UNDERSTANDING MAO AND CHINESE SOCIALISM AFRESH

UNDERSTANDING MARXISM-LENINISM A LITTLE BETTER

(This is actually a collection of two articles - one seeking to reassess Chinese socialism and
Mao’s role in it and the other is a critique of PP’si critique of RAYMOND LOTTA’sii
introduction to the THE SHANGHAI TEXT BOOK ON SOCIALIST POLITICAL
ECONOMYiii)

INTRODUCTION

It’s from the foreword to a larger piece of work ON MAO AND CHINESE SOCIALISM iv
that this piece has originated. Although this work is still not ready for final prints yet, and
perhaps for this reason, a few words about it and its background is not uncalled for or out of
context.

To begin with, let us frankly admit that the ascendance of Maoism (as a worthy extension or
development of Marxism-Leninism) in the International Communist Movement is something
we find reproachable and unacceptable. Although one may find a number of brilliant things
flush with “activism” and “communist fragrance” almost all the time and more so during the
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (henceforth GPCR), yet the Chinese socialism was
always wanting in many prerequisites of socialism – scientific socialism. Many good things
appeared but only as streaks of light – disappearing at once into the thick clouds. Although
one may find the dictatorship of the proletariat (henceforth DOP) finally discovered, class
struggle finally launched, purges undertaken to cleanse the CPCv and the state, Stalin’s
virtues rediscovered ……… yet they were never enduring, never promising. The GPCR
could not do away with the eternal burden of creative thinking that Mao was spiritually
‘endowed’ with and which led him astray – quite further and further away from the correct
understanding of Marxian Historical Materialism in its finer details and intricacies involved
in the socialist political economy. Moreover, Mao had neither time nor occasions – largely
the results of his own making – to scientifically substantiate with rigour the lessons that he
himself seems to draw on many occasion i.e. from the many “sins” committed during the first
decade of Chinese socialism after 1953 and also from “excesses”, emotional mish-mash and
many “extremes” the GPCR finally headed to, thanks to the enduring soul of Chinese creative
thinking. Above all, his many petit-bourgeois followers-turned-renegades never allowed Mao
any space or time to reinvent himself on the basis of his awakening to new realities in the
60’s and the powerful support of millions of masses, the Shanghai’s proletariat in particular
who unflinchingly responded to his slogan – the GPCR’s slogan – grasp the revolution and
promote production and development of technology. But Mao’s awakening to realities never

i
Proletarian Path, New Series, edited by Moni Guha for the name sake only, was published and authored by
Sunil Sen from Patna up till 2001.
ii
A leading Maoist intellectual and leader of the Revolutionary Communist Party (USA) and the Revolutionary
International Movement.
iii
Maoist Economics and the Revolutionary Road to Communism: The Shanghai Textbook on Socialist Political
Economy (Banner Press, USA).
iv
The basic document of ours. We’ll enrich this document further on the basis of the discussion on this piece and
then release it as the final document.
v
Communist Party of China.
led him to Marxist theoretical rigour and precision but were simply the outcome of
spontaneity and ever charismatic creativity arising out of the then prevailing situations. The
GPCR was too much burdened with creative Marxism to be steered clear of misdirection,
misadventure, chaos, secret manoeuvre and all that went along with it. What Mao’s creative
thinking promised notwithstanding, Mao proved to be creative to a fault. But then, to turn
every error to account was the historic ‘great’ trend of the day and nothing – absolutely
nothing – could be saved from this trend. Mao was sought to become an apostle of creative
Marxism – by then the fashion of the day and considered the super revolutionary road to
socialism – and sought to provide ammunition to many erstwhile Marxists-turned-apologists
of capitalism for attacking soviet model of socialism under Lenin and Stalin. Scarcely needed
to mention, such ‘Marxists’ previously used to feed on Stalin’s or Soviet’s prestige, and later
on Mao’s and finally survived and are still surviving on their symbiotic relationship with
today’s capitalism and imperialism. One such ‘Marxist’ Samir Amini now dares to replace
Marxism-Leninism with his own rubbishii in the name of creative Marxism.

Turning over the pages of Mao’s writings again and again and even trying to read in-between
the lines, one gets tired but never finds anything of such substance as may be accepted as
enrichment of the science of Marxism-Leninism. Only activism, conscious or otherwise
reigns all over. The domain of Mao’s creative thinking, as one may find if he makes a close
reading, abounds in instinctive and contemplative and even speculative Marxism marked by
an incessant appeal to “conscious activism” taking precedence over the ultimate driving force
of history i.e. the development of the productive forces, lofty ideals combined with phrase-
mongering, infinitely high-flown, only ideologically-motivated concern for selflessness,
distributive justice etc. amounting to unmarxist concerns for “man” in general i.e. ahistorical
man and leading to solicitous attempt at decentralisation by which Mao summons all the good
qualities of labouring masses to qualify and excel in at once creating technology as well as
learning political economy as against systematized scientific training and specialised
knowledge of science based on expertise historically produced up till now by capitalism.
According to Mao, any such attempt at technological development stands in contradiction
with “red”. Science is precisely turned into a heap of wishful acts but only to immediately
founder before realities. But then, firing shots against all these indiscriminately won’t work
either, let alone defending Historical Materialism.

How to evaluate such momentous things, then? Although we don’t rail against “activism” in
general of the labouring masses – their ideological awakening to achieve their historical
mission and the proletariat being “educated” about the same, their participation in scientific
endeavour and exerting extra effort to summon their inner, historically inspired will to build
socialism – inasmuch as these things don’t amount to, or, are not converted into irresponsible
acts of the proletariat in power obliged by history to facilitate the fullest development of
productive forces so as to usher in communism, yet we cannot afford to support such things
beyond a limit as happened in China under Mao’s instruction for which Mao had to resort to
unprecedented self-criticism – self humiliating, to say the least. Again, although we would
not like to pour heaps of scorn on the GPCR, rather, support the intent inasmuch as it aimed
at overthrowing the bourgeois yet again, inasmuch as it sought to rediscover Stalin’s virtues
and DOP for Chinese socialism and undertake heavy purges of bourgeois and non-proletarian
elements from the CPC while launching open class struggles and finally inasmuch as it
sought to undermine the “creative” thinking of the Chinese communists and demolish their
faith in affair de Coeur with Chinese capitalists, yet we cannot afford to glorify and accept
the theory of GPCR in such strands as practiced in China and prevalent among communist

i
Self-styled, self claimed Marxist and one of the leaders of the World Social Forum (WSF).
ii
See the other article of this piece.
revolutionaries in the name of Mao-Thought or Maoism and much less as a theoretical-
philosophical lead into the world of political economy of scientific socialism based on
Marxian Historical Materialism. In short, we neither find any substance worth its name in
Mao-Thoughti or Maoism, nor do we have any respect, let alone supporting or accepting
them, for a host of ever growing newer and newer forms/brands of ‘creative’ Marxists who
are all agog to see the ultimate doom of the long, protracted and live experience of the great
communist ‘spectre’ that Soviet socialism under Lenin and Stalin was (for the capitalist-
imperialist world). By trying to get rid of Stalin’s ghost – still the bug bear of imperialism –
the ‘creative’ Marxists are striving hard using all their intellectual stock to get rid of the
leaders of all such ‘ghosts’ – Marx and Engels. To hell with such people as post-modernist
anythingarianists under the signboard of creative Marxists!

Quite clearly then, we are loath to treat Mao at par with Marx, Engels, Lenin. But then, we
are loath to compare Mao and Stalin as well. Mao was a creative communist who would
always invent something new to rush up to communism ante mortem, would not care to treat
Marxism-Leninism as a precise science in the process, would always talk high having lofty
ideals under his sleeves and would always be up to something very special and unique. But
what was Stalin? He was a simple but “worthy” pupil of Lenin – the worthy successor of
Marx & Engels. But then he was the Lenin’s pupil par excellence in the same way as Engels
was the friend par excellence of Marx. As a communist I feel it quite disdainful to conceal
my views and hence this open admission. But however, I am unlike others who, while
concealing their ideas until opportune time, are in a habit of running amuck and demolishing
whatever comes in the way while evaluating critically a few of the most momentous decades
– the Maoist decades as one may call them – that ever presented themselves in history and
which also mark the end of the first phase and the last crop of socialism.

Having thus set my task, I had often got to strain my nerves to extremes as it required me to
take stock of and make correct appraisal of all the available (to me) critique of Mao and ‘his’
socialism, a few of which are indeed superbly spearheaded. I must take the name of PP (new
series) and its new author in this regard whom I have taken to task in this piece for his over
solicitous comments against activism or conscious activism of labouring masses seeking to
render Marxism lifeless and condemn it to radical passivism. But then, he has never criticised
Mao directly. Even up to now he has remained content with having himself engaged in
“proxy-war” against Stalin’s detractors like Raymond Lotta, Charles Bethelheim, ........., who
criticized Stalin and soviet socialism under him for nothing except their lofty ideals. PP’s
brilliance already shining through in all these notwithstanding, its author forgets the thin line
that demarcates Marxism from radical passivism while defending historical materialism
against “conscious activism”. Although his lapses are serious – quite unbecoming of a very
serious author that PP’s author himself is – yet for me, it is not as much a matter of criticizing
PP’s author as defending historical materialism with even more rigour. It is not more
important for me to deny what PP’s author has to say than to understand Marxism-Leninism a
little better. Anyway, I expect he will allow me my share of mind and won’t take amiss as I
fear he is, sometimes, in the habit of.

I appeal to all those who may disagree but are concerned not to close ranks and allow
dialogue. Locking the brains and turning the head impervious won’t work in this regard.

i
We accept the positive role of Mao–thought in China up till 1953 – the stage of New Democracy. We find no
such relevance in India for Mao-thought as here the stage of revolution is socialist revolution as we believe.
As regards it background, in short, we as an organization had been a part of CCIi almost two
years ago and had our own share of painful hard work in its formation in 2001. We broke
with CCI’s leadership mainly on the question of Mao’s evaluation. The process of break, as it
may appear and then really did appear to us as well, was superfluous, nevertheless, it was
potentially an ideological-political break, no matter how long did it take for us to come up
with a separate evaluation of Mao. True then, it does not automatically justify the break (as
on all other questions, except on practical work style, there was hardly any difference worthy
of a specific mention) unless we agree to resort to mud-slinging reproducing all the details
describing the then prevailing unhealthy atmosphere in the organization. We simply reject all
such things whatever be the provocations and refuse to open any attempt at the resumption of
tit for tat. It is also true that we have also not been successful in always keeping our mouth
shut in this regard on all occasion, particularly under a few intensely filthy and the ugliest
provocations from some quarters. However, let me also admit that we had our own
weaknesses, some of them quite serious, and in some cases quite unbecoming of a Marxist-
Leninist. But nevertheless, the CCI leadership failed and failed miserably in discharging their
duties and they, too, behaved very irresponsibly. Any way we broke away with a ‘bang’ and
organised ourselves into CCSSii on whose shoulder then lay the responsibility of preparing an
alternative document on Mao and Chinese socialism. Only in this manner was this task forced
upon us and we were ultimately face to face with this gigantic responsibility. Gigantic as this
task was and as we hardly measured up to it in the beginning, its realisation, although not yet
fully complete, has absorbed all our limited resources and mental strength. It urgently
required us to elevate our theoretical ability and self enlightenment to a new height. It
nevertheless must have many inadequacies and still demands a much closer attention and
enquiries and hence the obvious delay. Moreover, it is still to be decided whether the
document will go for publication in its full form for all and sundry. But then, as said earlier,
some urgent clarifications were needed to clear up the “things” as they stand and it was
already too late, we were ultimately obliged and duty bound to come out with this foreword
in print which, I think, is quite capable of fulfilling the above mentioned task and which very
much reflects upon the basic thought process contained in the main body. And here do I end
my extraordinarily long ‘foreword’ to the aforesaid foreword which is again lengthy given
the subject to deal with. I hope it is also as much interesting and worthy of proper attention
from all quarters – particularly the communists’.

