyeung et al., 2009; Hines et al., 2002; see features of the toys drive these preferences, as monkeys
Figure 14.8). They found that the higher the testoster- clearly have no evolved tendencies to interact with any of
one levels, the greater the children’s tendency to play these objects. Future studies that carefully and systemati-
with stereotypically male toys. Thus, there was a “dose- cally vary the perceptual features of different categories
dependent” relationship between levels of testosterone of toys will help researchers understand the real nature of
and the extent to which male activities were preferred. the effect.
The mothers in these studies were unaware of their
own testosterone levels, making parental attitude and
behavior effects less plausible in this case. In addition,
some studies show that “antiandrogen” compounds that
reduce prenatal testosterone levels in boys are associ-
ated with decreased levels of masculine play (Swann
et al., 2010). At the same time, it is important to note
that, in statistical terms, variations in testosterone levels
in these studies could account for only part of the varia-
tion in toy preferences, leaving room for parental influ-
ences as well (Jordan-Young, 2011).
The effects of prenatal testosterone could still be inter-
acting with differences in parenting if parents notice subtle
differences in body shape or activity level in girls who have
been exposed to more testosterone and then treat them
differently. But this account cannot explain the striking
findings of toy preferences in other primate species that
show no parental socialization related to toy preferences. FIGURE 14.9 Toy preferences and gender in vervet monkeys.
Studies have repeatedly found that young male monkeys For reasons that still need to be understood, even vervet monkeys,
prefer playing with trucks instead of dolls or plush animals, which have no reason to play with toy trucks or dolls, show gender-
and the females sometimes show the opposite preferences based toy choices.

PARENTING 517
 Parental socialization practices can certainly influence parental tensions less intensely, and they can learn much
toy preferences in boys and girls. Yet, it now seems clear that from their older siblings.
parents’ behaviors are likely to interact with aspects of toy In examining sibling effects, the critical question is
preferences that are present before the occurrence of social- whether these kinds of differences in family structure actu-
ization. In some cases, these presocialization toy preferences ally influence development. Like the debates about parent-
can even compete with parental biases. Most of the time, ing effects, there has been considerable contention, in recent
however, parents’ gender socialization behaviors and chil- years, as to whether sibling effects are real and substantial
dren’s early biases probably reinforce each other. (Harris, 2000). The true debate, however, seems to have
If we take a wider view of familial influences on gender, more to do with the degree of sibling effects than with
siblings, too, seem to influence one another’s gender role their existence. When considered in detail, family structure
qualities. One study examined families over a 3-year period seems to have a modest but broad, multifaceted influence
to determine how siblings’ and parents’ gender role qualities on children.
interacted. To learn whether children influenced the extent
to which their siblings adopted gender-stereotyped views and
roles, the researchers analyzed the effects of siblings on leisure
activities, toy preferences, and ways of approaching social situ- Birth Order Effects
ations (McHale et al., 2001). They found that older siblings’ Of the many factors proposed to be influenced by birth
gender role qualities predicted similar qualities in younger sib- order, the most heavily studied has been intelligence. In
lings 2 years later, even when parents’ and younger siblings’ 1975, a provocative paper was published showing what
initial roles were controlled for statistically. Moreover, the seemed to be a correlation between intelligence, as measured
older siblings influenced younger siblings’ gender role qualities by intelligence tests, and birth order. The data indicated
more than parents did, and their influence was significant in that firstborns had the highest intelligence and that intel-
both same-sex and mixed-sex sibling pairs. The older siblings, ligence consistently dropped the later a child’s position was
in contrast, were most influenced by their parents. Thus, par- in the birth order (Zajonc, 1976; Zajonc & Markus, 1975;
ents seem to influence gender roles most strongly in their first- see Figure 14.10). The documented drop in scores is very
born children, who then propagate those roles with younger modest, sometimes as little as 1 percent of the score of the
siblings. This may also interact with the finding, noted earlier, next oldest sibling, and large population samples are usually
that children are more tolerant of gender biases shown by par- needed to find a significant, reliable effect (Kristensen &
ents and peers than they are of other sorts of biases, such as Bjerkedal, 2007).
those involving ethnicity (Killen, 2007; Moller & Tenebaum, This pattern immediately raises the question of whether
2011). By acquiescing to, or even endorsing, such biases, sib- the birth order effect actually causes the difference in scores.
lings and peers may reinforce parental behaviors. One objection is that larger families tend to be more com-
mon in lower socioeconomic classes, who also, for a variety
of other reasons, tend to score lower on intelligence tests. But
when socioeconomic status is held constant, the birth order
Q: Describe at least three different interacting effect on intelligence remains significant in some popula-
influences that contribute to children’s gender tions. More subtle statistical issues have kept debates over
socialization. the magnitude of the effect alive (Armor, 2001; Rodgers
et al., 2000; Wichman et al., 2007; Zajonc, 2001). But despite
these disagreements, the current consensus still favors an
effect (Black et al., 2011; de Haan, 2010). Moreover, another
analysis has suggested that firstborns also tend to complete
Siblings and Family more years of schooling (Black et al., 2005).
Two potential causes for the birth order effect on intel-
Dynamics ligence have been frequently discussed. The first, resource
theory, holds that the more children in the family, the less
We have all heard people explain the behavior of another attention parents can devote to each child. The second expla-
on the basis of that person’s place in the family. Firstborn nation, confluence theory, argues that as families get larger,
children, at least early on, frequently have the undivided their average overall intellectual climate drops (Zajonc &
attention of both parents, whereas later-borns always have Markus, 1975). Thus, the firstborn child is more likely to be
to compete for parental resources. In other respects, though, exposed to the parents’ more adult-centered discourse, while
later-born children may have the advantage. They benefit a fourth-born will more likely be exposed to conversations
from more experienced parenting, they tend to experience about toilet training and various cartoon characters.

518 CHAPTER 14 BECOMING PART OF THE FAMILY

 0.5 More surprising and striking than the potential impact
of birth order on intelligence is the claim that birth order
0.3
also predicts a personality trait related to rebelliousness,
respect for authority, and conscientiousness. This link
was first proposed by a historian of science, Frank Sullo-
0.1 way, who stumbled on what seemed to be a pattern among
Psychometric intelligence score

historical revolutionaries, in which firstborns were more

(in standard deviations)

likely to defend the status quo and reject radical change. By

–0.1
contrast, the later-born children were more likely to ques-
tion and overturn traditions and norms (Sulloway, 1996).
–0.3 One study of 700 brothers who played professional base-
ball found that younger brothers were more than 10 times
as likely to attempt to steal bases than were the firstborns.
–0.5
This observation is interpreted as a sports-related measure
of risk taking, as attempts to steal bases are thought to more
–0.7 broadly reflect a tendency toward more radical behaviors
(Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010).
The effects in Sulloway’s analysis are impressive and
–0.9 provocative—making other failures to find comparable
personality effects in hundreds of birth order studies all
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5
the more puzzling (Harris, 1998, 2000, 2006). Some have
A Dutch B American
19-year-olds 17-year-olds
argued that birth order influences on personality are highly
Birth order of child
context specific, affecting the way children behave toward
FIGURE 14.10 Birth order and intelligence. These graphs
their parents and siblings, but not generalizing to other situ-
are from very large samples of children in the Netherlands and the ations as a broader personality trait would (Harris, 2006).
United States. They show consistently modest relations between Two arguments form a reply. One is that many studies that
birth order and intelligence. Each curve represents the data for fami- show no effects measure personality traits with self-report
lies of the size indicated by the rightmost number on the x-axis for data, which may be less reliable than other types. Thus,
that curve (thus, 1 indicates a family with 1 child, 2 indicates a fam- some people who say they are “open to new experiences”
ily with 2 children, and so on through 9, which represents a family or “welcome change” may really mean that they welcome
with 9 children). Studies of children from other populations showed
change within the existing paradigm. The most telling data
more mixed results. Adapted from Zajonc (1976).
come from people’s willingness to take real revolutionary
action, as rated by judges who know neither the hypothesis
Detailed statistical analyses have supported the con- nor the birth order of the individuals involved.
fluence theory. For example, this theory predicts that Such data are very rare outside of Sulloway’s studies, but
as later-born children get older, they should show fewer those that focus on real acts of rebellion seem to support his
negative effects of birth order than they do when they are birth order prediction. One study examined 17 college stu-
younger. (As their older siblings become more adult-like, dents who had participated in civil disobedience as part of
the intellectual climate in the family is bolstered, which an ongoing labor dispute (Zweigenhaft, 2000). This small
is predicted by the confluence theory.) In fact, analyses sample showed a significant relationship in which later-
have shown that birth order effects do tend to decline borns were more likely to have been arrested previously (and
as younger siblings age (Zajonc, 2001). It is important more frequently) for civil disobedience. A much larger study
to stress, once again, that although they do seem reliable of 1,022 families in California and British Columbia found
in very large data sets, these birth order effects are quite that siblings tended to describe firstborns as high-achieving
small, and it is not possible to predict intelligence differ- and conscientious, while later-borns were called most rebel-
ences on this basis in any single family. lious, liberal, and agreeable (Paulhus et al., 1999). To see
whether the participants were merely reflecting popular ste-
reotypes about birth order, the researchers varied whether
they emphasized birth order at the beginning of the ques-
Q: Describe two different models for the tionnaires or whether it went unmentioned. This manipula-
apparent relation between birth order and tion should have had large effects if the descriptions were
intelligence. based on popular stereotypes, but it made little difference
in respondents’ descriptions.

SIBLINGS AND FAMILY DYNAMICS 519

 If the claimed birth order effects on personality do exist, Parents from higher socioeconomic classes also tend to
on average, across large population samples, how might these have more social capital, and this knowledge of social struc-
effects come about? Sulloway and later authors (Paulhus tures and professional contacts provides another advantage
et al., 1999) offered a model that closely resembles evolu- for their children. This might include knowledge about
tionary notions about how different species compete for what sorts of schools and programs best prepare children
a particular biological niche. When a species takes over a for competitive colleges or what sorts of summer jobs offer
particular habitat or food source within an ecosystem, it an adolescent the best future opportunities (Furstenberg,
can force other closely related species to adapt to different 2005). Such differential social capital effects may be accel-
niches. Similarly, these authors argue, firstborn children erating in societies where the gaps between the affluent and
might tend to occupy certain typical family roles, thereby poor are increasing. These issues may have particular rel-
forcing their later-born siblings to seek out different niches. evance to societies that have implemented policies trying to
In their view, the firstborn is more likely to engage in behav- reduce family size (see Development and Social Policy box).
iors that imitate parents (such as caring for the younger sib- Parental resources can interact not only with family size
ling) and will often be rewarded for it if those behaviors but also with gender of children. For example, one study
help the parents. They further argue that the firstborn is in South Korea found that when families have limited
more likely to find that his acts of dominance and aggres- resources, there is an effect of family size on educational
sion against his siblings succeed, since the firstborn is physi- investments in girls, but little or no impact on boys (Kang,
cally bigger early on. These factors and others could make 2010). This gender difference was discovered by examin-
firstborns more likely to embrace their parents’ values and ing family expenditures on private tutoring for children, a
more strictly uphold norms. By contrast, the later-born chil- practice seen as essential in many South Korean families for
dren, having been forced out of that niche, may tend to be educational advancement. This finding presumably reflects
more rebellious as well as more agreeable (since they are the parental belief in South Korea that it is more important
weaker at first). to invest in the educational future of sons.
Of course, such stories are easy to tell after the fact and More broadly, these sorts of findings suggest new levels
difficult to test experimentally; but the notion of siblings of complexity to interactionist views. Researchers must
forcing others to seek out contrasting niches is a powerful consider how factors such as sibling spacing, birth order,
one that seems to fit many siblings’ personal experiences. sex, and family size interact with socioeconomic status of
Recent studies of this phenomenon often use the term the family, cultural beliefs and practices, and whether that
sibling differentiation to describe children’s process of family belongs to a group that is stigmatized by the larger
seeking out activities that resonate with their abilities and culture. By accounting for socioeconomic and cultural
also reduce their competition with older siblings. Interest- influences on sibling dynamics, researchers hope to predict
ingly, siblings tend to get along better as they see themselves more precisely when factors such as family size will signifi-
as occupying different roles in the family, rather than being cantly influence development.
in direct competition (Feinberg et al., 2003).

Sibling Relationships
Q: What is sibling differentiation? How can it and Socialization
be used to explain the socialization patterns in a
Aside from birth order effects, which remain somewhat
family? controversial, several other patterns of sibling interactions,
including siblings’ jealousy and conflict but also their degree
of social understanding, may have long-term developmen-
An Interactionist Approach to Birth Order Effects tal outcomes. These interactions often involve parents and
Even if these theories of birth order effects tend to hold true other important figures in a child’s life as well.
on average across large population samples, they undoubtedly
interact with many other aspects of family life, producing enor- Jealousy and Conflict between Siblings The birth of a
mous variations. As just one example, we saw at the beginning new child can be especially upsetting to firstborns who are
of this chapter that siblings’ development can vary considerably close in age to the new baby. This effect makes sense, given
depending on the socioeconomic status of the family (Conley, that parents do tend to devote less attention to the first-
2004). That is, siblings’ future outcomes will be more similar born after the new arrival, try as they might to do otherwise
when they grow up in families of high socioeconomic status, (Dunn & Kendrick, 1982). Firstborns tend to react to this
where parents do not have to make difficult choices about change by becoming more demanding of their parents. Sib-
resource allocation (Conley & Glauber, 2005). ling jealousy is also common and seems to vary in degree,

520 CHAPTER 14 BECOMING PART OF THE FAMILY

depending on the children’s age and their temperament. on social cognition. In a clear illustration of the intricate
Among younger children, a reactive temperament is associ- links between social and cognitive development, the early,
ated with more jealousy, whereas older children show more consistent presence of others with similar interests and apti-
jealousy if they have poor emotional understanding (Volling tudes apparently promotes the ability to think about other
et al., 2002). Moreover, siblings who perceive that parents minds.
treat them differently in terms of the resources they offer
tend to have more difficult relations with one another and Sibling Relationships within the Family Besides the
with their parents (Kowal et al., 2004; Reiss, 2001, 2003; direct effects that siblings have on one another, their rela-
Volling, 2012; Volling et al., 2010). A major goal for future tions can involve the entire family in a web of interactions.
research is to gain a better understanding of the circum- For example, several studies have now shown that parents
stances that increase jealousy and competition between sib- sometimes form expectations based on the firstborn child
lings and to find the best way to foster cooperation instead. that strongly influence their interactions with later-born
Conflict between siblings is not always based on jealousy, children (Brody, 2004; Whiteman & Buchanan, 2002).
and it can be one of the most stressful aspects of family This has been called “the first child as the first draft” effect
life. Although a moderate level of conflict can actually force (Whiteman et al., 2003). Thus, a difficult first child may
siblings to negotiate more and increase their theory of mind set up parental expectations that result in stricter parent-
skills (Howe et al., 2002), an excessive level exacts a toll on ing with younger siblings. These effects can even extend
all family members. Many parents identify sibling conflicts beyond the family when teachers make assumptions about
as their worst family problem (Smith & Ross, 2007). Fortu- how a child will perform academically based on how the
nately, parents can be trained to mediate sibling conflicts, child’s older siblings performed (Georgiou, 2008; Rubie-
and the training may also affect the children, who are more Davies et al., 2006). On the other hand, parents’ positive
likely to learn how to resolve conflicts in constructive as expectations can sometimes benefit later siblings. One
opposed to destructive ways (Smith & Ross, 2007; see Sci- study showed that when older siblings are both academi-
entific Method box). For example, after parents of 5- and cally and socially skilled, parents tend to show higher self-
10-year-olds received mediation training, children of both esteem and better psychological functioning that translate
ages compromised more often and seemed to understand into better parenting practices with later children (Brody
their sibling’s point of view better than a control group et al., 2003). Intricate statistical analyses suggest that the
of children of untrained parents (Smith & Ross, 2007). older sibling actually causes changes in the parents that
Conflict resolution is a complex cognitive and social skill affect how the parents interact with younger siblings How-
in which training can have strong, multifaceted, and long- ever, it is difficult to rule out other possible causes, such
lasting effects. In addition to conflict resolution, parental as shared genetic influences on parents’ and children’s
training and socialization of children should be concerned personalities.
with prosocial behaviors in their own right (Kramer, 2010). Much like the interactionist approaches to parenting
It is an oversimplification to focus on sibling conflicts as research, studies examining the effects of siblings and family
the central dynamic among children in a family when in structures on development are becoming more sophisticated
fact there are many positive dimensions of successful sibling by increasingly taking contextual factors (such as relation-
relationships that can be influenced by parents as well. ship quality) into account. Consider, for example, the effects
of sibling relationship quality on parents, parenting, and
Siblings and Social Understanding A positive effect for other siblings (Brody, 1998). As noted earlier, many parents
siblings, especially when they are close in age, is the devel- identify sibling conflicts as the worst problem in their fam-
opment of more advanced theory of mind skills. Compared ily (Smith & Ross, 2007). And when siblings are constantly
with only children or with those whose siblings are much at odds with each other, the likelihood of those siblings hav-
younger or much older, siblings who are close in age are ing problems with peers, poor performance in school, and
more likely to have practice thinking and talking about the general hostility increases (Smith & Ross, 2007). These cor-
mental states of others. This practice in turn may facili- relations must be treated with caution, since a number of
tate their understanding of the nuances of complex social other factors could cause both the sibling conflicts and the
interactions and the mental states of others (Jenkins & other problems; but there is the real possibility that the con-
Astington, 1996; McAlister & Peterson, 2007; Peterson, flict itself is corrosive to other relationships. Interestingly,
2000; Ruffman et al., 1998). Moreover, the more child-aged siblings with similar temperaments tend to have fewer con-
siblings a child has, the more theory of mind skills seem to flicts (Munn & Dunn, 1989). This finding was not imme-
be enhanced (McAlister & Peterson, 2013); thus, even if diately obvious, as some might think that siblings who play
a large number of siblings may have some minor negative distinct, complementary roles in a family would be most
effects on intelligence test scores, it can have positive effects compatible.

SIBLINGS AND FAMILY DYNAMICS 521

 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL P OLICY

China’s One-Child Policy

C
hildren who are “only children” and have no siblings Chinese politicians and social planners, and many articles in the
have been stereotyped in a variety of ways, some popular press have expressed worries about a new generation
of them contradictory. They are sometimes seen as of “little emperors”—terribly spoiled, overindulged only children
spoiled, unusually mature (or unusually immature), (Dean, 1992). Even in recent years, employers have posted
dependent, selfish, and socially incompetent (Silverman & job openings with the restriction that single children need not
Silverman, 1971). But are they really at greater risk for develop- apply (Chang, 2008). In addition, 75 percent of China’s urban
ing these largely negative traits? Although some early studies couples reported that they would have preferred to have larger
suggested problems in only children that accord with stereo- families, more like the ones they grew up in, and that they
types, later reviews of the body of research found that only regard the one-child policy as a considerable sacrifice. Parents
children show no systematic deficits (Falbo & Polit, 1986). This also worried that their children would be lonely without siblings
finding is reassuring given that in developed countries, many and would miss out on critical social interactions (Tao & Chiu,
more families are now choosing to have just one child compared 1985; Tung, 1997). A Chinese version of Sesame Street even
to a decade ago (Frejka & Sardon, 2007). included special segments aimed at teaching only children how
But what about cases where having an only child is not a vol- to get along with peers (Tung, 1997).
untary decision but a nationwide decree? In 1979, the People’s Early studies of China’s new generation of only children
Republic of China laid down a set of regulations known collec- reported differences that followed the “little emperor” stereo-
tively as the “one-child policy” (see Figure 14.11). These laws type. Only children were said to be more spoiled and demand-
stated that every family was to have not more than one child. The ing (Jiao et al., 1986). These studies, however, were challenged
goal was to prevent the widespread famines that had resulted in by later ones that found no major differences in the behaviors
the past when China’s food supplies fell short of its large popula- or personalities of only children and other children (Chen et al.,
tion. Some exceptions to the one-child policy were granted, espe- 1994; Falbo & Poston, 1993). Whether a child was the firstborn
cially in more rural areas, but it generally accomplished its goal: of several siblings or later-born, that child did not seem to differ
China’s birth rate fell and its incidence of single-child families in any systematic way from only children. In fact, in some stud-
greatly increased (Doherty et al., 2001). From 1980 to 2000, ies, only children were found better adjusted than other children
China’s birth rate declined from roughly 35 children per 1,000 (Liu et al., 2010). Incidentally, these children with siblings were
people each year to roughly 16 children per 1,000 people. quite easy to find in China because certain regions were permit-
Have such dramatic and rapid changes in the structure of ted fairly widespread exceptions to the one-child policy.
Chinese families caused developmental changes in children One explanation for this shift in research findings is that par-
and young adults? This question has been of great concern to ents and grandparents concerned about having spoiled children

FIGURE 14.11 China’s one-child

policy. As can be seen from
(A) a family photo taken in 1934 and
(B) a recent family photo, family size
in China has changed dramatically over
the years as a result of China’s one-
child policy to manage a burgeoning
population. Several commentators
have argued that a nation of only
children will grow up to be adults that
are very different from those of earlier
generations.
A B

522 CHAPTER 14 BECOMING PART OF THE FAMILY

might have changed their child-rearing patterns (Rosenberg & most notably less optimism about the future, less conscientious-
Jing, 1996). In addition, as more Chinese children of the current ness, and more neuroticism.
generation spend increasing amounts of time in community Demographically, one effect of the one-child policy is unmis-
day care from an early age, their interactions with peers may takable, namely, a huge shift in the ratio of boys to girls in the
re-create some of the effects of siblings. general population. As seen in Figure 14.12, in rural areas there
Although this second wave of studies did not show one-child are roughly 25 percent more male than female births, the high-
effects, some effects may well exist, despite being difficult to pin- est male-to-female sex ratio in the world, with some rural regions
point among the effects of other cultural and economic changes having 40 percent more male births (Zhou et al., 2011). A strong
unfolding in China. In the last two decades, the one-child policy cultural bias toward boys has led to a reduction in the number
has brought a population shift in the cities from roughly 20 per- of girls through abortion and infanticide. The psychological and
cent only-child families to 95 percent only-child families. Over the social consequences of such uneven sex ratios are unclear, but
same period, the ways children spend their time has shifted from they seem to cause many rural men to feel “useless, aimless,
mostly being at home around relatives in the extended family to hopeless, miserable, sad, distressed, angry and lonely” (Zhou
mostly being in day care. China has also seen improvements in the et al., 2011, p. 1426) as they consider their small chance for a
health and well-being of most of its people and a marked change future marriage. (To make matters worse, many rural men watch
in the political system and institutions of education. Any of these as their female peers leave for more affluent areas to find mates
changes—let alone all of them at once—would likely affect chil- and “marry up.”) These attitudes may start to emerge in late
dren’s social behavior regardless of our theory of socialization. The childhood and color the perspectives of many boys, especially
challenge for developmental researchers is that these large-scale those from more rural regions (Zhou et al., 2013).
changes have been so numerous and nearly simultaneous, making The full effects of the one-child policy will require many more
it difficult to untangle their cause-and-effect relationships without years to fully understand, but the situation helps to illustrate,
much larger and more systematic studies. once again, the critical importance of an interactionist perspec-
Some researchers argue that one-child effects can be found tive, where a huge confluence of factors must be considered to
in behaviors other than those revolving around erroneous ste- understand socialization effects and interventions that change
reotypes of only children (Mancillas, 2006). For example, one traditional family structures. Regardless of the long-term effects
study in the United States found evidence of a reduced ability of the one-child policy, it must ultimately be considered against
to manage conflict with peers, perhaps because of less prac- a larger backdrop of a country burdened with overpopulation
tice dealing with similar conflicts with siblings (Kitzmann et al., and a history of famines and other population-related disasters.
2002). Comparable studies in China have yet to be done. As Even the worst alleged psychological consequences of such a
only children grow older, they may also have greater anxiety policy may pale when considered against the alternatives.
about having to be the sole caregiver of their aging parents,
an obligation that is taken especially seriously in some Eastern
cultures (Mancillas, 2006). 126 Total
As the example with aging parents suggests, it may be that Urban area
123
Sex ratio: Male births per

some of the effects of being only children take many years to Rural area
100 female births

120
manifest and may only be found in adults. This was the argument
of one large-scale study of 412 Chinese adults who were born 117

just a year or two before or after the one-child policy was imple- 114
mented in 1979 (Cameron et al., 2013). The adults were studied 111
in experimental tasks designed to assess trust, risk, and perfor-
108
mance in competitive tasks. Children born in the first year of the
one-child policy performed in these tasks in ways that were less 105
1982 1987 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
trusting, less trustworthy, and less willing to take risks. Of course,
FIGURE 14.12 Sex ratios and the one-child policy. One effect
the presence of such traits in laboratory tasks might not translate of the one-child policy, especially in rural areas, is a huge shift in
into real-world behaviors. Somewhat more naturalistic question- the ratio of boys to girls, which may well have a profound impact on
naires after the experiments, however, also found strong effects, social relations among peers. Adapted from Hvistendahl (2010).

SIBLINGS AND FAMILY DYNAMICS 523

 SCIENTIFIC METHOD: Training Parents to Moderate Sibling Conflicts
Hypothesis:
Training parents to use formal mediation procedures helps them intervene in
sibling conflicts between their children and reduce the intensity of those conflicts.

Method:
1. Forty-eight families with children ranging in age from 5 to 10 years old were
randomly assigned to either mediation or control groups.
2. In the mediation group, parents were trained in a series of formal mediation
techniques.
3. In the control group, parents were told that the study examined sibling conflict
and parental interventions and were told to intervene normally.
4. Parents’ reports of subsequent conflict episodes between siblings were
recorded.

Results:
1. Let’s set some ground rules about
Siblings whose parents were assigned to the mediation group showed better how to resolve your disagreements.
conflict resolution strategies, compromised more frequently, and managed the
outcomes of conflicts better. They also showed less negativity in recurrent con- 2. Each of you should say what you
flicts, more nuanced assessments of blame, and greater ability to appreciate their think was happening and how you
disagree or agree.
siblings’ points of view (see table).
3. Each of you should say what you
Conclusion: want and how you feel.
Training parents in well-proven mediation strategies for adults can reduce the
intensity and tone of sibling conflicts both in terms of behaviors and in terms of 4. You should both try to find a way to
resolve your disagreement and
social cognitive styles. check to see if your solution is feasible.

Frequencies of Conflict Resolutions

Mediation Control
Condition Condition

Resolutions
Compromise 74 40
Win/lose 6 27
Reconciliation 18 9
No Resolution 10 52
Who Resolves?
Parent 11 74
Children 46 30
Children with parent’s help 50 26

Source study: Smith & Ross (2007).

524 CHAPTER 14 BECOMING PART OF THE FAMILY

 The interactionist approach to sibling dynamics sheds small nuclear families and large extended ones, families with
light on many developmental patterns and variations and older versus younger parents, and families in which both par-
suggests countless new research questions. Equally impor- ents work outside the home.
tant, it is also powerfully relevant to practical developmen-
tal issues. For example, when children have to be removed
from their parents’ care and placed in a foster home fol-
lowing a crisis (such as serious child mistreatment), social Changes in Parents’ Age
agencies are often anguished about whether to compromise Most people assume that the average age of parents in two-
the quality of the foster care placement in order to keep all parent families has been gradually increasing over the last
the siblings together. 100 years, but this assumption depends partly on the frame
Research on children in foster homes suggests an answer: of reference. To be sure, the median age of marriage in the
siblings should only be kept together when they have a low- United States—which is closely related to parents’ age when
conflict relationship. In one study, siblings with significant their first child is born—has risen in the past several decades.
behavior problems prior to placement in a foster home fared But as Figure 14.13A shows, looking at the median age of
better after 18 months if they were placed in separate foster marriage over a longer time frame reveals that the recent
homes. In contrast, siblings who had positive relationships rise is less marked than the striking drop that occurred right
prior to placement did better if they were placed together in after the Second World War (Cherlin, 2005). This is a use-
the same foster home (Linares et al., 2007). Clearly, poli- ful reminder that as dramatic as recent trends might seem,
cies that keep siblings together in foster home placements at they should always be considered in terms of broader his-
all costs should be made more sensitive to the context and torical contexts. Nonetheless, in recent decades, maternal
quality of sibling relationships. age at the birth of a married couple’s first child has increased
significantly throughout North America, Western Europe,
and Japan (Cliquet, 2003; Mathews & Hamilton, 2009; see
Figure 14.13B).
Changes in the Family It is not completely clear why parents of newborns are
getting older in many areas of the world, but one fac-
We have a tendency to think that “family” has had the same tor seems to relate to finances (Gustafsson, 2005). Many
meaning throughout history. In fact, it is among the most couples are postponing marriage until they have more eco-
dramatically changing concepts in the social sciences. Today’s nomic resources, so that they will be able to support a child
families differ in many respects from families in 1959, which without having to cut back on their normal levels of con-
were in turn different from families in 1910. From a psycho- sumption. As we will see shortly, older parents also tend to
logical viewpoint, how have these differences influenced chil- have smaller families.
dren’s development? In this section, we will consider different What are the effects of delaying the childbearing years
kinds of families, including one- and two-parent families, until the late 30s or even 40s? Although this question

Women 21.4 1970

United States 25.0
28 Men 22.0 2006
Poland 25.9
27
Hungary 22.8
Age (in years)

26 26.9
25 France 24.4
27.8
24 Canada 23.7
23 28.0
Finland 24.4
22 28.0
21 Denmark 23.8
28.4
20 Greece 25.0
28.5
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2002 Ireland 25.3
A 28.7
Italy 25.0
FIGURE 14.13 Median age of marriage and birth of first child 28.7
Sweden 25.9
over the last century. (A) The age of parents, which is related 28.8
to the age of marriage, has risen dramatically in the past 40 years, Netherlands 24.8
29.0
but much of that rise is related to a return from a dramatic drop in Japan 25.6
29.2
the age of marriage that occurred after World War II. Adapted from Switzerland 25.3
29.4
Cherlin (2005). (B) Over the past four decades, however, whether
the parents are from North America, Europe, or Japan, the mean age 0 20 25 30
of mothers at the time of the birth of their first child has increased Age of mother (in years)
B
dramatically. Adapted from Mathews & Hamilton (2009).

CHANGES IN THE FAMILY 525

has only recently been extensively studied, some provoca- 500 Fertility Spontaneous 100
tive suggestions have come to light. One analysis suggests abortions
450 90
that older parenting brings tradeoffs for the children (see

Rate of spontaneous abortions (percent)

Fertility rate (per 1,000 married women)
Figure 14.14). There is likely greater economic security for 400 80
the family, but perhaps some negative social costs, such as
350 70
greater psychological distance between parents and children
(Martin, 2004). In general, scholars have emphasized the 300 60
benefits of delaying marriage and childbearing, including
more stable marriages, more elaborate networks of social 250 50

support for the family, and parents’ ability to provide more 200 40
resources for the children (Gustafsson, 2005; Martin, 2004;
Miller, 2011). Older parents also tend to interact with their 150 30
children verbally in more sophisticated ways and to be less
100 20
reactive. As always, though, it can be difficult to distinguish
these effects from socioeconomic ones, since older parents 50 10
are more likely than younger ones to be of higher socioeco-
0 0
nomic status. 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 ≥45
The downside of delayed childbearing is less apparent, Maternal age (in years)
but some effects seem likely. First, many children of older FIGURE 14.15 Age and motherhood. When women choose to
parents may have grandparents so old that they play only a have their first child at later and later ages, fertility rates and spon-
marginal role, if any, in their lives, depriving these children taneous abortions can change dramatically. Adapted from Heffner
of the benefits of a close relationship with their grandparents. (2004).
These families may also be deprived of the kind of support
that grandparents can provide to a family, such as provid-
ing day care, helping out in times of crisis, or simply being pregnancy complications increases greatly in the third and
a mentor and source of expertise (Hayslip & Kaminski, fourth decades of a woman’s life (Heffner, 2004). This, in
2005). Second, children report that they identify less with turn, can have a huge influence on family planning as well
older parents, see them as more remote from their own lives, as creating additional stressors. In short, it will be important
and feel less in tune with them. Research also suggests that for future studies to systematically investigate the negative
older parents have less energy and more limited ability to effects of late childbearing, as the answers concern increas-
engage in physical activities with their children (Martin, ing numbers of families.
2004). Finally, as seen in Figure 14.15, there are clear bio- Older parents are only part of the story of the changes
logical factors to consider, as the incidence of fertility and in parental age in the last several decades. At the same time
that parents in two-parent families are getting older, there
has been a substantial increase in the number of single-
parent families (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012a). Some of
these single-parent families are headed by teenage mothers,
although the rate of teenage pregnancies and the percentage
of young teen mothers has decreased since the 1990s (Ham-
ilton et al., 2012; Martin et al., 2012; see Figure 14.16). The
net effect of these changes regarding parent age is to create
an increase in two kinds of parents: those who are young
and single and those who are older and have a partner.
What are the developmental effects of having very young
parents—what some call the phenomenon of “children hav-
ing children”? Several studies have reported that very young
teenage mothers are at greater risk for depression, and their
children are more likely to have academic and behavioral
problems, such as acting out in school (Beers & Hollo, 2009;
Pogarsky et al., 2006; Shaw et al., 2006; Sullivan et al.,
FIGURE 14.14 Older parents. In many countries, parents are 2011). In these cases, however, disentangling causation from
older when they have their first child. Being an older parent presents correlation is difficult. Very young mothers tend to be from
a number of tradeoffs in terms of its impact on children. lower income brackets than older mothers, are more likely

526 CHAPTER 14 BECOMING PART OF THE FAMILY

 175 30 1990 2006
150
Rate per 1,000 women

Age of mother (in years)

125 25
18–19 years
100

75 20
15–19 years
50

25 15–17 years 15

0
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0
FIGURE 14.16 Teen pregnancy rates. Teen pregnancy and birth Asian or Non- Total Hispanic Non- American
Pacific Hispanic Hispanic Indian or
rates have been steadily declining for the last four decades. Adapted
Islander white black Alaska
from Martin et al. (2012). Native
Race and Hispanic origin
FIGURE 14.18 Average age of mother at first birth for various
to be single parents, and tend to be less educated (see groups. For a diverse set of groups, the average age of mothers
Figure 14.17). When researchers try to account for these has increased in recent years. Adapted from Mathews & Hamilton
other correlated influences, the effect of being a teenage (2009).
mother per se often becomes smaller. However, when these
other factors are controlled, children—especially boys—of
teenage mothers still face a greater risk of negative outcomes teenage mothers. In short, although the number of very
(Olausson et al., 2001; Pogarsky et al., 2006). In many young mothers may be dropping overall, they still represent
other cases, factors such as the mother’s education level a large proportion of parents in some groups.
are so strongly linked to maternal age that it is difficult to
examine the effects of maternal age separately from these
associated factors.
Although the incidence of teenage pregnancy has Changes in Family Size
declined in recent years in the United States and other In countries where the average parental age is rising, one
countries, the statistics vary widely among racial and socio- consequence is a decline in family size. In addition, in many
economic groups. The mean age of U.S. mothers when they countries, factors independent of parents’ age also contrib-
first give birth ranges from roughly 29 for Japanese Ameri- ute to smaller family size. Parents are choosing to have fewer
cans and Chinese Americans to roughly 22 for African children partly because of the economic burden of support-
Americans, Mexican Americans, and Native Americans (see ing more children and because the demands of caring for
Figure 14.18). This increasing age for first births has larger families is more likely to impinge on the parents’
been found in many parts of the world. In some groups, career aspirations (Miller, 2011). Average family size varies
a younger mean age reflects a disproportionate number of considerably in different countries, as Figure 14.19A shows.
Most developed countries have seen a pattern of decreas-
ing family size over the years. Yet even countries that are
culturally very similar can show striking differences, both
in average family size and in family size trends over time
(see Figure 14.19B). In addition, within any given country,
family size can vary considerably as a function of race and
ethnicity (see Table 14.4). For these reasons, any statements
about the developmental influence of changing family sizes
have to consider the local cultural context.
It might seem that children in larger families would tend
to have worse outcomes. After all, the more children there are
in a family, the less economic resources and parental time and
energy can be spent on each child, an argument that has been
used to explain some sibling and birth order effects. On the
whole, children from larger families do tend to receive fewer
FIGURE 14.17 Teenage mothers. One major challenge, being years of education and earn less money, and they are more likely
met here by these teenage mothers in Brazil, is to continue schooling. to have disciplinary problems (Loeber & Stouthamer-Loeber,

CHANGES IN THE FAMILY 527

 All households Couples with children Single-parent households FIGURE 14.19 Family sizes in different
4.5
IRL
countries. (A) Family size varies considerably
TUR SVK AUS
ESP POL NLD NOR FIN OECD
across countries of similar levels of economic
4.0 CYP GRE HUN LTU AUS LUX
MEX POR NZD
JPN FRA CHE GER DNK development. The graph depicts family size in
SLV BGR CAN UKD EST
3.5
ROM CZE the early and mid-2000s. Adapted from OECD
Family Database (2010). (B) Despite the many
3.0 similarities between the United States and
Canada, these two nations are diverging rapidly
2.5
with respect to average family size, as revealed
2.0 by the mean total fertility rates from 1975
to 2001. Adapted from Eberstadt & Torrey
1.5 (2005).
ov ex ey
C Re o
yp p
Korus
la a
Ro Sp nd
Sl a in
Po ve ia
rtunia
N Pol gal
Zeree d
a ce
te land
St aly
AuJap es
Bu traan
H lga lia
Sw ga ia
e ry
ch ith na n
U Rep an a
te A ub ia
d u lic
N E ndoria
et s m

N landia
Sw F rw s
itz ranay
F rla e
G inl nd
O Lux en and
EC e m y
D mb ark
er rg
e
Ire re

u d

e c

ag
ze LCa de
ak ic

ew G an

D rm n
o n

un r

r n
a

av ou
Sl Murk

at

Ki st

e a
d It

he to
m

o
s
T

ni

ni
U

C
A

2.2
Canada
U.S.
2

1.8

1.6

1.4

1.2
1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001
B

1986). But a closer look at these statistics reveals that fam- up as an only child does not seem to make children more
ily size is unlikely to be the main reason for these patterns. spoiled or demanding, despite popular stereotypes (Chen
Family size is generally correlated with socioeconomic status: et al., 1994; Falbo & Posten, 1993; Mancillas, 2006).
poorer families tend to have more children. Thus, in many Another way of thinking about family size and struc-
cases, negative outcomes associated with large families may ture involves the difference between nuclear families and
also be due to socioeconomic status. As mentioned earlier, extended families. Nuclear families generally consist of the
family size may have negative effects primarily on poor fam- mother and father as heads of the household, along with their
ilies. For families that are not so poor, family size does not children. Extended families reach across generations and
seem to negatively influence educational outcomes (Black sometimes incorporate aunts, uncles, and cousins. Often a
et al., 2005). At the other end of the continuum, growing grandfather or grandmother may be head of the extended

Total Number of Average Household Size People under 18 in Household People over 18 in
Households (millions) Household

All 80.5 3.13 0.90 2.23

Hispanic 1.6 3.78 1.38 2.40
White 65.4 3.08 0.86 2.23
Black 10.0 3.31 1.16 2.15
Asian 4.3 3.40 0.92 2.48

TABLE 14.4 Family size and ethnicity in the United States. From U.S. Census Bureau (2012b).

528 CHAPTER 14 BECOMING PART OF THE FAMILY

family household. In many parts of the world, including 62.6
Sweden
much of Asia, extended families are the norm. Older par- 60.6
60 60.0
ents may also have more of an impact on family dynamics Canada 59.2
in such cultures because if the parents are old enough, the
grandparents may be too old to participate effectively. United States 56.8
55
Both kinds of family structures can have different positive
and negative effects on children. Members of the extended United
Kingdom 52.1
family, and especially grandparents, can provide extremely 50 50.0
48.7
important support to parents; in nuclear families, the sole 48.2
Japan
responsibility for child-care arrangements more often falls

Percent
45
to the parents. But extended families may encounter more 44.6
43.3
disruptive transitions than nuclear families as grandparents Germany
age and family structure changes. 40
38.4
38.3 38.2
Netherlands
Italy
35
Working Parents and Child Care
Sometimes, cultural influences on families reflect chang-
30
ing socioeconomic realities. In Chapter 6, we considered the
28.5
ways that day care arrangements might influence a child’s
26.4
attachment to his parents. In many countries, this issue is 25
part of a much larger change in the number of families in 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
which both parents work full-time outside the home. The FIGURE 14.20 The rise of women in the workplace. Over the
incidence has increased in several Western countries over past three decades, there has been a sharp rise in the percentage
the past few decades (see Figure 14.20). For example, in of women in the workplace, although differences between countries
the United States in 2012, 58 percent of mothers with a remain very large. Adapted from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
child under 2 years of age were employed outside the home (2011).
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). In contrast, in the early
1950s, only 18 percent of mothers with a child under age 6
were employed outside the home (Halpern, 2005). The that children’s cognitive development suffers when mothers
shift has primarily occurred among married women with work outside the home (Burchinal & Clarke-Stewart, 2007).
a husband present in the household, as single mothers have There are several reasons why the effects of having two
worked at higher levels all along. working parents seem small or nonexistent. Although some
How has such a dramatic shift influenced the children in researchers found that employed mothers spend less time
those families? Mothers who work outside the home might with their children (Gottfried & Gottfried, 2006), others
be spending less time with their children, which could found that by sacrificing leisure time, working mothers
have some negative effects. A few researchers have reported usually manage to spend just as much time with their chil-
negative socioemotional effects, such as more difficulty in dren as those who are not employed. One line of research,
interpersonal relationships (Belsky, 2002; Belsky & Johnson, in which mothers recorded their activities in detailed diary
2005; National Institute of Child Health and Human entries, carefully documented how these working mothers
Development, 2003), but the vast majority of studies do not engaged in more multitasking and cut back on time doing
find any consistent effects, and when effects are found, they housework in order to spend as much time with their chil-
tend to be small. dren as mothers did in prior generations (Bianchi, 2011).
In short, the shift to working outside the home by moth- Indeed, one study found that working mothers during
ers does not seem to have had any consistently measurable the period from 2003 to 2008 spent an hour more per week
negative impact on their children (Gottfried & Gottfried, with their children than did stay-at-home mothers in 1975
2006; Halpern, 2005). At least one study has shown that (Bianchi et al., 2006; Fox et al., 2013). In addition, fathers
children of mothers working outside the home have no dif- are spending more time with their children as mothers spend
ferences in educational achievements or in social or behav- more time working outside the home. As a result, today’s
ioral problems (Kalil & Ziol-Guest, 2008). One long-term children may actually spend more time with their parents
study followed children up to the age of 24 and found no than children did in prior generations (Halpern, 2005).
differences in occupational status at that age (Gottfried & Another reason why children of working mothers fare as
Gottfried, 2006). Likewise, there is little reliable evidence well as other children may relate to the consistent finding

CHANGES IN THE FAMILY 529

that poverty negatively influences child development: when Thus, financial stresses may be exacerbated by being a single
both parents work, their children are less likely to grow up parent, and vice versa.
in poverty. Other studies examining a wider range of economic
Sometimes when both parents are working, there are groups have found associations between single-parent fami-
negative effects on children. When mothers have nonstan- lies and children’s educational and economic outcomes. On
dard work hours, such as night shifts or erratic schedules, average, children of single parents tend to get fewer years of
their children are somewhat more likely to show substantial schooling and to earn lower incomes (Björklund et al., 2004).
delays in cognitive development (Han, 2005). One reason One intriguing analysis of African-American families sug-
for such an influence is that parents who work nonstan- gests that single parenting is not associated with problems
dard schedules have far more limited child-care options. for children as long as another individual is also acting as an
High-quality center-based care, which has consistently invested caregiver. For example, in many African-American
been shown to benefit young children, is often unavailable families headed by a single mother, a grandmother serves as
to parents who need care in the middle of the night or on a second caregiver, providing critical support that reduces or
unpredictable schedules. prevents any negative effects of single parenthood (Simons
Finally, there are some suggestions that working women et al., 2006), although later studies show that the positive
are often stretched to the limit more than working fathers effect of grandparents seems to vary as a function of con-
(Porter, 2006). Many working mothers are using up every texts that are not yet fully understood (Arnold et al., 2011).
available nonwork hour, and they sleep almost 4 hours less In short, having a single parent need not have negative con-
per week than mothers who stay at home (Bianchi et al., sequences for a child, but if that parent is also poor and lacks
2006). Although no negative effects of such busy lives have social support, there are increased risks for adverse effects.
been found, it is possible that for some working mothers, In addition, the rates of single-parent families have var-
fatigue and burnout take a toll. ied dramatically across countries, over time, and across eth-
nic groups (Ellwood & Jencks, 2004; McClanahan, 2004).
For example, a child born in the United States in 1995 was
five times more likely to grow up with a single parent than
Changes in Family Structures a child born in Italy in 1995. Even larger differences exist
There are as many traditional family structures as there are within the United States: a child born into poverty or a dis-
cultural traditions, but in general, the recent changes in fam- advantaged minority group is seven times more likely to
ily structure in many developed countries include increases in grow up with a single parent than a child born into afflu-
single-parent families, families with same-sex partners, and ence or in a more advantaged ethnic group (Hummer &
families in which parents divorce and sometimes remarry. Hamilton, 2010). The broad range of family structures
that exist within many different cultural contexts therefore
Single-Parent Families Much attention has been focused makes it difficult to generalize about the impact of family
on single-parent families, usually those with single moth- structures on children. More detailed and context-sensitive
ers, since they are far more common than families headed analyses are needed.
by single fathers. Throughout the world, the percentage of
single-parent families has been increasing over the past two Same-Sex Parents A different kind of family structure
decades (see Table 14.5). Because single-parent families are involves same-sex caregivers (see Figure 14.21). There has
more common in lower socioeconomic groups and some been a marked increase in the number of gay and lesbian
minority groups, it can be difficult to know whether any adults raising children over the past two decades. In 2005,
adverse outcomes for children of single parents truly arise approximately 300,000 children in the United States were
from having only one parent or whether they are largely due living in families with two same-sex parents (Romero et al.,
to other factors, such as economic hardship, and the ways 2007). When single gay and lesbian parents were included
they interact with other influences of single parenthood. in a 2013 analysis, almost 2 million children in the United
Low-income single parenting, for example, is strongly cor- States were being raised by gay and lesbian parents (Siegel
related with problems for children. One study examined dif- et al., 2013). These estimates are likely to increase consider-
ferences between three groups of low-income parents: those ably in future years in the United States and other coun-
who were single, those who were unmarried and living with tries where there is increasing social acceptance of same-sex
a partner, and those who were married. Among these low- couples and marriages.
income groups, the single parents showed higher levels of One reason for increasing approval of adoptions by same-
mental and physical illness and drug abuse than those with sex parents is that no negative outcomes have ever been con-
other family structures, but these correlations are not evident sistently found for children of gay and lesbian couples when
for single parents with high incomes (McLanahan, 2004). compared with children of heterosexual couples (Anderssen

530 CHAPTER 14 BECOMING PART OF THE FAMILY

 Country and Year Percent of All Households with Country and Year Percent of All Households with Children
Children

United States Germany

1980 19.5 1991 15.2
1990 24.0 1995 18.8
2000 27.0 2000 17.6
2008 29.5 2008 21.7

Canada Ireland
1981 12.7 1981 7.2
1991 16.2 1991 10.7
2001 23.5 2002 17.4
2006 24.6 2006 22.6

Japan Netherlands
1980 4.9 1988 9.6
1990 6.5 2000 13.0
2000 8.3 2009 16.0
2005 10.2

Denmark Sweden
1980 13.4 1985 11.2
1990 17.8 1995 17.4
2001 18.4 2000 21.4
2009 21.7 2008 18.7

France United Kingdom

1982 10.2 1981 13.9
1990 13.2 1991 19.4
1999 17.4 2000 20.7
2005 19.8 2008 25.0

TABLE 14.5 Single-parent families across cultures. The number of single parents has been increasing throughout the world to a degree
that far exceeds the rate of population growth in those countries. Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2012b).

et al., 2002; Chan et al., 1998; Patterson, 1992, 2013; Perrin, for most same-sex couples, the process of giving birth to or
2002; Siegel et al., 2013; Tasker, 2002, 2005). Children adopting a child is necessarily quite deliberate and involved,
who grow up in gay and lesbian families do not differ from so same-sex parents have fewer unplanned or unwanted
other children in their cognitive and social development or children. Moreover, same-sex couples, like all other couples
their incidence of behavioral problems. They also show the who adopt children, have to pass assessments by adoption
same profiles of sexual preferences, gender identities, and agencies and other social service organizations of their fit-
gender role behaviors. Some reviews suggest that children ness as parents before they are allowed to adopt. Finally,
in gay and lesbian families may have more negative experi- many lesbian partners exercise choice in their selection of
ences than their peers associated with others’ homophobia donors for insemination and may therefore be selecting for
and stigmatizing of their parents, but even these negative certain positive behavioral traits in fathers that are passed
experiences do not appreciably change child outcomes on to their children.
(Tasker, 2005). Indeed, at least one study reports higher In short, although there are many popular stereotypes
levels of cognitive and social functioning and lower levels about problems associated with single-parent families and
of behavioral problems among children of lesbian parents same-sex parents, the negative effects of growing up in
(Gartrell & Bos, 2010). One factor to keep in mind is that either of these kinds of families are usually nonexistent. In

CHANGES IN THE FAMILY 531

 (Amato, 2000; Cherlin, 2010; Kennedy & Bumpass,
2008). In the United States, over 1 million children are
affected by a divorce every year (U.S. Census Bureau,
2012a). Beyond formal marriages and divorce, there also
changes in cohabitation arrangements that may have
similar effects. Such effects may be especially strong in
the United States, where mothers are much more likely
to change their cohabitation partners than are mothers in
most European countries (Bianchi, 2011; Cherlin, 2010;
Kennedy & Bumpass, 2008).
Divorce rates also vary as a function of social class and
education, with increasingly higher rates among those who
have fewer years of education (Bramlett & Mosher, 2002;
Martin, 2006; see Figure 14.22). The reasons for this
FIGURE 14.21 Same-sex parents. Same-sex parents have difference are complex but may be related to the average
become more common in many parts of the world. Children of same- earlier age of marriage of those with fewer years of educa-
sex parents do not seem to have different psychological outcomes tion. It is possible that younger couples are less experienced
from children of different-sex parents. at dealing with the conflicts that can arise within relation-
ships. Divorce rates also vary considerably across race and
the case of single-parent homes, negative outcomes for chil- ethnicity. In the United States, the highest rates occur
dren more likely relate to other variables, such as poverty, for non-Hispanic whites, followed in decreasing order by
that are not inherent to family structure. African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians, who get divorced
at roughly one-third the rate of non-Hispanic whites. Again,
Divorce Over the past few decades, the incidence of the reasons for such differences are complex and are related
divorce has increased in several countries. In 1958, there to such factors as the overall rate of marriage, which is quite
were roughly 2 divorces per 1,000 individuals in the a bit higher, for example, for non-Hispanic whites than for
United States. This number rose rapidly in the follow- African Americans (Fischer & Hout, 2006).
ing decades and peaked at approximately 5.5 divorces per Divorce rates also vary considerably between countries. As
1,000 individuals in the 1980s, more than double the ear- Figure 14.23 shows, the U.S. rate is almost seven times that
lier rate. It has declined a modest amount since that time of Italy and considerably higher than that of several other
to roughly 3.6 divorces per 1,000 people (Centers for Dis- countries, including Canada. These patterns often reflect
ease Control and Prevention, 2013; Fields, 2003; Fields & cultural norms, which can also be reflected in laws and regu-
Casper, 2001). lations designed to discourage divorce. They should not be
Approximately 40 percent of all children in the United taken as evidence that, for example, unhappy marriages are
States will experience a divorce and a transition to a seven times more frequent in the United States than in Italy.
single-parent family by the time they are 18 years of age These differences do show that the study of divorce and its

No high school diploma

High school diploma or some college
College degree or more
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
FIGURE 14.22 Divorce rates and educational
10
level. Less educated parents are more likely to be
5
divorced, a trend that has become more pronounced in
0
1960–1964 1965–1969 1970–1974 1975–1979 1980–1984 1985–1989 1990–1994 recent years. Adapted from Martin (2006).

532 CHAPTER 14 BECOMING PART OF THE FAMILY

 550 First, the effects of divorce and their magnitude vary
500

Divorce per 1,000

450 across studies, but divorce is generally associated with
400 increased problems for children, potentially including
marriages
350
300 declining school performance, delinquency, depression,
250
200 aggression, and even increased health problems (Amato,
150 2010; Ellis, 2000; Grych & Fincham, 1992; Hetherington
100
50 et al., 1985; Oldehinkel et al., 2008). One large-scale study
United Italy Germany Canada Britain France Sweden of almost 1,500 families documented a wide range of behav-
States
ioral problems reported by parents, teachers, and the chil-
FIGURE 14.23 Divorce rates across different countries. Divorce
rates can vary dramatically across different countries. Divorce rates
dren themselves (Furstenberg et al., 1983). Across many
reflect, among other things, the degree to which a culture’s laws and studies, it seems that the incidence of problem behaviors
moral norms oppose divorce, so a country’s relatively high rate does ranges from slightly more to almost double the rate for chil-
not necessarily indicate that marital dissatisfaction is more common dren of married parents. These increases are concerning,
in that society. Adapted from Cherlin (2005). but their overall magnitude should not be exaggerated. Even
doubling the average incidence of problematic behaviors
means that only a relatively small minority of children in
impact on families must take into account many cultural divorced families struggle with serious behavioral or emo-
settings rather than simply drawing universal conclusions tional problems.
from the preponderance of studies conducted in the United
States. Nonetheless, because most major studies have been
U.S. based, they will form the bulk of our discussion. Q: What are some of the associations between
The central message here is that divorce patterns vary
greatly across nations as well as socioeconomic classes and divorce and behavioral problems in children?
ethnic and racial groups within nations. Since there are so
many divorce patterns, it is difficult to make many general-
izations about the effects of divorce on children. Are the effects of divorce more detrimental for boys or
for girls? The answer depends on the children’s age and the
particular problems in question. Among younger children of
divorced parents, boys tend to show more behavioral prob-
Q: Describe ways in which divorce rates vary lems than girls (Fauber et al., 1990). This is especially true
across historical time periods in one culture and when the child lives with a single mother, the most frequent
across cultures within the same time period. post-divorce outcome in most countries. In these circum-
stances, young boys show more intense behavior problems
than girls, and the problems arise sooner (Hetherington et al.,
Research on divorce has primarily focused on under- 1985; Wallerstein, 1985a, 1985b; Warshak, 1992). For girls,
standing its impact on children. This issue raises ques- the negative effects seem more pronounced later, during ado-
tions about differences in impact on boys and girls and on lescence. They are more likely to be delinquent from school
younger and older children. It also raises questions about or excessively sexually promiscuous, in some cases even when
whether different kinds of families (for example, extended the divorce occurred in early childhood (Allison & Fursten-
versus nuclear families) and children (for example, only berg, 1989; Hetherington, 1991; Slater & Haber, 1984).
children versus those with several siblings) fare differently in One difference between girls’ and boys’ responses to
divorce. Finally, it raises questions about tradeoffs. Is it bet- divorce, at all ages, is inherent in their trends for specific
ter for the children of an unhappy marriage for the couple styles of coping reactions. Girls tend to show internalizing
to stay together? Is it better for a child of divorced parents to problems, which are largely within the individual, such as
spend equal time with each parent or to live primarily with depression and loss of self-esteem. In contrast, boys tend to
one parent? Thousands of studies, not only by psychologists show externalizing problems, which are expressed by act-
but also by sociologists, economists, anthropologists, legal ing out in antisocial ways, such as bullying, underage drink-
scholars, and even evolutionary biologists, have examined ing, and disruptive behavior in the classroom (Peterson &
divorce and its consequences. Many controversies remain, Zill, 1986).
but a few fairly reliable patterns emerge, several of which Part of the complexity of the findings concerning differ-
may run counter to popular lore about divorce (Amato, ent impacts on the sexes may also have to do with the gen-
2010; Hetherington & Kelly, 2002; Hetherington & der of the single parent who remains with the child. This is
Stanley-Hagan, 2002). yet another example of how, in any discussion of the effects

CHANGES IN THE FAMILY 533

of gender in families, the gender of both the parent and
the child contribute to developmental outcomes. In most
cases, living with a parent of their same sex seems to be
better for the child; boys tend to fare better in single-father
homes, while girls typically do better with single mothers
(Camara & Resnick, 1988; Clarke-Stewart & Hayward,
1996). But this finding is complicated by the relative rar-
ity of single fathers with custody of their children. These
cases are roughly one-tenth as frequent as mothers with
child custody. In fact, a large number of fathers interact
very little with their children after the divorce. In one study,
20 percent of fathers interviewed reported not having seen
their children at all in the prior year, and another 50 percent
reported not seeing their children more than a few times a
year (Seltzer, 1994). Thus, the relatively rare cases where
FIGURE 14.24 Parental conflict. Overt conflicts between parents
fathers become the custodial parent may reflect the effects
can have negative psychological effects on their children. Less overt
of atypical fathers rather than fathers in general. tension or marital dissatisfaction does not seem to impact children as
The long-term nature of the effects of divorce runs severely.
counter to some commonly held views, which suggest that
the effects taper off after a year or two. Even as adults, how-
ever, children of divorced parents are more likely to experience 1996; Buchanan et al., 1991, 1996; Camara & Resnick,
divorce in their own marriages (Amato, 1996, 2010; Amato & 1988; Emery, 1988; Katz & Gottman, 1993). As one
Booth, 1996; Cherlin et al., 1998; Hetherington & Kelly, extensive review points out: “Living in a marriage marked
2002; Wallerstein et al., 2000). In some cases, and more by mutual disengagement is a less-than-satisfying experi-
commonly among women, divorce in childhood is associ- ence for parents. But . . . in these families, children have
ated with increases in depression and relationship difficulties ready access to both parents, a standard of living based on
when those children are adults (Kim, 2011; Wallerstein et al., both parents’ income, and a predictable and stable home
2000). In addition, parent-child relationships can suffer over environment. Divorce in these cases appears to increase
the long term, with more deleterious effects usually occur- the risk of a number of problems for offspring” (Amato,
ring with fathers (Kalmijn, 2013). The mechanisms behind 2006, p. 199).
such long-term effects are unclear. They range from contin- A stable family situation for the child can often be more
ued family stress to the power of early experiences to genetic important than parents first realize (Amato, 2010). But if
predispositions shared with parents. the parents cannot avoid overt conflict, then the picture
changes and the children are better off with one parent, pro-
viding that the post-divorce situation reduces the conflict
(Amato, 2006, 2010). Of course, these conclusions cannot
Q: How is divorce related differently to provide clear guidelines to a couple contemplating divorce.
behavioral problems in boys and girls? It may, for example, be difficult for parents to tell whether
their disengagement from each other is stressful for their
children. In addition, if parents’ disengagement causes one
What is it about a divorce that causes the most prob- or both of them severe distress, even if there is no overt
lems for children? Several studies now suggest that explicit discord, their distress may influence their parenting skills
conflict between parents is especially problematic for in other ways.
children. It is often said that it is always better for the As divorce is usually a powerful, painful experience, it is
children if unhappily married parents divorce; but several natural to assume that the parents’ divorce directly causes
studies suggest a more nuanced view that depends on the any associated problems in the children. But in many cases, a
circumstances of individual families (see Figure 14.24). If third factor, related to parents’ and children’s shared genetic
the parents’ difficulties do not erupt into overt verbal or disposition, may contribute to the difficulties that result in
physical conflict, there is some evidence that the children divorce and to the children’s difficulties afterward. In the
may fare better if the parents stay married, even if they past decade, researchers have become increasingly interested
are uncomfortable around each other or fairly detached in the genetic contributions to divorce and to the problems
from each other (Amato, 2006, 2010; Amato & Booth, that affect some children of divorced families. One study

534 CHAPTER 14 BECOMING PART OF THE FAMILY

of 398 adoptive and biological families with divorced par-
ents found an intriguing interaction between genetic and
environmental effects (O’Connor et al., 2000). The adopted
children all had been adopted in the first few weeks of life.
When the children were 12 years old, they and their families
were extensively interviewed, and the children were assessed
for a range of potential problems stemming from their par-
ents’ divorce. Based on these interviews and other assess-
ments, the researchers examined five categories of potential
effects of the divorce: changes in self-esteem, social compe-
tence (positive assertiveness and social responsibility), aca-
demic achievement, psychopathology, and substance abuse.
Notably, the differences in these categories were small
between the adopted children of divorced parents and the
children of divorced biological parents. Nonetheless, the
children who were biologically related to their divorced par-
ents seemed to show more negative effects from the divorce
than did the adopted children. In particular, children of
divorced biological parents showed more severe impacts on
self-esteem, social competence, and academic achievement.
The groups showed no differences with respect to more FIGURE 14.25 Blended families. Many children grow up
severe psychopathology. in blended families in which all members thrive. In some cases,
however, there are tensions with stepparents and stepchildren. In
These results support the idea that biological children
addition, some studies show that stepparents can be less invested in
and their parents share a genotype that both contributes stepchildren.
to the difficulties that lead to divorce and makes the chil-
dren more susceptible to problems as a result of the divorce.
However, we should not regard our genetic heritage as cohabitation with new partners after a divorce (Bumpass
strongly predicting our marital future. Indeed, some schol- et al., 1995; Radhakrishna et al., 2001). The increase in the
ars have argued that shared genotype has a very limited role incidence of these new kinds of families raises questions
in explaining causal links between parental divorce and about how stepparents and stepchildren interact differently
adverse outcomes in children (Amato, 2010). from the way parents and their biological children interact.
Popular lore often condemns stepparents, and the theme of
the cruel stepmother or stepfather is a frequent storyline in
Q: How can behavioral genetic models literature and folktales. Could there be any truth to the claim
potentially help to explain associations between that stepparents favor their own children over their spouse’s?
Although there are millions of stepparents and stepchil-
divorce and problems with children in divorced dren who have strong, loving relationships, the research
families? shows some modest differences, on average, in the expected
direction. Children tend to have more conflicts with their
stepparents and less intimate relationships with them than
Blended Families Given the high incidence of divorce with their biological parents (Furstenberg, 1987; Hether-
and remarriage in countries like the United States, it is not ington, 1999; Hetherington & Jodl, 1994). There is also a
surprising that there has also been a corresponding rise in great deal of variation, though, and some studies find that
blended families, created when parents remarry. Blended children of divorced mothers who remarry fare just as well
families consist of the parents and all children from their as those of divorced single mothers (Demo & Acock, 1996).
current relationship as well as children from prior rela- Other research, much of it spawned by claims from
tionships (see Figure 14.25). There are few reliable sta- evolutionary biology, has argued that there are significant
tistics on stepfamily configurations, but given divorce differences in how stepparents treat their spouse’s children
and remarriage statistics, it is safe to say that well over compared with their own biological children. One widely
10 percent of children live with at least one stepparent and cited study reported that stepfathers abuse their stepdaugh-
that stepmothers are more common than stepfathers. Some ters more than 8½ times more often than biological fathers
estimates run as high as 30 percent if we include parents’ abuse their daughters (Russell, 1984). These findings and

CHANGES IN THE FAMILY 535

similar ones have been interpreted as showing that step-
parents treat stepchildren more poorly because they have Q: Describe at least two distinct forms of
no genetic investment in them. According to this evolution- evidence that stepparents may treat their
ary argument, stepparents are less committed to their step-
children’s well-being because, unlike a parent’s biological children differently than biological parents.
children, stepchildren will not grow up to pass along the
stepparent’s genes to the next generation.
These explanations have been a source of controversy
(Adler-Baeder, 2006; Temrin et al., 2000), but most stud-
ies do suggest that stepparents tend to behave less posi-
Child Abuse
tively toward stepchildren than toward their own children Sadly, parents do not always provide healthy, or even
(Anderson, 2011; Gardiner & Björklund, 2007). Some benign, environments for their children. Throughout the
of the more interesting analyses of parental investment world, some parents inflict serious harm, which can take
concern the subtle ways that parents treat children differ- the form of physical abuse, psychological abuse (usually in
ently. One analysis of investments in college education in the form of verbal attacks), or sexual abuse. The abuse may
two-parent families found a difference in relative finan- involve taking physical action against a child, but neglect of
cial contributions between households with two biological the child’s physical or emotional needs can also constitute
parents and those in which one or both parents also had abuse. The question of which psychological factors can lead
stepchildren. Stepparents started college savings accounts a parent to commit abuse is more suited to a discussion of
later, put less money aside, and expected to pay less than adult psychopathology than to developmental psychology.
biological parents did for the first year of college (Zvoch, Here the central question concerns the impact of abuse on
1999). This pattern occurred even when stepparents and children.
biological parents were of equal socioeconomic status and First, consider some statistics about the prevalence and
income level. Other researchers have found similar pat- patterns of child abuse in the United States. One data
terns (Anderson et al., 1999a, 1999b). collection reported that almost 750,000 children were vic-
Another study found that stepchildren tended to be phys- tims of maltreatment each year, a rate of roughly 10 per
ically shorter than biological children (Flinn et al., 1999), a 1,000 children in 2011. In this group, roughly 20 percent
finding that gains some plausibility from other evidence that suffered from physical abuse, approximately 10 percent
stressful environments can affect a child’s height (Eiholzer from sexual abuse, and almost 60 percent from various
et al., 1999). Even doubts about paternity can have an effect. forms of neglect (U.S. Department of Health and Human
A father’s degree of confidence that he is the biological father Services, Administration for Children and Families, 2012).
of a child has been related to how much time he spends with These numbers come from cases that were reported and
that child (Anderson et al., 2007). At the same time, the officially recorded by an agency. It is widely assumed that
effects in these studies are generally small. Many interacting many cases of abuse are never reported, as parents fear being
influences bear on a child’s development, and most step- prosecuted and children often fear both parental retaliation
parents by themselves do not exert a dominant effect on a and abandonment.
stepchild’s future. Abused children are generally young—most are less than
There also seem to be some sex differences in the effects 3 years old—and the incidence of physical and verbal abuse
of stepparents on children’s emotional development. Boys is roughly equal between the sexes, although girls are four
sometimes benefit from the presence of a new father fig- times more likely than boys to be sexually abused. Moreover,
ure, while girls, especially adolescents, often seem to have abuse is highly likely to recur. Children who are reported
an increase in problems with the arrival of a new father as abused once are much more likely than other children
in the house (Hetherington, 1989; Hetherington et al., to be reported as abused in the future, even when agencies
1985; Hetherington & Stanley-Hagan, 2002; Zimiles & attempt to monitor the situation and prevent recurrences.
Lee, 1991). Both boys and girls tend to have more diffi- Victimization rates in the United States differ across eth-
cult relationships with stepmothers (Hetherington, 1999). nic groups, most likely because poverty and other stresses
One possible reason for the problem with stepmothers is on disadvantaged groups greatly increase the likelihood of
that fathers in such families often expect the stepmothers abuse and neglect. Overall, roughly 60 percent of the peo-
to take over the role of the more “full-time” parent, while ple who abuse children are female, usually the mothers. In
mothers do not tend to have similar expectations of step- the case of sexual abuse, however, the abuser is much more
fathers. Children may resent it when a new stepparent likely to be male and the father. These, then, are the raw
suddenly becomes the more dominant parenting figure statistics. The critical developmental questions concern how
(Hetherington, 1999). these patterns of abuse are set up and maintained and how

536 CHAPTER 14 BECOMING PART OF THE FAMILY

they affect children. Another key question is what sorts of and severe impact on girls. An important caution to keep
interventions can reduce the incidence of abuse. in mind, however, is that much of the data are collected by
interviewing adults about their psychological status. If men
are less willing than women to disclose psychological prob-
lems to an interviewer, the data on sex differences will be
Q: Describe some examples of how child skewed. Most of these studies have also been done with col-
lege students. But there is good reason to believe that many
abuse patterns seem to vary across population of the individuals most severely affected by abuse would
groups. How might these differences be never make it to college; consequently, they would not be
explained? included in the samples, thus reducing the apparent effects
(Dallam et al., 2001).
One major problem in child abuse research involves
appropriate ways of controlling for factors in abusive
families, other than the abuse itself, that affect children’s
Effects of Abuse development. Abuse of all forms is more common in fami-
There is an extensive body of research investigating how lies that also show other dysfunctional patterns, making it
abuse affects children, both in the short term and later on in difficult to distinguish the effects of abuse from those of
their adult lives. In general, all forms of abuse have substan- other forms of dysfunction (Boney-McCoy & Finkelhor,
tial negative effects on children of both sexes, but the size of 1996). Moreover, if common genetic predispositions
these effects varies enormously across studies (Dallam et al., influence such traits as low impulse control, then the
2001). The field is emotionally charged to an extraordinary same traits that lead parents to abuse may also lead their
extent, as most adults find child abuse, especially child sexual children to act out impulsively or show other kinds of
abuse, to be so morally repugnant that they find it difficult to behavior problems.
remain neutral about claims that seem to minimize its long-
term negative effects. Indeed, the gut feeling against abuse is
so strong that it may be subject to moral dumbfounding of Q: What are some of the challenges in trying
the sort described in Chapter 12. A similar outrage in many
scientists makes it difficult to objectively design and interpret to understand the psychological effects of abuse
studies. Even with those cautions, however, most studies do on children?
point to the same kinds of negative effects.
The effects vary somewhat across the aforementioned
categories of abuse: physical abuse, psychological abuse
(usually in verbal forms such as sarcastic and demeaning Explaining the Cycle of Abuse
remarks), and sexual abuse. A fourth category is neglect. For These issues come to the fore in considering different
infants and toddlers, all forms of abuse are associated with theoretical approaches to the causes and consequences of
insecure attachments. Older children who are physically child abuse. All of these approaches try to address one
and psychologically abused show more aggression starting of the most tragic aspects of child abuse: its tendency
as early as preschool. The aggression continues throughout to recur in ensuing generations of the same family line,
adolescence, often becoming increasingly severe (Aber et al., often known as the cycle of abuse (Egeland et al., 1988).
1989; Allesandri, 1991; Beitchman et al., 1991, 1992; Boney- One possible explanation for the cycle of abuse builds on
McCoy & Finkelhor, 1995; Gross & Keller, 1992; Hart & attachment theory, suggesting that abuse creates inse-
Brassard, 1987; Kendall-Tackett et al., 1993; Malinosky- curely attached children who, as a result of being inse-
Rummell & Hansen, 1993). curely attached, grow up to behave toward their own
Children who are sexually abused show different pat- children in a way that fosters insecure attachments. This
terns. Those who have been chronically, severely sexually attachment style could then increase the odds of negative
abused show insecure attachments early on, followed by a parent-child interactions and abuse (Egeland et al., 1988).
spectrum of both internalizing problems, like depression Other explanations invoke a social learning perspective,
and anxiety, and externalizing problems, such as substance arguing that children learn to model their parents’ behav-
abuse (Bouvier et al., 1999; Browne & Finkelhor, 1986; iors. In this view, abused children go on to re-create, in
Finkelhor et al., 1990; Fleming et al., 1999; Mullen et al., their own families, the abuse they have observed and
1994). There is some controversy over the relative impact of experienced (Bandura, 1971).
childhood sexual abuse on boys and girls when they become Environmental explanations argue that the stress of living
adults, but the evidence suggests perhaps a more prolonged in poverty, along with the attendant risks of crime and drug

CHILD ABUSE 537

abuse, sets up a context in which parents are more likely to ways that specific genes interact with other variables to
abuse their children. This effect might be further exacer- increase the risk of abuse.
bated in single-parent homes, where a second parent is not Studies show that the variety of interventions that
around to buffer the occasional lapses of the other. Thus, attempt to reduce child abuse have mixed results. There are
the immediate household environment and the larger-scale some significant success stories, but many other cases show
community in which a child lives may both increase the little reduction in violence. More systematic research on the
chances of abuse. In addition, some argue that a culture that factors that contribute to the cycle is essential to develop
emphasizes corporal punishment might make it easier for reliable, highly effective interventions.
parents to cross the line from physical punishment to abuse
(Gershoff, 2002; see Figure 14.26).
In contrast, a behavioral genetic view would argue that
a cycle of abuse continues because both parents and chil-
Q: How do cycles of abuse perpetuate abuse
dren have genetic tendencies to be aggressive, impulsive, or across generations?
likely to commit some other behavior that creates a climate
of abuse. The most extreme version of this view claims that
these inherited tendencies will express themselves regardless
of experience. The more nuanced and more common genet-
ically based view holds that some genetic factors put indi- Foster Care
viduals at high risk of becoming abusive if they are exposed When children are considered to be at serious risk of abuse,
to certain stressful or aversive environments that would be they are often removed from their parents and assigned to
much less harmful to others. live with a foster family. Children in foster care may have
It is critical to note that any and all of these factors a series of foster families, either until they reach maturity
interact; they are not mutually exclusive. Even so, under- or until it is considered safe for them to return to their bio-
standing which factors are most influential would have logical family. In the United States, the number of children
a huge impact on attempts to break the cycle of violence in foster care grew from approximately 276,000 in 1985 to
and abuse. Currently, programs throughout the world 568,000 in 1999 (Swann & Sylvester, 2006). This estimate
attempt to solve the problem by focusing on improving has since declined somewhat to roughly 424,000 in 2009
the attachment relationship, by modeling more posi- (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2011). The propor-
tive behaviors for parents and children, and by alleviat- tion of children in foster care is not evenly distributed across
ing environmental stresses that might make abuse more ethnicities, with disadvantaged minorities having a larger
likely. Applying the behavioral genetic approach is a more proportion in foster care (see Figure 14.27).
complex proposition because it requires theories about the It is difficult to measure the extent to which foster care
influences children’s development (see Figure 14.28). In
addition to the tremendous range of foster care situations,
most of the children in foster care are there because they
have suffered some sort of trauma. It is therefore not sur-
prising that children in foster care tend to have more psy-
chosocial problems than children who grow up in their
birth family homes. Children also commonly move in
and out of foster care. Roughly half the time, they end up
reuniting, at least temporarily, with their birth families
(Chipungu & Bent-Goodley, 2004), making it difficult
to estimate the effects of foster care itself.
One provocative study conducted in Minnesota looked
at three groups of children: 46 children who entered fos-
ter care primarily because of child maltreatment, 46 who
endured maltreatment but remained at home with the mal-
treating caregiver, and 97 who were not maltreated and not
put into foster care (Lawrence et al., 2006). All three groups
FIGURE 14.26 Corporal punishment and child abuse. Although
many cultures endorse some degree of physical punishment as part
of children were from poor families with young mothers. At
of child rearing, some researchers regard corporal punishment and the beginning of the study (and before any of the children
physical abuse as running along a continuum on which the appropri- were placed in foster care), all of the children were assessed
ate line can be difficult to draw. for attachment quality, self-control, and emotional health.

