Protecting Legitimate Expectations and Estoppel in English Law

Report to the XVIIth International Congress of Comparative Law, July 2006

John Cartwright*

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Introduction

This topic presents something of a difficulty in English contract law, but its real
interest—both for the domestic English lawyer and for the comparative lawyer—lies
in this difficulty. For at first sight there is a very short and simple answer to the
question: ‘what part is played by the concepts of legitimate expectations and estoppel
in the English law of contract?’: it is very limited. The judges do not commonly use
the language of ‘legitimate expectations’ in the context of the private law of contract.
It is not a phrase that appears in the index to most of the leading English contract law
textbooks.1 And although ‘promissory estoppel’ and certain other forms of estoppel
are placed firmly in the index to contract law, the relevant chapters of each of the
books then make clear—as will be explained below—that it has a relatively limited
role.
This is not, however, the end of the story. Once we have understood the role
played by the (literal) concepts of legitimate expectations or estoppel in English law
generally, and in the English law of contract in particular, we can see that the
underlying principles or ideas behind these concepts can indeed be found in the law of
contract, although under different names and using different language of description.

1. ‘Legitimate expectations’ and ‘estoppel’ in general

(a) Estoppel: the core notion

As we shall see, there are several varieties of ‘estoppel’ in English law, and there is
some debate as to whether all (or at least some of them) are species of the same genus,
or should be regarded as so different in principle as to be wholly independent.2 But we
can certainly begin by identifying a common underlying idea behind the varieties of
1
* John Cartwright is Reader in the Law of Contract, University of Oxford.
The exception is J. Beatson, Anson’s Law of Contract (28th ed, Oxford, 2002), although the
index reference is not to pages in the book discussing the general, private law of contract but to
the operation of the principles of estoppel and legitimate expectation in public law. On this, see
section 1(c) below.

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estoppel, which is explained by the very choice of the word ‘estoppel’. This was
explained by Lord Denning:3

‘The word “estoppel” only means stopped. You will find it explained by Coke in
his Commentaries on Littleton (19th ed, 1832), vol. II, s. 667, 352a. It was
brought over by the Normans. They used the old French “estoupail.” That meant
a bung or cork by which you stopped something from coming out. It was in
common use in our courts when they carried on all their proceedings in
Norman-French. Littleton writes in the law-French of his day (15th century)
using the words “pur ceo que le baron est estoppe a dire,” meaning simply that
the husband is stopped from saying something.
From that simple origin there has been built up over the centuries in our law a
big house with many rooms. It is the house called Estoppel. In Coke's time it
was a small house with only three rooms, namely, estoppel by matter of record,
by matter in writing, and by matter in pais. But by our time we have so many
rooms that we are apt to get confused between them. Estoppel per rem
judicatam, issue estoppel, estoppel by deed, estoppel by representation, estoppel
by conduct, estoppel by acquiescence, estoppel by election or waiver, estoppel
by negligence, promissory estoppel, proprietary estoppel, and goodness knows
what else. These several rooms have this much in common: They are all under
one roof. Someone is stopped from saying something or other, or doing
something or other, or contesting something or other. But each room is used
differently from the others. If you go into one room, you will find a notice
saying, “Estoppel is only a rule of evidence.” If you go into another room you
will find a different notice, “Estoppel can give rise to a cause of action.” Each
room has its own separate notices. It is a mistake to suppose that what you find
in one room, you will also find in the others.’

(b) Estoppel: the varieties

In the passage just set out, Lord Denning gives a long list of different varieties of
estoppel, and he notes that his list is not necessarily complete. The books name,
explain and group different forms of estoppel in different ways.4 That need not
concern us here, but we can notice briefly some of the principal forms of estoppel.
This is necessary in order to obtain a proper perspective on the general question about
the role of estoppel in the law of contract.

(i) Estoppel by record, or estoppel per rem judicatam: an issue which has been finally
determined in proceedings to settle a dispute between parties cannot generally be

2
This debate has a particular significance for the scope of the doctrine of promissory estoppel
in the law of contract, by reference to the links it might have to the doctrine of proprietary
estoppel in land law: see section 1(b), below.
3
McIlkenny v Chief Constable of the West Midlands [1980] QB 283 at 316-317. The case itself
raised a question about estoppel per rem judicatam.
4
For general treatment, see Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed, LexisNexis, London, 2003
reissue), vol 16(2); E. Cooke, The Modern Law of Estoppel (Oxford, 2000); and for detailed
treatment of particular forms of estoppel, see P. Feltham, D. Hochberg, T. Leech (eds) Spencer
Bower and Turner, Estoppel by Representation (4th ed, Tottel, London, 2003); M. Pawlowski,
Proprietary Estoppel (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1996); P. Barnett, Res Judicata, Estoppel and
Foreign Judgments (Oxford, 2001); The Hon. Mr Justice K. Handley, Estoppel by Conduct and
Election (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2006).

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raised again in subsequent proceedings between the same parties.5 This form of
estoppel will not concern us further here.

(ii) Estoppel by deed: a statement of fact made by a party in a deed cannot be

challenged by that party as against the other party to the deed: in effect, once a party
has committed himself to an unequivocal statement of fact in a deed, the legal
consequences for him must be determined on the basis that the fact is true (and
evidence cannot be led to contradict the fact: he is estopped from denying the fact). A
‘deed’ is a formal document which can be used to make a unilateral (gratuitous)
promise or a bilateral contract binding; and it is used also for other transactions such
as the transfer of the legal title to property, and the creation of certain property
interests such as leases.
This form of estoppel also covers the case where a party enters into a deed to
grant rights to which he has himself no right—such as a person who purports to grant
a lease of land to which he has no title. A ‘tenancy by estoppel’ arises; and once both
parties have acted on the assumption that the deed created a tenancy, neither is
allowed to deny to the other that their relationship has all the incidents of the lease.
Their legal relationship is enforceable by each as if it were a properly granted tenancy
(although third parties are not bound by the estoppel).

(iii) Estoppel by convention: where parties to a transaction act on an assumed state of

facts or law, the assumption being either shared by them both or made by one and
acquiesced in by the other, but as long as the assumption is communicated by each
party to the other, then each is estopped from denying the assumed facts or law if it
would be unjust to allow him to go back on the assumption.6 This form of estoppel is
not designed to create new legal rights but can have that effect; for example where the
parties share (and act upon) a mistake as to the legal effect of the terms of a contract,
then the mistaken effect (rather than the true legal effect) can be enforced.7

(iv) Estoppel by representation: a person who has made a representation to another,

with the intention that the latter should act on it to his detriment and he does so act on
it, is estopped from denying the content of his representation. This core idea has been
the subject of significant development.
At first, the courts applied the principle only to representations of existing fact,
and not to statements of intention, or promises.8 It was often described as a rule of
evidence,9 by which a party who had made a representation of fact would not be
permitted to lead evidence to contradict that fact in an action by or against the party to
whom he had made the representation and who had relied on it—had changed his
position in some way, on the faith of the representation, to his detriment. The estoppel

5
Or, sometimes, between different parties, where the finding is one of fact as to the status of a
person or thing that is relevant for that later litigation. The principle is based on the interest of
finality in litigation, and the Court of Appeal has recently suggested that the name should be
changed (e.g. ‘cause of action finality’) to reflect this: Specialist Group International Ltd v
Deakin [2001] EWCA Civ 777 at [10]. ‘Cause of action estoppel’ and ‘issue estoppel’ are
versions within this form of estoppel.
6
Republic of India v Indian Steamship Co Ltd (No 2) [1998] AC 878 at 913.
7
Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd
[1982] QB 84. See generally H. G. Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts (29th ed, Sweet & Maxwell,
London, 2004), paras 3-107 to 3-114.
8
Jordan v Money (1854) 5 HL Cas 185 at 214-215, 226-227.
9
Low v Bouverie [1891] 3 Ch 82 at 105, 112.

