Kalabagh Dam; Why It Should Not be Built - Technical

Report by ADN

Advocacy & Development Network

Publishing Date: Thursday, April 24 2003

On 11th June, 1998 the Government of Pakistan announced the
construction of Kalabagh Dam at a time when the international debate on
dams favored costs and benefits scrutiny of a mega hydropower projects.
There is a growing realization that pro-dam rhetoric -large dams are a
source of energy generation, flood control mechanism and regulated
irrigation network---needs to be verified and weighed against its adverse
impacts on environment and the society. The Kalabagh Dam project is an
outcome of a highly centralized and politically coercive decision-making
process; it is technically flawed; socially and environmentally unacceptable
and economically unfeasible.

Although the government has not gone ahead with the construction of the
Dam ever since it sparked off wide spread protests in Sindh and the NWFP
provinces, there has been no official announcement to rescind the decision.
However, the government now appears to be going ahead with Diamir-
another big dam. The impacts of Kalabagh and Diamir dams may be
different, but some of the issue involved such as resettlement of displaced
persons, financial viability of big dams and the environmental costs are
common.

The Advocacy Development Network (ADN) brings out this briefing paper
to initiate public debate on the feasibility of big dams and their alternatives
at a time when the international struggle of dam-affected communities has
forced donors and governments to start thinking along the lines of the big
dams� social, ecological and economic viability. The World Commission
on Dams, established in February 1998, is are such institution which is
studying there questions and will offer its recommendations on their
debated since in July 2000.

Why is Kalabagh Dam not Feasible:

 Politically Damaging:
The federal government's announcement of building
Kalabagh dam underscores fears of domination by Punjab province
over small provinces and this has serious repercussion for the
Federation. Three provincial assemblies (Sindh, Baluchistan and
NWFP) as we as the Senate Standing Committee on Water and Power
vetoed the proposal.
  Not Enough Water to Dam:
WAPDA bases its support for Kalabagh dam on water
availability figures which are highly suspect if not outright incorrect.
There is evidence to suggest that there may not be enough water to
fill the Kalabagh
reservoir.

 Shortage of Cultivable Land:

Water availability notwithstanding, there is evidence to prove that
additional land for substantive increases in food production in
cultivable areas is not available.

 More Water Logging and Salinity:

Higher water retention in the Indus Basin system risks aggravating
an already massive problem of water logging and salinity.

 Displacement and High Resettlement Cost:

WAPDA's past record of rehabilitation and resettlement of affectees
is highly unsatisfactory. There is no evidence to suggest that the
Kalabagh experience will be any different. Also, the massive
expenditure incurred during rehabilitation of affectees will result in
Kalabagh being economically unattractive.

 Damage Coastal Ecology:

Kalabagh will result in coastal ecosystem degradation, adding to
mangrove and species loss and impoverishing communities which
rely on the ecosystem's resources.

 Ineffective Flood Control:

Historical evidence suggests dams on the Indus have not resulted in
better flood control.

 Other Options:
De-silting Tarbela seems to be more economically, socially and
environmentally viable.

A Threat to the Federation:

The KBD decision comes at an important confluence of events. It comes at a

time when the Pakistani Federation is wreaked with the aftermath of the
nuclear explosion---international sanctions-and an increasingly
mismanaged economy. The decision reflects a crisis of governance, where
decision-makers are at odds with the vocal segment of the society. Despite
the provincial assemblies of Sindh, Baluchistan, and NWFP passing
resolutions against the project and disapproval from the Senate the project
and disapproval from the Senate Standing Committee on Water & Power,
the federal government continued with its propaganda campaign through
state-controlled media. If the government's experts are to be believed, KBD
is the answer to every problem facing the country. The Project exemplifies
centralized (autocratic and secretive) decision-making, zero accountability,
doctored information, a neglect of key linkages, omission of critical
variables and a tendency to use data selectively.

