9B13N013

HUAWEI ENTERS THE UNITED STATES1

Tim Simpson wrote this case under the supervision of Professor Ilan Alon solely to provide material for class discussion. The
authors do not intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised
certain names and other identifying information to protect confidentiality.

This publication may not be transmitted, photocopied, digitized or otherwise reproduced in any form or by any means without the
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Copyright © 2013, Richard Ivey School of Business Foundation Version: 2013-07-23

Huawei Technologies Corporation had a company vision to become not only a global technology leader,
but also an international giant, competing with such telecommunication equipment firms as Cisco
Systems. To make this a reality, Huawei needed to increase its presence in one of the largest markets for
telecommunications equipment products and services, the United States. Ren Zhengfei, CEO of Huawei,
led Huawei in its transformation from a company focused on the domestic Chinese market into an
international competitor involved in partnerships with all the major European operators, with the majority
of its sales coming from international contracts. Huawei had established four R&D centers in the United
States by 2001 and formed the joint venture H3C with American electronics manufacturer 3Com in
2003.2 However, Huawei was running into resistance in the U.S. market, and its presence in the market
was small compared to its relative international success. The U.S. Committee on Foreign Investment in
the United States (CFIUS)3 had blocked deals involving Huawei on the grounds that Huawei had possible
ties to the Chinese government, and the strategic nature of the telecommunications industry made such
deals potential threats to national safety and security.4

In May 2010, Huawei bought assets of the American server technology company, 3Leaf, but did not file
the acquisition with CFIUS until November of that year.5 In February 2011, CFIUS recommended that
Huawei voluntarily deconstruct its purchase of 3Leaf assets. This would cause Huawei to incur some
financial costs for canceling the deal, but more importantly, Huawei executives felt it was a major blow to
their reputation as a trustworthy international company. Huawei had been in the process of transforming
into an international company for over a decade but was running into a ceiling in the U.S. market.
Questions arose as to whether they could ignore the recommendation by CFIUS or whether there was
something that they could do as a company to gain approval from the U.S. authorities. Huawei executives
needed to decide how to respond to the recommendation by CFIUS and the possible outcomes for the
future of their company.

HUAWEI FROM 1987 TO 2000

In less than two decades, the privately held company grew from an importer of basic telecommunications
equipment into a telecommunications giant, supplying equipment and services to millions of people

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Page 2 9B13N013

across the globe and applying for a total of 10,650 patents under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) by
6
2011.

Zhengfei founded Huawei in the city of Shenzhen after the Engineering Corps of the People’s Liberation
Army, in which he was a deputy director, was disbanded in 1987.7 He used RMB21,0008 (equal to $4,400
at that time) of his own money to begin importing basic telecommunications equipment from Hong Kong
and sell it to vendors in China9. When that business became saturated with competitors, Huawei began to
develop and manufacture its own equipment. Choosing to design and manufacture products without a
relationship or joint venture with a foreign multinational partner was unique for a homegrown Chinese
company. Huawei’s first focus was on the rapidly expanding domestic market, where telephone
subscriptions grew 15.5 times from 1992 to 2000 and mobile phone subscriptions grew 500 times over the
11
same time period.10 There is little doubt that during this time, Zhengfei’s guanxi network, which likely
reached deep into the Chinese military and Chinese Communist Party hierarchy, was an invaluable asset
to the company for winning large state contracts and obtaining cheap financial support from state-owned
12
banks. However, Zhengfei was a particularly reclusive CEO, never granting interviews or making
public appearances, which did not help Huawei when rumors about ties to the military and the Party
started to spread in later years.

In early 2000, sensing an imminent end to sustained growth in China, Huawei’s vision evolved as it
focused on becoming an international competitor. Huawei’s internationalization strategy was very
successful, first winning international contracts from neighbouring Asian countries, and then moving into
developing markets in the African and Latin American regions. Huawei’s main advantage was its ability
to provide quality equipment and service for about 30 per cent less than its global competitors. This
advantage was largely due to the abundance of Chinese engineers, who could be paid much less than their
foreign counterparts. Huawei recognized this comparative advantage early on and made R&D a
cornerstone of its marketing strategy, with a standard company policy to invest no less than 10 per cent of
13
annual revenue in R&D (see Exhibit 1 for financial highlights).

THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY FROM 1960 TO 2000

The telecommunications industry is one of the most important industries to emerge over the last four
decades, as it accounts for a major share of the global economic growth and technological innovation.
Globalization has also played a major role in the rapidly evolving make-up of the industry. In the 1960s
and 1970s, the telecommunications industry had few equipment suppliers. Most suppliers specialized in a
single product category and supply chains were decentralized, serving regional markets with regional
14
subsidiary suppliers. But in the 1980s, digital technology changed the industry. Product lines became
much more diverse, and global organizations started to form with integrated, centralized supply chains
that increased production volume and decreased unit costs. By the 1990s, network equipment suppliers
evolved into providers of entirely integrated telecommunication systems. The market for global
networking products went from $15 billion in 1995 to $50 billion in 2000. Although the dot-com bubble
would result in a cooling down of the telecom industry, it did not prevent the emergence of new
technology that would continue to drive the industry.

Foreign multinational telecom firms had been in China since the 1980s. Most foreign multinationals had
to form joint ventures with local Chinese companies in order to enter the potentially massive Chinese
market. Foreign multinational telecom firms not only added to the growth of China’s telecommunications
infrastructure during this time, but also contributed to the growth of domestic manufacturers. The
presence of foreign multinational firms greatly accelerated the evolution of domestic telecom

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Page 3 9B13N013

manufacturers, from positions far behind industry competitors in the early 1980s into positions where
they were domestically competitive in the switch industry by the early 1990s; by the late 1990s, they were
in positions as major domestic players, beginning to go abroad in a wide variety of product categories. In
2001, the leading firms in the global telecom equipment industry were Ericson, Nortel, Nokia, Lucent,
15
Cisco, Siemens, Motorola and Alcatel (see Exhibit 2). In 2011, the leading firms in the global telecom
equipment industry were Ericsson, Huawei, Alcatel-Lucent, Nokia Siemens Networks, ZTE, Cisco and
16
Motorola (see Exhibit 3).

The landscape and the players in the telecom industry changed quite dramatically between 2000 and
2011, which led to a new set of issues for telecom industry players to manage. Prices became more
competitive as accessibility to cheaper R&D skill became more available. The market for
telecommunications equipment shifted toward major investments into the construction of wireless
networks, with major profits being made in software and services.17 Consumers demanded high-quality
products and services as well as leading-edge technology, which opened up new markets and room for
expansion. The growing perception of cyber-security and the possible threats to information systems
challenged the reputations of individual companies, as well as the industry as a whole, because of the
interdependence of global supply chains.

Both the Chinese and U.S. governments indicated that the telecommunications sector played a critical role
in national and security interests. Some members of the media were critical of the fact that the Communist
Party of China “ensured that ‘national champions’ dominate through a combination of market
protectionism, cheap loans, tax and subsidy programs, and diplomatic support in the case of offshore
markets.”18 Other members of the media criticized the U.S. telecom industry as being a “good old boys”
19
network that catered to incumbent relationships and kept new players out. International trade followers
described the issue of telecommunications in foreign and international trade policy as “the mother of all
cases” because of the huge commercial and strategic value of the industry (see Exhibit 4 and Exhibit 5).20

CFIUS

The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States is an inter-agency committee composed of the
heads of the Department of Commerce, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice,
the Department of Defense and five other departments and offices. 21 The committee is authorized to
review transactions that could result in control of a U.S. company involved in interstate commerce by a
foreign entity or foreign persons. This is not limited to transactions involving majority shares, but any
transactions that result in controlling power of any sort. The process involves a voluntary filing by a U.S.
company that is looking to sell equity or to be acquired. The filing includes a description of business
lines, which includes clear and detailed accounts of each company’s products and services, and a
description of the transaction, which includes clear descriptions of all entities involved and the nature and
structure of the transaction. CFIUS also suggests submitting organizational charts showing the control
and ownership interests of the foreign persons who are party to the transaction, as well as information
related to the foreign persons and their parents.

Each notice of transaction is reviewed, and further investigation may occur based on the buyer’s country
of origin and the industry in which the purchase is involved, such as the banking, transportation,
infrastructure or technology industries (see Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 7 for transaction details).

