THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs.

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997

Facts:
Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of
land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.5 The application was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86
and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.6 However, during the
pendency of his petition, the applicant died. Hence, his heirs — Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all
surnamed Abistado — represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were
substituted as applicants.

The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition "for want of jurisdiction."
However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.

Private respondents appealed to the Respondent Court of Appeals which, as earlier explained, set aside the
decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.

The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution.

The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court notes that
the petitioner's counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because
he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule
45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65.

Issue:
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave abuse of discretion in holding that
publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need not be published in a newspaper of general
circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication

Held:
YES, it should be mandatory.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1)
publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice of initial
hearing provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon
the land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of general
circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.
The answer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the
publication requirement.
The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon
the latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus
indicates the mandatory character of a statute.15 While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory
construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the
term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning.
There was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. Private respondents did not
proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses.
Thus, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
application of private respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No cost
 Pascual vs. Pascual, et. Al,
GR No. 84240, March 25, 1992

Facts:

Don Andres Pascual died intestate (on October 12, 1973) without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural,
adopted or spurious children. Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children
of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual.

Petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to
reiterate Hereditary Rights. the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued an order, the
dispositive portion of which resolved to deny this motion reiterating their hereditary rights. Their motion for
reconsideration was also denied.

Petitioners appealed their case to the Court of Appeals, but like the ruling of CA, their motion for reconsideration
was also dismissed. In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the
purview of Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized (and acknowledged)
natural children as their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were under
conception.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural
children from the inheritance of the deceased.

Held:
NO. Petition is devoid of merit.

The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, where this Court ruled that under Art.992
of the Civil Code, there exists a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestado between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child.

The interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in
statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what is says.

Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children and the term “illegitimate” refers to both
natural and spurious. It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).

People of the Philippines vs. Mario Mapulong

GR No. L-22301

Facts :
Mapulong in this case was indicted for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.

The lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on their authenticity, the
fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of
ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without
first having secured the necessary license or permit thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the
appellant, answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused
admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused admits."

The lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and
ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the Government.
Issue :
Whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would
constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.

Held:
NO. The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . .
possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended
to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition."

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task is
equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only
after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused
must stand. It cannot be set aside.

Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang, where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the
assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a
member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power
of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision
conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.a

IMMACULADA L. GARCIA v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

G.R. No. 170735 December 17, 2007

Facts:

Records show that around 1978, Impact Corporation started encountering financial problems. Laborunrest
besieged the corporation.On July 3, 1985, the Social Security System filed a case before the SSC for the collection of the
unremitted SSS contributions withheld by Impact Corporation from its employees, SSS filed an amended petition wherein
the directors of the Impact Corporation were directly impleaded as respondents namely:Eduardo de Leon, Ricardo de
Leon, Pacita Fernandez, Consuelo Villanueva and the petitioner. The SSC ruled in favor of SSS and declared Garcia as the
only surviving director of the ImpactCorporation liable to pay the unremitted contributions and penalties.

Issue: Whether the petitioner is liable only to the penalties imposed.

Held:
NO. While the Court of Appeals Decision provided that Section 28(f) refers to the liabilities pertaining to penalty
for the non-remittance of SSS employee contributions, holding that it is distinct from the amount of the supposed SSS
remittances, petitioner mistakenly concluded that Section 28(f) is applicable only to penalties and not to the liability of the
employer for the unremitted premium contributions.
Clearly, a simplistic interpretation of the law is untenable. It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
The liability imposed as contemplated under the foregoing Section 28(f) of the Social Security Law does not
preclude the liability for the unremitted amount. Hence, Immaculada L. Garcia, as sole surviving director of Impact
Corporation, was ordered to pay for the collected and unremitted SSS contributions of Impact Corporation.
The case was then remanded to the SSS for computation of the exact amount and collection thereof.
SPECIAL LAW

GOV. ANTONIO CALINGIN v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 154616 July 12, 2004

