The Facts: Chanro Blesvirtua Lawlib Rary
The Facts: Chanro Blesvirtua Lawlib Rary
The Facts: Chanro Blesvirtua Lawlib Rary
of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 11, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 05877 as well
as its Resolution dated April 19, 2012 denying reconsideration of the first assailed issuance.
The Facts
Petitioner is the registered owner of a 40,634-square meter parcel of land. Lot No. 4839, situated in
Mactan, Lapu-Lapu City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34555.
On January 25, 2006, respondent City of Lapu-Lapu (respondent) filed a complaint1 before the
Regional Trial Court seeking to expropriate, among others, a 300-square meter portion of Lot No.
4839 for its road opening project from Saac II to Bag-ong Silingan, Mactan, Lapu-Lapu City. Later,
or on February 19, 2006, the complaint was amended, captioned as "Second Amended Complaint,"
increasing the area sought to be appropriated to 2,750 sq.m.
Upon deposit of an amount equivalent to 15% of the fair market value of the property based on the
current tax declaration, respondent took possession of and utilized the property. On February 28,
2006, petitioner filed its Answer, accompanied by a Secretary's Certificate, which states, in part: chanro blesvi rtua lawlib rary
That at the Special Meeting of the Board of the Corporation on February 14, 2006, the following
resolution had been adopted and approved[.] to wit: chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry
Later, or on March 3, 2006, petitioner filed its Answer to the Amended and Second Amended
Complaint.
Meantime, the RTC issued two Orders, dated July 10, 2006 and March 28, 2007, directing the
issuance of a writ of possession. The branch clerk of court, however, failed to comply with any of
the orders.3 c ralawli bra ry
A year later, or on January 25, 2008, petitioner moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground
that respondent failed to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time as provided for
under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. According to petitioner, respondent has yet to move
for the setting of the case for pre-trial and it had done nothing to ensure compliance with the
Orders for the issuance of the writ of execution. Respondent opposed the motion, explaining that
the reason for the delay was that it is awaiting the RTC's resolution on the motion filed by petitioner
for the conduct of a joint survey and for the setting of the case for pre-trial. Petitioner filed a Reply
to respondent's Opposition and Comment on the Motion to Dismiss on February 14, 2008.
In its Order4 dated February 18, 2008 denying the motion to dismiss, the RTC ruled that respondent
cannot be faulted for the alleged delay in prosecuting the case as, indeed, petitioner's motion for
the conduct of a joint survey and for the setting of the case for trial had not yet been resolved. And
as an additional reason for its action, the RTC cited the non-observance of the three (3)-day notice
rule noting that the motion to dismiss was received by the plaintiff on January 31, 2008, but the
motion was set for hearing on the following day, or on February 1, 2008. The fallo of the Order
reads:chan roblesv irtualawl ibra ry
Plaintiff [respondent] is directed to prosecute this case within thirty (30) days from receipt of this
order.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the RTC's February 18, 2008 Order was likewise denied in
that court's January 26, 2011 Order,5 the dispositive portion of which states: chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry
For the third time, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to issue a writ of possession.
SO ORDERED.
In the latter Order, the RTC attributed the fault to its branch clerk of court for failing to comply with
its twin orders directing the issuance of a writ of possession.
On April 15, 2011, petitioner went to the CA on a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the
said February 18, 2008 and January 26, 2011 Orders of the trial court, the recourse docketed as
CA-G.R. SP. No. 05877. Attached to the petition is a Secretary's Certificate executed on April 12,
2011, by Elsie T. Mariño, petitioner's assistant corporate secretary. Said certificate states, among
others, that at the special meeting of petitioner's board on April 8, 2011, the following resolution
was adopted: chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib rary
RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to authorize Mr. Roberto Z. Sison [Sison] or Ms. Elsie T.
