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SECOND DIVISION

LAND TRANSPORTATION G.R. No. 213088

FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY
BOARD (LTFRB), Present:
Petitioner,
CARPIO, * J, Chairperson,
.
PERALTA**
'
MENDOZA,
- versus - LEONEN, and
MARTIRES, JJ.

Promulgated:
G.V. FLORIDA TRANSPORT, INC.,
Respondent. 2

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the

reversal and setting aside of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
dated June 26, 2014 in CA-G.R. SP No. 134772.

The pertinent factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as

follows:

Around 7:20 in the morning of February 7, 2014, a vehicular accident

occurred at Sitio Paggang, Barangay Talubin, Bontoc, Mountain Province
involving a public utility bus coming from Sampaloc, Manila, bound for
Poblacion Bontoc and bearing a "G.V. Florida" body mark with License

On wellness leave.
Acting Chairperson, per Special Order No. 2445 dated June 16, 2017.
Penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante, with the concurrence of Associate Justices
Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and Melchor Q.C. Sadang; Annex "A" to Petition, rollo pp. 29-48.

cl
Decision -2- GR. No. 213088

Plate No. TXT-872. The mishap claimed the lives of fifteen (15) passengers
and injured thirty-two (32) others.

An initial investigation report, which came from the Department of

Transportation and Communications of the Cordillera Administrative Region
(DOTC-CAR), showed that based on the records of the Land Transportation
Office (LTO) and herein petitioner, License Plate No. TXT-872 actually
belongs to a different bus owned by and registered under the name of a
certain Norberto Cue, Sr. (Cue) under Certificate of Public Convenience
(CPC) Case No. 2007-0407 and bears engine and chassis numbers
LX004564 and KN2EAM12PK004452, respectively; and that the bus
involved in the accident is not duly authorized to operate as a public
transportation.

Thus, on the same day of the accident, herein petitioner, pursuant to its
regulatory powers, immediately issued an Order2 preventively suspending,
for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days, the operations of ten (10) buses
of Cue under its CPC Case No. 2007-0407, as well as respondent's entire
fleet of buses, consisting of two hundred and twenty-eight (228) units, under
its twenty-eight (28) CPCs. In the same Order, respondent and Cue were
likewise directed to comply with the following:

1. Inspection and determination of road worthiness of the authorized PUB

unit of respondents-operators bringing the said buses to the Motor Vehicle
Inspection Service (MVIS) of the Land Transportation Office, together
with the authorized representatives of the Board;

2. Undergo Road Safety Seminar of respondents-operators' drivers and

conductors to be conducted or scheduled by the Board and/or its
authorized seminar provider;

3. Compulsory Drug Testing of the respondents-operators' drivers and

conductors to be conducted by authorized/accredited agency of the
Department of Health and the Land Transportation Office;

4. Submit the Certificates of Registration and latest LTO Official Receipts

of the units, including the names of the respective drivers and conductors;
and

5. Submit the video clippings of roadworthiness inspection, Road Safety

Seminar and Drug Testing. 3

Furthermore, respondent and Cue were ordered to show cause why

their respective CPCs should not be suspended, canceled or revoked due to
the said accident.

Annex "D" to Petition, rollo, pp. 77-86.

Rollo, p. 85.
cl
Decision -3- G.R. No. 213088

Thereafter, in its Incident Report dated February 12, 2014, the

DOTC-CAR stated, among others: that the License Plate Number attached to
the ill-fated bus was indeed TXT-872, which belongs to a different unit
owned by Cue; that the wrecked bus had actual engine and chassis numbers
DE12T-601104BD and KTP1011611C, 4 respectively; that, per registration
records, the subject bus was registered as "private" on April 4, 2013 with
issued License Plate No. UDO 762; and that the registered owner is
Dagupan Bus Co., Inc. (Dagupan Bus) while the previous owner is herein
respondent bus company.

