P.D.

Gupta v/s Ram Murti & Another

Civil Appeal No. 15496 of 1996
Decided On, 08 July 1997
At, Supreme Court of India
By, THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE D.P. WADHWA & THE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.C. AGRAWAL

J U D G M E N T THE 8TH DAY OF JULY, 1997 Present:

Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.C. Agrawal Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.P. Wadhwa Yogesh K. Jain, Sr.
Adv., Pravir K. Jian, M.A. Khan, B.K. Sharma, and Rajiv Dutta, Addvs. with him for the
appellant In-person for the Respondent in No.1 The following Judgment of the court was
delivered : D.P. WADHWA, J.

The appellant is an advocate practising in Delhi. He ha filed this appeal under section
38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 ( in short the Act,) against order dated May 4, 1996 of the
Disciplinary Committee of Bar council of India holding him guilty of misconduct and
suspending him from practice for a period of one Year. This order by the Bar council of
India was passed as the Disciplinary committed of the Bar council of Delhi could not
dispose of the complaint received by it with in a period of one year and proceedings had
thus been transferred to the Bar council of India under section 36 B of the Act. Section
36 B enjoins upon the Disciplinary committee of state Bar council to dispose of the
complaint receive by it under section 35 of the Act expeditiously and in any case to
conclude the proceedings within one case to conclude the proceedings within one year
from the date of the receipt of the complaint or the date of initiation of the proceedings if
at the instance of the state Bar Council. Under Section 35 of the Act where on the receipt
of a complaint or otherwise the state bar council has reason to believe that any advocate
on it s role has been guilty of professional or other misconduct, it shall refer the case for
disposal to its Disciplinary Committee.

One Srikishan Dass died on January 5, 1980 leaving behind extensive properties, both
movable and immovable. One Vidya wati claiming to be the sister and the only legal heir
of Srikishan Dass filed a petition under Section 276 of the Indian Succession Act in the
court of District Judge, Delhi for grant of probate/letters of administration to the estate of
deceased Srikishan Dass. This she filed in February, 1980. It is not that there was any
will. The complainant Ram Murti (who is now respondent before us ) and tow other
persons also laid claim to the properties of Srikishan Dass claiming themselves to be his
heirs and propounding three different wills. They also filed separate proceeding
under section 276 of the Indian succession Act before the District Judge, Delhi. Since
there was disoute regarding inheritance to the properties of srikishan Dass, Vidya Wati
also filed a civil suit in the Delhi High Court for declaration and injunction against
various defendants numbering 23, including the complainant Ram Murti who is defendant
No.

21. This suit was filed on February, 10 1982. Vidya wati had prayed for a decree of
injunction against the defendants restraining them from trespassing into property bearing
No. 4852 Harbans Singh street, 24 Daryaganj, New Delhi or from interfering with or
disturbing peaceful possession and enjoyment of immovable properties detailed in
Schedule-A to the plaint. She also sought a declaration that she was the absolute owner of
the properties mentioned therein in the schedule. It is not necessary for us to detail the
properties shown in schedule-A except to note two properties at 24 Daryaganj, New Delhi
bearing No. 4852 and 4852-A. It is stated that this suit is still pending in the Delhi High
court and all the proceedings under section 276 of the Indian Succession Act filed by
various persons relating to the estate of Srikishan Dass have also been transferred from
the court of District Judge. Delhi to the High court and are being tried alongwith the suit
filed by Vidya wati also filed various other proceedings respecting the properties left by
deceased Srikishan Dass against occupants or otherwise. P.D. Gupta, advocate who is
appellant before us had been her counsel throughout in all these proceedings. The
complaint alleged against him is that though he knew that there was doubt cast on the
right of Vidya Wati inheriting the properties of Srikishan Dass on account of pendency of
various proceedings and further that the complainant and others had alleged that she was
in fact an imposter and her claim to be sister of Srikishan Dass was false yet P.D. Gupta
purchase ground floor of property bearing No. 4858-A 24 Daryaganj from Vidya Wati by
sale- deed dated December 30, 1982. The complainant also alleged that Vidya Wati had
been describing herself either as the real sister, step sister or even halfblood sister of
Srikishan Dass which fact was well known to P.D. Gupta, her counsel.