Water Availability:

The question whether enough water is available to warrant the construction

of KBD has generated considerable controversy. Are there, as claimed by
WAPDA, adequate surface flows to justify the Project? WAPDA itself has
sown confusion by citing two average flow figures: 123 MAF and 143 MAF.
The first calculation is based on a 64-year period (1922-1996) and includes
both wet and dry cycles. The second estimate is based on a much shorter
wet cycle period of 22 years (1977-1994) and appears to have been
manipulated to justify Kalabagh. Since the total requirement (inclusive of
the additional allocation to 12 MAF under the 1991 a clear short fall of 20
MAF. This means Kalabagh may remain dry every 4 out of 4 years. Despite
WAPDA's claims, many questions remain unanswered. Potential water
availability needs to be reviewed more comprehensively while taking
system losses into account. It is not clear whether Kalabagh representative
additionally or a replacement for lost storage capacity. Thus the claim that a
million hectares will become
cultivable thanks to Kalabagh will also remain spurious in the face of
controversial water availability.

Food Security:

Crop production under Kalabagh can increase if its waters are used to
irrigate new land, to enhance cropping intensity on existing land, or to
increase yield. Reports of the NCANCS refute WAPDA's claim regarding
Kalabagh irrigating approximately a million additional hectares of barren
land thus bringing Pakistan closer to wheat self-sufficiency. According to
these reports, the amount of cultivable land available is nearly matched by
the amount already cultivated thus leaving little scope for expansion.
Between 1952-1997, about 80 percent of the
increase in total cropped area was due to extensive cultivation. Since then,
this proportion has fallen dramatically with double cropping accounting for
the bulk of the increase. These reports suggest that in addition to the water
constraint, a very tangible land constraint exists as well. The other two
options for increasing crop production are cropping intensity and crop
yield
enhancement. Both are water dependent and have been used to establish an
a prior justification for Kalabagh. Clearly water is the constraining factor in
achieving these yield increases but a critical choice needs to be made here.
Should one opt for additional water or can the same results be achieved
through equitable distribution and improved water use efficiency? The
preferred choice would be to use existing water efficiently and on making
necessary institutional changes for its equitable distribution. Food security
is likely to become a demand driven problem rather than a supply
constrained one.

Water Logging and Salinity:

Kalabagh will result in higher water retention thus aggravating an already

massive problem of water logging and salinity. Kalabagh will contribute to
this problem not only in its immedia te environs but also where new
irrigation infrastructure is to be situated. The incremental land degradation
is likely to be most pronounced in Sindh, reflecting the north-south land
gradient. It may be noted that water logging is higher in Sindh in
comparative terms and that it has been increasing over time against a
declining trend for the Punjab. The numbers for salinity also indicates its
highest incidence in Sindh. Also, according to latest data available, almost
30 percent of the area within the canal command area in Sind is affected by
salinity as compared to 20 percent in Punjab.

Thus attempts to increase crop production by tapping new sources of water

could be party selfdefeating thanks to the soil degradation which results
from it. The massive 25-year National Drainage Programme ($780 million)
has been launched to cope with the water logging and salinity problem,
which is a result of higher water retention in the system. Kalabagh will only
add to this problem.

Displacement and Resettlement Cost:

From their very inception, the construction of large dams in Pakistan has
given rise to major problems in land acquisition, rehabilitation, and
compensation. The initial attitude of authorities towards affectees has
historically been one of dismissal and neglect. Project Affected Persons
(PAPs) are seldom involved in decision-making which affects their
immediate and future lives. An atmosphere of helplessness and insecurity
prevails in an environment where information is not shared and decision-
makers are unwilling to explain how the project will affect the livelihood of
those compelled to sacrifice their interests for the sake of an intangible
national interest. Benefits usually accrue to the more powerful and affluent
PAPs having access to information which is used for profitable speculation.
Experience of large dams in Pakistan leads one to conclude that the state
lacks the institutions, the legal framework and the sensitivity which would
assure PAPs a better standard of living. Of the 100,000 Tarbela Dam
affectees and the 80,000 Mangla Dam affectees, many still await
compensation even though these projects have been generating profits for
the past 15 to 20 years.