As a result, Dagupan Bus was also ordered to submit an Answer on

the DOTC-CAR Incident Report, particularly, to explain why the bus
involved in the above accident, which is registered in its name, was sporting
the name "G.V. Florida" at the time of the accident.

Subsequently, Dagupan Bus filed its Answer claiming that: it is not the
owner of the bus which was involved in the accident; the owner is G.V.
Florida; Dagupan Bus entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with G.V.
Florida, which, among others, facilitated the exchange of its CPC covering
the Cagayan route for the CPC of Florida covering the Bataan route; and the
subsequent registration of the subject bus in the name of Dagupan Bus is a
mere preparatory act on the part of G.V. Florida to substitute the old
authorized units of Dagupan Bus plying the Cagayan route which are being
operated under the abovementioned CPC which has been exchanged with
G. V. Florida.

On the other hand, Cue filed his Position Paper contending that:
License Plate No. TXT-872 was issued by the LTO to one among ten public
utility buses under CPC No. 2007-040i issued to him as operator of the
Mountain Province Cable Tours; the application for the extension of the
validity of the said CPC is pending with petitioner; the subject CPC,
together with all authorized units, had been sold to G.V. Florida in
September 2013; and thereafter, Cue completely ceded the operation and
maintenance of the subject buses in favor of G.R. Florida.

In its Position Paper, herein respondent alleged that: it, indeed, bought
Cue's CPC and the ten public utility buses operating under the said CPC,
including the one which bears License Plate No. TXT-872; since Cue's buses

4
In petitioner's preventive suspension order, it was indicated that, based on the initial investigation
and report of the DOTC-CAR, the engine and chassis numbers of the subject bus were I 00300120 and
RF82140667. However, records show that these numbers were not actually taken from the engine and
chassis of the bus but were simply copied from the markings appearing on its body. It appears that these

d
were the engine and chassis numbers of the bus which were not erased when it was rebuilt.
5
The buses registered under the said CPC were authorized to ply the route Sagada, Bontoc-Manila
and vice-versa.
Decision -4- G.R. No. 213088

were already old and dilapidated, and not wanting to stop its operations to
the detriment of the riding public, it replaced these buses with new units
using the License Plates attached to the old buses, pending approval by
petitioner of the sale and transfer of Cue's CPC in its favor; and it exercised
utmost good faith in deciding to dispatch the ill-fated bus notwithstanding
the absence of prior adequate compliance with the requirements that will
constitute its operation legal.

On March 14, 2014, herein petitioner rendered its Decision canceling

Cue's CPC No. 2007-0407 and suspending the operation of respondent's 186
buses under 28 of its CPCs for a period of six (6) months. Pertinent portions
of the dispositive portion of the said Decision read as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered and by virtue of

Commonwealth Act 146 (otherwise known as "The Public Service Law"),
as amended, and Executive Order No. 202, the Board hereby ORDERS
that:

a. The Certificate of Public Convenience of respondent-

operator NORBERTO M. CUE, SR. under Case No. 2007-
0407, now under the beneficial ownership of respondent-
operator G.V. FLORIDA TRANSPORT, INC., be
CANCELLED and REVERTED to the State. Therefore,
upon receipt of this Decision, respondent-operator G.V.
FLORIDA TRANSPORT, INC. is hereby directed to
CEASE and DESIST from operating the Certificate of
Public Convenience under Case No. 2007-0407 involving
ten (10) authorized units, to wit:

xx xx

b. Upon finality of this Decision, the above-mentioned for

hire plates of respondent-operator NORBERTO M. CUE,
SR. are hereby ordered DESTRUCTED (sic) and
DESTROYED prior to their turn over to the Land
Transportation Office (LTO).