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is not itself the cause of action on which a claim is based, but it affects the outcome of
a claim by fixing the factual basis of the claim as it was represented to be.
Two other forms of estoppel, giving effect to a representation made by one
party that has been relied on by the other party, have been developed.10 In the context
of land law,11 proprietary estoppel is now a well-established doctrine. The general
principle is that where one party (A) makes a representation or promise to another
party (B) to the effect that B has or shall have an interest in, or right over, A’s
property, or acquiesces in B’s mistaken belief that he has or shall have such an interest
or right, then if A intends B to act in reliance on the representation, promise or
mistaken belief, and B does so act in reliance, equity may intervene to prevent (estop)
A from asserting his own strict legal rights to his property.12 The courts have
developed a broad discretion to decide what remedy is appropriate to satisfy B’s rights
arising by way of the estoppel. It might be the grant of the very interest in the property
that B expected to receive.13 Or it might be only the reimbursement of the expenditure
he incurred in reliance on the representation.14 Or it might be not exactly the
equivalent of his expectation or his reliance but some other measure which the court
judges to be most appropriate to do justice. Most recently the English courts have
tended to take the expectation as the starting-point, but to award less if the value of
the expectation is disproportionate to the value of the detriment incurred.15
Promissory estoppel is a doctrine applied within English contract law, but it is
of quite limited scope. English law normally requires a party to provide consideration
in order to enforce an informal promise: something done or promised in return for, or
as the price of the promise, at the promisor’s express or implied request. It is not
sufficient that the promisee has relied on the promise, even if the promisor intended
him to rely on it, or could have foreseen that he would rely on it. A person is therefore
not estopped from going back on his promise simply because the promisee has relied
to his detriment. Although a promise, or representation, to give an interest in land can
be given force under the doctrine of proprietary estoppel to the extent that the
representee can sue to obtain a remedy (the estoppel is here a ‘sword’16), outside the
law of property estoppel does not create new rights, and in particular it is not a general
alternative to the doctrine of consideration as being a condition for the legal

10
They are often referred to as forms of ‘equitable’ estoppel, because for their development in
the 20th century the courts drew on older cases decided by the Courts of Equity (before the
fusion of the old Common Law and Equity jurisdictions in 1875) or principles which can be
attributed in the modern law to the continuing development of the old jurisprudence of the
Courts of Equity.
11
This doctrine might also apply outside land law, but still within the law of property: Western
Fish Products Ltd v Penwith DC [1981] 2 All ER 204 at 218. It is also very closely linked to
other principles by which rights of property (real or personal) can sometimes be created without
compliance with certain formality requirements: Re Basham [1986] 1 WLR 1498 at 1503-1504.
See generally J. Cartwright, ‘Formality and Informality in Property and Contract’ in J. Getzler
(ed), Rationalizing Property, Equity and Trusts (LexisNexis, London, 2003).
12
For a general discussion of proprietary estoppel, see E.H. Burn and J. Cartwright, Cheshire and
Burn’s Modern Law of Real Property (17th ed, 2006), pp 814-827, 841-846; M. Pawlowski, The
Doctrine of Proprietary Estoppel (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1996)
13
Pascoe v Turner [1979] 1 WLR 431 (transfer of full legal title to the property)
14
Dodsworth v Dodsworth (1973) 228 EG 1115 (reimbursement of money spent by brother and
his wife on improvements to sister’s house which sister had led them to think they could live in
for life).
15
Jennings v Rice [2003] 1 P & CR 100, where Robert Walker LJ noted at [54] that this was
different from the general approach of the Australian courts which have preferred to compensate
only the reliance loss within their own developments of estoppel.
16
Pascoe v Turner, above, note 13.

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enforceability of a promise.17 In this, the role of promissory estoppel is much more

limited in English contract law than in the law of the United States18 or Australia,19
where it has been used to found a cause of action to remedy the non-performance of a
promise unsupported by consideration. Instead, in English law, the doctrine of
promissory estoppel can be used only as a ‘shield’: if one party to an existing contract
has represented to the other that he will not insist on his strict legal rights under the
contract, and the representee has altered his position in reliance on that representation,
the representor will be estopped from insisting on the true contractual position, but
has to accept his (reduced) contractual rights in the form in which he represented them
—at least until he has given the representee the opportunity of altering back his
position so as to be able to perform the contract according to its strict terms.20 It is a
means by which contractual rights can be suspended or (sometimes) permanently
given up, but not by which new rights can be created.
In promissory estoppel the representor is estopped from enforcing the contract
where it would be ‘inequitable’ or ‘unconscionable’ to do so because of the reliance
by the representee on the representation. This language of ‘unconscionability’ also
appears as the underlying rationale in the modern cases on proprietary estoppel. But it
has not been generalised into a doctrine of unconscionability in English law, nor has it
even been used as a common link to draw together promissory and proprietary
estoppel—and other forms of estoppel—into a single overarching doctrine, as appears
to be the case in Australia.21 Since there are contrary binding decisions of the Court of
Appeal, it would take a decision of the House of Lords to make such a development—
although it is certainly not out of the question that the House might be persuaded to
take such a step.22

(c) ‘Legitimate expectations’ in English law

17
Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215.
18
American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law (2d), Contracts (1981), para 90.
19
Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387.
20
Ajayi v RT Briscoe (Nigeria) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 1326 at 1330. See generally Chitty on
Contracts, above, note 7, paras 3-085 to 3-105.
21
Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher, above, note 19; Chitty on Contracts, above, note 7,
para 3-106.
22
Baird Textiles Holdings Ltd v Marks and Spencer plc [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 737 at [55]:
‘there is no real prospect of the claim succeeding unless and until the law is developed, or
corrected, by the House of Lords’ (Judge LJ). The bar on the use of promissory estoppel to
create new obligations in the absence of consideration was established by the Court of Appeal in
Combe v Combe, above, note 17; and the restriction of proprietary estoppel to property rights
was established by the Court of Appeal in Western Fish Products Ltd v Penwith DC, above, note
11.

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The ‘protection of legitimate expectations’ is not a doctrine of English private law. It

is, however, a doctrine which is presently under development in public law. It is well
established that if a public body has led an individual to believe that he will have a
particular procedural right, over and above that generally required by the principles of
fairness and natural justice, then he is said to have procedural legitimate expectations
that can be protected.23 In recent years it has also become accepted that if a public
body has led an individual to believe that he will receive a substantive benefit, then he
may have substantive legitimate expectations that can sometimes be protected,
although this area is not yet settled and presents some difficulties of principle.24 Even
if the public body’s representations are within its power to make, the enforcement of
the expectations created by them may fetter the public body’s discretion contrary to its
proper functions in public law; although against that there is an argument about
fairness of treatment of the particular individual.25 The protection of expectations
raised by reliance on a representation made outside the power of the public body is
even more problematic, because it might be held to be allowing the public body to
exercise powers which were not authorised by Parliament.
There are close similarities between the public law doctrine of legitimate
expectations and the private law doctrine of estoppel. The paradigm case of each
doctrine involves a clear and unambiguous promise, undertaking or representation (in
words or conduct) by one party which creates in the other an expectation or belief,
and the justification for allowing the representee to hold the representor to his
representation is that he has relied on it. However, there are significant differences,
which make these separate doctrines no more than analogies. For example, in the
public law context the courts have held that the justifications for enforcing the
legitimate expectations may be a broader principle of fairness, and the prevention of
the abuse of power by public bodies, and so they might not require detrimental
reliance of the kind that would be required under the private law doctrine of
estoppel.26 And, more generally, remedies awarded against public bodies must take
into account different considerations from those in a purely private law case, such as
the interests of the general public which the public body exists to promote, and the
hierarchy of individual rights protected by the Human Rights Act 1998.27 Most
recently, Lord Hoffmann said that the public law doctrine is sufficiently well
established to be recognised as quite independent of estoppel: ‘public law has already
absorbed whatever is useful from the moral values which underlie the private law
concept of estoppel and the time has come for it to stand upon its own two feet’.28