1. UNDERSTANDING MAO AND CHINESE SOCIALISM*

No matter whether one likes it or not, none would deny that Mao – the greatest leader and
theoretician of the Chinese new democratic revolution – had got to play, as if destined, the
most decisive role in the then ensuing international situations pertaining to international
communist movement following the death of Staliniii and thereafter, following the accession
to Power of the arch-revisionist Khrushchev in 1956 in the USSR. Mao gradually rose to

i
Communist Centre of India. It was the outcome of the merger between Sarvahara Chetna Kendra and the
Bihar Provincial Committee - the breakaway faction - of the CPI (ML) (Phani Bagchi). We were the part of the
Phani Bagchi Group and broke with it on the question of stage of revolution in India. We had also rejected Mao
Thought and the line of Protracted People’s War. Now we stand for Proletarian Socialist Revolution. PP’s
author belonged to Sarvahara Chetna Kendra.
ii
Communist Centre for Scientific Socialism.
*
This is in essence the amplified version of the foreword to ON MAO AND CHINESE SOCIALISM.
iii
Stalin died in 1953.
prominence in the international communist movement. The Great Leap, Great Debate and
finally the GPCR shot him directly into the position of authority, no matter how much and
what theoretical inconsistencies did they have. Despite all the unethical somersaults allowing
theoretical-political concessions to modern revisionism of Khrushchev on many questions
such as on Stalin, on Khrushchev’s three peacefuls, renunciation of DOP and class struggle
etc.1, it was to the credit of Mao’s and the CPC’s Great Debate and later the GPCR which
could successfully polarize, gravitate and galvanize the communist revolutionaries into a
force to be reckoned with against Khrushchevite revisionism and kept the revolutionary
fervour alive. Even the slightest mention of the Great Leap, Great Debate, and later, the
GPCR was enough to make one’s revolutionary zeal rise to the zenith. Earth-shaking and
volcano like developments in China that they really always were after 1956-57, caught the
attention and imagination of the communist revolutionaries of the whole world. Bewildered
and shocked as they were by the loss of the soviet power in the land of October Revolution,
they found in the GPCR their salvation. The anxieties, worries and painful mind-boggling at
the loss of socialism in the Soviet Union found great solace in the communist wind blowing
from China. Communist fervour was rising to the sky as if a nightmare turning into heavenly
day dreams and God’s blessings. The pendulum had swung to the other side. Socialism and
its building, revolution and change, science and political economy – everything was then a
matter of gusto. No serious study, no introspection, no substantive analysis. Nothing of such
things at all. On the contrary, activism, actions, high-flown motives became the order of the
day. Mundane Stalin, who was already in the firing line of all the imperialists and the
revisionists of all hues, was now also receiving bruises from the comradely attack of the
communist revolutionaries.2 Soviet model of socialism became the main casualty. Having
found salvation in the GPCR, the communist revolutionaries accepted and succumbed to the
already widely entrenched malicious propaganda against Stalin without much ado. Mao’s
loose remarks3 coupled with imperialist propaganda machines producing tons of cheap
materials against Stalin made such an acceptance quite easy. Loose remarks against Stalin
even by a new ‘communist’ guy, just an “apprentice” in revolution who had hardly a few
flashes of Marxism were making rounds.i Such gossips as these that Stalin was not farsighted
enough, that Stalin relied heavily on administration, that he had turned productivist and
believed in production and technology and cadres only and saw nothing else necessary for the
final victory of socialism, also that he was anti-democratic, authoritative, and stifled inner
party democracy, had personal cult, that he did not have confidence in peasantry and that he
had always been “walking on one leg” etc. – had been elevated to the level of ‘creative’
Marxist sermons – the fashion of the day! Thus, the most decisive and important historical
role that destiny had bestowed upon Mao after the death of Stalin had turned hostile to Stalin
and Stalin’s practice of socialism, the soviet model of socialism. Stalin was charged with and
found guilty for having not understood dialectics4, for having devoured a lot of metaphysics5,
for having no lofty ideals under his sleeves, for having not coined high flown phrases, for
having not often got labouring masses galvanized into the acts of phrase mongering and
slogan shouting crowd daily converging at red square! But then such were not always the
words of Mao. His followers were far more ‘intelligent’ (they always are as Mao would say6)
and picked up Mao’s loose remarks, made theories out of them and continued to rail against
Stalin and Soviet Socialism even during the GPCR when Mao himself had hardly spoken a
word against Stalin. Only thus the great revolutionary momentousness associated with
unrelenting stormy days of Chinese socialism gave way to a host of newer and newer brands
of ‘creative’ Marxist. Now, the booms of the GPCR having being silenced completely, the
Chinese revisionists having usurped the power long ago without much ado and without
almost any resistance and revolutionary fervour having completely subsided, we find

i
This trend can still be found in plenty among CRs.
ourselves being bomb-shelled from all directions by the detractors of Marxism-Leninism in
collusion with ‘creative’ Marxists forming the second and third line of defence for
Capitalism-Imperialism. And alas! Most of such creative Marxists swear by the name of Mao
and Chinese socialism!7

But then, not everyone among the communist revolutionaries was satisfied. There were
indeed some nagging doubts and suspicions. But with Mao in command, everything was
thought to be rest-assured and nothing led to deeper introspection and anxieties. However,
there were indeed a few communists who had discovered theoretical inadequacies in Mao’s
practice8. No one listened to them or worse, they were superfluous. What other results could
there have been? Being a part of the same momentousness, such ‘brave’ communists were
themselves very much impulsive and imbalanced. It was as if they were reactions to some
actions, an anti-thesis of an action as obtained in the Newton’s third law of motion and
consequently were having as much momentum as the action itself, but in the opposite
direction. It is also a matter pertaining to time which alone will allow an overall honest
introspection and evaluation, having relevance with the communist movement, of such a
stormy period which had really uprooted many trunks and effected many turnovers. On the
whole it can be safely said that the first phase of socialism as social system has proved its
superiority over capitalism with unflinching and convincing evidences, both in terms of its
capabilities of generating “conscious activism” of the labouring masses and their
unbelievable endeavour to learn expertise of all kinds (as happened in China as well as in the
Soviet Union) and also in terms of its capabilities as an efficient economic system to register
unhindered economic growth, unstoppable development of productive forces and efficiency
based on an overreaching development of technology and centralized planning (as occurred
mainly in Soviet Union). One was lofty and creative and was still wanting in many pre-
requisites to qualify as a Marxian Socialism in its truest sense. The other was real whose
slightest mention generates both fury and fear among the capitalists and imperialists.
Socialism and communism could not remain a utopia thereafter.

II

The year 1953 was the year of commencement of the socialist transformation of China.
Despite numerous challenges arising out of China’s “spiritual backwardness”, China had had
a great future. In spite of the balance of class forces having been completely altered
internationally against socialism by the rise to power of modern revisionism in the Soviet
Union and the ultimate bourgeoisie takeover of soviet socialism from within after Stalin’s
death, Chinese socialism would have performed fairly better and proves yet again, after the
Soviet Union, socialism’s superiority over capitalism, had they not preferred too much their
own creativity resulting in unstoppable submission to spontaneity, mental infatuations, phrase
mongering, lofty ideals which always foundered before realities, to ‘orthodox’ Marxism-
Leninism and Soviet experience and also, had they not given in under the enormous moral
influence of the Chinese bourgeoisie which shared power with the proletariat and which Mao
sought to transform9.

The Chinese communists had got to learn very hard from Lenin and Stalin on practically and
materially building socialism and apply Historical Materialism even with more precision.
However, the destiny had something else in its store. The internal and external situations –
the ever growing two line struggle in the CPC10 and the soviet’s betrayali of the proletarian
internationalism forced it upon the Chinese communists to adopt more and more creative
means and methods of building socialism. Their lack of depth of the understanding of

i
Here I mean Post-Stalin Soviet’s betrayal.
Historical Materialism had had its toll, too. Mao became creative to a fault i.e. over creative,
was so much creative that his creativity almost and many times amounted to detracting from
Marxism-Leninism. Only a thin line separates the two. Mao perhaps never got rid of it, not
even in the midst of the GPCR’s booms during which he sought to correct many things and
wanted salvation from many sins committed erstwhile11. He was always running out of time,
was almost breathlessly busy in the thick of the things, nor was it possible for him given his
old age and hence his physical fragility. It is, however, not our case that creativity per se is
reproachable or laudable. Creativity is worthy only inasmuch as it does not mean departure
from the basic mould of which Marxism has been cast, inasmuch as it eats from the same tree
of Historical Materialism while enriching Marxism-Leninism and thereby providing the
proletariat with new ammunition to take on capitalism-imperialism. Mao’s creativeness
wasn’t precisely cast of the same mould, to say the least. Above all, Mao does never appear
to care about such things. He appears to have never worried whether his creativeness
conforms to Marxism or not.

