1. PEOPLE V.

JANUARIO
G.R. NO. 98252 FEBRUARY 7, 1997

FACTS:

Accused- appellants Rene Januario and Efren Canape, together with their co-accused
were charged with violation of Republic Act No. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Law) for stealing
one Isuzu passenger type jeepney, after killing its driver and conductor. The NBI team
took the statements of appellants one at a time with the help of Atty. Carlos Saunar. In
convicting accused-appellants, the trial court relied upon the extrajudicial confessions of
the latter, extracted and signed in the presence and with the assistance of a lawyer,
Atty. Saunar, who was applying for work in the NBI. Counsels for appellants allege that
the extrajudicial confessions of the appellants are inadmissible in evidence for having
been extracted in violation of their constitutional right to counsel.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Saunar was a competent and independent counsel of the
appellants
RULING:
No. Proof of Saunar's presence during the custodial investigation of appellants is,
however, not a guarantee that appellants' respective confessions had been taken in
accordance with Article 111, Section 12(1) of the Constitution. This constitutional
provision requires that a person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have no less than "competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice." Elucidating on this particular constitutional requirement, this Court has taught:

It is noteworthy that the modifiers competent and independent were terms absent in all
organic laws previous to the 1987 Constitution. Their addition in the fundamental law of
1987 was meant to stress the primacy accorded to the voluntariness of the choice,
under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, by according the
accused, deprived of normal conditions guaranteeing individual autonomy, an informed
judgment based on the choices given to him by a competent and independent lawyer.

Thus, the lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as far as
reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer
were one furnished in the accused's behalf, it is important that he should be competent
and independent, i.e., that he Is willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the
accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory
and meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights.

In People v. Basay, this Court stressed that an accused's right to be informed of the
right to remain silent and to counsel 'contemplates the transmission of meaningful
information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle.
Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the
latter could not afford one) should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the
latter's relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon
proper petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition.

Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their
probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the
relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.

We find that Saunar was not the choice of appellant Januario as his custodial
investigation counsel. Saunar's competence as a lawyer is beyond question. Under the
circumstances described by the prosecution however, he could not have been the
independent counsel solemnly spoken of by our Constitution. He was an applicant for a
position in the NBI and therefore it can never be said that his loyalty was to the
confessants. In fact, he was actually employed by the NBI a few months after. As
regards appellant Januario, Saunar might have really been around to properly apprise
appellant of his constitutional right as reflected in the written sworn statement itself.

2. (A.G. Development Corp vs CA 281 SCRA 155)

Facts:

On November 4, 1981, petitioner A.G. Development (AGDC) and public respondent

National Housing Authority (NHA) entered into a "Memorandum of Agreement," 1
wherein the former agreed to construct on its lot a dormitory-apartment-commercial
building for the latter at a total cost of Eleven Million Four Hundred Fifty Two Thousand
Nine Hundred Eighty Nine Pesos (P11,452,989.00). Pursuant to the agreement, AGDC
executed in favor of NHA a promissory note 2 and a real estate mortgage 3 over the
land as a security for the obligation. Thereafter, NHA made an initial payment of three
million three hundred eight thousand four hundred forty (P3,308,440.00) to AGDC to
cover a portion of the contract price.

On August 30, 1983, however, NHA rescinded the agreement and demanded the
immediate return of the initial amount paid on the ground that AGDC was not able to
complete the project on time. The demand was refused, as a result of which, the real
estate mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed and the property sold to NHA as the
highest bidder. The one-year period to redeem having expired, a new Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued in favor of NHA; thereafter, a writ of possession
was applied for and granted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City docketed as
LRC Case No. 3067 (85).

On December 3, 1986, AGDC filed a complaint against NHA before the Makati RTC
docketed as Civil Case No. 15495 for breach of contract, declaration of nullity of the
promissory note and real estate mortgage, and annulment of foreclosure sale and
reversion of possession and title. NHA filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis
pendentia, which was denied by the trial court. While the case was pending, private
respondent A. Francisco Realty and Development Corp. (AFRDC) filed a Motion to
intervene claiming that it is an innocent purchaser for value of the subject property since
it had already bought the foreclosed property from NHA.
Consequently, AFRDC filed a motion to dismiss before the Makati RTC, reasoning that
the said court has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and annul the writ issued by
the Quezon City RTC since both are co-equal or coordinate jurisdiction. The Makati
RTC ruled in favor of AFRDC and dismissed AGDC’s complaint. 5 Recourse to the
Court of Appeals proved futile. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
the issuance of a writ of possession by the Quezon City RTC constitutes res judicata as
to bar the complaint filed by AGDC

RULING:
It is an oft-repeated rule that for res judicata to apply, the following requisites must
concur:
a) the former judgment must be final;
b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
c) the judgment must be on the merits; and
d) there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter
and causes of action.