xx xx

c. All existing Certificates of Public Convenience of

respondent-operator G.V. FLORIDA TRANSPORT, INC.
under case numbers listed under case numbers listed below
are hereby SUSPENDED for a period of SIX (6)
MONTHS commencing from March 11, 2014, which is the
lapse of the 30-day preventive suspension order issued by
this Board, to wit:

xx xx

I
Decision -5- G.R. No. 213088

[d.] During the period of suspension of its CPCs and as a

condition for the lifting thereof, respondent-operator G.V.
FLORIDA TRANSPORT, INC. must comply with the
following:

1. All its authorized drivers must secure the

National Competency III issued by the
Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA)

2. All its conductors must secure

Conductor's License from the Land
Transportation Office (LTO);

3. Submit all its authorized units that have

not undergone inspection and determination
of roadworthiness to the Motor Vehicle
Inspection Service of the LTO, together with
the authorized representatives of the Board;
and

4. Compulsory Drug Testing of all its

authorized drivers and conductors to be
conducted by the authorized accredited
agency of the Department of Health and the
Land Transportation Office at least thirty
(30) days before the expiration of its
suspens10n.

[e.] The Show Cause Order issued against respondent-

operator DAGUPAN BUS CO., INC. is hereby SET
ASIDE.

The Information Systems Management Division (ISMD) is also

directed to make proper recording of this Decision for future reference
against subject vehicles and respondents-operators. During the period of
suspension of its CPCs, respondent-operator G.V. FLORIDA
TRANSPORT, INC. is allowed to confirm its authorized units subject to
submission of all requirements for confirmation.

The Law Enforcement Unit of this Board, the Land

Transportation Office (LTO), the Metro Manila Development
Authority (MMDA), the Philippine National Police-Highway Patrol
Group (PNP-HPG), and other authorized traffic enforcement agencies are
hereby ordered to APPREHEND and IMPOUND the said vehicles, if
found operating.

SO ORDERED. 6 {/!
6
Rollo, pp. 63-72. (Emphasis in the original)
Decision -6- G.R. No. 213088

Respondent then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
mandatory injunction, assailing petitioner's above Decision.

On June 26, 2014, the CA promulgated its questioned Decision,

disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The

Decision dated March 14, 2014 of the Land Transportation Franchising
and Regulatory Board is MODIFIED as follows:

1. The Order canceling and reverting to the State of the

Certificate of Public Convenience of operator Cue under
Case No. 2007-0407, under the beneficial ownership of
petitioner G.V. Florida Transport, Inc. is AFFIRMED;

2. The penalty of suspension for a period of six (6) months

against all existing 28 Certificates of Public Convenience
of petitioner G.V. Florida, Transport, Inc., is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE;

3. The condition set forth in the Decision for the lifting of

the penalty of suspension is DELETED; and

4. The order to apprehend and impound petitioner G.V.

Florida Transport, Inc. 's 186 authorized bus units under the
28 CPCs if found operating is RECALLED

Accordingly, petitioner G.V. Florida Transport, Inc. prayer for

mandatory injunctive relief is hereby GRANTED. The Land
Transportation and Franchising Regulatory Board is hereby ordered to
immediately LIFT the order of suspension and RETURN or CAUSE the
RETURN of the confiscated license plates of petitioner G.V. Florida
Transport, Inc.'s 186 authorized bus units under its 28 Certificates of
Public Convenience without need of further order from this Court. Said
Office is further DIRECTED to submit its Compliance within five (5)
days from receipt thereof.

SO ORDERED. 7

Hence, the present petition grounded on a lone issue, to wit:

DOES THE LTFRB HAVE THE POWER TO SUSPEND THE

FLEET OF A PUBLIC UTILITY THAT VIOLATES THE LAW, TO THE
DAMAGE OF THE PUBLIC? 8

Id. at 47-48. (Emphasis in the original)

r7
Id. at 16.
Decision -7- G.R. No. 213088

The main issue brought before this Court is whether or not petitioner
is justified in suspending respondent's 28 CPCs for a period of six (6)
months. In other words, is the suspension within the powers of the LTFRB to
impose and is it reasonable?

