WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR THE

PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE TO APPLY?

1. There must have been a prior valid intrusion based on the warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present
in the pursuit of their official duties
2. The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are
3. The evidence must be immediately apparent
4. There was no need for further search

WHAT IS A STOP AND FRISK SITUATION?

WHEN IS IT VALID?
> It is a situation wherein there is a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons
> While probable cause is not required to conduct a stop and frisk, mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate such a procedure.
> A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person has detained the weapons concealed about him.
Sec. 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. – A motion to quash a search warrant
and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been
instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued search warrant.
However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion
shall be resolved by the latter court.

Juris Prudence – Plain View:

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

ABRAHAM MICLAT, JR. y G.R. No. 176077

CERBO, Present:
Petitioner, VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
- versus - SERENO,* JJ.

Promulgated:

August 31, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision[1] dated October 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 28846, which in turn affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 120, Caloocan City, in Criminal Case No. C-66765 convicting
petitioner of Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

In an Information[2] dated November 11, 2002, petitioner Abraham C.

Miclat, Jr. was charged for Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165, the
accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 08th day of November 2002, in Caloocan City, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without the authority of law, did then and there willfully and feloniously
have in his possession, custody and control [METHAMPHETAMINE]
HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU) weighing 0.24 gram, knowing the same to be a
dangerous drug under the provisions of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)[3]

Upon arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued.

To establish its case, the prosecution presented Police Inspector Jessie

Abadilla Dela Rosa (P/Insp Dela Rosa), Forensic Chemical Officer of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, NPD-CLO, Caloocan City
Police Station and Police Officer 3 Rodrigo Antonio (PO3 Antonio) of the
Caloocan Police Station Drug Enforcement Unit. The testimony of the police
investigator, PO3 Fernando Moran (PO3 Moran), was dispensed with after
petitioners counsel admitted the facts offered for stipulation by the prosecution.
 On the other hand, the defense presented the petitioner as its sole
witness. The testimonies of Abraham Miclat, Sr. and Ma. Concepcion Miclat, the
father and sister, respectively, of the petitioner was dispensed with after the
prosecution agreed that their testimonies were corroborative in nature.
Evidence for the Prosecution

First to testify for the prosecution was P/Insp. Jessie Abadilla Dela Rosa,
Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, NPD-CLO, Caloocan
City Police Station who, on the witness stand, affirmed his own findings in
Physical Science Report No. D-1222-02 (Exhs. D, D-1, and D-2) that per
qualitative examination conducted on the specimen submitted, the white
crystalline substance weighing 0.05 gram, 0.06 gram, 0.07 gram, and 0.06 gram
then contained inside four (4) separate pieces of small heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachets (Exhs. D-4 to D-7) gave positive result to the test for
Methylamphetamine (sic) Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

Also, thru the testimony of PO3 Rodrigo Antonio of the Caloocan Police
Station-Drug Enforcement Unit, Samson Road, Caloocan City, the prosecution
further endeavored to establish the following:

At about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of November 8, 2002, P/Insp. Jose

Valencia of the Caloocan City Police Station-SDEU called upon his subordinates
after the (sic) receiving an INFOREP Memo from Camp Crame relative to the
illicit and down-right drug-trading activities being undertaken along Palmera
Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City involving Abe Miclat, Wily alias Bokbok
and one Mic or Jojo (Exhs. E, E-1, and (sic) E-3, and E-4). Immediately, P/Insp.
Valencia formed a surveillance team headed by SPO4 Ernesto Palting and is
composed of five (5) more operatives from the Drug Enforcement Unit, namely:
PO3 Pagsolingan, PO2 Modina, PO2 De Ocampo, and herein witness PO3
Antonio. After a short briefing at their station, the team boarded a rented
passenger jeepney and proceeded to the target area to verify the said informant
and/or memorandum.

