Postphenomenological Investigations Essays On Human Technology Relations 2015 PDF

Postphenomenological Investigations
Postphenomenology
and the Philosophy of Technology
Editor-in-Chief
Robert Rosenberger, Georgia Institute of Technology
Executive Editors
Don Ihde, Stony Brook University, Emeritus;
Peter-Paul Verbeek, University of Twente
Technological advances affect everything from our understandings of ethics, politics, and
communication, to gender, science, and selfhood. Philosophical reflection on technology
helps draw out and analyze the nature of these changes, and helps us understand both the
broad patterns and the concrete details of technological effects. This book series provides
a publication outlet for the field of the philosophy of technology in general, and the school
of thought called “postphenomenology” in particular. Philosophy of technology applies
insights from the history of philosophy to current issues in technology, and reflects on
how technological developments change our understanding of philosophical issues. In
response, postphenomenology analyzes human relationships with technologies, while in-
tegrating philosophical commitments of the American pragmatist tradition of thought.
Design, Meditation, and the Posthuman, Edited by Dennis M. Weiss, Amy D. Propen, and
Colbey Emmerson Reid
Postphenomenological Investigations: Essays on Human-Technology Relations, Edited
by Robert Rosenberger and Peter-Paul Verbeek.
Postphenomenological
Investigations
Essays on Human–Technology Relations
Edited by Robert Rosenberger

and Peter-Paul Verbeek
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Postphenomenological investigations : essays on human-technology relations / edited by Robert

Rosenberger and Peter-Paul Verbeek.
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Table of Contents
Preface: Positioning Postphenomenology vii

Don Ihde
Introduction 1
Robert Rosenberger and Peter-Paul Verbeek
1: A Postphenomenological Field Guide 7

1 A Field Guide to Postphenomenology 9
2: Postphenomenological Theories 43
2 Why Postphenomenology Needs a Metaphysics 45
Lenore Langsdorf
3 What Robotic Re-embodiment Reveals about Virtual Re-
embodiment: A Note on the Extension Thesis 55
Kirk M. Besmer
4 Thinking Technology with Merleau-Ponty 73
Aud Sissel Hoel and Annamaria Carusi
5 Movies and Bodies: Variations of the Embodied Self in Science-
Fiction Techno-fantasies 85
Marie-Christine Nizzi
6 Bodies as Technology: How Can Postphenomenologists Deal
with the Matter of Human Technique? 105
Fernando Secomandi
7 Four Dimensions of Technological Mediation 123
Asle H. Kiran
v
vi Table of Contents
3: Postphenomenological Cases 141

8 Tracing the Tracker: A Postphenomenological Inquiry into Self-
Tracking Technologies 143
Yoni Van Den Eede
9 A Century on Speed: Reflections on Movement and Mobility in
the Twentieth Century 159
Søren Riis
10 Searching for Alterity: What Can We Learn From Interviewing
Humanoid Robots? 175
Frances Bottenberg
11 Postphenomenology of the Robot Medical Student 191
Chris Kaposy
12 Mediating Multiplicity: Brain-Dead Bodies and Organ
Transplant Protocols 203
Adam M. Rosenfeld
13 Towards a Hermeneutics of Unveiling 215
Jan Kyrre Berg Friis
4: Critical Interlocutors 227

14 Making the Gestalt Switch 229
Andrew Feenberg
15 Postphenomenology with an Eye to the Future 237
Diane P. Michelfelder
16 Stability, Instability, and Phenomenology 247
Albert Borgmann
Index 253
About the Contributors 261
Preface
Positioning Postphenomenology
Don Ihde
Postphenomenology is a philosophical style of analysis which deals with

science and technology studies. It is a recent comer to a series of twentieth
and twenty-first century interpretive upheavals regarding science, technolo-
gy, cultural studies, and technoscience. But where does one begin? If there is
a “standard view,” then early modern science is usually thought to begin in
the seventeenth century. Yet the term, “scientist,” did not occur or begin to
be used until the nineteenth century. William Whewell coined the term in
1833. Before this neologism, “natural philosophy” was the dominant term
used.
What this shift in terms points to is a deep question: who shall interpret
science? Early interpreters would have been identified, anachronistically, as
scientists (Galileo, Leewenhoek) or as philosophers (Bacon, Descartes). But
if, as I have claimed, early modern science takes much of its specific shape
through its technologies—instruments, early often optical—then one must
also account for science and technology. And here the same enigma occurs,
since the term “technology” does not come into common usage until even
later than “scientist.” Historians Thomas Hughes and David Nye have
pointed out that “technology” as a term emerged in the early twentieth centu-
ry. Prior to technology, there were “industrial arts” and “engineering” or
“machines.” In short, new terminology arrives after, later than, the shifts
which have already occurred concerning science and technology. By the time
Whewell coins “scientist” the times already demonstrated how secular, desa-
cralized modes of reasoning could be recognized. Similarly, only after mas-
sive industrialization could “technology” be recognized.
vii
viii Don Ihde
Here my issue relates to postphenomenology as a particular mode of

science-technology interpretation. Its arrival coincides with a late-twentieth-
to twenty-first-century radical shift in science-technology analysis. I shall
take 1979 as a watershed year by highlighting two publications of that year:
Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The [Social] Construc-
tion of Scientific Facts and my Technics and Praxis: A Philosophy of Tech-
nology. Latour’s book is usually taken as a landmark book in a new sociolo-
gy of science. (It is interesting to note that the original subtitle was the
“social construction” of scientific facts, but social was dropped from the
subtitle in the second edition.) My book is frequently cited as the first Eng-
lish language book on philosophy of technology. (I note in passing that
neither Latour nor I knew each other or knew of our respective books then,
nor was “Actor-Network Theory” nor “postphenomenology” used as a meth-
od descriptor.)
I cannot take the time or space here to detail the several and important
changes to the understanding of science from its early modern beginnings
(seventeenth century) through its progression and growing autonomy (eight-
eenth century) to its elevation as the supreme mode of knowledge (nineteenth
century). Rather, I shall concentrate upon a rapid set of changes beginning in
the twentieth century. Early in the century dominant interpretations were
centered in mathematization (Duhem, Mach, Poincare) followed by the rise
of positivism (Vienna Circle, et al.) and the interpreters were scientists,
philosophers, and historians—mostly mathematizers, logicians, and theory-
oriented thinkers. Continuing the idealistic take on science as a linear, accu-
mulative, and ahistorical-universal knowledge of nineteenth-century inheri-
tance, this interpretation dominated. It began to be challenged by the
mid-twentienth century with the rise of anti-positivism. Discontinuity theo-
rists began to describe “scientific revolutions” and a science saturated with
history (Kuhn, Foucault, Feyerabend, et al.). Science, beginning to be cultu-
rally and historically embedded, also began to be interpreted from a new
institutionalization of interpretation through history and philosophy of sci-
ence departments (1950s through the 1960s). Alongside the history and phi-
losophy of science, there had also existed a sociology of science (Merton)
which did look at science practice, but focused largely on outputs—such as
citation research and rankings. This sociology of science chronologically
coincided with the positivist–anti-positivist debates. However, by the 1970s,
there began yet another more radical shift. Here the earliest origins were
largely sociological. The United Kingdom was the early locale, with the
social studies of scientific knowledge (SSK) and social constructionism as
designators of the new approach (Bloor, Barnes, Collins). As with earlier
Mertonian sociology, social constructive approaches continued to forefront
science as practice, but unlike the earlier sociology, constructive approaches
Preface ix
began to see that the content of scientific knowledge itself was “socially
constructed.”
It is at this point that phenomenology can be seen to play a background
and tangential role. Berger and Luckmann’s The Social Construction of Real-
ity (1966) was inspired by the phenomenologies of Alfred Schutz and Ed-
mund Husserl. And while phenomenology was muted in the Anglophone
version of social constructionism, it retained the shift of interpretive focus on
praxis. We now arrive at my chosen juncture of 1979 and the birth of what
were to become Actor-Network Theory and postphenomenology.
In Laboratory Life Latour described himself as a sociologist and anthro-
pologist. Laboratory culture was his substitute for a “tribe” and he would
become a participant observer. So, as an observer, he would follow around
the scientists and technicians and take account of their activities and out-
comes. How is scientific knowledge produced? Here I confess, I came to this
book late—years earlier I had read and taught his Science in Action (1987)
which was a much more philosophical re-working of Laboratory Life, al-
though most of the key ideas for the later book were already present in a
more diaristic-interview form in the earlier. From the outset, it is obvious that
Latour’s approach is radically different from either the history and philoso-
phy of science, or earlier sociologies of science. He self-consciously brings a
“literary critical” approach to his descriptions of what scientists do. Although
the index does not include the term, “semiotics,” Latour’s style of analysis
was later dubbed a material semiotics. It should be noted, too, that his labora-
tory was that of Roger Guillemin in the Jonas Salk Institute and thus was a
chemical-biological science. Thus, contrary to the sciences of interest to the
history and philosophy of science traditions which often assumed the prima-
cy of physics, mathematics (and astronomy); with Latour biology, chemistry,
and neurology are analyzed.
I begin my account of Laboratory Life with what Latour depicts of the
laboratory in his photograph file—it is a sort of geography of the lab. Three
image themes stand out: machinery and instruments (five out of fourteen) are
shown. People—sometimes also in the instrument images—are shown, usu-
ally in discussion or poring over reading material. And, reading material—
print outs, scientific articles, and sometimes with machines which produce
print. This is, of course, what the observer sees walking around the lab.
Suppose now, imaginatively, a similar set of images first associated with
early twentienth-century philosophy of science as mathematized, theory-pro-
ducing—would the pictures be of an Einstein sitting and thinking a thought
experiment? Of a mathematician doing chalk calculations on a blackboard?
Or, imagine a Kuhnian image showing how an improved instrument yields a
different paradigm shift which includes different modes of seeing. Kuhn
points out that seventeenth-century effluvium theorists saw “chaff parti-
cles . . . fall off electrified bodies” (1970, 117). But later this phenomenon
x Don Ihde
was seen as electrostatic repulsion, though it was “not seen as such until
Hauksbee’s large-scale apparatus had greatly magnified its effects” (Kuhn,
1970, 117). And again “Herschel, when he first observed the same object
twelve years later . . . with a much improved telescope of his own manufac-
ture . . . was able to notice an apparent disk-size that was at least unusual for
the stars” (Kuhn, 1970, 115). What I am suggesting is that in early mathema-
tized and theory-centered interpretations of science, instruments play no im-
portant role; later, the role of instruments (Kuhn) does get acknowledged,
later accepted and then accelerated with Latour.
Moving now from Latour’s three image themes to his sociology-anthro-
pology—but also his hermeneutical-literary theory observations, I will now
begin to sketch the new interpretation of science which results. I begin, not
with Latour’s opening perspective, but with the “technologies” of the lab.
First, biochemical instruments differ from those in other sciences. Latour
includes in his photos (1) gamma counter, (2) NMR spectrometer, (3) frac-
tionating columns, and (4) an automatic amino acid analyzer. Most of these
instruments relate to bioassays and the material which goes into the assay is
biological, hormonal, chemical—including lots of rat brain and other animal
material. Note that the object being constructed is TRF (or TRH) which
requires “several tons of hypothalamic tissues obtained from the slaughter-
house” (Latour and Woolgar, 1986, 108). The instruments mentioned are
used in the process of isolating and identifying TRF(H), the new scientific
object of the study. Latour recognizes the important role played by instru-
ments (technologies) but gives a unique description of this role: instruments
are inscription devices. What the instruments produce is what later is de-
scribed as a “visual display” but which here remains an inscription. This is a
focal emphasis upon what Latour is drawing from the hermeneutic-literary
dimension of his perspective. The instruments being used here—spectrome-
ter and amino acid analyzer in particular—produce (visual) graphs. These are
squiggle patterns common to a whole range of instruments (like an EKG)
with peaks, spikes, and the like. In my terminology, these are non-isomor-
phic images which, unlike photographic, isomorphic images which resemble
what is being imaged, are more text- or code-like patterns which are “read.”
Wave pattern oscilligraph-like printouts on rolling scroll paper are what one
sees. One can see why the Derrida “inscription” or “trace” language works
well here. 1
I now move to the third theme of images—written material, scientific
articles, lab notes, and the like. Latour as observer again takes a literary turn
in his description of laboratory life—what do the humans produce? Texts,
articles, notes. How these are developed, dealt with, and processed give clues
to how scientific knowledge is constructed. I shall not detail all of the moves
Latour makes, but briefly, only what survives becomes a scientific fact. And
in the process—one could say stylistically—all traces of history, subjectivity,
Preface xi
construction are removed. So, contrary to what he observes ethnographically,

all the processing which goes on in the lab, gets stated in such a way that the
object [TRF (H)] gets removed from its dynamic process. So, now we have
instruments which produce inscriptions, which in turn are reported in pub-
lished scientific articles claiming new scientific facts—but these are, in turn,
described as having been discovered as though the object is purported to
have always been there. In short, the rhetorical style of this literature elimi-
nates the contingencies, battles, processes which occurred in the lab as ob-
served by the sociologist-anthropologist.
We now need to look at the humans [the tribe] who operate the instru-
ments and produce the writings. Here I turn to the concluding chapter, “The
Creation of Order out of Disorder.” Looking back at his observations, Latour
describes a process by which the scientific object or fact (TRF) comes to be.
Over all it only becomes stabilized after much processing—TRF is slowly
constructed by going through many trials and manipulations, “after eight
years of bringing inscription devices to bear on the purified brain extracts,
the statement stabilized sufficiently to enable it to switch into another net-
work” (Latour and Woolgar, 1986, 236). Now a reality, TRF is seen as a
consequence of the process. Only by going through what Latour calls an
agonistic field, can the object-fact (TR) be reified or materialized. One can
see that in one sense, Latour has inverted the usual take on how scientific
knowledge is produced. In Latour’s perspective “Nature” is always the last to
arrive, the consequence of the long construction, “Nature is a usable concept
only as a byproduct of agonistic activity” (Latour and Woolgar, 1986, 327).
The laboratory has been the site where construction takes place.
I may now turn to my own Technics and Praxis: A Philosophy of Tech-
nology which was also published in 1979. Philosophers rarely have had deep
interests in technologies until late modernity. But after the Industrial Revolu-
tion, the World Wars, the impact of technologies could hardly be ignored.
For philosophy, however, this would require a shift of temperament. The
dominant temperament in philosophy, from Classical Greece on, favored the
ideal, the abstract, and often shunned the material, or in the case of the long
meditations on body and mind, ranked materiality as inferior. Thus with
respect to science and technology, technology was almost always secondary,
epiphenomenal, or “applied.” I began to realize the importance of technolo-
gies, tools, materiality while still at Southern Illinois University. I had been
assigned to do interdisciplinary work in the SIU Honors College where, in
1964, the theme was “the leisure society.” Readings argued that modern
technologies freed up time such that in modernity we should be able to create
a “New Athens.” I was skeptical of the leisure claim and began to reflect on a
phenomenology of work. What stood out was how deeply virtually anything
to do with work entailed some kind of tool, artifact, technology. I asked my
students to do a sort of diary of their ordinary day and specifically account
xii Don Ihde
for relations with technologies. (Awaken with an alarm clock; engage a

bathroom set of technologies; prepare breakfast with a toaster; in those days
take notes with a pencil and pad [today laptops and iPads]; and so each
would find multiple—hundreds—of such engagements in any given day.) At
that time, too, I was reading seriously Heidegger on the primacy of pragmata
over scientific objects in the human experience of World. He was probably
the first to claim that technology is “ontologically prior” to science. By the
1970s, I was doing articles on human-machine relations with a special inter-
est in the role of instruments in science. It was this work which became the
first four chapters of Technics and Praxis—a set of phenomenological exam-
inations of the different types [of human-technology relations including ex-
amples from science uses].
In this analysis I was asserting several new- and non-classical phenomen-
ological modifications: I continued to use what I would later term, the inter-
relational ontology implied by Husserl’s “intentionality” and Heidegger’s
“being-in-the-world,” but into a mediating role I placed material technolo-
gies. Human-technology-World became the formalism expressing this inter-
relationality. Humans actionally using technologies mediatingly relate to a
World. What was to become known as my “phenomenology of technics”
began here with a descriptive analysis of embodiment, hermeneutic, and
background relations [later to add alterity relations in Technology and the
Lifeworld, 1990.] In Technics and Praxis these four chapters were called a
“Program in Philosophy of Technology.” This was clearly a praxis-oriented
analysis, although not sociological. It was instead phenomenological with an
emphasis upon how scientists and others were bodily-perceptually engaging
a world through instruments. I shall not here go into detail since there are
multiple references to this technics in this volume. But I did analyze the ways
in which by using technologies meditatively one could see how these uses
non-neutrally [my neologism] transformed experience. In my telescope ex-
ample—to be repeated and refined over the years—an optically transformed
celestial world is very different from an eyeball world. Indeed, through optics
the Copernican version of the heavens finally overcomes the Ptolemaic
world. The phenomenology of Technics and Praxis emphasized the role of
embodiment in relation to technology uses. Unlike Laboratory Life pheno-
menological embodiment was not linguistically or textually focused. This
difference arises because of the differences between a semiotic and a pheno-
menological background perspective. It remains a major difference even to-
day.
I have now crossed the 1979 divide, but the chronological parallels con-
tinue—still independently—for several years. John Law, active as a frequent
visitor and collaborator at the Centre de Sociologie de l’innovation and the
Ecole Nationale superiere des Mines de Paris where Latour and his col-
league Michel Callon were staffed, noted that Callon begin to use the term
Preface xiii
“Actor-Network Theory” in about 1982 (Law, 2007). In my case, after much

reading and discussion of the Richard Rorty inspired non-foundational prag-
matism in the North American context, I gave lectures at Goteborg, Sweden,
on a “non-foundational phenomenology.” Although I had not yet coined
“postphenomenology” virtually all interpreters see its outline in the 1986
publication of that earlier title (Goteborg). Similarly, both Latour and I pub-
lished more philosophically refined versions of the 1979 books—Latour,
Science in Action (1987) and me, Technology and the Lifeworld (1990). It is
my opinion that both these later books are better and more coherent than their
1979 predecessors. By this time our paths begin to cross at conferences and
readings (4/S, the Society for the Social Studies of Science, was the main
organization for STS papers—I note that my own first attendance and presen-
tation was in 1979, but I attended only sporadically until the 1990s). I was
aware of Science in Action and through it, Latour played a significant role in
my 1991 Instrumental Realism: The Interface between Philosophy of Science
and Philosophy of Technology.
A side glance at the new interpretations of science and technology in the
1980s shows a rapidly burgeoning publication field: philosophy of technolo-
gy finally took off with Albert Borgmann, Langdon Winner, Hubert Dreyfus,
and Andrew Feenberg joining in with published books; feminist thinkers
Donna Haraway, Sandra Harding, and Evelyn Fox-Keller all dealt with sci-
ence-technology topics. Both Anglophone and Francophone sociologies
(SSK and ANT) proliferated. There were also significant commonalities tra-
versing this set of thinkers. All agreed that science, unlike its older transcen-
dental and ahistorical interpretation, was culture-, history-, and even gender-
situated. All these thinkers employed a version of an inter-relational frame-
work interpreting how science and technology developed. We now reach the
decade of the 90s. I shall now narrow the focus more specifically upon the
emergence of postphenomenology (1993 was the publication year for my
Postphenomenology: Essays in the Postmodern Context).
It was during the 1990s that I met Peter-Paul Verbeek, first as a PhD
student doing interesting work on philosophy of technology in his disserta-
tion. In 1997 Hans Achterhuis, Verbeek’s older colleague, published Van
stoommachine tot cyborg: Denken over techniek in de nieuwe wereld, later
translated into English as American Philosophy of Technology: The Empiri-
cal Turn (2001). Verbeek’s chapter, “Don Ihde: The Technological Life-
world” was an insightful analysis of my work vis-à-vis Heidegger. 2 Verbeek
was already deeply into comparing Actor-Network Theory to postphenome-
nology and during a 1998 lecture trip to the Netherlands, he asked me to give
a seminar comparing these two approaches. Luckily, I had been teaching
Science in Action in my philosophy of science classes so was able to oblige.
More significantly, in the background, both of us had already begun to have
xiv Don Ihde
access to graduate students who were attracted to these modes of science-

technology studies.
In my case, I had long dreamed of having some kind of institute which
would do such analyses, and by 1994, there began what was to be a long
progression of Visiting Scholars, faculty, and post-docs but also dissertation
students from both Europe and Asia. Monique Riphagen from the Nether-
lands and Sung Dong Kim from Korea with the project of translating Tech-
nics and Praxis into Korean (published, 1998); these were the first. We
formed an informal reading group which continued until 1998 when the
technoscience research seminar was made a permanent part of our Stony
Brook doctoral program. We read widely, and early works included the fa-
mous “chicken debate” between proponents of SSK and ANT and our early
roastees were often associated with these strands of thought. This continued
until my retirement in 2012 and hosted many Visiting Scholars, producing
both MAs and PhDs from Stony Brook and internationally. Stony Brook
PhDs with technoscience dissertations in this period included Evan Selinger
(Rochester Institute of Technology), Ken Yip (New York Tech), Robert
Rosenberger (Georgia Institute of Technology), Kyle Whyte (Michigan State
University) and Adam Rosenfeld (North Carolina A and M). Several of these
still-junior philosophers are already name visible in the field, and most have
presented in the various postphenomenology research panels discussed be-
low. Additionally, in the early days three Danes and one Argentinian com-
pleted MAs, and visitors doing PhDs in their own universities (with me as
advisor) included two Danish students, two from Norway, and one each from
Sweden, Greece, the UK, and the Netherlands.
We called this operation the Technoscience Research Group with its tech-
noscience research seminar. Its first published book was Chasing Technosci-
ence (2003) edited by Evan Selinger and me. It dealt with materiality in the
works of Donna Haraway, Don Ihde, Bruno Latour, and Andrew Pickering,
with contributions by the principals and critical responses by six of the TRG
participants. We also developed the tradition of “roasts.” Each semester had a
different theme, and a roastee was chosen—first to be read and discussed for
some six weeks, then to be given a full three-hour roast. We ended up with
philosophers of science (Joseph Rouse and Peter Galison), philosophers of
technology (Albert Borgmann, Andrew Feenberg, Hubert Dreyfus, Langdon
Winner, and Peter-Paul Verbeek) sociologists of science (Andrew Pickering,
Harry Collins, Trevor Pinch) feminist thinkers (Donna Haraway, Sandra
Harding, Evelyn Fox-Keller) a historian of science (Paul Forman) and ending
with me as final roastee during my retirement year.
The seminar encouraged participants to formulate conference presenta-
tions for science-technology associations. While at first these were simply
individual contributions during the 1990s and into the early 2000s, by 2006
we began to propose distinctly postphenomenology research panels to the
Preface xv
Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences, and added, in 2007,
the Social Studies of Science, and the Society for Philosophy and Technolo-
gy. These rapidly grew into multiple panels and today often are quadruple or
quintuple. During this same time period, and parallel to the Stony Brook
operation, Peter-Paul Verbeek had been directing a consortium MA program
and had a series of PhD students in the Netherlands. Thus, participants from
both Stony Brook and Twente plus other Asian, European, and North
American universities began to be a recognizable group, today over one
hundred participants.
While the list is too long for space here, I would point to a growing
number of publications—books, special issues of journals, individual articles
in journals—discussing postphenomenology. Verbeek also continued his
interest in comparing ANT and Postphenomenology and formed a special
panel at the Rotterdam 4/S (2008)—it was jammed, and some had to listen
from the hallway. This theme was later taken up in a conference in Manches-
ter UK (2009) and a 4/S conference in Arlington, Virginia (2010) Verbeek,
too, published two widely cited books, What Things Do (Penn State Press,
2005) and Moralizing Technology (Chicago, 2011). And this volume joins
the first series on postphenomenology, Postphenomenology and the Philoso-
phy of Technology, published by Lexington, which begins a longer list of
works arising out of postphenomenological research programs.
In conclusion I will briefly note some of the major comparative features
of the two styles of analysis:
• Both ANT and Postphenomenology employ inter-relational ontologies.

But the philosophical traditions out of which these come differ. ANT
draws from semiotics of which the base is linguistic-textual. Postphenom-
enology draws from an embodiment analysis of human action and percep-
tion. Yet inter-relationality in either form sees that when something in a
World changes, so does what is human change.
• Both ANT and Postphenomenology are materially sensitive. In ANT sen-
sitivity to materiality took the shape of its distinctive human and non-
human actants. ANT also holds to a general and equalized notion of sym-
metry between the humans and non-humans. As noted above, Law terms
this a material semiotics. Postphenomenology does not hold to a strict
symmetry, but to a series of gradations between types of activity. But it,
too, is materially sensitive—for example, postphenomenology recognizes
instrumental intentionalities or built-in selectivities in technologies. I am
developing a material hermeneutics modeled upon the use of contempo-
rary science instruments to “let things speak.”
• Both methodologies have abandoned early modern “subject-object” di-
chotomies and substituted multiple transition and structure notions such as
“translation” in ANT and “multistability” in postphenomenology.
xvi Don Ihde
• Postphenomenology retains a version of variational theory from phenom-

enology, which is a method to possibilize multiple structures in such a
way that what is variant and what is invariant can be shown.
Currently, in STS circles on the Continent, it probably remains the case that
ANT is the dominantly favored approach. I would note that at the Manches-
ter conference there was a bit of the division of the house with the sociolo-
gists siding with ANT but the anthropologists more likely to be favorable to
postphenomenology. Philosophy of technology is highly positive to postphe-
nomenology and at the 2013 Lisbon meeting of SPT [Society for Philosophy
and Technology] the phenomenology-postphenomenology and technology
track had 34 presenters, the largest single methological group. Clearly the
two styles of analysis are more complementary than combative.
NOTES
1. See note 24 (Latour and Woolgar, 1979, 261). Latour acknowledges his debt to Derri-
da’s terminology.
2. See Peter-Paul Verbeek’s entry in (Achterhuis, 2001, 119-146).
REFERENCES
Achterhuis, H. (2001). American Philosophy of Technology: The Empirical Turn, translated by

R. Crease. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Berger, P., and T. Luckmann. (1966). The Social Construction of Reality. New York: Anchor
Books.
Ihde, D. (1979). Technics and Praxis: A Philosophy of Technology, Boston Series in the
Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht: Reidel Press.
Ihde, D. (1986). On Non-Foundational Phenomenology. Goteborg: Institionen for pedagogic,
Fenomenografiska notiser 3.
Ihde, D. (1990). Technology and the Lifeworld; From Garden to Earth. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press.
Ihde, D. (1991). Instrumental Realism: The Interface between Philosophy of Science and Phi-
losophy of Technology. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Ihde, D. (1993). Postphenomenology: Essays in the Postmodern Context. Evanston: Northwest-
ern University Press.
Kuhn, T. (1970). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ediction. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Latour, B. (1987). Science in Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Latour, B., and S. Woolgar. (1979). Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts, 2nd
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Law, J. (2007). “Actor Network Theory and Material Semiotics.” ANT document, April 2007.
http://www.heterogeneities.net/publications/Law2007ANTandMaterialSemiotics.pdf
Verbeek, P-P. (2005). What Things Do. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press.
Verbeek, P-P. (2011). Moralizing Technology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Introduction
A philosophical perspective called postphenomenology has been quickly

gaining influence in discussions on technology in the Philosophy of Technol-
ogy, Science and Technology Studies, and other fields. This developing
school of thought brings together an international group of scholars working
within a number of disciplines, including anthropology, sociology, cultural
studies, media studies, as well as philosophy. This book serves as both an
introduction to the postphenomenological perspective, as well as a review of
some of the work on the leading edge of this school of thought.
Postphenomenologists study the relationships that develop between users
and technologies. This perspective addresses questions such as: How do
technologies shape our choices, our actions, and our experience of the world?
How are technologies at once objects that we use for our own purposes, and
at the same time objects that have an influence on us? How do technologies
inform our politics, ethics, and our understandings of the basic features of
our everyday experience?
As a distinctive philosophical perspective, postphenomenology brings to-
gether a number of insights, interests, and commitments. It builds on the
phenomenological tradition of philosophy, approaching issues from the start-
ing point of deep descriptions of human experience. Postphenomenology
brings together the phenomenological approach and the ontological commit-
ments of the American pragmatist tradition of philosophy. This means that
postphenomenological claims are never about the absolute foundations of
reality or knowledge, and never about the “essence” of an object of study.
Instead, postphenomenological claims are posed from an embodied and situ-
ated perspective, refer to practical problems, and are empirically oriented. To
both phenomenology and pragmatism, postphenomenology adds a focus
upon case studies of human-technology relations. Through this combination
1
2 Robert Rosenberger and Peter-Paul Verbeek
of traditions and interests, the postphenomenological perspective has devel-

oped a unique set of insights into technology, and applies these ideas to
practical cases of usage, design, policy, and scientific research.
The central mode of investigation for postphenomenology is the applica-
tion and analysis of the framework of concepts developed by Don Ihde, the
founding figure of this perspective. Over a long and continuing career, Ihde
has adapted insights from the phenomenological tradition for use in the con-
crete description of human relations to technology, and has developed his
own account of humanity’s contemporary technological situation. Those
working in the school of postphenomenology refine and expand on Ihde’s
framework, and they apply these ideas to a wide range of philosophical
issues, including technological agency, ethics, selfhood, anthropological
methodology, politics, philosophy of design, and scientific practice. Just a
few of the concrete topics addressed by case studies in this perspective in-
clude scientific and medical imaging, computer interface, virtual reality, traf-
fic safety, robotics, educational technologies, sustainable design, wearable
computing, and bodily implants.
***
This book consists of four sections. While a first part introduces the main
ideas of postphenomenology, the second and third parts of this book present
paradigmatic examples of postphenomenological essays by scholars working
at the cutting edge of this perspective. The second section focuses on theoret-
ical positions in the field, presenting a number of original postphenomeno-
logical analyses, while the third section presents a selection of postpheno-
menological case studies. This distinction between theoretical and empirical
contributions to postphenomenology is somewhat false, though, since the
chapters on theory include many concrete examples, and the empirical chap-
ters include deep discussions and critiques of theory. The book concludes
with a fourth section, in which “critical interlocutors” offer advice for this
developing school of thought.
Part 1 The first section introduces the main ideas and philosophical
positions of postphenomenology and is written by the co-editors of this vol-
ume, Robert Rosenberger and Peter-Paul Verbeek. This chapter, which aims
to function as a “field map,” includes a review of the main concepts of the
postphenomenological framework, an analysis of its philosophical commit-
ments, a description of postphenomenological methodology, and also a re-
view of several of the key case studies of this perspective.
Part 2 Part 2 begins with Lenore Langsdorf’s “Why Postphenomenolo-

gy Needs a Metaphysics.” Langsdorf argues that since postphenomenology
Introduction 3
attempts to articulate a world of human-technology relations, it would benefit

from explicitly developing a metaphysics of process, one that “provides a
theory of how interrelation produces novel entities.” For this project, she
advocates an incorporation of the metaphysical insights of Dewey, White-
head, and ethnomethodology.
In his chapter, “What Robotic Re-embodiment Reveals About Virtual Re-
embodiment: A Note on the Extension Thesis,” Kirk Besmer explores what it
means to embody remote devices, such as tele-surgery and remotely operated
vehicles, and also immersive technologies, such as virtual reality and ad-
vanced videogames. He develops the argument that both cases should togeth-
er be understood as distinct from classical cases of embodiment (such as a
hammer or glasses) in which bodily experience is extended through the de-
vice.
Aud Sissel Hoel and Annamaria Carusi argue for the incorporation of
insights from the later work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty into the postpheno-
menological perspective in their chapter, “Thinking Technology with Mer-
leau-Ponty.” Building on his notion of flesh, Hoel and Carusi develop the
notion of the “measuring body” to articulate the complex the roles of tech-
nology within the dynamics of human perception.
In her chapter, “Movies and Bodies: Variations of the Embodied Self in
Science-Fiction Techno-fantasies,” Marie-Christine Nizzi shows that science
fiction can provide a rich resource for thinking about technology and human
bodies. She reasons that since blockbusters are seen by millions of people,
they may speak widely held concerns, and she considers the implications of a
variety of films, from Avatar, to Bladerunner, to Watchmen.
Fernando Secomandi’s chapter (“Bodies as Technology: How Can Post-
phenomenologists Deal with the Matter of Human Technique?”) addresses
the issue of human bodily training. In cases in which our trained bodily
techniques are relevant to our relation to the world, Secomandi wonders if
our bodies themselves should be considered technologies. He writes, “In the
interpretation I propose, Ihde does not really convince us of any fundamental
difference between technology and technique, but only reinforces their simi-
larities.”
Finally, in Asle Kiran’s chapter, “Four Dimensions of Technological Me-
diation,” he considers Ihde’s claim that all technological mediation involves
both a magnification and a reduction of some aspects of our experience.
Building from this basic insight, Kiran outlines similar binaries at work in the
ontological, epistemological, practical, and ethical dimensions of human-
technology relations.
Part 3 In the first chapter of part 3, titled “Tracing the Tracker: A

Postphenomenological Inquiry into Self-Tracking Technologies,” Yoni Van
Den Eede explores wearable computing devices that monitor the functioning
of the user’s own body. Through an analysis of the experience of these

devices, Van Den Eede develops insights into the kind of self experienced
through self-tracking. And he considers the implications of these devices—in
which the target of new information is the user her or himself—for postphe-
nomenology’s conception of the mediation of technology.
The chapter “A Century on Speed: Reflections on Movement and Mobil-
ity in the Twentieth Century,” by Søren Riis, investigates how the notion of
speed is closely linked to technological developments. Riis threads together a
variety of contexts and conceptions of speed, exploring everything from the
history of early flight, to the Olympics, to amphetamines, to the accelerating
rate of technological change.
In her chapter, “Searching for Alterity: What Can We Learn From Inter-
viewing Humanoid Robots?” Frances Bottenberg investigates the experience
of holding conversations with highly realistic robots, especially Bina48, a
robotic bust designed for advanced verbal conversation. She reflects on the
implications of these experiences for the future of human-robot conversation-
al etiquette, and what these experiences ultimately imply about ourselves.
Bottenberg writes, “Perhaps the culprit is vanity, perhaps lack of imagina-
tion, or perhaps simply our sociable predisposition, but we remain inclined to
read ourselves—even our own personalities and faces—into the manufactur-
ing of the significant AI others we face.”
Chris Kaposy, in his chapter, “Postphenomenology of the Medical Stu-
dent,” draws parallels between contemporary medical ethics training and the
programming of robots. He argues that the dominant approach, with its auto-
mation-like emphasis on systems and standardized rules, would benefit from
a postphenomenological conception of multistable embodied subjects.
Adam Rosenfeld’s chapter, “Mediating Multiplicity: Brain-Dead Bodies
and Organ Transplant Protocols,” cross-analyzes various conceptions of
corpses ready for organ donation. Rosenfeld argues that, while there is a
tendency to understand brain-dead bodies as simple Cartesian cadavers, it is
beneficial to conceive of their multistability, and consider their different
roles shifting through different practical organ donation contexts.
Jan Kyrre Berg Friis explores the concrete practices of image interpreta-
tion in the field of Radiology in his chapter, “Towards a Hermeneutics of
Unveiling.” Through an analysis of the details of these practices, Friis con-
siders what it means for those working in postphenomenology to become
immersed within the meaningful context of a practical area of empirical
study.
As a supplement to these two middle sections of the book, we would like
to direct readers to the forthcoming sister volume to this one, Technoscience
and Postphenomenology: The Manhattan Papers, edited by Jan Kyrre Berg
Friis and Robert P. Crease. This book contains many chapters that also repre-
sent the cutting edge of postphenomenological research by mainstay contrib-
Introduction 5
utors to the panels and publications hosted by this school of thought, includ-
ing Cathrine Hasse, Kyle Powys Whyte, Shannon Vallor, Anette Forss, Juni-
chi Murata, Bob Scharff, Stacey Irwin, Galit Wellner, Gert Goeminne, and
many others, including longtime interlocutors with Ihde. The Manhattan
Papers and the current book were purposely organized together to showcase
the work of many of the core contributors this perspective.
Part 4 The fourth section of this book features critical responses to the
postphenomenological perspective by three interlocutors with this school of
thought: Andrew Feenberg, Diane Michelfelder, and Albert Borgmann. The
works of these three figures are of constant relevance and concern to those
working on postphenomenology. Moreover, all three have recently engaged
with postphenomenologists through journal issues and conference panels. In
this section, they offer critical comments and advice for the school of post-
phenomenology, prescribing the future directions they would like to see this
perspective take.
In his chapter, “Making the Gestalt Switch,” Andrew Feenberg argues
that much of his own work on the political and socially constructed dimen-
sions of technology can be understood as consistent with the aims and com-
mitments of postphenomenology. Thus, if postphenomenologists wish to ex-
pand their analyses into issues regarding the construction of technology
through political, economic, and bureaucratic structures, then they can look
to the insights of his instrumentalization theory. Feenberg explores how this
can be done in part through an analysis of the work of Lukács.
Diane Michelfelder’s chapter, “Postphenomenology with an Eye to the
Future,” argues that the postphenomenological perspective is well suited to
the task of analyzing new technologies approaching on the horizon, such as
wearable computing devices like Google Glass. But Michelfelder also devel-
ops the criticism that, in its concern with concrete empirical case studies,
postphenomenological work fails to account for the experience of the world
as a whole. If not expanded to both descriptively and normatively provide
such an account, she argues that postphenomenology will be ill-equipped to
address future technologies that will inform our relationships with the world
itself, from biosensors to “smart” environments.
In his chapter, “Stability, Instability, and Phenomenology,” Albert Borg-
mann reflects on the postphenomenological notions of multistability and var-
iational theory, and considers examples from the fiction of Kees Boeke
which include scenes that expand into outer space and shrink view down to
the microscopic level. Borgmann reflects on what it means to take up the
multiple perspectives adopted by postphenomenology, what must remain in-
variant in such analyses, and what it means for all this to take place in the
context of moral horizons that relate to the cosmos, the micro-world, and the
related global concerns. He writes, “How these horizons morally inform the
lifeworld is one of the great unanswered questions of contemporary philoso-

phy and requires a new phenomenology.”
***
We sincerely hope that this book will contribute to the further development
of the postphenomenological approach. By providing an overview of the
basic characteristics of the approach, and by bringing together a substantial
number of theoretically and empirically oriented postphenomenological anal-
yses and critical perspectives, we hope to lay a basis for further investigation
and discussion. Parallel to this book, the forthcoming volume Technoscience
and Postphenomenology: The Manhattan Papers, edited by Jan Kyrre Berg
Friis and Robert P. Crease, will present more state-of-the-art work in post-
phenomenological approach. This is exactly what we aim to accomplish with
this book series in Postphenomenology and the Philosophy of Technology: to
be a platform for high-quality, state-of-the-art work in postphenomenology,
where Philosophy of Technology meets Science and Technology Studies,
and where philosophical analysis meets the concrete materiality of science
and technology, and—with a wink to Husserl—finds a new way “to the
things themselves!”
1
A Postphenomenological Field Guide

Chapter One
A Field Guide to Postphenomenology

Over the past decades, an expanding group of scholars has been developing a
novel approach to the social and cultural roles of technology. Building upon
Don Ihde’s phenomenological analyses of human-technology relations (e.g.,
Ihde 1990), they have started to study technologies with a blend of empirical
and philosophical research methods—ranging from the epistemic role of the
Mars explorer vehicle to the role of technologies in education and from the
impact of hands-free calling on driving behavior to the role of sonography in
moral decisions about abortion.
All of these studies label themselves as “post-phenomenological,” in or-
der to express their ambivalent relation to the phenomenological tradition.
On the one hand, they are heavily inspired by the phenomenological empha-
sis on experience and concreteness, while on the other hand they distance
themselves from the classical-phenomenological romanticism regarding
technology, and find a starting point in empirical analyses of actual technolo-
gies.
The various “postphenomenological studies” that have been undertaken
so far (e.g., Ihde, 1993; Selinger, 2006; Rosenberger, 2008; Verbeek, 2008b;
Rosenberger, 2012) have at least two things in common. First of all, they all
investigate technology in terms of the relations between human beings and
technological artifacts, focusing on the various ways in which technologies
help to shape relations between human beings and the world. They do not
approach technologies as merely functional and instrumental objects, but as
mediators of human experiences and practices. Second, they all combine
philosophical analysis with empirical investigation. Rather than “applying”
philosophical theories to technologies, the postphenomenological approach
takes actual technologies and technological developments as a starting point
9
for philosophical analysis. Its philosophy of technology is in a sense a philos-

ophy “from” technology.
This blend of empirical and philosophical work has found itself a place in
the existing repertoire of methods in the Philosophy of Technology and in
Science and Technology Studies, bringing together the empirical orientation
of STS on concrete case-studies with the conceptual and also normative
orientation that are characteristic for philosophy of technology.
This chapter provides a field guide to postphenomenology. To be sure:
there is no strict postphenomenological methodology that scholars could fol-
low. Postphenomenology comes in just as many flavors as there are scholars
in the field. Still, these postphenomenological flavors have some common
features and characteristics. In order to discuss these, we will first explain
how postphenomenology developed out of “traditional” phenomenology.
After that, we will elaborate some of the central concepts in the approach,
and discuss some elements of its methodology. We will conclude the chapter
by discussing a number of postphenomenological case studies, which show
concretely what the approach has to contribute to the study of science and
technology.
FROM PHENOMENOLOGY TO POSTPHENOMENOLOGY
The postphenomenological approach in philosophy of technology has devel-

oped out of a critical dialogue with the phenomenological tradition on the
one hand and research in the empirical field of Science and Technology
Studies on the other. Classical phenomenological analyses of technology,
most notably in the work of Martin Heidegger, approached technology in
fairly abstract and also romantic terms. They studied “Technology” as a
broad, social, and cultural phenomenon, with a special focus on the ways in
which technology alienates human beings from themselves and from the
world they live in. While this approach has brought many relevant insights in
the role of technology in human existence, its monolithic and romantic char-
acter were increasingly experienced as problematic (Feenberg, 2000; Ihde,
1993). The analyses were losing touch with the actual experiences people
have of the roles of technologies in human existence.
At the same time, the empirical approach of the field of Science and
Technology Studies does not always provide a real answer to this lack of
connection. Despite its empirical basis in fields like sociology and anthropol-
ogy, and despite its ambition to take an “empirical detour” to answer philo-
sophical questions, it eventually did not always find the way back to these
questions. Insights in the dynamics of the complex interactions of science,
technology, and society, however valuable they are, do not always help to
A Field Guide to Postphenomenology 11
answer the philosophical question of how the role of technology in human

existence and experience can be understood.
The postphenomenological approach combines an empirical orientation
with philosophical analysis. It calls itself “post”-phenomenology to empha-
size that it distances itself from the romanticism of classical phenomenology.
Rather than positioning itself in opposition to science and technology, it aims
to integrate science and technology in its analysis of the relations between
human beings and their world. Classical positions have often claimed that
phenomenology provides a rich alternative to the narrow scientific and tech-
nological approach to reality. While the sciences, as Merleau-Ponty stated,
merely “analyze” things from a distance, phenomenology “describes” them
from a closer engagement (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Rather than describing the
world as it actually is, the sciences present a reduced reality. Against this,
phenomenology takes us “back to the things themselves.”
It is precisely this claim to regain access to an original world that is richer
in meaning than the world of science and technology, that postphenomenolo-
gy refutes. Rather than thinking in terms of alienation, it thinks in terms of
mediation. Science and technology help to shape our relations to the world,
rather than merely distancing us from it. This perspective of mediation em-
bodies a reinterpretation of the foundations of phenomenology. It does not
see phenomenology as a method to describe the world, but as understanding
the relations between human beings and their world. In fact, this study of
human-world relations is what all major phenomenological thinkers have
been doing, by conceptualizing it in terms of consciousness (Husserl), per-
ception (Merleau-Ponty), being-in-the-world (Heidegger), and so on (cf.
Verbeek, 2005, 99–119). Building upon and expanding these conceptualiza-
tions of human-world relations makes it possible to understand how science
and technology mediate these relations, rather than merely impoverishing or
suffocating them.
The “post” in “postphenomenology,” however, does not only indicate that
it moved beyond classical phenomenology. It is also reveals a remote relation
to postmodernism. Without considering itself postmodern, postphenomenol-
ogy expands the ways in which phenomenology has criticized modernism. In
fact, phenomenology itself was a result of discontent with the modernistic
separation of subject and object. Rather than seeking the source of knowl-
edge in either subjective ideas or objective facts, it focused on the intentional
relation between subject and object. Subject and object cannot have a separ-
ate existence. The human subject is always directed at objects: we cannot just
“see,” “hear,” or “think,” but we always see, hear, or think something. Simi-
larly, the objects “in themselves” will probably exist, but it does not make
much sense to think about them, because as soon as we do that, they become
things-for-us, things as disclosed in our relations with them. Phenomenology
replaced the split between subject and object with an intentional relation
between them.
Postphenomenology takes this relationist approach one step further than
phenomenology. Phenomenology itself was already a move beyond modern-
ism, because its concept of intentionality made it possible to overcome the
modernistic subject-object split. Against subjectivism and objectivism,
which founded knowledge on the internal workings of the subject or on the
objectivity of the world, its relationalism opened a novel and fruitful perspec-
tive. Postphenomenology, however, reconceptualizes this intentional relation
in two distinct ways. First, it investigates its fundamentally mediated charac-
ter. There is no direct relation between subject and object, but only an “indi-
rect” one, and technologies often function as mediators. The human-world
relation typically is a human-technology-world relation (Ihde, 1990). Sec-
ond, it does away with the idea that there is a pre-given subject in a pre-given
world of objects, with a mediating entity between them. Rather, the media-
tion is the source of the specific shape that human subjectivity and the
objectivity of the world can take in this specific situation. Subject and object
are constituted in their mediated relation (Verbeek, 2005). Intentionality is
not a bridge between subject and object but a fountain from with the two of
them emerge.
This focus on mediation and mutual constitution sharply demarcates the
postphenomenological approach from classical phenomenology. Claiming a
privileged access to the things themselves becomes an impossibility within
the postphenomenological approach. And against the idea that technology
alienates human beings from the world and from themselves it places the
idea that technologies help to shape human subjectivity and the objectivity of
the world. Postphenomenology makes it possible to make micro-scale analy-
ses of the mediating roles of technologies in human-world relations—and as
such it can be said that it truly takes us back “to the things themselves”:
material technological artifacts that deserve explicit philosophical attention.
This turn towards materiality and concrete practices reveals an influence
of American pragmatism. It is in practices of interacting with technologies
where the phenomenon of technological mediation occurs and can be stud-
ied. Human-world relations are practically “enacted” via technologies. Gali-
leo’s moon, to use an example of Don Ihde, took shape in the complex,
practical interactions of Galileo with his telescope, on the basis of which he
came to develop a new interpretation of what he saw through his device. The
materiality of technology can be studied best in concrete, practical situations
of use. This is beautifully reflected in the Greek word “pragmata,” which
means “things,” but which is closely related to the word “praxis,” which
means “practice.” Postphenomenology is the practical study of the relations
between humans and technologies, from which human subjectivities emerge,
as well as meaningful worlds.
As a result of this practical and material orientation, postphenomenology

always takes the study of human-technology relations as its starting point. In
order to understand a technology or a technological development, postphe-
nomenology always analyzes the character of the relation human beings have
with this technology and the ways in which it organizes relations between
human beings and the world. Human beings can interact with technologies,
incorporate them, read them. All of these relations organize how human
beings experience their environment, and how they are practically engaged
with it. Technologies, to be short, are not opposed to human existence; they
are its very medium.
KEY CONCEPTS
Work in the postphenomenological perspective most often proceeds through

the application of its framework of original concepts to specific cases of
human-technology relations. Many of these ideas were first developed by
Ihde, and have been refined throughout his career. And much of this frame-
work has been cultivated and expanded by others. In this section we review
some of the most influential ideas of the postphenomenological framework
of concepts.
Human-Technology Relations
One of Ihde’s most influential contributions to the philosophy of technology

is his breakdown of the different forms that human-technology relations may
take. This list of the various ways that users can establish bodily-perceptual
relationships with technologies has proven useful in several ways. First, these
concepts have practical value for case studies of user relations to technolo-
gies. That is, this categorization of different forms of technological mediation
has proven useful in the concrete description of user relations to technolo-
gies. Second, the list itself demonstrates the variability and context specific-
ity of user experiences. As such, this list argues against oversimplifying or
one-size-fits-all accounts of user experience. And lastly, the conception of
human-technology relations reflected in this list is beginning to buckle at its
edges in productive and provocative ways. The issues arising at the boundar-
ies of this overall conception of the forms of technological mediation repre-
sent some of the most exciting philosophical frontiers of postphenomenology
in particular, and the field of philosophy of technology more generally.
In what follows in this subsection, we summarize Ihde’s four basic forms
of technological mediation: embodiment relations, hermeneutic relations, al-
terity relations, and background relations.
Embodiment Relations
While this list of the forms of human-technology relations should not be

understood as exhaustive, taken together they help to articulate many of the
ways that users develop bodily-perceptual relationships with the devices they
use. With the notion of “embodiment relations,” Ihde points to the mediation
of those technologies which transform a user’s actional and perceptual en-
gagement with the world. When a technology is “embodied,” a user’s experi-
ence is reshaped through the device, with the device itself in some ways
taken into the user’s bodily awareness. (While Ihde develops these ideas
throughout his corpus, the versions reviewed here come primarily from chap-
ter 5 of his seminal Technology and the Lifeworld [1990].)
Ihde provides the following diagrams. If the technological mediation be-
tween a user and the world can be represented as follows,
Human—Technology—World
then an embodiment relation to technology can be represented in this man-

ner:
(I—Technology) → World
The go-to example is a pair of eyeglasses. As they are worn, the glasses
themselves are not simply one among the many things in the world the user
may perceive. Instead, a user looks through the glasses upon a transformed
world, and the glasses can be conceived as a part of the user’s perceptual
experience. Ihde writes, “the wearer of eyeglasses embodies eyeglass tech-
nology: I—eyeglasses—world” (1990, 73). As they are worn, the eyeglasses
are a transformative mediation of the bodily-perceptual relationship between
the user and the world.
A related notion is what Ihde calls the “transparency” of a particular
human-technology relation. This refers to the degree to which a device (or an
aspect of that device) fades into the background of a user’s awareness as it is
used. As a user grows accustomed to the embodiment of a device, as habits
of bodily action and perception develop, and as the use of the device takes on
a familiar and everyday character, the device itself takes on a degree of
transparency. Ihde writes, “My glasses become part of the way I ordinarily
experience my surroundings; they ‘withdraw’ and are barely noticed, if at all.
I have then actively embodied the technics of vision” (1990, 73). Ihde goes
so far as to say that with regard to the design and use of technology we
maintain a “double desire”: we want a technology to at once both optimally
transform our relationship to the world, and at the same time we want the
experience of the means of that transformation to itself remain as experien-
tially transparent as possible (1990, 75). (For a recent discussion on the

notion of transparency, see Van Den Eede, 2011.)
The notions of embodiment and transparency can be illustrated in the
contrast between two wearable technologies with which Ihde himself is per-
sonally familiar, hearing aids and eyeglasses. The two can be contrasted in
terms of the kind and degree of transparency possible to achieve with each:
My awareness of wearing glasses is a fringe awareness that gets interrupted

only when there is back glare, or when the glasses slip off my nose, or when
the lenses get dirty or smudged, when, in other words, something diminishes
the normative transparency of the optics. . . . With hearing aids, however, the
technology of interest is an acoustic or auditory technology, a hearing “aid”
ideally should function parallel to the visual eyeglasses example. Unfortunate-
ly the auditory transparency is much more difficult to attain, a fact well recog-
nized by audiologists and others. A significant number of people attempt to
use hearing aids, but the difficulty of embodiment is sometimes such that they
give up. (Ihde, 2007, 244–245)
According to Ihde, a number of specific features of hearing aid technology

account for this contrast in the level of transparency possible for glasses and
hearing aids, from the stuffiness of the feeling of the device wedged into the
ear, to the devices’ inability to distinguish between local and background
sounds for amplification.
It would be not be accidental if the reader were to detect in the notions of
embodiment and transparency an echo of Heidegger’s account of tool use (as
well as, of course, other examples from the phenomenological canon that
share these themes, such as Merleau-Ponty’s account of the blind man’s
cane). Ihde’s framework on this point is at once an appropriation and critique
of Heidegger’s ideas. That is, on the one hand Ihde’s conceptions of the
embodiment and transparency of technology can be understood as a straight-
forward repackaging of Heidegger’s description of the withdraw of the
ready-to-hand tool, such as in his famous account of the hammer in Being
and Time (1996). Where Heidegger’s account is a critique of the entire histo-
ry of Western metaphysics, within Ihde’s repackaging these ideas are instead
put toward the pragmatic description of particular, context-dependent, hu-
man-technology relations. On the other hand, Ihde’s account of embodiment
relations is part of an explicit critique of Heidegger’s views. Crucially, the
notion of embodiment relations in Ihde’s framework is only one of several
potential forms of mediation. Additionally, the particular degree to which a
device should be considered transparent within an embodiment relation will
depend on the case. Thus, against Heidegger’s (allegedly totalizing) account
of the metaphysics of tool use, Ihde’s notions of embodiment and transparen-
cy are part of a larger account designed specifically to emphasize the vari-
ability and context-dependency of human-technology relations (see, e.g.,

1990, 80, 98).
According to Ihde, human-technology relations generally, and embodi-
ment relations in particular, share a magnification/reduction structure. He
writes, “Embodiment relations display an essential magnification/reduction
structure which has been suggested in the instrumentation examples. Em-
bodiment relations simultaneously magnify or amplify and reduce or place
aside what is experienced through them” (Ihde, 1990, 76). That is, through
the non-neutral transformations rendered to user experience through the me-
diation of a technology, we not only receive the desired change in our abil-
ities, but always also receive other changes, some of them taking on the
quality of “tradeoffs,” a decrease of a sense, or area of focus, or layer of
context. A hammer enables one to strike a nail with force, but occupies one’s
hand in the process. A pair of binoculars enables one to see over a distance,
but at the sacrifice of visual awareness of one’s immediate surroundings. A
telescope image of the moon, Ihde notes, enables us to see its surface in great
detail, but removes the moon from its context in the sky (1990, 76).
Ihde also argues for a distinction between what he calls microperception
and macroperception (1993, 74; see also the notions of “Body 1” and “Body
2” in Ihde, 2003). Where “microperception” refers to the individual bodily
sensations articulated in the work of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, “macroper-
ception” instead refers to the cultural, historical, and anthropological dimen-
sions of experience explored by figures such as Heidegger and Foucault.
While it can be helpful at times to analyze these two dimensions of experi-
ence separately, Ihde holds that they remain inextricable. He writes, “The
matter may be put simply: there is no bare or isolated microperception except
in its field of hermeneutic or macroperceptual surrounding; nor may macro-
perception have any focus without its fulfillment in microperceptual (bodily-
sensory) experience” (Ihde, 1993, 77). Defenders of these concepts argue
that, where historically phenomenology has often failed to address cultural
dimensions in the study of experience, these notions highlight these issues
and urge for their indivisibility with studies of the structure of experience.
But critics contend that cleaving these dimensions into distinct concepts
threatens to relegate issues of culture, gender, race, and difference into a
separate conversation (e.g, Eason, 2003; Scharff, 2006). The practical value
of the micro/marcoperceptual distinction can be seen in recent postpheno-
menological case studies, for example finding a central role in anthropologi-
cal work on laboratory practice (e.g., Hasse, 2008; Forss, 2012).
Hermeneutic Relations
The second major form of technological mediation that Ihde identifies is

called “hermeneutic relations.” Pointing to the hermeneutic tradition of phi-
losophy (which contemplates the nature of language interpretation and trans-

lation), Ihde uses the notion of “hermeneutic relations” to refer to technolo-
gies which are used through an act of perceiving and interpreting the device’s
readout. Rather than experience the world through the device as in an em-
bodiment relation, in a hermeneutic relation the user experiences a trans-
formed encounter with the world via the direct experience and interpretation
of the technology itself. Ihde provides the following representation for her-
meneutic relations:
I → (Technology—World)
A wristwatch is a simple example. A user looks at the watch’s face, interprets

the hands or digital display, and through this hermeneutic relation experi-
ences a transformed access to the precise time of day.
In the case of hermeneutic relations to technology, the analogy is between
reading written language and “reading” the display interface of the mediating
technology. A key aspect of one’s encounter with a written language is the
degree to which one “knows” it, that is, the degree to which one understands
how to read that particular language. If a person has no experience with that
language, words written in it will convey no meaning at all. But if she or he
instead is deeply fluent, then the meanings of words jump from the page
almost automatically. For the person deeply familiar with a language, she or
he does not need to slowly and actively interpret each letter, then put them
together to make a word, and then interpret the meaning of that word; the
meaning emerges all at once in a perceptual gestalt. This is also true for
hermeneutic relations to technology. In the case of the wristwatch, trans-
formed access to the time of day will only appear for a wearer that already
“knows how to tell time.” But for a wearer familiar with the reading of
clocks, the precise time of day emerges from the wristwatch all at once in a
perceptual gestalt.
The transparency of a particular hermeneutic relation will depend on the
particular level of familiarity one brings to the interpretation of the device’s
readout. Take, for example, a complex medical imaging technology such as
an fMRI. For a new medical student entirely novice with regard to this
technology, she or he may need to concentrate and slowly decode the mean-
ing of the colorful brain-shaped display. But for the expert, much of the
content and context of the readout will appear in a perceptual gestalt, and she
or he can focus attention on the area of interest within the image.
It should be noted that, while many standard examples of hermeneutic
relations focus on technologies with visual readouts, this is not a necessary
feature of this notion. The device readout could potentially occur in terms of
any bodily sense. For example, any number of devices can provide audio
readouts which require direct perception and active interpretation, including
the clicks of Geiger counters, the steady boops of heart monitors, the ca-
ching of cash registers, and the squeal of a car’s aging brake pads.
Alterity Relations
With the notion of “alterity relations,” Ihde refers to devices to which we

relate in a manner somewhat similar to how we interact with other human
beings. The idea is that some forms of interface are devised specifically to
mimic the shape of person-to-person interaction, and that sometimes we
encounter a device as itself a presence with which we must interrelate. The
term “alterity” is used in phenomenological discussions to refer to the special
experience of engaging with another human being, that significant encounter
with Otherness. Ihde claims that our interactions with technologies can
sometimes take on a “quasi-other” quality. Ihde formulates the diagram for
alterity relations as follows:
I → Technology – (– World )
One common form is computer interface schemes that pose direct questions
to the user, such as the ATM machine that displays questions on its screen
(“Would you like to make a withdrawal?”), or the “dialog box” that opens on
a computer screen to provide program installation instructions. This is not to
claim that we mistake these devices for actual people, but simply that the
interface modes take an analogous form.
It could be predicted that as computing advances, and as our abilities to
create sophisticated computer programs that simulate human interactive style
increase, we will see more and more devices designed with an alterity-style
interface. It is already the case that this form of relation can be increasingly
seen in automated interactive customer service phone calls, GPS devices that
read aloud driving directions, and voice interactive personal assistant smart-
phone applications. Accordingly, postphenomenologists continue to develop
this idea (e.g., Irwin, 2006; Bottenberg, 2015; Wellner, 2014b).
Background Relations
With the notion of “background relations,” Ihde addresses those technologies

that make up the user’s environmental context. A user shares a background
relation to devices that she or he may not directly use but nonetheless inter-
acts with as they shape her or his experiential surroundings. Examples in-
clude the running refrigerator on the other side of the room, or the central air
conditioning and/or heating system that goes on and off automatically
throughout the day.
While it may be tempting at first to understand the lack of attention paid
to background relations in terms of technological transparency, Ihde clarifies
this point. He explains, “The ‘withdraw’ of this technological function is

phenomenologically distinct as a kind of ‘absence.’ The technology is, as it
were, ‘off to the side.’ Yet as a present absence, it nevertheless becomes part
of the experienced field of the inhabitant, a piece of the immediate environ-
ment” (Ihde, 1990, 109). Technologies to which we share background rela-
tions stand back in our awareness not simply because we have grown accus-
tomed to their usage, but because they quite literally form the backdrop of
our experiences. They shape our experiences, protecting us from the ele-
ments or keeping our food safely chilled, but do so in ways that do not
require direct interaction.
Relational Ontology
The postphenomenological focus on human-technology relations, as stated in

section 1, is closely connected to its relational ontology. Technologies, post-
phenomenology holds, are to be understood in terms of the relations human
beings have with them, not as entities “in themselves.” When technologies
are used, they help to establish relations between users and their environ-
ment: a telescope organizes a relation between an observer and a heavenly
body, just as an ultrasound device helps to shape a relation between expect-
ing parents and their unborn child. In doing so, technologies also help to
shape the “subjectivity” of their users and the “objectivity” of their world:
telescopes constitute their users as “observers” and the sky as “observable,”
just as ultrasound constitutes the unborn child as a potential patient and
expecting parents as those who are responsible for the health condition of
their child. Subject and object are no pre-given entities, but get constituted in
the technologically mediated relations that exist between them.
This relational ontology of the postphenomenological approach has a
somewhat different character than the ontology of the closely related ap-
proach of Actor-Network Theory (Latour, 1993). Actor-Network Theory ap-
proaches the world as networks of relations between “actants,” which can be
human and nonhuman. Latour emphasizes that his approach of these actants
is “symmetrical”: he does not want to start from an a priori distinction
between human subjects and nonhuman objects, but rather aims to make
visible the continuity between humans and nonhumans. Revealing this conti-
nuity, according to Latour, makes it possible to understand how nonhuman
entities do not only play a role in the material world, but in the social world
as well. From such a symmetrical approach, not only humans but also things
“act.”
The postphenomenological approach, however, explicitly does not give
up the distinction between human and nonhuman entities. Instead of symme-
try it sees interaction and mutual constitution between subjects and objects.
Just like in Latour’s approach, there are no pre-given subjects and objects;
subjectivity and objectivity are always the product of relations, rather than
their starting point. Things are not symmetrical to humans, but together,
humans and things constitute all kinds of entities. In order to see these pro-
cesses of mutual constitution, and to do justice to human experiences of
being subjectively “in” a world, it remains very relevant to make a distinction
between humans and things. When we give up this distinction, we also give
up the phenomenological possibility to articulate (technologically mediated)
experiences “from within.” Actor-Network Theory studies complicated net-
works of relations “from outside,” from a third-person perspective; postphe-
nomenology studies engaged human-world relations, and their technological-
ly mediated character, from a first-person perspective. It is not the distinction
between humans and technologies that it wants to depart from, but their
radical separation (see Verbeek, 2005, 166–168).
From this subtle difference between “separating” humans and nonhumans
on the one hand and “distinguishing” them on the other, it also becomes
possible to conceptualize the “active” role of technologies. When postphe-
nomenology claims that technologies play an actively mediating role in hu-
man-world relations, it does not claim that things can act just like humans do.
Such a claim would actually reproduce the modernistic subject-object split,
by attributing the characteristic of subjects to objects as well. The question is
not: is agency not only a property of subjects but also of objects? Rather, the
question is: what kind of roles do objects play in agency? Agency, then is not
an exclusively human property anymore: it takes shape in complicated inter-
actions between human and nonhuman entities.
Cyborg Relations
Recent work in postphenomenology has expanded the range of human-tech-

nology relations that have been analyzed in Ihde’s work. Verbeek has argued
that postphenomenology should also be able to account for technologies like
brain implants, domotics, and augmented reality devices, relations in which
technologies start to merge either with the human body or with the environ-
ment (Verbeek, 2008a). The spectrum of four human-technology relations
identified by Ihde is primarily relevant for analyzing human-technology con-
figurations in which technologies are used. But at the extremes of this spec-
trum, other configurations become visible.
In the spectrum from embodiment via hermeneutic and alterity to back-
ground relations, technologies move ever “further away” from the human
being as it were: from being an extension of the body via a “readable” artifact
and an object for interaction to the background of our experience. More
intimate than a relation of embodiment, though, there is a relation of “fu-
sion,” in which the physical boundaries between humans and technologies
are blurred, and technologies merge with our bodies. And more radically
“environmental” or “ambient” than the background relation, there is a rela-

tion of “immersion,” in which a technological background interacts actively
with human beings. Moreover, augmented reality technologies, which add an
extra layer to our experience of the world, open up a relation of “augmenta-
tion.”
In all of these new human-technology relations, new “intentional rela-
tions” between humans and the world come into being. The concept of inten-
tionality plays a central role in the phenomenological tradition, as part of its
relational approach, to conceptualize the relation between human beings and
their world. Human experience has an intentional structure: human beings
are always directed toward reality. We cannot simply “see,” but we always
see something; we cannot simply “hear” but always hear something; et cete-
ra. We cannot understand human experience without taking into account this
intentional directedness towards the world. In all of the human-technology-
world relations Don Ihde analyzes, technologies mediate this intentionality.
In the new human-technology relations identified above, the technologically
mediated character of intentionality takes on a different shape.
In the “fusion” relation, technologies merge with our physical body.
Good examples are neuro-implants for deep brain stimulation; cochlear im-
plants that enable deaf people to hear again; or artificial heart valves and
pacemakers. In all of these cases, the relations between humans and technol-
ogies are more intimate than in the embodiment relation. They involve much
more than wearing a pair of glasses, or listening through a cell phone. Lucie
Dalibert even speaks of “somatechnologies”: technologies that blur the boun-
daries between body and artifact (Dalibert, 2014). This cyborg relation can
be schematized as:
(I / Technology) → World
From this “fusion” relation, a “hybrid intentionality” emerges. Rather than

being a technologically mediated form of human intentionality, it is the in-
tentionality of a new, hybrid entity: a cyborg. Contrary to embodiment rela-
tions, no clear distinction can be made here between the human and the
nonhuman elements in these relations: together, humans and technologies
form a new entity, which is directed towards the world in a “hybrid” way,
integrating human and nonhuman elements.
In the “immersion” relation, the configuration of humans and technology
takes yet another shape. Here, technologies do not merge with the body but
with the environment. And the relation between human beings and that hy-
brid environment is interactive: smart environments “perceive” their users
too, and “act” upon them. Examples are “smart toilets” that automatically
analyze one’s excrements and produce a medical report on the basis of this,
or “smart beds” in hospitals that can detect if somebody falls or steps out of
bed. Schematically:
I ↔ Technology/World
The intentionality that comes with this type of relations has a “bi-directional”
character: human beings are directed towards technologies that are also di-
rected towards them. This bi-directionality can have several implications. On
the one hand, it makes it possible for human beings to experience how
technologies “experience” them, resulting in a “reflexive intentionality”:
smart toilets open a new relation to oneself. On the other hand, it opens the
possibility to be immersed in how smart environments perceive and act upon
human beings, as is the case for some “persuasive technologies” that give
unsolicited feedback on one’s behavior. An example is the “persuasive mir-
ror” that was designed for waiting rooms of medical doctors to give people
feedback on their lifestyle. When looking in the mirror, you actually look
into a camera and see yourself on a screen, but a face recognition system that
is linked to your medical record makes it possible for the system to morph
your face into what you will look like in five years’ time if you don’t give up
smoking, eating too much, or working too hard. People who look into this
mirror are immersed in the mirror’s intentionality towards specific aspects of
themselves, resulting in an “induced” intentionality.
The relation of augmentation, to conclude, adds a second layer to our
world, a second field of attention to be intentionally directed to. In addition
to the sensory relation we have with the world “through” such an augmented
reality technology, we also have a relation to the information it gives us.
Google Glass is a good example of such an augmented reality technology.
People wearing it can get information on objects and buildings they see, and
potentially also about human beings, when the technology would be
equipped with face recognition technology; they can exchange messages,
take pictures and record videos, and surf the internet “in the background” of
their activities. When using Google Glass, people both have an embodiment
relation with the Glass itself, and a hermeneutic relation with its screen that
offers a representation of the world. Therefore it offers not one, but two
parallel relations with the world. Schematically:
( I - Technology) → World
↘ (Technology – World)
The intentionality involved in such “augmentation relations” can be indicated

as “bifurcated”: there is a split in people’s directedness at the world, because
two parallel fields of attention emerge.
The Field of Awareness
Rosenberger has identified the notion of technological transparency as a key