FACTS:
The Office of the President issued a Resolution suspending Gov. Calingin for 90 days. On April 30,
2001, Undersecretary Eduardo R. Soliman of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), by
authority of Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr., issued a Memorandum4 implementing the said Resolution of the Office
of the President. On May 3, 2001, Gov. Calingin filed before the Office of the President a Motion for
Reconsideration.
Gov. Calingin filed a petition for prohibition before the Court of Appeals to prevent the DILG from
executing the assailed suspension order. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the said petition and by
resolution and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner contends that decisions of the Office of the President on cases where it has original
jurisdiction become final and executory only after the lapse of 15 days from the receipt thereof and that the
filing of a Motion for Reconsideration shall suspend the running of the said period8 in accordance with Section
15, Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner further contends that Section 67, Chapter 4 of the Local Government Code (Rep. Act 7160),
which provides that decisions of the Office of the President shall be final and executory, applies only to
decisions of the Office of the President on administrative cases appealed from the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod of highly-urbanized cities and independent component cities, and sangguniang bayan
of municipalities within the Metro Manila Area. It does not cover decisions on cases where the Office of the
President has original jurisdiction such as those involving a Provincial Governor.

ISSUE: Was the decision of the Office of the President already final and executory?

RULING:
YES. The Local Government Code is the applicable law and must prevail over the Administrative Code
which is of general application. Further, the Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted much later than the
Administrative Code of 1987. In statutory construction, all laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the
later law are repealed or modified accordingly.
In sum, the decisions of the Office of the President are final and executory. No motion for
reconsideration is allowed by law but the parties may appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appeal,
however, does not stay the execution of the decision. Thus, the DILG Secretary may validly move for its
immediate execution.
CURATIVE LAW

JUAN G. FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996

Facts:
Private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of
Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections meanwhile, the petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition
with the Comele praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by
reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy be canceled.
The Comelec granted the petition and declares that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office
of Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's
certificate of candidacy is canceled.
Comelec promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en banc directed
"the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul
Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29, 1995.
Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995
proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon,
he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725
which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted". As such,
when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released and received by Frivaldo on June
30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo)
as governor . . ." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec,the
Vice-Governor - not Lee - should occupy said position of governor.

Issue: Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal?

Ruling:
Yes. The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in this
case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this.
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court as a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent upon
him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under the
said statute (R.A. 7160).
To remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo
RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, 39 "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless
the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions40 to this general rule, such as when the statute is
CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
PROSPECTIVE LAW

ALBINO S. CO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993

Facts:
In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel — and in payment of his share of
the expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated — petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm
on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in
the sum of P361,528.00.1 The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the
tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company
against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the
crime charged, and his being sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to indemnify the
salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible
error for the Regional Trial Court to have relied, as basis for its verdict of conviction, on the ruling rendered on
September 21, 1987
This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular
No. 12) — almost one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" check to the complainant on
September 1, 1983. Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter alia that Circular No. 4 of December 15, 1981
appeared to have been based on "a misapplication of the deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa
At the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the
promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing"
check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made
in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice. That Circular (No. 4), dated December 15, 1981,
Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction. Citing Senarillos v.
Hermosisima, 101 Phil. 561, the Appellate Court opined that the Que doctrine did not amount to the passage of
new law but was merely a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, i.e., BP 22, enacted on April 3,
1979.

Issue: Whether the Ministry Circular No. 12 is a prospective statute.

Ruling:

Yes. The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases.
These include: Buyco v. PNB, 961 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which
divested the Philippine National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of loans, does not
apply to an offer of payment made before effectivity of the act.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be
resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine
of mala prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above set
out and discussed, negating criminal liability.
EX-POST FACTO LAW

REPUBLIC V, FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-9141. September 25, 1956

FACTS:

Olimpio Fernandez and his wife Angelina Oasan had a net worth of P8,600 on December 8, 1941.
During the Japanese occupation the spouses acquired several real properties, and at the time of his death on
February 11, 1945 he had a net worth of P31,489. The Collector of Internal Revenue assessed a war profits tax
on the estate of the deceased at P7,614.60, which his administratrix refused to pay. The case was brought to the
Court of Tax Appeals which sustained the validity and legality of the assessment. The administratrix has
appealed this decision to this Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the tax against the estate of Olimpio Fernandez under the War Profits Tax Law (Republic Act
No. 55) is valid.