538 CHAPTER 14 BECOMING PART OF THE FAMILY

 40

35
2000
2009
30

25
Percent

20

15
FIGURE 14.28 Foster care families. Throughout the world, many
10 children spend part of their childhood growing up in foster care
families, which may consist solely of foster children or be a blend of
the foster parents’ biological children and foster children. Foster care
5 families vary greatly in terms of the kind of environment they provide,
and there is ongoing concern for those children being raised in sub-
0 standard foster care settings.
White/Non- Black/Non- Hispanic Other races/
Hispanic Hispanic Multiracial

FIGURE 14.27 Race and ethnicity of children in foster when placed in different foster homes (Linares et al., 2007).
care. The incidence of children in foster care in the United States Several additional, carefully designed studies will be needed
has increased over the past decade in all groups except African
to understand when it is better to place a child in foster care
Americans, who have shown a substantial decline. Adapted from
Child Welfare Information Gateway (2011).
rather than allowing him to stay in a problematic home.
Clearly, another central issue in this area of research is the
need to develop better ways of characterizing different kinds
At this point, both groups of maltreated children—those of foster care situations to understand which types will more
who would enter foster care and those who would remain often lead to developmental problems and how those situ-
at home—showed similarly high levels of many kinds of ations interact with the internal dynamics of the families
behavior problems compared with the control children. at risk.
After spending time in foster care, that group of chil-
dren showed more behavioral problems than the children
who remained with a maltreating parent. These problems
continued for many years after the children left foster care
and as they became young adults.
Conclusions
This study has its limitations, however, even with the An understanding of the child’s role in the family seems to
considerable methodological care taken by the researchers. invoke a different sort of approach from those used in earlier
For example, when maltreated children stayed in their par- chapters. Many different theoretical approaches can be used
ents’ homes rather than entering foster care, there was likely to examine the associations between behavioral and psycho-
something about their home life or their family relation- logical patterns in children and those in their parents and
ships that convinced social workers that they could safely siblings. The focus of these theories ranges from social learn-
stay in their homes—something that was not true of the ing effects, to behavioral genetic forces, to attachment-based
families whose children were placed in foster care. The dynamics, to environmental influences. As we have seen,
preplacement data showed comparable levels of problems in many cases, all of these factors are at work, making the
between the two groups of maltreated children, but these job of sorting out causes from mere correlations extraordi-
more subtle family differences may still have affected the narily complex. Given the numerous interacting influences
children’s development. that affect family dynamics, we cannot simply ask a ques-
As seen earlier in this chapter, the effects of foster care tion such as how much parents matter. Instead, we must ask
also interact with how siblings get along with each other, how parental influences interact with the child’s disposition,
such that low-conflict siblings should be kept together in the local environment, and the particular aspects of child
foster placements, but high-conflict siblings are better off development under investigation. The surrounding culture

CONCLUSIONS 539
can be critical as well. What constitutes harsh, unyielding The social policy implications of research on the fam-
parenting in one culture may be seen as a normal, caring ily are far too important to let larger patterns of cause and
style in another. effect go unexplained. We see once again how viewing
This complex web of interactions can be difficult to development as an active exploratory process is so impor-
disentangle, but the best work manages to conceptualize tant for understanding many aspects of the role of the
and empirically uncover stable, widely applicable patterns. child in the family. For example, the idea of child effects as
These patterns often take the form of interactions between explaining links between parenting and children’s behav-
types of parents, types of children, and types of behaviors. iors is closely linked to a perspective that sees the child as
For example, we saw that research on the effects of divorce an active, influential participant in the process of socializa-
points to a pattern of effects that interacts with the gender tion in the family (Grusec, 2011). It also fosters a view of
of both the parents and the children. That same pattern parents and children as frequently becoming intertwined
of effects is also influenced by the children’s age—both in interactive feedback loops, rather than seeing the child
when the divorce occurred and the age of the child when as a passive recipient of parental influences. We also see in
the potential effects of the divorce are studied. From this many ways how social, cognitive, and personality develop-
set of interactions, reliable patterns have emerged that can ment are interwoven in understanding many causal patterns
be used to make interventions more effective for children within the family. For example, gender roles are related to
struggling to cope with their parents’ separation. Simi- children’s beliefs about themselves and others, to interaction
larly, some studies suggest that teaching parenting skills patterns between parents and children, and to the particular
can have positive outcomes for children, although it is not personalities of all participants. Similarly, sibling conflicts
always easy to obtain long-term positive effects from such and jealousy within the family can only be understood by
interventions. Finally, research on foster care is starting considering cognitive capacities, social interactions, temper-
to help social workers and other professionals understand ament, and personality in all their interactive richness. As
when and why it is important to keep siblings together research models become better able to take all these causal
in foster family placements and when it is better to keep patterns into account, social policy decisions will be corre-
them apart. spondingly better informed.

STU DY AN D REVI EW

SUMMARY that parenting style causally influences the child’s personal-

ity and other factors. Although some studies have suggested
Parenting a causal role for parenting style, that conclusion must also be
● Parenting involves many different kinds of behaviors that tempered by other influential factors, such as child effects,
support a child’s development, including nurturance, dis- shared genotypes between parent and children, and the influ-
cipline, teaching, language use, providing toys and educa- ences of local environments and peers.
tional materials, monitoring children’s behavior, and time ● The influences of particular parenting styles seem to be
management. All of these behaviors vary, depending on the highly culturally specific. Children in different cultures may
family’s culture and socioeconomic status. interpret the same parental behaviors very differently, result-
● Parents in Western cultures show quite distinct parenting styles. ing in very different outcomes for the children.
Diana Baumrind and her successors described four styles— ● Interventions to improve parenting seem to help both par-
authoritarian, permissive, authoritative, and neglectful/ ents and children with their relationships when the programs
uninvolved. These styles differ in terms of the level of warmth are designed carefully and with sensitivity to the particular
and responsiveness that parents show to their children and in group of children at risk.
their level of demands or control. ● Parenting is not the only way to explain a child’s personality
● The authoritative style is more strongly correlated with positive and behavior. Children themselves produce effects in par-
outcomes in children, leading many to draw the conclusion ents and others, which set up feedback loops of interaction

540 CHAPTER 14 BECOMING PART OF THE FAMILY

 between parents and children. In addition, parents’ and chil- ● Children may be affected by family size and by living with
dren’s shared genetic bases for some behaviors may account single parents or working parents. But these effects are often
for some similarities in ways that go beyond the influence subtle and interact with factors such as a child’s socioeco-
of parenting practices. Parenting may be less important to nomic status.
understanding how a child’s personality takes shape than it ● Divorce does seem to increase the odds of problems for chil-
is in understanding the kinds of experiences to which a child dren, ranging from internalizing problems (such as depres-
has had access, such as sports teams, clubs, and shopping sion) to externalizing problems (such as increased aggression
venues. or sexual promiscuity).
● In the end, an interactionist view of parenting seems most ● When parents remarry and families become blended, other
useful as a way of understanding the variety of influences problems may emerge as well. Evolutionary theory predicts
that guide children in development. more problems between stepparents and their nonbiologi-
● Gender socialization is a complex process involving a web of cal offspring. There is some evidence in support of that
interacting influences. Parents tend to offer gender-stereotyped prediction.
toys and to engage boys in more physical activities and girls in
more conversational ones. Yet, children themselves also affect Child Abuse
this process, often showing strong gender-stereotyped toy ● Physical, psychological, and sexual abuse of children occurs
preferences before the age of 2. One facet of these early biases at alarming rates; recent data show that approximately 10 per
has been linked to hormone exposure before birth. For girls, 1,000 children were victims of some form of abuse in 2010,
a higher level of testosterone exposure in utero correlates with and most abused children are younger than 3. Abuse is more
preferences for more stereotypically male toys. Research into common among the poor, most likely because the stresses of
sibling effects on gender role qualities suggests that parents’ poverty increase the chances of child maltreatment.
influence is strongest on older siblings, who then propagate ● The effects of abuse on children vary considerably between
those roles to younger siblings. studies. One consistent pattern is that physical abuse and
psychological abuse seem to have different effects than
Siblings and Family Dynamics sexual abuse.
● Cycles of abuse, in which children of abusive parents go on to
● In families with more than one child, each child’s position
abuse their own children, may be caused by multiple factors.
in the family may have developmental effects. Firstborn chil-
These factors range from the children replicating parenting
dren appear to have richer and more stimulating environ-
practices, to the effects of adverse environments, to shared
ments. This may give them a slight edge in intelligence even
genotypes between parents and children that are correlated
when other factors are controlled. Other indications suggest
with abusive behavior phenotypes.
that later-born children may be more rebellious and willing ● Children are usually put into foster care when the situation
to challenge the status quo, although it is unclear whether
in their own biological family has high levels of abuse and
these effects are reliable and whether they apply only in spe-
when no other placements with relatives seem feasible. Foster
cific circumstances.
care arrangements vary widely, with some being associated
● Siblings can also affect one another more directly. Jealousy
with adverse consequences for children. This is especially
and conflict between siblings can take a toll on the whole
true when there is little long-term stability and sibling rela-
family, but when parents are trained to mediate these con-
tionships are not taken into account.
flicts, children often show a corresponding tendency to
resolve the conflicts constructively. Siblings who are close in
age may accelerate one another’s development of theory of
THOUGHT QUESTIONS
mind. There is less clear evidence that being an only child has
distinctive effects, despite popular claims of negative effects. 1. Should future parents be asked to get parenting licenses? In
most of the world, a teenager who wants to drive a car must
Changes in Families pass a test of driving proficiency before he or she is allowed
● Families are changing in many ways. On average, parents to drive. Some have argued that societies should also have
are having children at an older age and are having fewer “parenting” licenses wherein a prospective parent must take
children, and in many cases, both parents work full-time a course and pass a test to receive such a license, as the conse-
outside the home. Over the last few decades, a number of quences of being a poor parent are much worse than those of
changes in the family structure have also become more com- being a poor driver. Evaluate such a view in light of research
mon, including single-parent families, families with same- on parenting.
sex parents, and families in which parents have divorced 2. Foster home care has mixed results because the quality of
and perhaps remarried. These patterns vary dramatically, care varies so greatly and because some foster children have
both across cultures and across socioeconomic and ethnic no stable home. Sometimes foster children shift between
groups. more than a dozen homes as they grow up. Should local or

STUDY AND REVIEW 541

 state governments greatly increase the size of public facili- KEY TERMS
ties where children might spend their time growing up in
authoritarian parent (p. 507) gender schema (p. 515)
the same residence and surrounded by the same people?
3. Many states have required waiting periods for couples con- authoritative parent (p. 507) internalizing problem
templating divorce. Imagine that a state legislator proposes blended family (p. 535) (p. 533)
doubling the waiting period for couples with children under child effect (p. 511) nuclear family (p. 528)
the age of 21. Consider the pros and cons of such a proposal. confluence theory (p. 518) parenting style (p. 506)
4. How might the socialization of a young child be different cycle of abuse (p. 537) permissive parent
when that child grows up in a household in which both sets (p. 507)
ecological systems approach
of grandparents are living in the house as well as the parents? resource theory
(p. 510)
Consider how that child might have differing experiences (p. 518)
from a child who grows up in a household with no grandpar- extended family (p. 528)
externalizing problem sibling differentiation
ents present.
(p. 533) (p. 520)

542 CHAPTER 14 BECOMING PART OF THE FAMILY

 15
Becoming Part of the
Community
Levels of Affiliation Media Influences on Development Conclusions
• The Changing Nature of Social • Television
Interactions Summary
• Video Games, Computers, and the
• Developing Relationships Internet
• Social Groups
Roles in the Larger Culture
• Developmental Patterns in Levels of
Affiliation • Distinctive Cultural and Subcultural
Roles
• Social Network Effects
• Gender Roles and Stereotyping
 n December 7, 1941, the day Japan launched relationship. Expanding further, we can look at larger peer

O a surprise attack on Hawaii’s Pearl Harbor,

11-year-old Rahn Taoka watched as her Japa-
nese father was arrested in their San Francisco
home. He was one of the first Japanese citizens
arrested by the U.S. government because it was feared they
were spies. The government would soon initiate a nationwide
program to round up and incarcerate over 100,000 Japanese
groups to see how social status relationships work at the
level of a clique, a classroom, or a school. Finally, we can
consider the broadest cultural communities and their influ-
ences on children through the media, especially television,
video games, and the Internet.
In Chapter 14, we introduced Bronfrenbrenner’s ecologi-
cal systems approach to development as a way of understand-
Americans and Japanese nationals in the “war hysteria.” ing the different social contexts that affect the family. The
Rahn, her sister, and their English mother avoided incar- ecological approach stresses the importance of the environ-
ceration, but they had to agree to move to a small town ments in which a child develops and the need to consider
in northern Minnesota where they would stay with their these environments at several scales, ranging from the fam-
father’s European-American business partner. Though ily itself, to groups of friends, to the school, to the larger
Rahn was initially apprehensive, her life in this small town culture. We saw how researchers consider the child’s role in
suddenly brightened when she met Marilou. The girls were each of these “social ecosystems” and how that role inter-
inseparable and spent endless hours together both in school acts with the roles of all other players in those systems. In
and out. This friendship transformed Rahn’s frightening, this chapter, we will see how this approach can be extended
strange experience in which she was surrounded by many beyond the family and consider the kinds of social niches
suspicious peers into a year and a half that she later remem- that children occupy in an ever-widening web of social
bered as one of the happiest times of her life. relationships and communities. Socialization processes can
When her father was released to Japan in a prisoner occur at each level of grouping, often with quite different
exchange, Rahn and the rest of the family went with him, patterns of influence, depending on how the child’s disposi-
even though his wife and daughters did not speak a word tion interacts with her specific niche.
of Japanese. They suffered severe hardships in Japan in the This chapter focuses on these influences of broader
waning days of the war. The daughters were treated as social groups beyond the family. We will start with the group clos-
outcasts by their peers and struggled to adapt to their new est to the family, the friends in the immediate community,
cultural community. After many years, they finally man- and then expand the circle to eventually consider media
aged to move back to the San Francisco Bay Area in 1955. influences and differences across cultures. Finally, we will
Finally, 64 years after they had last seen each other, Rahn consider how gender and other sociocultural roles emerge
and Marilou were reunited through the efforts of their chil- in these contexts.
dren. Within minutes, they were interacting as if they had
never been separated. As Rahn reflected, “Don’t you find
that with any true friend, you can be apart for years and pick
up where you left off?” (Lagos, 2007).
What is it about childhood friendships that can make a
Levels of Affiliation
seemingly impossible situation into one of the best periods Developmental psychologists have been interested in the
of one’s life? How do such friendships help protect children influences of peers since the earliest days of psychology
when their status in a peer group is of poor quality or when (Renshaw, 1981), but research in this area gained signifi-
they are making a difficult transition? Some have argued cant momentum following two striking findings about the
that a special kind of “best friend” relationship in early ado- effects of peers on attachment. As described in Chapter 6,
lescence is an essential part of healthy development. How both Freud and Dann’s (1951) studies of groups of children
might friendships benefit a child, and does having a best who relied on one another for support in concentration
friend offer unique benefits? How do friendships change camps and after their liberation and Harlow’s studies of
from early childhood through middle childhood and ado- peer-raised monkeys (Meyer et al., 1975; Suomi & Harlow,
lescence? Finally, how do girls’ friendships and other social 1972) showed that peers could alleviate some of the conse-
relationships differ from those between boys? quences of otherwise dreadful social environments. More
Friendships are part of a larger complex of environments recently, the field of evolutionary psychology has stressed
outside the home that influence children’s development. We that peer relations might be an especially powerful realm of
can think of the moderate effects of occasional interactions social influence.
with others as well as the more pronounced effects of sus- The power of peers never ceases to amaze parents. At
tained relationships, either with friends, enemies, or even certain points in development, it certainly seems that peers
with bullies. One other especially influential sustained rela- are more important to children (and especially to adoles-
tionship that emerges in adolescence can be the romantic cents) and more influential than almost anyone else. Some

544 CHAPTER 15 BECOMING PART OF THE COMMUNITY

researchers have suggested that, in general, peers are far
more influential than parents (Harris, 1998), but most
researchers see peers and parents as operating in different
spheres of influence. Peers seem especially influential on
such things as personal taste, clothing, and hairstyles, while
parents hold more sway over such things as career choices
and broad social values (Smetana et al., 2006).
To gain a better sense of peer influences, we need to first
think about the different ways in which peers might inter-
act. These interactions can be categorized into three distinct
levels of affiliation, which apply to other animals as well as
to humans: interactions, relationships, and groups (Hinde,
1987, 1997; Rubin et al., 1998). Interactions can be proso-
cial if they facilitate social engagement, antisocial if they
FIGURE 15.1 Early social interactions. Although infants are
discourage social engagement, or withdrawn as in cases of
aware of other social beings, such as other infants, their patterns
shyness. Relationships consist of a progression of interactions of interactions may be largely limited to contagion of the emotional
over time. Particular relationships then become associated states of others.
with predominant emotions, such as love or hate, and dif-
ferent degrees of commitment. Finally, groups arise from
sets of relationships, and they can be evaluated in terms of uine instances of sharing and have some sense of reciprocity,
their cohesiveness, dominance relations, diversity, and local or cooperative exchange. They play pretend games with
norms. In this system, relationships build on interactions others, often playacting imagined episodes with each other.
in much the same way that groups build on relationships Their levels of conflict decrease somewhat with age, and more
(Rubin et al., 1998). The developmental study of peer rela- notably, the kinds of conflicts they experience show develop-
tions involves all levels, but most often focuses on groups. mental changes. In one study, 400 children at ages 2, 3, and
4 years were videotaped as they engaged in routine activi-
ties in their preschool classrooms. The experimenters later
Q: What are three different levels of affiliation scored the first conflict episode that occurred during a set
observation period (Chen et al., 2001). In most cases, at
between peers? least one conflict occurred, with several typically occurring
at all ages.
What changed with age, however, were several key fac-
tors relating to what triggered the conflicts and how they
were resolved. The 2-year-olds had more conflicts about
The Changing Nature of the distribution of physical resources, such as vying for a
Social Interactions coveted toy (see Figure 15.2). The 3- and 4-year-olds had
more conflicts around ideas, such as which superhero is
Infants’ and toddlers’ interactions are very simple and not stronger, or around play, such as who gets to be “it” in tag.
so different from those seen in other animals. They often In addition, the younger children showed less willing-
experience joint arousal (see Figure 15.1). When one child ness to back down and higher levels of insistence, often
is excited and happy, that state can induce a comparable prolonging the conflict until an adult intervened, while
feeling in another child, which can then cause a positive- the older children were better able to resolve conflicts on
feedback loop of increasing arousal. Moreover, sadness their own. Dealing with conflict seems to be an essential
and despair in one child can also cause a drop in arousal part of social development from an early age, and children
in the other child, as very young children apparently feel have much to learn to understand what is a reasonable
empathy. As seen in Chapter 6, infants and young tod- conflict and how to resolve disputes (Chen et al., 2001;
dlers are exquisitely sensitive to social agents and the tim- Rubin et al., 2003).
ing of back-and-forth social interactions, such as smiles
between mother and child. That sensitivity is only the
beginning of an ability to manage smooth, reciprocal
interactions with peers. Q: How does the nature of conflict interactions
Preschoolers show considerably richer and more varied rep- tend to change during the preschool years?
ertoires in their interactions than do infants. They show gen-

LEVELS OF AFFILIATION 545

 As children enter adolescence, their interactions seem to
change yet again. Peer interactions come to predominate
over interactions with parents or teachers. Finally, in many
cultures, cross-sex interactions emerge as a critical part of
most adolescents’ social lives. Teenage dating is for many
parents one of the most salient and nerve-wracking behav-
iors of children in this age group.

Developing Relationships
All relationships serve essential functions for the developing
child. They serve to transfer information between individu-
als and help set up stable, enduring patterns of interaction,
FIGURE 15.2 Negative interactions. When 2-year-olds get into
whether those interactions are between friends and mentors,
fights, they most often fight about toys. When older preschoolers
fight, the conflicts are more often around ideas, such as which super-
or bullies and enemies. Relationships can allow individuals
hero is stronger, or around games, such as who gets to go first. to provide mutual support for each other—both social and
physical support. In other, more harmful relationships, there
may be patterns of dependency and control between individ-
In the elementary school years, children experience a uals. All kinds of relationships, however, can serve to create
huge surge in social interactions. The networks beyond stable social links, and structured sets of links that are larger
the family, arising from sports teams, the school, and the than individuals.
neighborhood, for example, enable children’s social lives to
flourish. Peer group sizes increase throughout this period, Friends With respect to the earliest relationships,
going from groups of two or three early on to social circles infants show unique, repeated interaction patterns with
of a dozen or more. During this period, children require certain individuals, such as with a parent or a sibling, but
less and less adult supervision and can sometimes be found these interactions are not true friendships. Friendships
playing in the neighborhood or on school grounds for hours are ongoing, positive reciprocal relationships with cho-
with little or no adult oversight. During this period, most sen companions. As described in Chapter 6, infants have
children also shift markedly toward interacting with peers of particular expectations of certain specific interactional
their own sex. Suddenly, sometimes seemingly inexplicably, partners, but these interactions largely lack the reciprocal
girls and boys who have played together for years sort them- exchanges (for example, sharing toys or projects) that are
selves into same-sex groups and engage in predominately essential to friendships. In addition, these relationships
single-sex interactions (Fabes et al., 2003; Martin & Fabes, develop largely as a matter of convenience, depending on
2001; Strough & Covatto, 2002). According to the psycho- who is accessible, and less because of a desire to be with
analytic approach to development, this takes place during a specific peer. Some infants are naturally more friendly
what is referred to as the latency period of middle to late and outgoing than others and seem to enjoy being around
childhood, when sexuality is said to be largely dormant and others as opposed to being on their own, but they still
does not overtly influence interactions. During this period, do not seem to build structured social connections with
children also show a decline in pretend play and become others.
more likely to use verbal or physical aggression in conflicts, Toddlers, on the other hand, develop clear friendships
sometimes with great cruelty. In a similar vein, gossip (Howes, 1996; Newcomb & Bagwell, 1995), which seem
about others also increases (Crick et al., 2001; Crozier & to consist mostly of animated, positive interactions while
Dimmock, 1999). playing (Gifford-Smith & Brownell, 2003). Toddlers
purposefully choose their friends, usually picking the
children most like themselves. They begin to show more
prosocial behaviors—for example, sharing and empa-
Q: How do patterns of play between the sexes thy—with friends during this period, but they also begin
change during early and later childhood, and showing more hostility than before with both friends and
what classic construct in psychology has been enemies.
used to explain these changes? School-age children develop more sophisticated notions
of friendship. For example, they gain a clearer idea of reci-

546 CHAPTER 15 BECOMING PART OF THE COMMUNITY

procity, understanding that friends do not just get benefits
from each other; they also provide benefits (Hartup, 1999;
Selman, 1980, 2003). As their theory of mind skills improve,
children start to use their increasing social cognitive capaci-
ties to make more elaborate inferences about their friends’
mental states and to adjust their behaviors accordingly. In
short, they become increasingly adept at putting themselves
in their friends’ shoes (Rubin et al., 1998). Unfortunately,
school-age children also develop some less positive relation-
ship styles, such as bullying and verbal aggression.
Gender differences in friendships become more dra-
matic with increasing age. By the time they enter elemen-
tary school, boys tend to play in larger groups than girls
and are more likely to have clear dominance hierarchies
FIGURE 15.3 Chums. Harry Stack Sullivan proposed that in late
within those groups. Girls tend to show more prosocial
childhood, a special form of close friendship forms in which there is
behavior and empathy in relationships, while boys show a favored best friend. Sullivan called these best friends “chums.”
more rough-and-tumble play and focus on goals, such as
achieving dominance (Hartup, 1996; Rose & Rudolph,
2006). Late school-age children and young adolescents
show clear differences in the fragility of friendships. tion implicitly suggests that their friend values them less;
Girls tend to have fewer long-lasting very close friend- older children and young adolescents are generally better
ships than boys and to be more distressed at the thought at making these social comparisons. (2) Older adolescents
of losing their friends (Benenson & Christakos, 2003; may be better able to understand objectively that they can-
MacEvoy & Asher, 2012). One possible reason for this not meet all of their friend’s needs and that other friends
gender difference in the length of close friendships may can meet different needs without posing a threat to their
be that girls have more intimate relationships that result own relationship (Selman, 1980; Selman & Schultz, 1990).
in more intense reactions during conflicts, reactions that The increase in friendship jealousy in early adolescence
can cause irrevocable breaks. Greater intimacy may also may also be related to a proposal made many years ago that
provide girls with more ability to hurt each other dur- a pattern of chumships emerges in late childhood in which
ing a conflict, as they may divulge private information many children have one favored best friend (Sullivan, 1953;
that was shared in confidence. Finally, because girls tend see Figure 15.3). As a former best friend’s favored status
to have relationships in the absence of groups, they may wanes in early adolescence, jealousy may be more common.
not have the benefits of a group to buffer conflict (Rose
& Rudolph, 2006). During this period, girls and boys
tend to act out against friends in different ways. Girls Q: What are some of the ways boys’ and girls’
tend to victimize their friends in social ways, such as patterns of friendship differ?
conspicuously excluding them from an activity, a form of
antagonism known as relational aggression (Benenson
et al., 2011). In contrast, boys more often victimize friends As adolescence proceeds, friendships become closer and
physically (Crick & Nelson, 2002). more intimate, and friends form deeper loyalties (Rubin
School-age children also tend to try to control their et al., 1998). Adolescents develop more specific standards
friends’ other friends and can become jealous when a close about how they expect their friends to behave, com-
friend develops new, close friendships with others. Although ing to expect loyalty, support, and discretion (Furman &
this pattern can exist in older children and adults (Heider, Buhrmester, 1992; Johnson, 2003). More generally, they
1958), it is more common in younger adolescents (Parker see friendships as entailing high levels of self-disclosure to
et al., 2005; Selman, 1980). In early adolescence, jealousy each other, with corresponding confidentiality. The rise in
over friends is also more common among girls than among online communication methods and cell phone texting has
boys (Parker et al., 2005). Friendship jealousy seems to provided adolescents with dramatic new ways to commu-
peak in late childhood or early adolescence, which has been nicate confidential information and make self-disclosures
explained in two main ways: (1) Younger children may be to close friends, even when those friends are not physically
less sophisticated at engaging in social comparisons, and so present. Shy adolescents may be especially prone to using
they may not consider whether a friend’s new close connec- these new methods (Reid & Reid, 2007; Subrahmanyam &

LEVELS OF AFFILIATION 547

Greenfield, 2008; Underwood et al., 2012). The develop- friendships consist largely of supportive prosocial behav-
mental changes in self-disclosure are often thought to reflect iors, while others involve strong components of envy,
increasingly sophisticated social cognitive skills that enable rivalry, and bursts of conflict. Those negative interactions
friends to share more information and build stronger trust can, in some cases, outweigh the positive interactions
with each other (Gifford-Smith & Brownell, 2003; Rubin (Berndt, 1996, 2002; Salvas et al., 2011).
et al., 1998). For the most part, however, friendships are a critical,
Friendships can provide several advantages to children. positive aspect of development. They help provide a sense
They can foster social skills, such as the ability to sense of worth and a set of social skills that can serve as a buffer
and empathize with the thoughts and feelings of others. against a variety of negative experiences. The specific ben-
Being someone else’s preferred companion may also reaf- efits of friendship change with age, but its positive effects
firm a child’s sense of self-worth. Friendships can help persist throughout development, while its few negative
motivate children to acquire new skills, such as a sport or aspects pale by comparison.
hobby, and they can help instill in children a sense of their
culture’s norms (Bukowski, 2001). And it has been repeat- Imaginary Companions Children may develop relationships
edly suggested that friendships can buffer children from with imaginary companions—that is, fantasized characters
life’s stresses, whether those stresses arise from moving to a that they make up or objects that they treat as if they were alive.
new school or neighborhood or from a family crisis such as Having an imaginary companion is neither unusual nor a sign
divorce (Gifford-Smith & Brownell, 2003; Hartup, 1996; of distress in a child. Although popular media have sometimes
Hartup & Stevens, 1999). portrayed children with imaginary companions as deviant or
As is often the case, however, causality can be difficult to mentally ill, in fact, there are no indications that having imagi-
pin down in studies of friendship effects. Although it cer- nary companions is correlated with any sorts of childhood prob-
tainly seems plausible that friendships directly alleviate the lems. It might seem, for example, that children with imaginary
effects of some kinds of stressors, another possibility is that companions are especially lonely or shy, but neither of those
children who have more difficulty forming friendships are conjectures appears to be true (Taylor, 1999). Rather, imaginary
also more reactive to stressors. It is obviously unethical to companions are a sign of a vivid imagination. And for many
do an experiment in which children are randomly assigned years, it has been known that a vivid imagination in a young
to have friends or to be deprived of them and then subjected child is associated with positive outcomes, such as higher levels
to the same kind of stress. Sometimes, however, situations of creativity (Singer, 1961).
can approximate these conditions, providing more compel- Imaginary companions are quite common, even in children
ling evidence of whether friendships can truly protect chil- in the elementary and middle school years. In one survey of
dren from the effects of stress. For example, if two groups 1,795 British children between 5 and 12 years of age, 46 per-
of families with children have to relocate to new, faraway cent of the children reported having had an imaginary com-
communities, and they are randomly assigned either to panion, with a somewhat greater incidence (52 percent versus
neighborhoods with no children or to neighborhoods with 48 percent) among girls than boys (Pearson et al., 2001). When
many children, the case for causal effects of friendship can children of all ages are considered, some estimates suggest that
be more carefully explored. 65 percent of children have had an imaginary companion at
Friendships can also have detrimental effects on chil- some point (Taylor, 1999; Taylor et al., 2001; see Figure 15.4).
dren, although the positive effects generally far outweigh Imaginary companions may enable many young children
the negative effects. We have seen that friendships can to try out their developing ability to have social relations
lead to feelings of jealousy and even aggression toward outside of the family. One reason that researchers talk about
those who threaten a relationship. In addition, especially imaginary “companions” as opposed to just imaginary
among girls, friendships can sometimes foster a tendency “friends” is that imaginary companions can fill very different
toward co-rumination, a type of interaction in which social roles for children. In addition to being playmates,
friends tend to repeatedly discuss and mull over negative they may be older mentors, babies to care for, or animals,
events and emotions in ways that may exacerbate a prob- among others. In many cases, they may be invisible; in other
lem or increase anxiety, despair, and depression (Rose, cases, they may be partially embodied in a doll or stuffed
2002; Rose et al., 2007; Schwartz-Mette & Rose, 2012). animal (Taylor et al., 2001). This rich variety of social roles
Friendships can also sometimes foster undesirable behav- can be useful to children as they experiment with different
iors. If, for example, a child has some aggressive tenden- forms of relationships. Imaginary companions can therefore
cies, there is evidence that associating with friends who provide the child with an opportunity to safely enter a world
share these tendencies will increase the child’s own incli- with a wide range of social possibilities, in which the child
nations toward aggression (Dishion et al., 1995). Finally, can try out many forms of social interactions different from
the quality of friendships can vary dramatically. Some those she typically experiences.

548 CHAPTER 15 BECOMING PART OF THE COMMUNITY

 60
Current imaginary
companion
50
Imaginary companion

imaginary companions
in the past

Percent of reported
40

30

20

10

0
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Age (in years)
A B
FIGURE 15.4 Imaginary companions. (A) Imaginary companions are quite common, not only in elementary school but even in middle
school. When the entire span of childhood is taken into account, the majority of children report having had an imaginary companion sometime
during that period. (B) The graph shows how the incidence of having an imaginary companion changes with age. In this study, over 50 percent
of children at certain ages reported either having an imaginary companion or having had an imaginary companion. Older children either forgot
having had an imaginary companion earlier or chose not to disclose that fact. Adapted from Pearson et al. (2001).

Imaginary companions also serve several other purposes referential communication skills—that is, the ability to
for children. They may allow the child to act out various direct others’ attention to objects or tasks (Roby & Kidd,
social scenarios in a nonthreatening manner, they may alle- 2008). Thus, children with imaginary companions tend to
viate loneliness or boredom that occasionally afflicts virtu- show more advanced communication skills in experimen-
ally all children, and they may allow children to deal with tal tasks in which they have to communicate to someone
frightening situations or work out problems. In almost all behind a screen how to identify the correct picture from a
cases, however, children do realize that their imaginary set. (They are not better at understanding instructions in
companions are not real (Taylor, 1999). They may attri- these tasks, just at giving them.)
bute to their imaginary companion a personality, as well as Why do imaginary companions disappear as the child
beliefs, desires, and other emotions, but they do all of this grows older? One likely reason is that, as the child experi-
with full knowledge that their imaginary companion is not ences a wider range of real relationships, the imaginary ones
really “there” in the sense that other people are. become less necessary. Many cultures also stigmatize adults
Children with imaginary companions tend to have with imaginary companions, and children may choose to
somewhat higher levels of some cognitive and social skills. censor their own imaginations as they become aware of this
They tend to be less shy and are more able to consider situ- stigma. It is interesting to note that imaginary compan-
ations from another’s point of view, a valuable skill in many ions become much more acceptable for adults when they
social situations (Taylor, 1999; Taylor et al., 2004). Some- are in extreme isolation. Consider, for example, the main
times, the imaginary companion can be a vehicle for a character in the 2000 film Cast Away, who is marooned on
child to tell his parent about a problem he is encountering. a desert island and develops an imaginary friendship with
For example, a child might tell a parent that his imaginary a volleyball. The ball acquires a distinct character that is
companion is being picked on at school as a way of relating deeply missed when it is lost at sea. It is easy to empathize
his own experience. (This practice is not so different from with the need for a companion in times of isolation, suggest-
the adult technique of broaching an awkward topic by say- ing that, even as adults, we retain vestiges of the cognitive
ing, “I have a friend who [has the following problem].”) and emotional roots that give rise to children’s imaginary
An imaginary companion also enables a relatively helpless companions.
child to feel more powerful or competent as he acts out
roles with his companion that might not yet be feasible in Bully-Victim Relationships Some relationships have
daily life. More generally, imaginary companions increase decidedly negative consequences for one or both of the indi-
social skills and social understanding (Taylor et al., 2004) viduals involved. One especially vivid and much-studied
and provide a better sense of self-knowledge (Davis et al., case involves relations between bullies and victims of bully-
2011). They also have been shown to increase children’s ing. Bullying, which is also known as peer victimization,

LEVELS OF AFFILIATION 549

generally consists of making verbal or physical threats or do not have popular or powerful friends, apparently reinforc-
attacks against a victim. This form of aggression is repeated ing the sense that aggression against them will not provoke a
and sustained over time and is typically directed against a response from anyone who could pose a threat. In addition,
victim who is unable to defend himself (Espelage & Swearer, victims often tend to interpret provocative behaviors, such
2003; Olweus, 1993). Most of the time, it occurs when oth- as teasing, as more aggressive than they actually are, thus
ers are watching. These characteristic bullying patterns of indicating to bullies that they are liable to respond with fear
intimidation and aggression are extremely common and and psychological pain (Sullivan, 2000).
consistent across cultures (Olweus, 1993; Pepler & Craig, In other respects, however, victims can be quite a diverse
1999). group. While some are timid, withdrawn, and nonaggres-
Bullying is widely recognized as one of the major prob- sive, others are extroverted and even aggressive (Olweus,
lems in schools (Sharp & Smith, 1994). Victims of bullying 1997; Sullivan, 2000). If the extroverted, aggressive child is
often find it extremely painful, and when it occurs at school nonetheless seen as weak and unable to retaliate effectively
it can contribute significantly to not wanting to attend against violence, that child may still be victimized. Victims
school or to a very negative attitude toward school. Bul- also tend to show high levels of anxiety around bullies,
lied children are often unhappy, depressed, and lonely. As which seems to fuel the bully’s aggression. In a sense, this
always, the direction of causality can be difficult to ascer- picture of victims leaves room for optimism for reducing
tain. Depressed, unhappy, and lonely children may be more bullying, because victims’ behaviors, which are potentially
prone to being bullied, but many think that being bullied changeable, seem to be more important triggers of bullying
contributes to these states. One chilling recent finding was than more permanent physical traits.
that 60 percent of 41 children who engaged in shooting Bullies also have a number of distinguishing characteris-
sprees in schools were reported by neighbors, friends, and tics. Bullies are not generally individuals of low self-esteem
teachers as having been victims of bullying (Vossekuil et al., who are compensating for their feelings of inferiority by dom-
2002). This is far higher than the typical rate of roughly inating others. Although this is a popular way of character-
10 percent of children having been bullied (Kumpulainen izing bullies, there is little evidence to support it (Batsche &
et al., 1999). Knoff, 1994; Baumeister et al., 1996; Olweus, 1993). In fact,
Do bullies and victims have characteristics that make it inflated self-esteem may facilitate and empower bullies. Bul-
possible to predict who will bully and who will be victimized? lies often have siblings who engage in bullying or even par-
In each case, some common tendencies have been repeatedly ents who sometimes bully others. These correlations could
reported. The most central characteristic of victims seems result both from children modeling the behaviors of these
to be conveying the impression that they will not answer family members and from their shared, genetically rooted
aggression with retaliation (see Figure 15.5). The victim may dispositions. Bullies usually do not choose their victims out
be physically smaller or weaker, but in some cases, behav- of reactive aggression, which would involve retaliating for
ioral clues can indicate a victim’s docility or submissiveness, an offense the victim committed against them. Instead, they
even if the individual is physically quite large. In short, what tend to act out of proactive aggression, abusing the victim
seems to matter most is that the victim appears to be a safe because it helps them achieve a goal, perhaps taking some-
target to aggress against (Olweus, 1997). Victims frequently thing the victim owns or simply making the victim miser-
able (Dodge, 1991).

Q: Describe three distinct forms of aggression

shown by children, and characterize how they
might vary across the sexes and across bullies
and nonbullies.

Bullying tends to be most prevalent early in adolescence,

during middle school, and tends to decline in high school
(Pellegrini & Long, 2002). The reasons for this decline are
unclear, but one factor may be peers’ increasing intolerance
of bullying and the social ostracism of those seen as aggres-
FIGURE 15.5 Bullying. The effects of bullying can be highly nega- sors. Bullies seem to be angrier than other children, hav-
tive in the long run for both victims and bullies. ing higher sustained levels of anger and being more prone

550 CHAPTER 15 BECOMING PART OF THE COMMUNITY

to temper flare-ups (Espelage & Swearer, 2003). They are which to engage in interventions. The group contributions
also more likely to have criminal convictions later in life to such effects will be more apparent when we consider the
(Olweus, 2011). One popular view of bullies is that they group level of affiliation.
have certain deficits in processing social information that
lead them to make incorrect attributions about others Enemies Some negative relationships go in both direc-
(Crick & Dodge, 1994). Specifically, they are thought to tions, which is the case when two children become enemies,
have deficient theories of mind that lead them to make either after a friendship ends or in a relationship that is neg-
more hostile attributions about the actions of others than ative from the start. The pattern of mutual antipathies,
are warranted. This view, however, does not fit those cases in which two children intensely dislike each other, can
in which a bully has a precise awareness of the victim’s men- occur between bullies and victims (Card & Hodges, 2007),
tal state and uses it to maximally humiliate or antagonize but it can also occur between two children who are each
the victim (Sutton et al., 1999a, 1999b). aggressive and dominant (Abecassis, 2003; Abecassis et al.,
There are three main types of interventions to curb bul- 2001). In contrast to bully-victim relationships, inimical
lying: (1) regulating the bully’s behavior through external relationships are more symmetrical, in that the children
means, such as punishment; (2) having the bully regulate are equally hostile and aggressive toward each other and
his own behavior internally; and (3) changing the victim’s consider each to be the other’s enemy (Card, 2007). Interest-
behavior. It is quite clear that external regulation of bullies ingly, preschoolers very rarely have enemies, with incidences
works. If teachers or other adults closely monitor bullying usually under 2 percent (Abecassis, 2003; Card & Hodges,
and punish it, it will decrease (Ttofi & Farrington, 2011). It 2007). Starting in elementary school, however, far more
is also possible to improve a bully’s empathy and make him children have enemies—well over 30 percent according to
feel more uncomfortable mistreating others (Olweus, 1993, one study (Abecassis et al., 2001). And in later childhood,
1994). One way to increase empathy might be to get a bully there is a marked increase in enemy relationships (Berger
to imagine the situation from the victim’s viewpoint or to et al., 2011; Hodges & Card, 2003). These relationships
think through the consequences of bullying (Caravita et al., often cause both parties to avoid each other, but in some
2009; Cirillo et al., 1998)—but these internal changes are cases they are both drawn into a cycle of mutual aggression
less effective than external ones. They do not bring about as and retaliation in which revenge becomes a kind of social
much of an immediate cessation of bullying. Some research- bond. Having enemies is stressful, and children with ene-
ers suggest that bullies do not have a general problem feeling mies can show many of the same symptoms as victims of
empathy; they just do not feel it when they initially engage in bullying (Abecassis, 2003; Abecassis et al., 2001; Card &
bullying in a particular instance (Espelage & Swearer, 2003). Hodges, 2007).
Overall, despite many studies of interventions designed to Aggression between enemies usually takes one of two
reduce bullying by increasing the aggressors’ social skills, forms. Boys, especially at early ages, engage in more physi-
such as their empathy and perspective-taking, these pro- cal aggression, while girls tend to show more relational
grams have been, at best, only modestly effective (Vreeman & aggression (see Figure 15.6). This latter type of hostility
Carroll, 2007). involves efforts to damage an individual’s social relation-
Less research has focused on techniques for changing the ships through rumors, gossip, and ridicule, potentially caus-
victim’s behavior, which is unfortunate, since this behavior ing the person to be excluded from a desired peer group
can easily make the individual vulnerable in new situations. (Crick & Nelson, 2002). Some researchers have found gen-
Training in assertiveness and self-confidence sometimes der differences in physical aggression but equal incidences of
helps victims (Sharp, 1996), but it is challenging to con- relational aggression among girls and boys (Espelage et al.,
vince anxious, fearful children to stand up for themselves in 2003). Antipathy also often seems to arise between members
a manner bullies will find convincing. This is an important of groups representing different interests and backgrounds,
area of future research, as the child who gives off certain sig- such as between students who receive very high grades and
nals, such as high social anxiety, will be detected by bullies those who are more focused on sports. There certainly can
in many situations, and adults will not always be around to be mutually aggressive relationships between members of
punish tormentors at the mall, at summer camp, or at the the same group, but more often it may be that “opposites
movie theater. detract” (Laursen et al., 2010).
Research on bullying illustrates how dynamic interaction In short, mutually aggressive relationships are stress-
patterns can become self-perpetuating and more intense ful and related to a wide range of negative developmental
over time. It also illustrates the challenge of intervening, outcomes in terms of children’s social adjustment, depres-
given the interconnected set of factors that contribute to and sion, and more general acting out and misbehavior. Again,
sustain bullying. A clear goal of future research is to iden- however, the direction of causality is unclear. Perhaps the
tify the most effective points in such interactive patterns in same personality factors that make a child more prone to

LEVELS OF AFFILIATION 551

 relationships and men more equally distributing themselves
among the categories of bisexual, homosexual, and hetero-
sexual relationships. Individuals who are involved primarily
in homosexual or bisexual romantic patterns unfortunately
often suffer from stigma, prejudice, and discrimination
from others who disapprove of same-sex relationships. It
is particularly tragic that the more stigma and prejudice a
same-sex couple experiences, the more likely it is that their
own relationship quality will be negatively affected. Fortu-
nately, at least some same-sex couples are able to shield, and
sometimes even strengthen, their relationships in the face of
such prejudice. Researchers are trying to better understand
the strategies that more successful couples use to respond to
stigma and prejudice (Frost, 2011).
FIGURE 15.6 Relational aggression. Relational aggression
Compared with other kinds of relationships with peers,
can cause great discomfort in others through gossip or rumor,
with effects that can be just as devastating as those from physical adolescent romantic relationships tend to have more conflicts.
aggression. This may seem surprising, given that those relationships are
more intimate, but they are also more intense and are typically
of relatively short duration (about 18 months or less), with
mutually aggressive relationships also lead to other social the breakups often laced with conflict. Sexual relationships
difficulties. are seen by girls as more appropriately occurring in romantic
relationships than in more casual relationships, a perception
Dating and Romantic Relationships As children enter that is not as strong among boys (Collins et al., 2009). As seen
adolescence, a new form of relationship becomes more and from the perspective of evolutionary psychology, this differ-
more common: romantic relationships between pairs of indi- ence in perception follows from the argument that men seek
viduals. We will define romantic relationships as mutu- diverse mates to maximize procreation, whereas women seek
ally recognized voluntary interactions that are seen as more mates who will show longer-term loyalty during pregnancy
intense than other relationships. These relationships are also and child rearing (Buss & Shackelford, 2008).
distinguished by displays of affection, either with actual sex- What factors predict which pairs of individuals tend to
ual behavior or with the anticipation of such behavior occur- form romantic relationships? With heterosexual adolescent
ring (Collins et al., 2009). As seen in Figure 15.7, the rate of couples, males tend to choose same-age partners where
romantic relationships doubles from age 13 to age 17, from possible and females often choose somewhat older males.
an incidence of 36 percent in 13-year-olds to 54 percent in Despite some claims that opposites attract, adolescents gen-
15-year-olds to 70 percent in 17-year-olds (Collins et al., 2009). erally choose partners who are similar to themselves in level
It was commonly thought that such a rise was closely linked to of physical attractiveness, popularity, and even mood—for
the maturation of sexual gonads and sex-related hormones example, a depressive orientation (Collins et al., 2009).
such as testosterone and estrogen, but closer analysis tends
to show that the rise is more closely related to age norms
80
for dating in various cultures (Carver et al., 2003; Collins
Percent involved in “special”

et al., 2009; Dornbusch et al., 1981). Similar age-related 70

romantic relationships

norms seem to be found in both different-sex and same- 60

sex relationships, with somewhat later rates of incidence for 50
same-sex relationships, perhaps because such relationships
40
are not endorsed by many cultures (Floyd & Stein, 2002).
In adolescence, girls are somewhat more likely to have both 30

boys and girls as partners or as potential partners than do 20

boys (Collins et al., 2009). 10
Sexual orientation tends to remain quite stable across
0
adolescence and young adulthood among those who ini- 13 15 17
tially identify themselves as primarily preferring different- Age (in years)
sex or same-sex partners (Savin-Williams et al., 2012). Those FIGURE 15.7 Rise in romantic relationships among teenagers.
who identify themselves as bisexual tend to show more The incidence of romantic relationships reported as “special” doubles
change, with women showing a shift to mostly heterosexual between ages 13 and 17. Adapted from Collins et al. (2009).

552 CHAPTER 15 BECOMING PART OF THE COMMUNITY

 Developmentally, romantic relationships have often been those groups they tend to compete, engage in more physi-
described as shifting in their nature over the course of adoles- cal roughhouse play, and show concerns about dominance
cence. Older adolescents tend to see their significant others as relations (Maccoby, 1998; Parker et al., 2006).
more supportive, close, and interdependent. The shift seems Dominance hierarchies start to appear between group
to be most dramatic between ages 15 and 17 years (Collins, members, and these networks of social status relationships
2003). During that period, the rate of dating goes up from resemble those of many other species (see Chapter 13). These
roughly 25 percent to 75 percent. The length of relationships hierarchies can reduce aggression within groups, as subor-
also increases, with those younger than 15 rarely having rela- dinate members tend to reserve aggression for those of even
tionships lasting more than 11 months and the majority of lower status, and dominant members only rarely have to
those older than 17 having relationships that last longer than show aggression to assert their higher position (Sluckin &
11 months. Younger adolescents tend to choose partners for Smith, 1977). One interesting aspect of preschoolers’ domi-
reasons that are often superficial, including clothing style nance hierarchies is that even though such hierarchies can
and standing of the potential partner in a peer network. But be quite stable over time, the children are usually not con-
fortunately, older adolescents tend to focus on partner traits sciously aware of their own status in the hierarchy (Strayer &
that are more related to fostering intimate relationships and Santos, 1996). The mental mechanisms that maintain the
longer-term compatibility. Older adolescents are also more social structure appear to be largely implicit. This finding may
likely to resolve conflicts through compromise. In short, it sound improbable, but in fact, we have seen very similar cogni-
appears that the ability to form romantic relationships is a tive patterns in young children in other domains. Just as young
skill that develops over the course of adolescence into a more children are unaware of some properties of their language or
durable and rewarding form. their memory, even though they use them both heavily, they
Researchers argue that adolescent romantic relationships show little awareness of their own social position within a
and dating are important because the developmental trajec- group, even as they honor that position in their behavior.
tory of such relationships is related to the quality of relation-
ships later in life (Collins et al., 2009; Simpson et al., 2011). Cliques and Crowds Among elementary school children,
Difficult romantic relationships in adolescence have been groups have a very different character. Much more stable
linked to difficulties in later romantic experiences (Grello cliques, which are small groups of peers who voluntarily
et al., 2003). Moreover, simply having romantic relation- spend a great deal of time together and seem to actively
ships may increase the risk of experiencing later depressions, exclude others, start to emerge (see Figure 15.8). Cliques
given that a breakup of those early relationships is likely. play an important role by providing the child with a sense
Overall, however, adolescents who shift to deeper, more of belonging as well as helping form a group identity. Being
meaningful relationships as they progress through adoles- popular becomes a powerful social goal of many children.
cence seem to have a better chance of having sustainable By this time, children can be acutely, and often painfully,
rewarding relationships as young adults. One revealing line aware of their own status within groups, knowing full well
of work suggests that it is not just conflicts themselves that when they are unpopular or viewed as outsiders. Being
matter to long-term relationship quality, but how couples rejected by peers and not included in a group is linked to
recover from such conflicts. Thus, couples who recover problems of psychological adjustment (Ladd, 2006), but it
from conflicts well in adolescence are more likely to later can be difficult to tell if rejection causes such problems or
have more stable, positive relationships that provide greater if children with such problems tend to be rejected, or both.
satisfaction to both members of the relationship (Salvatore In a related vein, children in this age group show a marked
et al., 2011). increase in social comparison, evaluating others relative to
themselves or their group, such as assessing who is smarter,
richer, more athletic, or better looking. Even preschoolers
engage in some social comparison (Butler, 1998; Rhodes &
Social Groups Brickman, 2008; Yee & Brown, 1992), but it becomes much
Infants and young toddlers do not form groups of their more frequent and intense during the later elementary school
own making, probably because they lack the cognitive years. Presumably, during this time, children become more
complexity needed to manage a group. Preschoolers do sophisticated at noticing and interpreting differences between
form groups, but they are often temporary, forming briefly their own group and other groups—for example, becoming
around a particular activity and then dissolving. Preschool aware of social rules that might be special to a group. One
girls tend to play in smaller groups of the same sex, and in consequence of these group comparisons is that children tend
those groups they tend to be cooperative, engage in conver- to evaluate their own group more positively and other groups
sation, and show concerns about relationships. Preschool more negatively, even when group assignments are random
boys tend to play in larger groups of the same sex, and in (Bigler et al., 1997). With respect to majority and minority

LEVELS OF AFFILIATION 553

A B
FIGURE 15.8 Social groups in early adolescence. (A) Cliques appear in middle childhood and reach their peak in the early teens, declining
in high school. (B) In a group of children such as these, often the most popular children are the most physically attractive.

groups, there are indications that children as young as 7 years with the broader social patterns in these groups. To do this,
old reflect the adult pattern of showing stronger out-group we will consider a wide range of research that measures chil-
biases when they are members of a majority group as opposed dren’s social status in groups. Many of these studies inves-
to a minority group (Newheiser & Olson, 2012). tigate the factors that lead children to hold certain social
positions and what the developmental consequences might
be of occupying these positions.
Q: When, in the course of development, do
cliques tend to first appear? Why might they not Sociometric Status and Social Interaction For more
than 75 years, researchers have been interested in devising a
appear until that age? typology that describes how peers interact with each other,
which could then be used to classify children into different
Finally, in adolescence, cliques start to decline in impor- kinds of roles within groups. In 1934, the psychiatrist Jacob
tance. Although some adolescents still try to maintain cliques L. Moreno developed a method of discussing social status
and reap the benefits of belonging to an exclusive group, most in groups known as sociometry. Moreno believed that ana-
adolescents are less focused on cliques (Adler & Adler, 1998). lyzing a group’s internal structures and the particular posi-
The makeup of social groups also changes, shifting toward tion that an individual occupies in these structures—that
more mixed-sex groups in which both sexes interact and col- is, the person’s sociometric status—could help predict the
laborate. There is also a rise in what are sometimes called person’s psychological well-being (Moreno, 1951). Moreno
“crowds” in adolescence, where stereotyped identities, values, determined sociometric status based on how much peers
and activities tend to define a particular crowd and where liked or disliked others in their group. Moreno’s sociometric
a particular adolescent might get a reputation (perhaps not method has become a common tool for understanding chil-
fairly) that links him to one crowd. Thus, in high school, dren’s development within the context of social groups. Over
it is common to talk of groups such as nerds, jocks, Goths, the years, a typology of five types of children has developed:
stoners, punks, and preppies. For many high schoolers, affili- popular children, rejected children, controversial children, aver-
ations with such crowds can have enormous influences on age children, and neglected children (Newcomb et al., 1993).
their friendships and daily activities (Brown & Klute, 2003). The most common sociometric method for determining
Any careful observer of children at different ages would sociometric status and sorting a group of children into these
notice many of these patterns. The more challenging five types is the peer nomination technique. Each child in
research questions center around the different ways that chil- the group is individually asked to name the children in the
dren come to occupy specific niches or social roles within group whom they like the most and those they would most
groups. As we examine the wide variety of social roles that like to play with (Coie et al., 1982). They are also asked to
children occupy in groups, we will also keep in mind ques- nominate the children whom they like the least and those
tions about how developmental change interacts with the they would least like to play with. Computing the “like”
different social roles children play in their peer groups and and “dislike” ratings enables researchers to create the five

554 CHAPTER 15 BECOMING PART OF THE COMMUNITY

status types, which have proved to be associated with differ- but also by peers. Both groups of popular children were
ent behaviors and kinds of abilities. “cool,” which seems to reflect a kind of social adroitness and
Popularity is a topic of great concern to older children awareness, but beyond that trait, they displayed sharply con-
and teenagers and is frequently talked about (Adler & Adler, trasting types of personalities. This contrast has been found
1998). In sociometrics, popular children are nominated as in other studies with both boys and girls. The causal relation
being liked by most children and disliked by few children, is not always obvious, however. A behavior may make a child
often as a result of both appealing physical attributes and popular, but it is also possible that being popular may help
social skills. For example, popular children may be liked cause certain behaviors to emerge.
by other children because they are often smiling or because The social adroitness of popular children has been
they are friendly, helpful, and sensitive to others. But well- examined more systematically in studies of the social cog-
liked children are not necessarily the same children as those nitive capacities of popular children. One review of the
who are perceived as popular by their peers. Perceived popu- sociometric literature concluded that popular children are
larity (which is not always the same as true popularity) is more adept at navigating a wide range of social situations,
more influenced by perceived power and dominance within including perceiving actors’ intentions, developing social
a group than by factors such as kindness and trustworthi- problem-solving strategies, and focusing on interpersonal
ness (Parkhurst & Hopmeyer, 1998). relations—that is, how to get along with other children
Physical attractiveness is one attribute that is often related or adults—in addition to attaining concrete instrumen-
to popularity (Berscheid & Walster, 1974; see Figure 15.8B). tal goals, such as obtaining a desired object or mastering
Even preschoolers who are rated as more physically attractive a task (Gifford-Smith & Brownell, 2003). The connection
are more likely to be popular among their peers (Vaughn & between social cognitive skills and peer acceptance may
Langlois, 1983). Later on, near puberty, early physical matu- appear quite early, with some studies showing associations
ration is related to popularity. Moreover, as seen in Chapter 3, between higher theory of mind and peer acceptance in pre-
even in infancy there seems to be considerable consensus on schoolers (Slaughter et al., 2002).
what makes someone attractive. Thus, some children would One facet of popularity occurs in the cliques that
seem to have, simply by accident of birth, a better chance appear in late childhood, usually around the sixth grade,
than others at being popular. (There is a large literature and that continue into early adolescence, usually starting
also suggesting that physically attractive people continue to decline after the eighth grade (Crockett et al., 1984).
to enjoy a number of advantages in both their private and These small, exclusive peer groups can cause pain for those
professional lives; see Berscheid & Walster, 1974; Snyder who are excluded, as well as sometimes causing anxiety for
et al., 1988). At the same time, physical attractiveness is not group members concerned about maintaining their status.
a completely fixed attribute. A child’s attractiveness can vary It is interesting that cliques are rarely stable beyond a few
considerably as a function of demeanor, hair and clothing months (Adler & Adler, 1995). They are frequently forming
style, and mood. Besides physical attractiveness, athletic and dissolving or adding and dropping members, so that
ability and performance may also be physical factors that the composition can vary dramatically over time. Cliques
contribute to a child’s popularity. But athletic performance may be especially sought out during the middle school years
tends to be more associated with popularity in boys than in because children see them as a way to catapult themselves
girls (Closson, 2009; Lease et al., 2002a, 2002b). into an elite status group (Schrum & Cheek, 1987). As chil-
Beyond physical attributes, many psychological attributes dren grow older, they may start to realize that membership
are correlated with popularity and unpopularity. There seem in such transient groups does not really confer lasting posi-
to be different sets of attributes that make children popular tive status and that members of cliques can also be targets
to different sets of peers. One study with 452 grade school of considerable resentment and distrust, especially by for-
boys (fourth to sixth grades) found two quite distinct types mer friends who have now been excluded by a child who
of children that were highly popular within their respective has recently joined a clique (Adler & Adler, 1995). They
peer groups (Rodkin et al., 2000): popular prosocial “model” may also start to realize that they themselves may likely be
children and popular antisocial “tough” children. The model dropped from a clique and accountable to former friends
children were athletic, adept at leadership, cooperative rather that they excluded upon joining the clique.
than competitive, studious, outgoing, “cool,” and nonag- There is a huge literature on a group of children known
gressive. Moreover, kindness was also a common trait in as rejected children. These children receive the highest
model children (Estell et al., 2003; LaFontana & Cillessen, number of nominations as peers who are most disliked.
2002). The tough children were “cool,” athletic, aggressive, When this group is studied more directly, these children
and generally antisocial toward authorities and social norms. seem much more likely than other children to interpret
These traits were noticed not just by independent observers ambiguous actions by others as hostile (Dodge et al., 2003).

LEVELS OF AFFILIATION 555

 environment may increase hostile attributional styles
Children’s Children’s in both parents and children, which in turn may carry
Parent-child cognitive cognitive Children’s peer
interaction processing processing acceptance
over and contaminate relations with peers. Longitudinal
with parents with peers designs are meant to be able to tease apart such alterna-
tives, but in practice it is difficult to make a definitive
FIGURE 15.9 A causal model of peer acceptance. Several conclusion.
researchers have suggested that specific parent-child interaction pat- As researchers examine popularity in more subtle and
terns help instill certain social cognitive processing skills in children detailed ways, they start to see how particular kinds of
that then influence social cognitive processing of interactions with interactions might relate over time to particular kinds of
peers, which in turn influences peer acceptance. In practice, it is aggression. For example, among children from ages 10 to
difficult to tell if such links are causal as opposed to correlational,
14, especially girls, relational aggression predicts, and seems
mediated by other variables. Adapted from Rah & Parke (2008).
to cause, a form of “perceived popularity,” in which a child
is seen as one of the most popular; but this perceived popu-
This pattern of thought in rejected children is often known larity does not seem to lead to “sociometric popularity,” in
as the hostile attribution bias (Nasby et al., 1979). which the child is the one whom children most want to
How might something like a hostile attribution bias have as their friend (Cillessen & Mayeux, 2004; Cillessen &
appear in development? Some scholars have argued that cer- Rose, 2005). Sadly, this causal link between relational
tain kinds of social cognitive styles emerge out of parent-child aggression and perceived popularity may provide an incen-
interaction patterns and then come to influence peer interac- tive for some children to gossip and slander others.
tions (Rah & Parke, 2008). This kind of model is shown in When peer group acceptance is explained in terms of social
Figure 15.9. In particular, these researchers believe that par- cognitive capacities, this is known as the social information
ents’ manner of interaction with their children can lead to processing approach (Crick & Dodge, 1994). This approach
changes in three kinds of social cognitions in children: goals, is often broken up into five steps (see Figure 15.10): (1) The
strategies, and attributions (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Thus, if a child must encode social cues and the setting in which they
parent is constantly berating and coercing a child, that child occur (for example, Joe bumped into me in a crowded hallway).
might focus on instrumental goals—for example, obtaining (2) The child must make sense—that is, interpret the cause
a good grade—rather than relational goals—for example, and intent—of the cues in that situation (for example, Joe
developing a better relationship with the parent. Instrumental bumped into me because he is out to get me). (3) The child must
goals might in turn lead to strategies that neglect the parents’ set up goals for responding to the situation (for example,
feelings and interests, which in turn could lead to attributions I have to figure out a way to retaliate against Joe). (4) The child
about the hostile intent of the parents. The social cognitions must access a set of possible responses to attain that goal (for
that are learned from parent-child interactions are then trans- example, I could go up and bump into Joe right away, or I could
ferred to interactions with peers, with the child now continu-
ing to make hostile attributions about ambiguous situations,
attributions that often lead to peer rejection.
There are many studies suggesting associations between 4. Accessing or constructing
possible responses
5. Deciding on a response
parent-child interaction patterns and certain kinds of cog-
nitive styles, as well as many studies showing associations DATABASE
between children’s social cognitions and peer acceptance 3. Clarifying goals
• memory store
• acquired rules 6. Acting on the
or rejection (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Dodge et al., 2003). • social schemas chosen response
• social knowledge
Certain longitudinal studies suggest that the patterns of
PEER EVALUATION
correlation point toward the causal model shown in Figure 2. Interpreting cues AND RESPONSE
1. Encoding cues
15.9, in which parental behavior ultimately causes patterns
of peer acceptance or rejection (Rah & Parke, 2008). But
because these studies are not experimental in nature, it is
still possible that the patterns of association do not indi- FIGURE 15.10 Social information processing model of attri-
cate causal relationships. For example, children and their butions in children. Crick and Dodge (1994) proposed that the
child processes social information in five steps that lead to a final
parents might share common genotypes that might predis-
behavioral response. In the model shown here, the process is seen
pose them toward more hostile attributional styles, which as a repeating cycle that can lead a child to have a hostile attribu-
in turn might influence interactions between the children tional style and to be a rejected child or to have a more positive
and their parents and between the children and their attributional style and be a popular child. Adapted from Crick &
peers. Similarly, growing up in a harsh and threatening Dodge (1994).

556 CHAPTER 15 BECOMING PART OF THE COMMUNITY

spill food on him in the cafeteria). (5) Finally, the child must leaders, but they are also more likely to be seen as aggres-
decide which of the possible responses is the best one to use. sive and arrogant, with boys showing more of a propensity
Rejected children seem to have deficits in every one of for aggression and girls for arrogance (Gifford-Smith &
these five steps (Crick & Dodge, 1994), although most Brownell, 2003). Controversial children do not seem to
research has focused on the second step, in which the child have negative developmental outcomes. In addition, the
constructs an interpretation of the cues. Studies repeatedly classification of being a controversial child shows less
find that rejected children tend to be both aggressive and stability over time than being either a rejected child or a
more inclined to make hostile attributions about the actions popular child. Moreover, during adolescence, controver-
of others (Orobio de Castro et al., 2002). At the same time, sial children may become more popular with peers who
rejected children do not automatically make a hostile attri- value a certain degree of rebelliousness (Gifford-Smith &
bution about an ambiguous event. If a rejected child feels Brownell, 2003).
positively toward a peer, the same ambiguous action is Children who have average values on the like and dis-
much less likely to result in a hostile attribution than when like scales have not been studied much in their own right
it is carried out by a peer for whom the child has negative because they are generally assumed to have unremarkable
feelings (Peets et al., 2008). Thus, the hostile attribution behaviors and psychological problems. They may also be
bias is strengthened by the extent to which a child feels a quite mobile in that they can move in and out of the popu-
general dislike for another child. Since many rejected chil- lar groups. There is no evidence that average children fare
dren have at least some friends (Cairns et al., 1988), they any worse than popular children in the long run.
show quite different attributional patterns when settings Neglected children seem to be largely ignored by their
include primarily their friends as opposed to other groups of peer group and do not appear to be high on either the like or
peers for whom they have either neutral or negative feelings. dislike scale. These children go through their days without
The finding of increased deficits in all five steps means that much notice, and they do not seem to fare much worse than
rejected children may initially make mistakes in encoding average children (Asher & Wheeler, 1985; Gifford-Smith &
critical features of an event, as well as generating a nonopti- Brownell, 2003). Neglected children seem to be just as happy
mal set of response strategies and then choosing an option and no more lonely than peers who are classified as aver-
that is especially aggressive and usually counterproductive. age. They do seem to be more shy and withdrawn (Coie &
Rejected children tend to have difficulties in adjustment Dodge, 1988), but this behavior does not seem to be associ-
in childhood and adolescence, with higher rates of emo- ated with any negative outcomes. There is also some evidence
tional problems (for example, anxiety and depression) and that being in the neglected category is less stable than catego-
behavioral problems (for example, being disruptive in class, ries such as rejected and popular, suggesting that neglected
getting into fights, and substance abuse; Bierman, 2004; children might move in and out of other categories, such
Rubin et al., 2005). There are also indications that chil- as average and popular, at different times in development
dren who exhibit high levels of demanding behaviors at a (Gifford-Smith & Brownell, 2003; Newcomb et al., 1993).
younger age are more likely to become rejected children in Overall, the sociometric method has been useful for
later childhood (Dodge et al., 2003). Unfortunately, when classifying relationship patterns among peers. The classifi-
a child is classified strongly as being in the rejected group, cations with the most stability over time, rejected and popu-
that classification can remain quite stable over much of lar, are also the most divergent in terms of developmental
childhood and adolescence (Rubin et al., 2005). outcomes. Children who are well liked and not disliked
Yet, aggression does not always lead to rejection. Roughly tend to have happy lives with relatively low anxiety and rela-
half the children who are seen as aggressive are not rejected tively few behavioral problems. Children who are strongly
by their peers (Coie et al., 1991). It appears that children disliked and not liked tend to have unhappy lives tainted
who respond to an unambiguously aggressive action in an with depression, anxiety, and a large number of behavioral
aggressive way are not as likely to be rejected as those who problems. Children who are labeled as neglected, controver-
use aggression to achieve a particular goal. In other words, sial, or average do not seem to have any obvious problems. It
if aggression seems to be a reasonable response to a clear is tempting to draw causal inferences here, but a more cau-
provocation, other children do not seem to take that behav- tious interpretation is more appropriate. It may be that cer-
ior as a basis for rejection. tain attribution patterns cause peer rejection or acceptance,
Children who are classified as controversial score high but it may also be that peer rejection or acceptance greatly
on both the like and the dislike scales. In many ways, amplifies a particular attributional style. In addition, it may
they are the opposite of the neglected children (discussed be that other variables, such as a difficult home life, may
shortly), as they are noticed by everyone, just in different causally influence both attributional styles and attitudes of
ways. Controversial children are seen as sociable and as peers. In reality, it seems likely that all these factors, among

LEVELS OF AFFILIATION 557

many others, interact in a complex web of cycles and feed- is only within the context of these broader developmental
back loops, making any simple causal chain implausible. changes that we can understand how peer status categories
Longitudinal studies are now also revealing that peer rela- emerge in childhood, change over time, and then gradually
tions can have effects on quite subtle social cognitions, which dissipate in later adolescence.
in turn can feed back on social interaction abilities. For exam-
ple, difficulty understanding faux pas—social blunders such
as violating a local culture’s rules of etiquette—can be linked
to peer rejection over time. In younger children (5 to 6 years Social Network Effects
old), peer rejection predicts more difficulty in understanding A different research tradition has begun to make impor-
faux pas in later years, while difficulty in understanding faux tant contributions to the study of the developmental effects
pas in older children (8 to 9 years old) predicts higher levels of groups on behaviors. This line of work examines formal
of peer rejection in even later years (Banerjee et al., 2011). and quantitative properties of social networks to see if a
On the other hand, early theory of mind understanding (for person’s position in the structure of a social network influ-
example, at 5 years old) tends to predict more adept social ences that person’s nature. Social network effects were first
relations, higher peer acceptance, and lower rejection rates documented most dramatically in terms of health patterns
a few years later (Caputi et al., 2012). Thus, both directions and group relationships. For example, one study found that
of influence—from social cognitive capacities to peer rela- the more obese friends you have, the more likely you are
tion quality and from peer relation quality to social cognitive to be obese. More strikingly, if the friends of your friends
capacities—may be at work at all ages, depending on the are obese, those links can make it more likely for you to
particular social capacities studied. be obese. Finally, and most dramatically, even the level of
obesity of the friends of your friends’ friends can influence
whether you are overweight (Christakis & Fowler, 2007).
Over a period of 32 years, it was possible to predict the
Developmental Patterns in spread of obesity in a large social network based on friend-
ship links that had as many as three degrees of separation
Levels of Affiliation from the person who was affected. In general, same-sex
Research on interactions with peers and other people beyond mutual friends tended to have the strongest influences on
the family constitutes one of the largest areas of develop- each other in terms of obesity, while different-sex friends
mental psychology. Moreover, that research is increasingly did not have any measurable influence on each other in
being connected to other areas of research—such as the terms of obesity. Interestingly, at four degrees of separation,
development of social cognition, theory of mind, and per- no significant effects were noticed. These results indicate
spective taking, as well as to attachment patterns emerging that people who you do not know or may never meet can
from infancy. Individual differences loom large in much still influence your life through a form of social contagion
of this research and for very understandable reasons. We of habits, lifestyles, or health-related behaviors.
all are interested in the factors that made some children, More recent work has documented that such effects can
including ourselves, popular or unpopular during child- also spread through social networks in adolescence (Ali et al.,
hood and adolescence and in whether there are long-lasting 2012; de la Haye et al., 2010; Fletcher et al., 2011; Fowler &
consequences of occupying one of those social roles. We Christakis, 2008; Valente et al., 2009). Thus, obesity in
have seen that questions about causes and consequences adolescents can be predicted from the prevalence of obesity
are extremely difficult to disentangle, even as researchers among those who are as many as three links away from them
repeatedly document strong associations between some in social networks. Similarly, eating habits strongly reflect
sociometric categories and a host of social, emotional, and network relations (Fletcher et al., 2011). There is every rea-
cognitive factors. son to suspect that such network effects start much earlier
It is important, however, to step back and remind our- in childhood. Consider, for example, the ways that fads can
selves that above and beyond the sometimes striking indi- spread wildly among schoolchildren in a neighborhood.
vidual differences that are found, there are also very general Subsequent studies have found three-link effects in social
patterns of development for peer interactions, relationships, networks for a wide variety of behaviors, including smok-
and social groups that apply to virtually all children. We ing, alcohol use, exercise habits, and academic achieve-
return to those patterns here as a way of keeping in mind ment, with many such effects now being demonstrated
this broader developmental perspective. Table 15.1 summa- in adolescents and school-age children (Haas et al., 2010;
rizes the major developmental findings for peer interactions Macdonald-Wallis et al., 2011; Mundt, 2011; Veenstra &
that have been found over thousands of studies using the Dijkstra, 2012). One strong effect occurs for happiness,
perspective of levels of affiliation (Rubin et al., 1998). It with clusters of happiness appearing in networks (Fowler &

558 CHAPTER 15 BECOMING PART OF THE COMMUNITY

 Level of Affiliation 0–2 years 2–5 years 5–11 years 11 years and older

Interactions Not really social; more More elaborate Large increase in Peer interactions more
simply joint arousal patterns of play frequency of social influential and more
interactions frequent
Little reciprocal give- Increase in sharing,
and-take pretense, and orderly Increase in size of peer More cross-sex
interactions groups interactions
High conflict
Less adult supervision
More single-sex
interactions
More interactions
outside the home
More verbal aggression
and gossip; less
pretend play
Relationships Unique patterns of Children purposefully Bullying Recognition of
sustained interactions picking friends, usually nonexclusivity of
between pairs, but not Broader view of
choosing those most friendships and
really friendships friendship, allowing
like themselves granting of more
for a more diverse
autonomy to friends;
More prosocial with range of friends and
thus, less jealous
friends but also more friendships
of friends’ other
hostile
relationships
Increased intimacy with
friends
Groups Little evidence of group Dominance hierarchies; Stable cliques; Decreasing importance
behavior less overall aggression, popularity hierarchies of cliques
but little explicit
Social comparison more Increasing importance
awareness of own
frequent and influential of integration of sexes
status in hierarchy

TABLE 15.1 Developmental changes in social affiliations. Children’s social relations show distinct patterns of change during different
developmental periods and across various levels, from interactions to relationships to groups. Adapted from Rubin et al. (1998).

