SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs.

MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA

BAGUIO (CASE DIGEST) G.R. No. L-21450 - - April 15, 1968
FACTS:

The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of exactly P 1,908.00,
exclusive of interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy
and Lucia Baguio, was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A
month prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the
Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not
more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.)

The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding the
appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court of Appeals' adverse
decision.

Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in which
jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court
along with the records of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.

RULING:

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons.
Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for
the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a
mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claim to be enforced or asserted.

It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction
(Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was
further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the
action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct
not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the
reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease
vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127,
35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who
has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief,
to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of
Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a
party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it
for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591,
September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men
Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs.
Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could
have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take
cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law
then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at
several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the
jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the
merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up
to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be
declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948
and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this
is not only patent but revolting.

Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have become persuaded
that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the decision rendered by the Court
of Appeals x x x granting plaintiffs' motion for execution against the surety x x x

UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.
TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY (23 SCRA 29)
FACTS: Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from Sibongahanoy. Defendants filed a counter
bond with Manila

Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a writ of execution was issued
against the defendant. Defendants moved for writ of execution against surety which was granted. Surety
moved to quash the writ but was denied, appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction.

CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of
the petition for recovery. Act placed original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for
demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier decision and referred the case
to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in
issue.

ISSUE: WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for the first time
upon appeal.YES

RATIO: SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea after almost
fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for
the first time - A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel
by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier -
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court
-"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only
if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

: Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to
quash the writ of execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing - Summary
hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted"
(83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is resolved "with dispatch, with the least
possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What
is essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear
what is urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of
the parties - In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of
the date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present
in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period
of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer
or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.

The orders appealed from are affirmed.

SERAFIN TIJAM, et al. vs. MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY, et al.

G.R. NO. L-21450 APRIL 15, 1968

131 PHIL REP 556

 PLEASE NOTE THAT YOU ARE PRESUMED THAT YOU HAVE READ THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF THE CASE. THIS
IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF REVIEW. *Read at your own risk* :)

(Criminal Procedure)

FACTS:

· July 19, 1948 - The Sps. Tijam filed a complaint for collection of sum of money with writ of attachment
against Sps. Sibonghanoy.

· July 31 - Counter-bound filed by the defendants and Manila Surety and Fidelity Co. Inc. (Surety).

· RTC – in favor of Tijam; issued the writ of execution (woe) against defendants however insufficient;
further issued against the Surety.

· Surety ---> written opposition; failure to prosecute and absence of demand upon surety for the
payment.

· Plaintiff ---> 2nd motion to issue WOE.

· Surety ---> MTQ the writ; without required summary hearing ---> RTC DENIED.

· Surety ---> APPEAL to CA; although not one of the Assignment of Errors it is obvious raises the
QUESTION OF LACK OF JURISDICTION.

· January 10, 1963, Surety ---> MTD before RTC; Tijam’s action for recovery of P 1,908 should be filed
before the inferior courts; according to SEC. 88 (RA 296 – Judiciaty Act of 1948) : “within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts, all civil actions where the value of the subject matter or the
amount of the demand does NOT exceed P 2,000” the law was effective on JUNE 17, 1948.

THEREFORE, RTC has NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER

HELD: in favor of the Sps. Tijam

· The rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as
a lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings.

· HOWEVER, in the present case, SURETY IS NOW BARRED BY LACHES from invoking this plea at this late
hour for the purport of annulling everything done

· 15 YEARS before the surety filed MTD on raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.

· LACHES – is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier.

· DOCTRINE OF LACHES / STALE DEMANDS – upon the grounds of public policy, which requires, for the
peace of the society and discouragement of stale claims.

- it is NOT a mere question of time but principally a question of inequity or unfairness of permitting a
right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

NOTES:

Remedial Law; Party guilty of laches may not invoke lack o jurisdiction on appeal as in instant case -

It is undisputed fact that the action commenced by the appellees in the CFI of Cebu against the
Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of P 1,908.00 only - an amount within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948
which had taken effect about a month prior to the date when the action was commenced. True also is the
rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the
lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present
case - which shall forthwith be set forth - We are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches
from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the
case with its active participation.

Remedial Law; Estoppel; Different ways a party may be barred from raising question -
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reason.
Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.

Remedial Law; Laches; Definition

Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

Remedial Law; Instances when party may be estopped from invoking question of jusridiction.

A party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and,
after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. In the case
just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases
because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid
and conclusive as an adjudication, but for, the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated -
obviously for reasons of public policy.

