ECON 302 - Microeconomic Theory II: Strategic Behavior IRYNA

DUDNYK

Tutorial 1. Monopoly and Price Discrimination.

Question 1. Suppose there are 10 students in a class and teacher brings a bag with 10
candies. Assume all students have identical preferences and have positive marginal value of
candy.

(a) Is allocation in which each student gets a candy Pareto efficient?

An allocation is Pareto efficient when there is no other allocation such that at least
one person is better-off and no one is worse-off. The allocation in which each student
gets a candy satisfies the definition in this case: since all candy is already distributed,
the only way to make one of the students better off (give him more candy) is to make
some other student worse-off (take candy away).

(b) Is allocation in which one student gets all the candy Pareto efficient?

In this situation whether the allocation is efficient or not depends on whether utility
is transferrable. If transfers are not possible, then this allocation is efficient (provided
that for that one lucky student the value of candy is does not fall to zero). If transfers are
possible, then the efficient allocation must maximize the total well-being, in which case
each candy should be given to a student who places the highest value on it. For example,
if the marginal value of candy is diminishing and M V = 25 cents for the first candy and
falls to M V = 5 cents for the tenth candy, a situation when the student who got all ten
candies ‘sells’ his last candy at any price 5 ≤ P ≤ 25 is a Pareto improvement.

Problem 1. Monopoly sells its product to N = 10 identical consumers each of whom has
individual demand P = 30 − 2q, where q is quantity demanded by a single consumer at price
P . The firm has constant marginal cost M C = 5 and no fixed cost.

(a) Suppose the firm cannot price discriminate. Derive aggregate market demand P (Q),
where Q is the quantity demanded by all consumers at price P . Set up firm’s profit
function π(Q), find profit-maximizing quantity QM and price PM . Calculate firm’s prof-
its, consumer surplus and welfare loss. Demonstrate on a diagram.

At price P each consumer demands q = 30−P 2

units, therefore, market quantity demanded
is Q = 10q = 10 30−P
2
= 150−5P which solves for inverse market demand P = 30−0.2Q.
π = T R − T C = P · Q + AC · Q. Since F C = 0 and MC is constant, AC=MC=5; P
depends on Q, sub inverse demand for P, obtain π = (30 − 0.2Q)Q − 5Q. To maximize
dπ
profits F.O.C. is dQ = 30 − 0.4Q − 5 = 0; notice that this is same as ‘choosing output so
that marginal revenue equals marginal cost’: M R = 30 − 0.4Q = 5 = M C. The profits
are maximized at QM = 62.5. Sub into demand to find PM = 17.5. Calculate profits
π = 781.25, CS=390.625. To find welfare loss you need the efficient output, which satis-
fies M V = M C, that is MC curve intersects demand curve: P = 30 − 0.2Q = 5 = M C,
denote Q∗ = 125. DWL=390.625

(b) Suppose the firm decides to use two-part pricing. Describe optimal two-part pricing
scheme, calculate total quantity produced by the firm, firm’s profits, consumer surplus,

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DUDNYK

and deadweight loss.

When consumers have identical demands optimal two-part pricing is to set per unit
price P = M C, which is 5 in this case, and then charge the fixed fee equal to CS at
that price. Use individual demands to find that at P=5 each consumer demands q=12.5
and for each consumer CS=156.25, which is the highest fee he is willing to pay to be
able to purchase the good at P=5. Notice that in this case the firm does not make any
profits on the unit sales as P=AC, so the firm’s profits come from the fixed fees collected,
which totals 1,562 for the 10 consumers. Firm produces efficient output, however, in
this specific instance efficiency does not benefit consumers since CS is captured as firm’s
profits.
(c) Give definition of perfect price discrimination. Calculate quantity produced and profits
if firm employs this pricing strategy. Compare your results to part (b).