III

The objective problems and constraints of Chinese socialism were also too many and
primarily arose from its having to confront and successfully overcome the vastly agrarian and
backward economy of China and the challenges it posed thereby. It was almost mandatory for
Chinese communists to immediately take such steps as most urgent and necessary to place
socialism on its firm ground of large scale production by developing the productive forces,
modernizing the peasant farming and finally completing the task of collectivization of
agriculture and socialist industrialization. It was not easy to do. It could not be, either. The
Chinese society as it existed in 1953 didn’t materially possess all the potentialities required
for this. The greatest hurdle was the vast petty-bourgeois population which was engendering
capitalism every day, every hour and which was most unlikely to submit itself to socialist
discipline and control unless forced and also which was almost unamenable to reform
through State moral directive until and unless forced by circumstances of large scale
production (socialized) in towns and country, replacing their economy gradually, steadily but
surely. Above all, the national capitalists, by all means, had much at their command 12 to
influence the direction of the CPC in regard to method and means to be adopted to build
socialism assuring “relief” and “space”13 for themselves. On the other hand, China could not
immediately shed her backwardness, spiritual as it was, in spite of heavy doses of Soviet Aid,
given the vastness and enormity of the requirements of a country like China. Thus, building
socialism in China was to be an act of a very promising communist leadership par excellence,
like Lenin, who would display unprecedented flexibility, creativeness of mind, bending to the
utmost in all directions but would never uproot his legs i.e. would never fail to see through all
these the most fundamental things of Marxism without which there would be no socialism at
all. It required the Chinese communists to undertake complete ideological proletarianisation
of different communist organisations and the State and huge purges in the CPC which had in
its ranks embraced many non-proletarian elements, had been in close collaboration with
Chinese capitalists and rich peasants since the days of NDRi and till recently had shared
power with them14. The question of DOP was of the greatest importance. It must occur in
everyone’s mind that socialism without an instrument of suppression of bourgeois and all
other erstwhile exploiters, their saboteuring, pilfering and evasion of proletarian State laws
and for putting down every attempt at coup d’état with iron hand, is simply unthinkable. A
communist party which does not see or understand the importance of all these things and
refuses to be amenable to such Marxist teachings and historical experiences of Lenin’s way
i
New Democratic Revolution which became victorious in China in 1949.
of building socialism and affords to remain completely porous to alien ideology and openly
vulnerable to bourgeois influences cannot even think of protecting its communist image, let
alone completing socialist transformation and achieving communism.15

But then, Chinese socialism had many advantages, too. The Chinese communists, unlike their
Bolshevik counterparts, had the vast peasant masses behind them since the very beginning
who had responded with a great surge for co-operativisation. Again, the Chinese communists,
unlike Bolsheviks did not have to fight tooth and nail for life, the combined, prolonged
imperialist encirclement, nor did they have to resort to (temporarily) such humiliating
concessions to foreign capital, trust organizers and bourgeois experts and other imperialist
gangs of robbers as the Bolsheviks under the leadership of Lenin had to16, for the sake of
large scale production, for learning while standing side by side with them i.e. the bourgeois
experts whom Soviet power could force and “buy out” to work for the proletarian cause, for
learning technical knowledge and management including the knowledge of keeping control
and accounts of production, raw materials, distribution which put together involve
organization of millions of people and without which, as Lenin says, socialism would be a far
cry – almost an impossibility.17 Thanks to the all round support of the Soviet Union in the
beginning, the large enterprises and heavy industries producing means of production were
being set up with ease. But for all these, the “things” turned up quite differently in Mao’s
China right from the very beginning, even though, the Chinese ‘creativeness’ wasn’t still too
much above board and did not show up as much boldly in the early period.

But as already said, destiny had already cast bad omens. Chinese communists had already
worn an albatrossi around their necks and grown very sick of it. Socialism was sought but not
on the basis of DOP. The Chinese communists opted for State Capitalism, like in Russia and
in spite of heavy Soviet Aid but without assuring or ensuring complete suppression,
overthrown and expropriation of the bourgeoisie and without making them completely submit
to the proletarian State (which was not there) and without propping up a suitable proletarian
machinery to crush with heavy hands any bourgeois saboteuring and without putting in place
different forms of strict proletarian surveillance i.e. in essence without implementing DOP.18
With the bourgeoisie and their parties well entrenched in state power and the CPC, such
things as bourgeoisie pilfering and evasion of state laws were quite at large. With Mao’s call
to transform the bourgeois and bring them around the party – the CPC, many a bourgeois –
turned – a fresh communist adonais19 glittered here and there in different communist and
state organizations openly and without any fear. They were also quite above board in seeking
profit and expressing for it, with the Communist Party and the State issuing consolations to
indignant workers and labouring masses and issuing directives to those defying.20 China was
alive with bourgeoisie21 i.e. even after many years of socialist transformations. Thus, we find
that China had many apostles of socialism, had all the time huge cries and deafening
propaganda for all that was good in socialism, had the communist wind blowing many a time,
had many campaigns and movements against so many “evils” and bourgeois factionalists but
alas, they had none of the most fundamental instruments of socialism – the DOP, the entirely
proletarianised party and other instruments of applying the strictest supervision, control and
suppression. It is curious to hear from Mao himself talking about opposition, had they begun
to empty their bowels i.e. flush out bourgeoisie from party and state and launched open class
struggle.22 What then was Mao’s fight in the CPC for? Weren’t these fights against ‘evils’
and two line struggles in the CPC class struggles? It sounds intriguing, indeed! It is also self-
contradictory enough and amazing but it really isn’t. Launching anti-bourgeoisie class
struggles – a kind of struggle for life and death – is not synonymous with fighting “evils” and

i
A large white, sea bird, (infml) a thing that continually causes difficulties or prevents one doing something.
Here it means creativity of Chinese communists.
“factions”.23 Aren’t we already awash with such experiences in third world poor countries?
Don’t we hear noiseful bourgeois concerns for eradication of so many ‘evils’ i.e. pilfering
corruption, wastefulness etc.? Don’t we find bourgeoisie factions fighting each other? What
we mean is that fighting evils per se does not ensure DOP and proletarian surveillance.
Rather the opposite Mao thought and after 1956, even criticized Stalin’s “excessiveness” of
class struggle.24

Thus the question of class-struggle and DOP was never solved till Mao’s sudden awakening
to ground realities of one-third bourgeois take over in the early 60’s.25 But then alas! He
confused many things and turned a muddle by naively equating the socio-economic
conditions of the USSR under Stalin up to 1953 with that of China’s and then with post-
Stalin Soviet Union and betrayed his utter lack of sensible and precise analysis of things of
such importance.26 Democracy was glorified to extremes.27 An addle-egg as they perhaps
might have become, they had great hopes on such nonsense as transforming bourgeois as if
the bourgeois will evolve into communists by themselves through proletarian moral
directives to shun profit seeking. It was as if they were hoping against hope, or, as if the
Chinese capitalists had turned aide-de-camp to the CPC and communism.

IV

Tragedies, if they come at all, won’t come alone – as the saying goes. Already besieged by a
misfortune and a curse, Chinese socialism fell under another. Stalin’s death followed by
accession to power of the arch-revisionist Khrushchev caused instant worries and imposed
immediate constraints on Chinese socialism. The Chinese communists were aware of its
consequences and would not have expected the Soviet Aid still arriving with as much ease,
had they stood guard in defence of Stalin and the model of socialism he nurtured and took
care of. It was the most unfortunate turn of events for China – the danger of a powerful and
mighty friend turning a foe. Precisely due to this, none of the communist parties or
communist leaders of national or international level save Enver Hoxha of Albania, did come
forward in the forthright defence of Stalin and his practice of socialism. Enver Hoxha, too,
appeared as a meteor, a shooting star and disappeared in no time and no one knows much
what happened thereafter in his own “territory”. The CPC turned its face on the other side
and soon later criticized Stalin’s practice of socialism openly in the month just following the
“Secret Report” episode.28 Only now one can say it was only so expected and it couldn’t have
been otherwise. Tottering under the diabolical Khrushchevite pressure to fall in line to
prevent another Enver Hoxha, the Chinese communists had gone asunder – theoretically and
politically – and were condemned to do unbelievable somersaults. They sometimes
substantially demonstrated themselves as co-travellers of Khrushchev ante bellum, as some
would say.29 From hailing the Secret Report in part to tarnishing Stalin as having ‘devoured’
a lot of metaphysics, finding ‘serious inadequacies’ and ‘distortions’ in Stalin led socialism
and thereby rejecting much of the Soviet treasure-house of experience and ultimately to
rejecting in essence the ultimate primacy given to developing productive forces and achieving
necessary material conditions to usher in higher forms of socialism or communism by
glorifying decentralization and, based on it, men’s ideologically-awakened motives to
extremes as juxtaposed to historical materialism ……… and so on, the Chinese communists
had earned for themselves too many burdens of creative thinking and shown enough fidelity
to idealist obscurantism. A pitfall i.e. another misfortune lay in the wait as Chinese socialism
which was still less than a foetus was sought to deliver itself out and grow at once into
communism, keeping pace with the drumbeat of communist propaganda. The Chinese
creativism was heading out towards its zenith. Palmy days for communization had set in.30
Under material constraints or wishful thinking of socialism – the Chinese communists had
come under the spell of men’s high-flown motives. But there is also another dimension to it.

Having practiced peaceful transitioni from New Democracy to socialism while enjoying
tutelage of post-Stalin USSR for some time (up till 1957),31 Chinese communists particularly
Mao could not have for ever got to play a “mid wife” to already resurgent Chinese bourgeois
and ever watchful revisionists who ‘rightly’ counted upon post-Stalin USSR’s revisionism
and weakness32 of the Chinese socialism to finally restore themselves completely in the
driving seat. Mao chose to confront Khrushchev’s mean mindednessii and face the domestic
situations head on. The CPC under the guidance of Mao and Liu announced Great Leap in
response to Khrushchev’s slowly but surely refusing to continue with the Aid and poking
China on the most contentious border issue33, but without having shown any second thought
to correct past errors of leaving aside the most essential components of socialism. The whole
episode of the Great Leap that followed to surpass Great Britain34, the USSR (He believed
Khrushchev was planning to enter communism and wanted to beat him in the race!) and
America, created fairy tales of people’s enthusiasm – masses taking part in technological
revolution, masses learning political economy and innovating new techniques in agriculture
and industry, proletariat constantly revolutionarising production relations and superstructure
by instantly revolting against “discouraging” rules and regulations and by communization
creating communist wind blowing fast and hard ……… and so on, is a testimony to what
would happen if we take to “inventing” communism out of thin air. Not only that chaos,
indiscipline, anarchism, ‘high’ standards of false and exaggerated reporting, self-praise35 etc.
prevailed to an extreme extent, but production also fell by unimaginable amounts and
peasants concealed production and distributed among themselves the produce and finally ran
away from communes.36 There are stories about peasants driving their cattle, pigs and
chickens to the fields when commune inspectors arrived.37 Almost all communes were about
to be smashed by another gust of wind which again blew hard but in the opposite direction.
At first the commune level cadres were taken to task but later Mao had to subject himself to
the most humiliating kind of self-criticism, had to call upon to study political economy, refer
to Stalin, had to acknowledge his own and most of the leaders’ ‘illiteracy’ of knowledge
about economic construction and development of productive forces and what not.38 But then,
what to talk of Stalin – Marx, Engels and Lenin were all sacrificed at the altar of Mao’s
‘splendid’ self-criticism.39 When Mao’s communes fail, everything else must also go, be
demolished and thrown to bite dust – Mao perhaps believed like this. When Mao had to
accept and denounce his “illiteracy”, how could Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin retain their
shine!