RULING:

NO. The doctrine of unconstitutionality raised by appellant is based on the prohibition against ex post
facto laws. But this prohibition applies only to criminal or penal matters, and not to laws which concern civil
matters or proceedings generally, or which affect or regulate civil or private rights.

The contention that the deceased Olimpio Fernandez or his estate should not be responsible because he
died in 1945 and was no longer living when the law was enacted at a later date, in 1946, is absolutely without
merit. Fernandez died immediately before the liberation and the actual cessation of hostilities. He profited by
the war; there is no reason why the incident of his death should relieve his estate from the tax.
RETROACTIVE LAW

ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-54305 February 14, 1990

Facts:
Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation (ATLAS) entered into an operating agreement
with the heirs of Manuel Cuenco and Jose P. Velez (collectively referred to herein as CUENCO-VELEZ)
whereby in consideration of royalties to be paid by ATLAS to CUENCO-VELEZ, the former was granted the
right to explore, develop and operate twelve (12) mining claims belonging to the latter located at Toledo City,
Cebu.
ATLAS entered into a similar agreement with the Biga Copper Mines Exploration Company (BIGA
COPPER), a partnership composed of Pablo B. Gorosin, Francisco B. Gorosin, Pedro B. Gorosin and Vicente T.
Garaygay (collectively referred to herein as the BIGA PARTNERS). Subject of this Operating Agreement are
thirty-one (31) mining claims of BIGA-COPPER likewise located at Toledo City, Cebu.
It appears, however, that of the total mining claims "leased" by ATLAS from both the
CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER, nine (9) mining claims overlap. These nine (9) overlapping mining
claims became the subject of Mines Administrative Cases Nos. V-727 and V-750 whereby under date of
February 12, 1974, the Director of Mines resolved the same in favor of CUENCO-VELEZ. BIGA COPPER
appealed this decision to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who, in a decision dated April 14,
1974, in DANR Cases Nos. 3936 and 3936-A, affirmed the decision of the Director of Mines. This later
decision was appealed to the Office of the President under O.P. Case No. 0435.
During the pendency of this appeal in the Office of the President, the parties, namely, CUENCO-VELEZ
and BIGA COPPER, entered into a compromise agreement. This compromise agreement enabled
BIGA-COPPER to eventually lay claim over the nine (9) overlapping mining claims.

Issue:
Can a person who is not a party to a contract file a petition for declaratory relief and seek a judicial
interpretation of such contract?

Ruling:

No.The declaratory action flied by ATLAS is within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 1281. It is not
an entirely different or distinct cause of action. Were We to rule otherwise it would be ratifying two judicial
bodies exercising jurisdiction over an essentially the same subject matter—a situation analogous to split
jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.
Presidential Decree No. 1281 is a remedial statute. It does not create new rights or take away rights that
are already vested. It only operates in furtherance of a remedy or confirmation of rights already in existence. It
does not come within the legal purview of a prospective law. As such, it can be applied retroactively
independent of the general rule against the retrospective application of statutes. Being procedural in nature, it
shall apply to all actions pending at the time of its enactment except only with respect to those cases which had
already attained the character of a final and executory judgment. Were it not so, the purpose of the Decree,
which is to facilitate the immediate resolution of mining controversies by granting jurisdiction to a body or
agency more adept to the technical complexities of mining operations, would be thwarted and rendered
meaningless. Litigants in a mining controversy cannot be permitted to choose a forum of convenience.
Jurisdiction is imposed by law and not by any of the parties to such proceedings.
Furthermore, Presidential Decree No. 1281 is a special law and under a well-accepted principle in
statutory construction, the special law will prevail over a statute or law of general application. Jurisdiction
having been conferred by a special statute therefore prevails over the jurisdiction granted by a general law.

