PLAIR Notes - Revision Checklist 1-16
PLAIR Notes - Revision Checklist 1-16
Territorial Scope (Tehrani case): there is no extra territorial jurisdiction courts enjoy; must be within
territory of Scottish courts
Court of Session has jurisdiction over decisions taken in Scotland, relating to people located in
Scotland
Tehrani v Secretary of State for the Home Department:
o Petitioner must show “sufficient connection with Scotland” to invoke supervisory
jurisdiction of Court of Session – factors HoL considered here were: petitioner was
resident in Scotland; “harmful effects” were likely to be felt in Scotland; determination was
made exercising UK-wide jurisdiction
o Physical location of where decision took place isn’t decisive – even if appeal took place
in England, as long as it applied UK law it could still be brought for judicial review in
Scotland
o where both courts have jurisdiction, case is to be treated like any other case over which
2 jurisdictions preside – wherever case starts off in is the one where jurisdiction applies
unless respondent has taken plea of forum non conveniens whereby forum is deeply
inconvenient for him in which case it will take place somewhere else
What are the differences in the procedure of judicial review between Scotland and England?/Standing
Before and After Axa. Remember, there must be a petitioner for the Court of Session to review an
administrative decision. It cannot review decisions on its own initiative./What changes were brought
to the procedure of judicial review through Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 (Introduction of
Permission Stage, Sufficient Interest Test, Time Limits)
Court of Session can’t review acts of decision makers on its own initiative; someone must bring
in something for judicial review; rules of ‘standing’ developed under common law have
established who has capacity to bring action for judicial review
standing rules in England: sufficient interest test
standing rules in Scotland pre-Axa: title and interest to sue
o title to sue
D&J Nicol v Dundee Harbour Trustees: Applicant “must be a party to some legal
relationship which gives him some right which the person against whom he raises
the action either infringes or denies”
Scottish Old People’s Welfare Council, Petitioners: court found that social
security legislation conferred rights to bring proceedings to enforce its
proper administration on general public subject to demonstrating interest;
thus, organisation contained members who had those rights and had title to
sue
Rape Crisis Centre v. Secretary of State for the Home Department:
petitioners sought to challenge decision to grant Mike Tyson (convicted
rapist) leave to enter UK to participate in boxing match; court held that
immigration rules were only addressed to immigration officials and no
express/implied rights were conferred on any other parties; thus
organisation didn’t have title to sue
o interest to sue
Scottish Old People’s Welfare Council: established interest requirement which
Council couldn’t satisfy bc decision didn’t affect actual claimants though Rape
Crisis Centre did due to its concrete aim [to stop Tyson’s entry into UK]
exception: public interest intervention rules where applicant doesn’t need title and interest to
sue bc they are intervening in existing petition; they only need to show that petition concerns
matter of public interest and that their intervention is relevant to cause, will assist court and
won’t unduly delay parties’ rights
o Sustainable Shetland v Scottish Ministers: Royal Society for Protection of Birds applied
for leave to intervene in public interest in protest against wind farm; Inner House refused,
holding that they should have intervened at earlier stage and that there was no benefit to
be derived from intervention as legal issue was already being argued by one of actual
parties to case
In Gill Review [report of Scottish civil courts review that looked at judicial review and how it was
working in all its dimensions] Lord Gill said test should be brought in line with English sufficient
interest test
o AXA General Insurance Limited, Petitioners: 2009 Act entitled people to sue insurance
companies for damages due to personal injury; insurance companies said SP didn’t have
power to pass this law; certain people had attempted to come into case as additional
respondents; Lord Hope said only sufficient interest test [which depends upon context]
was required – petitioner needed to be “directly affected” and not “mere busybody”
o Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 which implemented Gill Review recommendations
thus provided (in s89) that standing was satisfied by sufficient interest
In England there is strict 3-month time limit (CPR Part 54.5); in Scotland there was traditionally
no specific time limit within which application had to be brought unless statute imposed it but
respondent public authority may make common law preliminary plea of mora, taciturnity and
acquiescence; if sustained, plea will suffice to dismiss application without consideration of merits
of case
o Mora is unreasonable delay in bringing legal proceedings but period of time required to
establish mora depends on facts and circumstances of case; taciturnity connotes
petitioner's failure to assert claim when it should reasonably be expected that person in
petitioner's position would speak out; acquiescence implies that petitioner by their conduct
when viewed objectively has assented to decision
o Uprichard v Fife Council: unjustified 19-week delay coupled with costly reliance meant
that application was dismissed
o Hanlon v Traffic Commissioner: All three elements – mora, taciturnity and acquiescence
– must be present to found plea: delay alone is not enough (Somerville v Scottish
Ministers)
o Gill Review recommended 3-month time limit like in England; 2014 Act s89 thus
established 3-month time limit beginning with date on which grounds giving rise to
application first arise or “such longer period as the Court considers equitable having
regard to all the circumstances”.
o McHarg’s criticism: “[A] statutory time bar shifts the burden of proof from the respondent
to establish that the delay was unreasonable to the petitioner to prove that it was not.