Ninety-three notices of transactions were filed with CFIUS in 2010, of which CFIUS conducted
subsequent investigations with respect to 35.22 Twelve of the notices were withdrawn (see Exhibit 8). In

This document is authorized for use by Sze Ching Cecilia Chow, from 12/1/2018 to 4/1/2019, in the course:
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Page 4 9B13N013

five of these cases, the parties filed a new notice. In five other cases, the parties abandoned their
transactions. In two cases, the parties withdrew and re-filed in 2011. If a transaction occurs without a
notice being filed to CFIUS, the committee can intervene at any time and undo the deal.

HUAWEI IN INTERNATIONAL MARKETS

By 2005, Huawei had captured 30 per cent of China’s domestic market, 23 had international contracts
24
exceeding domestic sales and was employing 30,000 people worldwide. Huawei brought in world-class
management consultants from IBM, PriceWaterhouseCooper, Intel and Microsoft to bring the company
up to modern and efficient global management standards. The company expanded into developed
European markets, first winning contracts from budget-constrained operators, but eventually winning
contracts from a number of major operators. By the end of 2007, Huawei had a partnership with all the
top European operators, such as France Telecom, Vodafone and the BT Group.

Huawei formed a joint venture, H3C, with the American electronics manufacturer 3Com in 2003, but it
still had little presence in the United States market relative to its international success. H3C would raise
the profile of Huawei in the U.S. market, and 3Com found the joint venture successful enough to buy out
25
Huawei’s 51 per cent share in 2006. However, when Huawei teamed up with Bain Capital to purchase
3Com in 2008, security concerns at CFIUS about the acquisition led to the termination of the deal. A Bain
Capital press release stated that they were informed that CFIUS intended to take action to prohibit the sale
if the deal was to continue. The U.S. Department of Defense had used 3Com products for cyber security
intrusion detection, which was a major red flag for U.S. policy makers.
26
The reclusiveness of Ren Zhengfei, who had never released more than a 200-word biography or granted
an interview, as well as the lack of transparent corporate governance or transparent company ownership
and the lack of a single non-Chinese member in the “inner-management sanctum,” made it very hard to
see the inner-workings of Huawei. 27 However, Xinhua News, the vehicle of the Communist Party of
China, described the problems as the struggle of a highly competitive, non-Western company with the
“rising protectionist sentiments in the United States,” which were possibly planted by the hometown
favorite, Cisco Systems.28

In 2010, Huawei had $22 billion in sales and was becoming one of the world’s top three sellers of telecom
equipment. 29 Huawei partnered with a newly formed consulting company, Amerilink Telecom Corp.,
which could have been a way for Huawei to win business from Sprint. Amerilink was located in Sprint’s
hometown and was composed of a former vice-chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and former
Sprint executives. However, Huawei and fellow Chinese telecom supplier ZTE were excluded from the
$5 billion contract to build a 4G network for Sprint Nextel Corporation. Several U.S. senators had sent
letters to the Obama administration expressing their concerns about Huawei potentially gaining access to
and undermining the critical U.S. telecom infrastructure. The U.S. Commerce Secretary, Gary Locke, also
personally called Sprint’s CEO, Dan Hesse, to discuss concerns about awarding the contract to a Chinese
firm. Both Huawei and ZTE submitted bids that were lower than those of the other competitors.30

A LESSON

In the summer of 2011, Huawei was the world-leading ICT provider, providing services to one-third of
the world’s population with operations in 140 countries.31 Huawei was popularly labeled as China’s most
successful privately held company and one of China’s “national champions.” However, the overly private
nature for which the company had become known and its popularly assigned title as a Chinese National

This document is authorized for use by Sze Ching Cecilia Chow, from 12/1/2018 to 4/1/2019, in the course:
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Page 5 9B13N013

Champion seemed to be impediments to further expansion of its global business, particularly in the U.S.
market.32