Finally it said:

" But for the purpose of the present complaint, having regard to all the facts and
circumstances of the case, the committee is of the opinion that the conduct of the
respondent is patently unbecoming of a lawyer and against professional ethics.
Consequently, we feel that as an exemplary punishment, Shri P.D. Gupta should be
suspended form practice for a period of one year so that other erring lawyers should learn
a lesson and refrain themselves form indulging in such practice."
In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra (The ... vs Unknown on 10 March, 1995
Equivalent citations: AIR 1995 SC 2348, 1995 (1) ALT Cri 674, 1995 CriLJ 3994,
(1995) 2 GLR 992, JT 1995 (2) SC 587, 1995 (2) SCALE 200, (1995) 2 SCC 584, 1995
2 SCR 638, 1995 (2) UJ 93 SC
Author: P Sawant
Bench: K S Verma, P Sawant

1. On 10th March, 1994; Justice S.K. Keshote of the Allahabad High Court addressed a
letter to the Acting Chief Justice of that Court as follows :

No. SKK/ALL/8/94 10.3.94 Dear brother Actg. Chief Justice, Though on 9.3.94 itself I
orally narrated about the misbehavior of Sh. B.C. Misra with me in the Court but I
thought it advisable to give you same in writing also.

On 9.3.94 I was sitting with Justice Anshuman Singh in Court No. 38. In the list of fresh
cases of 9.3.94 at Sr. No. 5 FAFO Record No. 22793 M/s. Bansal Forgings Ltd. v. U.P.F.
Corp. filed by Smt. S.V. Misra was listed. Sh. B.C. Misra appeared in this case when the
case was called.

Brief facts of that case M/s. Bansal Forgings Ltd. took loan from U.P. Financial
Corporation and it made default in payment of instalment of the same. Corporation
proceeded against the Company Under Section 29 of the U.P. Financial Corporation Act.
The company filed a Civil Suit against the Corporation and it has also field an application
for grant of temporary injunction. Counsel for the Corporation suo moto put appearance
in the matter before Trial Court and prayed for time for filing of reply. The learned trial
court passed an order on the said date that the Corporation will not seize the factory of the
Company. The company shall pay the amount of instalment and it will furnish also
security for the disputed amount. The court directed to furnish security on 31.1.94 and
case was fixed on 15.3.94.

Against said order of the trial court this appeal has been filed and arguments have been
advanced that Court has no jurisdiction to pass the order for payment of instalment of
loan and further no security could have been ordered.

I put a question to Shri Misra under which provision this order has been passed. On
putting of question he started to shout and said that no question could have been put to
him. He will get me transferred or see that impeachment motion is brought against me in
Parliament. He further said that he has turned up many Judges. He created a good scene in
the court. He asked me to follow the practice of this Court. In sum and substance it is a
matter where except to abuse me of mother and sister he insulted me like anything. What
he wanted to convey to me was that admission is as a course and no arguments are heard,
at this stage.

It is not the question of insulting of a Judge of this institution but it is a matter of

institution as a whole. In case dignity of Judiciary is not being maintained then where this
institution will stand. In case a senior Advocate, President of Bar and chairman of Bar
Council of India behaves in Court in such manner what will happen to other advocates.
Since the day I have come here I am deciding the cases on merits. In case a case has
merits it is admitted but not as a matter of course. In this Court probably advocates do not
like the consideration of cases on their merits at the stage of admission. In case dignity of
Judiciary is not restored then it is very difficult for the Judges to discharge their Judicial
function without fear and favour.

I am submitting this matter to you in writing to bring this misshaping in the Court with
the hope that you will do something for restoration of dignity of Judiciary.

Thanking you, Yours sincerely, Sd/-

(Jus. S.K. Keshote).