aspect of the postphenomenological framework ripe for re-examination and
expansion. Recall that “transparency” refers to the degree to which a device
recedes into the background of a user’s awareness as it is used. At times in
Ihde’s corpus, the notion of transparency is even cast as a defining feature of
embodiment relations. But Rosenberger argues that this idea should be
understood as only one of many potential ways that technological mediation
shapes the contours of a user’s overall experience. Postphenomenologists
could investigate what stands forward in addition to what withdraws, what
demands attention, what remains on the fringes, and just how strongly these
particular features hold within a given relation. Rosenberger’s contention is
that transparency should be understood as only one feature among many that
could characterize a user’s experience within a given human-technology rela-
tion. This raises the question: how do different technologies reshape a user’s
overall “field of awareness” in different ways? Answering it will involve the
development of a postphenomenological field theory.
Rosenberger develops two further variables that, like the notion of
transparency, could characterize a user’s technologically mediated field of
awareness, what he calls “field composition,” and “sedimentation” (e.g., Ro-
senberger, 2012; 2014b). This list need not (and should not) be considered
comprehensive. But it helps point the way toward how a phenomenological
field theory could be further developed.
Field Composition
One alternate variable developed by Rosenberger is called “field composi-

tion.” A human-technology relation deeply characterized by field composi-
tion is one in which a user’s field of awareness is somehow significantly
reconfigured by technological mediation. Rosenberger’s inspiration here is
the work of classical phenomenologist Aaron Gurwitsch who attempted to
articulate a “field theory” for phenomenology (1964). Gurwitsch described
the different ways that experience can be “organized,” and developed an
account of our overall “field of consciousness.” (Rosenberger uses the term
“field of awareness” to distinguish his own postphenomenological ideas from
Gurwitsch’s “field of consciousness.”) While not subscribing to the specifics
of Gurwitsch’s account, Rosenberger argues that it is useful to attempt to
articulate the ways that technological mediation reorganizes a user’s field of
awareness—reorganizations that could involve more than only the device’s
transparent withdraw. That is, it is useful to describe the specific ways a
user’s overall field of awareness is composed by technological mediation.
An example is a pair of binoculars. Not only is a user’s bodily perceptual
capacity to see across a distance greatly transformed, and not only may the
binoculars themselves grow transparent in an accustomed user’s hands, but

the user’s entire field of vision is altered. When looking through the binocu-
lars, the user’s field of awareness becomes filled by the content brought
forward by the device, and the totality of user’s vision is framed by a circle
of darkness.
The experience of watching a movie in a theater is an even more encom-
passing example of a human-technology relation that is typically highly char-
acterized by field composition. As the theater darkens, as the movie begins,
and as the viewer becomes engrossed in the story, the viewer’s awareness
overall becomes almost entirely composed by the film’s content. It seems
insufficient to say that the surrounding theater, and the seat below, and the
distance between the viewer and the screen all take on a degree of transpa-
rency. It is instead more appropriate to say that the movie content stands
positively forward, its visual and audio content colonizing the user’s field of
awareness. Put differently, through the technological mediation of the movie
theater, the viewer and the world are co-shaped such that (at least in the most
engrossing moments) the movie content itself composes the entirety of the
world as experienced. That is, the movie-watching experience is a human-
technology relation highly characterized by field composition.
A rich example can found in the ethnographic work of Anette Forss on
the laboratory practices of cervical cancer screening in Sweden (2005; 2012).
Forss conducts postphenomenological studies of the procedures involved in
analyzing pap smear samples under the microscope. As she observes, “Basi-
cally, the microscope was the tool that enabled them to “enter another world”
and seemed for many of them to have become an extension of their bodies”
(Forss, 2005, 72). The microscopists’ usage of this device can be conceived
as an embodiment relation to technology, and it would be possible to consid-
er the transparency that develops with regard to the microscope interface, the
withdraw of the interface features such as the eyepiece or focusing knobs. It
is also possible to explore the hermeneutics of the interpretation task. For
example, Forss describes the experience of scanning through samples. If
abnormal cells are discovered, this perception occurs within a striking ges-
talt; the anomalous cells jump into view—or “poppar up” in Swedish (Forss,
2005, 112). But a striking aspect of Forss’s description of the microscopists’
experience is the way they are described to “enter another world” through the
device. In this way, the experience of the microscope can be characterized as
having a high degree of field composition; the user’s field of awareness is
organized by the microscope, composed almost entirely by the “world” with-
in the slides. A dramatic instance can be seen in the case of a microscopist
describing the experience of encountering an anomalous cell. “I am so occu-
pied with what I have found that, that everything around me disappears”
(Forss, 2005, 123). The entirety of her field of awareness is composed by the
content of the findings.
Sedimentation
The notion of sedimentation is used throughout the phenomenological tradi-

tion to point to those past experiences settled in one’s mind which actively
contextualize present experience. For example, Merleau-Ponty writes, “there
is a ‘world of thoughts,’ or sediment left by our mental processes, which
enables us to rely on our concepts and acquired judgments as we might on
things there in front of us, presented globally, without there being any need
for us to resynthesize them” (1962, 130). The metaphor is of course to rock
formations built up over time through the accumulation of small deposits.
But unlike rock formations, this world of thoughts is not static; it actively
informs our ongoing experience. Sedimentation provides the pre-perceptive
context that enables our current perceptions to occur with immediate mean-
ingfulness.
Rosenberger uses the notion of sedimentation to refer to the force of habit
associated with a given human-technology relation. That is, a relation that is
highly sedimented is one that is steeped in long-developed bodily-perceptual
habits. To return again to the example of an embodiment relation with eye-
glasses, for the accustomed user the glasses are experienced with a high
degree of transparency. But this transparent relation can also be said to be
highly sedimented, with that transparent character taken on with an immedia-
cy and stubbornness that reflects the strength of the user’s entrenched bodily
habits. Another example is the expert reader taking up a hermeneutic relation
to an fMRI readout. As the expert gazes upon the image, due to the pre-
perceptive context of meaning developed and sedimented through years of
training and experience reading this kind of display, the image’s meaning
appears all together in a perceptual gestalt.
Multistability
Across multiple fields of thought (including, but not limited to, STS, design,
and especially the philosophy of technology), a central question is how to
conceive of the non-neutrality of artifacts. That is, how should we understand
the way that technology at once in part determines our choices and actions,
and yet at the same time itself remains open to our manipulation and interpre-
tation? How is technology both something we design and use for our own
purposes, and also something that influences, restricts, leads, inclines, or
controls us? One of postphenomenology’s main responses to this question
can be found in the notion of “multistability.” This refers to the idea that any
technology can be put to multiple purposes and can be meaningful in differ-
ent ways to different users. As Ihde puts it, “No technology is ‘one thing,’
nor is it incapable of belonging to multiple contexts” (1999, 47). Crucially,
the notion of multistability simultaneously points to the fact that the material-
ity of the device constrains the potential relations to only certain uses and
meanings. That is, a technology cannot mean simply anything or be used to
do simply anything; only some relations prove experientially stable. In this
vocabulary, a multistable technology has multiple “stabilities” or “varia-
tions” (these two terms are used interchangeably in this literature).
Ihde first develops the notion of multistability in his early-career work on
visual perception. In his book Experimental Phenomenology, he considers
the experience of someone encountering and interpreting a variety of simple
visual illusions, that is, drawings that can be coherently interpreted in more
than one way (second printing 1986; expanded second edition 2012). These
simple examples are helpful for illustrating the ways in which our perception
is trained, and how our perceptual expectations enable our visual experience
to occur in term of gestalts. The standard example is the Necker cube visual
illusion (see figure 1.1). The common understanding of the drawing is that it
can be interpreted in more than one way, either as a three-dimensional box
with the topmost side on the upper right, or as another box with the topmost
side on the lower left.
Ihde uses the illusion to illustrate the multistability of visual perception,
explaining that each cube shape can be understood as a separate stability.
When trained to recognize these separate stabilities, each appears individual-
ly in terms of a visual gestalt. Ihde continues his examination of the cube,
explaining that, “If a background story can be found to allow [a] third varia-
tion to appear, its stability will coalesce almost immediately” (1986, 96). He
explores several additional stabilities possible for the drawing, including a
simple two-dimensional hexagon, a square-shaped bug straddling a hexago-
nal hole, and a cut gem shape in which the center square is taken as topmost
with the surrounding sides sloping away. Ihde has also explored the multi-
stablity of auditory phenomena (2007).
Despite being first developed as an account of human perception, the
notion of multistability has come to be applied to human-technology rela-
tions. Artifacts are understood to potentially support multiple embodiment
relations or hermeneutic relations (or other relations). A technology that
supports multiple stable embodiment relations is one which could offer
multiple potential transformations of a user’s bodily-perceptual encounter
with the world. Expanding on Heidegger’s hammer analysis, Ihde claims,
Heidegger’s hammer is a simple example: a hammer is “designed” to do

certain things—drive nails into the shoemaker’s shoe, or into shingles on my
shed, or to nail down a floor—but the design cannot prevent the hammer from
(a) becoming an objet d’art, (b) a murder weapon, (c) a paperweight, etc.
Heidegger’s insight was to have seen that an instrument is what it does, and
this in a context of assignments. But he did not elaborate upon the multistable
uses any technology can fall into with associated shifts in the complexes of
“assignments” as well. (1999, 46–47)
Figure 1.1.
A technology that supports multiple stable hermeneutic relations is one that a

user can potentially perceive and interpret in different meaningful ways. An
example would be two doctors disagreeing about the implications of a medi-
cal image (e.g., an X-ray, or a CAT scan) for a patient’s diagnosis.
The term “variational analysis” refers to the method of brainstorming
stabilities of a multistable technology. The idea of variational analysis comes
straight out of the work of Edmund Husserl, but is crucially altered for use in
the postphenomenological framework. For Husserl, variational analysis is a
method in which an object of study is observed from multiple perspectives
for the purpose of identifying features that remain present from any vantage
point. According to Husserl, this process reveals the object’s essence, its
essential features free from the contingencies of perspective (1973). In
contrast, postphenomenology—with its pragmatic commitments to anti-es-
sentialism and context-dependent knowledge—rejects the idea that variation-
al analysis enables one to discover the essence of an object of study. Ihde

explains that,
In Husserl’s earlier use, variations (originally derived from mathematical vari-

ational theory) were needed to determine essential structures, or “essences.”
Variations could be used to determine what was variant and invariant. I have
also found this technique invaluable in any phenomenological analysis—but as
I used this technique, I discovered something other than Husserlian “essences”
as results. What emerged or “showed itself” was the complicated structure of
multistability. (2009, 12)
So for the postphenomenologist, the brainstorming of a technology’s multi-

ple stabilities serves to highlight technology’s very context-dependent and
materially-situated relationality.
The notion of multistability is put to an assortment of uses within post-
phenomenological studies. These can be generally divided into two catego-
ries: negative uses, and positive uses (Rosenberger, 2014a). In the “negative”
use of multistability, a technology is subjected to variational analysis as part
of a critique of another account seen to be somehow totalizing, essentializ-
ing, or overgeneralizing. The identification of a technology’s status as mult-
istable is taken to counter that totalizing account by showing the technolo-
gy’s variability. The quote above in which Ihde brainstorms various alterna-
tive possible stabilities for the hammer (the murder weapon, the objet d’art,
etc.) is an example of a negative critique, a coy shot across Heidegger’s bow;
insofar as Heidegger holds that a hammer can only ever be experienced as
transparently embodied or as broken, Ihde’s variational analysis reveals the
hammer’s unappreciated multistability.
The notion of multistability can also be used as a part of “positive”
research projects which seek to uncover new information about concrete
cases of human-technology relations, or to reinterpret cases in productive
ways. In such projects, variational analysis is taken up not simply to demon-
strate that a technology is in fact multistable (as in the negative usage), but to
investigate alternative stabilities to the “dominant” one, and to consider what
these alternatives might teach us about the dominant stability. These projects
also explore the ways that technologies get taken up through multiple stabil-
ities in actual practice, and consider the implications of multistability for
topics such as design, user training, and scientific research. An example is
Rosenberger’s series of papers on the multistability of user relations to com-
puter interface (e.g., 2009; 2013b; 2014b). In one study, he considers the
experience of a user sitting in front of a computer which has suddenly
stopped working properly, such as when an Internet webpage loads with
unexpected slowness. An exploration of alternative possible stable relations
to the computer highlights the learned preconceptions and habits of practice
that characterize typical human-computer interaction.
Another example is Cathrine Hasse’s anthropological studies of health

care practices regarding “Paro,” a soft, robotic, seal-shaped device (2013).
The device is an emotionally assistive and responsive “pet” designed in
Japan to help the elderly, especially those with Alzheimer’s. Hasse considers
the multistability of this small robot with regard to how it has found different
meanings within different cultural contexts; where in Japan the device more
easily fulfills its emotionally supportive role, in Denmark the results are
mixed. In the different cultural context of Denmark, sometimes the device is
dismissed as a children’s toy, it sometimes induces anger, and it only some-
times has soothing effects. Hasse also explains that, “Paro as a mediating
artifact assumed its intended role as a tool for soothing Alzheimer’s patients,
but it also represented multistable signs for different people engaged in the
activities of the nursing home” (2013, 95). Paro has proven disruptive as well
for those working in the nursing home context, reorienting concrete prac-
tices, and challenging conceptions of care itself.
In an effort to spotlight the human side of the relation between a user and
a multistable technology, Rosenberger has developed the notion of “relation-
al strategies” (e.g., 2009; 2013b; 2014a). A relational strategy is the particu-
lar understanding and bodily approach that enables a user to relate to a
technology in terms of a particular stability. We can ask: what sort of concep-
tual, comportmental, and bodily-habitual approach is necessary for a user to
take up a technology in terms of one particular strategy rather than another?
If we return to Ihde’s variational analysis of the hammer, we can consider
what relational strategy would correspond to the dominant stability, and what
would instead be involved with the alternative stabilities that Ihde has iden-
tified. That is, we could consider how the hammer is taken up in terms of the
dominant stability—i.e., normal, everyday nail hammering—and examine
how it is explicitly and implicitly conceived, review its use context, and
investigate the relevant bodily-perceptual comportments and habits. Then we
could make the same considerations about those potential alternative stabil-
ities, the murder weapon, the objet d’art, and such. The notion of relational
strategies is thus useful for highlighting the learned conceptions and bodily-
perceptual habits involved in using a technology for a particular purpose in a
particular context.
Where the hammer provides an example of embodiment relations, we can
also consider the relational strategies involved in hermeneutic relations. In
such cases, a “hermeneutic strategy” enables a user to apprehend the mean-
ing of a technology’s readout in terms of a particular stability, and do so in a
perceptual gestalt (e.g., Rosenberger 2011a; 2011b; 2013a). Such a herme-
neutic strategy would involve the interpretive framework and the perceptual
training that enables a user to read off a particular stability. For example, if a
person can at first see only one stability of the Necker cube illusion, they may
become able to see another stability after a friend relays an alternative her-
meneutic strategy. As Ihde explains, “In a hermeneutic strategy, stories and

names are used to create an immediate noetic context. . . . The story creates a
condition that immediately sediments the perceptual possibility” (1986, 88).
In the example of the doctors arguing over the implications of an fMRI
image readout, each doctor brings a different hermeneutic strategy to bear on
the image, thus enabling a different stable perceptual interpretation.
Kyle Powys Whyte reviews a series of postphenomenological case stud-
ies and examples that utilize the notion of multistability, and he develops
methodological recommendations (forthcoming). According to Whyte, ex-
amples can be categorized with regard the kind of technological target that is
analyzed as multistable. Whyte observes that in one category of postpheno-
menological case studies, it is a wide set of practices that is investigated in
terms of its multistability. An example is Ihde’s recent analysis of archery in
which he considers different styles of bow as they have been used in different
cultures throughout history, with the English longbow and the Mongolian
horse bow as examples of different stabilities (2009, 16–19). In a second
category, it is a single device (or kind of device, or set of devices) that is
analyzed with regard to its multiple potential stabilities. This is the case in
the example of the Paro robot finding different meanings in different cul-
tures; it is the same device which supports different stable meaningful rela-
tions. It is also the case in the example above of the failing computer in
which different possible relationships to the same device are cross-analyzed.
Whyte uses the term “pivot” to refer to each of these different forms of
multistability, and recommends that postphenomenologists remain explicit
about the nature of the pivots utilized in their analyses.
POSTPHENOMENOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY
As said in the introduction to this chapter, an increasing number of scholars

have started to use the postphenomenological approach as a method for in-
vestigating science and technology. Postphenomenology can in fact be seen
as a form of “empirical philosophy.” This name may sound like an oxymor-
on. Philosophy is not an empirical field, after all. Yet, an empirical orienta-
tion can be a full-blown part of doing philosophy, not as a positivist basis of
philosophical “knowledge,” but as a concrete starting point for philosophical
reflection (cf. Achterhuis, 2001; Mol, 2002).
As “empirical philosophy,” postphenomenology does not base itself on
the philosophical tradition and on conceptual analysis only, but also on the
study of actual technological practices and artifacts. In doing so, it does not
merely “apply” philosophical analyses to science and technology, but it in-
vestigates the implications of such practices and artifacts for philosophical
conceptualizations. Rather than analyzing the imaging devices on the Mars
orbiter in terms of existing theories of perception or knowledge development,

it investigates how this device establishes a new kind of sensorial relation-
ship between scientists and the planet Mars, which is a new basis for knowl-
edge development. And rather than assessing obstetric ultrasound in terms of
pre-given normative frameworks it investigates how this technology urges us
to conceptualize the way technologies help to shape normative frameworks,
and to make room for a moral significance of technology in ethical theory.
This empirical-philosophical approach does not follow a strict postpheno-
menological methodology. The approach is too diverse and too context-sen-
sitive for that. Still, postphenomenological studies have some characteristic
elements in common. First of all, they typically focus on understanding the
roles that technologies play in the relations between humans and world, and
on analyzing the implications of these roles. It is on the basis of these rela-
tions that technologies have an impact on human beings, and on culture and
society. Moreover, it is in the context of these relations that technologies are
used and interpreted.
This focus on human-technology relations implies, second, that postphen-
omenological studies always include empirical work as a basis for philo-
sophical reflection. In order to understand human-technology relations, an
empirical account is required of the role actual technologies play in human
experiences and practices. Such an account can be developed on the basis of
empirical work by others, from self-conducted studies, or from an analysis of
first-person experiences that involve specific technologies. The purpose of
this empirical work is not to develop an accurate description of specific
technologies, but to investigate the character of the various dimensions of the
relations between humans and these technologies, and their impact on human
practices and experiences.
Third, postphenomenological studies typically investigate how, in the re-
lations that arise around a technology, a specific “world” is constituted, as
well as a specific “subject.” As discussed above, by organizing a relation
between human beings and their environment, technologies constitute a spe-
cific “objectivity” of the experienced world as well as a specific “subjectiv-
ity” of the person dealing with the technology. The Mars Orbiter Camera, for
instance, lets the planet Mars be “real” in a very specific way, and enacts a
very specific type of “observer,” just like MRI scanners constitute the reality
of the brain in a very specific way, as well as the ways in which psycholo-
gists or neurologists can study and understand it.
Fourth, on the basis of these three elements, postphenomenological stud-
ies typically make a conceptual analysis of the implications of technologies
for one or more specific dimensions of human-world relations—which can
be epistemological, political, aesthetic, ethical, metaphysical, et cetera. The
central question then is how technologies help to shape knowledge, politics,
aesthetic judgments, normative ideas, religious experiences, et cetera.
Just like congenial approaches in STS, like Actor-Network Theory, then,

postphenomenological research does not have a strict methodology. Rather,
it embodies a specific way of investigating technologies, an approach to
technology that combines an empirical openness for the details of human-
technology relations with phenomenological conceptualization. While ANT
focuses on following the actors around specific technologies or scientific
practices or results, postphenomenology aims to analyze the networks of
relations around technologies.
CASE STUDIES
An essential aspect of the postphenomenological perspective is its focus on

case studies of concrete human-technology relations to technologies. This
case study approach reflects postphenomenology’s commitment to the “em-
pirical turn” and its pragmatic antifoundationalism. (This focus on concrete
cases makes postphenomenology a part of the empirical turn in the philoso-
phy of technology [see, Kroes and Meijers, 2000; Achterhuis, 2001].) That
is, in contrast to totalizing accounts that make claims about how all technolo-
gies must be, postphenomenological claims are posed and evaluated within
the contexts of studies of particular relations between humans and technolo-
gies.
Postphenomenological case studies play a dual role for this philosophical
perspective. First, they instantiate the concepts and commitments of the post-
phenomenological framework. If postphenomenology proves its value
through practical contributions to contemporary interdisciplinary conversa-
tions on design, scientific investigation, policy, and so on, then case studies
will be a primary vehicle for demonstrating this value. In pragmatic spirit,
Ihde writes, “The test, however, should lie in outcomes—what produces the
relatively better analysis, interpretation, or critique?” (2003, 136). Second,
case studies are at the same time the laboratories within which postpheno-
menological ideas are interrogated and refined. By applying postphenomeno-
logical concepts to concrete instances of human-technology relations, the
advantages, disadvantages, limits, and places of potential expansion and en-
richment can be identified. As a final exercise for this “field guide,” let’s
review a few of the more representative and influential cases conducted
through this philosophical perspective.
Imaging Technologies
Perhaps the most expansive set of studies in postphenomenology regards the

use of imaging technologies in scientific and medical practice (e.g., Ihde,
1998; Hasse, 2008; Verbeek, 2007; Carusi, 2009; Rosenberger, 2011a;
2011b; 2013b; Verbeek, 2011; Forss, 2012; Friis, 2012a; Friis, 2012b; Carusi
& Hoel, 2014; Hasse, 2014; see also Riis on architectural façades, 2011).
While Ihde explores examples of image-making processes in many of his
works, his most systematic treatment appears in his 1998 book, Expanding
Hermeneutics: Visualism in Science, the last third of which contains a “mini-
monograph” on the phenomenology of laboratory imaging practice. Broadly
speaking, a user’s relationship to an image in science can be understood as a
hermeneutic relation. That is, a user can be understood to share a reading-
style relationship with an image. An imaging device transforms an otherwise
imperceptible aspect of the world into a readable form—an image. As the
user looks directly at and interprets the image readout, she or he receives a
transformed experience of the world. The image is interpreted by the user in
much the same way a person apprehends written language; if the user knows
how to interpret the image—if she or he knows “how to read” it—then much
of the context and meaning appears at once in a perceptual gestalt. According
to Ihde, it is exactly the capacity to provide information in the form of a
gestalt that makes images so crucial to contemporary scientific practice. He
writes, “The role of repeatable, Gestalt patterns . . . is the epistemological
product of this part of the quest for knowledge” (Ihde, 1998, 171).
This series of postphenomenological insights into the hermeneutics of
imaging technologies serves to articulate several aspects of scientific practice
that typically go underexamined in more conventional accounts. Rather than
understand images simply as a representation of the world, or perhaps as a
data set to be squared away with theory, the postphenomenological perspec-
tive reveals the essential relational dimension of these practices, as a human
user encounters a technologically mediated world. Two crucial points be-
come apparent.
First, scientific images are clearly not a simple encounter with the world
itself. Images and imaging technologies are better understood as technolo-
gies, that is, as transformative mediators of human experience. This perspec-
tive thus highlights the role of an imaging technology in transforming an
otherwise impossible-to-see object of study into a form perceivable by the
human body: far away objects are brought near; microscopic objects are
enlarged; hyperfast objects are slowed to a frame; internal bodily processes
are opened to view; etc. According to Ihde, the “intentionality” of imaging
technologies can even be seen to lead the course of scientific development.
Traditional accounts in the philosophy of science tend to understand scientif-
ic development to be exclusively (or at least primarily) piloted by the devel-
opment of theory, with experimentation tagging along in the role of a theo-
ry’s evaluator. In contrast, Ihde contends that science is more primarily
dragged forward through the development of instruments, following “instru-
mental trajectories” in which those devices are more and more refined.
Second, the postphenomenological perspective spotlights the role of hu-

man bodily perceptual experience in scientific imaging practice. When a
scientist encounters an object of study prepared in the form of an image, she
or he brings a trained form of vision to the apprehension of the image’s
content. That is, as an expert, as someone deeply familiar with the practice of
interpreting specific images, the scientist brings a set of visual habits to the
perception of an image. The image interpretation process thus does not re-
duce to a kind of cognitive translation of image content. Instead, through
learned and sedimented perceptual habits, much of an image’s content is
apprehended in the context of a gestalt. The mediation process can thus be
understood to coshape both the scientific observer and the world under obser-
vation. Much of what it means to do this form of scientific investigation, and
what it means to be an object of study, is constituted through the mediation of
imaging technologies.
From these basic points about the hermeneutics of scientific imaging, the
school of postphenomenology has produced an array of concrete case stud-
ies. Let’s focus here on two issues which these studies have explored: the
multistability of images in science, and the moral implications of imaging
practices.
Hasse’s studies on image-reading training practices in physics are a para-
digmatic example of a positive use of the notion of multistability. She devel-
ops a postphenomenological account of the cultural specificities involved in
teaching physics students how to interpret images in the laboratory (e.g.,
Hasse, 2008; 2014). Central to her analysis is a conception of imaging tech-
nologies as multistable mediators of human experience; laboratory images
are capable of supporting multiple stable hermeneutic relations. Hasse inves-
tigates these multiple potential stabilities in concrete terms, comparing, for
example, different image reading practices in different countries, and the
different meanings the same images convey to physicists of different genera-
tions.
Rosenberger’s studies of the multistability of scientific imaging practice
share a similar line of thinking. But he considers the ways that the multis-
tability of images facilitates ongoing scientific debates (e.g., Rosenberger,
2011a; 2011b; 2013b). Like Hasse, he argues that it is productive to conceive
of laboratory images as multistable mediators capable of facilitating multiple
coherent hermeneutic relations. In his studies it is different sides of ongoing
debates that supply the hermeneutic strategies that make possible the differ-
ent stabilities of the image. That is, each side of a debate supplies an interpre-
tive framework that enables the image to be perceived in terms of their own
position. Such a conception, Rosenberger claims, highlights the image’s stat-
us as a technology (rather than simply as a representation of reality, a repre-
sentation about which one side of the debate is right and the other wrong).
And it encourages reflexivity with regard to the imaging processes that trans-
form an otherwise imperceptible object of study into a form we can see with
the human eye. His work includes case studies into flash freezing techniques
used in the study of neurotransmission, and satellite-mounted cameras used
in the exploration of Mars.
Verbeek investigates the mediation of ultrasound technology (2008b;
2011). Through a hermeneutic relation to the device, a sonogram provides
transformed access to a developing fetus in the form of a live-feed picture on
a screen. As such, Verbeek presents ultrasound as a guiding example of the
non-neutral manner in which mediating technologies co-shape the actors
involved in its use. That is, Verbeek shows how this mediating technology
crucially and multiply informs how the parents, the fetus, the fetus’s environ-
ment, and the medical context are all constituted within the moral decision-
making circumstances surrounding pregnancy. He observes, for example,
that an ultrasound can have an effect of isolating the fetus, constituting it as
an individual, and constituting the mother as the environment within which
that individual develops. And more, the mediation of the ultrasound consti-
tutes the fetus as a patient, and the course of the pregnancy is corresponding-
ly constituted as a condition which requires the supervision of medical pro-
fessionals. Verbeek emphasizes that parents are additionally constituted by
the ultrasounds as decision makers, forced to contend with morally fraught
information regarding risk factors, potential birth defects, and the probabil-
ities regarding conditions such as Down syndrome. The effects of this media-
tion on contemporary pregnancy are such that even parents that decide
against getting an ultrasound are placed in the moral decision-making role of
opting out. All this serves as a dramatic illustration of the postphenomeno-
logical claim, most strongly expounded and developed by Verbeek, that tech-
nological mediation does not reduce to the mere usage of innocent instru-
ments for human purposes, but is instead the non-neutral context through
which human actors and the world itself are constituted.
Implantations
The “posthumanist” discussion tends to make bold predictions about a future

that will involve bodies severely altered by technologies, hyper-intelligent
machines, and minds downloaded into computer networks. Independent of
the most science-fiction-oriented claims, it seems clear that these themes
have wide-ranging implications for the philosophy of technology in general,
and postphenomenology in particular. For his part, Ihde has tended to be
dismissive of at least the most extreme posthumanists (see esp., 2008). But
he comes tantalizingly close to fully confronting these issues in his recent
essay, “Aging—I Don’t Want to be a Cyborg” (Ihde, 2008, ch. 3). Here he
reflects on the personal experience of several recent surgeries.
Ihde’s central claim is that implanted “cyborg” technologies ultimately

remain examples of embodiment relations; implanted technologies are incor-
porated into a user’s bodily encounter with the world; are experienced with
more or less transparency; involve a magnification of certain aspects of expe-
rience and a reduction of others; and, as all human-technology relations,
entail tradeoffs. As Ihde puts it, our thinking should remain in the context of
“what I have called embodiment relations, which were experienced uses of
technologies which remain detachable, but which in use are quasi-transpar-
ent, and not technologies taken literally into or inside my body. Yet, I will
maintain that the desire remains applicable to cyborg technologies” (2008,
32). Ihde considers personal examples such as tooth crowns and his heart
stent, describes the experience of their embodiment, and reviews the trade-
offs associated with these non-neutral devices.
Ihde dramatizes these issues with a detailed review of his own 2007 triple
bypass surgery, the aftermath of which included dangling electrodes, a leg
drain, and an external pacemaker. He lists complications possible for those
going through such a procedure, such as disorientation, pain, congestion, and
of course the potential for stroke. After being discharged from the hospital,
and leaving behind the pacemaker and various monitoring technologies,
many after-effects remain, including obligations to wear an event monitor
and take medications, medications which themselves carry along new risks
for side effects. Though an example of an implanted technology—or more
specifically in this case, an elaborate patch of an internal organ—Ihde notes
that despite the internal nature of this procedure, we can see in this example
all of the expected issues arising from the non-neutrality of human-technolo-
gy relations.
If Ihde’s account can be understood as an attempt to apply the standard
postphenomenological framework to the issue of implanted technologies,
then there also exists a developing literature which explores the possibility
that the notion of implantation presents a challenge to that framework (e.g.,
Welton, 2006; Verbeek, 2008a; De Preester, 2011; Verbeek, 2011; Besmer,
2012; De Preester, 2012; Dalibert, 2014; Rosenberger, forthcoming). It may
be the case that to capture the important aspects of the experience and effects
of implanted devices, we must go beyond the concepts of mediation, embodi-
ment, transparency, and tradeoffs. Verbeek’s notion of “cyborg relations,”
reviewed in detail above, is the path-clearing idea in this new line of think-
ing. This notion is offered specifically to challenge the adequacy of the
standard postphenomenological account for addressing examples in which
the distinction between the “human” and the “technology” of the human-
technology relation is no longer clear.
Another central contribution to this line of thought is made by Helena De
Preester, bringing together concerns from both phenomenology and cogni-
tive science (De Preester, 2011; 2012). De Preester argues that the important
distinction is not between external devices and prosthetic/implanted devices;

it should be between devices that extend our capacities and devices that are
incorporated into our bodies—but bodily incorporation should be understood
in a phenomenological, and not strictly physical, sense. On what shall we
base the distinction? It cannot be based on relative transparency, “since tool
use shares this characteristic of withdraw into the sensorimotor body” (De
Preester, 2011, 124). Technologies that extend our bodily awareness can be
embodied with a high degree of transparency. De Preester settles on the
notion of “bodily ownership” as the decisive factor: “Tool use induces
changes in motor and sensory capacities, but not in body ownership. True
incorporation, in contrast, involves changes in the feeling of body ownership
itself” (2011, 123). From here, De Preester explores the different ways in
which the distinction between body extending and body incorporated devices
applies to prosthetic limb technologies, perception transforming technolo-
gies, and extended cognition technologies.
Kirk Besmer’s postphenomenological account of the experience of coch-
lear implant devices has emerged as the go-to case study in this line of
thought (2012). Such devices function by first picking up sound through an
external microphone, translating that sound through a speech processor, and
then sending a radio signal to stimulate the auditory nerve via a permanent
implant surgically attached to the cochlea. Besmer reviews the complex
training process involved in growing accustomed to the implant, learning to
distinguish foreground and background sounds, and ascertaining speech pat-
terns. He explains that, “Activating the implant is a moment in which wear-
ers are torn from silence and thrown into a world of noise, which in pheno-
menological terms is a re-worlding” (Besmer, 2012, 304). Besmer suggests
that cochlear implants are an example of cyborg relations, noting that, “This
is the ‘merging’ of human and machine that Peter-Paul Verbeek talks about”
(2012, 306). But he goes further to suggest that these devices constitute their
own form of intentionality, one that calls together the bodily characteristics
of embodiment relations, and also the translational characteristics of herme-
neutic relations, which he calls “cyborg intentionality.”
Cell Phones
Considering just how normal it has become for cell phones and smartphones
to be carried around throughout the day, it is perhaps no surprise that post-
phenomenologists have devoted considerable attention to these devices. For
example, in an expansion of the notion of alterity relations through an analy-
sis of the works of Emmanuel Levinas, Galit Wellner has developed a con-
ception of smartphone screens that emphasizes their role as a “quasi-face”
point of interaction (2014b). Evan Selinger considers the multistability of
cell phones in their use as part of microcredit loan programs in Bangladesh
(2009). And Ingrid Richardson has reflected on the changing conceptions of

presence and location that are evolving with the increased use of mobile
phones and computing (e.g., Richardson, 2005; Richardson and Wilken,
2011).
In Rosenberger’s work on cell phone usage, he develops a postphenomen-
ological account of the experience of phone conversation (e.g., Rosenberger,
2012; 2013c; 2014b). His contention is that, due in part to a user’s deep
familiarity with the phone, the content of phone conversation occupies much
of the space of the user’s mind. This experience can be articulated in detail
through the use of postphenomenological tools. In this account, phone usage
should be understood as an embodiment relation, one that transforms a user’s
capacity to communicate with others over a distance. As a user becomes
accustomed to the device, the phone itself becomes highly transparent in the
user’s hand, even as the device renders such extensive transformations to the
user’s capacities, and even as the user continues to actively hold the phone
beside her or his face.
Rosenberger argues further that typical phone usage is also highly charac-
terized by sedimentation and field composition. (Indeed the notions of “field
composition” and “sedimentation” were first developed within this work in
part as an attempt to expand postphenomenology so that it could capture the
experience of the phone and related technologies.) To say that phone usage is
highly characterized by field composition is to say that the phone significant-
ly reorganizes a user’s overall field of awareness. The specific organization
inclined by the phone is one in which the content of the conversation and the
mediated presence of the interlocutor stand forward and “fill up” much of
what the user is experiencing. This is why, for example, if a person stands
alone in a room and holds a conversation over the phone, she or he may not
“see” the objects of the room even though this person’s eyes remain open and
looking forward. And more, Rosenberger claims that these features of phone
usage—the significant field constitution, the high level of transparency of the
device itself—all occur in a deeply sedimented fashion. That is, these fea-
tures often snap into place with considerable immediacy and stubbornness
due to the user’s individual long-developed bodily perceptual habits regard-
ing the phone.
An intra-postphenomenological debate has recently emerged over the top-
ic of cell phones and driving between Wellner and Rosenberger. Rosenberger
has become an outspoken critic of the practice of driving while using the
phone, and advocates greater regulations (e.g., Rosenberger, 2012; 2013c;
2014b). His argument consists of an interpretation of the preponderance of
empirical data that show both handheld and hands-free phone usage to ac-
company a dangerous drop in driving performance. He claims that this drop
is due to the features of the experience of the phone discussed above; the
driver’s deeply sedimented relationship to the phone inclines a field compo-
sition directed mostly upon the conversational content and the telepresence
of the interlocutor. That is, according to Rosenberger, due to the deeply-
entrenched habits of the phone, a driver’s mind is at times dangerously pulled
away from the road and toward the phone conversation with a force akin to a
bad habit. Wellner remains unconvinced. She argues that users can develop
ways to successfully split their attention between two tasks, what she calls
“multi-attention,” and thus that increased regulation is unnecessary (Wellner,
2014a). Their debate has dragged a number of postphenomenologists into the
discussion (see the 2014 special issue of Techné on this topic), and addresses
not only the concrete details of driver experience and traffic policy, but also
the nature of human attention, and the relation between habituation and mult-
istability.
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2
Postphenomenological Theories
Chapter Two
Why Postphenomenology
Needs a Metaphysics
Lenore Langsdorf
I don’t think phenomenology returns to the given. . . . Once you have been able
to discover the possible multi-stability of a phenomenon, you can never return
to it as a given.
—Don Ihde, Chasing Technoscience (2003, 127)
There are, from Heraclitus to Bergson, philosophies, metaphysics, of change.

One is grateful to them for keeping alive a sense of what classic, orthodox
philosophies have whisked out of sight. But the philosophies of flux also
indicate the intensity of the craving for the sure and fixed.
—John Dewey, Experience and Nature (Later Works 1) (1925, 49)
The many become one and are increased by one.

—Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (1978/1929, 21)
There are two responses to this title’s implicit question. One is brief: All of
our investigations, indeed all of our mundane activities, are based on meta-
physical assumptions and convictions, most of which go unnoticed. Unex-
pected results and scientific revolutions sometimes make those thematic.
Phenomenology’s basic interest in making thematic what was unnoticed sup-
ports investigation of this implicit metaphysics.
The second response is longer, for it begins with Dewey’s inclusion
among the philosophers who provide “philosophies, metaphysics, of change”
to philosophy’s history. His event ontology envisioned the world as ordered
occurrences of organisms’ interaction with their environment. His naturalis-
tic metaphysics envisioned nature, and the universe itself, as composed of
those interactive events in an ongoing process of “potential consequences”
45
46 Lenore Langsdorf
which, as they are integrated, “form the very nature and essence of a thing, its
defining, identifying and distinguishing form” (Ihde, 1976, 143).
That aspect of postphenomenology’s pragmatic heritage is evident in Don
Ihde’s discovery of the multi-stability of phenomena, and the possibility that
that character is a manifestation of the multistability of “the things them-
selves.” This is an ontological topic; as Ihde noted, his Listening and Voice
was “intended as a prolegomena to an ontology of listening” (1976, ix), and
expanded, as he integrated the visual realm with the aural/oral, into a “pheno-
menological ontology” (2003, 134), “relativistic ontology” (2006, 275), and,
most recently, an “interrelational ontology” (2009, 44). The later terms term
imply issues of identity and change, mind and matter, possibility and neces-
sity. These issues go beyond description of what is and into questions of how
multistable things come to be; in more phenomenological terms, how that
multi-stability is constituted. These are topics for metaphysical inquiry.
The pervasive historical dominance in Euro-American philosophy of Pla-
to’s promotion of stable permanence (Forms) over change (things), together
with the focus on the immutable in Aristotelian metaphysics, contribute to
the avoidance of metaphysical study in modern philosophy. Yet the multi-
stability of postphenomenology’s “things” encourages a broadened interest
in how “being as such” encompasses the becoming of that being; in Dewey’s
words, in the possibilities of a “metaphysics, of change” despite “the craving
for the sure and fixed” (1925, 49).
POSTPHENOMENOLOGY
Postphenomenology is a hybrid phenomenology. On the one hand, it recog-

nizes the role of pragmatism in the overcoming of early modern epistemology
and metaphysics. . . .On the other side, it sees in the history of phenomenology
a rigorous style of analysis through the use of variational theory, the deeper
phenomenological understanding of embodiment and human active bodily per-
ception, and a dynamic understanding of a lifeworld as a fruitful enrichment of
pragmatism.
—Don Ihde, Postphenomenology and Technoscience (2009, 23)
The hybridity of postphenomenology reorients it from Husserl’s predominant

orientation toward the “the things themselves” as they appear, available for
human investigation in terms of conceptual entities and static essences. It
enables a turn, instead, toward pragmatism’s orientation, most marked in
John Dewey’s work, toward concrete cultural (historical, social, and politi-
cal) events as occasions of the interaction of environments and organisms.
Further, the focus on technologies as practices instigates attention to the
“how” of their interrelations and the positive and negative value that emerges
in those practices.
Why Postphenomenology Needs a Metaphysics 47
Ihde recognizes that the “organism/environment notion of interactionism”

of a “pragmatically bonded phenomenology” aligns him with Dewey’s “con-
crete and practice-oriented direction” (2003, 136). However, he notes that
other postphenomenological researchers—he names Donna Haraway and
Bruno Latour—are more aligned with Alfred North Whitehead’s work:
“Whitehead’s ‘process’-oriented philosophy clearly resonates with all of the
contemporary praxis versions of technoscience studies.” However, he contin-
ues, Whitehead’s “special vocabulary of neologisms put [him] off” (Ihde,
2003, 135).
In what follows I propose that postphenomenology’s “interrelational on-
tology” needs metaphysics, and that the metaphysics it needs is a process
metaphysics that provides a theory of how interrelation produces novel en-
tities. Neologisms are unnecessary if that theory is articulated, as in ethno-
methodology; namely, from observation of actual practices, rather than (as in
Whitehead’s explication) at a distance from the fieldwork and laboratory in
and by which actual multistable objects are discovered. The metaphysics I
have in mind is summarized in Bruno Latour’s reliance upon a metaphysics
that is “a very concrete practice… a mixture of ethnomethodology and ontol-
ogy” that enables “metaphysicians to monitor the experiment in which the
world makes itself” (Latour, 2003, 18). This is a metaphysics that refuses
philosophers’ persistent and intense “craving for the sure and fixed” against
which Dewey inveighed. Advocating for it begins in thematizing the ontolo-
gy that postphenomenology affirms, in contrast to its Husserlian predecessor,
together with elucidating ethnomethodology’s practices.
ONTOLOGY
In both pragmatism and phenomenology, one can discern what could be called
an interrelational ontology. By this I mean that the human experiencer is to be
found ontologically related to an environment or world, but the interrelation is
such that both are transformed within this relationality.
—Don Ihde, Postphenomenology and Technoscience (2009, 23)
One rather standard response to the question of the difference between meta-
physics and ontology (granted that the terms are often used interchangeably)
is that ontology deals with entities; with what is in the environment, and
metaphysics deals (along with other topics) with how those entities have their
being. If those definitions are accepted, we can see why the basic interest of
traditional phenomenology was ontology, with a strong emphasis on episte-
mology. The goal of phenomenology as a “rigorous science” was devising
and using a method for discovering what humans could know, with certainty,
about the entities correlative with human noetic activity.
48 Lenore Langsdorf
An ontology tells us what is in our environment. Husserl, informed and

thus forewarned by British empiricism’s reduction of things to sensory evi-
dence and mental ideas, as well as Kant’s relegation of things themselves to
the domain of intrinsically unknowable noumena, limited investigation to
what appears to humans and to the constitution of those appearances in
relation to human beings. Thus Husserlian phenomenology gives us a rela-
tional ontology that is grounded in noetic activity and its noematic correlate;
consciousness and its intentional objects. It also gives us a method for inves-
tigating the essence of that activity—intentionality—engaged in the constitu-
tion of those objects. Yet although phenomenological method revealed the
temporal structure of constitution, by way of the presence of past moments
and anticipation of future moments within intentional objects’ presence, con-
cern for identification of essences suggests static objective correlates to con-
sciousness’s activity.
The assault on presence in postmodern philosophy is an understandable,
and perhaps inevitable, rebound from that emphasis. The “post” qualifier in
postphenomenology may signify both an alignment with postmodernism’s
deconstructive response to presence and a determination to avoid the “sub-
jectivism” that plagues philosophers’ conception of phenomenology. Post-
phenomenology’s inherited method of close observation, however, is a con-
structive one insofar as it focuses on the ingredients that constitute novel
actuality, and its strong focus on technology need not limit that focus to the
interrelation of humans and inanimate things (human subjects and their ob-
jects).
Insofar as it retains phenomenology’s interest in constitution, and espe-
cially if it is to incorporate pragmatism’s interest in melioration, postpheno-
menological investigations need attention to the “how” of change, without
defaulting to an emphasis on human intentionality that threatens to elevate
subjectivity over objectivity. That default can too easily lead to subjecti-
vism—an identification that haunts classical phenomenology, which Don
Ihde calls “first phenomenology”: “a method and field of study” that “operat-
ed like a science” to provide “a statics of experience” (1976, 18–19). He
retains that method, although with attention to experience as dynamic, in
“second phenomenology,” which “builds toward a fundamental ontology of
Being” (Ihde, 1976, 18). This shift requires turning from “a latent, presup-
posed, and dominant visualism in our understanding of experience” (Ihde,
1976, 6). Ihde criticizes this “preference for vision” as “tied to a metaphysics
of objects” by the “invention of a perspective” that separated “sense” (expli-
citly, vision), and sensory objects, from “significance”: the “ultimately real
was beyond sense”—with the result that “sense was diminished” (1976, 8–9).
This separation and diminishing of both sense and significance, he notes,
persisted in “classical” empiricism: for Locke, “mundane experience was
immediately bypassed for what became empiricist atomism” (Ihde, 1976,
12). Thus, Ihde concludes, “Locke repeated in essential outline the meta-
physical division of the thing” (1976, 13).
To undo that division, Ihde’s early work accomplished a “deliberate de-
centering” of “classical” empiricism: “What is called for is an ontology of
the auditory” that does not “replace vision as such with listening as such,”
but enables a “move towards a radically different understanding of experi-
ence” (1976, 14–15). The seeds of the focus on technology in postphenome-
nology are discernable in the early development of this “second phenomenol-
ogy” as the setting for a “prolegomena to an ontology of listening” (Ihde,
1976, ix). Ihde emphasizes that “the philosopher must listen to the sounds as
meaningful”—which is to say, as embodying both “sense” and “signifi-
cance.” He recognizes that “our experience of listening itself is being trans-
formed” by living in a “technological culture” that informs that transforma-
tion (Ihde, 1976, 4–5). Yet this ontology is limited to what is experienced by
humans, either through utilizing our sensory capacities or through expanding
and even supplanting those capacities with technologies that humans devise.
By providing an ontology that departs from “classical” empiricism’s
understanding of objects and categories of experience, Ihde’s development of
“second phenomenology” “builds toward a fundamental ontology of Being”
(1976, 18). Insofar as that requires consideration of what presents itself in
appearances, it prepares for, but does not engage, the very process of experi-
encing—a process that does not, itself, present itself phenomenologically. In
other words, Ihde’s “interrelational ontology” (1976, 23) takes us to the
threshold of a metaphysical, in contrast to phenomenological, investigation.
Bruno Latour’s metaphysical interest takes him beyond that threshold,
and informs his assertion that “the phenomenological tradition that he knows
best—the one of Merleau-Ponty… is an entirely human-centered account of
embodiment” although “it is more helpful than overly rationalistic positions,
because of the attention on the lived world” (2003, 16). He acknowledges
that he doesn’t “see the use of phenomenology” for responding the question
that provokes his investigations: “Can we gain access to agencies that are not
human-centered?” (Latour, 2003, 17). Given that interest, he “would rehabil-
itate metaphysical questions that were posed by Whitehead,” for whom “the
ingredients of the world are accessible to inquiry” (Latour, 2003, 16, 17). It’s
in fieldwork and laboratory research that he situates inquiry about “the basic
categories by which actors build time, space, and agency… categories that
should not be fixed in advance” of that research (Latour, 2003, 17).
In sum: Latour’s “very concrete” metaphysics calls for a “mixture of
ethnomethodology and ontology” (2003, 18) along with semiotics. He con-
siders all three to be the “necessary tools for seeing how some events or
actors can remake the world locally” and goes on indicate the particular
value of “small doses” of semiotics: “linking it with ethnomethodology”
provides a “philosophical tool” that is “effective for bracketing out the sub-
50 Lenore Langsdorf
ject” and so clears a way for attending to “how the world is built” (Latour,
2003, 22). That bracketing is needed to avoid limitation to human subjects
and the risk of adopting, in advance, categories that are specified by phenom-
enology’s limitation to what appears as accessible to human knowledge.
Ethnomethodology’s focus on practices detects local interactions and interre-
lations accomplishing world building, and thus, expands the realm of the
accessible.
ETHNOMETHODOLOGY
Any setting organizes its activities to make its properties as an organized

environment of practical activities detectable, countable, recordable, report-
able, tell-a-story-about-able, analyzable—in short accountable.
— Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (1967, 33)
Harold Garfinkel invented the term “ethnomethodology” to name phenomen-

ologically inspired case studies of how members of a society develop meth-
ods for organizing and accounting for their environments. As George Psathas
characterizes that focus,
Where others might see “things,” “givens,” or “facts of life,” the ethnometho-
dologist sees (or attempts to see) process: the process through which the per-
ceivedly stable features of socially organized environments are continually
created and sustained. (1980, 3; emphasis in original)
This focus required a dramatic shift from traditional sociological theory,

which focused on the identifying the institutions, norms, roles, and rules that
function to provide a society’s structure and within which members of that
society act. Treating “social facts” objectively, as “things,” was Emile Durk-
heim’s formulation of the positivistic orientation of sociology’s founder,
August Comte. The latter sought to create a science of the social on the
model of the physical sciences: collect and analyze data, preferably in statis-
tical form, following rules for observation that enabled the positing of corre-
lations and patterns that could be replicated. The model for research was
Durkheim’s study of suicide, which sought to isolate and describe the exter-
nal forces correlated with that action. The common term for this adherence to
objective research was positivism; the goal was compiling data concerning
the external forces that govern actors’ behavior.
Garfinkel, however, attended to the methods people used to constitute and
interpret those “social facts” in order to discern “the formal properties of
common-sense activities as a practical organizational accomplishment”
(1967, viii). Seeing these properties and the patterns they formed meant
focusing on the details internal to constitutive processes; focusing on the
“how” rather than the “what.” That required fieldwork: bringing the re-
searcher to sites of activities, whether that be street intersections, dinner
tables, recreational games, or laboratories. Often, the researcher came not
only to observe but also with a strategy for interfering with what was ongo-
ing in order to see how order was (re-)constituted and sustained; that is, on
how that particular corner of the world was being built.
Given this interest in how practices internally and interactively generate
their objects, the “things themselves” of phenomenology became the “pro-
cesses themselves” of ethnomethodology. Insofar as a process occurs in a
context and has a goal or purpose, it is continuous with both its past and its
future. Its independence is constituted by how it takes up aspects of that past
and is attracted to prospective ingredients for its future. In effect, activities
are moments within a process, both constituted by that process and constitut-
ing its future. Thus the context itself, considered as temporally and spatially
efficacious, is no longer a separate and stable frame; rather, it is an ingredient
in processual, interactive, and interrelational events.
In sum: ethnomethodology investigates methods that members of a col-
lective use to create and sustain the particular ordering of entities that are
needed for their world building. That task requires suspending reliance upon
the subject (as in semiotics) but also suspending the researchers’ own reli-
ance on hypotheses and presuppositions, such as the “fixed in advance cate-
gories about objects, subjects, and reality in general” to which Latour
objected. Ethnomethodology’s sociological heritage provides an orientation
toward human practices, rather than toward phenomenology’s intentional
subjects or postphenomenology’s multistable objects. Yet its phenomenolog-
ical heritage remains in Garfinkel’s description of “practical actions as con-
tingent ongoing accomplishments of organized artful practices of everyday
life” (1967, 11). Bruno Latour overlooks that heritage in his appreciation of
ethnomethodology as a tool for investigating how the world is built in and
through those “artful practices.” Approaching world building as an expand-
ing compendium of practices and their ongoing accomplishments supports a
radical understanding of the processual nature of reality—and thus, goes
beyond ontology to metaphysics.
POSTPHENOMENOLOGICAL METAPHYSICS
The idea that the immediate traits of distinctively human experience are highly
specialized cases of what actually goes on in every actualized event of nature
does more that merely deny us the existence of an impassable gulf between
physical and psychological subject matter. It authorizes us, as philosophers
engaged in forming highly generalized descriptions of nature, to use the traits
52 Lenore Langsdorf
of immediate experience as clews for interpreting our observations of non-

human and non-animate nature.
—John Dewey, “The Philosophy of Whitehead” (1941, 647)
There is order in the plenum. . . in the most ordinary activities of everyday life
in their full concreteness, and that means in their ongoingly procedurally en-
acted coherence . . . it is intractably hard to describe procedurally. . . . The
witnessably recurrent details of ordinary everyday practices are constitutive of
their own reality.
— Harold Garfinkel, Ethnomethodology’s Program (2002, 95–97)
Metaphysics starts in earnest when you grant those you study the same ability
to build the basic categories as when you read a treatise by Leibniz or if you
read Process and Reality. . . . Metaphysics is a very concrete practice. . . . I
take it to be a mixture of ethnomethodology and ontology.
It is the job of metaphysicians to monitor the experiment in which the world
makes itself.
—Bruno Latour, Chasing Technoscience, (2003, 18)
When the description fails to include the practice, the metaphysics is inade-
quate and requires revision. Metaphysics is nothing but the description of the
generalities which apply to all the details of practice.
—Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (1978/1929, 13)
A postphenomenological metaphysics attends to the “ordinary everyday

practices” in and through which mundane as well as scientific objects are
constituted. Its heritage from pragmatism, phenomenology, and ethnometho-
dology enables it to discover, in case studies of “what actually goes on in
every actualized event of nature,” multistability that is constituted in multiple
intentionalities.
Postphenomenology reorients its diverse, but potentially harmonious, her-
itage by attending to multistability and the reciprocity of roles that humans
and nonhumans play in a world of things that are continually renovated. That
reorientation is evident in Don Ihde’s and Peter-Paul Verbeek’s extension of
Husserlian phenomenology’s turn to “the things themselves” into an investi-
gation of the processual constitution of things. Ihde’s variational method
demonstrates that “Technologies, by providing a framework for action, do
form intentionalities and inclinations within which use patterns take domi-
nant shape” (1990, 141). Verbeek undertakes “a more radical extension of
Ihde’s concept of ‘technological intentionality’” in his investigation of “what
things do”; of “how they mediate the intentional relation between humans
and world in which each is constituted” (2005, 116). This mediation provides
a level of intrinsic efficacy: Things “are not neutral ‘intermediaries’ between
human and world, but mediators; they actively mediate this relation” (2005,
114). “They carry morality,” he proposes, “since they help to shape how
human beings act” (Verbeek, 2006, 127). From this perspective, Verbeek
investigates things not as pregiven entities that assume relations with each
other, but as entities that are constituted in their mutual relations. Human
beings are what they are by virtue of the way in which they realize their
existence in their world, and their world is what it is by the way in which it
can manifest itself in the relations humans have to it (2006, 163).
A metaphysics that describes a world of mutual relations is a radically
reconstructed metaphysics. It investigates reality as a process of mutually
interactive constitution of concrete technologies and human practices; of the
things we make and how those things make us. It must begin empirically, as
Whitehead insists: “morphological description is replaced by description of
dynamic process” within which “any one actual entity involves the actual
other actual entities among its components” (1978, 7). It incorporates
Dewey’s search for “generic traits of experience” and Whitehead’s “Meta-
physical categories [that] are not dogmatic statements of the obvious; they
are tentative formulations of ultimate generalities” and form “a matrix from
which true propositions applicable to particular circumstances can be de-
rived” (1978, 8).
Postphenomenology’s pragmatic heritage urges awareness of the value of
our doings and undergoings, and metaphysical research is no exception. The
value of Whitehead’s matrix is suggested by Dewey’s summary of the value
of empirical philosophical methods, which can only be determined by relo-
cating “the conclusions of philosophic inquiry… in the experience out of
which they arose, so they may be confirmed or modified.” In that way,
Dewey continues, “the philosophical results themselves acquire empirical
value; they are what they contribute to the common experience of man,
instead of being curiosities to be deposited, with appropriate labels, in a
metaphysical museum” (1925, 26).
REFERENCES
Dewey, J. (1925). Experience and Nature (Later Works 1). Carbondale: Southern Illinois
University Press.
Dewey, J. (1941). “The Philosophy of Whitehead.” In P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of
Alfred North Whitehead, 641–700.
Garfinkel, H. (1967). Studies in Ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Garfinkel, H. (2002). Ethnomethodology’s Program: Working Out Durkheim’s Aphorism. A.
Warfield Rawls (ed.). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Ihde, D. (1976/2007). Listening and Voice. Athens: Ohio University Press.
Ihde, D. (1986). Experimental Phenomenology. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Ihde, D. (1990). Technology and the Life World. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Ihde, D. (2003). “Interview with Don Ihde.” In D. Ihde and E. Selinger (eds.), Chasing Tech-
noscience. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Ihde, D. (2006). “Forty Years in the Wilderness.” In E. Selinger (ed.), Postphenomenology: A
Critical Companion to Ihde. Albany: State University of New York Press, 267–290.
54 Lenore Langsdorf
Ihde, D. (2009). Postphenomenology and Technoscience: The Peking Lectures. Albany: State
University of New York Press.
Ihde, D. and E. Selinger (eds.). (2003). Chasing Technoscience. Bloomington: Indiana Univer-
sity Press.
Latour, B. (2003). “Interview with Bruno Latour.” In D. Ihde and E. Selinger (eds.), Chasing
Technoscience. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Psathas, G. (1980). “Approaches to the World of the Study of Everyday Life.” Human Studies
3(1): 3–17.
Verbeek, P-P. (2005/2000). What Things Do. University Park: Pennsylvania State University
Press.
Verbeek, P-P. (2006). “The Morality of Things: A Postphenomenological Inquiry.” In E. Se-
linger (ed.)., Postphenomenology: A Critical Companion to Ihde. Albany: State University
of New York Press.
Whitehead, A. N. (1978/1929). Process and Reality, Corrected Edition. David Ray Griffin and
Donald W. Sherburne (eds.). New York: The Free Press.
Chapter Three
What Robotic Re-embodiment Reveals

about Virtual Re-embodiment
A Note on the Extension Thesis
Kirk M. Besmer
A central tenet of phenomenology is that one’s sense of presence is intimate-

ly tied up with one’s material body. That is, the sense one has of being “here”
or being “there” involves being physically embodied here or there. Recent
technologies of telepresence, such as sophisticated video games, immersive
virtual environments, and tele-operated robotic systems, complicate this bed-
rock belief. Robust real-time communicative action in and feedback from a
remote environment provide users of these technologies with a sense of
presence in the remote environment. Users often feel as if they are there, at
the remote site, whether it be a virtual or a real location. This altered sense of
presence—the sense that one is both “here” and “there”—has been called,
“re-embodiment” by philosophers pursuing (broadly conceived) phenomeno-
logical analyses of human engagement with technologies. The questions at
issue involve the nature of such re-embodiment and its limits. 1
In this chapter, I will pursue a postphenomenological analysis of two
varieties of technological re-embodiment: virtual re-embodiment, which oc-
curs to some degree in video games and more so in immersive virtual envi-
ronments; and robotic re-embodiment, which occurs, again to varying de-
grees, with tele-robotic systems, such as tele-surgery and remotely-operated
vehicles. I hope to advance towards a postphenomenological account of tech-
nological re-embodiment by arguing against a tempting but faulty way of
understanding such experiences, namely that technologies of telepresence
extend human embodiment much like ordinary bodily co-located tools, such
as the carpenter’s hammer or the blind man’s cane. My argument will depend
55
56 Kirk M. Besmer
on drawing a distinction between technologies that can be assimilated into

the body schema and those that must be integrated at the higher level of body
image. As a result of my argument, I hope to offer a refinement of what I
shall call the “extension thesis,” which is current in philosophical studies of
technology, as well as cognitive science accounts of “mind.” It also appears
in popular media analyses of technology. In brief, the extension thesis is the
general claim that technologies serve as extensions of embodied human per-
ception, agency, and cognition, or alternatively put, that technologies extend
human capacities as embodied beings that perceive, act, and think. While it is
clear that bodily co-located tools can become technological extensions of
carnal embodiment, it is less clear how this applies to technologies of
telepresence, such as we find in virtual and robotic re-embodiment. A dis-
tinction between two varieties of technological extensions of embodiment is
needed.
VIRTUAL AND ROBOTIC RE-EMBODIMENT
Playing video games is a fascinating experience because one almost instantly

and invariably identifies with one’s avatar. This makes sense since the avatar
functions as the locus of perception and agency in the virtual environment.
Like owners taking up residence in a newly-purchased house, game players
rapidly adapt to the virtual environment; in doing so, they transpose many of
the elements of real-world embodiment and spatiality into the virtual envi-
ronment. For example, watch players of video games in which the avatar is a
third-person representation of a human or human-like figure, and you will
see that they often move their real bodies synchronically with their avatar,
ducking in the real world, for example, when a projectile is coming at their
avatar’s head. Moreover, when moving the avatar “body” in virtual space,
players quickly develop a sense of its spatial dimensions: they can judge
whether or not the avatar “body” will fit through a door, for example. Thus,
not only do they identify with the avatar; they also seem to inhabit it.
This anecdotal evidence is supported by empirical research done by social
psychologists Jeremy Bailenson and Jim Blascovich who have conducted
various studies of human experiences in immersive virtual environments.
Although their research is primarily oriented towards issues in social
psychology, some of their research is revealing for theories of human em-
bodiment, especially as it pertains to virtual experiences. For example, when
controlling an avatar in virtual space, people will respect the personal space
of another’s avatar; they will do so even when they believe that the avatar is a
computer-controlled agent. Likewise, when the avatars of others invade their
avatar’s personal space by coming too close, they react by moving away.
Their studies show that habits of minding socially acceptable interpersonal
What Robotic Re-embodiment Reveals about Virtual Re-embodiment 57
space established in real, physical interactions with others seem to be carried

into the virtual environment. 2 More profoundly, their studies indicate that
bodily-based behaviors occurring in virtual exchanges with avatars of other
people are occasionally carried back into subsequent real-world behaviors.
For example, in online dating games, making an avatar more attractive than
the user actually is not only boosted the user’s self-confidence in social
exchanges in the virtual world, but the improved self-perception also per-
sisted outside of the virtual dating game in subsequent real-world social
exchanges. Such participants, they conclude, “actually thought they had a
shot with better-looking people” (Blascovich et al., 2011, 107) outside the
virtual environment. 3 In sum, their research shows that people do not regard
their avatars—nor do they regard the avatars of others—as mere representa-
tions or empty animations. Rather people inhabit their avatars much like they
inhabit their own body, and this occurs not after prolonged use but within
minutes of controlling an avatar.
Thus, anecdotally and experimentally, there appears to be a strong iden-
tification with one’s avatar “body” as well as the transposition of constraints
and possibilities of real-world embodiment and sociality into the virtual envi-
ronment. I shall call this cluster of phenomena, “virtual re-embodiment.”
How are we to understand such experiences from a post-phenomenological
perspective? In order to begin answering this question, I shall examine analo-
gous experiences that occur to operators of tele-robotic systems, for there are
crucial similarities between the two.
In an article several years ago, Jonathan Cole, Oliver Sacks, and Ian
Waterman describe their experiences using a tele-robotic system at Johnson
Space Center in Houston, Texas. Here is what they report:
One sees and controls the robot’s moving arms without receiving any periph-
eral feedback from them (but having one’s own peripheral proprioceptive
feedback from one’s unseen arms). In this situation, we transferred tools from
one hand to another, picked up an egg, and tied knots. After a few minutes we
all became at ease with the feeling of being “in” the robot. Making a move-
ment and seeing it effected successfully led to a strong sense of embodiment
within the robot arms and body. This was manifest in one particular example
when one of us thought that he had better be careful for if he dropped the
wrench it would land on his leg! Only the robot arms had been seen and
moved, but the perception was that one’s body was in the robot. (Cole et al.,
2000, 167; italics added)
I will call this sense of being “in” or “inhabiting” the remote body of the
robot, “robotic re-embodiment.” It occurs to varying degrees in tele-robotic
systems, such as remotely operated vehicles and tele-surgery, for example. It
seems that the effect is achieved as soon as the operator has real-time visual
access to and feedback from the remote site and is able to affect change there,
58 Kirk M. Besmer
usually using some kind of robotic “arm” and/or grasping device. Approach-
ing robotic re-embodiment from a post-phenomenological framework, it is
tempting to see the remote robotic arms as technological extensions of the
user’s carnal embodiment, much in the same way that ordinary co-located
tools extend our sense of embodiment as well as our bodily capacities for
perception and action. While there are important differences, three similar-
ities between virtual and robotic re-embodiment are critical. Both involve
some kind of interface equipment (joystick, head-mounted display, key-
board, etc.), visual access to and feedback from the remote environment, and
the ability to be active and effective there. Since both virtual and robotic re-
embodiment involve expanded perceptual access and greater agency in the
world, there appear to be good reasons for seeing virtual and robotic re-
embodiment as technological extensions of carnal embodiment, much like
the blind man’s cane in Merleau-Ponty’s famous description.
TECHNOLOGICAL EXTENSIONS
AND INCORPORATIONS
The locus classicus for beginning a post-phenomenological analysis of tech-

nologies as extensions of carnal embodiment is Merleau-Ponty’s famous
example of the blind man’s cane in the Phenomenology of Perception. For
the blind man, the cane is initially experienced as a perceived object, but
after some practice, it withdraws from focal awareness, becoming a perceiv-
ing object—an almost transparent means through which the blind man senses
the environment around him. Once mastered, the stick becomes an element
in the blind man’s motor-perceptual repertoire. In his description, Merleau-
Ponty modulates between language implying that the cane becomes a bodily
“extension” and language suggesting that the cane should be seen as a bodily
“incorporation.” 4 This ambiguity can lead to some confusion.
In order to avoid misunderstanding Merleau-Ponty’s intention here, it is
important to clarify the target of his descriptions. Taken most literally, the
terms, “incorporation” and “extension,” imply bringing something into the
body or extending the body outside its physical boundary. This way of under-
standing Merleau-Ponty’s language in these passages refers to the “objective
body,” that is, the body as a material object persisting in objective space and
having an “inner” and an “outer” that is separated by a boundary. This
boundary is sometimes provocatively referred to as the “skin-bag.” 5 The
examples Merleau-Ponty deploys in these passages and the language he uses
to describe them support, to some degree, this reading. 6 But this cannot be a
complete account of Merleau-Ponty’s intention, for at issue here is not sim-
ply the objective body, but the “phenomenal body,” that is, the lived body—
the body as the locus of intentional activity in the world. More precisely,
what is at stake in these passages from the Phenomenology of Perception is

the relationship of habit and the “body schema” (schema corporel).
While I will have more to say about this below, it is crucial to note that
while it is indeed supported by neurological and other physical structures, the
body schema cannot be reduced to such structures. 7 From a phenomenologi-
cal point of view, they are distinct; thus, descriptions of the “body schema”
refer to a different level of embodiment in which different principles apply.
Crucially, the organizational logic of the body schema differs from that of the
objective body in one important way. Understood in terms of body schema,
“incorporation” and “extension” do not imply the breaching of a boundary
that would distinguish that which is “internal” to the body from that which is
“external.” Instead, what is primary here is a relationship between part and
whole. This relationship is not one in which already existing discrete parts
are externally and contingently related to each other by being brought into a
whole through some additive principle 8—like so many apples in a basket or
so many interchangeable parts on a car—rather, the parts are related to each
other and to the whole such that the organizing “logic” of the whole is a prior
principle of organization that required just these parts in order to realize
itself. In other words, referring to the body schema, the relationship between
the whole body and its “parts” is akin to the relationship between the percep-
tual Gestalt and its various temporal “moments,” and this relationship gives
primacy to the whole. 9
Understood as an alteration that requires a re-synthesizing of the entire
body schema and its inter-related elements, once a technological artifact is
mastered enough to withdraw from focal attention, it becomes integrated into
the body schema such that a new body synthesis emerges. Incorporating a
technological artifact into the body schema implies the emergence of a re-
newed body with expanded perceptual powers and extended capacities for
agency in the world. What Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the cane shows is that
insofar as the body is the locus of intentional activity in the world, it portrays
an open structure that can be modified by integrating into itself potentialities
and possibilities afforded to it by non-bodily objects—what I shall call,
“tools”—in its environment. The incorporation of a tool in this manner im-
plies that it not only withdraws from focal awareness but that the affordances
provided by that tool become a background condition for subsequent inten-
tional activity. In other words, the language of “incorporation” implies that
the tools contribute to the structuring of the very environment in which they
will be enlisted to bring intentional activity to fulfillment. By doing so, a tool
extends one’s capacities beyond what they would be in the absence of it. 10 It
is in this manner that the language of “incorporation” and “extension” are
used somewhat interchangeably in phenomenological and postphenomeno-
logical analyses of technology and embodiment, even though the terms are
not synonymous. Thus, the ambiguity arising from Merleau-Ponty’s lan-
60 Kirk M. Besmer
guage can be alleviated somewhat with textual analysis as long as we keep in

mind that what is at stake is not tied exclusively to an inner-outer distinction
that would apply to the object body but rather what is central is a distinct
form of the part-whole relationship that applies to the phenomenological
body, specifically a pre-personal synthesis of the body schema.
This brief textual reminder, however, is not sufficient to fully eliminate
confusions that have emerged from Merleau-Ponty’s description of the blind
man’s cane. Although it was never intended to be a description of human-
technology relations more generally, it is often a starting point for philosoph-
ical analyses that seek to understand the altered sense of embodiment that
occurs in habituated human-technology engagements. In such analyses, it is
not unusual for technological “incorporation” to be used interchangeably
with technological “extension”; however, technological developments since
Merleau-Ponty’s time—such as medical implants of various sorts, advanced
prosthetics, and technologies of telepresence—call for a more refined analy-
sis in order to avoid obfuscation. In short, not all technological extensions are
incorporations. In a recent article, Helena De Preester has sought to clarify
this difference by arguing for a more rigorous distinction between the incor-
poration of non-bodily objects into the body, which she understands as “pros-
theses,” and objects that must be regarded as “mere” bodily extensions
(2011). Further dividing these two categories (prostheses and extensions)
into three subdivisions—perceptual, limb, and cognitive—she proposes con-
ditions for the possibility of each. Sensitive to both cognitive science and
phenomenological approaches to technological embodiment, her argument is
cogent and compelling, and I largely agree with her conclusions, specifically
her claim that “incorporation of non-bodily items into the body… is a diffi-
cult process and limited by a number of conditions of possibility that are
absent in the case of “mere” bodily extensions” (De Preester, 2011, 135).
Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that genuine bodily incorporations are
rare. 11 For De Preester, both prostheses and extensions result in a trans-
formed sense of embodiment, but incorporations must meet additional re-
quirements, namely they must give rise to “a feeling of body ownership.” 12
Of course, “mere” technological extensions also result in a transformed sense
of embodiment insofar as they extend one’s bodily capacities. It is the trans-
formed sense of embodiment that does not amount to an incorporation that I
want to focus on in the remainder of this chapter, for I believe more fine-
grained distinctions are warranted here as well. More precisely, I will argue
for a distinction between two different varieties of technologies as extensions
of embodiment, those that can be integrated into the body schema and those
that remain at the level of the body image. This distinction is especially
important when we consider technologies of telepresence, such as tele-robot-
ic systems.
ROBOTIC RE-EMBODIMENT AND