Although not explicitly stated, a basic requisite for res judicata to apply is that there are
two cases which have been decided on the merits.

In affirming the Makati RTC’s dismissal of AGDC’s complaint, the Court of Appeals
ruled that the issuance of the writ of possession has the effect of confirming the title of
NHA over the property in question. As such, the grant of said writ constitutes an
absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is final as to the claim of nullity of the promissory
note, real estate mortgage and the resultant extra-judicial foreclosure sale. We cannot
agree with the Court of Appeals that the action to annul both the real estate mortgage
and the foreclosure sale is barred by res judicata.

The issuance of a writ of possession is not a judgment on the merits. A writ of

possession is generally understood to be an order whereby the sheriff is commanded to
place a person in possession of a real or personal property, such as when a property is
extrajudicially foreclosed. In this regard, the issuance of a writ of possession to a
purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function.
Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings and not to the exercise of administrative powers or to legislative, executive
or ministerial determination. Accordingly, cases disposed of on technical grounds do
not fall within the doctrine of res judicata.
In the absence of the necessary elements, the doctrine of res judicata cannot be applied
in the instant petition.
3. Pacific Banking Corporation vs. CA & Oriental Assurance
[GR. No. L-41014 28 November 1988]

Facts:
An open Fire Policy issued to Paramount Shirt Manufacturing for Php61,000 on the
following: stocks, materils, supplies, furniture, fixture, machinery, equipment contained
on the 1st to 3rd floors. Insurance is for a year starting 21 OCTOBER 1964.

Paramount Shirt is debtor of Pacific Banking amounting to Php800,000. Goods in policy

were held in trust by Paramount for Pacific under thrust receipts. Fire broke out on 4
January 1964.

Pacific sent letter of demand to Oriental. Insurance Adjuster of Oriental notified Pacific
to submit proof of loss pursuant to Policy Condition 11. Pacific did not accede but asked
Insurance Adjuster to verify records form Bureau of Customs.
Pacific filed for sum of money against Oriental. Oriental alleged that Pacific prematurely
filed a suit, for neither filing a formal claim over loss pursuant to policy nor submitting
any proof of loss.

Trial court decided in favor of Pacific. Decision based on technicality. The defense of
lack of proof of loss and defects were raised for the 1st time. (On presentation of
evidences by Pacific, it was revealed there was violation of Condition No.3, there were
undeclared co-insurances under same property –Wellington, Empire, Asian. The only
declared co-insurances were Malayan, South Sea, and Victory)
CA reversed decision. Concealment of other co-insurances is a misrepresentation and
can easily be fraud.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not unrevealed con-insurances is a violation of Policy Condition No.3

(2) Whether or not there was premature filing of action

Held:
(1) Yes. Policy Condition 3 provides that the insured must give notice of any insurance
already in effect or subsequently be in effect covering same property being insured.
Failure to do so, the policy shall be forfeited.
Failure to reveal before the loss of the 3 other insurances is a clear misrepresentation or
a false declaration. The material fact was asked for but was not revealed.
Representations of facts are the foundations of the contract. Pacific itself provided for
the evidences in trial court that proved existence of misrepresentation.
(2) Yes. Policy Condition 11 is a sine qua non requirement for maintaining action. It
requires that documents necessary to prove and estimate the loss should be included
with notice of loss. Pacific failed to submit formal claim of loss with supporting
documents but shifted the burden to the insurance company. Failing to submit claim is
failure for insurance company to reject claim. Thus, a lack of cause of action to file suit.
Furthermore, the mortgage clause in the policy specifically provides that the policy is
invalidated by reasons of FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION and FRAUD. Concealment
can easily be fraud or misrepresentation.
The insured – PARAMOUNT is not entitled to proceeds. Moreso, Pacific as indorsee of
policy is not entitled.

4. (Davao New Town Development Corp vs Commission on the Settlement of

Land Problems 459 SCRA 491

FACTS:
A huge tract of land consisting of 131.2849 hectares situated at Sto. Niño, Tugbok,
Davao City, which was a portion of a bigger landholding belonging to the late Roman
Cuison, Jr. The latter mortgaged the property to the Philippine Banking Corporation
(Bank), which, after emerging as the highest bidder in the foreclosure proceedings,
consolidated its ownership over the property and subdivided the land into two parcels,
namely: the first, covered by TCT No. T-162663; and the second, covered by TCT No.
T-162664, which is the property subject of the instant dispute ("Cuison property").