When the group of SPO4 Palting arrived at Palmera Spring

II, Caloocan City at around 3:50 oclock that same afternoon, they were [at] once
led by their informant to the house of one Alias Abe. PO3 Antonio then
positioned himself at the perimeter of the house, while the rest of the members of
the group deployed themselves nearby. Thru a small opening in the curtain-
covered window, PO3 Antonio peeped inside and there at a distance of 1 meters,
he saw Abe arranging several pieces of small plastic sachets which he believed to
be containing shabu. Slowly, said operative inched his way in by gently pushing
the door as well as the plywood covering the same. Upon gaining entrance, PO3
Antonio forthwith introduced himself as a police officer while Abe, on the other
hand, after being informed of such authority, voluntarily handed over to the
former the four (4) pieces of small plastic sachets the latter was earlier sorting
 out. PO3 Antonio immediately placed the suspect under arrest and brought him
and the four (4) pieces of plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance to
their headquarters and turned them over to PO3 Fernando Moran for proper
disposition. The suspect was identified as Abraham Miclat y Cerbo a.k.a ABE, 19
years old, single, jobless and a resident of Maginhawa Village, Palmera Spring II,
Bagumbong, Caloocan City.[4]

Evidence for the Defense

On the other hand, the [petitioner] has a different version of the incident
completely opposed to the theory of the prosecution. On the witness stand, he
alleged that at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of November 8, 2002, while he,
together with his sister and father, were at the upper level of their house watching
the television soap Cindy, they suddenly heard a commotion downstairs
prompting the three (3) of them to go down. There already inside were several
male individuals in civilian clothes who introduced themselves as raiding police
operatives from the SDEU out to effect his (Abe) arrest for alleged drug
pushing. [Petitioner] and his father tried to plead his case to these officers, but to
no avail. Instead, one of the operatives even kicked [petitioner] at the back when
he tried to resist the arrest. Immediately, [petitioner] was handcuffed and together
with his father, they were boarded inside the police vehicle. That on their way to
the Bagong Silang Police Station, PO3 Pagsolingan showed to [petitioner] a small
piece of plastic sachet containing white crystalline substances allegedly recovered
by the raiding police team from their house. At around 9:00 oclock in the evening,
[petitioner] was transferred to the Sangandaan Headquarters where he was finally
detained. That upon [petitioners] transfer and detention at the said headquarters,
his father was ordered to go home.[5]

On July 28, 2004, the RTC, after finding that the prosecution has established
all the elements of the offense charged, rendered a Decision[6]convicting petitioner
of Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, from the facts established, the Court finds the

accused ABRAHAM MICLAT Y CERBO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of possession of a dangerous drugs (sic) defined and penalized under
the provision of Section 11, sub-paragraph No. (3), Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 and hereby imposes upon him an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment, in view of the absence of
aggravating circumstances. The Court likewise orders the accused to pay the
amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php300,000.00) as fine.
 Let the 0.24 gram of shabu subject matter of this case be confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the Government and to be turned over to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)[7]

Aggrieved, petitioner sought recourse before the CA, which appeal was later
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 28846.

On October 13, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision[8] affirming in toto the

decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is

hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)[9]

In affirming the RTC, the CA ratiocinated that contrary to the contention of the
petitioner, the evidence presented by the prosecution were all admissible against
him. Moreover, it was established that he was informed of his constitutional rights
at the time of his arrest. Hence, the CA opined that the prosecution has proven
beyond reasonable doubt all of the elements necessary for the conviction of the
petitioner for the offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

Hence, the petition raising the following errors:

1. WHETHER OR NOT A POLICE SURVEILLANCE TEAM SENT TO

DETERMINE THE VERACITY OF A CAMP CRAME MEMORANDUM OF
SHABU TRADING ACTIVITY AT CALOOCAN CITY, WHICH
CONVERTED THEIR MISSION FROM SURVEILLANCE TO A RAIDING
TEAM, CAN VALIDLY MAKE AN ARREST AND SEARCH WITHOUT A
VALID WARRANT HAVING BEEN FIRST OBTAINED FROM A COURT
OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION.

2. WHETHER OR NOT PEEPING THROUGH A CURTAIN-COVERED

WINDOW IS WITHIN THE MEANING OF PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE FOR A
WARRANTLESS SEIZURE TO BE LAWFUL.

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE BELIEF OF PO3 ANTONIO THAT THE FOUR (4)
PIECES OF PLASTIC SACHETS ALLEGEDLY BEING ARRANGED BY
PETITIONER CONTAINED SHABU JUSTIFIED HIS ENTRY INTO THE
HOUSE AND ARREST PETITIONER WITHOUT ANY WARRANT.
 4. WHETHER OR NOT ARRANGING FOUR (4) PIECES OF PLASTIC
SACHETS CONSTITUTE AS A CRIME WITHIN THE MEANING OF
SECTION 5 (3), RULE 113 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

5. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS PROPERLY APPRAISED (SIC) OF

HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO BE INFORMED OF THE CAUSE AND
NATURE OF HIS ARREST AND RIGHT TO BE ASSISTED BY COUNSEL
DURING THE PERIOD OF HIS ARREST AND CONTINUED DETENTION.

6. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONVICTION BY THE LOWER COURT OF THE

PETITIONER, AS AFFIRMED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, ON THE BASIS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH AND ARREST, IS
CORRECT.[10]

Simply stated, petitioner is assailing the legality of his arrest and the
subsequent seizure of the arresting officer of the suspected sachets of dangerous
drugs from him. Petitioner insists that he was just watching television with his
father and sister when police operatives suddenly barged into their home and
arrested him for illegal possession of shabu.

Petitioner also posits that being seen in the act of arranging several plastic
sachets inside their house by one of the arresting officers who was peeping through
a window is not sufficient reason for the police authorities to enter his house
without a valid search warrant and/or warrant of arrest. Arguing that the act of
arranging several plastic sachets by and in itself is not a crime per se, petitioner
maintains that the entry of the police surveillance team into his house was illegal,
and no amount of incriminating evidence will take the place of a validly issued
search warrant. Moreover, peeping through a curtain-covered window cannot be
contemplated as within the meaning of the plain view doctrine, rendering the
warrantless arrest unlawful.

Petitioner also contends that the chain of custody of the alleged illegal drugs
was highly questionable, considering that the plastic sachets were not marked at
the place of the arrest and no acknowledgment receipt was issued for the said
evidence.

Finally, petitioner claims that the arresting officer did not inform him of his
constitutional rights at any time during or after his arrest and even during his
detention. Hence, for this infraction, the arresting officer should be punished
accordingly.
 The petition is bereft of merit.

At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the

irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active
participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed
to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in
his arrest.[11] An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if
he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him
on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or
the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived.[12]

In the present case, at the time of petitioners arraignment, there was no

objection raised as to the irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively
participated in the proceedings before the trial court. In effect, he is deemed to
have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an
accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity
of the conviction of the accused.[13]

True, the Bill of Rights under the present Constitution provides in part:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

However, a settled exception to the right guaranteed by the above-stated

provision is that of an arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does
not require a previously issued warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered
reasonable and valid under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. a peace office of a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
 (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;[14]

For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled
that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.[15]

In the instant case, contrary to petitioners contention, he was caught in

flagrante delicto and the police authorities effectively made a valid warrantless
arrest. The established facts reveal that on the date of the arrest, agents of the
Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU) of the Caloocan City Police Station were
conducting a surveillance operation in the area of Palmera Spring II to verify the
reported drug-related activities of several individuals, which included the
petitioner. During the operation, PO3 Antonio, through petitioners window, saw
petitioner arranging several plastic sachets containing what appears to be shabu in
the living room of their home. The plastic sachets and its suspicious contents were
plainly exposed to the view of PO3 Antonio, who was only about one and one-half
meters from where petitioner was seated. PO3 Antonio then inched his way in the
house by gently pushing the door. Upon gaining entrance, the operative introduced
himself as a police officer. After which, petitioner voluntarily handed over to PO3
Antonio the small plastic sachets. PO3 Antonio then placed petitioner under arrest
and, contrary to petitioners contention, PO3 Antonio informed him of his
constitutional rights.[16] PO3 Antonio then took the petitioner and the four (4)
pieces of plastic sachets to their headquarters and turned them over to PO3
Moran. Thereafter, the evidence were marked AMC 1-4, the initials of the name of
the petitioner. The heat-sealed transparent sachets containing white crystalline
substance were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for drug examination,
which later yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug under RA No. 9165.