Supreme Court Bar Association vs Union Of India & Anr on 17 April, 1998
Author: D Anand.
Bench: S.C. Agrawal, G.N. Ray, A.S. Anand, S.P. Bharucha, S. Rajendra Babu
PETITIONER:
SUPREME COURT BAR ASSOCIATION

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/04/1998

BENCH:
S.C. AGRAWAL, G.N. RAY, A.S. ANAND, S.P. BHARUCHA,S. RAJENDRA
BABU

JUDGEMENT
Dr. ANAND, J. - (1.) In Re:Vinay Chandra Mishra, (1995) 2 SCC 584 , this Court
found the contemner, an advocate, guilty of committing criminal contempt of Court
for having interfered with and "obstructing the course of justice by trying to
threaten, overawe and overbear the Court by using insulting, disrespectful and
threatening language". While awarding punishment, keeping in view the gravity of
the contumacious conduct of the contemner, the Court said:"The facts and
circumstances of the present case justify our invoking the power under Article 129
read with Article 142 of the Constitution to award to the contemner a suspended
sentence of imprisonment together with suspension of his practice as an advocate in
the manner directed herein. We accordingly sentence the contemner for his
conviction for the offence of criminal contempt as under: (a) The contemner Vinay
Chandra Mishra is hereby sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of
six weeks. However, in the circumstances of the case, the sentence will remain
suspended for a period of four years and may be activated in case the contemner is
convicted for any other offence of contempt of Court within the said period; and (b)
The contemner shall stand suspended from practising as an advocate for a period of
three years from today with the consequence that all elective and nominated
offices/posts at present held by him in his capacity as an advocate, shall stand
vacated by him forthwith."
(2.) Aggrieved by the direction that the "contemner shall stand suspended from
practising as an Advocate for a period of three years" issued by this Court by
invoking powers under Articles 129 and 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court
Bar Association, through its Honorary Secretary, has filed this petition under Article
32 of the Constitution of India, seeking the following relief: "Issue an appropriate
writ, direction, or declaration, declaring that the disciplinary committees of the Bar
Councils set up under the Advocates Act, 1961, alone have exclusive jurisdiction to
inquire into and suspend or debar an advocate from practising law for professional
or other misconduct, arising out of punishment imposed for contempt of Court or
otherwise and further declare that the Supreme Court of India or any High Court in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction has no such original jurisdiction, power or
authority in that regard, notwithstanding the contrary view held by this Hon'ble
Court in Contempt Petition (Crl.) No. 3 of 1994 dated 10-3-1995."
(3.) On 21-3-1995, while issuing Rule in the writ petition, following order was made
by the Division Bench: "The question which arises is whether the Supreme Court of
India can while dealing with Contempt Proceedings exercise power under Article 129
of the Constitution or under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution or
under Article 142 of the Constitution can debar a practising lawyer from carrying on
his profession as a lawyer for any period whatsoever. We direct notice to issue on
the Attorney General of India and on the respondents herein. Notice will also issue
on the application for interim stay. Having regard to the importance of the aforesaid
question we further direct that this petition be placed before a Constitution Bench of
this Court.
V.P. Kumaravelu v/s The Bar Council of India, New Delhi
Civil Appeal Nos. 3917-18 of 1986
Decided On, 04 February 1997
At, Supreme Court of India
By, THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.C. AGRAWAL & THE
HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE SUJATA V. MANOHAR
For the Appellant :- Mr. A.T.M. Sampath and V. Balaji, Advocates. For the
Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 :- Mr. A. Mariarputham, Ms. Aruna Mathur and Mr. V.
Krishnamurthy, Advocates.
Head Note:
ADVOCATES ACT, 1961:
Section 36B (i) – Disciplinary proceedings – Professional Misconduct –
Reprimand – Held that Bar Council has noted mitigating circumstances to
show that blame could not be attached solely to the appellant and that
office staff was responsible for mis leading the appellant – Appellant was
negligent and his client had to suffer ex parte decree that there is no finding
of mala fides or any deliberate inaction on his part – Negligence without
moral turpitude or delinquency may not amount to professional misconduct
– Held therefore that his conduct does not amount to professional mis-
conduct – Appeal allowed.

Professional mis-conduct

Advocates Act 1961 – Held negligence without moral turpitude does not
amount to professional mis-conduct.