(d) Underlying general principles

The discussion above has shown that the English courts have declined to unite the
public law doctrine of legitimate expectations with the private law doctrine of
estoppel; and that (so far, at least) they have also declined to draw out a general
principle from the different forms of estoppel that can itself be applied directly and
23
P. Craig, Administrative Law (5th ed, 2003, Sweet & Maxwell, London), ch 13.
24
P. Craig, Administrative Law, above, ch 19. The leading case which accepts a (defined)
principle of substantive legitimate expectations is R v North and East Devon Health Authority,
ex p Coughlan [2001] QB 213.
25
R v Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food, ex p Hamble (Offshore) Fisheries Ltd [1995]
2 All ER 714 at 731.
26
R (Bibi) v Newham LBC [2002] 1 WLR 237 at [55].
27
R (Reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd) v East Sussex County Council [2003] 1 WLR 348 at [34].
28
R (Reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd) v East Sussex County Council [2003] 1 WLR 348 at [35].

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independently in private law. But there are certainly some general principles that can
be identified in these several doctrines, which can then be seen in operation in, or
underlying, other specific rules or doctrines of English contract law. Lord Hoffmann’s
statement in the previous paragraph referred to absorption into public law of the
‘moral values which underlie the private law concept of estoppel’. And it has been
noted above that one link between estoppels (although not yet fully developed in
English law) is that they bind the individual on the ground that it would be
unconscionable for him to deny what he has represented or agreed.29 This
‘unconscionability’ arises from a combination of his representation and the reliance on
it by the representee. And it is the reliance that crystallizes the right in the representee:
this is what makes it inequitable for the representor to go back on that which he has
led the representee to believe. These core notions of the creation of expectations, and
the law’s intervention to protect the expectations by virtue of the other party’s acting
on the basis that they will be fulfilled, can be seen to underlie other rules that operate
within the English law of contract.

2. The application of the general principles underlying ‘legitimate expectations’

and estoppel within English contract law

(a) The precontractual stage

English law does not recognise a general principle of precontractual liability. Many
other legal systems would say that the relationship between the parties negotiating for
a contract can—even before the contract is formed—become one in which one party
acquires a duty to take some account of the other party’s interests, the duty arising
either in tort or in an autonomous liability for culpa in contrahendo.30 English law
takes a quite different view. The starting-point, at least, is that each party, in incurring
any pre-contract expenditure, retains the risk of whether the contract will be
concluded. Even where the negotiations have been long and detailed and are at an
advanced stage, and even where the parties have expressly agreed to continue to
negotiate in good faith with a view to reaching agreement, each is still free to
withdraw. The strongest statement is that of Lord Ackner in Walford v Miles:31

‘the concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently

repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties when involved in
negotiations. Each party to the negotiations is entitled to pursue his (or her)
own interest, so long as he avoids making misrepresentations. To advance that
interest he must be entitled, if he thinks it appropriate, to threaten to withdraw
from further negotiations or to withdraw in fact in the hope that the opposite
party may seek to reopen the negotiations by offering him improved terms.’

There is therefore no general principle in English law that a negotiating party can be
made to fulfil or otherwise compensate the other party’s disappointed expectations,
even where he has caused those expectations and knows of the other party’s reliance.

29
R (Reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd) v East Sussex County Council [2003] 1 WLR 348 at [33].
30
For a comparative study of this area, see the volume of the Trento project on The Common
Core of European Private Law on Precontractual Liability (edited by J. Cartwright and M.
Hesselink) (forthcoming).
31
[1992] 2 AC 128 at 138.

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The relationship between negotiating parties is seen as inconsistent with such a

principle.
However, this does not exclude all forms of redress during the precontractual
stage. Lord Ackner’s statement refers to one exception: misrepresentation. Where one
negotiating party gives false information to the other, by words or conduct, then if he
was fraudulent (not holding an honest belief in the truth of the information) he is
liable in the tort of deceit to compensate the other for the loss that he suffered by
relying on it.32 And the party who is (or holds himself out to be) in a position to know
the accuracy of the information may owe a duty to take reasonable care to the other to
whom he provides the information, and therefore be liable in the tort of negligence if
he failed to take care and the other party suffered loss in reliance on it.33 These actions
in tort have the effect of protecting the reliance by a negotiating party on
representations made by the other party—and, where they apply, the remedy of
damages compensates only the value of the party’s reliance and not his failed
expectation from the contract itself.34 But they are peculiar to the case of
misrepresentation and, indeed, are just applications in the precontractual stage of the
general liabilities in tort for fraudulent or negligent statements. Deliberate silence
(without any active misrepresentation by words or conduct) does not constitute the
tort of deceit.35 Nor is there authority in the English cases for a general duty of care in
tort between negotiating parties,36 and such a general duty is not likely to be
developed because it would cut across the courts’ reluctance to impose mutual duties
between negotiating parties, as set out in Lord Ackner’s statement.37
Misrepresentations can give rise to liability in damages in tort. But other
representations—for example, assurances by one negotiating party that he will in due
course go ahead with the contract—do not of themselves give rise to liability unless
they take the form of a contractual promise.38 English law has not adopted the
approach of the High Court of Australia, which has extended the doctrine of
promissory estoppel to impose liability in damages on the party seeking to withdraw
from negotiations. In Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher39 there was not yet a
concluded contract to grant the lease of property but the prospective tenant, who had
sought to withdraw, had encouraged the landowner to continue to build the property
when he had already decided not to take the lease. The Court held that the tenant was
estopped from denying that he was bound to complete the lease, because it would be
unconscionable for him to retreat from his implied promise to complete the contract:
the remedy, however, was not enforcement of the contract, but damages in lieu of
32
Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337.
33
Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon [1976] QB 801.
34
The damages can, however, cover consequential losses which consist in the claimant’s lost
opportunity to make profits from the capital which has been tied up as a result of the tort: East v
Maurer [1991] 1 WLR 461.
35
Peek v Gurney (1873) LR 6 HL 377 at 391, 403.
36
There can be duties between negotiating parties where there is a particular relationship
between them by reference to which the duties are imposed: for example, a solicitor negotiating
with his own client for a contract which benefits the solicitor personally, because of the
fiduciary duty between solicitor and client: cf Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1914] AC 932; J.
Cartwright, Misrepresentation (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2002), ch 11, esp. paras 11.36 to
11.40.
37
Such a general duty has been rejected explicitly by the Canadian and New Zealand courts:
Martel Building Ltd v Canada (2000) 193 DLR (4th) 1; Onyx Group Ltd v Auckland City
Council (2003) 11 TCLR 40.
38
If, however, the party at the time does not intend to go ahead, then he is misrepresenting his
intention and is liable in the tort of deceit: Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459.
39
(1988) 164 CLR 387.

