# 1 People v. Guevarra Oct 29, 2008 GR No.

182192

For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification the Decision of the
Batangas City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch IV, in finding accused-appellant Agripino Guevarra y
Mulingtapang, alias “Boy Dunggol,” guilty of murder, and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

On 30 August 2002, an Information3 was filed with the RTC charging appellant with murder. The
accusatory portion of the information reads:

On or about August 24, 2002 at around 9:15 o’clock in the evening at Ebora Road, Brgy. Kumintang
Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, while armed with a caliber .45 pistol, a deadly weapon, with intent to kill and with the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
repeatedly shot with said firearm suddenly and without warning one P/Chief Inspector Marcos Barte y
Paz while the latter was unarmed and completely defenseless, thereby hitting him on different parts of
his body which directly caused the victim’s death.
That the special aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm is attendant in the
commission of the offense.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC and the Court of Appeals were correct in imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua

HELD: No.

Article 63(1) of the Code provides that if the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, as in this
case, and there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.

Consequently, the penalty imposable on appellant is death. However, with the effectivity of Republic
Act No. 9346 entitled, “An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines,” the
imposition of the capital punishment of death has been prohibited. Pursuant to Section 2 thereof, the
penalty to be meted to appellant shall be reclusion perpetua. Said section reads:

“SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

Notwithstanding the reduction of the penalty imposed on appellant, he is not eligible for parole
following Section 3 of said law which provides:

“SECTION 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences
will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No.
4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.”

Hence, the RTC and the Court of Appeals were correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua on appellant.
# 5 People v. De GuzmanFeb. 4, 2009 GR No. 173477

On November 14, 2003 in the evening at Brgy. Guigui-lonen, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a handgun and
with the use of a motorcycle to facilitate the commission of the offense, with intent to kill, treachery and
evident premeditation, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, shoot and hit DR. FIDELITO MANAOIS several times, inflicting upon him fatal
gunshot wounds in the vital parts of the body, causing his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of
his heirs.

The RTC found the appellant Franco de Guzman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals
modified the appellant’s sentence to death.

ISSUE: Whether or not treachery and evident premeditation are present in this case

HELD: Yes, treachery is present in this case; The presence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and
without warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner of execution, affording the hapless and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.

In this case, the victim Dr. Fidelito Manaois was shot fourteen times resulting in numerous wounds in his
body. He was attacked suddenly and unexpectedly while on the way home aboard a tricycle. He was shot
several times in the back and so was the eyewitness Angelito Malanum. He was shot without warning and
with no means to put up any defense. The manner of commission of the crime was deliberately adopted
when the assailants purposely stopped their motorcycle, turned around and followed the tricycle where
the victim and Malanum rode. The assailants then attacked the victim and Malanum in a secluded area to
ensure that no one could witness the crime or come to the victim’s aid.
# 9 People v. Bohol Dec. 10, 2008 GR No.178198

The victim, Steven Alston Davis (Steven), a 31-year old British national, married appellant Evelyn Bohol
in Hong Kong sometime in March 1997, when the latter was only 17 years old. Together with their two
minor children, Steven and the appellant shared a house in Villasol Subdivision in Angeles City, Pampanga.
Steven and stayed with his family in Angeles City during weekends and spent his weekdays in an
apartment in Makati together with his business associate and long-time friend Michael Thomas Dunn
(Michael), a Canadian citizen.

On July 17, 2002, at around 2 o’ clock in the morning, Arnold Adoray, Alexander Dagami, and accused-
turned-state-witness Robin Butas with drawn handguns suddenly entered their apartment in Makati.
Arnold fired four consecutive shots upon the former, hitting the latter at the back. When the three fled,
Michael administered cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on the former’s chest but he no longer made
any response. Steven’s body was brought to the Makati Medical Center where he was pronounced dead
on arrival.

Evelyn could not be reached until around six o’clock in the morning; When Michael reached her, he
immediately informed her of the killing of her husband. When they met at ten o’clock in the morning, he
observed that appellant showed no signs of sadness or mourning despite the violent death of her
husband.

Arnold and Alexander were thus charged with murder on August 16, 2002. Robin was discharged as a
state witness, later on contended that the appellant was responsible for inducing/persuading him, Arnold,
and Alexander to perpetrate the killing of Steven. He further stated that the appellant and Arnold were
having a love affair, as he would oftentimes see them caress and kiss each other in the living room of
their house in Angeles City.

ISSUE: whether or not appellant was correctly convicted of murder.

HELD: Yes. Appellant Evelyn Bohol was found to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.

Murder is committed by any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), kills another, if the killing is committed with treachery. For treachery to be appreciated,
two conditions must be met, to wit: (1) the employment of means, methods or manner of execution that
would ensure the offender’s safety from any defense or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party;
and (2) the offender’s deliberate or conscious choice of means, method or manner of execution.