But then, for all these, there were some ‘silver linings’ too. His self-criticism ultimately bore
“some” fruits, even though Mao remained unimpressed by Marxian Historical Materialism
and remained stuck with his own understanding of socialism and Marxism. But the little
sense that prevailed during the latter half of the Great Leap had really stored production.40
Mao was slowly inching towards class struggles inside and outside the CPC. He
acknowledged that CPC, State and Communes were heavily infiltrated by the landlords and
bourgeoisie.41 The Chinese communists almost had forgotten that the bourgeois neither fears
communes or co-operatives nor even the communist partyiii but the DOP and intense class
struggle under DOP finally leading to their complete expropriation forever. Any possibility of
their socialist transformation only lay in Mao’s creativity. The bourgeoisie and the exploiters
are not as much foolish or else, they must not be bourgeoisie at all. Anyway, all-round heavy

i
Comparatively, unlike Soviet’s which never took a sigh of relief and struggled for every breath in the
beginning.
ii
Khrushchev’s refusal to comply with the agreements pertaining to Soviet Aid to China.
iii
In socialism, a Communist Party without DOP is no communist party at all.
purges were undertaken and some real and significant developments on the front of large
scale production were registered.42 Stalin virtues were restored. Stalin’s writings were
included with those of Marx-Engels and Lenin that Mao and the CPC recommended for
study.43 After so many years Mao refers to bourgeois undermining the DOP.44 Mao now
openly and quite frequently criticizes Khrushchev.45 Mao now more explicitly admits that he
knew nothing of economic construction and development of productive forces and did some
serious studies.46 He also now accepts the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois composition of the
CPC.47 By clearly saying that all the three levels – counties, the communes and brigades were
somewhat counter-revolutionary, he accepted that bourgeois take over was almost
complete.48 Here one should not forget that this took place not all at once, but was the natural
outcome of the state capitalism without DOP and the proletarian surveillance under it
ensuring arrest, execution, suppression, punishment, purges of bourgeois conspirators,
saboteurs and evaders of the laws of the proletarian state.49

So, the situations building up just before the GPCR are not indicative of any extraordinary
theoretical enlightenment of Mao on the question of how to prevent capitalist restoration,
rather, to the contrary, are the ‘shining’ example of an act of suddenly waking up – from deep
slumber of ignorance arising out of affaire de coeur of the Chinese communists with their
bourgeois – to the ground realities. It is natural that now Mao finds capitalists everywhere.
But then his limitations were obvious. Forced by circumstances and conditioned by his own
wishful creative thinking he never got to the bottom of Marxism and remained content with
making few assertions about DOP and class struggle and never lost his love for people’s
democracy.

Creativity always lured him. Although Mao agrees that “the development of productive
forces of China’s socialism had barely begun”50, yet he talks of contracting industry and
heavy industries51 and also talks of transformation of bourgeois in spite of his high sounding
class struggle.52 He also dares to equate inclusive People’s Congressi with exclusive Sovietsii
under the conditions of DOP. He also forgot that in Russia the Bolshevik Party was never an
appendage of the Soviets, but their leader, let alone an appendage of the bourgeois. So Mao
would not restore his clear vision, not even in the midst of stormy things happening during
the GCPR given the too much burden of his creative thinking since 1953. Neither he had time
or occasions nor, above all did he have comrades in arms with whom he could start afresh. It
was too late. Moreover, his creative mind was too old to be reckoned without. Apart from all
these, the way he later ‘theorised’ studying Marx53 and other things always put brakes to it
rendering useless and futile all previous exercises which only Mao himself had undertaken by
rightly exhorting the whole party for it occasioned by his great failures and self-criticism
about them.54 He seldom believed socialism and its political economy to be a matter of
precise study inasmuch as it has acquired the character of science. For him it was just a
question of an “appropriate” invention of a worthy idea that anyhow got occurred in his brain
by some isolated ‘important’ incidents (as happened in the case of communes55) that he
would become impatient. His awakened soul would get restless and would set out to enter
communism56 before he departed to see Marx – no substantiation of ideas, no hard work and
honest effort to demonstrate his intellectual-theoretical stock by worthily linking up the new
idea with Marxism and checking its basic conformity to the same, no sincere desire to see
whether the new idea departs from Marxism or is an extension of Marxism, no summing up

i
People’s Congress was the China’s supreme policy making body and had bourgeois individuals and parties in
it.
ii
Soviets were exclusive in nature as they did not have bourgeois parties and their representatives in them.
but only retracting under pressure from what was said and done earlier and only donning self-
criticism without substance. The whole period of the great leap and even the GPCR tells us
such a story about him. Letting commune and brigade level cadres and even masses plan up
and execute a whole lot of things in the name of decentralisation and democracy and “two
way traffic”, letting industry and heavy industry or large scale industrial production suffer at
the altar of an unsubstantiated and unexamined theory of “walking on two legsi“57 and then
exhorting the masses to the limit to go into communism on the basis of the existing level of
production58 marked by “spiritual backwardness” of China’s agriculture and the economy as
a whole – was no communism at all, but, in essence, monasticism.59 Mao never seems to have
believed in Marxist precision and believed in doing things guided by his own speculative and
creative thinking which, nevertheless, he believed, was true Marxism and relied mainly on
masses’ activism whose leader he truly was. He was never deprived of his mass following not
even when the peasants were deserting the communes. Masses again responded with a surge
to his call to rejoin the communes when he prevailed upon the party to set the things right and
restore production.60 Even earlier level of production was restored (production on an average
never fellii). Ultimately it was proved for the time being that the communist wind had had its
impact on people’s mind and imagination. Mao was, in this respect alone, successful in
demonstrating the enormity of importance of masses’ activism – one of the elements of the
revolutionary Marxism (though not primary) which, had they not gone way ahead of the real
material conditions, would have created wonders (as really happened in the USSR under
Stalin). But a Mundane Mao was never possible – not at all. Sensing correctly that Great
Leap and its failure had given way to an already resurgent bourgeois (which he himself
believed would be transformed) taking over ab intra, he swung into actions marked by chaos
yet again, but, this time for other reasons i.e. to discover DOP, Stalin’s virtues, class struggles
etc., to admit the requirement of suppressive machinery making possible arrest and
executions of the hidden enemies of socialism.61 But he also emphasises caution and restraint
while setting the target of attack. And he rightly does so.

VI

The theory of rejection of the GPCR on the basis of ruin of production during the stormy
days of the same62 is a bogus theory which bases itself on popular anti-nostalgiaiii of the
GPCR in the bourgeois media. It also smells pragmatism for such a theory turns on
immediate practical successes and achievements sans ideology and theory. It is a fact that
Mao was quite specific in the implementation of the second Five Year Plan, emphasised
caution and restraint and talked of “American spirit” in practical economic work. But only a
few might know what he meant by all these as he never relinquished his old basic line of
contracting industry or heavy industry, though the data and general knowledge of the then
China comfortably show that the production of industries, on an average, never fell rather
surged ahead during the GPCR in almost all branches of production.63 So one should not
accept the theory of failure of the GPCR on the basis of ‘ruin’ of production. For us,
nevertheless, the GPCR failed, but for other reasons. We believe that the GPCR’s failure
mainly lies in Mao’s ultimate inability to reinvent himself on the basis of his temporary, short
excursion to and his many flip-flop with a few Marxists assertions such as DOP, class
struggle, development of productive forces, understanding political economy etc. during the

i
Its ultimate results were: the implements of agriculture were not supplied but sold and the production teams
were mostly deprived of them as they could not buy those expensive implements and had to depend on drought
animals or small agricultural tools.
ii
We can produce a lot of data supporting our such arguments.
iii
A mixture of feelings of sadness and pleasure for an unhappy memory of a sad period or an event etc. earlier
in one’s life.
early 60’s occasioned by CPC’s ongoing Great Debate and debacle of the Great Leap
resulting in Mao’s awakening to the one third bourgeoisie takeover of the Chinese
socialism.64 The GPCR’s promises as expressed in its main slogan – grasp the revolution and
promote the production and technology – were really great and would have a great historical
significance, if Mao had not failed to see the wood from the tree.65 As the luck would have it,
Mao fell too short of these all. Had he not, he would have deserved more than what he is
normally accorded with by the revolutionaries of the world, albeit, for wrong reasons –
turning his errors to account, as said earlier. A close examination of the GPCR’s political
economy or that of the Great Leap does not however, instigate us to call him an advocatus
diaboli but a communist who was creative to a fault, who had always an ostrich belief in
Chinese bourgeois and non-neutrality of technology, who would always love masses chanting
communist mantras and would not tolerate mundane masses silently gathering bricks after
bricks to build socialism. Mao’s main success after 1960 and particularly after 1961 –
throughout the Great Debate, Socialist Education Movement and other things in the early
60’s all leading to the GPCR, indeed lies in his extraordinary efforts to thwart, restrict and
delay, for the time being, the instant and silent bourgeois takeover of Chinese socialism
which otherwise had already flirted, romanced and enjoyed affaire de coeur with the Chinese
bourgeois for such a long period. Who does not know that Liu-Shao-chi, having already
opposed the peasant co-operatives66 and demonstrated his hatred, arrière-pensee against
communism and socialisation from the very beginning would have gone for total reversal
right in the early years, would have postponed the Great Debate, however inconsistent and
rallied behind Khrushchev completely and would have harmed forever the international
polarisation of the communists against the “official” line of Khrushchev and would have left
us completely unarmed in those conditions and robbed us of every trace of revolutionary
fervour from the world communist movement, if he had had all the things his own way in the
event of Mao’s silent submission to Liu’s open revisionism. And here in lies the importance
of our having Mao with us, on our side. Herein lies the significance of evaluating and
defending Mao as he was as against running amuck and demolishing whatever comes in
one’s way. The world should also know that Mao had got himself ‘retired’ by himself opting
for the second line of leadership and relinquishing his day to day responsibilities.67 This
arrangement remained till 1965 (strange indeed!) and Liu looked after day-to-day works. So
we cannot blame Mao entirely for whatever we see in Chinese socialism. In that sense he was
just showering sermons to one and all like a saint.

But then Mao’s having trust in Liu in 1965 is beyond anyone’s appetite.68 It simply sounds
amazing for a new apprentice in Maoism that Mao could not smell revisionism in Liu till
1965 when he broke with Mao on his new 23-point articles on Socialist Education
Movement69 in the CPC’s central committee. This alone gives moral right to people like us to
rethink about Mao’s theoretical-intellectual stock. To say the least, Mao was not Stalin who
was not only well-versed in Marxism-Leninism but could also smell a rat (a rot, too!) at a
distance and was able to see through all the designs of the detractors of Marxism-Leninism.
Mao’s abnormal trust in Liu, then forces us to take stock of certain other things in Chinese
socialism so as to track through the unseen terrain of Mao-Liu fraternity that ends only in
1965.