Moreover, there is a worrying suggestion in the Scottish Legal Aid Board’s response to
the consultation on the draft Bill that petitions brought after three months are unlikely to
obtain legal aid”.
In England leave from court is required before petition for judicial review can proceed to full
hearing; in Scotland no leave was required
o Gill Review recommended leave filter to filter out unmeritorious claims and prompt early
settlement – thus petitioner had to show sufficient interest AND real prospect of success;
2014 Act s89 thus established leave filter
o McHarg’s criticism: This creates unnecessary additional barriers to access to judicial
review in Scotland.
Historically in Scotland standing was more restrictive than in England; for other matters e.g.
leave, timing, etc. Scotland had wider rules; however, Scots law has aligned with England now
The Court of Session can also review a public authority’s failure to act and can compel the authority
to take positive action through judicial review.
West: in addition to any excess/abuse of power, Court of Session can also review public
authority’s failure to act within limits of its jurisdiction
HRA 1998 s6(6): an act includes failure to act but doesn’t include failure to introduce in/lay before
Parliament a proposal for legislation or make any primary legislation or remedial order
GCHQ: procedural impropriety includes failure to act with procedural fairness
What are the available Remedies? Remember, the Court of Session can order remedies regardless if
these were sought in the original petition.
court can do many things:
o reduction – set aside decision
o declarator – declare that some rights exist
o suspension – suspend decision before administration looks at it again
o interdict – prevent someone from doing sth
o implementation – compel implementation of particular performance
o restitution and payment – restore ur position + give u damages
but court can’t interfere with a decision – it doesn’t act as a formal appeal on merits of decision
What was the Impact of the Human Rights Act to judicial review? Remember, the Scottish
Parliament is considered to be a public authority for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998 s6.
HRA 1998 s.6 created new statutory head of illegality – established that it is unlawful for public
authority to act in way that breaches convention right
this doesn’t apply where
o authority couldn’t have acted differently as a result of one or more provisions of primary
legislation; or
o in the case of one or more provisions of, or made under, primary legislation which can’t
be read or given effect in way which is compatible with Convention rights, authority was
acting so as to give effect to or enforce those provisions
HRA 1998 s6(3) defines “public authority” as court/tribunal/any person [not in connection with
Parliament/House of Parliament] whose functions are of public nature
HRA 1998 s6(6) extends “act” to include failure to act but doesn’t include failure to introduce to
Parliament proposal for legislation/make any primary legislation/remedial order
shorter time limit (1 year) under HRA 1998 s.7(5) for breach of ECHR right
o R (North Cyprus Tourism Centre) v Transport for London: court held that ban on North
Cyprus Tourism Centre’s holiday advertisement posters by London authority for political
reasons was considered breach of ECHR art.10 which guarantees freedom of expression
o R (Begum) v Denbigh High School: demonstrated that in domestic judicial review court is
more concerned about way local authority makes decision; in Convention judicial review
it’s what decision local authority makes; Begum brought action against her school’s
Muslim policy which permitted only particular type of Muslim dress on basis of ECHR art.9
(freedom of religion and conscience) and art.2 (freedom of education); court held policy
was justified, establishing that each school has right to form its own uniform policy; though
art.9 right to hold religious belief is absolute, right to manifest ur religious belief is subject
to certain restrictions; therefore, court found that uniform policy didn’t violate art.9
o Miss Behavin’ Ltd v Belfast CC: court rejected claim that refusal to grant license to sex
shops was freedom of expression issue and held that this was licensing issue, saying that
decision-makers are better placed to make decision on limitation of rights than they were
Procedural Impropriety: Express provision / common law standard, Mandatory / Directory, Natural
Justice and Fairness, Legitimate Expectations, Right to be heard, Duty to give reasons, Rules against
bias.