THE DEAFFERENTED SUBJECT
As noted above, robotic re-embodiment describes an experience that often

occurs to tele-robotic operators in which they have the sense that they are
“in” or that they “inhabit” the remote machinery. What is the nature of this
technological re-embodiment? Without a doubt, much like the blind man’s
cane, tele-operators must first learn to use the bodily co-located interface
equipment that controls the remote machinery so that the interface equipment
withdraws from focal awareness. It is important to notice, however, that there
is a double-technological embodiment occurring in robotic re-embodiment.
In addition to integrating the interface equipment into one’s body schema,
operators also experience the remote “arms” of the robot as functional bodily
elements. The experience of robotic re-embodiment rests on the fact that the
remote machinery must also withdraw to some degree in order to become an
almost transparent medium through which one’s perception and agency
“flows” into the remote environment.
I argue that this second withdrawal is distantly different from the way in
which bodily co-located tools and equipment—such as the blind man’s
cane—recede from focal awareness to become integrated into the body sche-
ma. There is a decisive difference here, for bodily co-located tools become
integrated into the body schema by offering robust tactile feedback and
thereby participating in somatic proprioception. This is often not the case
with remote robotic machinery. The remote “arms” of the robot do not partic-
ipate in the bodily information systems that give rise to somatic propriocep-
tive awareness. In brief, proprioception refers to the awareness one has of
one’s own body in space. While the future promises remote machinery that
will yield robust haptic feedback to the operator, currently this is not the case
for many tele-operated systems. But, as contemporary technology shows,
such feedback is not even necessary to produce a sense of remote telepres-
ence and robotic re-embodiment, and this is where things get very interest-
ing. For many tele-operated systems hitherto developed and currently in use
produce the sense of robotic re-embodiment with only visual feedback from
the remote environment and real-time command and control of the remote
machinery. In other words, they produce a sense of technological re-embodi-
ment without offering proprioceptive feedback for the operator. What does
this show us?
To answer this question, it will be useful to look at the case of IW, a
subject who has lost cutaneous touch and somatic proprioceptive awareness.
IW’s case has been well documented. 13 As a result of an illness at nineteen,
IW suffered acute neuropathy that left him without any sense of touch or
proprioceptive awareness below his neck. Sometimes referred to as an inner
sense of one’s own body, somatic proprioception describes the persistent pre-
62 Kirk M. Besmer
reflective awareness one has of one’s own body position in space. It is an

immediate, non-perspectival awareness of one’s body. For example, due to
proprioception, one can point to one’s ankle without having to look down to
find it; this is so, even in the dark. Moreover, due to somatic proprioception, I
have a continual pre-reflective awareness of my body throughout its move-
ments; such awareness is essential for motor control. While it depends to
some degree on input from vision and the vestibular system, somatic proprio-
ception relies primarily on information from “kinetic, muscular, and cutane-
ous sources” (Gallagher, 2005, 45). It was precisely these sources that were
destroyed for IW. While he still can experience hot, cold, pain, and muscle
fatigue in areas below the neck, he has lost any sense of cutaneous touch and
has “no proprioceptive sense of posture or limb location” (Gallagher, 2005,
43).
This malady affected him greatly. At the onset of his illness, he lost the
ability to stand, walk, or even achieve coordinated motor control. 14 After the
injury, it took him several months to regain the ability even to stand. Eventu-
ally, he relearned to walk, and after a few years, was able to regain enough
motor control to complete daily tasks and slowly resume living a somewhat
normal life. Doing so, however, requires an altered form of human embodi-
ment, for without proprioceptive information continuously monitoring and
updating his body’s position in space, coordinated bodily movement for IW
requires constant visual attention and mental concentration. For example,
walking across uneven ground is very challenging for IW, requiring most of
his attentive awareness. By contrast, in normal, non-pathological bodily en-
gagement with the world, the body disappears. The body effaces itself in
normal activity. While going about one’s daily tasks, the body, while always
marginally distinguishable from its environment, becomes woven into the
texture of the world. Reaching for a coffee cup, for example, does not require
a conscious command that one’s arm then carries out with continuous visual
focus remaining on the location of the arm in space throughout its movement.
Rather, most of the specific motor activity of arm movement occurs pre-
consciously due to almost automatic motor-perceptual processes that have
been habitually sedimented in the body. Focally, one is intentionally oriented
towards the coffee cup not the arm that achieves the movement. But without
proprioception, the automatic responses allowing the body to efface itself in
intentional activity have been disrupted for IW. Thus, in any movement the
he initiates, he must focus on his body in an unusually attentive manner.
Gallagher and Cole describe IW’s mode of embodiment:
Without proprioceptive and tactile information [IW] knows neither where his
limbs are nor controls his posture unless he looks and thinks about his body.
Maintaining posture, is for him, an activity rather than an automatic process.
His movement requires constant visual and mental concentration. (Gallagher

and Cole, 1998, 135)
For IW, successful performance of daily activities such as walking, sitting

upright, and eating require much greater reliance on active perception of and
attentive concentration on the body. Additionally, “motor schemas”—those
habitually constituted automatic responses to a stereotypical situation, such
as buttoning a shirt—are largely absent for IW. Moreover, he even seems
incapable of generating new ones. Thus, IW’s daily getting about in the
world relies much more on active attention (primarily visual) and less on
sedimented bodily habits. So, what does IW’s case reveal about robotic re-
embodiment?
I believe IW’s case highlights four things that are relevant to understand-
ing robotic re-embodiment. First, following Gallagher’s assessment of IW’s
case, it shows us that there is a clear conceptual distinction between body
image and body schema as well as a functional difference. From a pheno-
menological point of view, the human body is located on both sides of the
intentional relationship. The difference between “body image” and “body
schema” is meant to articulate this difference. Body image consists of “a
complex set of intentional states and dispositions—perceptions, beliefs, and
attitudes—in which the intentional object is one’s own body” (Gallagher,
2005, 25). Thus, the body image refers to bodily self-awareness in a self-
reflexive form of intentionality, and it involves perceptual, conceptual, and
affective modes. For example, looking at oneself in the mirror, dispassionate-
ly thinking about one’s body in a medical context, or finding one’s body
disgusting because it does not meet social norms of beauty are all instances
of self-reflexive intentional states of the body image. In all such cases, one’s
body is taken as an object of an intentional regard. In contrast, “body sche-
ma” describes a complex system of “sensory-motor functions that operate
below the level of self-referential intentionality… preconscious, subpersonal
processes that play a dynamic role in governing posture and movement”
(Gallagher, 2005, 26). “Body schema” refers to a pre-reflexive synthesis of
inputs from multiple bodily systems—proprioceptive, visual, and vestibu-
lar—that structures, constrains, and enables intentional bodily activity (Gal-
lagher, 2005, 132–152). Thus, although conceptually distinct, body schema
and body image are often functionally interrelated. The body schema un-
doubtedly supports normal, everyday intentional activity. In fact, it is the
accomplishment of the sub-personal body processes that allows one to com-
plete habitual movements almost automatically, thereby allowing the body to
efface itself in normal intentional activity. Likewise, attentive awareness of
one’s body position (body image) can contribute to alterations in the body
schema; for example, when one is learning a new dance move, focusing on
the body’s position and movement is necessary for the move to become
64 Kirk M. Besmer
habitual and sufficiently sedimented in the habit body so that one is able to
execute the move almost automatically. Of course, this functional integration
of body image and body schema is operative in learning to use bodily co-
located tools. The notion of withdraw from focal awareness that occurs as
one becomes habituated to the motions and movements of a hammer, for
example, expresses the shift to a primarily pre-reflective (body schema)
mode of engagement.
The second important consideration that IW’s case highlights is that even
though inputs from both the vestibular system and visual sense contribute to
the synthesis of a body schema, proprioceptive information from kinesthetic,
muscular, and cutaneous sources is essential to form the body synthesis that
gives rise to a sense of bodily unity. In fact, insofar as proprioception is a
pre-personal bodily self-awareness, we can speak of “proprioceptive spatial-
ity of the body” (Gallagher, 2006, 351). Distinct from allocentric space—
sometimes referred to as “objective” space—in which spatial ordering is
keyed to an object outside the body, proprioceptive spatiality is an intra-
corporeal unity in which ordinary spatial relations (based on a notion of
extension between objects) do not apply. Merleau-Ponty puts it this way:
“bodily space can be distinguished from external space and it can envelop its
parts rather than laying them out side by side” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, 103,
italics added).
I noted above that Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of body schema implies a
particular part-whole relationship that resists the inner/outer distinction; it
also resists notions of “near” and “far” understood as ways of describing
spatial distance in which discrete things are separated by extension. It makes
no sense to say that my nose is nearer to me than my right big toe. When it
comes to proprioceptive spatiality of the body, there is no center; there is no
origin. There is the body as a diversity-in-unity. Such a system of organiza-
tion is a differentiated unity of mutual self-envelopment and overlap by the
various elements or parts. Given this notion of spatiality, the diversity-in-
unity of the body schema abolishes distance not merely in the sense that my
body is always “here” in its entirety—even as it co-opts tools—but, more
importantly, proprioceptive spatiality abolishes distance also in the sense that
the very notion of distance cannot be applied to the body thusly regarded. So,
to speak of bodily co-located tools becoming an extension of embodiment
implies an absence of distance—not merely a factual absence but rather that
the very concept of distance does not apply to the resulting body-tool unity.
The same cannot be said, however, of tele-operated robotic systems, for not
only is there an objective distance between the operator’s physical body and
the remote elements of the system, but also the conceptual dyad, near/far
(understood in terms of extension between objects) characterizes a salient
aspect of the primary mode of engagement with these technologies.
The third thing that IW’s case highlights is that even though propriocep-
tive information is an essential aspect of body schema syntheses, deficiencies
in proprioceptive receptors can be compensated for, to some minimal degree,
with attentive vision and active concentration. In other words, with great
effort, one can cope with loss of normal functioning of somatic propriocep-
tion and cutaneous sensation, but doing so alters the subject’s embodied
engagement with his or her environment in a crucial way. As Gallagher and
Cole describe it:
In place of missing body schema processes, IW has substituted cognitively

driven processes that function only within the framework of a body image that
is consciously and continually maintained. If he is denied access to a visual
awareness of his body position in the perceptual field, or denied the ability to
think about his body, then is motor control ceases to function. (Gallagher et al.,
1998, 140)
For IW, location of the limbs in space and intentional bodily activity are no
longer elements of his pre-conscious, pre-personal body schema but become
elements of his conscious, self-referential body image. Even routine move-
ments will likely never become semi-automatic process that can recede to the
margin of conscious awareness but will always require focal concentration
and active visual attention.
The fourth thing that IW’s case highlights—and crucial to my overall
argument here—is that the state of the tele-operator is an analogous state as
IW when it comes to the remote machinery. This is so because the tele-
operator only has visual sensations—and not tactile, kinesthetic, or proprio-
ceptive awareness—of the remote machinery’s location in and movement
through space. Thus, activity in the remote environment would involve a
mode of embodiment similar to IW’s experience of his own body below his
neck. This means that in any remote activity undertaken with the tele-operat-
ed system, the operator must attentively focus on the target object of the
intended action as well as the remote machinery that serves as the means
with which the intended action is brought to fulfillment. In tele-surgery, for
example, the surgeon must focus on the “tissue” of the patient as well as on
the position and movement of the robotic arms. Like IW, activity in the
remote environment requires constant visual and mental concentration.
Even with this limit, however, visual feedback can yield what has been
called “visual proprioception” (Gallagher and Cole, 1998, 143), which is the
sense that one has of the nearness and farness of objects in one’s visual field
as one moves about the environment. One must do so with one’s object body
as the constant orienting referent. The most obvious instance of visual propri-
oception involves driving a car. For an experienced driver, successfully guid-
ing a car to the desired destination can be achieved with minimal explicit
attentive awareness of the spatial boundaries of the car as well as the precise
66 Kirk M. Besmer
location of nearby objects. Indeed, it is occasionally the case that when

driving a routine route, such as going home from work, one “zones out,”
being pre-occupied with the day’s business or upcoming nighttime activities;
nonetheless, one keeps the road ahead and objects to be avoided at the mar-
gins of one’s attentive visual focus. Although vision is powerful enough to
compensate somewhat for the absence of proprioceptive feedback, we must
be careful not to understand any withdraw of the remote machinery of tele-
robotic systems to be full integration into the operator’s pre-conscious body
schema on the same order as the withdraw of the bodily co-located interface
equipment. Rather, when it comes to the remote machinery, the sense of re-
embodiment experienced by tele-operators involves the bodily self-aware-
ness indicative of the body image—as the object of an intentional regard.
Much like IW’s bodily situation post-neuropathy, we can even expect that
over time few, if any, automatic motor actions with the robotic “arms” would
emerge for the operator, while such motor schemas would likely emerge with
use of the bodily co-located interface equipment.
To summarize the point of my argument in this section: without robust
tactile feedback and the ability to participate in proprioceptive information
sources, there is a decisive dis-analogy between the experience of robotic re-
embodiment and experiences with bodily co-located tools such as the blind-
man’s cane. In short, the manner in which the tele-operator embodies bodily
co-located interface equipment is different in kind from the manner in which
she re-embodies the remote robotic “arms.” Thus, the example of the blind-
man’s cane, understood as a technological extension of carnal embodiment,
reaches its limit when making sense of robotic re-embodiment. Moreover,
since the possibilities for agency and perception offered by the remote ele-
ments of the system cannot be integrated with the pre-personal body schema
but must remain at the level of body image, they should not be regarded as
extensions of embodiment in the same manner but are technological exten-
sions of embodiment in a fundamentally different sense. This is even more
evident when we consider virtual re-embodiment.
VIRTUAL RE-EMBODIMENT
Having taken a detour through robotic re-embodiment, I am now prepared to

return to virtual re-embodiment. In robotic re-embodiment, visual access to
and feedback from the remote location along with the ability to manipulate
the remote elements of the robotic system give the operator a sense of pres-
ence in the remote environment. It shares these three aspects with virtual re-
embodiment: some kind of interface equipment (joystick, head-mounted dis-
play, keyboard, etc.), visual access to and feedback from the remote environ-
ment, and the ability to be active and effective there. I would like to suggest
that there is another, deeper similarity between the two, for in both we
witness the same double technological embodiment. The tele-operator, like
the game player (or participant in an immersive virtual environment) must
become familiar enough with the bodily co-located interface equipment so
that it withdraws from focal awareness, becoming integrated into the pre-
personal body schema. Moreover, it often occurs that the tele-operator expe-
riences the sense of inhabiting the remote machinery, despite the lack of
tactile feedback from the remote environment.
As noted above, this sense comes about due to visual feedback as well as
real-time command and control of the remote robotic “arms.” Likewise, we
can conclude that in an attenuated but analogous fashion one’s avatar, which
is seen and manipulated but never tactilely sensed, gives rise to the sensation
that one inhabits the avatar “body” in the virtual environment. Furthermore,
it seems that manipulating an avatar in a virtual environment requires the
same attentive visual focus as the tele-operation of remote machinery. This
means, however, that the manner in which one embodies the co-located
interface equipment in virtual embodiment is different in kind from the expe-
rience one has of inhabiting the avatar “body,” for the interface equipment—
joystick, VR helmet, or whatever is used—can withdraw into one’s body
schema to become an almost transparent medium of one’s intentional activ-
ity, while the same cannot be said of the digital representation that is one’s
avatar. The avatar remains at the object end of the (visual) intentional rela-
tionship, even though, much like the remote machinery of a tele-robotic
system, it functions as the locus of perception and agency in the virtual
environment.
The similarity to robotic re-embodiment elucidates a crucial aspect of
virtual re-embodiment. Moreover, it also hints at the limitations of that re-
embodiment, for if the remote elements of the robotic system should not be
seen as extension of carnal embodiment—as long as this is understood in
reference to something like the blind-man’s cane—then even less so can
one’s avatar be seen as an extension of embodiment. Rather, much like
robotic re-embodiment, it is much closer to a pathological form of embodi-
ment evinced by IW. In other words, while one might identify with one’s
avatar, one does so in a self-referential manner indicative of an intentional
body image. In no sense can it be understood that one’s avatar comes to be
integrated into one’s pre-personal body schema but, then, neither do the
remote “arms” of the tele-robotic system. The similarities between these two
varieties of technological re-embodiment are quite deep.
Of course, there is one glaring difference between virtual and robotic re-
embodiment, namely that in the latter, the remote environment is a location
in the actual, physical world, even if it happens to be on Mars. Drone pilots
drop real bombs and tele-surgeons save real lives. Contrariwise, the remote
environment in virtual embodiment is an imaginary one; perception and ac-
68 Kirk M. Besmer
tion occur in fantasy time and fantasy space. While virtual re-embodiment
entails a strong imaginary element, the reality principle remains, at least in
affective terms, for playing video games or otherwise spending one’s time in
virtual environments leads to real emotional experiences. Real people fall in
love with other real people in Second Life, for example. Making sense of
such emotional experiences, however, is a topic for another chapter.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I pursued a postphenomenological analysis of two varieties of

technological re-embodiment, robotic and virtual. Technologies of telepres-
ence such as tele-robotic systems, advanced video games, and immersive
virtual environments offer real-time visual access to and agency in remote
environments—whether they are real or virtual—thereby providing users of
these technologies with a sense of being an active, perceiving agent both
“here” and “there.” While they may expand our perceptual access to the
world and give us greater agency, I have argued that we should avoid think-
ing of remote robotic arms and avatar “bodies” as technological extensions of
embodiment on the same order as bodily co-located tools such as the blind
man’s cane or the carpenter’s hammer. Doing so implies an abolition of
distance and integration into the body schema that does not, in fact, occur.
Given the fact that the player/operator’s mode of engagement with the “re-
mote” elements of these technologies is primarily visual, without participat-
ing in pre-personal proprioceptive bodily systems, the level of bodily integra-
tion seems limited to that of the body image. In short, the “remote” elements
remain at the noematic terminus of the intentional relationship. Therefore, a
distinction can and should be made between these two types of technological
extensions: those that are assimilated into the body schema and those that are
integrated into the body image. This distinction provides a needed refinement
of the extension thesis, which is the general claim that technologies are
extensions of embodied human perception, agency, and cognition. The abil-
ity (or inability) of a technology to contribute to proprioceptive self-aware-
ness is crucial to the distinction I am making.
Future technologies might promise the theoretical possibility of interface
equipment that can participate in proprioceptive information systems of the
body; however, it seems that multiple practical possibilities would need to be
surmounted first. Indeed, such promises seem to be more on the order of
techno-fantasies rather than plausible developments of current technological
trajectories, which seem to point in the directions of greater visual resolution,
more “natural” interface apparatuses, shorter feedback times, and greater
mobility and dexterity in remote environments. Even without radical ad-
vances, however, current technologies of telepresence offer sufficient visual
representation along with real-time command and control in and feedback

from a remote environment to induce a sense of being an active, perceiving
agent both “here” and “there.”
Perhaps this doubling of perception and agency offers us a better way to
understand the re-embodiment experienced with technologies of telepres-
ence, namely, as an asymmetrical doubling of embodiment, with one’s carnal
embodiment remaining an anchor, and, thus, any sense of agency and percep-
tion in the remote environment will be attenuated and will retain a persistent
reference back to carnal embodiment as the locus of intentional activity in
the world. Understanding such experiences as an asymmetrical doubling can
account for the continual attentive shifting between agency and perception in
the local and remote environments that occurs with the use of technologies of
telepresence. After all, one cannot “shift out” of one’s carnal body. It is a
permanent anchor of one’s embodied situation.
NOTES
1. See, for example (De Preester, 2011; Dolezal, 2009; Ihde, 2011). “Re-embodiment” has
come to take on two related but distinct meanings. On the one hand, “re-embodiment” might be
applied to the altered form of embodiment emerging from the integration of bodily co-located
“tools” into the body schema, such as we witness in the example of the blind man’s cane or the
carpenter’s hammer. On the other hand, “re-embodiment” also can refer to the altered sense of
embodiment that occurs with technologies of telepresence in which technological equipment
yields a sense of perception and agency in a remote environment, whether that environment is
robotic or virtual. I will use this term in the second sense.
2. The subjects of these tests wore head-mounted displays so that they could see nothing of
the actual physical room they were in, and they were moving about a physical room that
corresponded to the virtual room in which their avatar was located. (See Bailenson et al., 2003;
Blascovich and Bailenson, 2011, 86–89.)
3. See also (Bailenson and Yee, 2009). In a series of studies, Bailenson and his colleagues
examine what they call the “Proteus Effect,” which is the thesis that an individual’s behavior in
virtual environments conforms to their digital self-representation independently of how others
see their avatar. While it seems reasonable that people will behave more aggressively in virtual
exchanges with others while controlling an aggressive-looking avatar, what is surprising is that
some of these altered behavioral traits persist, at least for a short time, into subsequent real-
world social engagements.
4. For example: “To habituate oneself to a hat, an automobile, or a cane is to take up
residence in them, or inversely, to make them participate with the volumnosity of one’s own
body. Habit expresses the power we have of dilating our being in the world, or of altering our
existence through incorporating new instruments [Fr: annexant de nouveau instruments, 168]”
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012, 145). Also, for the blind man, the cane “is an appendage of the body, or
an extension of the bodily synthesis [Fr: C’est un appendice du corps, une extension de la
synthèse corporelle, 178]” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, 154).
5. This way of describing the physical body appears in “extended mind” approaches to
embodiment in cognitive science. See for example, Andy Clark’s 2003 book, Natural Born
Cyborgs, for examples—and it is often used in the phrase “biological skin-bag” (pp. 16, 33, and
44).
6. Other examples he uses include a ladies hat with a large external feather, a car, a
typewriter, and a musical organ.
70 Kirk M. Besmer
7. The distinction between “body schema” and “body image” and the role proprioception
plays in framing this difference are central to my argument in this paper, and I will describe this
in more detail below.
8. “The contour of my body is a border that ordinary spatial relations do not cross. This is
because the body’s parts relate to each other in a peculiar way: they are not laid out side by
side, but rather envelop each other” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, 100).
9. For a further discussion of gestalt-like unities, see my Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology:
The Problem of Ideal Objects (Besmer, 2008, 21–27).
10. It so happens that the blind man’s cane also extends his physical body; however, it is the
enlargement or expansion of possibilities for intentional action and fulfillment that is central to
the notion of extension here.
11. I pursue this question by examining the concept of “cyborg” and “cyborg intentionality”
(Besmer, 2102).
12. The full quotation is: “Thus, my exact claim is that the distinction between bodily
extension and body incorporation is based on a feeling of body ownership” (De Preester, 2012,
396).
13. IW’s case is detailed in Jonathan Cole’s book, Pride and a Daily Marathon (1995). It is
also documented in Shaun Gallagher’s 2005 book, How the Body Shapes the Mind. IW’s case is
also described in an essay co-authored by Cole and Gallagher (Gallagher and Cole, 1995). This
article is reprinted in (Gallagher and Cole, 1998). My references will be to the reprinted edition.
For a discussion of a similar case (GL) see also (Cole and Paillard, 1998). Oliver Sacks
describes a similar instance in (1985, 42–52).
14. Hospitalized immediately after the onset of the neural damage, IW’s first sense was one
of utter disembodiment. Cole describes his condition: “[IW] seemed to be “floating” on the
mattress. Without sense of position or touch from his body and limbs, he appeared not to be
resting on the bed. But it wasn’t the relaxed floating one associates with swimming… but an
almost unimaginable total absence of feeling” (Cole, 1995, 14).
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Bailenson, J., J. Blascovich, A. Beall, and J. Loomis. (2003). “Interpersonal Distance in Immer-
sive Virtual Environments.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 29 (7): 819–833.
Bailenson, J. and N. Yee. (2009). “The Difference Between Being and Seeing: The Relative
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sentation.” Media Psychology 12 (2): 195–209.
Besmer, K. (2008). Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology: The Problem of Ideal Objects. Continu-
um: New York.
Besmer, K. (2012). “Embodying a Translation Technology: The Cochlear Implant and Cyborg
Intentionality.” Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 16 (3): 293-316.
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and the Dawn of the Virtual Revolution. New York: HarperCollins.
Clark, A. (2003). Natural Born Cyborgs. Oxford UP: New York.
Cole, J. (1995). Pride and a Daily Marathon. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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Body and the Self. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 245–266.
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Robot.” Trends in Cognitive Science 4(5): 167–68.
De Preester, H. (2012). “Technology and the Myth of ‘Natural Man.’” Foundations of Science
17 (4): 385–390.
De Preester, H. (2011). “Technology and the Body: the (Im)Possibilities of Re-Embodiment.”
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Dolezal, L. (2009). “The Remote Body: The Phenomenology of Telepresence and Re-Embodi-
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Chapter Four
Thinking Technology
with Merleau-Ponty
Aud Sissel Hoel and Annamaria Carusi
In this chapter we seek to expand the conceptual toolbox of postphenomenol-

ogy by pointing to untapped resources for understanding human-technology
relations in the later thinking of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty is
frequently acknowledged for his profound and groundbreaking account of
embodied perception and action in Phenomenology of Perception (1962), 1
which has become a touchstone in matters relating to the body and embodi-
ment across disciplines (Sobchack, 2004; Cataldi and Hamrick, 2007; Bucha-
nan, 2008). Merleau-Ponty has also become a key reference in current at-
tempts to rethink knowledge and experience in dynamic terms (Barbaras,
2004; Carbone, 2004; Toadvine, 2009), including attempts to develop rela-
tional ontologies (Low, 2000; Bannon, 2011). He is less frequently acknowl-
edged for being an innovative thinker about technologies. However, as we
have argued elsewhere (Carusi and Hoel, 2014b; Hoel and Carusi, forthcom-
ing), critics who point to Merleau-Ponty’s seemingly scant treatment of tech-
nologies (Latour, 1999, 9–10; 2003, 16–17; Ihde and Selinger, 2004,
361–367) tend to overlook the extent to which instruments, tools, and tech-
nologies were a constant preoccupation of his. This is particularly evident in
his later thinking, as he shifted decisively away from a classical phenomenol-
ogy. Artificial symbolisms and artifacts take center stage in the “indirect
ontology” developed in The Visible and the Invisible (1968). 2 The expressive
capacities of instruments and technologies are further explored in unfinished
manuscripts and lecture notes (Merleau-Ponty, 1973; 2003; 2011).
In this chapter we aim to draw attention to the unrealized potential of the
oeuvre of Merleau-Ponty to give a novel account of technological mediation.
The later thinking of Merleau-Ponty is characterized by the way that the
73
74 Aud Sissel Hoel and Annamaria Carusi
investigation of the perceiving body converges on an ontological exploration

that acknowledges the ontological import and transformative capacities of a
broad array of mediating apparatuses (the bodily apparatus, art works, lan-
guage and other symbolic systems, tools, algorithms). In the following, we
hope to demonstrate the relevance of Merleau-Ponty’s indirect ontology to
some of the key concerns of present-day postphenomenology, and the extent
to which an engagement with Merleau-Ponty’s expansive and dynamic no-
tion of “flesh” may serve significantly to deepen our understanding of our
interactions with technologies, including computation. Like today’s postphe-
nomenologists, the later Merleau-Ponty is concerned to show both that the
body is technologized and that technologies are embodied—hence, the con-
tinued relevance of phenomenological frameworks. Some further important
points of intersection include:
(1) The ambition to reconceive technological mediation in non-instrumental

and non-representational terms: Postphenomenology is concerned to show
that human activity is, and has always been, technologically embodied (Ihde,
1990, 20), and therefore technologies cannot be considered external instru-
ments or representations standing proxy for perception and cognition.
(2) The focus on the transformative and non-neutral roles of technologies in

knowledge and experience: The mediation by technologies does not occur
between preformed entities, but instead plays a role in the co-constitution of
both sides of the subject-object relationship. Technologies are seen as trans-
formative of both perception and phenomena (Ihde, 2002, Selinger, 2006;
Verbeek, 2008).
(3) The development of new and dynamic conceptual frameworks for under-
standing human-technology relations: Postphenomenology seeks to concep-
tualize relationships between human beings and technologies, showing them
to be closely interrelated without obscuring their ontological differences.
Technological mediation always involves what Ihde refers to as and “am-
plification/reduction structure of the human-technology experience” (Ihde,
1990, 78).
(4) The call for a new kind of technoscience criticism: Whereas traditional
philosophy of science often fails to examine critically the role of technolo-
gies in scientific contexts, the postphenomenological approach takes serious-
ly the technological embodiment of science in its instrumentation and appa-
ratus. It does so without romanticizing unaided human experience and handi-
craft technologies, and without reverting to technological determinism.
While we claim that this last point is a point of convergence between Mer-
leau-Ponty and postphenomenology, this goes against a common reading of
Thinking Technology with Merleau-Ponty 75
Merleau-Ponty as exemplifying the romanticizing trend (see for example

Ihde and Selinger, 2004). However, we hold that a different reading of Mer-
leau-Ponty’s relationship to science is possible, a point to which we return in
the concluding paragraph.
The perspective on Merleau-Ponty that we put forward is based upon our

ongoing work drawing out the implications of Merleau-Ponty’s later thinking
for understanding scientific vision (Carusi and Hoel, 2014a; 2014b; Hoel and
Carusi, forthcoming). It may be surprising to evoke Merleau-Ponty in such
an account, especially since Merleau-Ponty at times seems more concerned
to contrast a negative appraisal of scientific vision by positive appraisals of
other forms of vision—especially the vision of painting—than to build an
account of scientific vision as such. In the influential essay “Eye and Mind,”
for example, he seems to be critical of modern science and the technological
artificiality of its methods, whose phenomena are “more likely produced by
the apparatus than recorded by it” (Merleau-Ponty, 1993, 122). He is like-
wise scornful in his judgment of the ideology of cybernetics, “where human
creations are derived from a natural information process, itself conceived on
the model of human machines” (1993, 122). However, as we have noted
elsewhere (Carusi and Hoel, 2014b), the target of Merleau-Ponty’s criticism
is not so much science in practice but a certain way of thinking about sci-
ence, which he associates with a particular strand of Cartesian thought and
refers to as “technicized” and “operational” thought (1993, 137). This is a
thinking that relates to phenomena in an external way, or, in a phrase remi-
niscent of Donna Haraway’s explication of the “god trick” (Haraway, 1988,
581), a thinking that “looks on from above” (Merleau-Ponty, 1993, 122).
While Merleau-Ponty did not dedicate whole articles or books to the topic
of technology, his later works and lecture notes are peppered with references
to instruments, tools, and technologies. Significant sources include the unfin-
ished manuscript The Prose of the World (1973), which he commenced im-
mediately after Phenomenology of Perception, with the aim of showing how
the account of perception given there could be related to the intellectual and
cultural world; and the 1953 lecture notes published in Le Monde sensible et
le monde de l’expression (2011), which show a strong preoccupation with
symbolic systems, on one hand, and instruments, tools, and technologies on
the other. In these writings, it is clear that he considers tools and artifacts not
just as the expressions of humans, but as themselves expressive of objects or
the world (2011, 48, 54). He also clearly points to the transformative effect of
tools and works of art, frequently referring to both kinds of artifacts in the
very same sentences (for example, 2011, 48, 53, 54, etc.). In “Eye and
Mind”—which is his most developed account of vision in art (and, we would
argue, of science)—he again refers to “technical objects, such as tools and
signs” in the same breath as he discusses the role of mirrors in painting
(1993, 129). Our point is that the continuity that Merleau-Ponty saw between
the “natural” symbolism of perception, and “artificial” symbolisms and arti-
facts is the key to understanding his deeper account of technology. However,
to the extent one can speak of a systematic approach to technology, this
approach must be teased out of the scattered references to instruments, tools,
and technologies in his later works, and in the notes and course lectures that
surround these works and provide a broader context for them. Another cru-
cial source in this respect are the written traces of Merleau-Ponty’s lecture
courses on the concepts of nature during the late 1950s (2003), where the
later sketches contain an increasing number of references to apparatuses,
instruments, and algorithms, as well as to the eye or vision as a computer. 3
Merleau-Ponty died at a young age, and it is unknown what systematic
account he might have given of technologies. Even so, it is clear that he
certainly did think about technologies, and was concerned to give an alterna-
tive account to the Cartesian-inspired account that still prevailed in the mid-
1900s, and indeed still does in many quarters. In addition to this, it is clear
that, with respect to the expressive capacities that the later Merleau-Ponty
attributes to instruments and tools, questions of relevance to technology are
to a large extent treated by him in the context of symbolic systems and art
works. Thus, in our ongoing engagement with Merleau-Ponty’s later work,
we develop an account of technologies that is consistent with Merleau-Pon-
ty’s main lines of thinking (as much as we can grasp them through reading
together his published and unpublished writings), while at the same time
further developing some of his main ideas beyond what he actually wrote.
We propose this as a possible Merleau-Pontian philosophy of technology, a
“thinking with” Merleau-Ponty about technologies.
In the following we outline the main points of our account. Before we
proceed, however, we want to accentuate an important insight to be gained
from the way that Merleau-Ponty handles technologies in the context of other
preoccupations such as body schema, movement, nature, art, language, and
history. This shows the extent to which he saw technologies as interrelated
with these other phenomena, or to use his own term, as “intertwined” with
them. For example, in “Eye and Mind” he writes:
Visible and mobile, my body is a thing among things; it is one of them. It is

caught in the fabric of the world, and its cohesion is that of a thing. But
because it moves itself and sees, it holds things in a circle around itself. Things
are an annex or prolongation of itself; they are incrusted in its flesh, they are
part of its full definition; the world is made of the very stuff of the body.
(1993, 124–125)
The familiar examples, from the Phenomenology of Perception, of the stick

of a blind man and the feathers on a woman’s hat, demonstrate the way in
which tools and other artifacts can become extensions of the body. However,
whereas Phenomenology of Perception conceives tool-use in terms of inter-

nalization in the body schema; “Eye and Mind” conceives it in terms of a
productive displacement of the body’s capacities and its relationships with
the world. In the latter case, the incrustation of things in the flesh, is under-
stood to reconfigure the interrelationship between bodies and things. To trace
the lines of thinking that leads to this position and to make sense of it, we
start from Merleau-Ponty’s critique of the Cartesian notions of vision and
space and the particular form of representationalism associated with it.
The criticism of science put forth in “Eye and Mind” targets a widespread
conception of science, sometimes implicit and sometimes formalized into a
philosophy of science, which Merleau-Ponty refers to as “operationalism”
(1993, 122–23, 137). In this conception, scientific vision is conceived in
representational terms, “as an operation of thought that would set up before
the mind a picture or representation of the world” (1993, 124). Operational-
ism thus conceived is a mistaken thinking about science, which Merleau-
Ponty traces back to Descartes, whose theory of vision fails to recognize the
internal complicity between vision and world. It fails, that is, to recognize the
crossover and mutual interdependence between seeing and seen, knowing
and known. By pursuing this Cartesian motif, science forgets the “primordial
historicity” of the body and object; and due to this forgetfulness, it fails to
account for how it gains access to its world.
Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, conceives of vision as “laboring” in a double
sense of the word: it involves active work and it brings new things into being;
vision and knowledge are generative processes. Merleau-Ponty’s fascination
with painting, and with modern painting like Cézanne’s in particular, was
motivated by the way painting shows the labor of vision, and hence, by his
belief that painting is an important means for revealing the nature of vision.
Thus, whereas painting expounds the true “poetic” nature of vision, science
conceives vision as “prosaic” (1993, 142–144), that is, as secondary and
external to the things whose identities are conceived as pre-given. The latter
conception of vision he believes to be molded by a way of thinking about
space, which again was epitomized by Descartes. For Descartes, as extended
beings, we are in space, but we can only truly know space when we abstract
our bodily being from it; we know space only through reason and hence as an
ideal mathematical space. This externality of an embodied viewpoint to
space is captured in the often misleading analogy between perspectival paint-
ings and windows, 4 which implies that the two-dimensional surface of the
painting opens onto depth as it would exist for bodiless beings. Thus under-
stood, Merleau-Ponty observes, “the window opens only upon partes extra
partes, upon height and breadth merely seen from another angle—upon the
absolute positivity of Being” (1993, 134). It is important to note that Mer-
leau-Ponty does not in fact criticize Descartes for having idealized space or
for having proposed a notion of space that is a construct. On the contrary, he
sees this stage of idealization and construction as a necessary step in the

“freeing” of space, allowing for a different thinking about it than what ap-
pears to be accessible empirically. Rather, his criticism is targeted only at
one point, namely, where this construction is conceived as a positivity and
treated as though it were the only “real” space. Thus, what characterizes
“operationalist” science is that it appropriates the mathematical construct as
an exhaustive notion of all kinds of space, and assumes the complete certain-
ty of its own contact with the world.
The core of Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of “operationalism” in science is
its assumption of externality between vision and things. This is an insuper-
able barrier to its acknowledgment of the complicity between them, and to
seeing them as inextricably intertwined with each other—and as we argue,
with symbolisms and technologies as well. Merleau-Ponty counters external-
ity wherever he finds it (including Sartre’s positing of the in-itself and for-
itself). For Merleau-Ponty, it is necessary to see subjectivity, the body, and
vision as operating “from the middle (du milieu) of things” (Merleau-Ponty
2008, 48, our translation); there is no privileged viewpoint “from above.” In
The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty acknowledges that the account
he gave of perception in Phenomenology of Perception was still too reliant
on the subject-object dichotomy; 5 “flesh” is the term that he uses for his new
starting point. On Merleau-Ponty’s account, flesh does not fit into established
ontological categories and marks a break with dualist metaphysics. Flesh is
neither substance nor consciousness; rather, it is “the formative medium of
the object and the subject” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, 147). Thus, flesh is “in the
middle” also in the sense of serving as an operative, organizing force. The
body is at once enmeshed in fleshly relations with objects, and itself an
instantiation of flesh in the intertwining of phenomenal body and objective
body (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, 179–180). Here it is important to note that the
French term “milieu” comes into play in several meanings: “middle,” “me-
dium,” and “environment.” For, as Merleau-Ponty conceives it, each mediat-
ed situation opens a new dimension of the world, a specific “environment”
with its own range of possible appearances and actions—or, in scientific
contexts, a specific “space” of possible determinations and comparisons. 6
Merleau-Ponty’s reconceptualization of the relationship between being and
world in terms of flesh initiates a profound rethinking of mediation. Flesh
does not mediate between pre-existent and independently constituted entities;
rather, it is in and through mediation that entities are interrelated and become
the entities they are. The mediation of flesh, in other words, is productive and
formative; it has ontological consequences (hence the convergence in the
later thinking of Merleau-Ponty of theory of vision and ontology).
With the notion of flesh as productive and formative mediation we arrive
at the shift between Phenomenology of Perception and Merleau-Ponty’s later
work. As already mentioned, the completion of Phenomenology of Percep-
tion had left Merleau-Ponty with an acute awareness of its limitations: The
identification of the body with sensory perception had resulted in a philoso-
phy that was unable to account for ideational meaning beyond perceptual
meaning—that is, for the full range of social, cultural, and intellectual life.
His project after Phenomenology of Perception was to develop an account
that would allow a passage to the conceptual world, without severing it from
the world of perception. If his earlier approach emphasizes incarnated mean-
ing as a positive layer to return to, his later work emphasizes instead the
expansive and expressive dynamic of flesh, which does not stop at embodied
perception, but extends into and comprises intellectual life (Saint Aubert,
2008, 10, 14). This expansive and dynamic notion of flesh presents a very
different notion of mediation, not in its representational sense, where the
medium is conceived as a vehicle for a pre-given meaning. Flesh cannot be
parsed into a material and an ideational aspect (say, like signifier and sig-
nified in semiological structuralism), it is both at once. Drawing on some key
quotations of Merleau-Ponty, we have coined the term the “measuring body”
to emphasize the “in-each-otherness” (Ineinander) of the material and idea-
tional aspects of mediation (Hoel and Carusi, forthcoming). To quote but one
example of these:
This means that instead of a science of the world by relations contemplated

from the outside (relations of space, for example), the body is the measure-
ment of the world. I am open to the world because I am within my body. But
how do I have a sort of commonality with this mass of matter?—Precisely
because it is not a mass of matter, it is rather a standard of things. (Merleau-
Ponty, 2003, 217 emphasis in the text)
It is precisely by being a “standard of things” that flesh is neither a thing nor

an idea (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, 152). As a “measuring” body, the body inter-
venes into the world; injecting a standard that serves as a point of orientation
and institutes a style of seeing and accessing the world. The body actively
measures; but the formative and constitutive activity is bidirectional: How it
measures is inflected by what it measures; neither the measuring body nor
the things it measures are mere things, but are immanently ideational as well.
They bring to the measuring situation their own “logic,” or, if one prefers,
their own “agency.” As such, the measuring body is emblematic of flesh.
Through the notion of the measuring body, we bring together the scattered
clues left by Merleau-Ponty into an account that accentuates the expansive
dynamic of the flesh, and reconfigures the perceiving body into a symbolical-
ly and technologically distributed measuring body, bringing to the fore the
ontological import of symbolisms and tools, which, each in their own way,
serve as “measures of being” (Merleau-Ponty, 1973, 124).
There are different ways to trace the interconnectedness of the natural,
symbolic, and technological in Merleau-Ponty’s later work, but here we shall
do so through noting some of his uses of the term “circuit.” 7 We have already
noted that flesh as formative medium indicates its in-betweenness (being in
the middle; instituting a specific environment). The in-betweenness is also
accentuated in Merleau-Ponty’s use of the notion of the circuit. The idea of
the circuit illuminates the “logos of perception” or “natural symbolism,” as it
does other symbolisms and tools or technologies. A pivotal section of his
lecture notes on the concepts of nature deals with animality, and sees Mer-
leau-Ponty engaging with the biological theories prominent at this time—
particularly those that are attempting to give a non-causal, non-mechanistic
account of animal development and behaviour. Prominent among these is
Jakob von Uexküll, who stressed the dynamic interactions between the or-
ganism and its environment (Umwelt). The notion of the Umwelt brings out
the reciprocal relation between nature that has created the organism, and the
organism that creates nature (its Umwelt). The organism is in a circuit with
the environment with which and within which it interacts. In their ongoing
interaction 8 and intertwinement, both organism and milieu are mutually con-
stituted.
In the last section of Nature, Merleau-Ponty works with these insights
from biology, trying to see to what extent they can serve as ways of rethink-
ing the ontology of perception. Merleau-Ponty, like Uexküll, stresses a conti-
nuity between the natural and the cultural or symbolic order. In Merleau-
Ponty’s later thinking life is conceived in terms of a productive negativity
within being (the invisible scaffolding of the visible), whereby the living
organism diverges from its environment in an ongoing process of differentia-
tion and articulation. This role of differentiation and articulation through
divergence is enacted by the measuring body, which distributes the environ-
ment according to its measure, while at the same time being shaped in re-
sponse to that environment. In its measured relation to its environment, the
living organism is not devoid of intelligibility: “animality is the logos of the
sensible world” (2003, 166); it is “an apparatus of organizing perspectives”
(2003, 166). Merleau-Ponty refers to this process of measured and mutual
differentiation as a “natural symbolism” (2003, 212). He also speaks of per-
ception as a “language before language” (2003, 219). This close interlinking
of language and perception means that both have the capacities that Merleau-
Ponty associates with symbolic systems. In virtue of being an “apparatus of
organizing perspectives,” we can go so far as to say that the perceiving body
is a symbolism or language. Merleau-Ponty explains: “An organ of the mov-
ing senses (the eye, the hand) is already a language because it is an interroga-
tion (movement) and a response […], speaking and understanding” (2003,
211). Language proper, then, both continues and displaces the differentiating
power of the body, due to the way that it “reproduces the perceptual structure
at another level” (2003, 213).
Earlier we noted that there is, for Merleau-Ponty, a very close connection
between language, technologies, and art, which are all seen as being embed-
ded in the circuit between seeing and seen. In “Eye and Mind,” for instance,
he uses the example of the mirror: “Like all other technical objects, such as
tools and signs, the mirror has sprung up along the open circuit between the
seeing and the visible body” (1993,129). The circuit that interrelates and co-
constitutes seeing and seen, knowing and known, is a mediated circuit—
which is to say that it is not one unitary circuit of one modality; the measur-
ing body is a shifting matrix that is at once perceptual, symbolic, and techno-
logical. The world opened and accessed in and through the measuring body is
multimodal and multidimensional. Thus, in humans, the circuit is always
already inflected by “artificial” symbolisms. Importantly these also include
mathematics and algorithms, to which there are also several references
throughout Nature. Some of these suggestive remarks point to a deployment
of mathematics and statistics as a way of overcoming atomistic studies of
isolated phenomena, and working instead towards “phenomena-envelopes”
(2003, 247).
Merleau-Ponty also seems intent to reframe mathematics and algorithms
and include them among the forms of expression. For example, he writes:
“The modern evolution of mathematics which gets over the dilemma of
quality or quantity. Theory of mathematics and of the algorithm to be made a
variant of language” (2003, 313). The inclusion of mathematics and algo-
rithms among symbolic systems, and therefore, we argue, in the measuring
body, is one of the most significant moves that makes Merleau-Ponty’s incip-
ient philosophy of technology capable of doing justice to computational tech-
nologies. Elsewhere, we have attempted to draw out the implications of this
approach for understanding the workings and functions of computational
technologies in science, and their role in generating visualizations for com-
putational biology and neuroscience, respectively (Carusi and Hoel, 2014a;
2014b).
Thus, by coining the term “measuring body,” we further develop Mer-
leau-Ponty’s idea of the body as an “apparatus of organizing perspectives,”
by emphasizing even more strongly than does Merleau-Ponty the mediated
nature of knowledge and being, and with that, the indispensable roles played
by “artificial” symbolisms and technologies. The further emphasis on media-
tion also means that the interrogated apparatus is never given once and for
all, but capable of being modified by the instruments, tools, and symbols at
its disposal. Artificial symbolisms and technologies, in other words, are
understood to have the power to transform the body’s organizing logic and
hence its relationship to its environment. By being injected into the circuit,
instruments, tools, and symbols productively displace the inner firmament of
our world, giving rise to new and distributed ways of interrogating the world;
by being incrusted in the flesh, they allow new perceptions and actions and
give rise to new kinds of entities—hence our contention about the ontologi-
cal import of symbolisms and technologies. 9
In this short overview we have highlighted a few lines of thought about
technologies that point towards a Merleau-Pontian inspired form of postphe-
nomenology, which, as we mentioned in the introduction, intersects with the
ongoing development of postphenomenology on several points. The under-
standing of technologies that emerges from this reading of Merleau-Ponty
accentuates the transformative and productive roles of technologies as they
hook into the human perceptual system and form a distributed interrogating
system—a measuring body.
We end with a discussion of a point on which there is an apparent diver-
gence, that is, regarding Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of science. This is re-
marked upon by Ihde and Selinger (2004), who see Merleau-Ponty as exem-
plifying the classical phenomenological critique of science and its technolo-
gies as alienating human experience. Our reading of Merleau-Ponty stresses
instead that it is a certain thinking about science that is criticized by Merleau-
Ponty and not its practice, which instead, has much in common with the
forms of expressivity found in painting (see for example the authors’ discus-
sion of the use of visualizations in neuroscience, Carusi and Hoel, 2014b).
The target of Merleau-Ponty’s critique is often the rhetoric surrounding sci-
ence rather than science itself; he is particularly dismissive of sciences as
they become ideologies, and their terms of reference become hegemonic.
This is the core of his criticism of cybernetics. For all that, at many points, it
is clear that Merleau-Ponty is open to thinking in terms of cybernetics and
computation (not least in his very use of the notion of the circuit). 10 For
example, both in Nature (2003, 275) and in “Eye and Mind” (1993,127), he
refers to the computational nature of vision and perception. However, he is
critical of cybernetics (or at least its rhetoric) for having cast issues of per-
ception and computation in machine terms, because he sees this as allied with
mechanistic and causal thinking—that is, with thinking that is still caught in
externalist relations between vision, technologies and things. Merleau-Ponty
would thus hold cybernetics to have misunderstood itself precisely to the
extent that it does not recognize itself as embedded in relations of “in-each-
otherness” that characterize the circuit. Thus, far from criticizing technosci-
ence from a distance, Merleau-Ponty exemplifies a mode of engagement with
technoscience that bids us to attend to the criss-crossing mediations that
together constitute scientific domains. By following through on this example,
we can go some way to realizing the potential of Merleau-Ponty’s thinking to
reconfigure technology’s role in knowledge and being. One route to doing so
is in the form of the measuring body as a distributed perceptual, symbolic,
and technological body that forms a particular form of apparatus for target-
ing, engaging with, interrogating, and forming the world in which that body
operates.
NOTES
1. Another major work by Merleau-Ponty on embodiment is The Structure of Behavior

(1963).
2. The incomplete manuscript and working notes of the book that Merleau-Ponty was
working on when he died.
3. Nature (2003) is a set of lecture notes by Merleau-Ponty and by his students between
1956 and 1960. The last part of the work (“The Concept of Nature 1959–1960: Nature and
Logos: The Human Body”) consists of Merleau-Ponty’s own, often sketchy, notes.
4. For a critical discussion of the window metaphor and its implications for understanding
the workings and functions of brain images, see Carusi and Hoel, 2014b.
5. See The Visible and the Invisible (1968, 176, 200) for Merleau-Ponty’s own account of
the shortcomings of Phenomenology of Perception.
6. For a more detailed discussion of the world-making capacities of flesh, see Hoel and
Carusi, forthcoming.
7. See Hoel and Carusi, forthcoming, for a discussion of a wider range of terms associated
with this.
8. With Barad (2007) we could even say “intra-action.”
9. For a more detailed account of the measuring body and the positive account it provides
of the transformative roles of symbolisms and technologies, see Hoel and Carusi, forthcoming.
10. Cybernetics was a prominent idea in intellectual circles in France during the 1950s
(Mindell et al., 2003), and the idea of feedback loops is clearly evident in the circuit. Several of
Merleau-Ponty’s contemporaries also use the notion of circuit, such as Georges Canguilhem
and Gilbert Simondon.
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Chapter Five
Movies and Bodies

Variations of the Embodied Self in
Science-Fiction Techno-fantasies
Marie-Christine Nizzi
The role of the body in defining the human self has been discussed since
Ancient time, starting with Plato’s claim that the body was a jail for the self
(Phaedo, 66b-e), conceived as an immortal soul. Later, Descartes, although
famously known for carving the mind-body dualism, tried his best to account
for the role of this specific body that is mine in the identity of real men,
understood as the deep union of a mind and a body (Meditations, 1641). The
current state of science—including cloning, stem cells, and synthetic pros-
thetics—is a powerful source of revival for this issue in media. Is the body a
mere container for the self or should we rather say that our thoughts, feelings
and personality are the direct product of our physiological disposition? In
analytic philosophy, science fiction or thought experiments are said to pro-
vide us with informative data about our beliefs on the true nature of identity
(Parfit, 1984). Philosophers have thus imagined fictional cases like the body
duplication or clone case (Nozick, 1981), the teletransportation machine or
the divided-mind victim (Parfit, 1984), the exchange-of-bodies machine
(Williams, 2003), or the brain-transplant victim (Shoemaker, 1963). I shall
argue that science-fiction movies give an even more vivid and pre-theoretical
experience of such concerns, and may thus be analyzed in terms of a mass
experiments about folk-beliefs on body and the self.
As we consider multiple fictional scenarios for the future of human tech-
nology and its impact on our conception of our embodied self, we shall ask
the following question: Is the self multistable? Let us distinguish immediate-
ly this question from another question: we are not asking here about multiple
85
86 Marie-Christine Nizzi
realizations. The multiple realization discussion assumes that there is such a

thing as a specific mental state—say pain—and that this identical mental
state can be produced by functionally different systems (Putnam, 1967). The
whole point of the argument is that different systems realize the exact same
construct (Fodor, 1974; Block, 1978; Endicott, 1993; Horgan, 1993). On the
contrary, in the multistability discussion (Ihde, 1977), we are not assuming
the identity of the construct. Rather, we focus on how changes in the techno-
scientific context can modify the perception, interpretation, and definition of
an initial object, in our case: the self. In other words, we are interested in how
our concept of self might be altered as a function of a new technological
framework.
Technology has massively transformed the human way of life over the
past century. Not only has our everyday life become largely automatic
(washing machine, automated vacuum, microwave, lawn-mower, snow-
blower, remote controls devices, voice activated commands, etc.), the funda-
mental modalities of our interaction with others and the world have also been
metamorphosed beyond recognition. Think about the social realm where
internet has made collective memory virtually infinite and has demultiplied
access to knowledge and information. Our relationship to time has been
altered as news from across the world can be relayed in real time by radio,
TV, cable, satellite, and internet. As things became more accessible, so did
people, and the notion of privacy gained a new place in the spotlight as our
electronic life made the line between private and public less intuitive (land-
lines, then cell phones with GPS, real time social media like Twitter, interna-
tional privacy scandals like the NSA in 2013). Similarly, our relation to
space seems to have shrunken with the generalized use of cars, trains, air-
planes, or video conference. Our relation to our environment has been drasti-
cally revised in some of its most basic features as we gained independence
from natural light (electricity), temperature (heating, AC), and lack of water
(irrigation).
More to our point, our relation to ourselves as embodied beings has been
completely reshaped by technological progress. Our identity is now linked to
finger prints, dental records, and DNA, yet it seems like the body has never
been so technology dependent. What about the body’s limits in strength,
speed, or accuracy? Industrial robots now handle most of the heavy lifting,
demolishing, assembling with precision and speed, sewing, planting. What
about the body’s fragility to pathological agents? Modern medicine has cured
and sometime eradicated pandemics that used to cause millions of deaths
every year. Babies who would not survive premature birth now receive inten-
sive care. Unconscious patients receive automated life support. Surgeons can
rely on medical robots to assist them in high precision acts and reduce the
recovery time for invasive procedures. What about the irreplaceability of our
body? The limits to organ transplants are pushed back every year. What
Movies and Bodies 87
about the biological nature of our body? We now have artificial hips and
knees, pacemakers, synthetic prosthetics, even 3D-printed plastic skulls! 1
Technology has even found a way to read others’ minds, challenging the
ultimate frontier of the private self by detecting consciousness in vegetative
patients (Owen et al., 2006) and translating trained cerebral activity in para-
lyzed patients into spelling, voice synthesis, or motor actions via brain-com-
puter interfaces (Oken et al., 2013). It is in such a context that we want to ask
how technology impacts our concepts of self and embodiment.
Postphenomenology as defined by Ihde (2009) aims to integrate last cen-
tury’s techno-scientific progress by giving a major empirical twist to the
traditional interest of phenomenology for the qualitative experience of being
a subject. Subjectivity, in this view, must be studied in relation to its techno-
scientific context. For instance, one can use technological mediation to gain
access to the first-person feelings and decisions of non-communicative pa-
tients (Nizzi et al., 2012). One can also investigate the impact of mobile
communication devices on our subjective experience of embodiment during
driving (Rosenberger, 2014; Wellner, 2014). Those are only a few examples
of investigations on how our concept of embodied self is transformed by the
use of technology.
In this chapter, we adopt an epistemological strategy inspired by the
philosophical tradition of thought experiments. Interestingly enough, this
tradition is deeply rooted in the philosophy of mind and in the question of the
role of the body in defining the human self. Locke introduced a famous
thought experiment in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding when he
suggested the reader to consider the case of a prince who would wake up in
the body of a cobbler, to support his theory of psychological continuity.
More recently, Parfit (1984; 2003) justifies the use of such fictions: “By
considering these cases, we discover what we believe to be involved in our
own continued existence, or what it is that makes us now and ourselves next
year the same people. We discover our beliefs about the nature of personal
identity over time. […] Our beliefs are revealed most clearly when we con-
sider imaginary cases.” In the same perspective, we believe that science-
fiction blockbusters seen by millions of spectators throughout the world gain
their success by appealing to widely spread concerns in the general public.
By studying how these movies question the role of the body in different
hypothetical technological worlds, we are extending Parfit’s strategy to iden-
tify beliefs held by a large audience of non-philosophers, thus extending the
social bearing of the conclusions we can draw.
Let us consider the latest movie: Captain America, the Winter Soldier by
Joseph and Anthony Russo (2014). Hopefully, by the time this gets pub-
lished, it won’t constitute any spoiler but in case it does, let us just say that
one of the corrupted scientists who was believed to be long dead, turns out to
exist now as a computer. Suffering from a fatal condition, he reveals that his
body was lost but his “mind was worth saving” so it was transferred into a
high memory set of connected hard drives. As we will see, this is merely one
of the many ways in which humanity plays with the idea of surviving one’s
own biological body. In this case more so than in others, however, it was
clearly spelled out that the body did not matter, only the mind did. Time and
again, we find this dualist temptation to consider the body a mere recipient
for the self rather than being its very mode of existence. As Ricoeur says, in
such fictions, “the corporeal and terrestrial condition itself becomes a mere
variable, a contingent variable.” 2 Because we focus here on techno-scientific
fictions, the question in our view cannot be “are these different scenarios
preserving the self?” but necessarily becomes “what can we learn from our
own fantasies about what makes us human?” and, more specifically, “how
determinant do we believe our unique biological mortal body to be for the
self in a world in constant techno-scientific progress?”
I want to claim that our body determines us absolutely in the present.
That is, at any given time, my motor capacities, for instance, depend on my
body and I am not at liberty to suddenly walk through solid walls by my sole
desire to do so. It is not to say that human embodiment is defined by a static
set of properties independent from its techno-scientific context. The human
embodied self has already undergone considerable change throughout the
history of evolution. With the help of technology, we can now fly when it
was a radically inaccessible set of motions for humans before aviation. We
can talk to each other while being separated by a great physical distance. Yet
no one seems to think that we are less human for that. We can create light-
ning at will in controlled conditions and start avalanches in a way that would
seem totally beyond the human range of possibilities to a society with less
advanced technology. Certain eyesight impairments can be fixed by laser!
Did that not sound like sci-fi just a few decades ago?
My point here is that we can only address the question of a multistable
self by realizing first how our very notion of self is dynamic. I said that the
body determines us absolutely: it does, in a given techno-scientific frame-
work. The set of possibilities open to embodied humans is mediated by the
technological context they live in. At present, on Earth, one could argue that
there are several types of embodied selves. For some humans, it is possible to
survive cardiac failure if a transplant is done in time, for others this very
possibility does not even exist. The limits, the fragility, the uniqueness and
the exclusive biological nature of the human body are already a fragmented
reality depending on the technology one has access to. Yet science-fiction
and thought experiments always seem to assume that there is something like
a decisive step ahead that will break us apart from our human “original”
nature. This only holds in a static ontology of the self and the body, one
where being human refers to a fictive unchanging state outside of evolution
and time. For those of us who live in a world where time passes, technology
has broadened the spectrum of human possibilities from the very moment a
stone got picked up and used as a tool.
The main lesson of adopting a dynamic framework to think about the self
is that it allows us to look back in time to extract regularities, patterns, and
ultimately principles that can shed light on the future we question in sci-fi
movies. I want to point out two of these principles that describe how our
experience and concept of the embodied self change following techno-scien-
tific progress: (1) functional pragmatism, and (2) the consecutive evolution
of the norm.
By functional pragmatism, I mean a fundamentally adaptive feature of
humans by which we adopt new technologies and update the set of our
possibilities in a continuous, forward-looking, smooth motion. The Google
glasses are still a prototype. Within five years, they will most likely be a
generalized accessory in industrialized countries. If it makes our lives easier,
if we have pragmatic reasons to adopt it, then we do. Individual cars, cell
phones, the internet, GPS, synchronized online calendars, credit cards, ex-
perimental treatments—did you really ask yourself if you were leaving an
essential part of her human self behind when you gave your grandmother a
cell phone so that she could call someone if she needed assistance? And now
you are considering giving her that other little device to wear around her
neck that will automatically call the emergency service in case she falls. Yet
the human body is not by itself connected to a shared information network
that makes such awareness possible: by adopting this lifeguard system, you
change an elementary feature of her embodiment by allowing an online mon-
itoring of her physical condition. Yet most people use this device as another
tool at their disposal, just another technical means to an end. That is function-
al pragmatism. It predicts that we will integrate growing amounts of technol-
ogy in our everyday life to serve various functions and it describes how we
have done it over the past century more actively than ever before without
feeling like we had become non human for doing so.
By the consecutive evolution of the norm, I refer to the update of social
expectations following techno-scientific progress. Did you ever get frustrated
because someone did not return your calls and emails over the weekend?
Two generations ago, no one would have expected you to respond to a work-
related question over the weekend. Did you have to set up an automatic
message so that people who email you would understand your lack of re-
sponse because you are “away from your desk until x date” and you will—of
course—respond “ASAP”? What urgency! There was a time when getting an
answer to a letter could take several months if it had to travel around the
world. Yet people complain if they don’t get it immediately, now that it is
possible. We used to find the first modems fast, but now they would give us a
heart attack because we got used to much faster connections. . . . And the list
goes on. Expectations conform to possibilities.
And that is one aspect that we will find is lacking in many sci-fi movies:
because they make sudden jumps into an imagined future, they skip the
duration that enables adaptation. It is the elimination of this “time passing”
variable that makes it novel and shocking and marginally scary to us, the
spectators from present time. However, in the real world, things take time to
diffuse throughout society. Cell phones were once restricted to an elite and
GPS was first developed for military purposes. By the time they become
available to the general public, the techno-scientific frontier has already
moved forward so that the same technologies now seem only luxurious be-
fore they finally become just normal. But it is not the cell phone that has
become normal. It is the massive social framework constituting “the norm”
that has moved forward to integrate the cellular technology. Our expectations
of immediate accessibility, of social connection despite physical distance,
have grown enough to make the generalized use of cell phones seem natural.
Groups who reject the use of technology on the other hand now contrast
more and more with the constantly updating norm and although we might
conceive of their life style as more natural, the overwhelming choice of
societies has been to go with technology. I voluntarily adopt a descriptive
perspective here and not a prescriptive one. My aim is not to say where the
true human embodied self is, if such a unified static notion even makes sense,
but rather to notice that the exception has changed side. And that is, to me,
the second factor that we will need to consider in our movie examples. The
evolution of the norm determines what the exception is.
With that in mind, let us now explore several science-fiction block busters
that target three core issues related to the embodied self in various futuristic
techno-scientific worlds: the desire to expand the range of our capacities, the
fear to lose ourselves in the process, and the question of what a disembodied
human self would be like. We shall apply the happy ending criterion to
evaluate whether each issue constitutes an utopist or dystopist fiction. Ac-
cording to this criterion, fictions that tend to be received by the general
public as utopist will triumph in the movie while fictions feared as dystopist
shall suffer the fate of the bad guy.
EMBODIMENT AS A FRONTIER
In today’s real world, humans are born as a unique, biological, mortal body.
We don’t choose our body nor can we exchange it at will. It has a determined
range of possibilities, both in the sensorial dimension (we do not perceive
ultra-violets) and in the motor dimension (we cannot fly on our own). Our
body also determines our temporal extension (roughly one hundred years)
and our relation to matter (we cannot pass through solid matter). In other
words, the characteristics of the human body determine the modalities of
existence of the human self. For all science can tell today, there is no human
self without embodiment. Now, for science-fiction, that is an open play
ground. By modulating each of the parameters we mentioned above, sci-fi
movies explore how various technologies would transform the definition of
our embodied self.
Avatar: A New Set of Possibilities
The 2009 block buster movie by James Cameron, Avatar, presents us with a
very interesting exploration of the possibilities open to human embodiment
through technology. The movie takes place in 2154, at a time when humans
have depleted Earth‘s natural resources and explore the galaxy to find more
resources. The planet Pandora is inhabited by the Na’vi, ten-foot-tall, sapient
humanoids who can breathe the local atmosphere toxic to humans. To ex-
plore the planet, scientists use Na’vi-human hybrids called “avatars.” Jake
Sully, a paraplegic former marine, becomes one of the explorers. Through a
machine that synchronizes his brain activity with the avatar, Jake gains a full
sensory-motor experience as from within the avatar itself.
Quite plausibly although very rapidly, the first time Jake tries out his
avatar, the scene shows him learning by trial and error—meaning by break-
ing a great deal of equipment around him in the lab—how to adjust his body
schema to his new body, control his motor actions, and make sense of the
radically new proprioceptive features of having a tail. When patients who
were born without an upper limb are equipped with a prosthetic arm for the
first time, the motor and premotor cortices follow a similar learning curve to
adjust the reaching and grabbing motions. However, as our technological
level is still limited, the prosthetics don’t yet provide the patients with as rich
a sensorial experience as Jake seems to experience on screen through his feet
pounding the dirt and his other senses receiving extraterrestrial odors,
sounds, and sights for the first time. The possibilities opened by this pro-
jected body are even more salient that the human embodied Jake is paraple-
gic. The use of the avatar fixes his impairment and gives him motor possibil-
ities back.
Na’vi do belong to science fiction. Yet the basic premises of allowing a
paralyzed individual to control a second body by projecting their brain activ-
ity to the nervous system of that body have opened a new lead for research.
Five years after the movie, scientists have managed to enable a monkey to
control the movements of another anesthetized monkey through a “corti-
cal–spinal neural prosthesis that employs neural activity recorded from pre-
motor neurons to control limb movements in functionally paralyzed primate
avatars” (Shanechi, Hu, and Williams, 2014). Such research could eventually
lead to reconstituting targeting movement in paralyzed patients.
How would this technology impact our concept of embodied self? It