Petitioner contends that it is vested by law with jurisdiction to regulate

the operation of public utilities; that under Section 5(b) of Executive Order
No. 202 (E. 0. 202), 9 it is authorized "[t]o issue, amend, revise, suspend or
cancel Certificates of Public Convenience or permits authorizing the
operation of public land transportation services provided by motorized
vehicles, and to prescribe the appropriate terms and conditions therefor;" and
that petitioner's authority to impose the penalty of suspension of CPCs of
bus companies found to have committed violations of the law is broad and is
consistent with its mandate and regulatory capability.

On the other hand, respondent, in its Comment to the present Petition,

contends that the suspension of its 28 CPCs is tantamount to an outright
confiscation of private property without due process of law; and that
petitioner cannot simply ignore respondent's property rights on the pretext of
promoting public safety. Respondent insists that the penalty imposed by
petitioner is not commensurate to the infraction it had committed.

The Court rules in favor of petitioner.

Section 16(n) of Commonwealth Act. No. 146, otherwise known as

the Public Service Act, provides:

Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and

hearing. - The Commission shall have power, upon proper notice and
hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to
the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the
contrary:

xx xx

(n) To suspend or revoke any certificate issued under the

provisions of this Act whenever the holder thereof has
violated or willfully and contumaciously refused to comply
with any order rule or regulation of the Commission or any
provision of this Act: Provided, That the Commission, for
good cause, may prior to the hearing suspend for a period
not to exceed thirty days any certificate or the exercise of
any right or authority issued or granted under this Act by
order of the Commission, whenever such step shall in the

9
Creating the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board, which was issued on J:J'/
19, 1987. {//"
Decision -8- GR. No. 213088

judgment of the Commission be necessary to avoid serious

and irreparable damage or inconvenience to the public or to
private interests.

xx xx

Also, Section 5(b) ofE.O. 202 states:

Sec. 5. Powers and Functions of the Land Transportation Franchising and

Regulatory Board. The Board shall have the following powers and
functions:

xx xx

b. To issue, amend, revise, suspend or cancel Certificates of Public

Convenience or permits authorizing the operation of public land
transportation services provided by motorized vehicles, and to
prescribe the appropriate terms and conditions therefor;

xx xx

In the present case, respondent is guilty of several violations of the

law, to wit: lack of petitioner's approval of the sale and transfer of the CPC
which respondent bought from Cue; operating the ill-fated bus under its
name when the same is registered under the name ofDagupan Bus Co., Inc.;
attaching a vehicle license plate to the ill-fated bus when such plate belongs
to a different bus owned by Cue; and operating the subject bus under the
authority of a different CPC. What makes matters worse is that respondent
knowingly and blatantly committed these violations. How then can
respondent claim good faith under these circumstances?

Respondent, nonetheless, insists that it is unreasonable for petitioner

to suspend the operation of 186 buses covered by its 28 CPCs, considering
that only one bus unit, covered by a single CPC, was involved in the subject
accident.

The Court is not persuaded. It bears to note that the suspension of

respondent's 28 CPCs is not only because of the findings of petitioner that
the ill-fated bus was not roadworthy. 10 Rather, and more importantly, the
suspension of the 28 CPCs was also brought about by respondent's wanton
disregard and obstinate defiance of the regulations issued by petitioner,
which is tantamount to a willful and contumacious refusal to comply with
the requirements of law or of the orders, rules or regulations issued by

10
In the assailed Decision of petitioner, it adopted the findings of the investigating police officers
that the cause of the accident was the malfunctioning of the brake system of the bus, coupled with driver's
eJTor; see ro/lo, p. 62.

It
Decision -9- G.R. No. 213088

pet1t10ner and which is punishable, under the law, by suspension or

revocation of any of its CPCs.