Remedial Law; Failure to raise question of Jurisdiction at an earlier stage bars party from questioning
it later.

Where from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question
of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by
reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in
the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an
adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of
jurisdiction. Were We to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all
the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the
judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only
patent but revolting.

TIJAM vs SIBONGHANOY

January 08, 1963 – 5 days after the surely received notice of the decision, it filed a motion asking for
extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration. Appellees action was filed in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, July 19, 1948 for the recovery of 1,908.00 Pesos.

RA 296, Judiary Act 1948 – Section 88 of which placed within the jurisdiction of inferior court all civil
actions where the value of the subject matter or the amount of demand does not go beyond 2,000
Pesos, exclusive of interest and costs that the Court of First Instance of Cebu has no Jurisdiction.

The Court is in Opinion that Surety is now barred by laches from invoking the plea at this late hour for
the purpose of annulling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation.

Definition of Laches:

Failure of neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been earlier, it is negligence or commission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitle to assert it has abandoned it or
declines to assert it.

. Sun Insurance v. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274 (1989)Sun Insurance v. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274 (1989)
FACTS:
Petitioner Sun Insurance filed a complaint with the Makati RTC for the consignation of a premium refund
on afire insurance policy with prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent
Manuey Uy Po Tiong.Private respondent was declared in default for failure to file the required answer
within the reglementary period.Private respondent filed a compliant in the Quezon City RTC for the
refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ ofpreliminary attachment. Only the amount of P210 was
paid by private respondent as docket fee which promptedpetitioner to raise objection. Upon order of the
SC, the case was assigned to a different branch due to under-assessmentof docket fees.
The case was thereafter assigned to Judge Asuncion who required the parties to comment on the Clerk
of Court’s letter
-report signifying her difficulty in complying with the SC Resolution since the pleadings filed by private
respondent didnot indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered.Private respondent filed a Re-
Amended complaint stating therein a claim of not less than 10M as actual compensatorydamages in the
prayer. However, the body of the amended complaint alleges actual and compensatory damages and
atty’s fees in the total amount of about P44,601,623.70
Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the second amended complaint and stating that the
same constitutedproper compliance with the SC Resolution. Petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari with
the CA questioning the order ofJudge Asuncion. Private respondent filed a supplemental complaint
alleging an additional claim of P20M as damagesbringing the total claim to P64,601,623.70. CA denied
petition and granted writ of prelim attachment.
HELD:
1) It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribeddocket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of theinitiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within areasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. 2) Permissive counterclaims,third party claims and similar pleadings,
shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed thereforeis paid. The court may
also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicableprescriptive or reglementary period. 3) If the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified thesame has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.Escolin: There are some compulsory counterclaim that
needs payment of docket fees, and some which does not

Rule 2

3. Bayang v. CA, 148 SCRA 91 (1987)Cause of Action:

Bayang vs. CA
, 148 SCRA 91 (1987)
Facts
Bayang sued Biong for Quieting of Title with damages in 1969, which resulted in a ruling in his favor in
1978. In 1978,
Bayang sued Biong again but this time for the income earned from the land while it was still in the
latter’s possession
from 1970 to 1978.
Issue
Whether or not the second case is barred by the first.
Ruling
The subject matter in the two cases are essentially the same as the income is only a consequence or
accessory of thedisputed property. The claim for income from the land is incidental to, and should have
been raised by Bayang in his
earlier claim for ownership of the land. As the filing of the two cases constitute splitting of the cause of
action, the secondcase is barred by the first. Also, for about seven years, the petitioner made no move at
all to amend his complaint toinclude a claim for the income supposedly received by private respondent
during that period. He did not make the properclaim at the proper time and in the proper
proceeding. Whatever right he might have had is now deemed waivedbecause of his negligence
joinder of parties