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specific performance. This analysis is not yet possible in England below the level of
the House of Lords.40
Nor does English law recognise a principle that an offer once made during the
negotiations cannot be withdrawn without giving a reasonable opportunity for the
offeree to consider it; nor even that an express promise to keep open an offer for a
fixed period will be enforced (either through an award of ‘expectation’ or ‘reliance’
measure damages or an order to complete the contract) unless it is itself in the form of
a contractually binding promise, such as an option contract. No tort is committed by
withdrawing an offer, even at a late stage; and a party cannot be estopped from
withdrawing it.
If the precontractual duty takes the form of a contractual obligation, however,
English law will recognise and enforce it.41 So, for example, the parties may expressly
enter into a contract to cover the allocation of risk of expenses incurred before the
main contract is concluded; or an option contract which binds one party to enter into
the main contract if the other so decides. But sometimes the courts will find an
implied contractual promise during the negotiations which is designed to protect one
party’s expectations. This has occurred in the case of invitations to tender. As a
general rule an invitation to tender is not a contractual offer: it is the tenderer (bidder)
who makes an offer which the person inviting tenders is free to consider and to decide
which (if any) bid to accept.42 However, in Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club Ltd v
Blackpool Borough Council43 it was held that, where tenders had been solicited from
selected parties, all of them known to the invitor, and where the invitation to tender
prescribed a clear, orderly and familiar procedure, the invitation to tender was an offer
to the extent that it promised to each tenderer that if he submitted a conforming tender
it would be considered, or at least would be considered if other tenders are.
Solutions can also sometimes be found for the precontractual phase in the law
of restitution (unjust enrichment). In principle, the focus here is not the protection of
one party’s expectations, or his reliance on them. However, some cases which are
usually classified within restitution are in substance doing exactly that. For example,
one party who incurs expenditure in advance of the contract being concluded, but
without there being any (pre-)contract providing for reimbursement by the other party,
might sometimes have a claim in restitution for the expenditure where the other party
has requested the other party to incur it. The fact of the defendant’s request is treated
within the law of restitution as showing that it provided a benefit to him which
justifies the imposition of a duty to repay the benefit. For example, in William Lacey
(Hounslow) Ltd v Davis44 Barry J held that a builder could recover for work done after

40
Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215; Baird Textiles Holdings Ltd v Marks and Spencer plc
[2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 737; above, text to note 22.
41
It must, however, fulfil the normal requirements of a contract: including consideration (if not
executed as a deed); and being sufficiently certain as to its terms. Lord Ackner’s objection in
Walford v Miles, above, to a contract to negotiate in good faith was put on two grounds: in
addition to contradicting the inherently adversarial relationship of negotiating parties, it is also
not sufficiently certain for a court to know whether a proper reason exists for breaking off
negotiations.
42
Spencer v Harding (1870) LR 5 CP 561.
43
[1990] 1 WLR 1195. This is quite a narrow decision; the judges emphasised the small class of
intended bidders, selected by the invitor, as a significant feature in implying the offer to consider
the bids. And the remedy is only useful if the bid would have satisfied the conditions for
acceptance if it had been properly considered; otherwise there is no loss consequent upon the
breach of the (implied) contract to consider the tender.
44
[1957] 2 All ER 712. See also British Steel Corp v Cleveland Bridge and Engineering Co Ltd
[1984] 1 All ER 504.

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he had been told that his tender was the lowest and that he could expect to receive the
contract. But the claim was not in contract but implied or quasi-contract (or, in
modern terms, restitution).
In short, therefore, although English law does not recognise a general
underlying principle of precontractual liability, nor a general rule that one party must
fulfil or otherwise compensate the expectations created in the other party during
negotiations which do not come to fruition in a completed contract, there are a range
of circumstances in which the courts have given some legal effect to such
expectations through the law of contract, tort and restitution.

(b) Forming the contract: finding the agreement

There are two respects in which the rules of English law for the formation of the
contract are designed to give effect to a principle of protecting the parties’
expectations. In effect, they are rules of interpretation of the communications between
the negotiating parties, when one is asking whether a contract was formed, and (if so)
on what terms. The first is the use of an objective test in order to identify the
agreement between the parties sufficient to form a contract; the second (perhaps less
obvious) is in the application of the rules of offer and acceptance in order to establish
the agreement.

(i) The objective test of agreement

English law is generally said to determine whether the parties have agreed by the use
of an objective test, rather than a subjective test. Of course, where the parties are in
subjective agreement about the terms of the contract, the court will normally easily
find a contract on those agreed terms.45 But where the parties are not in subjective
agreement, the courts can still in certain circumstances find a contract, thereby
overriding the mistake of one of the parties. This objective approach to contract
formation has even been identified as based on the desire to protect the reasonable
expectations of the party whose interpretation and understanding is held to have been
correct:46

‘English law generally adopts an objective theory of contract formation. That

means that in practice our law generally ignores the subjective expectations
and the unexpressed mental reservations of the parties. Instead the governing
criterion is the reasonable expectations of honest men.’
It has also been said to rest on the same principles as estoppel:47

‘if one of the parties intends to make a contract on one set of terms, and the
other intends to make a contract on another set of terms, or, as it is sometimes
expressed, if the parties are not ad idem, there is no contract, unless the
circumstances are such as to preclude one of the parties from denying that he
has agreed to the terms of the other. The rule of law is that stated in Freeman v

45
Some writers have proposed a wholly objective test which could override even the shared
subjective intentions of both parties, but this has not generally been followed: compare
W. Howarth (1984) 100 LQR 265 and J. P. Vorster (1987) 103 LQR 274.
46
G Percy Trentham Ltd v Archital Luxfer Ltd [1993] 1 Lloyd=s Rep 25 at 27 (Steyn LJ).
47
Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597 at 607.

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Cooke.48 If, whatever a man's real intention may be, he so conducts himself
that a reasonable man would believe that he was assenting to the terms
proposed by the other party, and that other party upon that belief enters into
the contract with him, the man thus conducting himself would be equally
bound as if he had intended to agree to the other party's terms.’

Whether, however, this is really an illustration of estoppel is doubtful: the courts do

not require detrimental reliance, beyond his entering into the contract, for one party to
be able to hold the other to his (reasonable) interpretation of it. It may be better
viewed as simply a rule of interpretation of language, but a rule which is based on an
underlying principle similar to that in estoppel: one party is bound in law to the
consequences of that which he has led the other party reasonably to believe.49

(ii) Protecting expectations through the rules of offer and acceptance

Some of the rules applied by the English courts to determine whether there is an offer
and an acceptance appear to be based on such things as commercial convenience and
standard business practice.50 But others appear to have the purpose or effect of
protecting the reasonable expectations of one of the negotiating parties.
For example, an offer is withdrawn only if the withdrawal is actually
communicated to the offeree51 or at least if the offeree knows from a third-party
source that the offeror no longer wishes to contract.52 In effect, this allows a party who
holds an offer to accept it as long as he does so without actual knowledge that it is not
still intended to be open—the rule protects the offeree’s reliance on the offer. And at
least in the case of some non-instantaneous forms of communication, an acceptance
may be effective to conclude the contract at the moment that it is sent, rather than only
when it reaches the offeror (often referred to the ‘postal rule’). This ‘rule’ applies only
where it is reasonable to use the postal service to send the acceptance. 53 In substance,
this has the effect of protecting the offeree who reasonably believes himself to be still
entitled to accept by post—and then to act (for example, in further dealings with third
parties) on the basis that he has a concluded contact without waiting for further
communication from the offeror. And, in the case of other forms of communication,
when determining the time at which it takes effect the courts will sometimes ask at
what time the party seeking to rely on the fact that the communication has been made
could reasonably have expected it would be received. For example, the time at which
a telex or fax sent to a business address will take effect will depend on when the
sender could reasonably have expected it to be read—so if it is outside business hours,
it would normally take effect only at the opening of business the next day, but if it

48
(1848) 2 Ex 654 (a case dealing with estoppel by representation). For a more recent explicit
use of estoppel to analyse and apply the test of formation of the contract, see The Hannah
Blumenthal [1983] 1 AC 854 at 914 (Lord Brandon).
49
J. Cartwright, Unequal Bargaining (Oxford, 1991), pp 13-15.
50
E.g. public offers: Partridge v Crittenden [1968] 1 WLR 1204; supermarket sales:
Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots [1953] 1 QB 401.
51
Byrne v Van Tienhoven (1880) 5 CPD 344.
52
Dickinson v Dodds (1876) 2 Ch D 463.
53
Holwell Securities v Hughes [1974] 1 WLR 155. There are also other explanations of the
postal rule: see, e.g., S. Gardner, ‘Trashing with Trollope: A Deconstruction of the Postal Rules
in Contract’ (1992) 12 OJLS 170.