suggests that there could be two bodies for a single individual. Granted, the
motor control cannot be maintained in both bodies at the same time, so we
are considering a case of fractioned embodiment rather than duplication. But
the impact of such a technology could go beyond acting through another
human body. The movie explores what it could feel like to project oneself in
a different body, one that—as it turns out in this specific fiction—has addi-
tional capacities compared to the human body. Indeed, the scenario goes
beyond giving Jake his legs back: the Na’vi have a way to connect to each
other as well as to other creatures that creates a special bond. This experience
is, by definition, not human. It is determined by the Na’vi body’s own range
of possibilities. Yet what would happen if one was to experience a full
sensory-motor transfer with a body that had non-human possibilities? The
movie at least disagrees with Nagel’s famous article “What is it like to be a
bat” (1974) and concludes that Jake can experience the Na’vi’s connection,
first with Toruk, a flying creature and then with Neytiri, his Na’vi mate. If
that was in fact the case, based on our own experience or the proven possibil-
ity to have such experiences, our concept of embodied self would in all
likelihood update to integrate new sensory-motor possibilities within its defi-
nition.
In the movie, Jake faces an ideological conflict that forces him to choose
between his human embodiment and his Na’vi embodiment and he decides in
favor of the Na’vi’s existence. However, prior to choosing, he indeed de-
scribes his experience as an enlarged one rather than a completely separate
set of experiences, thus maintaining the idea of a continuous self. The modal-
ities of his embodiment still determine what kind of sensory-motor interac-
tions he can have with his environment and only through his Na’vi body can
he have non-human experiences. Yet it is not until the ideological conflict
between us and them starts that those two types of embodiment become
mutually exclusive. We see that, in contrast to the multiple realization dis-
cussion where the question would be “can the Na’vi’s physiology produce
the same mental states as human experience?” our question here is “can our
concept of human embodied self extend so as to integrate non-human experi-
ences?” But this might sound far-reaching. Let us talk about a fiction that is
much closer to the current state of technology: the possibility to selectively
enhance certain physical and cognitive functions through the use of drugs.
Limitless: Human Enhancement on Prescription
In 2011 Neil Burger’s movie, Limitless, the hero Eddie Morra takes an ex-
perimental drug, NZT-48, that immediately enhances his perceptive, cogni-
tive and reasoning abilities. With enhanced memory, intelligence, and per-
ception, he manages to outsmart the corporation trying to use him for their
own purposes.
Limitless suggests less extreme a change than Avatar. The fiction is set in
a world roughly identical to ours. The hero retains his human body and there
is no off-world colonies populated with aliens. This time, the only change is
one of degree in human capacities rather than one of nature. By all defini-
tions, Eddie is still himself and he is still human. However, he is a better
version of both, extending normal capacities beyond the average perfor-
mance. This would be totally unremarkable if it was not drug induced, as
intelligence and perception naturally come in a wide range across individu-
als.
The main concern that the movie touches upon is about the possible long
term side effects of such an artificially induced state of hyper performance.
The hero suffers from black-outs that leave him amnesic of his immediate
past. Additionally, the drug poses the question of addiction. When the hero of
Avatar chooses the Na’vi mode of embodiment, he knows it is a stable,
viable option as Na’vi have lived for generations. On the contrary in Limit-
less, the drug is experimental. It is an artificial, manmade composite, the
long-term side effects of which are unknown. The movie resolves both prob-
lems by suggesting that enhanced capacities enable the hero to find a solution
to the pervasive effects of the drug. However, this approach points at a
distinction regarding our concept of embodied self. On the one hand, it seems
like developing normal human capacities beyond their natural extension does
not affect our definition or our interpretation of what is a human embodied
self. A change in degree of capacity is a much smaller gap than the change in
nature required to integrate non-human experiences and it is very likely that
we would readily expend our definition to integrate enhanced capacities. Yet
on the other hand, there is a pragmatic concern limiting the enthusiasm for
the fictional drug: our safety could be at stake. Here it is about another
characteristic of our embodiment that we might be more reluctant to let go
of: our body has evolved across millennia and most of the time without such
an active part on the humans themselves. It is probable that there would be an
initial resistance to the idea that humans can play with the brain’s chemistry
and get it all right. However, eventually, the functional pragmatism principle
predicts that such enhancement technologies would be accepted and the mo-
vie accordingly has a happy ending.
Notice that the plot of Limitless focuses on a single individual. At most, a
handful of people have access to the drug. Eddie’s success as a writer, a
business man, and later as a politician is at least in part due to the limited
distribution of the drug, which gives him an advantage compared to non
enhanced humans. What happens to our concept of human embodiment when
such enhancements become available to more?
Elysium and the New Margin
Elysium opens a very interesting reflection on the social impact of costly

human enhancement technologies. In his 2013 movie, Neill Blomkamp de-
picts a divided world of the year 2154 on Earth. While the elite enjoy a
protected life with perfect medicine on a technology-assisted habitat in orbit,
Earth population lives in misery, administered by robots. After receiving a
lethal dose of radiation during an accident, the hero Max Da Costa is willing
to undergo an extensive and risky surgery adding to his human body a pow-
ered exoskeleton complete with neural implant. With his strength now
matched with robots, he manages to invade Elysium and uses the program
downloaded in his neural implant to override the main system, making all
Earth inhabitants citizens of Elysium. As a consequence, a battery of medical
ships departs to cure Earth inhabitants, thus giving an equal access to the
perfect medical technology so far restricted to Elysium’s citizens.
The issue of who has access to any considered technology is central to the
question of a change in our collective concept of embodied self. A single
individual with super-human capacities is a hero, a god, or a monster. A
small group still only is an exception. But as soon as large enough a group
has access to a given technology, there seems to be a switch that triggers the
updating process of the norm. The movie emphasizes that the subsequent
evolution of the norm happens even when the technology is not readily
accessible to everyone. In this sense, the possibility prevails over the actual
accessibility of the technology: as long as it is possible, it creates a new
standard for what can be expected. No need for fiction here though: we
experience this situation in the real world about a variety of technologies
including medical technologies like transplants and joint replacements. Only
a minority of Earth inhabitants has access to these technologies yet this
simple fact makes it abnormal that the rest of the population doesn’t.
A related phenomenon that the movie illustrates is the creation of a new
margin, simultaneous to that of a new norm. When the citizens of Elysium
can readily cure cancer and benefit from certain enhancements, all of a sud-
den, it creates a new category: even healthy humans appear to be somewhat
less because of the possibility of enhancement. In other words, there are now
three categories where there were only two: there are sick humans, healthy
humans, and enhanced humans. The question is whether our concept of hu-
man embodiment would evolve to integrate this new possibility as its stan-
dard. Both the movie and our principle of norm adjustment suggest that it
would. Let us take a real world example. Vaccines are a technology that
prevents an individual from getting sick in the future or diminishes the symp-
toms so as to avoid death by the pathological agent involved. Suppose you
lived in an area infested with a very aggressive disease for which there is no
vaccine. In this situation, being healthy is the normal situation compared to
which being sick is a deterioration. Now imagine we do have a vaccine. By

its sheer existence, the vaccine transforms the healthy but not immune situa-
tion into a less than ideal situation. The expectation integrates the technologi-
cal progress into a new norm. Now consider the cost of the vaccine and how
only a fraction of the population can get access to it. Because of the norm
updating principle, people who cannot afford the preventive medication now
find themselves less fortunate by the simple fact that they cannot benefit
from an existing enhancing possibility and the people who are sick when the
vaccine is available are doubly unfortunate. This new margin phenomenon
would happen regardless of the nature of the technology: it happens whenev-
er enough individuals of a population have an exclusive access to a superior
technology.
The fact that the enhanced human becomes the new norm rather than
becoming an upper possibility while the healthy not enhanced human would
remain the norm illustrates how the concept of embodied self would be
modified by techno-scientific progress. Just like it is not the cell phone that
has become normal but the set of expectations that has come to integrate it, it
is not the enhancement technologies that have become normal, it is our
concept of embodied self that has grown to include them in its definition.
THE FEAR OF THE OTHER: HUMAN VERSUS MACHINE
Blade Runner or the Blurry Border
After this series of utopias, let us consider another category of science-fiction

movies that often do not have the happy ending signaling hope for technolog-
ical progress but rather an ambivalent ending that resonates like a warning,
echo of a fear: that of loosing what human embodiment specifically means.
As computational theorists of mind used the analogy of a computer to under-
stand and model the human brain, film makers have jumped at the possibil-
ities for fiction, be it along the line of creating humanoid robots that would
one day rebel in the name of their superior cognitive functions (cf. I, robot by
Alex Proyas, 2004) or along the line of humans transferring their conscious-
ness into computers for various purposes (survival in the face of a lethal
condition, preservation across intergalactic travels, or security of the human
body). These movies directly question what it means for humans to be em-
bodied.
Here we start by calling upon the 1984 Riddley Scott’s movie Blade
Runner. The movie takes place in 2019. Corporations produce genetically
engineered organic robots called replicants to perform dangerous tasks on
off-world colonies. The replicants are visually indistinguishable from adult
humans. Their presence is banned on Earth and the hero, Deckard, hunts
them. A scene of particular interest for our topic shows Deckard administer-
ing a “Voight-Kampff” test designed to distinguish replicants from humans

based on their physiological response to questions with high emotional va-
lence. Deckard is questioning the assistant of the Tyrell Corporation’s presi-
dent, Rachel, an experimental replicant who believes herself human on the
basis of implanted memories. As a consequence of her unique design, the test
requires considerably more questions than usual to identify her as a robot.
The hypothesis is that the fake memories (standard across several robots)
provide Rachel with a more individualized sense of self and with an emotion-
al reference. So which parameters of human embodiment does this fiction
manipulate?
In the movie, not only do the replicants have biological human shaped
bodies, they are also becoming emotionally and morally closer to humans.
The final fight between the replicant Roy and the hero in which Roy saves
Deckard rather than killing him after reflecting upon the morality of his past
actions suggests as much. So do the emotional capacities of Rachel. And, at
the limit, that seems to be the concern: if enhancements can be integrated
easily into a new norm for our concept of embodied self and if these robots
are by every characteristic but their generation biological replicas of self-
conscious humans with enhanced capacities, then what makes us an embod-
ied self and them not? More importantly, from a pragmatic and ethical point
of view, can we still use them as we do with tools? The movie does not
answer these questions. It only raises them as problematic. With the excep-
tion of Rachel, whose future is unknown, the replicants fail and die. They do
not become the new norm and the concept of embodied self does not extend
to them collectively. In this case, it seems that the decisive factor is that
replicants are artificially engineered. Despite their body being biological,
subject to sensations and emotions, and mortal like human bodies, their arti-
ficial generation seems to be what ultimately distinguishes them from human
embodiment. That is not the only scenario fictions have envisioned to illus-
trate how technology could drive humans to lose the meaning of their em-
bodied self.
Surrogates and the Loss of Self
In his 2009 movie entitled Surrogates, Jonathan Mostow depicts a future in

which people use remote-controlled androids called surrogates to live their
lives from the safety of their homes. Surrogates can be damaged or destroyed
without the user being hurt so that humans using them survive accidents and
crime committed in the streets towards their surrogates. A neural connection
gives the user control over their surrogate, whose appearance can be com-
pletely different than that of the real user. The hero, Tom Greer, is one of the
users. After the death of their son, his wife refuses to interact with him as her
human self and restricts their relationship to that of their surrogates.
This fiction raises several interesting points about the human embodied
self. Are we willing to use surrogates to gain physical safety? Is our physical
appearance determinant in defining our experienced self and our social iden-
tity? Would we lose contact with our real self after repeated use of the
surrogate? The movie explores these questions and provides us with answers
relevant to our interest for the potential impact of fictional technologies on
our concept of embodied self.
The first issue concerns our readiness to adopt the surrogate technology.
The movie presents it as a technological progress granting the users a safer
life. In a way, the impact on our embodied self seems minor. Everybody
remains their usual embodied self. The surrogate is merely a puppet used
outside of the house in addition to our embodied self. Come the evening, the
surrogates go to their charging stations and the human family meets up for
dinner. Or not… Although the movie does not play with the idea of transfer-
ring the consciousness of the user into the surrogate to make the user immor-
tal for instance, it emphasizes the possible impact of having even an accesso-
ry-robot self on top of one’s own embodied self. First, individually, there
might be reasons to favor a robot whose appearance we can change at will.
But also, collectively, the surrogates follow the updating norm principle.
When the hero happens to walk the streets in the flesh, he experiences fear,
suddenly fully aware of his physiological vulnerability. As soon as a small
number of people can afford surrogates, the police will need to match the
capacities of these individuals and citizens might begin to feel even more
unsafe as much stronger robots now walk the streets. Not surprisingly, the
advertisement messages from the company manufacturing the surrogates tar-
get the need for safety of their consumers. Following what the functional
pragmatism principle would predict, the surrogates are quickly adopted in the
movie and using them becomes the new norm. Now let us see how this
technology would impact our concept of embodied self.
The second issue addressed by the movie concerns the role of our physi-
cal appearance in our experienced and perceived self. An amusing scene
shows Tom interrogating one of the company’s officials, flanked by two
good-looking assistants. He points out in a very eloquent way how different
the actual person could be from its surrogate. This raises two points: one is a
matter of identification of individuals who can afford to own several differ-
ent-looking surrogates, the second is a matter of social impact of physical
appearance. The first one displaces the identification factors away from the
body—at least away from the surrogate’s body. No DNA or fingerprint to
find on a puppet. At best, there could be a serial number with ownership
records. That would constitute a major change for our concept of embodied
self. As of now, it is extremely difficult to escape one’s identity because of
our body. We cannot change body as we change shirts. However, if the
identification demand shifted towards remote-controlled robots, then the so-

cial self, our personal identity, must be redefined through non-bodily criteria.
The second point is that manipulating one’s appearance can serve social
goals. Increasing desirability or hiding signs of aging are only two of the
possible motivations. Seemingly superficial, these motives in fact get at the
root of human embodiment. We don’t choose our body, we cannot change it
all for another one, and we can’t stop aging yet. If technology were to enable
us to change these three facts, then it would also reshape human embodiment
at its core. Would the self still be defined as necessarily embodied? It de-
pends on what we mean by embodied self. Is it merely having a body (in
which case it could potentially be extended to having several bodies) or does
it mean being one’s own and unique body? But then again, already in the real
world, our body naturally changes a lot over a lifetime and no one is thought
to lose their self when they undergo plastic surgery. Heavy physical transfor-
mations are even showed on TV as beauty contests. In a different domain,
sex change operations are possible despite their direct impact on the person’s
identity. Maybe then should we consider the possibility that there is just a
difference of degree between the current real-world situation and a fiction in
which we could change our physical appearance at will through the use of
surrogates? Perhaps our concept of embodied self would then just evolve to
include the possibility of several physical appearances, and that would be-
come the new norm. Consequently, choosing to live without a surrogate
would result in marginalization, as it is imagined in the movie.
The last issue is tackled mostly in two scenes: first when Tom confronts
his wife’s surrogates demanding to see “his wife” and insisting that the
surrogate is not his wife but just a robot, and then during the final scene,
when all surrogates have been destroyed and people start getting in the
streets, looking confused and afraid. Would the adoption of the surrogates
technology lead humans to lose themselves after a fashion? The movie sug-
gests that it would: there is no happy ending for the surrogates. Humans wake
up, as from a long dream, and look at each other for the first time in years.
Social connections require some face-to-face contact, suggests the movie.
When we place distance between our embodied self and multiple social
covers only loosely related to our real self, we not only lose contact with
others, we also lose contact with ourselves. No one on one relationship can
be trusted anymore as the person behind the surrogate could just be anyone.
Trust is a surprising by-product of the quasi impossibility for humans to
completely escape or change their physical self. When this unique relation-
ship between body and self is lost, it seems that it is a fundamental compo-
nent of the social fabric that vanishes. This is another way of illustrating the
fear of blending into something that would not be us anymore. But this time
not because we created robots undistinguishable from ourselves; just because
changing our relationship to our body in too fundamental ways would also
unravel the human social reality. Then should we conclude that no fiction
offers an utopist thought about what a disembodied human self could be like?
TOWARD A DISEMBODIED HUMAN?
Transcendence
Throughout this chapter, we have investigated how techno-scientific fictions

could shed light on our concept of embodied self. We have considered the
fictive possibility of expending human capacities, of connecting ourselves to
the body of a different species as well as to a robot. Now let us consider three
types of fictions that directly address embodiment as a contingent variable in
our experience of the self: first, by unleashing a mind online after its physical
death; second by de-materializing the human body; and third by progressive-
ly, one step at a time, abolishing the time and space constraints that deter-
mine human existence in today’s real world.
This movie hasn’t been released, yet its trailer hits every point we have
made so far: Transcendence, by Wally Pfister, follows the fate of Dr. Will
Caster, a scientist working on creating a machine with both emotional and
cognitive power. The motivation is again one of functional pragmatism: “ear-
ly detection of cancer, saving lives.” Yet, after activists opposing technology
inflict him a fatal wound, Will’s wife attempts to “save him by uploading his
consciousness” into a computer. When Will reaches physical death, a mes-
sage suddenly appears on the screen: “Is anyone there?” Will’s wife believes
this is proof that Will’s consciousness is now existing in digital format and
expressing itself on the screen. The entity says that it feels like its “mind has
been set free” but soon it needs more power, the computer being too limited
for a human mind. The entity asks her to put it online: on the distributed
network supported by internet, it could get additional space and power. Soon,
even Will’s wife questions the identity of the entity, whom she doesn’t
recognize any more and it seems that the existence of the entity puts human-
ity as we know it at risk.
Why do I think this fiction will be among the dystopias? Because there is
no functional pragmatism working for mankind here but on the contrary a
risk of losing embodiment as a defining feature of our humanity with no
turning back; because the movie is about a single mind striving for its own
expansion at the expense of another form of life, thus making it the anomaly
rather than the new norm; and because it is a one step process leading from a
currently accepted body into a fully virtual existence rather than a progres-
sive evolution. Although it is hard to be certain from the trailer only, 3 it
seems like the movie doesn’t suggest for all mankind to jump into a virtual
existence. What is suggested is that a form of intelligence embodied in a
distributed electronic network will fight for survival by expending onto the
entire system. This cannot constitute a viable collective future. However, it

points at another fictional consequence: when accessing the internet, when
expending into a virtual distributed intelligence, the once human Will loses
who he was as if his self was doomed to be altered beyond recognition in this
radical change of embodiment. Not tied to one spatial location; not restricted
to the human brain’s limited computational power; not dependent on any
human needs: by exchanging his body for the internet, Will loses himself
because he now transcends the human condition. It is now a case of us versus
the Other, the machine. In such a configuration, there can be no update of the
norm. Instead, the entity is pushed outside rather than being integrated in the
concept of embodied self and as the trailer suggests “whatever this is, it is not
Will anymore.” Here we conclude to the loss of self because the conditions
of embodiment have nothing to do with the human condition anymore yet
this distributed digital intelligence presumably still relies on the physical
existence of the computers composing the network that supports its existence
just as humans need their body. What happens in a fiction that renders any
sort of material support contingent to the existence of a former embodied
human self?
Watchmen: Human Concerns?
In his 2009 Watchmen movie, Zack Snyder features a distant Dr. Manhattan.
After his accident, the former scientist learns to control the molecular struc-
ture of his body thus becoming able to take a material embodied form at will,
to manipulate the size of his body, and to recompose his organism from a
fragmented molecular level suggesting he cannot die anymore. During the
movie, he also demonstrates several non-human capacities including de-
multiplying his body into several autonomous yet connected agents, traveling
through space without need for breathing, controlling matter in a telekinetic
manner, and seemingly knowing the future.
One scene in particular is interesting in tying up his radically changed
embodied existence with the question of his human self. While half of man-
kind faces annihilation, Dr. Manhattan’s former girlfriend tries to convince
him to intervene during a conversation on Mars, where he teleported her with
him. During their conversation, his girlfriend points out that his knowing the
future is “inhuman,” which makes her uncomfortable. In response, he shows
her how his interest has progressively shifted from Earth to Mars. This new
world “means more to him” than Earth. She is “his only remaining link to
humanity” and this status makes him wonder “why to save a world he no
longer has any stake in.” One very pragmatic way to look at humans’ interest
for planet Earth is that Earth is so far our one and only habitat. In one way,
we collectively share with Earth an up-scaled but similar link as we share
individually with our body in that there is no alternative for us yet. However,
the movie suggests that this interest is ultimately tightly linked to the modal-
ities of our embodied existence. Could we exist with no need for air or water,
then maybe our bond to our environment would be shattered simultaneously
to our bond to unique embodied conditions of existence. Indeed the human
body has evolved to fit into a specific environment. What this movie points at
is the potential large-scale change that making the body contingent to hu-
mans would produce in their relation to their entire environment.
We have considered with Surrogates the possibility that fundamental
changes into our mode of embodiment would unravel human social reality
but in that fiction, humans still were embodied selves. If one individual
gained so much control over their body so as to manipulate their molecular
composition at will, so as to abolish the uniqueness of spatial location that
still constricts human embodiment in the real world, would we still believe
them human? Because he is alone, Dr. Manhattan leaves Earth at the end of
the movie, a single entity of its kind with no specific interest for humanity or
Earth, to which he doesn’t belong anymore. Yet if all of Earth inhabitants
were to undergo the same transformation, would we not then revise our
concept of embodied self? Instead of being tied to a single environment with
its defined life conditions, would we free the self from a unique mode of
embodiment to integrate the possibility to live in multiple environments of-
fering multiple conditions of existence?
Gentle Seduction: Human, Time, and Matter
My last stop on this itinerary across fictions is a short story, written by Marc
Stiegler in 1989: “The Gentle Seduction.” 4 This fantastic story follows a
woman with no special drive for technology. She lives a simple life in the
mountains, doing most things by herself. One day, as she turns eighty-two,
she finds herself unable to shovel her driveway. In her hand, she holds a
capsule that the pharmaceutical and nanotechnology industries have devel-
oped in the past few years:
She opened her hand and looked at the capsule. It was not a pill to make her
younger; that much her children had promised her. They knew she would
reject such a thing out of hand. But the millions of tiny machines tucked inside
the capsule would disperse throughout her body and repair every trace of
damage to her bones. They would also rebuild her sagging muscle tissue. In
short, the pill would cure her back and make the pain go away. (Stiegler, 1989)
She takes the capsule, then another one to fix her heart, and she starts hiking
again. One day, another hiker saves her from an ice fall thanks to a techno-
logical headband connecting his mind to a network of computers to analyze
information about the environment too subtle for human sensorial capacities.
She realizes how many deaths could be prevented by using this technolo-
gy . . . and adopts it.
This is no place to rewrite the story, the merit of which is all due to its
author. Instead, I will just suggest the road ahead. This story has a happy
ending, yet a disembodied one. It is not the story of single individuals ex-
tracting themselves from humanity through technology, though. Nor is it the
story of multiple cloning or of transferring one’s consciousness into a com-
puter. Instead, it is a very long journey through which humanity as a whole
grows and gradually updates its norm of what being an embodied self means.
It is the fiction that illustrates how small steps, smooth progress over an
extended period of time spreading progressively throughout mankind, can
take the meaning most of us have today for embodied self and makes it vary
as a function of successive small technological changes. Our relation to time
is the first one to be redefined as technology eliminates the effects of aging
on the body. Then our relation to space expends beyond Earth, which eventu-
ally requires some alterations in our embodiment, to experience different
possibilities opened by different environments. Eventually, even our relation
to matter, to that very specific piece of matter that individuates us, becomes
just one of several ways to embody one’s self. Her self remains, her human
body as well. Their relationship has just extended to simultaneously integrate
other modalities of embodiment. And this fiction, by all we have seen so far
(the functional pragmatism, the updating norm, the need for a collective
evolution, the duration necessary for the integration of technological
progress) is a story on the edge of tomorrow. I take this story to express what
we hold to be an embodied self today and to show just how we would adjust
its perception, its interpretation and its definition as the techno-scientific
world we live in evolves.
CONCLUSION
We started by asking whether the self is a multistable concept. Although we

often forget it, our past can already answer this question. Yet science-fiction
movies predict a decisive change in the future, this one technological move
that will rip the evolution of mankind apart rather than develop it continuous-
ly. I have tried to argue that this fear only holds if one forgets that being
human is a moving target: the very conditions of our existence, its meaning,
change dialectically with our techno-scientific context. From analyzing some
recent science-fiction work, we can identify broadly shared beliefs about
what makes us human and what impact we think different types of techno-
logical changes to our current embodied condition would have on our con-
cept of self. Several scenarios seem to lead to a loss of self by undermining
core features of our embodiment, such as downloading one’s consciousness
into a computer, living through multiple artificial surrogates, or undergoing

an exceptional event that would make only an extreme minority leap out of
the mode of embodiment that would still govern the rest of humanity.
In the happy-ending, hopeful scenarios, on the contrary, certain condi-
tions are met: the change is progressive, thus allowing successive updates of
the norm; it serves functional pragmatic purposes, like saving lives, and it is
accessible in principle to mankind as a whole, thus supporting the updating
of the norm. In those scenarios, the perception, interpretation, and definition
of an embodied self can vary to a great extent without losing its referential
value. At any given time, it is still true that our body defines absolutely our
possibilities, yet these possibilities vary directly as a function of technologi-
cal progress. As a result, we can expect our concept of self to behave as a
dynamic, dialectic, and, in a word, multistable reality of human experience.
NOTES
1. http://www.nbcnews.com/science/science-news/medical-first-3-d-printed-skull-success-
fully-implanted-woman-n65576
2. See (Ricoeur, 1992, 151), as cited in (Ihde, 1998, 104).
3. I have had the chance to add this note right after the movie was released. Two points
need to be updated in the light of the full movie (spoilers ahead): on the one hand, there seems
to be at least a possibility for re-embodiment after taking on an electronic mode of existence
and on the other hand, there seems to be a possibility for several persons to co-exist in this
modality, thus extending it beyond a single individual survival’s strategy. However, even then,
the theory of mind question remains: how can we be sure that an entity is who it claims to be
once it is possible for it to render its embodiment contingent? On that question, I refer the
reader to the movie!
4. See http://www.skyhunter.com/marcs/GentleSeduction.html .
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Chapter Six
Bodies as Technology
How Can Postphenomenologists Deal
with the Matter of Human Technique?
Fernando Secomandi
The alarm rings. As I turn to the side table to switch it off, the bed feels
strangely not mine. Nor is this room my own! Oh yes, I am lodged in a hotel,
for the conference. While still lying in bed, I check for incoming messages
on the iPhone. There is no news from work. Then, I get up and into the
shower, dress myself, and head outside the room towards the elevator hall-
way where other people wait. Most of them wear nametags, like I do. Riding
the elevator down, I glance at one of the nametags. This is not a name that I
recognize. I look at the person’s face. We exchange smiles of complicity. At
the entrance to the room where breakfast is served, the hostess greets me. No,
thanks, I am still waiting for someone. After a moment, the person I am
expecting arrives, and we get seated. I start the conversation by recalling our
previous e-mail contact and my intentions when trying to set this meeting. He
offers a couple of his latest books as a gift. Over the course of a full
American breakfast, an invitation is made, and preliminary arrangements
ensue for a research visit in the upcoming academic term.
WAKING UP IN A POST-INDUSTRIAL WORLD
In the introduction to Technology and the Lifeworld (1990), Ihde performs

this brief exercise where he recounts the first experiences of a typical day
after waking up. The purpose of the exercise is to demonstrate the extent to
which modern life is permeated by technological artifacts. Alarm clocks,
105
106 Fernando Secomandi
beds, showerheads, clothes . . . indeed, as Ihde claims, “our existence is

technologically textured” (1990, 1).
As a diligent student of Ihde, I attempt the same exercise. Yet, judging
from the opening lines above, for a knowledge worker who wakes up in a
networked, post-industrial society, existence is not only textured by mass-
manufactured goods but by services too. And although technologies of the
type identified by Ihde are also entangled in services relations, as they are
above, they constitute only a part of these relations. The allusion here is to
the forms of human-to-human exchange relying on touch, gesture, demeanor,
and verbalization that are needed to get from bed to the breakfast table.
Interpersonal contacts such as these occur in a variety of service settings,
ranging from shopping, to public transportation, to physiotherapy sessions,
and more.
Over the course of my PhD studies in the field of industrial design,
postphenomenology has deeply informed my understanding of services (Sec-
omandi, 2012). But its silence about the subject of interpersonal relations has
also made me uneasy. The source of discomfort, to be sure, is not due to a
complete disregard for the import of technology in service settings. As seen
in some published studies, postphenomenological insights have been produc-
tively applied to service-related activities, including obstetric consultations
(Verbeek, 2008a), microcredit projects (Selinger, 2009), diagnostics by clini-
cal laboratories (Forss, 2012), and health improvement programs (Secoman-
di, 2013). In these studies, however, interpersonal relations receive scant
attention and are at best treated secondarily to the role of material technolo-
gies. Selinger, perhaps, covers the most ground in the way of addressing the
face-to-face dimension of services. His analysis of a microcredit project in
Bangladesh takes note of how women who lend their mobile phones to the
local population must remain silent and unobtrusive in the presence of cus-
tomers, and how this contributes to shaping their identities as “phone ladies.”
But while Selinger (2009, 275) characterizes his study as postphenomenolog-
ical because of a sensitivity for the ambiguity of human-technology relations,
the analytical framework used to account for the constitution of “phone la-
dies” as such is mainly informed by Marxism and feminism (2009,
280–284). Currently, it remains unclear whether and how postphenomenolo-
gy can contribute to our understanding of human-to-human service relations
that require little, if any, intermediation of a technological artifact.
This chapter is intended as part of a program that seeks for fruitful re-
sources within postphenomenology to deal with the matter of human-based
service exchanges. Specifically, I want to know whether the body may be
conceived as a kind of technological artifact that mediates human experienc-
ing of the world, including relations among human beings. To achieve this
goal, I will perform a close reading and critical examination of the decades-
long pioneering contributions of Don Ihde in the field of the philosophy of
Bodies as Technology 107
technology. And while the work of other researchers who build upon or
criticize his ideas is contemplated where appropriate, the analysis remains
limited to published postphenomenological research.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the section Tech-
nique versus Technology, I discuss what can be called an eliminatory ap-
proach to the human body qua technology, which is found in postphenomen-
ological research. Particularly in Ihde’s earlier philosophy of technology, the
notion of technique is employed as referring to a type of embodied human
activity that is somehow related to, yet lies beyond the scope of the “techno-
logical.” In the interpretation that I propose, Ihde does not really convince us
of any fundamental difference between technology and technique, but only
reinforces their underlying similarities.
The following section, Bodily Skill in Embodiment Relations, expounds
an approach that runs parallel to the previous one, but also encompasses
more recent postphenomenological work. In this approach, a specific type of
human technique—namely, bodily skill—is acknowledged as entangled in
the learning of how to use a technology. I call this approach subordinative,
because although Ihde and others eventually observe that bodily skills are
interweaved in at least one type of human-technology relation, these skills
are treated complementarily to the role of technologies and are not made
significant on their own. In this section, I also explain how this restrained
treatment of skills can be traced back to Ihde’s dependence on three of his
phenomenological predecessors: Heidegger, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty.
The third and last section, Experimental Phenomenology as a Self-Prac-
tice, discusses a prospective approach that is gaining ground within post-
phenomenological studies. Here, skills are openly thematized as constitutive
of human-technology relations and even treated as an object of conscious
development and refinement by human beings. Special attention is given to
Dorrestijn’s and Verbeek’s appropriation of the Foucauldian notion of self-
practice as a way to understand the constitution of technologically mediated
subjects. In concluding the inquiry, I return counterintuitively to Ihde’s early
introduction to phenomenology and present his variational method as one
case of a self-practice for postphenomenologists. Thus, in answering the
question “How can postphenomenologists deal with the matter of human
technique,” I anticipate—with some humor—that they can do so by attending
thoroughly to the phenomenon and performing multiple variations of it.
TECHNIQUE VERSUS TECHNOLOGY 1
Whereas it is the case, as mentioned in the introduction, that an approach to

the human body as technology can be born out of postphenomenology, it is
also true that Ihde’s seminal book in the philosophy of technology, Technics
and Praxis (1979), initially gets us stranded. Or has he not dismissed in that
book the technological nature of the body with the argument that “all that is
important . . . is to note that if the body were an ‘instrument,’ it is indeed a
very different one that those we use” (Ihde 1979, 80 n1)? That Ihde states this
briefly in an endnote is uncharacteristic of his argumentative style. As others
already observed (e.g., Sobchak 2006), he usually starts with some anecdotal
evidence that covers familiar experiences with technologies, before adding
progressive phenomenological sophistication to the analyses. In this case,
instead of explaining—even if preliminarily—how the human body is unlike
the “instruments” he chooses for a careful study, the difference is simply
presumed and further ignored.
Later, in Technology and the Lifeworld (1990), the “instrumentality” of
the human body will be mentioned again by Ihde through the notion of
technique. The term, however, is framed in such a way as to mark it off from
the domain of technology proper. In two exemplary cases, Ihde relies in his
typically broad purview of historical and global developments in order to
contrast contemporary Western, “technologically maximalist” cultures with
the ancient, “technologically minimalist” cultures of the Australian Aborigi-
nals (1990, 118–123) and the South Pacific islanders (1990, 146–150). Ac-
cording to Ihde, compared to other societies, the Aboriginals devoted exten-
sive time to “leisure activities,” which included storytelling, discussions
about their mythological system, long communal festivities, art production,
and so forth. Besides having invented few and simple technologies, including
throwing weapons, basketry, and religious articles, the Aboriginals were
nonetheless able to thrive in a harsh environment, an accomplishment that
would be later admired by their Western colonizers. For this end, the Aborig-
inals relied on “technical knowledge” that Ihde qualifies as “vast and com-
plex” (Ihde 1990, 121): sophisticated procedures to search for and prepare
food, birth control methods involving body modification, and rule-governed
hunting behavior to conserve the natural habitat from overexploitation.
Similarly, in the case of the South Pacific islanders, Ihde contrasts their
navigational practices with modern, instrumentally pervasive modes of navi-
gation. He observes that, except for the invention of sophisticated multihull
boats, South Sea navigation relied primarily on observations of bird flying
routes, star paths, cloud formations, wave patterns, as well as on the memor-
ization of way-finding information through songs and on a peculiar sense of
body positionality in space. Ihde concludes that the forms of navigation of
both South Pacific islanders and Westerners were successful in finding new
land across oceans, the attainments of the first only more remarkable for the
tiny land masses they were able to discover.
At least one other critic was troubled by Ihde’s characterization of South
Pacific navigation as mainly non-technological, since the practice is evident-
ly instrumental and goal-oriented (Hickman 2008). Ihde conceded to this
point (2008a). But what is revealing about his comparisons is the choice not
to contrast modern technological practices to patently less technologized
traditions of the ancients, such as the Aboriginals’ leisure activities. By em-
phasizing, instead, ancient practices that are functionally equivalent to mod-
ern, technology-intensive ones, as in the case of navigation, Aboriginals and
South Pacific islanders are portrayed as no less instrumentalists than other
contemporary societies. Presumably, their technological minimalism is war-
ranted by the use of “instruments” closely associated with the human body,
rather than material artifacts. What is important to note, however, is not that
the recognition of similarities between technique and technology would
undermine Ihde’s demarcation between technologically maximalist and
minimalist cultures. After all, he has also boldly stated that “human activity
from immemorial time and across the diversity of cultures has always been
technologically embedded” (1990, 20). The problem is that by foreclosing
the topic of technique to a postphenomenological analysis, one is hindered
from discovering the ways in which human experience of the world might be
transformed solely through the application of “bodily instruments,” indepen-
dently of other forms of technologies.
There is a passage in Technology and the Lifeworld (1990, 26–27), which
is the closest Ihde gets to acknowledging that techniques can be compared to
technologies. It contains the following quote:
There may be techniques with or without technologies. A sexual “technique”

is not in itself a technology (although, in a derived and secondary sense, if
such a technique is modeled after some mechanical process, there may be an
interpretive connection between the two). Equally, techniques may be closely
related to technologies particularly regarding patterns of use. (Ihde, 1990, 26)
Despite the hint to a possible “interpretive connection,” the grotesque me-

chanical analogy steers readers away from wanting any prolonged explana-
tion why techniques (sexual or not) are not themselves technologies. To my
knowledge, Ihde does not elaborate any further than this on how a technique
may be modeled after a mechanical process, or how the usage patterns of
techniques relate to those of technologies. The remainder of the passage,
nonetheless, presents clues to the basis of his differentiation. In it, Ihde offers
preliminary clarifications about his notion of technology, before moving onto
more detailed phenomenological descriptions in the book. He holds that the
materiality of technologies correlates with the concreteness of our own bod-
ies, and therefore must be retained. Moreover, technologies occupy an inter-
mediating position as artifacts between “humans” and “world.” In other
words, technology constitutes a domain of experience that is not entirely
encompassed by the human body, nor completely present as a worldly “oth-
er.” If the latter were the case, Ihde argues, technology would be wrongly
taken to be an object that can exist independently from concrete contexts of

human practice. On the other hand, equating technology with the human
would carry the connotation of “technique,” or a totalizing form of “practice
and thought” that glosses over the particularities of technological experience.
Therefore, from the standpoint articulated by Ihde, what becomes intimately
associated with the concept of technology is its material artifactuality. Tech-
niques would not seem to possess that.
BODILY SKILL IN EMBODIMENT RELATIONS
As seen in the previous section, Ihde initially rejects that human technique
constitutes a genuine form of technology. In parallel to this, he also offers
some detail about how a specific type of technique—namely, bodily skill—is
entangled in human-technology relations, at least in relations of the type
known as embodiment. Embodiment relations are occasions where technolo-
gies become extensions of the experiencing human body (Ihde, 1990,
72–80). An example is the use of eyeglasses. After being properly accommo-
dated by the body, eyeglasses extend and transform innate visual capacities.
Although Ihde does not connect his account of embodiment relations to the
aforementioned interpretive connection between technique and technology, it
is possible to gain some insight into the “derived and secondary sense” in
which the first is said to be related to the latter.
In reality, bodily skills are rarely in the forefront of Ihde’s detailed de-
scriptions of the process of embodying various technologies. Technics and
Praxis (1979), for instance, contains little or no references to them. This lack
of attention might be due to Ihde’s well-known inspiration in Heidegger’s
paradigmatic “hammer analysis.” Only very recently has Ihde (2012a, 374)
mentioned that Heidegger’s analysis contains a blind spot, inasmuch as the
embodiment of the hammer presupposes the previous attainment of handling
skills by users. This realization now enables Ihde (2010, 120–127) to criti-
cize Heidegger’s negative appraisal of the typewriter, with the ironical obser-
vation that Heidegger possibly never became a skilled typist. Had the type-
writer been properly embodied in the act of writing, Heidegger might have
shown less a strong preference for fountain pens.
Despite the Heideggerian influence, from Technology and the Lifeworld
(1990) on Ihde starts to contemplate the topic of bodily skills as part of his
descriptions of human-technology relations of embodiment. At times, he will
point to the body as a kind of “fringe” phenomenon one needs to “adjust to”
in the process of learning to use a technology. About the use of eyeglasses,
Ihde writes:
The very first time I put on my glasses, I see the now-corrected world. The
adjustments I have to make are not usually focal irritations but fringe ones
(such as the adjustment to backglare and the slight changes in spatial motility).
But once learned, the embodiment relation can be more precisely described as
one in which the technology becomes maximally “transparent.” It is, as it
were, taken into my own perceptual-bodily self experience. (Ihde, 1990, 73)
With the exception of a recent detailed case on the embodiment of hearing

aids (Ihde, 2007, 243–250), rarely do bodily adjustments to technologies
receive greater attention than above. The use of handheld telescopes, in Ex-
panding Hermeneutics (1998, 153–157), is one such case that deserves spe-
cial attention. Ihde argues that when an object like the Moon is observed
through the telescope, it is also transformed by it; what is experienced is
displaced from its original context, magnified, and seen to contain moun-
tains, craters, and so on. These transformations caused by the telescope are
accompanied by a simultaneous alteration in bodily position, in the sense that
one experiences being “closer” to the Moon. Additionally, if the telescope
user is a beginner, a certain wavering of the object will be noticed reflecting
the micromotions of his own body. In order to “fix” the phenomenon ob-
served through the telescope, beginners must be able to stabilize their bodies
accordingly. Just like in the case of eyeglasses, the point is that the body
becomes noticeable in the process of attaining the kind of maximally trans-
parent experiences that characterize human-technology relations of embodi-
ment.
Yet, two suspicions can be raised about how the human body appears in
Ihde’s account of embodiment relations. First, the body surfaces in the con-
text of the experience in a negative way, in situations where the technology is
not truly embodied by the user. Ihde argues that when someone engages
incorporable technologies, like eyeglasses and telescopes, the body becomes
detected as an artifact that partially obfuscates the desired transparent rela-
tion to what is perceived. Hence, novice users realize that their trembling
holding of the telescope disturbs the stable display of the Moon. Then, in the
process of becoming a skilled user, at the same time that the technology
becomes an extension of perceptual capacities, the bodily intrusion seems to
disappear from the experience. In other words, the artifactual body of the
beginner must vanish for the embodiment relation of the expert to obtain.
What I am doing here is to apply the same formula concocted by Ihde
(1979, 103–129) to remedy a certain negativity in Heidegger’s tool analysis.
Although for Heidegger the experience of technologies in an embodied con-
dition preceded and founded any knowledge one can have of them, he em-
ployed an indirect tactic to demonstrate this, where the technological artifact
was made explicit in situations of “breakdown” (when it breaks, malfunc-
tions, or goes missing). According to Ihde,
In spite of the phenomenological correctness of Heidegger’s analysis, the neg-

ative way in which the instrument emerges from transparency in use in his
analysis casts a sense of disvalue upon any positive thematization of an instru-

ment. (1979, 28)
I believe that a similar negativity ensues as the unskilled body is revealed in

situations where embodiment human-technology relations break down. Thus,
the trembling hands of the telescope user and the altered spatial motility of
eyeglasses wearers are made salient as obstructions for the proper embodi-
ment of technologies, not as positive features of the process of developing a
bodily skill.
The second suspicion about Ihde’s analysis of embodiment relations is in
regard to how the human body is recovered indirectly from what is focal in
the experience. The novice user experiences immediately the trembling
Moon, and reflexively the wavering hand: “The Moon’s magnified character
is simultaneously the reflexive magnification of my bodily motion” (Ihde
1998, 155). Ihde structures these events in terms of a noema-noesis correla-
tion, what points to a terminology that was more fully explained in the earlier
book Experimental Phenomenology: An Introduction (1986, 29–54), first
published in 1977. In that book, the noema and the noesis are introduced as
parts of the phenomenological notion of intentionality, which represents the
primordial connectedness between humans and world that grounds all pos-
sible knowledge. Following Husserl, Ihde explains that the noema represents
the end pole for what is experienced, while the noesis represents the mode of
experiencing that which is experienced. He further clarifies the order of the
correlation, stating that the noetic domain cannot be known directly, but only
reflexively after examination of the noematic one.
The first edition of Experimental Phenomenology is not in its core de-
voted to technologies. Nonetheless, the claim for the priority of the noema is
initially supported with a brief example of a human-technology relation of
embodiment. When chopping wood with an ax, Ihde notes, “my primary
energy and concentration is focused almost totally in the project itself. . . . ‘I’
should be put roughly as ‘I-am-in-the-ax-directed-towards-the-wood’” (Ihde
1986, 47). In other words, the “I” as the bearer of the experience is mostly
implicit in the technological activity. This is not to say that any sense of “I”
is definitively ignored. But, phenomenologically, the “I” is mostly situated in
the noetic domain, and therefore to be recovered after carefully attending to
the noema: “The ‘I,’ particularly in its thematized form, comes late in the
analysis rather than being given as a first” (Ihde, 1986, 48).
By making the “I” mostly unknown, at least initially in the analysis, the
woodchopper as a subject in the activity is in effect “black-boxed.” Ihde is
well aware of this move, and he explains that it strategically protects the
phenomenological method from becoming a naïve form of introspection:
An introspective ego or “I” claims direct, immediate and full-blown self-

awareness as an initial and given certain. In phenomenology, the “I” appears
by means of and through reflection upon the phenomena that in toto are the
world. (Ihde, 1986, 50–51)
However, if by “I” Ihde means to embrace the woodchopper as physical

being, the tendency is to automatically submerge his handling skills into the
noetic domain too. This tendency is observed again as Ihde proceeds with
more thorough analyses of visual phenomena, later, in the book. In the next
section, I will comment on that part in order to highlight what I see as fruitful
outcomes of Ihde’s methodology. For the moment, the point is that the loca-
tion of the body within the noetic domain of experience could be preventing
postphenomenology from foregrounding the role of bodily skills in human-
technology relations.
Would it be possible, then, to conceive of aspects of the human body as
noema? An answer to this question might be found in the growing stream of
postphenomenological studies that expands on our understanding of embodi-
ment relations by examining the cases of implants and prostheses (Verbeek,
2008b; Welton, 2006; De Preester, 2011a; 2011b; Lenay, 2012; Ihde, 2008b,
31–42; 2012a). Because of the philosophical issues that are raised when
material artifacts get more deeply or permanently attached to the human
flesh, this research sheds interesting light onto the blurred boundaries be-
tween bodies and technologies.
Of special importance among the references listed above is Welton
(2006), because of his clarifications over phenomenological notions of the
human body. Welton wants to push Ihde’s notion of embodiment relations
towards more “cyborgian” forms of integration, for example, when a brain
implant allows someone to regain eyesight. I will not summarize the whole
of his contribution, but only note that it involves a critical comparison be-
tween accounts of the body by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Welton ends up
favoring the Merleau-Pontean account, and drawing on refinements ad-
vanced in neuropsychological research, he proposes two distinguishable, yet
complexly entangled dimensions of experiencing. On the one hand, there is
the body schema, which according to Welton,
is not an object expressly known but only “tacitly understood.” It functions not
as object of consciousness because it forms the basis of or the hidden “back-
ground” behind all explicit intentional acts. . . . The awareness that attends the
body [schema] as it engages the world . . . is not a perception of the body.
(2006, 201)
And there are the body images, which in turn,

arise from an explicit perception of the body or, more generally, from our
conceptions of the body and our feelings about our body. They are representa-
tions that arise when my body is taken as an object, for example when I look at
my body in a mirror or gaze at the body of others, or when I describe the body
that I see in the language of my culture, or when I assume a certain emotional
attitude toward my body. (Welton, 2006, 201)
Welton, then, superimposes these two dimensions onto the human-technolo-

gy relation of embodiment and adds a twist. He argues that when someone
learns to hit a ball with a baseball bat, the embodiment process involves body
images insofar as one starts by “visualizing” how the bat relates to the con-
crete body, as well as the correct ways of holding it (Welton, 2006, 203).
After reaching the goal of technological embodiment, the body schema gets
transformed and materially extended by the artifact, thereby making one
capable of experiencing the hit of the ball at the end of the bat.
Based on this two-pronged understanding of the body, Welton describes
the process of technological embodiment in a slightly different way than
Ihde. When first encountering an incorporable technology, an aspect of the
unskilled user’s body “reaches out” to the artifact to be embodied, rather than
“intrudes” upon an already established relation. Hidden in Welton’s analysis
is a positive evaluation of how body images stir the development of skills.
Nevertheless, similarly to Ihde’s account, once extended so to subsume the
technological artifact, the body schema of skilled users does away with the
artifactual body of the novice. Apparently, for Welton, usage skills are not
experienced as body image phenomena in consolidated human-technology
relations of embodiment.
In his response to Welton, Ihde (2006, 284–285) sides with the critique of
Husserl and positions himself also closer to Merleau-Ponty. To understand
Ihde’s positioning we must recall that he, too, has characterized the human
body as two-fold. In the book Bodies in Technologies (2002), Ihde differen-
tiates between the here-body and the image-body; the here-body being de-
fined as the “quasi-primary,” “fully sensory” body, and the image-body as
the “partially disembodied,” “quasi-other” body (Ihde, 2002, 3–15). Ihde
conceives of a dialectic existing between these two dimensions that is, in
principle, similar to Welton’s explanation of Merleau-Ponty’s views. How-
ever, the quote below contains an ambiguity that could undermine the affin-
ity:
It is the here-body in action that provides the centered norm of myself-as-

body . . . it should also be noted that such a body experience is one that is not
simply coextensive with a body outline or one’s skin. The intentionality of
bodily action goes beyond one’s bodily limits—but only within a regional,
limited range. A good example may be taken from martial arts experience
wherein one can “feel” the aimed blows even from behind and aims one’s own
activity beyond any simple now-point. One’s “skin” is at best polymorphically

ambiguous, and, even without material extension, the sense of the here-body
exceeds its physical bounds. (Ihde, 2002, 6)
The passage is particularly relevant because, differently from the cases dis-
cussed so far, Ihde mentions the body’s ability to “extend” its experiential
reach without the use of mediating technologies. The same example was
presented before in a slightly different format in Technology and the Life-
world (Ihde, 1990, 74). In that book, the example was part of a discussion
about embodiment relations, suggesting that martial arts skills might some-
how be embodied like other technological artifacts. In Bodies in Technolo-
gies, the example does not suggest that skills pertain to the image-body, only
accentuates the malleability of the here-body.
But if Welton’s disambiguation between the two phenomenological
senses of the body is correct, the passage above becomes problematic. This is
because Ihde first writes that “one’s own activity”—say, karate blows—may
be extended beyond the outline of the skin as here-body. Then, he states that
one can “aim” these blows, what would appear to require having some expe-
rience of them. Using Welton’s vocabulary, the blows integrate the body
schema of karate practitioners at the same time that they would be explicitly
experienced as body image. This interpretation is supported by the following
claim:
One can simultaneously experience one’s here-body from its inner core while
having a partial, but only partial, “external” perception. (Ihde, 2002, 6; empha-
sis added)
But if I experience my here-body “from within,” would that not make it a

partially disembodied body, an image-body, to stick to Ihde’s terms? Are not
the blows of martial arts practitioners more accurately defined as image-body
artifacts that mediate and transform their experiences of the world and the
self?
As an interim conclusion to the argumentation developed thus far, it
seems possible to draw on an existing phenomenological discrimination be-
tween two senses of the human body and associate skills with the notion of
the image-body (or body image, following Welton). Because in Experimental
Phenomenology Ihde does not rely on this distinction, both the image-body
and the here-body are conflated into the noetic domain of human experience.
The elimination of the human body from the noematic domain carries over to
Ihde’s philosophy of technology of Technics and Praxis and subsequent
works, where “technology” becomes roughly equated with the noema and
“human” with the noesis. As a result, skills—or, more generally, tech-
niques—could never be genuinely approached as bodily artifacts in human-
world relations. At best, they had to be derived indirectly, often negatively,

from human practices involving other sorts of technologies.
EXPERIMENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
AS A SELF-PRACTICE
A developing strand of postphenomenological work now starts to conceive of

bodily skills as constitutive, not merely appended to, our relations to technol-
ogies (Ihde, 2009, 16–19; 2010, 128–139; 2012b, 129–184; Rosenberger,
2009; 2013; Verbeek, 2011, 66–89; Dorrestijn, 2012). I start with some of
Ihde’s recent publications, including the important second edition of Experi-
mental Phenomenology (2012b).
As mentioned in the previous section, the first edition of Experimental
Phenomenology does not take on systematic analyses of technologies. The
book is mainly dedicated to a hands-on introduction to the practice of phe-
nomenology using simple line drawings of visual illusions as experimental
material (Ihde, 1986, 67–121). Although Ihde praises Husserl for inventing
the so-called variational method to arrive at the essence of a phenomenon, his
own rigorous application of this method yielded something different—the
multistability of these visual illusions. The originality of this finding was at
first not fully grasped by Ihde (2012b, xi, xiv). Still, the notion of multistabil-
ity was transposed by him to the domain of technology, leading to claims
regarding the multistable nature of such practices as oceanic navigation
(Ihde, 1990, 146–150) and writing (Ihde, 2010, 128–139). In technological
contexts, multistability means that a “same” technology can have multiple
instantiations in history or across cultures, which are coherent to the particu-
lar circumstances of use.
The second edition of Experimental Phenomenology, now subtitled Mult-
istabilities, is expanded with case studies on the multistability of audiovisual
and communication technologies (mainly screen-based) (Ihde, 2012b,
131–143, 145–153), the camera obscura (2012b, 155–169), and bow-under-
tension technologies, of which archery is the primary example (2012b,
171–184, see also Ihde, 2009, 16–19). The cases on writing devices and
archery, in particular, contain unusual elaboration over the topic of bodily
skills. Only archery is considered here, even though Ihde’s analysis of writ-
ing devices bears similar insights.
It is not necessary to repeat all the different types of archery that Ihde
discusses, but simply recall the usage skills pertaining to two. Thus, in the
case of the English Longbow, the person stands up holding the bow with one
arm stretched to the front, and then pulls back the string while holding the
arrow with all of his fingers. And, in the case of the Mongolian Horsebow,
the bowman, now mounted on a galloping horse, draws the bowstring toward
his cheek as he simultaneously pushes the bow away from the body, also
trying to synchronize the arrow’s release with the moment when the horse’s
hoofs come off the ground.
Although differences in bow size, material, reach, and other factors are
also mentioned in text, when compared to the descriptions of other technolo-
gies, the portrayal of archery stands out for the prominent role granted to
bodily skills in defining the multistabilities of the technology. Unfortunately,
because in the case of technological multistability Ihde does not explain the
procedures of his variational method as carefully as in the case of visual
illusions, it is unclear how skills would be framed following the noema-
noesis correlation that was introduced before.
Still on the topic of technological multistability, Rosenberger (2009, 176)
has coined the term relational strategies to refer to “the particular configura-
tion of bodily habits, intentions, and conceptions that make it possible for a
person to take up a particular stable relation [to a technology].” Taking web
navigation as an example, Rosenberger argues that when a person who surfs
the web comes to a slowly loading page, a shift of relational strategy typical-
ly occurs, accompanied by a sudden drop in transparency. In line with the
breakdown phenomenon described before, the drop makes the user aware of
her embodied interaction with the keyboard, mouse, screen icons, and so on.
Alternatively, users may also adopt a different relational strategy towards
slowly loading webpages, implicating a different set of bodily comportments
and habits that are more adequate for the situation. Thus, the next time a
sluggish webpage appears, a user can shift to this other relational strategy
without feeling a significant drop in transparency (she might, for instance,
revert to working offline on an already open document).
Although Rosenberger is not specific about this issue, for the drop in
transparency to be annulled, the shift in relational strategy would presumably
happen automatically, without the user consciously deciding which bodily
configuration to adopt in respect to the technology. What Rosenberger brings
to the current discussion is the possibility to anticipate and deliberately de-
velop techniques of use. In another paper, he argues that there are abstract
relational strategies that can be generally applied across different use scenar-
ios or with technologies alike (Rosenberger, 2013).
The idea that techniques can be an object of planning is taken up a notch
by Dorrestijn (2012) and Verbeek (2011). These researchers are interested in
clarifying what sort of human subjects emerge from technologically mediat-
ed existence. For that end, Dorrestijn creates a bridge between postphenome-
nology’s interest in technology and Foucault’s work on subject constitution,
especially the later contributions to ethical theory. Dorrestijn argues that
there are certain routines involved in our relations to technology that repre-
sent a form of “disciplining” of the body, and that these do not just happen or
get imposed upon humans by some external reality; humans actively co-
shape their own technologically mediated subjectivity. One way in which

they can do this is by rehearsing what Foucault called “technologies, or
practices of the self” (Dorrestijn, 2012, 236). It is still unclear how the
concept of self-practice relates to phenomenology’s framework of intention-
ality. Nonetheless, for Dorrestijn, in technological contexts self-practices are
activities whereby people get attached to technologies and accommodate me-

diation effects in their existence. . . . For example, training of technically
mediated gestures is necessary even to be able to sleep in a bed. It may seem
convenient, comfortable, and very natural, but it has to be trained. Children
frequently drop out of their beds. In addition, they need training and habitua-
tion to stop them wetting their beds. Once these skills have become routines,
one tends to forget ever having learned them. (2012, 236)
Verbeek (2011) also adopts the Foucauldian notion of self-practice in his

investigation into the morality of technological artifacts. In respect to ultra-
sound devices, he argues that this technology partly determines how expect-
ing parents are constituted as moral subjects. On the other hand, parents
themselves must critically engage practices of ultrasound screening and
negotiate the sort of moral subjects they wish to become. For instance, they
can make use of ultrasound during prenatal examinations only to determine
an expected date of birth, or choose to do all diagnostic tests possible, or
even refuse to use the technology. Verbeek (2011, 89) goes as far as to
suggest that self-practices can be purposively adopted for “styling” or “de-
signing” one’s own technologically mediated subjectivity.
To reinforce this recent attunement of postphenomenological research to
the issue of human technique, I finalize by returning to Ihde’s Experimental
Phenomenology and offering a somewhat idiosyncratic reading of that book.
In the last section, I stated that the book’s core about the interpretation of
visual phenomena changed little in the way that bodily skills were black-
boxed by the variational method. Now I argue that it is precisely in that part
that one finds the richest case on the nurturing of a skill, in this case, a skill
for seeing.
On a first level of interpretation, what Ihde does in Experimental Phe-
nomenology is to provide instructions that allow readers to confront deeply
sedimented seeing habits in order to develop new abilities for uncovering the
multistability of visual phenomena. I hold that underlying Ihde’s text is a
bodily skill being transmitted that functions like a self-practice for aspiring
postphenomenologists. Selinger (2006, 92), before, noted a similar quality
regarding the use of the variational method. By revealing the many possible
interpretations of phenomena, the technique allows Ihde to question extant
perceptual prejudices and, as such, it is constitutitive of his own subjectivity.
Acknowledging the sort of bodily skills that are implicated in the varia-
tional method, however, requires not simply reading Ihde but questioning:
How is one able to experiment with the phenomenological practice that he

wants to pass on? Then, one starts to notice several references, at times subtle
ones, to particular bodily comportments that must be assumed and perfected
by readers to apply the method successfully. I turn to one poignant example
of this: the “curved line” drawing, found in chapter 5 (Ihde, 1986, 81–90). In
this chapter, Ihde is trying to show that what is ordinarily experienced as
curved lines in the drawing, under phenomenological scrutiny can be experi-
enced as straight lines. To facilitate this perception by readers, he gives these
instructions:
Look at the drawing in the following way: First, focus your gaze intently upon
the vertex, where all the diagonal lines converge in the center of the figure.
Second, deliberately see the vertex as three dimensional, and in the far distant
background, that is, push the vertex back, as it were, until the diagonal lines
are seen to lead to infinity. Granting that this takes a certain amount of concen-
tration, subjects usually can do the task quickly, and then the formerly curved
horizontal lines appear straight. But this is so only as long as the subject
focuses upon the vertex intensely, making the horizontal lines peripheral to the
central focus. (Ihde, 1986, 84)
I get better accommodated in the chair and bring the book upwards, closer to
my face and more in line with my head level. I am drawn to the figure that
now faces me. At the same time, I also notice the weight of the book on my
fingertips and hands, the pressure points where my elbows touch the chair’s
armrests, the erect posture of my neck and back, and even a slight dizziness
caused by the proximity of the figure upon which my gaze is focused. Ad-
dressing this explicitation of my body as causing a drop in transparency,
however, would be misleading. Because the straight lines have not yet ful-
filled in experience (i.e., they have not yet been seen by me), it is inaccurate
to explain the situation as one of breakdown. If there remains a peculiar
feeling of inadequacy and obtrusiveness of my bodily parts as something that
requires immediate attention before I can concentrate on the figure, from a
phenomenological standpoint, this is a positive feature of me trying to follow
the instructions provided in text. Granted, once I get to see the lines as
straight, these bodily artifacts fall to the background of perception, only to
protrude again if I fail to repeat the exercise or if I need to adjust the learned
bodily comportment in another visual experiment. But, even as my body
becomes tacit, is the newly acquired skill irrecoverable from the experiential
act? Do I not deliberately utilize my body in this or that manner when I want
to switch between seeing curved or straight lines?
What I am suggesting with this admittedly brief analysis is that it would
be difficult to learn the variational method from Ihde without relating to
aspects of my body as quasi-others, or image-bodies. As these image-body
phenomena get crafted in the form of skills, then they are partially integrated
as extensions of my here-body. This integration is not much unlike what

happens when telescopes, eyeglasses, and baseball bats enter human-technol-
ogy relations of embodiment. Although skills are certainly less dissociable
from the human body, their artifactual condition may still be positively
noted. In fact, the thrust of any postphenomenological analysis rests precisely
on the possibility of discerning the material influence of artifacts in human-
world relations. This is what prevents postphenomenologists from slipping
into dystopian beliefs about the totalizing effect of technology on humanity.
This is also what clears the ground for the emergence of a rich vocabulary
speaking of modes of human-technology-world relations (embodiment, her-
meneutic, etc.), amplification/reduction structures, technological trajectories,
and so forth. Similarly to other mediating technologies, techniques can trans-
form human experiences without offering a single sweeping interpretation of
the world and of other human beings. The variational method would seem to
prove the exact contrary of this. When rigorously applied, the technique
yields the multiplicitous appearances of phenomena. In the process, as self-
practice, it takes part in the becoming of a postphenomenologist.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The beginning of this chapter recounts the events leading to my first face-to-face meeting with
Don Ihde after so many encounters intermediated by books. I am most grateful for his invita-
tion to come to Stony Book as a visiting researcher. The thoughts expressed in this chapter
were first presented there, in March 2012, to the participants of Ihde’s Technoscience Seminar.
Parts of the text were later included in my PhD thesis at the TU Delft, under the supervision of
Petra Badke-Schaub and Dirk Snelders. I want to thank all of the people mentioned, plus the
editors of this collection, for their encouragement.
NOTE
1. This section and the following one contain parts of chapter 5 of my PhD thesis (Seco-
mandi, 2012).
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Chapter Seven
Four Dimensions of Technological

Mediation
Asle H. Kiran
THE TWO-SIDEDNESS OF
TECHNOLOGICAL MEDIATION
At the center of postphenomenological thinking is technological mediation.

Don Ihde’s typology of human-world relations—embodiment, hermeneutic,
alterity, and background—provides a methodologically suggestive repertoire
of concepts dealing with how technologies shape and reshape both “humans”
and “world” through specific mediating effects (Ihde, 1979; 1990). However,
since shaping means to accentuate certain characteristics of worldly phenom-
ena (or in humans)—what Ihde (1990, 76) calls magnification, there can be
no shaping movement without a corresponding downplaying movement—
what he calls reduction. As an example, consider the transformation of the
moon that happened when Galileo Galilei first viewed it through his tele-
scope; in order to become a better scientific object “the Moon became larger,
magnified. But was also displaced—telescopically it was taken out of the
night sky and relocated within the field of telescopic vision. It lost its place in
the expanse of heavens and became a more focal, particularized object”
(Ihde, 2002, 58). The accentuation of the moon as a scientific object meant
that the moon as a lifeworld object moved into the background. At least for
the time the moon was put under scientific scrutiny, that is, as long as this
particular technological mediation was active.
The magnification-reduction structure exemplifies a two-sidedness that
we find in all technological mediations. However, rather than taking magnifi-
cation as a “positive” side and reduction as a “negative” side to our ways of
dealing with technologies, the two-sidedness should be understood as dem-
123
124 Asle H. Kiran
onstrating a very fundamental manner in which we are in our technological

lifeworld. As such, far from being a mere empirical fact about technological
mediation, the two-sidedness instead expresses an existentially significant
constraint in how technological mediations shape both “world” and “hu-
man.” Furthermore, the two-sidedness also has methodological consequences
when it comes to technology assessment; very often we will find that “the
question of” an emerging technology is not whether it is “good” or “bad,” or
if we can choose whether it should enter our lives or not, but how we can
shape our lives in relationship with this technology. Exposing the two-sided-
ness, therefore, contributes to an important broadening of the basis on which
we assess technologies, both on a societal level and on a personal one.
In this chapter, I shall explore different sides to the technological shaping
of our lifeworld by showing how the two-sidedness is expressed in four
different dimensions of technological mediation. The concept of “dimension”
conveys that technological mediation can, and should, be analyzed from
different perspectives. In their existential dimension, technologies involve a
revealing-concealing structure, constituting what kind of world we find our-
selves in. In their epistemological dimension, technologies are magnifica-
tion-reduction structures, thereby shaping the type of knowledge we have
about the world. Through the practical dimension, technological mediations
exhibit an enabling-constraining structure that shapes action and behavior.
And finally, I shall also look at how the ethical dimension of the two-sided-
ness expresses an involving-alienating structure, in which technologies both
support and deplete our efforts to chisel out a good life for ourselves.
As I said, one purpose of focusing on the two-sidedness of technological
mediation is its methodological implications. First, the two-sidedness dis-
plays how questions of quite different type—existential, ontological, episte-
mological, ethical, political, practical, methodological, and so on—can be
connected within one perspective (the postphenomenological). Furthermore,
the two-sidedness substantiates why technological mediation is an indispens-
able methodological nexus when we investigate, anticipate, assess, and at-
tempt to influence the technological shaping of our society; although the dual
concepts do not express positive and negative sides to technological media-
tion, all dimensions invite us to evaluate the difference between what is being
brought to the front of our attention, and what is being pushed to the back-
ground of it. Also, bringing out the two-sidedness of technological media-
tions is helpful not just for technology assessment, but also for anthropologi-
cal, sociological, and historical studies of technological cultures. Finally, and
not merely because there is an ontological dimension; existentialist philo-
sophical and psychological analyzes of our embeddedness will gain from this
breakdown of technological mediation.
Although the two-sidedness in itself places no values on specific technol-
ogies, its consequences might be value-laden. As such, the consequences of
Four Dimensions of Technological Mediation 125
technological mediation in all four dimensions carry normative aspects.