Held:
In fact, the Bar Council of India has noted mitigating circumstances which
go to show that blame cannot be attached solely to the appellant. It has
noted that from the correspondence which is brought on record, it is clear
that at no point of time the papers pertaining to the case were placed
before the appellant except for moving an application for setting aside the
ex parte order. It is also not known whether the application was actually
moved by the appellant himself or through a junior. It is not clear whether
the order which was passed on this application for payment of costs was
brought to the notice of the appellant either. The Bar Council has also
noted that after the summons in the case was served on the State of Tamil
Nadu through the Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu in June
1978, a letter was sent on 27th of June, 1978 by the then Government
Pleader.
Looking to all the circumstances the appellant was negligent as he had
failed to attend to the two cases. His client had to suffer ex parte decrees.
There is, however, no finding of any mala fides on the part of the appellant
or any deliberate inaction on his part in not attending to the two cases. Will
his negligence or “constructive negligence” as the respondent-Bar Council
puts it, amount to professional misconduct? Whether negligence will
amount to professional misconduct or not will depend upon the facts of
each case. Gross negligence in the discharge of duties partakes of shades
of delinquency and would undoubtedly amount to professional misconduct.
Similarly, conduct which amounts to dereliction of duty by an advocate
towards his client or towards his case would amount to professional
misconduct. But negligence without moral turpitude or delinquency may not
amount to professional misconduct.
U.P. Sales Tax Service ... vs Taxation Bar Association, Agra & ... on 1 September,
1995
Equivalent citations: 1996 AIR 98, 1995 SCC (5) 716
Author: K Ramaswamy
Bench: Ramaswamy, K.
PETITIONER:
U.P. SALES TAX SERVICE ASSOCIATION

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
TAXATION BAR ASSOCIATION, AGRA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT01/09/1995

BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
HANSARIA B.L. (J)

Leave granted.

This appeal by special leave arises from the order dated 14th October, 1993 of the
Allahabad High Court made in Writ Petition No. Nil of 1993 titled The Taxation Bar
Asociation, Agra through its General Secretary & Anr. vs. The state of U.P. through the
Secretary, Institutional Finance & Ors. Pursuant to our direction under Article 139A
(1) of the Constitution withdrawing the said writ petition to this Court, we dispose of the
same ourselves.

The crucial question before us is whether the High Court could issue a writ or direction
prohibiting a statutory authority, viz., the Appellate Authority under Section 9 of the Uttar
Pradesh sales Tax Act, 1948 [for short, the Act ] from discharging the quasi-judicial
functions; direction to the State Government to withdraw all powers from it and
transferring the pending cases before the officer to any other authority? Whether
advocates would be justified to go on strike as a pressure group in that behalf?

The impugned order is the same, as prayed for in the main writ petition, which reads as
under:

"Until further orders of this Court, the respondent no.3 Satti Din is restrained from
discharging his function as Deputy Commissioner [Appeals] Sales Tax, Agra under
Section 9 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. However, it will be uponto the Commissioner, Sales
Tax U.P. to transfer the cases pending before respondent no.3 to some other Court".

The Court indicated as under :

"(1) In the rare instance where any association of lawyers (including statutory Bar
Councils) considers it imperative to call upon and/or advise members of the legal
profession to abstain from appearing in courts on any occasion, it must be left open to any
individual member/members of that association to be free to appear without let, fer or
hindrance or any other coercive step.

(2)No such member who appears in court or otherwise practices his legal profession, shall
be visited with any adverse or penal consequences, whatever, by any association of
lawyers, and shall not suffer any expulsion or threat of expulsion therefrom.

(3)The above will not preclude other forms of protest by practicing lawyers in courts such
as, for instance, wearing of arm bands and other forms of protest disrupt the court
proceedings or adversely affect the interest of the litigant. Any such forms of protest shall
not however be derogatory to the court or to the profession.

(4)Office bearers of a Bar Association (including Bar Council) responsible for taking
decisions mentioned in clause (1) above shall ensure that such decisions are implemented
in the spirit of what is stated in clauses (1), (2) and (3) above."
John D'Souza vs Edward Ani on 17 December, 1993
Equivalent citations: 1994 AIR 975, 1994 SCC (2) 64
Author: S Pandian
Bench: Pandian, S.R. (J)
PETITIONER:
JOHN D'SOUZA