The Court agrees with petitioner that its power to suspend the CPCs
issued to public utility vehicles depends on its assessment of the gravity of
the violation, the potential and actual harm to the public, and the policy
impact of its own actions. In this regard, the Court gives due deference to
petitioner's exercise of its sound administrative discretion in applying its
special knowledge, experience and expertise to resolve respondent's case.

Indeed, the law gives to the LTFRB (previously known, among

others, as Public Service Commission or Board of Transportation) ample
power and discretion to decree or refuse the cancellation of a certificate of
public convenience issued to an operator as long as there is evidence to
support its action. 11 As held by this Court in a long line of cases, 12 it was
even intimated that, in matters of this nature so long as the action is justified,
this Court will not substitute its discretion for that of the regulatory agency
which, in this case, is the LTFRB.

Moreover, the Court finds the ruling in Rizal Light & Ice Co., Inc. v.
The Municipality of Morang, Rizal and The Public Service Commission, 13
instructive, to wit:

xx xx

It should be observed that Section 16(n) of Commonwealth Act No.

146, as amended, confers upon the Commission ample power and
discretion to order the cancellation and revocation of any certificate of
public convenience issued to an operator who has violated, or has willfully
and contumaciously refused to comply with, any order, rule or regulation
of the Commission or any provision of law. What matters is that there is
evidence to support the action of the Commission. In the instant case, as
shown by the evidence, the contumacious refusal of the petitioner since
1954 to comply with the directives, rules and regulations of the
Commission, its violation of the conditions of its certificate and its
incapability to comply with its commitment as shown by its inadequate
service, were the circumstances that warranted the action of the
Commission in not merely imposing a fine but in revoking altogether
petitioner's certificate. To allow petitioner to continue its operation would
be to sacrifice public interest and convenience in favor of private interest.

A grant of a certificate of public convenience confers no

property rights but is a mere license or privilege, and such
II
Pantranco South Express, Inc. v. Board of Transportation, et al., 269 Phil. 619, 628 (1990).
12
Id., citing Javier, et al. v. De Leon, et al., 109 Phil. 751 (1960); Santiago Ice Plant Co. v. Lahoz, 87
Phil. 221 (1950); Raymundo Transportation Co. v. Cedra, 99 Phil. 99 (1956); Manila Yellow Taxicab Co.,
Inc. v. Castelo, 108 Phil. 394 (1960).

d
13
134Phil.232(1968).
Decision - 10 - GR. No. 213088

privilege is forfeited when the grantee fails to comply with

his commitments behind which lies the paramount interest
of the public, for public necessity cannot be made to wait,
nor sacrificed for private convenience. (Collector of
Internal Revenue v. Estate ofF. P. Buan, et al., L-11438 and
Santiago Sambrano, et al. v. PSC, et al., L-11439 & L-
11542-46, July 31, 1958)

(T)he Public Service Commission, ... has the power to

specify and define the terms and conditions upon which the
public utility shall be operated, and to make reasonable
rules and regulations for its operation and the compensation
which the utility shall receive for its services to the public,
and for any failure to comply with such rules and
regulations or the violation of any of the terms and
conditions for which the license was granted, the
Commission has ample power to enforce the provisions of
the license or even to revoke it, for any failure or neglect to
comply with any of its terms and provisions. x xx

xx x 14

Respondent likewise contends that, in suspending its 28 CPCs, the

LTFRB acted in reckless disregard of the property rights of respondent as a
franchise holder, considering that it has put in substantial investments
amounting to hundreds of millions in running its operations. In this regard,
the Court's ruling in the case of Luque v. Villegas 15 is apropos:

xx xx

Contending that they possess valid and subsisting certificates of

public convenience, the petitioning public services aver that they acquired
a vested right to operate their public utility vehicles to and from Manila as
appearing in their said respective certificates of public convenience.