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arrived within business hours it would take effect even if the receiving party failed to
read it.54

(c) Forming the contract: the force of the promise; consideration and promissory
estoppel

English law does not see a contract as simply an agreement: a party is not bound by
virtue of the force of his will alone, or his declaration of will. In the case of an
informal contract,55 a party is bound to his promise; but only where the other party has
provided consideration for the promise. This means that the promisee must have done
something, or promised something, in return for the promise at the promisor’s express
or implied request. A contract is therefore a bargain; the promise is enforceable
because the promisee has earned the right to enforce it by (as it were) paying the price
for its enforcement by providing something in return. The details of the doctrine of
consideration need not concern us here,56 beyond noting that it gives a particular
framework to the English law of contract, and provides a justification for the
enforcement of contracts which relates to the theme of this paper. If the English
lawyer is asked what creates legitimate expectations and what justifies the law’s
intervention to fulfil them, he will think first of the role of promises within the law of
contract, and the doctrine of consideration. Expectations are created by the promise.
As we have seen in the previous paragraphs, they are ‘legitimate’ in one sense57 by
being the expectations that the promisee on reasonable grounds has in fact been led to
believe he can rely upon. But they are also made ‘legitimate’ in a narrower and more
technical sense58 by the fact that he has provided consideration. By doing that which
the promisor asked, he deserves the protection of the law to enable his expectations to
be fulfilled. A promise without consideration can be withdrawn: the making of a
promise does not itself in law restrict the freedom of the promisor to withdraw it, even
if it might (in fact) have created the expectation in the promisee that the promise will
be kept. Morality of promise-keeping is different from the legal enforcement of
promises. For the law to become involved in making a party keep his promises, and to
provide legal sanctions if he does not fulfil the expectations he created—that is, for
the expectations to be ‘legitimate’ in the technical sense of the word—more is
required. And that is what is provided by the doctrine of consideration.

54
Cf The Brimnes [1975] QB 929, not a case on formation but one which is often cited as
demonstrating the general principle.
55
A party can give legal effect to his will alone, without the requirement of consideration being
provided in return, by putting his promise in the form of a deed: sections 1(b)(ii), above; 2(d),
below. But this is not then within the scope of the general law of contract as discussed in this
paper.
56
For a detailed account, see Chitty on Contracts, above, note 7, ch 3.
57
Oxford English Dictionary, ‘legitimate’, a., 2.e.: ‘valid or acceptable; justifiable, reasonable’.
58
Oxford English Dictionary, ‘legitimate’, a., 2.d.: ‘conformable to law or rule; sanctioned or
authorized by law or right; lawful; proper’.

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It should be noted that the ‘bargain’ need not have equivalence in the value of
exchange: as long as the promisee has done something at the promisor’s request, and
as long as it is not wholly illusory, the courts will not inquire into what value it had to
the promisor.59 This reinforces the argument here: we are looking for a justification for
the promisee’s legal right to the protection of his expectations. It is based simply in
the fact that he has done what the promisor asked of him. We shall see later that the
remedy that follows in English law from non-performance of a contractually binding
promise is generally designed to fulfil the expectations. It is important to realise that
the consideration is the justification for the legal enforcement of the expectations
created by the promise: it is not the measure of enforcement. It is often said that
consideration involves the promisee doing something which is to his detriment, or to
the promisor’s benefit (or, in most cases, it is both detriment and benefit).60 But
identifying the value of the detriment to the promisor does not identify the value of his
rights to enforcement: his rights are to the expectations. And the consideration can be
a promise of something in return, as well as the doing of an act in return. A contract
can be formed by the exchange of promises, each party’s promise being the
consideration for the other’s. In the case of such an executory contract, it is not
necessary (as in the context of estoppel) to go further and find that the party enforcing
the promise has suffered some detriment, or acted in some way to change his position
in reliance on the promise, beyond the giving of his promise in return.61
It has already been noted62 that English law has not developed a general doctrine
of promissory estoppel by which a promise, not supported by consideration, can be
enforced by virtue of the promisee’s reliance on it. Promissory estoppel is used within
contract to allow for the variation of existing contractual rights, but not for the
creation of new rights to the enforcement of the promise, nor to the compensation of
the detriment incurred on the basis that the promise would be kept.

(d) Formalities for contracts

A contract is not normally required to be in writing, or to be evidenced in writing, in

order to be valid or to be enforceable. However, by statute a contract for the sale or
other disposition of an interest in land must be in writing;63 and a guarantee cannot be
enforced without a memorandum signed by the guarantor or his authorised agent.64 In
addition, if the parties put their contract in the form of a deed,65 the deed must comply
with certain formality requirements in order to be valid.66 In recent years the courts
have considered whether each of these formality requirements is absolute—and, in
particular, whether a party can be estopped from relying on the statutory requirements.

59
Chappell & Co v Nestlé Co Ltd [1960] AC 87.
60
Currie v Misa (1875) LR 10 Ex 153 at 162.
61
Centrovincial Estates plc v Merchant Investors Assurance Company Ltd [1983] Com LR 158.
62
Above, section 1(b).
63
Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, s 2. The form is a condition of the
formation of the contract.
64
Statute of Frauds 1677, s 4. The form is a condition of enforceability, not of formation.
65
Section 1(b)(ii), and note 55, above.
66
A deed executed by an individual must comply with Law of Property (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1989, s. 1.

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In relation to contracts for the sale of land, the Court of Appeal in Yaxley v
67
Gotts held that a person who was promised an interest in a building if he undertook
work on the building could be granted the interest (or, at least, an interest which
protected his expectation) under the doctrine of proprietary estoppel,68 in spite of the
fact that the promise was not contained in a contract which complied with the
statutory formality. Beldam LJ said:

‘The general principle that a party cannot rely on an estoppel in the face of a
statute depends upon the nature of the enactment, the purpose of the provision
and the social policy behind it. This was not a provision aimed at prohibiting
or outlawing agreements of a specific kind, though it had the effect of making
agreements which did not comply with the required formalities void. This by
itself is insufficient to raise such a significant public interest that an estoppel
would be excluded.’