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
EDWARD ANI

DATE OF JUDGMENT17/12/1993

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN, J.- The
appellant who is an Advocate in Bangalore practicing since 1942 was proceeded against
for professional misconduct on the basis of a complaint dated November 7, 1986 lodged
by the respondent, Mr Edward Am with the Karnataka State Bar Council (Bangalore)
under Section 35 of the Advocates Act alleging that the appellant with whom a will dated
July 1, 1968 executed by his mother-in-

law, Mrs Mary Raymond was entrusted for safe Custody against receipt dated July 5,
1968 bearing Seriai No. 576 in his register of Wills (marked as Ex. P-1) refused to return
that will In spite of two letters dated January 4, 1982 and April 15, 1986 demanding the
appellant to hand over the will kept in his custody and that the appellant thereby has
committed professional misconduct.

2. The synoptical resumption of the case which has given rise to this appeal may be
briefly stated. One, Mr N.E. Raymond and his wife, Mrs Mary Raymond were the clients
of the appellant. Mrs Mary Raymond during her lifetime got her will drafted by the
appellant and entrusted the same after execution with the appellant in respect of which the
appellant had given a receipt dated July 5, 1968 vide Ex. P-1. The fact that the will has
been deposited with the appellant is supported by an entry in the register of Wills
maintained by the appellant. The execution had appointed her husband as the executor.
Her husband, N.E. Raymond died in the year 1974. Mrs Mary Raymond changed her
lawyer, the appellant herein and engaged one Mr George DaCosta as her advocate.
According to the respondent, who is none other than the son-in-law of Mrs Mary
Raymond and who claims to be the legal representative of her estate that when Mr
George DaCosta requested the appellant in 1978 to let him have his client's will, the
appellant denied having it. Thereafter, Mrs Mary Raymond was obliged to make another
will prepared by Mr George DaCosta on June 24, 1978.

3. It is the case of the respondent that he wrote two letters to tile appellant of which one
dated January 4, 1982 was sent on behalf of Mrs Mary Raymond under Certificate of
Posting from Manchester (U.K.) marked as Ex. P-6 and another letter dated April 15,
1986 by himself under Registered Post with A/D marked as Ex. P-8. Both the letters were
addressed to the appellant requesting him to return the will dated July 1, 1968. But the
appellant did not reply to both the letters and kept conspicuous silence.

The second will executed in 1978 was probated on February 21, 1984 after the death of
Mrs Mary Raymond on October 29, 1983.

5. On being aggrieved at the conduct of the appellant in not replying to his letters and
returning the will kept in his custody, the respondent filed a complaint dated November 7,
1986 before the Karnataka Bar Council. By a Resolution No. 110 of 1987 on July 12,
1987, the State Council rejected that complaint holding that there was no prima facie case
made out. The respondent preferred a revision before the Bar Council of India which by
its order dated November 20, 1988 set aside the order of the State Bar Council and
allowed the revision holding that there existed prima facie case of misconduct against the
respondent (advocate) and remitted the matter to the Disciplinary Committee of the State
Council.

6. Pursuant to the order of the Bar Council of India, the parties appeared before the
Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council. The appellant filed his reply on July 3,
1989 to which the respondent filed his rejoinder on August 12, 1989. The Disciplinary
Committee of the State Bar Council by its order dated June 7, 1990 again held that the
respondent was not guilty of professional or other misconduct within the meaning
of Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961 as alleged by the appellant.

It is disheartening to note that the documentary evidence and the circumstances bearing
the case leave an irresistible inference that the entry dated January 13, 1982 in the register
of Wills should have been manipulated as if the document had been returned. No doubt,
in a disciplinary proceeding of this nature, the rule is that the charging party has the
burden of proving the charge of misconduct of the respondent. On an overall evaluation
of the facts and circumstances of the case we hold that the respondent has proved that the
appellant had not returned the will. It has to be remembered, in this connection, that his
earlier stand was that he did not have the will. He changed the position later and came out
with the case that he had returned it in 1982 and for this purpose he relied upon an
endorsement made by his wife in his register of documents. We are left with the
irresistible conclusion, in the circumstances, that he had not returned the will though
demands were made first by the testatrix, then by her new lawyer and by the respondent
who was also holding the power of attorney from the testatrix when he wrote the first
letter and was the executor appointed under the second will. Theconduct of the appellant
in not returning the will even on demand is unworthy of an advocate belonging to a noble
profession. The appellant has no right to withhold the will. On the other hand, he was
bound in duty to return the said will when demanded because the instrument was
entrusted to his custody by the testatrix, Mrs Mary Raymond only on trust.