In February 2011, CFIUS recommended that Huawei voluntarily deconstruct its purchase of assets in the
American computer company, 3Leaf Systems. Huawei had not immediately disclosed the purchase to
CFIUS in the spring of 2010, which some cite as the cause of the deal’s failure. Teng Bingsheng, a
Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business (CKGSB) professor of strategy, saw the ordeal as a lesson for
Huawei, courtesy of the U.S. Government; if Huawei wanted to operate in the U.S. market, it had to play
by the rules and respect the authorities.33 Xinhua News saw this as the U.S. government again interfering
with its “valued fair market system” by preventing beneficial business that would bring much-needed
jobs, investment and spending to a slowing U.S. economy.34 Xinhua News also noted the “very dangerous
market-distorting policy precedent” the U.S. government was setting and the possible consequential
dangers to U.S. companies operating overseas. Other than the lost financial costs of canceling the deal
with 3Leaf, Huawei executives felt that abandoning the 3Leaf purchase was a major blow to their
reputation and brand image.35 Huawei could follow CFIUS’s recommendation to withdraw its purchase
agreement with 3Leaf or Huawei could decline CFIUS’s recommendation and force their application to
be decided by President Barack Obama, which at the time was an unprecedented action.36 Zengfei and his
executives needed to determine how they would lead their company in order to ameliorate their current
troubles in the U.S. market.

T h i s d o c u m e n t i s a u t h o r i z e d
S T R T - 4 6 0 - 0 - 3 1 : I n t e r n a t i o n
A n y u n a u t h o r i z e d u s e o r r
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EXHIBIT 1: HUAWEI FIVE-YEAR FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS

CNY Million 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007

Revenue: China 65,565 62,143 59,038 - -
Revenue: Overseas 138,364 120,405 90,021 - -
Total Revenue 203,929 182,548 149,059 123,080 92,155
Operating Margin 9.1% 16.8% 15.2% 13.9% 10.1%
Total Assets 193,283 178,984 148,968 119,286 89,562

Source: “Huawei Annual Report 2011,” www.huawei.com/en/about-huawei/corporate-info/annual-report/annual-report-

2011/index.htm, accessed February 20, 2013.

EXHIBIT 2: TOP TELECOMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURERS – 2001

Growth (%)
2000 Revenue 1999 Revenue
Company Based on
(Billions US$) (Billions US$)
Revenue
Ericson 31.3 25.7 21.5
Nortel 30.3 21.3 42.2
Nokia 27.2 20.1 35.4
Lucent 25.8 33.8 -23.5
Cisco 23.9 15.0 59.3
Siemens 22.8 20.0 14.5
Motorola 22.8 19.7 15.3
Alcatel 21.6 17.1 26.6

Source: Gartner Dataquest, February 2001.

EXHIBIT 3: TOP TELECOMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURERS – 2011

2011 Operating
2011 Revenue Growth Based on
Company Profit (Billions
(Billions US$) Revenue
US$)
Ericsson 203.3 12% 11.2
Huawei 32.8 11.5% 12.3
Alcatel-Lucent SA 19.9 –2.1% 1.4
Nokia Siemens 13.6 10.6% 3.7
ZTE 13.9 23.4% 0.15
Cisco Systems 43.2 7.9% 6.5
Motorola Solutions 8.2 7.2% 1.15

Source: Ericsson Annual Report 2011, Huawei Annual Report 2011, Alcatel-Lucent SA, Nokia Siemens, ZTE, Cisco Systems,
Motorola Solutions.

T h i s d o c u m e n t i s a u t h o r i z e d
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A n y u n a u t h o r i z e d u s e o r r
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EXHIBIT 4: TOP TELECOMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT EXPORTING COUNTRIES OR AREAS IN

2011

Value Growth (%) World

Country or Area
(million US$) 2010 to 2011 Share %
Cum.
World 506,103.3 13.3 100.0 -
China 162,171.4 21.5 32.0 32.0
China, Hong Kong SAR 64,056.3 12.6 12.7 44.7
USA 38,248.6 14.5 7.6 52.3
Republic of Korea 35,388.6 0.3 7.0 59.2
Mexico 18,515.2 –10.7 3.7 62.9
Germany 18,403.8 13.5 3.6 66.5

Source: UN Comtrade.

EXHIBIT 5: TOP TELECOMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT IMPORTING COUNTRIES OR AREAS IN 2011

Value Growth (%) World

Country or Area
(million US$) 2010 to 2011 Share %
Cum.
World 557,900.0 13.3 100.0 -
USA 93,097.5 7.6 16.7 16.7
China, Hong Kong SAR 58,408.0 19.2 10.5 27.2
China 42,897.3 25.1 7.9 35.0
Japan 26,332.1 23.6 4.7 39.7
Mexico 25,401.2 -1.4 4.6 44.3
Germany 24,727.8 21.1 4.4 48.7

Source: UN Comtrade.