Topic: PartiesCase:
Flores vs. Mallare-Phillipps
FactsFlores sued the resps for the collection of sum of money with the RTCThe first cause of action
alleged in the complaint was against Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the amountof P11,643
representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from Flores on various occasions from
Augustto October, 1981;The second cause of action was against resp Fernando Calion for allegedly
refusing to pay the amount ofP10,212 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from
pet on several occasions from March, 1981to January, 1982.Binongcal filed a MTD on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction since the amount of the demand against said respwas only P11,643.00, and under Section
19(8) of BP129 the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if theamount of the demand is more
than
P20K. Although another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to pet in the amount of P10,21
2.00, hisobligation was separate and distinct from that of the other resp. Calion joined in moving for the
dismissal of the complaint.RTC dismissed the complaint.IssueWhether or not the trial court correctly
ruled on the application of the permissive joinder of parties.Ruling
The lower court has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel" totality rule introduced in Section
33(l) of BP129 andSection 11 of the Interim Rules.Section 33(l) of BP129That where there are several
claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in thesame complaint, the
amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action,irrespective of
whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. ...Section 11 of the Interim
Rules Application of the totality rule. In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the
amount involved,the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the money demands, exclusive
only of interest andcosts, irrespective of WON the separate claims are owned by or due to different
parties. If any demand is fordamages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be specifically
alleged.Former rule under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948Where there are several claims or
causes of action between the same parties embodied in the same complaint,the amount of the demand
shall be the totality of the demand in all the causes of action, irrespective of whetherthe causes of action
arose out of the same or different transactions; but where the claims or causes of action joined in a
single complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties, each separate claim shall furnishthe
jurisdictional test.Under the present law, the two cases would be under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Similarly, Brillo vs. Buklatan andGacula vs. Martinez, if the separate claims against the several defendants
arose out of the same transaction or seriesof transactions and there is a common question of law or fact,
they would now be under the jurisdiction of the RTC.In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as
plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total ofall the claims shall now furnish the
jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of joining or being joined in onecomplaint separate
actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish
the jurisdictional test.The lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on
joinder of parties pursuant to Section5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that,
after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appearsthat there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason
that the claims against resps Binongcal and Calion are separate anddistinct and neither of which falls
within its jurisdiction
Rule 1

To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and
other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not
only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be
considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails
to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall
otherwise be expunged from the record.

G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987

MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN
ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP, respondents.
Facts:
Manchester contended that the filing fee must be assessed on the basis of the amended
complaint, citing the case of Magaspi v. Ramolete. The environmental facts of Magaspi as
compared to the current Manchester case were as follows:

Magaspi v. Ramolete Manchester v. CA

Action for recovery of ownership and Action for torts and damages and
possession of parcel of land with specific performance, with prayer for
damages. temporary restraining order

Seeks not only the annulment of title of Prayer is for the issuance of writ of
defendant to property, the declaration of preliminary prohibitory injunction during
ownership and delivery of possession to the pendency of action against
Magaspi; defendant’s announced forfeiture of P3M
But also for the payment of A/M/E paid by Manchester for the property in
damages and attorney’s fees arising question;
therefrom with the amounts specified To attach such property of defendant
therein that may be sufficient to satisfy any
judgment that may be rendered;

And after hearing, order defendants to

execute contract of purchase and sale of
property and annul defendant’s illegal
forfeiture of Manchester’s money;

Ordering them to pay A/C/E damages

and attorney’s fees;

And declaring the tender of payment of

 purchase price of Manchester valid and
producing the effect of payment and to
make injunction permanent.;

The amount of damages sought is not

specified in the prayer, although the
body of the complaint alleges the total
amount of P78M as damages.

No such honest difference of opinion.

As per complaint, it is both an action for
damages and specific performance;
There was an honest difference of Docket fee paid upon filing of complaint
opinion as to nature of action. The P410 because the action is merely one
complaint was considered an action for for specific performance where the
recovery of ownership and possession of amount involved is not capable of
parcel of land. Damages were treated as pecuniary estimation is wrong, because
merely to the main cause of action. the body of complaint totaling P78M
Thus, docket fee of P60 and P10 for should be the basis of assessment of
sherrif’s fee were paid. filing fee.

When the under-reassessment of the

filing fee in Manchester was brought to
the attention of SC together with other
similar cases, an investigation was
immediately ordered by the Court.
Manchester, thru another counsel and
with leave of court, filed an amended
complaint for the inclusion of Philips Wire
and Cable Corporation as co-plaintiff,
and by emanating any mention of the
amount of damages in the body of
RTC ordered Magaspi to pay P3k as filing complaint.
fee covering the damages alleged in the
original complaint, as it did not consider RTC directed Manchester to rectify the
the damages to be merely an or amended complaint by stating the
incidental to the action for recovery of amounts which they are asking for. It
ownership and possession of real was only then that Manchester specified
property; the amount of damages in the body of
The amended complaint was filed by complaint in the reduced amount of
Magaspi with leave of court to include P10M.
the State as defendant and reducing the
amount of damages and attorney’s fees Still, no amount of damages were
to P100k. Such amendment was specified in the prayer. Such amendment
admitted. was admitted.