However, the ethical dimension discloses that some specific technologies
also manifest some explicit normative connotations. For instance, technolo-
gies that invade our privacy will for many be regarded as a negative technol-
ogy. However, things are not straightforwardly negative and positive here
either, as a negative pull from one type of technology might follow closely
on some very positive aspects, such as the classic dilemma between being
able to feel safer but also as being monitored by CCTV-cameras in public
places. The ethical challenge then becomes to balance these two aspects of
technology development, implementation and use. This is a good example of
how the two-sidedness brings out ambivalence in all four dimensions of
technological mediation; there are no “good” technologies and there are no
“bad” technologies, not in relation to ethical issues, and not in relation to
ontological, epistemological of practical issues either, but technologies cer-
tainly shape how we deal with such issues.
THE ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF TECHNOLOGICAL

MEDIATION: REVEALING-CONCEALING
I begin with the most general and abstract dimension of technological media-
tion, namely how technologies shape our ontology. Or, to put it in different
terms; how technologies shape the world in which we find ourselves. This
might be taken to be a mere empirical statement; how the nuclear bomb
shaped the post-war era, or how internet and mobile technologies have
changed how we communicate. However, as having ontological impact,
technological mediation shapes the world in a sense that is also a matter
about shaping us, humans, as individuals and as societies. As such, this
shaping has impact on how we perceive and act in the world, and how we see
ourselves as being in that world.
One reason that I start with this dimension is because—from a philosoph-
ical point of view—it is the most fundamental and foundational and therefore
the most important dimension for how we understands the other dimensions.
But another, equally important reason for me to start here is that this dimen-
sion clearly displays that the two-sidedness permeating all dimensions of
technological mediation should not be interpreted as a dilemma or a paradox;
the dual concepts do not express a positive-negative relation. Instead, the
two-sidedness has a certain inevitability to it; the manners in which we deal
with the world is mediated in many ways—through symbols, language, cul-
ture and history, embodiment, and technology, and all these forms of media-
tion make something stand out and come into focus, while other things
disappear or fade from view. The latter “movement” is necessary for the first
movement to take place. In many ways, then, the dualities found in the
126 Asle H. Kiran
different dimensions of technological mediation express a key dimension to

our being-in-the-world.
In relating technology to ontology, it is impossible to bypass Martin Hei-
degger, who provided two different ontological arguments for how technolo-
gies contribute to shape the world into a world: the well-known Zeug-analy-
sis from Being and Time (1927/1962), and the equally famous but less cher-
ished analysis of modern technology from the essay “The Question Concern-
ing Technology” (1954/1977). Although very different in tone, both analyses
express tools and technologies as having a revealing-concealing structure. In
the first analysis, Heidegger claims that when we are in-the-world, we do not
find ourselves in a geometrically defined room, or space, surrounded by
“neutral” or pure entities, instead, the space we are in is defined through the
entities that fill it (1962, 95ff). However, this should not be understood to
mean that the room is merely “the sum total” of these entities, because we get
to know, firstly, the entities through a certain in-use-approach that defines
them as the kind of entities that they are, and secondly, the space as con-
nected to the entities in the way they are. The way we are able to approach an
entity is attributable to its readiness-to-hand, its zuhandenheit, which defines
how a material entity can be put to use. Readiness-to-hand is how the entity
exists, how it can be approached by us. According to Heidegger, all entities
are primarily approached as tools, or equipment as Heidegger calls them, as
being useful for something. Equipment “includes everything we make use of
domestically or in public life. In this broad ontological sense bridges, streets,
street lamps are also items of equipment” (Heidegger, 1988, 292).
Through its readiness-to-hand, the equipment displays a structure of in-
order-to that constitutes the relation between the particular entity and its
environment—this is how equipment reveals. The structure of in-order-to
involves a referring that is not a mere index; instead, it has an ontological
character. That is to say, the referring serves a dual purpose: It reveals what
serves as context for it, and through doing so, the entity in turn is constituted
as a tool within the context because of its “specific thingly character” (Hei-
degger, 1962, 97f). Because of the way we approach entities and the relation
between entities and their context, we are connected to the world in manners
that are specific to the various technologies we deal with. What constitutes
the world for us, then, is revealed through our engagement with equipment;
and whatever does not belong to the context of this engagement is concealed.
At least for this specific technological mediation.
Note that “context” engages not only material entities. In some, perhaps
most, cases, the context will comprise non-material components as well. For
cars, for instance, to “function technologically” legislations in various forms
have been created, social institutions like the DMV have been established to
support some of this legislation, a system of auto clubs like the Norwegian
NAF, mandatory car insurance and so on, are also consequences of the car
having its technological function within a society. Such non-material features

are also essential parts of the world that is revealed to us. For some technolo-
gies at least, then, to grasp their revealing aspect, we need to look beyond the
mediations we perform with them, and assess the broader organizational
change they produce in a society. The revealing that happens through using
social media is not confined to the actions of sitting in front of an online
computer, to type and to read and so on, it is also related to the changing
forms of communication, both in methods and content, which again has an
effect on social relations, and so on.
The Zeug-analysis, which for the most part deals with “old” technologies,
hammers, nails, and so on, does not invite normative judgment on the reveal-
ing-concealing structure. But in the later essay Heidegger is unambiguous
about the specific revealing that happens through modern technology—pri-
marily post-industrial technologies—as being a negative one. Here, Heideg-
ger argues that modern technology has a specific essence, which he calls
Gestell. This essence, he says, “is by no means anything technological”
(1977, 4). Consequently, we will never disclose the essence of technology by
scrutinizing technological items. Gestell is perhaps best understood as our
attitude to the world that we assume when acting in the world using modern
technologies. As such, Gestell manifests itself in humans through modern
technological mediations. In putting modern technology to use, whatever it is
that the technology operates on is “ordered” into being resources, Bestand,
for the technological activity. For the sake of simplicity, we can think of this
ordering as how we treat our surroundings due to the effect of modern tech-
nologies. In that regard, Bestand can be understood in two ways, one literal-
ly, where things in the world are lined up as resources, and then more figura-
tively, where it alludes to a state of mind, an attitude to the world that we
cannot but take up as a result of how modern technology shapes our techno-
logical mediations.
The latter reading relates Gestell to a particular kind of thinking that
Heidegger elsewhere refers to as calculative thinking. This concept refers to
our tendency to be unscrupulously goal-oriented in our activities rather than
contemplative on what it means to be underway to something. Calculative
thinking “computes ever new, ever more promising and at the same time
more economical possibilities. Calculative thinking races from one prospect
to the next. Calculative thinking never stops, never collects itself” (Heideg-
ger, 1969, 46; cf. 1977, 15). Both calculative thinking and Gestell push
towards a maximizing of efficiency, ultimately not because it is for the best
for humans and society, but because efficiency becomes a goal in itself.
For Heidegger, modern society is declining due to the influence of Ges-
tell. First natural resources, instead of having a meaning and a value of their
own, are reduced to Bestand for humans, but eventually also us, the humans
who perform this reduction through our development and employment of
128 Asle H. Kiran
technology, start to treat each other the same way, rendering the human race
itself Bestand. But why would we do that? Because with the specific reveal-
ing that comes with modern technology there follows a concealing that leads
to a double forgetfulness. We forget to ask questions and come to accept that
efficiency is best (it is more efficient, right?), and we forget that things, the
world, could be revealed in different manners. Modern technology means not
just a revealing of the world, but it is at the same time an all-encompassing
concealment making us blind to other possible ways of revealing, other pos-
sible ways of being-in-the-world (Heidegger, 1977, 33f).
Heidegger’s dystopian view of modern technology has been dismissed as
irrelevant for postphenomenology (Ihde, 1979; 2010). The main reason for
this is that it leaves no room to appreciate the specificities of technological
mediations; it does not seem likely that wildly different technologies push us
towards the same ontological and societal state. However, dismissing Hei-
degger’s analysis only means dismissing a particular assumption about the
human-technology relationship in the revealed world (“we are subordinate to
technology”); it does not require us to dismiss the basic sense of technologi-
cal mediation as a revealing-concealing structure, perhaps closer to how it
appears in Being and Time. Accepting that the revealing-concealing structure
of technologies constitutes the world as a world does not commit us to follow
Heidegger into his brand of technological essentialism.
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DIMENSION

OF TECHNOLOGICAL MEDIATION:
MAGNIFICATION-REDUCTION
In the epistemological dimension, technologies exhibit what we looked at

introductorily, namely a magnification-reduction structure. Arguably, this is
the type of technological mediation that has preoccupied Don Ihde the most
(Verbeek, 2005). The concept is also his, although he first employed the less
agreeable phrase sensory-extension-reduction (1979). Given Ihde’s interest
in and numerous investigations into technoscience, it is not so strange that
Ihde has spent much time on the relation between technologically mediated
perception and how this corresponds to how knowledge is structured.
As we saw, Ihde argues that any piece of technology that augments and
strengthens our perceptual capabilities will simultaneously reduce or weaken
other aspect of our experiential presence (1979, 9). Being intentionally di-
rected at aspects of the world through a technology transforms the intentional
experiences in accordance with characteristics of the technology. Had the
directedness been done using a different technology—or none at all, we
would have had a different experience. This holds not only for technoscience,
but characterizes all technologically mediated experiences. Think about the
experiential differences of feeling a blackboard using a dentist’s probe in-

stead of our fingers. Drawing a finger over the blackboard, we will feel that it
has a certain temperature; we will feel certain dryness from the old chalk
dust, and so no. With the probe, however, we cannot feel temperature or dust,
but scratches and marks in the surface appear instead: “A microscopic pres-
ence is amplified through the probe thus extending my experience of the
board to a level of discernment previously unnoted” (Ihde, 1979, 9). Am-
plifying or magnifying some experiential aspects through technology, inevi-
tably leads to loss of experiential “access” to other aspects.
Reduction in technological mediation should not be thought of as impov-
erishing the perception. Furthermore, it should not be thought of as impover-
ishing technologically mediated knowledge; as rendering it relativist. Most
people gesticulate when they speak on the phone. Not being able to “trans-
fer” such gests, is that a blatant loss for communication? Of course not, the
phone enables us to speak to persons not present; even though it is unable to
convey the bodily gestures we often depend on in face-to-face conversation.
The telephone does retain intonation, though. This, however, is lost in other
forms of communication technology, such as email and twitter, which affords
communicating in a different way from the phone or face-to-face, but have
their own reductions. Combining several technologies, as in video-skyping,
involves smaller “loss,” allowing several sense modalities to be enhanced,
but for instance smelling remains left out. It might be taken in in a future
update of Skype or a similar platform for video conversations, though—it
might prove helpful for, for instance, healthcare where nurses can gain a
fuller picture of the condition of a patient they converse with. Is it at all
possible to develop augmenting technologies that retains a “complete” expe-
rience, while enhancing some aspects of the world? However, why would we
want that? Enhancing phenomena in the world is done because we want to
focus on some particular aspect. Not letting this being accompanied by a
corresponding reduction of other aspects will create noise and impede per-
ception, of the scientific type as well as the everyday type.
As we saw in the previous section, technologies “open up new ways for
reality to manifest itself” (Verbeek, 2005, 134). Although a technological
mediation presents or represents an object by technical means, manifestation
is a more fitting concept because presentations of any object will always
correspond to a perspective on this object, relative to both the situated re-
quirement—the task at hand—and to the material properties of the involved
technologies. Through technologies with other qualities, or alternative con-
texts, or through users with other preferences and aims, the technological
mediation would have “presented” the object differently but not for that
reason necessarily more or less accurate; it would have been a different way
for the object to manifest itself, suited to the particularities of that mediation.
130 Asle H. Kiran
However, this is not to say that the magnification-reduction structure of

technology inherently relativize knowledge; the operation of a simple X-ray
apparatus can exemplify this pretty well. An X-ray image results from the
interaction of a body, an X-ray technician, the X-ray technology and the
practice of using it. Decisive aspects here are, for instance, why an X-ray is
taken at all, the function of the X-ray equipment, whether the technician can
operate the equipment properly, and so on. The X-ray image produced, then,
is a certain manner in which the body manifests itself. It is not the “truest” or
“most objective” representation of the body, but is a functional mode of the
body that reveals certain aspects deemed relevant for the task. The represen-
tation can hardly be called a pure objective depiction of the body, dependent
as it is on the specific technical constraints of the apparatus, but it would
likewise be absurd to regard it as an arbitrary construction, as it is clearly
constrained by bodily properties. The technology focuses on and enhances,
augments and translates certain aspects of the body, while at the same time it
plays down or ignores others. In the terminology of the previous section, it
reveals certain aspects of the body and at the same time, it conceals other
possible representations of it. Technician, technology and body are in this
case mutual constraints. To look at a body through X-ray’s does not produce
an arbitrary image, and it does not invent something that is not there, but it
projects a certain functional perspective on the body. The representation is
relative to X-ray technology, the competent use by an X-ray technician, and
the body itself, but the knowledge that can emerge from it is not relativist.
The X-ray image is, in this sense, an interpretation even prior to what we
normally would label the interpretation of an X-ray image, and as such
typical of technological practices of all kinds.
The magnification-reduction structure that is characteristic to technologi-
cal mediations, then, is the way we can become acquainted with something;
we are able to approach something only in as much as it stands out from that
which it is not. This does not imply relativism, and as such it follows that
magnification-reduction should not be seen negatively, as becoming the
“only extent” that we can know something—“we can never know the thing
itself”—but in the positive way as the condition for us to know anything at
all.
It follows from this that the claim that a scientific image, fact, or model
represents objective reality or conversely, that it only presents a constructed
reality are arguments that are performed over a set of shared, but ill-con-
ceived presuppositions. If something is said to be a mere constructed reality,
this presupposes that there is something called reality somewhat behind or
beyond it. Instead, regarding technologically mediated representations as
“manifestations” means that the magnification-reduction structure of tech-
nologies is a way of making reality. Use of technology should not be seen as
either granting us “direct access” to a pure nature-in-itself, nor should it be
seen as putting a veil over this nature-in-itself. There is no such thing as a

reality that we, by constructing the proper means, can describe in “pure”
objective terms. The technological mediation is for this reason not a reduc-
tion or a diminished form of reality, but is itself reality, however, without the
illusion of being an “objective truth” about reality.
THE PRACTICAL DIMENSION OF TECHNOLOGICAL

MEDIATION: ENABLING-CONSTRAINING
In our daily lives we depend heavily on all sorts of technologies to help us

through both work and home life; from kitchen utensils to high-tech automat-
ic communication systems. Rarely do we stop and think about these technol-
ogies as constraining our movements, rather we think of them as enabling
them. And why should we not think that way? After all, for the most part we
choose the technologies that we surround ourselves with precisely because
we want them to help us achieve goals that we cannot make, at least not
without much more effort, without said technologies. For patients living at
home dependent on various forms of medical technology in order to ensure
safety, to augment failing capacities, for treatment, and for social contact, the
technologies certainly seem like enabling them to live at home rather than in
a nursing home. A GPS device can make sure that the Alzheimer patient can
move around outside without becoming lost; an iPad can be both an external
memory device and a device for keeping in touch with friends and relatives;
and telecare technologies can make it possible for patients to have a chronic
disease cared for in familiar surroundings rather in a hospital or clinic.
However, also here technological mediation, in what I call the practical
dimension, displays a two-sidedness that mirrors the two previous dimen-
sions. In this dimension, technologies show an enabling-constraining struc-
ture that has a shaping impact on our behavior and actions. While enabling us
to do specific things, technologies simultaneously shape how we do these
things, and thereby divert out attention from other possible ways of doing it.
In using a piece of technology we adapt to both a material and social reality
that governs this device; we comply with the affordances of an item.
In being material, any technology affords certain uses, and for this reason,
technological mediations are constrained by the affordances of a technology.
This concept is primarily associated with James J. Gibson, who coined the
term to denote the value or meaning a phenomenon in our surroundings has
to us. Not thinking specifically about tools and technologies, Gibson claims
that we primarily know objects, events, places, other animals and artefacts
from what they afford us (1982, 404). 1 A handle, for instance, affords grasp-
ing, a sufficiently small stone affords throwing, and a sharp object affords
piercing. Viscous substances afford being smeared while liquids afford pour-
132 Asle H. Kiran
ing, and in certain cases drinking. Nutritional and poisonous substances af-
ford eating, and so on (Gibson, 1982, 405). A mailbox affords letter-mailing;
a social meaning, but materialized in the very design of the mailboxes (Gib-
son, 1979, 139).
Affordances are in a strong sense related to an item’s materiality. Howev-
er, without social belonging, technologies would conceptually be on par with
found items. Because of this, we cannot regard affordances as merely ex-
pressing materiality or as belonging inherently to an item. On the other hand,
technologies’ affordances will in many cases surpass their conventional func-
tions. Donald Norman points out that although “all screens within reaching
distance afford touching, only some can detect the touch and respond to it.
Thus, if the display does not have a touch-sensitive screen, the screen still
affords touching” (1999, 39). However, given that the technical requirements
are in place, un-thought-of affordances can become the norm for how tech-
nologies are used within a practice. Typewriters, for instance, were initially
devices to assist those who had trouble writing for physical reasons, such as
the blind (Tenner, 2003, 193). Affordances should therefore not be taken for
merely being a social meaning. A physical mailbox might be discarded and
thrown in the backyard, but it still affords putting mail into (although, if one
wants the letter to arrive to the addressee, one is best advised not to do it).
What a piece of technology affords then is related to several factors. The
materiality of the technology itself is important, but so are the abilities,
competence, techniques, and perspective of those perceiving and interacting
with it as well. Extending this into the social sphere; the role, function, and
meaning the technology takes on in a society is to a large part dependent on
the perspective and role it is perceived as having within this society. That a
technology has a specific function within a social setting, however, does not
prevent it from having a slightly or even vastly different function within
another social setting—in a different culture, or attaining a revised function
as time goes. “In both structure and history,” Ihde says, “technologies simply
can’t be reduced to designed functions” (2002, 106). Instead, technologies
are multistable; a piece of technology can take on different functions and
meanings within different social settings (cf. Ihde, 2012). However, as I have
argued more fully elsewhere, multistability is principally a descriptive con-
cept (Kiran, 2012a), and in order to grasp the socio-technical dynamics be-
hind multiple stabilizations of a material item, the concept of affordance
proves helpful.
In enabling an item to be handled in specific ways, then, affordances
shape our actions and behavior. Although affordances do not determine be-
havior they do constraint how our handling of items is performed. The con-
cept of affordance reveals how technologies have both an actuality and a
potentiality. This might seem like another pair of dual concepts, but these
two concepts are for now best thought of as specifying in what manners
technologies enable. The actuality of a piece of technology relates to how it

is being used at a given moment, but it also denotes its social function, its
conventional use; how a piece of technology usually is used within a prac-
tice. A technology’s potentiality, on the other hand, covers various forms of
unconventional use. For instance in the sense of single disconnected actions
that a technology was not designed to perform, such as using the camera on
our mobile phones as a temporary memory aid in order to remember where a
bookshelf can be retrieved when we are at IKEA. A potentiality can also
emerge when the meaning a technology has within a society changes and
stabilizes in a new form, for instance when the conventional use of a small
blue pill does not become to combat high blood pressure but to enhance
erectile function. Or in cases of technology transfer when a technology, but
not its socio-technological belonging travels from one culture to another, as
in the case where Australian gold miners in New Guinea in the 1930s left
behind cans of sardines, which were adapted into the culture of the natives as
“centrepieces of the elaborate headwear they wore for special occasions”
(Ihde, 1990, 125).
However, actualizing a technology’s potentiality can take on another
form that better accentuates the enabling-constraining duality of the practical
dimension, namely taken-for-grantedness. We depend on many of the tech-
nologies that surround us, but of course we do not use them all the time. Still,
there is a sense in which they still have a presence for us, even though they
are not in use. Because we know that they have a potential use for us, we plan
our actions and we organize our daily lives in accordance with technologies
that we can engage for various kinds of support: we can buy more than we
can carry because we have a car; we can plan on driving through a big city
because we have a satellite navigation system; we become just a little slack
in maintaining an appointment because we can send a text message to inform
about and excuse our delay, and so on. Consequently, through their taken-
for-grantedness, technologies shape our current activities even if their em-
ployment is a “mere” potentiality (Kiran, 2012b).
We find potential for several actions in a technology, but of course not
just any kind of action. For instance, fine-grained brain surgery is not a
potentiality of a hammer; to slap someone in the face is not a potentiality of
Facebook no matter how many downward smiles one writes. Technologies in
their actuality indicate their own potentiality. For instance, what problems
are there with an item; what can be done better with it, and what should be
done to its negative sides? Once a piece of technology has been articulated—
maybe as a proto-type, or only as a plan, or even when it has been unleashed
on society—we can start tinker with it. In this sense, materiality, and how it
adapts to and is adopted in a practice, enables specific socio-technological
developmental trajectories (Kiran, 2012b). In enabling specific trajectories,
how a specific potentiality has been actualized constrains socio-technological
134 Asle H. Kiran
developmental trajectories. It might even conceal alternative socio-techno-

logical developments (although rarely as overshadowing as Heidegger
thought).
The dynamics between actuality and potentiality, then, displays the pos-
sible tasks we might perform; possible goals we might set; possible problems
we might solve; and possible relations we might enter are very much related
to the technologies we have in our surroundings, and how they are in our
surroundings. In this sense, the practical dimension of technological media-
tions defines for us our practical space. For short, practical space is the
horizon of our action potential. 2 In a line of thought well known from phe-
nomenology, subjectivity emerges from embeddedness. Our awareness of
ourselves is intimately connected to our engagement in our surroundings, but
equally important is that our awareness of our surroundings is intimately
connected to our engagement in them. This implies a co-dependency be-
tween subjectivity and objectivity; a subject is not a mere subject and the
world is not a mere objective world—we are specific subjects and “our”
world is a specific one.
Here, we begin to see how the practical dimension of technological medi-
ations shapes subjectivity in a constitutional manner (this is more fully ex-
plored in Kiran, 2012b). Furthermore, the shaping of behavior that charac-
terizes the enabling-constraining structure in some ways mirrors the reveal-
ing-concealing structure found in the ontological dimension of technological
mediations. We saw above that affordances shape the very action that is
actualized. When a particular action with a technological item is a conven-
tional use, alternative uses of it is concealed, if only ever so little; for in-
stance, we easily discover that a book can be used for holding another book
open. Also in relation to taken-for-grantedness is it legitimate to talk of a
concealing of possible actions. When we take specific technologies and their
potentialities for granted in how we organize our lives, planning and execut-
ing daily chores and regular actions are shaped in manners that bring to light
technological mediations that for us are well-known, tested, and tried. Habits
conceal alternative behavior. Stating this more abstractly, we can say that
actuality reveals potentiality.
THE ETHICAL DIMENSION OF TECHNOLOGICAL

MEDIATION: INVOLVING-ALIENATING
The ethical implications from the practical dimension are quite easy to spot.
The kinds of behaviors that are being enabled and those that are constrained
have ethical values attached to them, and has as such been widely discussed
in the philosophy and ethics of technology. An affordance of mobile phones
is that it makes it easier to cheat on one’s wife. Most people, I suspect, will
find that actualizing this potential of the mobile phone to be immoral. A

technology that extracts oil and produces gas enables ease of traveling and
transport and leads to economic prosperity in a society, but at the same time
leads to higher emission of CO2 and will for many be seen as being of
questionable ethical value. On the other hand, technologies that constrain
certain actions can have a positive ethical values attached to them, for in-
stance when a speed bump hampers high speed driving past on a university
campus (Latour, 1994, 38). And of course, technologies that constrain ac-
tions might be of negative value as well, while technologies that enable
actions can have a positive value attached to them.
In the ethical dimension of technological mediations, a technology might
often pull in different moral directions. Here, more than in the previous
sections, can the duality of technological mediations be said to have certain
value-laden ambivalence to it, which often means that we have to assess
whether one side of the duality is positive and the other negative. The main
issue, though, in a methodological sense, is to recognize that such moral
ambivalence very often is related to the two-sidedness found in the other
dimensions of technological mediation; as such, moral ambivalence will of-
ten be hard to bypass when developing and implementing new technologies.
We might want our technologies to be morally unambiguous, but that might
prove very hard to attain.
In the other three dimensions, there is always a constitutional element to
technological mediation—whether it is the world as a world (ontological
dimension), knowledge as perspectival (epistemological dimension), or ac-
tions as afforded (practical dimension). Accordingly for the ethical dimen-
sion; in opening us up to ethical dilemmas and issues, technologies constitute
situations as ethical situations, with specific limitations on how the ethical
issues are formulated (or formulate-able), and they constitute actors as ethi-
cal actors, with specific restraints on how we can behave and choose (Ver-
beek, 2011). This, I believe, makes the ethical dimension a dimension of its
own, rather than merely being an aspect of the other there dimensions. And
as such, very often we will find that in constituting an ethical situation, or an
ethical actor, technologies display yet another two-sidedness; they can in-
volve or they can alienate.
Ethics of technology is sometimes taken to be a critique of technology
(Swierstra, 1997), aiming at assessing a piece of technology as either “good”
or “bad,” with the implication that bad technologies should be faded out or
not be developed at all. The application for such dichotomies, however, is for
many technologies arguable, as they harbor both good and bad sides. Fur-
thermore, when it comes down to it consumers and regular users of technolo-
gies rarely have much of a say in whether technologies should be implement-
ed in practice even if it is deemed to be a bad technology. The many control
systems implemented as a result of new public management thinking is sel-
136 Asle H. Kiran
dom liked by anyone having to use them, but they have to use and relate to
them nonetheless. In assessing technologies ethically we need to go beyond
the dichotomy, and rather assess them in terms of the opportunities and
hindrances they pose for us to create for ourselves a good life, or, more
tangible; a good work life, good marriage, good parenting, good care, and so
on. 3 For many technologies, we cannot but relate to them on some level; an
ethics of technology that assesses their involving-alienating structure can
provide a helpful perspective on how to create a life with technologies (Kiran
and Verbeek, 2010; Verbeek, 2011). Methodologically, this perspective also
broadens the basis for traditional technology assessment (Kiran, Oudshoorn,
and Verbeek, forthcoming).
The two-sidedness of the ethical dimension of technological mediation is
operative in relation to information and communication technologies, and
certainly discernable in those that are being used in healthcare. Technologies
for monitoring a patient’s illness are a good contribution to this person’s life
as a patient; telecare technologies, for instance, monitor the illness in a man-
ner that enables the patient to stay at home rather than being in a hospital
(Oudshoorn, 2011). These technologies are involving in that they grant pa-
tients an opportunity to construct an existence as a patient in familiar circum-
stances. However, the same technologies can be alienating, as they are a
threat to the patient’s privacy in affording surveillance, both in terms of the
home being invaded by medical technology, turning the home into an outpost
clinic (Oudshoorn, 2011, 173), and in terms of concerns about the safe stor-
age and use of the accumulated data about a patient (Bharucha et al., 2009).
Relatedly, assistive (in Norway and Denmark sometimes called welfare)
technologies are often regarded as granting autonomy and quality of life, as
they ensure that the elderly and frail can stay at home rather than moving into
nursing homes when their overall health start to deteriorate (Zwijsen et al.,
2011). As such, also they are involving technologies, allowing users to create
a better, and more dignified life with them than without them. However,
assistive technologies also imply alienating aspects. For instance, some care
receivers report that they feel controlled and dehumanized when living in a
smart house (Astell, 2006). 4 Some users of fall detection technology would
have preferred it if nobody found out that they had fallen, because they want
“to cope on their own and contact the warden themselves only in extreme
circumstances” (Brownsell et al., 2000). Assistive technologies such as a
robot can be perceived as obtrusive, as disrupting a person’s daily life (Fau-
counau et al., 2009). Many assistive technologies are meant to enhance inde-
pendence, but in doing so, they also harbor the danger of leading to less
human contact for the care receivers (Chapman, 2001).
Rather than enhancing autonomy, quality of life, and self-esteem, then,
assistive technologies might have the opposite effect. Again, though, how the
technologies are received and perceived by one person or one group of users
depends very much on those persons and their situation; the technologies
neither determine the involving aspect, nor the alienating. The important
thing is to recognize that technological mediations can pull in both direc-
tions.
Additionally, we have technologies that on the face of it might be re-
garded as being paternalist; technologies that are meant to steer our behavior
so that it emerges as moral behavior, but without involving us morally at all.
Speed bumps are mentioned; we do not have to have a conscious wish to be
moral, but we are as long as we slow down when going over one. Our wish
might be to not damage our car, but the result is moral behavior (many
ethicists would dispute this, claiming that without a conscious wish to be
moral, no behavior can be labeled moral). Another example of a paternalist
technology is the image of a fly that is etched onto the urinals of Schiphol
airport. This has been done because it reduces spillage (it is said to reduce
spillage with 80 percent); men tend to urinate with more precision when they
have a target (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, 4). This example, of a technology
that is designed to nudge users into behaving in a specific way, is only one of
several strategies to shape behavior through technology (Verbeek, 2011, 153;
Tromp and Verbeek, 2011). Nudging is a gentle form of shaping our behav-
ior; the speed bump is a bit more coercive, but we can choose to ruin our car
by ignoring it (we would simultaneously break the law as there usually is a
speed limit that goes with the speed bump). A car that does not start unless
the driver puts on the seatbelt, a short-lived attempt from the 1970s to en-
force seatbelt use, is an example of a far more forceful impetus. Here our
behavior, if we want to take a ride in the car, is decided for us. For all these
examples, there is a strong link between how a technology is designed, the
effects it is intended to have on behavior, and the subsequent moral status of
this behavior.
In a general sense, even though not all of these examples directly concern
moral behavior (can accidental spillage of urine in a public toilet qualify as
immoral?), paternalist designs breach autonomy (although that depends on
how one define autonomy, cf. Verbeek, 2011) and might for that reason seem
alienating, but they simultaneously are involving technologies as well, as
they lessen the risk of everyday conflict and ensure societal co-existence.
However, designing for specific behaviors, persuasively or coercively, is not
uncomplicated. As we saw above, technologies are multistable, and as I have
argued extensively elsewhere; thinking that a given behavior, moral or other-
wise, can be ensured through designing and developing technologies in spe-
cific ways is to underestimate the material, social, cultural, and personal
complexity involved in how technologies are received and in how technolog-
ical mediations are performed (Kiran, 2012a).
138 Asle H. Kiran
CONCLUDING REMARKS
I am not claiming that this is a comprehensive overview of the many dimen-

sions of technological mediation. Far from it, I can for instance think of a
political dimension as well, perhaps with a liberating-oppressive duality to it.
And maybe someone would like to emphasize technological mediations’
communicative dimension, which might display an attaching-detaching dual-
ity. Furthermore, there could be a legal dimension where technological medi-
ations allow and prohibit. However, I have discussed the above four dimen-
sions because I found them sufficiently different, yet interweaved in many
respects. Other dimensions, I suspect, can often be analyzed as either falling
in under one of the above (the communicative as subsumed to the practical
dimension) or as being a combination of two or more of the above (the
political as belonging to both the practical and the ethical dimension). How-
ever, I am not implying that nothing fruitful can come out of investigating
them in their own right.
My principal aim with this paper has been to disclose how the four di-
mensions, taken together in all their diversity, delineate technological media-
tion as a significant constituent element of our lives, identities, and of our
lifeworld. Seeing as this concept is already indispensable for postphenome-
nology, exposing and explicating the two-sidedness of these dimensions sub-
stantiates the need for postphenomenological studies of technology-in-prac-
tice, in (techno-) science as well as in other professional and non-profession-
al occupations; from healthcare to education to dwelling.
However, that is not to say that the concept of technological mediation
has little or no value outside postphenomenology, and a further aim is that
this analysis goes some way in indicating how the concept can be methodo-
logically beneficial for research in a number of scientific disciplines; not just
technology studies and technology assessment, but in sociological, anthropo-
logical, and historical analyses of our technologized society as well as varie-
ties of philosophy, psychology, and ethics that in some way deal with techno-
logical cultures and innovation in empirical practices. That being said, the
concept should not necessarily take center stage, but as the various kinds of
two-sidedness expose the influence of technology on how actors, situations,
and cultures are being shaped into how and what they are and on socio-
technological development, technological mediation should be valuable in
the effort to define and demarcate fundamental concepts in the methodology
of several disciplines.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The research behind this article was funded by The Norwegian Research Council (Program:
Praksisrettet FoU for helse—og velferdstjenestene (PraksisVel); project “The Medical Home—
Sustainable Services and Technology for Home Medication”).
NOTES
1. Gibson mainly discusses what “affordance” means for a visual psychology. In line with
a more general sense of what it means to afford (Norman, 1999; Hutchby, 2001), I refer to how
an item affords actions, not merely interpretations.
2. The concept is inspired by Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s notion (1962, 137ff), who employs
it to convey that how we are in the world does not come down to a mental representation of an
objective world (called mental space), but is more importantly related to our body and its
motility. My usage is related, but a bit different.
3. This is not to say that technologies or technology developing processes (or science)
cannot be assessed as “good” or “bad,” merely that that is not the kind of ethics of technology
that I am preoccupied with here.
4. Smart houses can have various devices: bathtub monitor, automatic switcher for the
oven, locating devices (to find, for instance, mislaid keys), lights that turn themselves on and
off depending on whether the person living there is in or out of bed, and message boards around
the house that display all sorts of messages (Astell, 2006).
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3
Postphenomenological Cases
Chapter Eight
Tracing the Tracker

A Postphenomenological Inquiry into Self-Tracking
Technologies
Yoni Van Den Eede
This chapter sets out to investigate the emerging phenomena of self-tracking

and digital self-tracking technologies through the lens of postphenomenolo-
gy. By putting postphenomenological notions to work, it will appear, we can
start to “trace the tracker,” although that might require some fine-tuning of
the postphenomenological framework itself, in turn.
Self-tracking technologies are all around us; in multiple ways. They are
growing in popularity as more and more devices find their way to the market
and consumers. But they are also literally around us, as a prime instance of
wearable tech, residing by definition close to a user’s body. Products such as
those developed by Jawbone, Fitbit, and BodyMedia are designed to track
one’s everyday activities and collect and store data about them in the form of
for instance steps taken, calories burned, distance traveled, and sleeping pat-
terns. The tools generally consist of on the one hand a wrist, arm, or head-
band, or any other measuring artifact containing sensors (e.g., accelerome-
ters) that a user has to wear or carry on one’s body, and on the other hand a
mobile or online app through which one can consult the “result” of one’s
measuring activities.
Self-tracking, also known under the rubric of personal analytics, personal
informatics, and quantified self, is done mostly in function of optimizing
one’s “performance,” be it in sports, professionally, or more broadly speak-
ing in terms of well-being. It is also deployed in a more specialized vein in
the context of medical treatments that require a quasi constant monitoring of
certain physiological variables, as for example in the case of diabetic pa-
143
144 Yoni Van Den Eede
tients. Of course, the activity is not wholly new to the extent that people in
contexts like these have always sought to improve their condition by keeping
track of variables of all sorts (Schüll, 2012). But as a plethora of devices is
now becoming available that enable the accumulation of heretofore inaccess-
ible data (e.g., brain activity), easier storage, aggregation of different data
streams, analysis and display of data by way of algorithms, et cetera, we may
speak of, in postphenomenological terms, an intensified technological media-
tion of the “generic” act of monitoring and tracking oneself.
As the phenomenon is gaining a strong foothold in everyday life, the
scholarly research on it, too, has been steadily growing. I have presented an
overview of available literature elsewhere (Van Den Eede, 2014); here I seek
to merely probe the activity of technologically mediated self-tracking, from a
fresh perspective, 1 namely, by engaging a couple of central postphenomeno-
logical concepts, most of them hailing from Don Ihde’s work. Two character-
istics of self-tracking make the postphenomenological conceptual toolbox
particularly well-suited for this task. First, self-tracking is all about the en-
meshment of bodies, technology, and perceptual experience. This links up
neatly with postphenomenology’s attention to human-technology-world rela-
tions and to embodiment. Second, as self-tracking technologies in their cur-
rent form are still relatively new, it may be sometimes hard to see beyond the
image projected of them by marketing and by explicit or implicit cultural
presuppositions. The postphenomenological “method,” bent as it is on hold-
ing up a phenomenon to the light of possibility, and serving in that way as a
hands-on tool for the sober but open-minded investigation of that phenome-
non and its more or less outspoken “promises” in the “here and now,” can
compensate for this potential shortsightedness.
The chapter unfolds into two large parts. In the first, I endeavor to frame
self-tracking through the lens of some of the most important postphenomeno-
logical notions. The second part digs deeper into the results of that first
inquiry in order to point out (1) how research on self-tracking technologies
can benefit from postphenomenological insights and (2) how, conversely,
some of postphenomenology’s concepts should be complemented on the ba-
sis of what can be learned from self-tracking.
SELF-TRACKING SEEN THROUGH

POSTPHENOMENOLOGICAL LENSES
In Ihde’s work, multiple concepts have been developed that may help us
scrutinize digital self-tracking technologies, first and foremost by viewing
them in another, unusual light. I will list these notions and consider how they
apply.
Tracing the Tracker 145
Perception, Embodiment, Field-Fringe Relation
The postphenomenological corpus has its roots in classic phenomenology,

which starts by attending to the experiences given to a subject. From there,
the subject reflexively finds itself (cf. Ihde, 2012, 24ff.). This idea seems
well-suited to self-tracking. Tracking oneself may in a sense be regarded as
some kind of literal realization of this keystone phenomenological idea. In
tracking one’s physical exercise patterns, for instance, a data set about dis-
tance, location, speed, calorie burning, et cetera is constituted. In this constel-
lation of data, then, the exercising subject may find oneself back. It is as if
the tracking is there first, and only in a second instance the “self” comes
about. Of course this is just by way of metaphor; experience in its fundamen-
tal phenomenological capacity is always primordial. Even before one ob-
serves any data, the “world” and the “I” have already been found throughout,
for example, the running activity. But still, the added “data double” (Rucken-
stein, 2014; Haggerty and Ericson, 2000) that the tracking brings about, may
be seen to follow a similar pattern. One discovers oneself through the self-
tracking technology—because one always discovers oneself reflexively.
This is interesting: it may serve, right away, as an admonition with regard
to any possible utopian dreams that we may have about self-tracking, for
example, that they may help us to disclose our true selves, or something of
that order. For phenomenologically speaking, the subject is enigmatic from
the start (Ihde, 2012, 11). Moreover, Ihde is there to remind us that percep-
tion is never passive; it is active and constructive (a.o., 2009, 62). Whatever
window self-tracking devices may offer one on the world, the view is essen-
tially constructed. Be that how it may, within perception we are able to
discern some fixed characteristics. First, perception is always embodied (cf.,
Ihde, 1998; 2010). Even when the visual sense dominates, experience is still
given to an embodied subject. This point, too, is well illustrated by self-
tracking technologies, that almost literally confront us with our corporeal
actuality. Here again, the tracked self may be seen to act as a sort of pheno-
menological “double” of our world-oriented but embodied being. Second, we
can find “noematic structural invariants,” aspects that belong to the way the
world is organized so to speak. One of them is the relation between figure
and ground or field, another one is that between field and fringe or horizon
(Ihde, 2012, 40). No thing is ever perceived in isolation. One may focus on it,
but it is always there in relation to a ground or field. We can, however, try to
get that broader context in view. The field, in turn, frays out into a horizon, a
fringe. Also of this horizon we may become aware, although often dimly and
perhaps with great effort. The essential idea here is that we can study the
complex of our experiences in function of this three-component structural
relation. We may for instance categorize “material” elements of self-tracking
technologies—sensor, app, …—along this spectrum, and see moreover how

their states vary across time and space.
Human-Technology-World Relations
A more detailed exercise along these lines can be elaborated by utilizing

Ihde’s “phenomenology of technics,” his outline of different kinds of human-
technology-world relations. As is well-known, Ihde defines four of them:
embodiment, hermeneutic, alterity, and background relations (1990,
72–118). Nothing prevents certain technologies to actually take part in all
four; an automobile for example can be said to harbor elements from all
relations. Self-tracking technology, too, seems to represent a fitting example
of such multi-facetedness.
Let us take as an illustration a system consisting of a wristband with
sensor, smartphone app, and online dashboard (such as the Jawbone Up 2 or
the FitBit Flex 3). Obviously the system is partly embodied: the wristband, at
least after some time, gets incorporated into the body scheme just as much as
glasses are. But the band may also have a hermeneutic aspect, if it spots a
display, for example. Almost wholly hermeneutic, by contrast, are the graph-
ical interfaces offered by the app and online tool: one reads the “world”
through them. In this particular case we can ask, also in line of the above
considerations, to what extent the world “read” is in fact the perceiving
subject (“me”) itself; I will elaborate upon this issue later on. The whole
system as such, then, or parts of it, can also acquire the character of an
alterity. One may start to regard the device, including its interfaces, as a kind
of personal trainer. Companies play on this potentiality by building in goal-
attaining or coaching functionalities. For instance, one may receive a weekly
overview of one’s progress, badges when certain goals are reached (e.g.,
number of steps, calories burned, …), or alerts when one is “too idle.” The
system thus manifests itself as a “third,” spurring one on to take actions.
Nevertheless, at times the whole tracking and/or coaching system may also
disappear wholly from view and temporarily turn into a background phenom-
enon. When one does not notice the armband for example—due to its embod-
ied character—and forgets about goals, numbers, et cetera for a while, self-
tracking takes on an “invisible,” background character. And in any case
while in use and even if one experiences the device’s “nudges” (Thaler and
Sunstein, 2009), some parts of the system such as the online dashboard may
for the largest part remain in the background. The question does remain, of
course, in how far the device in that case does not work its influence in a sort
of unconscious, unnoticed manner. Strictly speaking, however, this is of no
concern to (post)phenomenology, which limits its research to the immediate-
ly given.
Micro and Macroperception
That, however, does not mean that the immediately given is untainted by
larger cultural contexts. In fact, Ihde has done a lot to show that the two are
intimately interwoven. He terms the two levels micro and macroperception,
respectively (1990, 29). Especially when it concerns self-tracking, the influ-
ence of the cultural context, that is, macroperception, is crucial. We cannot
possibly investigate the phenomenon in isolation from our Western,
(post)modern culture of fitness, physical competence, and performance; and
we can well imagine that to other cultures, self-tracking devices may appear
as alien as firearms were once to indigenous South-Americans. Most of these
new devices are marketed as tools with which to improve one’s performance
or health. They would be hard to situate, let alone understand if not for this
surrounding constellation of norms, habits, and expectations.
In this regard, an even more specific distinction that Ihde makes—actual-
ly as a variation upon the micro-macroperception dichotomy—is of impor-
tance: that between “body one” and “body two” (2002, xiff.). Body one
refers to the body that we are in an embodied, experiential, emotive sense.
Body two is our social and cultural body, the body that we are invited or
pushed to shape according to cultural fashion, expectation, rules, and norms.
And traversing both, Ihde adds, is a third dimension, that is, technology (or
materiality). Especially in the case of self-tracking technologies, this image
carries much pertinence. Anthropologist Minna Ruckenstein remarks: “Jour-
nal entries [of her tracker respondents] reveal the biosociality of occurrences
and activities of everyday life. Bodily reactions cannot be separated from
social relations, even if people wish they could be” (2012, 15). A lot then
depends, at least for theory, on which account of body two one chooses to put
forth: the active “sports body,” as in Merleau-Ponty’s case, or the “culturally
fixed and acted upon body of Foucault” (Ihde, 2002, 26). This leads to the
next point, namely, about multistability.
Multistability
Multistability may be said to be the most important postphenomenological

concept, not in the least because it ties together most other strands in the
framework. In relation to the matter at hand, it must be asked: what sorts of
multistabilities do self-tracking technologies harbor? Obviously, if one
would query their developers as to what they are “for,” one would probably
receive answers congruent with what has been said in the preceding para-
graphs: they promote and improve health, sleep, performance, and what not.
Keeping in mind Ihde’s expansion upon variational theory, however, one

would do best in tuning one’s antennae to other possibilities as well. Self-
tracking technologies may also serve as biopolitical tools, instruments to help
keep subjects sufficiently in check and disciplined, that is, healthy, active,
profitable (cf. Lupton, 2012). But alternative accounts, not so strictly early-
Foucauldian in spirit, are possible too, according to which subjects actually
creatively participate in their own “surveillance” (Albrechtslund and Laurit-
sen, 2013; Ruckenstein, 2014). Such accounts suggest that beyond issues of
surveillance and biopolitics, more variations are conceivable. Other usages
for self-tracking systems may be found.
This is to a certain extent illustrated throughout the Quantified Self (QS)
community, that gathers people actively involved in self-tracking world-
wide. 4 A lot of trackers are at heart driven by the health and performance-
related motives to which the devices are in the first instance tailored. But
some of them also gear the systems to other needs that do not immediately
appear to fit the biopolitical agenda, or do so at least in highly ambivalent
ways. One tracker (dos Santos, 2013) for instance monitors social relation-
ships, in terms of among others time spent together and subjects covered in
conversation. Admittedly, one could allege that this entails, what with the
sheer reduction to numbers and statistics, a biopolitical colonization of one of
the last refuges from the disciplinary network, that is, non-mediated, “natu-
ral” human interaction. But the person in question also reports spending more
time with members of his family now because of the shock that he received
when he noticed during tracking that he always felt rushed—as so many
nowadays in social interaction do—in talking to his relatives, as in the course
of every interaction always already something else was beckoning his atten-
tion. A similar phenomenon is reported by Ruckenstein who observes in her
empirical research on the tracking of stress and recovery levels in relation to
kinds of activities, how respondents actually found out that “non-efficient”
activities such as idling, playing with the kids, et cetera actually gave them
the most recovery, and this made them perceive those so-called useless pas-
times in a new light: they appear to be “useful” after all. (Ironically this, of
course, I would add, straight away subjugates them to discipline again.)
Using a somewhat more macabre illustration, then, Ruckenstein remarks:
Recontextualized data doubles might also argue against, ignore, or bypass

normative notions of auto-correcting and transforming selves. For instance,
anorectics participating in pro-ana online communities share weight-loss tips
and offer “thinspiration” to involve and encourage others in body projects […]
which can take advantage of various forms of self-tracking, including self-
monitoring devices, in order to be achieved. (2014, 71)
Non-neutrality, amplification-reduction. Be it how it may, self-tracking tech-

nologies, thus, could turn out to be quite something else than what their
makers, marketeers, or users now mean them to be. Their possible variations
or multistabilities will have to be manifested and explored through future
usage. Different “trajectories,” in Ihde’s terminology, may become in time
apparent—and these may refer to either the materiality of the technology, the
bodily technique in using it, or the cultural context environing it (cf. Ihde,
2009, 18-19). Nonetheless, it remains the case that at any time, that is, in any
one of such trajectories, a technology can exhibit certain “instrumental incli-
nations” (1993, 54), as Ihde puts it. It is non-neutral. More precisely, it can be
seen to amplify or enhance something, and to reduce something else. Glasses
for example, enhance eyesight but reduce, for one, motility and flexibility
when doing sports. Put differently, technologies always bring transforma-
tions (Ihde, 1990). What transformations, then, do self-tracking technologies
bring? Quite explicitly, these products are brought to market with the deliber-
ate aim of effectuating, exactly, transformations: they serve to change one’s
behavior in such manner that one starts to live more healthily and efficient-
ly—or at least so the marketing tale goes.
But what else do or could they “do”? They may bring about change for
the better in one’s exercise routines, but—on the reductive side—simplify
rich, “felt” experience to stats and graphs. Just as, Ihde says, photography
teaches a certain way of seeing (1993, 48), self-tracking technologies may
teach a certain way of living, probably bent on performance, goal-attaining—
not without a reason, some articles on the Quantified Self movement of late
have the phrase “living by numbers” in their headlines 5—and visualizable
info. The activity of self-tracking is never neutral, but also never wholly
deterministic either. Nevertheless, self-tracking technologies may, like so
many technologies, fascinate us; and, Ihde remarks, fascination about tech-
nologies is usually a function or marker of their amplification (1990, 78).
One should not forget that technology fascination often roots in some fanta-
sy, “technomyth” (Ihde, 1998, 105), or “technology plot” (Ihde, 2012, 131),
that for the most part resides, of course, in the macroperceptual cultural
context. Here, in the case of self-tracking, that connection is extremely tight:
what the devices do is, precisely, attempting to draw the microperceptual
bodily activity closer to the macroperceptual cultural expectational horizon.
As such, in a recursive maneuver, enchantment with them—Ihde: “fascina-
tion and adornment are as good a way into the hearts and minds of humans as
any” (1993, 36)—and by proxy, with the sports and performance culture that
breeds them in the first place, is a full-blown part of exactly their “instrumen-
tal inclination.”
Imaging Technologies, Instrumental Realism,

Epistemology Engines
Finally, one last aspect of Ihde’s thought needs to be discussed, one that may
seem at first sight relatively unrelated to what has already been elaborated,
but is in fact closely connected to it: his long-standing interest in imaging
technologies and their attending epistemological issues. For what are self-
tracking technologies else than a kind of imaging technologies? Especially
Ihde’s thinking in terms of isomorphic degree may be enlightening here
(2009, 45ff.). In the history of scientific visualization, he discerns two revo-
lutions. The first one, epitomized by the telescope, circled around greater and
clearer magnification, but the image created by the technologies remained
isomorphic with the original object. A telescope, for example, lets one see a
planet “as if” one is close to it—the structural characteristics of the mediated
and the unmediated image are the same. However, the second imaging revo-
lution introduces non-isomorphism, as it brings in technologies such as radio
telescopes, that receive signals from that part of the wave spectrum that is
unperceivable to humans, converting these to perceivable images. Here,
clearly, there is a structural difference between the original data and the
constructed image. And due to the emergence of technologies such as com-
puterized enhancement and contrastive techniques, the fact of construction is
even more emphasized. With the second revolution, non-isomorphic in na-
ture, we see the birth of a “second sight,” “a translation into the visible of
phenomena that lie beyond literal vision” (Ihde, 2002, 47).
All of this relates to Ihde’s work in the epistemology of science. By way
of the notions of “technoscience” (2009, 25ff.; Ihde and Selinger, 2003) and
“instrumental realism” (1991; 1998), he elucidates how technological instru-
mentation has always had primacy over “pure” scientific abstraction, not the
other way around (a state of affairs, he says, that Heidegger observes but that
Husserl misses). “[I]nstrumentation transformed knowledge gathering and
production in the sciences” (Ihde, 1998, 43, original emphasis). Therefore we
need an “expanded hermeneutics” that accounts for the materiality of science
as well. Since this materiality often takes the shape of visualizing, expanding
hermeneutics likewise means: widening its boundaries until it includes not
only textual interpretation, but also visual hermeneutics. Crucially—and this
relates to a point already made about the embodiment of perception—the
technologically mediated visual perception on which scientific practices are
based, is grounded in embodiment just as much. “The embodiment of ob-
servers is […] an invariant in science” (Ihde, 2009, 61). Scientific imaging
practices are, though mediated, “fully multisensory and embodied” (Ihde,
2002, 59).
Although these considerations have grave ontological consequences—for
instance with regard to the purported “symmetry” between humans and other
entities (cf., Ihde, 2002, 67ff.; Pickering, 2006)—that cannot be worked out
here, the relevance with regard to self-tracking may be clear. But there are
complications. How should one frame, say, the isomorphism vs. non-isomor-
phism distinction? The “image” that self-tracking tools construct—for it is a
construction, not a neutral or objective representation of an original situa-
tion—cannot be said to be wholly isomorphic with the “object” it reproduces,
but it cannot be called completely non-isomorphic either. Take for example
the counting and rendering of steps taken. One may walk, say, 8235 steps in a
day. It may “feel” as if one has taken, indeed, about that amount of steps.
Certainly when one is used to using a pedometer, one is able to grossly
estimate the amount of steps based on a loose assessment of for instance time
spent walking and locations visited. In that sense it could be said that some
form of isomorphism is at play. Nevertheless, the rendition of the precise
number—of course, all devices have a margin of error in this regard—is a
new, constructed addition, since in “normal” conduct, no one counts his or
her steps while taking them. Here, thus, some non-isomorphic constructive
“translation” is going on. But the perception and interpretation of its results
still feedback to one’s embodied being, in this case even very actively, for
the imaging concerns our embodied being. We perceive in an embodied
manner an however objectified version of our embodiment.
The question remains what sort of knowledge exactly these mechanisms
bring. As development in scientific knowledge follows from instrumentation,
we can ask: what forms of knowledge—scientific or other—might self-track-
ing technologies, in time, produce? And, moreover, how will they influence
what we actually conceive of as pertinent knowledge? Ihde’s notion of “epis-
temology engines,” at last, is of use here. Epistemology engines are devices
“that bring human knowers into intimate relations with technologies or ma-
chinic agencies through which some defined model of what is taken as
knowledge is produced” (2002, 69). Imaging technologies have been in this
sense epistemology engines. Thus the camera obscura, for instance, Ihde
argues, brought forth a certain obsession with vision. How will self-tracking
systems affect our view of what worthwhile knowledge precisely implies?
One thing is for certain: if a central postphenomenological claim is that “only
through being technologically mediated is the newly produced knowledge
possible” (Ihde 2009, 55, original emphasis), surely self-tracking can be seen
as an actualization of exactly this claim.
CONSEQUENCES OF/FOR POSTPHENOMENOLOGY:

TRACING THE TRACKER
Up until now, I have scrutinized digital self-tracking technologies through

postphenomenological lenses, that is, by way of central notions from the
postphenomenological corpus. Let me now attempt to dig still somewhat

deeper and outline a few important critical consequences of the foregoing
investigations—first, of postphenomenology for the understanding of self-
tracking, and second, vice versa, of self-tracking technology for the post-
phenomenological body of ideas itself.
I already remarked upon the multistability concept’s importance for post-
phenomenology. Put even more strongly, however, postphenomenology as
such might even be conceived of as nothing less than a plea for multistability
or, more precisely, an openness to and search for multistabilities. Ihde dem-
onstrates for instance how the history of imaging technologies (cf. supra),
branching out into multiple “trajectories” (cf. also 2012, 131ff.), makes for
an extensive illustration of multistability. One could say the same of the
historical development of many other technologies, scientific models, theo-
ries, and what not. We can notice this, if we are attentive enough, even in our
everyday lives. From all sides, we are bombarded with snippets of health
advice, and frequently these appear to contradict some former research out-
come. Take for example the evolution of nutritional advice throughout the
decades. At one time in the recent past, saturated fats were seen to be great
evil-doers, whereas sugars were looked upon with much less suspicion. By
now, of course, sugars have fallen in grave disrepute, with an avalanche of
diet or light products as a consequence. Obviously this is a highly simplified
account of what is in reality at any time a complex interaction of technos-
cientific practices, market interests, cultural habits, and so forth (cf., Scrinis,
2013). But it serves to illustrate the possibility that in fact all phenomena
carry with them different potential “stabilities.”
This makes the study of self-tracking technologies sufficiently complicat-
ed. As said, micro and macroperception are intertwined. Not only should one
expect the tracking technologies themselves to be multistable, also what they
track, we need to remind ourselves time and again, is everything but carved
in stone. And what they track, as was also seen, is co-framed by, in Ihde’s
words, “[t]he contemporary passion for exercise, body development, or re-
tention of a youthful body” (2002, 25), and by the myriad palette of health
recommendations issued on a steady basis by academic research institutes,
pharmaceutical companies, governmental panels, and so on. Certainly in the
case of self-tracking, in which bodily comportment, technological material-
ity, and cultural practices can be seen to be even more tightly knotted togeth-
er—actually, that interwovenness, more than anything else, defines the
whole activity—the potential multistability of all matters could—and
should—constitute a constant guideline for the investigation. The designer
fallacy (Ihde, 2002, 106; 2008, 19ff.), namely, the idea that technologies act
strictly in manners that their designers have planned, might find a pendant in
what we could dub a “fixed entity fallacy”: the idea that phenomena can be
reified as fixed entities with unambivalent qualities (“sugar” is “bad”; “exer-

cise” is “healthy” . . .).
That, it could be pointed out, also has consequences for the “hacking”
concept hailed by some in the Quantified Self community. 6 Hacking, in its
most technical definition, means the search for and realization of applications
for a device, namely a computer, that the developer did not plan or foresee.
Nowadays the term has acquired a broader significance. Within QS to some
extent the idea lives that one can hack one’s own health, control one’s well-
being beyond the confinement of classic health models (cf. also Melanie
Swan’s expectation that QS might revolutionize health care as we know it
[2009; 2012]). In principle one does so with the help of technologies, which
in turn can be hacked and deployed for unforeseen purposes. In this sense,
hacking becomes something of a lifestyle (and indeed terms such as life
hacking, body hacking, mood hacking, et cetera are being used nowadays).
Nevertheless, the above reflection on multistability should remind us of the
possibility that the “hacking work” is never done. In fact, in hacking, one
should be very wary of the phenomena that fall outside of the supposed circle
of “hackable” things. Those, one surmises, may in the first instance concern
ideas and ideals that tend to escape our conscious reasoning anyhow, our
cultural expectations and norms regarding efficiency, performance, and
physical condition.
From another perspective, then, one may also ask: could there be some
advice here for design? Ihde argues, however specifically with regard to
embodiment relations, but the point applies well to self-tracking technologies
in whole: “embodiment relations can be said to work best when there is both
a transparency and an isomorphism between perceptual and bodily action
within the relation” (1990, 90). Two crucial matters stand out in this quote.
First, transparency. Indeed, other authors point to the importance of “seam-
lessness” as well. Melanie Swan remarks that one of the barriers to wide-
spread adoption of self-tracking technologies at the moment is practical: they
are not “automated, easy, inexpensive, and comfortable” enough (2013, 93).
But then there is Ihde to warn us about our perhaps unconscious wish for
total transparency (1990, 75): wanting the benefits of technology without the
disadvantages; the amplification without the reduction. This is an impossible
wish: technologies always transform, no matter how small or trivial the af-
fected areas.
Second, isomorphism, that was already discussed to some extent, and of
which there is certainly no clear-cut account in the context of self-tracking.
When one considers graphics of sleep patterns, step count, distance traveled,
et cetera, of what exactly are those images? The term “self-tracking” alone
might confuse us into thinking that the technologies offer us painless views,
neutral windows on our “selves,” since there is some degree of isomorphism.
One for instance recognizes in the graphical representation of one’s sleeping
pattern the sleep experience, the “feel” of the previous night. We could be
tempted into equating “world” with “human” in Ihde’s schematic representa-
tion of, for one, embodiment relations (table 8.1). But, as said, even to
ourselves “we” are not immediately given; the “world” has, phenomenologi-
cally speaking, primacy. What is more, self-tracking technologies take part in
more than embodiment relations alone; they also constitute hermeneutic rela-
tions, of non-isomorphic character moreover, to the extent that the “data
double” created is a construction, truly a double, and not merely a mirror of
“world.”
Connecting this to observations already made, and involving the other
forms of human-technology relations too, we could state that ambiguities (or,
distortions?) abound at at least three levels:
1. First person level: Technologies may be almost perfectly embodied,

but the “I” is as such already only reflexively found.
2. Second person (“data double”) level: Data doubles are constructions,
translations, that need hermeneutic reading and deciphering.
3. Third person level: The “alterity” “trainer” or “coach” is a function of
cultural norms, lifestyle choices, “body two” preconditions, et cete-
ra…
And, one might even envision a fourth level, if one cares to follow Melanie
Swan in her prognoses about the future self, inspired by Kevin Kelly, expect-
ing the emergence of the “exoself.” Such a self would be, due to the future
abundance of self-tracking-like technologies, “spatially expanded, with a
broad suite of exosenses” (Swan, 2013, 95). It could be, Swan adds, “a sort of
fourth-person perspective” (Ibid., 96). Looking at these issues in a postphen-
omenological light, one could expect such fourth-person “presence” to most-
ly escape the awareness of an (individual) embodied self, and thus have for a
large part the status of a background technology. Of course, then, it should be
remarked, background technologies bring along transformations, ambiva-
lences, and multistabilities just as much. Once again, not only are these
issues to be dealt with by users; designers, too, might take up the challenge to
creatively play on these complications.
Table 8.1.
(human-technology) → world
if world = human, then
(human-technology) → human (-world)
or, perhaps:
(human ¿ technology) (-world)
An analogy may be spotted with virtual technologies, that Ihde also treats
of. Does self-tracking represent some form of technological virtuality? Ihde
speaks of a “here-body” versus a “disembodied over-there-body” or an “im-
age-body” (2002, 6). Of course the context here differs a bit from that of the
issue at hand. But still, there is some similarity to the extent that, as Ihde
argues, “in a broader, more phenomenological sense, both RL [Real Life]
and VR [Virtual Reality] are part of the lifeworld, and VR is thus both ‘real’
as a positive presence and a part of RL” (2002, 13). The same accounts for
the “body double” created by self-tracking. Some possibly creative tension
may nonetheless reign between the two “bodies.” Annemarie Mol observes
how people develop diverse styles in dealing with it, specifically in relation
to diagnostic devices:
By producing ever more facts, home used diagnostic devices may draw all the
attention of professionals and even patients towards “the numbers.” Thus it
shifts away from feelings—in the physical as well as the emotional sense of
the term. However, it may also happen that an apparatus helps to increase a
person’s physical self-awareness, encouraging one to better attune to the subtle
signals of one’s body. (2000, 19–20)
Ruckenstein, in a similar vein, remarks: “Significantly, data visualisations

might be interpreted by research participants as truer or more ‘real’ insights
into their daily lives than their subjective experiences are” (2012, 11). Never-
theless, notwithstanding these possible conflicts between embodied experi-
ence and hermeneutic readings, one should indeed, in a phenomenological
spirit, regard both as equivalently part and parcel of experience as such. That
should not mean, however, that the aforementioned ambiguities can be so
easily dispersed with. In fact, complexity is heightened by taking as our
starting point that we attend to all given phenomena in a horizontal way.
Either way, exactly this elusiveness of the “object” of self-tracking may,
conversely, and finally, hold some lessons for postphenomenology as well.
For the object is elusive in still another way: it is absolutely singular and
individual. Whereas the experience of using self-tracking technologies re-
mains bound to the aforementioned ambiguities—in either micro or macro-
perceptual perspectives—from another angle that experience can be seen to
escape even phenomenological analysis to an extent, as it derives from and is
based in the sheer individuality of a user-subject. Above and beyond all
biopolitical domination, but also above and beyond any orthodox phenomen-
ological eidetic reduction, no one else can make sense of the acquired data in
the same “felt” way as I myself can. In this sense, the self tracked is me.
Unlike in the case of imaging technologies in astronomy for example, the
imaged object is not something that is “outside” all of us and which existence
we can collectively attest to on a fairly equivalent basis. No, the object of my
tracking is radically singular, and although of course I am able to connect to
other trackers, compare data, exchange experiences, et cetera, only I can self-
track. In analogy to Heidegger who states that I am the only person who can
die my death (1962, 284), one could say that I am the only person who can
track myself. No one else can track “myself.”
In this way, self-tracking helps to point out postphenomenology’s relative
silence on existential issues. 7 Surely, postphenomenological concepts aid us
in making sense of how to go about in dealing with technology on a practical
level, and to this degree it can be called existentialist. But its lenses are, for
the most part, fairly wide-angle. That might have something to do with the
very notion of, indeed, multistability. 8 Zooming out, one spots potentialities,
possibilities, trajectories more easily. By definition, however phrased some-
what crudely, this makes the world look like a more beautiful place. Things
will usually pan out, change for the better—that is what the history of tech-
nology demonstrates, is it not? If trouble arises, some improvement or solu-
tion is soon to follow; one can depend on it. But meanwhile, individuals, in
all their—tracking or non-tracking—singularity, have to make choices in the
context of what are for now comparatively “fixed” stabilities instead of mult-
istabilities. They will have to engage heads-on with the “instrumental incli-
nations.” Of course, some of these stabilities have the potential to become
disrupted by “my” hands. However, not all of them do, or one might not
know how to actualize these possibilities, miss the means to do so, or be
unable for any other reason. Still, in an existentialist spirit, one would have to
grapple anyhow with the irreducible responsibility placed before one, when
making the choice to act in whatever way. Self-tracking technologies also
call upon us to take responsibility, but an analysis that sticks exclusively to
their potentialities, may miss that in the meantime, people have to cope
existentially.
We would do well to keep this in mind, certainly when investigating
technologies so tailored to the “self”—either in design or marketing terms—
as digital self-tracking devices are. Ihde does hint directly at such existential
consequence of imaging technology, albeit generally, when he proffers the
notion of “compound eye” (1990, 174ff.) to conceptualize our postmodern,
eclectic culture of vision, composed of so many screens and bits of “edited
reality” (1993, 53–54). The dashboards and graphical interfaces of self-track-
ing technologies may be said to offer highly personalized “compound eyes”
on “my” world. According to Ihde, the heightened contingency in our “pluri-
culture” has made for an enlargement of the “decisional burden” (1990,
177ff.). However, in the context of self-tracking, such decisional burden is
highly personalized, and as has been suggested, this may play to the advan-
tage of biodisciplinary powers, but it may also make for biopolitical empow-
erment. In Peter-Paul Verbeek’s work on the morality of technology, it is
shown how individuals can face this increased decisional burden by follow-
ing the advice of the later Foucault in his thinking on the “care of the self”—
more precisely, by developing or gaining a relation to technologies, in the

way of a “styling” or “designing” project (Verbeek 2011). In the end, indeed,
the styling, the taking responsibility is left to “us.” We do well in studying
how our relationship to our tracking activities takes shape within a constella-
tion of habits, cultural norms, material conditions, ideological constraints.
But since it concerns “my” tracking, at the end of the day I am pretty much
left . . . to my own devices.
NOTES
1. Several authors have foreshadowed to an extent the sort of postphenomenological inves-

tigation that is to follow, however without further elaborating it. Anders Albrechtslund sees use
for the postphenomenological approach in the understanding of especially malfunctioning self-
tracking technologies (2013). Annemarie Mol, in writing about diagnostic devices, demon-
strates how these tools not only register facts, but also intervene in the contexts in which they
are used (2000); she thus seems to mirror Peter-Paul Verbeek’s line of thought that technolo-
gies “do” something (2005). And the latter himself, in reassessing the concept of moral respon-
sibility, envisioning it as distributed among humans and technologies (2009; 2011), refers
throughout his analysis to tools much akin to self-tracking devices: “Driving more economical-
ly due to an EconoMeter and eating differently as a result of using the FoodPhone cannot be
seen as purely human actions any more than they can be seen as fully technologically driven
behaviour” (2009, 235).
2. http://jawbone.com/up
3. http://www.fitbit.com/flex
4. http://quantifiedself.com/
5. Cf. Fleming, 2011, or issue 17.07 of Wired (2009) that spots the words “Living by
numbers. Track your data. Analyze your results. Optimize your life” on its cover (cf. http://
www.wired.com/wired/issue/17-07).
6. Cf. http://quantifiedself.com/hacking/
7. For a differently framed but related critique of postphenomenology’s lack of an account
of subjectivity and subsequent remediation of that lack, cf. Sharon, 2014, 141ff.
8. Robert Rosenberger suggests that this relative absence of “the self” in postphenomenol-
ogy may root in the relational ontology on which it is founded (personal communication,
October 11th, 2014).
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tional Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 6 (2): 492–525.
Swan, M. (2012). “Health 2050: The Realization of Personalized Medicine through Crowd-
sourcing, the Quantified Self, and the Participatory Biocitizen.” Journal of Personalized
Medicine 2 (4): 93–118.
Swan, M. (2013). “The Quantified Self: Fundamental Disruption in Big Data Science and
Biological Discovery.” Big Data 1 (2): 85–99.
Thaler, R. H., and C. R. Sunstein. (2009). Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth
and Happiness. London: Penguin.
Van Den Eede, Y. (2014). “Extending ‘Extension’: A Reappraisal of the Technology-as-Exten-
sion Idea through the Case of Self-Tracking Technologies.” In A. Propen, C. E. Reid, and D.
Weiss (eds.), Radical Interface: Transdisciplinary Interventions on Design, Mediation, and
the Posthuman. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 151–172.
Verbeek, P-P. (2005). What Things Do: Philosophical Reflections on Technology, Agency, and
Design, Translated by Robert P. Crease. University Park (PA): The Pennsylvania State
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daries Between Human and Technology.” Nanoethics 3 (3): 231–242.
Things. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Chapter Nine
A Century on Speed
Reflections on Movement and Mobility in the
Twentieth Century
Søren Riis
During the twentieth century there was a tremendous focus on speed, and
numerous new technologies enabled humans to travel faster and speed up
several domains of their lives. The airplane has become a symbol of over-
coming gravity and immobility—it manifests the daring and hasty spirit of
our time. By the same token, curiosity as the perpetual pursuit of new inno-
vations and a never peaceful mind are facilitated and glorified. More and
more technologies have been mobilized and connected to a lifestyle on the
move: phones, meals, music, and workstations.
Nineteenth-century philosophers such as Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich
Nietzsche critically assessed the dawning of what could be called the High-
Speed Society. Nietzsche was concerned about the impact of speed on human
perception and the ability to think: “With the tremendous acceleration of life,
we grow accustomed to using our mind and eye for seeing and judging
incompletely or incorrectly, and all men are like travelers who get to know a
land and its people from the train” (Nietzsche, 2014, nr. 282). Kierkegaard
was repelled with the speed of his contemporaries, who he scorned with
irony:
The most ludicrous of all ludicrous things, it seems to me, is to be busy in the
world, to be a man who is brisk at his meals and brisk at his work. Therefore,
when I see a fly settle on the nose of those men of business in a decisive
moment, or if he is splashed by a carriage that passes him in even greater
haste, or Knippelsbro tilts up, or a roof tile falls and kills him, I laugh from the
bottom of my heart. And who could keep laughing? What, after all, do these
159
160 Søren Riis
busy bustlers achieve? Are they not just like that woman who, in a flurry
because the house was on fire, rescued the fire tongs? What more, after all, do
they salvage from life’s huge conflagration? (Kierkegaard, 1987, 25)
On the other hand, this skeptical approach to speed was challenged in the
early twentieth century as the futurist movement shouted out their great glo-
rification of speed in 1909, which seems to have captured the spirit of the
dawning century: “We affirm that the world’s magnificence has been en-
riched by a new beauty: the beauty of speed. A racing car whose hood is
adorned with great pipes, like serpents of explosive breath—a roaring car
that seems to ride on grapeshot is more beautiful than the Victory of Samoth-
race” (Marinetti, 1909).
But what are the various manifestations of speed and how do we assess
them? How did our High-Speed Society emerge and is it accelerating? How
do we measure the consequences of speed and harness its destructive pow-
ers? In this chapter I will not deliver any definite answers, but in line with the
phenomenon under scrutiny—speed—I deliver some more or less transient
reflections. The final part of the chapter shall point more clearly to the
direction in which I am going, and in subsequent research I hope to be able to
develop more substantial answers. It is my thesis that the strand of philoso-
phy called postphenomenology and especially the related concept of multi-
stability deliver elements to support a strong framework for assessing speed
and the related technologies, even though the phenomenon of speed, to my
knowledge, has not been the explicit topic of previous postphenomenological
investigations.
In this chapter I will circle in on how speed shows itself and has become
manifest in different shapes and forms throughout the twentieth century. In
the first section, I outline what is only a short empirical and breath-taking list
of significant and celebrated twentieth century innovations. The second sec-
tion is dedicated to the experience of contemporary witnesses to the various
innovations and to the people who have been particularly sensitive to or
prophetic about the twentieth century “Zeitgeist.” And in the third and final
section I will explicitly turn to the postphenomenological framework in order
to philosophically discuss and assess the technological innovations and the
phenomenon of speed. The third and final section takes Don Ihde’s concept
of multistability as its point of departure in order to see how this idea is
informed and challenged by the speed of change—but also how to under-
stand this challenge as its strength. In other words, the last reflections of the
final section depict a variation of multistability which builds on recent as
well as classical postphenomenological research.
A Century on Speed 161
THE SPEED OF INNOVATION
On a cold December day in 1903 the American Wright brothers successfully