EXHIBIT 6: CFIUS TRANSACTION NOTICES BY SECTOR AND YEAR, 2008 TO 2010

ADD IN-TEXT REFERRENCE

Finance,
Mining, Utilities and Wholesale and
Year Manufacturing Information Total
Construction Retail Trade
and Services
2008 72 (46%) 42 (27%) 25 (16%) 16 (10%) 155
2009 21 (32%) 22 (34%) 19 (29%) 3 (5%) 65
2010 36 (39%) 35 (38%) 13 (14%) 9 (10%) 93
TOTAL 129 (41%) 99 (32%) 57 (18%) 28 (9%) 313

Source: 2011 CFIUS Annual Report to Congress.

T h i s d o c u m e n t i s a u t h o r i z e d
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A n y u n a u t h o r i z e d u s e o r r
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EXHIBIT 7: CFIUS TRANSACTION NOTICES: TOP INTRA-SECTOR MANUFACTURING,

2008 TO 2010

Number of % of Total
Manufacturing
Transactions Manufacturing
Computer and Electronic
62 48%
Products
Transportation Equipment 21 16%
Machinery 15 12%
Primary Metal 8 6%
Chemical 7 5%

Source: 2011 CFIUS Annual Report to Congress.

EXHIBIT 8: CFIUS TRANSACTIONS, WITHDRAWALS AND PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS,

2008 TO 2010

Year # of Notices Notices Withdrawn #of Notices Withdrawn Presidential

During Review Investigations During Investigation Decisions
2008 155 18 23 5 0
2009 65 5 25 2 0
2010 93 6 35 6 0
TOTAL 313 29 83 13 0

Source: 2011 CFIUS Annual Report.

ENDNOTES

1
This case has been written on the basis of published sources only. Consequently, the interpretation and perspectives
presented in this case are not necessarily those of Huawei Technologies Corporation or any of its employees.
2
Leila Abboud, “Chinese Telco Gear Makers Aim to Leap U.S. Barriers,” 2011, www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/16/us-
mobilefair-chinagear-idUSTRE71F19S20110216, accessed February 2, 2013.
3
CFIUS is an inter-agency U.S. government panel that reviews acquisitions and mergers of U.S. entities by foreign
companies for possible national security implications.
4
Steven R. Weisman, “Sale of 3Com to Huawei Is Derailed by U.S. Security Concerns,” The New York Times, February
2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/02/21/business/worldbusiness/21iht-3com.1.10258216.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, accessed
February 15, 2013.
5
“Huawei Backs Away from 3Leaf Acquisition,” Reuters, February 2011, www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/19/us-huawei-
3leaf-idUSTRE71I38920110219, accessed January 29, 2013.
6
“Research and Development,” www.huawei.com/en/about-huawei/corporate-info/research-development/index.htm,
accessed March 5, 2013.
7
Mike Rogers and Dutch Reppersberger, “Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese
Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE,” House of Representatives: Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
(HPSCI), p. 32.
8
All currencies are in US$ unless otherwise stated.
9
“The Long March of the Invisible Mr. Ren,” The Economist, June 2011, www.economist.com/node/18771640, accessed
February 23, 2013.
10
Victor Zhang, “Huawei Technologies UK CEO Speaks on Internationalization and Innovation by Chinese Multinational
Companies,” February 2013, www.tmd-oxford.org/content/huawei-technologies-uk-ceo-speaks-internationalisation-and-
innovation-chinese-multinational, accessed February 27, 2013.
11
Guanxi is an informal network of trust-based relationships grown from family, school and work ties.
12
Ali F. Farhoomand, “Huawei: Cisco’s Chinese Challenger,” Asia Case Research Centre, 2006.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.