In this case, the court was able to hold that the statute by its own language, as well as
by its context as evidenced by the background to its enactment, indicated that to give
effect to an informal agreement through the doctrine of proprietary estoppel would not
necessarily undermine the policy requiring written contracts for the sale of land.69 In a
later case,70 the Court of Appeal applied dicta in Yaxley v Gotts to hold that the
statutory requirements for the formality required of a deed were also not absolute, in
the sense that a party who had not in fact executed a document as a deed in
compliance with the section could be estopped from denying it. The document in the
case was expressed to be a deed, and was signed and delivered by the defendants. But
the defect of formality came in its witnessing: it was attested, but by someone who
signed as witness after the defendants had signed but not (as required by the Act) in
their presence. The Court of Appeal held that the delivery of the document constituted
an unambiguous representation of fact that it was a deed, and the claimant had acted
in reliance on that fact (and on the deed having validly created the obligations it
purported to contain). Following Yaxley, they considered the policy behind the Act,
and the Law Commission Report which had proposed it, and concluded that estoppel
could be permitted to avoid some, but not all, of the formality requirements. Pill LJ
said:71

‘there was no statutory intention to exclude the operation of an estoppel in all

circumstances or in circumstances such as the present. The perceived need for
formality in the case of a deed requires a signature and a document cannot be a
deed in the absence of a signature. I can detect no social policy which requires
the person attesting the signature to be present when the document is signed.’

67
[2000] Ch 162.
68
Above, section 1(b)(iv).
69
The Court relied on s 2(5), which provides that the section does not affect ‘the creation or
operation of … constructive trusts’; and the Law Commission’s report which proposed the
provision, Law Com No 164 Formalities for Contracts for Sale etc of Land (1987), which at
pp 8-20 discussed estoppel as a means of giving effect to an agreement which would not comply
with the formality.
70
Shah v Shah [2002] QB 35.
71
At [30].

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Most recently the House of Lords72 has considered whether estoppel can be used to
avoid the requirement that a contract of guarantee be evidenced in writing. The House
held that there was no estoppel on the facts, but a majority of their Lordships appears
to have assumed that there could in an appropriate case be such an estoppel.73
These cases show that where a party seeks to enforce a contract which does
not comply with a statutory requirement of form for its validity or for its enforcement,
the courts consider the policy behind the statute to see whether it should be applied
strictly, or whether the fact that one party has been led by the other party to believe
that the contract is in fact valid, and has relied on that belief, should give him a right
as against the other party to enforce the contract. The doctrine of estoppel is used to
prevent the party who created the belief that the contract was valid from taking
advantage of the statutory rule.

(e) ‘Defects of consent’

English law has not developed an overarching theory of defects of consent. Legal
systems which focus on the will of the party, or his consent, as a justification for the
enforcement of the contract, naturally focus their attention on the validity of the
consent and generally group together matters such as mistake, fraud and duress as
vitiating the consent and therefore the contract. This does not mean that English law
does not recognise that such factors can vitiate the contract. But the approach of
English law is different; and it again fits with the particular approach taken to the
finding the binding agreement in the contract.
English law does not give a large role to mistake. We have already seen that a
mistake of one party about the terms of the contract itself can be overridden by the
fact that the other party reasonably believed that the mistaken party was agreeing to
his terms. Rather than focusing on the mistake of the party as a reason for his escaping
the contract, English law tends to view the matter more (or, at least, as much) from the
point of view of the other party who would lose the contract if the mistake were
allowed to be operative. And this sets the general approach to the English law view of
the vitiating factors. In all of this, one is piecing together a theory of the vitiating
factors, and their underlying principles and unifying characteristics, which the courts
do not usually discuss: mistake, misrepresentation, duress and undue influence are
generally treated separately, according to their own separate rules.74 But one can see
that the reluctance of English law to allow a subjective mistake to render the contract
void is balanced by the fact that, if the mistake was caused by the other party—that is,
by a misrepresentation, even made innocently, which induces the mistake—then the
reluctance disappears. The fact that one party has caused the other’s defect of consent
makes all the difference. For then it is right that he should not be entitled to insist on
the performance of the contract, but should risk the other party’s exercising his right
to the contract being set aside. Similarly, duress involves a form of misconduct (the
application of illegitimate pressure) by one party against the other—and this justifies
72
Actionstrength Ltd v International Glass Engineering IN.GL.EN SpA [2003] 2 AC 541.
73
This was explicitly left undecided by Lord Hoffmann and Lord Clyde.
74
Apart from duress and undue influence, which are seen as related, they are not placed in the
same chapters (or, sometimes, even in adjacent chapters) of the English contract textbooks. For
a detailed discussion of the links and underlying principles, see J. Cartwright, Unequal
Bargaining (Oxford, 1991); and for a comparative discussion of English and French law, see
J. Cartwright, ‘Defects of Consent and Security of Contract: French and English Law
Compared’ in P. Birks & A. Pretto (eds), Themes in Comparative Law in Honour of Bernard
Rudden (Oxford, 2002), p 153.

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the latter having the right to avoid the contract.75 English law does not allow
misrepresentation, duress or undue influence applied to one contracting party by a
third party to affect the validity of the contract unless the other contracting party was
in some way responsible for it, or knew of it (or, sometimes, at least ought to have
known of it) when he took advantage of it by agreeing to the contract.76
Insanity and intoxication are treated similarly in English law. Although one can
say that a person’s capacity to contract is affected by a mental disability, or the fact
that he was so under the influence of drink or drugs that he could not give consent,
these are not treated as absolute bars to the validity of the contract. Only if the other
party knew of the insanity or the intoxication can the contract be set aside against
him.77 Here again the law takes a position which protects the party who did not know
that there was a lack of full and free consent by the other party: in effect, it is
protecting his legitimate (reasonable) understanding and expectations.

(f) Agency

One area where the doctrine of estoppel can be seen to operate is that of agency.
If a person holds himself out to a third party78 as acting as another’s agent, but
in fact has no authority to do so, he may impliedly warrant to the third party that he
has the necessary authority—thus rendering him directly and personally liable to the
third party for breach of contract by virtue of the fact that he has no such authority.79
The ‘principal’ in such a case is able to ratify the unauthorised act of the ‘agent’ and
thereby perfect the agency (and the contractual rights and duties that then follow as
between the principal and the third party); but if he does not do so, and if the ‘agent’
had no apparent authority (see below), the third party has a claim in contract against
the ‘agent’ for the losses that flow from his misrepresentation of authority, and from
the contract itself by reason of the fact that does not in law bind the ‘principal’.
However, it is also possible for a principal to be himself liable to the third
party with whom an agent dealt without authority, where the principal made an
express or implied representation to the third party that the agent did have the
necessary authority; and the third party relied on it. The agent has ‘apparent’, or
‘ostensible’ authority, rather than actual authority. The principal cannot deny that the
agent had sufficient authority and therefore in effect becomes bound by a contract
which he did not authorise. This is commonly put in the language of estoppel:80

75
Undue influence also involves a form of wrongdoing: Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No
2) [2002] 2 AC 773 at [13], although this is not uncontroversial: P. Birks and N. Y. Chin, in
J. Beatson and D. Friedmann (eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (Clarendon, Oxford,
1995), p 57.
76
Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2), above, note 75, esp at [40].
77
Imperial Loan Co Ltd v Stone [1892] 1 QB 599; Hart v O’Connor [1985] AC 1000. Some
forms of disability and incapacity are however treated more strictly, such as the capacity of a
minor to enter into a contract: Chitty on Contracts, above, note 7, ch 8. Here the policy of
protection of the party deemed not to have full legal capacity overrides the policy of protection
of the other (innocent) contracting party.
78
This is not a ‘third party’ in the sense used in the doctrine of privity, or under the Contracts
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, below; but a third party in the sense of being neither the
principal nor agent under the contract of agency. In discussing the law of agency, it usual to talk
of the persons with whom the agent deals (whether with or without the authority of the principal
to do so) as third parties. See generally Chitty on Contracts, above, note 7, ch 31.
79
Collen v Wright (1857) 8 E & B 647. He may also be liable the tort of deceit if he did not
honestly believe that he had the authority that he represented.
80
Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA [1986] AC 717 at 777 (Lord Keith of Kinkel).