Petitioner's argument pales on the face of the fact that the very
nature of a certificate of public convenience is at cross purposes with the
concept of vested rights. To this day, the accepted view, at least insofar as
the State is concerned, is that "a certificate of public convenience
constitutes neither a franchise nor a contract, confers no property right, and
is a mere license or privilege." The holder of such certificate does not
acquire a property right in the route covered thereby. Nor does it confer
upon the holder any proprietary right or interest of franchise in the public
highways. Revocation of this certificate deprives him of no vested right.
Little reflection is necessary to show that the certificate of public
convenience is granted with so many strings attached. New and additional
burdens, alteration of the certificate, and even revocation or annulment
thereof is reserved to the State.

14
Rizal Light & Ice Co., Inc. '· The Mun;dpaUty of Marong, R;w/ and /he Pubhc ~
Commission, supra, at 248-249.
15
141 Phil. 108 (1969).
Decision - 11 - G.R. No. 213088

We need but add that the Public Service Commission, a government

agency vested by law with "jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all
public services and their franchises, equipment, and other properties" is
empowered, upon proper notice and hearing, amongst others: (1) "[t]o
amend, modify or revoke at any time a certificate issued under the
provisions of this Act [Commonwealth Act 146, as amended], whenever
the facts and circumstances on the strength of which said certificate was
issued have been misrepresented or materially changed"; and (2) "[t]o
suspend or revoke any certificate issued under the provisions of this Act
whenever the holder thereof has violated or wilfully and contumaciously
refused to comply with any order, rule or regulation of the Commission or
any provision of this Act: Provided, That the Commission, for good cause,
may prior to the hearing suspend for a period not to exceed thirty days any
certificate or the exercise of any right or authority issued or granted under
this Act by order of the Commission, whenever such step shall in the
judgment of the Commission be necessary to avoid serious and irreparable
damage or inconvenience to the public or to private interests."

Jurisprudence echoes the rule that the Commission is authorized to

make reasonable rules and regulations for the operation of public services
and to enforce them. In reality, all certificates of public convenience issued
are subject to the condition that all public services "shall observe and
comply [with] ... all the rules and regulations of the Commission relative
to" the service. To further emphasize the control imposed on public
services, before any public service can "adopt, maintain, or apply practices
or measures, rules, or regulations to which the public shall be subject in its
relation with the public service," the Commission's approval must first be
had.

And more. Public services must also reckon with provincial

resolutions and municipal ordinances relating to the operation of public
utilities within the province or municipality concerned. The Commission
can require compliance with these provincial resolutions or municipal
ordinances.

Illustrative of the lack of "absolute, complete, and unconditional"

right on the part of public services to operate because of the delimitations
and restrictions which circumscribe the privilege afforded a certificate of
public convenience is the following from the early (March 31, 1915)
decision of this Court in Fisher vs. Yangco Steamship Company, 31 Phil. 1,
18-19:

Common carriers exercise a sort of public office, and have

duties to perform in which the public is interested. Their
business is, therefore, affected with a public interest, and is
subject of public regulation. (New Jersey Steam Nav. Co.
vs. Merchants Banks, 6 How. 344, 382; Munn vs. Illinois,
94 U.S. 113, 130.) Indeed, this right of regulation is so far
beyond question that it is well settled that the power of the
state to exercise legislative control over railroad companies
and other carriers 'in all respects necessary to protect the
public against danger, injustice and oppression' may be
exercised through boards of commissioners. (New Yor~
Decision - 12 - G.R. No. 213088

etc. R. Co. vs. Bristol, 151 U.S. 556, 571; Connecticut, etc.
R. Co. vs. Woodruff, 153 U.S. 689.).

xx xx

.... The right to enter the public employment as a common

carrier and to offer one's services to the public for hire does
not carry with it the right to conduct that business as one
pleases, without regard to the interests of the public and
free from such reasonable and just regulations as may be
prescribed for the protection of the public from the reckless
or careless indifference of the carrier as to the public
welfare and for the prevention of unjust and unreasonable
discrimination of any kind whatsoever in the performance
of the carrier's duties as a servant of the public.