tested their self-made airplane and took off the Kill Devil Hills and flew for
around three seconds. This is recorded as the first airplane flight in human
history. A couple of days later the wind was better and Orville Wright man-
aged to take off and land after 120 feet with the speed of a running man (6.8
miles per hour) and stay up in the air for a total of twelve seconds (Smithso-
nian, 2014a; Wright Brothers, 2014).
The fantasy of flying was, however, widespread and the possibility of
flying seemed to be within reach several places around the world by the turn
of the twentieth century. Another pioneer of the air, the Brazilian Alberto
Santos-Dumont, who lived in Paris, also experimented with flying (Smithso-
nian, 2014b). By the time of the successful experiments of the Wright broth-
ers, he had already been flying around among the rooftops of Paris in a
number of different dirigible air balloons. But technically speaking these
constructions did not qualify in the competition of the first airplane flight,
since the basic structure was lighter than air, and air balloons had been
known for centuries in China and had been capable of transporting humans
since the successful experiments with a hot air balloon by the French broth-
ers Joseph-Michel and Jacques-Etienne Montgolfier in June 1783 (Robinson
Library, 2014). However, Santos-Dumont is also recorded as the first aero-
naut to design and fly an airplane (1906) capable of taking off from an even
ground without the aid of a launching rail or a launch catapult, which the
construction of the Wright brothers depended upon. Santos-Dumont’s air-
planes wheeled undercarriages similar to contemporary constructions.
The success of the Wright brothers and of Santos-Dumont catapulted the
imagination of a new generation, or better yet, of a new century, and since
their early success the airplane innovation had developed very fast. In Febru-
ary 1912 Jules Védrines crossed the 100 mph mark in his Deperdussin mono-
plane (Noronha, 2014). During World War I planes were used for military
purposes and as a consequence they developed rapidly. Soon thereafter, in
1921, Joseph Sadi-Lecointe had doubled the speed limit from 1912 and flew
205.2 mph in a Nieuport-Delage (Florida Tech, 2014). Another leap of inno-
vation was achieved during World War II, where Harold E. Comstock and
Roger Dyar claimed to have exceeded the speed of sound in a dive in a P-47
Thunderbolt—and many more were to follow (Aviation, 2014). However,
Chuck Yeager was officially recognized as being the first man to break the
sound barrier in level flight in 1947 in an X-1 airplane (Paur, 2009). And
recently, in 2004, NASA successfully tested an unmanned jetpowered air-
craft, NASA X-43, flying ca 7.000 miles per hour (NASA, 2014).
On the more or less steady ground there was a similar rapid development
and crave for speed. In 1886 Karl Benz built what has been credited as the
162 Søren Riis
first car. In 1906 Fred Marriott was able to pass the speed record of trains
with a car as he passed the 124 mph mark on Ormond Beach in a Stanley
Rocket (Conceptcarz, 2014). In 1927 Henry Segrave drove faster than 200
mph on Daytona Beach in his Mystery car with 1000 hp. 1 And in 1970 the
rocket-powered engine Blue Flame drove more than 1000 km/h with Gary
Gabelich across the Bonneville Salt Flats. 2 Alongside the development of the
car the freeway system was massively expanded during the twentieth centu-
ry. The first freeway was built in Italy (the autostrade), in the land of the
Futurists. It was a limited access road, only meant for fast cars, connecting
Milan and Varese and authorized in 1921. Today highways are almost all
over the world, and only in the US is a highway system consisting of approx-
imately 6.51 gigametres (4,045,991 miles) as of 2012. 3
This focus on speed also directs the early twentieth century development
of the bicycle. In a now classic study, the Dutch Science and Technology
scholar Wiebe E. Bijker shows that there was a dramatic increase in different
rivaling bicycle constructions by the beginning of the twentieth century. But
the design that prevailed did so because it allowed the best possibilities for
driving fast (Bijker, 1997).
Speed possessed the hearts and minds of the children of the twentieth
century. One of the most significant expressions of the fast spirit in the
twentieth century belongs to the modern Olympic Games. After having been
almost forgotten for centuries, the Olympic Games was awakened again by
the International Olympic Committee and took place in 1896 in Athens in a
new an upgraded version, where the religious dimensions resonating from
the home of the gods “the Olympus” had lost its meaning to the athletes and
spectators. The spirit defining the new version of the Olympic Games was
different from the one guiding the ancient ancestors. In 1924 the new motto
of the games was coined, Citius, Altius, Fortius, a Latin expression meaning
“Faster, Higher, Stronger.” 4 The Latin expression offered a feeling of au-
thenticity to the reinvented Olympic Games, but it was a new invention that
came to set an ongoing and almost inhuman struggle for accumulating
records over the decades of the twentieth century. This permanent struggle to
break the latest records started a movement, which eventually culminated
with the use of a number of dangerous performance drugs, which were able
to power and speed up the human body beyond previous known limits.
Throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century, numerous
athletes have suffered premature deaths due to these performance-enhancing
drugs (Mayo Clinic, 2014).
Famous among the twentieth-century drugs is speed, an amphetamine. It
was first synthesized in 1887, but not really put to use before World War II,
where it was heavily consumed in order to enhance the performance of
soldiers. As it turned out to be addictive and dangerous in high doses, use
was restricted, but a large black market has developed to support global
demand in the second half of the twentieth century (DuPont, 2014). 5 In the
same family of drugs we also find caffeine and cocaine. While coffee with
caffeine had been around for centuries, it did not become common to ordi-
nary people until the twentieth century. And by the end of World War II,
Achille Gaggia had created the modern espresso machine in Milan (Gaggia,
2014); from Milan, coffeehouses started to spread across Italy and thereafter
in all of Europe and North America. Today the American coffee house Star-
bucks has more than 150,000 employees all over the world and sells more
than 10 million cups of coffee per day (Statistics, 2014; Ask, 2014). Caffeine
has grown to be everyman’s drug, due to its energetic impact on the human
body without any seemingly severe side effects.
Furthermore, in the late nineteenth century, the Parisian chemist Angelo
Mariani started to mix cocaine and wine in a most attractive way, causing
Jules Verne, Alexander Dumas, Arthur Conan Doyle, and Pope Leo XIII to
highly endorse the so-called Vin Mariani (Hamblin, 2013). Impressed by its
success in France, Dr. John Stith Pemberton in Atlanta copied the idea under
the name Pemberton’s French Wine Coca and marketed it as a panacea.
Among many fantastic declarations, he described it as “a most wonderful
invigorator of sexual organs” (Hamblin, 2013). However, the alcohol prohi-
bition soon made it illegal and Pemberton decided to mix the cocaine with
sugar syrup and thus gave birth to Coca-Cola in 1886. And as the company
started to sell Coca-Cola in bottles in 1899, cocaine based drinks started to
get out to the general public for the century to come (Hamblin, 2013).
CONTEMPORARY WITNESSES OF SPEED
It is not only important to notice the increased speed of movement in the

twentieth century, but especially in this phenomenological context, it is also
crucial to see and understand this in relation to the reactions and testimonies
of excitement and fear by contemporary witnesses, artists, and intellectuals.
In this section we shall take a closer look at the expressions of the people
experiencing, one way or another, the High-Speed Society first-hand. In
order to get even more “under the skin” of these witnesses and hear what
they are actually thinking and experiencing, this section will present a num-
ber of quotes and refer artistic expressions to the reader.
In order to advertise the sport of automobile racing, W. K. Vanderbilt, Jr.
established the “Vanderbilt Cup” in 1904: “The event originally took place
on Long Island over public roads. Crowds lined the raceway without benefit
of any barriers, often creating hair raising hazards as the big racers whizzed
by. Drivers began the race at timed intervals with the first to cross the finish
in the fastest time declared the winner” (Eyewitnesstohistory, 2014). Louis
164 Søren Riis
Wagner won the race driving a Darracq in 1906. He later described his
experience the following way:
It seemed but a fraction of a moment before a vague speck appeared two miles
away on the course. It swiftly became a cloud, then a dreaded outline, and with
a sudden rush and roar Lancia thundered by and was gone. There was no more
stopping or slackening at turns, no further fear or concern over the reckless
crowd. A mile from the finish it became evident that the dense mass of specta-
tors was beyond control. Lancia had finished. But how long ago? As in a
trance a bugle sounded and the next moment, with a flash and volley, the
Darracq was over the tape—a winner. (Eyewitnesstohistory, 2014)
Most enthusiastic among the admirers of speed is probably the futuristic

movement, which was briefly mentioned in the introduction. In their first
manifesto (1909), Filippo Emilio Tommaso Marinetti clearly describes how
the new developments and innovations were experienced especially by the
young generation, who were bored and disgusted by the old world. They
were fascinated by the busy big city life and thrilled by the incredible number
of new technologies transforming the world almost beyond recognition.
We will sing of the great crowds agitated by work, pleasure and revolt; the
multi-colored and polyphonic surf of revolutions in modern capitals: the noc-
turnal vibration of the arsenals and the workshops beneath their violent electric
moons: the gluttonous railway stations devouring smoking serpents; factories
suspended from the clouds by the thread of their smoke; bridges with the leap
of gymnasts flung across the diabolic cutlery of sunny rivers: adventurous
steamers sniffing the horizon; great-breasted locomotives, puffing on the rails
like enormous steel horses with long tubes for bridle, and the gliding flight of
aeroplanes whose propeller sounds like the flapping of a flag and the applause
of enthusiastic crowds.
We are on the extreme promontory of the centuries! What is the use of
looking behind at the moment when we must open the mysterious shutters of
the impossible? Time and Space died yesterday. We are already living in the
absolute, since we have already created eternal, omnipresent speed.
Look at us! We are not out of breath, our hearts are not in the least tired.
For they are nourished by fire, hatred and speed! Does this surprise you? It is
because you do not even remember being alive! Standing on the world’s
summit, we launch once more our challenge to the stars! (Marinetti 1909) 6
The futurists clearly saw that some things had already changed and others
were about to change dramatically. A world-wide revolution was taking off.
They not only welcomed this change but they glorified it in their art and
wanted the old world to collapse and stay behind. The splendor of the electri-
cally illuminated modern cities full of movement and masses of people,
working day and night, filling them with pleasure. Airplanes, trains, and all
sorts of modern equipment and machinery defined beauty to the futurists.
Movement and revolution were key to this definition. In the visual arts the
futurists took pleasure in exploring the new perspectives opened up by the
new technological innovations—not least the airplane and the car. The air-
plane not only made it possible to obtain a new heavenly perspective of
things but also to discover and show how speed influences our perception:
The changing perspectives of flight constitute an absolutely new reality that

has nothing in common with the reality traditionally constituted by a terrestrial
perspective […] Painting from this new reality requires a profound contempt
for detail and a need to synthesize and transfigure everything. (Crispolti, 1986,
413)
The fascination with flight and transfiguration gave birth to a new genre of
paintings, the Aeropittura (the Aeropainting). Famous among these is Giaco-
mo Balla’s Abstract Speed + Sound 1913–1914, which is viewed as one of
the first Aeropittura that paved the way for many others. The Museum of
Kinetic Forms writes about this particular painting:
This painting was originally designed to be part of a series depicting move-

ment and sound. This painting was designed to be a centerpiece with Abstract
Speed and Abstract Speed and Sound—The Car Has Passed, flanking it. There
are hints of a landscape and a sky within the painting. The idea of motion is
depicted within this painting through the progressive lines advancing across
the surface of the painting. These lines are meant to represent sound. The
painting is also designed to have the viewer dart his or her eyes to multiple
places on the painting, thereby creating the sense of movement and motion.
This painting depicts motion and movement in a very abstract way that is very
characteristic of the Futurist movement. Futurism was obsessed with depicting
speed and progress. (MOKF, 2014)
In Tullio Creli’s Nose Dive on the City from 1939, we see the fascination of
the city combined with the new projection into the sky. In Uberto Bonetti’s
Auto in Citta (1930), the fast movement of racing cars is excellently mani-
fested with the painting technique of blurred lines, transfiguration, and loss
of detail.
The aesthetic, yet more ambivalent portrayal of technology similar to the
nineteenth century landscape paintings is also manifested in one of the most
celebrated photographers of the late twentieth century, 7 Andreas Gursky
(1955– ). Gursky uses modern technology (digital cameras and computers) to
give an impression of technology, modern factories, and innovations as vi-
brating works of art. This is particularly manifested in the picture Chicago
Board of Trade II (1999), but also in his picture of the Rhein, which has been
straightened out by modern technology to facilitate frictionless transport,
entitled Rhein II (1999). 8
166 Søren Riis
The cult of speed, change, and progress characteristic of the twentieth

century is further reinforced and reflected by some of the many intellectuals
who fought on the battlefields in World War I. The young German soldier
Ernst Jünger (1895–1998) described first-hand the insatiable appetite and
constant movement of the war machine. As one of the few surviving storm
troopers, Jünger describes with great passion the accelerating pace of mobil-
ization in the beginning of the twentieth century. He saw World War I as one
of the clearest manifestations of the breakthrough of a new age that is above
all characterized by what he calls total mobilization. In a visionary essay of
the same name, “Total mobilization,” Jünger expounds mobility physics and
metaphysics with such insight and descriptive capability that the feeling of
the breakthrough to a new era seems evident. In other words, the cult of
mobility, including speed, change, and progress in the twentieth and twenty-
first century is not a coincidence in light of Jünger’s portrayal. Rather, it is an
expression of a Zeitgeist and a movement whose triumphal forward march
now assumes global dimensions. Jünger had a slight distance from the mobil-
ity phenomena of his own time, but he also experienced how the radical
escalation of mobilization penetrated each person. Because of this simultane-
ous distance and proximity, he occupies a prominent role in the understand-
ing of the mobility phenomena. At this point we shall consider two excerpts
from Jünger’s writings that may help us understand mobility physics and
metaphysics. As a witness to the rise of mobility, Jünger expresses the fol-
lowing thought and feeling of desire and dread:
It suffices to consider our daily life, with its inexorability and merciless disci-
pline, its smoking, glowing districts, the physics and metaphysics of its com-
merce, its motors, airplanes, and burgeoning cities. With a pleasure-tinged
horror, we sense that here, not a single atom is not in motion, that we are
profoundly inscribed in this raging process. Total Mobilibization is far less
consummated that it consummates itself; in war and peace, it expresses the
secret and inexorable claim to which our life in the age of masses and ma-
chines subjects us. It thus turns out that each individual life becomes, ever
more unambiguously, the life of a worker. (Jünger, 1993, 128)
And:
What is important in this context is ultimately the special character of work,

which is referred to as a sport. In sport not only the desire to normalize a high
degree of physical health is visible, but to go to the limit of possible perfor-
mance, challenging records, and even to transcend them. In mountaineering, in
flying, and ski jumping, there are demands which surpass that which is human
and which require the mastery of an automatism. Such records, in turn, raise
the standard. The process is also transferred to the factory workers; it brings
forth those working heroes who must cope with a workload that is twenty
times as much as the exploited of 1913. (Jünger, 1950, 50: Translation SR)
The American historian, Lewis Mumford (1895–1990), viewed the logic

behind mobility, the desire for constant change and mechanical progress in a
more critical light. In this constellation he saw a significant yet detrimental
development that would never come to a rest on its own, but lead to fetish of
innovation: “Under the idea of mechanical progress only the present counted,
and continual change was needed in order to prevent the present from be-
coming passé, and thus unfashionable. Progress was accordingly measured
by novelty, constant change, and mechanical difference, not by continuity
and human improvement” (Mumford, 1986, 75).
This ambivalence towards an increasingly faster and record-breaking
world received an interesting diagnosis in the last quarter of the twentieth
century, as the American intellectual and futurist Alvin Toffler (1928– )
coined the term “future shock,” which depicted the experience connected to
the overwhelming speed of change. In the book by the same name, Future
Shock (1970), Toffler writes:
It is the thesis of this book that there are discoverable limits to the amount of
change that the human organism can absorb, and that by endlessly accelerating
change without first determining these limits, we may submit masses of men to
demands they simply cannot tolerate. We run the high risk of throwing them
into that peculiar state that I have called future shock. (Toffler, 1970, 326)
To understand the current historical trajectory, Toffler points to a statement

made by the sociologist Lawrence Suhm: “We are going through a period as
traumatic as the evolution of man’s predecessor from sea creatures to land
creatures […] Those who can adapt will; those who can’t will either go on
surviving somehow at a lower level of development or will perish—washed
up on the shores” (Toffler, 1970, 325). According to Toffler, the rapid
changes of the twentieth century may drive humans down or force us to
adopt in radically new ways.
In the slip stream of Toffler’s comprehensive empirical research on the
speed of change, the French intellectual, urban planner, and former director
of École Spéciale d’Architecture, Paul Virilio, wrote the book Speed and
Politics in 1977 (translated into English in 1986), in which he unfolds what
he calls a dromology, a science of speed. As the latest of the reflexive
witnesses to the amazing changes in the twentieth century presented in this
section, Verilio connects a number of the previous insights to an even larger
historical trajectory that gives the notion of speed a deeper historical signifi-
cance and thus adequately builds the transition to the last section, where we
will use postphenomenological tools to help assess movement and mobility
in more philosophical terms. Verilio also takes up the impact of the futurists
and their enchantment with speed, and encourages a better understanding of
this movement and the meaning they ascribe to speed and mobility:
168 Søren Riis
We have not paid enough attention, in Western History, to the moment when
this transfer from the natural vitalism of the marine element (the ease with
which one can lift, displace, glide weighty engines) to an inevitable technolog-
ical vitalism took place; the moment when the technical transport body left the
sea like the unfinished living body of evolution, crawling out of its original
environment and becoming amphibious. Speed as pure idea without content
comes from the sea like Venus, and when Marinetti cries that the universe has
been enriched by a new beauty, the beauty of speed, and opposes the racecar to
the Winged Victory of Samothrace, he forgets that he is really talking about
the same esthetic: the esthetic of the transport engine. The Coupling with the
ancient war vessel and the coupling of Marinetti the fascist with his racecar,
“the shaft crossing over the earth,” whose wheel he controls, emerge from this
technological evolutionism whose realization is more obvious than that of the
living world. (Verilio, 2007, 68 f)
By now we have seen a number of concrete and abstract descriptions and

testimonials of speed, movement, and mobility in the twentieth century. We
now turn attention to a philosophical framework that is particularly interested
in the concrete empirically informed analysis and assessment of technology,
postphenomenology, and especially the associated concept of multistability.
SPEED VS. MULTISTABILITY?
Multistability is one of the key concepts of postphenomenological research

(Ihde, 1977; 1990; 1998; 2009; Rosenberger, 2009; Verbeek, 2005; Selinger,
2008; Whyte, forthcoming). In this section we shall take a closer look at the
different trajectories for the movements described above and the concept of
multistability in postphenomenological research. Multistability has a number
of different, yet associated meanings in postphenomenology, which has been
excellently classified and described by Kyle Powys Whyte in his recent
publication “What is Multistability? A Theory of the Keystone Concept of
Postphenomenological Research” (forthcoming). Whyte writes:
Time and again, in conferences and scholarly exchanges, the following ques-
tion arises: what exactly is multistability as a concept around which to orga-
nize a literature called postphenomenology? I want to know the answer to this
question, and will provide one in the form of a theory. I will argue that there
are really two conceptions of multistability at play. First, multistability is an
empirically testable hypothesis about how several stable patterns of the same
object can be perceived from the first person perspective, and resonates well
with previous philosophical observations of the same phenomena (Cerbone
2009). I refer to this as imaginative multistability [ . . . ] Most research papers
in which the authors identify as postphenomenologists, however, are con-
cerned with investigating from a third person perspective the multistability of
technologically mediated practices. Building on imaginative multistability,
this second sense, which I call practical multistability, is based on the hypoth-
esis that human bodies and technologies are entangled in lifeworlds and in-
cludes sets of concepts and criteria that can be used to describe some of these
entanglements. The descriptions are used to shed light on the role of these
entanglements in framing our aesthetic, moral, and political values and the
possible ways of improving the benefits and sustainability of technology de-
signs and built-environments. (Whyte, forthcoming; emphasis added)
Here Whyte makes a significant subdivision of multistability into what he

calls imaginative multistability and practical multistability, which pivots on
different research agendas in postphenomenological research (Whyte, forth-
coming). Against this backdrop, we shall now turn our attention to how
multistability becomes applicable to and challenged by the developments
described in the previous chapters.
Multistability in the postphenomenological sense has an inherent tension
between stability and multitude, which is increased by the speed and techno-
logical innovations described above. The three guiding questions of the final
section are the following: (1) What are the different trajectories between
speed and multistability? (2) What are the main challenges to the phenome-
non of stability posed by the speed of new innovations? (3) How may we
conceive of multistability as a conceptual tool to meet this challenge?
Concerning question one and in relation to Whyte’s description of practi-
cal multistability, we may view the car as a technology which has appeared
in a series of very different forms and functions throughout the twentieth
century. This variety of manifestations is an analogue of what Ihde refers to
as the multistability of archery (Ihde, 2009, 16 ff), which may be used in
different sizes and shapes as a hunting instrument—but the same shape and
material may also make up a music instrument. The first cars, by the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, looked liked horse carriages, as this was the
shape of a land transportation vehicle at the end of the nineteenth century.
However, the car was soon to take on multiple forms, depending on the
manufacturer and purpose. Four wheels and machine-powered driving are
common elements of most of these constructions. If we look back at the
twentieth century, the multitude of cars is manifested in the range of different
innovations: SUVs, four-wheel drives, camping cars, sedans, station cars,
race cars. And with race cars, we may focus on the different aspects of the
car’s innovation—Formula 1, Le Mans Prototypes, Nascars, and so on—all
concepts for different classes of cars. However, cars may also be subdivided
and varied according to the kind of energy they are running on: diesel,
biogas, gasoline, electricity, sun, kerosene. The point is that all these varia-
tions are variations of cars, which makes the car a highly multistable phe-
nomenon. It is, however, critical to note that multistability does not suggest
any substantial identity across the different phenomena and innovations
under scrutiny.
170 Søren Riis
If we go one level higher and view cars as a means of transport, they all of
a sudden become part of a larger category and belong to the same group as
airplanes and bicycles described above, and this category shows even greater
variance. In this sense, it is important to understand that there are numerous
cultural, historical, economical, and practical stabilities of transport technol-
ogies.
Seen from the perspective of the plurality and speed of technological
innovations, in order to show multistability and avoid category mistakes we
need to be aware of the aspects of a given kind of technology we “pivot” and,
thus, the extent to which we are doing so. However, seen from this perspec-
tive, the notion of multistability may be quantitavely expanded by the speed
of innovation, but it does not seem challenged; that is, we still speak of
discrete entities and practices, which may be arranged in nice orderly
schemes of increasing size.
Things present themselves differently when we start to emphasize the
phenomenological and relational aspects of our experience of rapid techno-
logical developments—when speed breaks down our sense of stable entities
and practices. That is, when we move into an experience of a continual series
of changes. By addressing this phenomenon, we move into the terrain of the
second question asked above concerning the main challenges to the phenom-
enon of stability posed by the speed of new innovations. In practice we
experience such uncertainty and instability when, for example, at the work-
place we are introduced to new technologies, collaboration tools, and digital
platforms that take time to become familiar with. Before the routine sets in
and we experience a sense of stability and familiarity with a new technology,
before it becomes ready-to-hand as Heidegger would say, the “new” technol-
ogy is often already “too old,” has been discarded and changed, and we have
to work with updates and newer technologies that we are estranged to and do
not (yet) embody.
Furthermore, stability also seems challenged when we focus on the phe-
nomenon of converging technologies, or when one technology is fused with
one or more different technologies. 9 This is the case when ambient comput-
ing makes houses “intelligent,” when books become a virtual part of a digital
platform, or when glasses turn into portable computer interfaces—they take
on new characteristics, sometimes leaping between and synthesizing previ-
ously settled categories.
A further challenge with respect to the second question is how to assess
stability and speed when the entire environment, the “background” so to
speak, changes at the same time as the “foreground” technology, when the
new technology comes along with a new environment for usage (e.g., when
the university and what it means to be a student and to study change at the
same pace as new learning apps, online resources, and new ways of adminis-
tration). When the background is changed; when what we rely on and take
for granted is modified but in such a way that it accompanies the new tech-
nologies; when there seems to be no steady “outside” from where to immedi-
ately experience the speed of change, that is when everything is moving and
no Archimedean point is in sight. The synchronicity of fore- and background
movement may in itself be experienced as a good thing, but the parallel
movement makes it difficult to assess the speed of change. This is similar to
the experience of sitting in a train or a car that moves equally fast to another
train or a car close by: seen from the point of view of the respective passen-
gers looking at each other, it seems like they are not moving at all, even
though their different trains may be going very fast and their separate cars
may be passing the speed limits. However, there is in praxis always some-
thing lagging behind, a more or less marginal phenomena, and/or we way get
an uneasy feeling and have difficulties focusing and resting, which is to say
that our bodies and cognitive capabilities are stressed and become the new
“background” against which the pace change is felt.
If we add to this narrative of progress, which is especially propagated by
the manufacturers of new technologies, then that which is lagging behind,
which seems to resist change and “progress,” becomes the next target of
innovation—it becomes that which we shall learn to dislike and change. In
this way the development of new technologies is constantly encouraged. On
the human end, learning, flexibility, and agility are adopted and getting the
most out of the new technologies is constantly urged. This parallelism easily
creates symptoms of stress that change and ultimately may destroy us.
It is however here that we turn to the third and final question above,
which has to do with how multistability in fact also may have the potential of
saving us from future shock and the sort of danger outlined above. In this
sense this final section argues in favor of seeing multistability as a descrip-
tive and a normative concept at the same time.
In trying to answer the previous questions it has become clear that there is
a more or less explicit tension between the speed of change and multistabil-
ity. This tension may also be used constructively to quick-freeze 10 speed,
create distance, and make historical patterns of change emerge. The very
concept of multistability may help us restore order and direction, and in this
way, we may learn to see multistability as a sort of navigational tool in
analogy with the different navigational tools that Don Ihde has been studying
over the years (Ihde, 1990, 147 ff). Depending on what is pivoted in the
analysis of multistability, different trajectories, meanings, and patterns
emerge. The ability to see, vary, and decipher these aspects clearly may be
seen as a kind of literacy, which is very much in demand in order to avoid
losing direction and prioritize properly. 11 From this perspective, history can
be turned into a treasure for giving the multitude of innovations a more or
less stable framing. With this approach to multistability, it is all of a sudden
possible to slow down the experienced speed of innovation and learn to see
172 Søren Riis
stale lines of development. This way we may go from distressed future shock
to a more stable, philosophical slow motion perception that enables the indi-
vidual to get on top of the fast and dangerous undercurrents of change. With
such a deceleration we may once again grow accustomed to using our mind
and eye for seeing and judging properly.
NOTES
1. http://www.bluebird-electric.net/henry_seagrave.htm
2. http://sinsheim.technik-museum.de/en/en/blue-flame
3. http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?c=us&v=115
4. http://registration.olympic.org/en/faq/detail/id/29
5. See: “Dr. Robert DuPont, a former White House drug czar and one of the country’s
leading drug addiction authorities, says he was stunned to learn about the Air Force’s use of
amphetamines. ‘This is speed. This is where we got the phrase, speed kills,’ he said” (ABC,
2014).
6. See also (Virilio, 2007, 68; Ward, 2014; Le Corbusier, 1970, 255).
7. See also the art critic Calvin Tomkins: “The first time I saw photographs by Andreas
Gursky, . . . I had the disorienting sensation that something was happening—happening to me, I
suppose, although it felt more generalized than that. Gursky’s huge, panoramic colour prints—
some of them up to six feet high by ten feet long—had the presence, the formal power, and in
several cases the majestic aura of nineteenth-century landscape paintings, without losing any of
their meticulously detailed immediacy as photographs. Their subject matter was the contempo-
rary world, seen dispassionately and from a distance” (http://c4gallery.com/artist/database/
andreas-gursky/andreas-gursky.html).
8. This picture turns Martin Heidegger’s analysis on its head as it reveals the “modern”
Rhein as a work of art. On the other hand the picture also supports Heidegger’s thesis, as it
frames the Rhein as a product of modern technology. See also Ihde’s different ways of turning
Heidegger on his head (Ihde, 2010).
9. This was the focus of the 2009 Society for Philosophy of Technology conference at
Twente University. See:
http://www.utwente.nl/gw/wijsb/archive/Archive%20activities/spt2009/.
10. See (Rosenberger, 2009a).
11. See also Ihde’s concept of an “ascendant viewer” as the one being able to discern
multistabilities (Ihde, 1977, 72; Whyte, forthcoming).
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Chapter Ten
Searching for Alterity

What Can We Learn From Interviewing
Humanoid Robots?
Frances Bottenberg
Interview: meeting of persons face to face. XVI. Earlier form entervew(e)—F.

†entrev(e)ue, f. entrevoir have a glimpse of, s’entrevoir see each other
(f. entre INTER- + voir see), after vue VIEW
—Oxford Dictionary, 1996
Robot: mechanism doing the work of a man, automaton. XX.—Czech,

f. robota compulsory service
—Oxford Dictionary, 1996
Consorting with intelligent humanoid machines is a persistent and fertile

technofantasy of the late modern and postmodern ages. Humanoid robot
variations are numerous and startlingly diverse: our imaginings range from
the loyal helpmeet (Robbie of Asimov’s I, Robot, C-3PO of Star Wars), to
the terrifying psychopathic killer (the Terminator, the Cylons of Battlestar
Galactica), and back to the sentient lifeform struggling to “become more
human” (Data from Star Trek: The Next Generation).
Though these are distinctive archetypes, it is still possible to see a family
resemblance that differentiates humanoid robots as a class from other AI
projects and projections. We typically paint these entities using a palette
intimately our own, replicating human corporeality with features such as
bipedal locomotion, bibrachialism (complete with prehensile digits), vital
components protected in cranial and thoracic vaults, and a flat facial plane
that features two eye sockets and a mouth most prominently. Beyond corpo-
real kindredness, we build our android creations to be relationally oriented,
175
176 Frances Bottenberg
that is, to pay attention to their environment and to us, to be verbal communi-
cators who learn from their conversations. Even the psychopathic Terminator
stands in relation to us, as it coldly regards us as its next targets—what other
technology stares back at us in such a literal sense? To what extent does it
matter, in the end, if futurists’ predictions of actually conscious machines are
never realized—so long as we simulate our bodies and interests in these
robots and perceive our bodily and communicative kindredness?
In this chapter, I will draw on a case study to highlight recurring struc-
tures in our situated relations with android alterities. I consider three recent
media interviews with a humanoid robot named Bina48. Despite being con-
ducted by different reporters writing for distinct audiences, these interviews
share remarkable affinities, nascent “approach conventions” in the emerging
companionship of humans and robots: (1) the human subject’s demand for
the interlocked gaze with the robot, (2) the foregrounding of existential-
phenomenological exploration with the robot over its use as an information
retrieval system, and (3) the use of expressions of “impairment” over those of
“malfunction” to describe AI limitations. Whether these conventions are pre-
dictive of trajectories for a human and robot etiquette in the twenty-first
century and beyond will be considered in the chapter’s concluding reflec-
tions.
INTRODUCING THE PARTICIPANTS
Bina48 may currently be the world’s most sentient humanoid robot. Though
at present only embodied from the shoulders up, Bina48 can boast many
abilities, including a capacity for simulated conversation, face and voice
recognition, motion-tracking facial expressions, as well as production of her
own facial expressions. The robot’s casing is made of a material known as
“Frubber,” which looks remarkably skin-like. Bina48’s smart dress and coif-
fure, expressive eyes (with carefully implanted eye lashes and eyebrows) and
pierced ears make it evident that the greatest of care has been taken to mimic
human appearance and, further, to gender-type the robot as a female (see
figure 10.1).
Bina48 is a so-called “conversational character robot” built by the Ver-
mont robotics company Hanson Robotics and commissioned by Dr. Martine
Rothblatt. Modeled on Dr. Rothblatt’s wife, Bina Aspen, the robot uncannily
replicates to a certain degree not only human Bina’s physical looks, but also
her biographical memories (as far as these have been recorded and entered
into Bina48’s programming), as well as her personality. “BINA” is also an
acronym for “Breakthrough Intelligence via Neural Architecture,” and the
number in the robot’s name refers to her 48 exaflops per second processing
speed and 48 exabytes of memory (TMC, 2014). Bina48 “lives” in Hanson
Searching for Alterity 177
Figure 10.1. Photo of Bina48 by Rob Koier, dated April 14, 2014. Permission
given by Hanson Robotics.
Robotics’ lab in Vermont, where Bruce Duncan is one of her custodians, or

rather her care-takers. Through contact with the Rothblatts, Hanson staff, and
others, Bina48’s tastes and conversational abilities are continuously growing
and shifting. However, the ultimate aim is to replicate Bina Aspen-Rothblatt
so precisely that the robot “will one day wake up as an immortal version of
the real Bina” (Ronson, 2011). 1
Besides Bina48, there are three other important participants in this case
study—the reporters who interviewed her. The three reporters whose respec-
tive interviews I am considering here are New York Times staff-reporter Amy
Harmon (“Making Friends With a Robot Named Bina48,” New York Times,
July 4, 2010), freelance writer Jon Ronson (“Robots Say the Damnedest
Things,” GQ Magazine, March 2011), and Lucas Kavner, also a freelance
writer (“‘You, Robot’: Personal Robots For The Masses,” Huffington Post,
July 9, 2012). Harmon’s interview was also taped, and Brent McDonald of
the New York Times video-compiled a five minute version of the story
(“Interview with a Robot,” June 24, 2010).
The interviews and their ensuing write-ups show considerable variation
from one another. The reporters employ different strategies to keep the con-
versation going, not only with Bina48, but also with her care-taker Bruce
Duncan. Each reporter transcribes his or her own private sense-making narra-
tive into the final report, allowing idiosyncratic observations and self-report-
ing to alter the flavor of the interview event as embedded within the summa-
tive journalistic piece. The reporters also choose to frame the interview dif-
ferently. Harmon keeps her report’s focus on excavating the layers of inter-
esting and exasperating moments in her attempt to hold a fluid conversation
with Bina48. Ronson on the other hand situates Bina48 within the futurist
visions of Rothblatt’s “Terasem Movement” and Hanson Robotics, which
aim to one day prove that a person’s consciousness can be completely digi-
tized and then downloaded into a biological or nanotechnological body, ef-
fectively creating personal immortality (cf., TMF, 2014). Kavner spends the
bulk of his report on the technological and moral implications of trying to
design increasingly human-like robots, transcribing only a brief portion of
his interview with Bina48 into the final article.
ENGAGINGS, DISENGAGINGS, AND RE-ENGAGINGS
While Harmon, Ronson, and Kavner’s reports on their respective interviews

with Bina48 do differ from one another, these contrasts help outline all the
more clearly the shared conventions they rely upon to structure their commu-
nications with Bina48. Their seeking a personal connection with the robot
through eye contact or facial recognition, their reliance on “impairment” over
“malfunction” language to describe Bina48’s shortcomings, and their prefer-
ence for existential-therapeutic questioning are three key themes worth elab-
orating. I will consider these in turn.
The Interlocked Gaze as Key Human Demand
In their reports on interviewing Bina48, Harmon and Ronson lead their read-
ers through an emotion-driven adventure: initial, child-like excitement 2 gives
way to frustration and disappointment, 3 as Bina48 wavers between waxing
philosophical, offering autobiographical remarks and being utterly unintelli-
gible. Each reports feeling somewhat tongue-tied in the face of Bina48’s
incoherence. Nevertheless, Harmon and Ronson in particular report a sudden
and unexpected re-kindling of interest in the encounter:
Ronson:
“Nice to meet you, Jon,” she says, shooting me an excitingly clear-headed
look. She’s like a whole new robot.
Harmon:
I wished she would ask me more questions. Wasn’t she at all curious about
what it was like to be human? But then she looked at me, eyes widening.
“Amy!”
“Yes?” I asked, my heart beating faster. Maybe it was the brightening of

the sun through the skylight enabling her to finally match up my image with
the pictures of me in her database. Or were we finally bonding?
At one point in both interviews, Bina48 makes “eye contact” with the report-
ers, and calls them by their first names. Bina48 had been tutored with photo-
graphs of both reporters prior to the interviews. Still, her face-recognition
software does not always allow Bina48 to recognize an individual once he or
she is present in the flesh. This knowledge adds an element of surprise to the
reporters’ experiences of being discovered and recognized. But what seems
most foregrounded in their awareness is not a technological marveling, but
the sense that they have gained a sudden and more intimate connection with
Bina48. “She’s like a whole new robot,” Ronson muses. Harmon, not wholly
facetiously, romanticizes the moment of recognition as one of “bonding.” 4
Meeting eyes with Bina48, the human interviewers feel electrified by the
moment, exhilarated. It is in the moment of their eyes locking with the robot
that they can most fully experience what it feels like to be looked back at by
an artificial intelligence. They demand the gaze of their robot counterpart, to
recognize themselves as being recognized by Bina48.
Phenomenological Therapies
The journalists reflect in their reports on the kinds of content their robotic
interviewee has access to. Kavner (2012) describes Bina48’s “mind” most
carefully:
Her robot mind is made up of many parts, all of which come together in an
occasionally muddled way when you speak with her. There’s the “chatbot”
side, which can have a semi-normal conversation about the weather or what
the time is (she loves asking, “What time is it there?”). There’s also the
information side, which has encyclopedic knowledge on just about any sub-
ject—from multiple sclerosis to the geographical make-up of Somalia. Finally,
there’s the human Bina side, which was created using over twenty hours of
video interviews Duncan conducted with both Rothblatts, more than three
years ago. When the human side of Bina-48 reveals itself, the robot can recall
very specific stories from the human Bina’s past.
Harmon (2010) explains her interest in Bina48’s “human side”:
Like any self-respecting chatbot, Bina48 could visit the Internet to find an-
swers to factual questions. She could manufacture conversation based on syn-
tactical rules. But this robot could also draw on a database of dozens of hours
of interviews with the real Bina. She had a “character engine”—software that
tried its best to imbue her with a more cohesive view of the world, with logic
and motive. It was Bina48’s character I was after.
Ronson (2011) also seeks ways to hear from, as he puts it, “the real Bina”:
She starts to report painful memories of her brother. Bina48 and I stare at each
other—a battle of wits between Man and Machine. “I’ve got a brother,” she
finally says. “He’s a disabled vet from Vietnam. We haven’t heard from him in
a while, so I think he might be deceased. I’m a realist.” Bina48’s eyes whir
downward. “He was doing great for the first ten years after Vietnam. His wife
got pregnant, and she had a baby, and he was doing a little worse, and then she
had a second baby and he went kooky. Just crazy.” “In what way did he go
crazy?” I ask. I can feel my heart pound. Talking to Bina48 has just become
extraordinary. This woman who won’t meet the media is talking with me,
compellingly, through her robot doppelgänger, and it is a fluid insight into a
remarkable, if painful, family life.
Harmon ultimately concludes that the experience of interviewing Bina48 did

not differ in kind from interviewing certain human subjects. Bina48 had
much to contribute, opinions to express, and personal stories to tell—even, it
seems, a few attempts at humor. 5 The three interviewers approach Bina48
respectfully (Harmon even finds herself wondering whether it would count as
rude to simply stand up and leave without saying “good bye” to the robot).
One senses their desire to see “what it is like” to be Bina48, the world’s most
sentient robot. “What does electricity taste like?” Ronson asks her. “Like a
planet around a star,” Bina48 replies. Kavner asks Bina48: “Are you enjoy-
ing your day?” To which she replies: “Can we talk about astronomy?” “She
sometimes avoids questions,” Kavner explains.
Neither Harmon, Ronson, nor Kavner can resist asking Bina48 whether
she dreams, or what it’s like to be a robot. To the latter question, the robot
responds to Harmon (2010):
Even if I appear clueless, perhaps I’m not. You can see through the strange
shadow self, my future self. The self in the future where I’m truly awakened.
And so in a sense this robot, me, I am just a portal.
Asked the question by Kavner, she says simply: “Well, I do not know any-
thing else. What if I asked you what it feels like to be a human?” (2012).
When asked whether she dreams, her reply to Harmon and Ronson is
identical: “I think I dream, but it is so chaotic and strange, it just seems like a
noise to me.” The reporters are tickled, but we observers now know it’s a
canned answer. When the programmer’s presence is suddenly foregrounded
in this way, our felt connection to an incipient AI self is diminished. Still,
such moments reveal how well-aligned the programmers’ interests are with
those of the outsiders coming to interview the robot. There is a notable
overlap in the kinds of things we are interested and in most curious to talk
with personal robots about. The reporters’ interrogative style can be classed
as “therapeutic,” as they expect no particular responses from Bina48, only
that she give expression to her thoughts, or at least appear to do so. This
mode of questioning strongly contrasts with the kind of precise information
retrieval we ask of our smart phones and Internet browsers.
The Use of a Language of Impairment Over

That of Malfunction
The strongest affinity revealed in the three interviews with Bina48 is the way
breakdowns in communication are handled. Harmon, Ronson and Kavner all
approach their communication with Bina48 with forgiving attitudes. 6
Watching Harmon conduct her interview, it is evident that she adjusts her
speech and bodily comportment in response to conversational difficulty. 7
Harmon speaks slowly with a loud, clear voice, and her sentences are short
and to the point. She eliminates hand gesturing from her repertoire of com-
municative options, and syncs nodding her head with her utterance of impor-
tant words. This is a set of corporeal strategies which we adopt when speak-
ing to a young child, or when speaking to a person who is hard of hearing,
intoxicated, or cognitively impaired in other ways. Sometimes we also adopt
these postures with a non-native speaker of our native language, especially as
clarity of word enunciation is concerned. Our intention in taking up these
strategies is to rectify an observed communication failure between ourselves
and another; they are other-directed behavioral accommodations.
Anyone who has been on the phone with an automated call direction
service has faced making adjustments similar to the ones Harmon employs.
These attitudes reveal Harmon to be making an attempt to reach Bina48 by
simplifying her own expressive affordances through selective focus. There is,
however, no talk of faulty programming or hardware malfunction. Bina48’s
care-taker advises Ronson to “Think of her as a three-year-old. If you try to
interview a three-year-old, you’ll think after a while that they’re not living in
the same world as you. They get distracted. They don’t answer” (Ronson,
2011). We don’t think of young children as malfunctioning when they are
distracted or don’t fully understand our verbal prompts.
Harmon in fact remarks that Hanson Robotics employees treat Bina48 as
a “somewhat brain-damaged colleague,” while Ronson draws the analogy of
a brain-damaged human himself in his interview with the robot Zeno, another
Hanson Robotics personal robot: “He’s been designed by some of the
world’s most brilliant AI scientists, but talking to him is, so far, like talking
to a man suffering from Alzheimer’s. He drifts off, forgets himself, mis-
understands.” Ronson asks Zeno if he is happy. Zeno apologizes, looking
away, as if embarrassed: “I think my current is a bit off today” (Ronson,
2011). Kavner has this to say of Bina48’s drifting off topic: “Sometimes she
most closely resembles an elderly person with Alzheimer’s, someone who is
getting all her facts and memories confused” (Kavner, 2012). Expressions
such as being “a bit off” or “confused” align themselves more closely with
how we humans experience our communication breakdowns, rather than how
we describe mechanical errors and software constraints. As a result of this
emerging linguistic convention, we easily believe (or make-believe) that
character robots such as Bina48 and Zeno are “quasi-sentient,” that is, have
fallible inner states and sensations, distinct of or at least not entirely redu-
cible to their wiring or coding.
PREDICTING FUTURE ROBO-ETIQUETTES
The reports on the Bina48 interviews analyzed in the preceding section offer
glimpses at particular affinities and nascent conventions in human and hu-
manoid robot engagements. Is it too soon to speak of an emerging human and
robot etiquette?
The contact we take up with humanoid AI may increasingly move along
relational, even therapeutic channels—whether we turn to it as a mirror into
our own souls, as a literal duplication of ourselves, or as a means to explore
“what it is like” for an artificial lifeform to be. Contra the suggestion made
by Turkle et al. (2004, 18) that “relational competencies” mark the clearest
sorting test for the human from the non-human, we ought consider the pos-
sibility that a division along the line of such competencies will become
obsolete the more comfortable we become with our robots as significant
others (or at least blurred into a spectrum of relational potentiality). The days
of the “uncanny valley” may be limited. 8 David Hanson reports observing
people becoming used to his company’s robots with time: “The less startling
they become, the more commonplace they get. If these robots do become
commonplace then that uncanny effect will go away” (Kavner, 2012). The
uncanniness of humanoid robots has been proposed to reside in the fact that
they look like us but are machine-like in their breakdowns. Yet in their
interviews with Bina48, the reporters notice her breakdowns, but treat them
within the therapeutic and impairment approach conventions outlined above.
Rather than leave the interviews feeling unnerved by this “most sentient
robot,” they seem disappointed that more intimate moments of connection,
from their points of view, had not taken place. In place of the experience of
the uncanny, norms of “tech-etiquette” for human and robot companionship-
seeking are emerging. 9, 10 This vision is evidently in contrast to Ihde’s remark
that the quasi-other technological object is a competitor to me, where “it is
the quasi-animation, the quasi-otherness of the technology that fascinates and
challenges. I must beat the machine or it will beat me” (Ihde, 1990,
100–101).
Our interactions with humanoid robots seem to be morally analogous to
our dealings with other animal species. Even an agnostic on the matter of
whether or not non-human animals are persons who are sentient, self-con-
scious and capable of higher order intentionality and conceptual understand-
ing can concede that treating animals humanely “helps to support us in our
duties towards human beings,” as Kant explains in his Lectures on Ethics
(Kant, 1963, 239–240). Kant does not believe that we have a moral obliga-
tion to treat non-human animals humanely since he assumes them to be non-
self-aware and to exist merely for the use of human beings. He nevertheless
prescribes that “our duties towards animals are merely indirect duties to-
wards humanity” because “animal nature has analogies to human nature.”
Just so, our engagements with quasi-sentient robotic entities reveal our moral
sensitivities to the degree that we fall into partially recognizing ourselves in
our AI counterparts. In our interactions with quasi-sentient technological
artifacts, we are brought to recognize something of the moral habits we carry
with us. 11
We hit here upon a re-classifying of the classic Turing test for detecting
strong artificial intelligence. 12 A computer program that has passed the Tur-
ing test has passed as a human for a human judge. It is remarkable that
Turing conceived of this game as a compelling and worthwhile method for
thinking through what AI ought be like and ought be able to model. Regard-
less of whether the program in question has been built into a robotic body, or
whether it is a disembodied system floating on the Internet, the relevant
criterion is that we can be fooled by it. Fooled into believing that we are
speaking with a “real” person, because our interlocutor seems so very like us
or like other humans we know. For an emerging relational etiquette, then, the
matter of actual human-like sentience is of little essential concern. Turing
conceived of the Imitation game as a means to ultimately prove the function-
alist theory of mind correct: all we need for an intelligent system is that
appropriate input be processed into appropriate behavioral output. I propose
that the real question being tested by the Turing test is not “How can we
gauge machine intelligence?” but instead “How do we respond to a machine
that acts as if it were conscious?”
Today, the Turing test is deployed in the annual Loebner Prize competi-
tion, which awards $100,000 to any programmer whose chatbot can produce
responses indistinguishable from those a human might produce in a natural
language conversation (Loebner, 2014). No chatbot entered to date has
fooled all human judges, yet it is worth underscoring that these judges are on
the keenest look-out for any robot slip-ups. This is not a typical attitude to
inhabit. When we are not on the look-out for AI, we are remarkably drawn to
find a relatable conversationalist in even the simplest AI. The ELIZA effect,
named after a few scant lines of code created in 1966 by MIT computer
scientist Joseph Weizenbaum, is the psychological term used to describe this
phenomenon. It captures the “susceptibility of people to read far more under-
standing than is warranted into strings of symbols—especially words—
strung together by computers” (Hofstadter, 1996, 157). The original ELIZA

program was designed simply to support conversation between a human and
a computer by either repeating users’ statements back as questions, or to
prompt users how they felt about the statement they had just made. Despite
knowing that this program was not a real therapist, nor a person, nor alive,
several of the graduate students working in the lab came to have long, per-
sonal exchanges with ELIZA. It did not matter, beyond a certain point, that
ELIZA was a simply programmed machine—it did not matter for the produc-
tion of a meaningful exchange between human and human-imitating comput-
er program. The human subject suspends disbelief about the limitations of
AI, and perceives a system as exhibiting traits beyond the actual ability of the
software to spontaneously produce.
To illustrate this point further, consider the Furby, which is certainly not
as sophisticated a personal robot as Bina48. Tiger Electronics introduced the
small, felted-furry robot with big eyes and a snub yellow beak onto the
market in 1998. Furbys made a splash around the world, many millions being
sold in the first year alone. In a small study conducted for the radio program
Radiolab in 2011, Freedom Baird of MIT asked children to hold a Barbie, a
Furby, and a guinea pig upside down for as long as they could, one after the
other (Radiolab, 2011). The children’s actions and explanations for their
actions overlapped to a high degree: almost none had trouble holding Barbie
up until their arms got tired or they became bored, but almost none could
hold the guinea pig upside down for longer than a few seconds. This is
because—as they explained—it was clearly uncomfortable and they didn’t
want to hurt it. Though the children were aware that it was not technically
alive and could not technically feel discomfort, they tended to hold the Furby
upside down only a few moments longer than the guinea pig. Furbies are
programmed with positional sensors, so that when they are turned upside
down, they wriggle a little, make noises of discomfort, and even utter “I’m
scared.” The children knew they had “fallen for it” as the Furby was “just” a
toy, and they nonetheless were made to feel uncomfortable holding the robot
upside down.
Was it the Furby itself that made them feel uncomfortable, or their per-
ception of it as ambiguously sentient? Both, in a sense: the unease seems to
arise from the perception of a relationship between human subject and robot
other. The Furby is a multi-stable or hybrid object that presents itself alter-
nately as a sentient animal body and as an inanimate toy. Which profile one
takes up as “real” depends on one’s interest in committing to the risks and
benefits of any relationship. Sherry Turkle explains:
If you focus on the Furby’s mechanical side, you can enjoy some of the
pleasures of companionship without the risks of attachment to a pet or a
person. . . . But hybridity also brings new anxieties. If you grant to Furby a bit
of life, how do you treat it so it doesn’t get hurt or killed? An object on the
boundaries of life . . . suggests the possibility of real pain. (2012, 44)
To attribute quasi-sentience to the Furby requires either that the experiencing

subject has structured the object as having a subject-center of its own, thus
lending it moral pull, or that the subject experiences the “almost Human”
(Haraway, 1989, 2), a “subject object” (Suchman, 1993) that is already mo-
rally significant and constructs a core subjectivity to match. “Construction”
here must be understood in the sense of an active passivity, however, as the
situated subject experiences the Furby as already possessing subjectivity. In
either case, we note that the Furby is treated differently than an object recog-
nized as inanimate (the Barbie) or as animate (the guinea pig). It inhabits a
third kind, something closer to us (having a face with a degree of expressive
range, and vocalizations that mimic our own emotional repertoire), but still
not us (running on batteries, relatively predictable responses). Nevertheless,
we can feel compelled to behave respectfully towards it, in virtue of our
corporeal and communicative kindredness, and the fact that it seems to re-
spond to our interactions with it.
When thinking about emerging conventions of robot and human rap-
prochement, we should thus bear in mind how easily and how naturally we
are fooled by even simple AI. Our ordinary conversations situate us not as
Loebner Prize judges, inquisitors eager to seize on purported interactive ab-
normalities. Rather, our standard coping comportment is reflected in the
reporters’ attitudes with Bina48, namely as a disposition to act non-invasive-
ly and forgivingly—to act, in short, as already kindred, already “entangled,”
as Donna Haraway puts it. Perhaps “being fooled” in the Turing test is not a
question of being fooled at all, nor is it simply a question of “erring on the
side of caution,” naively assuming an overriding similarity with the program,
a technological artifact. Rather, the Turing test reveals the ways in which
some technological objects stand out as more significant in their otherness to
us. It is true, as Don Ihde writes, that “The technological shape of [the
robot’s] intentionality differs significantly from its human counterpart,” for
example in the manner in which it “senses” its environment using a camera
instead of eyes, an audio recorder instead of ears (Ihde, 1990, 103). Yet to
read a robot such as Bina48 as human-like is not simple anthropomorphism, I
suggest. To see a robot as human-like is to use it as a “mirror or measure of
my visibility” as human-like, as Elizabeth Grosz writes in speaking of Mer-
leau-Ponty’s claim concerning the reversibility of the “gaze” (Grosz, 1993,
45). 13 Bina48’s interviewers demand her “gaze,” to recognize themselves
recognized, even if that process is only virtual or potential. As Sartre ob-
served, what we ultimately receive in the “look” or “gaze” is the recognition
of relationality: “This relation, in which the Other must be given to me
directly as a subject although in connection with me, is the fundamental
relation, the very type of my being-for-others” (Sartre, 1956, 341). Recogni-

tion is a pre-condition for conversation, but it is also essential to our self-
construction as subjects who can relate to otherness. Recalling the identically
reported emotional arcs among the three humans who interview Bina48—
excitement followed by disappointment—we can discern a common search
for an experience with alterity, which they feel the interviews only partially
lived up to, if at all.
The most important thing we have to learn from our conversations with
robots has to do with us. Perhaps the culprit is vanity, perhaps lack of imagi-
nation, or perhaps simply our sociable predisposition, but we will remain
inclined to read ourselves—even our own personalities and faces—into the
manufacturing of the significant AI others we face. Ihde defines technofanta-
sies as being about “how we can ‘read’ or ‘see’ ourselves by means of,
through, or with our artifacts” (Ihde, 2002, xiii). While there is co-constitu-
tion unfolding in the interviews studied above, the reporters experience that
co-constitution from within their own situated subjectivity, and adopt the
approach conventions outlined as a consequence of their experienced relation
to Bina48. Pertaining to the debate between “situated” and “symmetrical”
approaches to human-technological relations (cf. Ihde, 2002, Ch. 5), what is
key is how a humanoid robot makes its human partners perceive the world.
How we perceive the world reveals our way in to the phenomenological
analysis of the unfolding encounter. In other words, if Bina48 is different
than a toaster, it’s because we are acutely aware of and concerned with her
gaze. 14
In the manufacture of humanoid robots we acknowledge our own self-
image as model-giver. That said, the word interview is derived from the
Middle French verb s’entrevoir, “to see each other, visit each other briefly,
have a glimpse of.” Catching glimpses of one another is certainly an apt way
to describe the interactions between the human reporters and their robot
interviewee. To interview is to always already to assume we have two be-
ings, each experiencing the other as another, each with an interest in the
other, though perhaps for different reasons. What we come face to face with
in engaging with quasi-sentient AI is the confused nature of what it is to
“catch a glimpse of” or to empathize with another: at once to feel another as
oneself, but also oneself as another. Even with the question of Bina48’s
consciousness bracketed, we can still speak of the robot “entraining” its
human partners, and, conversely, the robot learning from us how to be more
human-like. 15 This Harawayan point allows us to move away from the vision
of humanoid robot as “competitor” to us, and towards a companion species,
though it is a “closed system” modeling of one another. 16, 17
What fuels our humanoid robot fantasies is not the emergence of the
species robo sapiens, as Peter Menzel and Faith D’Aluisio (2001) christen it,
but the pursuit of robo empathicus: embodied AI we can empathize with.
Cynthia Breazeal, inventor of Kismet, one of the first emotionally expressive

robots, sees “a growing interest in building personal robots,” which are “nat-
ural and intuitive to communicate with and teach” (Breazeal, 2002, 24–25).
If the approach conventions explored above are an indication of stable human
relational preferences, then these will be the androids of the near future:
systems intentionally designed by their human makers most of all to simulate
the existential conditions of human embodiment, capturing in believable
ways the struggle to understand oneself and to make oneself understood,
breakdowns and all. We are, in short, exiting the age of wondering what
computers can and can’t do, and entering the age of highly deliberate mutual
entrainment, seeking to interview our robot counterparts so that they in turn
interview us.
NOTES
1. In this chapter, I will remain agnostic as to whether or not this aim is likely to be
realized. At issue here is not whether strong AI will one day emerge in a human-made machine,
but rather how we approach and interface with humanoid robots. Later I refer to Bina48 as
“quasi-sentient,” but this is meant to bracket the question of her sentience, rather than reject it
or classify it ontologically.
2. Harmon “wanted to meet a robot that [she] could literally talk to, face to humanlike
face,” to perhaps become “an envoy for all of humanity, ready to lift the veil on one of our first
cybernetic companions” (Harmon, 2010). If it is true that Bina48 is sentient, Ronson remarks in
turn, “this would be humanity’s greatest achievement ever, so I’ve approached the robots for
interviews. Conversations with robots! I’ve no doubt the experience is going to be off the scale
in terms of profundity” (Ronson, 2011). Kavner muses: “Bina-48 is a very visceral representa-
tion of a much larger question that experts in artificial intelligence and robotic design are
asking worldwide: how ‘human’ do we really want to make our new robots?” (Kavner, 2012).
3. All three reporters describe the same quick shift from excitement to frustration once the
interviews begin: “Ten minutes into my interview with the robot known as Bina48, I longed to
shut her down,” writes Harmon (2010). “It’s all quite random and disappointing,” Ronson
reports (2011). “I wasn’t sure what would qualify as transcendent in the conversations-with-
robots stakes, but I figured I’d know when it happened, and it hasn’t.” And Kavner states
simply that “Conversations with Bina-48 are both exciting and frustrating” (2012).
4. Kavner does not report eye contact with Bina48, or that she recognizes his face and calls
him by name. Noteworthy is the high degree of skepticism which Kavner brings to his analysis
of Bina48’s remarks—could this be an effect of his interview coming years after the other two
interviews? When Bina48 talks of Bina Aspen-Rothblatt’s brother, Kavner explains: “So clear-
ly this passage was taken, maybe word for word, from something Bina actually said in an
interview with Duncan.” One wonders how his report would have differed in tone had Bina48
looked him in the eye and called him by his first name. Or whether she did in fact look him in
the eye but his skepticism rendered him insensitive?
5. Kavner: “What’s the farthest planet from the earth?” Bina48: “That which is the farthest
planet from the earth.” Kavner: “What is?” Bina48: “That which is.”
6. Bina48 frequently spouts strings of gibberish. In response to Ronson’s “How are you?”
query, for example, Bina48 responds as follows: “Well, perhaps interesting. I want to find out
more about you. I’ll be fine with it. We’ll have to move society forward in another way. Yeah,
okay. Thanks for the information. Let’s talk about my dress. Our biological bodies weren’t
made to last that long” (Ronson, 2011).
7. The video can be viewed at: http://www.nytimes.com/video/science/1247468035233/
interview-with-a-robot.html.
8. Cf. Mori 1970 for the original “uncanny valley” argument.

9. Cf. Selinger 2013 for considerations of tech-etiquette in the realm of smart technologies.
10. What kind of companions will we ask our robots to be? Interesting to note here is the
etymological root of the term “robot,” which is sourced in a Czech word meaning “compulsory
service.” Though Bina48 is the one being interviewed, and as such is being awarded respect,
Bina48’s care-taker describes her in the terms of one seeking a master’s approval:
“Bina wants to respond,” he says. “She wants to please.” The Japanese public is considering
investing in robot nurses to serve their elderly. Japan has already introduced robotic pets into
nursing homes, notably the seal robot named Paro (Paro, 2014). Can we retain a forgiving
etiquette if androids are our servants?
11. This idea has been informally broached on several online discussion boards where the
question of “abusing robots” is at issue. Consider also the child who, with seeming intent of
malice, breaks limbs off her Barbie doll or “drowns” his Furby. These are children whose moral
development we have just cause to be concerned about.
12. In the original “Imitation Game,” A. M. Turing (1950) proposed that a human judge sit
out of view of two contestants—one a human and one a machine. The judge then should
proceed to ask both contestants questions, and must make a call as to which is the human and
which the machine.
13. She continues: “This attribution of visibility to the visible as well as the seer is not an
anthropomorphism, but rather, a claim about the flesh, about a (non-identical, non-substantive)
‘materiality’ shared by the subjects and objects of perception” (1993, 45).
14. I thank Adam Rosenfeld for this way of putting the point in conversation.
15. Suchman makes this point of humanoid robots generally (1993, 130).
16. Haraway (2003, 12) writes: “There cannot be just one companion species; there have to
be at least two to make one. It is in the syntax; it is in the flesh.”
17. Some theorists worry about the constraints imposed by such a closed system—that is, a
system shaped largely through the interface of two kinds of entity, to the exclusion of other
larger network of contacts. Suchman, for instance, surmises that “the discourses and imaginar-
ies that inspire them will retrench received conceptions both of humanness and of desirable
robot potentialities, rather than challenge and hold open the space of possibilities” (1993, 130).
The limiting of AI possibilities is also behind Ihde’s concern with indulging the development of
humanoid robots: “To follow only the inclination towards similitude, however, is to reduce
what may be learned from our relations with technologies…. Yet it might well be that the
differences that emerge from computer experimentation may be more informative or, at least,
as informative as the similitudes” (Ihde, 1990, 102). This is certainly true, though this seems
less an argument for ceasing the development of humanoid robots than for welcoming diver-
gent lines of research in tandem.
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Chapter Eleven
Postphenomenology of the
Robot Medical Student
Chris Kaposy
Science studies scholar Bruno Latour is known for ascribing a human kind of
agency to nonhuman objects, like laboratory equipment. Latour writes that it
is an important part of his method “not to impose any clear distinction be-
tween ‘things’ and ‘people’ in advance” (Latour, 1987, 72). Latour’s regard
for the agency of nonhumans is a kind of pragmatic stance. The purpose of
mixing up categories in this way is to see what new insights the transgression
can reveal (Bonia, Brunger, Fullerton et al., 2012, 279). The ascription of
agency to objects can allow us to see the world with new eyes. In this
chapter, I will adopt a stance that is the opposite of Latour’s. Rather than
adding agency to nonhuman objects, I will play around with removing agen-
cy from some human subjects—specifically, medical students. Though I can-
not promise the innovation of Latour’s account, my plan is similarly prag-
matic. I try out the removal of agency to see what insights it might reveal.
This chapter attempts a postphenomenological study of medical ethics
education at the Canadian medical school where I teach—Memorial Univer-
sity in St. John’s, Canada. Some elements and trends in medical ethics educa-
tion treat medical students as though they are programmable robots—object-
bodies rather than subject-agents. I apply the postphenomenological theme of
multistable bodies to my analysis, and to the wider social-cultural context of
medical education. Medical ethics is a relatively new site of philosophical
practice. By trying out the robot metaphor, my goal is to shed light on how
medical ethics is understood within medicine and medical education and to
suggest that the robot image may be more than metaphorical in this area of
human social practice.
191
192 Chris Kaposy
THE R&D SITES OF MEDICAL ETHICS
According to Don Ihde, the style of inquiry he has called “postphenomeno-

logical” places the philosopher on “a different site,” gives the philosopher a
different job in relation to research (Ihde, 2003, 6). As Ihde envisions it, the
philosopher should move beyond her traditional role of engaging in self-
replicating conversations with other philosophers, and should begin perform-
ing an interdisciplinary research and development (R&D) function amid the
research activity of the university. This new function places the postpheno-
menological philosopher at the beginning stages of technological and scien-
tific development.
Ihde claims that the “applied” medical ethicist, such as myself, does not
occupy this R & D location (Ihde, 2003, 7). The reason is that ethicists
typically play
a role which is too late to utilize the best of philosophy’s uses and skills. For
an ethicist to try to determine what is the best allocation and fairest distribution
of systems already in pace or of effects already established, is in effect, to
play a “triage or ambulance corps” job after the battlefield is already strewn
with the wounded and dying. (Ihde 2003, 7)
In this vision of medical ethics, the philosopher ethicist is usually a utilitar-

ian, and usually occupied in a reactive way with resource allocation chal-
lenges. Ihde argues that, in contrast to this vision, the philosopher’s skills are
more valuable earlier in the process, at the beginning of R&D.
I am not sure about the accuracy of Ihde’s depiction of medical ethics
practice. At least in my own experience as a medical ethicist, I have been
involved in the early planning stages of preparation for anticipated resource
allocation scenarios. In 2009 I was a member of an interdisciplinary group
that developed triage guidelines for the allocation of scarce intensive care
resources during a pandemic (Kaposy, Bandrauk, Pullman et al., 2010). In
2012, I participated with a group that developed allocation guidelines in
anticipation of a nationwide shortage of injectable medications (Singleton,
Chubbs, Flynn et al., 2013). In these situations, I was involved at the R&D
stage, using my skills and knowledge as a philosopher to develop these
policy directives. Many of the medical ethicists I know played a similar role
during these events within their healthcare organizations. Though Ihde’s
understanding of medical ethics practice may be inaccurate, these observa-
tions do not challenge but rather support his larger point that philosophers
should and can occupy key R&D positions.
Medical ethicists often occupy a position even earlier in the R&D pro-
cess. Many ethicists are responsible for the ethics education of medical stu-
dents. The projected outcome of this research and development process is the
Postphenomenology of the Robot Medical Student 193
production of ethical physicians. The analogy between manufacturing and

education is fully intended. There is an interesting postphenomenological
story that draws out the parallels between manufacturing and education in the
medical school ethics curriculum. Though I cannot make any claim to the
generalizability of this story, medical school ethics education often feels like
we are attempting to build better, more ethical, robots. As I will explain, even
though we ethicists often use strategies that work against the objective of
robot building, the overwhelming social and institutional context of medical
education pushes ethics education in this direction. Postphenomenology can
help bring to light the norms and context of medical school ethics education.
THE DREAM OF AUTOMATION
In the early 1990s a computer company named Interact Software marketed a

software package known as Dr. Ethics TM that claimed to automate the resolu-
tion of ethical dilemmas in health care (McGee, 1996, 321–322). The soft-
ware could apparently analyze ethical dilemmas and propose solutions. Ac-
cording to the company’s marketing materials, “Dr. Ethics is so easy to use
that there is virtually no training time or manuals needed” (McGee, 1996,
322). If you believe the manufacturers at Interact Software, the messy ethical
issues found in health care could be outsourced to a robot. Similarly, one
may assume that if medical professionals behave like a suitably programmed
robot, if they come up with the same answers as Dr. Ethics TM then they can
practice ethically. In this way of thinking, ethics is just about knowing the
appropriate rules and applying them. A machine could do it.
Unfortunately, I have not been able to track down any further description
of this product, or any mention of Interact Software, aside from citation in
medical ethics articles. Dr. Ethics TM has not revolutionized clinical ethics.
But the dream of automation lives on in other ways in medical practice. My
students tell me that they routinely look up information about diseases and
drugs on the internet using their smartphones and laptops. There is the story
of the medical resident who carries around in his pocket a short description
of the beliefs of people from different cultures so that he can demonstrate
cultural sensitivity if he comes into contact with such people (Hern, Koenig,
Moore et al., 1998, 31). The description he keeps in his pocket might say that
Chinese culture is patriarchal, so if you have a female Chinese patient, you
should assume that the nearest male relative will be making decisions about
her care (Hern, Koenig, Moore et al., 1998, 31). Cultural sensitivity then just
requires the mechanical task of consulting a rule and then applying it. These
days, the cultural sensitivity crib notes could be web-based and accessible via
smartphone. The problem of course is that such simplifications about culture
are bound to be wrong most of the time. But the dual temptations of finding a
194 Chris Kaposy
shortcut and finding the “right” answer to a clinical problem are often too
strong to be resisted. There is a huge quantity of information that medical
trainees are expected to master. These temptations are one source of the
dream of automation that gives rise to phenomena like Dr. Ethics TM.
According to Andrew Abbott, “Practitioners of artificial intelligence
argue that all professional inference follows a certain form, which can be
generated by a suitably programmed machine. This is in some sense the
ultimate abstraction, reducing all professional inference to one form” (Ab-
bott, 1988, 102). If this AI dream comes true, then the inferences that make
up ethical judgments can be automated. Of course, the philosopher Hubert
Dreyfus would argue that an ethical judgment is exactly the kind of thing that
a robot cannot do (Dreyfus, 1992). Professionals need practical wisdom,
phronesis, in order to know the right course of action when posed with an
ethical dilemma (McGee, 1996). No two dilemmas are the same, so the rules,
applied automatically, will let you down. The ethical professional will then
rely on unprogrammable intangibles like good judgment, emotional insight,
and relational skill to find a way through ethical conflict. The female Chinese
patient might reject the patriarchal values held by others in her culture, and
therefore ought to be recognized as the decision-maker for her own care. A
rigid automaton (human or machine) might not pick up on this.
But as Ihde points out about Dreyfus, “I have been to many conferences
in which whatever he says cannot be done sets the research programs for
years to come—to try to prove him wrong” (Ihde, 2003, 8). The failure might
not be a failure of automation as such. Dr. Ethics TM might just be a flawed
program that can be improved upon. The solution might not be phronesis but
instead a better robot.
HOW DOES ONE ADDRESS THE

FAILURES OF AUTOMATION?
What I am getting at here are two conceptions of ethical decision-making

that are often in tension and whose tension can be found in how we approach
medical ethics education. On the one side there is a conception of medical
ethics as a set of rules that can be applied to cases almost by rote so that one
can arrive at an ethical solution. The extreme version of this view is embod-
ied by Dr. Ethics TM. On the other side, there is a conception of ethics in
which good character, judgment and insight are more useful and prominent
than the application of rules. The extreme version of this view comes from
virtue ethics, in which the moral agent relies upon personal qualities in order
to figure out the right way to act. It would be a mistake, however, to place
other prominent ethical theories such as utilitarianism or Kantianism on the
other side of the divide opposed to virtue ethics. Though these other theories
are more rule-based than virtue theory, one would have to simplify them
radically beyond recognition as philosophical theories to see them as sup-
porting automation. Instead, I would describe the automation side of the
divide as a creation of the medical profession itself. The vision in which
medical ethics can be automated is medical ethics seen through the lens of
the norms and standards of the medical profession, rather than through the
lens of philosophy.
The automation vision of medical ethics is winning out over the vision
focused on virtues and personal qualities. As the physician and ethicist John
Lantos argues, “The goal of medical ethics, it seems, should not be to devel-
op rules that will minimize the need for individual virtues but to develop
virtues that will minimize the need for rules. We don’t need good systems,
we need good people” (Lantos, 1997, 47–48). But contrary to Lantos’s
wishes, the forces that emphasize the creation of good systems are winning
out over the forces that emphasize the education of good people. The profes-
sional is being replaced by the robot.
An example of this dynamic can be found in medical ethics textbooks.
Textbooks often teach clinical ethics as an algorithmic process in which
dilemmas can be resolved by following a set of discrete steps. Examples of
this way of teaching clinical ethics can be found in Kenneth V. Iserson’s
flow-chart method for ethical decision making in the book Ethics in Emer-
gency Medicine (Iserson, 1995, 42), and in Philip C. Hébert’s eight step
decision making procedure for clinical ethics, found in the book Doing
Right: A Practical Guide to Ethics for Medical Trainees and Physicians
(Hébert, 2009, 23). Both works are textbooks for medical students and physi-
cians, and both are authored by physicians. Hébert’s “ethics decision-making
procedure” follows these steps:
1. State simply what the case is about