Christakis, 2008; see Figure 15.11), and it is also possible to

predict loneliness based on how peripheral versus central a
person is to a particular network. These studies also show
Media Influences on
how happiness in a few individuals can spread through a
network over time, with some fortunate indications that
Development
happiness spreads more robustly than sadness (Fowler & Moving beyond face-to-face peer interactions and relation-
Christakis, 2008). ships, we now consider how the media come to have a social-
This new approach to group influences in development izing effect on children. The media can be intimately related
has great promise and offers the potential for major advances to peer influences, suggesting how peers supposedly look
in the study of peer relations and groups. For example, it and behave in a wide range of circumstances. The media can
allows more formal analysis to be undertaken, which in provide a large, albeit distorted, database for social compari-
turn enables quite precise predictions about effects. In addi- son, suggesting, for example, typical levels of affluence and
tion, it illustrates for the first time how there can be effects typical hobbies and styles. Media also can portray morally
at three degrees of separation from an individual and by laden norms, such as appropriate ways to act both proso-
people never encountered face-to-face in the person’s life- cially and aggressively. Television has long been thought to
time. Finally, whether a person is central or peripheral in be the most influential medium, but in recent years, Inter-
a network or has a dense versus a sparse set of connections net communities and video games have also come to exert
may lead to interesting predictions about both social conta- major influences on children. All of these influences in turn
gion and likely psychological states such as loneliness. feed back on how peers interact with each other, whether it

MEDIA INFLUENCES ON DEVELOPMENT 559

 ment programs dominate. In the discussions that follow, we
will consider both the potential of television programming
to have positive and negative effects when experimenters
have children watch particular kinds of shows in experi-
mental settings, and also the most common effects given
the actual viewing habits of most children. But it is impor-
tant to keep in mind the tradeoffs between experimental
designs and naturalistic studies. Experimental studies, in
which children are randomly assigned to one of two condi-
tions, such as viewing violent versus nonviolent television,
have the virtue of uncovering causal effects. They are also,
however, often faulted for extrapolating from a situation in
which children watch television for a few hours in a labo-
FIGURE 15.11 Social networks and happiness. Friendship rela- ratory to real-life influences of television that may happen
tions in a social network can predict many facets of health and psy- over thousands of hours and years of watching. Naturalistic
chological states. This graph depicts “happiness clusters” by showing studies have the obvious advantage of looking at real-life
squares for males and circles for females and showing the connections viewing habits that occur over appropriate time frames and
of individuals with friends, spouses, and siblings. Siblings are shown viewing situations, but they have real limitations as well.
as connected by black lines, and friends and spouses are connected If a correlation is found between, for example, viewers of
by red lines. Yellow indicates happiness; blue indicates sadness;
violent television and higher levels of aggressiveness toward
shades of green indicate moderate levels of happiness. Such graphs
can be constructed for both adults and adolescents. People who are
friends, it could be that television is causing the effect or
surrounded by other happy people tend to be happy. The research- it could be that aggressive children prefer to watch violent
ers in this study found that happiness spreads through the network programming.
rather than simply occurring because of associating with other happy
people. In addition, a peripheral (as opposed to a central) location in a The Pervasiveness of Television Watching Watching
network can predict loneliness. From Fowler & Christakis (2008). television occupies a very substantial part of children’s time in
almost all cultures. Although the majority of studies of tele-
vision viewing have occurred in North America, Japan, and
is through social networking sites or through adopting the Europe (since those regions were the first to have televisions in
styles and values of a popular television show. most households) television viewing has now spread through-
out the world (see Figure 15.12). In the United States, there
is at least one television in almost every home, and roughly
75 percent of those households subscribe to cable or satellite
Television feeds, thus guaranteeing a huge variety of viewing options
Although television is prevalent, it varies dramatically in its (Anderson et al., 2003). Moreover, in many households, tele-
content and how it influences children across their develop- vision watching is the dominant activity in the home. Far
ment. Any discussion of the possible influences of televi- more homes have the television on for several hours a day as
sion on children must consider how influences vary both as opposed to 1 or 2 hours a week. An elementary school child
a function of content and of age. Television can influence in the United States typically spends 4 hours each day watch-
children in various ways, ranging from the cognitive to the ing television. Counting weekends and summers, a child
emotional to the social. And these influences can be either may spend far more time watching television than attending
positive or negative. On the positive side, television has the school, playing sports, or engaging in activities with the fam-
potential to teach children about the world, to encourage ily (Comstock & Scharrer, 2006; Roberts et al., 1999). In
them to engage in prosocial behaviors, to give them prac- addition to watching television shows, children also watch an
tice in various forms of reasoning, and to facilitate language enormous number of commercials, with a typical child seeing
acquisition. On the negative side, television has the poten- over 40,000 commercials a year (Kunkel, 2001).
tial to hinder cognitive development, to impair prosocial Given the extraordinary prominence of television pro-
behavior, and to foster antisocial and aggressive behavior. gramming and advertising in children’s lives, it is natural to
Obviously, the effects must depend at least partially on assume that it must be having an influence on their develop-
the kinds of programs that children watch. Because edu- ment. Researchers have asked about the potential negative
cational programs make up only a small fraction of the and positive effects of watching television. On the posi-
television shows that most children watch, we need to ask tive side, we can ask whether television can enhance cog-
about the overall effects of television in which entertain- nitive skills such as attentional strategies, problem-solving

560 CHAPTER 15 BECOMING PART OF THE COMMUNITY

 an action demonstrated by a television actor even after a
24-hour delay, they showed a considerably higher incidence
of imitation when the actor was live as opposed to televised
(Hayne et al., 2003). Another study found that 12-month-
olds had considerable difficulty reproducing actions they
had observed on a video monitor but could easily reproduce
these actions when they saw them performed by a live actor
(Barr & Hayne, 1999). The relative inability of younger
children to learn as effectively from video as from live dem-
onstrations is often called the video deficit and is repeatedly
found across a wide range of studies (Anderson & Hanson,
2010; Kirkorian et al., 2008). In addition, it appears that
infants younger than 12 months have difficulty telling the
difference between coherent content and incoherent content
FIGURE 15.12 Television watching throughout the world.
in videos, such as the difference between a sequence that
Although television was initially found primarily in the homes of those
living in more developed countries, it is now a fixture in the lives of has logically ordered clips versus clips that are shuffled ran-
children in most areas of the world, even when there is no direct domly (Anderson & Pempek, 2005; Kirkorian et al., 2008;
electrical service to a home. see Figure 15.13). Thus, the narrative structure of most
programs is not likely to be understood by infants younger
than 12 months old. Detailed analyses of eye movements
routines, and literacy. We can also ask if television can show that 1-year-olds have much more difficulty tracking
improve prosocial behavior, such as sharing or resolving dis- changes from one scene to another, often requiring sev-
putes. On the negative side, there has been extensive work eral seconds to orient to the new scene; as a result, they are
asking if exposure to violence on television leads to both a unable to follow the unfolding narrative (Kirkorian et al.,
greater tolerance of violence by children and an increase in 2012). Similarly, 1-year-olds often have difficulty connect-
violent behavior. Other studies have asked if television can ing what they see in videos with what is occurring in the
impair aspects of cognitive development, such as attention, real world, even when the relationships are very obvious to
reading skills, and comprehension of complex narratives. older children (Troseth, 2010).
Television does not simply reflect the culture at large. It is
often a distortion of that culture, which may help create a
distorted image of reality. In this discussion, we will try to
give a modest sense of those other influences as well.

Q: Describe, in quantitative terms, the

incidence of television watching by children in
North America.

Changes in Television Watching with Age To under-

stand how television might influence various aspects of a
child’s mind and behavior, it is helpful to first examine how
a child develops the ability to extract information from tele-
vision. Observe a child under 1 year of age in a room with
a television. Even if older children and adults in the room
are watching the television with rapt attention, the baby is
unlikely to spend much of her time staring at the television
screen. While quite young infants can extract some infor-
mation from video monitors and even imitate facial expres- FIGURE 15.13 Very young television viewers. Before 1 year of
sions displayed on a monitor, imitation of complex actions age, infants do not seem to be able to understand the narrative struc-
takes more time to develop. For example, one study of 24- ture of programs and have difficulty telling the difference between
and 30-month-olds found that while they would imitate randomly ordered clips and those that follow a thematic progression.

MEDIA INFLUENCES ON DEVELOPMENT 561

 After infancy, children become much more dedicated tele- effects interact with programming content. In one study,
vision viewers, and the typical toddler spends several hours when children viewed educational television between the
a day in front of a television. At approximately 30 months ages of 2 and 3, they subsequently scored higher on vocabu-
of age, a much larger range of programming may become lary tests at 4 and 5 years, but when children between 2 and
comprehensible to the child and therefore of interest (Ander- 3 watched more entertainment-oriented programs, their
son & Hanson, 2010; Anderson & Pempek, 2005). Audio- vocabulary was subsequently lower at 4 and 5 years than
visual presentations that are especially tailored to younger children who had watched less of such programming. This
audiences—for example, “baby videos” that are marketed as was not an experimental study with random assignment,
enrichment materials—may well be of interest to children as but it did try to demonstrate statistically the causal effect
young as 12 months, especially when adults are present who of television viewing on vocabulary. Studies with experi-
direct the infant’s attention to critical actions and actors (Barr mental designs have also shown such effects. Yet, when
et al., 2008). The vast majority of commercial programming children are younger than 2 years old, they often may not
on cable television or networks, however, is usually only of learn words from television that they can easily learn from
interest to children older than 30 months. Obviously, highly live models (Krcmar et al., 2007; Zimmerman et al., 2007),
complex plots and actions will continue to elude the under- even when they are viewing television and video programs
standing and imitative abilities of younger children, but at targeted for children under 2 years of age. Thus, they still
least by the time they are 3 years old, children can pick up show the video deficit that is found in younger children.
on and reproduce relatively elaborate televised actions, often In general, there is little evidence that videos designed for
after considerable delays. children under 2 years of age actually teach them anything
(Anderson & Hanson, 2010; Kirkorian et al., 2008).
Some educational television programs also appear to
have positive effects on other cognitive skills, such as prob-
Q: How does the child’s ability to absorb the lem solving. For example, one popular program, Blue’s Clues
content of television change with age? (see Figure 15.14), posed a problem at the beginning of
each episode and then presented a story containing a series
of clues; the viewer was then invited to see how the clues
Positive Effects of Television Television can transmit might be used to solve the problem. When children lived
a great deal of beneficial information to children that can in a community that had Blue’s Clues in its programming,
help them in their development. Such positive effects usu- they showed cognitive advantages on problem-solving tasks
ally occur when children watch educational or other sorts in comparison to children from a demographically com-
of shows specifically designed to teach children—programs parable community that did not have the programming
usually shown on nonprofit television channels. Children (Anderson et al., 2000). Viewing educational television that
who watch prosocial and academic programming are some-
what more likely to perform better academically and to have
better social skills (Calvert & Kotler, 2003). A major prob-
lem with evaluating the findings, however, is achieving true
random assignment of viewers to watch different forms of
television content. When studies show that children who
prefer prosocial and academic television have positive out-
comes, it is difficult to tell if there is another factor causing
the children both to want to watch those forms of program-
ming and to show better academic and prosocial skills. Far
more compelling are studies that approximate experimental
designs in which children are randomly assigned to watch
different kinds of programming or to be part of groups that
either have unrestricted television watching or limits to the
programs they can watch. Nonetheless, such studies are less
frequent than correlational studies because of the practical
difficulties in carrying them out in naturalistic settings.
FIGURE 15.14 Educational programming for young children.
In terms of cognitive skills and learning, there are Television shows with a clear and well-designed educational mission,
positive links to watching educational television. Children such as Blues Clues, which posed a problem to be solved through a
can learn vocabulary by watching television and video series of clues, is associated with improved cognitive skills in younger
programs (Rice et al., 1990; Wright et al., 2001a), but the viewers.

562 CHAPTER 15 BECOMING PART OF THE COMMUNITY

specifically aims to promote literacy also can have a positive comprehending it. For example, children between 12 and
effect with younger children (Moses, 2008). 18 months who watched Sesame Street Beginnings with
The overall message about the positive cognitive effects their parents later had more frequent and higher-quality
of television is clear. If the content has a well-designed interactions with their parents in free-play sessions than
educational mission, it can have a positive effect on many did control children (Pempek et al., 2011). This indirect
aspects of cognitive development in children over 2 years effect is not the same as an effect that directly increases
old, perhaps especially for children from disadvantaged prosocial behavior, and it may primarily reflect changes
backgrounds (Huston & Wright, 1998). Children from in parents, but it does show how a certain kind of posi-
low socioeconomic backgrounds may benefit more than tive interaction pattern between parents and very young
advantaged children from watching educational television children may get promoted if both watch a program that
programs because they may encounter ways of speaking models such actions.
and situations that they are less likely to encounter at home Finally, television may increase children’s sensitivity to
than are advantaged children, and such exposure may help cultural issues and their acceptance of diversity in others.
better prepare them for learning in school. If the content Educational programming often exposes children to a wider
is designed primarily for entertainment and commercial range of ethnic and racial groups than they might encounter
value, however, it usually has negative rather than posi- in their daily lives, and it often portrays people from other
tive effects. This is unfortunate, given that children tend ethnic groups in professional or social roles that might be
to prefer to watch entertainment programs (Comstock & different from what a child most commonly observes. Chil-
Scharrer, 2006). dren who watch such programming tend to show more posi-
In terms of social effects, the message is quite similar. tive attitudes toward members of other groups and hold less
Educational television can have positive effects on prosocial negative stereotypes (Wilson, 2008). Of course, if a child
behavior. There is some evidence suggesting that viewing mostly watches cartoon shows, there may be very little infor-
programs such as Sesame Street can help young children gain mation that could create positive attitudes for diverse groups.
a better understanding of different emotions and what sorts
of factors are likely to give rise to those emotions. In addi-
tion, with the right kinds of programming, there may be Q: Describe some ways in which television
modest influences on the ability to feel empathy for others might present distorted impressions of social
(Wilson, 2008).
In general, prosocial behavior is more salient and frequent
and cultural patterns in the world.
in educational as opposed to entertainment-oriented televi-
sion, and the positive effects tend to occur in children who
regularly watch educational shows. In experimental studies Negative Cognitive Effects of Television Most of the
with random assignment, children assigned to watch proso- studies on the effects of television viewing have focused on
cial television episodes are more likely to later show altru- the negative effects rather than the positive effects in regard
istic behavior, such as sharing, than are children assigned to both learning and social behavior. For the most part, the
to watch episodes without obvious prosocial behavior. One negative effects tend to occur when children watch enter-
meta-analysis of 34 studies found consistent positive effects tainment programming, which in the elementary school
of television shows that had prosocial content (Mares & years and later years is by far the most common form of
Woodard, 2005). Other studies found that children who programming watched.
regularly watched shows such as Mister Rogers’ Neighborhood We have already seen some glimpses of the negative cog-
or Barney & Friends were more likely to help another child nitive effects of television in our discussion of the positive
with a difficult project than were children who watched cognitive effects. In general, when children are exposed to
programming without prosocial content (Friedrich & Stein, entertainment television instead of educational television,
1975; Singer & Singer, 1998). Across several such studies, it there tend to be negative effects on attention, problem solv-
also appears that when parents point out to their children ing, vocabulary, and literacy. For example, the same study that
instances of prosocial behavior in educational program- showed positive effects of educational television on attentional
ming, the act of commenting enhances positive effects in skills also showed negative effects of entertainment televi-
the children, quite possibly because prosocial actions are sion on attentional skills (Kirkorian et al., 2008). Similarly,
less salient or less comprehensible than violent actions and another study showed that 4-year-olds who were exposed to
are therefore easier to miss without parental commenting fast-paced cartoon shows for just 9 minutes showed deficits
(Wilson, 2008). immediately afterward on executive function tasks, such as
Even younger children may have some positive ben- those involving delay of gratification, compared with children
efits of watching prosocial television, despite not fully who had watched educational shows or engaged in drawing

MEDIA INFLUENCES ON DEVELOPMENT 563

for the same period (Lillard & Peterson, 2011). Other stud- % first story % first five stories
80
ies have found a negative relationship between the amount
of viewing of commercial television and vocabulary in very 70
young children (Zimmerman et al., 2007).

Percent violent news reports

One major source of concern about the negative effects 60

of television revolves around achievement in school. If chil- 50

dren are spending a great deal of time watching television,
doesn’t that activity take time away from academic activi- 40
ties, such as doing homework? Certainly, this is the mes-
30
sage that many parents impart to their children. But the
evidence for such effects is not strong. Television tends to 20
displace other leisure activities, such as listening to the radio
10
and going to movies, but not academic activities (Kirkorian
et al., 2008). There are negative correlations between the 0
amount of television watching and academic achievement, CNN CBS-local CBS-network WWOR

but closer analyses do not strongly support a causal link. For FIGURE 15.15 Violent television programming. News reports
example, children from disadvantaged backgrounds tend to are heavily skewed toward reporting violent events. Adapted from
Johnson (1996).
spend more time watching television, but a host of other
factors associated with disadvantaged backgrounds may be
influencing academic performance and not television per se.
Again, without additional experimental studies, it is diffi- Does all this violence matter? Some writers have gone so
cult to find strong evidence for a causal effect. Similarly, it far as to suggest that the violence in television is actually
is difficult to find clear evidence that entertainment televi- good because it gets everyday violence out of children’s sys-
sion displaces time spent on reading and thereby reduces tems through the psychological mechanism of catharsis. The
literacy. Although some older studies seem to suggest that catharsis hypothesis, which was initially proposed in a much
such an effect occurred when television was introduced into broader and potentially plausible account by Freud, argues
one town and not into another, recent studies do not con- that experiencing violence in a pretend setting is a form of
sistently show a causal relation between amount of enter- release that makes it less likely that aggressive impulses will
tainment television watched and reduced literacy (Moses, be released in real life. The catharsis hypothesis for televi-
2008). While there is a positive relation, there is no evidence sion, however, has been repeatedly discredited (Bushman
supporting claims by some in the entertainment industry et al., 1999; Geen & Quanty, 1977). It is safe to say that vio-
that entertainment television increases literacy. lent television does not normally reduce aggression in viewers
of any age. Moreover, many people believe, on some intuitive
Negative Social Effects of Television A great deal of level, that violence on television increases aggression.
violence occurs in television shows, and there are no indica-
tions that it is on the decline. One analysis compared the
number of antisocial acts per hour on television in contem- Q: What is the catharsis hypothesis, and what
porary programming with that occurring 25 years earlier is the nature of the evidence about the effects of
(Potter & Vaughan, 1997). There was a slight increase from
40.8 antisocial acts per hour to 42.1 antisocial acts. In addi-
violent television programming on children?
tion, the content of violent programming is very different
from reality. In the television world, violent acts are punished The question of whether violence on television actually
much less often, and violent actors are often more attractive does increase aggression has been addressed in experimental
and heroic than in the real world (Potter et al., 1995). Even ways, as well as in naturalistic studies, with the limitations
the news portrays violence at far higher rates than it actually inherent in both kinds of studies. As the total number of
occurs in most people’s daily lives (Anderson et al., 2003; studies on the influences of television is well over 1,000,
Johnson, 1996; see Figure 15.15). By some estimates, a child it is not possible to survey these studies with any degree of
at the end of elementary school is likely to have witnessed completeness. It is possible, however, to describe the over-
roughly 8,000 murders and over 100,000 other violent acts whelming patterns found in both naturalistic studies and in
on television (Anderson et al., 2003, Condry, 1989; Huston experimental settings.
et al., 1992). Ironically, cartoon shows for children show In naturalistic settings, the evidence normally must be cor-
three times as much violence as violent entertainment tele- relational in nature. It is extremely difficult to make strong
vision for adults (Wilson et al., 2002). inferences about causation when experimental control is

564 CHAPTER 15 BECOMING PART OF THE COMMUNITY

 Adult Composite Aggression Adult Physical Aggression Adult Indirect Aggression

Child TV measures Men Women Men Women Men Women

TV violence viewing .21 .19 .17 .15 .03 .20
Perceived realism of TV .22 .25 .14 .14 .05 .28
violence
Identification with aggressive .15 .23 .05 .09 .01 .19
female characters
Identification with aggressive .29 .22 .14 .12 .05 .22
male characters

TABLE 15.2 Violent television viewing in childhood and adult aggression. Significant positive correlations are found between various
measures of watching and identifying with television violence as a child and displaying both physical and more indirect forms of aggression as
adults, with men showing more physical aggression and women showing more indirect aggression. Adapted from Huesmann et al. (2003).

lacking. Nonetheless, the naturalistic studies do show consis- designed to tease out evidence for causal effects do suggest
tent correlations between higher levels of watching violent tele- that watching violence on television causes more aggressive
vision and higher levels of aggression. For example, Table 15.2 behavior (Anderson et al., 2003; Huesmann et al., 2003).
shows one analysis of how viewing television in child- An alarming pattern occurs across all the nonexperi-
hood was correlated with aggressive behavior 15 years later mental studies: the correlation between violent television
(Huesmann et al., 2003). watching and aggression seems to be rising. As seen in
Unlike the experimental studies, naturalistic studies often Figure 15.16, the rise has been most dramatic since 1995.
have the appeal of looking at patterns of television viewing One possible explanation for the rising correlation is simply
that occur over the course of several years, as opposed to that the quality of studies is improving and that the relation
an hour or two in a laboratory. Summarizing across many is being measured with increasing precision and is coming
naturalistic studies, one meta-analysis of 400 studies on the closer to the correlations found in carefully controlled exper-
relation between violence and television found a positive imental studies (Bushman & Anderson, 2001). An alterna-
correlation of roughly .2 (Paik & Comstock, 1994; see also tive explanation is that somehow aggression on television is
Hogben, 1998). As we will see shortly, even though a cor- becoming more influential on children’s behavior, perhaps as
relation of .2 means that most of the variations in violent expertise in programming and special effects increases.
behavior are not accounted for by variations in how much
violent television is watched, it still represents a strongly sig-
nificant effect for a population as a whole. .22

One classic study looked at links between how many

hours adolescents spent watching violent television and the .20

degree to which they reported engaging in aggressive behav-

.18
ior (Robinson & Bachman, 1972). Other studies have found
Correlations

correlations between watching violent television in child-

.16
hood and engaging in aggressive behavior as adults many
years later (Huesmann et al., 1984). As we have repeatedly
.14
seen, the obvious question in such cases is whether viewing
aggression on television is causing children to become more
.12
aggressive or whether children who prefer violent television
are also those who prefer to be aggressive throughout their
.10
lifespan. Thus, it is possible that some intrinsic aggressive
tendency, or perhaps one that is socialized into the child by
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
factors other than television, may lead the child to watch
FIGURE 15.16 How watching violence on television correlates
more violent television and to exhibit more aggressive behav- with violent behavior. This graph shows the cumulative correlations
ior, without the television violence actually causing increases over the years between watching violent shows and violent behavior.
in a child’s aggression. It is difficult to fully address this As studies accumulate, the correlation has risen substantially, espe-
concern in nonexperimental studies, but statistical analyses cially since 1995. Adapted from Bushman & Anderson (2001).

MEDIA INFLUENCES ON DEVELOPMENT 565

 Experimental studies of the relationship between televi- a link between desensitization and increased violent behavior
sion and aggression allow us to more directly infer causa- (Anderson et al., 2003).
tion, even as we lose some of the naturalistic realism of the There is substantial evidence from a wide range of stud-
studies. In general, the experimental studies tend to show ies for a link between watching violence on television and
stronger effects of watching violent television than do the increases in violent behavior. One classic laboratory study
naturalistic studies. Recall from Chapter 12 the classic stud- showed elementary and middle school children programs
ies of children’s inclination to model aggressive behaviors of that varied in levels of violence and then presented them with
adults after watching film clips showing adults beating up a scenarios in which they were asked to choose between one
toy Bobo doll (Bandura et al., 1961). In the years since those of two possible actions. For example, a researcher describes a
early studies, other experimental studies have shown similar situation to a child in which someone comes up to him and
relationships between observing violence on film and televi- calls him names and then asks the child whether it is better
sion and acting aggressively. to engage in one of two actions in response, such as hitting
Aggressive behavior might increase because children the person or telling an adult about the incident. The results
start to accept higher levels of violence as normal, a pro- clearly indicated that violent actions were chosen more often
cess often called desensitization. One particularly chilling by viewers of violent episodes (Leifer & Roberts, 1972).
study had 44 fourth-graders watch either violent or nonvio- When children are compared with adults, the effects of
lent programming (Drabman & Thomas, 1974). All fourth- violent television on children are often longer lasting than
graders were then taken to a room where they were led to the effects on adults. When adults view violent television,
believe that they were keeping an eye on younger children they may experience a brief increase in arousal and prim-
in another room by observing them on a video monitor ing of aggressive thoughts and actions; when children view
linked to a camera in the other room. In fact, the video violent television, it appears that they learn new, long-
monitor was not playing a live broadcast of events in the term methods for dealing with difficult situations, as well
other room, but rather a filmed sequence of staged events as a general desensitization toward violence (Bushman &
in which there were gradually escalating violent physical Huesmann, 2006; Huesmann, 2007). This difference in age
actions. The children in the room initially played quietly effects has important implications for studies that attempt
together, but then they became increasingly destructive to generalize results from adult studies to children.
and engaged in more physical abuse toward each other,
with the tape ending as they seemed to destroy the cam-
era. The experimenters measured how long it took for the Q: Describe the overall findings of naturalistic
fourth-graders who were observing the monitors to seek and experimental studies on the effects of
out adult help to respond to the situation and whether they violent television programming on children and
did so when physical abuse between the children was first
seen. There was a strong effect from the sort of television describe the tradeoffs of each approach.
programming that the fourth-graders had watched. Those
who had watched violent television were much less likely It is, of course, difficult to determine just how much vio-
to seek out adults when physical abuse first occurred, and lence researchers can ethically elicit in children, especially
they took much longer to seek out adult help. It appeared of the interpersonal sort. Nonetheless, the vast majority of
that those children had come to regard a much higher level studies indicate that a substantial increase in physical and
of violence as acceptable. verbal aggression can be created in laboratory tasks by expos-
Desensitization studies of this sort in both television and ing children to violent programming (Anderson et al., 2003;
video game media demonstrate that children, as well as adults, Bushman & Huesmann, 2012; Comstock & Scharrer, 2006;
can start to take certain levels of violence for granted if they Wilson, 2008). Despite these repeated results, however, some
watch enough of it on television (Carnagey et al., 2007). But critics argue that the real-life effects of violent television on
desensitization does not in itself lead to increased aggressive individual children are not that large and that researchers
behavior. Perhaps viewers of violent television shows stop make too much out of the negative effects of violence in the
noticing violence in others but still are just as restrained in media (Freedman, 2002; Gunter, 2008). This criticism is an
committing it themselves. Indeed, it could even be argued important one that must be acknowledged. In the research
that desensitization reduces the chance that individuals see the literature, correlations at or near .3 between violent television
acts of others as aggressive and overreact—that is, desensitiza- watching and aggression are on the high end of the measured
tion may make their “fuse” longer and slower. In reality, most effects. This means that most of the time there will not be an
experts suspect that desensitization increases the tendency to observable effect of violent television programming on any
violence by making the experience of violence a less aversive given child’s behavior. Statistically, only 10 percent of the
emotion, but there are not yet any definitive studies showing variance in a child’s aggressive behavior would be accounted

566 CHAPTER 15 BECOMING PART OF THE COMMUNITY

for by a .3 correlation. Thus, even if a child spends every day treated as a “toxic environment” for children in much the
of his summer vacation watching extremely violent television, same way that more traditional chemically toxic environments
the odds are that this experience will not lead to behavior are treated (Woodhouse, 2004).
problems in the child.
At the same time, when television violence is viewed as a
public health threat in the same way as biological factors, its
impact seems quite large (see Figure 15.17). Instead of asking Q: If violence on television is considered a public
about the likelihood of any given child engaging in violent health threat analogous to biological threats, how
acts as a result of watching violent television, we can instead serious a threat does it seem to be relative to
ask whether, in a population as a whole, there will be a greater
incidence of violence as a result of violent programming.
those other threats?
Thus, if we consider a metropolitan area of 10 million people
(such as the greater Chicago area), we can ask how many more
violent events might occur because of a positive correlation Responding to the Influences of Television Violence
between violent television and aggression. Considered that Given that violence on television does seem to increase levels
way, even a correlation of .2 could still mean that hundreds of aggression in many viewers, what options are open to par-
of additional incidents of violent behavior would occur in that ents to limit the effects? One option is to try to limit access
region. In this manner, the effects of violent programming are to violent programming. In practice, this is difficult to do.
considered in the same way that smoking is considered as con- Children often watch television in public places or at friends’
tributing to lung cancer. Even among heavy lifelong smokers, houses, venues where parents have little or no control. In addi-
the odds are that the smoking will not lead to death from lung tion, it is not always obvious from the name of a program that
cancer. Although the lifelong smoker is much more likely to there will be extensive violence in its content. Even in their
die from lung cancer than a nonsmoker, the correlation is still own home, parents may have difficulty restricting access to
far from 1. It is true, however, that a smoker is more than 10 violent television. They are certainly not present at all times
times as likely to die from lung cancer as a nonsmoker. When when their children are watching television, and few parents
watching violent television is viewed in this way, the public have the time to carefully censor the content of all shows their
health threat of violence on television can be construed as one children watch.
of the largest threats in the United States, second only to that More official attempts to allow regulation of violence have
of smoking. There is a stronger correlation between media vio- not been widely implemented. In 1996, the U.S. Congress
lence and aggression than there is between condom use and passed legislation requiring manufacturers to install V-chips
sexual transmission of HIV, exposure to lead and IQ scores, in all television sets with screens larger than 13 inches by
and exposure to asbestos and laryngeal cancer (Bushman & January 1, 2000 (see Figure 15.18). Despite unfounded
Anderson, 2001). It is striking, especially in the wake of mas- opposition based on the claim that the chips would signifi-
sive legal settlements in areas such as smoking and asbestos cantly add to the price of television sets, V-chip technology
exposure, that the effects of media violence have never been was soon made available in all television sets at virtually no
adequately addressed. If, for example, studios and networks increase in cost. Programs were rated by networks for level
produced and distributed violent shows while fully knowing of violent and sexual content, and parents could select the
that such programming increased violent behavior, others level of violence they were willing to have on their televi-
might well hold them accountable for such actions. Indeed, sions. This technological innovation, however, led to little
some legal scholars have suggested that television should be real-life use by parents (Hazlett, 2004). Parents were mostly

Smoking and lung cancer FIGURE 15.17 Television violence

Media violence and aggression
as a public health threat. When
Condom use and sexually transmitted HIV
the correlations (both positive and
Passive smoking and lung cancer at work
Exposure to lead and IQ scores in children
negative) between various behaviors and
Nicotine patch and smoking cessation outcomes are compared, the correlation
Calcium intake and bone mass between media violence and aggression
Homework and academic achievement is larger than all other major public health
Exposure to asbestos and laryngeal cancer threats except for the correlation between
Self-examination and extent of breast cancer smoking and lung cancer, which is
−.2 −.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 only modestly higher. Adapted from
Correlation Bushman & Anderson (2001).

MEDIA INFLUENCES ON DEVELOPMENT 567

 dren (as well as being aversive if the parents do not enjoy the
content!).
In the end, censorship of content by parents or joint
watching and commenting by parents may mitigate some-
what the influences of television violence on aggression
in their children, but the effects of these interventions are
likely to be modest given the practical difficulties involved.
A more dramatic effect might occur if viewing of television
of any sort were heavily restricted. But to avoid being hypo-
critical, parents would also need to cut back on their own
viewing habits, and most are not willing to do so. More-
over, television acts as a form of “electronic babysitter” for
many parents who are unable to engage in more interac-
tive encounters with their children. Children are usually
remarkably passive and docile when lounging in front of a
television set (Condry, 1989), and this tranquilizing effect is
not lost on parents or on car manufacturers, who routinely
FIGURE 15.18 Filtering out television violence. In 2000,
include small video displays as a highly attractive option in
following a recommendation made by President Clinton (shown
here holding up a V-chip), the U.S. Congress mandated that all new
the family minivan.
television sets had to contain a V-chip, which could be set to filter out
television shows containing different levels of violence. Even though
most televisions soon had such chips, only a tiny percentage of par- Q: Describe at least two different approaches
ents ever programmed their televisions to limit their children’s access to reducing the effects of television violence on
to violent programming.
children. How effective have these approaches
been?
unwilling to learn the new techniques for programming
their televisions to block violent shows or did not want to Stereotyping in the Media While the vast majority of
deal with the hassles of having to turn the violence filters research on the effects of television has focused on how vio-
on and off for different viewers. Some cynical commenta- lent content increases aggression, the effects of television
tors have suggested that the V-chip was largely intended to may also involve gender, racial, and lifestyle stereotyping.
be a public relations maneuver to placate V-chip advocates Television programming shows young, traditionally attrac-
without ever threatening the ratings of television networks. tive women far more often than their representation in the
That argument gains credibility given the minimal effect population and more often than it does so for men (Witt,
of V-chip technology. An additional side effect of censoring 2000). When couples are shown, the casting director picks
television violence in the home, whether by means of the women who are considerably younger than the men, even
V-chip or some other intervention, may be to make such if the ages in the script are meant to be quite close, thus
programs become more desirable (“forbidden fruits”) to conveying a sense that married women should look younger
the children who are not allowed to watch the programs at than they actually are. In addition, the average television or
home. Although there are no systematic studies demonstrat- film actress is far more likely to have had extensive cosmetic
ing such a possibility, parents do report that their children surgery than is the norm in the general population, again
become especially eager and attentive audiences of forbid- creating a distorted image of body appearance.
den shows when at their friends’ houses. Women and girls are generally portrayed as less smart
Another option for parents who want to limit the effects and more submissive than men, and physical attractiveness
of violent television programs is for the parents to attempt is conveyed as more essential to a woman’s worth (Witt,
to reinterpret the violent content of shows or to make the 2000). Women’s marital status is usually clearly indicated,
shows less attractive to their children. Some studies do while it is often ambiguous for men. Men are more fre-
indicate that when parents watch shows with their children quently portrayed in leadership roles or as being pivotal to
and voice concern over the violent episodes as they occur, a decision or change in events. The same stereotypes occur
children who might otherwise be at risk end up being less in advertising. Although there are some recent exceptions
violent (Anderson et al., 2003), but extensive work has not in which women are portrayed in smart, strong roles (for
yet been done in this area. Moreover, it is difficult for many example, as judges, lawyers, doctors, and even as the presi-
busy parents to consistently watch television with their chil- dent of a country), these are exceptions to a general pattern

568 CHAPTER 15 BECOMING PART OF THE COMMUNITY

that has been consistent for decades (Collins, 2011). More- impression to viewers that their lifestyles are out of line with
over, across several types of media, there is an increasing the “norms” presented on television. Given frequent claims
trend to portray women, but not men, in explicit sexual of how television might distort children’s perceptions of vari-
roles (Bleakley et al., 2012; Hatton & Trautner, 2011). ous norms (Woodhouse, 2004), there is a clear need for more
It is commonly believed that such depictions give children focused experimental research on such issues.
distorted images of norms of appearance, affluence, and even
diet. There are also frequent claims that the media pressures
young women to engage in certain behaviors, pushing some
into anorexia (Hamilton & Waller, 1993; see also Groesz Video Games, Computers,
et al., 2002; Kilbourne, 1994; see Chapter 17). One particu- and the Internet
larly dramatic suggestion of such influences arose from a study
on the introduction of television into a rural community in One of the most dramatic changes in recent years has been
Western Fiji in 1995 (Becker, 2004; Becker et al., 2002). In the surge in the use of video games, computers, and the Inter-
3 years, exposure to prime-time soap operas featuring young net by children in developed countries and, increasingly, in
female characters who were all attractive and thin was associ- developing and undeveloped regions. In addition, because
ated with a rise from almost no weight-conscious behaviors to the Internet and games can now be accessed not just through
15 percent of adolescent girls reporting using induced vomit- computers, but also through tablets and smartphones, many
ing to control weight and 69 percent reporting having been children are connected and playing games almost every wak-
on diets (see Figure 15.19). Roughly half the girls thought that ing hour and in every possible location. The patterns of usage
they were too fat. It certainly appeared that television had ush- are now so extensive that they have led researchers to initiate
ered in a new set of views of the preferred female body. a wave of studies on the effects of these forms of media on
Television may also influence perceptions of norms of children. Although the studies and effects are quite similar
affluence and consumerism. The protagonists in most shows in many ways to research on television, there are important
tend to be more affluent than most people in North America, differences related to intrinsic properties of these forms of
let alone in other parts of the world (Taylor, 1989; Yang et al., media, most notably their interactive features.
2008). Moreover, the activities of the protagonists are often
consumer based, including shopping and attending events Video Games Playing video games now rivals the time
and clubs, and rarely show activities such as doing homework, children spend watching television (Rideout et al., 2010).
household chores, or working at a desk (Anderson, 1995). In The emerging literature on video games generally suggests
many ways, this bias is hardly surprising, as much of real life that the effects of video games can be both more positive
does not make good entertainment. But it may convey an and more negative than the effects of television, in essence
amplifying influences when a child is an active participant
in a game as opposed to a passive viewer. In addition, as
video games become ever more realistic and engrossing, their
effects may increase as well (Greitemeyer, 2011). Finally, just
as with television, the content of the video games is critical
to whether they have positive or negative effects.
One surprising positive change that differs from the effects
of television viewing involves improvements in attention skills,
such as noticing objects and avoiding distractors (Green &
Bavelier, 2003; Powers et al., 2013). Moreover, people with
extensive experience playing video games can have a distinct
advantage in learning laparoscopic surgical techniques that
involve manipulations of robotic arms via joysticks and other
computer interfaces (Rosser et al., 2007). This is hardly to
say that aspiring surgeons should devote more energy to
video games than to traditional academic experiences, but
it is intriguing that, as surgical techniques increasingly use
FIGURE 15.19 The introduction of television into rural Fiji.
video and robotic interfaces, those techniques may come to
One study documented a close association between the introduction
of U.S. network television programming into rural areas of Fiji and draw on skills derived through extensive experience with
a very substantial rise in weight-conscious behaviors, ranging from video games. In many areas of expertise, it can take several
dieting to eating disorders. The associations were primarily found for thousand hours of practice to reach high levels of proficiency
girls in late childhood and the teenage years. (Ericsson & Charness, 1994). Comparable effects of video

MEDIA INFLUENCES ON DEVELOPMENT 569

 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL P OLICY

Free Speech and Children’s Rights

A
discussion of children and the media should consider protection of free speech and that the high school’s principal
not just the media that children are exposed to but was allowed to forbid publication in the school newspaper
also the media that children produce. One of the most of items that he thought might embarrass members of the
controversial topics in social policy concerning school community (for example, the effects of divorce on
children involves restraints on what children are able to families) or that might be inappropriate for younger readers
say and write. This topic brings into play issues concern- of the paper (for example, discussions of birth control and
ing the moral development of children, the development of sexual activity).
impulse control, and peer aggression, among many others. Why was free speech not guaranteed in a high school
It also raises questions about whether children should be newspaper, given that it is usually allowed on college cam-
restricted in their own speech so as to protect others from pus newspapers? Why should high school students be forced
that speech, and it thereby again introduces issues concern- to “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
ing the influence of media on children, even when it is pro- expression at the schoolhouse gate” (Tinker v. Des Moines
duced by peers. Independent Community School District, 1969)? Some cases
In many countries, free speech is one of the most cher- are related to concerns that the school newspaper might
ished rights of its citizens. It may therefore seem ironic that contain material that would be inappropriate for younger
free speech is not guaranteed for children and adolescents in readers at the school, but many other cases simply involve
some contexts, most notably in the schools. The legal rationale speech that is uncomfortable for the faculty and administra-
against granting free speech to children is based on theories tion of a school or that is perceived as “disruptive to the edu-
about children’s cognitive and social development as well as cational mission of the school” (Garnett, 2008). The notion
ideas of promoting the educational mission of schools. In 1988, of disruption, however, can be difficult to define and often
the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Hazelwood School District seems to involve assumptions about how the immaturity of
et al. v. Kuhlmeier et al. that a group of high school students minors makes them more easily influenced. In one highly
who were members of the Hazelwood East High School, in publicized case (Morse v. Frederick, 2007), a student in a
St. Louis County, Missouri, did not automatically have the public high school in Juneau, Alaska, was suspended from

game experience are now being found in other domains as course airplane piloting. There are few popular video games
well, such as learning how to remotely operate drone aircraft that focus on prosocial behavior and even fewer studies of
(McKinley et al., 2011). the positive effects of such games. But based on findings
Given that many children start playing video games about the effects of prosocial television shows, researchers
before they even enter school, the cognitive effects of play- expect to find comparable if not even stronger effects of
ing such games that are seen in adolescents may be building video games that reward prosocial, nonaggressive behavior
on many years of prior experience. Any adult without video (Wilson, 2008). In fact, such effects are now being uncov-
game experience who tries to learn a new game along with ered by researchers. For example, one study randomly
a child rapidly realizes how much he is at a disadvantage as assigned college students either to a prosocial video game
a learner. Children may have years of expertise gained from in which their goal was to take care of small creatures or
playing a wide variety of video games that gives them a huge to a neutral game involving falling shapes (Tetris). Later,
head start even for learning a completely novel game. the experiments staged an aggressive encounter between
Many video games are designed to teach specific skills, people in the laboratory and measured the likelihood of the
such as mathematics skills (Lopez-Morteo & Lopez, 2007) game players to intervene. Those who had previously played
and various science topics (Minton, 2008). When the games the prosocial version intervened more than half the time,
are well designed, they usually have strong educational ben- while those who had played the neutral game intervened only
efits (Swing & Anderson, 2008). In addition, video games one-fifth of the time (Greitemeyer & Osswald, 2010). Other
have successfully been used to facilitate instruction in mili- studies have shown that even when playing violent video
tary strategy and operations, disease management, and of games, if the players form cooperative teams, some prosocial

570 CHAPTER 15 BECOMING PART OF THE COMMUNITY

school when he held up a banner with the phrase “BONG HiTS suspension was constitutional. The Court ruled that the banner’s
4 JESUS” as an Olympic torch was being carried down the street message had the potential to be disruptive to the school because
(see Figure 15.20). Even though the student did not display the it might encourage students to engage in illegal drug use. The
banner on school grounds, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the same behavior by a college student or a town resident would be
protected under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
What is it about younger children that suggests that they should
be treated differently?
The challenge here is knowing what is appropriate in terms of
constraints on what children are allowed to say or have access
to (Hudson, 2004). Some, for example, have argued that in the
post-Columbine era, students’ rights, free speech among them, are
being trampled through such actions as censorship in attempts to
ensure their safety (Calvert, 2000). It would seem that the only
way to have informed opinions about when to curtail such rights
would be to have better research on a host of developmental ques-
tions. In particular, is there something about younger children that
requires that they need protection from certain kinds of information
while older youth do not? In what ways are the taste and judg-
ment of younger children deficient and in need of monitoring? Are
aspects of children’s ability to engage in moral reasoning relevant
to their entitlement to free speech? As children and adolescents
FIGURE 15.20 Freedom of speech and minors. When a group have ever-increasing access to public forums through such means
of high school students unfurled a provocative banner on a public as Internet websites, blogs, and social networking, the challenges
street while a parade passed in Juneau, Alaska, a student from an
of constraining their free speech appropriately are also increas-
area high school was suspended for holding up the banner. The case,
which was heard by the U.S. Supreme Court, raised fundamental ing. Scholars are now asking how developmental psychology might
questions about why the developmental status of minors should inform debates about the boundaries of free speech for children
curtail some rights concerning free speech. and adolescents (Levesque, 2007).

behaviors may also be promoted in later tasks (Greitemeyer where the causal influence is much clearer but the effects
et al., 2012). The authors of these studies strongly suggest are more likely to be measured only on a short-term basis
that such positive effects of prosocial games should also be (Anderson & Bushman, 2001; Gentile & Anderson, 2006;
found in quite young children, but large-scale experimental Sherry, 2001; Swing & Anderson, 2008). Researchers suggest
studies still need to be done with younger populations. that the same clusters of factors that mediate the influence of
When video games contain violence, they may facilitate violent television on aggressive behavior are at work in video
aggression even more than television programs, as video games as well, including desensitization, arousal, priming of
games foster and train active aggression as part of the experi- certain actions and response tendencies, and learning new
ence rather than offering passive viewing, as is the case with ways to aggress (Anderson et al., 2010; Swing & Anderson,
television. A child learning to play a video game becomes 2008). In addition, researchers have argued that video games
more and more skilled at killing, maiming, and brutalizing have properties that may cause greater effects than televi-
other agents, many of which can look like normal humans. sion. These properties include increased identification with
Although the body of research on video games and aggres- the aggressor (in many games the player can pick an aggres-
sion is less extensive than that on television, most reviews sor that he identifies with), active participation, rehearsal
of the research conclude that, similar to the findings with of aggressive actions from start to finish, direct rewards for
television, there is a relation between the time spent playing engaging in violent behavior, and a much higher incidence of
violent video games and increased levels of aggression. More- violent episodes per hour. Heavy involvement in aggressive
over, the relation is found in both naturalistic studies, where role-playing games on the Internet may have similar effects
causation is more difficult to infer, and experimental studies, (Holtz & Appel, 2011; Krahé et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2010). In

MEDIA INFLUENCES ON DEVELOPMENT 571

some experimental studies with children, simply playing vio- Computer use Internet use
lent video games for a few hours can increase levels of both

Percentage of computer
100
aggressive cognition (speed of accessing violent concepts) and

use or Internet use

aggressive behavior, such as deciding on harsh punishments 75
for opponents in games (Anderson et al., 2007). Playing vio- 50
lent video games also results in decreased empathy and pro-
social behavior, with these effects apparently equally strong 25
in both males and females (Anderson & Hanson, 2010).
0
In short, although video games have great potential for 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
positive effects, ranging from well-documented influences in Age (in years)
cognition and learning to effects in the prosocial realm, they FIGURE 15.21 Percentage of computer use or Internet use by
also can have well-documented negative effects, depending age. In the United States, the use of computers and the Internet has
on the content of the games. In particular, when the games become widespread. Even 25 percent of 5-year-olds in 2001 used
contain violence, as the vast majority of popular video games the Internet. From DeBell & Chapman (2003), based on data from
do, they increase aggressive thoughts and behaviors in chil- the U.S. Census Bureau (2001).
dren at least as much as watching violent television shows
does and quite possibly a good bit more.
ing to a community of peers (Valkenburg & Peter, 2007). One
Internet Communities In a relatively brief period of time, possible consequence is that children and adolescents are likely
a whole new kind of community has emerged that children to disclose personal details about themselves to relative strang-
and adolescents, as well as adults, have joined in droves: ers far more quickly online than in person (Bargh et al., 2002;
social networks on the Internet (Subrahmanyam & Green- Gross et al., 2002), with the possible effect of forming much
field, 2008). Although social network sites such as MySpace more intimate friendships in a shorter period of time while not
and Facebook officially prohibit users younger than 14 or really having those people as normal friends.
13 years of age, assessments of real users suggest that many A closer look at Internet use patterns by children and
of the users are quite a bit younger (Rosen et al., 2008). adolescents suggests how proposals for both negative and
By some estimates, almost 40 percent of children between positive effects may be true in specific contexts. In partic-
9 and 12 years old use Facebook (Livingstone et al., 2011). ular, we can partition social interactions on the Internet
In addition, while many children and young adolescents are into two kinds: those that continue relationships devel-
using social network sites to create communities of friends oped in the real world, taking them into the Internet via
and role-playing groups, and while parents report that they e-mail, instant messaging, and status updates, and those
are concerned about what goes on in such Internet commu- that involve meeting strangers online via chat rooms and
nities, in practice most parents are unaware of what their social networking sites (Blais et al., 2008). The use of
children are actually doing when logged onto such com- the Internet to support already formed real-world rela-
munities (Rosen et al., 2008). More broadly, in developed tionships generally seems to have positive social benefits,
countries, and increasingly in developing countries, many with children and adolescents experiencing stronger and
children are using the Internet by the fourth grade, through more satisfying social relationships in ways that seem to
e-mail, instant messaging services, chat rooms, and other build and enhance friendships and romantic relationships
ways that connect individuals (Blais et al., 2008; Lenhart (Manago et al., 2012; Reich et al., 2012). In contrast,
et al., 2001). When simple access to the Internet of any type those who form new relationships with strangers online
is examined, even 25 percent of 5-year-olds have some access generally find them to be less satisfying and experience
(see Figure 15.21). In addition, use of the Internet for such increased alienation and lower-quality friendships. While
activities as chat rooms, instant messaging, and role-playing it does appear that the majority of children use the Inter-
games occurs widely across the entire socioeconomic spec- net to build on existing real-world relationships, as many
trum (see Table 15.3). as a quarter of those in some age groups may focus on
Scholars have been divided over the effects of Internet activ- developing friendships with strangers (Blais et al., 2008).
ity on social development. Some suggest that social interac- Moreover, in some cases, patterns of online media usage
tions on the Internet are a poor substitute for real-world social are related to negative social outcomes. For example, one
interactions and result in weakened real-world social relation- study of over 3,000 girls between the ages of 8 and 12
ships and loneliness (Kraut et al., 1998). Others propose that found that girls who showed high use of Internet media,
the Internet provides opportunities for maintaining, enrich- especially online videos, experienced increased negative
ing, and discovering new social relationships and thereby social interaction (they had trouble making friends or
enhances social relationships, intimacy, and a sense of belong- engaging in social activities and disapproval by their par-

572 CHAPTER 15 BECOMING PART OF THE COMMUNITY

 Family Income

Internet activity Less than $20,000– $35,000– $50,000– $75,000 or

$20,000 $34,999 $49,999 $74,999 more
Completing school 63.5 65.8 68.7 73.2 78.2
assignments
E-mail or instant messaging 45.6 54.3 61.6 68.3 75.8
Playing games 58.1 61.4 65.3 63.7 62.6
News/weather/sports 32.2 33.8 33.0 38.9 42.3
Finding information on 24.0 28.7 30.2 34.7 41.6
products
Chat rooms or listservs 20.1 17.4 19.5 20.6 22.5
Watching/listening to TV, 19.3 18.1 19.4 18.5 20.4
movies, radio
Making purchases 5.9 6.1 6.7 10.5 16.8
Phone calls 4.5 3.3 3.3 2.6 3.0
Taking a course online 1.5 0.7 1.2 0.7 0.9

Other 1.7 1.7 1.3 2.0 1.7

TABLE 15.3 Internet use patterns (shown as percentages) and socioeconomic status. Usage patterns of the Internet are quite similar
across various socioeconomic groups, with a tendency toward higher usage rates in most categories for more affluent children. Adapted from
DeBell & Chapman (2003), based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau (2001).

ents of their friends). In contrast, higher levels of face-to- longer periods by posting hurtful messages or graphics on
face communication were associated with more positive Web pages or bulletin boards. Cyberbullying raises concerns
social well-being (Pea et al., 2012). because of the ways it departs from real-world bullying (Men-
Other studies suggest that a primary focus with online esini & Spiel, 2012). Cyberbullies can be anonymous, they
friends can lead to a form of “Internet addiction” in which can search out a wider range of vulnerable targets, and they
children of both sexes seem to become intensely preoccupied can more easily find willing accomplices. The potential to
with online activities as opposed to face-to-face interactions embarrass or humiliate another person can be greatly exacer-
(Smahel et al., 2012). Most children, however, seem to use bated by having a much larger audience to witness the event.
the Internet in a manner that helps promote and maintain In addition, cyberbullying tends to be even less monitored by
offline relationships. In addition, only a relatively small num- adults, who may be largely oblivious to harsh bullying that
ber of children seem to engage in Internet activities that are would be noticed in the real world. This may be a particularly
unsafe with respect to exposure to either inappropriate con- acute problem because incidences of bullying can spiral out
tent or individuals (Valcke et al., 2011). For parents who are of control in a community when parents and school authori-
concerned about the time their children are spending on the ties have little or no awareness that it is happening. Finally,
Internet, it is clearly important to get a sense of what activities any feelings of empathy that might be triggered when a vic-
their children are engaging in to assess whether they might tim is being bullied face-to-face are not likely to be triggered
be harmful. As noted earlier, the vast majority of parents on the Internet (Li, 2007; see also Blais, 2008; Patchin &
find it difficult to monitor Internet activity at that level of Hinduja, 2006; Smith et al., 2008, for related discussions of
detail. Fortunately, the early fears of children being exposed the unique aspects of cyberbullying). Moreover, cyberbullies
to nearly continuous hazards seem to be heavily exaggerated. report lower feelings of remorse for their actions than do bul-
One troubling pattern in Internet activity among children lies in the physical world (Slonje et al., 2012).
and adolescents is known as cyberbullying, a form of aggres- It appears that bullies on the Internet are often the same
sion over the Internet, often by a group against an individual individuals who engage in bullying in the real world (Blais,
(Li, 2007; Ybarra & Mitchell, 2004, 2008). Cyberbullying 2008; Gradinger et al., 2009; Olweus, 2012; Vazsonyi
can occur in real time as users gang up on one another in an et al., 2012). The effects of cyberbullying seem quite simi-
instant message board or chat room. It can also occur over lar to those of real-world bullying, with victims showing

MEDIA INFLUENCES ON DEVELOPMENT 573

decreased levels of social belonging and a worse quality of of this chapter is the influences of ever-widening communi-
social life at school. In addition, because cyberbullying is ties on the developing child. We therefore will ask how cul-
usually a form of relational social aggression, it appears to tures and subcultures can cause children to come to adopt
be practiced more by girls than by boys (Blais, 2008; Smith certain “lenses” on reality that result in their interpreting
et al., 2008; Sourander et al., 2010). Taken together, the situations and adopting values quite differently from those
research on cyberbullying suggests that parents and other who come from different backgrounds. In addition, we will
authority figures need to maintain their own presence on see how socialization of attributional styles, as discussed
the Internet and a level of Web literacy if they are to have earlier this chapter, can be a mechanism of immersing a
some influence in stopping inappropriate aggressive behav- child in a cultural role.
ior between peers on the Internet.
The effects of cyberbullying can be so devastating as
to compel a victim to commit suicide. In a widely publi-
cized case in 2006, Megan Meier, a 13-year-old girl, was Distinctive Cultural and Subcultural Roles
befriended by a “Josh Evans” on MySpace. But Josh Evans One example of the role played by culture is seen in how
was a fictitious name invented by the mother of a former children who grow up in the southern United States react
friend of Meier who was worried about what Meier was say- to insults as opposed to how children in the rest of the
ing about her daughter online. After initially sending Meier country react to them. The culture in the South has been
friendly messages, the mother and others had “Josh Evans” labeled a culture of honor in that many people in the
turn on Meier and reject her on the website. The rejection South endorse greater levels of violence in certain situations,
was seen as leading to Meier’s suicide. This case also illus- most notably when they have been insulted or perceived
trates how bullying of a child can sometimes not just come threats to their home or property (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996;
from peers but from adults as well when they think their see Figure 15.22). Adult southerners show higher levels of
identities can be concealed. In short, cyberbullying has the anger responses, including greater testosterone and cortisol
potential to amplify the effects of offline bullying in dev- levels, to threats that northerners might shrug off as incon-
astating ways. But it is important to also understand that sequential. Similarly, acts of violence in response to insults
its prevalence is far less than traditional bullying, that the or threats to home and property are viewed as more accept-
extreme sensationalized accounts are very rare, and that able by southerners. This difference is confined to violent
very often the same individuals are involved in cyberbully- responses of the sort just described, not to violence of all
ing and traditional bullying (Olweus, 2012). sorts. The culture of honor is sometimes compared with
cultures that emphasize “dignity” or “keeping face,” with
each culture having particular ways of perceiving and react-
ing to social situations (Leung & Cohen, 2011).
Q: How might the greatly increased presence
of computers, Internet access, and video games
influence the social development of children?

Roles in the Larger Culture

In addition to the influences of various specific factors on
children, such as television, video games, and peers, the
broader culture as a whole can exert its own influences on
children, influences that may largely be invisible to those
within that culture but obvious to those outside it. These
influences can be seen as setting up certain roles that all
members of that culture are expected to play in social inter-
actions. We will consider roles that apply similarly to all FIGURE 15.22 The culture of honor in the South. Children who
are brought up in the southeastern United States tend to adopt a
members of a culture or subculture, as well as roles that seem
“culture of honor” in which acts of violence in response to insults or
to be organized around gender. Throughout this book we threats to property are seen as more acceptable than in other areas
have considered cultural and gender differences in specific of the United States. Similar cultures of honor have been found in
contexts as they arise, but it is useful in this chapter to con- other regions of the world where children are socialized in ways that
sider cultural and gender roles more directly. A major theme teach accepted forms of response to aggression and insult.

574 CHAPTER 15 BECOMING PART OF THE COMMUNITY

 Adherence to this culture of honor seems to take place by Allowing for these variations within cultures as a func-
middle childhood, and it may be partly learned through dif- tion of social status and gender, it has still repeatedly been
ferent patterns of child rearing in which violent responses to observed that children in individualist societies are strongly
perceived insults are often seen as a legitimate way of socializ- socialized to act as individuals who are self-directed and have
ing children. It may also be mediated by how the culture, par- their own personal styles. Children in collectivist societies
ents, and peers shift the social attributional styles of children. are strongly socialized to identify with a group and to think
Thus, as discussed earlier in this chapter, children vary in the about the common good (Chen & French, 2008). This also
attributions they make about ambiguous situations. Attitudes seems to be reflected in play. Children from individualist cul-
produced by different cultures may cause group differences tures show increased tendencies to engage in “sociodramatic”
in how ambiguous situations are interpreted and what the play, meaning that they tend to act out more fantastical sce-
thresholds are for considering an act as aggressive (Dodge, narios, often with superheroes or other exotic actors, playing
2006). These differences can appear very early in develop- dramatic and unrealistic roles in which they personally save
ment. For example, one study showed behaviors and social the day. In contrast, children from collectivist cultures tend
categorizations that are typical of a culture of honor appear- to act out more mundane, everyday situations that involve
ing earlier and more robustly in young Spanish children than family members. Children from these two cultures also tend
in young Dutch children (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2000). to resolve conflicts differently. Thus, when groups of four
Cultures also vary in the extent to which their children are 7-year-olds from China and groups of four 7-year-olds from
guided toward making either compliant or defiant responses, Canada played with a single highly desirable toy, the Chinese
with the result that different scripts are activated in difficult children tended to respond more positively to requests by
situations (Chen & French, 2008). Thus, in rural Nepal, chil- peers for possession of the toy. Moreover, passive and reticent
dren from the high-status Brahman caste are not rebuked for behaviors were treated with more group acceptance by the
using anger to solve problems in difficult situations, while Chinese children than by the Canadian children. It was also
children from the low-status Tamang caste are strongly dis- common for Chinese children to defer to one or two children
couraged from doing so (Cole et al., 2002, 2006). as group “leaders” who coordinated actions of the group with
respect to the toy. Canadian children, on the other hand,
referred more to norms of sharing and were more likely to
Q: What is the “culture of honor”? In what ways spontaneously give the toy to a peer (French et al., 2011). This
might it influence how children from such a study, which had several subtle cultural contrasts, illustrates
how in a specific setting and task, cultural differences can
culture react in certain situations? manifest themselves in unique and complex ways.
Socialization differences are also seen in parental views
A different cultural contrast discussed earlier in this book of how children should control themselves under stress and
(see Chapters 1, 12, and 13) is between collectivist and indi- how they should handle conflicts with peers. Parents in col-
vidualist cultures (Triandis, 1995). Individualist cultures, lectivist cultures are less tolerant of overt conflicts among
which include most Western cultures, stress the rights of the children, while parents in individualist cultures see merit
individual as the most important consideration in a soci- in some level of disagreement and in defending one’s own
ety. The United States is often said to have one of the most views. Similarly, parents in collectivist cultures highly value
individualist cultures. Collectivist cultures, which exist self-regulation skills in difficult situations or conflicts and
throughout the world, tend to emphasize the rights of the place a higher priority on the importance of preserving
group relative to those of the individual. It is not simply the harmony, even if it is at some expense to individual rights
case, however, that a particular culture produces only one (Chen & French, 2008).
kind of orientation. When researchers examine parenting These cultural differences have also been interpreted in
styles cross-culturally, they find that both forms of cultural terms of Bronfenbrenner’s ecological systems approach to
values are taught to young children in all cultures, even if development, which has been used to interpret many pat-
these cultures are normally labeled collectivist or individu- terns in this chapter (Chen & French, 2008). Children adapt
alist (Wang & Tamis-Lamonda, 2003). But within a par- to the niches in which they grow up, finding ways to fit
ticular culture, a child’s social status may influence what their talents and natures within the culture around them.
values are expressed in what contexts. Thus, dominant The dynamic nature of such adaptation is vividly seen in
and powerful members of a culture often find it easier to cases where cultures change dramatically over time. One of
embrace moral reasoning from an individualist perspective the first documented instances occurred in the 1930s when
(Turiel, 2002). Moreover, there are also some gender differ- the great Soviet psychologist Alexander Luria went to cen-
ences in patterns of socialization across cultures, leading to tral Asia to study what happened as rural peasants became
differences in what values are expressed by girls and boys. assimilated into a town and the emerging Soviet culture

ROLES IN THE LARGER CULTURE 575

(Luria, 1974). Although Luria’s investigations largely focused what behaviors, preferences, and beliefs are associated with
on cognitive factors, they showed how, as peasant children both genders, and then usually adopt the gender behaviors,
and their parents learned to read, write, and function within preferences, and beliefs that are typical of their own gender
Soviet culture, their cognitive styles and ways of interpreting (Bigler & Liben, 2007; Martin & Halverson, 1981; Ruble &
situations began to change and they became better able to fit Martin, 1998).
into the radically changing social structures around them. While gender-based toy preferences emerge quite early,
Later studies have applied this analysis of historical change at least by 2 years of age (Weinraub et al., 1984), inferences
to the collectivist/individualist contrast. For example, par- about complex roles and activities take considerably lon-
ents in traditional cultures in Turkey shifted away from col- ger to develop, with a majority of children not matching
lectivist ideals to individualist ones concerning their views activities to gender until late preschool or early elementary
on child rearing when they moved into cities and became school (Campbell et al., 2004). For example, while a 2-year-
more affluent (Chen & French, 2008). Similarly, as China old boy might prefer playing with trucks to playing with
went through revolutionary changes toward a market econ- dolls, not until 4 or 5 years of age might he actually know
omy in the 1990s, researchers found shifts in the traits that that certain activities are stereotypically done by boys or
parents and peers valued in children. For example, during girls. Such activities can include hobbies, careers, and even
the early 1990s, childhood traits that were compatible with intellectual pursuits, such as mathematics. For example, by
group harmony, such as shyness, were perceived positively second grade, many children, especially boys, see math as
and were related to peer acceptance. But by the end of the an especially appropriate activity for boys (Cvencek et al.,
decade, those same traits were perceived negatively and asso- 2011). Although these particular stereotypes may vary from
ciated with peer rejection, as the ability to excel and stand culture to culture, it does appear that in all the cultures that
out became increasingly prized (Chen et al., 2005; Chen & were studied, gender-based stereotypes are picked up on at
French, 2008). roughly the same time (Knobloch et al., 2005). Thus, the
The message of the collectivist/individualist contrast may cognitive factors involved in adopting cultural stereotypes
extend to other supposed contrasts between cultures. Cul- involve both universal processes and those that are specific
tures are rarely, if ever, exclusively dedicated to one cognitive to a particular culture (Kohlberg, 1966).
style or value system. Instead, most children in most cultures If cultures can influence perceptions of gender-appropriate
can be thought of as being exposed to most variations. As activities, can they also affect positive and negative attitudes
they grow older, children start to master nuances of how dif- toward the work typically done by different genders? Unfortu-
ferent styles and value systems are likely to be favored in local nately, there appears to be a widespread effect of how society
cultural contexts. Overall, this can amount to broad differ- values different kinds of work associated with different gen-
ences between cultures, but the subtleties and contextually ders, and it seems to be difficult to change. Consider one series
induced variations should always be kept in mind as well of studies looking at how children perceive the relative status
(Conry-Murray & Turiel, 2012; Rentfrow et al., 2008). of pink- and blue-collar jobs (Liben et al., 2001). Children at
ages 6 and 11 years were asked to judge the status of various
jobs and their own personal interest in the jobs. First, they
Q: What are some general ways in which were asked to judge familiar jobs, such as doctor, farmer, den-
cultures vary in their perspectives of the social tist, plumber, truck driver, auto mechanic, and scientist (cul-
turally masculine jobs), and fashion model, librarian, nurse,
world? Are these perspectives better thought of secretary, teacher, and bank teller (culturally feminine jobs).
as fixed limitations or as default biases? Girls and boys at both ages judged the masculine jobs to have
a higher status (as measured by questions such as “How hard
do you think it is to learn to be a(n) ____?” or “How impor-
tant is the job of being a(n) _______?”), while saying that they
Gender Roles and Stereotyping would be more interested in actually doing the jobs that cor-
As we saw in Chapter 14, quite young children are aware of responded to the stereotypes associated with their gender.
their gender. But how do they learn to map certain activities This pattern of results, however, does not make it clear
and objects onto their gender so as to conform to their cul- how the linkage between gender, status, and occupation
ture’s stereotypes? Although there are arguments that some gets set up in the first place. Perhaps children see the higher
preferred activities and toys may arise from children’s own status accorded to people in specific jobs and then note the
dispositions, it also seems clear that the culture at large pro- dominant gender. Alternatively, they might form a stereo-
vides considerable information about what it considers to be type that men’s work is of higher status, regardless of what
gender-typical behaviors and preferences. It is thought that it is, simply because it is performed by the “higher-status”
children first identify themselves with a gender, then observe gender. To test this second alternative, Liben and her col-

576 CHAPTER 15 BECOMING PART OF THE COMMUNITY

leagues created novel occupations to which children could high
not have had any prior exposure and described them to a
child either with all males engaging in the occupation or all
females, as shown in Figure 15.24. The researchers asked

Rigidity
younger and older children the status questions and inter-
est questions. The older children showed a clear gender-

consolidation
linked status rating, judging exactly the same occupation as

flexibility
being of higher status when modeled by males. The younger

learning
children showed no significant difference in their ratings
based on whether the job was modeled by a male or female;
low
there were no differences in their interest in doing the jobs, 3 12
and the gender of the children did not influence how they Age (in years)
judged the status of the jobs (Liben et al., 2001). FIGURE 15.23 Gender stereotype rigidity and age. The rigidity
The results suggest that for familiar jobs, gender stereo- of gender stereotypes, as learned from a culture, reaches a peak at
types emerge quite early and that jobs typically associated roughly 5 years of age. Adapted from Martin & Ruble (2004).
with males are valued more highly. Apparently, this value
structure then becomes an interpretive schema for prejudg- groups is further enhanced when the culture at large tends
ing the status of totally novel occupations as a function of to label them, as when a teacher says, “Good morning boys
the gender that models that occupation. One obvious ques- and girls.” Quite remarkably, negative attitudes toward a
tion for future research is whether there might be dramatic group can be produced in just a matter of a few weeks. In
cross-cultural differences in the extent to which occupa- one study, researchers randomly assigned children as young
tions gain or lose status merely as a function of which gen- as 6 to either a blue-colored T-shirt group or a green-colored
der typically holds that kind of job. T-shirt group, and teachers had the children form lines or be
One intriguing finding on the emergence of gender stereo- seated or do other tasks based on whether they were wearing
types is that as younger children learn and consolidate a stereo- a blue or green T-shirt. Even though both groups were treated
type and before they learn to be more flexible, they may hold equally, within a few weeks, the children in each group had
stronger stereotypes than older children (Martin & Ruble, increased negative attitudes toward the members of the other
2004). It seems that initially, at around age 3, they struggle group (Bigler et al., 1997). If bias can be found in such artifi-
to learn a stereotype and that during that period, they apply it cial cases with no real differences in treatment, it is easy to see
unevenly to a sex. Then, when they clearly master the stereo- how much stronger the effects can be in the real world. Later
type, they tend to apply it far too rigidly as an essentially all-or- studies have shown that 5-year-olds will quickly adopt nega-
none statement about appropriateness of an activity for males tive biases to an out-group that is set up on clearly arbitrary
or females. Thus, a 5-year-old might be observed to vehemently grounds and will distort information so that it is positively
insist that police officers can only be men, even if that child has construed for the in-group and negatively construed for the
regularly observed female police officers in his neighborhood. out-group (Dunham et al., 2011; see Scientific Method box).
This rigidity may be related to an early tendency to see gender More naturalistically, even preschoolers show group favorit-
roles as closely linked to biological essences (Taylor et al., 2009). ism at an implicit level that is just as strong as it is in later
As the stereotype is mastered in later childhood and becomes childhood and adulthood. The preschool children seem to be
easy to deploy, children tend to become increasingly flexible in “prepared” to develop such implicit prejudices and to quickly
the way they use it (see Figure 15.23). Even younger children, adopt them at full strength (Dunham et al., 2013).
however, can show some flexibility when they think about the Biases can also emerge from other superficial markers of
context in which a gender norm is observed, such as when it out-group status, such as accent. For example, when two novel
occurs in a different culture (Conry-Murray & Turiel, 2012). speakers were observed by 2-year-olds, both U.S. and French
This may provide ways of helping younger children abandon children preferred to give a “present” to the individual who
rigid stereotypes. was a native speaker as opposed to giving it to someone who
The general process of forming group-based stereotypes was speaking with a foreign accent (Kinzler et al., 2012). Even
has been examined within the framework of what is known younger infants (10-month-olds) preferred toys that were
as developmental intergroup theory (Bigler & Liben, modeled by people with native accents as opposed to foreign
2007). According to this theory, at least as early as age 4, accents. Children also preferred to associate with those who
children start to notice perceptually salient group differences had their same native accent (Kinzler et al., 2009).
and attach these to stereotypes. (This especially happens The use of stereotypes to predict the behaviors of oth-
in regard to “minority groups,” groups that are proportion- ers does not require a rich sense of the mental lives of oth-
ally smaller in an overall population.) The salience of such ers, which is part of the reason stereotypes are so pernicious.

ROLES IN THE LARGER CULTURE 577

 NEW DIRECTION S IN DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH

The Development of Racial and Ethnic

Occupational Stereotypes

F
or many years, it has been known that prejudice against culture stereotypes about the relation of job status to the domi-
disadvantaged ethnic and racial groups is present by nant ethnic and racial groups, assuming that European Ameri-
at least the elementary school years (Clark, 1955). The cans were more likely to dominate in the higher-status jobs and
nature of prejudice and discrimination has changed African Americans in the lower-status jobs. This difference was
in the past few decades, however, from explicit and willful just as strong in African-American children whose parents were
attacks on other groups to more implicit forms of discrimina- from high-SES backgrounds and thus occupied high-status jobs.
tion in which the actor often believes that he is not prejudiced Evidently, counterexamples from their own family were not suf-
(Dovidio et al, 1997; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Wittenbrink et al., ficient to block the cultural stereotype. At the same time, and
1997). Interestingly, the attitudes of parents and peers do contrary to gender results, the children all indicated a prefer-
not always predict those of children (Aboud & Doyle, 1996; ence to have the higher-status jobs, even though they perceived
Stephan, 1999). Children seem to be most influenced by those such jobs as being dominated by a racial group different from
peers and adults whom they most respect and who discuss their own.
prejudice in ways that touch on topics that the children care The most compelling result, however, came in a study mod-
most about (Aboud & Fenwick, 1999). In addition, some forms eled closely after the gender study described in Figure 15.24.
of prejudice may arise from observations of how the culture at Novel occupations were pictured with either European-American
large seems to treat and value different groups. In the United models or African-American models doing the same jobs. For
States, it has repeatedly been shown that both European- exactly the same occupation, the race of the models had a large
American and African-American children tend to develop nega- impact on status ratings by both first- and sixth-graders, with
tive stereotypes regarding African Americans (Aboud, 1988; the occupation being granted higher status when modeled by
Spencer & Markstrom-Adams, 1990), assuming that positive European Americans. The children also tended to show a ten-
traits, such as being intelligent or nice, are more likely to be dency to have a greater interest in pursuing a job when it was
seen in European Americans and that negative traits are more modeled by European Americans. This result has been echoed
likely to be seen in African Americans. by other findings, including the finding that children in South
One line of work asks how children’s views of occupations Africa tend to associate racial groups with social class (Olson
might be influenced by these ethnic and racial stereotypes et al., 2012).
(Bigler et al., 2003). This research follows the same approach as This constellation of results illustrates the challenges of reduc-
that used in studies of gender stereotypes and children’s evalu- ing stereotypes about occupations and roles and reducing the
ations of occupations (Liben et al., 2001). African-American use of those stereotypes to drive prejudices about types of peo-
children from the first and sixth grades and from higher and ples. Sadly, it seems that even if an underprivileged group makes
lower socioeconomic status (SES) groups were asked about great strides by moving into a profession previously populated by
the status of familiar and novel occupations and also about their a dominant group, unless those strides are made in many fields at
interest in engaging in those jobs themselves. For the famil- the same time, those advances may be undercut by a reduction
iar jobs, even the first-graders had already learned from their of the perceived status of the profession.

578 CHAPTER 15 BECOMING PART OF THE COMMUNITY

FIGURE 15.24 Job status and gender. Illustrations based on a study in which a novel occupa-
tion (here called “a clipster”) was described to children with either all-male or all-female workers.
At age 11, children accorded the same job much higher status when it was modeled by males.
Adapted from Liben et al. (2001).

ROLES IN THE LARGER CULTURE 579

 SCIENTIFIC METHOD: Effects of “Minimal” Group Affiliations
Hypothesis:
By age 5, assignment to a clearly arbitrary group can cause immediate
biases against members of another group.

Method:
1. Sixty-four 5- and 6-year-olds were randomly assigned either to a
group that wore green T-shirts or to a group that wore blue T-shirts,
with assignment based on the children choosing a coin from the
experimenter’s closed hand.
2. Children heard one story about a child in a picture who wore the
same-colored T-shirt as the participant and another story about a
child who wore the other-colored shirt. Both stories assigned an
equal number of positive and negative behaviors to the child in the
picture (four each).
or
3. All children were asked to recall details of the stories and to choose
which child protagonist they wanted to play with.
4. Researchers coded memory of positive and negative behaviors and
playmate choice.