Considering the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the

arrest of the petitioner, petitioner was clearly arrested in flagrante delicto as he was
then committing a crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of
the arresting officer.
 As to the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it too falls within the
established exceptions.

Verily, no less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and
consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it
becomes unreasonable, and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.[17] The right against warrantless searches and
seizure, however, is subject to legal and judicial exceptions, namely:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. Search of evidence in "plain view";
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.[18]

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure

is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure
was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.[19]

It is to be noted that petitioner was caught in the act of arranging the heat-
sealed plastic sachets in plain sight of PO3 Antonio and he voluntarily surrendered
them to him upon learning that he is a police officer. The seizure made by PO3
Antonio of the four plastic sachets from the petitioner was not only incidental to a
lawful arrest, but it also falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a

position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search
warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The plain view doctrine applies
when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search
of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position
from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence
in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that
the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial
intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the
area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece
of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand
and its discovery inadvertent. (Emphasis supplied.)[20]
 It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is
plainly exposed to sight. Since petitioners arrest is among the exceptions to the
rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest and the evidence seized from the
petitioner was the result of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, which
incidentally was in plain view of the arresting officer, the results of the ensuing
search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove petitioners guilt of the
offense charged.

As to petitioners contention that the police failed to comply with the proper
procedure in the transfer of custody of the seized evidence thereby casting serious
doubt on its seizure, this too deserves scant consideration.

Section 21, paragraphs 1 and 2, Article II of RA No. 9165 provides:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or

Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of

the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory andphotograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of

dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same
shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a
qualitative and quantitative examination;

x x x x.
 Corolarilly, the implementing provision of Section 21 (a), Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165, provides:

(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items.

x x x x.[21]

From the foregoing, it is clear that the failure of the law enforcers to comply
strictly with the rule is not fatal. It does not render petitioners arrest illegal nor the
evidence adduced against him inadmissible.[22] What is essential is the preservation
of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.[23]

Here, the requirements of the law were substantially complied with and the
integrity of the drugs seized from the petitioner was preserved. More importantly,
an unbroken chain of custody of the prohibited drugs taken from the petitioner was
sufficiently established. The factual antecedents of the case reveal that the
petitioner voluntarily surrendered the plastic sachets to PO3 Antonio when he was
arrested. Together with petitioner, the evidence seized from him were immediately
brought to the police station and upon arriving thereat, were turned over to PO3
Moran, the investigating officer. There the evidence was marked. The turn-over of
the subject sachets and the person of the petitioner were then entered in the official
blotter. Thereafter, the Chief of the SDEU, Police Senior Inspector Jose
Ramirez Valencia, endorsed the evidence for laboratory examination to the
National Police District PNP Crime Laboratory. The evidence was delivered by
PO3 Moran and received by Police Inspector Jessie Dela Rosa.[24] After a
qualitative examination of the contents of the four (4) plastic sachets by the latter,
the same tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[25]

An unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs had, therefore, been

established by the prosecution from the arresting officer, to the investigating
officer, and finally to the forensic chemist. There is no doubt that the items seized
from the petitioner at his residence were also the same items marked by the
investigating officer, sent to the Crime Laboratory, and later on tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.

For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the following

elements must be established: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an
object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being
in possession of the drug.[26] Based on the evidence submitted by the prosecution,
the above elements were duly established in the present case. Mere possession of a
regulated drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus
possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of
such possession the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain the absence
of knowledge or animus possidendi.[27]

It is a settled rule that in cases involving violations of the Comprehensive

Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police
officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner.[28] Although not constrained to blindly accept the findings of fact of trial
courts, appellate courts can rest assured that such facts were gathered from
witnesses who presented their statements live and in person in open court. In cases
where conflicting sets of facts are presented, the trial courts are in the best position
to recognize and distinguish spontaneous declaration from rehearsed spiel,
straightforward assertion from a stuttering claim, definite statement from tentative
disclosure, and to a certain degree, truth from untruth.[29]

In the present case, there is no compelling reason to reverse the findings of

fact of the trial court. No evidence exist that shows any apparent inconsistencies in
the narration of the prosecution witnesses of the events which transpired and led to
the arrest of petitioner. After a careful evaluation of the records, We find no error
was committed by the RTC and the CA to disregard their factual findings that
petitioner committed the crime charged against him.

Against the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, petitioner merely

denied the accusations against him and raised the defense of frame-up.The defense
of denial and frame-up has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for
it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in
prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the
defense of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing
evidence.[30]

As to the penalty, while We sustain the amount of fine, the indeterminate

sentence imposed should, however, be modified.
Section 11, Article II, RA No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, provides:

Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. The penalty of life

imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the
following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:

x x x x.

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities,

the penalties shall be graduated as follows:

x x x x.

(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to

twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand
pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than
five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine
hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin
oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or other
dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy,"
PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly-
introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any
therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond
therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of
marijuana.[31]

From the foregoing, illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is penalized with imprisonment of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from
Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P400,000.00). The evidence adduced by the prosecution established beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner had in his possession 0.24 gram of shabu, or less
than five (5) grams of the dangerous drug, without any legal authority.
 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period of the
imposable penalty shall not fall below the minimum period set by the law; the
maximum period shall not exceed the maximum period allowed under the law;
hence, the imposable penalty should be within the range of twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The
Decision dated October 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
28846 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

*
Designated additional member, per Special Order No. 1028 dated June 21, 2011.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, with Associate Justices Vicente Q. Roxas and Apolinario
D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 140-51.
[2]
Id. at 40.
[3]
Id.
[4]
Id. at 76-77.
[5]
Id. at. 78.
[6]
Id. at 75-82.
[7]
Id. at 81-82.
[8]
Supra note 1.
[9]
Id. at 151.
[10]
Id. at 209-210.
[11]
Valdez v. People, G.R. No. 170180, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 611, 622.
[12]
Rebellion v. People, G.R. No. 175700, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 343, 348.
[13]
People v. Santos, G.R. No. 176735, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 578, 601.
[14]
Emphasis supplied.
[15]
People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752, 775 (2003).
[16]
TSN, (PO3 Rodrigo Antonio), April 21, 2003, p. 5; rollo, p. 60.
[17]
1987 Constitution, Article III, Sections 2 and 3 (2).
[18]
People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 633, 641.
[19]
People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007, 516 SCRA 463, 476.
[20]
People v. Lagman, G.R. No. 168695, December 8, 2008, 573 SCRA 224, 236, citing People v. Doria, 361 Phil.
595, 633-634 (1999).
[21]
Emphasis supplied.
[22]
People v. Pagkalinawan, G.R. No. 184805, March 3, 2010, 614 SCRA 202, 218, citing People v. Naquita, G.R.
No. 180511, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 430, 448.
[23]
Id.
[24]
Rollo, p. 37.
[25]
Id. at 38.
[26]
People v. Teddy Batoon and Melchor Batoon, G.R. No. 184599, November 24, 2010.
[27]
People v. Sembrano, G.R. No. 185848, August 16, 2010, 628 SCRA 328, 343.
[28]
People v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 187070, February 24, 2010, 613 SCRA 556, 564.
[29]
People v. Willie Midenilla, et al., G.R. No. 186470, September 27, 2010.
[30]
People v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 184804, June 18, 2009, 589 SCRA 625, 642.
[31]
Emphasis supplied.