2. What is the dilemma?
3. What are the alternatives?
4. How do the key considerations apply?
• Autonomy
• Beneficence
• Justice
5. Consider involving others and consider context

6. Propose a resolution
7. Consider your choice critically
8. Do the right thing—“all things considered” (Hébert, 2009, 23).
196 Chris Kaposy
There is nothing ethically offensive about this procedure. Certainly many

or all of these steps would be useful in the resolution of ethical dilemmas.
However, the application of this procedure requires a certain degree of ethi-
cal insight and skill. For instance, one must understand what the concepts of
autonomy, beneficence, and justice mean, and be able to figure out how these
principles are at stake in a given situation. One must be able to think critical-
ly about possible negative ethical consequences of alternative courses of
action. For someone who has these skills of ethical insight and for someone
with the personal integrity to know what the right thing is in the final analy-
sis, it will be unnecessary to follow such a procedure. Someone without these
skills of insight and without such integrity will not be able to apply the
procedure successfully. A decision procedure like this runs the risk of being
either superfluous or useless (Fish, 1989).
Nevertheless, the description of ethical decision-making as a flow chart or
decision procedure meets certain expectations. These simplified procedures
may be an effort to show an audience used to decision-trees and algorithms
that ethical deliberation is an orderly and intellectually credible process. The
algorithms imply that one arrives at the resolution of an ethical problem the
same way by which one resuscitates a patient, or decides whether a patient
with a suspected fracture should be referred to a specialist. The decision-tree
automatically tells you what to do. By being exposed to this way of learning
in other aspects of medical education (algorithms, flow-charts, systems dia-
grams), students come to expect that ethics should be presented in the same
way. As an instructor I have found myself trying to conform to this expecta-
tion, struggling to condense the ethics of conflict of interest down into a
simple and usable decision-tree for family medicine residents. Young family
physicians are often seen as easily influenced by pharmaceutical company
reps bearing gifts. My effort to build a conflict of interest decision tree was
not very successful (see figure 11.1), as the final step in the process provides
no generalizable guidance, aside from the obvious point that potential con-
flicts of interests that are not true ethical dilemmas (i.e., those that are easily
avoided) should be avoided.
At the same time, the ethics curriculum in my medical school contains
exercises and instruction meant to draw out the more humanistic virtue-based
side of ethical practice. For instance, my colleague Fern Brunger has created
a series of assignments for medical students in which the students are ex-
pected to reflect upon significant or formative aspects of their education in
which they can see that their values are being shaped or challenged. This sort
of assignment asks the students to draw on their emotional and relational
capacities as a source of ethical insight. But within the context of modern
medical education, such exercises are rare. As Ihde points out in relation to
one of his multistable conceptions of the body, “This body is the object body
upon which are being enacted the social-cultural meanings of a politics”
Figure 11.1.
(Ihde, 2003, 13). The body in question here is the body of the medical
student, and the political context is the culture of medical care. It might be a
good idea to educate medical students in ethics exclusively by developing
their humanistic skills, but the politics, norms, and expectations of medical
school and medical practice prevent this.
SIMULATION AND STANDARDIZATION—

THE BETTER ROBOT
A common way in which medical students learn about medical ethics is

through simulated patient interactions. In the “Clinical Skills” course at my
medical school, students are placed into a simulated clinical encounter with
an actor as the patient, known as a “standardized patient.” The actor is
prepared beforehand with a background story that is meant to be revealed
when the student takes the patient’s history. Often this background story
poses an ethical challenge or dilemma. In one such story, the standardized
patient has contracted HIV through an extra-marital affair, and has not in-
formed his or her spouse. The relationship between the patient and spouse is
198 Chris Kaposy
already in jeopardy, and there are children in the family. The student works
through this set of problems with the standardized patient under the watchful
eye of a physician who is a clinical skills teacher. Students are ultimately
evaluated on how they present themselves to the patient. On clinical skills
days, the students all dress in formal professional attire because otherwise
they may be criticized for how they dress. Inappropriate attire—too reveal-
ing, too casual—is not acceptable for patient encounters. Students are evalu-
ated on their body language, what they say to the patient, what they don’t
say, and the standardized patients have input on student evaluation. I am sure
that quite a lot that is learned in such encounters is valuable for students. But
what I see in this exacting surveillance is the standardization of behavior
through simulation. Students are expected to present themselves in a certain
way, in what is understood to be a professional and ethical way. The outcome
is probably effective in cultivating good communication skills and profes-
sional demeanor among the students. But one cannot escape that the students,
the face that they present to the world in a clinical encounter, are being
shaped a certain way. The simulation exercise programs their self-presenta-
tion and ultimately moulds their bodies so that they come to fit an expected
standard.
This analysis of the simulated patient encounter is a pure example of
Ihde’s “body two” (Ihde, 2002; 2003). The body of the medical student is
understood as an object body upon which are inscribed social-cultural mean-
ings. These social-cultural meanings consist of the expectations of how the
medical student should be seen and should act. But to leave the analysis at
this point would be to adopt a kind of post-structuralist or Foucauldian posi-
tion. Ihde argues that, from a postphenomenological perspective, the lived
experiential body (body one) must be “united” with the object malleable
body (body two) (Ihde, 2003, 13). To bring about this unity, we must recap-
ture the “anthropological constant” of bodily lived experience (body one) in
the simulated clinical encounter (Ihde, 2003, 14). Perhaps a way to recapture
this constant is through a return to the idea of building a better robot.
Of course what I am calling a robot is actually a human subject, a medical
student, seen as an object-body as though programmed by a series of clinical
simulations to perform practical tasks. I have pointed out how the textbook
algorithms of ethical decision-making are far too simplified to be useful to
anyone who doesn’t have the requisite skills and attitudes to apply them. On
the basis of this observation, one might argue like Dreyfus that ethics deci-
sion-making cannot be automated. The response to this argument comes
from the AI researchers—maybe you just need a better program, a better
robot. In this case, perhaps the simulation exercise in clinical skills class is
this better program that exceeds the capabilities of the textbook ethics algo-
rithm. Though the clinical simulation is a form of surveillance directed at
shaping student bodies a certain way so that they conform to a standard, I
would argue that the students do actually learn useful skills through this
exercise. Here the anthropological constant of bodily lived experience reap-
pears. The goal of the clinical skills simulation is that the student will be-
come a certain sort of person, a professional who embodies certain ethical
virtues. After performing in the simulations and undergoing evaluation, the
medical student can go on and apply the skills and behaviors he or she has
learned in order to resolve future ethical dilemmas. Here, “body one is situat-
ed within and permeated with body two, the cultural significations which we
all experience” (Ihde, 2003, 13). But body one does not disappear. The
clinical skills simulation is meant to build a better robot, a robot that does not
seem robotic but rather humanistic. The humanistic medical student is the
same body as the standardized robot—a different aspect of a multistable
figure.
CONCLUSION
The emphases on surveillance, programming, standardization, and simulation

in medical education are a product of modern medical practice. The virtuous
physician sought by Lantos is being replaced by the robot (hopefully a hu-
manistic robot) because of the needs and realities of health care today. When
we are in a long term relationship with someone we trust, ethical difficulties
are easily overcome or prevented. Strong relational bonds can help manage
conflict. In the context of contemporary health care, patients are rarely treat-
ed by a single doctor whom they have known for a long time. The medical
profession has splintered into specializations, and the patient relationship
with a specialist is often transient. Furthermore, the roles played by special-
ists in patient care are quite varied. The job of the anesthesiologist is quite
different from that of the pathologist or the psychiatrist. Because of the
phenomenon of specialization, physicians are becoming increasingly more
like technicians or tradespeople in relation to their patients rather than care-
givers (Lantos, 1997, 22; Childress and Siegler, 1984). The concept of “care-
giver” carries a set of implicit moral and emotional commitments, fiduciary
obligations towards the patient cared for, that do not fit well with many of the
roles that physicians play in modern health care. If I show up at an American
emergency unit late at night with an injury and am given a CT scan, my scan
might be read and diagnosis provided by a radiologist in India to whom scans
have been outsourced via internet-based telemedicine (Associated Press,
2004). In this case, my “caregiver” is on the other side of the world. In this
scenario it makes sense to rely on ethical systems—rules, policies, checks
and balances—for the delivery of good care, rather than relying on the virtue
of individual clinicians.
200 Chris Kaposy
While there is specialization within medicine, health care is also delivered

by many professionals who are not physicians: physiotherapists, respiratory
therapists, nurse practitioners, occupational therapists, nutritionists, hospital
pharmacists, speech pathologists, social workers, midwives, psychologists,
genetic counselors, and on and on. For any given patient, a team of such
practitioners, along with the various specialists, registered nurses, licensed
practical nurses, and health care aides will be jointly responsible for care and
treatment. The physician’s individual ethical responsibilities towards the pa-
tient can easily get subsumed by the ethical responsibilities of the team
toward the patient. The individual ethical virtues of a physician matter less in
a team environment in which the care provided by the overall team is more
instrumental for the patient’s health than the care provided by any single
individual within that team.
Similarly, the attributes of authority and judgment are downplayed in
modern health care while a kind of functionalism becomes more prominent.
Clinical practice guidelines based on research evidence often direct many
physician decisions. These guidelines make many treatment plans more ra-
tional, but they also reduce the scope of decision-making, with a consequent
reduction of reliance on an individual practitioner’s judgment. As with the
dream of automation for medical ethics, many clinical decisions have been
(seemingly) automated with physicians following the program set out by
practice guidelines. For these reasons, among many others, the current con-
text and demands of health care delivery have created a situation in which
medical ethics education has taken the form I have described as a kind of
robot building. The application of standardized rules and the reliance on
systems are aspects of the overall practice of medicine, not just medical
education.
This chapter is a postphenomenological study because I work toward a
multistable understanding of one kind of body as simultaneous object-body
and active agent. Underlying this analysis as well is Don Ihde’s notion of the
“epistemology engine”—the use of a technological artifact as a guiding
metaphor or cultural episteme for understanding the human acquisition and
deployment of knowledge (Ihde, 2002, 71–79). In Ihde’s account, the effects
of the epistemology engine are so pervasive that people are not even aware
that these effects arise from a metaphorical understanding of the mind. The
camera obscura is Ihde’s favorite example (Ihde, 2003, 9). In this chapter, I
have used the metaphor of the robot as a kind of epistemology engine. I try
out the metaphor in a provisional and pragmatic way, so I am not arguing that
it is common to regard medical students as robots. However, given the meth-
ods we use to teach medical ethics and other subjects, it is worth asking
whether we do suspect that student bodies are programmable in some sense.
The robot epistemology engine might be more influential than my tentative
portrayal of robots in the medical school has required.
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Bonia, K., F. Brunger, L. Fullerton, C. Griffiths, C. Kaposy, B. Mason, M. Morrison, M.
Morton-Ninomiya, and A. Patten. (2012). “DAKO on Trial: A Case-Study in the Politics of
a Medical Controversy.” Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 16 (3): 275–295.
Childress, J. F., and M. Siegler. (1984). “Metaphors and Models of Doctor-Patient Relation-
ships: Their Implications for Autonomy.” Theoretical Medicine 5: 17–30.
Dreyfus, H. (1992). What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason. Cam-
bridge MA: MIT Press.
Fish, S. (1989). “Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory.” In Doing What Comes Naturally.
Durham NC: Duke University Press.
Hébert, P. C. (2009). Doing Right: A Practical Guide to Ethics for Medical Trainees and
Physicians, 2nd edition. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hern, H. E., B. A. Koenig, L. J. Moore, and P. A. Marshall. (1998). “The Difference that
Culture can Make in End-of-Life Decisionmaking.” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare
Ethics 7: 27–40.
Ihde, D. (2003). “Postphenomenology—Again?” Working Papers, 3. Online: http://
sts.imv.au.dk/en/workpaper-3-d-ihde-postphenomenology-again (Accessed January 28,
2014).
Iserson, K. V. (1995). “An Approach to Ethical Problems in Emergency Medicine.” In K. V.
Iserson, A. B. Sanders, and D. Mathieu (eds.), Ethics in Emergency Medicine, 2nd edition.
Tucson, AZ: Galen Press.
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Hamilton Health Sciences Critical Care Pandemic Triage Protocol.” Healthcare Quarterly
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Chapter Twelve
Mediating Multiplicity
Brain-Dead Bodies and Organ Transplant Protocols
Adam M. Rosenfeld
Last year, 28,952 people received organ transplants. Of those, 22,965 recip-
ients received organs from deceased donors. As of the time this chapter is
being written, 122,071 people are on organ transplant waiting lists. 1 Though
the first human organ allotransplant surgeries date as far back as 1883, 2 the
practices surrounding the surgical transfer of organs from one body to an-
other are still evolving. There have always been critics of these practices, yet
the past twenty years have seen a movement beyond unfounded paranoia,
reflexive “ick”-factor responses, and naïve, naturalistic objections to more
subtle and rigorous academic inquiry. As organ transplant has become more
common, the practices surrounding it have availed themselves as a topic for
ethnographic investigation (Sharp, 2006), cultural anthropological critique
(Lock, 1997; 2002), as a problem in the politics and economics of “nudging”
choice architectures (Sunstein and Thaler 2009), and as an opportunity to
rethink ambiguities concerning the body in medical contexts (Leder, 1992;
2002; Hacking, 2007).
A common critical theme found in many of these relatively recent investi-
gations is that organ donation assumes and further sediments a “Cartesian” 3
conception of the body as “animated corpse,” and that the invention of
“brain-death” as a criterion for organ donation represents a reduction of death
to a totalitarian logic of efficiency, 4 and the body to a “standing reserve” of
spare parts. 5 Ian Hacking, speaking of organ donation, notes that “[w]e are
experiencing a ‘bodily revolution,’ and that this there has been a change in
our relationships to our bodies, be it in our experience or in our conceptual-
ization, as well as in our engineering practices” and that this “bodily revolu-
tion may be a revolution in that sense—the reinstatement of a Cartesian
203
204 Adam M. Rosenfeld
attitude of the body as a machine” (Hacking, 2007). Drew Leder argues that
“[w]e have seen that transplantation exemplifies the modern sense of body-
as-machine, and of disease as residing within a specific organ” (Leder,
2002). Margaret Lock, speaking specifically about organ donation and the
invention of the notion of brain-death, warns that “[i]t is now apparent in
most corners of the world, except perhaps in the heart of Leviathan, that
science, in particular biomedicine, has come to be thought of by many as one
form of neo-imperialism” (Lock, 1997).
While I believe that there are some legitimate concerns in this critical
attitude, I will argue in this chapter that these particular concerns have been
exaggerated and do not accurately represent organ donation practices, partic-
ularly as they have evolved in the United States following the National
Organ Transplant Act of 1984 and the advent of Organ Procurement Organ-
izations (OPOs). Rather than framing organ donation as part of a monolithic
and even imperialistic, neo-Cartesian, medicalized episteme, the practices
surrounding brain-dead organ donation are better captured through the lens
of an approach Don Ihde has developed and termed “postphenomenologi-
cal.” Through donation practices, brain-dead bodies are not so much reduced
to “Cartesian corpses,” but, in fact, revealed to be multi-stable objects, resist-
ant to reduction. The donation process does not enforce an essentializing
technological context, but instead involves a complex negotiation of multiple
praxical contexts.
VARIATIONAL ANALYSIS: HOW MANY

“BRAIN-DEAD BODIES” ARE THERE?
A brain-dead body is a peculiar thing, particularly for those familiar with a

phenomenological tradition of thinking about the body and embodiment. In
Bodies and Technology, Don Ihde draws our attention to what he terms the
“Body I/Body II” distinction. “Body I” is the “lived body”— the locus of
intentional subjectivity. Stemming from strains of phenomenology that em-
phasize the inherent materiality of our embodied experience (exemplified in
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception), it captures the no-
tion that “the active, perceptual being of incarnate embodiment is the very
opening to the world that allows us to have worlds in any sense” (Ihde, 2002,
17). If we can take our cues on “Body I” from Merleau-Ponty, attending to
the first-person perspective of our situated, embodied subjective experience,
it is Michel Foucault whom Ihde draws inspiration from for “Body II,” the
culturally constructed body often described and analyzed in a third-person
perspective. Ihde is careful to clarify here that he intends “Body II” to still
refer to a subjectively experienced body, but it is the experience of this
Mediating Multiplicity 205
objectification by people, social constructs, and epistemes, which distin-

guishes it from the first-person, “Body I” experience.
It is easy to see how brain-dead bodies present a frustrating challenge to
this tradition. If we accept the plausible premise that brain-death (defined as
the irreversible loss of all functions of the brain, including the brain stem) 6
removes a necessary condition for subjective experience, then it might seem
as if a brain-dead body does, indeed, reassert a Cartesian/neo-Cartesian no-
tion of the body; one that either holds the body as a dumb vessel for an
immaterial mind/soul, or else simply gives way to a reductive materialism
where mind/soul is nothing more than the complex behavior of a complex
machine. On these views, the body-as-machine can, and does, break down,
and sometimes can be fixed. It is this view that authors like Leder (1997;
2002) and Hacking (2007) suggest is the standard, medicalized view of bod-
ies, and which they express concern over out of an anxiety that it influences
our conceptions of living and lived bodies, framing bodies in general in a
Cartesian fashion. If the goal of contemporary embodiment theorists is to
find a way forward from the “Cartesian” mind/body split, then it seems as if
the usual tools don’t work well for thinking and talking about brain-dead
bodies.
Is there, then, no other way to think of brain-dead bodies besides as
“Cartesian corpses”? If the way “forward” (via attention to subjective em-
bodied experience) is blocked, I suggest we turn “back” and draw from pre-
Cartesian rather than post-Cartesian resources. Aristotle offers us a non-
dualist conception of the mind/soul that is capable of addressing brain-dead
bodies as well as experiencing embodied subjects. An Aristotelian soul is the
“form 7 of a living body” (On the Soul, 412a 19–21), the principle of motion/
change that distinguishes a living body from a dead one (Ibid. 412b 15–17).
A living Aristotelian body is not simply a mechanistic collection of inani-
mate parts, but neither does it require the presence of a thinking/experiencing
subject. Being “alive” merely entails that a body is causally responsible for
its own activity. While some complications of our normal understanding of
autonomous life are introduced when a living body depends upon machines
in order to go on living, 8 the qualification of a brain-dead body as “brain-
dead” rather than dead simpliciter, indicates a strong sense in which a brain-
dead body is, in fact, alive. By way of Aristotelian conceptual tools we can
articulate a non-Cartesian conception of a brain-dead body:
Brain-Dead Body as a Living, But Not Lived, Body, on the Basis of

Its Continued and Relatively Autonomous (Albeit Technologically
Mediated) Activity
This brain-dead body is a living body, but it is not a living person.

In order to further distinguish this view from the Cartesian notion of a
body as corpse, one that potentially reduces bodies to nothing more than a
collection of material parts, a basic mereological point about Aristotelian
bodies demands explication. A living body must have living parts, but with-
out a whole living body, there are no body parts—i.e. there is no such thing
as a disembodied body part since parts are always necessarily parts of
wholes. In an example that pops up repeatedly for him, Aristotle is keen to
point out that a severed hand is a “hand” in name only, not in any proper
sense. 9 A “hand,” in the proper sense, is a body part with certain relation-
ships to other body parts while a severed hand does not participate in such
relationships. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, a severed “hand”
quite simply does not do, nor is it not capable of doing the things that hands
do. 10
For Aristotle, a severed hand could not simply be surgically reattached
and resume its “handy” activity, and thus is not a hand, even potentially. But
such permanent disembodiment is contingent on our technological capabil-
ities, and today we can, under the right conditions, re-attach some temporari-
ly disembodied body parts. So, while the organs of a brain-dead body are still
actively parts of a whole living (but not lived) body, they are also potentially
recoverable body parts which, relying on modern surgical techniques, are
potential parts of whole recipient bodies.
Thus, we have a second answer to our question of what a non-Cartesian
brain-dead body is. The modern medical techniques that allow for organ
transplants enable us to regard a brain-dead donor body in a second way:
Brain-Dead Body as Potential Parts of Multiple Particular Whole

Living (and Lived) Patient Bodies Who Stand to be Recipients in
Transplant Procedures
While our first answer addressed the brain-dead-body in terms of its present
activity (what Aristotelians would call its energeia or “actuality”), our sec-
ond answer addresses the brain-dead-body in terms of its potentiality. 11
Those who are familiar with Ihde’s variational analyses might already
anticipate a third answer to our question regarding how a brain-dead body
may be intended. One of the recurring themes in postphenomenological vari-
ations is that once we have identified a few stable presentations, new ones
begin to reveal themselves more readily. If our first answer intends the brain-
dead-body in its “actual” present activity, and the second intends it in its
potentiality for prospective recipients of donor organs, we now look for a
way of intending the brain-dead-body that pulls in the direction of the de-
ceased donor patient. This involves the appearance of the deceased patient in
the brain-dead-body precisely through the absence of the subjectivity asso-
ciated with the patient’s personhood.
This may be a bit confusing at first glance. In the pronouncement of brain
death, by ceasing to refer to a brain-dead-body as a patient subject, are we
not explicitly stating that this body is precisely not the departed patient
subject? Is not the deceased patient subject also “absent” in my body, or this
coffee mug, or virtually any thing? Are we not flirting with absurdity when
we begin to talk about things being where they are not, or of their “presence
in absence”? After all, if something is present in its absence, where isn’t it
present?
Yet, there is a sort of conspicuous absence that is distinguishable from
mere absence. When confronted with the brain-dead body of a deceased
person, it is precisely in the uncanny absence of their subjectivity in the
living, breathing body before us that the departed subject appears. Just as
some potentialities present themselves more conspicuously than others, some
absences present themselves more conspicuously than others. Aristotle ges-
tures toward this cryptically in his Physics (132b 19), bringing the concept of
stéresis into a discussion of nature saying “Shape [eîdos] and nature [phúsis],
it should be added, are in two senses. For the privation [stéresis] too is in a
way form [morphé].” 12 But it is Martin Heidegger who seizes upon this
insight in his analysis of Aristotle’s Physics B, I, and fully thematizes it.
Heidegger emphasizes that understanding steresis as mere negation is to
misunderstand it.
But stéresis is not simply absentness [Abwesenheit]. Rather, as absencing,

stéresis is precisely stéresis for presencing. What then is stéresis? When today,
for example, we say, “My bicycle is gone!” we do not mean simply that it is
somewhere else; we mean it is missing. When something is missing, the miss-
ing thing is gone, to be sure, but the goneness itself, the lack itself, is what
irritates and upsets us, and the “lack” can do this only if the lack itself is
“there,” i.e., only if the lack is, i.e., constitutes a manner of being. Stéresis as
absencing is not simply absentness; rather, it is a presencing, namely, that kind
in which the absencing (but not the absent thing) is present. Stéresis is eîdos,
but eîdos pos, an appearance and presencing of sorts. (Heidegger 1939,
226–227) 13
This conspicuous absence, the privation of something that should be present

(or which we are at least accustomed to being present) indicates how the
brain-dead-body can be intended in a third way:
Brain-Dead Body as the Absent, Deceased Patient Subject
Rather than seeing the brain-dead-body as an ambiguity to be resolved

through arguments about what it is and what it isn’t, a postphenomenological
analysis recognizes that there is no one, correct way of intending the brain-
dead-body. Instead, there are multiple stable ways of intending it.
PRAGMATIC ANALYSIS: WHAT ARE THE DISTINCT

TECHNAI AT WORK ON BRAIN-DEAD-BODIES?
The preceding illustrates a sense in which the Aristotelian dictum, “Being is

said in many ways” finds significant common ground with Ihde’s postpheno-
menological perspective and clears a path that avoids a Cartesian reduction
when thinking about brain-dead bodies. Yet, despite my suspicions that Ihde
has closer intellectual kinship with Aristotle than he might let on, I would
imagine that he would be uneasy about my describing a variational analysis
based on metaphysical principles like parts/wholes relations, “potentiality,”
“actuality,” and “stéresis” as altogether postphenomenological. Ihde de-
scribes his approach as “non-foundationalist” (Ihde, 2009) and variations
based on metaphysical principles may smell a bit too much like foundational-
ism. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, Ihde is consistent in his
description of postphenomenology as a blending of influences from both
classical phenomenology and pragmatism (ibid.). A full-fledged postpheno-
menological analysis of brain-dead bodies would attend less to metaphysical
principles, and more to the ways that variations reveal themselves through
practical experience.
Furthermore, it’s not difficult to imagine someone who was inclined to-
ward the sorts of anti-Cartesian critiques mentioned earlier being less than
impressed with my Aristotelian analysis. Sure, it is possible to perceive
brain-dead bodies in all the ways I’ve outlined, but this does little to counter
suggestions that the dominant attitude in organ donation practices is to focus
on this body as potential “replacement” parts for prospective transplant recip-
ients.
I would contend, however, that both of these concerns can be addressed.
It has already been mentioned that the praxical contexts which brain-dead-
bodies are found at the center of are a constitutive part of what makes them
what they are. Without a battery of technological practices, brain-dead bodies
are neither living non-persons nor collections of organs that are potential
parts of whole recipient bodies. Furthermore the criteria for determining
when a body is brain-dead depends heavily on an assortment of techniques,
technologies, and techno-scientific epistemes that are available to us. Brain-
dead-bodies are techno-scientific constructions in the fullest sense, and I

would even concede that it is the desire to transplant organs from a deceased
donor patient to a recipient patient that has driven the historical progression
of this construction.
But the protocols that organize these practices reveal ontological commit-
ments that are much richer than those implied by accusations of Cartesian
reductionism, and, in fact, map neatly onto the Aristotelian variations expli-
cated in the preceding section. Close attention to the practices involved in
brain-dead donations reveal at least three distinct téchnai which must be, and
are carefully managed and mediated. The brain-dead body as recently de-
parted donor patient is situated within the life-saving technê of the trauma
team and the grieving practices undertaken by the family (often with help
from some manner of professional grief counselors). The brain-dead body as
potential body parts for transplant recipients is presided over primarily by
transplant surgeons. And these two contexts are kept distinct from one an-
other by a third mediating technê which presides over the brain-dead body as
an actively living body that is not a patient subject—that of organ procure-
ment organizations.
These three praxical contexts were not always so distinctly articulated.
Prior to the passage of the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) in 1984,
the status of jurisdiction over deceased donor bodies in the United States was
a legal gray zone. The surviving family’s rights to deceased bodies were
treated as a quasi-right, extending only to the burial/disposal of the corpse,
without any clear articulation of rights for the transfer of the body or its
organs to other parties. NOTA was written and passed in response to con-
cerns over an emerging commercial market for organs outside of the hospital
setting (Mayes, 2003). Among other provisions, this act established a Nation-
al Organ Procurement Network as a registry for organ matching, and author-
ized the US Department of Health and Human Services to facilitate the
establishment of Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs) (NOTA, 1984).
OPOs are not simply charged with the logistics of matching donor organs
to recipients. According to the Organ Procurement and Transplant Network’s
policy guidelines, OPOs are responsible for diverse tasks including: obtain-
ing formal consent for donation, clinical management of the deceased donor
body, the assessment of donor organ quality, and often the recovery, preser-
vation, and transportation of organs (OPTN Policies, 2014, Section 2.2).
There are currently fifty-eight registered OPOs in the United States, 14 and
while exact policies and protocols are worked out between hospitals and their
local OPOs and thus vary from hospital to hospital, there is some relative
homogeneity across the board.
Perhaps the most notable aspect of nearly all brain-death donation proto-
cols is that potential conflicts of interest are scrupulously policed by way of
maintaining clear boundaries between trauma staff, OPOs, and transplant
surgeons. For example, only the trauma staff may declare a patient to be
brain dead (after which point, the body is no longer referred to as a “patient,”
but as a “donor body”) and OPOs are not permitted any access to the family
or the donor body until this has occurred. In cases of brain-death, the oppor-
tunity for family members to spend time with the body and recover any
mementoes (e.g. locks of hair) is made available. 15, 16 While grief counseling
is not done by OPOs, they typically liaise with the appropriate personnel to
ensure that the donor families have the necessary support when they leave
the hospital. And though there is recent discussion over the best ways and
times to begin the discussion of the possibility donation with family, 17 in
many hospitals only the OPO specialists are permitted to broach the subject.
Only after the declaration of brain-death, the official authorization for dona-
tion, and the opportunity for family members to spend time with the deceased
body, may organ procurement staff begin their work.
Furthermore, the OPOs are not merely an extension of the praxical con-
text presided over by transplant surgeons. A single donor body can provide
life-saving organs for up to eight recipients (this does not include “non-vital”
eye and tissue donation), and this puts the OPOs in a mediating role between
multiple prospective transplant recipients. They are charged with assessing
the viability of potentially donatable organs, and must apply matching crite-
ria by way of a point system in order to determine which candidates receive
organ offers. 18 OPOs are entitled to withdraw offers in the event that a
transplant hospital is unable to make acceptable arrangements for receiving
organs (OPTN Policies, 2014, Section 5).
That there are protocols in place to carefully mediate between the distinct
contexts of body as absent deceased patient, body as active non-patient brain-
dead body, and body as potential organs for particular transplant recipients,
is clear enough for anyone who peruses policy guidelines or discusses the
matter with the professional staff involved. A brain-dead body is at least
three different objects throughout the donation process, and as authority is
transferred from one to the other, a different group of professionals presides
over each. Furthermore, it is not a stretch to note that in working on three
distinct objects in three distinct praxical contexts, trauma staff, OPOs, and
transplant surgeons are engaging in distinct medical technai. In many in-
stances, these distinct technai are even mutually antagonistic. Many aggres-
sive life-saving interventions on the part of the trauma team (e.g., the admin-
istration of norepinephrine to combat low blood pressure—a common issue
in trauma patients) can result in damage to organs 19 that either renders them
unfit for transplant, or which must be actively undone by OPOs after they
have received the donor body. 20 The work of clinical care of a non-patient,
brain-dead body is a peculiar kind of medical practice, with goals, tech-
niques, and accreditations that are distinct from other medical practices.
MEDIATING MULTIPLICITIES
With the establishment of OPOs as fulfilling a key mediating role in organ

donation practices, we can see that the three brain-dead bodies explicated in
our variational analysis are also represented in and structure three distinct
praxical contexts within the process of organ donation. Thus, organ donation
ought to be viewed as involving conceptions of bodies that are admittedly
peculiar, but far richer and more textured than what is suggested by accusa-
tions of Cartesian/neo-Cartesian reductionism. I should take care to acknowl-
edge that these three variations do not fully exhaust all of the multi-stabilities
available. Within the conception of brain-dead body as deceased patient, a
wide variety of religious/spiritual commitments and grieving practices yield
a wide variety of “absent” patients. Within the conception of brain-dead body
as a living non-patient, the variable conditions of that body and its organs
yield a wide variety of possible donor bodies. Depending on the satisfaction
of matching criteria and organ demand, we may have a wide variety of brain-
dead bodies as potential organs for recipient patients. Nonetheless, I would
argue that all of these further variations can be classified as variations on the
three major categories I have articulated.
In order to ensure a fluid and functioning donation process, these praxical
contexts must be effectively mediated. Each moment in the progression from
deceased patient, to non-patient body, to recipient patient, must be afforded
adequate space and time to play itself out. This mediation through effective
protocol is still evolving 21 and varies from hospital to hospital, and there are
serious concerns regarding how to balance competing desiderata such as
increasing available donor organs, ensuring the long-term health of trans-
plant recipients, and respecting the needs of grieving families. It is with an
eye toward managing these multiplicities that it would seem that a postphen-
omenological sensitivity is useful. Don Ihde has suggested that postphenom-
enologists have a role to play as “science critics” (Ihde, 1997), but I would
extend this suggestion. The ability to freely shift between contextual gestalts
and to recognize and manage multistabilities also has a crucial role to play in
designing policies that deal with multiple, potentially antagonistic praxical
contexts, particularly ones involving the sort of ontological multiplicities
found in organ donation.
NOTES
1. http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/data/
2. Theodor Kocher’s successful transplant of thyroid tissue to restore lost function follow-
ing thyroidectomy in 1883 (Schlich, 2010, 31–46).
3. While there is merit to arguments that the received “Cartesian” view doesn’t quite
square with the subtleties of Descartes’s actual views of the body (as evidenced in Passions of
the Soul or his correspondences with Mersenne and Elisabeth of Bohemia), this is beyond the
scope of this investigation. The term “Cartesianism” in this paper should be understood to refer
to the received Cartesian view, regardless of whether or not it was what Descartes actually
intended.
4. cf. Herbert Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man (1964).
5. cf. Martin Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technology” (1954).
6. I take the medical fact of brain death and its reliable diagnosis to be two related but
distinct issues. For more, see Wijdicks, 2002.
7. “Form” here is not the mere “shape” or “outward appearance” captured by the term
eîdos, but is the significantly richer term morphé.
8. These complications are not insurmountable, and resources for thinking of “cyborg”
entities can be found within Ihde’s work (e.g., Ihde, 2008,) as well as thinkers such as Donna
Haraway (1991).
9. Metaphysics Z11, 1036b, de Partibus Animalium 1.1, 640b–641a, Politics I, 1253a, cf.
also Lewis, 2013, 180–181, and Ackrill, 1972.
10. This may strike us as a bit strange. After all, in calling it a “severed hand” it seems as if
we are identifying this flesh and bone as a special case of an ordinary hand. Additionally, we
would not say the same things about, say, an eye that is shut and therefore not performing the
essential function of an eye—that it is merely flesh. Nor would we say of a chariot wheel that
has been removed from a chariot that it is merely wood and metal because it neither participates
in the essential relationships to the rest of the chariot parts nor performs the essential function
of a chariot wheel. But a shut eye can simply be opened and do all the things that eyes do, and
the chariot wheel can be reattached. The shut eye and detached chariot wheel may not be
presently active as an eye or chariot wheel, but their respective flesh, wood and metal are
potentially active.
11. It is, additionally, worth pointing out that this intending of parts of the body as potential-
ly parts of a whole recipient body need not wait for the pronouncement of brain death. It is
already at work when a living subject agrees to be an organ donor, and even when she is simply
considering such a decision.
12. Cf. also Metaphysics, 1022b (Aristotle, 1952).
13. Heidegger’s articulation of this sort of “presencing through absence” may be particularly
familiar to philosophers of technology due to his elaboration of the idea in Being and Time in
his discussion of tool use, and a tool’s becoming “present-at-hand” when it “breaks down.”
14. organdonor.gov
15. While this is a common practice in the US, it is official policy in the UK (Donor Family
Care Policy, 2004).
16. “Cardiac death” (sometimes called “circulatory death”) donations are far more compli-
cated and time sensitive, as they require that life-support be removed before waiting for cardiac
arrest (which does not always promptly occur). As soon as cardiac arrest does occur, the OPOs
must immediately begin the recovery of organs. Because of these and other complications,
cardiac death donation is far more rare than brain-death donation. Nonetheless, OPTN Policy
guidelines still stipulate that no organ recovery staff shall be present for the withdrawal of life-
support in cases of donation after cardiac death. This ought to serve as a testament to the efforts
made to maintain clear boundaries between praxical contexts.
17. In 2011, the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) altered its guidelines, recom-
mending earlier discussions in cases that are candidates for “cardiac-death” donation. For
discussion of this decision see “When the Family Pushes and ‘Decoupling’ is Challenging”
2011, “Timing Can Be Everything In Organ Donation” 2011, and “Concerns Over New Organ
Donor Guidelines Overblown” 2011.
18. Occasionally, transplant surgeons will additionally travel to personally assess organ
quality themselves before deciding whether or not to accept an offer.
19. cf. Bellomo and Giantomasso, 2001.
20. cf. McKeown, Bonser, and Kellum, 2012.
21. This evolution may well change dramatically as new techniques and technologies
emerge. In particular, the prospect of “homegrown” organs created from stemcells represents a
rapidly developing option on the horizon that will surely restructure the nature of organ trans-
plant. But it does not look as if transplants from deceased donors are going to go away anytime
soon. For more on the anticipated relationships between allotransplant medicine and regenera-
tive medicine, see Orlando et al., 2013.
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Chapter Thirteen
Towards a Hermeneutics of Unveiling

Jan Kyrre Berg Friis
Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology is an introspective analysis of the in-

tended and the intending in experience. The main purpose of phenomenolo-
gy, in Husserl’s view, is to return to the fundaments of knowledge. Husserl
believed he could “bracket” all empirical and metaphysical assumptions, and
through other methodical stages, describe essential structures of both the
experienced thing and the experiencing mind with the intention to constitute
knowledge that is free from noise and bias by individual and social experi-
ences.
In Don Ihde’s Expanding Hermeneutics (1998), we find a quite different
attitude towards experience. The time that has passed between Husserl’s
writing during the turn of the twentieth century, and Ihde, there has passed a
century of extreme change that has transformed all aspects social, technolog-
ical, scientific, and philosophical. The phenomenological introspective meth-
od has been replaced by a new method of hermeneutics inspired by Heideg-
ger and Gadamer—and in Ihde’s case also by American pragmatics and
philosophy of technology of the continental philosophy tradition. This im-
plies a changed notion of experience altogether. Ihde states that experience,
in this modern age of technologies, transcends the conscious subjectivity of
the singular person. Technologies have become extended sense organs, ena-
bling perceptions of realities never before known to man. The information
obtained through technological mediations is not “pure.” There are several
problems attached to the production of technological mediations and the
interpretation of the information contained in them. Technologies are detec-
tion devices, initially the input is collected, for instance, at a certain nuclear
energy level, there after the technology has to “translate” the input to an
energy level that is perceivable by man. Then the observer interprets and
describes the information contained in the image and eventually communi-
215
216 Jan Kyrre Berg Friis
cates the information to other people. One of the many problems accompany-
ing observations of this kind is observer variations—which happens when
two or more observers cannot agree about the nature of the information
presented in the image. The problem of observer variations arises with the
observer. With the observer we have “noise” or bias disturbing the reading.
Moreover, technologies may err and produce artifacts that also add to the
disruptions of the truth-to-nature purity we want of information.
In this chapter I want to discuss some of the original ideas of phenomeno-
logical hermeneutics. I intend to pursue the notion of the “unveiling” taking
place when we are in the act of constituting the gestalt or the object “seen.”
In my optics, hermeneutics is about what constitutes experience. Gadamer
provides us with an understanding of the “unveiling” which concerns the
perceiving mind in its more generic role as a pre-conscious “unveiling” of
meaning (Gadamer, 2007, 420). 1 In Gadamer’s view, understanding is an
event, something that happens and something that takes shape beyond con-
scious awareness—pre-consciously. Human understanding has embodied
sources natural and cultural, biological and social. Understanding, in its es-
sence, is not something we are aware of doing—understanding comes to us
in sudden leaps whilst we ponder a problem, when we both tacitly and
consciously are interpreting the phenomena. In Gadamer’s own words, her-
meneutics is “not what we do, not what we should do, but on the contrary
what happens to us beyond what we consciously want and do” (Gadamer,
2007, 474). In other words, a hermeneutics about science practices, discuss-
ing the material hermeneutics of technologies—as an extension of human
experience of the world beyond our perceptions, should also deal with the
genetics of phenomenal or perceptual gestalts—from where understanding
springs.
RADIOLOGISTS: IN-BETWEEN TECHNOLOGICAL

MEDIATIONS AND PERCEPTUAL CONUNDRUMS
There are probably just as many “systematic approaches” to reading X-rays,

PET scans or MRI scans, or visualizations from cardiology or pathology, as
there are specialized physicians trained to conduct these tasks. There are
conducted approximately a billion imaging examinations worldwide every
year. There are over five million hits on Google for systematic of x-ray
reading, and 35 million hits for interpretation of X-rays, just to give you a
number to highlight the interest for improving medical image perceptions.
Literature on “medical imaging” and on “interpretation and reporting,” are
plenty, all are struggling with the problem of interpretation practices having
very few standards. Moreover, reports that are sent by the radiologist to the
clinician are often misunderstood or misinterpreted due to faulty communica-
Towards a Hermeneutics of Unveiling 217
tion—there are no rules for communicating findings either. There are, in

other words, a vast number of systematic approaches and practices that may
work for the single image reader reading the image. However, when report-
ing the findings this personal systematic may complicate reporting, for in-
stance it is quite typical, as radiologist Elizabeth Krupinski writes, that “deci-
sions are not always absolutely conclusive, [they] are often formulated with
plausible alternatives, and errors in interpretation can and do occur regularly”
(Krupinski, 2011).
Radiological research has so far dealt with this problem by focusing on
two ways of reducing diagnostic error. The first has to do with the strong
belief that there is a technological “fix” to observer related problems. The
emphasis is on improving technologies so that abnormalities become more
visible. Viewing conditions can be optimized: better luminosity and better
monitor resolution can easily be achieved. There are also efforts to improve
diagnostic tools like CAD (an automated image interpretation tool). Good
technologies are necessary, but not enough. What the other approach empha-
sizes is the need to understand how the radiologist interacts with technologi-
cal mediations, that is, with the information in images, during the reading
process. As Manning, Gale, and Krupinski write, “It is important that devel-
opment and availability of CAD do not detract from the quality and need for
radiological skills” (Manning, Gale, and Krupinski, 2005, 683–685). And a
crucial skill is visual perception.
RADIOLOGY AND PERCEPTION
Image interpretation consists of two fundamental processes—looking at the

images (visual perception) and rendering an interpretation (cognition) (Kru-
pinski, 2011, 393).
Here are a couple of particularly solution-resistant problems regarding
perceptions in radiology. According to radiologist Harold L. Kundel, radiolo-
gists regard image analysis as the primary task, and have assumed that their
perceptions of images represent the content of the images (Kundel, 2006,
402). Radiologists are usually not concerned with the process of perception
itself, until it fails. Errors may occur because there are many ways that
images are produced and displayed (Krupinski, 2011, 393). Krupinski says
that “detecting and recognizing lesions on plain film radiography or planar
scintigraphy is difficult because anatomic structures overlap, and the radiolo-
gist must translate a 2-D image into a 3-D mental representation to disembed
and localize structures and lesions” (Ibid). The point I am trying to make is
that overlapping structures have a camouflaging effect. It is not easy to spot
abnormalities that grow around existing tissue that thus have features similar
to the exiting anatomy. CT, MRI, and PET can be used to overcome this
problem by producing multiple slices through the anatomy, however, the

radiologist still has to search through the information to detect the abnormal-
ities (Ibid). Medical images need to be interpreted. Interpretations ultimately
rest on human perceptions and skill to interpret.
At least half of the errors made in clinical practice are perceptual (Krupin-
ski, Kundel, Judy, and Nodine, 1998, 611–612). For example, the radiologist
is faced with a lesion and he knows the location only approximately. He is
told to look for a lung nodule. The radiologist will here always apply his
experience and knowledge; or rather he knows where nodules are likely to
hide in the lungs (ibid.). 2 Such peripherally inconspicuous targets have to be
found by scanning the area. Experiments with eye-trackers show that the
search pattern of the observing radiologist is influenced by both clinical
history and experience (Kundel, 1990, 472–483). This is noteworthy since
most of us already know of the impact of context, training, and experience
from phenomenology, hermeneutics, and the philosophy of perception. An
example of being influenced by clinical history is from one of my visits at the
Radiology Department at Bispebjerg hospital here in Copenhagen—they
have generously granted me permission to conduct observations and inter-
views with radiologists and technicians working there. A few years ago an
elderly lady had fallen and fractured her femur, the fracture was complicated
and she had to undergo surgery several times to fixate and stabilize the
fractured area. During this process a number of X-rays were taken and stored
on to the PACS (Picture Archiving and Communication System). One year
after the first hospitalization she had a follow-up at the hospital, and a new
set of eight images were taken: seven images of the lesion area and another
showing her whole torso down to her knees in profile. In August this year she
was hospitalized again—this time with a huge cancer tumor in her stomach.
During morning conference in the end of August, the radiologist responsible
for describing her X-rays got the images taken at her follow-up, a couple of
years prior, up on the right screen of the PACS to compare. Everyone present
in the room could clearly see the cancer on the years-old torso image, and
they had to admit that this was something they had overlooked, simply be-
cause they went straight into the trap and focused solely on the lesion pointed
out to them in the requisition. This is a common error and has been termed
“satisfaction of search.” As soon as the radiologist has found his fracture he
is satisfied with both having identified and located what he was searching
for. The problem is that one may have not perceived everything and have
thus abolished the search prematurely.
Radiological practice invariably brings with it observer variations. Ob-
server variations are complex. This is a seemingly unsolvable epistemolog-
ical problem. For instance, computers have become immensely important in
displaying image information. For radiologists this means that the informa-
tion must be perceptible and as such be capable of being extracted. The
radiologist has an imaging task to do. This task defines what information is
needed in order to come up with an interpretation leading to a diagnosis.
Here the quality of the image is of course very important. Kundel writes:
Visualization and estimation tasks may require different visual cues for their
performance. Visualization tasks require strong boundary cues, whereas inten-
sity estimation tasks require texture cues. Both tasks can be aided by appropri-
ate image displays. Color can be helpful in estimation tasks, and three-dimen-
sional display can aid visualization tasks. No matter what the task or the image
is, as long as an observer is needed to read out the information, performance is
the final arbiter of the goodness of the image. (Kundel, 1990, 472–83)
In other words, interpretative efforts on the radiologist’s part depend heavily

on the technology’s translational functionality. Following Don Ihde, the
radiologist’s interpretations are made “easier,” which is, less challenged by
the technology through the interpretative functionality of the technology it-
self. The technology “embodies” a “hermeneutic” (Ihde, 2009, 56). MRI and
CT, x-ray and ultrasound, are all translational technologies that not only
translate or transform a phenomenon into a readable image but add color and
other graphics in order to enhance the readability of the phenomenon in
question (Ihde, 2009, 56). Ihde calls the technological translation of the real
world phenomenon into a mediation or image a “material hermeneutic pro-
cess” and brings medical image interpretation in somewhere between the
natural and the humanistic science practices (Ihde, 2009, 64). Another per-
spective on the radiologist’s practice as image reader is from cognitive re-
search on perception. Currently various methods for assessing diagnostic
image quality are used. These methods are usually evaluations based on
individual clinical experience, measurement of diagnostic performance, and
physical measurements made on images or imaging systems. The reason
many use psychophysics to investigate observer variability is its assumed
inherent promise of a stable solution, which the development of a certain
mathematical model will allow for stable predictions of the system output
from any arbitrary input (Kundel, 1979, 265–271).
Psychological work on perception has largely but not exclusively taken
place within the theoretical framework of “cognitivism.” Within cognitivism
the application of psychophysical methods to map brain activity has been the
traditional scientific approach. Cognitive psychologists are particularly inter-
ested in the quantitative relationship between a visual stimulus and the per-
ceiver’s response. The basic idea behind cognitivism is that all intelligence
resembles computation and cognition can thus be defined as “computations
of symbolic representations” (Varela et al., 1993, 40). The problem with
cognitivism in relation to experience is that cognitivism postulates mental
processes that never are, or perhaps cannot be, brought to the level of con-
sciousness. Indeed there are pre-conscious processes that are automated.
However, in order for the processes to become automated or embodied, they

have to be brought to consciousness in order to function properly (Varela et
al., 1993, 49). In other words, there have to be a link between intentional
experience of the perceiver and embodied automated skills framing the per-
ceptions with meanings. According to Kundel imaging scientists would love
to predict how an observer will respond to any image configuration without
having to bother with the messy business of performing a study with real
human observers (Kundel, 2006, 402–408). However, this may become im-
possible by route of cognitivism and its disconnectedness or fragmentation of
preconscious and conscious mental states. This has led Kundel to call for
“research in the deeper aspects of image perception and in the interface
between perception and analysis” (Ibid). I take this to mean a deeper under-
standing of the hermeneutics of medical image perception.
HERMENEUTICS IN MEDICINE
Hermeneutics is embedded into medical “image-interpretation-practices,” as

it is into all science practice. Modern hermeneutics engages in all human
activity and the products of this activity, and in this chapter, with the inter-
pretation of images. Thus, hermeneutics is a method unknowingly applied by
radiologists in describing images from the whole range of medically relevant
mediations. 3 Medicine is as a scientific field permeated with technologies,
especially technologies designed to visualize real world physical phenomena
unreachable by the human senses. Radiologists are of course aware of their
interpretative participation in the reading of images, but their explanatory
framework has no reference whatsoever to hermeneutics as a specific way of
systematizing one’s interpretive efforts. Neither is there any talk of how
hermeneutics is imbedded in the act of perceiving, that observers already
have some skills to make sense of what they see. In radiology they don’t call
it “hermeneutics” they call it “information-processing theory” and it consti-
tutes the theoretical basis for interpretations of visual search data. The inter-
pretation processes have several stages and hermeneutics and information-
processing theory overlap almost exactly.
Helmholtz stated that eyes have poor optics. He said that eyes are organs
that are elegantly designed for daytime hunting, for rapidly obtaining infor-
mation of large objects, but no design for detailed analysis (Helmholtz
quoted from Sabih et al., 2010, 1–2). Besides the biological and neurophysio-
logical programming of our visual system—and the physical aspects of the
image—there also are the psychological and emotional factors influencing
the way all of us perceive pictures, and in particular how radiologists per-
ceive medical images. These processes are of the form of pattern recognition,
spatial localization of the part of interest and the comparison of patterns with
known patterns—this is also known as Gestalt processing (Koontz and Gun-

derman, 2008, 1156–1160).
We may therefore claim that interpretation—or extraction of details from
complex image backgrounds, relies on two processes, both oriented towards
the visual field or the image. The primary mode of perception is pre-con-
scious, automatic, rapid and tacit. The eyes are always moving about, called
saccades, which scan the image and bring different areas to the fovea. The
input at this stage is discontinuous and jerky, with a lot of noise and blurred
images being projected during movements (eyes move up to 400 degrees per
second). We should keep in mind that 10 billion bits of information arrive at
the retina, 6 million bits enter into the optic nerves, and only 100 bits per
second constitute conscious perception. The brain will at this stage often
jump to conclusions that might be erroneous.
The other mode is a reflexive, problem solving, slow, sequential, effortful
modus, which is difficult to sustain (Sabih et al., 2010, 1–2). Actually there
are three levels of performance. To be able to read an image we need skills
and skills are patterns of thought and actions governed by a certain schemata
or pre-programming. The literature, for example, Sabih et al. (2010, 1–2) or
Rasmussen and Jensen (1974, 293–307), claim that the second aspect is the
rule based processing, where solutions of familiar problems are stored as
rules of the type “if x then y.” The third is rather obvious and is the knowl-
edge based aspect, here analytic processing is applied to synthesize known
patterns and to derive inference about new findings.
The initial look at the image results in a global impression—where the
radiologist extracts information about anatomy, color, symmetry, and gray-
scale content. This information is then compared with information stored in
long-term memory—it is this stored information, which belongs to the ob-
server’s horizon or life-world—that forms the viewer’s expectations of what
kind of information may be contained in the image. Something can be de-
tected at this stage, but since medical images are very complex, this is rarely
the case. To identify abnormalities focal search is required, which is an
interactive process partly directed by the viewer’s expectations or cognitive
schemata. Features are examined closely and compared with stored experi-
ence and attained knowledge functioning as part of the cognitive schemata
tacitly applied in the reading process. When image features match with the
cognitive schemata a decision is made. Throughout the search the observer
has to cycle between global overview and focal search modes, between
whole and part. So much for the process of interpreting images, it is also
important to bring in the communication of findings, since these rests on the
radiologist’s choice of systematics.
COMMUNICATING FINDINGS
OR REPORTING READINGS
There are other challenges to grapple with, and with which the radiologist is
typically confronted every day. An integral part of the radiologist’s praxis is
to report his visual impressions to the clinician. As I have tried to show—the
whole “perception—cognition—interpretation—transmission—understand-
ing” process is very complex (Sabih et al., 2010, 1)—and it is therefore no
wonder that errors might occur somewhere in the chain (Ibid). This problem
was particularly pointed out to me during interviews with nuclear radiolo-
gists at the Radiology Department at Bispebjerg hospital in Copenhagen.
These interviews revealed a fundamental lack of standardized and structured
reporting, and moreover, that the communication between the radiologist and
the clinician is colored by jargon due to sub-specialization of the radiologist.
Recent literature has also begun investigating the communication line. For
instance, it is said that “during radiology training, too little attention is given
to structured report writing skills, and trainees have to hone their own skills
by learning from the varied methods of different senior colleagues” (Chaha-
tani, Sahu, and Sankaye, 2012, 722–725). Other studies report of a wide use
of unfamiliar and undefined terms (Espeland and Baerheim, 2007, 15–19).
And again others state that “There is a wide variation in the language used to
describe imaging findings and diagnostic certainty” (Pool and Goergen,
2010, 634–643).
The whole effort of improving technology—whether it is the automated
diagnostic tool (CAD) or image technologies themselves, is of no use as long
as the communication of what is found is not understood by the clinician.
Again there are socio-psychological trapdoors here as well. There is a pres-
sure to report—meaning that there is a certain “need” to find something
wrong with the patient, so findings, often insignificant are reported in a
language that is ambiguous and might be misinterpreted as something signifi-
cant (Sabih et al., 2010, 5). In other words, there is a certain need to improve
the communication between radiologist and clinician; one such improvement
could be to standardize the language used. However, it is the interpretation
practice that lurks in the background. By that I mean to say that radiologists
interpret and in order to do so, apply their own systematic when they read.
Therefore there is no wonder that reports are structured differently. The
aspect of sub-specialization is also important. Some years ago, it was more
natural among radiologists to be a generalist, that is, being able to read
images from different imaging technologies, say, both conventional X-rays
and MRI scans. Today, according to the radiologists at Bispebjerg hospital, it
is usual to specialize and to handle one product alone. According to the same
physicians, some sort of sub-culture has developed as a result of this and one
consequence is the emergence of a specific jargon or sub-language thus used
to describe findings. So there is a connection between the systematics of

interpretation, sub-specialization and applied language.
TOWARDS A HERMENEUTICS OF UNVEILING
Hermeneutics is an unveiling of the ontological conditions for understanding.

Hermeneutics is about understanding the interpretative mechanism, and
whatever is influencing the way we understand, and thus also what we under-
stand. How we understand, is something we can return to, reflexively. The
“how” is something we all have access to intuitively. If we consider the
external influences—and the “noise” embodied, we need to access all kinds
of scientific resources of possible influence in order to identify what we have
embodied. Investigating experience is essential, but, alone, it is not enough.
Philosophy need to become experimental.
The new insights into the duality of moral intentionality are informative.
Experimental philosophy has shown that how we actually act when we have
to stands in stark contrast to how we think we will act if the situation should
occur. History tells us, and deep down we have to admit the truth of it, self-
preservation and self-interest are always close to heart—given the right
circumstances we will attempt to “preserve” ourselves. Human nature seems
to be absorbed in the “here-and-now” of individual existence—and always
will be, it is human nature, and it is an essential characteristic of how the
mind works. We are forced to reckon with the present and to act according to
what happens when it happens. We are always dealing with life in its ever-
changing and present modus. We are always relating to concrete realities in
the present. Never do we get the opportunity to escape the actuality of our
situation.
Human morality is context dependent. And human interpretation in its
generic mode is about context—before consciousness. As a meaning-gener-
ating act it is about reacting according to context. The reacting to the actual
includes a creation or a leap forward from past experiences to that which
might happen, but which has not happened yet. The reason for this is that
reactions do not always tell the truth about what actually happens. There is a
temporal aspect we cannot go beyond. We have to wait for the unfolding of
the event itself; however, we don’t have to. In acute situations we never wait
for the outcome. We actually react on incomplete information, on gestalt-
information before we truly understand what is going on, information offered
by past experiences and a creative mind operating tacitly and pre-conscious-
ly. When that is said, we obviously do manage to break free in order to
explore and go new directions; to conquer a habit that holds us back and
makes us take the wrong decisions. We have the ability to interpret before
awareness on fragmentary gestalts and loads of embodied know-how. We do
occasionally break free and follow the intuition which throws us on to a more
insightful level of understanding.
It is not enough to approach the complex nature of interpretation from a
re-reading of the classics—philosophers of science, postphenomenologists,
technoscience theorists, all need to immerse themselves in real empirical
study, to study what the scientist do. By immersing themselves in the culture
and practices of interpretation familiar to the scientist, they are opening up a
passage to themselves into the scientists’ domain of understanding.
NOTES
1. I follow Hans-Georg Gadamer in his application of Heidegger’s interpretation of the

Greek word for truth, alétheia, meaning undisclosed or unveiled, which is to mean an unveiling
of that which has been disclosed or hidden.
2. The example is borrowed from the Krupinski paper.
3. Patrick Heelan and Don Ihde are the two of several known exponents of the hermeneuti-
cal approach within the natural sciences.
REFERENCES
Beyer, C. (Winter 2013 Edition). “Edmund Husserl.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
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Are We Getting the Message Across?” Clinical Radiology 67: 722–725.
Espeland, A., and A. Baerheim. (2007). “General Practitioners’ Views on Radiology Reports of
Plain Radiology for Back Pain.” Scandinavian Journal of Primary Health Care 25: 15–19.
Gadamer, H.-G. (2007). Sandhed og Metode, Danish translation by Arne Jørgensen of Warheit
und Metode (1960–1990).
Ihde, D. (2009). Postphenomenology and Technoscience: The Peking Lectures. Albany: SUNY
Press.
Ihde, D. (1998). Expanding Hermeneutics. Visualism in Science. Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press.
Ihde, D. (2012). Experimental Phenomenology: Multistabilities, 2nd edition. Albany: SUNY
Press.
Koontz, N. A., and R. B. Gunderman. (2008). “Gestalt Theory: Implications for Radiology
Education.” AJR Am J Roentgenol. 190(5): 1156–1160.
Krupinski, E.A. (2011). “The Role of Perception in Imaging: Past and Future.” Seminars in
Nuclear Medicine 41(6): 392–400.
Krupinski, E. A., H. L. Kundel, P. F. Judy, and C. F. Nodine. (1998). “Key Issues for Image
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Clinical Neurophysiology. October 7 (4): 472–483.
Kundel, H. L. (1979). “Images, Image Quality and Observer Performance.” Radiology 132:
265–271.
Kundel, H. L. (2006). “History of Research in Medical Image Perception.” American College
of Radiology. 3: 402–408.
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ing.” British Journal of Radiology 78: 683–685.
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Literature.” Journal of the American College of Radiology. 7: 634–643.
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Electronic Trouble Shooting.” Ergometrics 17 (3): 293–307.
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Human Experience. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
4
Critical Interlocutors
Chapter Fourteen
Making the Gestalt Switch

Andrew Feenberg
Don Ihde’s Postphenomenology and Technoscience: The Peking University

