This case involves a dispute over possession of land between heirs of Sabanpan (petitioners) and Comorposa (respondents). The respondents had been in possession of the land since 1960. A DENR regional director upheld the respondents' possession. The petitioners argued a certification from a CENR officer submitted by the respondents, which bore a facsimile signature, was inadmissible. However, the Supreme Court held the certification was valid as it bore a facsimile signature, not a fax transmission, and the DENR had acknowledged and used it. The certification was also included in the pre-trial order, so it was not a new issue on appeal. The petition was denied.
This case involves a dispute over possession of land between heirs of Sabanpan (petitioners) and Comorposa (respondents). The respondents had been in possession of the land since 1960. A DENR regional director upheld the respondents' possession. The petitioners argued a certification from a CENR officer submitted by the respondents, which bore a facsimile signature, was inadmissible. However, the Supreme Court held the certification was valid as it bore a facsimile signature, not a fax transmission, and the DENR had acknowledged and used it. The certification was also included in the pre-trial order, so it was not a new issue on appeal. The petition was denied.
This case involves a dispute over possession of land between heirs of Sabanpan (petitioners) and Comorposa (respondents). The respondents had been in possession of the land since 1960. A DENR regional director upheld the respondents' possession. The petitioners argued a certification from a CENR officer submitted by the respondents, which bore a facsimile signature, was inadmissible. However, the Supreme Court held the certification was valid as it bore a facsimile signature, not a fax transmission, and the DENR had acknowledged and used it. The certification was also included in the pre-trial order, so it was not a new issue on appeal. The petition was denied.
This case involves a dispute over possession of land between heirs of Sabanpan (petitioners) and Comorposa (respondents). The respondents had been in possession of the land since 1960. A DENR regional director upheld the respondents' possession. The petitioners argued a certification from a CENR officer submitted by the respondents, which bore a facsimile signature, was inadmissible. However, the Supreme Court held the certification was valid as it bore a facsimile signature, not a fax transmission, and the DENR had acknowledged and used it. The certification was also included in the pre-trial order, so it was not a new issue on appeal. The petition was denied.
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Cuevaz v. Muñoz (G.R. No.
140520; December 18, 2000)
Facts: The Hong Kong Magistrate’s Court at Eastern Magistracy issued a warrant for the arrest of respondent Juan Antonio Muñoz for seven (7) counts of accepting an advantage as an agent and seven(7) counts of conspiracy to defraud, contrary to the common law of Hong Kong. The Department of Justice received a request for the provisional arrest of the respondent from the Mutual Legal Assistance Unit, International Law Division of the Hong Kong Department of Justice pursuant to Article 11(1) of the RP-Hong Kong Extradition Agreement. Upon application of the NBI, RTC of Manila issued an Order granting the application for provisional arrest and issuing the corresponding Order of Arrest. Consequently, respondent was arrested pursuant to the said order, and is currently detained at the NBI detention cell. Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus assailing the validity of the Order of Arrest. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring the Order of Arrest null and void on the grounds, among others that the request for provisional arrest and the accompanying warrant of arrest and summary of facts were unauthenticated and mere facsimile copies which are insufficient to form a basis for the issuance of the Order of Arrest. Thus, petitioner Justice Serafin R. Cuevas, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice, lost no time in filing the instant petition. Issue: Whether or not the request for provisional arrest of respondent and its accompanying documents must be authenticated. Held: The request for provisional arrest of respondent and its accompanying documents is valid despite lack of authentication. There is no requirement for the authentication of a request for provisional arrest and its accompanying documents. The enumeration in the provision of RP-Hong Kong Extradition Agreement does not specify that these documents must be authenticated copies. This may be gleaned from the fact that while Article 11(1) does not require the accompanying documents of a request for provisional arrest to be authenticated, Article 9 of the same Extradition Agreement makes authentication a requisite for admission in evidence of any document accompanying a request for surrender or extradition. In other words, authentication is required for the request for surrender or extradition but not for the request for provisional arrest. The RP-Hong Kong Extradition Agreement, as they are worded, serves the purpose sought to be achieved by treaty stipulations for provisional arrest. The process of preparing a formal request for extradition and its accompanying documents, and transmitting them through diplomatic channels, is not only time-consuming but also leakage-prone. There is naturally a great likelihood of flight by criminals who get an intimation of the pending request for their extradition. To solve this problem, speedier initial steps in the form of treaty stipulations for provisional arrest were formulated. Thus, it is an accepted practice for the requesting state to rush its request in the form of a telex or diplomatic cable Respondent’s reliance on Garvida v. Sales, Jr. is misplaced. The proscription against the admission of a pleading that has been transmitted by facsimile machine has no application in the case at bar for obvious reasons. First, the instant case does not involve a pleading; and second, unlike the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which do not sanction the filing of a pleading by means of a facsimile machine, P.D.No. 1069 and the RP Hong Kong Extradition Agreement do not prohibit the transmission of a request for provisional arrest by means of a fax machine. HEIRS OF SABANPAN v. COMORPOSA FACTS: This case arose from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed in the MTC by petitioners against respondents involving possession of a parcel of petitioner’s land by respondents. Respondents argue that they have acquired just and valid ownership of the premises and that the Regional Director of the DENR has already upheld their possession over the land in question when it ruled that they were the rightful claimants and possessors. MTC ifo petitioners. RTC reversed, ruled if Respondents. CA affirmed RTC.CA Ruling: Although not yet final, the Order issued by the DENR Regional Director remained in full force and effect. The certification that the DENR's community environment and natural resources (CENR) officer issued was proof that when the cadastral survey was conducted, the land was still alienable and was not yet allocated to any person. Respondents had the better right to possess alienable and disposable land of the public domain, because they have sufficiently proven their actual, physical, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof since 1960.Hence, SC petition. ISSUE (related to Evidence): Did the CA gravely abuse its discretion and err in sustaining the RTCs ruling giving weight to the CENR Officer's Certification, which only bears the facsimile of the alleged signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda and, that it is a new matter raised for the first time onappeal? SC Held: Petition has no merit. Ratio: Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated July 22, 1997 is a sham document, because the signature of the CENR officer is a mere facsimile. In support of their argument, they cite Garvida v. Sales Jr. and argue that the Certification is a new matter being raised by respondents for the first time on appeal. In Garvida, the Court held: "A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. "Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact copies. As such, they are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic. The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the signature of CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in Garvida. The one mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means but recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions. Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the DENR regional director has acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order dated April 2, 1998.If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director would not have used it as reference in his Order. Instead, he would have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the appropriate action, as the latter was under the former's direct control and supervision. Petitioners' claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on appeal is incorrect. As early as the pretrial conference at the Municipal Trial Court(MTC), the CENR Certification had already been marked as evidence for respondents as stated in the Pre- trial Order. The Certification was not formally offered, however, because respondents had not been able to file their position paper. Neither the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would sanction the admission of evidence that has not been formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable only to ordinary trials, not to cases covered by the rule on summary procedure -- cases in which no full-blown trial is held.