Business of certain kinds, including the business of a

common carrier, holds such a peculiar relation to the public
interest that there is superinduced upon it the right of public
regulation. (Budd vs. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 533.) When
private property is "affected with a public interest it ceases
to be Juris privati only." Property becomes clothed with a
public interest when used in a manner to make it of public
consequence and affect the community at large. "When,
therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the
public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an
interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the
public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he
has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by
discontinuing the use, but so long as he maintains the use
he must submit to control." (Munn vs. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113;
Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. vs. Smith, 128 U.S. 174; Budd vs.
New York, 143 U.S. 517; Louisville, etc. Ry. Co. vs.
Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677, 695.).

The foregoing, without more, rejects the vested rights theory espoused by
petitioning bus operators.

xx x 16

Neither is the Court convinced by respondent's contention that the

authority given to petitioner, under the abovequoted Section 16(n) of the
Public Service Act does not mean that petitioner is given the power to
suspend the entire operations of a transport company. Respondent must be
reminded that, as quoted above, the law clearly states that petitioner has the
power "[t]o suspend or revoke any certificate issued under the provisions of
[the Public Service Act] whenever the holder thereof has violated or
willfully and contumaciously refused to comply with any order rule or
regulation of the Commission or any provision of this Act x x x" This
Court has held that when the context so indicates, the word "any" may be

'" LuquH Vi/foga'"'"P'"· at 119-123. ~

Decision - 13 - G.R. No. 213088

construed to mean, and indeed it has been frequently used in its enlarged and
Plural sense ' as meaning "all ' " "all or every"
'
"each " "each one of all "
' '
"every" without limitation; indefinite number or quantity, an indeterminate
unit or number of units out of many or all, one or more as the case may be,
several, some. 17 Thus, in the same vein, the Merriam-Webster Dictionary
defines the word "any" as "one, some, or all indiscriminately of whatever
quantity"; "used to indicate a maximum or whole"; "unmeasured or
unlimited in amount, number, or extent." 18 Hence, under the above
definitions, petitioner undoubtedly wields authority, under the law, to
suspend not only one but all of respondent's CPCs if warranted, which is
proven to be the case here.

As to whether or not the penalty imposed by petitioner is reasonable,

respondent appears to trivialize the effects of its deliberate and shameless
violations of the law. Contrary to its contention, this is not simply a case of
one erring bus unit. Instead, the series or combination of violations it has
committed with respect to the ill-fated bus is indicative of its design and
intent to blatantly and maliciously defy the law and disregard, with impunity,
the regulations imposed by petitioner upon all holders of CPCs. Thus, the
Court finds nothing irregular in petitioner's imposition of the penalty of six-
months suspension of the operations of respondent's 28 CPCs. In other
words, petitioner did not commit grave abuse of discretion in imposing the
questioned penalty.

Lastly, the suspension of respondent's CPCs finds relevance in light of

the series of accidents met by different bus units owned by different
operators in recent events. This serves as a reminder to all operators of
public utility vehicles that their franchises and CPCs are mere privileges
granted by the government. As such, they are sternly warned that they
should always keep in mind that, as common carriers, they bear the
responsibility of exercising extraordinary diligence in the transportation of
their passengers. Moreover, they should conscientiously comply with the
requirements of the law in the conduct of their operations, failing which they
shall suffer the consequences of their own actions or inaction.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of

the Court of Appeals, dated June 26, 2014 in CA-GR. SP No. 134772, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 14, 2014 Decision of the Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board is REINSTATED.

17
Gatchalian, etc. v. Commission on Elections, 146 Phil. 435, 442-443 ( 1970).
18
Webster's 3" New International Dictionary of the English Language, 1993 Copyright, p . ' { J i
Decision - 14 - G.R. No. 213088

SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

On wellness leave
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

'

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusion in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

Associate ~ustice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division
Decision - 15 - GR. No. 213088

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Acting Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice