Blind Oracles Presentation

Policymaking:
Blind Oracles
Chloe, Julia, Niki, Ramiro, Emma

In the words of Kuklick
The questions I took up in the book are much more complex than I thought when I
wrote it. The greatest complexity is how to define the group of people in foreign policy
making that I think are particularly destructive or "blind." I still think the same way
about those I spoke about in the book except for George Kennan -- my treatment of
him was not very good, and I have complicated ideas about how I could change it. I try
not to have opinions about today's events that I share . I am an historian and not a
pundit, or futurologist, or policy maker -- I think the worst thing historians do is to
pontificate about the present and future.
My motivation in writing the book came from a suspicion about the views of social
scientist that they have a way of changing the world for the better. I have deeply
pessimistic and conservative ideas about how the world can be bent to human
purposes, and I am skeptical about our ability to know what is morally right, or rather
our presumption that our moral ideas are so good.
Introduction
● Kuklick is a historian- does he fit in our

framework of historical thinking and
writing?
● Who was his intended audience?
○ Was his targeted audience effective in
delivering his message?
● What was the primary takeaway for you
from Blind Oracles?
Introduction continued:
● The book was organized in chronological order. How

effective do you think the organization of the book
was?
○ What are the pros and cons of organizing this
book in that manner?
Kennedy vs. Eisenhower
● Do you think that there is a difference between excluding
intellectuals (i.e. Eisenhower) and inviting them into the White
House and positions of power but ignoring them during crisis
situations (i.e. Kennedy)?
● Is a scholarly background required to make useful decisions, or

is political decision making more reliant upon logical
reasoning?
○ Eisenhower, Kennedy as examples of this
○ Digest and repeat ideas pervasive in the culture
● The author offers his opinion about Kennedy (that he was the
“high point” of American foreign policy during this time). What
is added or detracted from the work by including this?
Chapter 1: Scientific Management and War
1910-1960
● How do we see the conflict of intellect and technical skills
playing out in modern times? (in reference to the conflict
of RAND and the military)
● How did capitalism playing into the theories RAND put

forth?
○ Would these theories have arisen in a non-capitalist
society?
Chapter 2: Theorists of War, 1945-1953
● How did Kennan’s view change?

○ How does this relate to the echo chambers of
today? (In other words, how does political climate
temper the thoughts intellectuals can have?)
● Nitze as an example of intellectuals giving legitimacy to

ideology (sometimes to his own benefit)
○ What examples do we have of this today?
Chapter 3: RAND in opposition: 1946-1961
● Does this chasm between immediacy and long term

dialogue still exist between policy and intellectualism?
○ What about in your field in particular?
Chapter 3: The Day the Earth Stood Still (1951)
● The Day the Earth Stood

Still: what do you think
Waltz would have to say
about this?
● What influence does pop
culture have in
policymaking and
intellectualism?
Chapter 5: RAND and the Kennedy
Administration
● What made Kennedy so amiable
to intellectuals?
Chapter 6: Cuba and Nassau, 1962
● What gives the United States the right to tell all other nations
that it should keep all weapons of destruction? Why should
they trust us? To what extent should other nations trust us?
● Khrushchev's goat metaphor- told a story of a man who had

to live with a goat: he did not like it, but got used to the smell.
American missiles and West Berlin were Russia's goats;
Russian Missiles in Cuba would’ve been America's.
○ What are America's goats today? What are other nation's
goats involving America?
Chapter 7: Intellectuals in Power, 1961-1966
● Based on the fact that intellectuals floated

between administrations with different aims,
what does this say about the integrity of their
viewpoints offered?
●
● Why did Johnson rely on his advisors? Following
the footsteps of Kennedy?
Chapter 8: The Kennedy School of
Government, 1964-1971
● In relation to their investigation into the men who were funding
them and the concerns of RAND & the Air Force:
○ Does place, biography and employer put all intellectual
contributions into question? In other words, are any proposed
theories truly universal?
○ Can we think of any intellectuals we have read this quarter
who you would pinpoint as having “unbiased” theories?
● What led the politicians who took the US into war, “can-do”
decision makers, to become victims of institutional
mismanagement?
Chapter 9: The Pentagon Papers
● What need is there for government secrecy in a

democracy? What is the difference between
government secrecy and government deception?
● Where do different intellectuals in Blind Oracles

lie on a scale of anti-democracy?
Chapter 10: Henry Kissinger
● Henry Kissinger was looked down upon by his
colleagues, how did he reach such a high level of
power?
○ How did these people get where they were?
○ Was the fact that institutions like Harvard
were linked to government the biggest reason
why these individuals made it to power over
others?
Chapter 11: Diplomats on Foreign Policy,
1976-2000
● What aids intellectuals in excusing their past

mistakes in comparison to other people in power?
Were they successful?
● Never really made moral analysis in
reflection-does this impact other intellectuals in
the policy world?
Critical Reception
● Most of the critics had the same critique-

that Kuklick was too harsh on
intellectuals and pessimistic about policy
making. What do you think?
Modern Day Parallels
● To what extent has the career
politician in recent years taken on
characteristics of Kuklick’s career
intellectual?
● Does the ratio of military: civilian

intellectual: career politician matter in
actual administration policy trends?
Conclusion
● What do you think of the title, Blind Oracles?
● Is Kuklick extending the critiques he makes

about policy influencers and experts in
government position to all of academia?
○ Is he claiming that academics were
victims of politics?
Chapter 4: Accented and Unaccented
Realism: 1946-1961
● Do you agree with Morgenthau- are there

different moralities between personal
and political life?
● What do you think of Morgenthau’s view
that “scholars should be detached
commentators” (77)?
Chapter 6: Cuba and Nassau, 1962
“If historians are interested in the causes of what happened, they

must be concerned with speculation about what might have
happened.” - Bruce Kuklick
● To argue that decision making was good, the analyst must link
the desirable outcome to effects of the decision and argue that
some effects were better than others.
● Is speculation a useful tool for decision making?
Conclusion 2
● Is Kuklick right in concluding that experts
don’t truly lend much of value to the
conversation about politics?
○ What do you think of his assertion that
there isn’t a better course of action?
● What should be the role of intellectuals in the
ideal government?
Thank you!
Further conversation
● Why did President Kennedy offer Polaris to England

when there was already financial and technological
problem? (Chapter 6)
● With having credible soviet threat, do you think that
changed how americans felt and their standing in
foreign struggle with nuclear power. Did it build us or
make us scared?
● Kennan: What other thinkers is his distrust in the
demos reminiscent of? (Chapter 2)
Further conversation
● In a quote on the handout, the author claims that it was
critical for Eisenhower to, one, absorb existing ideas in the
foreign policy culture and, two, have the political will to act on
those ideas. Do you agree, as the author infers, that being
aware of foreign policy (and not necessarily an intellectual in
the field) was enough for Eisenhower and that he only began
to fail as president towards the end of his term when he lost
political will?

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Policymaking:

Chloe, Julia, Niki, Ramiro, Emma

● Kuklick is a historian- does he fit in our

● The book was organized in chronological order. How

● Is a scholarly background required to make useful decisions, or

● How did capitalism playing into the theories RAND put

● How did Kennan’s view change?

● Nitze as an example of intellectuals giving legitimacy to

● Does this chasm between immediacy and long term

● The Day the Earth Stood

● Khrushchev's goat metaphor- told a story of a man who had

● Based on the fact that intellectuals floated

● What need is there for government secrecy in a

● Where do different intellectuals in Blind Oracles

● What aids intellectuals in excusing their past

● Most of the critics had the same critique-

● Does the ratio of military: civilian

● What do you think of the title, Blind Oracles?

● Is Kuklick extending the critiques he makes

● Do you agree with Morgenthau- are there

“If historians are interested in the causes of what happened, they

● Why did President Kennedy offer Polaris to England

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