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‘Ostensible authority comes about where the principal, by words or conduct,

has represented that the agent has the requisite actual authority, and the party
dealing with the agent has entered into a contract with him in reliance on that
representation. The principal in these circumstances is estopped from denying
that actual authority existed.’

The effect of this estoppel is to protect the third party’s expectations: he can enforce
the contract fully against the principal by virtue of his reliance on his representation of
the agent’s authority. The same principles apply to those dealing with a partner.81

(g) Third party rights

Before the enactment of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 there was no
general principle under which a third party to a contract could enforce a term in a
contract that sought to confer a benefit on him, even where the term was intended by
the contracting parties to be enforceable by him.82 The 1999 Act, however, has
introduced a general exception to this rule of privity of contract, and so a third party
who is expressly identified in the contract (by name, class or description) may now
have a direct right against the promisor to enforce a promise which was expressly or
impliedly intended by the contracting parties to be enforced by him.
For our present purposes, however, the important provision is section 2 of the
Act, which deals with the question whether the contracting parties can vary or rescind
the contract so as to change or remove the third party’s benefit or his right to enforce
it. When they create the right for the third party in the contract, the parties may also
reserve expressly the right to vary or rescind it. But, if they do not, then they may not
do so without the third party’s consent if:83

‘(a) the third party has communicated his assent to the term to the
promisor,
(b) the promisor is aware that the third party has relied on the term, or
(c) the promisor can reasonably be expected to have foreseen that the third
party would rely on the term and the third party has in fact relied on it.’

The second and third conditions here are using the third party’s reliance on the term
(and the fact that the reliance is either known to the promisor, or was reasonably
foreseeable by him) as a reason to make the third party’s right secure. And, of course,
he can rely on the term only if he is aware of it. So this is an example of English law
using the reliance by a person on his expectation of receiving a benefit from a contract
as the reason that his expectation is protected. It is similar to the underlying principles
81
Partnership Act 1890, s 5: ‘Every partner is an agent of the firm and his other partners for the
purpose of the business of the partnership; and the acts of every partner who does any act for
carrying on in the usual way business of the kind carried on by the firm of which he is a member
bind the firm and his partners, unless the partner so acting has in fact no authority to act for the
firm in the particular matter, and the person with whom he is dealing either knows that he has no
authority, or does not know or believe him to be a partner’. A person who holds himself out as a
partner is liable to anyone who gives credit to the partnership on the faith of that representation:
s. 14. The doctrine of ‘holding out’ is a branch of the doctrine of estoppel: Re Fraser [1892] 2
QB 633 at 637.
82
Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) 1 B & S 393. Solutions were found to deal with certain problems
which followed from this rule, but these were piecemeal: see generally Chitty on Contracts,
above, note 7, ch 18.
83
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, s 2(1).

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of estoppel, as discussed earlier in this paper, although it applies only in the particular
context covered by the Act. In using the third party’s reliance as a ground to protect
the expectations created by a promise for which he himself provided no consideration,
the Act has made no change to the basic rule which requires consideration to make a
promise itself binding.84

(h) Interpreting the contract

We have already seen that, where there is disagreement between the parties about
whether they reached agreement, and what the terms of the contract are, the question
is generally solved by an application of an objective test viewed from the position of
each of the parties—and so a party is entitled to hold the other to have agreed to the
terms of the contract as he understood them if the other party so conducted himself
that he could reasonably have done so, and in fact did so. That approach is generally
applicable in a case where the contract is formed by communications (written or oral)
between the parties, where it is necessary to interpret those several communications.
Where, however, the contract is concluded in writing, a different approach is
appropriate: once the parties have committed themselves to the written document,
then it is the document that is the embodiment of their agreement and is therefore
subject to interpretation. The courts have traditionally favoured an approach to
interpretation of written contracts and other legal documents which relies on the
objective, ordinary meaning of the words used in the document.85 There has been a
reluctance to admit evidence outside the written document itself in order to interpret
the document, although extrinsic evidence may be admitted in cases of ambiguity, or
where a word is used in a technical sense, or where the ordinary, literal meaning
would give rise to an absurd result,86 although for the last thirty five years87 it has been
clear that a contract must not be interpreted in isolation from the ‘matrix of facts’ in
which it was set. However, in a series of recent cases the House of Lords has become
even more open to the contextual interpretation of contracts and other documents. In
part, this appears to be a desire to ensure that the words used can be given a meaning
which would be the objectively sensible interpretation to parties placed as the
particular parties were—more objective, perhaps, than the rules of interpretation of
offers and acceptances discussed above, yet focussing quite closely on an approach
that should give effect to understanding of the document held by the reasonable party
in the circumstances. In one of these recent cases Lord Hoffmann said:88

‘Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would

convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which
would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which
they were at the time of the contract…. The background was famously referred
to by Lord Wilberforce as the “matrix of fact,” but this phrase is, if anything, an
understated description of what the background may include. Subject to the
requirement that it should have been reasonably available to the parties … it
84
In a case covered by the 1999 Act, there will be consideration for the promise which is being
enforced by the third party, but it is provided by the promisee.
85
K. Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts (3rd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2004),
para 5.01.
86
G. H. Treitel, Law of Contract (11th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2003), pp 192ff.
87
Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381 at 1384.
88
Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 at
912-913.

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includes absolutely anything which would have affected the way in which the
language of the document would have been understood by a reasonable man.’

Again, therefore, the approach of English law is not to seek to find the subjective,
common intentions of the parties, but that which their outward expression conveyed to
a reasonable person, with the parties’ own understandings of the context—and this
will have the effect of protecting a party whose understanding is reasonable, against
one who finds himself bound by his signature to a document which he had not
understood or had not himself interpreted reasonably.89
English law also has another remedy—rectification—to deal with the case
where a written contract does not give effect to the parties’ agreement. Sometimes a
contract can be rectified (that is, ordered by the court to be re-worded into the terms
which remove the mistake) where its written form does not fulfil the parties’ shared
agreement. And it can even be rectified in a case where the parties were not in
agreement about the terms, and the written document reflects the terms intended by
one of the parties, where it is ‘unconscionable’ for him to insist on the contract as
written. This ‘unconscionability’ arises where the party knew that the other was
mistaken; or diverted his attention and intended him to make the mistake, and
suspected that he was mistaken.90 When this is read alongside the general approach to
the interpretation of written contracts, we might say that the written contract is
binding in its interpretation as it would reasonably have appeared to a someone in the
party’s position—thus protecting the reasonable understandings of parties to a
contract; but if a party has obtained that document, in his own favour, on the basis of
his ‘unconscionable’ conduct, then he loses the right to that protection, and the
protection is instead given to the other party who was himself reasonable and was
taken advantage of. This analysis fits well with much of the general approach to the
formation of a contract, and dealings between parties leading up to the time of
formation, discussed above.

(i) Remedies for breach of contract

It is in the remedies for breach of contract that one finds the clearest overt policy in
favour of the protection of expectations in English contract law. But this is what might
be expected in most legal systems’ rules of contract law, and the nuances of English
law have to be borne in mind. Although the remedies for breach show that English
law favours the protection of the expectation, it normally interprets the expectation in
economic terms, rather than in terms of literal performance. And the full economic
expectation is sometimes not protected by the remedies because it is tempered by
principles which allow the party in breach to be heard to say that the claimant does
not fully deserve it.