Perfect price discrimination is a rather unrealistic strategy when for each unit sold firm is
able to extract highest possible price, the unit’s MV that is. Notice that in this case to sell
an additional unit the firm does not lower the price on the units it is selling otherwise,
which means MR=MV=Demand curve. This results in the profit-maximizing output
(MR=MC) being same Pas the efficient output (MV=MC), therefore QM = Q∗ = 125.
0
Firm collects T R = M V s, which is the total value of the good to the consumers
(area under demand curve for Q∗ ). In conclusion, same as in part (b) the firm produces
efficient output, however it does not mean that consumers get any benefit out of it: the
entire CS is captured as firm’s profits.

Notice that in parts (b) and (c) the firm captures all potential gains from trade as profits,
that is why in those cases π equals to the sum of CS, DWL, and π from part (a).

Problem 2. A firm is selling its product in two markets. In market A the demand is given
by QA = 100 − 2P and in market B the demand is QB = 80 − 4P . The firm’s total cost is
2
C = Q12 where Q = QA + QB is the total output.
(a) Find the profit-maximizing prices and quantities, calculate the profits if firm can suc-
cessfully price discriminate.

This would be a case of ordinary price discrimination: segregate consumers into market
segments and charge different prices in each segment1 . Find inverse demands in both
markets PA = 50 − 0.5QA and PB = 20 − 0.25QB . Profits are the difference between the
sum of the revenues generated in both market segments and the total cost of producing
the output:

π(QA , QB ) = T RA (QA ) + T RB (QB ) − T C(QA + QB ) = PA · QA + PB · QB − T C(QA + QB )

Sub demands and the cost function to obtain
(QA + QB )2
π = (50 − 0.5QA )QA + (20 − 0.25QB )QB −
12
1
Recall that this is not always possible: the firm must be able to prevent re-sales and also identify consumers’
types.

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Find the first-order conditions:

∂π QA + QB
= 50 − QA − =0 (1)
∂QA 6
∂π QA + QB
= 20 − 0.5QA − =0 (2)
∂QB 6
Notice that from the FOCs it follows that the profit-maximizing combination of Qs must
satisfy M RA = M RB = M C(QB + QB ). Think about why it must be true (prove why if
it is not satisfied the profits are not maximized). The quantities that satisfy both FOCs
are QA = 40, QB = 20 and the respective prices are PA = 30 and PB = 15.
(b) Calculate the price elasticities of demand at the equilibrium prices and quantities.

ε = dQ
dP
P
·Q . In Segment A dQ A
dPA
= −2, εA = −2 · 30
40
= −1.5. In Segment B dQ B
dPB
= −4,
15
εB = −4 · 20 = −3.
You can play around with the numbers: recall that M R = P (1 + 1ε ), use M R = M C
MC
to find that P = 1+ 1 . In total firm produces Q = 60, at which point MC=10, so
ε
10 10
PA = 1
1+ −1.5
= 30 and PB = 1
1+ −3
= 15.

(c) What is the relationship between the price elasticities and the prices charged in each
market?

Problem 3. A monopoly is facing two groups of consumers. Consumers of type 1 have

relatively low demand given by PL = 5 − qL and consumers of type 2 have relatively high de-
mand PH = 10 − qH , where qi is quantity demanded by one consumer per month, i ∈ {L, H}.
The firm’s marginal cost is M C = 0.
(a) Suppose the types are observable and the firm offers two packages with quantity qi at
fixed monthly fee Fi , what quantities and fees maximize the firm’s profits?

For consumers of type 1 the package is qL = 5, FL = 12.5; for consumers of type 2

the package is qH = 10, FH = 50. Similar to the two-part pricing, the firm will choose
qi s.t. M Vi = M C = 0 and charge the fee Fi equal to the total value (area under the D
curve) for the package.
(b) Now suppose that the firm is unable to distinguish the types, would the pricing scheme
from part (a) work if the firm kept offering the same two packages?

Now consumers of type 1 keep buying their package (for them the other package does
not look attractive at all), but consumers of type 2 prefer the package designed for type
1: If they consumer 5 units they get total value T V = 37.5 (area under their D-curve
for q=5), but only pay 12.5 dollars, which leaves them with a positive consumer surplus,
whereas their own package results in CS = 0.

(c) If the firm is unable to distinguish between the types, but wants to offer two different
packages with quantities you found in part (a), what monthly fees should it charge to

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the different types of consumers?