Results:
Participants recalled significantly more positive behaviors about
in-group characters than about out-group characters and showed a 1.6
tendency to recall more negative behaviors about out-group characters. 1.4 In-group

Number recalled
They also strongly preferred in-group characters as potential playmates. 1.2
Out-group
1.0
0.8
Conclusion: 0.6
Even though membership in the group was clearly arbitrary, children 0.4
as young as 5 processed information differently about characters that 0.2
matched their in-group versus those in an out-group. 0
Positive Negative
Action valence
Source study: Dunham et al. (2011).

We only need to associate negative behaviors with a certain negative bias toward those out-groups. Apparently, having
group to predict how they will behave. Those predictions additional information on how the two groups potentially
may be more wrong than right, but they are often made in differed enabled children to build up stronger reasons for
cases of racist and gender-based stereotypes. Because we do their biases (Abrams, 2011).
not need to take into account another’s beliefs and desires As children begin to enter middle school, they start to
when using a stereotype to predict behavior, even individuals realize the inappropriateness of holding negative stereotypes.
with autism can use stereotypes even though they are unable This emerging awareness can in some cases cause older chil-
to pass traditional theory of mind tasks (Hirschfeld et al., dren to do worse than younger children on tasks that would
2007). It could be that sophisticated insight into another be most easily solved by explicitly acknowledging race. For
person’s mind would lead to empathy and thereby blunt example, when 8- and 9-year-olds were shown pictures of
the bias. But unfortunately, sophisticated insight into other 40 faces that varied on several dimensions, including race,
minds does not guarantee open-mindedness toward other and had to guess which one the experimenter had in mind,
groups. In fact, in one study, elementary school children who they solved the task more quickly and with fewer questions
were less egocentric and more aware of how an out-group’s than 10- and 11-year-olds (Apfelbaum et al., 2008). The
preferences might differ from their own also showed more older children were more reluctant to use explicit references

580 CHAPTER 15 BECOMING PART OF THE COMMUNITY

to race to solve the task even when it would clearly have but one that is gaining a great deal of attention in recent
helped them to do so, whereas the younger children were research. The challenge for the future is to integrate these
relatively oblivious to the social discomfort of talking about cognitive components with the social and motivational fac-
others in terms of their race. tors that govern the interactions between children, their
Parental behavior is related to racial bias in their children, peers, and their larger culture. Many of these issues can also
but perhaps not in ways that you might think at first. For be fruitfully informed by taking a social ecological perspec-
example, one study of European-American mothers and their tive on development in which we ask how children end up
children found that virtually all the mothers in the study fitting into social ecosystems.
used “color-blind” language in reading race-themed books to Although all areas of developmental psychology must
their children, and thus the way they referred to other races in confront the tradeoffs between naturalistic observational
that context did not predict racial bias in the children. How- studies and experimental paradigms, this dilemma is espe-
ever, those children whose mothers had a higher proportion cially vivid in studies of how larger communities influence
of non-European-American friends showed considerably less a child’s development. Whether the research is focusing on
racial bias than those children whose mothers had fewer non- the media, cultural groups, or peers, the difficulty of mak-
European-American friends (Pahlke et al., 2012). Apparently, ing random assignments to experimental designs can pose
children are more influenced by their parents’ actual relation- a special challenge for making unambiguous causal con-
ships with people from other ethnic groups than by how they clusions. Thus, it can be difficult to truly randomly assign
talk about them. children to groups that experience different kinds of media
in different ways or that are immersed in different kinds of
peer relationships. Almost always, other factors—including
Q: Describe some parallels and differences the child’s own disposition and background environment—
are also involved in whether a child is in one situation or
in the development of gender and racial another.
stereotypes. Moreoever, the rapid rise of Internet communities, social
network sites, and new forms of communication, such as
texting, all raise questions about how these new forms of
relationships might have qualitatively different kinds of
Conclusions influences on children. It is too soon to tell whether an
increasingly wired world really will change the nature of
The child’s life outside of the family clearly matters. At social and cognitive development or whether developmental
times in development, the influences of peers can be truly patterns will remain robust across these dramatic technologi-
dramatic and can seem to overwhelm the influence of par- cal changes. The only way to know is to constantly conduct
ents. In addition, the culture at large, through its media well-designed studies that track each new technology and its
and simply through daily encounters with its rituals, insti- possible influences. We also see that these new social tech-
tutions, and workers, communicates a host of beliefs, atti- nologies and the rich trails of interactional data that they
tudes, and stereotypes to young children. For the most part, leave behind can lead to new forms of analysis, such as the
these influences are implicit, occurring outside of awareness; rapidly growing formal and computational studies of social
indeed, those who hold certain prejudices and stereotypes network effects. Without such tools, we might never have
are often shocked when those mental views are revealed known the extent to which individuals we have never met,
to them. The cognitive components of social interactions but who are three friendship links away from us, may influ-
and of cultural influences remain a largely unexplored area ence our health, our values, and our lifestyles.

CONCLUSIONS 581
 STU DY AN D REVI EW

SUMMARY controversial children, average children, and neglected chil-

dren. The most negative developmental outcomes are associ-
Levels of Affiliation ated with rejected children, who are the most heavily studied
● Children grow up in several levels of communities, starting
group as well.
with their own families, then moving on to peers, local sub-
cultures, and finally the culture at large in which they live. Media Influences on Development
● Peers have a critical influence, especially in middle child- ● As a person moves beyond peers to the larger culture, one

hood and early adolescence. Indeed, some have argued that, of the most powerful influences worldwide is that of televi-
as humans mature, they have an evolutionary bias to attend sion, which has become a major part of the daily lives of
more to peers than to parents. people, not just in the developed world but also in the devel-
● Peer relations can be thought of as occurring at three levels: oping world. Many children in developed countries spend
interactions, relationships, and groups. more time watching television than doing any other activity,
● Interactions are the simplest forms of relations, ones that may including time spent learning in school.
well be transient. In younger children and infants, interactions ● While infants may not be influenced much by the content of

may be little more than mutual arousal of excitement or dis- television, by 2 years or so, children start to become engrossed
tress. Older children show notions of reciprocity and sharing with the content of television that is age appropriate.
and start to engage in play and pretense. ● Educational programming has been shown to have both
● Relationships are unique and repeated patterns of interac- positive cognitive and positive social effects on children.
tions between two people, such as a child’s relationships with Unfortunately, it is not the most frequently watched form of
peers, parents, or siblings. Infant relationships may include television.
strong bonds of affection and expectations of classes of ● Entertainment television tends to contain high levels of vio-

behaviors, but they do not contain the reciprocal give-and- lence, levels that have remained equally high for decades. The
take found in toddlers and older children and which is so vast majority of research on the influences of television on
essential to friendships. As children approach and enter ado- children has focused on the question of whether violence on
lescence, friendships take on more intensity, and gender dif- television leads to aggression in children. Across several hun-
ferences in friendship patterns become more prominent. dred studies, both of a naturalistic and experimental nature,
● In addition to real friends, many children also have imagi- it is clear that exposure to violent programming is correlated
nary companions. They may also have enemies. Children also with higher levels of aggression and probably causes it.
can become involved in bully-victim relationships. Bullies ● The correlation between violent television watching and

often have an inflated sense of self-esteem rather than low self- aggression is not massive, and it is certainly not able to pre-
esteem, contrary to popular lore. The victims of bullies tend dict a high likelihood of aggression by any child based on her
to be repeated targets of bullying who suffer considerably from viewing habits, but when taken for a population as a whole,
the experience. the risk of increased aggression as a result of viewing violent
● While friends and even imaginary companions are usually television may represent a health hazard of a magnitude close
associated with positive outcomes, enemies and both par- to that of the relation between smoking and lung cancer. It
ties in bully-victim relationships are associated with negative has been difficult to address this potential health problem
outcomes. through public policy. A large array of other potential effects
● Because the formation of groups may require somewhat more of television is increasingly receiving attention.
cognitive complexity, groups are not voluntarily formed by ● As computers become ever more prevalent in the home

human infants. Preschoolers form ad hoc groups, but in ele- and video games become more complex, comparable ques-
mentary school, children start to form groups that are more tions have arisen about their influences. Although a smaller
stable, often exclusive cliques. number of studies have been conducted in this area, the
● Sociometric status is a measure of a child’s standing in a group. effects appear to be similar to those produced by television,
It is usually measured by asking peers which children in the at least in the area of violence. Nonetheless, positive cogni-
relevant group are the most liked and which ones are the least tive benefits can be found for educational video games, and
liked. There seem to be five different kinds of children as even prosocial effects may be found for the right kinds of
revealed by such ratings: popular children, rejected children, games.

582 CHAPTER 15 BECOMING PART OF THE COMMUNITY

● As interactive technologies improve on the Internet, the high school newspaper. What regulations would you put in
very nature of social interactions may be shifting as well and place, and how would you justify them to the students?
may reflect a new form of cultural socialization of children. 2. Children often tease each other in ways that are playful
Internet communities can have positive influences when they forms of affection. Yet, other forms of teasing can be highly
serve to maintain and enhance relationships that started and destructive and can even be considered bullying. Is it feasible
continue in the real world. There is greater concern about to develop an intervention program for children that could
relationships that start on the Internet. sanction playful teasing but stop harmful teasing, or is it bet-
● One worrisome new trend is the occurrence of bully-victim
ter to try to stop all forms of teasing?
relationships on the Internet, often known as “cyberbul-
3. Many middle schoolers and young high schoolers spend
lying.” Cyberbullying may be more severe than real-world
countless hours texting to each other when it is equally possi-
bullying because it can occur more easily without adult mon-
ble to talk on a phone or even chat face-to-face. What factors
itoring and has the potential to put vulnerable children into
painful circumstances with much larger audiences. motivate this preference for texting, and how might these
factors change during the high school and college years?
Roles in the Larger Culture 4. It has been argued that extensive use of social network-
● Cultures as a whole can also convey styles of thought and ing sites can lower children’s self-esteem as they encounter
kinds of roles that the actors may never explicitly know inflated, sculpted, and unrealistically positive portrayals of
that they play. These may include a culture of honor in the peers and feel that they are inferior in comparison. Consider
American South and different attitudes in individualist and whether this claim is plausible and whether children might
collectivist cultures. The most reasonable view of all these be much more at risk to such influences than young adults.
effects may be that most people in most cultures have access
to several of these roles and cognitive styles, but use them to
different extents in different contexts.
● Distinctive roles for the two sexes can also be communicated KEY TERMS
by cultures, not just in terms of favorite toys, but in terms
bullying (p. 549) mutual antipathy (p. 551)
of expectations about gender-appropriate occupations and
hobbies. Those expectations are abstracted from familiar catharsis hypothesis (p. 564) neglected child (p. 557)
instances, allowing generalizations about novel instances in clique (p. 553) peer nomination (p. 554)
which men and women are seen as more likely to be in cer- controversial child (p. 557) peer victimization (p. 549)
tain occupations. culture of honor (p. 574) popular child (p. 555)
● Just as there is gender stereotyping, there is also racial stereo-
cyberbullying (p. 573) proactive aggression (p. 550)
typing. Racial stereotypes are typically first seen in young
schoolchildren and become stronger during the elementary desensitization (p. 566) reactive aggression (p. 550)
school years even as older children become better at mask- developmental intergroup rejected child (p. 555)
ing overt bias. There are strong tendencies to build negative theory (p. 577) relational aggression (p. 547)
impressions of out-groups that can easily fuel racial and eth- friendship (p. 546) romantic relationship (p. 552)
nic stereotypes and biases. hostile attribution bias social comparison (p. 553)
(p. 556) social information processing
THOUGHT QUESTIONS imaginary companion (p. 556)
1. Imagine that you are a principal of a high school in a diverse (p. 548) sociometric status (p. 554)
but fairly affluent community. The PTA comes to you with inimical relationship (p. 551) video deficit (p. 561)
concerns about controlling the content of the student-run latency period (p. 546)

STUDY AND REVIEW 583

 PA R T V
Broader Developmental
Context
 16
Psychopathology in Childhood
Autism Depression Treatment of Childhood
• Features of Autism • Unipolar Depression Psychopathologies
• Diagnosis of Autism • Bipolar Disorder • Behavioral Therapies
• Incidence of Autism • Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy
Conduct Disorder: The Case
• Causal Factors • Psychoanalytic Therapies
of Psychopathy
Anxiety Disorders • Family Therapies
• Features of Psychopathy
• Pharmacological Treatments
• Incidence of Anxiety Disorders • Diagnosis of Psychopathy
• Evaluating Therapies
• Causal Factors • Causal Factors
• Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder Conclusions
Schizophrenia
Eating Disorders • Features of Schizophrenia Summary
• Anorexia Nervosa • Causal Factors
• Bulimia Nervosa • Early-Onset Schizophrenia
 ometimes parents have dramatically different out- Finally, how do developmental issues affect these psychologi-

S comes with their children, despite treating them very

similarly. Imagine a family with two boys, Adam
and Bill, who are fraternal twins. Born at the same
time and seemingly experiencing pretty much the
same childhoods, they nonetheless take very different trajec-
tories. Adam is an easygoing child who develops along a nor-
mal path in virtually all respects. He is a popular, outgoing
cal disorders? Is it even meaningful to use the same label to
classify a mental illness in a 7-year-old child and in a 37-year-
old adult? More broadly, all of these questions relate to the
question of what counts as psychopathology and how those
criteria might change with age. In most cases, psychopathol-
ogy is considered present when an individual reveals behav-
iors, thoughts, or emotions that are unusual and that make
boy who does somewhat above average in school and enjoys it difficult for the individual to function or that cause diffi-
a wide variety of extracurricular activities. In high school, culties for others (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011). Psychopathology
he dates frequently, plays second-string quarterback on the can manifest itself in the despair of depression, the disabling
football team, and does well enough to be admitted to one of feelings of anxiety, or the disordered thoughts of a person
the regional state universities. with schizophrenia. In all disorders, however, we have to
Bill is not an easygoing child, and he seems to gradu- keep in mind that deviance at one age may not be deviance at
ally decline into his own private hell. His parents do not a younger age. We may think that an adult who throws tan-
remember anything unusual about his infancy, but by the trums by dropping down on his stomach and pounding on
time he is in preschool, problems start to emerge. Bill is told the floor of a supermarket is severely emotionally disabled,
that it is important to wash his hands before eating or else but we may accept such behaviors as within the range of nor-
he might ingest germs. Very soon, hand washing becomes mal for a toddler. Thus, it is important to put behaviors in
a dominant part of his life. He washes his hands dozens of a developmental context when considering whether they are
times a day, often for more than 30 minutes at a time. His likely indications of psychopathology. Psychopathology from
hands are bright red and cracked and sometimes bleed. His a developmental perspective therefore poses several unique
parents tell him that the washing is excessive, and at one challenges. First, we need to reinterpret behaviors in terms
level he seems to recognize the problem, but he cannot seem of whether they are symptoms of psychopathology. Second,
to help himself. we need to ask if some forms of psychopathology require
As he grows older, Bill’s problems compound themselves. a certain level of psychological development to manifest
He continues to wash obsessively, but now he also spends themselves. For example, the forms of depression that seem
excessive time in the bathroom wiping himself, usually with to be driven by ruminative cognitions (repeated thoughts
the result of completely filling the toilet bowl with toilet that won’t go away) might not be present in young children.
tissue. His parents give him a house key when he is 12 so Third, there is the challenge of knowing how to treat psy-
that he can enter and leave the house when they are not chopathology when it is present. For example, will therapies
home. Soon he finds himself going back to the house as designed around a certain form of self-awareness or “mind-
much as a dozen times to make absolutely sure that he has fulness” be effective in a kindergartener?
really locked the door. Often, after checking that the door In this chapter, we will consider several mental and behav-
is locked, he rushes into the house to make sure he hasn’t ioral disorders, starting with those that tend to emerge earli-
left the faucet running, which in turn might trigger another est in development and progressing to those with the latest
bout of hand washing. As Bill cycles through these routines, typical age of onset: autism, anxiety disorders, obsessive-
he is often late for school. compulsive disorder, eating disorders, mood disorders, con-
Bill’s problems continue to plague him throughout his duct disorders, and schizophrenia. As we work through these
life. His parents try a wide variety of therapies to little avail, disorders, we will revisit the questions just raised and see how
often because they don’t seem to be designed for children. the answers vary across different types of disorders. Finally,
For example, his parents put him on medications to reduce we will consider how clinicians treat these problems and how
his symptoms, but there is no evidence that the medications the science of developmental psychology, as discussed in ear-
are safe when used by children. As an adult, Bill takes a lier chapters of this book, contributes to a better understand-
medication that helps control his rituals, but the side effects ing of the disorders.
are aversive, creating a constant battle between the effects of
the medication and those of the disease.
This example raises several questions that frame much
of this chapter. What sorts of psychological problems com- Q: What are some general questions that arise
monly afflict children and adolescents? What are the distin- in considering psychopathology in children?
guishing features of such problems and what are their causes?

PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD 587

 faces during a social interaction. Most people keep referring
Autism back to another person’s eyes as the most significant source
Some children seem to have severe problems in socially of social information, but people with autism often seem to
interacting and communicating with others (autism) or focus primarily on the mouth (perhaps because it moves the
substantial problems in social intelligence (Asperger’s syn- most) or even on other salient objects in the environment,
drome). In Chapter 13, we mentioned that autism may such as a moving hand. Figure 16.1 shows how eye-scanning
provide evidence for a theory of mind module that may be patterns in toddlers with autism differ from the patterns seen
defective, perhaps for genetic reasons, in people with autism in typically developing toddlers.
and Asperger’s. Behaviorally, however, autism is associated
with a wide range of other problems as well. In the clinical
psychology literature, disorders in which such a broad spec-
trum of problems occurs have often been called pervasive
developmental disorders, presumably because they affect
so many aspects of a person’s life.

Features of Autism
Autism was first diagnosed by Leo Kanner in the 1940s
(Kanner, 1943), when it was often known as Kanner’s
syndrome. Before Kanner’s work, individuals with autism
were often lumped together with children who were labeled
“retarded.” Kanner noticed a set of problems that occur
together and that are now considered the central features of
autism: emotional aloneness or remoteness, obsessions with
preservation of sameness, and a tendency toward elective
mutism, in which children capable of speaking seem to have
no desire to do so, especially in a communicative manner.
Children diagnosed with autism can range from those who
show massive cognitive deficits in all areas and require assis- A
tance with even the simplest daily functions to those who,
in rare cases, can exhibit remarkable skills in specific areas. Toddler with autism
Percent of visual fixation time

For that reason, any description of the features of autism 80 Typically developing toddler
must be understood as only approximate for a given child
with that diagnosis. Indeed, it is common to talk of “autism 60
spectrum disorders” so as to make clear how much the vari-
ous deficits and atypical behaviors can vary (Klin et al., 40
2004; Lord & Jones, 2012; Rapin & Tuchman, 2008a;
Volkmar et al., 2007). For the same reason, most current
20
researchers tend to think that there is not just one cause of
autism and that, instead, different kinds of “autisms” may
0
arise through different causal pathways (Betancur, 2011; Eyes Mouth Body Object
Rapin & Tuchman, 2008b). B
One set of symptoms revolves around problems with FIGURE 16.1 Visual fixations by toddlers with autism and
social skills. Children with autism may not respond to social toddlers without autism. Toddlers with autism and typically
overtures by others. For example, they may not respond developing toddlers watched a video of an adult, and researchers
when spoken to, sometimes even if their own name is called. tracked where the toddlers directed their eyes. (A) Stills of the video
They often seem to lack empathy for others (see Chapter 12) indicate the eye scan patterns and show striking differences between
the scans of typically developing toddlers (in yellow) and the scans
and seem to have trouble understanding the mental states of
of toddlers with autism (in green). Note in particular how typically
others, such as their beliefs or feelings (Rapin & Tuchman, developing toddlers focus on the eyes to a vastly greater extent.
2008a; Volkmar et al., 2007). A related set of problems con- (B) The graph shows the percent of visual fixation time on different
cerns difficulties in “reading faces.” One sign of this is shown body parts by the toddler with autism and the normally developing
in the very different ways in which people with autism scan toddler. Adapted from Jones et al. (2008).

588 CHAPTER 16 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD

 A second set of symptoms revolves around language and fledged autism and possibly reveal early precursor behaviors.
communication skills. Children with autism frequently show It is still too early to know what the full set of precursor
significant delays in the emergence of language, sometimes behaviors might be, but there are indications of some subtle
never acquiring language at all. Even when they do have problems with social engagement during the first year of life
some language, they may have difficulty with such linguistic (Caronna et al., 2008; Macari et al., 2012). At 1 year, there
devices as irony. They may also engage in echolalic speech, seem to be delays in early language skills, ranging from dif-
in which they repeat back the words and phrases of others ficulties in joint attention (the ability to understand a social
verbatim or repeat certain set scripts. Above and beyond interaction in which both parties are meant to attend to the
language deficits, they may also show communicative dif- same thing; see Chapter 6) to delays in babbling.
ficulties when engaging in or understanding such activities Another method for investigating early signs of autism
as pretend play (Rapin & Tuchman, 2008a; Volkmar et al., relies on parents’ videotapes of their children’s earliest birth-
2007). They also may show difficulties in adjusting their day parties, which can give researchers a window into a
gaze appropriately in communicative tasks involving point- child’s social interactions as early as 1 year of age. In one
ing and gesturing, often taking an excessively long time to such study, judges used birthday party videos to score 20
shift their gaze (Falck-Ytter et al., 2012). children later diagnosed with autism and 20 children who
A final set of symptoms involves stereotyped movements were not later diagnosed with autism on various com-
that are often repeated many times, such as a particular man- municative measures, including the degree to which they
ner of waving the hands. Children with autism may show responded when called by name and the extent to which they
such repetitive movements and marked resistance to any seemed to engage in joint attention. The judges who scored
change in routine as well as a tendency to make the world the children’s behaviors in the videos were not informed
orderly in ways that other children do not, such as sorting about which children were later diagnosed with autism, but
all the toys in a room by color. They may also focus on an they found less social interaction, less joint attention, and
extremely narrow area of interest, such as having a particular less responsiveness to their own name in the children who
fascination with airplanes. And they may sometimes show were later diagnosed with autism (Osterling et al., 2002).
rigidity and perseveration—that is, the continuing repetition Researchers who watched videotapes of infants in other situ-
of a behavior over an extended period of time (Leekam et al., ations (not birthday parties) claim to have found anomalies
2011; Rapin & Tuchman, 2008a; Volkmar et al., 2007). in gaze and affect perhaps as early as 6 months in infants
who would later develop autism (Clifford & Dissanayake,
2008). Even so, these results pertain to older infants, and it
remains much less clear whether signs of autism are already
Diagnosis of Autism present in the first few months of life.
Although the age of onset of autism remains unclear, the
first diagnoses typically are made no earlier than about 18
months of age, often in association with language delays.
There are some suggestions that even in infancy, autistic Incidence of Autism
children do not connect well socially to their caregivers, Autism was initially reported to occur in roughly 3 to 5
leading researchers to wonder whether it might be possible out of every 10,000 children. But the incidence has been
to base a diagnosis on symptoms that are present even before reported to be rising, with some studies finding rates as high
language delays are evident (Barbaro & Dissamayke, 2009; as 1 per 150 children, and over 1 per 100 children when the
Macari et al., 2012; Yirmiya & Charman, 2010). But the low less severe Asperger’s disorder is also included (Elsabbagh
incidence of autism makes it very difficult to collect enough et al., 2012; Fombonne et al., 2011; Rapin & Tuchman,
data to support firm conclusions about symptoms in the first 2008b). Some prenatal factors (such as viruses or maternal
few months of life. (After a child is diagnosed with autism, illnesses or substance abuse or environmental toxins) or
retrospective reports from caregivers can be colored by their some postnatal environmental experiences may account for
current perceptions of the child, making such reports less some of the increase in autism (Kaye et al., 2001; Taylor
useful than observational data gathered before a problem et al., 1999). But most of the increase is probably illusory
is suspected.) One recent strategy involves baby sib stud- and reflects more extensive screening in all social groups
ies. Such studies are based on the finding that younger sib- and more accurate diagnosis as well as diagnosis at earlier
lings of children with autism are at far greater risk for the ages (Rapin & Tuchman, 2008b).
disorder themselves, presumably because of shared genetic There has been some recent controversy as well over
risk factors. Researchers are therefore starting to intensively whether autism is overdiagnosed as a result of other cognitive
study younger siblings from early infancy on the assump- and social disabilities being swept into the category inap-
tion that some percentage of the siblings will develop full- propriately. This controversy crystallized around the revision

AUTISM 589
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders reasoning (see Chapter 13). At the neural level, some fMRI
(DSM), the manual used by clinical psychologists and psy- studies have suggested that individuals with autism show
chiatrists to diagnose mental disorders. In May 2013, the less activity in brain regions associated with social cognition
DSM-V revision replaced prior versions that had appeared (Philip et al., 2012). The theory suggests that without these
in 1994 (DSM-IV) and 2000 (DSM-IV-TR). DSM-V listed social skills, people with autism tend to rely on other more
the same diagnostic features of autism as earlier manuals, analytical and systematized ways of understanding, which is
but it increased the strictness of the diagnostic criteria (for an extreme form of the usual male analytical tendency. This
example, requiring more symptoms for a diagnosis), which observation also fits with the tendency for many individuals
may result in the exclusion of less severe cases. As part of the with autism to have an intense interest in orderly routines,
changes, it also combined autistic disorder, Asperger’s disor- arrangements of objects, and the like. It may also explain
der, childhood disintegrative disorder, and pervasive devel- why autism has been found to be more common in fami-
opmental disorder not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS) lies of physicists, engineers, and mathematicians, groups
into one larger category called autism spectrum disorder, or that tend to represent stereotypical male cognitive styles
ASD, arguing that the divisions into four related disorders (Baron-Cohen et al., 1998). Yet, it is not clear how such sex
had been artificial and that the disorders occurred in more differences are affected by biological mechanisms—that is,
of a continuum. It is not yet clear how much the changes will how the presence of a Y chromosome could lead to behav-
affect the number of diagnosed cases of autism, but some ioral differences related to autism. There are some indica-
researchers project quite substantial drops in those receiving tions of links of subsequent autistic traits (such as reduced
ASD diagnoses, especially among those who were formerly eye contact, less empathy, and more systematizing) to fetal
diagnosed with Asperger’s or PDD-NOS (McPartland testosterone levels (see Figure 16.2). Higher levels of fetal
et al., 2012). More generally, however, the shifting boundary testosterone in either sex are correlated with reduced social
of criteria for diagnosis with ASD is not likely to influence skills and increased systematizing tendencies (Auyeung &
psychological theories of autism as much as debates about Baron-Cohen, 2008; Auyeung et al., 2009, 2010; Mills
availability of resources for people with disabilities and con- et al., 2007). Normally, of course, higher fetal testosterone
clusions as to whether there is a true “autism epidemic.” levels are much more common in males. Somewhat more
Autism is diagnosed four times as frequently in boys as in surprisingly, even in adults, testosterone can have an influ-
girls. This is a pronounced sex difference, but this kind of ence on empathy-related brain regions that presumably had
disparity is not unusual for incidences of mental illness. The been influenced prenatally by sex hormones. Thus, when
difference may be even larger for milder cases of autism, such
as Asperger’s disorder, which has been reported to have a male
to female ratio of 8:1 (Auyeung & Baron-Cohen, 2008). One 50 Girls
hypothesis aimed at explaining why autism is more common Boys
in boys suggests that the psychological features of autism
resemble an extreme version of the male social brain (Baron- 40
Q-CHAT score

Cohen, 2003; Baron-Cohen et al., 2005). According to this

theory, the sexes have different ways of viewing the social
30
world, which can be imagined as opposite ends of a con-
tinuum. In particular, females are said to be more sensitive to
emotional and mental states in others and to be more skilled 20
socially and more empathic, while males have a tendency to
be less socially aware, empathic, and adroit and to also have
more of a tendency to analyze and systematize objects and 10

events (Lai et al., 2012). The ability to systematize is more 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00
explicitly defined as “the drive to analyze a system in terms Fetal testosterone level (nmol/L)
of the rules that govern the system, in order to predict the FIGURE 16.2 Fetal testosterone and subsequent autism.
system” (Baron-Cohen et al., 2005, p. 820). For both boys and girls, there is a significant positive relationship
between the amount of fetal testosterone and later diagnosis of
autism-related symptoms. On the graph, the y-axis is a measure
of degree of autism symptoms, known as Q-CHAT (Quantitative
Causal Factors CHecklist for Autism in Toddlers), in which higher scores represent
more symptoms. The x-axis depicts the amount of fetal testosterone
As we have noted, autism has been hypothesized to involve as measured in the mother’s amniotic fluid. Higher levels of testoster-
a severe impairment of the ability to empathize and the one are related to higher Q-CHAT scores, especially in boys. Adapted
related ability to “read” others by engaging in theory of mind from Auyeung et al. (2010).

590 CHAPTER 16 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD

adult women are given low doses of testosterone, they expe- during cell division. Thus, the older the father, the more
rience temporary impairments in their ability to perform on errors and possible mutations that may have occurred in his
subtle empathy tasks (van Honk et al., 2011). Such effects of sperm and therefore the greater the risk of the child hav-
testosterone and other hormones on social-emotional states, ing new mutations in his or her genome related to autism
however, are complex and often only occur in specific con- that were not present in either parent’s genome, a relation-
texts (Bos et al., 2012). ship that was borne out through whole-genome analyses
of fathers in Iceland. The increase in risk is not massive,
and autism still does not have a high probability of occur-
ring in children of older fathers, but it may help explain
Q: What is the sex difference with respect the increase in the incidence of autism in many developed
to the incidence of autism, and what is an countries, where the age of fathers has also been increasing.
explanation for this difference?

Another biological explanation for autism focuses on the

Q: What is the evidence for a genetic basis for
genes. While there is substantial evidence for a genetic predis- autism and related disorders?
position to autism, the specific genetic influences are complex,
involving several distinct gene locations and intricate patterns
of gene interactions (Devlin & Scherer, 2012; Folstein & There was an early environmental theory of autism, com-
Rosen-Sheidley, 2001; Freitag, 2007; Geschwind, 2008; Hu, monly called the “refrigerator mother” scenario (Bettelheim,
2013; State & Levitt, 2011). Nonetheless, the rates of autism 1972), a socialization theory that has since been discredited.
in monozygotic and dizygotic twins provide a clear illustra- Clinicians had thought that autistic children were dispro-
tion of a genetic influence at work (Geschwind & Spence, portionately from middle- and upper-class families, and
2008). Each member of a pair of monozygotic twins is sub- they hypothesized that the mothers in those families were
stantially more likely to have autism if the other twin has the often cold and disengaged from their children, creating such
disorder. One study that used fairly strict diagnostic criteria a violation of the normal attachment sequence as to cause
found a concordance rate (the likelihood that two individuals autism. One problem with the greater incidence of cases of
share the same trait) among monozygotic twins of roughly autism in children of better-educated parents, however, may
60 percent, with a concordance of roughly 20 percent among be that those parents are more likely to refer the children to
dizygotic twins. If the diagnostic criteria are broadened to specialists who diagnose autism, creating a sampling bias.
include a spectrum of cognitive and social abnormalities, Consequently, the refrigerator mother theory has not held
the concordance is almost 80 percent for monozygotic twins up over time. There is no evidence that a colder, more dis-
and roughly 30 percent for dizygotic twins (Hallmayer et al., passionate parent causes a child to develop autism. None-
2011). In a related study, researchers gave a difficult theory of theless, there may be a modest correlation between socially
mind task both to siblings of people with Asperger’s disorder nonresponsive parents and autistic children because they
and to a control group of nonrelatives. They found higher share a genetic tendency to be emotionally limited in social
concordance rates for difficulty in understanding others’ interactions.
states of mind among the siblings than among the nonrela-
tives (Dorris et al., 2004).
Genetic influences for autism may also arise as a result of
mutations to the mother’s eggs or the father’s sperm later in
Q: Describe a socialization theory of the origins
the parent’s life. The risk of some disorders, such as Down of autism, and comment on its limitations.
syndrome, are related to the mother’s age, and maternal age
was often thought to be more associated with the devel-
opment of most disorders in the child than paternal age. Other environmental factors have been found to be associ-
This is because the same set of eggs is present throughout ated with autism, although the direction of causality is often
much of the mother’s life and has more time to accumulate unclear. Researchers have found that various infections in
mutations than sperm cells, which are constantly being pro- early infancy or prenatally are associated with higher levels
duced. Yet, some researchers have suggested that the age of of autism (Atladottir et al., 2010, 2012). For example, chil-
the father may be related to the incidence of autism in the dren with autism are likely to have higher levels of antibod-
child (Kong et al., 2012). This is because sperm cells arise ies associated with having had various viral and bacterial
from dividing precursor cells, and they acquire new muta- infections (Hornig & Lipkin, 2001; Patterson, 2011). This
tions each time they divide as a result of errors occurring pattern is often interpreted as indicating that children with

AUTISM 591
autism (or their mothers) have had a higher incidence of having briefly discussed phobias in Chapter 7 in the context
various infections early in development, although it is also of prepared fears. We will then discuss obsessive-compulsive
possible that they may have more active immune responses disorder as an anxiety-related disorder that has some dis-
to infections or that autism early on could lead to greater tinctive components that do not affect all people with anxi-
susceptibility to infections. Other work suggests that autis- ety problems.
tic individuals may have more immune-related diseases,
such as autoimmune disorders (Patterson, 2011; Trottier
et al., 1999). Indeed, one view suggests that as many as one-
third of the cases of autism may result from problems of Incidence of Anxiety Disorders
immune system regulation in the mother, sometimes as a Considered collectively, anxiety disorders are the most prev-
side effect of an infection, but other times simply because alent mental illness in children, with incidences approaching
a poorly regulated immune system results in inflammatory 15 percent of children between ages 9 and 17 (Cartwright-
disease that influences fetal brain development (Velasquez- Hatton et al., 2006; Costello et al., 2005; Muroff & Ross,
Manoff, 2012). 2011; Southam-Gerow & Chorpita, 2007; Velting et al.,
More broadly, a wide array of environmental factors, rang- 2002). Anxiety disorders seem to be about equally common
ing from infectious diseases to exposure to insecticides, has among boys and girls in childhood, but they become more
been seen as potentially related to the onset of autism. In common among girls in adolescence (Kashani & Orvaschel,
addition, when such effects do occur, they may be produced 1990; Kubarych et al., 2008; Nielsen et al., 2000). Anxi-
through gene-environment interactions. For example, a par- ety disorders are among the earliest psychopathologies to
ticular kind of environmental exposure might influence a emerge, with patterns of anxious behavior in infancy pre-
genetic mechanism regulating a specific aspect of neuronal dicting social anxiety many years later—probably even in
development (Pessah & Lein, 2008). Environmental factors adulthood. Moreover, when anxiety problems are identified
on their own may not be sufficient to trigger the onset of in children, they are highly likely to be predictive of long-
autism in most individuals, but these factors may have such term problems. For example, the child who is excessively
effects in a special subset of individuals who are at risk because anxious about school tests, parties, and athletic events is
they have a certain genotype. Such gene-environment inter- more likely to have severe anxiety problems as an adult, and
action patterns are often described in terms of the diathesis- often depression as well (Bernstein et al., 1996; Brady &
stress hypothesis, which proposes that some individuals have Kendall, 1992; Southam-Gerow & Chorpita, 2007).
a genetic or biological vulnerability (a “diathesis”) that causes
them to be more likely to show a disease when immersed in a
stressful, negative environment. At the present time, however,
the research community has not achieved much consensus on
Q: Describe the prevalence of anxiety
the links between specific environmental factors and autism disorders in children.
spectrum disorders.

Anxiety and fearfulness can first manifest themselves in

the young infant. We saw in Chapters 6 and 7 that preverbal
Anxiety Disorders infants can vary considerably in the degree to which they
become alarmed or upset by novel or mildly threatening
We all have observed children who are more fearful and stimuli. Moreover, some infants seem much more inhibited
anxious than others. Within the normal spectrum, we can than others around novel stimuli, exhibiting fearfulness and
simply attribute variations of anxiety and fearfulness to dif- withdrawal, as seen in Chapter 7. Infants who are highly
ferent personality types. Similarly, the different attachment inhibited in infancy are more likely to show social anxiety
styles that we considered in Chapter 6 do not in themselves disorder and generalized anxiety disorder as adolescents
indicate psychopathology. But in some cases, anxieties can (Chronis-Tuscano et al., 2009; Khalid-Khan et al., 2007;
become so strong and persistent as to be debilitating for the Schwartz et al., 1999, 2003; Trentacosta et al., 2008; White
child, interfering with the child’s normal functioning and et al., 2011). Social anxiety disorder tends to involve fears
thereby becoming a form of mental illness known as an and anxiety about social situations or situations in which a
anxiety disorder. Anxiety disorders can cover a wide spec- person is being evaluated by another (see Figure 16.3). This
trum of problems, ranging from severely insecure attach- disorder can lead to either avoidance of such situations or to
ment styles to phobias to obsessive-compulsive disorders. high levels of discomfort when the person is in those situa-
In this section, we will focus on generalized anxiety disor- tions (Muroff & Ross, 2011). Generalized anxiety disor-
der, separation anxiety disorder, and social anxiety disorder, der involves excessive levels of worry about a wide range of

592 CHAPTER 16 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD

 physical objects or threats to their person (will they fall off
a bridge, will a trip to the dentist be painful), whereas older
children might worry about behavioral performance (will
they do well on a test, will they be able to remember their
way home) or about social and psychological threats (will
they be disliked by others, will they be too nervous to speak
in front of the class) (Gullone, 2000; Westenberg et al.,
2004; Wood et al., 2003).

Q: How do anxiety disorders tend to change

with increasing age?

Causal Factors
FIGURE 16.3 Social anxiety disorder. Most people feel some There have been several theories about how and why anxi-
anxiety in front of groups, but when the anxiety becomes so strong ety disorders emerge in children, ranging from those that
that the individual cannot even look at others, it may be a sign of focus on the biological components, like the genetic basis
social anxiety disorder. Social anxiety disorder often becomes most
for cortical circuits that inhibit behaviors (see Chapter 7), to
salient when children are in middle school.
accounts that refer to a child’s early experiences, such as pat-
terns of parenting (see Chapter 6). Freud described cases of
situations. A child with such a disorder might worry exces- anxiety arising out of internal conflicts. In one of his most
sively about an upcoming trip to the zoo, whether she will colorful accounts, he described the case of “Little Hans,”
have to use the toilet at school, and whether her school bus who supposedly acquired a phobia of horses because of an
will crash on a field trip. If the worries are more focused on Oedipal conflict in which he saw the horse as proxy for a
just social situations, the disorder is a social anxiety disor- castrating father (Freud, 1909). By contrast, we saw in Chap-
der. If the worries are primarily about a particular fear, such ter 4 how John Watson instilled anxiety in a child through
as a fear of large dogs, the disorder is a phobia. classical conditioning, a technique that tried to deny any
Developmentally, the earliest signs of anxiety are seen in value to considering mental states in the child (Watson &
the form of separation anxieties (discussed as separation dis- Rayner, 1920). Here, however, we focus mostly on general-
tress in Chapter 6), with some children showing excessively ized anxiety disorder, in which a child seems to be anxious
fearful and anxious responses upon separation from a par- about a wide range of events and possible futures and not
ent or other adult caregiver. Specific phobias are usually the about a highly specific object, as in the case of phobias.
next disorder to appear, often before 7 years of age. General- Insecurely attached infants and children are more likely
ized anxiety disorder doesn’t usually appear until around age to show anxiety problems later on (Brumariu & Kerns,
9 or 10 (Muroff & Ross; 2011; Southam-Gerow & Chorpita, 2011; Cassidy & Berlin, 1994; Colonnesi et al., 2011; Esb-
2007). Social anxieties tend to become more prominent jørn et al., 2012; Thompson, 2001). As is often the case with
around age 12, while panic disorder (a disorder in which attachment-related research, however, it is difficult to assess
panic attacks occur frequently and for no obvious reason) causal directions. While it might be that parents who are
doesn’t usually occur until around age 15 (Southam-Gerow & insensitive to children’s needs may cause children to become
Chorpita, 2007). With the exception of children with panic more anxious, it is also possible that anxious children cause
disorder, children who show one kind of anxiety disorder parents to behave in ways that make the parents appear to
are more likely to show other kinds of anxiety disorders as be insensitive. Moreover, there are associations between
well, suggesting some shared underlying causes (Muroff & depression in mothers and increased anxiety in children
Ross; 2011; Wood et al., 2003). (Feng et al., 2008; Pilowsky et al., 2006). Such associations
Taking a closer look at the anxiety disorders, we observe may reflect the influences of unresponsive mothers or the
that anxiety manifests itself differently throughout develop- modeling of anxiety by depressed mothers (Gerull & Rapee,
ment. Most notably, for both normal and abnormal cases 2002). In fact, researchers have shown in experimental stud-
of anxiety, the objects that produce anxiety tend to change ies that when parents are told to model anxiety-reducing
with age. Younger children tend to worry more about behaviors, children show less anxiety toward potentially

ANXIETY DISORDERS 593

anxiety-inducing stimuli (Egliston & Rapee, 2007). In
addition, when mothers go into remission from depres- Q: How might a child’s cognitions be involved
sion after treatment, their children show improved mental in precipitating or maintaining generalized
health, with one measure involving reduced levels of anxi-
ety (Wickramaratne et al., 2011). Thus, beyond any shared anxiety or social anxiety?
genotype effects, parental behavior seems to also influence a
child’s level of anxiety, at least in specific contexts. Anxious children appear to have cognitive biases that
contribute to anxiety in several different ways. They have
Cognitive Factors Children with anxiety disorders tend attentional biases that lead them to pay more attention to
to be apprehensive about the present and to worry a great aversive and distressing stimuli, and they have greater dif-
deal about the future. They tend to engage in catastrophiz- ficulty disengaging from such stimuli. They have inter-
ing, assuming the worst possible outcome for future events, pretation biases that lead them to make more negative
even when those outcomes are highly unlikely or implau- interpretations of ambiguous situations that other children
sible. These features are considered central to diagnoses of might see as neutral or even positive. Finally, they have
anxiety disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). memory biases that lead them to recall more negatively
Researchers looking for ways in which children with anxiety charged aspects of prior events. These different biases can
disorders might be cognitively different from children who be integrated into a single model, as shown in Figure 16.4
do not have anxiety disorders have therefore asked whether (Muris & Field, 2008).
anxious children show a higher preponderance of some kinds Children who are socially anxious may have less devel-
of cognition as opposed to children who are not anxious. oped social intelligence, making it more difficult for them to
A range of studies suggests that there are more negative understand the nuances of delicate social situations (Sood &
cognitions in anxious children. For example, when research- Kendall, 2007; Southam-Gerow & Kendall, 2000). Their
ers asked children to describe the cognitions they had had anxiety may arise from difficulty in understanding their
during a previously taken test, anxious children tended to own emotional states as well as those of others. Or it may
report higher numbers of negative cognitions (thoughts like result from particular difficulties in understanding the rela-
“I did not do well on the test” or “I incorrectly answered tion between cognition and action and between different
most of the questions”) than children who were not anx- emotional and cognitive states that may co-occur in the
ious (Hogendoorn et al., 2012; McDonald, 2001; Prins & same mind at the same time. These difficulties may cre-
Hanewald, 1997). The same pattern emerged when research- ate a default bias to assume that when in doubt, the social
ers presented children with ambiguous stories about social
situations and asked the children to say when they thought
the story started to be “scary” and how they themselves
Situation
would feel if they were the protagonist in the story (Muris
et al., 2002a). Socially anxious children ages 8 to 13 tended
to hear fewer sentences of the stories before they decided
they were scary—that is, they formed a judgment of the
story as socially threatening earlier than children who were Attention Encoding
bias
not socially anxious. In addition, the socially anxious chil-
dren showed a higher overall incidence of labeling stories as
Overactivity of
threatening and displayed higher levels of negative feelings vulnerability and Interpretation
and cognitions as a result of listening to the stories than danger schemas bias

did children who were not anxious. It therefore appears that Interpretation
socially anxious children form different cognitive interpre- Memory
tations of social situations, even when they are bystanders, bias

and that these interpretations result in higher perceptions of

threats and higher levels of negative emotions (Gregory et Anxiety
al., 2007; Muris & Field, 2008). In addition, socially anx-
ious children tend to perceive their own bodily indications
FIGURE 16.4 Cognitive and attentional biases contributing to
of anxiety in more dramatic and public terms. For example,
anxiety disorders in children. Children with anxiety disorders show
in socially stressful situations, they perceive their heart rate (1) more attention to and more difficulty disengaging from disturbing
as faster and more noticeable to others than do children stimuli, (2) a tendency to interpret ambiguous events in more nega-
with low social anxiety who have the same actual heart rate tive ways, and (3) selective recall of memories of events that are
(Schmitz et al., 2012). more negatively charged. Adapted from Muris & Field (2008).

594 CHAPTER 16 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD

situation is a threatening one. A better understanding of that have low levels of social support. In families with high
all children’s abilities to grapple with multiple simultane- levels of support, however, the same patterns of variation are
ous emotions and cognitions may therefore be essential to not related to anxiety. This is a gene-environment way of
understanding how social anxiety disorder develops and understanding the notion of being “at risk”—namely, some
changes as the child develops (Choe et al., 2005). children may be genetically predisposed to show a disorder
We discussed phobias briefly in Chapter 7. The main but only in a certain range of environments.
point here is that individual differences in the tendencies to In general, genetic factors don’t just act on their own;
form phobias may be related to generalized anxiety disorder rather, they interact with both environmental and cognitive
in children. Thus, the child who always imagines worst-case factors. Thus, genetic influences on attention and memory
scenarios and who cannot disengage from thinking about might in turn influence some forms of anxiety. Similarly,
all that could go wrong in a present or future situation may some kinds of family environments might make a child
well be more likely to develop and maintain phobias than more susceptible to genetic influences. Finally, environ-
less anxious children. All children can develop phobias, and ments might even trigger the turning off or on of a genetic
the phobias are constrained by preparedness phenomena of regulatory pathway.
the sort discussed in Chapter 7, but anxiety may help exac-
erbate the process.

Biological Factors Across many twin and adoption stud- Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder
ies, researchers have consistently found evidence for genetic As seen at the beginning of this chapter, some children can
influences on anxiety (Gregory & Eley, 2007; Rapee et al., develop a series of behaviors that involve a high level of anxi-
2009; Sakolsky et al., 2012). Most studies have focused on ety as well as high incidences of checking various things, per-
genes associated with the production and regulation of the sistent, intrusive thoughts that cannot be ignored or set aside,
neurotransmitter serotonin, but other studies have suggested and highly repetitive behaviors (American Psychiatric Associ-
links to genes associated with other neurotransmitters, ation, 2000; Leckman et al., 1997). This pattern of behaviors
such as dopamine, and genes associated with stress-related is known as obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD).
hormones. In addition, the association between genes and
anxiety disorders can be stronger in some environments Types of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder Let’s consider
than in others (Fox et al., 2005; Sakolsky et al., 2012). For in more detail the four main types of obsessive-compulsive
example, variations in genes that regulate serotonin show disorder that researchers have repeatedly proposed (Bloch et
significant relations to anxiety when children are in families al., 2008; see Figure 16.5). One cluster of behaviors revolves

Obsessions Factors Compulsions

Hoarding Hoarding Hoarding

Symmetry
Ordering

Aggressive Symmetry
Repeating
Sexual
Counting
Religious Forbidden thoughts

Checking
Somatic

Contamination Cleaning Cleaning

A B
FIGURE 16.5 Clusters of symptoms in obsessive-compulsive behaviors. Obsessive-compulsive behaviors are often classified into four
types or factors, with characteristic obsessions and compulsions, which can overlap somewhat: cleaning and contamination fears, a desire to
order things, hoarding of objects, and forbidden thoughts (usually aggressive, blasphemous, or sexual).The diagram shows solid lines for links
between obsessions or compulsions and factors that can be found in both adults and children, and dashed lines for links between obsessions or
compulsions and factors found only in children. Adapted from Bloch et al. (2008).

ANXIETY DISORDERS 595

around fears of contamination and is accompanied by com- children, it is more likely to be seen in boys, but by adoles-
pulsive cleaning. A person might obsess about dirt, germs, cence the distribution between the sexes becomes more even.
or other forms of contamination and might engage in com- There is a second, later period, between ages 20 and 29, in
pulsive cleaning and washing to reduce anxiety about the which another wave of onsets of the disorder is seen. This
contamination. later period, combined with the shifting gender ratios, leads
A second cluster revolves around an obsession with order some to suggest that early-emerging obsessive-compulsive
and symmetry and is accompanied by compulsive ordering, disorder may have a somewhat different basis than the dis-
repeating, and counting behaviors. A person with this clus- order that first emerges in young adults (Taylor, 2011).
ter might repeatedly line up a set of objects in a precise and
symmetrical manner, or a child might take all of his toys Diagnosis of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder The diag-
and carefully arrange them in a neat geometric pattern. nosis of obsessive-compulsive disorder relies on several con-
A third cluster revolves around an obsession with losing verging forms of evidence. Although there are no simple
things that may be of importance and is accompanied by genetic markers or other physiological markers of the dis-
hoarding behavior in which a person is extremely reluctant order, there are some physical signs that can indicate some
to throw anything away for fear it might be needed someday. variants of the disorder. Thus, simple examination of the red
People can hoard everything from used pieces of aluminum hands of a compulsive hand washer or the bleeding gums of
foil to old magazines to bottle caps. a compulsive tooth brusher can help confirm a diagnosis.
Finally, a cluster revolves around unwanted aggressive, Behaviorally speaking, we can ask if engaging in the behav-
sexual, or religious/blasphemous thoughts or excessive ior seems to reduce anxiety but is not enjoyable in its own
somatic (bodily) worries about catching severe illnesses, right (for example, washing hands may reduce anxiety but
such as cancer or AIDS. A person with this cluster might be may not be at all pleasurable). These behaviors can be quite
plagued with highly unwelcome thoughts about assaulting time-consuming, often taking well over an hour each day.
another person or engaging in a horrible transgression of his More cognitively, the obsessions, in addition to falling into
or her religion. Attempts to reduce the anxiety associated categories such as contamination, loss of objects, and order-
with such thoughts might often take the form of compul- ing, also tend to consist of unrealistic concerns. The obses-
sive checking behavior, such as going back to make sure the sions are usually unwelcome and intrusive thoughts that
apartment is locked a dozen times or looking both ways adults, at least, will often regard as not making any sense
20 times before crossing a street. and will frequently regard with fear and disgust. Diagno-
These four clusters are found repeatedly when we look sis in children is the same as in adults except that, unlike
across cultures (Matsunaga et al., 2008; Pallanti, 2008; Tor- adults, who normally are aware of the irrationality of their
resan et al., 2009). In addition, there are reports that each compulsions and/or fears but cannot stop doing them, the
cluster involves somewhat different brain structures (Maia children may not have such an explicit awareness (American
et al., 2008). Across all types, however, there is a common Psychiatric Association, 2000).
theme of a debilitating obsession that creates anxiety and of It is interesting that the diagnostic criteria for obsessive-
compulsive behaviors that are attempts to reduce that anxi- compulsive disorder in children do not require any aware-
ety. In addition, some individuals can show symptoms from ness that the compulsion is irrational. Moreover, younger
more than one cluster (Calamari et al., 2012). children with the disorder often do not consciously think
about or discuss the threats that they are trying to avoid.
Incidence of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder Obsessive- Thus, while adults might say that they are afraid of get-
compulsive disorder is estimated to occur in about 2 to ting germs when they are asked why they excessively wash,
3 percent of the general population (Calamari et al., 2012; younger children might simply say that things do not feel
Gilbert & Maalouf, 2008; Jenike, 2004; Karno et al., 1988). right. It seems as if, in its early stages, obsessive-compulsive
The incidence may be even higher because many people disorder involves self-protective behavior programs that get
afflicted with the disorder go to great lengths to conceal it triggered by stimuli so minor that they are not even noticed
from others because they sense how irrational it is. By contrast, and then are set in motion with little or no thought as to
younger children are less self-conscious and less likely to feel why. Even in adults, it is not uncommon for a patient to
the need to conceal their behaviors. The incidence is reported develop a compulsion before having a good reason for it,
to be roughly 1 to 2 percent in children and adolescents. with the reason emerging later, often as a form of “discov-
Although obsessive-compulsive disorder has been reported ery.” For example, one patient who had a set of compulsions
in 2-year-olds (Rapoport et al., 1992), it is normally first around contagion and contamination for many years learned
noticed in children between 6 and 15 years of age (Gilbert & about AIDS and declared that the compulsive behaviors
Maalouf, 2008). When the disorder appears in young had always been to avoid getting AIDS, even though the

596 CHAPTER 16 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD

behaviors began before AIDS was publicly known (Rapo- water can induce a feeling of satiation long before the water is
port, 1989). absorbed into the body.

Causal Factors Compulsions may originate in the normal

levels of ritual and repetitive behavior in young children
(Leckman & Bloch, 2008; Leonard et al., 1990; Thomsen,
Q: How has the presence of a security
1998). Children younger than 3 years old often engage in motivational system been used to explain the
such behaviors, which then gradually die out in toddler- emergence of obsessive-compulsive disorder?
hood. It may be that obsessive-compulsive disorders lead to
the retention and elaboration of such behaviors rather than
the normal course of decay. In short, obsessive-compulsive disorder may arise from
a relatively modular threat anticipation/avoidance system
that, while involving a high level of anxiety, works quite
differently from the system leading to other fears. Its modu-
Q: What are some examples of obsessive- lar nature allows compulsions to be set up and maintained
compulsive behaviors in young children? largely outside of conscious control. Most models of the
disorder in adults put a heavy emphasis on cognitive fac-
tors, assuming that obsessional thoughts help trigger and
Many behaviors associated with OCD, including clean- maintain the compulsions. But in young children, and by
ing and checking, may be part of a security motivational some accounts perhaps in adults as well (Szechtman &
system that is part of many animals and is built to recog- Woody, 2004; Woody & Szechtman, 2011), the obsessions
nize and respond to very subtle and indirect cues to danger, may not precede the compulsions as much as follow them.
including cues to predators, toxins, and other possibly harm- Development may promote a growth of unwanted obses-
ful changes in normal routines (Szechtman & Woody, 2004). sive thoughts that enhance the already present compulsions
Such a system is thought to be a separate module that is akin and that ultimately can take on a life of their own, leading
to modules for language and spatial cognition and that may to new forms of compulsions (for example, counting words
have four distinctive features: (1) risk detection of potential in sentences or the number of streetlights passed) that may
dangers, (2) easy activation and slow deactivation, (3) ori- depart more and more from those evolutionary ancient ones
entation toward action designed to reduce the likelihood of (for example, excessive washing to avoid contamination). At
future dangers (such as checking behavior), and (4) orienta- all ages, the compulsions tend to be more common in times
tion toward prevention of future events as opposed to avoid- of stress, suggesting again that a relatively automatic vigi-
ance of present ones. lance system gets put into action trying to discover subtle
The security motivational system recognizes a “feeling and often nonexistent cues to threats and ways to avoid
of knowing” that appropriate protective actions have been them. Developmental differences in the manifestation of
taken, which serves as a signal for the system to shut down. obsessive-compulsive disorder (such as a higher incidence of
In normal circumstances, a person appraises his actions, checking behaviors with increasing age) may be critical to
concludes that he has taken all reasonable precautions, understanding the different cognitive and emotional com-
and reduces his levels of threat prevention. According to ponents of this disorder (D. Geller et al., 2001).
this theory, cases of obsessive-compulsive disorder seem to Problems identifying the source of their memories (see
involve blocking information that prevents a person from Chapter 10) may also contribute to the incidence of com-
feeling that he has taken all reasonable protective actions. pulsive behavior in children, who may have more difficulty
As a result, the person continues trying to protect himself knowing whether they have really performed an action or
because “things just don’t feel right,” even though at a more just thought that they did and therefore perform it again.
rational level he knows full well that his hands must be Because younger children in general have greater difficulty
clean, the oven must be off, or the house must be locked. identifying the sources of their memories (for example,
Here the problem of OCD is less a cognitive issue and more whether the memories come from a dream or from a real-
related to emotion—namely, getting the feeling of assurance life experience), a child concerned with contamination may
or “satiation” in the activity that causes the person to feel that have more difficulty accurately remembering whether he
he has done enough and can stop his self-protective behaviors washed his hands or just thought about doing so.
(Szechtman & Woody, 2004). The process is thought to be Why do some children develop obsessive-compulsive dis-
analogous to cases of physiological satiation. For example, if order and others do not? There are several distinct models
someone is thirsty, the awareness of having just drunk a lot of of etiology, many of which could mutually contribute to the

ANXIETY DISORDERS 597

disease. There are clear indications of a genetic basis, as the on eating disorders that normally divides the disorders into
incidence of OCD in MZ twins is roughly twice that in DZ anorexia nervosa, bulimia, and binge eating, while also
twins (approximately 80 percent versus 40 percent concor- allowing for other rarer forms of eating disorders, such as
dance rates), with far higher concordance rates for OCD fixations on the “right” foods (Brownell & Foreyt, 1986;
than for most other anxiety disorders (Carey & Gottes- Keel et al., 2012). These disorders can have devastating
man, 1981; Pauls, 2008, 2012; Pauls et al., 1995; Rasmus- health consequences. For example, girls with anorexia ner-
sen, 1993). Alleles linked to higher levels of OCD are often vosa are 12 times as likely to die in a given year as girls
involved in serotonin-related pathways (Abudy et al., 2012; who do not have the disorder (Smink et al., 2012; Sullivan,
Taylor, 2013). In addition to a genetic basis, adverse neu- 1995).
rological events in infancy and early childhood may cause The incidence among teenage girls of all forms of eating
the disorder. These may include birth difficulties, responses disorders is estimated to be as high as 3 percent (Favaro
to various infections such as meningitis, autoimmune reac- et al., 2003; Hoek, 1995; Hsu, 1996; Smink et al., 2012).
tions, or even brain damage from an accident (D. Geller The age of onset of anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa
et al., 2008; Jenike et al., 1998). appears to be decreasing in younger generations, although
In contrast to the strong evidence for biological factors still occurring in the teen years. This earlier onset is associ-
causing obsessive-compulsive disorder, there is far less evi- ated with earlier age of menstruation, a reduction in num-
dence for psychological models, such as the Freudian idea ber of siblings, and higher levels of socioeconomic status,
that failures to progress normally through toilet training although the specific causal relations among these factors
and the anal stage lead to disorders of control (Sears et al., remain unclear (Favaro et al., 2009). The incidence among
1957). There simply doesn’t seem to be any good reason to girls younger than 9 years old is vastly lower, usually reported
believe that a particular type of parenting causes the emer- at well under 1 percent for anorexia nervosa, bulimia,
gence of obsessions and compulsions. In a sense, this may be and binge eating (Nicholls & Bryant-Waugh, 2009; Smink
a bit surprising. It might seem that a parent who constantly et al., 2012). Anorexia nervosa occurs less than one-tenth
worries about potential future threats and models endless as often among boys than girls in all age groups, and
checking behaviors might well instill such behaviors in the bulimia occurs in boys at about one-hundredth the rate
child, and such associations between parental overprotec- among girls (Hoek & van Hoeken, 2003; Levine & Piran,
tiveness and childhood OCD have been found (Wilcox 2005; Smink et al., 2012). It should be noted, however, that
et al., 2008). But when the genetic commonality is taken into the prevalence may be underestimated because so many
account, it is difficult to find an independent contribution people afflicted with these disorders go to great lengths to
from patterns of child rearing. One final route for parental conceal them.
and broader environmental influences might simply be one Eating disorders in general have several common prop-
where increased stresses cause a rise in obsessive-compulsive erties: they are more common in girls, often much more
behavior in children who are already at risk for the disorder. common; they usually first emerge in adolescence; and they
Thus, if a child with a tendency for obsessive-compulsive are often associated with nonoptimal family structures.
behavior is repeatedly put into circumstances that raise anx- Their absence in younger children is probably not due to
iety, that heightened anxiety may trigger obsessive thoughts a limitation imposed by younger children’s cognitions as
and compulsive behaviors. much as it is a function of the sorts of physical and social
changes that are associated with entering puberty and how
the child, her family, and the culture at large relate to those
Q: What are the most likely causes of changes. The two most commonly discussed eating dis-
orders are anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa. A brief
obsessive-compulsive behavior in children? summary of the contrasting diagnostic criteria of these two
eating disorders is given in Table 16.1. We will discuss each
in turn.

Eating Disorders Anorexia Nervosa

One of the most striking developmental phenomena in psy- Anorexia nervosa is distinguished by a person’s intentional
chopathology is the emergence of certain eating disorders in refusal to eat anything beyond minimal amounts of food.
early adolescence, with a significant preponderance of the It may be a way for an achievement-driven girl to demon-
disorders appearing in girls. There is an immense literature strate her own form of control in situations in which she

598 CHAPTER 16 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD

 Smink et al., 2012). The contemporary media’s emphasis on
Anorexia Nervosa Bulimia Nervosa the desirability of very thin bodies may have helped contrib-
Body weight voluntarily Large uncontrolled eating
ute to that modest increase, but the more important pattern
maintained at below normal binges at least twice weekly is that, for centuries, in the context of religious fasting or
level simply worrying about being thin, anorexia nervosa has
Intense fear of gaining weight Inappropriate compensatory occurred in a higher proportion of girls than boys, with the
or becoming fat behavior (e.g., vomiting) huge sex difference remaining relatively constant over that
Amenorrhea (in females) Self-esteem closely linked to
period (Brumberg, 1988).
body weight/shape It had long been held that anorexia nervosa was a disor-
der that was more common among those in the upper socio-
TABLE 16.1 Key diagnostic features of anorexia nervosa economic classes and among those in advantaged groups
and bulimia nervosa. While both eating disorders are much more that had more achievement-driven girls trying to assert con-
common in females than males, they have distinct characteristics. In trol. While there is some support for this view (Levine &
addition to the diagnostic features described here, anorexia nervosa Piran, 2005; Pate et al., 1992), analyses of reports of the
has a slightly earlier age of onset than bulimia nervosa and has been disorder do not always show a preponderance of cases in the
a more consistent disorder both historically and cross-culturally. It
upper ranges of the socioeconomic spectrum (Forman &
also has been more closely associated with genetic influences. From
Walsh & Devlin (1998). Goodman, 1999; Gard & Freeman, 1996). Rather, there are
reports of higher incidences of anorexia in more technologi-
cally advanced societies that tend to have an abundance of
food for their citizens (Miller & Pumariega, 2001). It may
feels powerless. Adolescents with anorexia nervosa tend to be that cultural factors are becoming more important than
have extremely low body weights, and their self-esteem is socioeconomic factors as all members of a culture, rich and
based on an excessive concern with being thin rather than poor, start to adopt standard images of the ideal body shape
on their intellectual skills, personality, or physical skills (see for that culture (Lake et al., 2000; see also Kayono et al.,
Figure 16.6). A preoccupation with a high level of exercise is 2008; Keel & Klump, 2003).
also often observed. Anorexia is also associated with amen- We saw in Chapter 15 how the introduction of Western
orrhea, the absence of a menstrual period in women who television programming into traditional communities in
are of menstrual age. Anorexia in a child is frightening for Fiji was related to an increase in eating disorders based
parents because they feel powerless to stop their child from on an “idealization of thinness” as depicted in the West-
wasting away. ern programs. Even this commonly reported cross-cultural
finding, however, needs to be supported by large-scale
Incidence of Anorexia As indicated earlier, this disor-
der shows the strongest bias toward girls, occurring at least
10 times as frequently in girls as in boys. The disorder is
very rarely seen before middle school, although a very small
number of cases of what seems to be the disorder have been
reported in girls under age 10 (Bostic et al., 1997; Rhodes
et al., 2009; Watkins & Lask, 2002). It typically appears
around age 12, reaches its height in adolescence and college,
and then gradually wanes, although it may continue to be
seen in middle age (Keski-Rahkonen et al., 2007; Smink
et al., 2012). Anorexia often co-occurs with other forms of
psychopathology, especially depression and anxiety-related
disorders.
The disorder has been reported in various forms for cen-
turies (Vandereycken & Van Deth, 1994). But given some of
the popular press on the topic, it might seem as if there has
been a surge of anorexia cases in recent years, perhaps even
FIGURE 16.6 Anorexia in young adults. In 2010, the highly suc-
an epidemic. A closer look at historical patterns, however, cessful French model and actress Isabelle Caro died from complica-
suggests only a modest rise over the course of the twenti- tions related to anorexia. For many unfamiliar with the disease, it was
eth century, with drops sometimes occurring in recent years baffling that such a successful and popular figure could actually die
(Currin et al., 2005; Keel & Klump, 2003; Keel et al., 2006; from the eating disorder.

EATING DISORDERS 599

rigorous comparisons of different cultures that use the same ACTUAL ESTIMATED IDEAL
Control
assessment instruments in the same way. For example, one
problem is that some cultures may have much higher stigma
attached to the disorder and therefore may have higher
levels of underreporting by children to their families and
by the families to their physicians. One extensive analysis
of cross-cultural differences in anorexia found that while
there may be some cultural variation in anorexia as a func-
tion of a culture’s “idealization of thinness,” anorexia is Bulimic
found in every culture in the world where the numbers
and methods are adequate for reporting it (Keel & Klump,
2003).

Q: How does anorexia vary across gender and

across cultures? Anorexic

Cognitive Distortions in Anorexia A person with anorexia

may report that she sees herself as fat and needs to be thin-
ner, while others would say that she already appears to be
extremely thin. Thus, there seems to be a form of distorted
cognition in which a girl who by any objective account is FIGURE 16.7 Body distortions by those with anorexia and
incredibly thin still sees herself as fat or overweight. This bulimia. When computer software is used that simulates accurately
distorted perception of one’s body has been documented how weight gets added to the body, individuals with both anorexia
many times in the literature (Cash & Deagle, 1997; Exter- and bulimia will adjust the images in ways that show a distortion of
kate et al., 2009; Keizer et al., 2012). The most common their body image to higher weights than they really are. In addition,
method to assess an individual’s body image is to take a individuals with anorexia have an ideal body image that is thinner than
the ideal shown by normal participants. From Tovee et al. (2003).
photo of the individual and then stretch the image on either
a horizontal or vertical axis and ask the individual to adjust
the image on those two dimensions until it fits with how anorexia really “perceive” their bodies differently or whether
she thinks she looks. Compared with participants who do they actually have the same perceptions as everyone else but
not have eating disorders, an individual with anorexia or respond differently because they want to convince others,
bulimia is more likely to adjust the image so that it portrays and perhaps even themselves, that they are fat. One way
an individual as considerably heavier than she actually is. to explore this issue is to develop more tasks that tap into
To make these simulated images more realistic, researchers very rapid perceptual processing of images that might not
have used software that allows participants to adjust several be as influenced by conscious response biases. For example,
dimensions of their body image. In one study, participants consider a set of photographs of an individual with anorexia
were asked to adjust an image of themselves that showed in a natural setting, including head shots, full body shots,
their real weight and body shape, then to adjust the image and partial body shots, where some of the shots were accu-
to correspond to their ideal weight. As seen in Figure 16.7, rate and others were distorted to make the individual look
participants with anorexia and bulimia were more likely to heavier (as the person with anorexia normally seems to
depict themselves as heavier than they really were. In addi- perceive her body). If those images were then embedded
tion, the participants with anorexia set up a considerably in a much larger set of images of other women of roughly
thinner ideal image (Tovee et al., 2003). the same age and the woman with anorexia was asked
Many clinicians and researchers believe that such dis- to identify herself as rapidly as possible when the images
torted images help set up and maintain anorexic behavior, were presented in rapid succession, would the woman with
and indeed many therapies are designed around the idea anorexia actually be faster at identifying her “fat” self than
of shifting the distorted perception (Exterkate et al., 2009; her real self? This is just one example of the sorts of studies
Rosen, 1997). Nonetheless, the causal link between dis- that researchers might conduct to assess how much anorexia
torted body image and anorexic behavior remains largely is a problem in actual perception as opposed to response
speculative. For example, one issue is whether people with biases.

600 CHAPTER 16 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD

 isfaction (Lynch et al., 2008; Stice & Whitenton, 2002). To
Q: How has the idea of distorted cognition or the extent that physical and physiological changes in girls’
perception been supported by experimental bodies are related to genetic factors, these genetic factors
may also be indirectly related to the onset of anorexia. That
work with girls who have anorexia? is, if genetic factors cause a more rapid increase in fatty tis-
sue in some girls, those changes may also put the girls at
higher risk of developing anorexia.
Genetic and Environmental Causal Factors There is
evidence of a genetic component for anorexia, with a higher
concordance rate both for monozygotic twins and dizy- Q: How have the gender differences in
gotic twins (Bulik et al., 2000, 2007; Devlin et al., 2002; anorexia been explained? Which explanation
Klump et al., 2001; Thornton et al., 2011). Heritability
estimates are at roughly 50 percent, which indicates a sub- seems to have the best support?
stantial genetic contribution. Specific genes also seem to be
emerging as especially relevant to the disorder (Bulik et al.,
Family influences have often been thought to be an impor-
2007; Grice et al., 2002). The causal pathways for genetic
tant factor in anorexia. Indeed, one family therapist, Salva-
influences, however, remain unclear, although at least some
dor Minuchin, coined the term anorexic families to describe
scholars have wondered if there might be a link to certain
families in which particular patterns of interactions may be
cognitive styles related to obsessional thought, as described
related to the emergence of anorexia in the child (Minuchin et
earlier.
al., 1978). Minuchin hypothesized that the parents in anorexic
Although 50 percent is an impressive degree of genetic
families have difficulty allowing their daughter to become
influence, this still allows for substantial environmental
more independent from the family in which she is enmeshed
influences as well. One theory of environmental influence,
and to become an individual in her own right. In particular,
which also tries to explain the gender difference, focuses on
anorexic families were said to have the following traits:
the physical and physiological changes that happen in girls
during puberty (see Chapter 1). As girls approach puberty, 1. Enmeshment. A family structure in which everyone is so
their bodies increase dramatically in certain dimensions, intertwined in their relationships and responsibilities that
such as hip and breast size, and there is normally a con- it is difficult for each member to emerge as an individual.
siderable increase in the proportion of body fat. They also 2. Overprotectedness. A family structure in which parents
start to menstruate. Boys undergo quite different patterns of worry too much about a child’s safety and tend to over-
changes, often losing body fat and developing a body shape react to minor threats, resulting in not allowing the child
that is thinner than their prepubertal form. Given these dif- to learn to cope in a more autonomous fashion.
ferences, it has been repeatedly suggested that girls are more 3. Rigidity. A family structure in which there is an unwill-
at risk for being upset with these body changes, especially ingness to change the dynamics that constitute the dys-
in a culture that embraces thinness. Moreover, many girls functional family, including a tendency to stick to old
may feel apprehension over the body changes associated patterns, no matter how painful they might be.
with becoming a woman because of the increased sexuality 4. Conflict avoidance. A family that is unable to ever
that is implied and reinforced by the monthly recurrence of deal with conflicts or have useful confrontations. Parents
menstruation. avoid the conflict by withdrawing, refusing to respond,
These speculations lead to an interesting prediction. In or otherwise escaping interactions over the conflict.
those who will develop anorexia, girls who mature earlier
physically should show an earlier onset for the disorder Collectively, these four factors were thought to drive
than those who mature later. This prediction is borne out some children toward seeking a way to exercise control and
(Swarr & Richards, 1996). The effect of puberty itself, how- have autonomy. Supposedly, one of the few ways for them
ever, seems to be more modest when other factors, such as to do so is to exercise extreme control over their own bodies
peer group and culture, are considered (McCabe & Ric- by refusing to eat, as this is the one pattern of behavior that
ciardelli, 2003; Tremblay & Lariviere, 2009). Moreover, the the enmeshed, rigid, protective family environment cannot
actual influence of body changes on anorexia may be caused control.
more by the buildup of fatty tissue that occurs in puberty Minuchin’s hypotheses about the interactions of anorexic
rather than by the actual onset of puberty itself. Thus, when families were later tested in studies that compared the
the proportion of fatty tissue and the age of menstruation interaction patterns within families that had children with
are looked at independently of each other, large increases in anorexia with the patterns of families that did not have chil-
fatty tissue seem to be the primary predictor of body dissat- dren with anorexia (Casper & Troiani, 2001; Humphrey,

EATING DISORDERS 601

1989). In some studies, there are indications of different Incidence of Bulimia As already noted, bulimia is much
family dynamic patterns roughly similar to those proposed more common in girls than in boys (Carlat et al., 1997;
by Minuchin, but even in those cases, the causal argument Keski-Rahkonen et al., 2009; Smink et al., 2012). Bulimia is
does not follow directly, as parents may simply be manifest- more common than anorexia, and it is observed at least twice
ing a shared genotype with their children. Even Minuchin as often (Favaro et al., 2003). Moreover, the disorder seems
is careful to state that family factors might not initially to have been documented more recently than anorexia, as it
cause anorexia, but rather they might maintain and perhaps has been widely reported for only a few decades (Gotestam &
exacerbate the disorder once it emerges. As is so often the Agras, 1995). This recent rise of bulimia fits with the
case, the real causal pattern most likely involves a complex observation that its prevalence also varies more dramati-
interaction of many social factors, with particular emphasis cally across cultures than anorexia does, being essentially
on genetic predispositions (Lacy & Price, 2004). absent in some cultures while relatively common in others,
such as in North America (Keel & Klump, 2003). As with
anorexia, bulimia is virtually nonexistent in young chil-
dren and then shows a significant rise in adolescence (see
Q: Describe how family interaction patterns Figure 16.8).
have been thought to be involved in the
causation or maintenance of anorexia. Causal Factors While there is some evidence for a genetic
component to bulimia, the strength of the evidence and
the possible genetic conclusion is not as strong as it is for
anorexia (Kaye et al., 2004; Keel & Klump, 2003; Waller &
Sheffield, 2008). Bulimia may therefore be more strongly
Bulimia Nervosa influenced by cultural and familial factors. In particular,
Bulimia nervosa is an eating disorder that is quite different cultures that put tremendous emphasis on thinness and
from anorexia. A person with bulimia will engage in huge stigmatize obesity may have higher levels of bulimia. One
bouts of excessive rapid eating two or more times a week interesting indication of the power of cultural effects is
and then follow those episodes of overeating with some way found in a study of 9- and 11-year-old girls who were either
of purging the food, usually by self-induced vomiting. A in schools with considerably older children or in schools
person’s anxiety and stress may trigger a bout of eating that with children around their own age (Wardle & Watters,
is often accompanied by feelings of disgust toward her own 2004). Being exposed to older girls in school was associated
body, with the purging then bringing a form of relief from with the participants feeling more obese and being more
the stress and negative feelings. In contrast to individuals concerned with dieting. Because the girls were essentially
with anorexia, those with bulimia tend to be of normal randomly assigned to the schools and the body weights did
weight and can even be quite overweight. not differ between girls assigned to the different schools,

100 100

80
150
Number of cases

Number of cases

60

100

40

50
20

0 0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
A Bulimia Age at onset (in years) B Anorexia Age at onset (in years)

FIGURE 16.8 Age of onset of bulimia and anorexia. Despite being quite distinct diseases with different etiologies, the typical age of
onset for bulimia is very similar to that for anorexia. Adapted from Favaro et al. (2009).