Action was not only one for recovery of No such honest difference of opinion is
 ownership but also for damages, so that
the filing fee for damages should be the
basis of assessment.
Although docket fee of P60 was
insufficient, SC held that the payment
was the result of an honest difference of
opinion as to the correct amount to be
paid as docket fee. As such, the court
had acquired jurisdiction over the case,
and the proceedings thereafter were
proper and regular. possible as the allegations of the
complaint, the designation, and the
Hence, as amended complaint prayer showed clearly that it is an action
superseded the original complaint, the for damages and specific performance.
allegations of damages in the amended The docket fee should be assessed by
complaint should be the basis of the considering the amount of damages as
computation of filing fee. alleged in the original complaint.

Issue:
In relation to docket fees as applied in Manchester case:
a) Must it be based in original complaint or in the amended complaint?
b) In which part of the pleading must the amount of damages being prayed for stated?
c) Is the court devoid of jurisdiction for failure to pay the correct docket fees?
Held:
1.a) It must be based in the original complaint (as compared from Magaspic case where the
docket fee was based from amended complaint due to honest difference of opinion.
1.b) The amount of damages being prayed for must be stated in both the body of the pleading
and the prayer. Such amount will be the basis of the filing fees.
1.c) Yes

In Magaspi case, SC declared that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of docket fee
regardless of the actual date of filing in court. As such, in Manchester, the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case by payment of only P410 as docket fee. Neither the
amendment of complaint vested jurisdiction upon the court because in essence, there was no
such original complained that was duly filed which could be amended. The orders admitting the
amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the RTC are null and
void.

CA was correct in ruling that the basis of assessment of docket fee should
be the amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not in the
amended complaint.
SC frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint by omitting any
specification of the amount of damages in the prayer, although the real amount is
alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose
than to evade the payment of correct filing fees or to mislead the docket clear in the
assessment of filing fee. Such fraudulent practice was compounded when
Manchester, through another counsel, filed an amended complaint, deleting all
mention of the amount of damages being asked for in the body of complaint. It was
only when in obedience to the order of the SC that the amount of damages be
specified in the amended complaint, that Manchester wrote the damages in a
reduced amount in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The
design to avoid payment of the required docket fee was obvious.

To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions,

answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in
the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the
filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this
requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading
will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of
the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended
pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case in so far as it is inconsistent with
this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL.,
Petitioners
, vs.
COURT OFAPPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN
ROXAS, ANDREWLUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP,
Respondents
.
G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987FACTS:
Originally, this was a case of an action for torts and damages and
specificperformance with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. In the present
case thedamages were not specifically stated in the prayer but was alleged in the
body of thecomplaint which assessed
₱
78.75 million as damages suffered by the petitioner. The amountof the docket fee
paid was only
₱
410.00. With leave of court the petitioner then amendedthe complaint with the
inclusion of additional co-plaintiffs and by eliminating any mentionof the amount of
damages in the body of the complaint thereby reducing the amount of damages to
₱
10 million pesos only.
ISSUE: WON THE COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE WHEN
THECORRECT AND PROPER DOCKET FEE HAS NOT BEEN PAID.HELD:
No. The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only
₱
410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby
vest jurisdiction upon the Court. The basis of assessment of the docket fee should b
e theamount of damages sought in the original complaint and not in the amended
complaint. Allcomplaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should
specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, andsaid damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case. Anypleading that fails to comply with this
requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, orshall otherwise be expunged
from the record.
ERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL.,
plaintiffs-appellees, vs.
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and
LUCIABAGUIO,
defendants,
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH)
bondingcompany and defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968FACTS:
Spouses Serafin and Felicitas commenced a civil case against spouses
Sibonghanoyto recover from them a sum of P1, 908.00 with legal interest. A writ of
attachment was
issued by the court against the defendants’ properties but the same was soon diss
olved.After trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and after the
same hadbecome final and executor, the court issued a writ of execution against
the defendants. Thewrit being unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of
the writ of execution against
the Surety’s bond. Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the
ground that the
same was issued without summary hearing. This was denied by the RTC. The
Suretyappealed in the CA, which was denied. This time, the surety just asked for an
extension inorder for them to file the motion for reconsideration. But instead of
filing for a motion forreconsideration, it filed a motion to dismiss saying that by
virtue of R.A. 296 which is theJudiciary Reorganization Act of 1948, section 88 of
which placed within the exclusive original jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil
action where the value of the subject matter does notexceed P2,000.00. The Court
of First Instance therefore has no jurisdiction over the case. Thequestion of
jurisdiction was filed by the Surety only 15 years from the time the action
wascommenced in the Court of First Instance.
ISSUE: WON THE CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED DUE TO THE LACK OF
JURISDICTIONHELD:
No. After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on
themerits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the
court. The ruleis that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the
courts exclusive by law asby law and as the lack of it affect the very authority of
the court to take cognizance of thecase, the objection may be raised at any stage
of the proceedings. However, considering thefacts and circumstances of the present
cases, a party may be barred by laches frominvolving this plea for the first time on
appeal for the purpose of annulling everything done
in the case. A party cannot invoke a court’s jurisdiction and later on deny it to
escape a
penalty
MARIO RODIS MAGASPI, JUSTINO R. MAGASPI, BALDOMERA M.
ALEJANDRO, and MANOLITA M.CORTEZ,
petitioners,vs.
HONORABLE JOSE R. RAMOLETE, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, ESPERANZA V.GARCIA, Clerk of Court of First Instance of Cebu, THE
SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINESLIMITED and/or THE SHELL
REFINING COMPANY (Phil.) INC., CENTRAL VISAYAN REALTY
&INVESTMENTS CO., INC., CEBU CITY SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION and
the GOVERNMENT OF THEREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
NATURE:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the actuations of the CFI of Cebu in respect of the
correct amount to be paid for the filing of the case as provided in Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court.
FACTS:
On September 16, 1970, the petitioners filed a complaint for the recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land with damages against The Shell Co. of the Philippines, Ltd. and/or
The Shell Refining Co.(Phil.) Inc., Central Visayan Realty & Investment Co., Inc. and Cebu City
Savings & Loan Association in theCFI of Cebu. Upon filing and the payment of P60.00 as
docketing fee and P10.00 for sheriff fees, the casewas assigned.Central Visayan Realty &
Investment Co., Inc. and Cebu City Savings and Loan Assn. filed a motion tocompel the
plaintiffs to pay the correct amount for docket fee within the time prescribed by Court,
asproperly computed by the Clerk of Court and failing to pay the same within the prescribed
period todismiss the case. Further, until such time as the correct docket fee is paid, the time for
filing of responsivepleadings by the defendants be suspended. The motion was opposed by the
petitioners who claimed that the main cause of action was the recovery of a piece of land and on
the basis of its assessed valued, P60.00was the correct docketing fee and that although the
Revised Rules of Court do not exclude damages in thecomputation of the docket fee, damages
are nonetheless still to be excluded.On October 5, 1970, the presiding judge ordered the Clerk of
Court to comment on the motion and theopposition which it assessed that the correct fees shall
be fixed at of P3,164.00 plus P2.00 Legal Researchfee (the value of the land, which is
P17,280.00, plus the damages amounting to P3,390,633.24). Hence,petitioner shall pay P3,104,
net of the P60.00 already paid. However, private respondents filed theirrespective answers that
the same was exclusive of exemplary damages must be included in thecomputation therein.On
November 3, 1970, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint so as to include
theGovernment of the Republic of the Philippines as a defendant. Nine days after, respondents
filed anopposition to the admission of the amended complaint.On November 16, 1970, Judge
Canonoy admitted the amended complaint although the plaintiffs had not yet complied with his
Order that they should pay an additional P3,104.00 docket fee. On April 3, 1971,Judge Jose R.
Ramolete who had replaced Judge Canonoy, issued the same order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case may be considered as having been filed and docketed when P60.00 was
paid tothe Clerk of Court even on the assumption that said payment was not sufficient in
amount HELD:

The rule is well-settled that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee
regardless of theactual date of its filing in court. The Court holds that it was docketed upon the
payment of P60.00although said amount is insufficient. Accordingly, the trial court had
acquired jurisdiction over the caseand the proceedings thereafter had were proper and
regular.The next question is in respect of the correct amount to be paid as docket fee. Judge
Canonoy ordered thepayment of P3,104.00 as additional docket fee based on the original
complaint. However, the petitionersassert as an alternative view, that the docket fee be based on
the amended complaint. The petitionershave a point. "When a pleading is amended, the original
pleading is deemed abandoned. The originalceases to perform any further function as a
pleading. The case stands for trial on the amended pleadingonly. On the basis of the foregoing,
the additional docket fee to be paid by the petitioners should be basedon their amended
complaint.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted: the petitioners shall be assessed a
docket fee on the basis of the amended complaint; and after all of the lawful fees shall have been
paid, the proceedings in Civil CaseNo. R-11882 shall be resumed