GCHQ: established that there are 2 elements to procedural impropriety
o breach of express provision of instrument granting decision-making power: courts can
ensure that prescribed procedural standards have been observed
o breach of implied provision/common law implied standards of procedural
propriety/principles of natural justice
Moss’ Empires Ltd v Assessor for Glasgow: authority’s decision can be quashed if
it does right thing in wrong way; petitioner was not informed that right of appeal
was available to him which was enough to render decision nullity
court may hold that petitioner in absence of concrete right nevertheless had
legitimate expectation that decision-maker would act in particular way; allowed
fairness in public administration so petitioners and ordinary citizens could place
their trust/reliance on particular conduct of public decision-maker; to be decided by
courts in each case; there are 2 elements to this doctrine
procedural: public authority has followed certain way of making decisions in
past which petitioner relied on and that way changed to petitioner’s
detriment
substantive: applicant seeks particular benefit/commodity, for instance
welfare benefit; once again claim to such benefit will be founded upon some
governmental action which is said to justify existence of relevant expectation
nonetheless, it is always balancing act between what courts supervise and right
and liberty of governments and administration to make changes for public interest
the liberty to make policy changes is inherent in government
R v North & East Devon HA ex parte Coughlan: established that legitimate
expectation shouldn’t unduly fetter discretionary choices; legitimate
expectation requires proof of expectation + proof that public body had
sufficient reasons to depart from expectation
A-G of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629: Where public body has
made ‘representation’ as to its future conduct
o board people of Vietnam were flocking in great numbers to HK
seeking political asylum; sudden change of immigration policy where
certain undertaking/representation made to this category of
immigration applicants was suddenly devoid; felt that undertaking
was taken in such specific and concrete terms to give rise to
legitimate expectation
Walsh v Secretary of State for Scotland: in certain circumstances where
sufficiently concrete release date has been announced it might be case that
petitioner can claim that legitimate expectation has arisen
Rooney v Chief Constable of Strathclyde Police: legitimate expectation that
procedural guidelines issued by the Secretary of State would be followed
natural justice and fairness
R (on the application of Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs: neither party must privately communicate with judge
3 basic elements
o right to be heard – audi alteram partem – no general common law
requirement for hearing for every case but courts have typically
argued that fairness requires hearing taking place;
Irvine v Royal Burgess Golfing Society of Edinburgh: Golfing
Society was held to be procedurally improper because it failed
to give member who was kicked out of club for disrupting other
members’ play opportunity/procedure to give his version of
events; established that failure to hold hearing may render
decision invalid
o duty to give reasons
English v Emery Reimbold & Strick: justice will not be done if
it is not apparent to parties why one has won and other has
lost; courts deny that there is general common law rule
requiring reasons to be given for decisions but fairness and
ability to determine whether decision-making process has
been intra vires may require that reasons are given
even where there is no duty to give reasons but reasons have
been given, courts will take it upon themselves to view those
reasons to decide whether decision was intra/ultra vires
(Smith) v Parole Board (No 2); R (Hammond) v Home
Secretary: there is no requirement for oral hearing to take
place for decision to be deemed fair; it will depend on
circumstances of case; the greater the impact of the decision
to the petitioner, the greater the likelihood of lack of oral
hearing being found unfair
o rules against bias
actual bias: judge is party to litigation/has interest in outcome;
leads to automatic disqualification, e.g.
Sellar v Highland Railway Co: arbiter had pecuniary
interest – was shareholder in party to arbitration
R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex
parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2): interests in promotion of
cause
potential bias: conduct/behaviour of judge is such as to give
rise to suspicion that he is not impartial possible
disqualification; test is applied to determine whether decision-
maker should be disqualified
Porter v Magill: The question is whether the fair-minded
and informed observer, having considered the facts,
would conclude that there was a real possibility that the
tribunal was biased.
Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd: religion,
ethnic or national origin, gender, age, class, means or
sexual orientation, social or educational background,
previous political associations, extra-curricular
utterances, membership of social bodies and Masonic
associations can’t disqualify judge for bias
Hoekstra v HMA (No 2), 2000 SCCR 367: Lord
McCluskey’s scathing newspaper article attacking
Human Rights Act was enough to disqualify him for
bias in case involving criminals raising human rights
arguments
courts used to make distinction between
o mandatory procedural requirements – non-compliance with these requirements is fatal to
validity of decision
o directory procedural requirements – non-compliance doesn’t affect validity
R v Soneji: Lord Steyn held that mandatory/directory distinction had outlived its usefulness bc it
was felt to lead to inconsistent conclusions in different cases and suggested looking at whether
Parliament intended non-compliance to result in total invalidity; however, as j munro says,
statutes rarely make clear what effect of non-compliance will be so it will have to fall to courts to
determine issue which is question of construction [of interpretation] to be decided by reference
to whole scheme and purpose of measure, necessitating weighing of many complicated factors,
e.g. importance of condition prejudice to private rights and interests flowing from non-compliance
and claims of wider public interest, etc. to decide what legal effects are
Shahid v Scottish Ministers: some parts seemed to affirm approach in Soneji whereas others still
seemed to rely on “traditional” view of consequences of “merely directory” provision and suggest
that distinction may yet have continuing force in law
Recent Supreme Court cases on the relationship between irrationality and proportionality
[Supreme Court case] Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department: suggested that
judges were setting stage to rework principles of substantive review, for which proportionality
would be valuable
[Supreme Court case] Keyu v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs:
suggested replacement of Wednesbury rationality basis which set far too high threshold with
proportionality test which was more structured and principled
[Supreme Court case] Youssef v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs: Lord
Carnwarth made it clear that where fundamental rights are interfered with proportionality
approach to review will be appropriate; said it is unlikely that different result would be obtained
using proportionality test rather than traditional grounds of review – there is less of distinction
between these doctrines than some commentators believe; so hoped that “an opportunity can
be found in the near future for an authoritative review in this court of the judicial and academic
learning on the issue”