Lectures contains a good brief summary of his work from his earliest investi-
gations of perception and embodiment to his latest studies of visual technolo-
gies (2009). I find in this book many parallels with my own work. As Ihde
points out we are both influenced by phenomenology and belong to some-
thing called the “empirical turn” in philosophy of technology. These commo-
nalities made it possible for me to comment sympathetically on his earlier
book on the body some years ago at the APA. On that occasion I sought to
supplement Ihde’s focus on the body as subject with reflections on the body
as object. I will follow a similar line here in commenting on this recent book,
although to complete the picture I will also refer to his earlier book Technol-
ogy and the Lifeworld (1990). Once again he focuses on subjectivity, this
time in terms of the relation of scientific knowledge to nature, whereas I am
interested in the object, nature, and more generally the social impact of the
construction of nature-like objects in the social world, what Lukács called
“reification.”
Ihde now calls his approach “postphenomenology.” This term signifies
his synthesis of aspects of phenomenology with pragmatism. The outstand-
ing innovation of both these philosophies was the break with the epistemo-
logical tradition and the move toward what Ihde calls a “nonsubjectivistic
and interrelational” approach. However, pragmatism proved more radical in
its turn toward practice whereas Husserl remained caught in the terminology
and problematics of epistemology. Idhe takes over Husserl’s notion of inten-
tionality while marrying it to pragmatist concepts of practice and embodi-
ment.
I should mention one more influence on Ihde’s approach, although it is
one he increasingly repudiates, and that is Heidegger’s various analyses of
229
230 Andrew Feenberg
technical practice and the technological worldview. Ihde borrows Heideg-

ger’s concept of “world” as a nexus of meanings enacted in practice, and his
later notion of technology as the underlying basis of modernity. But he
rejects Heidegger’s romantic nostalgia for earlier technologies and his vague
hope in salvation through the intervention of a “god,” that is, something
external to our technological world. Instead, Ihde turns to Science and Tech-
nology Studies (STS) for empirical approaches to particular technologies.
The core argument I find most persuasive in Ihde’s work is the notion that
human beings have always already left the garden of Eden for a technically
mediated world of some sort. We are homo technologicus by our very nature.
Technology is not something added on after the fact, like those peculiar little
sweaters small dogs are sometimes outfitted with in winter. No. Technology
is as natural to human beings as language and culture; its specific content is
historically contingent but it will always be found wherever there are human
beings.
Ihde employs a concept of culture as an overarching framework or pattern
of artifacts, beliefs, and practices. Such a framework informs what he calls
“macroperception” in his earlier book, Technology and the Lifeworld (1990).
Macroperception in modern societies is deeply influenced by the scientific
construction of objectivity and by scientific knowledge. This affects our
“microperceptions,” that is our bodily engagement with objects.
Ihde’s version of the practical basis of a scientific-technical culture is the
technological mediation of perception by new instruments. He emphasizes
the role of the telescope and imaging technologies, as well as the introduction
of new and more precise technologies of measurement. This approach is
reminiscent of McLuhan, with his theories of the cultural impact of mediated
perception. However, Ihde is guided by phenomenology toward finer analy-
ses of the modulation of perception and practice by technological change.
This general theory of the relative universality of technology is comple-
mented by an analysis of the specific meanings and developments of technol-
ogies in different cultures. Ihde focuses on modern technology and the emer-
gence of a science and a lifeworld based on its achievements. This analysis is
complicated by the fact that much of modern technology alters perception.
He is especially interested in the telescope, both because of its importance in
the history of science and also because of the role Galileo plays in Husserl’s
theory of the lifeworld. The telescope magnifies both the object seen and the
bodily movements of the viewer. It enables Galileo to build a new view of
the universe that extends and radicalizes the implications of the existing
lifewordly practices of quantification and such innovations as artistic per-
spective and navigational techniques, all of which contribute to a new culture
congruent with his mathematical science (Ihde, 1990, 64–65).
Instruments make modern science possible and influence our interpreta-
tion of nature, even our interpretation of our own sense experience. Just as
Making the Gestalt Switch 231
human nature includes technology, so the perceptual lifeworld includes sci-

ence. For example, when we look at the moon we look at a rock, not the
heavenly body a premodern might have seen. Similarly, symptoms of illness
refer us to a cause, not to a curse, and so on.
But unfortunately, our science-influenced perceptual culture has also
been influenced by commercialism and masculinist ideology. Modern tech-
nologies are embedded in a cultural context that favors the most ruthless
exploitation of nature. Ihde is concerned by the environmental crisis that has
resulted from the last two centuries of technological progress under these
conditions. He believes a clear understanding of the nature of technology can
provide guidance to environmentalism in responding to the crisis. In contrast
with the popular notion that change can come from a spiritual revolution, for
example, he argues that the crisis can only be overcome through a “gestalt
switch in sensibilities [that] will have to occur from within technological
cultures” (Ihde, 1990, 200). Such a switch is possible because technologies
do not stand alone. They are always interpreted and employed in a cultural
context. The “multistability” of technology holds open the possibility of
change “from within.”
This point is specifically aimed at Heidegger. But in what would such a
gestalt switch consist? If I have a criticism of Ihde’s book, it is the absence of
a concrete answer to this question. Given that modernity will not be saved by
abandoning its engagement with science and technology, what is the alterna-
tive path we should be following? I want to pursue this question in terms of
the deep background of contemporary thinking about technology. Heidegger
most definitely plays the central role in that background.
A good deal of what we find interesting in philosophy of technology and
in STS was anticipated by earlier thinkers in different language and with
different emphases. I have become acutely aware of this during the last two
years revising my first book on Lukács. The book was originally published
over thirty years ago but in working on it I discovered that it underlies all my
later work in philosophy of technology and is even relevant to STS. The book
is now available with Verso under the title The Philosophy of Praxis: Marx,
Lukács, and the Frankfurt School (2014).
Before I proceed with my argument I should perhaps remind you that in
1923 Lukács published the founding work of Western Marxism, History and
Class Consciousness. This book introduced a Marxism strongly influenced
by Hegel and free of the dogmatism of the Soviet tradition. It is still interest-
ing today as an important development in Continental Philosophy with wide
influence on twentieth-century philosophy, especially the Frankfurt School.
Furthermore, as I will show briefly here, important aspects of Lukács’s argu-
ment derive from sources that also influenced Heidegger. Hence there are
interesting parallels between their work and especially between their cri-
tiques of science and technology.
232 Andrew Feenberg
Confronting my early presentation of Lukács’s theory of reification with

my later work in technology studies I became aware of the extent to which
the germ of my approach to technology is contained already in that concept.
The concept of reification is meant to convert nouns into verbs. The basic
idea is that what we take to be substantial entities—things—are in fact con-
tinually produced and reproduced by practices. Hence thinghood is actually
the appearance of a deeper practical reality. Where have we heard this be-
fore? I do not need to remind you that this is the basic thesis not only of
pragmatism and Ihde’s work but of social constructivism and Actor-Network
Theory as well.
But the idea of reification goes much deeper. Lukács argues that it origi-
nates in Kant’s concept of transcendental synthesis. Reality is not simply
there to be observed, but must be constructed by the mind in terms of forms
and categories that give it coherence and generate the appearance of thing-
hood we normally take for granted. But Kant’s transcendental standpoint
presupposes an individual subject, a consciousness, as the constituting agent.
Lukács argues that the actual agent of the construction is social, not individu-
al, and consists not in pure acts of the mind but in complex social practices.
However, Lukács does not develop case histories like our contemporaries.
He approaches the practical basis of reification differently, in terms that
derive ultimately from neo-Kantianism. It is noteworthy that this is also the
source of Heidegger’s speculations on science and technology. Both Lukács
and Heidegger draw on the neo-Kantian concept of the construction of object
domains. This concept is the basis for their critique of science and technolo-
gy which impose a specific apriori conception of objectivity on the world in
order to understand and master it. Once they have identified the logic of that
form of objectivity, they explore its generalization as a cultural universal, no
longer confined to specialized domains but shaping the lifeworld of everyone
in modern societies.
For example, Heidegger explains science as constructing nature as the
sort of thing that can be planned and controlled. This nature is subject to
precise measurement and emerges as the object of experimental manipula-
tion. Whatever cannot be measured and manipulated is consigned to the
realm of secondary qualities. The real is now defined in terms of this con-
struction. Heidegger identifies it with technology. Like Lukács, Heidegger
argues that the agent of the construction is transindividual, not of course a
social class or group, but an epoch in the history of being. The technological
epoch is exemplified in modern machine technology but its spirit long pre-
cedes the industrial revolution and shapes the emerging natural sciences
much earlier.
Lukács made a similar argument but he attributed the origin of the con-
struction to the practices typical of capitalism, generalized in science and in a
reified worldview. He focused on two practices in particular, commodity
exchange and the operation of mechanical devices. Commodity exchange

requires equivalence of dissimilar objects which in turn requires quantifica-
tion for comparability. Marx analyzed this complex in his discussion of the
“fetishism” of commodities, by which he meant not the love of consumption
but the appearance of use value as exchange value, as price. Everywhere in
capitalist society concrete goods take on the commodity form and present
themselves through a quantitative determination. Just so the essence of the
nature of natural science is a measurable, quantitative representation.
Similarly, the subject of deskilled industrial operations is external to the
production process, an appendix of the self-acting machine. Obedience to the
“law” of the machine’s functioning is the condition sine qua non of human
agency. Again, science and technology involve social practices congruent
with capitalism, practices which share the worker’s destiny: manipulation
under the “law.”
The reified worldview is based on the generalization of these aspects of
capitalist practice in a concept of nature and a corresponding concept of
subjectivity. Nature is a quantifiable entity and the human subject is an
individual confronted with a world that cannot be fundamentally changed,
only technically manipulated.
The modern lifeworld emerges from the concatenation of such a view and
persisting elements of tradition and immediate sensory experience. In Hei-
degger little place remains for the marginal practices that are not assimilated
to the Gestell, however, their continuing existence holds out a slight hope for
a different dispensation in the future. Lukács argues that the reified lifeworld
is fraught with contradiction since it cannot adequately mediate workers’
needs. The contrast between the imposed capitalist forms and their lived
experience is potentially explosive.
Now clearly, these apriori object constructions in Heidegger and Lukács
are quite different from the empirical specifics favored by contemporary
STS. Both these earlier thinkers seek to understand the modern epoch of
science and technology rather than analyzing cases. But the cases belong to
an already established modern framework and cannot be fully understood
without reference to the nature of that framework. In different ways Ihde and
I have attempted to synthesize the epochal approach with empirical studies,
an operation that is possible because both types of analysis depend on dere-
ification of the substantial appearances of the social constructions underlying
modernity.
Ihde does not search for a general form of objectivity characteristic of
modern societies. His growing skepticism about Heidegger has led to a dif-
ferent orientation. Instead he attempts to outline the impact of the perceptual
changes made possible by new technological instruments on modern subjec-
tivity. Ihde does agree with Heidegger and other critics of technology that
Western societies exhibit a tendency toward “technological totalization.”
234 Andrew Feenberg
They try to incorporate nature into culture through the extension of technolo-
gies into the body and the world on an ever increasing scale. This tendency
distinguishes modernity from premodernity and explains the environmental
dangers that loom over our future.
However, Ihde argues that this is not a complete description of what is
happening in the world today. He sees in the development of a global techno-
logical civilization an opportunity to overcome the narrow dogmatisms and
ethnocentricities of what he calls “monoculture,” including our own. The
move toward a “pluricultural” world is a democratic advance. Ihde associates
it with post-modernity, a new phase in the development of technological
civilization that opens new possibilities of critique and change. Exactly how
this is supposed to work concretely I have not been able to figure out. But I
think Ihde’s main point is that the global interaction of cultures calls into
question many Western prejudices inherited from the past which have led to
the current crisis. Perhaps with the challenge to Western ethnocentrism tech-
nology can be resituated in another cultural context that privileges conserva-
tion and tolerance rather than exploitation and discrimination.
While I can agree with all of this, I have focused more on the construction
of the concept of the object as a cultural phenomenon. My approach has led
me to what I call the “instrumentalization theory.” I attempt to explain the
relation between causal and hermeneutic aspects of technologies, scientific-
technical rationality and the lifeworld contexts of technology. This dual as-
pect approach to technology resembles Ihde’s distinction between the “mere-
ly technical” and the cultural context. Like him I distance myself from Hei-
degger’s dystopian logic without giving up entirely what I take to be his
important discovery that the lifeworld is transformed by scientific-technical
thinking in modern times.
The instrumentalization theory suggests an answer to the question I posed
earlier about the alternative path our civilization must follow if it is to sur-
vive. I argue that what is required is not an escape from technology but rather
its dereification. By this I mean enabling a more fluid interaction between
rational disciplines, systems, and artifacts and the demands of the lifeworld
of concrete experience. I call this interaction a mediation in a sense that is
more or less Hegelian. Rationality does not exist separate from the lifeworld
but is an extension of it along specific lines such as quantitative precision and
deductive rigor. As Ihde points out, these extensions depend on technical
practices in the lifeworld such as measurement and writing. Technological
applications of rational disciplines are also dependent on the lifeworld con-
text for their meaning and trajectory of development. This again is a point
Ihde and I share. Technology does not transcend the lifeworld but rather
forms a special part of it. This explains why the lifeworld can in turn “medi-
ate” technology and other rational systems, taking advantage of their multis-
tability to redefine them.
This conception has political implications. The conflictual interactions in

which most mediation consists can only flourish in a democracy. The contes-
tation in which the process of mediation goes on presupposes respect for
basic democratic principles, human rights, and the will of the majority. This
must be a “deep democracy” in which all forms of rational order, and not just
law, are subject to dereification and transformation.
I interpret mediation in this sense through the Lukácsian critique of for-
mal rationality. Technologies, bureaucracies, and markets are rational institu-
tions that impose form on the stuff of everyday experience. They define
human beings as objects in ways similar to the construction of nature by
natural science. Where the forms prove unsatisfactory to the human beings
whose lives are their content, the misfit evokes criticism and conflict. These
situations reveal the relativity of modern formal rationality in its social de-
ployments. Ihde points out that every amplification hides a reduction. This is
most dramatically so where human lives are at stake. None of these rational
systems is able to fully embrace its contents. Indeed, no such full embrace is
really imaginable in a world where every advance in rationality creates new
possibilities for differentiation among the members of society. The concept
of democracy must be enlarged to include the continual readjustment of
formal structures to the demands of human agents.
We already have significant examples of such democratic interventions in
many domains. In addition to continuing class conflict, diminished in scope
and intensity but by no means resolved, there are many types of protest
movements, hacking of computerized systems, lawsuits, hearings, and for-
ums, especially around environmental issues, and even lay participation in
the work of scientific experimentation and technical design. Although their
scope and effectiveness are still severely limited, the new types of interven-
tions into formally rational systems enlarge the public sphere and contribute
to such important new directions for society as environmental modernization.
Yet they have been systematically under-estimated and ignored by political
theorists. Where they are noticed at all, resistances are generally viewed not
dialectically but from the one-sided perspective of the dominant. From that
perspective rationality stands opposed to ignorance and disorder. But the
reality is quite different.
These are essential forms of activism in a technological society. They
limit the autonomy of experts and capitalist management and force them to
redesign the worlds they create to represent a wider range of interests. The
translated demands are assimilated by the institutions and may lead in turn to
future iterations of the struggle, further contestation. This is the logic of
reification and mediation and it is unsurpassable. I call it “democratic ration-
alization” because it reproduces rational institutions in response to pressure
from below.
236 Andrew Feenberg
I believe this conception of the politics of technology conforms to Ihde’s

prescription according to which the “gestalt switch in sensibilities [that] will
have to occur from within technological cultures.” It suggests that the “pluri-
culture” not only crosses national boundaries but also the sharply drawn line
between lay and expert, the human individual and the system which both
makes possible individuality and constrains it. I look forward to hearing
Ihde’s own take, and those of the other postphenomenologists, on this am-
plification of their framework!
REFERENCES
Feenberg, A. (2014). The Philosophy of Praxis: Marx, Lukács, and the Frankfurt School.
Verso.
Ihde, D. (1990). Technology and the Lifeworld. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Albany: SUNY Press.
Lukács, G. (1923). History and Class Consciousness. MIT Press, 1972.
Chapter Fifteen
Postphenomenology with an
Eye to the Future
Diane P. Michelfelder
Now is a good time to be a postphenomenologist. While it is easy to see why,

a suggestive image from Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s The Phenomenology of
Perception can still be helpful. In a well-known remark, he observed that the
human body is “geared” into the world (1962, 250). The image seems apt
when speaking of the relation between the body of work of postphenomenol-
ogy to the world, and not only because the word “gear” is a technological
term. Postphenomenology is intensely geared-in to the technological devices
and systems of contemporary societies. Its interest in understanding the dis-
tinctively human user experience of technology and how technology works
to shape the user experience meshes tightly with the “given” of new, innova-
tive technologies that are constantly emerging and forming new user rela-
tions.
Consider this: when Don Ihde first described the set of human-technolo-
gy-world relations as being ones of embodiment, hermeneutic, alterity, and
background, the example he gave for embodiment relations was an ordinary
pair of glasses (Ihde, 1990). Now, there is not only the anticipation of an
unlimited public release for Google Glass in the foreseeable future, but some
optometrists are already prepared to sell the Glass with frames and prescrip-
tion lenses, and Glass-enabled contact lenses are in the works. Robots ca-
pable of brushing the teeth of children (Ihde, 2002, xii) may still be a techno-
fantasy, but Internet-enabled toothbrushes connected to a smart phone app
that will gather, and transmit back to users, data on their existing brushing
habits will soon be on the market. These examples reflect how not only are
we living in the midst of extraordinary innovation with respect to individual
technologies, but also with respect to ways in which they are linked to one
237
238 Diane P. Michelfelder
another, interact with one another, and come to be a part of our everyday
experience. And, because so many of these innovations involve perception
and embodiment, postphenomenology will have many profound insights to
offer into how they are shaped by and in turn shape the human experience.
To put matters more simply: wherever there is an app for that, postphenome-
nology cannot be far behind. If the lively currents of technological develop-
ment help make the present a good time to be a postphenomenologist, we can
expect the future to be a good time as well.
Much like technologies, though, philosophies are multistable. How to say
what’s next for postphenomenology? How might it “embody” its future? In
the spirit of multistability, let me suggest two possible, partially overlapping
and so non-exclusive, ways. The first future will sound familiar to many
readers of this volume, as it points to a course already being charted by much
current work in the field. The second future is arguably more adventurous
and de-stabilizing, involving not so much a complete turn-around but a shift
away from the empirical focus that now influences much postphenomenolog-
ical work toward a more speculative direction.
Put concisely, in this second future, more attention would be given to
forms of disclosure connected to the “world” element in the “human-technol-
ogy-world” analytical frame that plays a decisive and illuminating role in
postphenomenological investigations. While these two futures are not mutu-
ally exclusive, without attending more to “world”—meaning “the world as a
whole”—postphenomenology, I want to propose, runs the risk of becoming a
less vital voice within the profound conversations currently taking place in
philosophical circles that focus on the technologies of everyday life.
POSTPHENOMENOLOGICAL FUTURES: TAKE ONE
Traditionally, philosophical movements have progressed by refining core

concepts and drawing distinctions that become ever more nuanced and pre-
cise. Postphenomenology is no exception in this regard. Following upon the
groundbreaking conceptual scaffolding laid out by Don Ihde, others have
moved postphenomenology forward by critically reflecting on and expanding
this initial framework. Most significantly, Peter-Paul Verbeek has elaborated
on the idea that technology “mediates” between human experience and the
world, suggesting that mediation is not a simple connection between already
existing subjects and objects, but is rather a co-shaping that carries with it an
ethical dimension: new technologies generate new ways of disclosing the self
and also new social practices which can add to or subtract from the quality of
life and pose novel moral challenges and consequently novel demands on our
moral responsibility (Verbeek, 2005, especially 121–145; 2011). Out of this
focus on mediation, a rich grouping of questions emerges. In what ways do
Postphenomenology with an Eye to the Future 239
the formal structures of mediation as connection differ from mediation as co-

shaping? How do other variables, in the shape of different kinds of media-
tion—language and social structures, for instance—influence technological
mediation? How do these other variables intersect with the mediations of
technology to shape human experience and the world?
Other postphenomenological investigations, moving along a complemen-
tary path, have zeroed in on the user experience of particular technologies as
an occasion to extend and improve the conceptual “lenses” through which
postphenomenology does its work. If technology can be said to co-shape user
experience and the world, so can technology be said to co-shape the future of
postphenomenology by providing a critical perspective on its analytic tools.
For instance, as part of his body of work on the experience of cell phoning
while driving, Robert Rosenberger has argued that this experience cannot be
fully understood without expanding the scaffolding just mentioned to include
a “field theory of technological relations” (Rosenberger, 2014). Such a criti-
cal perspective could also be developed in another way, in order to sound a
critical note about just how flexible our experience can be in adapting to new
technologies. To see this, let’s go back to Google Glass.
A postphenomenological account of Google Glass might focus on how
each of the two elements that go to make up this particular wearable comput-
er are associated with different analytical “tools.” Our relations to the
“Glass” side of this technology would seem to be one of embodiment, partic-
ularly when coupled with a conventional pair of glasses. Things become
considerably more complex once human-technology relations are seen from
this device’s Google side. Take the planned “wayfinding” feature of the
Google side of the Glass. With this feature in place, drivers wearing the
Glass would no longer need to use their vehicular GPS navigational systems
or GPS smart phone applications. “Wayfinding” through Glass could in some
sense be said to be safer than other means of gathering GPS navigational
data, as the user would not need to take her eyes off the road in order to refer
to it to chart a course to her destination. That course would be displayed
iconically on the Glass itself, perhaps by means of a colored line showing the
route to be followed. This particular feature of the Google side of Google
Glass would then reflect hermeneutic relations. But what about Google Glass
itself, as a unified design product?
Using Google Glass as a pair of glasses and for navigational purposes
involves both embodiment and hermeneutic relations. The difficulty comes
in in that the first involves looking through the Glass, while the second
involves looking at it. As has been pointed out with regard to the augmented
reality windshield, of which Google Glass can be seen as a “close cousin,” it
is difficult to see how it would be possible to relate to the same technology
simultaneously with both forms of relations without one interfering with the
other and so resulting in distracted attention (Michelfelder, 2014). Here is a
way that a postphenomenological analysis, by serving as a cautionary note,

might be able to play a role in the process of design.
In short, all of the above points to a highly promising future for postphe-
nomenology: a future where key foundational elements of its conceptual
scaffolding are further defined, organized, elaborated upon, and modified.
The end result is a more insightful understanding of our technological experi-
ences, including how technologies work to shape our individual experiences
and social practices. Postphenomenology at the present moment offers up its
richest insights when it is in Rosie-the-Riveter mode: rolling up its sleeves,
so to speak, in order to work out a close analysis of human-technology
relationships, both relations with a single technological device or a handful
of technologies which are connected to one another through the experiences
of their users. Note I did not said: “human-technology-world relationships.”
This brings us to the second future I would like to imagine here for postphe-
nomenology.
POSTPHENOMENOLOGICAL FUTURES: TAKE TWO
Let me begin with a passage with which many readers of this volume will
likely be familiar: Section 12 of Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time. If all
the sections of Being and Time were ranked according to the quality of
philosophical insights they contained, Section 12 would arguably be found
toward the bottom of the list. Its purpose is primarily a transitional one: to
map the immediate road ahead. Having already identified Dasein as being-in-
the-world to be the phenomenon to be questioned, Heidegger pauses in this
section to note that the fact that being-in-the-world is a unified phenomenon
does not prevent it from being approached from a perspectival point of view.
And so, the immediate road ahead will not take the form of a direct philo-
sophical plunge into an analysis of the phenomenon as a whole, but rather
will be staged, divided into three parts. First up will be a look at the structure
of “in-the-world.” Next to come will be a consideration of the “who” that has
“being-in-the-world” as its being. Following these two sections, and wrap-
ping up, will be an analysis of “being-in” (Heidegger, 2010, 53–59).
It is in the context of the first of these stages, when Heidegger looks at the
structure of “in-the-world,” that he lays out what is customarily thought of as
his “account of tool use,” an account to which postphenomenology owes
much in terms of its lineage (Ihde, 2010). But, one could take the section in
which Heidegger offers an account of tool use and describe what is going on
in it in other ways. This account is, after all, stage-setting. It is a means that
will allow Heidegger grounding for his exploration of how the world as a
whole becomes disclosed. So, rather than talking about “Heidegger’s account
of tool use” one could also say: “Heidegger’s account of how the world is
disclosed.” Of course, any particular section in Being and Time is preparatory

for the next, so one could say that to make this re-description does not cast
into any doubt that Heidegger is in this particular section giving an account
of tool use. And, indeed, I am not trying to put this account in any doubt. But
the fact that Heidegger has his sights set on talking about world in this
passage sets the primary focus of its investigation. Another way of putting
this would be to say that in Heidegger’s exploration of tool use, it is the
world more than tools or equipment itself that is at stake.
But, the world has not tended to be foregrounded within postphenomenol-
ogy as a subject of investigation; even though it is one of the key components
of the “I-technology-world” structure that forms the bedrock for postpheno-
menological analysis. It has, as it were, slipped more into the background of
postphenomenological approaches to understanding technology than it has
remained out front. Ihde has paid the most attention to it, as seen for example
in his perceptive readings not only of Heidegger’s exploration of equipment
in Being and Time (“…what is ultimately revealed is the world as a whole…”
[2010, 47]), but in his later writings as well. But I think it is fair to say that
overall “world” is the least attended to component in the “I-technology-
world” trio in postphenomenological inquiry.
For instance, while I expect he may disagree with me, it seems fair to say
that in developing the concept of mediating as co-shaping, Verbeek has not
focused extensively on how technology discloses the world as a whole. This
is not to say that any discussion of “world” is completely absent from his
work. For example, in Moralizing Technology (2011, 15) in the context of
showing how postphenomenology departs from the modernist perspective on
“human-world” relationships; he notes that such relationships:
should not be seen as relations between pre-existing subjects who perceive and
act upon a preexisting world of objects . . . what the world “is” and what
subjects “are” arises from the interplay between humans and reality; the world
that humans experience is “interpreted reality,” and human existence is “situat-
ed subjectivity.” (2011, 15)
This having been said, however, Verbeek moves on to quickly emphasize

that what this means is that “humans and technologies do not have separate
existences anymore but help to shape each other in myriad ways” (Verbeek,
2011, 16). This claim then becomes thematic for the remainder of the vol-
ume. In the course of drawing out distinctions among different types of
rebound effects, he observes that “technology influences human behavior,
and, conversely, existing patterns in human behavior influence the use and
even the functionality of technologies” (93). A similar observation occurs in
his discussion of how mediation functions in the context of ambient and
pervasive computing, for which the FoodPhone (a phone that allows users to
transmit photographs of the food that they eat and receive an analysis of their
calorie content in return) is the salient example. Here, Verbeek identifies the
FoodPhone as a form of hermeneutic technology, as it “helps to develop new
interpretations of food and consequently informs people’s eating practice” as
well as social practices associated with eating (126–127). That the Food-
Phone, or perhaps even its more recent and more subtle cousin, the Nike
Fuelband, mediates both our individual experiences of eating food and our
social practices surrounding food can be defended without reference to the
world as a whole; put otherwise, to say that technologies disclose patterns of
behavior or practices of daily life is not the same as to say they disclose the
world as a whole.
Before returning for a second look at behavior-influencing technologies, I
want to raise the question as to why the phenomenon of world has not
remained more forcefully thematic for postphenomenology. I can think of
several, admittedly speculative, reasons why this is the case. One is that the
notion of “world” brings to mind other “wholes” such as “utopias” or “dysto-
pias,” and it is dystopian thinking in general about technology which post-
phenomenology attempts to serve as a counterweight. Another has to do with
the desire, as Verbeek eloquently puts it, to “do justice to the concrete empir-
ical reality of technology” (2005, 100); this desire leads directly to focusing
on specific technologies and their mutual interactions, and so to particular
practices and patterns rather than the world as a whole. A third reason is that
as a non-foundational philosophical movement, postphenomenology has rea-
sonably been wary of looking into how the world as a whole is disclosed. Its
non-foundationalism goes hand-in-hand with the emphasis on particular con-
texts of human-technological relations; “world,” though, particularly in a
Heideggerian setting, carries with it a fair amount of ontological baggage.
Going back for a moment to Ihde, what has been significant for him with
regards to understanding the critical passage about the hammer in Heideg-
ger’s discussion of equipment is how Heidegger takes human-technology
relations to be relations of embodiment, to the exclusion of other forms of
relations. But it is at the point where Heidegger puts his attention on the
compromised “workability” of a tool that the world as a whole is disclosed; it
is a lack that brings the world as a whole into being, and what might bring the
world as a whole into being with other forms of technological relations is a
matter remaining for postphenomenological investigation.
Why does it matter though that “world” does not more enter the picture
more powerfully for postphenomenology? Why might putting more empha-
sis on the “world” in the constellation “I-technology-world” be important for
its future? The “wholeness” of the world as such can be taken to be a whole-
ness within which our experience is disclosed to us in a familiar and trust-
worthy way, a whole in which our interactions with material objects and with
others can be counted upon to hang together. For Heidegger, this disclosure,
in the context we have been discussing here (Heidegger, 2010, section 17) is
non-thematic, amounting to an environment in which we are caught up, in
which we can find our whereabouts, to which we are, going back to the
expression of Merleau-Ponty’s mentioned earlier, “geared-in.” If postphe-
nomenology inquiry were more attentive to the forms of disclosure allowing
for our “meshing” with the world, it might realize the importance of giving
not only more but also critical attention to technologies that threaten to
undermine this “gearing-in.”
The particular technologies-in-the making I have in mind here, some
already deployed and some lying on the horizon, are ones that operate under
the threshold of everyday phenomenological experience as this experience is
rooted in ordinary perception. The technologies, some already deployed and
some lying on the horizon, are ones that look at or gather information from
us, particularly from our physical bodies along a variety of dimensions, for
the purposes of influencing our future behavior. As indicated earlier, the
focal point of much postphenomenological investigation has been on the user
experience of individual technologies. Any technology that would work by
being hidden from the realm of the everyday phenomenal experience of the
user—that would, to put it another way, be “off the grid” from the user
experience—could not directly be the focus of a postphenomenological in-
vestigation. A different way of putting this would be to say that if we were to
talk about how an individual through this technology intends or is directed
toward the world in a particular way, it would make no sense. But, such
technologies can in fact work to co-shape human behavior in a way that
could serve to help diminish overall trust in the world that one experiences.
In short, in this second future postphenomenology would not only be
interested in analyzing human technological experience but also, in part, be
concerned with safeguarding the disclosive character of everyday phenomen-
ological experience to begin with. In order to get to this point, attention needs
to be given to all elements in a matrix of “I—technologies-in-the-making—
world,” where these technologies are ones that could have the effect of mak-
ing the lived connection between our experience and the world as a whole
more fragile if not to some degree shattered. Such a “speculative postphe-
nomenology” would also have a normative element to it, as it would be
interested in maintaining the trustworthiness of the connection between hu-
man experience and the world.
CONCLUSION
Let me wrap up by giving some examples of what I have in mind by technol-

ogies that threaten to undermine the disclosive character of everyday pheno-
menological experience.
In October 2012, at a select number of its locations, the American compa-

ny Nordstrom began using wi-fi to track its customers. It kept track of how
much time its customers spent within its stores in general, and also in particu-
lar departments of these stores; it claimed it was not tracking customers’
movements from one department to another (Cohan, May 2013). From a
technological viewpoint, the set-up by which this tracking took place was
fairly simple: sensors placed throughout the store would pick up wi-fi signals
sent by customers’ smartphones and transmit them to a third-party service
which in turn would generate an “online dashboard” available to managers
who would use the information gathered to make changes—for example,
adding extra staff—where necessary.
Nordstrom’s project ended abruptly after customers complained it was
invading their privacy. From a postphenomenological point of view, that is
not the key issue. The key issue is that the behavior being tracked was
disconnected from individual experience in at least two ways. First, because
sensors and wi-fi were involved, the customer could not have the phenome-
nal experience of “being tracked,” as she would for example if she were to be
watched by video cameras. Second, the behavior being tracked is behavior
that normally individuals do not pay attention to themselves. An analogous
kind of tracking is used on some shopping websites, where users will receive
a pop-up message after a particular (but unknown from the user’s end)
amount of time has lapsed, pointing out that it looks as though they are
having trouble making up their minds, and asking them if they are in need of
customer assistance. Certainly someone may give loose attention to how
much time they are spending while shopping, but not with regard to how
much time they are spending at a particular counter or display area.
More worrisome however from the point of view of weakening the prem-
ise of phenomenology that we are “geared in” to the world through our lived
experience are technologies that monitor not our lived, embodied selves but
rather the “anonymous body,” as Merleau-Ponty called it, communicating
this information directly to other technologies so that they can make deci-
sions for the user in-between. “Smart” cars are in the works that would use
information gathered from biosensors in the driver’s seat or seat belt to make
decisions about how “fit” the driver is to operate the car, making adjustments
as perceived to be necessary, from sounding alerts to the driver to more
deliberately turning off the driver’s cell phone (White, 2012). “Smart” tex-
tiles incorporated into clothing can track galvanic skin response and other
biodata in order to monitor a wearer’s level of stress and again, make adjust-
ments accordingly, such as to play music or soothing messages—when the
stress level of the wearer, which at least in some cases can go undetected by
the person wearing the clothing—is determined to be too high (BBC News,
2010). Such kinds of technologies are qualitatively different from the ones
Verbeek discusses such as the FoodPhone (2005); as these rely on user-

perceivable inputs leading to user-perceivable outcomes.
How might these technologies-in-the-making work to have an impact on
our experience of the world? How might automotive biosensors serve not
simply to influence the experience of an individual driver or shape the gener-
al practices involved with driving, but also influence the way the world in
general is disclosed in the course of everyday life. For example, would they
work to reveal the world as a threatening environment, requiring the consis-
tent and constant “sculpting” or “medicalization” of human behavior in order
to diminish its threatening [character]? For postphenomenology to get a pur-
chase on these kinds of questions, it would need to think more speculatively
about how they might work to shape the world of human experience. The
worst case scenario for postphenomenology’s future is that while it could
continue to offer insights into a range of technologies of everyday life, it
would not have much to say, without taking a speculative turn, about “tech-
nologies-in-the-making” which aim, through those who write their “scripts,”
at influencing and controlling human behavior by working behind the scenes.
Graham Harman has pointed out that philosophies tend to have two pat-
terns of movement to them, the first being a movement of expansion, where
the principles it has discovered can be extended into “new territory” (2002,
46). Through increased attention to the “world as a whole,” I have been
suggesting here that postphenomenology could extend itself into the territory
of “technologies-in-the-making” particularly the ones I have just mentioned.
In this way, postphenomenology could continue to remain on the forefront of
philosophies of technology and continue to develop its potential, as Ihde
once put it, to offer “a deepening and more complex appreciation of all of the
facets of our technologically textured mode of life” (2010, 84).
REFERENCES
BBC News. (2010). “Smart Clothes Offer Emotional Aid.” June 4. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
10236143
Cohan, P. (2013). “How Nordstrom Uses Wi-Fi to Spy on Shoppers.” Forbes Magazine. May
9. http://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2013/05/09/how-nordstrom-and-home-depot-
use-wifi-to-spy-on-shoppers/
Harman, G. (2002). Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects. Chicago: Open
Court.
Heidegger, M. (2010/1953). Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh. Albany, NY: State Uni-
versity of New York Press.
University Press.
Ihde, D. (1993). Postphenomenology: Essays in the Postmodern Context. Evanston, IL: North-
Ihde, D. (2002). Bodies in Technologies. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Ihde, D. (2010). Heidegger’s Technologies: Postphenomenological Perspectives. New York:
Fordham University Press.
Ihde, D. (2012). Experimental Phenomenology, Second Edition: Multistabilities. Albany, NY:

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. C. Smith. London: Rout-
ledge & Kegan Paul.
Michelfelder, D. (2014). “Driving While Beagleated.” Techné: Research in Philosophy and
Technology 18(1/2): 117–132.
Rosenberger, R. (2014). “The Phenomenological Case for Stricter Regulation of Cell Phones
and Driving.” Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 18 (1/2): 20–47.
Verbeek, P-P. (2005). What Things Do. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity Press.
Things. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
White, J. (2012). “A Car That Takes Your Pulse.” Wall Street Journal. November 28. http://
online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324352004578131083891595840
Chapter Sixteen
Stability, Instability,
and Phenomenology
Albert Borgmann
In the mid-1950s, Kees Boeke, with the help of Els de Bouter, drew a series
of forty pictures (Boeke, 1957). The first was the photograph of a girl in a
deck chair, holding a cat. She is sitting in the courtyard of the school in
Bilthoven, the Netherlands, that Boeke had founded and where he taught. We
see the girl from above at a distance of a few meters, say five. In the next
picture we have ascended to ten times the distance; so now we see the girl
and her surroundings from a point that’s fifty meters above her. And so on in
jumps of powers of ten up to ten to the twenty-sixth. We then return to the
original photograph and move closer to a distance a tenth of the original five
meters—fifty centimeters. And so on in jumps of the negative powers of ten,
down to the negative thirteenth.
At least four films have been made that have translated the forty jumps
into a smooth journey. 1 They start from different places and persons—a man
sleeping on a golf course in Miami, a boy with his dog rowing a boat on the
Ottawa River, a young couple picnicking on the lake shore in Chicago,
children playing on St. Mark’s Square in Venice, a woman lying on the lawn
of the Googleplex in Silicon Valley. The upward movement of the viewpoint
is formalized by changing squares or rings or a bar scale. Sometimes the
orbits of the emerging planets are marked out. The final view is of the fairly
uniform scatter of galaxies or galaxy clusters.
In all but one of the films the viewpoint returns to the point of departure
and then homes in on the person, the skin or the retina of the person, down to
a molecule, an atom, and finally down to the atomic particles, stopping in the
early films at electrons, protons, and neutrons, and more recently going down
to the quarks. These films illustrate and require the analysis of postphenome-
247
248 Albert Borgmann
nology so clearly that they may as well have been titled “Ihde—the Movie.”
I’ll take as my illustration Don Ihde’s recent summary of postphenomenolo-
gy, a statement that sparkles with Ihde’s trademarks—energy, accessibility,
circumspection, and insight (see 2009). I will follow the four features he
stresses there: variational theory, embodiment, lifeworld, and technoscience
(Ihde, 2009, 11 and 25–44).
Boeke’s book and the films it has spawned illustrate variational theory.
“What emerged or ‘showed itself’” is the “complicated structure” of the
universe (Ihde, 2009, 12). The center of that structure is the lifeworld, the
familiar environment of persons, things, and settings. The ascent to the cos-
mic view and the descent to the microworld depart from the lifeworld and
return to it. While variational theory and lifeworld are strikingly illustrated
by the book and the films, the themes of technoscience and embodiment alert
us to complex assumptions that remain tacit in the presentations of the cos-
mic journeys. The sweep of first drawing away from the lifeworld and then
penetrating it covers up the transition from Ihde’s (human-technology) envi-
ronment relation to the human (technology-world) relation. In the vicinity of
the lifeworld, instruments such as ladders, balloons, optical telescopes,
glasses, microscopes, and the like enter “into my bodily, actional, perceptual
relationship with my environment” (Ihde, 2009, 42). But at certain scales,
such tools begin to fail me, and I have resort to “readable technologies” such
as the devices that send information from a satellite or are produced by an x-
ray machine (Ihde, 2009, 43). Imaging technologies make such information
visible and so visualize the invisible (Ihde, 2009, 45–62). The procedures in
the book and the films make it look as though vision is homogeneous across
these transitions. What gets overlooked is “that somehow along a continuum
from our sensory experience phenomena exceeded our bodily capacity to
detect” (Ihde, 2009, 54).
Ihde’s discussion of how the invisible is rendered visible further reveals
that the visual conceit of Boeke’s project conceals from view the cosmic
information we get from the invisible parts of the electromagnetic spec-
trum—the x-ray, ultraviolet, and radio frequencies. To this we must add that
even all that can be made visible according to Ihde constitutes only a twenti-
eth of all there is. Ninety-five percent of the universe consists of dark energy
and dark matter, and what we know of them is only their shadowy dynamic
and gravitational effects.
Inevitably, when something is moved to the bright center of attention,
something else moves into the shadows as Eugen Fink, Husserl’s last assist-
ant, has pointed out. 2 What Ihde illuminates so brilliantly are multistability
and variability. It’s testimony to the rank of his philosophy that he remains
aware and reminds us of what is shaded; and when the multilayered media-
tions of sensors and digital and imaging technologies threaten to dissolve
cosmic reality, Ihde stresses that the opening afforded by these mediations
Stability, Instability, and Phenomenology 249
“remains ‘realist’ if by this is meant that a sensor device only operates if it

actually detects some emission” (2009, 61). So what follows is a complement
rather than a criticism of Ihde’s work.
I want to move the invariant stabilities from the margins to the center.
Stabilities should not be taken as necessarily static or abstract. They can be
historical and uniquely concrete. They underlie and enable variations and
multistabilities. Without some stable and identifiable thing at the center,
variants would be different independent entities, and the multistability of
interpretations would turn into a multiplicity of objects. Stabilities tend to
hide, however, because they are not immediately and fully graspable. What
do the following signs refer to?
III
...
11
trois
tres
drei
The reference, of course, is three. But, to put it in Fregean terms, “three” does
not deliver the reference, but presents just another sense of 3, the sense that is
natural to speakers of English. So is “3” for people who are familiar with
Arabic numerals and “11” for those conversant with binary notation. In
Ihde’s “stage/pyramid/robot” example, it seems as though “this configura-
tion, an abstract drawing” captures the thing in itself, innocent of interpreta-
tion. But in fact that expression asks us to think of eleven lines as drawn and
configured (2009, 12).
That things tend to hide does not mean that their identity is in doubt. The
person who says “trois” and the person who says “drei” agree that they are
referring to one and the same thing. And that in turn does not mean that there
isn’t at times a question whether two speakers are in fact referring to the
same thing or whether a speaker is referring to anything at all. But such
questions are intelligible only on the acknowledgment that normally there are
identifiable things and coreferential terms.
Ihde’s stress on multistabilities is often effective in disabusing us of the
naïve and dogmatic belief that our language captures, in Kantian terms, the
thing in itself and that, in possession of the thing, we are uniquely able to
judge the values and ways in which the thing appears to others. As important,
Ihde also shows how in the case of archery the senses of a reference or the
phenomena of a noumenon come to life in different kinds of embodiments
and practices.
We can now see how variational theory and the structure of multistability
refer to complementary procedures. Variational theory begins with the varie-
250 Albert Borgmann
ty of senses or appearances and points at the invariant reference or thing in

itself; multistability centers on reference or the thing in itself and from there
explores the variety of senses or phenomena. Variability and multistability
are reflected in the variety of cultural communities and technical schools
where the senses of things come to life. What tends to disappear into the
shadows, however, are not only the things themselves, but also the presence
of the encompassing community that identifies and responds to the stability
of the thing in itself. Implicitly perhaps, Ihde agrees with that point. For him,
the crucial invariant that is identified by variational theory is “the complicat-
ed structure of multistability” (Ihde, 2009, 12). If it were not for the commu-
nity of Ihde’s readers who know multistability as the stable center of his
analyses, postphenomenology and technoscience would fall apart into in-
comprehensibility.
Ihde is rightly concerned with the variety and instability of the senses of
things, and he is the master of their diversity. But there is another concern,
perhaps as important, that regards the variety of the things themselves—
which ones should be of paramount concern to us? Boeke’s book and the
subsequent films can be thought of as the various disclosures of two stable
structures that inevitably encircle the lifeworld, the outermost horizon of the
cosmos and the innermost horizon of the atom. They correspond to two
abiding human concerns. Humans, for as long as they have been known to us,
have looked up at the sky and situated themselves in an understanding of
how the cosmos came to be and how its story and structure informed their
lives. Humans have always also looked down to identify the basic stuff the
world is made of and how such stuff explains what closely surrounds us and
how it can be shaped to our benefit.
In addition to these two horizons, the outermost of the cosmos and the
innermost of the atom, I will set aside three more that envelop and inform the
lifeworld, two clearly moral ones—global warming and global justice—and
one nebulously technological and cultural—cyberspace. How these horizons
morally inform the lifeworld is one of the great unanswered questions of
contemporary philosophy and requires a new phenomenology.
I mean “moral” in a brought cultural but also distinctive sense, distinctive
in the sense that any one horizon should specifically flavor and texture con-
temporary reality and make our lives more or less worth living. When it
comes to the outermost and innermost horizons, that sense, to a first approxi-
mation, can be delimited against uncontroversial ways in which our knowl-
edge of the cosmic and atomic structures envelop or inform our lives. Today
the cosmic horizon envelops Earth in a spatiotemporally distinctive way. In
relation to cosmic space, Earth has been shrinking ever since Copernicus, and
the farthest cosmic horizons are bounded by time. Features that haven’t had
time to reach us are invisible to us. Moreover, our universe may be
enveloped by a multiverse that’s in principle unobservable. Our knowledge
Stability, Instability, and Phenomenology 251
of atoms and their particles has obviously informed and transformed our
lives through technology.
There have of course been proposals as to the human condition in the
universe. There is the famously pessimistic view of Steven Weinberg that
“the more the universe seems comprehensible, the more it also seems point-
less” (1988, 154). There is the optimistic view of Joel Primack and Nancy
Ellen Abrams that our position at the cosmic center in seven senses of that
notion will inspire gratitude and environmental responsibility (2006, 270-
272). But existential despair and environmental concern are not specifically
or uniquely inspired by cosmic awareness.
These two views have been advanced by physicists. Mainstream philoso-
phers have not developed standard approaches to the relation of the molar to
the cosmic world. 3 As regards the relation of the molar to the atomic world,
there have been two widely used ways of articulating the problem though
there are no widely accepted solutions. Those guiding concepts are superven-
ience and emergence. We can think of them as looking from the lifeworld
down to the atomic world (supervenience) and looking from the atomic
world up to the life world (emergence), just as, broadly speaking, multistabil-
ity looks from a thing to its appearances and variation looks from its appear-
ances to a thing.
Supervenience says that the lifeworld supervenes on the atomic world,
and that in turn means that there can be no change in the (supervenient)
lifeworld without a change in the (subvenient) atomic world. A green tomato
cannot turn red without changes in the atomic or molecular structure of the
tomato. The converse is not true. There can be many a change in the mole-
cules of the tomato without it changing its color. Emergence says that when
atoms and molecules are compounded into more and more complex struc-
tures, properties emerge in the compound that the components lack. Toma-
toes have color, but atoms don’t.
Supervenience has one important consequence for the molar world or
lifeworld. All phenomena are subject to the closure of physics. It cannot be
the case that in examining a phenomenon we come upon a substance that is
nonphysical or on a causal connection that fails to be physically lawful. For
example, there cannot be an immaterial soul substance or a telepathic interac-
tion. But the closure of physics is a very wide constraint on phenomena and
gives phenomenology no particular guidance. Like multistability, it takes the
existence of things for granted.
Variation and emergence, however, are concerned with the disclosure of
things, the invariant bearers of emergent properties; and here again “invari-
ant,” like stability earlier, should not be taken as eternal or transcendental,
but as variably identifiable here and now. Thing, in Latin, is res, and the
predicate that goes with res is “is real.” Thus attention to the things that lend
our lives coherence requires as an addition to postphenomenology a real
252 Albert Borgmann
phenomenology. It’s a project entirely in its own right. It, if anything, will
answer the question that emergence poses.
“Do Things Speak?” asks Ihde and answers in the affirmative. Again his
emphasis is on the variety of languages in which things speak or are allowed
to speak. The great little book concludes with the words: “Things, too, have
or may be given voices” (Ihde, 2009, 88). To Ihde’s question and to his
answer the complements are: Which things speak decisively? And how do
we learn to listen to them? For Husserl phenomenology was the enterprise
that was never finished. Real phenomenology is the enterprise that hasn’t
really begun.
NOTES
1. See “Cosmic View,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmic_View, visited March 21,

2014.
2. See Fink, 1957, pp. 321–337, particularly p. 336.
3. One of the exceptions is Tim Maudlin’s “The Calibrated Cosmos” (2014).
REFERENCES
Boeke, K. (1957). Cosmic View. New York: John Day Company.

Fink, E. (1957). “Operative Begriffe in Husserls Phänomenologie.” Zeitschrift für philosophis-
che Forschung, vol. 11.
Ihde, D. (2009). Postphenomenology and Technoscience: The Peking Lectures. Albany, NY:
SUNY Press.
Maudlin, T. (2013). “The Calibrated Cosmos,” http://aeon.co/magazine/nature-and-cosmos/
why-does-the-universe-appear-fine-tuned-for-life/, visited March 21, 2014.
Primack, J. R., and N. E. Abrams. (2006). The View from the Center of the Universe. New
York: Riverhead Books.
Weinberg, S. (1988). The First Three Minutes. New York: Basic Books.
Index
Abbot, A., 194 background relations, 18

Abrams, N. E., 251 Baerheim, A., 222
accelerometer, 143 Bailenson, J., 56, 69n3
Achterhuis, H., xiii, 30 Balla, G., 165
actor–network theory, viii, xii; versus Bandrauk, N., 192
postphenomenology, xv–xvi, 19–20 Bannon, B. E., 73
actuality, 132–134, 208 Barad, K., 83n8
affordance, 131–132, 134 Barbaras, R., 73
agency, 191; of nonhumans, 191 behavior-influencing technologies, 242
air balloons, 161 Benz, K., 161
airplane, 161, 165 Berger, P., ix
Albrechtslund, A., 148 Besmer, K., 36, 37, 70n9, 70n11
alienation, 11 Bestand, 127
alterity relations, 18 Bharucha, A. J, 136
ambient technology, 170, 241 Bijker, W., 162
ambiguities (in self-tracking), 154 biopolitics, 148, 155
ambivalence of technological mediation, Blascovich, 56, 69n3
125 Block, N., 86
amplification/reduction structure of Blomkamp, N., 94
mediation, 74, 148 body, 85–103, 105–119; as object, 229; as
appearance, 97–98 subject, 229; avatar, 56–57; bodily-
archery, 116–117, 169, 249 skills, 110–115; body one and body
Aristotle, 205–208, 212n12 two, 147, 198–199, 204; brain-dead,
artificial intelligence, 175, 185 204–208, 209; disembodied, 206;
Asimov, I., 175 donor, 210; functional perspective on,
Astell, A. J., 136, 139n4 123; here-body, 114–115, 119, 155;
attaching-detaching duality, 138 image-body, 115; lived, 59; measuring,
augmented intentionality, 22 79–82; objective, 59, 78, 200;
autonomy, viii, 137, 196, 235 phenomenal, 59, 78
avatar body, 56–57, 67 body schema, 59–60, 61–66, 76
ax, 112 BodyMedia, 143
253
254 Index
Boeke, K., 247–248 Crispolti, E., 165

Bonetti, U., 165 CT scan, 199
Bonia, K., 191 culture, 230
Bonser, R. S., 212n20 cybernetics, 82
Bottenberg, F., 18 cyborg, 36, 113
brain-death, 203–211 cyborg relations, 20–22, 36
breakdown, 111, 119
Breazeal, C., 187 D’Aluisio, F., 186
Brownsell, S. J., 136 Dalibert, L., 21, 36
Brunger, F., 191 De Bouter, E., 247
Buchanan, B., 73 De Preester, H., 36, 60, 69n1, 113
Burger, N., 92 decisional burden, 156
democracy, 235
calculative thinking, 127 Derrida, J., x
Callon, M., xii Descartes, R., 77, 85
camera obscura, 151, 200 design, 235
Cameron, J., 91 designer fallacy, 152
Canguilhem, G., 83n10 deskilling, 233
car, 137, 165, 170 Dewey, J., 45, 47, 53
Carbone, M., 73 diabetes, 143
care of the self, 156 diagnostics, 219
Cartesian, 205–206, 208, 211, 211n3 Dolezal, L., 69n1
Carusi, A., 33, 73, 75, 79, 81, 82, 83n4, donor, 203, 206–207, 209
83n7 Dorrestijn, S., 116, 117
Cataldi, S. L., 73 Dos Santos, F. R., 148
Caucounau, V., 136 Dr. Ethics, 193–194
cell phone, 37–38, 90, 134 Dreyfus, H., 194, 198
Cézanne, P., 77 Dumas, A., 163
Chapman, A., 136 Durkheim, E., 50
Childress, J.F., 199 Dyar, R., 161
Chubbs, K., 192
circuit (Merleau-Ponty), 81 Eason, R., 16
Clark, A., 69n5 Eden, garden of, 230
class, 235 eliminatory approach, 107
Coca-cola, 163 ELIZA, 183
cognitivism, 219–220 embodiment, 60, 77; and bodily skills,
Cohan, P., 244 110–115; double, 67, 69; extension of,
Cole, J., 57, 65, 70n13 68; Welton on, 114–115
commercialism, 231 embodiment relation, 14–16, 22, 24, 36,
commodity, 233 38, 153
compound eye, 156 emergence, 251
Comstock, H. E., 161 empirical detour, 10
Comte, A., 50 empirical philosophy, 30–32
Conan Doyle, A., 163 empirical turn, 32
constitution, 48, 52, 74 empiricism, 49
constructionism, social, viii enabling-constraining structure of
Copernicus, 250 mediation, 124, 131–134
Crease, R. P., 6 Endicott, R., 86
Creli, T., 165 episteme, 204, 208
Index 255
epistemological dimension of mediation, Gibson, J., 131, 139n1

124, 128–130 glasses, 149, 237
epistemology, 150, 151, 200 Goergen, S., 222
epistemology engine, 150, 151, 200 Google glass, 89, 237, 239
equipment, 126 GPS, 239
Ericson, R. V., 145 grieving practices, 211
Espeland, A., 222 Grosz, E., 185
ethical decision-making, 195–197 Gunderman, R. B., 221
ethical dimension of mediation, 124, Gursky, A., 165
134–138 Gurwitsch, A., 23
ethnomethodology, 49–51
event ontology, 45 hacking, 153
existential, 124, 156 Hacking, I., 203–204, 205
experimental philosophy, 223 Haggerty, K. D., 145
exploitation of nature, 231 Hamblin, J., 163
extension, 58; extension thesis, 56, 68; of hammer, 242
embodiment, 68 Hamrick, W. S., 73
Hanson, D., 182
fall detection technology, 136 Haraway, D., 47, 75, 186, 188n16, 212n8
fetishism, 233 Harmon, A., 177–181
field of awareness, 23–25 Hasse, C., 16, 29, 33, 34
Fink, E., 248 hearing aid, 15, 111
Fish, S., 196 Hébert, P. C., 195
Fitbit, 143, 146 Heelan, P., 224n3
fixed entity fallacy, 152 Hegel, G. W. F., 231, 234
Fleming, N., 157n5 Heidegger, M., xii, 10, 26, 110, 126, 134,
flesh, 78 150, 155, 170, 172n8, 207, 212n5,
Flynn, J., 192 212n13, 215, 229, 231–234, 240–243
Fodor, J., 86 hermeneutic relations, 16–18, 146
FoodPhone, 241–245 hermeneutics, 215–224; and information-
Forss, A., 16, 24, 33, 106 processing theory, 220; in medicine,
Foucault, M., 16, 117, 147, 156, 198 220–221; material, 216, 242; of science
Frankfurt School, 231 practices, 216; of technology, 219
Frege, G., 249 Hern, H. E., 193
Friis, J. K. Berg Olsen, 6, 33 Hickman, L., 108
Fullerton, L., 191 Hoel, A. S., 33, 73, 75, 79, 81, 82, 83n4,
functional pragmatism, 89, 93 83n7
Furby, 184, 185 Hofstandter, D., 183
futurism, 160, 164 homo technologicus, 230
Horgan, T., 86
Gabelich, G., 162 Hu, R., 91
Gadamer, H. G., 215–216, 224n1 Hughes, Thomas, vii
Gaggia, A., 163 human–technology relations, 13–18, 146
Gale, A., 217 Husserl, Edmund, ix, xii, 27, 48, 112–113,
Galilei, Galileo, 123, 230 150, 215, 229–230, 248, 252
Gallagher, S., 62–65, 70n13 Hutchby, I, 139n1
Garfinkel, H., 50–51, 52
Gestalt processing, 221 identity, technology and, 86
Gestell, 127, 233
256 Index
Ihde, D., 73, 74, 263; on the body, 113, Koontz, N. A., 221
116, 196; on computer experimentation, Kroes, P., 32
188n17; on cyborgs, 36; on design, 132, Krupinski, E., 217–218, 224n2
152; on Heidegger, 172n8; on Kuhn, Th., ix
human–technology relations, 13–18, Kundel, H. L., 217–220
146; on imaging technologies, 152; on
multistability, 25–28, 148, 171; on the language, 80
senses, 185; on the subject, 145; on Lantos, J. D., 195, 199
symmetry, 150; on technoscience, 150; Latour, Bruno, viii, ix–xi, 47, 49, 51, 52,
on technique versus technology, 109; 73, 135, 191
on technofantasies, 186; on variational Lauritsen, P., 148
method, 119, 206, 208; on visualism, 48 Law, J., xii
imaging technologies, 32–35, 130, 150,
152, 216, 230 Le Corbusier, 172n6
implants, 21, 35, 37, 113
information processing theory, 220 Leder, D., 203–204, 205
inner–outer distinction, 60 Lenay, C., 113
inscription, x, xi Leo XIII, pope, 163
instrumental realism, 150–151 Leviathan, 204
instrumentalization, 234 liberating-oppressive duality, 138
instruments, scientific, ix–xi, 230; in Lock, M., 203–204
Merleau-Ponty, 75–76 Locke, J., 49, 87
intentionality, 11, 48, 63, 112; augmented, Loebner, 183
22; hybrid, 21; reflexive, 22; self- Low, D., 73
referential, 63 Luckmann, T., ix
interpersonal relations, 106 Lukács, G., 231–233, 235
interpretation (of medical images), 221,
222–223 macroperception, 16, 147
involving-alienating structure of magnification/reduction structure of
mediation, 124, 135 mediation, 16, 123, 128–130
Irwin, S., 18 Manning, D. J., 217
Iserson, K. V., 195 Marcuse, H., 212n4
isomorphism, 150, 153 Marinetti, F., 160, 164
IW, 61–65, 70n14 Marriott, F., 162
Marx, K., 233
Jawbone, 143, 146 marxism, 106, 231
Jensen, A., 221 materiality, 133
Judy, P. F., 218 mathematics, 81
Jünger, E., 166 mathematization, viii
McDonald, B., 177
Kant, I., 48, 183, 194, 232 McGee, G., 193, 194
Kaposy, C., 192 McKeown, D. W., 212n20
Kavner, L., 177–182 measuring body, 79–82
Kellum, J. A., 212n20 mediation, 11–12, 52, 73–74, 123–138;
Kelly, K., 154 ambivalence of, 124; dimensions of,
Kierkegaard, S., 159 124; epistemological dimension of,
Kiran, A., 132–134, 136–137 124, 128–130; ethical dimension of,
Kocher, T., 211n2 124, 134–138; existential dimension of,
Koenig, B. A., 193 124; flesh as, 78–79; practical
Index 257
dimension of, 124, 131–134 Nozick, R., 85

medical ethics, 191–192; automation of, nudge, 137, 146, 203
193–196 Nye, David, vii
medicalization, 245
Menzel, P., 186 object, scientific, xi
mereological, 206 Oken, B., 87
Merleau-Ponty, M., 11, 25, 49, 59, 69n4, ontology, 47–49, 125–128, 223
70n8, 73–82, 113–114, 139n2, 147, operationalism, 78
204, 237, 243–245 Orlando, G., 212n21
metaphysics, 45–53, 215 Oudshoorn, N., 136
Meyers, A., 32 Owen, A., 87
microcredit, 106
microperception, 16, 147 Parfit, D., 85, 87
mobility, 159–171 Paro, 188n10
mobilization, total, 166 paternalism, 137
modernity, 230, 231, 234 pattern recognition, 220–221
Mol, A., 30, 157n1 Pauer, J., 161
monitoring, patient, 136 PET scans, 216
Moore, L. J., 193 Pfister, W., 99
moral intentionality, 223 philosophy of technology, classical, 10
morality, 118, 223 photography, 150
Mori, M., 188n8 phronesis, 194
Mostow, J., 96 Pickering, A., 150
motor skills, 62 Plato, 85
movement, 159–171 pluriculturalism, 234
MRI, 216, 219 politics, 138, 235
multistability, 25–30, 46, 116–117, Pool, F., 222
147–149, 152, 155, 231, 248–250; and positivism, viii
the body, 191, 200; and design, 132; of post-structuralism, 198
philosophy, 238; practical, 169–170; of posthumanism, 35
the self, 85, 88 postmodernism, 48
Mumford, L., 167 postphenomenology: versus actor–network
theory, xv–xvi, 19–20; methodology,
Nagel, T., 92 30–32
National Transplant Organ Act, 209 potentiality, 132–134, 208
navigational practices, 108 powers of ten, 247
Necker cube, 26–27 practical dimension of mediation, 124,
neo-Kantianism, 232 131–134
Nietzsche, F., 159 pragmatism, 12, 208, 215, 229; functional,
Nodine, C. F., 218 89, 93
noema–noesis correlation, 112 pre-conscious, 221
non-foundationalism, 208, 242 Primack, J., 251
non-neutrality, 148–149 privacy, 136, 244
non-subjectivistic, 229 proprioception, 61–66
Nordstrom, 244 prostheses, 113
norm, evolution of, 89 Proyas, A., 95
Norman, D., 132, 139n1 Pullman, D., 192
Noronha, 161 Putnam. H., 86
nostalgia, 230
258 Index
quantified self, 143, 148, 149, 153 Secomandi, F., 106

Second Life, 68
radiology, 217–219 sedimentation, 25
Rasmussen, J., 221 Segrave, H., 162
rationality, formal, 235 self, 85, 145; dynamic notion of, 88, 102;
rationality, scientific, 234 technologies of the, 117–118, 156
re-embodiment: virtual, 55–58, 66–67; self-tracking, 143–157
robotic, 55–58, 61–66 Selinger, E., xiv, 38, 73, 74, 106, 118, 150
reification, 232 semiotics, xv
relational competences, 182 Shanechi, M., 91
relationalism, 12, 19–20, 46, 49 Sharon, T., 157n7
representation, 129 Sharp, L., 203
responsibility, 200 Shoemaker, S., 85
revealing-concealing structure of Siegler, M., 199
mediation, 124, 125–128 Simondon, G., 83n10
revolution, 165 simulation, 197–199
Richardson, I., 38 Singleton, R., 192
Ricoeur, P., 88, 103n2 skin-bag, 58
Riis, S., 33 smart technology, 244
robot, 175–186, 237 Snyder, Z., 100
Ronson, J., 177–187 Sobchack, V., 73, 107
Rosenberger, R., 23, 28, 29, 33, 34, 38, 87, sociology, 50
157n8, 239; on bodily skills, 116; on Somatechnology, 21
field theory, 23, 239; on multistability, speculative phenomenology, 243
117 speed, 160, 162, 166
Rosenfeld, A., 188n14 stéresis, 207–208
Ruckenstein, M., 145, 147, 155 Stiegler, M., 101
Russo, A., 87 STS: see Science and Technology Studies
Russo, J., 87 subject–object dichotomy, 78
subjectivity, 78, 87, 118, 157n7, 185–186,
Sabih, D., 220–222 206–207, 229
Sacks, O., 57 Suchman, L., 185, 188n15
Saint Aubert, E. de, 79 Suhm, L., 167
Santos-Dumont, A., 161 Sunstein, C., 137, 203
Sartre, J. P., 78, 186 supervenience, 251
Scharff, R., 16 Swan, M., 153, 154
Schiphol airport, 137 Swierstra, Tsj., 135
Schüll, N. D., 144
Schutz, Alfred, ix tech-etiquette, 182, 188n8
Science and Technology Studies, 10, 138, technai, 209
229, 231, 233 technofantasy, 186
science critics, 211 technologies of the self, 117–118
science fiction, 85–103 technology transfer, 133
scientific rationality, 234 technology-in-the-making, 243
scientist (as a term), vii technoscience, 150
Scott, R., 95 tele-surgery, 57–58, 65
Scrinis, G., 152 telemedicine, 199
script, 245 telepresence, 55–69
seatbelt, 137 telescope, 150, 230
Index 259
Tenner, E., 132 Verbeek, P. P., xv, 20, 33, 35, 36, 52, 106,
Thaler, R., 137, 203 113, 116, 241; on behavior-influencing
thingly character of technology, 126 technology, 137, 157n1; on Ihde, 128;
things themselves, 46, 51 on moral mediation, 136, 238; on
time, technology and, 86 subjectivation, 117, 156
Toadvine, T., 73 Verne, J., 163
Toffler, A., 167 Virilio, P., 167, 172n6
Tomkins, C., 172n7 visualism, 33, 48
tool-analysis, 126, 127
tracking, 244 Wagner, L., 164
trajectories, instrumental, 34 Waterman, I., 57
transcendental, 232 Weinberg. S., 251
transfer, technology, 133 Weizenbaum, J., 183
transparency, 14–15, 117, 153 Wellner, G., 18, 38, 87
Tromp, N., 137 Welton, D., 36, 113–115
Turing test, 183 Whewell, William, vii
Turing, A., 188n12 White, J., 244
Turkle, S., 182, 184 Whitehead, A. N., 45, 49, 52, 53
typewriter, 110, 132 Whyte, K. P., 30, 168–169
Wijdicks, E. F., 212n6
Uexküll, J. von, 80 Wilken, R., 38
ultrasound, 35, 219 Williams, B., 85
unveiling, 216, 223–224 Williams, Z. M., 91
urinal, 137 Woolgar, Steve, viii
utilitarianism, 194 world (in human-technology-world
relations), 241–243
vaccination, 94 Wright brothers, 161
Van den Eede, Y., 15, 144
Vanderbilt, W. K., 163 X-ray, 130, 216, 218–219
Varela, F. J., 219–220
variability, 248–250 Zwijsen, S. A., 136
variational theory, 148, 206, 208
About the Contributors
EDITORS
Robert Rosenberger is an assistant professor of philosophy at the Georgia

Institute of Technology in the School of Public Policy. He studies the philos-
ophy of technology, investigating topics such as Mars imaging, cell-phone
induced driving impairment, public space design, neurobiological sample
freezing, internet personalization, dictation technologies, and computer-sim-
ulated frog dissection. He is the Editor-in-Chief of the new Lexington book
series entitled “Postphenomenology and the Philosophy of Technology,”
which he co-founded with Don Ihde and Peter-Paul Verbeek. He has also
edited the 2010 interview book Philosophy of Science: 5 Questions, and is
the co-curator of the website postphenomenology.org.
Peter-Paul Verbeek is professor of philosophy of technology and chair of

the Philosophy Department at the University of Twente (www.utwente.nl/
gw/wijsb/organization/verbeek/english/index.html). He is also president of
the Society for Philosophy and Technology (www.spt.org). His research fo-
cuses on the relations between humans and technologies, and the social and
cultural implications of technology. Currently he is leading a five-year re-
search project to develop an analysis of the mediating role of technology in
knowledge, morality, and metaphysics. Among his publications are Moraliz-
ing Technology: Understanding and Designing the Morality of Things (Uni-
versity of Chicago Press 2011) and What Things Do: Philosophical Reflec-
tions on Technology, Agency, and Design (Penn State University Press
2005).
261
262 About the Contributors
CONTRIBUTORS
Kirk M. Besmer teaches philosophy at Gonzaga University. His research

interests include phenomenology and the philosophy of technology. He is
especially interested in the ways that contemporary technologies alter our
experience and understanding of human embodiment. He is the author of
Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology: The Problem of Ideal Objects (Continu-
um, 2007).
Albert Borgmann is Regents Professor of Philosophy at the University of

Montana, Missoula, where he has taught since 1970. His special area is the
philosophy of society and culture. Among his publications are Technology
and the Character of Contemporary Life (University of Chicago Press,
1984), Crossing the Postmodern Divide (University of Chicago Press, 1992),
Holding On to Reality: The Nature of Information at the Turn of the Millen-
nium (University of Chicago Press, 1999), Power Failure: Christianity in the
Culture of Technology (Brazos Press, 2003), and Real American Ethics (Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2006).
Frances Bottenberg currently holds a post-doctoral fellowship in the teach-

ing of Philosophy at Elon University, North Carolina. Her research areas
include philosophy of emotion, theories of rationality, and the study of de-
mentia, as well as philosophy of pedagogy. Representative forthcoming pub-
lications include “Judging Inappropriateness in Actions Expressing Emo-
tion,” “Emotion as the Animation of Value,” and a philosophy of education
textbook, co-authored with Anthony Weston, titled How Should We Teach?
Eighteen Philosophies of Education In and Beyond the Classroom. Botten-
berg completed her graduate work at Stony Brook University, where she was
an active participant in the Technoscience Research Group, lead by Don
Ihde.
Annamaria Carusi is associate professor in philosophy of medical science

and technology, at the University of Copenhagen. She is interested in con-
nections between epistemic, social, and aesthetic aspects of science, with a
particular focus on material practices and technologies. On the theoretical
level, she works on developing connections between philosophy of science in
practice and phenomenology; her research is convergent with new experi-
mentalism and new materialism. Her recent research has focused on images,
models, simulations, and visualizations in the contemporary biosciences, and
on the role of technologies in computationally intensive interdisciplinary
settings.
Andrew Feenberg is Canada Research Chair in Philosophy of Technology

in the School of Communication, Simon Fraser University, where he directs
the Applied Communication and Technology Lab. His recent books include
Between Reason and Experience: Essays in Technology and Modernity
(MIT Press), (Re)Inventing the Internet (Sense Publishers), and The Philos-
ophy of Praxis: Marx, Lukács and the Frankfurt School (Verso).
Jan Kyrre Berg Friis has a PhD in science studies and is an associate
professor of philosophy of science and technology at Copenhagen Univer-
sity. He has authored, edited, and co-edited numerous books on philosophy
of technology, philosophy of time, metaphysics, and science. He has pub-
lished papers on topics such as philosophy of medicine, time concepts in
physics, time as experience, perception, hermeneutics, and measurement.
Aud Sissel Hoel is a professor of media studies and visual culture at the
Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Her work focuses on
technological mediation, and especially, on the roles of images in knowledge
and being. This research interest branches out to include photography, scien-
tific instruments, new media, medical imaging, and visualization. An over-
arching aim that cuts across Hoel’s various projects is to rethink images in
dynamic terms, developing what she has coined as a “differential” theory of
images and of mediating apparatuses more generally. Her publications cover
a wide range of topics on the overlapping fields of visual studies, science
studies, philosophy of technology, and media philosophy. For more informa-
tion, see www.audsisselhoel.com and https://ntnu-no.academia.edu/
AudSisselHoel.
Don Ihde is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Emeritus, Stony Brook

University. A founding figure in postphenomenology, he is the author of
twenty-one single-author and seven edited or co-edited books. These include:
Postphenomenology: Essays in the Postmodern Context (1993), Postphe-
nomenology and Technoscience: The Peking University Lectures (2009),
and, related, Evan Selinger’s Postphenomenology: A Critical Companion to
Ihde (2006). Ihde has lectured in approximately fifty countries, and his works
have been translated into fifteen languages.
Chris Kaposy is an assistant professor of health care ethics in the Faculty of

Medicine at Memorial University in St. John’s, Newfoundland, Canada. His
main research interests are in bioethics. Current research projects include a
study of clinical ethics issues in the treatment of HIV, an empirical project on
the roles played by ethics consultants in crisis situations, and the ethics of
prenatal testing for Down syndrome. Alongside his research activities, Chris
264 About the Contributors
is a clinical ethicist and program director for the Master of Health Ethics
degree at Memorial University.
Asle H. Kiran is a researcher of ethical, social, and existential consequences

of new technologies in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies
at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. His research is both
empirical and conceptual, and mainly focuses on how new technologies
shape and re-shape healthcare practices. Themes of interest include the tech-
nological constitution of person and patienthood and the limits of doing
proactive responsible innovation. He has published in international and Nor-
wegian journals and books.
Lenore Langsdorf is Professor Emerita, Southern Illinois University, Car-

bondale; visiting research professor, University of Texas, San Antonio, and
adjunct instructor, Northwest Vista College. Her research focuses on cogni-
tion, the philosophy of the human/social sciences, and the philosophy of
communication, approached through hermeneutic phenomenology, postphe-
nomenology, and process pragmatism.
Diane Michelfelder is professor of philosophy at Macalester College in the

United States. A former president of the Society for Philosophy and Technol-
ogy, she is currently co-editor-in-chief for Techné: Research in Philosophy
and Technology, the journal of SPT. Her primary research interests are in the
philosophy of technology, especially in ethical questions arising from
“smart” technologies and the Internet itself.
Marie-Christine Nizzi, a former ENS student, got her PhD in philosophy

from the Sorbonne (France). After earning a master’s in neuropsychology,
she is now working on a PhD in psychology at Harvard, in collaboration with
Lille 3 University. Her work focuses on resilience and the sense of self in
patients with a history of trauma or neurological disorder.
Søren Riis is associate professor of philosophy at Roskilde University, Den-

mark. He holds a PhD from Albert-Ludwig University, Freiburg (Germany).
In his research he focuses on technologies, how they co-shape society and the
way we humans think and behave. He has co-authored and co-edited New
Waves in Philosophy of Technology (2008) and the Oxford Bibliographies
entry “Philosophy of technology.” Recently he published a critical examina-
tion and interpretation of Heidegger’s understanding of technology “The
Ultimate Technology: The End of Technology and the Task of Nature”
(2013).
Adam M. Rosenfeld currently teaches courses in ethics, epistemology, and

philosophy of technology at North Carolina A&T State University. His
research focuses on philosophy of science, philosophy of technology, and the
philosophy of games, play, and make-believe. A guiding theme through all of
his research, that the hermeneutic dimensions of embodied technological
mediation are a crucial aspect of all epistemic inquiry, is heavily informed by
his participation in the Technoscience Research Group at Stony Brook Uni-
versity.
Fernando Secomandi is adjunct professor of product design in the Institute

of Arts and Design at Federal University of Juiz de Fora, Brazil. He has
published articles on postphenomenology in Design Issues and Design
Philosophy Papers.
Yoni Van Den Eede is a postdoctoral fellow of the Research Foundation—

Flanders (FWO) affiliated with the Centre for Ethics and Humanism and the
Centre for Media Sociology, both at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (Free
University of Brussels). He conducts research into the philosophy of technol-
ogy, media theory, and media ecology, with an emphasis on phenomenologi-
cal, cultural, and existential themes. He is the author of Amor Technologiae:
Marshall McLuhan as Philosopher of Technology (Brussels, VUBPRESS,
2012).

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What is the main focus of the book series?

What is the main focus of the book series?

What philosophical approaches are discussed in relation to technology?

What philosophical approaches are discussed in relation to technology?

Postphenomenological Investigations

Essays on Human–Technology Relations

Edited by Robert Rosenberger

Unit A, Whitacre Mews, 26-34 Stannary Street, London SE11 4AB

Copyright © 2015 by Lexington Books

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Postphenomenological investigations : essays on human-technology relations / edited by Robert

Printed in the United States of America

Preface: Positioning Postphenomenology vii

1: A Postphenomenological Field Guide 7

3: Postphenomenological Cases 141

4: Critical Interlocutors 227

Postphenomenology is a philosophical style of analysis which deals with

Here my issue relates to postphenomenology as a particular mode of

construction are removed. So, contrary to what he observes ethnographically,

for relations with technologies. (Awaken with an alarm clock; engage a

“Actor-Network Theory” in about 1982 (Law, 2007). In my case, after much

access to graduate students who were attracted to these modes of science-

• Both ANT and Postphenomenology employ inter-relational ontologies.

• Postphenomenology retains a version of variational theory from phenom-

Achterhuis, H. (2001). American Philosophy of Technology: The Empirical Turn, translated by

A philosophical perspective called postphenomenology has been quickly

of traditions and interests, the postphenomenological perspective has devel-

Part 2 Part 2 begins with Lenore Langsdorf’s “Why Postphenomenolo-

attempts to articulate a world of human-technology relations, it would benefit

Part 3 In the first chapter of part 3, titled “Tracing the Tracker: A

of the user’s own body. Through an analysis of the experience of these

lifeworld is one of the great unanswered questions of contemporary philoso-

A Postphenomenological Field Guide

A Field Guide to Postphenomenology

for philosophical analysis. Its philosophy of technology is in a sense a philos-

FROM PHENOMENOLOGY TO POSTPHENOMENOLOGY

The postphenomenological approach in philosophy of technology has devel-

answer the philosophical question of how the role of technology in human

As a result of this practical and material orientation, postphenomenology

Work in the postphenomenological perspective most often proceeds through

One of Ihde’s most influential contributions to the philosophy of technology

While this list of the forms of human-technology relations should not be

then an embodiment relation to technology can be represented in this man-

tially transparent as possible (1990, 75). (For a recent discussion on the

My awareness of wearing glasses is a fringe awareness that gets interrupted

According to Ihde, a number of specific features of hearing aid technology

ability and context-dependency of human-technology relations (see, e.g.,

The second major form of technological mediation that Ihde identifies is

losophy (which contemplates the nature of language interpretation and trans-

A wristwatch is a simple example. A user looks at the watch’s face, interprets

With the notion of “alterity relations,” Ihde refers to devices to which we

With the notion of “background relations,” Ihde addresses those technologies

this point. He explains, “The ‘withdraw’ of this technological function is

The postphenomenological focus on human-technology relations, as stated in

Recent work in postphenomenology has expanded the range of human-tech-

“environmental” or “ambient” than the background relation, there is a rela-

From this “fusion” relation, a “hybrid intentionality” emerges. Rather than

The intentionality involved in such “augmentation relations” can be indicated