VII

Mao and Liu – as the world knows – were poles apart separated by a yawning gap between
them on the question of socialist transformation of agriculture, commerce, trade and
industries. Mao was correct in his belief to go for peasant co-operatives aimed at
collectivisation of peasants farming even before the completion of socialist industrialisation
i.e. before heavy and large socialist industries were producing in plenty the machinery, tools
and necessary implements needed in agriculture. Liu on the other hand opposed peasants’
cooperative till the fullest development of productive forces and till then wanted no
proletarian ideology and its propagation and tried his best to retain New Democracy and also
opposed communist ideological propaganda like “communism is the ultimate hope of the
Chinese people” and “Down with private property”.70 Thus, Liu apparently was a believer of
the productive forces but wanted ND to continue and capitalism to grow unrestrictedly and
freely, while Mao wanted to speedily effect transition from ND to socialism and seemed to
correctly rely on soviet experience and aid for the success of socialism in China. Liu had to
do self-criticism for this, and after that, Mao-Liu conflicts ceased and a kind of fraternity
prospered between them. The question of DOP, class struggle, heavy purges of non-
proletarian element from the CPC and the State and other social organs, ensuring ruthless
suppression of bourgeois saboteuring – all such things turned out to be an object of
compromise between Mao and Liu and naturally became the first biggest causalities or
sacrifice at the altar of Mao-Liu’s fraternity. It’s no surprise then that the “sixty point
working methods”i which laid the foundation of the Great Leap in the early 1958 were mostly
written by Liu with Mao adding only a few points and approving the whole text for study in
the whole party and nation.71 True, Mao-Liu’s fraternity had entirely different worlds of
thoughts behind at work but producing the same results. Mao’s rejection of DOP etc.
emanated from and had its origin in Mao’s fondness for socialist transformation of Chinese
bourgeois and also in his belief that the socialist transformation to China would be peaceful,
given the balance of social forces having already tilted internationally in the favour of
socialism.ii Not to mention, Liu must have hated DOP and class struggle having already
demonstrated himself as bon vivant i.e. a jovial companion of the Chinese bourgeois.

On the question of the development of the productive forces, too, Mao-Liu’s fraternity
abounds and prospers as a fait accompli. Contrary to what is an object of gossip among a few
sections of communist revolutionaries, we firmly believe that Liu’s opposition to peasant co-
operatives and collectivisation of agriculture apparently on the basis of the “productive forces
first” theory had nothing to do with the theory of the productive forces as the ultimate driving
force of history based on the Marxian Historical Materialism and therefore we reject such
gossip as Liu’s owing allegiance to Stalin as something totally baseless and inane. 72 On the
contrary, we find, having made a little more attentive and closer reading of Mao’s writings,
yet another element upon which was based more firmly and more properly the Mao’s unique
and extraordinary trust in Liu. It is comme il faut given the Mao’s famous but erroneous
theory of non-neutrality of technology.iii Apparently divergent stands of Mao and Liu on the
development of productive forces notwithstanding, they stand united in essence. Liu on the
one hand believes that the fullest development of productive forces is necessary before
socialisation, but also believes that productive forces can develop only under capitalism and
hence wanted to continue with NDiv and enjoy pleasantries with the Chinese bourgeois, while
Mao, on the other hand, believed more and more particularly after 1956 that any much
emphasis on development of productive forces will lead to capitalism and hence always
treated technologically productivist, efficiently and centrally planned socialism system as an
Osage orange.

i
The important points (on rules and regulation) – as Mao says, Page 19, Mao’s selected writings, vol. VIII.
ii
Mao believed so until 1958-59 and therefore wanted to beat Khrushchev who, he believed, was making
preparations to enter communism.
iii
Mao’s inhibition against technology which was sought to become the “theory of non-neutrality of technology”
by his followers.
iv
New Democracy established in China as a result of and after the victory of New Democratic Revolution in
1949.
While talking of Red and Expert, he gives an exposure to his theory of one excluding the
other. For him Red and Expert are dialectical anti-thesis to each other and their unity is a
unification of contradictions, a unification of opposites.73 Hence, he always stood against any
such emphasis on the development of productive forces based on modern science and
technology which he would deem unfit or inedible for socialism. He used to believe that
“with the focus on technology, they were adept to reject politics”74 by which he meant having
the greatest faith in men’s awakened motives and activism ……… awakening to communism
etc. so as to constantly put on agenda the task of revolutionarising the superstructure and
production relations. When at all he talks of technological revolution (for Mao everything
starts with a bang, a revolution, so does the technology75) he preferentially mean masses
learning technology all at once as if from thin air or from Mao’s constant moral drives which
he was so used to. Only after the debacle of the Great Leap did he have some faith (through
temporarily and in flashes) on the kind of advance scientific training based on which only, a
real technological revolution worth its name could have been ensured which would have
completely done away with the China’s spiritual backwardness and liberated the Chinese
people in real sense of the terms. It’s no wonder then that Mao, having reject DOP as well as
scientific-technological revolution and development of productive forces based on this,
counted heavily on his moral drives, communist propaganda and ideologically high-flown
ideals and conscious activism of the labouring masses.

Liu, a foxy (very cunning) character as he was, had sensed, well in advance, the hidden
concurrence of his lines of thought with Mao’s – the basis of their long fraternity in future –
and was therefore never in a hurry to precipitate a showdown with Mao. Liu was perhaps
convinced that Mao’s socialism based on the rejection of DOP and without the fullest
development of productive forces, was no socialism at all and would leave many “spaces”
and “loopholes” for bourgeois to wriggle out and finally stage a comeback at an opportune
time, when “masses” had the least faith in socialism and could easily be taken for granted.
The first phase of the Great Leap i.e. the period of utter confusion and chaos on every front
had come handy for already resurgent Chinese bourgeois. It is not without reason that the 8th
Congress is called the Liu’s Congress. Mao himself, in 1965, at the Zenith of the storm just
before the GPCR and even during the GPCR, acknowledges splendidly his old fraternity with
Liu when he took to task those who blamed only Liu and Teng for the theory of
“disappearance of classes in China” passed by the CPC’s 8th Congress.76 But then, this is high
time, at such a turn of discussion as this, to settle my score with those “excellent” and
“intelligent” minds – bagful of wastes and dead material – who while picking isolated
instances from unfaithful sources, equate and draw comparison of the “Chinese theory of
disappearance of classes” with a few such “discovered” as well as invented assertions made
by Stalin in or after 17th Congress of the CPSU without taking them in proper context and
who, at the same time, blind themselves to the sea of differences lying between the social
conditions of China of 1959-60 and those of the USSR of 1937-38. Such people look at the
USSR after 1933 with the spectacles of China of 1959-62.77 How poor! How misleading!!
Let’s go a little deeper and find out how such minds work so terrifically, so horribly!

VIII

Actually it should have been no one’s business talking such nonsense as drawing comparison
between the USSR and China and counting similarities which they had really none between
them except in such creative minds as those of Mao’s followers as a figment of imagination
and then saying – look, in socialism classes do exist. Stalin overlooked it and moreover did
not understand bourgeois right which engenders capitalism ... etc. but leave here such
nonsense marked by unbelievable ignorance. Let’s ask: Can anyone who is in his senses ever
say that the bourgeois had not been completely expropriated in the USSR and not fully
submitted to the proletarian state? Had not the collectivisation of agriculture and socialist
industrialisation been completed in the truest revolutionary-proletarian manner? Did
capitalists exist in the USSR after 1933? Wasn’t it that there was indeed no antagonistic
(capitalist or otherwise) class in the USSR in 1937 and hence no open class-struggle which
physically existed in 1937 in the social-political life of the soviet proletariat? However, the
danger of capitalist restoration in the USSR under Stalin was, after all, indeed a possibility,
but not due to the existence of the bourgeois as a class and people having been still alive and
resurgent, as in China, but due to the reasons that originated from the soil of the bourgeois
right, the narrow horizon imposed historically on mankind, the remnants of old division of
labour, the anti-thesis between town and country and physical and mental labouri, the
elimination of which did not solely depend upon Stalin’s wishes or Stalin’s invention of ideas
or for that matter, was beyond masses’ activism however revolutionary. It solely depended
upon the fullest ever development of productive forces and production, upon overreaching
development of science and technology allowing mankind to lord over nature, a definite level
of plentifulness of things still having got to be achieved and, along with this, the
simultaneous evolution of social organisations strictly corresponding with the material
conditions already achieved in the society. This is no occasion to discuss at length such things
right now, but, let us not have any doubt in our mind that the USSR, having just recently been
almost materially demolished in the Second World War, had still not all the pre-requisites
fulfilled (as it existed in or before 1953) to usher in still higher forms of socialism. It had just
started, under the leadership of Stalin moving ahead on to the road of fulfilling those pre-
requisites without being overpowered by emotions and fickle-mindedness, without behaving
irresponsibly vis-à-vis dealing with the laws of political economy of socialism.

So far as China is concerned, just the opposite happened. China never had DOP, never
ensured complete expropriation of the bourgeois, and the landlords, never forced them to
submit to the proletarian state (which was not there). The bourgeois and landlords were
almost “doing things” at pleasure to stage a comeback, they had all the space to wriggle out,
had already captured one third of the counties, the communes and brigades. Capitalists class
as a people and a class did exist in large numbers even in 1962-63 when Mao suddenly
awakened to the requirements of DOP and class-struggle and GPCR, thanks to the final show
down between Mao and Liu in 1965 which provoked Mao to turn the fire of class struggle
from the bourgeois to the party bourgeois leadership by calling upon the masses to “Bombard
The Headquarter”. But then, Mao longed for the democratic parties even at the height of the
GPCR and sometimes preferred them to communists78 and needed political consultative
committee comprising the democratic parties.79 In such conditions Chinese communists and
their followers in the whole world only demagogically believed that they were engaged in
eliminating bourgeois right when, they say, NDR was still to be completed in a few regions. 80
Those who believe that the bourgeois takeover of Chinese socialism was an outcome of the
bourgeois right and not the result of the continued renunciation of DOP and CPC’s affaire de
coeur with the Chinese bourgeois, are unwise and hollow-minded. They don’t see that real
ground for elimination of bourgeoisie right through (forced) communisation and on the basis
of the existing level of production marked by utter backwardness and lack of efficiency
existed only in Mao’s brain. A country where technological backwardness, poverty, illiteracy,
still reigned and Nature heavily lorded over “mankind”, where people’s penury forced them
to live without adequate amount of calorie in-take and above all where NDR still remained to
be completed in a few areas, had really no business talking of eliminating bourgeoisie right.
They must have known that if one cannot hitch his wagon to the earth, he should not hitch it
to a star, either.

i
Here we are not up to reasoning why capitalism was restored in the USSR – not at all. It’s a completely
separate discussion.
 APPENDIX

1
It’s well known that Mao criticised Stalin and ‘his’ socialism for the first time in April 1956 in his famous
articles – Ten Major Relationships. See page 265, Mao’s Selected Writings, vol. V (Hindi edition) and its
appendix no. 2, page 283. Also see on page 41, Mao’s Selected Writings, vol. VIII which reads – “When Stalin
was criticized in 1956, we were on the one hand happy, but on the other hand apprehensive. It was completely
necessary to remove the lid, to break down blind faith, to release the pressure, and to emancipate thought.* But
we did not agree with demolishing him at one blow. They (the Khrushchevites #) do not hang up his picture, but
we do.” So Mao was under pressure given Stalin’s prestige and could not feel “emancipated” until Stalin was
demolished!
See again – “After the criticism of Stalin (he is referring to the notorious “Secret Report” of Khrushchev#), the
victims of blind faith had their eyes opened ……… the old ancestor (Stalin#) also had his faults, we should apply
analysis to him, and not have blind faith in him.” (ibid) Such loose remarks can be found almost in every
chapter of this volume.
And we all know that later the CPC had undertaken to fight, however inconsistently in many senses, the secret
report in its Great Debate (see on page 89, The Great Debate on Stalin question, dated 13th September 1963).
The documents concerning the Great Debates are themselves a testimony to CPC’s inconsistencies with regard
to its own fight against Khrushchevite criticism of Stalin and CPSU’s 20th Congress. The CPC’s critical analysis
of CPSU’s open letter as published by the editorial department of “People’s Daily” and “Red Flag” dated 6th
September 1963 says – “Comrade Mao Tse-tung has said that Stalin should be criticized*, but we are not in
agreement with the methods of his criticism* (see on page 48, The Great Debate, Hindi edition).
Again, the same article does not completely refute the fact that Liu-Shao-Chi in the 8th CPC’s Congress had
pledged full support to CPSU’s 20th Congress and that Teng-Shiao-Ping had supported the CPSU’s fight
against the individual personality Cult of Stalin. (see on page 50, ibid).
In the joint draft of declaration of the CPC and CPSU gives theoretical concession in large amount on the
question of peaceful transition and speaks in such a compromising tone – “In spite of mentioning the
possibility of peaceful transition in the joint declaration, other than peaceful transition has also been
discussed* ………” (page 54, last para, ibid).
The concluding part of this paragraph is all the more compromising. Even in the CPC’s own outline about the
CPSU’s theory of peaceful transition sent to the CC, CPSU, the same compromising tone was present ---- “but
to emphasize more than enough on peaceful transition would be wrong.” (page 55, ibid).
There is also an open admission of CPC’s compromise vis-à-vis CPSU’s theory of peaceful transition. (see on
page 56, para 2, ibid).
The CPC’s compromises on both CPSU’s Congress and the theory of peaceful transition etc. are again accepted
on page 67, para 7 (ibid) and it is clearly said in this paragraph that such compromises were in essence sacrifices
of theory* in lieu of certain wrong formulations which the CPSU agreed to withdraw from their 127 page
written statement distributed in 1960 Moscow Meeting of 81 fraternal communist parties of the world.
2
Refer to different publications of CLI.
3
Mao’s loose remarks not only against Stalin but also against Marx and Lenin can be found in plenty in Mao’s
Selected Writings, vol. VIII. Just see a few of them. Mao writes – “The Chinese people had got so used to being
slaves that they seemed to want to go on. When Chinese artists painted pictures of me together with Stalin, they
always made me a little bit shorter*, thus blindly knuckling under to the moral pressure exerted by the Soviet
Union at that time.” (page 39-40, ibid) How wonderful! That is perhaps why Mao felt emancipated when “the
lid was removed”. This is a part of Mao’s speech in which he is fighting blind faith.
Again – “The number of mistakes [should be like] the relation between a giant and a dwarf. It is possible to
commit few errors, and we must achieve this. Marx and Lenin achieved it.” (page 51, ibid) So what Mao is
driving that Marx and Engels are just as good as the Chinese communists because they also committed few
errors.
Again – ……… This shows that the approach of Marx and Lenin was lofty*. While ours is low” (page 54, ibid).
This is how Mao argued important things.
Not only this, Mao argues strangely on the question of learning too. Let’s have one specimen – “In history it is
always those with little learning who overthrow those with much learning * ……… Li Shih-min was in his teens
when he rebelled and became commander-in-chief. At twenty-four he ascended the imperial throne. He was
neither particularly old nor learned. The question is whether your direction is right or not.” (page 55-56, ibid).
It is as if the question of right direction is not decided by learning. The readers can well understand where Mao
is headed to.
Again – “Comrade Stalin had a slight overlord flavour. Educated in a missionary school, he was not so good in
dialectics, nor materialism. He was divorced from reality ……… In the past, the relations between the Soviet
Union and us were those of between father and son, cat and mouse, and the thinking was inflexible. Now, it is
somewhat better.*” (page 71, ibid) So in the companionship of Khrushchev he feels better and emancipated too.
It is also perhaps right to say that only by negating Stalin and ‘his’ socialism was it possible for Mao to develop
his own ‘creative’ Marxism as lofty as ‘Marx’s’ and ‘Lenin’s’. True, it was for other reasons, but, the Stalin’s
ghost haunted both Khrushchev as well as Mao.
Also see how he belittles Marx and Lenin by his loose remarks – “As I mentioned ……… do not be afraid,
because Marx was also a human being ……… except that he had a lot of Marxism in his mind. He wrote many
books for us to read. We do not have to read all of them ……… It is not necessary to read all of Marx’s books
……… what we have done has surpassed Marx ……… Marx never undertook China’s great revolution;
therefore, our practice also surpassed Marx. Principles are created in practice. Marx did not succeed in his
revolution, but we did.* When such revolutionary practice is reflected in ideology, it becomes theory.” (page
77-78, ibid) One may wonder what Mao was really up to. When Mao says in the next paragraph that “our
theoretical level is not high ……… but we must not be afraid ……… we must not belittle ourselves or hold
ourselves in contempt”, he forgets that he has just belittled Marx, as if he has all such right (to belittle Marx) so
as to rouse Chinese communists’ morale, as someone will say.
Mao also speaks his mind on the purpose of such dirty exercises – “My purpose ……… is to show that the
young people must surpass the old and the less educated can excel the more educated. Do not be intimidated by
famous people and scholars. We must be courageous in thinking, speaking and doing ……… We must
liberate ourselves* ………” (page 84, ibid). Hence Marx had to be sacrificed! Only thus Mao’s creative thinking
developed!! We are really ‘overwhelmed’ by Mao’s way of putting things when he says that “Marx did not
create Marxism during his adulthood or old age, but in his youth.”* (page 81, ibid) Marx had perhaps later
become an indulgent lover of his wife as Mao would have us believe!
Also see on page 85 (ibid) for his loose remarks on big nation chauvinism and his strange comments on
“negation of negation” as well as his first ever theoretical expression of his creativity when he says – “The
creativity of the people exists objectively. It is important to set up an opposite.* Opposites exist objectively.”
(page 85, ibid) No wonder he perhaps wanted the capitalists classes and the rightists to remain alive so that he
could have his opposite, so necessary for his “creativity”. His creativity allows him to praise the traitors’
courage as Tito’s in defying Marxism-Leninism. (see on page 89, ibid)
He sounds strangely narrow minded when he says – “Dialectics should develop in China. We are not concerned
about other places*” (page 95, ibid).
Let us also see one of the jewels of his creative thinking when he defends disasters theoretically like this –
“Disasters are social phenomena, natural phenomena. Sudden changes are the most fundamental law of the
universe. Birth is a sudden change; so is death ………” (page 102, ibid). Actually there is no substance in it and
these are very inane. But then he in latter pages opts for preventing big disasters like world war and party split.
His lofty mind would not find peace with “preventing small disasters” in which people die of hunger arising out
of backwardness (unindustrialization) of the economy.
His following loose remarks fuel nationalism – “The Soviet Union defeated the intervention of fourteen
imperialist countries. That was a long time ago. The Soviet Union has had the experience of the Second World
War. We defeated Chiang Kai-shek, Japanese imperialism, American imperialism. We have rich experience,
more than the Soviet Union.*” (page 121, ibid). This piece is obviously pitted against the post-Stalin and the
Khrushchevite era of the Soviet Union, yet it directly belittles the great Soviet Union and its fight against
imperialism under Lenin’s and Stalin’s leadership as stated above.
But it is really painful to see Mao nodding his head at what his once most favourite – later turned – renegade Lin
Piao has to say by way of intervening Mao during his speech – “---- Our Party’s Marxist-Leninist level is very
high, not to speak of the Chairman’s ……… When it comes to the superstructure, in military science, in
problems of strategy, we have our own fully developed system ……… He (Lenin #) did not have time to attend to
this question. Stalin had no developed system ………” (page 123, ibid) The whole piece/paragraph seems to be
laden with nationalist outpourings. True, as Mao himself says, disciples are far ahead of their Gurus. Hence,
Mao nodded his head in support of Lin and said – “That is the way.” (ibid)
Only Mao, not even his enemies could ever say this for Stalin – “Stalin’s nerves were not sound and never went
anywhere before.” (page 139, ibid)
But the biggest jewel of thought is about to arrive which will more amuse than inspire us. He compares the
China’s material strength with the USSR’s and then says – “………but we have only this little bit. Its (the
USSR’s#) reserve strength is great and cadres numerous, while we have just begun. Therefore, capacity is a
question. The seven-year plan proposed by Khrushchev is a preparation to enter communism (and this he is
speaking in December, 1958#) ……… This is good ……… Even if it is possible for us to be the first, we should
not do so. The October Revolution was Lenin’s cause. Are we not emulating Lenin? So, what’s the need of
hurrying? It would be only for the purpose of seeking credit from Marx ……… We must give attention to
dialectics and mutual benefits. Dialectics has made great developments and this is one of them.” (page 51, ibid)
So, he still believed in 1958 (December) that Khrushchev was to enter communism! He dares to label October
Revolution as only Lenin’s cause and above all, is being kind to Lenin. Had he not been kind enough, Lenin and
‘his’ accomplished cause would have been turned into a straw! It is to Mao’s credit that Lenin is not dwarfed!
How dare he speak like this! How dare he describe such things as great progress of dialectics in China!
No matter what he accepts as failure, he goes on and on with the same, glorifies setbacks and collapses with his
peculiar dialectics – “without a few collapses, there will be no consolidations ………” (page 152, ibid).
These all are quite peculiar and inane. In the meantime, his loose remarks against Stalin goes on as usual – “We
must study, understand, master, and become familiar with objective rules. Stalin (as if he suddenly appears as a
ghost in between when Mao self-criticises for the debacle of the Great Leap!#) discussed this issue a lot, but he
did not follow through.” (page 165, ibid) Peculiar it is really! He perhaps thinks because he has just only begun
to be familiar with Marxism, so everyone else has. This is as if Mao was suffering from Stalin phobia. Mao also
calls Stalin subjective – “The tragedy of Stalin was that he wanted to do good deeds but ended up doing bad
deeds. Subjective matters can only produce an effect in objective practice.” (page 161, ibid) Such innumerable
loose remarks are lying almost in every chapter of this vol. VIII, Mao’s Selected Writings.
But let us finish this by such a splendid quote of Mao’s which will prove beyond doubt that he did not
understand Marx. See how Mao argues while doing self-criticism – “If you want to talk about haste, Marx also
made many mistakes. Every day he hoped that a European revolution would arrive, but it did not arrive. ………
it had still not arrived when he died. It only arrived in Lenin’s time. Wasn’t this a case of impatience? Wasn’t
this petit-bourgeois fanaticism? ……… Marx at first opposed the Paris Commune, while Zinoviev opposed
the October Revolution. Zinoviev was put to death later. Should Marx also have been killed? When the Paris
Commune rose up he supported it, although he reckoned that it would fail. When he realized that it was the
first proletarian dictatorship, he thought it would be a good thing even if it only lasted three months. * If we
assess it (Paris Commune#) from an economic point of view, it was not worthwhile. We also had our Canton
Commune, but the Great Revolution failed. ………” (page 217, ibid) (For an exposition of Canton Communes,
see notes, no. 26 on page 220, ibid). How can we explain Mao’s such exercise to put Marx himself in bad light?
I leave it to the readers.
4
See Mao-se-Tung on Stalin’s philosophical errors, excerpts from Talks at the conference of secretaries of
Provincial, Municipal and Autonomous Region Party Committees held on 27 January, 1957, printed in “The
Stalin question” edited by Banebehari Chakrabarty, Page 274.
5
Also see on Page 85, Mao’s Selected Writings vol. VIII. Also see Appendix no. 4.
6
See Appendix no. 3.
Also see on Page 77, Mao’s speech at the second session of the Eighth Party Congress. Mao’s Selected
Writings, Vol. VIII.
7
See Samir Amin’s “Future of Maoism”, Rejoinder. Also see the last party of the next article with the sub-
heading – Super Revolutionary Lotto Turns Apologist of Capitalism.
8
One such critic of Mao is Moni Guha who wrote – Revisionism Against Revisionism quite early.
9
See on page 51, Mao’s Selected Writings, vol. VIII, para 2, which reads like this – “The second is the national
bourgeoisie (the first being imperialism, bureaucratic capitalism and feudalism #), by which I mean all [the
members of this class] except for the rightists. They are of a divided mind about the new China. They are drawn
to us in spite of themselves, and at the same time they want to engage in capitalism. Now that they have passed
through rectification, there have been some changes; we may perhaps have the support of two thirds of them.
Incidentally, the democratic parties and groups in Peking have called a big meeting for self-criticism, reform,
and oath-taking; such meetings should be held in the whole country. *” Also see the notes, no. 40 which tells
us that – “In the autumn of 1957, during the anti-rightist campaign, ceremonies were held in schools and
elsewhere, at which participants swore to give their hearts to the Party.*”
10
By growing two line struggles in the CPC we mean the two line struggles between those who were adherents
of peasants cooperatives and socialisation and those were opposed to it. Also see Page 307, vol. VIII, ibid.
11
Here we mean the continuing renunciation of DOP, class struggles, purges etc. which Mao ultimately had to
undertake during later half of the Great Leap and in the early 60’s. For example, Mao, for the first time criticises
Khrushchev openly (see on page 304, 331, vol. VIII, Mao’s Selected Writings). Mao justifies arrest and
execution of bourgeois saboteurs and undertake purges (page 300, 302, 333, 338, ibid). Mao after a long time in
August 1959 talks of the Chinese bourgeois undermining proletarian dictatorship. Mao also hints at, rather,
openly admits that many of the CPC’s members/leaders were not spiritually prepared for Socialist Revolution.*
(page 229, ibid) Mao once said – “After liberation for several years ……… we didn’t have a very good
understanding of circumstances ……… It was only after disturbances broke out that we realized that the
landlords were being restored. Generally, all three levels, the counties, the communes and the brigades, were
somewhat counter-revolutionary.*” (page 306, ibid)
Now let us have a brief look at the situations during the Great Leap period as reflected in one of the Mao’s
special type of self-criticism. Mao says – “Many things have happened which we could not possibly predict
beforehand. ……… Now the planning organs do not concern themselves with planning: for some time they have
not been concerning themselves with it. The planning organs are not confined to the Planning Commission
……… But the Planning Commission and the central ministries have been in existence for ten years, and
suddenly at Peitaiho they decided not to concern themselves with it (planning#). ……… By doing away with
planning I mean that they dispensed with overall balances and simply made no estimates of how much coal,
iron and transport would be needed. Coal and iron cannot walk by themselves; they need vehicles to transport
them. This I did not foresee. I and XX and the Premier did not concern ourselves with this point. You could say
that we were ignorant of it. I ought not to make excuses, but I shall too, because I am not the head of the
Planning Commission. Before August of last year my main energies were concentrated on revolution. I am a
complete outsider when it comes to economic construction, and I understand nothing about industrial
planning.* ……… But comrades, in 1958 and 1959 the main responsibility was mine ……… In the past the
responsibility was other people’s ………” (page 216, ibid) and so on. Such were the Sins committed by Chinese
communists. One may wonder what was happening in China.
Let us see one more example of such sins. Mao writes – “I do not claim to have invented the people’s
communes, only to have proposed them. The Peitaiho Resolution was drafted according to my suggestion. At
that time, it was as though I had found a treasure in the regulations of the Cha-ya-shan [commune].*” (page
216, ibid). Such were the examples of “walking on two legs” and an alternative to ‘Stalinist’ sovietism.
But then, Mao calls upon the party to study in depth the Stalin’s Economic Problems and says – “otherwise
we cannot develop and consolidate our cause* (page 217,218, ibid). Following this, Mao recommends some
classical works of Marx, Engels, Lenin as well as Stalin to be studied deeply by high ranking cadres. It seems
Mao had concentrated on reading these books himself very seriously (see on page 294, ibid).
Mao also admits on January, 1961 that – “After the victory, dealing with the lives of several hundred million
people, the situation was more complicated.……… We had no deep understanding of conditions ………” (page
299, ibid). Mao also says – “In our party there are also those who represent the landlord class and the
bourgeoisie.*” (see on page 301, ibid)
After 1960, Mao takes a lot of care of the second Five Year Plan and talks of “working on quality, technology,
standards, management, rate of production … overcoming insufficiencies ………” (page 302, ibid).
He again admits in the next paragraph – “We lack experience in economic construction” Again – “When it
comes to the productive forces, I know very little. As for our party as a whole, our knowledge of socialist
construction is very inadequate. In the forthcoming period ……… we must become clearer on the laws of
socialist contruction.*” (page 327, ibid) So such were a few examples of Mao’s attempts which he undertook,
although temporarily, to get salvation from the sins.
12
The bourgeois were still sharing power with the CPC through their political parties i.e. like Democratic
League whose members were ministers. Bourgeois were individually present in political consultative committee
which was disbanded only for a small period during the GPCR after which Mao had again started longing for it.
Chang Po-Chun, a leader of the China’s Democratic League was the minister of communication in the
Chinese Government. (See the Notes, no. 16 on Page 219, vol. VIII, Mao’s Selected Writings).
13
See appendix no. 12.
14
See appendix no. 14.
15
See appendix no. 13, 14.
16
Refer to Lenin’s On State Capitalism during the Transition to Socialism.
17
See appendix no. 16.
18
See appendix no. 12.
19
See appendix no. 12. Also see, Mao’s selected writing Hindi edition Vol. V, Directive no. 9, 10. Also see on
Page 126, ibid. Also see Page 240, ibid.
20
See Mao’s Selected Writings – Hindi version, vol. V, Page 95, Directive no. 8.
21
See appendix no. 11.
22
See on Page 125, Mao’s Selected Writings, Vol. V, Paragraph 2.
23
Refer to Vol. V, ibid.
24
See More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, page 30, Mao writes – “After
the elimination of classes, one should now continue to stress intensification of the class-struggle with the result
that the healthy development of socialist democracy was hampered. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union
is quite right in resolutely correcting Stalin’s mistakes in this respect.*” Also see, Mao’s Selected Writings,
vol. VIII, page 114, para 2, Mao writes – “We follow Lenin in the mass line and the class struggle. We want to
eliminate the bourgeois thoroughly including its ideology, but without confiscating the property and destroying
the people of the bourgeoisie.* Stalin did not promote the mass line. He played favouritism and was too
excessive in the class-struggle.*”
25
See Mao’s Selected Writings, vol. IX, page 129, para 3, Mao writes – “In our State at present one third of the
power is in the hands of the enemy or of the enemy’s sympathizers* ……… At present you can buy a [party]
branch Secretary for a few packs of cigarettes, not to mention marrying a daughter to him.”
26
The question of classes and class struggle that Mao speaks so much of was actually China specific and had
nothing to do with the USSR’s socialism under Stalin who had led the Soviet socialism to expropriate all the
bourgeois completely. China had not undertaken and completed such task (see appendix no. 24) and hence the
kind of class struggle as Mao talks of was needed, rather was delayed for too long. See what Mao says in May
1963 while enumerating four great problems and their reasons – “The historical reason. On one hand there are
regions where the task of democratic revolution has still not been completed. * There are areas where feudal
landlords have not been overturned. This is a problem of renewed revolution. On the other hand there is the
reason of the history of work. After land reform we did not handle class struggle again.*” (page 14, ibid)
27
Refer to the famous slogan of Mao – “Let hundreds of schools of thought contend, let thousands of flowers
boom.” Also see on Page 95, Directive no. 10. Mao’s Selected Writings, Hindi edition, Vol. V.
28
“Secret Report” refers to the report delivered by Nikita S. Khrushchev, as the first Secretary of the CPSU, on
February 24-25, 1956 at midnight, to a closed session of the Party’s Twentieth Congress. The fraternal
communist parties were also barred. It was also never mentioned in the columns of Pravda even.
Mao’s first ever criticism of Stalin’s practice or Soviet practice of socialism came on the 25 th April, 1956 and
was probably inspired by Khrushchevite criticism/slander of Stalin. For Mao’s aforesaid criticism of Stalin, see
on Page 267, Mao’s selected writing, Vol. V, Hindi edition.
29
Refers to Mao’s criticism of Stalin before Mao chose to defend Stalin ‘forthrightly’ and oppose
Khrushchevite anti-Stalin slanderous campaign.
30
Refers to Peitaiho’s conference when the Mao’s draft proposals for communisation were accepted. See
Appendix no. 11.
31
Refers to the Soviet Aid even after Khrushchev’s accession to Power for some time (up till 1957) after which
problems had arisen in this regard. See for CPC’s admission of this fact in the documents of Great Debate
(Hindi Edition) on Page 63, para 2. Also see on page 78, para 6, ibid.
32
Refers to ideological-theoretical and political weaknesses as well as the material weaknesses of the Chinese
socialism.
33
See Great Debate (Hindi edition) Page 63, Para 2.
34
Such over glorified statements can be found in plenty in vol. – VIII, Mao’s Selected Writings.
35
See on Page 138, vol. VIII, last paragraph which reads – “…………… currently the main problems are
coercion and false reporting.” There are many such instances in the first part of Vol. VIII, dealing with the
debacles of the Great Leap.
36
See on page 174, para 2, vol. VIII, Mao’s Selected Writings, Mao writes – “………Furthermore, there has
appeared almost everywhere the practice of the peasants’ “concealing production and dividing it among
themselves” and great unrest about food grains, edible oils, pork and vegetables being “insufficient.” The
large scale of the unrest clearly surpasses that of both the 1953 and the 1955 periods of unrest over food*. . . .
I think that we should look for the answer to the problem mainly in the area of what we know about the
ownership system in the rural people’s commune* and the policies we have adopted.”
This is how the situations stood in February 1959 in China. But let us listen from Mao who was obviously only
concerned with the ownership system to find solution to such problems, how he talks of people’s poverty and
sufferings ---- “Some provinces are extremely poor. It does not matter if they remain poor for another few
decades (!#)” (page 144, ibid). Let us also see how he had done self-criticism about the same just one page back.
Mao says – “I made a mistake at the Peitaiho conference. Concentrating on the 10.7 million tons of steel, the
people’s commune and the bombardment of Quemoy, I did not think of other things. I failed to combine
revolutionary fervour and the practical spirit.” (page 143, ibid)
As for the readers to help them understand the gravity of the situation in the first year of the communes, let us
have more quotes from Mao’s Selected Writings, vol. VIII on page 169. Mao says – “……… old women
blocked the way and wouldn’t let the food be taken and this problem is reappearing in the first year of the
communes.*”
On the same page – “During the discussions on the report it was stated that some people were afraid of the
commercial departments buying up their pigs. So they turned the pigs loose on the land and let them run off
and some people hid them* in the cotton.” On page 176, para 3, Mao himself mentions trends of egalitarianism
and that of excessive concentration (wasteful). Mao says – “At the same time, a good many communes
and hsien have extracted too much capital accumulation (and still poverty was widespread, strange! #) from the
production brigades and, moreover, the administrative expenditures of the communes include a great deal of
waste*. For example, there are some large communes that have as many as a thousand or more working
personnel who eat without doing any labour and there are even cultural work teams which are divorced from
production altogether.” Mao also ‘enlightens’ us more on the political economy of the communes in this
manner – “It consisted mainly of three elements: the first was the levelling of the poor and the rich brigades*,
the second was that capital accumulation by the commune was too great and the commune’s demand for labour
without compensation (!#) was too great and the third was the “communization” of all kinds of “property.”
Mao opposes these all but without grasping the “substance” and could understand all these only when large
scale unrest surfaced.
It should not be doubted that it was a ‘forced’ communization, not even on the basis of ideologically awakened
masses and their conscious activism. Let us hear from Mao himself – “The things (taken away by the
communes#) must be given back. You cannot say that what is yours is mine and just pick up things and walk off
……… The Red and Green gangs (The Shanghai’s Underworlds in 1920s#) behaved like this stealing and
robbing away in broad day light.” (page 208, ibid) Is this establishing higher forms of socialism or thwarting
every such future prospect of it? Is it communist wind or capitalist wind, as only capitalists and saboteurs will
be pleased and make merry out of such hellish things harming communism irreparably? But Mao will not stop
defending such ‘enthusiasm’ – “We must not pour cold water on this kind of broad mass movement.”(page 207,
ibid) He then asks common, “illiterate” people, the peasants and everyone else to study political economy as if
he himself had well understood everything and had no share of the sins committed, as if masses acted in
contradiction with party and leaders, as if the party was being led by the masses.
37
See the above.
38
See the previous appendices. Also see pages 143, 245, 302, 306, Vol. VIII, ibid.
39
See the previous appendices particularly no. 3.
40
See on pages 227, 235, vol. VIII. These are data available.
41
See on page 240, vol. VIII, ibid.
42
See appendix no. 40.
43
See on page 294, vol. VIII, ibid.
44
See on page 229, 299, vol. VIII, ibid.
45
See on page 304, 331 (Para 2), vol. VIII, ibid.
46
See previous appendices.
47
See previous appendices.
48
See previous appendices.
49
See on Page 333, vol. VIII, ibid.
50
See on page 346, vol. VIII, ibid.
51
See on Page 308, vol. VIII, ibid.
52
See on Page 351, vol. VIII, ibid.
53
See on page 57, vol. IX, ibid.
Mao says – “We shouldn’t read too many books. We should read Marxist books, but not too many of them
either. If we read too many, we can move towards our opposites, become bookworms, dogmatists,
revisionists,* ………” and so on. Really strange! This is the great Maoist dialectics!! Let us have a little more
glimpses of such a theory of his. We have seen him earlier on the question of “Red and Expert” where he
believes that more (emphasis on) technology will turn into capitalism. True to himself, Mao believes that
too much “Marx” in someone’s brain will change him into a revisionist. See how Mao theorises masses
learning ‘advanced’ technology – “……… on the basis of raising [the standard] of understanding of the masses,
[we] permit and encourage the masses to break those rules and regulations which restrict the development of
the productive forces. ……… They (party leaders and the people belonging to the central departments #) should
develop innovations of this kind [attained] at the basic level and by the masses which are beneficial to socialist
construction ………” (page 28, vol. VIII, ibid). It was actually “a levelling down proceeding from the
preconceived minimum” leading to a socialism based on “crude” productive forces and abandonment of “the
entire world of modern culture and civilization” which yes, capitalism has so far produced (and is now
destroying as well) as the historical-material basis for socialism.
Again Mao feels quite rightly that “the fundamental way out of agriculture lies in mechanisation”. But then he
cannot understand it in the correct Marxist perspective. He says – “Every province, every district and every
county must establish farm tools research stations and concentrate a group of scientific-technological personnel
and experienced carpenters and blacksmiths of the rural areas to gather together all kinds of more advanced
farm tools from every province………” (page 192, ibid). So what Mao meant was not something urgently
needed such as heavy tractors, fertilizers, harvesters etc. only which could have mechanised the Chinese
agriculture completely. He understands that economic work cannot be done in a haphazard manner only in “high
sounding” talks, but cannot understand how to come out of the mess. (See the last para on page 192).
On page 165 (ibid), Mao says, “In regard to the problem of planned and proportionate development of the
national economy. I am not very clear.” But then having said so, he had no business criticising Stalin which
means he talked so high of the things which, he himself says (as the one above), did know ‘nothing’ about.
When Mao comes to studying Marx, Lenin or Stalin and political economy, he is still very much under the spell
of his own creative thinking. See how he argues – “There may not be anyone who understands all this
completely. There are some who have understood some of it. Let them understand some more. If the top cadres
of the commune don’t understand a little (why a little only!#) political economy, this won’t do. If people cannot
read, you can explain to them ……… I think they can learn it ……… infact they can understand better than
intellectuals. I myself have not read the text book and I have no right to discuss them until I have. * We must
squeeze but sometime ………” (page 209). For all these, he then has all the right to denounce and malign Stalin
as if he was even less literate than Mao’s own comrade in arms! But then one may not understand who will
explain political economy to whom, as none, not even Mao is well-versed in Marxism! And lastly, although
Mao, in his speech at the 6th plenum of the 8th Central Committee, calls upon to study Stalin’s “Economic
Problems” and Marx on the communist society, he pushed forward his own creative understanding of political
economy of socialism. He talks of “native” and “foreign” method instead of backward and advanced method.
He talks of local areas having enough authority instead of consistent centralized planning. He talks of
“preferential” development of heavy industry, yet he emphasises “simultaneous” promotion of industry and
agriculture, heavy and light industry, large and small or medium scale production. But, then, in Mao’s brain
“concentrating preferentially” very quickly metamorphosizes into “concentrating only” on heavy
industries (big projects) and then naturally turns out to be monotonous in a fraction of a second (see on
page 149, vol. VIII). Thus Marxist understanding is being turned null and void perhaps for someone’s
entertainment!
54
See above.
55
See appendix no. 11.
56
See above.
57
See on page 9 (notes), vol. IX, Mao’s Selected Writings, “The team is the basic ownership and production
unit, owning the land it works, a number of draught animals, and small agricultural tools such as threshers and
crushers. The next unit, the production brigade ……… owns larger means of production too expensive for the
team to buy and too large for them to use effectively ……… In addition to providing over all coordination
among the brigades, the communes own and run large industrial enterprises and projects too large for the
brigade to handle, such as large water conservancy programmes.”
58
See the previous appendices. Actually a reader can find such things in all the writings of Mao during and after
the Great Leap period.
59
See on page 63-64, Feuerbach, Opposition of Materialistic and Idealistic Outlook, Marx-Engels’ selected
work in three volumes, vol. I.
Marx says, “The setting up of a communal domestic economy presupposes the development of machinery, the
use of natural forces and of many other productive forces ……… lacking any material basis and resting on
purely theoretical foundation, it would be a mere freak and would end in nothing more than a monastic
economy………”
60
See the previous appendices.
61
See on page 333, vol. VIII, Mao’s Selected Writings.
62
Many, particularly the Dengite revisionists including CPI and CPM, reject the GPCR on this basis alone.
63
See the data from Chinese Hand Book series “ECONOMY”, Foreign Language Press, Beijing.
64
See the previous appendices.
65
See the previous appendices. Here we mean, had Mao not been unsuccessful in seeing through the difficulties
the main key link – the DOP and material development under it.
66
See on pages 74, 75 (footnotes), vol. V, Mao’s Selected Writings.
67
See on page 309, vol. IX, ibid.
68
See on page 309, Mao’s talk at the central work conference dated October 25, 1966.
Also see on page 313, the notes, no. 1, which says that Mao broke with Liu only when he opposed Mao’s fresh
(new) twenty-three point directive for the Socialist Education Campaign in January, 1965. It is really
unbelievable given the general belief among the communist revolutionaries about Mao-Liu estrangement.
69
See the above.
70
See appendix no. 69.
71
See on page 19, ibid – “The important points (on rules and regulations) are drafted by comrade Liu-Shao-Chi
after consultations with comrades working the regions; only a few are put forward by me* …………” So, Mao
and Liu were united for all practical purposes on the eve of Great Leap. The CPC’s 8th Congress is called Liu’s
only because Mao had consented and allowed it to be.
72
Almost all the followers of Maoism or Mao Tse-tung Thought believe overtly or covertly that Liu’s right
deviation had its origin in their allegiance to Stalin’s practice of socialism.
73
See on page 25, vol. VIII, ibid.
74
Same as above.
75
See on page 25, vol. VIII, Mao says – “Technological revolution is designed to make everyone learn
technology and science.” The subsequent lines show that Mao was not discussing technological revolution from
the point of view of material-historical perspective of creating grounds for building higher forms of socialism,
but out of his moral obligations to help the poor masses learn science and also out of his drives to instantly put
an end to division of labour. Even this much, when it really comes to learning and realising it, then for him
“there is not yet the need to publicize it in the newspaper” (page 25, ibid). In the same manner when Mao deals
with the question of change over from small collectives to large scale collectives, Mao rightly says that it can
take place step by step by which he scarcely means step by step corresponding to the material achievement,
but step by step corresponding to their (masses) ideological awakening towards the goal of communism.
76
See on page 302, vol. IX, ibid, Mao says – “I read the report (the one containing the theory of disappearance
of classes#) and it was passed by the Congress. We cannot make those two – Liu and Teng – solely responsible.”
So clear enough, the report had the consent of Mao.
77
See the above appendices.

78
See on page 302, vol. IX, Mao says – “The party added many new members. Were they all good? Are the
democratic parties all so very bad? I think the democratic parties are better than P’eng, Lo, Lu and Yong. We
still want the democratic parties, the political consultative conference; * we should explain this clearly to the
Red Guards.”
79
See the above.
80
See the above appendices.

*
Bold in the quote by SS’s author for emphasis.
#
SS’s author’s added comments.