MANDATORY STATUTE
ENRIQUEZ v. ENRIQUEZ
G.R. No. 139303 August 25, 2005

FACTS:
Maximo Enriquez, later substituted by his heirs (now respondents), filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 71 of Iba, Zambales a complaint for partition against petitioners. The complaint involves a
parcel of land situated at Amungan, Iba, same province, with an area of 44,984 square meters. He alleged that
he owns 10/18 undivided portion of the property, 9/18 by purchase and 1/18 by inheritance; and that petitioners
have been residing in the premises without his knowledge and consent, thereby depriving him of his undivided
share of the property.
Petitioners, in their answer, averred that Cipriano Enriquez, one of the petitioners, owns ½ of the
property, while the others are in possession of the other areas with his knowledge and consent.
The RTC rendered a Decision ordering the petitioners to vacate the property and to surrender possession
thereof to respondents.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of petitioners for their failure to pay the appellate court
docket fee

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners failure to pay the appellate court docket fee because of erroneous interpretation
of the Section 4, Rule 41 of Rules of Court is not mandatory.

RULING:
No. The use of the word "shall" underscores the mandatory character of the Rule. The term "shall" is a
word of command, and one which has always or which must be given a compulsory meaning, and it is generally
imperative or mandatory.4 Petitioners cannot give a different interpretation to the Rule and insist that payment
of docket fee shall be made only upon their receipt of a notice from the trial court to pay. For it is a rule in
statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that
every part of the statute must be interpreted together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment. Indeed, petitioners cannot deviate from the Rule.
However, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which took effect on July 1, 1997, now
require that appellate docket and other lawful fees must be paid within the same period for taking an appeal.
This is clear from the opening sentence of Section 4, Rule 41 of the same Rules that, "(W)ithin the period for
taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees."
 DIRECTORY STATUTES

FIDEL C. QUERUBIN v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-2581. December 2, 1948

Facts:
Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to continue taking cognizance of the appeal
in the election case of Fidel C. Querubin vs. Felipe S. Mamuri, CA—2843-R, concerning the mayoralty of
Ilagan, Isabela, because of the expiration of the three-month period provided for in section 178 of the Revised
Election Code, which reads as follows:

Sec. 178. Appeal from the decision in election contests. — From any final decision rendered by
the Court of First Instance in protest against the eligibility or the election of provincial governors,
members of the provincial board, city councilors, and mayors, the aggrieved party may appeal to the
Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court, as the case may be, within five days after being notified of the
decision, for its revision, correction, annulment or confirmation, and the appeal shall proceed as in a
criminal case. Such appeal shall be decided within three months after the filing of the case in the office
of the clerk of the court to which the appeal has been taken. (C. A. 357-172.)

The record of the appealed case was received by the Court of Appeals on May 22, 1948. On August 23,
1948, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the three-month period provided for by
section 178 of the Revised Election Code expired on August 22, 1948, and that, consequently, the Court of
Appeals had lost its jurisdiction over the case, invoking to the effect the doctrine in Portillo vs. Salvani (54
Phil., 543) holding mandatory a former legal provision that "all proceedings in electoral contest shall be
terminated within one year."

Issue:
Whether the provision of section 178 of the Revised Election Code is directory in nature

Ruling:

The provision of section 178 of the Revised Election Code, that the appeal in election contents be
decided "within three months after the filing of the case in the office of the clerk of the court to which the
appeal has been taken", the same as the provision in section 177 of the same code requiring that the trial court
shall decide a protest within six months or one year from its filing when contesting a municipal or a provincial
office, is directory in nature. The purpose of the law in sections 177 and 178 of the Revised Election Code is to
impress the need of speedy disposal of election contests, as imperatively demanded by public interest. The
terms of office of elective positions are short. Any cloud as to the true result of an election should be dispelled
as soon as possible.