While it is true that appellant did not directly participate in shooting Steven, nevertheless, evidence
clearly shows that she was part of the conspiracy to commit the crime. There is conspiracy when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It
must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself. However, direct proof is not
required, as conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence. It may be established through the
collective acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of a felony that all the accused
aimed at the same object, one performing one part and the other performing another for the attainment
of the same objective; and that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact concerted and
cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments.
# 13 People v. Tampus June 16, 2009 GR No. 181084

The offended party, ABC, is the daughter of appellant Ida, and was 13 years old at the time of the
incident. Ida worked as a waitress in Bayanihan Beer House in Mabini, Cebu City. On February 19, 1995,
Ida and ABC started to rent a room in a house owned by Tampus, a barangay tanod.

On April 1, 1995, about 4:30 p.m., ABC testified that she was in the house with Ida and Tampus 9 who
were both drinking beer at that time. They forced her to drink beer10and after consuming three and one-
half (3 ½) glasses of beer, she became intoxicated and very sleepy.11 While ABC was lying on the floor, she
overheard Tampus requesting her mother, Ida, that he be allowed to “remedyo”12 or have sexual
intercourse with her.13 Appellant Ida agreed and instructed Tampus to leave as soon as he finished having
sexual intercourse with ABC. Ida then went to work, leaving Tampus alone with ABC. ABC fell asleep and
when she woke up, she noticed that the garter of her panties was loose and rolled down to her knees.
She suffered pain in her head, thighs, buttocks, groin and vagina, and noticed that her panties and short
pants were stained with blood which was coming from her vagina.14 When her mother arrived home from
work the following morning, she kept on crying but appellant Ida ignored her.15

On April 4, 1995 around 1:00 a.m., she was left alone in the room since her mother was at work . Tampus
went inside their room and threatened to kill her if she would report the previous sexual assault. Tampus
raped her again. When ABC told appellant Ida about the incident, the latter again ignored her.20

On May 4, 1995, after being maltreated by her mother, ABC sought the help of her aunt, Nellie
Montesclaros (Nellie). She told Nellie about the rape and that her mother sold her. 21 ABC, together with
Nellie and Norma Andales, a traffic enforcer, reported the incident of rape to the police.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC and CA was correct in ruling that Ida is liable as an accomplice in the
rape of her daughter, ABC.

HELD. Yes. It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation by the accomplice should
not be indispensable to the commission of the crime; otherwise, she would be liable as a principal by
indispensable cooperation. The evidence shows that the acts of cooperation by Ida are not indispensable
to the commission of rape by Tampus. First, because it was both Ida and Tampus who forced ABC to drink
beer, and second because Tampus already had the intention to have sexual intercourse with ABC and he
could have consummated the act even without Ida’s consent.

Accomplices are persons who, not being included in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, cooperate in
the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. The following requisites must be proved in
order that a person can be considered an accomplice:
(a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he
concurs with the latter in his purpose;
(b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and,
(c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the
person charged as accomplice.
# 17 People v. Abay Feb. 24, 2009 GR No. 177752

On March 8, 2000, appellant Roberto Abay y Trinidad was charged with rape in relation to Section
5(b), Article III of RA 7610 in the Manila RTC, with the information that sometime in December 1999,
[appellant] by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
commit sexual abuse and lascivious conduct against [AAA], a minor, 13 years of age. To which, appellant
pleaded not guilty.

During trial, the prosecution presented AAA, her mother BBB and expert witness Dr. Stella Guerrero-
Manalo of the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital. AAA testified that appellant, her
mother’s live-in partner, had been sexually abusing her since she was seven years old. BBB corroborated
AAA’s testimony. She testified that she knew about appellant’s dastardly acts. However, because he
would beat her up and accuse AAA of lying whenever she confronted him, she kept her silence. According
to Dr. Guerrero-Manalo, AAA confided to her that appellant had been sexually abusing her for six years,
confirmed by AAA’s physical examination indicating prior and recent penetration injuries.

The RTC concluded that appellant had indeed sexually abused AAA. A young girl would not have
exposed herself to humiliation and public scandal unless she was impelled by a strong desire to seek
justice. The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and imposes upon
him the death penalty. The Court of Appeals (CA), affirmed the findings of the RTC but modified the
penalty.. In view of the enactment of RA 83537 and RA 9346,8 the CA found appellant guilty only of simple
rape and reduced the penalty imposed to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in finding the appellant guilty only of simple rape.

HELD: Yes, SC affirm the decision of the CA with modifications.

Under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 761012 in relation to RA 8353,13 if the victim of sexual abuse14 is below
12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under
Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code15 and penalized with reclusion perpetua.16 On the other
hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse17under
Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code.

However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes18for the same act because his right against
double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single
criminal act.19 Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610.

Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code
(such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.