89
A party’s signature to a contract is also given particular significance in the context of unfair
contract terms. When a document containing contractual terms is signed, the party signing it is
bound not only to the contract itself, but to all of the terms, even those that were unusual and
unexpected, and whether he has read the terms or not—unless the signature was obtained by the
other party’s fraud or misrepresentation: L’Estrange v F. Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394; Curtis
v Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing Co [1951] 1 KB 805. This also appears to be based on the idea
that one party is entitled to assume that the other party’s signature shows assent—except where
he has himself been responsible for improperly obtaining the signature. Of course, such terms, if
they form part of the contract, are then subject to the usual statutory controls on unfair terms.
90
Commission for the New Towns v Cooper (GB) Ltd [1995] Ch 259 at 280.

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(i) Specific performance is not the primary remedy

English law does not regard a court order for performance (‘specific performance’) as
the primary remedy for actual or threatened breach of contract.91 There are historical
reasons for the preference of damages over specific performance as the primary
remedy,92 but the courts have maintained it in the modern law and appear to see this
ordering of remedies as a matter of principle. The expectation created by the contract
is not seen as the right to performance of the obligations in such clear terms as in
some other legal systems. The courts will sometimes order performance; but the
general rule is that they will not do so unless damages would not be an adequate
remedy in the circumstances.93 A party can expect to receive the economic equivalent
of performance (see below); but unless an award of damages cannot give him that, he
cannot demand actual performance from the court. Where, however, damages would
not adequately compensate his disappointed expectations, and as long as there are no
other objections to an award of specific performance (such as impossibility, or the fact
that it involves the enforcement of a personal service obligation), the court may make
an order. A common case is where there is a contract for the sale of a unique
commodity for which an award of damages does not enable the disappointed claimant
to go into the market to buy a substitute.
One area in which the court will in effect order performance, however, is
where the contract provided for a specific price to be paid. The right to the payment of
the price once it has been earned by the claimant under the terms of the contract is not
subject to the court’s discretion; nor is it subject to any of the arguments which might
enable a defendant to resist the full payment of expectation measure damages (see
below). There can be no problem of foreseeability, because the price was provided by
the terms of the contract (and therefore there is no relevant rule of remoteness, which
applies only to damages); nor is it a defence to a claim for payment of the price that
the claimant should have mitigated his loss. If the contract gives him the right to
payment of a specific sum, then in general he is entitled to that, to fulfil that
expectation.94

91
On specific performance generally, see Chitty on Contracts, above, note 7, ch 27.
92
Specific performance was a remedy developed by the Courts of Equity, before the fusion of
the Common Law and Equity jurisdictions in 1875, to deal with cases where the common law
remedy of damages was inadequate.
93
There have been some suggestions from academic writers in recent years that the courts have
become more disposed to exercising their discretion to order performance of contractual
obligations; and in particular that the traditional rule has been relaxed to a rule that specific
performance will be awarded if it would be the more appropriate remedy. However, the most
recent discussion of the remedy by the House of Lords, in Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v
Argyll Stores Ltd [1998] AC 1, does not support this.
94
An exception is where the agreed sum is characterised as a penalty: not the price, however
high (the courts will not enquire into the adequacy of consideration); nor an attempt to value in
advance the likely loss in the event of breach (a liquidated damages clause); but a clause
designed to pressurize the defendant not to breach the contract: Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd
v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79.

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(ii) Damages protect the claimant’s expectation, not his reliance

Sometimes a court will award as the measure of damages the expenditure incurred by
the claimant in performing the contract, rather than the value of his disappointed
expectation. But it must be understood that damages to cover the wasted expenditure
(sometimes called his ‘reliance’ loss) is not the normal measure, nor a measure to
which the claimant is entitled if he so chooses. It is only awarded in cases where the
claimant cannot prove his expectation or, at least, where if he claims the wasted
expenditure, the defendant cannot show that he is claiming more than his
expectation.95 In effect, therefore, the wasted expenditure claim is only a substitute for
the expectation, and is used to give the claimant the benefit of the doubt that the
contract would at least have broken even (i.e., he would at least have recouped his
expenditure).

(iii) The valuation of the expectation is made in economic terms

The remedy is designed to protect the claimant’s economic expectation.96 This means
that the courts generally take into account only those losses which had an economic
value. Non-economic losses are not normally included, unless the contract was one
which had as a major or important object the provision of a non-economic benefit—
such as a holiday contract, or a contract where the parties had expressly made the
provision of non-economic benefits part of the bargain.97

(iv) But the whole of the failed economic expectation may not be awarded

Although the courts seek to compensate the claimant’s failed expectation in economic
terms, they will sometimes not award it in full, because of other countervailing
policies. Under the rule of remoteness of damage, the defendant is liable only for the
claimant’s losses which are of a kind that the defendant could have had in
contemplation at the time of the contract. This reflects the idea that the economic risk
to which the defendant is subject (and therefore the scope of the claimant’s legitimate
expectation) is fixed at the time of the contract.98 However, the claimant is also
expected to mitigate his loss: to take such steps as a reasonable person would take to
seek to reduce the loss flowing from the defendant’s breach. This does not appear to
be based on any underlying idea that the claimant’s expectations were themselves
limited in this way: it is more a question of deciding what is reasonable to allow him
to recover when the breach has occurred.99 In this sense, the loss flowing from a
breach of contract is not seen as being itself fully and automatically comprised within
the expectation that was created by the contract. A sum of money that is promised,
95
CCC Films (London) Ltd v Impact Quadrant Films Ltd [1985] QB 16.
96
How the expectation should be valued in economic terms can sometimes give rise to
difficulties which need not be considered here. See, e.g., Ruxley Electronics and Construction
Ltd v Forsyth [1996] AC 344 (breach of contract in not digging out a new swimming pool to
contracted depth: was the lost expectation the difference in value between the pool as built, and
the pool as it should have been built? or the cost of curing the defect? or the loss of the
(consumer) claimant’s ‘amenity’ in not having the pool as he ordered it?).
97
Farley v Skinner [2002] 2 AC 732 (contract for surveyor to check property for noise, as well
as to undertake the usual structural survey: £10,000 awarded for the lack of peace and
tranquillity caused by aircraft noise).
98
The Heron II [1969] 1 AC 350 at 385-386.
99
British Westinghouse Electrical and Manufacturing Co v Underground Electric Railways Co
of London Ltd [1912] AC 673.

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must be paid. But where the question is as to how to value the failure of an obligation
of performance, the courts begin to re-assess the circumstances as they stand at the
time of breach and take the respective positions of both parties more fully into
account.

3. Conclusions

This survey has shown that, although English law does not have a private law doctrine
of ‘legitimate expectations’, and although the doctrine of estoppel is separate from the
law of contract, takes many forms, but does not in principle allow the creation of new
obligations, nevertheless the principles and ideas which underlie these doctrines can
be found within the law of contract. The law protects explicitly the expectations of the
contracting parties, and generally uses the doctrine of consideration to determine
whether the expectations are ‘legitimate’—in the sense of being recognised and
enforced by law. The remedies for breach of contract are designed to protect these
expectations (although normally in money, rather than by enforced performance).
Elsewhere in the law of contract, however, we have seen that one party to the contract,
or a third party, may be protected where he has reasonably relied on the other party’s
representation that he would have the benefit of obligations—and thus one can find
the protection of ‘legitimate’ expectations—in the sense of their being reasonable—
on a basis which is analogous to, or sometimes even explicitly based on, doctrines of
estoppel.

Cite as: John Cartwright, Protecting Legitimate Expectations and Estoppel in English Law, vol. 10.3
ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW, (December 2006),
<http://www.ejcl.org/103/article103-6.pdf>.

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