Sometime in 1989, the government acquired the Cuison property for distribution to the
beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Claiming that
the disputed property had already been classified as "urban/urbanizing" and therefore
beyond the coverage of the CARP, the Bank filed a complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Adjudicator. Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision finding that the
Cuison property was not agricultural land and, therefore, outside the coverage of the
CARP because as early as 1982, it had already been classified as "urban/urbanizing."

Respondents appealed the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator to the DARAB, where
petitioner intervened as the new owner of the Cuison property. While the appeal was
pending, private respondents filed an unnumbered case with the Provincial Adjudicator
against petitioner and the
Register of Deeds of Davao City, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction and the
restoration of their CLOAs and of TCT No. CL-850.
They alleged that while the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator in DARAB Case was
seasonably appealed, the Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. CL-850 and reinstated
the Bank’s certificate of title to the Cuison property. They also claimed that petitioner
had introduced preliminary works on the Cuison property and was poised to forcibly
eject private respondents from the premises.

Herein private respondents, who are members of SNFC, again referred their complaint
with another agency, this time, COSLAP. On December 10, 1998, COSLAP issued a
subpoena on petitioner directing the latter and PBC to appear for an investigation on the
case docketed as COSLAP Case No. 98-343. At the scheduled investigation no
representative from COSLAP appeared.

ISSUE/S:
1. W/N respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion when it refrained
from passing upon the jurisdictional questions raised by petitioner.
2. W/N whether or not COSLAP has jurisdiction over this case

RULING:
FIRST ISSUE: NO.
Petitioner alleges that respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it refrained from passing upon the jurisdictional questions raised in its motion to
dismiss and that respondent Commission had threatened to immediately enforce said
patently void resolution, thereby rendering petitioner without any plain, adequate and
speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law. When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

SECOND ISSUE: NO.

Petitioner mainly argues that respondent Commission was without jurisdiction in
entertaining private respondents’ complaint and in promulgating the assailed Resolution
because the matter falls within the primary and exclusive original jurisdiction of the
DARAB.

First. The dispute between petitioner and private respondents over the Cuison property
is not cognizable by COSLAP. An account of the laws creating COSLAP and its
predecessor is in order. COSLAP was created on September 21, 1979 by virtue of E.O.
No. 561. Its forerunner was the Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems
(PACLAP) founded on July 31, 1970 pursuant to E.O. No. 251. As originally conceived,
the committee was tasked "to expedite and coordinate the investigation and resolution
of land disputes, streamline and shorten administrative procedures, adopt bold and
decisive measures to solve land problems, and/or recommend other solutions." It was
given the power to issue subpoenas duces tecum and ad testificandum and to call upon
any department, office, agency or instrumentality of the government, including
government owned or controlled corporations and local government units, for
assistance in the performance of its functions. At that time, the PACLAP did not
exercise quasi-judicial functions.

Second. COSLAP is not empowered to review decisions of the DARAB or the Provincial
Adjudicator or any other quasi-judicial agency for that matter. In their Position Paper,
private respondents questioned the validity of the DARAB and the Provincial
Adjudicator’s order of cancellation of private respondents’ CLOAs and of the
government’s certificate of title over the Cuison property on the ground that the Republic
of the Philippines was not impleaded in those cases.
5. PROTON PILIPINAS CORPORATION et al. v. BANQUE NATIONALE DE PARIS
460 SCRA 260 (2005), THIRD DIVISION

FACTS:

Petitioner Proton Pilipinas Corporation (Proton) availed credit facilities of respondent

Banque Nationale De Paris (BNP). In order to assure payment, co-petitioners
Automotive Corporation, Asea One Corporation and Autocorp Group executed a
corporate guarantee.

Proton failed to comply with his obligation to BNP. Thereafter, BNP demanded the
payment of Proton‘s obligation to its co-petitioners pursuant to corporate guarantee. But
the same remained unheeded. BNP then filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) against Proton et al. The clerk of court assessed the docket fee. Proton et al.
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over
the case because BNP did not properly pay the docket fees. The RTC denied the
motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied the motion of Proton et al.
Hence this present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court does not acquire jurisdiction when there is an improper
payment of docket fees

HELD:
The Court rules that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. It also stated that where the trial court acquires
jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefore shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and
assess and collect the additional fee.

In the case at bar, BNP merely relied on the assessment made by the clerk of court
which turned out to be incorrect. Under the circumstances, the clerk of court has the
responsibility of reassessing what respondent must pay within the prescriptive period,
failing which the complaint merits dismissal.