Under these circumstances, we do not find any reason much less compelling reason to
interfere with the impugned order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of
India. The Appeal is accordingly dismissed and the stay granted by this Court shall stand
vacated. No costs.
Delhi High Court
D.S. Dalal vs State Bank Of India on 11 December, 1984
Equivalent citations: 1984 (8) DRJ 156
Author: N Goswamy
Bench: N Goswamy

JUDGMENT N.N. Goswamy, J.

(1) The case of the petitioner, at the time when notice to show cause was issued, was that
he had never appeared for Singh & Co. in the High Court and as such was not concerned
in the High Court matters. This statement was not accepted by the counsel, for the
respondent In fact, Mr. Vohra stated that if it can be shown even in one case that the
petitioner bad appeared in this Court, the petitioner will be out of court. The respondent
lies filed an affidavit. Along with the affidavit various orders of this court have also been
filed. I find that the petitioner had not only signed the pleadings and Vakalatnama but has
appeared on various' dates in different suits of the plaintiff itself.

(2) The complaint, by the counsel, for the petitioner is that his criminal trial may be
prejudiced if he is examined under Order 10 Rule 1. This submission is also not tenatle,
for the simple reason that the petitioner has already disclosed his defense in a written
statement filed before.:the Bar council. There can be no question of any prejudice in the
present case. Dismissed inliming.
Mrs. Roma Banerjee v/s Ushapati Banerjee, Muktear, Alipore
Civil Ref. 3 of 1953
Decided On, 29 January 1954
At, High Court of Judicature at Calcutta
By, THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.C. LAHIRI & THE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J.P. MITRA
For the Appearing Parties: Hemendra Kumar Das, Purnendu Sekhar Basu, Sunil
Mukherji, Kiron Bandhu Mukharji, Advocates.

JUDGEMENT
J.P.Mitter, J. - (1.) This Reference under Section 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act is
by the Additional Sessions 'Judge, First Extra Court, Alipur.
(2.) The case against the respondent Mukhtear Ushapati Banerjee is as follows:
(3.) He was engaged by one Mrs. Roma Banerjee to conduct a prosecution by her
against one Mrs. Anjali Lindsay and her husband for cheating. The case ended in the
conviction of the accused persons whereupon they preferred an appeal to the
Sessions Judge, 24-Parganas. At this stage, the respondent represented, to the
complainant Mrs. Roma Banerjee that a senior lawyer should be engaged on her
behalf and induced her to pav to him Rs. 75/- as the fee of the senior lawyer to be
engaged in the case. As for a long time Mrs. Banerjee received no information as to
the fate of the said appeal, she caused enquiries to be made and discovered that the
respondent Mukhtear had, in the meantime, without her knowledge, compromised
the said criminal appeal on the accused, persons paying a sum of Rs. 1,500/--. The
appeal had been transferred for disposal to the said Additional Sessions Judge and it
was before him that the compromise concerned was effected. Pursuant to the
compromise, the accused persons paid to the respondent Rs. 500 on 24-5-1952, Rs.
5007- on July 2, 1952 and Rs. 500 on July 19, 1952, It was on the last mentioned
date that the appeal was disposed of in terms of the compromise, and no senior
lawyer was at any stage engaged on Mrs. Banerjee's behalf. These sums
aggregating Rs. 1,500/- were received lay the respondent against receipts which
were written out by him in the margin of three petitions which the appellant accused
persons filed in Court. Neither the sum of Rs. 1,500/- nor any part thereof, was,
however, made over by the respondent to his client, Mrs. Banerjee. Upon discovery
that the appeal had been compromised by the respondent, Mrs. Banerjee caused a
pleader's notice, dated 31-10-1952, to be served upon the respondent; yet the
respondent made no restitution and offered no explanation as to his conduct. This
led Mrs. Banerjee to move the learned District Judge for appropriate action against
the respondent under the Legal Practitioners Act. The learned District Judge
forwarded this application to the said Additional Sessions Judge for disposal.;