Mariño, to commence any action and. or represent the corporation as he/she may deem fit and
necessary and to do any and all acts that may be essential in the prosecution and defense of the
cases of the corporation more particularly involving the Complaint for Eminent Domain filed
with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City, any proceedings for just compensation for its lots in Lapu-Lapu
City including the execution/signing and verification of the necessary documents and do such other
acts necessary and proper in connection therewith.6
CA Ruling
The CA dismissed the petition in its July 11, 2011 Resolution7 owing to the following infirmities,
viz:
cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary
1. a One Hundred and Fifty Peso (PhP 150) deficiency in docket fees;
2. the absence of the serial number, as well as the province or city of commission of the
Notary Public in the Notarial Certificate of the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping
The fallo of the CA's July 11, 2011 Resolution reads as follows: c hanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry
In view of the foregoing premises, petitioners' Petition for Certiorari dated April 11, 2011 is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
As regards the absence of a board resolution, the CA held that "the Petition is subject to dismissal if
a certification was submitted unaccompanied by proof of the signatory's authority."8 Petitioner,
thus, moved for reconsideration, offering explanations for the defects cited by the CA including the
absence of the board resolution.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration dated
August 10, 2011, is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.10
The Issues
Petitioner now comes before this Court assailing the foregoing Resolutions of the CA and raising the
following issues, to wit:
chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry
I. [WHETHER THE CA] SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SECRETARY'S CERTIFICATE
EXECUTED BY ASSISTANT CORPORATE SECRETARY ELSIE T. MARIÑO AUTHORIZING
ROBERTO Z. SISON TO ACT FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER CORPORATION IN
FILING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DOES NOT CONSTITUTE SUFFICIENT PROOF OF
[SISON'S] AUTHORITY TO REPRESENT THE CORPORATION.
II. [WHETHER THE CA] SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BASED ON A
TECHNICALITY WHEN PETITIONER HAS SUBSTANTIALLY RAISED VALID GROUNDS TO SET
ASIDE THE ORDERS OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS
THE CASE FOR FAILURE OF THE RESPONDENT TO PROSECUTE THE CASE FOR AN
UNREASONABLE LENGTH OF TIME.11
Accompanying the Petition is a copy of the April 8, 2011 Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Board
of Directors of petitioner authorizing Sison to represent petitioner in the expropriation case.12 cralawl ibra ry
On the first issue, petitioner argues that the Secretary's Certificate executed by Assistant Corporate
Secretary Marina—reflecting the Board's resolution that authorized its Chief Operating Officer,
Sison, to file the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA—is sufficient proof of authority.
We agree.
The Court, in several cases, has recognized the sufficiency of a Secretary's Certificate as proof of
authority for an individual named in it to represent a corporation in a suit.13 In Vicar International
Construction, Inc. v. FEB Leasing and Finance Corp.,14 We held: c hanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry
In Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, the petitioner had not attached any proof that its
resident manager was authorized to sign the Verification and the non-forum shopping Certification,
as a consequence of which the Petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Subsequent to the
dismissal, however, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, to which was already
attached a Certificate issued by its board secretary who stated that, prior to the filing of the
Petition, the resident manager had been authorized by the board of directors to file the Petition.
Citing several cases excusing noncompliance with the requirement of a certificate of non-forum
shopping, the Court held that "with more reason should x x x the instant petition [be allowed,] since
petitioner herein did submit a certification on non-forum shopping, failing only to show proof that
the signatory was authorized to do so." The Court further said that the subsequent submission of
the Secretary's Certificate, attesting that the signatory to the certification was authorized
to file the action on behalf of petitioner, mitigated the oversight. (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted.)
A simple perusal of the records shows that separate authorizing board resolutions, as evidenced by
the Secretary's Certificate, were executed a few days prior to the filing of the Answer to the basic
complaint to expropriate and the petition for certiorari interposed before the CA. The Answer was
filed on February 28, 2006. Prior to this date, the board of petitioner already authorized Mariño
"to do any and all acts that may be essential in the prosecution and defense of the cases of the
corporation, more particularly involving and in connection with the Eminent Domain case filed by
the City of Lapu-Lapu" during its February 14, 2006 special meeting. Similarly, the Petition for
Certiorari before the CA was filed on April 15, 2011, accompanied by a secretary's certificate
executed on April 12, 2011 by Mariño, which states, among others, that the latter, as well as
Sison, was authorized by the Board on April 8, 2011 to represent petitioner in said eminent
domain case.
Clearly then, Sison, petitioner's representative, was duly authorized to sign the verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping and that a Secretary's Certificate is sufficient proof of said
authority, it not being limited to the Board Resolution itself. Accordingly, We hold that the CA erred
in dismissing petitioner's certiorari petition and in denying its motion for reconsideration.
This is not to say, however, that the petition before the CA is meritorious. Taking into consideration
the length of dormancy of Civil Case No. 653 8-L and a review of the developments in said case
convinces Us that the issue of whether the denial of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss by the RTC is
proper, which issue the CA has yet to resolve, should be resolved in respondent's favor. The Court
likewise finds it apt to settle said issue once and for all instead of directing the appellate court to
proceed with CA-G.R. SP. No. 05877 in order to avert further delays in its resolution.15 Thus, for
practical reasons and in the greater interest of justice, the Court shall now address the issue of
whether the RTC erred in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss.
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in not dismissing the case for respondent's failure to
prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 18 and Sec. 3,
Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.
Sec. 1. When conducted. - After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the duty of
the plaintiff to promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial. c hanro b1esvi rt ualawlib ra ry
Related to the above section is Sec. 3 of Rule 17, which states: chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib rary
Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. - If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails x x x to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, x x x the complaint may be dismissed upon
motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion x x x. chanrob1e svirtualawl ibra ry
Sec. 1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court imposes upon the plaintiff the duty to set the case for pre-trial
after the last pleading is served and filed. With this in mind, We have, in several cases,16 ruled that
the plaintiffs omission to promptly move that the case be set for pre-trial is a ground for the
dismissal of the complaint due to his fault, particularly for failing to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time, pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17.
The parties, as well as the courts below, however, failed to consider that the afore-quoted Sec. 1 of
Rule 18 had already been superseded by A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC,17 which took effect on August 16,
2004, Item 1.2 of which states: chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry
I. PRE-TRIAL
A. Civil Cases
1. Within one day from receipt of the complaint: cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary
1.1. Summons shall be prepared and shall contain a reminder to defendant to observe restraint in
filing a motion to dismiss and instead allege the grounds thereof as defences in the Answer, in
conformity with IBP-OCA Memorandum on Policy Guidelines dated March 12, 2002. xxx.
1.2 x x x Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must promptly move ex
parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within
the given period, the Branch [Clerk of Court] shall issue a notice of pre-trial.
Thus, the present rule is that if the plaintiff fails to file a motion to set the case for pre-trial within
five (5) days from the filing of a reply, the duty to set the case for pre-trial falls upon the branch
clerk of court. However, this does not relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to prosecute the case
diligently.
For a plaintiff, as herein respondent, to be excused from its burden to promptly prosecute its case,
it must convince the court that its failure to do so was due to justifiable reasons. If the neglect
is justified, then a dismissal of the case on said ground is not warranted.
In an attempt to convince Us that it was not remiss in its duty to diligently prosecute its case,
respondent proffered the following reasons, to wit: chanro blesvi rtua lawlib rary
1. Respondent was constrained to await the trial court's resolution of petitioner's Motion to
Conduct Joint Survey and Set the Case for Pre-Trial, which the RTC has not yet resolved to
this date;18
cralaw lib rary
3. Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss is a mere scrap of paper, petitioner having violated the three-
day notice rule under Sec. 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court;20 and
4. Respondent cannot be faulted for the alleged delay not only because of the pendency of the
resolution of said Motion and because of petitioner's failure to strictly comply with the
three-day notice rule, but also because the branch clerk of court failed to comply with the
July 10, 2006 and March 28, 2007 directives of the RTC that a writ of possession be
issued.21
A consideration of the events that transpired in the said expropriation case readily shows that the
delay cannot solely be attributed to respondent City of Lapu Lapu but is in fact due to the failure of
the branch clerk of court to set the case for pre-trial pursuant to A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, as well as
the trial court's delay in resolving petitioner's Motion to Conduct Joint Survey and Set the Case for
Pre-Trial. We find good reason to believe respondent's assertion that it acted in good faith when it
did not move to set the case for pre-trial, since petitioner already moved for the pre-trial setting.
Another motion from respondent can be simply repetitive of petitioner's earlier motion.
The Court, however, is mindful of petitioner's predicament that the delay in the resolution of the
expropriation case and respondent's continued occupation and enjoyment of the subject property
for more than half a decade is extremely disadvantageous and prejudicial to said corporation
without any payment of just compensation. To prevent further damage to petitioner, the trial court
is directed to immediately resolve petitioner's Motion to Conduct Joint Survey, set the case for pre-
trial, and take all appropriate measures to expedite the resolution of said case.
The February 18, 2008 and January 26, 2011 Orders of the RTC are hereby AFFIRMED. However,
in the interest of substantial justice, the RTC, Branch 27 in Lapu-Lapu City is hereby DIRECTED to
take immediate action on all pending matters in Civil Case No. 6538-L, set the case for pre-trial,
and expedite the resolution of said case.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.