If the firm wants to sell qL = 5 and qH = 10 respectively, it should lower the FH t

$25 so that the customers of this type get at least as high CS as when they buy the other
package.
Notice that if there is equal number of consumers of both types, this does not really make
sense: it would be better to just offer the package with 10 units at fee 50 dollars and
only serve high demand customers. However, if the proportion of the low-demand clients
is relatively high, the firm will get higher profits by serving both types. Finally, if firm
is facing heterogeneous consumers, it can also charge P > M C and FEE=CS of low-
demand clients at that price. That way firm will be making profits from both fee and
marking up the price.

100
Problem 4. A monopoly is facing a non-linear inverse market demand given by P = √ Q
and has cost function C = 20 + 10Q. Derive firm’s M R and M C curves, calculate profit-
maximizing price and quantity if the firm is charging single price. Show on a diagram.

50
MR = √
Q=M C=10
. QM = 25 and PM = 20.

Additional Questions

1. Go back to problem 1, part (a). Calculate price elasticity of demand at QM . Calculate

Lerner index, give a verbal interpretation of the value you obtain. ε = −1.4

2. Prove formally (using mathematical equations) that a monopoly with a non-zero marginal
cost operates on the elastic part of the demand curve. Use M R = P (1 + 1ε ) and
M R = M C to prove that when M C > 0 it must be that |ε| > 1.

3. YYoga offers several membership options: drop in at $17 dollars per class, package of 10
tickets for $145, monthly memberships at $105 and yearly membership at approximately
$90/mo. Is this an example of price discrimination? Argue why yes or no. Explain how
the firm can increase profits this way compared to charging single price. This can be an
indirect price discrimination: consumers with inelastic demand go for the drop in or the
10 ticket option while consumers with more elastic demand choose to buy memberships
(in this case marginal cost of attending a class becomes zero, which results in higher CS,
part of which is captured by the firm).

4. If a market is monopolistic, how would you determine whether it is a natural monopoly?

Is Canada Post a natural monopoly?

5. Suppose that there are two outcomes one is efficient and the other is inefficient. In the
efficient outcome everyone is better off compared to the inefficient one. Is this true or
false? False. You can use your calculations for problem 1 as an example.

6. Exercises 6.5.5.1 and 6.5.5.2 on page 6-240 of MAF.

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Technical Notes.

Deriving Aggregate Demand.

Recall that individual demand curve is the result of maximizing utility subject to budget
constraint q1 = q1 (P1 , P2 , M ) - quantity demanded of good 1 is a function of consumer’s
income M and prices P1 and P2 . When we draw a demand curve for good 1 on a diagram we
keep M and P2 constant, and, to be precise, we plot inverse demand curve P (q) - which tells us
the marginal value of the good (sometimes referred to as reservation price). To derive market
demand we need to find total quantity demanded by all consumers at each price (horizontal
summation of individual demand curves):

Q(P ) = Σqi (P ) (3)

where Q is the total quantity demanded and qi is quantity demanded by a consumer i.

When there are N identical consumers, like in problem 1, then to find market demand you
need to

• Single out q(P ) from individual demands

• Write market quantity as Q = N · q, sub q(P )

• Single out P , which now will be function of Q

For example: there are N = 100 consumers with individual inverse demands P = 50 − 10q.
Follow the steps above: q(P ) = 50−P
10
;
50−P
Q = 100( 10 ) = 500 − 10P , P = 50 − 0.1Q - is the inverse market demand. Notice that is
has the same vertical intercept and flatter slope compared to individual demands.

For exercises 6.5.5.1 and 6.5.5.2 you need to find aggregate demand when you are given
two market demand curves. The idea is the same: single out Qi demanded in each market
segment, to find total Q add them up, solve for P .

Elasticity.
ε= ∆%Q
∆%P
= ∆P
· Q = dQ(P
∆Q P
dP
) P
· Q . If you have equation of the inverse demand P (Q) you can
1 P dP (Q)
use ε = dP (Q) · Q
where dQ is the slope of the inverse demand.
dQ

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