602 CHAPTER 16 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD

this study shows how a relatively small difference in school
environment can create some of the psychological differ- Q: How do the most likely causes of bulimia
ences thought to be associated with eating disorders, espe- seem to differ from the most likely causes of
cially bulimia.
Family influences have also been explored extensively. anorexia?
Mothers of girls who are bulimic tend to have a variety of
traits that are different from the traits of other mothers.
In one study, mothers of girls with bulimia were more
unhappy about how their families functioned, more likely
to have eating disorders themselves, had atypical patterns
Depression
of dieting, and were more likely than other mothers to Everyone feels sad or blue from time to time, but some people
think that their daughters should lose weight. They were fall into more sustained states of sadness and despair that
also more likely than other mothers to judge their daugh- become pathological. In adults, depression is a kind of affec-
ters as less attractive than the girls judged themselves tive (mood) disorder that has two prominent subtypes: uni-
(Pike & Rodin, 1991). Parents of children with bulimia polar depression and bipolar disorder. Each has its own course
are also more likely to be depressed and to show less of progression. In children, the incidence of both types was
affection and more hostility and belittling in interactions long considered to be rare until at least some time in adoles-
with their children (Humphrey, 1989). Moreover, there cence, raising profound questions about what factors protect
seems to be a linkage between parental concerns about most children from these potentially debilitating disorders.
their children becoming obese and the children’s eating A large set of adult studies suggests that these two types of
behaviors long before the typical onset of bulimia in ado- depression are quite distinct clusters that occur in different
lescence. In one study of infants and toddlers of mothers groups of people (Angst & Marneros, 2001; Forty et al., 2008;
who had eating disorders (mostly bulimia), the mothers Winokur et al., 1995; see Table 16.2). Unipolar depression
were more concerned about the baby’s eating habits and is a severe and sustained drop in affect that is often accom-
the babies themselves were described as being more avid panied by agitation, feelings of sadness and worthlessness,
eaters, as if a fixation with eating had been set up very insomnia, and loss of appetite. It tends to be roughly twice
early in their lives (Agras et al., 1999). Again, however, as common in women as in men (6 percent of women versus
claims of family influences need to be evaluated in the 3 percent of men), a ratio that is present from early adolescence
context of the alternative of a common genetic contri- (Nolen-Hoeksema & Girgus, 1994). The most typical age of
bution to problems in both parents and children. The onset is in the 20s (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).
weaker evidence for genetic factors does at least initially Bipolar disorder is a distinct affective disorder character-
lend more support for family and cultural influences in ized by swings between periods of lethargy and low affect and
the case of bulimia. periods of high activity, or “mania,” in which the person often

Symptoms Unipolar Bipolar Statistical Significance of

Difference

Incidence of psychoses during Half as common as in bipolar Twice as common as in unipolar Large
depression
Number of lifetime episodes of Somewhat less frequent Somewhat more frequent Moderate
depression
Longest episodes of depression Much longer Much shorter Large
Excessive self-reproach More extensive Less extensive Large
Difficulty sleeping Less difficulty More difficulty Large
Loss of energy Greater loss Less significant loss Large
Diminished libido More diminished Less diminished Large

TABLE 16.2 Bipolar disorder versus unipolar depression. Even in their depressive periods, people afflicted with unipolar depression have
different symptoms and time courses than those with bipolar disorder. People with bipolar disorder have more frequent incidences of psychoses,
more frequent episodes of depression, and shorter episodes of depression, among other differences. From Forty et al. (2008).

DEPRESSION 603
has inflated self-esteem, grandiose plans, increased talkative- 30
ness, and a diminished amount of sleep (American Psychi- Total

Percent clinically depressed

atric Association, 2013). It affects men and women equally 25
Male
(roughly 1 percent of the total population) and has an earlier Female
20
average age of onset than unipolar depression, typically dur-
ing late adolescence. People with bipolar disorder may have
15
difficulty sleeping, but they are also more likely to have diffi-
culty waking up in the morning. The genetic basis for bipolar
10
disorder is considerably stronger than for unipolar depression.
Loss of appetite is less common and may oscillate with binge
5
eating. In the depressive phase, people with bipolar disorder
are likely to be very slow in motor movements and not agi- 0
tated as in the unipolar case. People with unipolar depression 11 13 15 18 21
are more likely to display anger than those with bipolar dis- Age (in years)
order. Because of these differences, it is useful to think about FIGURE 16.9 Rise of depression in adolescence. The incidence
the development of the two forms of depression separately. of clinical depression rises dramatically during the teenage years,
especially among females. Adapted from Hankin et al. (1998).

Q: What are some differences in how with reduced intensity, increases markedly after 15 years of age
depression is manifested in people with bipolar (Hankin et al., 1998; see also Ge et al., 1994; Lakdawalla et al.,
versus unipolar versions of the disorder? 2007; Petersen et al., 1993).
Why is there such a dramatic increase in the rate of
depression after puberty? Several possible reasons have
been proposed: more stressful life events during and after
puberty (Ge et al., 2001), increased interpersonal vulner-
Unipolar Depression ability (Gotlib & Hammen, 1992), physiological changes
It was traditionally held that young children simply didn’t get produced by puberty, and changes in cognition (Lakdawalla
depressed. More recently, there seems to be a consensus that et al., 2007; Lockhart et al., 2002; Rutter, 1987). These
young children can develop true depressions that are similar accounts also attempt to explain why the surge in incidence
to both the unipolar and bipolar types in adults (Coyle et al., coincides with the quite sudden onset of a large gender dif-
2003). This opinion is based on the ability to reliably use assess- ference. Each of these factors is considered in exploring the
ment questionnaires for childhood depression and because of etiology of childhood and adolescent depression.
convergences between what parents say about the behaviors of
their children and the children’s own self-reports (McClellan & Biological Causes Unipolar depression and its weaker
Werry, 2000). The childhood assessments focus on factors variants tend to run in families, suggesting a genetic compo-
that tend to be more behavioral in nature, such as problems in nent. Indeed, in one study of severe depression among mono-
school and in social interactions and the presence of behaviors zygotic and dizygotic adolescent twins, the much higher
that are disruptive and aggressive. There are also indications concordance rate among MZ twins suggested a heritability
of unpleasant or uncomfortable moods and an undervaluing of roughly 40 percent (Glowinski et al., 2003; Lau & Eley,
of the self relative to others (Carle et al., 2008). Some children 2010; Rice & Thapar, 2009). Thus, even in cases of relatively
do seem to enter sustained periods of reduced affect and have early onset of the disorder, the heritabilities are as high as in
some of the other symptoms found in adults, such as feelings adults, suggesting that the biological basis in adolescence may
of hopelessness about the future, excessive rumination about be similar to that found in older individuals. Moreover, if one
negative events, and suicidal thoughts. It is far less clear, how- individual in a family experiences depression in adolescence,
ever, that these children experience the full range of adult or the likelihood that a relative will also experience depression
adolescent symptoms. In fact, the recent flurry of attention in adolescence increases based on how closely related the two
to the presence of depression in young children runs the risk individuals are (for example, MZ twins, DZ twins, non-twin
of overlooking much more dramatic developmental facts: the siblings, or cousins), suggesting that genetics plays an impor-
incidence of unipolar depression skyrockets during adolescence tant role in the onset of the disorder.
and swings from an even distribution among the sexes to a Genetic factors may often work in combination with
huge preponderance among females (see Figure 16.9). Unipolar daily life stressors, such that adolescents who have a par-
depression, with its somewhat muted forms of negative affect ticular genetic vulnerability may be much more likely to

604 CHAPTER 16 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD

be plunged into depression when encountering a series of effects through the social consequences of early and late
stressful life experiences, even though they may not fall into maturity are more feasible, these explanations, too, remain
depression in less stressful environments (Hyde et al., 2008; controversial. This is because hormones and physical matu-
Wichers et al., 2009). These extensive interactions with ration, while related, are not the same, as the initial spurt of
environmental influences may help explain why, despite hormones may happen for quite a while before the physi-
high heritabilities, it continues to be difficult to isolate spe- cal maturation is evident, thus making it important to ask
cific genes that are consistently associated with unipolar about the independent contributions of these two factors.
depression (Cohen-Woods et al., 2012). Such interactions Hormones may also have other indirect physiological effects,
also provide a good example of the diathesis-stress model of such as increased levels of estrogen, which influence levels of
the development of psychopathologies, in which some indi- the neurotransmitter serotonin, which in turn is related to
viduals are seen as vulnerable to a specific psychopathology depression (Hyde et al., 2008; Naninck et al., 2011).
when exposed to stress.
Social Causes Social factors may also play a role in their
own right. Certainly children in most cultures tend to expe-
Q: How does the incidence of depression rience major changes in their life experiences as they enter
puberty. Such dramatic social changes influence both sexes,
change with development? hence explaining the rise of depression in both sexes. Still,
some researchers have argued that the influence is greater
for girls, which can help explain the sex differences as well.
Genes can code for a wide variety of developmental For example, gender role socialization may be more intense
changes, ranging from hormonal to cognitive changes, and constraining for girls than for boys during this period
which has led researchers to investigate possible connec- (Hill & Lynch, 1983). In one study of 12,000 Norwegian
tions between hormone levels and depression. In particular, adolescents, the onset of depression in girls seemed to be
some studies have focused on whether the rapid changes in more closely related to perceptions about sex roles than it
the levels of hormones circulating through the body during was in boys (Wichstrom, 1999). On a smaller scale, parent-
puberty, which differ between the sexes, could be related ing styles also have a relation to the onset of depression in
to girls’ much higher rates of depression in adolescence. children. For example, the adolescent children of mothers
Despite the intuitive appeal of this hypothesis, however, the who unconditionally accept their children for who they are
idea of a direct connection between adolescent hormone lev- have lower incidences of depression, while the adolescent
els and depression has not been borne out by the research children of mothers who are highly controlling (through
(Brooks-Gunn & Warren, 1989; Brooks-Gunn et al., 1994; such means as criticism, negative comparisons, and “guilt
Buchanan et al., 1992). In short, despite the popular idea trips”) have higher incidences of depression (Barber, 2002;
that teenagers are being overwhelmed by “raging hor- Garber et al., 1997; Mandara & Pikes, 2008; see also Blatt
mones,” circulating levels of hormones in their blood have et al., 1979, for a different view of parenting effects). The
not been shown to directly affect their emotional states. higher incidences of depression are thought to be partially
Nonetheless, there are good reasons to believe that there produced through feelings of low self-worth in the children,
are indirect relations between hormones and emotions as a but again having a shared genotype may also produce these
result of other processes. One possible influence may be that results. The same genotype that causes girls to be depressed
girls tend to mature earlier than boys and that those who may cause a combination of depression and excessive con-
mature especially early are put under social stresses at an ear- trol in their mothers. Surely, any social factors influenc-
lier age owing to their changing bodies and appearance (Ge et ing the development of depression in childhood interact in
al., 1996; Hyde et al., 2008). The 13-year-old girl who looks important ways with both biological and cognitive factors.
like a fully grown woman may encounter more social stresses
than the 13-year-old who continues to look like a young girl
for a few more years (Graber et al., 1997). By contrast, for
boys, maturing early, when it does happen, may actually be
Q: What are some explanations for gender
a positive event. There is some evidence to support the idea differences in depression?
of increased social stresses both for early-maturing girls and
late-maturing boys (Angold & Rutter, 1992; Ge et al., 1996;
Kaltiala-Heino et al., 2003). According to this account, the Cognitive Causes The role of cognitive patterns is one
hormones themselves do not have a direct effect on depres- of the most intriguing explanations for the emergence of
sion, but they do bring about physical changes that, in turn, depression in adolescence and for the gender differences.
can cause depression-inducing stress. Yet, while indirect For some time, researchers have proposed that people with

DEPRESSION 605
major depression have different cognitive schemas for think- arguments mentioned earlier to tendencies to appraise many
ing about the world and interpreting events. For example, life events in more negative terms. But it is not always the
Aaron Beck proposed that depressed individuals have a case that the environments faced by teenagers are that much
negative style of thought that leads them to make different more stressful than those encountered a few years earlier.
sorts of attributions than nondepressed individuals and that In fact, as seen in Chapter 15, bullying and other forms
this difference in attribution style leads to depression (Beck, of peer aggression often reach their peak before puberty.
1967). Beck hypothesized that depressed individuals have Nonetheless, adolescence may pose its own uniquely stress-
a mutually reinforcing set of negative beliefs about them- ful challenges, and with respect to sex differences, there are
selves, about the world, and about their future that causes a consistent reports that girls both report and actually experi-
negative schema to automatically be used in most situations. ence more negative life events in late childhood and adoles-
A key part of Beck’s approach was the idea that various bio- cence (Hyde et al., 2008).
logical factors, such as a certain genotype, place a child at We can also look beyond the impact of stressful life
risk and then a particular kind of stressful environment trig- events on cognition and instead directly consider the child’s
gers the negative cognitive style. Thus, not all children with cognitive development. Are there more general changes in
a genetic vulnerability to depression will become depressed how children think about the world that might be related
and not all children growing up in highly stressful environ- to the surge of depression in teenagers? Such a change does
ments will become depressed, but when the two factors are seem to occur in the extent to which children are optimistic
both present, depression may emerge. about whether current negative traits will change into more
positive versions of those traits in the future. As described in
Chapter 13, there is a major shift during the elementary and
middle school years in how children regard the malleability
Q: How might stress and genetic factors of negative traits (Lockhart et al., 2002). Younger children
interact to create depression? assume that negative traits, even physical ones like missing
a finger, are likely to change for the better with maturity.
Older children and adults think that such change toward
A related theory proposes that depression grows out of the positive is much less likely. In addition, younger chil-
feelings of hopelessness that are usually engendered by spe- dren tend to see more of a role for their own efforts in bring-
cific life experiences (Hyde et al., 2008; Rose & Abramson, ing about change, hence inoculating them from learned
1992). A child might be ill treated, and in her attempts to helplessness. Children’s views of the role of effort also seem
figure out why, she might develop a cognitive style in which to vary across cultures, which may explain the lower rates
she assumes that her misfortune is because of something of depression in cultures such as Japan, where traits are seen
about her rather than about the world. When she starts as more changeable through effort (Lockhart et al., 2008).
to see this negative feature in global terms (that is, across Although a decrease in cognitive optimism may offer
many different contexts) and as stable over time, she may insight into the increase in depression in adolescence, it does
fall into a state of cognitive hopelessness in which her future not in itself explain sex differences. Future studies need to
looks very bleak. This is because she thinks that something examine more systematically whether children’s diminished
intrinsic about her, which is very wide ranging in effects and optimistic bias as they age coincides with the onset of depres-
which will always be present, will doom her to a future of sion on an individual basis. As with other models, some
negative events. This view evolved out of a theory known as interaction with a biological risk factor or social experiences
learned helplessness, in which animals (including humans) more common to girls is also needed to explain why some
are put in a series of uncontrollable negative situations from individuals develop depression and others do not. It is also
which they cannot learn a way to escape, leading them to important to keep in mind that changes during puberty do
“learn to be helpless.” For example, a rat might be put into not seem to be correlated with the rate of cognitive develop-
a cage in which it receives shocks that it can neither escape ment during the same period (Litt, 1995). Thus, cognitive
nor have any control over. When animals or people are put development is likely to make an independent contribution
in these situations, they seem to learn a helpless style that is to depression that is above and beyond any direct or indirect
thought to be closely related to depression (Seligman, 1975). effects of puberty (see also Lakdawalla et al., 2007).
Yet, neither of these cognitive approaches on their own
can explain either the huge surge of depression in adoles-
cence or the sex differences. We can argue that transitions Q: How might patterns of cognitive
during puberty result in changes in learning experiences development explain the increase in depression
in school, peer groups, and the like, and that girls have with age?
more stressful transitions. This links the social influence

606 CHAPTER 16 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD

 Sex differences in depression during adolescence may also present in elementary school children just as much as it is
be related to another cognitive difference known as rumi- in adolescents. But in adolescence, parental socialization
nation. While some people respond to negative situations recedes and peer influences rise, and ruminative tendencies
by problem solving or simply by distracting themselves, a among peers may be mutually reinforcing and rise to higher
third response style is to continue to think about the nega- levels than at earlier ages (see New Directions in Develop-
tive problem. People with a ruminative response style tend mental Research box).
to mull over negative events both in the present and in the While the etiology of all mental disorders involves an
past in a manner that helps set up and maintain depressive interaction of multiple factors, unipolar depression may well
states. That style is more common both among depressed involve the most factors in the most complex web of inter-
individuals and among women than in the population at actions. Figure 16.10 illustrates one model of how affect,
large. Women may have a stronger tendency than men to biology, and cognition interact over the course of develop-
ruminate, partly because of their socialization, as girls are ment to create depression, and in particular gender differ-
more likely to be encouraged to think through a situation ences in depression (Hyde et al., 2008). In this model, some
thoroughly, whereas boys are often encouraged to problem- individuals are more vulnerable, either cognitively, biologi-
solve or to fix negative situations (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). cally, or emotionally in terms of temperamental traits, but
For those who get used to this cognitive style, it can be in many cases the individuals may be more vulnerable in
quite difficult to change. Thus, if a group of people who all three ways at the same time. When these vulnerabili-
tend toward depression and another group who do not are ties interact with negative life events, they together lead to
asked to think positive thoughts about themselves, the more what is called depressogenic vulnerability, which represents
depressed individuals are more reluctant to do so on the the convergence of all the separate factors to create depression.
grounds that they are still gaining insight into themselves Unfortunately, these factors tend to be stronger in girls, and
through the negative ruminations (Lyubomirsky & Nolen- they therefore collectively contribute to the large sex difference
Hoeksema, 1993). Moreover, there seem to be reciprocal in depression during adolescence, as shown in Figure 16.10.
negative-feedback loops in female adolescents in which
rumination increases depression, which in turn increases
ruminative thinking, leading to a kind of downward spi-
ral (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2007). In addition, those ado- Bipolar Disorder
lescents who show more rumination about negative events As described earlier, bipolar disorder is marked by two dis-
are more likely to later show severe major depressive epi- tinct phases, a depressive phase and a manic phase. Although
sodes than those who show lesser amounts of rumination earlier views tended to see the depressive behaviors of uni-
about comparably negative events, a pattern that has led polar and bipolar depression in similar ways, more recent
some researchers to conclude that rumination may serve to approaches point toward some behavioral differences,
amplify the effects of negative events in ways that lead to including more lethargy and sleeping in bipolar disorder,
depression (Abela & Hankin, 2011). as well as more changeable mood and perhaps less rumi-
Even if girls are more likely to be socialized to ruminate native cognition (Bowden, 2005; Forty et al., 2008; Gold-
than are boys, this still does not explain the surge of depres- berg et al., 2008; Hantouche & Akiskal, 2005). The same
sion in the teenage years. Rumination would seem to be approximate range of behaviors is used in the diagnosis of

Pubertal hormones:
Biological Genetic
pubertal timing
Vulnerability vulnerability
and development
FIGURE 16.10 Factors
Gender contributing to the emergence
Affective Depressogenic difference in of depression in adolescence.
Temperament
Vulnerability vulnerability depression It now appears that biological,
(age 13–15) affective, and cognitive factors
can create a high level of
Negative Objectified “depressogenic vulnerability”
Cognitive
cognitive body Rumination
Vulnerability that interacts strongly with
style consciousness
negative life events to create
depression in adolescence and
that seems to converge more
Negative Peer sexual Other negative
Life Events harassment life events strongly for girls. Adapted from
Hyde et al. (2008).

DEPRESSION 607
 NEW DIRECTION S IN DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH

Co-rumination, Gender, and Depression

A
s researchers attempt to explain the large gender dif- outgrowth of girls’ tighter social relations and higher levels of
ference in depression and its onset in puberty, one self-disclosure? Is it a side effect of socialization differences
new variable of interest is that of co-rumination. Co- that tend to push girls toward thinking more about internal
rumination occurs when a group tends to dwell on states and personal attributions? Or does it reflect something
negative events in a mutually reinforcing manner. Like rumination, deeper about the cognitive styles of girls and boys? Whatever
it seems to maintain and perhaps exacerbate depression, and it the answers, the co-rumination hypothesis does suggest that
occurs more frequently among girls and women than among boys girls who are depressed might be helped by interventions that
and men. Yet, it may seem paradoxical that girls, who are known focus on the social groups in which they are embedded and
to have generally closer and more extensive social relationships how the members of those social groups interact. More broadly,
than boys, are more depressed, as social bonds are thought to the social interaction patterns that distinguish boys and girls,
normally alleviate depression (Bukowski et al., 1996). But if co- especially shortly before and during adolescence, may be criti-
rumination is often a consequence of those bonds, it may help to cal to understanding the emergence of gender differences in
explain the higher rates of depression among girls. psychopathology (Crick & Zhan-Waxler, 2003).
Co-rumination is more socially dynamic and interactive than Co-rumination may have costs by inducing depression. But it
rumination. As we first mentioned in Chapter 15, co-rumination also may have benefits by promoting close friendships and net-
is the excessive discussion of personal problems in one-on-one works of social support, which may help explain why it persists
interactions with friends. These discussions may include going even with some negative consequences. Studies of ado-
over the problem again and again, speculating about future lescent girls do indeed suggest such a dual role in which
problems, being encouraged by others to engage in such dis- co-rumination levels are associated both with higher levels of
cussions, and focusing on negative emotions. Such discussions depression and with tighter social bonds (Rose et al., 2007; Starr &
might be about whether a potential boyfriend is about to break Davila, 2009). In addition, co-rumination seems to facilitate
up with a girl or whether a comment made by another girl is contagion of depressive emotions among friends (Schwartz-
really a veiled insult (Rose, 2002). The constant discussion of Mette & Rose, 2012), illustrating how the positive effects of
problems and negative emotions might prevent vulnerable girls friendships may also have negative side effects in vulnerable
from thinking or acting more positively and hence might lead to groups prone to co-rumination. The study of co-rumination rep-
or maintain depression. resents a new direction of research because it takes the process
When a co-rumination scale was developed, it did indeed of rumination beyond that of a lone individual. In considering how
demonstrate more co-rumination among third, fifth, seventh, a social network might cause a kind of positive feedback that
and ninth grade girls than among boys, with the gender dif- increases the depressive effects of rumination while also being
ference much larger among the adolescents in the group reinforced by the ways in which it builds social bonds and mutual
(Rose, 2002). Questions still remain about why co-rumination support, researchers can seek ways to break the loop and reduce
occurs more among girls in the first place. Is it simply a natural depression.

bipolar disorder in both children and adults, except that it is In addition to the behavioral differences, bipolar and
necessary to adjust the ratings of such factors as “grandiose unipolar affective disorders tend to occur in different family
plans” for what is normal for a child of that age (Leibenluft, groups and are reliably distinguished by different assessment
2008; Leibenluft & Rich, 2008). Thus, it might not be that instruments and by different developmental time courses,
unusual for a fourth-grader to think that he might really with bipolar disorders tending to emerge earlier (Leiben-
become an NBA star, despite having limited athletic skills, luft & Rich, 2008; Moreno et al., 2012). Unlike unipolar
but it would be unusual for a fourth-grader to think that he depression, bipolar disorder is not characterized by any dif-
could study hard and get a college degree over the next few ference between the sexes. Finally, the heritability of bipolar
months. disorder seems to be a good deal higher than the heritability

608 CHAPTER 16 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD

of unipolar depression. In some studies, the heritability order is misdiagnosed as ADHD, several of the medications
of bipolar disorder is as high as 85 percent and averages for ADHD might help launch a bipolar child into a manic
around 65 percent (Craddock & Jones, 1999; Edvardsen episode rather than be therapeutic.
et al., 2008; McGuffin et al., 2003; Potash & DePaulo, Bipolar disorder is likely to have its own developmental
2000; Taylor et al., 2002; Wray & Gottesman, 2012). trajectory that is quite distinct from unipolar depression,
with bipolar disorder emerging earlier and with different
Causal Factors Although there is a strong genetic compo- symptoms even in the depressive state. The developmental
nent to bipolar disorder, it is not so strong as to rule out other trajectory does not seem to surge as dramatically at a partic-
important influences. As in unipolar depression, there seems ular age, and the disorder has even been seen in preschoolers
to be an important contribution from stressful life events (Blumberg, 2007; B. Geller et al., 2004), suggesting that
that can both trigger the initial onset of the disorder and the relatively strong genetic predisposition toward bipolar
launch a new series of mood cycles (Post & Leverich, 2006; disorder may result in early manifestations in childhood
Rush, 2003). One study of 2.1 million Danes found clear instead of late manifestations in adolescence or adulthood
evidence for a genetic influence based on family relatedness as a function of environmental stresses. Moreover, because
and a possible environmental trigger caused by the death the cases that are diagnosed very early often do show all the
of a parent, although the authors acknowledge a possible symptoms of a full-fledged disorder several years later, there
confound in that parents who have bipolar disorder have a is good reason to believe that the same disorder is involved
higher mortality rate, and thus it could be the genetic factor (B. Geller et al., 2008; Wozniak et al., 2011). Indeed, in
that is actually at work (Mortensen et al., 2003). Children studies that develop careful assessments to distinguish the
and adolescents who show deficits in the ability to label mania of bipolar disorder from other high levels of activity
facial emotions and emotions in vocalizations may also be in children, misdiagnoses were quite uncommon (Wozniak
at greater risk for bipolar disorder (Brotman et al., 2008; et al., 2011). The challenge is to instill the same level of care
Deveney et al., 2012), perhaps because such deficits lead to in frontline clinicians. Finally, treatment with lithium and
more stressful social interactions. other mood stabilizers seems to be equally effective at all
ages (Weller et al., 2004).
Diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder One major problem in
uncovering the cause of bipolar disorder is the difficulty
in diagnosing the disorder in younger children as distinct Q: How are the etiology and developmental
from diagnosing attention deficit hyperactivity disor- trajectory of bipolar disorder different from those
der (ADHD), conduct disorders, and even schizophrenia
of unipolar disorder?
(Weller et al., 1995). Children and young adolescents in gen-
eral seem to have far more variable mood states than older
individuals, and when those mood states are embedded in
other disorders, they can sometimes be mistaken for symp-
toms of bipolar disorder. Over the last decade or so, there
has been a substantial increase in the diagnosis of children,
Conduct Disorder: The Case of
and even preschoolers, with bipolar disorder. In some cases,
these may be misdiagnoses in which difficult behaviors in
Psychopathy
a child are confused with the more specific symptoms asso- There is a huge area of developmental psychopathology
ciated with pediatric bipolar disorder. If the strict criteria that focuses on conduct disorder, which can be diagnosed
of the DSM-IV-TR system are used with age-appropriate in terms of a set of behaviors that are both aggressive and
adjustments for some symptoms, however, it appears that antisocial (Baker, 2009; Kazdin, 1995; Loeber et al., 2009).
bipolar disorder can be clearly identified in quite young As seen in Table 16.3, the critieria fall into four categories:
children, although probably not at the high levels that are aggression against people and animals, destruction of prop-
often reported (Leibenluft, 2008, 2011; Leibenluft & Rich, erty, theft or other violations of trust, and breaking major
2008). A related diagnostic problem is that children with rules. For a child to be diagnosed with conduct disorder,
bipolar disorder often have several other disorders at the he or she must show at least three of these behaviors over
same time, and so the overall suite of symptoms of a bipolar the course of a year. Because we have considered aggres-
child can overlap with those of children who have no bipo- sion and antisocial behaviors in other chapters and because
lar component. This can create agony for parents who may the full scale of conduct disorders is so vast, this discussion
hear multiple diagnoses from different professionals, each will focus on one particular subtype—that of psychopathy,
of which might lead to radically different treatments and or sociopathy. We will not discuss antisocial behaviors in
medications. For example, if a genuine case of bipolar dis- which there is evidence of empathy, regret, guilt, and other

CONDUCT DISORDER: THE CASE OF PSYCHOPATHY 609

 Behavior Category Specific Behaviors

Aggression against people or other animals 1. Bullies or threatens others.

2. Becomes easily engaged in or initiates physical fights.
3. Uses a weapon, such as a knife or large stick, to threaten or hurt another.
4. Is physically cruel to people or animals.
5. Has robbed another person through force or intimidation.
6. Has forced another into some form of sexual activity.
Willful destruction of property 1. Sets fires intentionally, hoping to cause damage.
2. Intentionally destroys others’ property in ways other than fire.
Theft or violation of trust 1. Has broken into or entered (without permission) another’s home, car, or place of
business.
2. Uses lies for personal gain, such as lying about needs or obligations.
3. Has stolen items in ways that don’t involve direct confrontation with the owner, such
as shoplifting or using another’s credit card.
Violation of major rules 1. Stays out late at night as a preteen even though parents may have strict rules
against doing so.
2. Is truant from school as a preteen.
3. Has run away from home overnight at least twice.

TABLE 16.3 Diagnosing conduct disorder. Conduct disorder is diagnosed when at least three of these behaviors are present within a
1-year time interval. Adapted from American Psychiatric Association (2000).

emotions, since a different basis for these inappropriate class. Harry gives George small gifts and flatters him heavily.
behaviors has been hypothesized (Blair & Blair, 2009). In He finds out about George’s secret crush on Mary, one of the
addition, when we consider conduct disorders as a whole, girls in their class, and he tells George that he knows Mary.
the primary focus will be on treatment methods. He then shows George some alleged excerpts from Mary’s
diary that he says he accidentally found and which say nice
things about George. A few days before a critical take-home
final examination, Harry asks George for help on the exam,
Features of Psychopathy a clear violation of the honor code. When George objects,
Psychopathy is one of the most chilling disorders, and Harry downplays the moral issues and reminds George that
adults afflicted with this disorder often arouse highly nega- he did look at Mary’s diary. In a veiled threat, he asks George
tive reactions in those around them. For centuries, histori- if helping on the exam would be as embarrassing as everyone
ans and writers have discussed individuals who seem to be knowing that George looked at Mary’s diary and had a secret
cold, calculating, and remorseless. In 1941, Hervey Cleck- crush on her. George ends up helping Harry on the exam.
ley crystallized these observations in a compelling account Since Harry has no further use for George, he stops interact-
of the disorder entitled The Mask of Sanity (Cleckley, 1941), ing with him and, to relieve boredom, writes an anonymous
which described the adult with psychopathy as having e-mail telling the entire class about George’s crush on Mary.
no guilt, shame, or emotional attachments, and as highly When George confronts Harry, Harry denies involvement in
manipulative and intelligent. In essence, this characteriza- a completely compelling manner that also casts George’s one
tion remains the same today, with somewhat less emphasis true friend in the class under a pall of suspicion.
on intelligence as a critical factor. A person with psychopa- It is difficult to imagine that people could behave so cal-
thy can be described as someone who is driven by the pursuit lously and ruthlessly to others and without any pangs of
of goals but who does not feel the impediments of morality conscience, but the abundant case reports of such individ-
or empathy toward others. As such, to get to a desired end, uals suggest that they constitute roughly 1 percent of the
a skilled person with psychopathy will manipulate a victim general population and a much higher proportion of inmate
through lies, deception, and distortions. populations. Some of the most successful people with psy-
Imagine a teenager, Harry, who “befriends” George, one of chopathy are so adroit at manipulating others that they
the least popular but most academically talented students in a are rarely recognized as having caused the pain that they

610 CHAPTER 16 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD

inflict. It might seem that psychopathy is a disorder that in both adults (Hare, 1991) and children (Corrado et al.,
could not emerge until adolescence or adulthood because of 2004; Das et al., 2009; Frick et al., 2000). Table 16.4 lists
the manipulative skills involved. As seen shortly, however, the features of psychopathy that are looked for in the most
the roots of this disorder appear very early, and a core deficit widely used child assessment, the Psychopathy Checklist:
may well be shared between young children with psychopa- Youth Version (PCL:YV), which is used to assess psychopa-
thy and adults with the disorder. thy in adolescents between 13 and 18 years of age. The adult
version is quite similar. One critical aspect of psychopathy
is that the disorder is distributed fairly evenly among all
socioeconomic groups, which tends to argue against the
Diagnosis of Psychopathy theory that psychopathy is completely a product of social-
Specific assessments for psychopathy have been developed ization (Pitchford, 2001; Rutter et al., 1998). More specifi-
relatively recently, as the disorder was originally lumped into cally, it has proved difficult to use differences in parenting
a much larger category of antisocial personality disorders practices to explain why some children appear to be callous
in the DSM diagnosis system. When a specific screening and unemotional (Wootton et al., 1997).
device for psychopathy was developed, it became possible
to recognize a highly specific disorder that differed from
disorders in which people transgress against society for a Q: Describe some typical symptoms of
wide variety of other reasons (Harris et al., 1994). There are psychopathy.
reliable assessment instruments for diagnosing psychopathy

Item Description

1. Impression management Exhibits superficial charm and presents positive attributes to gain trust of others.
2. Grandiose sense of self-worth Is opinionated and domineering and shows inflated sense of self.
3. Stimulation seeking Is prone to boredom, seeks novelty and excitement, and enjoys taking risks.
4. Pathological lying Lies easily and often.
5. Manipulation for personal gain Deceives, manipulates, and cons people.
6. Lack of remorse/guilt Does not feel guilty or care about hurting others.
7. Shallow affect Does not feel deep emotion, but pretends to feel emotion and to care about others.
8. Callousness Lacks empathy, views others as objects, and does not care about others’ feelings and needs.
9. Parasitic orientation Exploits others by taking their money and possessions or by manipulating others to do his work.
10. Poor anger control Is easily offended and provoked to violence.
11. Promiscuous sexual behavior Has many casual sexual encounters, often involving threats and coercion.
12. Early behavioral problems Lies, steals, and sets fires before age 10.
13. Lacks goals Has no interest in education and has unrealistic future goals.
14. Impulsivity Acts out, may quit school or leave home on a whim, and does not consider consequences of
his actions.
15. Irresponsibility Engages in reckless behaviors and does not fulfill obligations or pay back debts.
16. Failure to accept responsibility Blames others for his problems and does not take personal responsibility for his actions.
17. Unstable interpersonal relationships Does not show commitment or loyalty to others and has volatile relationships.
18. Serious criminal behavior Engages in many instances of criminal activity.
19. Serious violations of conditional Commits two or more violations (for example, crimes or drug or alcohol abuse) when released
release on probation from juvenile correctional facilities.
20. Criminal versatility Engages in at least six kinds of criminal behavior.

TABLE 16.4 Symptoms of psychopathy. The Psychopathy Checklist: Youth Version rates individuals on 20 items that collectively are quite
effective in identifying adolescents with psychopathy. Adapted from Dolan (2004).

CONDUCT DISORDER: THE CASE OF PSYCHOPATHY 611

 The early roots of psychopathy are a matter of some con- Sylvers et al., 2011; see Scientific Methods box). Children
troversy. Adults with psychopathy often have a history of as young as 9 years old who score high on psychopathy have
various antisocial behaviors in childhood (Lynam et al., been shown to have difficulty detecting sadness and fear in
2007), although some children who behave this way grow both facial expressions and verbal tones, but no difficulty in
up to be normal adults (Hill, 2003; Saltaris, 2002). Are detecting happy or angry facial expressions or tones (Blair &
there more specific precursors to developing psychopathy? Coles, 2000; Blair et al., 2001). Other studies, however, sug-
Among aggressive or antisocial children, some seem to lack gest that the deficits in emotion recognition may be broader
a moral sense that guides their actions, show no genuine than just for fear and sadness and may cover a wider range
affection, and are unusually self-centered (Lynam, 1997). of emotions in both facial and vocal expressions (Dawel
These children, who also tend to form weak attachments to et al., 2012). Children with high psychopathy scores have
their caregivers and peers, seem to be more likely to develop also been shown to have greater difficulty distinguishing
psychopathy (Saltaris, 2002). Some scholars have identified moral principles from social conventions (Blair, 1997), a
callous or unemotional traits that are indicators of psychop- distinction that comes very naturally to much younger
athy in young children (Barry et al., 2000; Frick & Ellis, children who do not score high on psychopathy (Lockhart,
1999). Indeed, one review suggests that stable indicators 1981; Turiel, 1983).
of aberrant empathy and guilt can be found in children as Adults with psychopathy appear to have a particular def-
young as 3 years old (Loeber et al., 2009). Moreover, even icit in the amygdala, a brain region associated with emo-
children under 2 years old who show disregard and lack tional responding (Blair, 2008; Dawel et al., 2012; Laakso
of concern for others are more likely to show some antiso- et al., 2001; LeDoux, 1998). Recall from Chapter 7 that the
cial and psychopathic characteristics in middle childhood amygdala is a central part of a brain circuit concerned with
(Rhee et al., 2013). Another study followed young chil- processing emotional stimuli and generating emotions in
dren who showed strong antisocial patterns to see whether response to those stimuli. For example, when adults who
they later developed psychopathic tendencies. These chil- score high on psychopathy are asked to remember words
dren were compared to another group of children who first with negative connotations, they show less activation in
showed antisocial behavior as adolescents. In adolescence, the amygdala than individuals who do not score high on
the two groups’ antisocial behaviors were quite similar. But psychopathy, as revealed by fMRI studies, but they do
as 26-year-olds, those who had been antisocial as young not show this difference when remembering neutral words
children were far more likely to show adult psychopathic (Kiehl, 2006; Kiehl et al., 2001; see Figure 16.11). Similar
tendencies (Moffitt et al., 2002). physiological measures also seem to be present in children
who score high on psychopathy. When electrodes are used
to record skin responses from high-scoring and normal-
scoring children, both groups responded similarly to neu-
Q: How might the first signs of psychopathy tral stimuli. But when they were exposed to threatening
emerge in children? stimuli, the high-scoring children showed much smaller
skin responses than did the normal-scoring children (Blair,
1999). Using functional neuroimaging techniques (fMRI),
researchers have shown that children as young as 10 years
old who are callous and unemotional show reduced acti-
Causal Factors vation levels of the amygdala when viewing fearful facial
At all ages, those with psychopathy seem to share a core expressions, but not when viewing angry or neutral expres-
deficit: an inability to have empathy for the emotional states sions. The results suggest that children who show signs of
of others. While a skilled, successful person with psychopa- early psychopathy may have a specific deficit at the neu-
thy might be able to feign interest and pretend to care for ral level in the ability to process information related to
another so as to attain some goal, the real ability to empa- perceiving distress in another (Jones et al., 2009; Marsh
thize and perceive others’ emotional states may be severely et al., 2008). A similar finding has been found in adults
impaired. Using the Psychopathy Checklist (youth and (Kiehl, 2006).
adult versions) and other measures, researchers have assessed These neural deficits are presumably related to diffi-
whether children and adults who score high on the checklist culties in emotional regulation that are often noticed in
also have specific deficits pertaining to empathy. They have children and adults who exhibit psychopathic behaviors.
found that both adults and children with high psychopa- Not only is there less activation in the amygdala for those
thy scores seem to have a selective impairment in the ability scoring high on psychopathy, there is also reduced con-
to process sad and fearful expressions (Blair et al., 2001; nectivity with frontal brain regions that can regulate and

612 CHAPTER 16 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD

 SCIENTIFIC METHOD: Psychopathy and Fear Processing
Hypothesis:
Children with psychopathic traits display fear-recognition deficits when
engaging in automatic visual processing outside of their attention and
awareness.

Method:
1. Researchers included in the study 88 boys, ages 7 to 11, who had
often been in trouble at home or at school.
2. All boys were administered the Antisocial Process Screening Device
(APSD), which detects psychopathic tendencies. Higher scores
indicated more psychopathy.
3. All boys sat at a monitor while wearing goggles that quickly flashed
different images to each eye. One eye saw an abstract pattern in
motion that faded; the other eye saw a face (either fearful, happy,
disgusted, or neutral) that also faded. The abstract pattern made it 2000

minus time (msec) to detect neutral faces

difficult to notice the faces.

Time (msec) to detect fearful faces

4. Children were asked to press a button on the monitor as soon as
they saw the face. 1000
5. Researchers measured how quickly the boys pressed the button.

Results: 0
Children who had lower APSD scores noticed the fearful faces before
other kinds of faces, but children who had higher scores (and more
signs of psychopathy) did not.
-1000
Conclusion:
Children who score high on psychopathy screening tests take longer
to notice fearful faces when they are automatically processing visual -2000
stimuli that are outside of their awareness. This may be because they 0 2 4 6 8 10

are not as sensitive to potential threats in their environment when they APSD score
are engaged in preattentive processing of the world around them. This
early automatic deficit may make it difficult to train them to be more
sensitive to such expressions.
Source study: Sylvers et al. (2011).

inhibit emotions (Glenn et al., 2009; Motzkin et al., 2011; the heritability of psychopathy has not been studied in as
Verona et al., 2012). EEG studies of children who exhibit much detail as the heritability of other mental disorders,
psychopathy-related behaviors when they are as young as there are consistent indications of genetic influences on two
8 years old show that these children have similar difficul- distinct factors, one that is concerned with impulsivity and
ties in modulating negative emotions (Granic et al., 2012). antisocial behavior (especially of a proactive as opposed to
Thus, it may be that early difficulties in appropriately mod- a reactive sort) and another that is associated with callous-
ulating and regulating emotions interact with difficulties ness and “interpersonal detachment” (Bezdjian et al., 2011;
in empathy and emotion perception to create psychopathic Larsson et al., 2006; Liu et al., 2002; Taylor et al., 2003;
behaviors. Viding et al., 2008, 2012). It is not yet clear if one of these
It has also been hypothesized that there is a specific gene factors is more primary and tends to lead to the other or
variant in mice that results in reduced amygdala volume whether both contribute relatively equally to the emergence
and increased aggressive behavior and that it may have a of psychopathy, but there is some sense in the literature that
counterpart in humans (Blair, 2003; Meyer-Lindenberg callousness and interpersonal detachment may be more cen-
et al., 2006; Monaghan et al., 1997; Raine, 2008). While tral to the emergence of psychopathy.

CONDUCT DISORDER: THE CASE OF PSYCHOPATHY 613

 FIGURE 16.11 Psychopathy and
decreased brain activation levels.
Brain-imaging studies repeatedly
find decreases in brain activation
in areas that involve the emotions
when a person with psychopathy is
asked to perform a task related to
the emotions. Here the amygdala
(left panel) shows lower levels of
activation (compared with healthy
controls) in individuals who have
high scores in four different factors
associated with psychopathy (middle
panel) as well as reduced levels
of activation in several other brain
regions (right panel) in individuals
who score high for psychopathy on
interpersonal factors. In all cases, the
color yellow depicts lower levels of
activation relative to healthy controls.
These effects have been found in
adolescents as well and are thought
to reflect a strong biological basis
for the disorder. From Glenn et al.
(2009).

In short, problems in empathy and concern for others

may appear very early in development and may predict psy- Schizophrenia
chopathy in childhood and adulthood. Children who are
In many ways, schizophrenia captures the most popular
unrelentingly cruel to animals and do not show any signs
assumptions about madness, and the earliest discussions
of remorse and who show callous disregard for others are
of it often focused on the bizarre thoughts and behaviors
likely to later develop psychopathy (McPhedran, 2009).
of those with the disorder (Bleuler, 1911/1950; Kraepelin,
One learning theory view of how this deficit results in full-
1919). From a developmental perspective, it is an especially
fledged psychopathy works as follows: Pain or distress in
intriguing disorder because it seems to occur in only a very
others will not be a negative stimulus to a child with an
small number of children and teenagers. Instead, it usually
empathy deficit. Because the negative event of empathizing
first appears in a person’s 20s. One of the most publicized
with distress in others will not be paired with acts by the
cases of a normal young adult succumbing to schizophrenia
child that cause that distress, the child will not learn moral
was that of John Nash, who later won the Nobel Prize in
rules or other guidelines to inhibit behavior that is hurtful
economics and was the subject of the film A Beautiful Mind
to others (Blair, 2003). The possibilities for intervention are
(see Figure 16.12).
discouraging. It may be that children who really cannot tap
into negative emotional states of others will be exceedingly
difficult to socialize in ways that build a conscience. But
there may still be elements of empathy that can be identified Features of Schizophrenia
in even the most extreme children that can then be used
as targets of socialization. In addition, full-fledged psy- Schizophrenia in adults is distinguished by a large set of
chopathy may also involve problems in inhibiting impulses symptoms that are usually sorted into three types: posi-
and low anxiety, and these problems might be addressed tive, disorganized, and negative symptoms. Positive symp-
through other means, including medication. toms refer to distortions or excesses of normal sensations,
thoughts, beliefs, or behaviors. These may include halluci-
nations, usually abnormal auditory or thought patterns that
are often revealed through stretches of incoherent speech,
Q: What is the evidence for neurophysiological and grossly false beliefs known as delusions. Collectively,
and genetic causes of psychopathy? such patterns of positive behavior are frequently referred to
as evidence of psychosis and often involve loss of contact

614 CHAPTER 16 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD

 than one cleanly defined deficit. In fact, Eugen Bleuler,
when he initially labeled the disease, called it the “group of
schizophrenias” in recognition of this possibility (Bleuler,
1911/1950).
The lifetime prevalence of schizophrenia is approxi-
mately 4 out of 1,000 (Bhugra, 2005). The disease is quite
rare in children; roughly 1 out of every 40,000 cases occurs
in a child under 13 years of age (Gochman et al., 2011),
and most cases do not appear until late adolescence or early
adulthood (Eaton et al., 1995). The obvious question is:
What causes the dramatic rise in the late teens and early
20s, and why does it occur during that age period in par-
ticular? This question still puzzles researchers, as do the
rare cases of clear schizophrenia that emerge much earlier
in some children.
FIGURE 16.12 The emergence of schizophrenia in young There may be two different populations of children who
adulthood. John Nash, whose brilliant work in mathematics and develop schizophrenia after childhood: those who through-
economics led him to be awarded a Nobel Prize, led a normal out childhood seemed somehow odd, and those who seemed
childhood and adolescence but was diagnosed with schizophrenia
completely normal and were suddenly afflicted with the dis-
as a young adult and had to cope with the disease for the rest
of his life.
ease (Brennan & Walker, 2000; Neumann et al., 1995). The
children who show more sudden onset are in the group that
seems to be especially affected by changes in puberty. How-
ever, even in the rare cases of child-onset schizophrenia, there
with reality. Disorganized symptoms include more chaotic
appears to be a catastrophic series of brain events occurring
forms of speech and behavior that either make no sense or
during puberty that greatly exacerbates the disease.
are inappropriate for a situation (such as going to the gro-
Unlike in cases of eating disorders and depression, it
cery store in pajamas).
is more difficult to argue that the unique social pressures
Negative symptoms refer to an apparent loss of normal
of adolescence or patterns of cognitive development are
behaviors and traits. These may include a restricted range
responsible for the emergence of schizophrenia during late
of emotional responses, flat affect, a lack of social respon-
adolescence or early adulthood. Nevertheless, stress has cer-
siveness, and poor eye contact. They may also include dif-
tainly been implicated as a possible factor in precipitating
ficulty in communicating, such as problems in answering
the disorder, perhaps through the effects of cortisol released
simple questions. Finally, negative symptoms can include a
on at-risk brain circuits (Corcoran et al., 2003; Walker
loss of motivation or desire to engage in activities. A person
et al., 1996, 2008). Adolescence can pose unique stresses, but
may appear listless and may sit for long periods without any
a more detailed and plausible account of how such stresses
apparent desire or interest in doing anything.
could spur such a significant increase in the incidence of
the disorder remains elusive. Moreover, schizophrenia tends
to surge more in males than in females, a finding that is at
Q: What are the differences between positive, odds with the more rapid rise in females of depression and
disorganized, and negative symptoms of eating disorders, both of which are thought to be related
schizophrenia? to females’ experience of greater stresses in puberty (Eme,
1979; Zahn-Waxler et al., 2008).
In short, the reasons for the surge of schizophrenia in
Many researchers are convinced that the core of the dis- adolescence remain a mystery. No straightforward biologi-
order concerns the cognitive deficits, perhaps most critically cal, social, or cognitive story has yet been well supported.
in working memory and attention (Elvevag & Goldberg, More indirectly, we can look for explanations by consider-
2000; Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2009; Whitfield-Gabrieli & ing the full developmental history of children who develop
Ford, 2012). These core cognitive deficits are thought to schizophrenia during or after puberty. Are there develop-
result in positive, disorganized, and negative symptoms. mental precursors to this disease that can give us some
There are also often motor problems and tics, unusual jerky insight into its occurrence? Although there may be different
movements, or lack of coordination. As with so many mental subpopulations of children who manifest the disease in dif-
disorders, schizophrenia may be a cluster of several related ferent ways, this account will focus on a few general patterns
disorders that have overlapping symptoms and causes rather that seem to hold for most cases.

SCHIZOPHRENIA 615
 phrenia. In addition to simple delays in motor development,
Q: What is the typical developmental course of the unusual motor patterns include writhing and jerky
movements of the limbs, unusual postures with the arms,
late-onset schizophrenia?
and tics and spasms (MacManus et al., 2012). Such motor
abnormalities have even been reported in infants (Walker
Because of the low incidence of schizophrenia, it is not et al., 1994).
very practical to closely observe a large group of children None of these predictors, however, means that we can
knowing that only 1 percent will end up being the group foretell the future of any individual child. Many children
of interest. It would be much easier to take a group of with these symptoms will not develop schizophrenia,
people who have the disease and somehow observe what and many people who are diagnosed with the disorder as
they were like as children. This idea seemed impossible adults do not seem to have had any history of these pre-
until researchers realized that with the rise of video cam- dictive behaviors in childhood. This raises challenges for
eras and home movie systems, it has become a ritual for interventions, for even if a child exhibits many predictive
many families to record their children at each birthday behaviors, we would not want to intervene in too radical a
party and other events (Grimes & Walker, 1994; Schiff- way to try to reduce the possibility of schizophrenia if the
man et al., 2004; Walker et al., 1993). Could information intervention itself was potentially harmful (for example,
in these home movies suggest precursors of schizophrenia? using strong medications that might have harmful side
Once the idea emerged, the general method was clear. A effects).
group of judges watched large collections of these home
movies of children, some of whom later developed schizo-
phrenia and some of whom did not (usually siblings of the Q: What are some possible signs that young
first group). The judges, who were blind as to the children’s children will develop schizophrenia in the future?
future outcomes, coded a wide range of behaviors in the
children. There were unmistakable indications of differ-
ences. In particular, children who developed schizophrenia
showed more affective blunting—that is, less pronounced
emotions as well as less frequent displays of responses indi- Causal Factors
cating either strong positive or negative emotions. Thus, The genetic basis for schizophrenia has been extensively
while those diagnosed with schizophrenia may not show studied, and a clear relation exists between the likelihood
the symptoms of the disorder as children, a significant of developing the disorder and how closely one is related to
number do tend to show precursor behaviors having to another relative who has the disorder (Cannon et al., 1998;
do with social responsiveness that may reflect social and Jablensky & Kalaydjieva, 2003). The genetic story is com-
cognitive deficits that continue to gradually accumulate plex, involving several different genes and their interactions
throughout adolescence and beyond (Algon et al., 2012; and cases where some of the genes may be present but not
Cannon et al., 2002; Welham et al., 2009). expressed (Claes et al., 2012; Gejman et al., 2011; Gottesman
Beyond social responsiveness deficits, we can also find & Bertelsen, 1989).
communicative and language difficulties and some cognitive The strong genetic component of the disease is unmis-
and attentional deficits (Erlenmeyer-Kimling et al., 2000; takable and might seem to suggest a purely biological expla-
Kates, 2010; Reichenberg et al., 2010). Moreover, when at- nation. But another equally dramatic finding raises further
risk children and adolescents show higher levels of unusual questions: roughly half of MZ twins in which one twin is
thought content, greater tendencies of suspicion/paranoia, diagnosed with schizophrenia do not share the disorder,
and a history of substance abuse (for example, heavy use of even though they have identical genomes, a genetic effect
marijuana), they are substantially more likely to later exhibit that is weaker than that for obsessive-compulsive disor-
psychosis and other symptoms of schizophrenia (Cannon der (see Figure 16.13). Thus, although researchers repeat-
et al., 2008). The association of later schizophrenia with edly find higher heritabilities for schizophrenia in relatives
earlier marijuana use does not mean that heavy marijuana of those with schizophrenia than in the general popula-
use early on causes schizophrenia, but some researchers do tion, it is important to keep in mind that many adults
suspect that it may play a role in aggravating or precipitating with schizophrenia have never had any relatives who were
symptoms (Anglin et al., 2012). diagnosed with the disorder (Gottesman & Erlenmeyer-
Other potential early signs may involve motor movement Kimling, 2001). In addition, the same study that found
difficulties, with children who show a certain class of motor that higher paternal age is linked to higher rates of autism
movements more likely to later develop symptoms of schizo- in children also found a link between higher paternal age

616 CHAPTER 16 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD

General population 1% FIGURE 16.13 Genetics of schizophrenia.
If an individual has schizophrenia, the odds of a
First cousins 2%
relative also having the disease are closely related
Uncles/aunts 2% to the degree of genetic overlap between the two
Nephews/nieces 4% relatives. Thus, if one identical twin has schizo-
Grandchildren 5%
phrenia, the odds of the other having the disease
are essentially 50 percent, whereas for siblings
Half siblings 6% who are not identical twins, the odds are around
Parents 6% 10 percent. From Williams et al. (2009), based
Siblings 9% on data from Gottesman & Wolfgram (1991).
Children 13%
Fratemal twins 17%
Identical twins 48%
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Risk of developing schizophrenia (percent)

and higher rates of schizophrenia in children, apparently order emerges. One account suggests that children with
resulting from mutations being introduced into the child’s the at-risk gene carried by the Genain sisters will be much
genome when precursors of sperm cells repeatedly divided, worse off if they contract certain infections while in the
and not because of the inheritance of mutations in either womb or shortly after birth (Rentakallio, 1997; Torrey,
parent’s genome (Kong et al., 2012). 1988). Since even Myra had some schizophrenic symp-
The lack of a complete genetic predetermination for toms, it appears that all four sisters were equally at risk,
schizophrenia was most dramatically revealed in a highly but that differences in the severity of an early infection
unusual case of four sisters born in the 1930s. Known as resulted in a difference in the extent to which the schizo-
the Genain quadruplets, they first came to the attention of phrenic effects were amplified. A prenatal infection seems
researchers in the 1950s because one of them was showing more plausible than a postnatal one, because that is the
the symptoms of a full-blown case of schizophrenia. They period during which the brain is especially susceptible to
were all monozygotically related—hence, they had identi- trauma (see Chapter 2).
cal genes—yet they varied strikingly in the extent to which Support for the infection theory was found after the
they manifested the disorder, and they continued to dif- massive 1918 worldwide influenza epidemic. Following
fer from one another at age 66, almost 40 years after they the epidemic, children whose mothers had been victims
were first studied (Rosenthal, 1963; see also Mirsky et al., of the epidemic when they were pregnant with the child
1995, 2000). One sister, known as Myra, had symptoms of showed a higher incidence of schizophrenia (Yudofsky,
schizophrenia, but she was able to manage with them quite 2009). In addition, the incidence of schizophrenia shows a
well, and she married, had children, and successfully raised seasonal variation based on when children are born, with
a family. At the other extreme, a sister known as Hester schizophrenia tending to be more likely in those born in
was never able to make it on her own outside of a sheltered winter or spring months, shortly after periods when infec-
environment such as an institution or a home with exten- tious diseases are more common (Mortensen et al., 1999).
sive care. The other two sisters, called Nora and Iris (all are Of course, many pregnant mothers contract influenza and
pseudonyms to protect privacy), showed moderate levels of have children who never develop schizophrenia. Thus,
symptoms between Myra’s and Hester’s. some researchers have suggested that the disorder develops
because of the combination of being genetically at risk and
contracting an infection by a particular type of virus—
Q: Describe evidence showing how genetic sometimes called a “schizovirus”—that amplifies the
factors cannot provide a full explanation of genetic effects. In some cases, a particularly bad infection
schizophrenia. on its own, such as toxoplasmosis, a disease often passed to
pregnant mothers by house cats, may cause schizophrenia
in those who are not genetically at risk (Torrey & Yolken,
The glaring question was: How could four genetically 1995, 2003).
identical individuals have such a wide range of outcomes The infection theory remains controversial. Higher levels
with a disorder that is often thought to be biologically of antibodies for some viruses have been found in those
based? The answer may lie in the details of how the dis- with schizophrenia, but not for other viruses that are also

SCHIZOPHRENIA 617
thought to be agents that cause schizophrenia (Brown et al., natal events (Marenco & Weinberger, 2000). One neuro-
2004; Karlsson et al., 2001). Because some viruses have been developmental account posits three distinct times when there
known to be dormant for many years before flaring up, the may be influences that increase the odds of an individual
infection account has also been used to explain the surge of developing schizophrenia: conception, early development
schizophrenia in adolescence, but the mechanism remains (prenatal and during and soon after birth), and later devel-
unclear. From a cross-cultural viewpoint, some striking dif- opment (childhood, adolescence, and young adulthood).
ferences in the incidence of the disease, such as a rate that is As seen in Figure 16.14, the influences at conception
four times higher in some regions of Ireland, have also been are largely genetic factors that put a developing human
cited to support a model based on local disease epidemics. at risk (Karlsgodt et al., 2011). Influences during early
Taken as a whole, there seems to be an emerging consensus development involve both prenatal complications aris-
that exposure to influenza in the womb probably can be a ing from factors such as malnutrition and maternal dis-
contributing factor to developing the disorder (Brown et al., eases and complications right at the time of birth, such
2004; Yudofsky, 2009). as excessively low levels of oxygen being supplied to the
An alternative account argues that stress and maltreat- baby, resulting in brain damage. These early complica-
ment early on can amplify the disorder, and once again the tions may combine with certain genetic risk factors to cre-
Genain sisters may offer hints. There is some evidence that ate abnormalities in several brain regions, especially those
the sisters’ abusive father was considerably kinder to Myra involving the frontal and temporal lobes, the limbic system,
and Nora than to Iris and Hester, leading some to argue and the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis. Later devel-
that while stress alone cannot cause schizophrenia, it can opmental factors may involve genetic abnormalities that
greatly amplify the symptoms (Mirsky et al., 2000). There cause excessive pruning of gray matter in frontal and tem-
is also the possibility, however, that Hester and Iris were poral lobes and diminished development of white mat-
treated worse because they were more impaired. ter tracts that connect regions concerned with attention
The most plausible model is one that suggests strong and memory. These later developmental factors are likely
interactions between biological factors, such as genes and to be exacerbated by environmental stresses. A series of
infections, and environmental ones, such as stress (Walker & detailed MRI structural studies looking both at gray mat-
Diforio, 1997; Walker et al., 2008). This “neurodevelop- ter volume and white matter connectivity between brain
mental model,” which emphasizes the critical influence of regions has shown that deterioration resulting from exces-
a biological factor during prenatal development that then sive pruning of neurons and synapses and decreased con-
gradually unfolds for many years after birth, may offer the nectivity often precedes the onset of full-blown symptoms
best explanation of how the disorder gets initially launched, of schizophrenia, strongly suggesting a causal role of these
especially when combined with a genetic factor that makes changes—that is, they are not just consequences of hav-
some fetuses more vulnerable to the effects of those pre- ing the disorder (Karlsgodt et al., 2011).

Synaptic Social
Genomic pruning, white matter environmental factors
development (stress)

Prenatal
and perinatal
complications Later neural system
vulnerabilities

ration
Deterio
Early neural system
FIGURE 16.14 A neurode-
vulnerabilities Symptoms of deterioration
velopmental model of schizo- (e.g., abnormalities
phrenia. According to this in frontal and medial Psychosis onset
model, there are three distinct temporal lobes, limbic Precursor symptoms
periods in development: concep- system, and HPA axis) Functional deterioration
tion, early development, and later Premorbid behavior disturbance
development, at which times Delayed language
different factors may contribute to Motor abnormalities
the later onset of schizophrenia. Conception Birth Infancy Childhood Adolescence Young Adulthood
Adapted from Karlsgodt et al.
Conception Early development Later development
(2011).

618 CHAPTER 16 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD

Early-Onset Schizophrenia
For some time, scholars dismissed the presence of
Q: Compare early-onset schizophrenia with the
true schizophrenia in children. Indeed, there are seri- more common case of late-onset schizophrenia.
ous problems distinguishing the distorted and unrealistic
thoughts of a person with schizophrenia from the occa-
sional lapses seen in many children. But as more careful
measures have been introduced, including ones that look
closely at cognitive abilities and distortions, researchers
Treatment of Childhood
have identified a genuine form of schizophrenia in children
(Asarnow et al., 2004; Kim-Cohen et al., 2003; Kumra &
Psychopathologies
Schulz, 2008; Rapoport & Frangou, 2012; Vyas & Gogtay, If this were a text on childhood psychopathology, it would be
2012). Moreover, that form of the disorder shows strong natural to discuss the treatment strategies for each disorder in
developmental continuity with adult forms of the disorder, turn, since they have to be tailored to the particular properties
since positive, negative, and disorganized symptoms all of each disease. In the context of developmental psychology
seem to be present (Poulton et al., 2000). When schizo- as a whole, however, it is more useful to consider the general
phrenia occurs in children, it seems to particularly involve issues arising with treatment of children and to see how they
a loss of cortical gray matter in the neocortex (Rapoport apply to specific cases. The primary issue is how changing
et al., 1999; Thompson et al., 2001). One study compared patterns of development interact with treatment. The issue
the brains of children who had early and sustained psycho- concerns both normal developmental patterns and the spe-
sis, a hallmark of childhood schizophrenia, with the brains cific patterns of development associated with psychological
of both children with no signs of the disorder and children disorders. With respect to normal patterns of development,
who had transient psychosis—namely, a relatively brief we can ask how, for example, cognitive development might
episode of hallucinations and other delusional behaviors. relate to the efficacy—that is, the effectiveness—of various
Only those in the group with sustained psychosis showed therapies that assume some level of information processing.
the loss of cortical gray matter, a pattern of loss that is not With respect to the development of a disorder, we can ask
seen in those with late-onset schizophrenia (Gogtay et al., whether the disorder progresses in a way that requires treat-
2004). More focused analyses of these declines suggest that ments for young children that are different from those used
as the temporal lobes lose gray matter, there is a rise of for adolescents or adults. These are complex issues. In this
positive symptoms, such as auditory hallucinations, and as overview, we will consider some common methods of treat-
the frontal lobes lose gray matter, there is a rise of negative ment in adults and whether they need to be modified for use
symptoms, such as withdrawal. The early-onset cases are in children, and then we will consider techniques used only
thought to end up being more severe disorders in adults with children. Some of the most common adult treatment
and to have a stronger genetic predisposition as well as a strategies are behavioral, cognitive-behavioral, psychoana-
higher incidence of relatives with the disorder (Kumra & lytic, family systems, and pharmacological treatments, with
Schulz, 2008). frequent combinations of one or more of the first four tech-
In summary, schizophrenia remains a puzzling disorder niques with pharmacological treatments.
with a host of causal factors that have been implicated,
including genetic influences, infections, environmental
stressors, and distinct periods in development when differ-
ent contributing factors may dominate. The neural conse- Behavioral Therapies
quences of the disorder are, in some cases, quite dramatic Behavioral therapies seem to be applicable to all ages, as
and suggest that a combination of excessive pruning and they are based on behaviorist principles that should work
diminished connectivity of brain regions may be responsible on a wide variety of animals, including people. Behavioral
for the huge surge of the disorder in late puberty, especially therapies have three major forms: classical conditioning,
among those who have already been put at risk by earlier operant conditioning, and modeling.
developing factors. In the future, more sophisticated pat- Classical conditioning approaches attempt to cre-
tern recognition analyses of MRI structural information, ate or extinguish a relationship between a stimulus and
combined with newer fMRI studies, may enable clinicians a response. For example, if a child has developed a fear
to identify with some confidence teenagers who are highly of dogs, the therapist might attempt to expose the child
likely to soon show symptoms of the disorder (Karlsgodt repeatedly to dog images, toy dogs, and eventually real
et al., 2011). dogs in a manner that extinguishes any fear response

TREATMENT OF CHILDHOOD PSYCHOPATHOLOGIES 619

that may have originally arisen because of a highly nega- dent on a large number of variables that may in turn depend
tive encounter with a dog (Marks, 1987; Wolpe, 1958). on the child’s cognitive and social development. A child
This technique can be effective, but it has its limitations must be able to mentally represent the adult model’s action
as well. It works best for problems that have clear exter- at an appropriate level of cognitive complexity and must have
nal triggers, such as phobias. Moreover, increased expo- a positive social relation with the model for the modeling
sure to the threatening stimulus can sometimes result in to be effective. In tweaking all the variables of modeling to
a heightened fearful response to the stimulus, as opposed make it most effective, the therapist has to take into account
to extinction of the response (Zinbarg et al., 1992). More every facet of social and cognitive development and thereby
broadly, it now appears that fear conditioning may have use very different modeling interventions as the age of the
its own unique properties and associated neural circuits child varies.
that make it different from other kinds of classical condi-
tioning, as well as from the conditioning of more general
anxiety disorders (Mineka & Oehlberg, 2008). This, in Q: What are three different versions of therapy
turn, suggests that treatments for specific phobias might that are based on traditional learning theories?
work differently from treatments for generalized anxiety, What are their limitations?
or at least that treatments might need to take into account
several distinct processes that combine in different ways
to contribute both to specific fears and to more general
anxiety (Beckers et al., 2013).
Operant conditioning techniques, modeled after Skinner’s
methods, seek to shape a child’s behavior in the appropriate Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy
direction through rewards and punishments (Patterson et al., Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) is based on the idea
1982). These techniques have often proved successful in treat- that a person’s problems stem from how she sees and thinks
ing a child with a conduct disorder—for example, in treating about the world and how abnormal perceptions and cogni-
a child who acts out frequently in the classroom or throws tions can cause problem behaviors. Consequently, the way
tantrums in supermarkets in ways that are highly disruptive to change the behaviors is not simply to shape the behaviors
and that go beyond normal childhood outbursts. A num- themselves but to try to change the way the person pro-
ber of therapeutic programs try to use some sort of reward cesses and encodes information—that is, to change the way
system with tokens that provide benefits for good behavior she interprets and thinks about the world around her. CBT
(Sulzer-Azaroff & Mayer, 1977, 1991). One problem concerns has become the most widely used of all therapies, and it is
the finding that reinforcement schedules, while changing a used to treat a wide range of disorders, including depression,
behavior, can often turn the newly shaped behavior into a anxiety, obsessive-compulsive disorder, eating disorders,
form of work (Lepper et al., 1973), thereby removing any and even schizophrenia (Butler et al., 2006; Rector & Beck,
intrinsic reasons to engage in the behavior and increasing the 2001; Spangler, 1999).
probability of it disappearing when the rewards disappear (as First introduced by Aaron Beck as a way of treating depres-
seen in Chapter 13, this problem often occurs when extrinsic sion (Beck, 1967; Beck et al., 1979), cognitive-behavioral ther-
motivations are frequently used). apy has a variety of techniques for helping people change
A final behavioral technique uses social learning, or their cognitive schemas. Beck identified certain patterns of
modeling approaches (Bandura, 1971). As we have seen in thinking that were associated with depression and devel-
earlier chapters on socialization, this technique can effec- oped his therapy around trying to alter those cognitions.
tively instill behaviors that are otherwise difficult to develop Cognitive-behavioral therapy requires active engagement
through operant conditioning. Modeling approaches have and effort on the part of the patient as well as a clear goal
been used to reduce aggression, increase social skills, foster that the patient wants to address. This alone can make it
feelings of self-efficacy, and inhibit fear reactions, among difficult to use with young children, who may not be able
many other targeted behaviors. For example, if young tod- to identify a complex behavioral goal or who may find it
dlers watch their mothers model positive reactions to poten- hard to grasp techniques intended to change thought pat-
tially fearful stimuli, such as toy spiders and snakes, they are terns. Cognitive-behavioral therapy tries to make a patient
less likely to develop specific phobias to those stimuli when aware of “automatic” thought patterns that are maladaptive
they later observe others reacting in a more aversive manner and tries to get the patient to recognize how changing
to the same stimuli (Egliston & Rapee, 2007). these thought patterns would be desirable. In that sense,
Yet, all three of these approaches are affected by devel- it requires a certain degree of metacognitive ability, the
opmental considerations. With modeling, for example, the capacity to think about one’s thoughts. For example, if
effectiveness of the modeling intervention is heavily depen- a college student feels that he is a complete loser when he

620 CHAPTER 16 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD

fails an exam or doesn’t make a team, a CBT practitioner
will try to help him see that such an extreme conclusion is Q: What are some challenges of using
not warranted and will try to guide him toward more rea- cognitive-behavioral therapy with young
sonable interpretations, which will presumably make him
less depressed. This technique of pointing out the irratio- children?
nality of a thought or way of thinking in order to motivate
change is one of the most common methods of CBT. Cog- Because anxiety disorders are one of the most frequent
nitive-behavioral therapy does not try to go as deep as psy- forms of psychopathology in young children, most CBT
choanalytic approaches and instead seeks to find the more studies with children have focused on anxiety-related disor-
immediate cognitive causes of specific behaviors and to ders. As researchers start to adjust CBT in developmentally
attain specific behavior change through changing those appropriate ways, there are indications of its increasing effec-
particular cognitive causes. tiveness as a way of treating anxiety disorders in school-age
children, although young children do tend to show a larger
remission rate for the disorder than do older children and
Q: How does cognitive-behavioral therapy adults (Barrett et al., 2001; Cartwright-Hatton & Murray,
differ from more psychoanalytic approaches 2008). CBT is now being used more broadly to treat other
in the way it explores cognitive states in an forms of psychopathology in children (Brent & Maalouf,
2009; Creswell & O’Connor, 2011; Hofmann et al., 2012).
individual? The challenge for the future is to more fully integrate
the rapid pace of basic research on cognitive development,
especially those areas related to metacognition and reason-
CBT was designed for use with adults, so its methods ing skills, with the techniques of CBT (Erickson & Achil-
need to be adjusted for use with children. Adult CBT les, 2004). There may also be a convergence of methods
patients are often asked to do specific “homework” exercises based on recent advances in using CBT to treat adults with
in which they are to try out new cognitive schemas in every- intellectual disabilities. Traditionally, it was thought that
day situations. They may be asked to keep a detailed journal CBT would not work with people who scored very low on
of their day, recording adverse situations as they arise, which intelligence tests and that classical and operant techniques
increases their awareness of a problem. They may also be would have to dominate. But with carefully tailored thera-
asked to explain or justify their distorted beliefs, and in pies analogous to some changes made for children, CBT
doing so, they may recognize their inherent contradictions. can have good treatment effectiveness with that population
Obviously, these techniques would be ineffective or impos- as well (Taylor et al., 2008).
sible to use with young children.
There are several techniques to make CBT more work-
able with younger children. One is to engage the parents as
full partners and have them work closely with their children Psychoanalytic Therapies
to make them aware of alternative cognitive interpretations Psychoanalytic approaches to therapy with children have a
and to gently remind them of the problems with their dis- long history that goes back as far as Freud. That history has
torted cognitions. By helping their children think through been a checkered one, however, as the efficacy of psychoan-
these issues, parents can reduce the cognitive complexity alytic approaches has been challenged by newer approaches,
of the children’s task (Albano & Kendall, 2002; Kendall such as CBT. Several of the psychoanalytic approaches build
et al., 2002). Therapists can also simplify the representa- on the ideas of Freud, his daughter Anna, and many others,
tions of thoughts by drawing cartoons for the children or by but the area is too vast and complex to discuss in detail here.
accompanying them in a difficult situation and rehearsing It is impressive that despite many years of sustained attacks
alternative cognitive strategies with them. The huge wave of by alternative approaches, psychoanalytic approaches retain
cognitive developmental research in recent years has shown a considerable following and are increasingly being sub-
that there is far more cognitive capacity in young children jected to careful experimental tests for their efficacy as well
when tasks are structured at their level. This can mean that as being connected to recent research on cognitive develop-
if CBT is done in a developmentally sensitive manner, it ment and attachment (Fonagy & Adshead, 2012; Fonagy &
can be made more easily accessible to children. As we move Target, 2002; Fonagy et al., 2002). One meta-analysis of
beyond the older views of young children as limited by almost 40 years of studies concluded that long-term psycho-
stages of pre-logical thought or concrete reasoning, it seems analytic therapy does consistently produce positive effects
more viable to use developmentally sensitive CBT with chil- in many adults (de Maat et al., 2009). Given what seems to
dren (Cartwright-Hatton & Murray, 2008; Derisley, 2004). be an emerging consensus that this form of therapy has an

TREATMENT OF CHILDHOOD PSYCHOPATHOLOGIES 621

important role to play in treating adults, there is renewed the family and the older siblings talk about the younger
interest in how it might be modified to be effective with child (Rober, 2008). Like so many other forms of therapy,
children. the sensitivity and competency of the therapist is critical to
the success of the therapy.

Family Therapies
We briefly discussed family-based approaches in the context
Q: What are some of the challenges of using
of anorexia, when we presented Minuchin’s bold ideas on the family therapy techniques?
role of dynamic systems in families that fall into abnormal
interaction patterns (Minuchin & Fishman, 1981). These
approaches are notable because they require far more than
a one-on-one therapist-child relationship; they focus on
engaging the entire family. In many cases, it seems to make Pharmacological Treatments
sense to view the child’s problem as part of a full family In addition to the wide range of therapies based on inter-
system that has dysfunctional interaction patterns that need personal interactions, there are, of course, attempts to treat
to be treated. Family therapy approaches have been shown disorders directly through various medications. The steady
to be effective on problems ranging from infant sleep pat- increase in the use of drugs to treat childhood psychopa-
terns, to conduct disorders, to obsessive-compulsive behav- thology in recent years is a vast and controversial topic (see
iors, to depression, to substance abuse (Asarnow et al., 2001; Development and Social Policy box). Drug treatment tended
Carr, 2009). In some cases, treating the family as a whole initially to be for children with disorders related to ADHD
seems to produce larger and more enduring results. For and most often consisted of doses of methylphenidate (trade
example, in one study comparing treatments for teenag- name Ritalin). As described in Chapter 10, the use of meth-
ers with substance abuse problems, researchers found that ylphenidate and related drugs for ADHD with ever younger
while both CBT and family therapy had similar short-term children has soared, but in many cases, such drug treatment
effects, family therapy had better long-term outcomes, as may be overused, even as it seems to have clear benefits for
well as being more effective for more severe forms of abuse children who are correctly diagnosed with the disorder.
(Liddle et al., 2008). Simply treating the child alone may At present, a much wider range of drugs is being used to
not be as effective in the long term if the parents are also treat adolescents and children (Figure 16.15 illustrates the
engaging in behaviors that tend to aggravate or even pro- increase in use of both stimulants and antidepressants in
mote drug use—for example, belittling a child’s compe- children and adolescents over the past few decades). In addi-
tence or not providing opportunities for rich and rewarding tion to drugs for ADHD, antidepressants such as fluoxetine
social interactions with the rest of the family.
One major challenge of family therapy is that many
members of the family often do not want to acknowledge 5
their role in creating the underlying problems. It is all too Stimulants
Percent of children prescribed drugs

4.5
common for parents to drop their children off at the thera- Antidepressents
4
pist and assume that all of the child’s problems are within
3.5
the child and simply need to be fixed by the therapist. Even Stimulants
if there is some sense of a larger context for the problem, 3

parents and therapists may not agree as to what it is. For 2.5
example, in one study, researchers asked children, parents, 2
and therapists to identify the fundamental problem or prob- 1.5 Antidepressents
lems that they should be working on. More than 75 percent
1
of the child/parent/therapist triads began therapy without
any agreement on even a single problem that they were sup- 0.5

posed to be working on. Even when the problem was put 0

1987 1991 1996 2002
in the broadest terms, such as aggression or anxiety/depres-
FIGURE 16.15 The rise of psychiatric drug use in children.
sion, only half of the triads mutually agreed as to what the
The use of both stimulants and antidepressants by American children
problem was (Hawley & Weisz, 2003). It is easy to see the younger than 20 rose dramatically in the last part of the twentieth
challenges of family therapy approaches in such cases. In century. Although the rate of increase has slowed somewhat in
addition, it can take especially skilled therapists to draw a more recent years, it continues to stay high. Adapted from Whitaker
young child into a conversation rather than simply having (2010).

622 CHAPTER 16 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD

 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL P OLICY

Prescribing Psychoactive
Medications to Young Children

A
lthough most childhood psychopathologies have Chapter 2). How might elevated levels of neurotransmitters and
been treated through different sorts of therapies, in certain firing patterns caused by psychiatric drugs influence
recent years drugs have emerged as a frequent form brain growth? At present, the answers to these questions are
of treatment as well, a phenomenon that has gen- unknown. And even if psychoactive drugs do improve the short-
erated enormous controversy (Morris & Stone, 2011; Whitaker, term mental health of some children, it will be years before the
2010). There has been an extraordinary rise in the use of various long-term developmental implications are fully understood.
psychoactive medications with children, with the age for pre- Some researchers are concerned that the welfare of children
scribing such medications decreasing to the point where even may be in conflict with the profit motive of some pharmaceutical
preschoolers are being given medications originally developed companies (Harris, 2004). In that context, it is notable that the
for adult forms of psychopathology. In fact, the fastest-growing United Kingdom, which has a more socialized form of medicine
rate of prescriptions for antidepressants is in preschoolers, with than the United States, has much more stringent rules against
the rates of prescriptions for some groups of children tripling prescribing antidepressants to children (Satel, 2004). The con-
in the last decade (Brown, 2003; Zito et al., 2003). Over one trast between the two countries reveals how economic factors
recent 4-year period, prescription rates for preschool girls rose have the potential to interact with the health interests of children.
65 percent (Delate et al., 2004; Warner et al., 2004), and the These issues have become especially salient, given reports of
rates have continued to rise significantly (Parens & Johnston, higher levels of suicide among children taking antidepressants
2008). It is true, of course, that these increases were from an as opposed to placebos (Brent & Maalouf, 2009; Jureidini
initially very low rate, but the increases are nonetheless dramatic. et al., 2004). It has even been argued that giving extended high
There is a lack of critical information about the risks of using doses of medications such as Ritalin to young children could
such medications to treat very young children, especially over increase the risk of tipping some children into psychotic states
the long term. In most cases, young children are prescribed (Whitaker, 2010).
drugs that have had little or no testing of their effects in children Some have argued that opposition to using such medica-
(Brown, 2003; Hsia & Maclennan, 2009). Children are being tions with children is “misguided resistance to appropriate treat-
given medications based on the results of studies conducted ment” (Koplewicz, 2004), on the grounds that any increased
on adults and based on doctors’ best guesses about the likely risks posed by the medications for depression, psychosis, and
impacts and best dosages for children. But children absorb conduct disorders are offset by the larger risks associated with
medicine at different rates than adults, and children may metab- harm to the child, such as in adolescent and child suicide, or
olize psychoactive medications differently than adults, which to others through violence by the child. Consider the case of
could change the drug concentrations that would be harmful in depression. If it could be reliably demonstrated that prescribing
the target tissues of children. Moreover, young children might antidepressants to children and adolescents does reduce the
have difficulty expressing whether they are experiencing side incidence of suicide, it would make it easier to evaluate the costs
effects from too large a dosage of a drug. All of these factors and benefits of such prescriptions, but no such demonstration is
make guessing at doses a risky procedure. available (Jureidini et al., 2004; Tsapakis et al., 2008).
When a psychological disorder is diagnosed in preschool- Parents must consider all of these concerns when deciding if
ers, it is exceedingly difficult to know whether its causes might their child should take psychoactive medications. When children
resemble those in an adult or older teenager, raising even more are in a state of clear psychological distress and at great risk
doubts about whether a particular medication designed for to themselves or others, it is inevitable that parents will have
those groups would work in young children. Of special con- to consider the use of medications that are at least sometimes
cern is the effect of medications taken over the long term on effective in bringing short-term improvements in a child’s condi-
a child’s developing brain. We have seen that there are exqui- tion. Given these considerations, there is a clear need for more
sitely sensitive feedback loops between various neural circuits long-term studies of the efficacies and side effects of using
in development that help regulate aspects of brain growth (see psychoactive drugs in children (Rapoport, 2009).

TREATMENT OF CHILDHOOD PSYCHOPATHOLOGIES 623

(trade name Prozac) are commonly used for children who at a particular level when prescribed to a child. In prac-
are either depressed or anxious, and antipsychotic drugs tice, this is much more difficult than it sounds. Many of
such as risperidone (trade name Risperdal) are used for chil- the therapies that we have considered may be vastly more
dren who have severe conduct problems and emotional out- effective in the hands of a highly skilled and experienced
bursts as well as for some children diagnosed with ADHD therapist. Attempts to design large-scale experiments with
(although this latter use is highly controversial). such therapies frequently end up in the hands of relatively
The patterns of usage can be troubling. First, the drugs unskilled research assistants, who are often fairly young
are often used “off-label,” meaning that while they may have graduate students using “manualized” versions of the
been approved for treatment of a specific disorder in adults, therapy, meaning that they try to follow what is almost
they may not have been approved for treatment of this dis- a procedural cookbook. It is easy to see how much can be
order (or any other disorder) in children, as their effective- lost in the implementation and how flexibility and on-the-
ness and safety in children may not have been established. spot fine-tuning may be missing in such studies, potentially
Off-label usage can result in either overdosing or under- undermining an approach (Connor-Smith & Weisz, 2003).
dosing children and does not take into account potential Without great care, the research could show the effective-
long-term developmental effects (Mehler-Wex et al., 2009). ness of just those therapies that are the easiest to mind-
Second, there are enormous variations in prescribing drugs lessly implement without much therapist skill. No one
among different populations, raising questions about the thinks that such results would shed the best light on what
right level of use and the dangers of overprescribing. For really works and why. There are, however, strong economic
example, prescribing antipsychotics, antidepressants, and incentives to manualize therapies as much as possible so
stimulants to children is much higher in the United States that they can be delivered by less extensively trained, and
than it is in the Netherlands and Germany (Mehler-Wex therefore less expensive, therapists.
et al., 2009). Within the United States, children in foster care Despite these cautions about evidence-based approaches,
are almost four times more likely to receive ADHD-related it is clear that all of health care should focus on treatments
drugs, antidepressants, and antipsychotics than children in with proven effectiveness and that treatment for psychologi-
the same socioeconomic group who are not in foster care cal disorders should be no different. Fortunately, there are
(Zito et al., 2008). While it is true that children in foster now extensive studies of evidence-based treatments, espe-
care do have a higher incidence of diagnosed psychopathol- cially of CBT, that go beyond simply asking if certain pro-
ogies, it is not clear if the level of drug use is appropriate or grams can be easily implemented (Weisz & Kazdin, 2010).
if it reflects attempts to “manage” difficult children through The emphasis on evidence-based treatments has resulted in
medication because more social therapeutic means are less welcome increases in studies with true random assignment
available. Comparable higher rates have also been found for to conditions that compare different treatments or that con-
children on welfare (Raghavan et al., 2012). trast a treatment with a no-treatment condition, and there
In many cases, it appears that psychoactive drugs in has been more attention to replicating these studies (Kaz-
combination with one or more forms of therapy can be din, 2011). Clinicians can now employ treatments with good
much more effective—especially over the long term—than confidence that there is research supporting their effective-
any single approach used alone (Keller et al., 2000). These ness. There are now even several studies of such treatments’
“multimodal” approaches may try to produce rapid change effectiveness with preschoolers (Njoroge & Yang, 2012).
through drug treatment and then maintain the change One remaining challenge is the need to conduct longitu-
through other forms of therapy. Such approaches do require, dinal studies of various treatments. Evidence-based studies
however, that the health practitioners involved be open to a often favor treatments that do not take extended periods,
range of techniques and not be wedded too strongly to any as it makes it much easier to conduct efficient studies if the
one method in which they may have received their training. researchers do not have to wait several years to assess the
effectiveness of a treatment. But it seems likely that as more
long-term studies are conducted, there will be some cases
where more extended treatments are shown to be equally
Evaluating Therapies if not more effective for specific disorders. In addition, as
Researchers are very concerned about the need for evi- clinicians are increasingly blending together several thera-
dence-based therapy with children (Kazdin & Weisz, pies in one program of treatment, such as combining drugs,
2003). This phrase, as well as “outcome-based therapy,” is CBT, and family therapy, there is still a need to carefully
a way of simply asking that studies have been conducted examine the effectiveness of all of these approaches in vari-
showing that the therapies have proven effectiveness when ous patterns of combination, including evaluating the ther-
used with children. It is clearly important to determine if apies both when used at the same time and when used one
a therapy is beneficial for children or if a drug is working after the other.

624 CHAPTER 16 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD

 sharper focus as a result of attention to psychopathology in
Conclusions children and adolescents. There is potential for enormous
The field of childhood psychopathology is so vast that it has advances if the interactions of findings in these two tra-
often been viewed as a separate domain only loosely affili- ditional areas of psychology—developmental psychology
ated with the rest of developmental psychology. The goal and abnormal psychology—are explored more and more
of this chapter has been to familiarize readers with com- in the future.
mon childhood psychopathologies and how they emerge in Neuroscience is also taking on a larger role both in
development as well as to provide some basic information our understanding of the causes of psychopathology over
about possible ways to treat these disorders. As each disor- the course of development and in devising therapeutic
der was considered, it became clear how issues in neuro- interventions. From an etiological viewpoint, several new
biological development, social development, and cognitive technologies may start to provide converging insights. High-
development are central to understanding how and when a resolution MRI studies are uncovering changes both in gray
disorder initially emerges and how it changes over time. In matter, suggesting local change through excessive pruning
turn, the problems in psychopathology pose questions that of neurons and synapses, and in white matter, suggesting
will drive future research. What sorts of cognitive capaci- impaired connectivity between brain regions. These struc-
ties are needed to see contradictions and inconsistencies tural brain changes are, in turn, being linked to advanced
in one’s own beliefs, and how do these capacities develop? genomic analyses that are able to track how genetic variants
What are the socialization patterns that might cause par- might be related to and even predict such changes. Epigen-
ents to guide girls toward more intrapersonal introspection etic factors are also now being explored more fully, with
and boys toward more problem-solving strategies? Why do factors ranging from stress, to infections, to use of various
these patterns exist, and how might they be related to gen- medications as all potentially being involved in turning cer-
der differences in depression? How does the child’s buoyant tain gene pathways on or off. Neuroscience will not replace
cognitive optimism change into the pessimism that might psychological models of psychopathology, but it will inform
be responsible for the surge of depression in adolescence? and constrain them just as psychological models will guide
These and countless other questions are coming into much neuroscientific investigations.

STU DY AN D REVI EW

SUMMARY sor behaviors, including subtle problems with social engage-

● Studying psychopathology from a developmental perspective ment, language delays, and difficulties with joint attention. It
means evaluating unusual behaviors, thoughts, and emotions is diagnosed four times as often in boys as in girls.
● Genetic predispositions and environmental factors, such as
that cause difficulties in functioning in terms of whether they
are symptoms of psychopathology in children or symptoms infections or disease either prenatally or in early infancy,
that will appear as an individual grows older. It means estab- have been implicated in the etiology of autism, but not cer-
lishing criteria for diagnosing and treating psychopathology at tain forms of socialization.
different ages. A developmental approach not only illuminates
problems that occur in childhood, but it can help explain the Anxiety Disorders
nature of psychopathology in adult populations as well. ● Anxiety disorders are some of the most common mental dis-
orders in children and, in addition to specific phobias, can
Autism take the form of generalized forms of anxiety or social anxi-
● Autism has early origins and seems to involve deficits in rea- eties. Negative cognitions seem to predominate in children
soning about the mental states of others, deficits that can with these disorders and have been thought to play a causal
have a cascade of other consequences. Usually diagnosed at role, interacting with genetic predispositions to anxiety.
18 months, those with autism may exhibit even earlier precur- Anxiety problems in childhood generally predict long-term

STUDY AND REVIEW 625

 anxiety problems, although the source of the anxiety gener- and do not have guilt or shame or emotional attachments
ally changes with age. that prevent them from manipulating or hurting others.
● Obsessive-compulsive disorder is a special form of anxiety ● There may be much earlier precursors of psychopathy in
disorder that seems to have its own distinct etiology and a childhood, including difficulties in detecting sadness and
strong genetic basis. The four main types of this disorder fear in others’ facial expressions and verbal tones. The disor-
cluster around obsessions about dirt and contamination; der may be related to deficits in certain capacities for emo-
order and symmetry; losing things and hoarding; and unwel- tions of caring and empathy.
come violent, sexual, or blasphemous thoughts. This is a
quite early-emerging disorder that may reflect a defect in an Schizophrenia
evolved safety vigilance system. ● Schizophrenia does not normally occur until late adolescence
or early adulthood. The reasons for its late onset remain a
Eating Disorders mystery but may be related to the consequences of excessive
● Eating disorders emerge relatively late in development, pruning of neurons and synapses and impaired connections
usually in early adolescence, and tend to be far more com- between brain regions that occur during adolescence.
mon in girls than in boys. The three eating disorders are ● A very small number of cases of early-onset schizophre-
anorexia nervosa, bulimia, and binge eating. Adolescents nia have now been documented and have been shown to
with anorexia tend to be extremely thin because they inten- be related to loss of gray matter in the neocortex. It is
tionally refuse to eat more than minimal amounts of food, thought that early-onset schizophrenia, with its more dev-
and they base their self-esteem on their thinness. Those with astating prognosis, may provide insights into late-onset
bulimia tend to be of normal weight or even overweight and cases as well.
engage in bouts of excessive eating followed by purging. ● Although there are clear genetic contributions to schizo-
● Anorexia seems to have a more powerful genetic component phrenia, there are also striking cases where individuals with
than bulimia, while bulimia may be more culturally influ- identical genes manifest the disease to dramatically different
enced. Several theories attempt to account for the gender extents, making it clear that environmental factors, ranging
difference and late onset but none have yet been conclu- from disease to stress, are also at work.
sive. There does seem to be a major cognitive component
to anorexia that involves distorted cognitions and/or percep- Treatment of Childhood Psychopathologies
tions. Some children in overprotective, conflict-avoiding ● There are many ways to treat mental illness in children, rang-
families may develop anorexia as a way of exercising control ing from classical and operant conditioning, to modeling, to
and autonomy. cognitive-behavioral techniques, to psychoanalytic methods,
to methods that work with family systems. All of these forms
Depression are still used, although cognitive-behavioral treatments,
● Depression shows a later onset in the vast majority of cases, often in conjunction with medications, have become much
although clear cases of depression in early childhood have more widespread in recent years.
also been observed. The two different forms of depression, ● All of the treatment approaches must be sensitive to the

unipolar and bipolar, have quite different symptoms and pat- developmental status of the child. Cognitive development,
terns of development. Unipolar depression increases markedly in particular, interacts heavily with the ways in which vari-
in females after puberty. Bipolar disorder, which consists of ous forms of treatment might be implemented. For example,
shifts between depressive and manic phases, tends to occur therapies that ask children to think about their own beliefs
equally in males and females, and generally emerges in late must take into account metacognitive development, and
adolescence. therapies that focus on family dynamics must adjust for the
● The late emergence of most cases of unipolar depression may social and communicative abilities of the youngest members
be related to changes in cognitive development, including a of those families.
reduction of an optimistic bias that colors the thoughts of
younger children and an increase in various forms of rumina-
tion. Unipolar depression tends to run in families, as does THOUGHT QUESTIONS
bipolar disorder, which has an even higher genetic heritability. 1. There are several reported cases of identical (monozygotic)
twins who experience very different outcomes with respect to
Conduct Disorder: The Case of Psychopathy psychopathology. Discuss a hypothetical pair of twins where
● Conduct disorder is a broad class of behavioral problems, but one develops a serious mental illness and the other lives a life
one severe form, known as psychopathy, is normally not diag- without any apparent mental illness. Consider at least three
nosed until adolescence or adulthood. People with psychopa- different causal factors that could be responsible for these
thy are extremely self-centered, are superficially charming, different outcomes.

626 CHAPTER 16 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD

2. The onset of puberty may be related to increases in certain KEY TERMS
forms of psychopathology. Consider a form of psychopa- affective blunting (p. 616) evidence-based therapy
thology in which the incidence might be most related to the (p. 624)
amenorrhea (p. 599)
onset of puberty and one in which the incidence might be
anorexia nervosa (p. 598) generalized anxiety disorder
most unrelated. Explain your predictions in terms of poten-
anorexic family (p. 601) (p. 592)
tial underlying mechanisms.
3. Imagine that a 6-year-old and a 26-year-old are both referred to anxiety disorder (p. 592) learned helplessness
a clinical psychologist because of a crippling generalized anxi- autism (p. 588) (p. 606)
ety disorder that is most often manifested in terms of intense baby sib study (p. 589) obsessive-compulsive disorder
anxiety when in public places. The psychologist devises two bipolar disorder (p. 603) (OCD) (p. 595)
treatment programs within the cognitive-behavioral therapy bulimia nervosa (p. 602) pervasive developmental
(CBT) framework. Describe in detail how the treatment pro- disorder (p. 588)
catastrophizing (p. 594)
grams would both be compatible with CBT but at the same psychopathy (p. 610)
cognitive-behavioral therapy
time be quite different because of the two ages involved. psychosis (p. 614)
(CBT) (p. 620)
4. A boy enters kindergarten as the youngest boy in his class
conduct disorder (p. 609) rumination (p. 607)
and soon appears to have problems sitting still and paying
co-rumination (p. 608) sampling bias (p. 591)
attention. The teacher and the school psychologist conclude
that the young boy has ADHD and strongly urge the par- delusion (p. 614) schizophrenia (p. 614)
ents to see a specialist who will prescribe Ritalin for their son. depressogenic vulnerability security motivational system
The specialist whom they recommend, a psychiatrist, agrees (p. 607) (p. 597)
and suggests a medication schedule. Given that this is a very diathesis-stress hypothesis social anxiety disorder
young age to start a child on Ritalin, how would you evalu- (p. 592) (p. 592)
ate the costs and benefits of these recommendations in terms elective mutism unipolar depression
of what is best for the child? What alternatives might you (p. 588) (p. 603)
consider?

STUDY AND REVIEW 627

 17
Development after Childhood
and Adolescence
Physical and Physiological Changes in Personality in the • Understanding Stages of Adult
Changes in Adulthood Lifespan: Individual and Group Development
Changes What Does It Mean to Be Old?
Cognitive Changes in Adulthood
• Changes in Individuals • Stereotypes and Ageism
• Reaction Time and Speed of Processing
• Stressful Life Events • Cultural Variation in Stereotypes and
• Memory, Higher Cognitive Functions,
• Group Changes Ageism?
and Reasoning
• Daily Activities and Cognitive Aging Stages of Life? Conclusions
• Circadian Rhythms, Cognition, and the • Erik Erikson’s Approach
Lifespan Summary
 n 1968, the U.S. Democratic Party nominated a charis- perhaps perpetuated by older people trying to hold on to

I matic representative from the state of Georgia, Julian

Bond, as its candidate for vice president. A short while
later at the party’s national convention, Mr. Bond stood up
and withdrew his name from consideration. At age 28, he
was younger than the minimum age required for the presi-
dency of the United States (see Figure 17.1). Based on the age
restrictions for serving in the British Parliament, the U.S.
power, or are there real advantages that occur with age?
In this chapter, we will explore psychological changes
that occur after adolescence, recognizing that psychologi-
cal development is a lifelong process that is not arbitrarily
cut off at the end of adolescence. We will also consider a
somewhat different approach known as the life course per-
spective, which emphasizes key transitions that occur in
Constitution states that the vice president and the president various social contexts. More broadly, we will explore how
of the United States must be at least 35 years of age. Other we change physically and psychologically after young adult-
age restrictions are placed on members of the Senate (30 years hood and how others view and respond to those changes.
old) and the House of Representatives (25 years old). Such We will also ask what factors can explain these changes
requirements are not unique to the United States and Great and whether individual differences in personality and intel-
Britain. They are written into constitutions of countries ligence stay relatively stable with increasing age. We will
throughout the world, some of which require even older ages, consider whether age groups as a whole shift in the degree
such as 40, for the head of state. to which they exhibit certain kinds of personalities, but we
Why should country after country set up age restrictions will also examine the enormous variation in how people
for its leaders, often extending them well into middle age? age, ranging from successful aging, in which people seem
In most cases, the reasons revolve around a conviction that to thrive until very late in life, to pathological aging, in
people older than 35 or 40 years of age have better psy- which people decline very rapidly starting in their mid-60s.
chological qualifications for leadership roles than those who In a related vein, we will consider whether certain lifestyles
are younger. This view may seem a bit surprising at first. and daily activities might influence the quality of aging.
In many areas of cognitive functioning, there is a gradual Finally, we will ask if there are adult “stages” of develop-
decline after people reach their mid-20s; in tasks that mea- ment and, to the extent that there are, whether they reflect
sure processing speed and working memory capacity, for internal changes in the maturing individual or changes dic-
example, people in their 20s often outperform those who tated by the individual’s changing role in society. We will
are older. But older adults may outperform younger adults also consider whether cultural influences can change the
in tasks requiring experience and expertise as well as more whole meaning of what it means to be old. One key mes-
emotional regulation. Are the alleged superior psychologi- sage throughout the chapter is that despite clear signs of
cal qualifications of people in their 40s and 50s a myth, the decline of some basic physical capacities, many cognitive
capacities do not decline with age and can even develop fur-
ther in the elderly. Similarly, when personality changes do
occur, such as a greater ability to inhibit impulsive behav-
ior with increasing age, they often are changes that would
widely be considered desirable.

Physical and Physiological

Changes in Adulthood
The health and lifestyle of older adults continue to improve
as researchers discover more about the process of aging and
find medical treatments and adaptive strategies that enable
people to cope with age-related changes more effectively.
People born in the mid-nineteenth century were consid-
ered old when they were in their 50s, and most people of
FIGURE 17.1 Age limits on certain jobs. On August 29, 1968,
that age had chronic disabilities. People born in the 1920s
at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, 28-year-old Julian
Bond had to decline the nomination to be vice president of the
mostly lived past 60 without developing serious or chronic
United States because, according to the U.S. Constitution, a candidate diseases, but they then showed a marked increase in dis-
must be at least 35 years old to be suitable for the presidency or ease and infirmity starting in their 60s. People born in the
vice presidency. 1980s, however, are considered to have a 50-50 chance of

630 CHAPTER 17 DEVELOPMENT AFTER CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE

living to 100 and being highly active, fit, and healthy into or type 1, muscles. The loss of endurance is also thought to
their 70s (Fogel, 2005). In addition, there is more variation reflect loss of mitochondria—the “energy factories” of the
than ever in aging patterns as people engage in behaviors cell—in muscle cells (Holloszy et al., 1995). At the same
that result in either highly successful aging or unsuccessful time, however, the effects of muscle atrophy can be reduced
aging. Positive behaviors include healthier diets and eating to a remarkable degree by increased levels of exercise, espe-
patterns, physical and cognitive exercise, building networks cially in resistance training (Koopman & van Loon, 2009;
of social support, and avoiding excessive amounts of stress Yarasheski, 2003).
(Jeste et al., 2010). For these reasons, discussions of patterns
of aging are a moving target, and most readers of this text
are likely, with appropriate behaviors, to live longer and be Q: What aspects of muscle function decline
healthier than even those born in the 1980s. most with age?
Despite the many ways in which older adults are health-
ier and living more vigorous lives than ever before, most
physical and physiological measures show a continuous People decrease in height as they age, as the vertebrae in
pattern of decline from the mid-20s onward. Muscle mass their backs become more compressed (Rothman & Sime-
and strength gradually decline throughout middle age, and one, 1982). The skin becomes less taut and consequently
the rate of decline accelerates in later years. From age 45 more wrinkled, apparently becoming thinner and losing
on, muscles decrease roughly 15 percent in strength each fat and collagen content (Newcomer & Young, 1989).
decade (Frontera et al., 1991; Hughes et al., 2001). A typi- Aging adults may also show osteoporosis, in which cal-
cal, active 25-year-old may have a total muscle mass equal cium depletion in bones leads to a drop in bone density
to 30 percent of body weight, while a typical 75-year-old and some skeletal deformities after age 50, especially in
may have a total muscle mass equal to only 15 percent of women. The onset of menopause and the sharp drop in
body weight, with men losing muscle at a considerably related hormones cause the accelerated decline in bone
faster rate than women (Murton & Greenhaff, 2009). At density in women. Interestingly, humans seem to be one
the same time, however, muscle endurance—that is, the of the very few species that undergo menopause, leading to
ability to repetitively engage in a task over a long period of speculation that there may have been evolutionary pressure
time—declines much more slowly. This is evident in the to stop fertility in older females because of their increased
much longer careers of long-distance runners and cyclists risk of dying in childbirth, which would then make them
as opposed to sprinters, whose performance is more depen- unavailable to care for older children and grandchildren
dent on strength (see Figure 17.2). Fast-twitch, or type 2, (Diamond, 1996).
muscles also tend to decline more quickly than slow-twitch, Almost all organ systems show some degree of decline.
The kidneys show a decline in the ability to filter blood and
excrete urine. The heart muscle weakens and loses capacity,
and there is a drop in peak heart rate. The ability to circu-
late blood also declines as the arteries become more clogged.
The lungs lose some capacity. The basic rate of metabolism
also tends to decline, and as many middle-aged people pain-
fully notice, their dietary intake must be cut back accord-
ingly or their weight will increase (Cristofalo & Adelman,
2002; Tallis & Fillit, 2003).

Q: Describe three different patterns of physical

change in the body that occur later in life.

Just as their organ systems decline with age, older adults

also experience a pattern of decline in aspects of their brain
FIGURE 17.2 Relative sparing of endurance-related muscles.
and sensory receptors. The actual size of the brain decreases
While muscles related to sprinting and other explosive rapid move-
ments tend to decline quite noticeably throughout the 20s, muscles with age, losing as much as 10 percent of its weight and
related to longer-lasting activities can be highly effective for many volume by the time a person reaches roughly 70 years
more years, as seen when 37-year-old Meb Keflezighi finished fourth (Cristofalo & Adelman, 2002; Scahill et al., 2003; Tallis &
in the 2012 Olympic Marathon. Fillit, 2003). There are also decreases in volume in many

PHYSICAL AND PHYSIOLOGICAL CHANGES IN ADULTHOOD 631

 NEW DIRECTION S IN DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH

Why Do We Age and Why Do We Live

as Long as We Do?

A
basic fact of human life remains a mystery: Why do pairs of the telomeres were not there. But some of the base
we age? Why don’t we reach a peak adult form and pairs of the telomeres are not reproduced, and so the telomeres
then simply maintain that form for perpetuity, con- become a bit shorter with each division, sacrificing themselves
stantly replenishing damaged tissue in the same to save the more critical base pairs. Ultimately, they will become
manner that a salamander regrows its tail? One long-accepted too short and will lose their functional roles, although at least
theory argues that aging is an evolved trait in which organ- some cells in the body, as well as cancer cells, seem to have a
isms are programmed to gradually die after they have created mechanism for re-extending the telomeres through an enzyme
viable offspring so that they can make resources available for known as telomerase (Hastings et al., 2004; Klingelhutz,
the next generation (Weismann, 1889). More recently, the idea 1999; Rubin, 1998). Recent work also suggests that high-stress
of evolutionarily programmed aging and death has been dis- environments, either physiologically in terms of poor nutrition or
counted as implausible when considered in detail (Kirkwood & psychologically in terms of adverse events, may accelerate the
Cremer, 1982; Sutphin & Kennedy, 2009), but the original pro- rate of telomere shortening (Effros, 2009, 2012; Epel, 2009).
posal illustrates how the overall question of how and why we More optimistically, some hypotheses suggest that more benign
age is one of the most central questions in biology and one that environments may halt and even reverse the effect and cause
is still not well understood. More current views argue that aging telomere lengthening and slower aging (Effros, 2009; Epel,
is a side effect of the lack of natural selection for repair mecha- 2009). This work has led to proposals that telomere length
nisms of tissue damage occurring later in life (Partridge, 2010). might be seen as a psychobiomarker—a biological feature
Average lifespans vary considerably across organisms and are that serves as an indicator of psychological functioning—of the
certainly related to their genetic makeup. It has been possible, for quality of aging (Epel, 2009).
example, to selectively breed species of worms (Kenyon, 2001) We can also see how the full life cycle becomes relevant to
and fruit flies (Landis et al., 2004) to obtain ”Methuselahs” with the effects of shortened telomeres. Thus, it may be that stress
far greater lifespans (for example, 75 days in fruit flies rather very early in life starts to prematurely shorten telomeres. One
than 40 days). Such a genetic involvement, however, should not study of chick embryos showed that injecting the eggs with hor-
be taken as evidence for a genetic program that specifically trig- mones related to stress responses resulted in shortened telo-
gers aging. It simply means that the factors that contribute to meres when the chicks were born (Haussmann et al., 2012).
aging are partially related to an organism’s genetic makeup. In humans, children who suffer from maltreatment also show
Several distinct theories of aging remain under debate. One shortened telomeres compared with controls (Price et al., 2013).
posits a gradual accumulation of negative random events, most There are even reports that children from lower socioeconomic
often as a product of metabolic processes such as oxidation, groups have shortened telomeres compared with more affluent
which can leave by-products that decrease the efficiency of pro- children, with calculations that the shortening is “roughly equiva-
teins and metabolic structures such as mitochondria. lent to 6 years of additional aging” (Needham et al., 2012). If
A second view argues that cells can divide only a limited supported by further research, these reports suggest that with-
number of times, roughly 50 in many cases. This cell division out amelioration later, earlier negative life experiences could
limit is known as the Hayflick limit (Hayflick, 1965, 1998). It have negative effects on aging half a century later.
is thought to be related to DNA sequences called telomeres, A third view suggests that the genetic material itself, the ani-
which are located at the ends of chromosomes and protect the mal’s DNA, becomes slowly degraded over time through muta-
chromosomes from deteriorating and from fusing with other tion and other events, such that it becomes more and more
chromosomes. Telomeres prevent the loss of critical base pair likely to produce nonoptimal proteins. If this third view is cor-
sequences at the ends of the chromosomes during cell divi- rect, the greater longevity of some species, such as humans,
sion by acting as protective caps to these base pairs. Because may be related to the higher incidence of redundant strings of
duplication of base pairs cannot occur at the extreme end of DNA, which can provide a kind of backup production of critical
the chromosome, essential base pairs would be lost if the base proteins (Morrish et al., 2002).

632 CHAPTER 17 DEVELOPMENT AFTER CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE

 Why do women live longer than men? The difference is quite
dramatic, and ever more so with increasing age, as seen in
Figure 17.3. There are a host of potential proximal causes, such
as differences in hormonal influences on various body tissues,
but the larger question remains whether there is any sort of
adaptive reason for women to have longer lives. One evolution-
ary theory is based on the idea that women have more certain
knowledge that their offspring are truly theirs, and therefore
they have more reason to be fully invested in their offspring
for the long haul so as to maximize the transfer of their genetic FIGURE 17.4 Grandparents and the transmission of human
material to future generations (Perls & Fretts, 1998). Men, culture. About 30,000 years ago, grandparents may have begun
to play a critical role as reservoirs of human cultural practices that
especially in societies of thousands of years ago, had far less
they passed down to their grandchildren, thereby amplifying the
certainty about paternity of any potential offspring and thus effects of culture for future generations.
less of an investment in continuing care.
Genetic breeding studies with species such as worms and effects in rhesus monkeys, the consequences for human aging
fruit flies may provide powerful new insights into questions of are less clear.
why we age and why there are sex differences in that process. The flip side of asking why people age is to ask why we
These species are used because their life cycles are relatively should survive much past the age when our own offspring are
short, allowing for relatively quick breeding. As the genomes able to reproduce. In traditional hunter-gatherer societies that
of these species become available and as researchers come have existed for much of human evolution, parenthood comes in
to better understand the precise roles of genes and gene the early teenage years. Why should parents need to live much
pathways, the reasons for differences in aging may become past their 30s? For hundreds of thousands of years, they may
clearer, as well as the possibility, someday, of gene therapy not have survived much longer than that, but comparison of the
for aging humans. Unfortunately, those species that are opti- teeth of fossil populations from four successive time periods
mal for this kind of research because of their short life cycles suggests that a radical shift occurred in the demographics of
tend to be very different from humans, making implications for ages in a population about 30,000 years ago. Through careful
humans highly tentative and speculative. As discussed earlier, analyses of the teeth of humans and hominins over these dif-
one finding that seemed to hold across a diverse range of spe- ferent time periods, it is possible to estimate the distribution of
cies is that dietary restriction tends to increase longevity, and ages in a population through the degree of wear in the teeth
there are even some indications of such effects in humans (Caspari, 2011; Caspari & Lee, 2004). Such analyses reveal a
(Partridge, 2010). Nonetheless, given the failure to find such dramatic surge in the population of older adults about 30,000
years ago. In a relatively short time interval, there were more
90
than four times as many people living into old age. This surge
80
Number of men per 100 women

in the elderly coincided with simultaneous bursts in populations

70 and cultural complexity. There may have been a mutual sym-
60 biosis between cultural complexity and the proportion of older
individuals. Cultures were able to grow in size and complexity to
50
the extent that the collective information of that culture could be
40 retained and passed down to the next generation. Especially in
30 preliterate societies, the best repository of that knowledge was
20 almost surely the elder members of those populations. Thus,
the elderly served as a source of essential information that more
10
and more complex societies could use as a foundation for fur-
0
65–69 70–74 75–79 80–84 85–89 90–94 95+ ther advancements (see Figure 17.4). In turn, as these cultures
Age (in years) became more advanced, they were better able to protect and
FIGURE 17.3 Sex ratios and aging. As is quickly evident at care for their elderly, thus completing the symbiotic circle. It is
any retirement home, women vastly outnumber men in elderly fascinating that this sort of dramatic change may have occurred
populations. Adapted from the U.S. Census Bureau (1996). over such a relatively recent time in the history of humans.

PHYSICAL AND PHYSIOLOGICAL CHANGES IN ADULTHOOD 633

local brain regions (in the hippocampus, for example, which hands, and slow movements (Jankovic, 2008), psychologi-
affects memory; see Driscoll et al., 2003; Jernigan & Gamst, cal deficits also occur as the disease progresses, ranging
2005; Ystad et al., 2009), in cortical thickness, and in neu- from distractibility and difficulty in planning, to memory
rotransmitter functioning. Moreover, there are increases in problems, to sleep disorders, to depression (Chaudhuri et al.,
incidences of brain metabolites and neurofibrillary tangles, 2006). Finally, in still later stages, many patients come to
which are signs of Alzheimer’s disease but not limited to have severe dementia. Most cases start after age 60.
those with the disease, as such increases appear in other Alzheimer’s disease is often first noticed when an indi-
elderly populations as well (Salthouse, 2009). vidual has difficulty solving problems or remembering recent
With respect to perception, there are usually substantial events or confuses recent memories with earlier ones. As
declines in vision and audition with age. Acuity drops off, the disease progresses, the affected individual can have
even with corrective lenses. One of the most pervasive and substantial mood changes, language difficulty, and loss of
commonly noticed changes is a decline in the ability to long-term memory. The disease develops at different rates
change the shape of the eye lens to focus on near objects. in different individuals, but in most cases, once the disease
The need for reading glasses and bifocals is inevitable for is correctly diagnosed, few individuals live much more than
most people at some point in their 40s. Even the most 10 to 15 years. Its cause is not yet known, although it is
ardent health addict who defies aging in most other respects associated with the buildup of plaques (pathological accu-
cannot avoid the need for corrective lenses for reading. Later mulations of protein fragments that collect between nerve
in life, the disorder known as macular degeneration may cells) in the cortex and fiber tangles (twisted fibers of pro-
occur, a condition in which the central area of the retina tein) within nerve cells (Minati et al., 2009). Most cases
becomes pigmented and develops thinning layers; these start after age 60.
changes eventually cause a dramatic drop in acuity. The Dementia is a much broader pattern of disease associ-
lens of the eye also deteriorates with age, becoming yellow ated with difficulties in problem solving, attention, mem-
and filtering out some wavelengths of light. Night vision ory, and language, and those who have dementia may also
also tends to decline, as does the ability to quickly adapt to have late stages of Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s disease, as
changing levels of illumination (Hyman, 1987; McMurdo & well as many other disorders. While it can occur early in
Baines, 1988). life, dementia is typically found in older individuals. By
There are also reliable patterns of decline in hearing. As some estimates, roughly 1 out of 20 people older than 65
the hair cells of the inner ear, or organ of Corti, become have some form of dementia, 1 in 5 people over 80 have
damaged, fragile, or simply die, there is a decline in the abil- it, and perhaps as many as half the people over 100 have it
ity to hear certain frequencies, especially high frequencies. (Mathers & Leonard, 2000). But it appears that the rate
Nerves from the hair cells also tend to diminish in number. of dementia is gradually declining as the elderly engage in
The bones that transmit sounds into the hair cells become more adaptive aging behaviors and as treatments for vari-
more calcified and less able to transmit sounds. Taken ous disorders improve (Manton et al., 2005; Rocca et al.,
together, these factors result in a decline in the overall sen- 2011; Schrijvers et al., 2012).
sitivity of hearing, which leads many elderly people to be Many people older than 60 have difficulty sleeping through
hard of hearing and especially to have problems with hear- the night, often waking up several times for extended peri-
ing higher frequencies. Some entrepreneurs have capitalized ods. The reasons for this change are unclear, especially given
on the ability of teens and young adults to hear frequencies that there is considerable variation across individuals in the
that are not heard by older adults by developing devices that extent to which sleep patterns change. It is not yet known
emit very annoying high-pitched sounds that discourage how much of the rise in “sleep fragility” is directly related
teens from loitering (Delaney, 2008). to aging or how much is due to other age-related changes.
Declines in taste, olfaction, and touch sensitivity also One important consideration is that all people who are sleep
occur, but they tend to be more modest. Unfortunately, as deprived show cognitive decline, so it may be that some of
vision and audition are often most needed in many psycho- the cognitive declines that are observed in the elderly might
logical tasks, these two areas of more extensive decline can be reduced simply by improving their sleep (Crowley, 2011).
influence task performance quite dramatically. What factors cause some people to age much more suc-
There are several psychologically relevant diseases that cessfully than others? The answer is complex and only slowly
occur primarily, although not exclusively, in the elderly. unfolding. It might seem that genes would strongly predict
These include Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer’s disease, longevity, but their contribution, while significant, is cer-
general dementia, and sleep disorders. Parkinson’s disease tainly not the entire story. Thus, even monozygotic twins
occurs when certain dopamine-producing cells in the mid- can show considerable variation in aging rates, although
brain start to die off. Although the best-known symptoms the rates are more correlated in MZ twins than in strangers
are related to motor skills, such as difficulty walking, shaky (Talens et al., 2012). In addition, it is proving exceedingly

634 CHAPTER 17 DEVELOPMENT AFTER CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE

difficult to isolate specific genes that may be predominantly that occur in those with Alzheimer’s disease are comparable
responsible for aging effects (Barzilai et al., 2012). to the effects of normal aging. When people in their 40s and
There has also been a great deal of interest in the effects 50s begin to forget people’s names or where they left their
of diet on aging, especially in the effects of restricted diets. keys, the decline is more likely directly attributed to aging.
In several other organisms, such as rats, a restricted diet far
below the normal level of intake (from 10 to 40 percent less)
is associated with living substantially longer (Messaoudi Reaction Time and Speed of Processing
et al., 2006). Nonetheless, this finding may not hold for
humans—a disappointment to those who have restricted Older people appear to slow down with normal aging. It
their diet in the hope of living longer. When research- might seem that this change simply reflects aging muscles
ers studied rhesus monkeys, a primate closely related to and the ability to move limbs quickly, but in fact, speed of
humans, they found no extension of life as a consequence of processing also starts to decline and at a surprisingly early
caloric restriction (Mattison et al., 2012). Given the large set age. First consider reaction time. Simple reaction time—
of studies showing diet restriction effects in other species, namely, the time it takes to respond to a stimulus, such
it may be that future studies will also start to show stron- as pressing a computer key whenever an x appears on the
ger effects in primates, including humans. But the failure screen—speeds up from infancy on into young adulthood.
to find effects in one large-scale study does highlight some But as a person approaches her third decade of life, there
of the risks of extrapolating conclusions to humans. And is a longer response time, at first quite gradually through
since a large-scale random assignment study in humans is midlife and then much more dramatically in the seventh
not feasible, it may be many years before there is convincing or eighth decade of life (Cerella, 1985, 1990; Finkel et al.,
evidence of how dietary restrictions affect aging in humans. 2003). The decline that starts in the late 20s is reflected in
those sports where a slower reaction time may mean that an
athlete in his 30s is beginning to lose his edge. Tennis may
Q: Describe four different ways in which the be one such example.
sensory capacities and brain structure change in More complex reaction times, such as those involv-
ing different responses, depending on various spatial and
the last two decades of life. temporal configurations of stimuli, also tend to slow down
with increasing age after a person is in her 20s, but this
depends on the task. With novel stimuli, there is a standard
U-shaped curve (Hommel et al., 2004; Li et al., 2009; see
Figure 17.5). By contrast, in areas of high expertise, reac-
Cognitive Changes tion times and speed of processing may not slow down with
in Adulthood increasing age but may hold constant or even get faster. One
classic demonstration of increasing speed with age involved
Given all the age-related changes in physiology, sensory a study of the speed at which telegraph operators could type
systems, and brain architecture, we might expect related out a message in code (Bryan & Harter, 1899). By chunking
declines in psychological capacities. In fact, while there are sequences of dots and dashes—that is, grouping them into
certainly some declines, there are also many areas of pre- hierarchically organized clusters—expert telegraphers were
served and even improved psychological performance with able to achieve levels of speed that were far more related to
age. Human cognitive capacities are so flexible and adaptive their years of experience than to their age. Nonetheless, less
that they are not that closely tethered to underlying biologi- expertise-laden measures of processing speed generally do
cal changes. We will start, however, with some of the areas of decline with age, with differences in the rate of decline par-
cognitive decline, for these make all the more interesting the tially influenced by genetics, as shown by research that has
areas of preserved and improved performance. The cognitive found that MZ twins show more correlated rates of decline
aspects of aging have been an intensive area of research for than DZ twins (Lee et al., 2012).
many years. There are practical questions about the loss of
cognitive capacity in the elderly. But a major problem in such
investigations is distinguishing between patterns of decline Memory, Higher Cognitive
in diseases that happen to be more frequent in the elderly
and patterns of decline that are caused by the aging process Functions, and Reasoning
itself. For example, Alzheimer’s disease tends to occur much Declines have also been found in higher-level cognitive per-
more frequently in the elderly, but it would be incorrect to formance. The declines often start to occur when a person
assume that the massive patterns of psychological decline is in his early 20s and then gradually lessen until he reaches

COGNITIVE CHANGES IN ADULTHOOD 635

 2,000 his mid-50s, after which point the drop can be quite a bit
Feature 2 more dramatic (Salthouse, 2004, 2009). Figure 17.6 shows
1,800 Feature 8
curves for four different sorts of general tasks: speed of pro-
Feature 14
1,600 Conjunction 2
cessing, working memory, long-term memory, and world
Mean reaction time (in msec)

Conjunction 8 knowledge. There is a drop on the measures of speed of

1,400 Conjunction 14 processing, working memory, and long-term memory. Only
1,200
Simple reaction time world knowledge improves with age, at least until the indi-
vidual reaches his late 60s, and then there is only a very
1,000 modest decline (Salthouse, 2004). Between the ages of 20
and 80, the drop in cognitive performance for speed of pro-
800
cessing, working memory, and long-term memory is hardly
600
subtle. Adults in their early 20s perform near the 75th per-
centile in the overall population, while those in their early
400 70s perform near the 20th percentile (Salthouse, 2004).
Moreover, the drop occurs in roughly the same way for all
200
20 40 60 80
healthy aging adults and is not caused by a small subset
Age (in years) of the population afflicted with such age-related diseases as
Alzheimer’s (Deary et al., 2009). These differences in per-
FIGURE 17.5 Complex reaction times. Reaction times in a com-
plex task where expertise is irrelevant follow a pattern of speeding
formance on cognitive tasks have sometimes been described
up until about age 25 and then gradually slowing down into late life. as the difference between fluid and crystallized intelligence
In a visual search task, adults are asked to respond as soon as they (Cattell, 1987), where fluid tasks tend to be those involv-
see a certain combination of features. Adapted from Hommel et al. ing reasoning and stimulus processing in novel situations
(2004). with new information, while crystallized tasks rely more on

1.2
Speed of processing:
Performance declines with increasing pattern comparison task
age for speed of processing, working
memory, and long-term memory Working memory:
reading span task
0.6
Performance on task (z-score)

Long-term memory:
cued recall task

World knowledge:
Shipley vocabulary task
0

−0.6
Performance is preserved
and even increases with age
for world knowledge

−1.2

20s 30s 40s 50s 60s 70s 80s

Age (in years)

FIGURE 17.6 Fluid versus crystallized intelligence and aging. On most cognitive measures of what is considered “fluid intelligence,”
there is a marked decline in performance with increasing age. On measures of more “crystallized intelligence,” performance can increase
until a person is well into his 70s. Tasks involving speed of processing, working memory, and long-term memory clearly show declines in
performance, while tasks involving general world knowledge generally show increases in performance. Adapted from Zimerman et al.
(2011).

636 CHAPTER 17 DEVELOPMENT AFTER CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE

the use of information that is already available and familiar. There are several reasons why people in their 60s and 70s
The continuing strength of task performance relying on may continue to do well on a wide variety of cognitive tasks.
crystallized intelligence is a robust finding found across First, many everyday tasks, such as shopping for groceries,
a wide literature (Hertzog, 2011; Palmer & Dawes, 2010; preparing a tax return, or assessing a cell phone plan, build
Salthouse, 2010). on large blocks of familiar knowledge, an area where age
In some tasks that are particularly dependent on accu- can often be an advantage. Second, as seen in the telegraph
mulated knowledge, the hallmark of crystallized intelligence, operator example, many skills can continue to improve over
the advantages of age can be striking. For example, the time as individuals develop ever more integrative strate-
success rate on difficult crossword puzzles often contin- gies. For example, even though muscle movements, reaction
ues to rise well into a person’s 70s (Hambrick et al., 1999; times, and other speed-related measures all decline starting
Salthouse, 2004; see Figure 17.7). But even though they when people are in their 20s and into their 50s, there is
show good performance on vocabulary tests and cross- no decline in typing speed among expert typists (Salthouse,
word puzzles, we might expect people in their 60s and 70s 1984, 1999). Indeed, in many cases, there is a continuing
to do less well on many everyday cognitive tasks, especially increase in speed well into midlife. Many skills can be more
since 20-year-olds are in the top quarter of the popula- and more refined and hierarchically organized in ways that
tion on many laboratory tasks and 70-year-olds are in the make them more efficient to produce. People often under-
bottom quarter. Yet, older people generally do retain their estimate just how long it takes to become truly expert in a
competence when doing everyday cognitive tasks. Why is domain. In many areas of complex skills, such as anesthesi-
this so? ology, stock trading, or carpentry, it is estimated that at least
10,000 hours of full, effortful engagement in the task are
needed to reach the highest level of expertise (Ericsson &
Q: Describe two cognitive tasks on which Lehmann, 1996). Assuming that many people in their jobs
adults show major declines in performance with may not spend more than 20 hours a week actually engaged
in a task (such as surgery), it would take roughly 10 years to
increasing age. Describe two others at which they reach such a level, which after initial qualifying training is
improve. factored in, may mean that people do not reach the maxi-
mum skill level until sometime in their mid-40s.
Thus, in many areas, as people grow older, they decide
to specialize in a manner that optimizes a particular niche
70
Study 1
of expertise. This means that they choose an area in which
Study 2 they can use the strategy of optimization—that is, con-
Study 3 tinuing to practice over many hours to perfect a skill such
Number of words correctly completed

60
Study 4 as manuscript editing—and they select specific goals within
that area—for example, building up world knowledge rele-
50 vant to the topic areas where they do most of their editing by
reading extensively about those areas. Although the upper
limits of the benefits of such specializations and practice are
40
not yet known, it seems reasonable that, in many cases, a
person may be able to continually optimize performance for
30 20 or even 30 years. Those individuals who cognitively age
in a “successful” manner may be those who develop a skill
that they can continue to fine-tune and improve in decade
20 after decade.
A different phenomenon that mitigates the effects of
aging on performance may be compensation—using aids
10
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 or altering behavior to make up for losses in cognitive or
Age (in years) physical abilities. As people age, they may start to realize
more clearly the limits of their cognitive systems and may
FIGURE 17.7 Consistent cognitive improvement with aging.
One of the most robust examples of a cognitive skill that increases develop ways of working around those limits. This might
throughout the lifespan is that of solving crossword puzzles. This be as simple as learning to use a notepad to help them
graph shows strikingly similar improvements across four different remember novel information or as complex as develop-
studies. Adapted from Salthouse (2004). ing new networks of friends and acquaintances who can

COGNITIVE CHANGES IN ADULTHOOD 637

complement their cognitive shortcomings. An aging person Skills in selection, compensation, and optimization may
may learn a large array of strategies for dealing with declin- play a large role in the increasing ability to remember to do
ing facets of cognition and thereby keep her performance a task or to attain a goal in the future, which is known as
at a high level (Bäckman & Dixon, 1992; Dixon et al., prospective memory. Prospective memory might include
2001; Freund & Baltes, 2002a). A general model of selec- remembering to pick up the dry cleaning on the way home
tion, optimization, and compensation has been proposed from work or remembering to send in an absentee ballot
by Baltes and his colleagues (Baltes, 1997; Freund & Baltes, before an election. Although performance on memory tasks
2002b; Marsiske et al., 1995), in which successfully aging generally tends to decline in the elderly, prospective mem-
individuals learn to select tasks at which they will excel, ory is often preserved until very old age. Thus, as people in
optimize performance in these tasks, and compensate for their 50s continue to age, their ability to remember to per-
some deficits with other skills. Baltes and his colleagues form future acts may stay constant or even improve in some
describe the particularly compelling case of the aging, bril- areas (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990; Einstein et al., 1997).
liant pianist Arthur Rubinstein, who continued to play the One common explanation of this improvement may be that
piano with enormous skill well into his 80s (see Figure 17.8). there is a robust ability for a person to monitor his cognitive
When asked how he did it, Rubinstein described in detail performance with metacognitive and executive skills, which
how he picked a smaller set of age-appropriate pieces (selec- may continue to function well with age, perhaps especially
tion), worked on them with great effort (optimization), and as a means of compensating for specific areas of decline
learned to mask loss of finger motor speed with a technique (Baltes, 1997; Einstein et al., 1997; Scullin et al., 2011). As
of speed contrast that gave a strong illusion of great speed older people start to confront the limits of working memory
(compensation). in more novel tasks, they may develop a clear sense of the
ways that memory can fail and acquire strategies for work-
ing against such failures. Such strategies might be as simple
Q: What are some reasons why certain as putting a note on a door as a reminder to do something
cognitive functions stay constant or even when leaving the house in the morning or as complex as get-
improve in aging populations? ting several friends to feel socially obligated to do an impor-
tant task. These everyday strategies may help explain why
older adults may show deficits in laboratory tasks of pro-
spective memory but actually outperform younger adults in
many real-life prospective memory tasks (Bailey et al., 2010;
Henry et al., 2004).
Not all memory processes that involve strong metacogni-
tive and executive processing continue to function well in
the elderly. One area of decline involves failures in source
monitoring (Henkel et al., 1998) and in related abilities to
distinguish the frequency with which memories have been
encountered from the actual instances in which those mem-
ories were experienced (Hay & Jacoby, 1999; Jacoby, 1999b).
As we saw in Chapter 10, source monitoring involves the
ability to tag a memory to the source or situation in which
it was learned. Was it learned firsthand, through testimony
of another, or through a dream? There is now consider-
able evidence of source monitoring problems in the elderly
(Johnson & Mitchell, 2002; Mitchell & Johnson, 2009). For
example, older adults are more likely than younger adults to
say that they saw something that was only falsely suggested
to them and are more confident of those false memories.
Subsequent analyses revealed that older adults were less
likely than younger adults to encode or use various cues to
source information, such as perceptual cues distinguishing
FIGURE 17.8 Successful aging and motor skills. Arthur speakers, or context, or temporal (time-related) cues that
Rubinstein continued to dazzle audiences well into his 80s by could place information in a plausible or implausible time
cleverly compensating for some slowing of his finger movements frame. Moreover, confidence in the semantic information
with other skills. (knowledge of the facts) of a message often seems to give

638 CHAPTER 17 DEVELOPMENT AFTER CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE

a false confidence in the episodic information (knowing adults’ decisions. As such, context affects judgments where
the experience and situation in which facts were learned; it should not (Tversky & Simonson, 1993). When the same
see Mitchell et al., 2003). It seems likely that difficulties tasks are given to older adults, however, they make deci-
in source monitoring are closely related to difficulties with sions in a more rational and consistent manner that is not
episodic as opposed to semantic memory and with declines buffeted about as much by context (Tentori et al., 2001).
in function in some processing areas of the left prefrontal Moreover, older adults show this resistance to context influ-
cortex. In a related manner, implicit memories also tend to ences not only in domains of expertise but also in unfa-
show much less decline than explicit memories (Chauvel miliar domains, whereas college students tend to be more
et al., 2012; Fleischman et al., 2004). Thus, an elderly per- limited, showing some immunity to context only in more
son might learn to remember how to do a new routine in a familiar domains (Kim & Hasher, 2005).
nursing facility quite easily but not be able to remember ever It is not completely clear why older adults should show
having been taught the new routine. an advantage over younger adults in decision-making
A related problem may be a loss of the ability to distin- tasks that are prone to attraction effects. But one possible
guish a strong sense of familiarity from more episode-specific explanation may have to do with a tendency on the part of
memories; indeed, some have argued that unscrupulous sales younger adults to try to adopt analytical strategies in which
representatives prey on such disabilities to lull the elderly each alternative is weighed carefully, setting up possible
into a false sense of trust (Jacoby, 1999a). For example, a interference effects from new information. Older adults,
sales representative for a dubious life insurance policy might who use more global heuristics, may not be so “attracted”
call up an elderly woman several times and give his name to discrete new pieces of information (Kim & Hasher,
each time. The woman would not initially know his name, 2005; Peters et al., 2000).
but over time she would come to recognize it as familiar. More broadly, it would be misleading to characterize
She might not, however, remember the context in which she most elderly people as easy marks for unscrupulous preda-
had acquired that familiarity. Thus, when the salesperson tors who are attempting to bamboozle them into making
called for the sixth time, she might have a reassuring sense bad decisions. Even though there may be declines in several
of familiarity but no memory that the familiarity had been components of memory processing, attention, and reason-
built up by repeated calls from a stranger. The salesperson, ing, elderly people often do well in more complex decision
who would be aware of this deficit, would start to act as if tasks. In some cases, they do so by engaging in the decision-
he were an old acquaintance and then would make the sales making process in a manner that minimizes the effects of
pitch on that basis. The precise deficit here seems to involve any deficits, such as slowing down the decision task and
a lack of explicit memories of specific events but a near com- perhaps writing down key points on a notepad (Yoon
plete sparing of an implicit memory that provides a strong et al., 2009). In other cases, as shown in the case of attrac-
sense of familiarity. tion effects, the cognitive abilities of the elderly may confer
A different domain of cognition that often seems to be advantages in certain decision tasks without the need for
spared in the healthy elderly is that of spatial memory. When any real efforts to compensate for deficits (Blanchard-Fields,
tested over brief intervals to determine their memory for at least 2007; Healey & Hasher, 2009: Zimerman et al., 2011).
modest-sized displays of objects in different spatial locations, Elderly adults seem to be especially adept at making emotion-
the healthy elderly showed no obvious decline with age (Olson laden interpersonal decisions, apparently because they are
et al., 2004). Because these sorts of memory traces are often more sophisticated at regulating their emotions during deci-
learned incidentally in real life—that is, we build a cognitive sion making (Blanchard-Fields et al., 2007). Greater abili-
map automatically as we move through an environment—it ties in some of these areas may be why some governments
may be that such memories are relatively spared in the same require that elected leaders be above a certain age. In an
way as much of implicit memory (Pilotti et al., 2003). emotion-laden crisis, a higher level of emotion regulation
In some cases, older adults can show considerably bet- may be important.
ter reasoning skills than younger adults in context-rich
everyday decision tasks. For example, younger adults tend
to commit reasoning errors because of an attraction effect
in which their estimates of the value of a good may vary Daily Activities and Cognitive Aging
as the result of additional information about other goods, Although it is clearly a mistake to see aging as a decline
even though that information should be irrelevant. Thus, if on all psychological fronts, most people in their later years
I know that a medium-quality radio costs $30 and a high- would like to slow down, stop, or even reverse the decline of
quality radio costs $60, my choice of which is a better buy some aspects of their cognitive abilities. It has been assumed
should not be influenced by knowing that a poor-quality for some time that exercise and diet matter, but only recently
radio costs $15. Yet, such information does influence younger have experimental studies shown that they affect cognitive

COGNITIVE CHANGES IN ADULTHOOD 639

functioning. Based on these studies, it is now clear that shown that those who are randomly assigned to a group that
daily activities can make a difference. engages in aerobic exercise will not only have increases in
People who exercise regularly in their later years tend to cognitive performance but will also have increased activa-
show slower rates of cognitive decline, a finding that was tion levels in brain regions associated with those tasks and
originally based on correlational studies (Spirduso, 1980). increases in gray matter and white matter volume in those
But it is difficult to make inferences about causation from brain regions (Bherer, 2012; Colcombe et al., 2004, 2006;
such studies. Perhaps people who have high levels of cogni- Erickson & Kramer, 2009; Hillman et al., 2008; Kramer
tive functioning are more likely to pick exercise activities. Or et al., 2006).
perhaps people with a more positive mood choose to engage In short, simple physical exercise seems to stimulate and
in both more cognitively challenging tasks and more strenu- preserve brain systems that support both simple and com-
ous forms of exercise. The causal effects of exercise become plex cognitions, and it may actually slow the various forms
clearer when experimental studies are considered. From a of neural and cognitive decline that occur with aging. It
large series of studies, we know that when elderly partici- is important to note, however, that the positive effects of
pants are randomly assigned to exercise groups and control exercise on brain function and cognition occur at all ages, so
groups, those who engage in regular exercise for as little as a even college-age populations can show significant cognitive
few months will show better levels of cognitive functioning benefits from exercise (Aberg et al., 2009).
on tasks as diverse as simple speed tasks and complex execu- Diet can also influence cognitive decline. But the most
tive functions such as planning, switching tasks, and inhibit- dramatic influence may not be a function of what we eat
ing distracting information, with the strongest effects usually as much as a consequence of how much we eat. In particu-
occurring for the higher cognitive and executive function- lar, a diet that is sharply restricted in total calories has been
ing tasks (Colcombe & Kramer, 2003; Hillman et al., 2008; associated with a slower rate of cognitive decline. Again, the
Kramer et al., 2006; see Figure 17.9). At the neural level, majority of the human studies are correlational. Lean adults
studies with rats and mice show that regular exercise can tend to have slower rates of cognitive decline than over-
have a dramatic effect on structures throughout the brain, weight adults, but this may be because people with a cer-
not just in the motor cortex (Cotman & Berchtold, 2002; tain level of achievement motivation are both more diligent
van Praag et al., 2005). In addition, there are improvements learners and more diligent dieters. Experimental studies with
in cognitive performance in abilities associated with those healthy elderly participants more clearly show a causal influ-
brain regions (van Praag, 2009; van Praag et al., 2005). ence of caloric restriction on cognitive ability. In one study
These effects are strong in older animals as well, not just with people whose average age was around 60, the group
in young adult animals. The mechanism seems to involve that had their daily calories reduced by 30 percent showed
the turning on of several gene cascades responsible for nerve marked improvement in performance on memory tasks
growth and synaptic activity (Chae et al., 2009; Cotman & after 3 months (Witte et al., 2009). On some memory tasks,
Berchtold, 2002). In studies with humans, it has also been the calorie-restricted group showed a more than 20 percent

0.8
Control
0.7 Exercise
0.6
Size of effect

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Executive Controlled Spatial Speed
Task type
A B
FIGURE 17.9 Exercise and cognitive aging. (A) Regular aerobic exercise has been causally linked not just to improved physiological health
in the elderly but also to improved cognitive performance. (B) In older adults, exercise is strongly associated with higher scores on a variety of
cognitive tasks, with the strongest effects occurring on executive tasks and more modest effects occurring on speed-of-processing tasks. These
effects are found not only in correlational studies but also in experimental studies that randomly assign elderly individuals to exercise groups
and control groups. This graph summarizes a meta-analysis of a large set of such studies. From Hillman et al. (2008).

640 CHAPTER 17 DEVELOPMENT AFTER CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE

increase in performance when compared with controls who dramatic decline (Shimamura et al., 1995). The finding of
did not have their diets restricted. The reduced calories may a decline in simple speed tasks tends to suggest that a cog-
work through changing insulin levels that lead to increases nitive reserve explanation cannot be the whole story, since
in synaptic connections and protection of neurons in the the reserve might be expected to reduce decline in those
brain (Witte et al., 2009). areas as well.

Q: What aspects of cognition are influenced Q: What contrasting roles do implicit and
most by daily exercise? explicit memories seem to play in aging
populations?
It has long been thought that there is a “use it or lose
it” rule that governs cognitive aging, because those who
stay more cognitively active show slower rates of cognitive Circadian Rhythms, Cognition,
decline (Hultsch et al., 1999; Schaie, 2008). Many older
adults who believe in this rule will engage in regular cog- and the Lifespan
nitively challenging activities such as word and card games Circadian rhythms—that is, the shifts in biological activ-
as a form of cognitive calisthenics. Again, random assign- ity and functions throughout a daily cycle—typically vary
ment training studies are the best way to make strong in college-aged people and middle-aged people. Most college
inferences about causality. Here the findings are complex students seem to be more alert and cognitively functional
but point toward the need for a good deal of specificity in the late afternoon or evening, while most middle-aged
in the training. Thus, if a group of elderly people practice adults seem to be “morning people” (see Figure 17.10). Inter-
daily on a certain activity such as a video game, they will estingly, children also tend to have peak performance ear-
show improvements in that game and in closely related lier in the day, but a shift toward peak performance later in
tasks but generally not in other less similar cognitive tasks the day happens rather rapidly around puberty. As people
(Mather, 2010; Rabipour & Raz, 2012).
Some accounts of the sparing of cognitive functions in
the elderly refer to the idea of “cognitive reserve” (Stern,
2009). Cognitive reserve is the idea that some people
have more brain capacity to begin with and thereby have
more brain structures “in reserve” to support function-
ing in the face of aging-associated decline or minor brain
injuries. They may also have richer links between memo-
ries, thereby allowing the memories to more robustly rein-
force each other. There is good evidence that people with
above-normal cognitive capacities in college and middle
age do tend to show higher levels of cognitive functioning
in old age (Stern, 2009), but it is not yet known if cogni-
tive reserve is the primary reason or if people with higher
levels of cognitive ability remain active on many fronts
and thereby maintain their abilities through activity, not
because of reserves.
One study of young and old college professors and
young and old people selected from a more general popula-
tion documented less decline in the older professors than
in the general population, but also found interesting differ-
ences across tasks. Simple speed tasks, such as tasks involv-
ing one-choice reaction times, showed similar patterns of
FIGURE 17.10 Time of day and cognitive functioning. Although
decline in the elderly professors and among the elderly in
many college students may find that they study best late in the
the general population. With more cognitively complex afternoon or in the evening, older adults tend to be more effective
tasks, however, such as recall of a prose passage, the elderly cognitively in the early morning and can show marked drops in
professors showed almost no decline in performance, while performance in the late afternoon, often taking naps on purpose or
the elderly people from the general population showed a simply falling asleep unintentionally wherever they are.

COGNITIVE CHANGES IN ADULTHOOD 641

progress into middle age and beyond, however, they seem impressive that before very advanced age (80s and older) we
to shift back to the morning as the time of day when they do not see obvious evidence of these deficits in the daily
do their most productive and challenging intellectual work. lives of the elderly (see Figure 17.11). We have seen that com-
This shift might reflect the ways in which adults take on pensatory strategies, as well as continued building of spe-
the habits of the workplace, where productivity in the early cialized expertise and adaptive shifts in chosen activities, all
hours may be a critical part of a business. Or the causation work together to compensate for the effects of aging. If the
may operate in the opposite direction, with the workplace raw components of reaction time, speed of processing, and
hours of middle-aged individuals reflecting the optimal working memory of novel items were all that mattered to
time of day for being most productive. Support for this sec- cognitive performance, then everything would be downhill
ond interpretation comes from a wide variety of studies in after the early 20s, and there would be little to learn from
both humans and animals in which the optimal period for our elders in college, job internships, and medical residen-
complex tasks has been shown to gradually shift toward ear- cies. Fortunately for those adults who are well past their
lier and earlier times of the day as organisms age (Hasher 20s, other aspects of cognitive ability, many of which arise
et al., 1999; Martin et al., 2008; Winocur & Hasher, 2002). from ever more elaborate knowledge bases, allow the older
Moreover, the shift does not seem to merely reflect generations to provide added value in their contributions to
increasing fatigue over the course of the day in older people. society. In addition, in some areas, the elderly may actually
Instead, people’s daily circadian rhythms, which reflect be prone to fewer errors in reasoning than younger people,
24-hour cyclical surges of a large number of hormones, and especially in interpersonal, emotionally laden reasoning
changes in neurotransmitter functions and physiological tasks, where the elderly may show more effective emotion
patterns, shift with respect to the time of day correspond- regulation than adolescents and young adults.
ing to optimal arousal (Ingram et al., 1982; Yoon et al., in One major principle concerning aging is that there are
press). The shift does not apply to everyone, but it does hold enormous individual differences ranging from success-
for most people. Thus, roughly 75 percent of older adults ful aging, in which a person retains and even improves
find morning to be their peak time, while only about 35 per- in some abilities up until the very last months of life, to
cent of college students feel that morning is their best time pathological aging, in which people experience a dramatic
(Winocur & Hasher, 2002). decline starting in their late 50s or early 60s (Schaie, 2008).
The shift with increasing age to better performance dur- While we have seen that some of these differences are due
ing an earlier time of the day is seen in many other spe- to genetic predispositions and to the effects of specific dis-
cies besides humans. In rats, for example, older members eases, such as Alzheimer’s disease and Parkinson’s disease,
of a population perform better on memory tasks shortly it is also reassuring that for virtually all of us, healthy or ill,
after waking for the day, while younger rats tend to show exercise and diet can make a substantial difference in the
a surge in their performance later in the day (Winocur & rate of decline of our abilities.
Hasher, 2002, 2004). In addition, in humans at least, the
daily rhythms may have different influences on different
forms of memory. Thus, older adults seem to do better on
explicit memory tasks early in the morning, while younger
adults seem to do better on such tasks later in the day;
older and younger adults often show the reverse patterns
when engaged in implicit memory tasks. Such results sug-
gest that these different memory systems may interact with
endogenous circadian cycles in quite different ways (May
et al., 2005). Moreover, older adults often use compensatory
strategies with respect to time-of-day effects, shifting to the
mornings those tasks that are most demanding.

Q: How does the time of day tend to interact FIGURE 17.11 Cognitive activities and aging. Many elderly
with patterns of cognitive functioning in older people engage in challenging mental activities, such as playing
and younger adults? bridge, out of the conviction that one of the best ways to hold off the
decline of cognitive skills is by continuing to vigorously exercise their
cognitive faculties. Such activities can indeed help to slow or even
Overall, the range and extent of cognitive changes in the halt decline, especially in tasks that are closely related to the original
elderly are large and often dramatic, making it all the more activity.

642 CHAPTER 17 DEVELOPMENT AFTER CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE

Changes in Personality Changes in Individuals
How likely is it that a shy, anxious, and messy teenager will
in the Lifespan: Individual become an outgoing, carefree neat freak as an elderly person?
For the most part, such an outcome is unlikely, especially if
and Group Changes that person’s personality is evaluated relative to his peers. If
We have now considered extensive evidence for patterns of John was much shier than most teenagers, he is also probably
change in cognitive functioning from adolescence on into much shier than most of his peers in the retirement home.
old age. Many of those changes are declines in function, William James, the great psychologist/philosopher of the late
but some are actually improvements in function. Moreover, nineteenth and early twentieth century, was convinced that
most of the changes are in skills or bodies of knowledge; little changed after the college years:
there is far less evidence for stage-like changes in the man- Already at the age of twenty-five you see the professional
ner of thought. As we saw in Chapters 10 and 11, stage mannerism settling down on the young commercial traveller,
theories of cognitive development in children have under- on the young doctor, on the young minister, on the young
gone serious challenges, and there is even less evidence for counsellor-at-law. You see the little lines of cleavage running
such changes in adults. Beyond cognition, however, there through the character, the tricks of thought, the prejudices,
are many aspects of personality that need to be considered. the ways of the “shop,” in a word, from which the man can
These questions can be addressed in two ways. First, we by-and-by no more escape than his coat-sleeve can suddenly
can ask if personality traits remain relatively stable over fall into a new set of folds. On the whole, it is best he should
time. Personality traits are typically thought of as “relatively not escape. It is well for the world that in most of us, by the
enduring patterns of thought, feelings, and behaviors that age of thirty, the character has set like plaster, and will never
distinguish one person from another” (Roberts & Mroczek, soften again. (James, 1890/1950, p.121)
2008), but such a definition raises the question of whether
some traits are more likely to change over time than oth- Continuity in personality type has often been assessed
ers. The adage “You can’t teach an old dog new tricks” is by repeated administration of personality assessment tools
very often meant to apply to personality. Therefore, it might over a person’s lifespan. One widely cited series of stud-
seem that happy teenagers will be happy seniors, shy teen- ies conducted in Baltimore, Maryland, argued that few
agers will be shy seniors, and messy children will be messy personality traits change at all over much of the lifespan
seniors (see Figure 17.12). Moreover, the strong genetic (Costa & McCrea, 1994; McCrea & Costa, 1984, 1994).
components for many personality behaviors described in Not surprisingly, continuity seems particularly strong for
Chapter 7 would seem to support that claim as well. Second, those aspects of personality that have been shown to have
we can ask if an age group as a whole can show a change the strongest genetic components: extroversion, neuroticism,
in personality style that goes beyond individual personal- openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientious-
ity differences within the peer group. For example, do the ness. Known as the Big Five (Goldberg, 1992), these traits
elderly as a whole become more conservative, more anxious, repeatedly emerge in a statistical technique known as factor
and more depressed? Both questions have received consider- analysis, which looks for relatively independent clusters of
able attention in recent years. traits. One developmental version of the continuity view

FIGURE 17.12 Constancy of

personality traits. Bill Clinton, shown
here at ages 25 and 66, today is
notably extroverted compared with his
peers. But his outgoing nature was also
evident in his 20s compared with his
peers.

CHANGES IN PERSONALITY IN THE LIFESPAN: INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP CHANGES 643

argues that personality traits arise from primarily biologi-
cal causes (such as genetic factors) and that personalities Q: Describe some of the arguments for and
evolve and develop in childhood and young adulthood against the idea of continuity of an individual’s
but then become fixed at around age 30, as William James
believed (Costa & MacCrae, 1994). More thorough longi- personality over the course of the lifespan.
tudinal and cross-sectional analyses of personality change
after age 30, however, suggest that there is continued change
into old age, change that is influenced by the environments
in which each person spends his life. Contextual perspec- Stressful Life Events
tives emphasize the influences of social environments, life One possible exception to the stability of personality traits
events, and social roles on personality, with people tending over adulthood may occur in the face of repeated stressful
to score higher on conscientiousness when they enter the life events. Such events appear to increase the incidence of
workforce and higher on agreeableness when they become depression in some at-risk people. Researchers have found
parents, but lower on openness to new experiences during several different patterns linking stressful life events and
middle and old age (Roberts & Mroczek, 2008; Srivastava depression in midlife and later years (Kendler et al., 1999;
et al., 2003). Thus, the idea that people become rigidly set Mazure & Maciejewski, 2003a, 2003b; Monroe, 2008).
in personality by around age 30 does not seem to hold up. One pattern involves gender differences and indicates that
Rather, there is considerable plasticity throughout adult women seem to be quite a bit more likely than men to
development (Baltes, 1997). Nonetheless, people tend to become depressed as a result of exposure to stress (Husky
occupy the same relationships relative to their peers in terms et al., 2009; Kendler et al., 2001; Maciejewski et al., 2001;
of how they as individuals score on the Big Five traits—for Sandanger et al., 2004; Stegenga et al., 2012). While it is dif-
example, those who are anxious when they are adolescents ficult to match stress precisely for men and women (typical
continue to be more anxious than their easygoing peers stressful events include relationship terminations and work-
throughout life. related stresses such as job loss), there consistently seems to
Some scholars have suggested that consistency measures be a pattern in which roughly equivalent stressful events are
have tended to focus on continuity from early life into early more likely to influence the lives of women than men, even
middle age and that later in life, as many people move into quite late in life. Some analyses of twin data do suggest that
their 50s, continuity of traits starts to erode for some indi- researchers may overrate the influence of stressful life events
viduals (Lachman, 2004; Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000). on depression in middle age and underrate genetic predispo-
As people start to assess their lives as a whole and often sitions that are independent of those events (Kendler et al.,
become more self-reflective about their roles, that increased 1999), but there do seem to be residual effects arising from
level of introspection may cause some real reorganizations the stressful events themselves.
of personality. Even with this caveat, and even taking into It has often been thought that the elderly are less likely
account continued plasticity, continuity is probably the to be fazed by life’s ups and downs, having learned over the
dominant pattern for major aspects of personality, especially course of their lives that such variations are inevitable and
when an individual’s personality is considered in compari- simply must be taken in stride. There does seem to be some
son with her peers. The shiest person in a large group at truth to this view, as elderly adults overall do not seem to be
age 30 is likely to still be a very shy person in the same group as susceptible as younger adults to the effects of stressful life
at age 80. events in terms of depression. At the same time, however,
There is some evidence that there may be more poten- there are subgroups of elderly adults who show certain cog-
tial for change in individuals who suffer from personality nitive styles that can make them much more vulnerable to
disorders, which are manifestations of psychopathology in stressful events, with the odds of depression being from 6 to
personality traits, than for personality change in their peers 11 times more likely in people with such cognitive styles and
who do not manifest such psychopathologies (Clark, 2009). personality types when they encounter stressful events of
Personality disorders can range from paranoia to narcissism specific types (Mazure et al., 2002). Thus, people who expe-
to obsessive-compulsive disorder. It now appears that, in rience negative interpersonal events (for example, divorce)
cases of severe personality disorder, more change is possible are much more likely to be influenced by those events if
over time. A person who exhibits extreme paranoia may they show a high need for approval and reassurance in inter-
show a much more muted form several years later. The rea- personal relationships. In contrast, people who experience
sons for this greater variability relative to his peers are not negative events pertaining to achievement (for example,
yet clear, but one factor may be that, as a person learns to being passed over for an important promotion) are influ-
change other aspects of his life to cope with a severe disor- enced by those events to the extent that they put a heavy
der, the disorder itself may become less prominent. emphasis on individual success and on control. In this way,

644 CHAPTER 17 DEVELOPMENT AFTER CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE

we see that while many elderly adults may have developed for young adults not only because these individuals are less
adaptive ways of coping with stressors, substantial subsets experienced drivers; young people also take more risks when
of elderly adults have cognitive styles that continue to make driving. They are more likely to engage in risky sex, unsafe
them quite susceptible. It may also be that there is a connec- travel, and dangerous patterns of drug and alcohol use
tion between cognitive styles and whether stressful events both because of increased sensation-seeking behaviors and
lead to depression in men and women, with more women because of different perceptions of risk (Cohn et al., 1995;
having cognitive interpersonal styles that make them prone Greene et al., 2000; Lightfoot, 1997). In addition, when
to depression (Mazure & Maciejewski, 2003b). put into highly stressful situations, older adults tend to slow
down and take fewer risks, while younger adults show no
such decline (Mather et al., 2009). Such risky behavior by
younger adults has been argued to be an important part of
Group Changes demonstrating their fitness in mate competition (Wilson &
Above and beyond the question of whether individuals have Daly, 1993), but it is also a bit paradoxical. Why, with most
roughly the same personality relative to their peers over of their lives ahead of them, do young adults put themselves
the course of adult life, one can ask if people in an entire at such risk? Why don’t the elderly members of a society,
age group tend to show certain gradual shifts in personal- who have relatively short futures ahead of them, choose to
ity. One way this might happen is through “cohort effects,” take larger risks? As discussed in Chapter 2, the increased
where all people who grow up during a certain historical risk taking in adolescence may reflect relatively late emer-
period, such as the Great Depression of the 1920s, have gence of frontal lobe circuit feedback on the limbic system,
personality shifts as a cohort—for example, the ability to but it is not clear whether brain changes underlie behavioral
thrive in the face of adversity (Schaie, 1984). Moreover, changes in older adults.
there may be other ways that people in different age groups Young adulthood is not the only period in which a group
show different personality tendencies. In earlier parts of the is thought to shift along a personality dimension such as risk
life cycle, such patterns are largely taken for granted. Young taking. There have been many stereotypes about the person-
adults and older adolescents are considered much more alities of the elderly. Are older people more anxious, more
likely to engage in risky behaviors that may well increase conservative, or more irritable than people in younger age
their chances of being seriously injured or seriously injur- groups? Despite negative views about older people, such as
ing others (Steinberg, 2008; see Figure 17.13). There seems the stereotype of “grumpy old men,” the best-documented
to be considerable truth to this stereotype, especially for age group changes are generally more favorable (Charles &
young adult males. Automobile insurance rates are higher Carstensen, 2010). For example, one well-studied dimension
of personality is that of the positivity bias (Carstensen &
40 Charles, 1998; see Figure 17.14). It appears that as adults
grow older, they tend to have a more positive view of reality
35 Females and of their experiences. This positivity bias has been dem-
30 Males onstrated in many ways. Compared with younger people,
Percentage speeding

older adults tend to pay less attention to negative events in

25
a variety of experimental settings. In one study, participants
20 were asked to look at side-by-side pairs of faces that depicted
neutral and either positive or negative emotions. When the
15
emotion was positive, both young and old adults were more
10 likely to have encoded the positive face, but when the emo-
tion was negative, the people in the two age groups showed
5
sharply contrasting patterns. Younger adults encoded the
0 negative face, while older adults focused their attention on
15–20 21–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65–74 75+
the neutral face (Mather & Carstensen, 2003; see Scientific
Age (in years)
Method box). This positivity bias has repeatedly been found
FIGURE 17.13 Speeding in fatal crashes in different age when older adults engage in perceptual and attentional tasks
groups. Data on traffic fatalities and age are complex, as elderly (Lee & Knight, 2009; Mather & Carstensen, 2005; Samanez-
people die much more often in car crashes because of their greater
Larkin & Carstensen, 2011).
frailty. But if car crashes are looked at from a perspective of
risk-tasking behavior, as defined by speeding, it is clear that younger Older adults also do not remember negative informa-
drivers are much more prone to die in car accidents because they tion as well as they remember positive information. One
were engaging in riskier driving—that is, speeding. Adapted from study with 300 nuns looked at their memory of responses
Nell (2002). on a questionnaire that they had filled out 14 years earlier

CHANGES IN PERSONALITY IN THE LIFESPAN: INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP CHANGES 645

 A B C
Positive
5
Negative
Neutral
4
Number of images recalled

2
FIGURE 17.14 A positivity bias in memory. Participants of dif-
ferent ages were shown photos of (A) positive events, (B) negative
1 events, and (C) neutral events. (D) As shown in this graph, older
adults (ages 65 to 80) recalled more positive images than either
neutral or negative ones, while middle-aged adults (ages 41 to 53)
0 and younger adults (ages 18 to 29) recalled both positive and
18–29 41–53 65–80 negative images more than neutral ones. Adapted from Mather &
Age (in years) Carstensen (2005).
D

(Kennedy et al., 2004). The nuns ranged in age from 47 to and list positive and negative features. If they were sim-
102 years at the time of recall. Older nuns showed a strong ply asked to pick an object and then rate satisfaction with
bias toward recalling items in their questionnaires more their choice, there was no difference between the groups.
positively than they had originally reported them 14 years Thus, the positivity bias influences feature choice in the
earlier. Older nuns were seen as more motivated to provide evaluation task, which then influences satisfaction with the
a positive interpretation of past life events, perhaps as a choice. There may be real-world implications concerning
way of regarding their lives, as they neared their ends, as strategies used to influence decision making in older adults
more worthwhile. (Since more than 60 percent of the nuns as opposed to younger adults. Having older adults gener-
who had originally filled out the questionnaire had died ate a list of pros and cons for a decision is more likely to
during this period, the impending end of life was likely to result in their being satisfied with the decision than it is for
be very salient to the older nuns.) Over shorter time inter- younger adults.
vals, older people also show a distinctly better memory of At the neural level, this positivity effect has been dem-
positive pictures compared with negative and neutral ones onstrated by showing that the amygdala, a brain region
(see Figure 17.14). heavily involved in emotions, shows markedly less acti-
Positivity effects also have an influence on decision vation in response to negative stimuli than to positive
making. For example, when college students and people in stimuli in older adults, while showing strong responses to
their 60s were asked to list positive and negative features of both kinds of stimuli in younger adults (Mather et al.,
several common objects (for example, a pen, a mug), those 2004). Because negative events do not elicit as strong an
in the older group tended to list more positive features and emotional response in older adults, they are not nearly as
fewer negative ones. Both groups then got to pick an object motivated to attend to or remember negative information.
to keep, and those in the older group declared more satisfac- It appears that older adults also focus more on emotional
tion with their choice both immediately and after 2 weeks regulation and are often better at it than younger adults,
(Kim et al., 2008). This difference in satisfaction occurred being less quick to feel anger in reaction to negative events,
only when both groups were asked to evaluate each object reacting less strongly, and letting anger and negative affect

646 CHAPTER 17 DEVELOPMENT AFTER CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE

 SCIENTIFIC METHOD: The Positivity Bias in Older Adults
Hypothesis:
Older adults are biased to attend more strongly to positively slanted
forms of information.

Method: Time
1. Fifty-two younger adults (18 to 35 years old) and 52 older adults
(62 to 94 years old) participated.
2. All participants started by looking at a blank screen across the room. What emotional expression was on the
face where the dot now is?
3. Two faces appeared for 1 second: one with a positive or negative
emotion and one that had a neutral expression. A happy
4. A small dot then appeared where one of the faces had been, and face.
participants were asked to say what the emotional expression had
been on that face.
5. The researchers measured the speed of the participants’ response.

Results: What emotional expression was on the

Positive scores indicated faster responses when the dot appeared after face where the dot now is?
an emotional face than after a neutral face. Negative scores indicated
slower responses when the dot appeared after an emotional face than Uh, I don’t
after a neutral face. Younger adults had faster responses for both posi- know. Was
it a happy
tive and negative faces than they did for neutral faces. Older adults face?
were much faster in responding to positive faces but slower in respond-
ing to negative faces.
15

Attentional bias score

Conclusion:
10
Older adults track information about positive faces more effectively,
showing a positivity bias for information. 5
0
-5 Positive faces
-10 Negative faces
-15
Source study: Mather & Carstensen (2003). Younger Older

dissipate more quickly. One reason for this shift in focus is them to be more optimistic and to show the positivity bias
the related finding that, as people approach the end of life (Samenez-Larkin & Knutson, 2014).
(including younger people with terminal illnesses), they Beyond the preference for noticing and remembering
tend to shift their priorities more to goals related to emo- positively construed information, there are other ways in
tional well-being in the present and less to those related to which personality for an entire age group tends to change
gaining knowledge for future use (Mather & Carstensen, as people age. Again, while a person may still be disagree-
2005). Older adults also show an asymmetry in neural able relative to his same-age peers, he may become much
processing of anticipated gains and losses compared with more agreeable in more absolute terms (comparing across
younger adults. This, too, may be related to the positivity all ages) as he grows older. As seen in Figure 17.15, these
bias. In particular, when anticipating rewards, individuals changes can be very substantial in some areas, such as
from both age groups show equally strong neural responses conscientiousness or agreeableness. Overall, scholars have
in reward-related centers. But when they are anticipating repeatedly noted that these changes tend to be ones that
losses, older adults show considerably lower levels of activ- impartial observers would rate as desirable. Thus, as people
ity in both the dorsal striatum and the anterior insula, grow older, their personalities tend to shift in ways that
which are regions related to processing gains and losses others would see as making them better people (Roberts &
(Samenez-Larkin et al., 2007). This pattern may result Mroczek, 2008).
in older adults having less anxiety associated with wor- Sometimes, apparent age-related shifts in personality
ries about potential future losses, which may thereby lead may simply reflect changing realities. Older individuals are

CHANGES IN PERSONALITY IN THE LIFESPAN: INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP CHANGES 647

 Agreeableness Conscientiousness
1.2 1.2

1 1
Cumulative d value

Cumulative d value
0.8 0.8

0.6 0.6

0.4 0.4

0.2 0.2

0 0

−0.2 −0.2
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Age (in years) Age (in years)
Emotional stability Openness to experience
1.2 1.2

1 1
Cumulative d value

Cumulative d value
0.8 0.8

0.6 0.6

0.4 0.4

0.2 0.2

0 0

−0.2 −0.2
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Age (in years) Age (in years)
FIGURE 17.15 Group changes in personality. While people tend to show consistency in personality types relative to their same-age peers,
age groups as a whole can show quite dramatic changes with increasing age along various personality dimensions. Here we see substantial
rises in three dimensions (agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional stability) and relative stability in another (openness to experience).
From Roberts & Mroczek (2008).

often described as being more anxious, but the increase in

anxiety may not be as much an endogenous change in per- Stages of Life?
sonality as a reflection of the greater likelihood of injury As seen in Chapters 5 and 10, the notion of stages of cog-
in their lives. People in their 90s, for example, are highly nitive development in infancy and childhood were prob-
likely to suffer a broken hip from a fall. Their greater anxi- lematic. It might still be the case, however, that within the
ety about falling when getting around may simply be a broader context of the full lifespan, there are stages of devel-
rational appraisal of the ways in which they are more phys- opment. For the most part, proposals of such stages have
ically at risk, just as younger adults with at-risk conditions, not been about cognitive functioning per se and have been
such as asthma or heart problems, might be more anxious. more about social, emotional, and general life perspectives.
More broadly, age group effects raise questions about As mentioned earlier in Chapters 7 and 13, the best-known
whether there are general life stages that people tend to pass theory of lifespan stages was put forth by Erik Erikson (see
through, stages that might be related to some trends in per- Figure 17.16).
sonality change in different age groups.

Q: What are some ways that older adults as a Erik Erikson’s Approach
group tend to shift in terms of their personality Erikson was initially trained in the psychoanalytic tradition
characteristics, their views of reality, and their and in fact studied under Anna Freud. At the same time, he
remembered experiences? had a strong background in anthropology, which led him
to take into account the effects of culture to a far greater

648 CHAPTER 17 DEVELOPMENT AFTER CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE

 handled and form a good foundation for the next stage, or
it may be unsuccessfully managed and not only form a weak
foundation for the next stage but also reappear later, espe-
cially in times of stress. Let’s consider each stage in more
detail.

Stage 1: Trust versus Mistrust As babies start out in life,

relationships with the mother are thought to be central. If
the mother or other primary caregiver is able to respond
to the baby’s needs and make him feel safe and secure, the
infant is likely to develop a sense of trust in those around
him. By contrast, if the mother is unable to meet his needs,
the baby is likely to become mistrustful and suspicious of
others.

Stage 2: Autonomy versus Shame/Doubt As children

start to walk about and explore their environments,
their parents need to grant them some sense of auton-
omy while also making sure that they do not get into too
much trouble. Ideally, parents will allow their children
FIGURE 17.16 Erik Erikson. Erikson proposed a series of stages to explore and move about in the freest manner that still
of psychosocial development that applies to the entire human ensures their safety. But Erikson believed that if the par-
lifespan and is marked by a distinctive conflict at each stage that an ents are too controlling or too protective, their children
individual either masters positively or endures negatively.
will develop doubts about their own abilities and shame
at their incompetence.

extent than either Freud or his daughter. Erikson proposed Stage 3: Initiative versus Guilt Preschool children
eight stages of psychosocial development, as summarized develop a better and better sense of their own personal
in Table 17.1, with each stage organized around a type of responsibility. As their circle of relationships extends to the
psychosocial conflict (Erikson, 1950). These conflicts are family as a whole, they become more aware of how their
the challenges people face in relating to others or to society actions influence others. They need to learn to take the
at large. They occur throughout the lifespan and must be initiative as they seek to gain mastery of a wide variety of
addressed in order to establish an identity within the social life tasks, but too much initiative without any guilt may
world. The challenge at each stage may be successfully lead to psychopathic behavior, producing a child without

Stage Approximate Age (in years) Developmental Period Psychosocial Conflict Most Important Relations

1 0–1.5 Infancy Trust vs. mistrust Mother/primary caregiver

2 1.5–3 Toddler Autonomy vs. shame/doubt Parents

3 3–6 Preschool Initiative vs. guilt Family

4 6–12 Childhood Industry vs. inferiority Neighborhood/school

5 12–18 Adolescence Identity vs. role confusion Peer groups

6 18–30 Young adulthood Intimacy vs. isolation Partners, friends

7 30–50 Middle age Generativity vs. stagnation Family, coworkers

8 50 and older Later adulthood Integrity vs. despair Mankind /“my kind”

TABLE 17.1 Erikson’s stages of psychosocial development. Erikson proposed eight stages of psychosocial development, each marked by
a distinctive form of conflict that an individual has to address to help construct his social identity.

STAGES OF LIFE? 649

 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL P OLICY

When Is It Acceptable to Deprive

the Elderly of Some Rights?

A
t first, it might seem outrageous to discuss depriving Legal scholars continuously wrestle with appropriate guide-
the elderly of certain rights, but in fact it happens lines (Frolik & Kaplan, 1999; Schuster, 1998; Walsh et al., 1994).
every day with the implicit consent of most members But wills are only the tip of an ever-growing iceberg as more and
of the larger society. Unfortunately, many people start more people reach advanced age. When should we deprive the
to have diminished psychological capacities toward the end of elderly of the right to drive? We know that past age 65 or so,
their lives. Certainly not everyone, but a large number of people there is an increased risk of accidents. How much of an increase
in their 80s and 90s show serious patterns of mental decline. is too much? Many states recognize this problem by requiring
At some point, that drop in abilities has strong social policy that the elderly have far more frequent renewals of their driver’s
implications. license and that they show up in person rather than renew by
An often-discussed example concerns wills. At what point mail (Grabowski & Morrisey, 2001; McLachlan, 1997).
does a person who is in intellectual decline lose the right to What about the right to vote? That nearly sacred right has not
change her own will? Offspring often contest changes in wills been challenged as much for the elderly, but there is no logical
that deprive them of resources on the grounds that the changes reason not to challenge the right to vote of a person of severely
were made by a parent who was no longer “all there.” When diminished capacity. Consider the case of a man with advanced
wealthy Aunt Hattie changes her will so as to give all her earthly senile dementia whose wife helped him vote in the 2000 Florida
goods to her butler, her heirs may claim that she was no lon- election. The man thought it was 1942 and that Franklin Delano
ger able to think clearly. What counts as sufficient grounds for Roosevelt was president. His wife went into the voting booth
depriving her of the right to change her own will? One well- with her husband and cast the ballot for her husband (voting
known case concerned the hotel owner Leona Helmsley, who for George Bush in an election where a few hundred votes
left $12 million to her Maltese dog “Trouble” and nothing to two decided the U.S. presidency; see Vedantam, 2004). Increas-
of her grandchildren. The grandchildren argued that Helmsley ingly, there has been an interest in the legal basis for allowing
was mentally incompetent when she signed that version of the elderly people with severely diminished capacity to vote, espe-
will, and a judge agreed, cutting back Trouble’s inheritance to a cially since some of the most pivotal “swing states” in elections
mere $2 million and giving some of the remainder to the grand- have large numbers of elderly voters. In Florida, nearly 500,000
children (Roberts, 2009). people had Alzheimer’s disease in 2000 and a sizable number

a conscience. Too much guilt, however, leads to exces- dren become aware of how their performance compares
sive inhibition in the child and trepidation about her own with that of others. The school and neighborhood value
actions. This illustrates a point that Erikson believed was high levels of achievement and reward industry. If goals
true of the conflicts in all of the stages. While one of the and tasks set up by their communities are appropriate,
contrasting traits is usually heavily favored, a healthy indi- children develop a sense of competence as they accom-
vidual has some degree of both traits. Without any ini- plish a task. A feeling of industry emerges. Alternatively,
tiative at all, a child might not be likely to try any new if the school and community ask too much of a child
behaviors or social situations. Without guilt, a child might or do not give the child a fair chance, the child may
be too impulsive, trying new behaviors without regard to develop a sense of inferiority and may see herself as a
how they affect other people. failure.

Stage 4: Industry versus Inferiority An elementary Stage 5: Identity versus Role Confusion Adolescents are
school child is confronted with tasks in which high lev- seen as striving to find their place in the world. If they suc-
els of achievement are valued. As relationships in the ceed, they develop a sense of their role in life and feel that
neighborhood and school increase in importance, chil- they have a future path that will lead them into adulthood.

650 CHAPTER 17 DEVELOPMENT AFTER CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE

 of them voted, raising the possibility that the president of the 250
United States won his election on the votes of some individuals

Collision rate per 1,000

200
whose capacities were well below that of an average 12-year-

licensed drivers
old. Indeed, in many prior elections, as many as 70 percent of 150
the people in a population who had severe dementia nonethe-
less voted (Henderson & Drachman, 2002; Vedantam, 2004). 100
Moreover, voting rates are highest among people in the 65- to
50
74-year-old age group (Karlawish et al., 2004).
Some legal scholars contrast driving, which they call a “privi- 0
lege,” with voting, which they call a “right.” But even with that

16
17
18

20 19
25 24
30 29
3 5 34
40 39
45 4
50 49
55 54
60 9
6 5 64
70 6 9
75 4
80 79
4
5
–4

–5

–7

–8
≥8
–
–
–
–

–
–

–
–

–
difference, it is not clear that everyone past age 18 should be
Driver’s age (in years)
voting regardless of their mental status. After all, “moral status”
prevents many felons from voting. Some state laws on voting do FIGURE 17.17 Collision rates by age. Older drivers, even
very old ones, are not nearly as likely to get into an accident as
set restrictions based on criminal records and mental incapacity,
younger drivers. Part of the reason lies in the fewer miles driven
but any limits on voting rights, especially of the sort that gradu- by the elderly. But even taking into account those fewer miles
ally increase with aging, are intensely controversial. One recent driven, people older than 85 years still have a lower accident rate
appeals court outlined the following principle: “A person has the than people in their early 20s.
capacity to vote if he or she understands the nature and effect
of voting and has the capacity to choose among the candidates
and questions on the ballot” (Karlawish et al., 2004). Yet, for the right to drive. Clearly, we need better ways of assessing
that principle to be implemented, there needs to be a standard- patterns of decline for each individual in his own right. More-
ized and fair way of assessing cognitive understanding of the over, a particular person’s pattern of decline may be relevant for
“nature and effect of voting” and “the capacity to choose.” restricting just one narrow range of rights, such as driving, and
Regardless of the details of this debate and how it turns out, not any others. It seems likely that psychologists, the people
one fact is likely to dominate. There is immense variation in pat- most qualified to make such assessments, will be very active
terns of decline among the elderly, and it would be impossible participants in determining when it is appropriate to reduce the
to set up any restrictions of rights solely on the basis of chrono- rights of the elderly (Baker et al., 1998; Ball et al., 1993, 2006).
logical age. For example, a 95-year-old might be vastly more One likely outcome is that quite different profiles of psychologi-
intellectually intact than a 75-year-old. While it might be best to cal capacity will be considered adequate for different sorts of
keep some elderly people from driving, others might actually be legal procedures and public rights, requiring particular tests for
more careful drivers (see Figure 17.17) and still deserve to have each sphere of life potentially affected by aging.

If they fail, they may reject the society at large and the roles Stage 7: Generativity versus Stagnation Generativity
that it offers. They may lack a sense of group identity or consists of making contributions to the world and to the
identify with a group that defines itself as rebellious and next generation. As people go through middle age, gen-
that is against any traditional life roles. erativity may take the form of having children and raising
them. Or it could take the form of making major contri-
Stage 6: Intimacy vs. Isolation In this stage of life, a criti- butions in a career, contributions that enhance the lives
cal task is that of forming close interpersonal bonds, typi- of others and that do not just advance the self. Society as
cally those of a married couple. Intimacy may be a major a whole benefits from the activities of a generative person.
challenge for many young adults, not just because of the A person who shows stagnation, however, tends to be overly
difficulties of forming stable close bonds, but also because concerned with her own selfish needs, making no contribu-
of the dangers of excess intimacy in the form of promiscu- tions to the community at large.
ity. At the other end of the extreme, failure to develop inti-
macy may result in a sense of isolation, leading to feelings of Stage 8: Integrity versus Despair The final stage is a
loneliness and perhaps bitterness toward those who do have potential capstone on a life of positive prior stages or the
intimacy. final act in a tragedy of a life gone wrong. People who achieve

STAGES OF LIFE? 651

integrity feel good about the life they have led, mistakes and whether and how they have contributed to society. It is also
all. They see themselves as having made contributions of quite easy to frame these last few stages in terms of evo-
value, having taken a good journey, and they are content lutionary psychology, emphasizing the need to find mates,
with their gradual exit from the main stage, feeling they care for offspring, and then disengage so that the next gen-
have done their part. Others are consumed by an envelop- eration can take over.
ing sense of despair as their life starts to end, and they feel It is interesting how often some fundamental contrasts of
that they have not accomplished what they had hoped to personality seem to be repeated at various stages. For exam-
in their life. They see the present negatively and the future ple, we have repeatedly seen how impulsive versus inhibited
even more bleakly. Every sign of further aging makes them aspects of temperament describe younger children. Simi-
feel more impotent and of less consequence. (Fortunately, larly, some of the tension that occurs in each stage consists
the positivity bias may shield some adults from despair even of striking a balance between openness to new experiences
when their lives have had some serious failings.) versus being closed off from trying new things. A second
dimension, concerning optimism versus pessimism, seems
to be an important part of the conflicts and outcomes that
Q: What are the psychosocial conflicts that occur in the later life stages. Thus, a few contrasts along per-
sonality dimensions that tend to remain stable over develop-
organize each of the eight stages of Erikson’s ment, along with some nearly inevitable transitions imposed
theory of lifespan development? by the culture at large, may be helpful in understanding
both the general Eriksonian stages as well as the conflicts
that occur at each stage and how the challenges from one
Understanding Stages stage carry forth to the next—that is, how they show conti-
nuity in an underlying personality trait.
of Adult Development There is also a delicate balance between dwelling on the
Although the stages described by Erikson have not been crises in life and trying to ignore them altogether. Being
subjected to careful experimental validation, there is a broad haunted by regrets about all the things we should have done
consensus that many people do go through life transitions but did not can lead to a depressive view of life as a failed
roughly like those that he describes. Moreover, his stages existence. Alternatively, never looking back and evaluating
have global similarities to those proposed by other theorists our history and denying the mistakes in our past can also be
of adult life stages (Levinson, 1986; Schaie, 1994, 2008). A detrimental to personal growth. When older adults are asked
critical question, however, is whether the stages are mani- to describe how past failures or other actions they regretted
festations of a gradually unfolding process inside the self or influenced their subsequent lives, it appears that those who
whether they are almost inevitable consequences of the dif- took stock of the experience and used it as an opportunity to
ferent roles that society and culture imposes on individuals. grow and change showed more personal development and
With his strong background in anthropology, Erikson was more contentment with their life as a whole. Those who did
deeply sensitive to the influences of culture, but his stages so seemed to attain a “mature happiness” that often seemed
have often been described as more intrinsic developmental to have strong components of both humility and courage
changes occurring in the individual. (King & Hicks, 2007).
Consider for a moment how some stages are dictated by
the surrounding culture, especially Stages 6, 7, and 8. In
Stage 6, most people form a stable long-term relationship
with a single significant other, a process that requires mastering
the challenges of intimacy (or coping with the consequences
What Does It Mean
of isolation). Moreover, as most cultures favor monogamous
relationships, the surrounding culture pressures individuals
to Be Old?
to form long-term pairings. Stage 7 is more or less a con- When we describe a person as “old,” our meaning is tied to
sequence of Stage 6. People who have children and remain the present day and may not be the same as that used in other
invested in them will do whatever they can to promote their places or times. Consider, for example, how much lifespan
well-being and advance their futures. And most people who has changed in recent history. In many developed countries,
do not have children will feel compelled to contribute in the average lifespan has more than doubled over the past few
either material or social ways to society at large. Finally, hundred years (see Figure 17.18). What it means to be old
Stage 8 reflects some of the inevitable decline in abilities has changed dramatically from a time when a 60-year-old
toward the end of life. Moreover, as people enter their later was considered to be an elder to our present time when in
years, they reflect on the sort of life they have lived and many cultures a person of this age is considered to be in

652 CHAPTER 17 DEVELOPMENT AFTER CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE

 100 college-age women were worried about graduating without
Females
Males a fiancé in hand to the present, when many are worried
80 about how a marriage in their early or mid-20s might hin-
der their careers. When people do marry later, a cascade of
60 other changes can also occur. People who marry later tend
to have children later and hence are older when their own
40
children go on to college and careers, get married them-
selves, and start their own families. In those families, it may
20
be relatively rare for grandparents to see their grandchildren
graduate from college, while such events were more com-
0
mon for those who married young and had children at an
18 1–1 90
18 6–1 15
18 1–1 40
18 1–1 50
18 1–1 60
1 8 1–1 70
18 1 – 1 80
19 1–1 9 0
19 1–1 00
19 1–1 10
19 1–1 20
19 –1 0
19 1–1 40
19 1–1 50
19 1–1 60
19 1–1 70
19 1–1 80
19 6–1 85
19 1–1 90
–2 5
0
31 93

96 99
00
early age.
9 7
1 8
4 8
5 8
6 8
7 8
8 8
9 8
0 9
1 9
2 9

4 9
5 9
6 9
7 9
8 9
8 9
9 9
17 1–1

Average family size has declined dramatically in many

5
17

FIGURE 17.18 Increase in average lifespan. As seen in this graph, developed countries, with the consequence that parents’
the average lifespan in Sweden more than doubled in 250 years. roles outside the home are correspondingly larger. Women
have entered the workforce in unprecedented numbers in
midlife. Moreover, with the average lifespan in some devel- many countries over the past few decades, and the role of
oping countries less than half that in developed countries, homemaker is no longer viewed as the only way to have
the age at which a person is considered old in Swaziland may a productive and meaningful life. There is every reason to
be considered middle-aged in Japan. believe that many equally dramatic changes will happen
Changing views of the roles we should occupy at different over the next few decades as well.
ages are often evident in how visual media portray people of One particularly interesting case of changing perceptions
different ages. Whether it be the cover of a nation’s leading of age-related roles concerns the debate about whether peo-
magazine about senior citizens (see Figure 17.19) or the depic- ple go through midlife crises. The notion of a midlife crisis
tions of 50- and 60-year-old characters in film and art, the has waxed and waned in recent years. It normally refers to
notion of “old” seems to have clearly shifted upward in age. a time when a person in his 40s, more often a male, goes
In addition, older adults are increasingly keeping physically through a period of dramatic self-questioning and reevalua-
fit and engaging in activities that were formerly restricted to tion, sometimes said to be brought on by a relatively sudden
younger adults. At age 70, Mick Jagger continues to perform awareness of an inevitable and not-too-distant future death
as a rock star to sold-out audiences in large stadiums. For- (Jacques, 1965). In reality, however, there is little reliable
mer president George H. W. Bush went skydiving on his 85th evidence that men or women regularly go through such a
birthday, and countless other men and women in their 70s crisis in their 40s more than in any other decade in their
and beyond are skiing, surfing, and doing many other activi- lives (Freund & Ritter, 2009; Lachman, 2004). There are
ties that only a few years ago were thought to be the domain of important transition points throughout adulthood, rang-
adolescents and young adults. Of course, many older adults do ing from the arrival of children, to having an empty nest,
have real limits as to what they can do, but it is very difficult to finding that a career path has reached an apogee lower
to make generalizations about an entire group of older adults. than had been expected, to dealing with retirement. Each of
The age when people marry has also changed consid- these, and many others, can precipitate a crisis of introspec-
erably in developed countries from a time when many tion and reevaluation, but no one decade seems to dominate

FIGURE 17.19 When is a person

old? As seen in these photos of grand-
mothers with their daughters and grand-
daughters, views of senior citizens have
changed rather dramatically, suggesting
that cultural shifts in what it means to be
old may have a dramatic influence on how
people perceive their life roles.

WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE OLD? 653

in terms of having the most dramatic crisis. Taken together, some of the component building blocks of mental and physi-
all of these changes clearly relate to what it means to be old cal ability show continuous decline from college onward, the
and what ages are considered to be old and what a typical more complex configurations of actual real-life abilities can
progression through life would be. And all of these factors stay level or even increase well into a person’s 70s, whether
influence the stereotypes that younger people have in mind those abilities concern decision making, expert performance
when they think about the elderly. in a local domain, or the ability to regulate emotions. It
is therefore important not to seize on some salient aspects
of decline, such as slower motor speed or reduced physical
Q: What is the evidence for a distinct period strength, and not to make overly broad inferences from such
when a person is in his 40s that is known as the information.
There is also a perception of decreasing competence in
“midlife crisis”? the elderly. But this perception is in most cases not justified.
For example, older workers are often rated as less competent
in carrying out their jobs, yet actual performance measures
Stereotypes and Ageism usually find them equal and sometimes more competent
We do not always regard the elderly in a positive light. More- than younger workers (McCann & Giles, 2002). In addi-
over, many negative impressions of the elderly may be inac- tion, attributions about failure for younger and older adults
curate (see Figure 17.20). These inaccurate negative biases are often different. When a younger adult fails on a memory
toward the elderly are often known as ageism, which in task, the failure is usually attributed to lack of attention or
many ways is analogous to racism or sexism. We have already effort, but when an older adult fails on the same task in
seen how the “grumpy old men” stereotype does not reflect exactly the same way, the failure is much more often attrib-
the general tendency of the elderly to actually become more uted to declining cognitive abilities (Cuddy et al., 2005;
agreeable with age. There are several other ways in which Erber & Long, 2006; Hummert, 2011). The stereotypes
we stereotype the elderly that may do them, and our culture about the elderly can be so strong that they can override
at large, a major disservice. Perhaps the most important is other well-known strong stereotypes, such as those related
a general perception of a decline in abilities. But we have to gender (Cuddy et al., 2005).
clearly seen throughout this chapter that life after age 20 is There may be a link between perceptions of competence
not one of uniform decline. While it may well be true that and a perception of the elderly as warm. More broadly,
people tend to see those who they evaluate as incompetent
in a warmer light and those who they see as highly com-
petent as more devious and cold (Fiske et al., 2007). This
might be seen as softening the harshness of views of the
elderly as less competent, but it can also help predators to be
more confident that they can take advantage of the elderly
without retaliation or repercussion. In addition, in situations
in which the elderly are meant to be partners in decision
making, such as in discussions with doctors about critical
health care decisions, doctors may not provide as much
information as they should to an elderly patient because of
a mistaken stereotype about incompetence (Adelman et al.,
2000). This is not to say that doctors and others who provide
information to the elderly should not make simple changes
to the wording and sentence structure that can hugely help
some older people more easily comprehend an explanation
(Liu et al., 2009). But no one should assume lower levels
of cognitive competence and refrain from providing infor-
mation that could help an individual—elderly or not—in
making a difficult decision.
Assumptions about the elderly can change the nature
of communications with an elderly person for the worse.
FIGURE 17.20 Stereotypes of the elderly. If you find this image Assumptions of incompetence in hearing and comprehen-
remarkable, it may be because it counters strongly held stereotypes sion can lead others to alter their speech in ways that reduce
about the elderly. message quality for the elderly. Speakers often fail to real-

654 CHAPTER 17 DEVELOPMENT AFTER CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE

ize that there is enormous variation among the elderly in
hearing and comprehension ability and speak to elderly
people who have excellent hearing and comprehension as
if they were deaf and confused (Hummert, 2007). They
also fail to realize that even some adults who do have hear-
ing and memory problems have learned ways to adjust to
those limitations through such means as hearing aids and
taking notes. With those adaptations, older adults may be
fully capable of comprehension at a high level. There is
also a general tendency, especially among younger adults,
to speak in patronizing terms to the elderly—and some-
times even other elderly adults will be patronizing as well
to their peers. In general, the less competent a person is
perceived to be, the more patronizing the speech will be.
Unfortunately, patronizing speech can make the elderly FIGURE 17.21 Cross-cultural views of the elderly. It is com-
feel like they are having more communication problems monly believed that many Eastern cultures revere the elderly and
view them with much more positive regard than Western cultures.
(Kemper & Harden, 1999), which in turn can cause the
While this may once have been true, recent studies suggest negative
speaker to see them in an even worse light and to then views of the elderly are quite similar across cultures.
engage in even more patronizing speech. Such a pattern
of interactions creates a destructive negative-feedback loop
in which stereotypes can end up seeming to be confirmed
because of their effects (Hummert, 2007, 2011). In addi-
tion to the influence of perceived incompetence, there seem people who show no memory problems in a wide range of
to be residual biases in which younger adults, and even tasks (Ryan et al., 2009).
senior peers, judge communication with the elderly to be a Have negative stereotypes always been present in all cul-
negative experience, even if there are no obvious differences tures? The evidence here is weak. Based on descriptions of
in communication quality (Giles et al., 2008). In short, a the elderly in some cultures’ literature and customs, it might
variety of stereotypes, which are often inaccurate, plague seem that the elderly are held in such respect that negative
interactions with the elderly in ways that not only impair stereotypes might not be possible. Yet, some stereotypes
opportunities for the elderly but also deprive everyone else might remain concealed behind a more public veneration
of the elderly’s skills and talents. of the elderly. Some have suggested that collectivist cultures
may have shifted to more negative views in the past few
years because of other changes, such as the rapid accelera-
Cultural Variation in Stereotypes tion of technology, which can make the elderly look less
competent (Fiske et al., 2007). (Just think of the way some
and Ageism? elders groan about the difficulties of using a cell phone.)
Perhaps the negative stereotypes about the elderly are limited More thorough historical analyses may reveal whether such
to certain cultures. For example, ageism might be more pro- accounts are true.
nounced in individualist cultures, such as the United States,
than in collectivist cultures, such as Japan, because concerns
for the common good in collectivist societies might result in Q: What are some factors that have
more respect for the elderly (see Figure 17.21). This position contributed to greatly changed views of what it
has often been suggested, but most research suggests that it
is not the case. Not only is ageism seen across a wide variety
means to be old?
of cultures; it takes on similar forms in most cultures. Thus,
across both collectivist and individualist societies, developed Some have argued that relatively confining roles of what
and developing countries, and cultures in the East and West, people are supposed to do at various points in their lives have
older people are regarded as both less competent and warmer started to disappear in more recent years in many Western
than are younger adults (Fiske, 2012; Fiske et al., 2007). In cultures (Neugarten & Neugarten, 1986). Thus, it used to be
terms of more specific cognitive capacities, people in both that there were clearly age-appropriate and age-inappropriate
Western and Eastern cultures strongly stereotype older mem- activities throughout the lifespan. A few decades ago, people
bers of their cultures as having defective memories, again a were expected to marry and have children in their 20s.
global stereotype that can do a great injustice to many elderly Thirty years ago in Japan, a young man was expected to start

WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE OLD? 655

working at a corporation as a “salaryman” and continue loy- ory, and attention, some forms of cognition show little
ally working for that same corporation for the rest of his life; or no decline in the later years. Other forms of cogni-
today job and even career changes are much more common tion continue to improve, even in the last decade of life,
in Japan. People past age 65 were, in earlier years, expected and they reflect a process of continuous development of
to retire and largely withdraw from professional activities. a skill, such as doing crossword puzzles and regulating
Yet, with the abolishment of mandatory retirement ages in one’s emotions during decision making. These patterns of
some countries, such as the United States, many people con- change are better understood by recognizing that, just as
tinue working into their 70s. And when retirement accounts children are active participants in the changes that occur
began to shrink after the great recession of 2008, it became early in the lifespan, older adults are active participants
common to see retirees leaving retirement to take on new in the changes that occur later in the lifespan. Processes
jobs that were often quite different from their old ones. such as optimization, selection, and compensation all
We seem to be living in a time of considerable flux with help aging adults refine some cognitive skills in ways that
respect to what people are supposed to do at various ages help them to maintain or continue to improve these skills.
in life. Moreover, the examples we have just considered At the same time, people do tend to show continuity of
come largely from the majority cultures in developed coun- personality traits as they grow older. Thus, changes pro-
tries. But age-related life roles can be very different in other duced by compensation must be understood as occurring
groups. To give just one personal example, some years ago I within personalities that are likely to stay relatively the
worked briefly in a very impoverished area of Jamaica. I was same with respect to their peers. Changes that occur in
stunned to learn from several local people that there was a the later years are also likely to be quite different in the
powerful expectation that young girls get pregnant in their decades to come as people live longer and stay healthier in
early teenage years. Having a child at that young age was their later years.
considered a sign of maturity and coming of age. Girls in We have also seen that the entire developmental pro-
those poor communities who resisted having early pregnan- gression through the lifespan is continuously changing as
cies were often mercilessly taunted as “mules,” implying that a function of medical advances, emerging attitudes, new
they were sterile and unable to have children. ways of viewing exercise and diet, and shifting roles in the
We may all go through important life transitions as culture at large. Compared with the other periods of devel-
adults, but those transitions should be understood as highly opment, adulthood is especially likely to look different in
relative to the culture we inhabit and to the particular group the decades to come. It may become routine for children
that we belong to in that culture. More than any other time born today to live past 100 because of medical advances
in the lifespan, adulthood may require a careful analysis of and lifestyle changes. Such increased longevity will have
how specific cultures frame life roles at various points in the massive consequences, influencing when people retire, how
life cycle and the extent to which those roles are relatively they support themselves in retirement, how they relate to
stable or undergoing rapid flux. their children and grandchildren, and how younger adults
adjust their lives in light of such an extended future. In
addition, a new wave of medical issues may arise as some
Conclusions parts of the body stay healthy much longer than others.
To cite one example, osteoporosis, especially in women,
There are many changes in physiological and psychologi- may be especially hard to slow down, and even if centenar-
cal functioning after young adulthood, but it is a gross ians are otherwise very healthy, many may be extremely
oversimplification to see those changes as either patterns fragile in the face of even the slightest fall. As these and
of continuous and universal decline or as continued devel- other changes occur, the nature of ageism and stereotypes
opment of the sort found in childhood and adolescence. about the elderly will surely change as well, not necessar-
Despite substantial declines in many of the basic com- ily becoming less unfair, but definitely different from what
ponents of cognition, such as speed of processing, mem- they are today.

656 CHAPTER 17 DEVELOPMENT AFTER CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE

 STU DY AN D REVIEW

SUMMARY abilities) that remain the same or improve in middle and late
life.
Physical and Physiological Changes in Adulthood ● Speed of information processing, such as tasks involving
● Any account of the physical and physiological changes that simple reaction times, generally shows decline. At the same
occur in adulthood must address the ways in which those time, in local areas of high expertise in which tasks are richly
processes are changing over the course of history in light of structured (through chunking) and highly familiar (through
medical advances, lifestyle changes, and new cultural prac- many hours of practice), skill levels may continue to improve
tices. The distinction between successful aging and patho- for much of the lifespan.
● By selecting a smaller subset of tasks that fit well with suc-
logical aging illustrates many ways in which older individuals
can thrive far longer in life than was considered feasible even cessful aging, people can continue to practice and develop
a few decades ago, while others may suffer from irreversible an area of expertise throughout much of their life. People
debilitating diseases. can optimize their selected skills, and they can also learn to
● Pathological aging may also involve several diseases that compensate for losses in one cognitive skill by shifting to a
occur more frequently, but certainly not inevitably in the reliance on another that is less affected by aging.
● Memory declines with age, but not in a global manner. Some
elderly. These include Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer’s dis-
ease, and other forms of dementia that can rise quite dra- aspects of memory—especially explicit recall of situations—
matically in incidence as some people progress through their show substantial declines, while others—for example, more
80s and 90s. implicit memories driven by frequency and familiarity—
● People can age at different rates and any account of changes stay more constant. Similarly, fluid intelligence—which
in adults must recognize the considerable variances that can involves reasoning and processing new information—often
occur and how they are related to successful and pathological shows declines, but crystallized intelligence—which involves
aging. Chronological age and biological age are increasingly familiar facts and knowledge—tends to remain strong in
distinct concepts. older adults.
● Today, middle age is generally thought to be roughly 40 ● Some aspects of memory, such as prospective memory,
to 60 years of age, and the term elderly typically refers to which is memory to do a task or obtain a goal, actually show
those 65 and older. These ages are quite a bit older than a improvement with age. But older adults may have more diffi-
few decades ago. In another few decades, the ages associated culty than younger adults with source monitoring, often not
with “middle age” and “elderly” are likely to be considerably knowing where they first learned something. This may be
older as well. because of the relative sparing of semantic memory (memory
● After the early 20s, there are multiple patterns of decline in of a fact) but the decline in episodic memory (memory of the
the human body. Muscle strength drops to an ever-increasing event in which a fact was learned).
● Patterns of reasoning show subtle shifts. In tasks that require
extent in the later years, bone density drops, and most physio-
logical organs show a reduction in their functional capacities. equal weighing of several factors or considering additional
Sensory receptors also tend to decline in sensitivity, especially but irrelevant information, older people can sometimes rea-
those of vision and hearing. son more accurately than younger adults. Older adults also
● Several hypotheses as to why we age are still under active can show better decision making in some emotion-laden
investigation, with no clear answer yet emerging. One view is situations.
that metabolic processes may leave by-products that decrease ● Circadian rhythms are cyclical surges in hormones and
the efficiency of proteins and metabolic structures. Another transmitters throughout the day that lead most middle-aged
view is that cells may be able to divide only a limited number and older adults to have optimal cognitive functioning in
of times. A third view is that DNA may slowly degrade over the morning hours and most younger adults to show optimal
time because of mutations. cognitive functioning later in the day.
● Activities, both cognitive and physical, can have a substantial
Cognitive Changes in Adulthood effect on the quality of life as we get older. Physical exercise
● While there are some declines in psychological capacities can greatly slow down many forms of age-related cognitive
that occur in older adults, there are also areas of psychologi- declines, especially those concerned with higher levels of cog-
cal performance (for example, some cognitive and emotional nition. Cognitive activity—for example, doing puzzles and

STUDY AND REVIEW 657

 playing card games or word games—can also help maintain of aging across individuals, stereotypes of the elderly can be
mental abilities, although often the positive effects are lim- particularly distortionary.
ited to the task that is practiced and to highly similar ones.
With cognitively complex tasks, cognitive reserve may help to
preserve memories by providing multiple links to the memo- THOUGHT QUESTIONS
ries. Moreover, diet restriction has been claimed by some to 1. In most countries, there are no age or competency limits
increase longevity, as well as to improve cognitive functioning. on the rights of the elderly to vote in elections, yet there is
clear evidence that some older adults vote in highly con-
Changes in Personality in the Lifespan: fused states, sometimes thinking they are voting for candi-
Individual and Group Changes dates from earlier decades. Discuss the tradeoffs in trying to
● In the realm of personality, there is considerable evidence for develop a method for screening potential voters in terms of
continuity of a person’s personality traits relative to his peers. their ability to understand who the candidates are and what
Thus, a shy person relative to his peers is likely to stay that their positions are, and using that screening device to exclude
way throughout the lifespan. Nonetheless, specific personal- elderly individuals with severe dementia.
ity traits are not rigidly set by age 30; rather, they continue 2. In light of the full body of research covered in this chapter,
to be affected by the social environment in which a person evaluate the reasonableness of laws specifying that heads of
spends his life. state cannot be younger than certain ages, such as 35 years
● Relatively constant personalities do not mean relatively
old. Are such laws reasonable ways to protect countries from
constant beliefs; individuals can show dramatic changes in
risks associated with younger leaders, or are they based on
beliefs and attitudes as a result of life experiences.
unreasonable stereotypes about younger adults?
● There are certain group changes in personality in the later
3. If a majority of children born today in developed countries
decades of life. One such change is toward a positivity bias,
were to live past 100, what would be some of the most impor-
in which older adults tend to experience current situations
and remember past situations in a more positive manner tant consequences for those countries as a whole? How, for
than younger adults. example, would health care insurance, the workplace, and
career opportunities for younger adults be influenced?
Stages of Life? 4. Imagine that you are asked to design ideal professional
● There are several theories of stage-like changes throughout jobs for two outstanding groups of individuals: a group of
the lifespan, changes that can be seen as having an influence 30-year-olds and a group of 60-year-olds. How might you
on personality. Erik Erikson’s theory of psychosocial devel- design the two positions differently so as to maximize the
opment has been one of the most dominant theories of this potential of individuals in each group?
sort. If challenges at each stage are successfully resolved, that 5. Given that most college students are at peak cognitive per-
stage will form a good foundation for the next stage. formance levels in the afternoon or evening and that most
● While stage theories have not been the subject of extensive older professors are at peak cognitive levels in the morning,
empirical investigations, some of the patterns they describe how might you adjust teaching and examination schedules to
are almost surely the consequences of how culture and the make teaching and assessment most effective?
process of raising a family or building a career can influence
the major conflicts of a person’s life. These cultural influ-
ences have changed considerably in the past century and will KEY TERMS
likely change in important ways in the decades to come. ageism (p. 654) pathological aging (p. 630)
What Does It Mean to Be Old? attraction effect (p. 639) positivity bias (p. 645)
● What it means to be old has changed greatly, as increased
Big Five (p. 643) prospective memory (p. 638)
lifespan, greater variety of career paths, and improved health circadian rhythm (p. 641) psychosocial conflict (p. 649)
care have all influenced patterns of aging. cognitive reserve (p. 641) psychobiomarker (p. 632)
● Ageism and negative stereotypes of the elderly are powerful, compensation (p. 637) simple reaction time (p. 635)
often inaccurate, and surprisingly consistent across cultures. complex reaction time (p. 635) successful aging (p. 630)
They can result in older individuals being discriminated
against in the workplace. They can also be the basis for nega- factor analysis (p. 643) telomerase (p. 632)
tive attributions during social interactions and for failures in Hayflick limit (p. 632) telomere (p. 632)
communication. Given the enormous variation in patterns optimization (p. 637)

658 CHAPTER 17 DEVELOPMENT AFTER CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE

Epilogue

fter 17 chapters, it is helpful to remind students reasonable to hope that they may remember some larger-

A about the broader picture and to consider why the

study of development is so important. It is all too
easy to get so immersed in the many details of
development that some of the broader messages
can be missed or forgotten. The reader is therefore invited to
take just a moment or two to think about how the content
of this book might make a difference to his or her own life.
scale developmental patterns and what they mean. The seven
themes described in the preface (the centrality of feedback
loops, development as a dynamic exploratory process, devel-
opment as constrained by factors that arise both internally
from within the child and externally from the environment,
a focus on what children can do and not their deficits, view-
ing infants and children as having some viable version of a
What do I hope students will take away from this skill throughout development, the ever-present links and
text? I hope that they will have some enduring sense of interdependencies between different areas of development,
developmental patterns, such as how language unfolds and seeing developmental psychology as not just a human-
over time or how peer relations emerge. They should have based process) are good examples of ideas that might be
a sense of what changes and what doesn’t change over time retained over the longer term. There are also important gen-
with respect to knowledge and skills in various domains eral impressions about the problems that children confront at
such as mathematical understanding or the self-concept. different ages and how they tend to solve them. In addition,
They should be familiar with some of the grand theories it is important to remember the different nested communi-
and models of development, such as the debates between ties in which a child develops and how each can have its own
nativists and empiricists, or the debates between stage special influences. Finally, all of these patterns can help us
theorists and those who see more developmental continuity. better understand our own developmental journey and even
Moreover, in all these cases, I hope that students remember a bit about our likely developmental future. Doing so will
enough concrete examples of developmental phenomena also enable us to better understand the different facets of
and experimental studies so that they can form the basis being an adult.
for their own views of what develops and why. But, most 3. An appreciation of the sheer beauty and complexity of develop-
importantly, I hope that students take away four things: ment. Even if there were no social policy implications of hav-
ing a better understanding of psychological development (of
1. An ability to evaluate arguments about children. It is impor-
which there most assuredly are), it is worth studying devel-
tant to be able to critically evaluate arguments about chil-
opmental psychology simply for the sake of appreciating a
dren. The arguments can range from claims about the effects
remarkable story. For example, when we come to understand
of video games on cognitive development to the position that
the extraordinary complexity of language and that a child
teenagers should be treated as adults in criminal cases. They
masters much of that complexity in just a few short years, that
can be arguments about the benefits of funding preschool
developmental achievement becomes all the more extraor-
education programs for disadvantaged children to claims
dinary. It easily rivals the complexity and beauty of any
about the rights of 18-year-olds to drink alcohol. Whether
account of the cellular machinery studied by the molecular
we have our own children or simply want to curb adolescent
biologist or of the origins of the universe by an astrophysicist.
misbehavior at the local mall, there are clear benefits in being
By studying such cases as language acquisition in detail, even
able to evaluate in a sophisticated and data-driven way argu-
though such development is commonplace throughout the
ments about children.
world, we will never take them for granted again. Instead, we
2. A sense of how children develop and how they fit into broader
can see not only the marvels in all the things that children
contexts. Ten years from now, most students will not remem-
come to do, but also in all that adults can do as well.
ber many fine-grained details from this text. But it is more

659
4. How a better understanding of children helps create a better in their own right and to see their nobler goals and beliefs.
future. All of us, not just parents, live on in the generations If we can live our own lives in ways that are aligned with
that follow us. Our ideas, our values, and all our positive our children’s optimal futures and if we do our best to help
contributions can only be carried forth after our deaths them achieve those futures, all our good works can be carried
if those who come after us choose to carry them forward. forth long after we are gone. In this way, to better understand
After their parents are gone, most children will not simply children is to give much more meaning to our own lives.
live according to a preordained plan laid down by their par-
If some versions of these four insights resonate with
ents, and most did not do so when their parents were alive.
students who have worked through this text, they will
Moreover, as we have seen, parents do not create or sculpt
have learned a great deal not just about developmental
a child into a desired form. Instead, if things go well, they
psychology but also about its relevance to a much wider
work as mentors, coaches, and partners with children, help-
range of intellectual and social issues. On an almost
ing them develop in the most optimal way possible. To better
daily basis, I am still struck by new ways in which these
understand children is to know their likely trajectories and
insights influence my own interpretations of the world
to know how our own lives may be partially carried forth in
around me.
those trajectories. It is to appreciate children as individuals

660 EPILOGUE
Glossary
accommodation The process by which the child adapts her cognitive disorders include phobias, social anxiety disorder, generalized
and behavioral structures or schemes to more accurately fit with a anxiety disorder, and obsessive-compulsive disorder.
pattern in the environment. anxious attachment See insecure/resistant attachment.
action potential A wave of changing electrical potentials that travels aphasia A form of brain damage that causes problems in language
down the axon, which is a neuron’s main path of transmission. function. There are different kinds of aphasias that impair different
adaptation In Piaget’s sense, a process by which the child better fits aspects of language.
her schemes with new experiences in the environment. apoptosis Programmed cell death that occurs in the course of normal
affective blunting Showing a low level of expression of emotion, and neural development.
thought to be a developmental precursor of schizophrenia. aptitude-treatment interaction Relationship between the effectiveness
affordances The possibilities for action based on the properties of of a particular teaching method (treatment) and the learner’s specific
the objects or surfaces on which the action will be performed. strengths (aptitudes) and weaknesses; often known as “learner
The same object may have different affordances for different characteristics.”
organisms. assimilation The process by which the child incorporates new infor-
ageism A form of bias against elderly people that can result in unfair mation from the environment into his preexisting mental structures
discrimination against them in a manner analogous to cases of or schemes in a way that usually distorts the new information to fit
racism and sexism. with the preexisting structures.
alerting Arousing the attentional system through a cue that both astigmatism A visual condition that affects the focusing of light and
indicates that a target stimulus is about to occur and that gives results in stimuli at different orientations being perceived with
some information about the target. different levels of acuity.
allele A gene variant. attachment The strong and enduring emotional bond between
allocentric representation A representation of space that is objective a child and a significant other and the processes that create and
and not relative to the position of the viewer. maintain this long-lasting social relationship.
altruism Behavior in which an individual acts for the benefit of attachment complex The set of behaviors and mental states that, taken
another at his or her own personal expense. together, are responsible for setting up and maintaining attachment.
amenorrhea The absence of a menstrual period in women who attachment style A pattern of relating to significant others based on
are of menstrual age. This often occurs in those with anorexia expectations about how they will respond and affecting perceptions,
nervosa. emotions, thoughts, and behaviors in close relationships.
amygdala A brain structure that is located near the brain’s midline attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) A constellation
in the right and left temporal lobes and that is involved in the of problems resulting in difficulty staying on task, often
manifestation and regulation of emotions. accompanied by restless activity.
analogical reasoning A way of comparing things that, on the attentional deployment A method of emotional regulation that
surface, seem quite different in order to see deeper level similarities involves purposely shifting the focus of one’s thoughts in a way
between them. that makes a situation feel less emotionally charged.
animism According to Piaget, the tendency of young children to attentional schema A cognitive structure that is learned through
attribute psychological motivations to nonliving things. experience in response to a particular set of stimuli in a specific
anorexia nervosa An eating disorder characterized by an intentional kind of task. When embedded in such tasks, attentional schema
refusal to eat anything beyond minimal amounts of food as well as form a framework for organizing information and responses to that
by an excessive concern with being thin. information and for recognizing particular patterns of information
anorexic family A family in which a certain pattern of interaction is and filtering out irrelevant information.
thought to foster the emergence of anorexia. attraction effect An effect in judgment and reasoning in which
A-not-B error The tendency of infants to search for an object where people tend to change their estimates of the values of goods in the
it has previously been found and not where it was most recently face of additional, but irrelevant, information.
observed to be hidden. attribution theory A theory that encompasses the way that people
antisocial behavior Behavior that hurts or impairs another individual explain their own behavior and the behavior of others.
or a group. Such behavior can include both verbal and physical authoritarian parent A parent who adopts a stern, coercive mode of
aggression as well as cheating and lying. child rearing.
anxiety disorder A disorder in which anxiety is so strong and authoritative parent A parent who adopts a warm mode of child
persistent that it interferes with normal functioning. Anxiety rearing with clear limits and guidelines for the child’s behavior.

G-1
autism A disorder characterized by difficulty relating to others that high activity, or “mania,” in which the person often has inflated
generally appears before age 3. It is usually associated with a lack self-esteem, grandiose plans, increased talkativeness, and a
of empathy, problems with social responsiveness, language and diminished amount of sleep.
communication deficits, and resistance to changes in routine, and blended family A family consisting of the parents and all children
it often includes repeated stereotyped movements and a narrow from their current relationship as well as children from prior
focus of interest. relationships.
autobiographical memories Explicit memories of specific experiences blocking A phenomenon in classical conditioning in which pre-
in one’s own life. training with one conditioned stimulus can interfere with (block)
autonomous stage In Piaget’s theory of moral development, a stage the formation of an association with a subsequent conditioned
in which children think of rules as social conventions that are stimulus.
created by humans and can be changed by humans. bootstrapping Building new conceptual structures out of earlier ones
avoidant attachment See insecure/avoidant attachment. that serve as a framework for fostering conceptual change and growth.
axon Tubelike projection from the neuron along which the action brainstem A structure beneath the brain and above the spinal cord
potential travels and which ends in an axon terminal containing that is concerned with regulating heart rate, breathing, swallowing,
neurotransmitters that will be transmitted to another neuron. blood pressure, digestion, and other automatic nonvoluntary
processes in the body.
babbling Part of the sequence of prelinguistic vocalizations occurring branching direction Language structure in which the hierarchical
in the first year of life. Children go through increasingly complex embeddings of grammatical categories branch in a particular
patterns of babbling, starting from around 4 months onward. direction. Different languages have strong tendencies to be either
Deaf children show a comparable babbling with sign language. right branching or left branching.
baby sib study A study in which younger siblings of children who bulimia nervosa An eating disorder in which a person eats excessively
have a disorder are studied for signs of early precursors of the and rapidly and then follows those episodes of overeating with
disorder. If there is a substantial heritability to the disease, the some way of purging the food.
younger siblings are much more likely to develop the disorder than bullying Repeated and sustained verbal or physical threats or attacks
the general population of young children, making the odds of against a victim who is unable to defend himself or herself. Also
discovering early precursors higher. known as peer victimization.
base pair A pair of complementary bases (adenine with thymine;
guanine with cytosine) in DNA. canalization The process in which cells get committed to becoming
basic emotion An emotion, such as joy, sadness, disgust, surprise, certain cell types over the course of development.
fear, or anger, that is thought to be present in young infants and catastrophizing Assuming the worst possible outcome for future
that is one of the building blocks for the emergence of later more events, even when those outcomes are highly unlikely or
complex emotions; also referred to as a primary emotion. implausible.
basic level of categorization A level of categorization at which categorical perception The tendency to group stimuli that vary
category members maximally contrast with members of other along a physical continuum, such as light wavelength, in terms of
categories while also having high similarity among members of the categories, such as different colors.
same categories. catharsis hypothesis The hypothesis that experiencing aggression in
behavioral genetics The study of how genetic variation between a pretend setting (such as watching a violent television program)
individuals or populations in a species contributes to behavioral releases aggressive impulses so that such impulses are less likely to
variation. be released later. This hypothesis was popularized by Freud and
behavioral genomics The study of genetic variation in a species’ then extended by those trying to minimize the impact of television
genome and its effects at the molecular level and links between violence. With respect to viewing violence on television, this
those molecular effects and behavioral variations. hypothesis is, with only rare exceptions, false.
behaviorism The view that psychology is best understood as centration A mental operation, according to Piaget, that emerges in
describing the effects of external contingencies on behavior and the preoperational period and that causes the child to focus on
not by referring to unseen mental events and representations. one dimension (for example, height) while ignoring relevant other
bell curve A plot of the distribution of scores in a large population; dimensions (for example, width).
also known as a normal distribution curve. cephalocaudal development Development in which the more ante-
between-subjects design A design in which different but equivalent rior sections mature earlier than the posterior sections (cephalo =
groups are assessed in each experimental condition in a study. head, caudal = tail).
Big Five Relatively independent clusters of five personality traits— cerebellum A brain structure beneath the rear end of the cerebral
extroversion, neuroticism, openness to experience, agreeableness, cortex that is involved in coordination of voluntary movement and
and conscientiousness—that have repeatedly been shown to have integration of some sensory information with action.
strong genetic bases. cerebral cortex The region of the brain associated with high-level
bilateral symmetry Symmetry of structures around both sides of a thought and perception. It is commonly divided into four major
center line, such as right and left kidneys, arms, legs, eyes, and ears. regions on each side of the brain: the frontal, parietal, temporal,
binocular cue A cue to the perception of depth that arises from the and occipital lobes.
use of both eyes. cerebrum A complex of three structures in the brain, consisting of
binocular disparity See binocular parallax. the basal ganglia, the olfactory bulb, and the cerebral cortex.
binocular parallax A binocular cue to depth that arises from small characteristic feature In the study of word meaning, a feature that
disparities between the images that reach the two eyes; also called is typically associated with members of a category but that is not
binocular disparity essential to any members of the category.
bipolar disorder A distinct affective disorder that is characterized by child effect A genetically determined behavior in a child that evokes
swings between periods of lethargy and low affect and periods of a particular kind of behavioral response in the parent.

G-2 GLOSSARY
child-directed speech Speech by adults or older children that is concrete operational period A stage of cognitive development
directed toward younger children and that is altered in a wide occurring after the preoperational period and before the formal
variety of ways (for example, slower, louder, and higher-pitched operational period, roughly from 7 to 12 years. During this
speech that stresses the boundaries between words) that make it stage, children start to use mental operators such as identity and
different from speech directed toward adult peers; also known as reversibility to more flexibly understand the physical world and the
motherese and infant-directed speech. ways in which it can change.
chromosome An organized cluster of genes within the cell nucleus. conditioned response (CR) A response that becomes associated with
The chromosomes contain the cell’s DNA. a stimulus that normally does not elicit that response.
circadian rhythm Daily cycle of biological function and activity conditioned stimulus (CS) A stimulus that becomes associated with
based on the rise and fall of hormones and neurotransmitters in an an unconditioned stimulus (and its response) but that would not
organism over the course of a 24-hour period. normally elicit a response.
classical conditioning A form of learning in which the pairing of an conduct disorder A pattern of frequent and recurring antisocial
unconditioned stimulus with a conditioned stimulus results in a behaviors in children and adolescents, whereby the children
conditioned response. regularly violate the rights of others as well as violating social
classification In Piaget’s theory, the ability to think about groups of norms or rules.
things as forming classes defined by a single property or relation. confluence theory The theory that as family size grows, there is a
class-inclusion relations How different classes of things in a hierarchy corresponding drop in the overall intellectual climate in the family
relate to each other and how broad superordinate categories can because many conversations and interactions would be between
encompass narrower, subordinate categories. children rather than between adults and children.
clique A small group of peers who voluntarily spend a great deal of connectionism An approach to learning and representation that
time together and seem to actively exclude others. posits massively parallel processing of small elements, none of
codominant Referring to a case where two different alleles for a gene which by themselves may be explicitly represented. This approach
are both expressed phenotypically. draws heavily on statistical patterns of feature correlations in the
cognitive empathy A form of empathy that requires social cognitive environment.
skills and the ability to take another’s perspective and that involves conservation task Any of the tasks designed by Piaget in which
understanding and representing the emotional and mental points children are asked to judge whether certain physical properties of
of view of others. an object, such as its size, or aspects of an array, such as its number,
cognitive map A mental representation of the spatial layout, used to remain unchanged when the object or array is transformed along
infer distance, direction, and a way of navigating the environment. different dimensions.
cognitive reserve Psychological capacity that is available to support constraints on word meanings Constraints on the possible meanings
cognitive functioning in the face of age-associated declines or that can be assigned to a given word. These are thought to be
minor brain injuries. necessary to explain how word meanings are acquired because
cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) A therapy that is based on the they narrow down the enormous number of possible meanings to a
idea that a person’s problems stem from how he sees and thinks workable number.
about the world and that the way to change the behaviors is to constructivist approach An approach to moral development that
change the ways the person interprets and thinks about the world sees the child as constructing moral interpretations of a situa-
around him. tion by evaluating the situation, the actors, and the cultural
cohort effect An effect produced in children of a particular age context.
group based on their experiences in the culture that differ from the controversial child When sociometric status is measured, a child clas-
experiences of those who are younger or older. sified as high on both the like and the dislike scales. Controversial
collectivist culture A culture in which the rights of the group are children are noticed by everyone and are seen as sociable and as
deemed to be more important than the rights of the individual. leaders, but they are also more likely to be seen as aggressive and
compensation The process of mitigating the effects of aging on arrogant.
cognitive performance by introducing aids to cognition or altering convergence A binocular cue to depth that arises from the sensation
behavior. that occurs when the two eyes converge to focus on an object.
compensation A mental operation, according to Piaget, that emerges converging methods Using various approaches to study a prob-
in the concrete operational period and that enables the child to lem from different vantage points in order to arrive at a more
understand how a change in one dimension, such as height, might accurate, objective answer than any single method could produce
be compensated for by another change, such as in width, with a alone.
third dimension, such as quantity, remaining invariant. core domain A domain of knowledge and thought that is thought
compensation plasticity The capacity for an area of the brain that to have a privileged role in development, emerging early in
has been deprived of its normal inputs and processing routines to infancy and maintaining a strong influence throughout much of
have heightened functions in other abilities that compensate for development.
the loss. corpus callosum A central pathway made up of a large set of heavily
complex emotion An emotion, such as guilt or pride, that is thought myelinated nerve fibers that transfers information between the two
to emerge later in development and that may build on interactions hemispheres of the cerebral cortex.
of basic emotions and involve supporting cognitions. co-rumination The tendency for a social group to dwell on negative
complex reaction time The time taken to engage in a response to events in a mutually reinforcing manner.
various spatial and temporal configurations of stimuli, such as creativity The ability to come up with ideas or strategies that are
pressing a key when the number following a prior number is twice both novel and truly original as well as being useful or functional.
that prior number. critical period A period in development when a particular experience
conceptual self A view of the self that includes a sense of the roles may have a dramatic impact and during which learning a particular
that we occupy in broader cultural and social contexts. kind of information or skill is possible. Before or after such a

GLOSSARY G-3
 period, experience barely seems to have an effect and learning does dishabituation The expression of interest in a new display or scene,
not occur. as shown by increased responses to the novel stimulus.
crossing-over A recombination of genetic material from the father disorganized attachment An attachment style marked by less
and the mother that occurs when part of one chromosome switches consistency across situations and characterized by combinations of
locations with the corresponding part of the other chromosome in both insecure and controlling behaviors. Infants showing this style
the pair. may have a higher incidence of psychopathology in later life.
cross-sectional approach An approach to development in which display rules Norms governing the kinds of emotional expressions
studies look at different groups of participants at different age a particular group considers appropriate in particular situations.
periods. dispositional factor A factor intrinsic to a person, such as a trait or
crystallized intelligence The ability to use specific skills and the person’s temperament.
knowledge gained through experience. dizygotic (DZ) twins Twins from two different zygotes; often
cueing hypothesis An explanation of infantile amnesia that is based referred to as fraternal twins.
on the idea that early memories are present but not available unless DNA Deoxyribonucleic acid, normally found in cell nuclei; contains
linked to the right sorts of cues. the molecular code in the form of sequences of chemical bases
cultural psychology A view of psychology in which cultural (adenine, thymine, guanine, and cytosine) for cellular construction
differences are believed to greatly influence psychological processes and growth.
and representations. This view argues against the existence of domain general Referring to a learning mechanism or representational
intrinsic universals of moral thought. format that applies across all domains of cognition.
culture of honor A cultural style, seen in the American South, domain specific Referring to a learning mechanism or representational
in which there is an endorsement of relatively higher levels of format that applies to a specific domain of cognition.
violence in response to threats to oneself, one’s property, or dominance hierarchy A network of relations between members
one’s background. (It does not endorse more violence in all of a social group, often primates. The structure of the network
situations.) often involves a single powerful individual at the top and groups
cyberbullying A form of aggression over the Internet, usually in of subordinates that get ever larger with decreasing social status.
which a group victimizes an individual. dominant Referring to an allele that is expressed in the phenotype,
cycle of abuse The pattern in which abused children grow up to be both when paired in a homozygous pair of alleles and when paired
abusing parents, whose abused children then grow up to abuse with a recessive allele in a heterozygous pair of alleles.
their children. dual representations Models that can be both physical objects in
their own right and also symbols for other objects.
declarative memory Memory that can be described as “knowing dynamic cue A cue to the perception of depth that arises from moving
that,” such as knowing a fact or that an event has occurred; objects and surfaces.
sometimes used synonymously with explicit memory. dynamic systems theory A theory of motor development that stresses
defining feature In the study of word meaning, a feature that is the importance of the physics of the limb and the environment
necessary to specifying meaning. in which an action is made in addition to central cortical control
delay of gratification The ability to hold off engaging in an action programs.
that will bring a desired reward. dyslexia A learning disability typically involving a deficit in phonological
delusion A false or highly unrealistic belief. Delusions are often processing despite normal intelligence, a good motivation to learn to
evidence of psychosis and frequently a symptom of schizophrenia. read, and ample early exposure to environments that normally foster
dendrite One of many signal-receiving branches extending from a reading.
nerve cell. Dendrites contain terminals that respond to specific
neurotransmitters from other neurons and conduct the information ecological self A sense of the self as moving through the world,
received toward the cell body. As many as 10,000 dendrites may be gained through perception and action.
present per neuron. ecological systems approach An approach to the study of families
dependency A reliance on another for basic physiological needs, such that emphasizes the various contexts in which children develop
as food and shelter and protection from harm. Attachment and and how children fit into those contexts.
dependency can be largely dissociated. ecological validity A quality of a study that captures all the critical
dependent variable The variable that one is measuring in a study to factors to understanding a behavior or ability in a natural context.
see how it varies as a function of different values of the independent ectoderm One of three cell layers at an early stage of development.
variables, which are manipulated as a way of exploring and Cells from this level become skin, hair, the brain, and the spinal
explaining the nature of the dependent variable. cord.
depressogenic vulnerability The convergence of the separate egg cell The female gamete that merges with the male sperm cell
cognitive, biological, and emotional factors to create depression. during fertilization.
desensitization A process in which experiencing continuous high ego One of three components of the mind described by Freud that
levels of violence comes to be accepted as normal and may lead normally emerges in development after the id and before the
to increased tolerance of aggressive behaviors as well as increased superego and that enables the child to channel and direct the id.
willingness to engage in aggressive acts. egocentric representation A representation of space that is relative
developmental intergroup theory A theory that children as young as to the position of the viewer.
4 years of age start to notice perceptually salient group differences egocentrism In cognitive development, a tendency to fail to take into
and to attach these to stereotypes. account the points of views of others.
diathesis-stress hypothesis The proposal that a genetic predisposition elective mutism A phenomenon, often found in autism, in which
for a mental disorder may combine with high levels of environmental a child who is capable of speaking almost never does so in social
stress to cause the disorder to become manifested. interactions.

G-4 GLOSSARY
embryo The developing organism between the middle of the second week the creation or elimination of synapses or the creation or death of
and the end of the eighth week of development. During the embryonic neurons.
period, rudimentary systems, structures, and organs first appear. experimental study A study in which a certain variable (the inde-
emergent constraint A constraint that emerges over the course of pendent variable) is manipulated while holding all other aspects of
development and that reflects the influences of experience and the the experimental situation constant to see how the manipulation
environment. affects the dependent variable.
emotion A transient state that corresponds to physiological and explicit cognition Knowledge or thought processes that are part of
cognitive processes associated with distinct internal sensations, or conscious awareness and that can often be described in words.
feelings. explicit memory Memory for information that involves conscious
emotional contagion A process in which the emotional states of recall.
others, such as laughter or sadness, become manifested in a person extended family A family whose members reach across generations
who is exposed to those states. and sometimes incorporates aunts, uncles, and cousins.
emotional empathy A form of empathy that involves directly extended self A sense of the self as traveling along an autobiographical
witnessing another person’s emotional state and feeling the same timeline.
emotion in a relatively immediate and direct way. externalizing problem A problems that is expressed externally by a
emotional intelligence The ability to recognize, think about, child, such as aggression or sexual promiscuity.
and manage our own emotional states and processes as well as
recognizing the emotional states of others. factor analysis A technique in data analysis that isolates relatively
emotional regulation The ways in which people of all ages influence independent clusters of information that vary along dimensions
the particular emotions they experience, when and how they known as factors.
experience them, and how they reveal these emotions. false-belief task A task that assesses the ability to understand how
empiricism A view of development that stresses the presence, at birth, others might have beliefs that are contrary to a true state of affairs
of a general, all-purpose learning system, with little or no biases to in the world.
acquire particular kinds of information. false-photograph task A task developed to investigate whether
encoding The process of turning information into a mentally useful children who fail false-belief tasks actually misunderstand beliefs
representational format. per se. The task does not involve beliefs, but young children still
endoderm One of three cell layers at an early stage of development. have trouble inhibiting a default (incorrect) response based on the
Cells from this level become glands and the linings of the lungs. objects that are in view when they are questioned.
environmental niche A particular kind of environment that fast mapping The phenomenon of rapidly learning the mapping
an organism lives in and for which the organism has evolved between words and the entities they refer to. While specifically
adaptations that enable it to thrive in that environment. proposed for word learning, it seems to be a broader phenomenon
epigenetic regulation The process in which changes in gene that also applies to other forms of mapping.
expression occur based on internal and external environmental feedback loop In developmental psychology, the constant interplay
signals that affect the DNA. between an infant and his environment, in which an experience
episodic memory Memory of specific events that one has experienced; causes a change in the infant’s state, which in turn influences how
a type of declarative memory. Autobiographical memories are a the infant’s next experiences are encountered.
kind of episodic memory. feral child A child who grows up in the wild and has no contact with
equilibration The process through which a child’s mental structures humans.
come into a better fit with various aspects of the environment fetus The developing organism after the embryonic period, when
through assimilation and accommodation. later prenatal change appears more qualitative. During the fetal
essentialism A tendency to assume that the surface properties of period, which occurs from week 9 until birth, organs, muscles,
entities are caused by deeper essences. structures, and systems grow larger and mature, developing into
ethology The study of traits (either body parts or behavior) from an recognizable forms.
adaptive evolutionary perspective that usually involves comparisons fixed-trait theorist An individual who tends to think that traits are
across species. intrinsic and unchangeable regardless of effort.
evaluative reasoning Thinking about an individual’s qualities and fluid intelligence The ability to think flexibly and solve novel
behaviors in terms of whether the person is entirely good or entirely problems. It supposedly does not depend significantly on acquired
bad and predicting his future behavior on that basis. (Compare knowledge.
trait-based reasoning.) Flynn effect The finding that intelligence test scores have been
evidence-based therapy Therapy for which efficacy has been shown consistently rising throughout the world for the past 60 years, a
by rigorous, carefully controlled studies that compare one therapy pattern that was masked by the changing the norms of the tests.
with another or with no therapy. formal operational period A stage of cognitive development
evolutionary psychology A view of psychology that emphasizes occurring after the concrete stage, at roughly 12 years old but with
evolution of a variety of psychological adaptations that increased considerable variability. In this stage, children start to engage in
the fitness of individuals. In regard to moral development, the deductive and logical reasoning about situations and processes
emphasis is on the universals of moral thought and behavior that and are able to consider logical alternatives and their potential
have been selected as adaptive in all humans. consequences.
executive functioning The collection of cognitive activities involved foundational constraint A constraint that is present from the start
in goal-directed tasks and problem solving, including inhibitory and is usually associated with nature accounts of learning and
control, error correction and shifting, and working memory. development.
experience-dependent plasticity The phenomenon of changes in friendship An ongoing, positive reciprocal relationship with a chosen
brain structure as a result of experience, usually referring to either companion.

GLOSSARY G-5
frontal lobe A lobe in the cerebral cortex involved in planning, habituation method A method to determine if an infant can
problem solving, and the regulation of thought and emotion. More distinguish a new stimulus from a familiar stimulus. An infant’s
posterior parts of the frontal lobe are also involved in aspects of responses (for example, looking time) will decrease with repeated
motor activity and the processing of grammar. presentation of a familiar stimulus, but they will increase if the
functional fixedness A bias to use an object or device in its traditional infant perceives that there is a new stimulus.
manner and not to come up with novel, more creative uses. Hayflick limit The view that human cells can only divide roughly
functionalist approach An approach to emotion that stresses the 50 times, putting an upper limit on the lifespan of an organism.
function of emotional responses—specifically, that emotions help heritability The extent to which variations in a trait within a
mobilize us to take action toward goals. particular population are due to genetic differences rather than
fundamental attribution error The tendency to explain the behavior environmental differences.
of others in terms of dispositional factors as opposed to situational heterochronic gene A gene that is related to the timing of
factors. development, often regulating when other genes turn on or off.
heteronomous stage In Piaget’s theory of moral development, a
gamete A specialized sex cell from either the male (sperm) or the female stage in which children think that rules are fixed and immutable
(egg) that combines with another sex cell during reproduction. realities that are part of the natural world.
gastrulation The process of cell differentiation into three primary heterozygous Having two different alleles for a particular gene.
germ layers: ectoderm, endoderm, and mesoderm. hippocampus Bilateral structures that are involved in developing new
gender identity A sense of whether we are male or female. memories and that bind information from different brain regions.
gender role The behaviors and traits that are considered typical of Bilateral damage may cause difficulty in consciously accessing new
each sex. memories.
gender schema A cognitive structure for interpreting gender-related holophrase A single word that stands for a larger phrase or full sentence
activities and roles. that is mentally present but that the child is unable to produce.
gene A section of genetic material with inherited instructions for homeobox A short stretch of 180 base pairs of DNA that occurs
creating a protein (or part of a protein) and regulating when the in the same precise sequence in many different species and that
protein will be active. encodes the proteins that regulate the formation of body regions
general intelligence, g A common factor that seems to be behind and structures.
performance on the vast majority of items on standardized homeobox genes Master-switch genes that contain the homeobox
psychometric tests of analytical intelligence. and that affect the body plan of many different species by encoding
generalized anxiety disorder A disorder in which there are high proteins and regulating gene expression.
levels of anxiety for a wide range of situations as opposed to the homozygous Having the same alleles for a particular gene.
specific fears in phobias. hostile attribution bias A tendency to interpret ambiguous situations
generativity The degree to which a language is able to generate a as hostile.
large number of novel patterns and structures from a small number Hox genes Homeobox genes in vertebrates. Hox genes encode proteins
of primitives and rules. and regulate gene expression and thereby affect the body plan of
genome The entire body of genetic information for an organism, vertebrates.
often used to describe the most typical profile for a species or hue The aspect of color that is a consequence of wavelengths of light.
subspecies. hypothetico-deductive reasoning The ability to think systematically
genotype The genetic makeup of a specific individual or a specific about different possibilities that might depart from the current
gene, encoded as alleles in the individual’s DNA. reality and to derive predictions given that certain information is
geometric information The information about an environment’s true.
overall shape (its contour) that helps to locate oneself in space.
Gestalt principles Holistic principles of perception that allow viewers id One of three components of the mind described by Freud that
to parse up the world into objects and other meaningful units. emerges first in development and represents an individual’s basic
glial cell A brain cell that provides nutrients, produces myelin, and desires and drives.
provides structural support. Glial cells are roughly 10 times as identity A mental operation, according to Piaget, that emerges
common as neurons. in the concrete operational period and that enables the child to
global change A type of development that occurs at roughly the realize that a single dimension or aspect remains the same despite
same time in very different areas of thought or behavior. dramatic changes in other dimensions.
goodness of fit The idea that infants with different temperaments idiographic approach With respect to creativity, studying case
may thrive in different environments that fit best with those histories of highly creative individuals to see whether they seem to
particular temperaments. cluster into different types.
grammar The structural relations of a language that govern how imaginary companion A fantasized character that a child makes up
words and other syntactic units are organized. or an object that the child treats as an animate creature.
grasp reflex A reflex found in newborns in which they will grasp an immanent justice In Piaget’s theory of moral development, a form
object when it is pressed against their palm. of reasoning about justice in which the child believes that most
growth cone The end of an axon that is migrating through neural events that adversely affect an individual who has previously
tissue to its eventual destination. It guides reactions toward and done something wrong are forms of punishment for the earlier
away from chemical gradients until it arrives at its destination, transgression.
where it forms a synapse with a target neuron. impersonal moral situation A moral situation in which the
individuals involved are not salient and in which it is possible to
habituation The gradual decline of interest in a display or scene, as adopt a moral stance that appeals to abstract moral principles and
shown by a decrease in responses to a repeated stimulus. patterns of reasoning.

G-6 GLOSSARY
implicit cognition Knowledge that exists outside of awareness and joint attention The situation in which two people are jointly
that may be difficult to describe in words. attending to an object and are aware that they are both doing so.
implicit memory Memory for information or actions that occurs
outside of conscious awareness. kinesthetic self-concept A concept of the self that arises from an
imprinting A form of learning that takes place during a critical period awareness of our motor actions as we moves in an environment.
in which young members of a species acquire a behavior or response
pattern that remains permanent after the critical period is over. landmark A large object in the environment that enables an
incremental theorist Someone who views traits as changeable organism to navigate by estimating distance and direction from
through effort. the landmark.
independent variable A variable that one manipulates so as to language acquisition device (LAD) A hypothesized mental system
understand patterns of variation in the dependent variable. in humans that is specialized for the acquisition of language and
indiscriminate attachment An attachment style in which infants not other kinds of knowledge.
are as affectionate and receptive to complete strangers as they are latency period A time in middle to late childhood, posited by Freud,
to their primary caregivers. when children tend to practice strict segregation of the sexes in
individualist culture A culture in which the rights of the individual terms of preferred playmates and friends.
are deemed to be more important than the rights of the group. learned helplessness A learned state in which an organism concludes
infantile amnesia The inability to recall any memories prior to a that escape from an aversive situation is impossible and that it is
certain age, usually around 2½ years of age. helpless and cannot change things for the better.
information integration theory A theory of cognitive development lexicon The set of words that a person knows; often referred to as a
that says that older children integrate different dimensions or com- person’s vocabulary.
ponents of a task into a coherent system for successful reasoning, linguistic determinism The view, first attributed to Whorf and
whereas younger children focus excessively on one dimension or Sapir, that the language that one learns determines the nature of
component of the task at the expense of others. one’s thoughts.
inimical relationship A relationships characterized by conflict, linguistic relativity The view, first attributed to Whorf and Sapir, that
dislike, and aggression in which each person considers the other patterns of thought vary as a function of the language one learns.
to be an enemy. local change A specific psychological capacity that develops relatively
insecure/avoidant attachment An attachment style in which infants independently of other specific capacities.
not only avoid or fail to initiate interactions with the mother after longitudinal approach An approach to development in which studies
a reunion, but also show less visible anxiety in the absence of the look at the same group of participants at different age periods.
mother. long-term memory Memory that endures for extended periods of
insecure/resistant attachment An attachment style in which infants time. Information in long-term memory has often been processed,
show elevated anxiety in the absence of the mother and often try to organized in terms of meaning, and stored for later retrieval.
vigorously prevent her from leaving. They may also show distress
and anger when the mother returns while nonetheless clinging to Machiavellian emotion An emotional expression that is used to
her. In the presence of a mother and a stranger, they may explore produce an effect in others and that does not necessarily reflect the
minimally and be quite clingy. Also known as anxious attachment. emotion actually felt by the agent expressing it.
instrumental conditioning See operant conditioning. maturational account An account of development in which
instrumental helping Prosocial behavior to help someone else achieve developmental change is largely attributed to biological maturation
a goal, even though there is no obvious benefit to the helper. as opposed to experience.
intelligence quotient (IQ ) Originally an index of intelligence meiosis The process in which certain types of cells divide and produce
based on the ratio of a person’s mental age to his chronological cells with single sets of chromosomes. The correct chromosome
age. IQ is now calculated in a different manner and simply refers number is once again restored during sexual reproduction.
to where a specific score stands on a distribution of intelligence memory format change hypothesis An explanation of infantile
test scores. amnesia that is based on the idea that infants and very young
intermodal perception The ability to see objects and events in an children represent the world in a format that is radically different
integrated manner across different sensory systems, such as vision from later formats and is therefore inaccessible at later ages.
and hearing. mesoderm One of three cell layers at an early stage of development.
internal working model A mental representation of the self and Cells from this level become muscles, organs, and skeleton.
others and how they might interact in different circumstances. meta-analysis A technique of data analysis in which data from
internalizing problem A problem that is largely within the individual, multiple prior studies are gathered into a large-scale study and the
such as depression. data are statistically analyzed to determine which treatments are
interpersonal intelligence The ability to have empathy and to think most effective.
about factors governing interactions between people; a form of metacognition Knowledge about the nature of one’s own mind and
emotional intelligence. thoughts and those of others.
interpersonal self A sense of the self as engaged in social interactions metamemory A form of metacognition involving knowledge about
with others. what memory is, how it works, and what its limits are.
intrapersonal intelligence The ability to think about factors methylation A process in which methyl groups become attached to
governing our own mental, social, and emotional states; a form of certain DNA base pairs, usually with the result of turning off genes
emotional intelligence. that follow them in a regulatory sequence.
invisible displacement The movement of an object to a new hiding microgenetic analysis A study in which the researcher monitors the
spot when it is covered by another object and therefore not directly process of development by assessing participants every few days or
visible. weeks rather than every few years.

GLOSSARY G-7
migration The process by which cells in a developing organism move negativity bias A bias to pay more attention to and/or weigh more
to their eventual permanent destinations. heavily negative rather than positive information.
mirror neuron A neuron in the brain that is activated both when neglected child A child who does not appear to be high on either
performing an action and when perceiving it being performed by the like or dislike scale of an assessment of sociometric status.
others and that is thought to support imitation. Neglected children are often shy and withdrawn, and they are
mirror test A test of someone’s sense of self in which a mark is put largely ignored by their peers.
on a subject such that it can only be seen when the subject views neural change hypothesis An explanation of infantile amnesia
himself in a mirror. based on the idea that early memories do not become permanent
mitosis The normal process of cell division in which genetic material because of intrinsic immaturities of the child’s brain that make it
is conserved. initially unable to store information for the long term.
modeling theory An approach to learning and socialization based neural tube The round, enclosed structure that is usually formed in
on the idea that children and adults reproduce behaviors that they the first few weeks of life and that encases the spinal cord and the
observe others performing; also called social learning theory. brain.
module In Fodor’s sense, a functionally specialized cognitive system neurogenesis The making of new neurons, usually prenatally, in
that is tailored for processing certain forms of information in ways humans.
that are not influenced by other cognitive systems. neuron A brain cell containing a cell body, axon, and dendrites; also
monozygotic (MZ) twins Twins from the same zygote; often referred known as a nerve cell. Brain cells communicate with other cells
to as identical twins. both within the brain and from other parts of the body.
moral dilemma Devised by Kohlberg to study moral reasoning, an neurotransmitter A chemical that mediates transmission of impulses
ambiguous situation in which a person in a story must make a across synapses.
difficult moral decision and the participant in the study must say neurulation The formation of the neural tube through closing of the
which choice is better and why. The pattern of reasoning used by neural plate.
the participant is more important than the actual choice selected. nomothetic approach With respect to creativity, comparing the lives
moral dumbfounding The finding that in some moral situations, of especially creative individuals to look for common patterns or
people have strong convictions about what is right and wrong but principles.
are unable to explain why. normal distribution curve A plot of the distribution of scores in a
moral modules Forms of moral reasoning that have evolved to deal large population; also known as a bell curve.
with specific kinds of moral problems encountered by individuals nuclear family A family typically consisting of the mother and father
and groups. as heads of the household, along with their children.
Moro reflex A reflex found in young infants in which an abrupt lack
of support of the head results in an outward and upward movement object concept A concept of the behavior of a bounded physical object,
of the arms. which is generally studied under certain conditions of change, such
morpheme The smallest unit of language that represents a discrete as when it disappears from view.
meaning. Morphemes are not only words but also parts of words object permanence The property that objects continue to exist even
that carry meaning, such as plural endings in English. when they are out of sight.
motherese See child-directed speech. object solidity An object’s property of cohering and taking up space,
motion parallax A cue to depth that arises from the relative motion preventing other objects from passing through it.
of objects at different distances. observational study A study in which the researcher simply observes
motor deprivation A condition under which an organism is either participants acting in various contexts.
prevented from moving or not given the opportunity to pair obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) A disorder involving a
movement with perception or objects acted upon. high level of anxiety about contamination, order, loss of objects,
motor empathy A form of empathy in which a person tends to or aggressive or sexual thoughts and characterized by persistent,
automatically copy the motor actions, postures, and facial intrusive thoughts and highly repetitive checking behaviors.
expressions of another. occipital lobe A lobe in the cerebral cortex that has structures
multiple intelligences The theory that intelligence is divided into primarily concerned with processing visual information at various
eight distinct modalities that often have strong sensory or motor levels of increasing complexity.
links. operant conditioning A form of learning in which desired behaviors
mutual antipathy A pattern found in both bully-victim relationships are gradually approximated in an organism through schedules of
and inimical relationships in which two children intensely dislike positive and negative reinforcement for increasingly accurate versions
each other. of the desired behavior; also called instrumental conditioning.
mutual exclusivity A constraint on word meanings based on the operator A formal mental tool by which people mentally represent
assumption that entities do not tend to have more than one label. states and changes in the world.
myelin A fatty substance that wraps around the axons of neurons and optimization The continued perfection of a skill through hours and
speeds up the transmission of action potentials. hours of diligent practice; often a way in which older adults can do
myelination The process by which the axons of neurons are enclosed better than younger adults, who are faster on simple reaction times
in a myelin sheath. for all components of the skill.
optokinetic nystagmus method A technique used to measure
nativism A view of development that stresses the existence, at birth, of acuity, in which increasingly thin arrays of stripes are moved across
a set of different learning systems, each biased to acquire particular the infant’s visual field and the infant’s spontaneous eye tracking of
kinds of information better than others. the stripes is observed.
natural language A language that can be learned and used easily and orienting Drawing attention to a particular area so that a person can
relatively effortlessly by young humans. recognize when a stimulus occurs.

G-8 GLOSSARY
overextension A phenomenon in semantic development in which the phonology The sound patterns of a language and the rules that
child uses a word to apply to a larger set of entities than is normal govern them.
in adult usage. pictorial cue A cue to the perception of depth that arises from
overjustification effect A drop in spontaneous behavior due to information in two-dimensional pictures.
reduced motivation, produced when we perceive the behavior as place error Another name for the A-not-B error.
having been done for an external award. placenta The organ that is attached to the mother’s uterus and
overregularization The excessive use of a rule so that it applies to connected to the developing fetus by the umbilical cord and
more cases than it actually should. through which nutrients and oxygen are transferred from the
oxytocin A hormone that leads to increased levels of trust and mother and wastes and carbon dioxide from the fetus.
nurturance to members of one’s group. plasticity Flexible abilities that enable a developing organism to be
responsive to changing environmental contingencies.
parenting style The behaviors and attitudes that parents have platoon school A model of education promoted by William
toward their children, which together create a particular parenting Wirt early in the twentieth century that stressed efficiency and
environment or climate. envisioned modeling student instruction in a manner analogous to
parietal lobe A lobe in the cerebral cortex that has several functions, the new technology of assembly lines.
including processing and interpreting touch sensations, integrating pleiotropic Referring to a single gene that affects many traits.
visual and spatial information, and processing some aspects of the polygenic Referring to a trait that is affected by many genes at the
semantic properties of language. same time.
patellar reflex An early-emerging reflex, also known as the “knee popular child When sociometric status is measured, a child who is
jerk reflex,” involving the extension of the lower leg when the nominated as being liked by most children and disliked by few
tendon at the kneecap (the patella) is abruptly pressed. children, often as a result of both appealing physical attributes
pathological aging A pattern of aging that reflects the effects of and social skills. Sociometric popularity contrasts with perceived
other physiological or mental diseases or of extreme environmental popularity, which may be more related to perceived dominance
influences. and power than to kindness and trustworthiness.
peer nomination A process of measuring sociometric status or positivity bias A tendency for older adults to process information in
popularity by asking peers to name other children who they like a more positive manner than younger adults.
the most and the least or want to be friends with the most and the poverty of the stimulus argument The idea that the linguistic
least. Peer nominations are often asymmetrical. information that a child hears is so impoverished that, on its own,
peer victimization See bullying. it is inadequate to explain the ability to learn a language.
perceptual narrowing A process in which infants increase their pragmatics The ways in which language is used to effect successful
processing ability and precision in a narrow category, but often at communication in social contexts, conveying intended meanings
the expense of processing outside that category. such as inferred goals and motivations.
perceptual reasoning index A subcomponent of the WISC-IV that preferential looking method A method to determine whether a
uses pictures and other visual materials and largely avoids using subject can detect a difference between two types of displays,
language to assess intelligence. It includes items testing the ability implied when the subject looks at one display more than the
to (1) complete missing details in pictures, (2) arrange pictures other.
to form a reasonable sequence of events, and (3) use blocks to prefrontal cortex The front-most region of the frontal lobes, which
re-create abstract designs. is often heavily involved in many aspects of memory, including
perceptual-motor development Development that proceeds memory storage and retrieval and the use of various memory
through an integration of action with perceptual feedback. While strategies.
normally discussed with respect to vision, it can also apply to other prelinguistic vocalization Any of a number of sounds made by the
modalities. infant prior to the clear use of language. Vocalizations include
permissive parent A parent who adopts a style of child rearing that is babbling but can also include other earlier sounds, such as cooing
warm but sets few if any guidelines for the child’s behavior. and squealing.
personal moral situation A moral situation in which individuals are preoperational period A stage of cognitive development occurring
depicted in personal ways that invoke strong, immediate judgments after the sensorimotor period, at roughly 2 to 7 years. In this stage,
that often bypass more abstract and reflective moral reasoning. children are able to represent the world in symbolic terms, but
pervasive developmental disorder A disorder in which there is a broad have difficulty thinking nonegocentrically or considering different
spectrum of problems usually associated with delays in socialization dimensions of situations and the relations between them because
and communication. The term is often used to describe individuals they are missing mental operators.
with symptoms similar to those found in autism. prepared Having a tendency to associate a class of responses more
phenotype The physical manifestation of a gene sequence, either with easily with one class of stimuli than with another without having
respect to one trait or with respect to the entire organism, including prior experience with those stimuli.
its anatomical structures, biochemical processes, and behaviors. prereaching Mostly failed attempts to touch objects by very young
phobia An extreme, often irrational fear of a specific thing or situation. infants.
phoneme The smallest unit of a language that makes a difference in preterm infant An infant born 3 or more weeks early; also known as
word or morpheme meaning. a premature infant.
phonics approach An approach to reading that emphasizes the primacy effect When memorizing a list of items, the tendency to
sounds of letters and letter patterns and how they can be combined better recall items near the beginning of the list relative to items
into larger units. in the middle.
phonological awareness An understanding of the sound units and primary circular reaction The discovery by chance of new ways of
sequences in spoken language. acting on one’s own body.

GLOSSARY G-9
primitive streak A ridge of tissue that emerges early in prenatal radial glial cell A special glial cell that acts as a guide for the
development and that forms the basis for an environment that migration of nerve cells in areas such as the cerebral cortex.
induces changes in cells that pass through the streak to become the reactive aggression Aggression that is engaged in as retaliation for
mesoderm and endoderm. aggression against oneself.
principles and parameters approach An approach advocated by recasting Repeating back a child’s utterance to him or her, but with
Noam Chomsky that says that there are a common set of principles expansions of the sentence into a larger, grammatically correct form,
that govern the internal structure of all languages and that, early in or repeating an ungrammatical sentence back in grammatical form.
life, the child’s mind contains a large number of possible linguistic recency effect When memorizing a list of items, the tendency to
forms or alternative parameters that will later become fixed based better recall items near the end of the list relative to items in the
on the specific language the child learns. middle.
private self A sense that we have experiences that no one else has, recessive Referring to an allele that is not expressed in the phenotype
such as dreams, points of view, and thoughts. when paired with a dominant allele; if the alleles in the pair are
proactive aggression Aggression that is engaged in against another recessive homozygous, however, their properties will be expressed.
person without provocation and usually as a way of achieving a referential communications task A task in which a speaker tries to
goal, such as obtaining material goods or causing intimidation or communicate to a listener, who cannot see the speaker, a series of
suffering in a victim. operations that involve reference to a set of materials that both the
procedural memory Memory of how to perform certain actions or speaker and the listener have in front of them.
procedures; “knowing how” memory. Many procedural memories, reflex An innate response that occurs automatically to a particular
but not all, are also implicit memories. form of stimulation.
processing speed index A subcomponent of the WISC-IV that regulatory cascade A series of interactions consisting of sets of genes
measures how quickly a child seems to process information in that turn other genes on or off. When one gene can turn on other
tasks ranging from time spent searching for a target shape among genes that turn on still other genes, a cascade is said to occur.
a much larger set of shapes to tasks identifying all instances of a rehearsal A memory strategy consisting of repeating the information
target image—for example, an animal or a specific number—in a to be remembered.
very cluttered field of diverse objects. rejected child A child who is nominated as being disliked by most
production deficit An apparent inability to spontaneously use a children and liked by few children on an assessment of sociometric
strategy that would clearly improve performance on a memory status. Rejected children often interpret ambiguous situations in a
task. hostile way.
prosocial behavior Behavior that benefits other individuals, groups, relational aggression Aggression that is intended to damage a social
or the society as a whole, often at a cost to the person who engages relationship between a victim and other individuals. Gossip,
in the behavior. rumor, and ridicule are often the weapons used to damage another
prosody The acoustic properties of speech, such as intonation, person’s reputation and that person’s relationship with others.
rhythm, and pitch. reliability The capability of a research design to achieve the same
prospective memory Remembering to do a task or attain a goal in results when repeated with the same kinds of participants.
the future. replicability The ability for others to easily reproduce a study and
psychobiomarker A biological feature, such as telomere length, that find the same results.
can be used as an index or marker of a person’s psychological state, resilience The ability of some children to have very positive
indicating, for example, a recent history of high levels of stress. behavioral and psychological outcomes, despite growing up in an
psychometric approach An approach to the study of intelligence environment that normally is associated with a high incidence of
based on the scores on standardized tests administered to large behavioral and psychological problems.
groups of people. These tests tend to focus on analytical forms of resistant attachment See insecure/resistant attachment.
intelligence. resource theory The idea that the more children there are in a family,
psychopathy A disorder in which a person seems to lack empathy or the fewer resources there are for each child.
a moral sense to guide his or her actions and manipulates victims response modification A form of emotional regulation that involves
through lies, deception, and distortions. managing an emotional reaction by directly influencing the
psychosexual development A series of stages of development response itself or engaging in an activity that indirectly reduces
proposed by Freud and related to drives, instincts, and sources of anxiety or increases arousal.
pleasure, with a particular focus on sexual desire. retrieval The process of finding a memory in storage and bringing it
psychosis A loss of contact with reality, as often shown by to mind for use, usually in a conscious manner.
hallucinations and delusions in a person with schizophrenia. reversibility A mental operation, according to Piaget, that emerges in
psychosocial conflict According to Erik Erikson, a conflict that the concrete operational period and that enables the child to realize
characterizes each stage of psychosocial development and that that certain transformations on the physical world are reversible.
must be successfully resolved to form a good foundation for the riddle of reference The dilemma of knowing whether a word refers
next stage and its challenges. to a whole object, a set of its parts, or an event or action associated
with the object.
qualitative change A stagelike form of developmental change in romantic relationship A mutually recognized voluntary interaction
which a new kind of structure or process emerges that was not that is seen as more intense than other relationships and that is also
present before the change. distinguished by displays of affection, either with actual sexual
quantitative change A developmental change in which the same behavior or the anticipation of such behavior occurring.
structures and processes remain but change in magnitude—for rooting reflex A reflex found in newborns in which a gentle touch on
example, an incremental expansion to a mental process rather than the cheek results in movement of the face so as to bring the mouth
a totally new kind of mental process. around the touching object.

G-10 GLOSSARY
rumination A form of cognition in which the individual dwells sense of self A composite of the various ways an individual thinks
on negative events in ways that may help maintain a depressive about himself and has distinct kinds of self-awareness.
state. sensitive period A period in development when learning a particular
kind of information is much easier. Before or after such a period,
sampling bias A problem in research in which participants are learning is more difficult.
selected in a nonrandom manner that suggests a relationship that sensorimotor period According to Piaget, a period of development
might not really be present in a truly random sample. from birth to 2 years of age, when infants largely understand
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis The idea that specific languages powerfully the world in terms of the way they perceive and act on it and
mold thought, affecting how individuals perceive and understand understand objects primarily as embedded parts of perceptual and
the world. motor activities.
scaffolding A process through which adults and older children sensory memory A brief memory for sensory information, such as
structure the young child’s environment and social milieu in a visual images, sounds, odors, tastes, and touch.
manner that enables the child to move to new levels of cognitive separation anxiety See separation distress.
achievement. separation distress The distress felt by an infant when a specific
scheme A complex of mental structures, processes, and actions that individual with whom the infant has a specific bond leaves. The
are used to interact with the environment. infant wants that particular person—not just any social partner—
schizophrenia A cluster of disorders in which there may be to come back. Also known as separation anxiety.
hallucinations and delusions, disorganized thoughts, chaotic speech serial position curve A record of recall of a list of serially presented
and behavior, and difficulties responding and communicating items, showing different rates of recall as a function of where the
with others. items appear in the list. In adults, the curve usually has a U shape,
scientific reasoning The ability to develop and test hypotheses about with greater recall near the beginning and the end of the list.
some aspect of the world and then efficiently test those hypotheses seriation The ability to order objects according to a shared property,
with relevant data. such as length. This ability is often facilitated by transitive reasoning.
secondary circular reaction A scheme that is applied directly to sexual diffentiation A process in which differences between females
external objects (beyond the infant’s own body) and modified and males are initiated by the X and Y sex chromosomes, which
accordingly. trigger and regulate sex hormones that affect male or female
secure attachment An attachment style in which infants show some characteristics. These differences appear in major anatomical
distress when the mother leaves, but not an excessive amount, and structures, in physiological systems, and in the brain.
show positive affect when she returns. They also show substantial shape bias A putative constraint on word meaning in which labels,
exploratory behavior in the presence of the mother, using her as a when applied to objects, are assumed to apply to other objects of
secure base. the same shape.
secure base The role that a caregiver may play with respect to a shaping The gradual modification of a behavior through operant
securely attached infant, who uses the caregiver as a base from conditioning, by gradually rewarding behaviors as they come
which to explore. closer and closer to resembling a desired behavior.
security motivational system A system that has been selected for sibling differentiation A phenomenon in which siblings strive to
by evolution and that is meant to increase vigilance for future occupy contrasting social and skill niches as a way of developing
threats to one’s well-being, including clues to predators, toxins, their own distinctive identities in a family. This is in contrast to the
and harmful changes in normal routines. case where younger siblings imitate older ones.
self-concept A conscious sense of the self that involves both facts simple reaction time The time it takes to engage in a motor response
about the self and evaluative beliefs about the self. for a stimulus, such as pressing a key whenever a particular stimulus
self-conscious emotion An emotion that requires some degree of appears.
self-awareness and an evaluation of the self as distinct from others situation modification A method of emotional regulation that
and in relation to others. involves changing the circumstances that bring about an emotional
self-determination A sense of having a choice in decisions about our reaction.
life and daily activities, of feeling that we have had an important situation selection A method of emotional regulation that involves
role in determining our behaviors. choosing one’s circumstances based, in part, on the kind of
self-efficacy Our beliefs about our ability to achieve certain goals, emotional reaction they elicit.
often tied to a particular set of circumstances. situational factor A factor that arises from external circumstances
self-esteem The extent to which we value our own worth and the and influences behavior.
emotions that accompany such an assessment. social aggression A kind of aggression that includes such behaviors as
self-regulation The ability to regulate our own emotional states malicious teasing, social exclusion from a group, and humiliation.
and reactions to situations and others. This may also include the social anxiety disorder A disorder in which the individual feels
ability to understand and evaluate our emotional states and the intense anxiety in social situations, often concerning how he or she
consequences of those states for ourselves and others. is viewed by others.
semantic development The process of learning word meanings and social comparison The act of comparing ourselves to another as a way
their interrelationships by linking words to concepts and then of calibrating our standing in a group or relative to another group.
applying those concepts to objects. Such comparisons emerge strongly in the elementary school years.
semantic memory Memory for episode-independent facts, such as social convention A rule of human interaction that is jointly decided
the capital of a country or the meanings of words; a component of upon as a means of achieving some sort of coordinated activity in
declarative memory. which both parties will benefit. Such rules are usually arbitrary,
semantics The ways in which words and the relations between them such as driving on a particular side of the road, but they must be
yield meaning. honored by everyone once they are established.

GLOSSARY G-11
social information processing An approach to encoding, interpret- superego One of three components of mind described by Freud; it
ing, and responding to social cues that is often used to explain peer represents the emergence of a conscience, an internal sense of right
group acceptance or rejection. and wrong.
social intelligence The ability to manage our interactions with others. synapse The gap between two nerve cells where a signal can be
social intuitionist model A model of moral judgment in which transmitted by a neurotransmitter.
perceived violations of norms and rights automatically trigger synaptic pruning The process by which extra synaptic connections
emotions like anger or contempt without consideration of abstract are reduced in normal development.
moral principles. synaptogenesis The process by which new synapses are created.
social learning theory The idea that people tend to copy behavior syntax The ordering relations in a language that yield what is
modeled by others, especially those they like and respect; also normally thought of as a grammar.
called modeling theory.
social referencing The use of the emotional and social states of tabula rasa A “blank writing tablet” or “blank slate,” used as a meta-
others as information on how to interpret a situation. phor by empiricists to describe the newborn’s mind as completely
sociometric status A person’s social standing in a group, often malleable by experience; originally used in a Latin translation of
computed from a combination of ratings of how much the person Aristotle, but attributed to John Locke, who actually used the
is liked and disliked by peers in that group. metaphor “white paper.”
source monitoring The ability to keep track of the sources of our telegraphic speech Speech by young children that is severely
memories, such as whether we experienced them directly, learned truncated by dropping out nonessential elements such as articles,
them from someone else, or acquired them through a dream. prepositions, and pronouns.
specific bond A bond to a particular individual, usually formed at telomerase An enzyme that re-extends telomeres and which may
about 6 to 7 months. Also called specific attachment. be used by cancer cells to keep dividing in ways that exceed the
specific language impairment (SLI) A language impairment in Hayflick limit.
which there are highly specific problems with particular syntactic telomere An ending on a chromosome that is thought to shorten
structures, such as noun-verb agreement and the use of articles and with each cell division and to be the reason for the Hayflick limit.
prepositions. temperament Early emerging behavioral characteristics that
sperm cell The male gamete that combines with a female gamete distinguish one infant or young child from another, typically
(egg cell) during fertilization. understood as precursors to later emerging personality traits.
stages of development Relatively discontinuous changes in thinking temporal lobe A lobe in the cerebral cortex with structures that
and behaving, resulting in new kinds of accomplishments and process auditory information and other aspects of language
patterns of thought that were not present before that stage. meaning and that support crucial components of memory.
standard deviation An indication of how much variation there is teratogen An internal or external hazardous environmental factor
from a mean score—that is, how widely scores are distributed that can potentially cause problems during the prenatal period.
around the mean. One standard deviation encompasses roughly Teratogens include drugs, diseases, malnutrition, and environmen-
68 percent of all scores, two standard deviations encompasses tal toxins.
roughly 95 percent of all scores, and three standard deviations tertiary circular reaction A scheme used intentionally by infants
encompasses roughly 99.7 percent of all scores. to actively explore the world. With such reactions, infants start
statistical learning Learning based on the probability of events co- to recognize objects as entities in their own right, independent of
occurring or occurring in certain orders. specific schemes.
stem cell An undifferentiated cell that can become a cell of any type. theory of mind A well-developed set of untaught, intuitive beliefs about
stepping reflex A newborn reflex of engaging in repetitive stepping others’ mental states and processes and an understanding of how to
motion when held upright. use those beliefs to infer others’ goals and explain their actions.
stereopsis The fusion of an image that is seen with both eyes, a fusion theory of mind module (TOMM) A specialized, autonomous system
that uses binocular disparity to compute depth and give a sense of dedicated to processing the beliefs and mental state processes in
three-dimensionality. others.
stereotype threat The perception that an activity, usually some trait-based reasoning Thinking about an individual’s qualities and
sort of performance, such as taking a test, is governed by a behaviors in ways that focus on specific traits. (Compare evaluative
negative stereotype about the group to which one belongs. Fear of reasoning.)
confirming that stereotype then reduces task performance. transitive reasoning A way of reasoning about known relationships
still face An impassive, straight face shown by a caregiver in the still- to make logical inferences about other unknown or less direct
face task, in which the caregiver abruptly stops interacting with an relations (for example, if A is taller than B, and B is taller than C,
infant and breaks the normal cycle of social interaction by showing then A must be taller than C). Some theories have argued that
unresponsive facial expressions. young children are unable to reason transitively.
storage The process of preserving information in memory over time. trisomy 21 A defect resulting from an error in meiosis that results in
Strange Situation A series of laboratory episodes developed by Mary three chromosomes for chromosome 21 and leads to Down syndrome.
Ainsworth and used to measure the kind of attachment a child
shows to a parent. The method examines an infant’s reactions to unconditioned response (UCR) A response that is normally
unusual, mildly threatening situations in the presence of a parent associated with a stimulus without the need of associative learning.
and when the parent has left the room, as well as how the child unconditioned stimulus (UCS) A stimulus that normally elicits an
responds when the parent returns. unconditioned response.
successful aging A pattern of aging that reflects the adoption of underextension A phenomenon in semantic development in which
strategies and behaviors that optimally adapt an older person’s the child uses a word to apply to a smaller set of entities than is
changing skills and abilities to her daily activities. normal in adult usage.

G-12 GLOSSARY
unipolar depression An affective disorder in which a severe and visual flow fields The streaming visual patterns made by objects and
sustained drop in affect is often accompanied by agitation, feelings terrain over time as they flow by an observer who is either moving
of sadness and worthlessness, insomnia, and loss of appetite. or is having the environment move about her.
universal constraints Limitations on the sets of language rules that visually evoked potential (VEP) method A method of measuring
are cognitively natural, resulting in consistent patterns of linguistic at what point of resolution the changing patterns that an infant is
structure seen in all languages and thereby aiding in language watching on a screen no longer cause corresponding changes in his
acquisition. brain’s electrical activity.
U-shaped developmental curve A developmental pattern in which vitalism The belief that living things are imbued with a vital force
an early, rudimentary ability or capacity initially declines with that is the cause behind growth, movement, and possibly other
increasing age and then increases, becoming more sophisticated than biological activities.
it was at the start. This pattern is associated with the replacement of
an early system with a later-emerging, more mature one. whole language approach An approach to reading that emphasizes
utilization deficit An inability to benefit from a memory strategy reading in the context of stories, narratives, and even pictorial
when it is first used. support.
whole-object bias A bias to assume that labels refer to whole objects
validity The capability of a research design to measure what was rather than their parts, their colors, or other properties.
intended to be measured. Williams syndrome A genetic disorder leading to an elfin appearance
verbal comprehension index A subcomponent of the WISC-IV that and below-average intelligence but in which individuals seem to
measures both comprehension of language-based materials and have intact language skills while having considerable difficulties in
the ability to solve problems posed in words. It includes questions many other areas of cognition.
designed to measure vocabulary, general knowledge about the within-subjects design A research design in which the same
world, and some questions that require abstract reasoning about participants are assessed in different experimental conditions.
similarities. working memory A form of memory in which incoming information
video deficit The relative inability of younger children to learn is attended to and processed in a preliminary or limited way before
as effectively from viewing videos as from watching live it either decays or is further processed into long-term memory; also
demonstrations. referred to as short-term memory.
visual acuity Sharpness of visual perception based on the ability working memory index A subcomponent of the WISC-IV that
to see the contrasts in the world that represent lines, shapes, and assesses performance on tasks that draw on working memory. It
shadows. includes doing simple arithmetic tasks and remembering strings of
visual cliff An apparatus for assessing depth perception in infants. It digits either backwards or forwards.
consists of a large, transparent and nonreflective pane of glass with
two similar patterned displays below it. One-half of the glass pane zone of proximal development A level of cognitive attainment that
has a pattern directly beneath it, so that the surface appears solid, is the next possible achievement by a child, often made possible
and the other half of the glass pane has the same pattern roughly through adult guidance.
3 feet below, giving the impression of a sudden drop-off. If the zygote A fertilized cell formed at conception from the merging of the
infant perceives depth, she will be afraid to crawl over the half of father’s sperm and the mother’s egg.
the glass pane that appears to have a drop-off.

GLOSSARY G-13
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Society. Figure 14.19a: Chart 1 from “Family sizes in different countries”
Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 70, pp. 1715–1721 (© 2009).
from “Family size and household composition, “OECD Family
Physicians Postgraduate Press, Inc. Figure 16.9: From “Development
Database, Reprinted by permission. Figure 14.22: Figure 1: “Percentage
of depression from preadolescence to young adulthood: Emerging
of Women with a Permanent Separation or Divorce within 10 Years of a
gender differences in a 10 year longitudinal study,” by Hankin, B.L.,
First Marriage: Life Table Estimates by Education Level” from “Trends
Abramson, L.Y., Moffitt, T.E., Silva, P.A., McGee, R., & Angell,
in Marital Disollution by Women’s Education in the United States,” by
K.A., Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 107, pp. 128–141 (© 1998).
S. P. Martin, Demographic Research, 15, p. 552. Reprinted under an open
Reprinted by permission of the American Psychological Association.
access license. Figure 14.23: From “American marriage in the early twenty-
Figure 16.13: From “New findings from genetic association studies
first century.” by Cherlin, A. J. Future of Children, 15, pp. 33–55. ©
of schizophrenia,” by Williams, et al. Journal of Human Genetics, 54,
2005 Princeton University. All rights reserved.
pp. 9–14. Copyright © 2009, Nature Publishing Group, a division
of Macmillan Publishers Ltd. All rights reserved. Reprinted with
Chapter 15 permission. Figure 16.15: From “The neurodevelopmental hypothesis
Photos: 543 Alamy; 545 Siri Stafford/Getty Images; 546 © Stuart of schizophrenia,” Schizophrenia: The final frontier—Festschrift for R.
Cohen/The Image Works; 547 © Steve Skjold/Alamy; 549 Alamy; 550 M. Murray. By Karlsgodt, K. H., Ellman, L. M., Sun, D., Mittal, V., &
Cultura/Getty Images; 552 Jamie Grill/Getty Images; 554 (left) Yellow Cannon, T. D. © 2011 Psychology Press. Reprinted by permission of
Dog Productions/Getty Images; (right) © MBI/Alamy; 560 Social Taylor & Francis, Ltd.

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CHAPTER 17 with permission from Elsevier; 649 © Jon Erikson The Image Works;
Photos: 629 © Stephen Simpson Inc./Getty Images; 630 © Bettmann/ 653 (left) © ClassicStock/Alamy; (right) © Hero Images Inc./Alamy;
CORBIS; 631 AP Photo/Emilio Morenatti; 633 © Peter Titmuss/ 654 Florence Delva/Getty Images; 655 ROMEO GACAD/AFP/Getty
Alamy; 638 Erich Auerbach/Getty Images; 640 © Bob Daemmrich/ Images
The Image Works; 641 © Jack Sullivan/Alamy; 642 © Ron Berg; Drawn art: Figure 17.15: From “Personality trait stability and change,”
643 (left) Arnold Sachs/Getty Images; (right) Michel du Cille/The by Roberts, B. W., & Mroczek, D. K. Current Directions in Psychological
Washington Post via Getty Images; 646 (all) Reprinted from Trends in Science, 17, pp. 31–35 (© 2008). Reprinted by permission of the
Cognitive Sciences - Aging and motivated cognition: the positivity effect American Psychological Association.
in attention and memory by Mara Mather, Laura L. Carstensen 2005/

CREDITS AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS C-5

Name Index
Abecassis, M., 551 Amabile, T. M., 419 Asarnow, J. R., 619, 622 Baltes, P. B., 6, 638, 644
Abela, J. R., 607 Amano, S., 200 Asher, S. R., 456, 547, 557 Bamshad, M., 402
Aber, J., 537 Amato, P., 532, 533 Askew, M., 378 Banaschewski, T., 364
Aberg, M. A., 640 Amato, P. R., 534, 535 Aslin, R. N., 21, 101, 105, Bandi-Rao, S., 270
Aboud, F. E., 580 Ambady, N., 405 172, 271 Bandura, A., 456, 461, 476,
Aboudy, A., 598 Ambrose, S. E., 429 Astington, J. A., 293 477, 537, 566, 620
Abrams, D., 578 Amedi, A., 64 Astington, J. W., 436, 521 Banerjee, D., 40
Abramson, L., 419 American Psychiatric Asso- Atance, C. M., 348 Bang, M., 337
Abramson, L. Y., 606 ciation, 364, 594, 595, 596, Atkinson, J., 101 Banks, M. S., 81, 84, 89, 95
Abravenel, E., 132 604, 610 Atkinson, L., 203, 206 Banta Lavanex, P., 322
Abrous, D. N., 60 Ames, A., 89 Atladottir, H. O., 591 Bao, A. M., 474
Achilles, G., 621 Amsel, G., 165 Atran, S., 293, 327, 332, 333 Bao, X. H., 499
Acock, A. C., 535 Andersen, S. L., 65 Au, T. K., 332 Barac, R., 296
Acredolo, L. P., 170, 322 Anderson, C., 234 Audet, K., 217 Barbaro, J., 589
Adams, M., 374 Anderson, C. A., 359, 409, 560, Austin, C., 52 Barber, B. K., 507, 605
Adamson, L. B., 199, 201, 469 565, 566, 567, 568, 570, Auyeung, B., 517, 590 Bard, J. B. L., 5
Adelman, R., 631 571 Axia, G., 298 Bargh, J. A., 572
Adelson, E., 128 Anderson, D. R., 561, 562, 572 Barglow, P., 212
Adler, P., 554, 555 Anderson, J. R., 471 Bachman, J. G., 565 Barker, D. J., 34
Adler, P. A., 554, 555 Anderson, K. G., 536 Bäckman, L., 638 Barkley, R., 362, 364
Adler-Baeder, F., 536 Anderson, L. M., 213, 564, Baddeley, A. D., 291, 349 Barlow, G. W., 53
Adolph, K. E., 128, 130, 200 565, 566 Baddeley, J., 440 Barna, J., 236
Adshead, G., 621 Anderson, N. H., 436 Bagner, D., 206 Barnett, D., 203
Agras, S., 603 Anderson, P. J., 48 Bagwell, C. L., 546 Baron-Cohen, S., 483, 484,
Ahissar, M., 361 Anderson, S. W., 481 Bahrick, L. E., 110, 112 491, 590
Ahmed, A., 155 Andrews, G. S., 368 Bai, D. L., 128 Baroni, M. R., 298
Ahnert, L., 210 Angelev, J., 312 Bailey, P. E., 638 Baroody, A. J., 377
Ainsworth, M., 192, 193, 202, Anggoro, F., 333 Baillargeon, R., 158, 159, Barr, R., 561
204, 210 Anglin, D. M., 616 160, 161, 162, 174, 178, Barrett, J. R., 488, 621
Ainsworth, S. E., 499 Anglin, J. M., 273, 274, 278 179, 180, 313, 317, 318, Barrett, K. C., 230, 244, 462
Akerud, P., 66 Angold, A., 605 335, 490 Barrett, L., 484
Akiskal, H. S., 607 Angst, J., 603 Baines, P. S., 634 Barrouillet, P., 350
Aksan, N., 463 Antell, S., 166 Baird, A., 134 Barry, C. T., 612
Albano, A. M., 621 Anthony, J. L., 374 Baird, J. A., 293, 436 Barry, H., 204
Alberts, J. R., 197 Anzures, G., 97 Bakeman, R., 201 Bartlett, E., 274
Albiach-Serrano, A., 164 Apfelbaum, E. P., 578 Baker, K., 297, 609 Bartocci, M., 109
Alev, C., 45 Appel, M., 405, 571 Baker, M., 290 Barton, B. K., 363
Alexander, G. M., 517 Archibald, L. M. D., 286 Baker, R. R., 651 Barton, M., 277
Alfonso, V. C., 391 Archibald, S. L., 54 Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J., Bartoshuk, L. M., 107
Algon, S., 616 Arenas, E., 66 513 Bartsch, K., 492
Ali, M. M., 558 Arikha, N., 248 Bakwin, H., 214 Bartzokis, G., 63
Alioto, A., 267 Armor, D. J., 408, 518 Balas, B. J., 96 Barzilai, N., 635
Allen, A., 366, 441 Arnold, A., 530 Baldwin, B. A., 95 Bascandziev, I., 335
Allen, M., 48 Aronson, E., 128 Baldwin, D. A., 277 Bates, E., 201, 286, 298
Allesandri, S. M., 537 Aronson, J., 404, 405 Baldwin, L. M., 51 Bates, J. E., 247
Allison, P. D., 533 Artman, L., 413 Ball, H. L., 204 Bateson, P., 135, 136
Allport, G. W., 248 Arunachalam, S., 275, 277 Ball, K., 651 Batsche, G. M., 550
Alvarez, J. M., 494 Arvidsson, A., 66 Ball, W., 469 Batterman, N., 279

N-1
Bauer, P. J., 347, 348, 349, 355 Bhugra, D., 615 Bos, H., 531 Brown, R., 263, 267, 269, 553
Baumeister, R. F., 475, 479, 550 Bialystok, E., 296, 297 Bos, K. J., 218, 475 Brown, R. T., 403
Baumrind, D., 506, 507 Bianchi, S. M., 515, 529, 532 Bos, P. A., 591 Browne, A., 537
Bavelier, D., 63, 569 Bickerton, D., 290 Bostic, J. Q., 599 Brownell, C., 546, 548, 555,
Bayley, N., 118, 396 Bidell, T. R., 313 Bouchard, T. J., Jr., 392, 399 557
Baylies, M. K., 40 Biederman, J., 366 Boucher, B. H., 137 Brownell, K. D., 598
Beaton, A. E., 378 Bierman, K. L., 557 Bouma, G., 263 Bruck, M., 360
Beauchamp, G. K., 107, 109 Bigi, L., 362 Bourne, E. J., 441 Bruder, C. E., 43
Beck, A. T., 620 Bigler, R. S., 553, 576, 577, 580 Bouvier, P., 537 Bruer, J. T., 181, 415
Becker, A., 569 Binet, A., 387 Bowden, C. L., 607 Brumariu, L. E., 210, 593
Beckers, T., 620 Birch, S. A., 493 Bower, T. G. R., 95, 155 Brumback, R. A., 366
Beckett, K., 40 Birch, S. A. J., 489 Bowlby, J., 192, 193, 208, 222 Brumberg, J. J., 599
Bedford, F., 127 Birdsong, D., 283 Bowman, L. L., 277 Bruner, J., 200, 264
Bednar, D. E., 508 Biro, S ., 182 Boyatzis, R. E., 390 Bruner, J. S., 338
Beers, L., 526 Bisanz, J., 413 Boykin, A. W., 410, 411 Brush, T., 418
Beilock, S., 405 Bishop, D. V. M., 39, 286 Boynton, R. M., 84, 85 Bryan, W. L., 635
Beitchman, J. H., 537 Bjerkedal, T., 518 Boysen, S. T., 471 Bryant, P., 314, 315, 318, 374
Bekkering, H., 172, 173 Bjork, E. L., 155 Brackett, M. A., 395 Bryant, S. L., 494
Bell, M. A., 348, 481 Bjorklund, A., 66 Braddick, O., 101 Bryant-Waugh, R., 598
Bell, R. Q., 511 Bjorklund, D. F., 350, 352, 536 Bradshaw, K., 457 Buchanan, C. M., 521, 534,
Bell, S. M., 192 Bjorklund, F., 247, 446 Brady, E. U., 592 605
Bellgrove, M. A., 365 Black, J. E., 63, 64 Braine, M. D. S., 267 Buckner, J. C., 453
Bellugi, U., 265, 285, 286, 288 Black, S. E., 518, 528 Brainerd, C., 313 Bugental, D. B., 463, 512, 513
Belmont, M., 408 Blades, M., 348 Brainerd, C. J., 360, 361 Buhrmester, D., 547
Belsky, J., 204, 212, 511, 529 Blair, C., 392, 481 Bramlett, M. D., 532 Buhrmester, M. D., 475
Beltz, A. M., 516, 517 Blair, K. S., 610 Branchi, I., 513 Bukowski, W., 548
Bem, D. J., 441 Blair, R. J. R., 455, 456, 610, Brannock, J., 312 Bukowski, W. M., 608
Bem, S. L., 515 612, 613, 614 Brannon, E. M., 167, 169 Bulik, C. M., 601
Benenson, J. F., 547 Blais, J. J., 572, 573, 574 Brans, R. G., 399 Bull, R., 401
Bengtsson, S. L., 64 Blakemore, S. J., 62 Bransford, J. D., 419 Bullock, M., 335
Benjet, C., 460 Blanchard-Fields, F., 639 Brassard, M. R., 537 Bumpass, L. L., 532, 535
Bennett, A. J., 221 Blank, M., 318 Brauer, J., 486 Bumpus, M. F., 509
Benson, J. B., 165 Blascovich, J., 474 Braungart, J. M., 239 Burchinal, M. R., 529
Bent-Goodley, T. B., 538 Blass, E., 107 Braungart-Rieker, J. M., 204 Burdge, G. C., 40
Bentley, A., 509 Blatt, S. J., 605 Brendgen, M., 454 Bureau of Labor Statistics, 529
Berchtold, N. C., 640 Bleakley, A., 569 Brennan, P., 615 Burgess, N., 322
Berenbaum, S. A., 516 Bleuler, E., 614, 615 Brent, D. A., 621, 623 Burke, P. B., 207
Berenthal, B. I., 122, 124, Bloch, M. H., 595, 596, 597 Brent, M., 273 Burn, J., 54
128, 129 Bloechlinger, S., 66 Brentari, D., 284 Bushman, B. J., 564, 565, 566,
Bergan, J. F., 103 Bloom, L., 265 Bretherton, I., 194 567, 571
Berger, C., 551 Bloom, P., 5, 235, 246, 273, Brewer, M. B., 494 Bushnell, I. W. R., 96
Berkeley, G., 88, 123 278, 283, 293, 299, 379, Brewer, S., 40 Buss, A. H., 248
Berko-Gleason, J., 266 447, 487, 489, 492, 493 Brewer, W. F., 336, 369, 370 Butler, A. C., 620
Berlin, B., 85, 327 Blossfeld, I., 108 Brickman, D., 553 Butler, R., 553
Berlin, L. J., 593 Blumberg, H. P., 609 Bridges, K. M., 230 Buttelman, D., 484
Bernal, S., 158 Blumenthal, A. L., 139 Broadbent, D., 359 Butterfill, S., 491
Berndt, T. J., 548 Bodemer, D., 419 Brody, G. H., 521 Butterworth, B., 169, 325
Berninger, G., 298 Boden, M. A., 157 Bronfenbrenner, U., 441, 510 Butzin, C. A., 436
Bernstein, G. A., 592 Bogdan, R., 222 Bronson, G. W., 231
Bernstein, N., 120 Bohannon, J. N., 267 Bronstein, P., 205 Cahan, S., 413
Berscheid, E., 555 Bokhorst, C. L., 207 Brooks-Gunn, J., 471, 505, Cairns, R. B., 557
Bertamini, M., 335 Boland, A. M., 356 510, 605 Calamari, J. E., 596
Bertelsen, A., 616 Bonatti, L., 174 Brossard, L. M., 140 Calders, Y. M., 516
Bertin, E., 95, 199, 469 Boney-McCoy, S., 537 Brotman, M. A., 609 Caldi, S., 174
Best, J. R., 361, 363 Boo, K., 51 Brower, T., 110 Caldji, C., 512
Betancur, C., 588 Booth, A., 534 Brown, A. A., 171 Calkins, S. D., 207, 238, 239
Bethea, C. L., 221 Borer, H., 283 Brown, A. L., 306, 367, 368, Call, J., 182, 289, 485
Bettelheim, B., 591 Bornstein, D., 410, 411 413, 415 Callender, W. M., 216
Beugnon, G., 170 Bornstein, M. H., 85, 174, Brown, A. M., 88 Callistel, C. R., 168
Bezdjian, S., 613 245, 397 Brown, A. S., 618 Calvert, C., 571
Bhatt, R. S., 95, 96 Boroditsky, L., 292 Brown, B. B., 508, 554, 623 Calvert, S. L., 562
Bherer, L., 640 Borton, R. W., 110 Brown, P., 298 Camara, K. A., 534

N-2 NAME INDEX

Cameron, C. E., 481, 482 Cavalli-Sforza, L. L., 402 Chuang, Y. C., 48 Connor, C., 449
Cameron, J., 498, 499 Cayre, M., 60 Ciarrochi, J., 390 Connor, C. M., 374
Cameron, L., 523 Ceci, S. J., 356, 360, 402, 412, CIA World Facebook, 8 Connor-Smith, J. K., 624
Camos, V., 350 413 Cicchetti, D., 203 Conry-Murray, C., 576, 577
Campbell, A., 576 Centers for Disease Control and Cillessen, A. H. N., 555, 556 Conway, M. A., 356
Campbell, D. B., 206 Prevention, 532 Cimpian, A., 317, 318 Conway, P. F., 378
Campione, J. C., 306, 413 Cerella, J., 635 Cirillo, K. J., 551 Cook, M., 243
Campos, J. J., 199, 230, 232, Cervera, M. D., 253 Claes, S., 616 Cooke, L. J., 499
234, 236, 237, 247, 249 Chabris, C. F., 106 Clahsen, H., 283 Coontz, S., 212
Camras, L. A., 231, 234 Chae, C. H., 640 Clark, C. A., 376 Cooper, H., 412
Candee, D., 448 Chaiken, M., 133 Clark, E. V., 263, 277, 278, 644 Cooper, R. G., 166
Cannon, M., 616 Chamarro-Premuzic, T., 390 Clark, H., 492 Cooper, R. P., 101
Cantor, N., 395 Chambers, J., 497 Clark, H. H., 298 Coppola, M., 284
Canty, N., 92 Champagne, D. L., 221, 512 Clarke-Stewart, A., 360 Corbo, M., 66
Caputi, M., 558 Champagne, F. A., 69, 513 Clarke-Stewart, K. A., 191, 194, Corcoran, C., 615
Caramazza, A., 335 Chan, M. E., 291 212, 529, 534 Corrado, R. R., 611
Caravita, S. C. S., 551 Chan, R. W., 531 Claxton, L. J., 125 Corriveau, K. H., 337, 371
Card, N. A., 551 Chance, B., 21 Cleckley, H., 610 Cosgrove, K. P., 401
Carey, G., 598 Chandler, M., 253 Clement, J., 335 Cosmides, L., 429
Carey, S., 165, 169, 172, 173, Chandler, M. J., 436 Clifford, A., 291 Costa, P. T., 643, 644
183, 274, 293, 320, 326, Chang, C., 298 Clifford, S. M., 589 Costanzo, P. R., 436
329, 330, 364, 369 Chang, L. T., 522 Clifton, R., 101, 122, 124, 125 Costello, E. J., 592
Carlat, D. J., 602 Chao, R. K., 509 Cliquet, R., 525 Cotman, C. W., 640
Carle, A. C., 604 Chapa, C., 174 Closson, L. M., 555 Cotter, D., 212
Carlo, G., 448 Chapman, C., 572, 573 Coghill, D., 364 Cotugno, A. J., 365
Carlson, J., 402 Charach, A., 366 Cohen, D., 356, 574 Courage, M. L., 81, 348,
Carlson, M., 218 Charles, S. T., 645 Cohen, L., 169 349, 353
Carlson, S. M., 479 Charman, T., 589 Cohen, L. B., 30, 165 Covatto, A. M., 546
Carnagey, N. L., 566 Charness, N., 569 Cohen, L. G., 64 Covey, E., 107
Carone, B. R., 40 Chase, W. G., 352 Cohen, S., 215 Cowan, C. P., 510
Caronna, E. B., 589 Chaudhuri, K. R., 634 Cohen-Brendahan, C. C., Cowan, N., 346
Carpendale, A. B., 201 Chauvel, G., 639 516, 517 Cowan, P. A., 510
Carpendale, J. I. M., 201 Cheatham, C. L., 355 Cohen-Kettenis, P., 474 Cowan, W. M., 59
Carpenter, M., 200, 487 Cheek, N. H., 555 Cohen-Woods, S., 605 Cowie, F., 16
Carr, A., 622 Cheema, I., 416, 417 Cohn, J., 231 Cox, M. J., 206
Carr, N., 419 Chen, D. W., 545 Cohn, J. F., 199, 469 Coyle, J. T., 604
Carriger, M. S., 397 Chen, X., 522, 528, 575, 576 Cohn, L. D., 645 Coyle, T. R., 350, 391
Carrington, H., 234 Chen, Y., 123 Coie, J. D., 554, 557 Craddock, N., 609
Carroll, A. E., 551 Chen, Y. R., 494 Colapinto, J., 473 Crago, M. B., 286
Carroll, J. J., 86 Cheney, D.L., 484 Colby, A., 439 Craig, D., 448
Carruthers, P., 16, 293 Cheng, K., 170, 171, 322, 324 Colcombe, S., 640 Craig, J. M., 43
Carstensen, L. L., 645, 646, 647 Cherlin, A. J., 525, 532, 534 Cole, D. A., 496 Craig, W. M., 550
Carter, A. S., 206 Cherney, I. D., 380 Cole, M. W., 391 Craighero, L., 134
Cartwright-Hatton, S., 592, 621 Cheshire, A., 26 Cole, P. M., 244, 455, 575 Crain, S., 263, 265
Carver, K., 552 Chess, S., 249 Coles, R., 612 Crawford, M. L. J., 88
Casey, B. J., 63, 65, 67, 348, Chi, M. T. H., 280, 352, 353 Colletti, V., 102 Crawley, S. L., 349
365 Chierchia, G., 277 Collier, V. P., 297 Creighton, M. R., 234
Cash, T. F., 600 Child Welfare Information Collins, M. D., 54 Cremer, T., 632
Cashon, C. H., 30 Gateway, 538, 539 Collins, R. L., 569 Creswell, C., 621
Caspari, R. E., 633 Chipungu, S. S., 538 Collins, W. A., 210, 552, 553 Crick, N. R., 546, 547, 551,
Casper, L. M., 532 Chiu, J., 522 Colom, R., 400 556, 557, 608
Casper, R. C., 601 Choe, K., 595 Colombo, J., 397 Crisafi, M. A., 274
Caspi, A., 221, 252 Chomsky, N., 13, 269, 272, Colonnesi, C., 593 Cristofalo, V. J., 631
Cassiba, R., 207 280 Comeau, L., 298 Crockenberg, S. C., 207
Cassidy, J., 208, 210, 214, 593 Chong, S., 348 Comstock, G., 560, 563, Crocker, C. T., 475
Cassidy, K. W., 487 Chorpita, B. F., 592, 593 565, 566 Crocker, J., 479
Castellanos, F. X., 365 Christakis, N. A., 558, 559, 560 Condry, J., 497 Crockett, L., 555
Castles, A., 375 Christakos, A., 547 Condry, J. C., 564, 568 Croft, C. M., 207
Cattagni, A., 419 Christian, D., 297 Conel, J., 62 Cronbach, L., 253, 416
Cattaneo, K., 116 Christian, V., 286 Conel, J. L., 117 Crouter, A. C., 509
Cattell, R. B., 248, 392, 636 Chronis-Tuscano, A., 592 Conger, D., 297 Crowder, R. G., 373
Caughy, M. O. B., 213 Chu, A. T., 64 Conley, D., 504, 520 Crowley, K., 515, 634

NAME INDEX N-3

Crozier, W. R., 546 Dehaene, S., 169 Donlan, C., 325 Eley, T. C., 595, 604
Crystal, D. S., 235 De Jong, P. F., 374 Doris, J. M., 444 Elliott, J. M., 291
Csibra, G., 200, 201 de Kieviet, J. F., 48 Dornbusch, S. M., 552 Ellis, E. M., 533
Csikszentmihalyi, M., 420 de la Haye, K., 558 Dorris, L., 591 Ellis, M., 612
Cuban, L., 418 Delaney, J., 634 Douglas, A. S., 412 Ellis, N. C., 291
Cuddy, A. J. C., 654 Delate, T., 623 Douglas, R. N., 352 Ellwood, D. T., 530
Cummings, E. M., 155 Del Carmen, R., 206 Dovidio, J. F., 456, 580 Elman, J. L., 98
Cunitz, A. R., 349 DeLoache, J. S., 142, 243, 246, Dowell, R., 102 Elsabbagh, M., 589
Cunningham, W. A., 239 322, 353, 378, 379 Doyle, A. B., 580 Eluvathinga, T. J., 64
Curley, J. P., 221, 513 DelVecchio, W. F., 644 Doyle, L. W., 48 Elvevag, B., 615
Currin, A., 599 de Maat, S., 621 Doyle, O., 181 Eme, R. F., 615
Curtiss, S., 282, 408 Deming, D., 511 Drabman, R. S., 566 Emerson, P. E., 216
Cushman, F., 430 Demo, D. H., 535 Drachman, D. A., 651 Emery, R. E., 534
Cushman, F. A., 446 Dennett, D. C.., 157 Draghi-Lorenz, R., 234 Enard, W., 287
Cutting, J. E., 129 Dennis, M. G., 118, 119 Drake, A. J., 40 Englis, B. G., 456
Cvencek, D., 576 Dennis, W., 118, 119 Drananski, B., 64 Enns, M. P., 109
Cyranoski, D., 44 Denton, K., 439 Driesenga, A., 488 Epel, E. S., 632
Czeizel, A. E., 37 DePaulo, J. R., Jr., 609 Driscoll, I., 634 Erber, J. T., 654
Deppe, A. M., 164 Duckworth, A. L., 390 Erickson, J. E., 332, 371
Dabbagh, N., 419 Derisley, J., 621 Duff, S. J., 400 Erickson, K. I., 640
Dabholkar, A. S., 348 Derringer, J., 243, 244 Duit, R., 415 Erickson, R. P., 107
Dahl, R. E., 64 Derringer, J. L., 142 Dunbar, K., 369 Erickson, S. J., 621
Dale, P. S., 417 D’Esposito, M., 346 Duncan, S., 54 Ericsson, K. A., 420, 569, 637
Daley, T. C., 407 Detterman, D. K., 387, 390 Duncker, K., 417, 420 Erikson, E., 649
Dallam, S. J., 537 Dettman, S., 102 Dunham, Y., 577, 578 Erlenmeyer-Kimling, L., 616
Daly, M., 645 Deveney, C. M., 609 Dunn, J., 453, 520, 521 Ernst, M., 51
Damon, W., 442, 470, 474 de Vignemont, F., 456 Durbin, D. L., 508 Esbjørn, B. H., 593
Dan, N., 335 de Villiers, J. G., 263, 293, 492 Durfee, H., 214 Espelage, D. L., 550, 551
Dann, S., 215, 544 de Villiers, P. A., 263, 293, 492 Durston, A. J., 54 Espinoza, F., 335
Danovitch, J., 246 Devlin, B., 591, 601 Dweck, C. S., 497 Essex, M. J., 513
Danovitch, J. H., 372 Devlin, M.J., 599 Dwyer, S., 446 Estell, D. B., 555
Darling, N., 509 De Vos, G., 234 Dye, M. W., 63 Esterbrook, M. A., 96
Darlington, R. B., 409 DeVos, J., 159 Dykas, M. J., 201 Evans, D., 170
Darwin, C., 245 Dew, P. C., 48 Evans, E. D., 448
Das, J., 611 de Waal, F. B. M., 455 Earls, F., 218 Exterkate, C. C., 600
Dasen, P. R., 312 Dewar, K., 174 Easterbrook, M. A., 95 Eyestone, L. L., 365
Davey, G. C. L., 247 Dewey, J., 410 Eaton, W. W., 615 Eysenck, H. J., 453, 454
Davies, I. R. L., 85 De Wolff, M. S., 205 Ebbeson, E. B., 478, 479 Eysenck, R., 417
Davila, J., 608 Diamond, A., 155, 156, 157, Eberstadt, N., 528
Davis, B. L., 264 361, 363, 365 Eccleston, C. P., 478 Faban, J. W., 140
Davis, P. E., 549 Diamond, J., 631 Eckert, M. A., 286 Fabes, R. A., 462, 546
Davis, S. F., 448 Diaz, R. M., 296 Ecuyer-Dab, I., 400 Fagan, J. F., 397
Davis-Kean, P. E., 408, 477 Dickens, W. T., 407 Edvardsen, J., 609 Falbo, T., 522, 528
Davydov, V. V., 414 Diener, E., 481 Edwards, C. P., 439 Falch, T., 412
Dawel, A., 612 Diforio, D., 618 Edwards, L., 69 Falck-Ytter, T., 589
Dawes, S. E ., 637 Di Giorgio, E., 96 Edwards, R. G., 52 Fan, J., 362, 365
Dawood, K., 53 Dijkstra, J. K., 558 Effros, R. B., 632 Fantz, R. L., 93
Dayan, E., 64 Dimmock, P. S., 546 Egeland, B., 537 Faraone, S. V., 366
Deagle, E. A., 600 Dishion, T. J., 250, 548 Egliston, K. A., 594, 620 Farnill, D., 436
Dean, D., 522 Dissanayake, C., 589 Ehri, L., 374 Farrington, D. P., 551
Dearing, E., 213 Dixon, R. A., 638 Eiholzer, U., 536 Farroni, T., 96
Deary, I. J., 399, 400, 636 Dobkins, K. R., 83 Eimas, P. D., 104, 105 Fauber, R., 533
DeBell, M., 572, 573 Dodd, J., 60 Einav, S., 495 Favaro, A., 598, 602
Decarie, T. G., 196 Dodge, K. A., 512, 514, 550, Ein-Dor, T., 203 Fawcett, S. L., 88
Decarie, T. J., 140 551, 555, 556, 557, 575 Einstein, G. O., 638 Fazel-Zandy, S., 125
DeCasper, A. J., 100 Doescher, S. M., 137 Eisenberg, J., 443, 454, 455 Fazio, R. H., 580
Decety, J., 134, 237, 455 Doherty, J. P., 522 Eisenberg, L. S., 102 Fees, R. C., 105
Deci, E. L., 497, 499 Dolan, M., 611 Eisenberg, N., 238, 239, 244, Feigenson, L., 168
De Dreu, C. K., 196 Dolinoy, D. C., 39, 40 430, 450, 453, 455, 456, Feinberg, M. E., 520
DeFries, J. C., 375 Domes, G., 513 462, 463 Feinman, S., 199
De Groot, A. D., 352 Donaldson, M., 317, 319 Eisenberger, R., 498, 499 Feldman, H., 284
de Haan, M., 349, 518 Donaldson, R., 318 Ekman, P., 229, 230 Feldman, J., 397

N-4 NAME INDEX

Feldman, R., 196, 197, 513 Fraley, R. C., 207, 210 Garmezy, N., 253 Giraud, A. L., 375
Felser, C., 283 Franchak, J. M., 128 Garnett, R. S., 570 Girgus, J. S., 603
Feng, X., 593 Francis, D. J., 374 Garon, N., 361, 479, 481