In this case, the victim was more than 12 years old when the crime was committed against her. The
Information against appellant stated that AAA was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Therefore,
appellant may be prosecuted either for violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A
(except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. While the Information may have alleged the elements
of both crimes, the prosecution’s evidence only established that appellant sexually violated the person of
AAA through force and intimidation by threatening her with a bladed instrument and forcing her to
submit to his bestial designs. Thus, rape was established.
# 21 People v. Araneta Jan. 28, 1926 GR No. L-24622

Defendant Germiniano Araneta is accused of the crime of misappropriation of public funds through
falsification of public documents. The court below found the defendant guilty as charged in the
information and sentenced him to suffer ten years of prisión mayor, with perpetual disqualification from
holding public office, and to pay a fine of 800 pesetas, with the costs. From this sentence the defendant
appealed to this court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in treating the offenses charged in the complaint as the complex
crime of misappropriation of public funds through falsification of public documents.

HELD: Yes. Misappropriation of public funds is now punished under section 2672 of the Administrative
Code, while the crime of falsification of public documents by a public employee falls under article 300 of
the Penal Code; one of the two offenses being punishable under the Penal Code and the other under an
ordinary Act of the Legislature, they must be regarded as two separate and distinct offenses. (People
vs.Reyes, R. G. No. 18394; People vs. Manipula, supra.)

The judgment appealed from is therefore reversed and the defendant is found guilty of each of the
separate crimes of misappropriation of public funds and of the falsification of public documents. For the
commission of the crime of misappropriation of public funds, the defendant is hereby sentenced to suffer
two months of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P1.50, with perpetual disqualification from public office.

For the commission of the crime of falsification of public documents, the defendant is hereby sentenced
to suffer eight years and one day of prisión mayor, with the accessory penalties prescribed by the Penal
Code, to pay a fine of 250 pesetas, with perpetual disqualification from public office, and to pay the costs.
# 27 People v. Ramos Oct. 12, 1998 GR No. 118570

Information was filed against Benedicto Ramos y Binuya alias “Bennie” charging him with the complex
crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder, to which he pleaded not guilty.

After trial, the court a quo convicted Ramos of two (2) separate crimes—kidnapping for
ransom and murder—instead of the complex crime charged in the Information. It held that there was no
proof that the victim was kidnapped for the purpose of killing her so as to make the offense a complex
crime. Thus, the killing of the victim was found to be merely an afterthought, making accused-appellant
liable for two (2) separate offenses. The RTC sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH in
each case and to indemnify the heirs of the victim.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in finding him guilty of the crimes of kidnapping for
ransom and murder.

HELD: Prior to 31 December 1993, the date of effectivity of RA No. 7659, the rule was that where the
kidnapped victim was subsequently killed by his abductor, the crime committed would either be a
complex crime of kidnapping with murder under Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code,30 or two (2) separate
crimes of kidnapping and murder.

However, RA No. 7659 amended Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code. This amendment introduced in
our criminal statutes the concept of “special complex crime” of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It
effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing of the
kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not
deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the
person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely
sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be
complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex
crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659.

Obviously, the instant case falls within the purview of the aforequoted provision of Art. 267, as amended.
Although the crime of kidnapping for ransom was already consummated with the mere demand by the
accused for ransom—even before the ransom was delivered—the deprivation of liberty of the victim
persisted and continued to persist until such time that she was killed by accused-appellant while trying to
escape. Hence, the death of the victim may be considered “a consequence of the kidnapping for ransom.”

Thus, Bennie is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of KIDNAPPING FOR
RANSOM WITH MURDER under Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 7659, and is
accordingly sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH and indemnify the heirs of victim Alicia
Abanilla in the amount of P50,000.00 plus P105,150.00 for burial expenses.
# 31 People v. Navales Feb. 14, 1934 GR No. 40390

From the evidence of record and the confession of guilt of the appellant, it appears that on August 11,
1933, he took a piece of ham valued at P3.20 in the Quinta Market of the City of Manila, without the
knowledge and consent of Ong Siong, the owner thereof; that said appellant had already been convicted
once of estafa and four times of theft; and that he finished serving his last sentence only on March 14,
1931, that is, scarcely two years and five months before the commission of the offense of which he
pleaded guilty.

According to paragraph (c). of rule 5 of said article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, the additional
penalty which should be imposed upon the appellant, taking into consideration the fact that he is a
recidivist for the sixth time and that he is furthermore a habitual delinquent, is prisión mayor in its
maximum period to reclusión temporal in its minimum period, that is, from ten years and one day
of prisión mayor to fourteen years and eight months of reclusión temporal.

the appellant contends that it is discretionary on the part of this court to impose or not the
additional penalty prescribed in article 62 of the Revised Penal Code upon a habitual delinquent.

ISSUE: Whether or not appeallants contention is correct.