This document is authorized for use by Sze Ching Cecilia Chow, from 12/1/2018 to 4/1/2019, in the course:
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Page 9 9B13N013

15
P. Fan, “Catching up Through Developing Innovation Capability: Evidence from China’s Telecom-Equipment Industry,”
Department of Urban Studies and Planning, MIT, November 2004.
16
“Cisco, Alcatel-Lucent, Juniper Gain Carrier IP Edge Router/Switch Share in Q1; N. America up 27%,” Infonetics
Research, May 2012, www.infonetics.com/pr/2012/1Q12-Service-Provider-Routers-Switches-Market-Highlights.asp,
accessed March 5, 2013.
17
“The Long March of the Invisible Mr. Ren,” The Economist, June 2011, www.economist.com/node/18771640, accessed
February 23, 2013.
18
John Lee, “The Other Side of Huawei,” Business Spectator, March 30, 2012, www.theworld.org/2013/02/chinas-
telecommunications-giant-huawei-under-scrutiny/, accessed February 20, 2013.
19
Mary Kay Magistad, “China’s Telecommunication Giant Huawei under Scrutiny,” The World, February 2013,
www.theworld.org/2013/02/chinas-telecommunications-giant-huawei-under-scrutiny/, accessed February 20, 2013.
20
Joshua Chaffin, “EU Faces up to China over ‘Mother of All Cases,’” Financial Times, 2012,
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/e4edbcca-6bab-11e2-8c62-00144feab49a, accessed February 20, 2013.
21
“Resource Center,” U.S Department of the Treasury, www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/Pages/Committee-
on-Foreign-Investment-in-US.aspx, accessed February 26, 2013.
22
“Annual Report to Congress for CY 2011” U.S. Department of the Treasury, www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/international/foreign-investment/Pages/cfius-reports.aspx, accessed February 26, 2013.
23
Winter Nie, “How Chinese Companies Test Global Waters: The Huawei Success Story,” International Institute for
Management Development, 2010, www.imd.org/research/challenges/TC067-10.cfm, accessed June 13, 2013.
24
“Milestones,” www.huawei.com/en/about-huawei/corporate-info/milestone/index.htm, accessed February 27, 2013.
25
Ibid.
26
Steven R. Weisman, “Sale of 3Com to Huawei is Derailed by U.S. Security Concerns,” The New York Times, February
2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/02/21/business/worldbusiness/21iht-3com.1.10258216.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, accessed
February 15, 2013.
27
“The Long March of the Invisible Mr. Ren,” The Economist, June 2011, www.economist.com/node/18771640, accessed
February 23, 2013.
28
“Huawei Down, Not Out, in Acquisition Bid on U.S. Firm,” Xinhuanet, February 2008,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-02/22/content_7647378.htm, accessed February 22, 2012.
29
Paul Ziobro, “Huawei Enlists an Ex-Sprint Team,” The Wall Street Journal, August 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703846604575447803097958776.html, accessed February 23, 2013.
30
Joann Lublin and Shayndi Riace, “Security Fears Kill Chinese Bid in U.S.,” The Wall Street Journal, November 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704353504575596611547810220.html, accessed February 15, 2013.
31
Victor Zhang, “Huawei Technologies UK CEO Speaks on Internationalisation and Innovation by Chinese Multinational
Companies,” February 7, 2013, www.tmd-oxford.org/content/huawei-technologies-uk-ceo-speaks-internationalisation-and-
innovation-chinese-multinational, accessed February 27, 2013.
32
M. Zeng and P. Williamson, “The Hidden Dragons,” Harvard Business Review, October 2003, http://hbr.org/2003/10/the-
hidden-dragons/ar/1, accessed June 13, 2013.
33
“Huawei and 3Leaf: What Went Wrong?” March 2011, http://knowledge.ckgsb.edu.cn/2011/03/04/technology/huawei-and-
3leaf-what-went-wrong-chinese-telecoms-set-sights-on-strategic-foreign-assets/, accessed February 22, 2013.
34
Wang Zongkai, “News Analysis: Chinese Tech Firms Hurt by U.S. Political Illusions,” Xinhua News 2012,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-10/09/c_131895231.htm, accessed February 23, 2013.
35
Ken Hu, “Huawei Open Letter,” Chairman of Huawei Technologies USA, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Huawei20110205.pdf, accessed February 22, 2013.
36
“Huawei Waits for White House Review Before Selling Unit,” February 2011, www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12461553,
accessed January 29, 2013.

This document is authorized for use by Sze Ching Cecilia Chow, from 12/1/2018 to 4/1/2019, in the course:
STRT-460-0-31: International Business Strategy - Levy (Winter 2019), Northwestern University.
Any unauthorized use or reproduction of this document is strictly prohibited.