HELD: No. The appellant's contention is erroneous in view of the express and unequivocal provisions
of said article 62 of the aforesaid Code. Said provisions enjoin that in all cases the habitual delinquent
should be punished not only with the penalty prescribed for the offense of which he was last found guilty
but also with the additional penalty prescribed therein, which penalty varies according to the
circumstances and the number of times said delinquent has been convicted of any of the offenses therein
enumerated. The only discretionary power granted by the law to the courts is to fix said additional
penalty within the limits specified in the foresaid article, taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances of each case. (People vs.Tanyaquin, 57 Phil., 426; and People vs. Chua Buan, p. 106, ante.)

Wherefore, taking into consideration the fact that the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, which
was present in the commission of the crime of which the appellant has pleaded guilty, is compensated by
the mitigating circumstance of a voluntary confession of guilt, the judgment appealed from should be as
it is hereby modified, sentencing said appellant to two months and one day of arresto mayor with the
corresponding accessory penalties (article 309, 6th case of the Revised Penal Code), instead of one month
and one day of said penalty, and being a habitual delinquent, to suffer the additional penalty of ten years
and one day of prisión mayor and to pay the costs.
# 35 People v. Santiago Nov. 28, 2007 GR No. 175326

On 8 April 1999, at around 10:00 in the evening, an informant approached Inspector Cortez at the latter’s
Narcotics Office in Imus, Cavite, and reported the drug trafficking activities of appellants in Binondo,
Manila. Inspector Cortez instructed the informant to contact the appellants and arrange a transaction
between him (Inspector Cortez) and the appellants for the purchase of shabu. The informant called the
appellants and told them that an interested buyer wants to procure from them 300 grams of shabu for
P300,000.00. Appellants agreed to the transaction. Thereafter, Inspector Cortez formed a team and
planned a buy-bust operation. The team agreed that Inspector Cortez would act as the poseur buyer
while the rest would act as back-up during the buy-bust operation.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision finding appellants guilty of violating Section 15, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and imposing upon them the penalty of
death. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, the accused, Edgardo Santiago, Vicente Santiago and Vladimir Amado, are hereby
convicted of the crime of Violation of Section 15, Article III in relation to Section 21 of Article IV of R.A.
6425 as amended by R.A. 7659, involving 312.2 grams of shabu with the aggravating circumstance of the
offense having been committed by an organized/syndicated crime group, and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of death by lethal injection and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 each, plus the costs. The 312.2 grams
of shabu is forfeited in favor of the government and is ordered to be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs
Board, for proper disposition”

Aggrieved, appellants elevated the instant case directly to this Court for review. However, pursuant to our
ruling in People v. Mateo, we remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for disposition. On 29 March
2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming the guilty verdict with modification to the
RTC decision penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court grievously erred in appreciating an aggravating circumstance
which was not even alleged in the information and which was not proven at all.

HELD: Yes. We agree with appellants’ contention, as affirmed by the OSG and the Court of Appeals, that
the RTC erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of organized/syndicated crime group and in
imposing the maximum penalty of death. While the existence of conspiracy among appellants in
selling shabu was duly established, there was no proof that appellants were a group organized for the
general purpose of committing crimes for gain, which is the essence of the aggravating circumstance of
organized/syndicated group under Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code.

Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7659, mandates that
the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person who belongs to
an organized/syndicated crime group.The same article defines an organized/syndicated crime group as a
group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating, or mutually helping one another for the
purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.
# 39 People v. De Jesus Oct. 31, 1936 GR No. 45198

Basilio de Jesus y Javier was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila in criminal
case No. 52270 of said court, of the theft of an umbrella and a buri hat valued at P2.65
committed, according to the information, on April 28, 1936. He was therein sentenced to
one month and one day of arresto mayor with the accessory penalties, to indemnify
Francisco Liwanag in the sum of P2.50 representing the value of the umbrella which was
not recovered, and being a habitual delinquent, the additional penalty of two years, four
months and one day of prisión correccional with the corresponding accessory penalties was
also imposed upon him in conformity with the provisions of subsection 5, paragraph (a), of
article 62 of the Revised Penal Code.

Not agreeing with said penalties he appealed from the sentence undoubtedly for the review
of his case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant deserves the additional penalty imposed.

HELD: Yes.

In view of the foregoing facts and considerations and furthermore taking into account the
provisions of article 62, rule 5, paragraph (a), of the Revised Penal Code, we deem it clear
that the appellant deserves the additional penalty imposed by the lower court upon him.
The penalty prescribed by said rule is prisión correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, or from two years, four months and one day to six years. What was imposed upon
the appellant is the minimum of said penalty and he has absolutely no reason to complain
because after all he can not be exempt from the additional penalty by reason of his
admission at the trial that he is a habitual delinquent, having committed the crime of theft
for the third time before the expiration of ten years from the commission of his former
crime.