Previous experience suggests that the Kalabagh rehabilitation and

compensation will not be any better. The government's fiscal constraints
and the already outstanding payments to Tarbela and unresolved claims of
Gazai-Brotha affectees (e.g. fishermen etc) leaves little reason for the
approximately 100,000 to 200,00 KBD affectees to hope for anything
better. The total cost of Rs. 5 billion allocated for resettlement in the case of
Kalabagh is a gross underestimation, given that the number of affectees is
much larger than in previous Dam projects in Pakistan. For instance in the
case of Ghazi Barotha, the total cost of land compensation is close to Rs. 5
billion whereas there were only 20,000 affectees to be
compensated. In the case of Kalabagh besides land compensation, the cost
of close to 47 model and extended villages which have been planned for
affectees would entail a heavy cost. If all these costs are taken into account
the total project cost would be more than what WAPDA claims. Moreover,
given the reluctance that multilateral agencies are showing in funding large
dams ever since the World Commission for Dams has started scrutinizing
large dams projects, the government may have to borrow from the
commercial financial markets to finance Kalabagh. This would further push
up the cost of Kalabagh, making it a less attractive project.

Downstream Ecosystem Impacts:

The effects of reduced water outflows on the Indus delta ecosystem are
already highly visible. The present level of silt discharge, estimated at 100
million tons per year, is a four-fold reduction from the original level before
the rivers were dammed. The combination of salt water intrusion (as much
as 30 km inland) and reduced silt and nutrient flows has changed the
ecological balance of the delta and has resulted in the area of active growth
of the delta being reduced from an original estimate of 2600 sq. km to
about 260 sq. km. The mangroves have taken an exceptionally hard toll
since their health is directly related to fresh water outflows to the sea.
Releases below Kotri barrage average 34 MAF of which about 20 MAF
actually reach the mangroves in July- September period, the rest being lost
to evaporation or diversions. According to the Sindh Forestry Department,
about 27 MAF is required to maintain the existing 260,000 hectare of
mangroves in reasonably healthy conditions; this is 7 MAF more than what
is currently available. The Indus Water Accord intends to divert an
additional 11 MAF for upstream dam construction, including Kalabagh,
thus resulting in further reduction and aggravating an already critical
situation. The hardest hit will be the community of about 100,000 people
residing in coastal villages for whom the managroves are a vital source of
livelihood providing fuel, fodder, fishing and grazing grounds. These
communities already suffer from a denial of fishing rights since large
stretches of the Indus have been closed and river resources exploited
through contractual arrangements. Besides mangroves, the Indus dolphin
(blind dolphin) and the palla fish are under threat of extinction whose
impending loss signals the loss of a way of life. In view of these facts, the
claim that the waters of the Indus are "wasted into the sea" can only be
dismissed as an ill-informed rhetoric.

Flood Control:

Another myth firmly embedded in the minds of our planners is that large
dams are the perfect flood prevention devices. The evidence for Pakistan
shows otherwise; its large dams notwithstanding, there has been no
reduction in the incidence and intensity of floods nor in the associated
losses in lives, crops, livestock and infrastructure. There is no seeming
pattern to the floods other than the fact that they could have coincided with
wet cycles. In fact, the severity of flood impacts appears more prevalent
after Tarbela and Mangla dams were constructed. Indeed river systems
have a natural capacity for dealing with the threat of floods and the natural
processes emboided in them provide many benefits. Flood plains, wetlands,
backwaters are commonly referred to as nature's sponges; they absorb
excessive water and purify it so that it can be tapped during lean periods,
and act as spawning grounds for fish and water fowl. The floods themselves
replenish agricultural soils and communities living around these areas
adapt to this natural rhythm and use its bounty to ensure and Mangla have
merely disturbed the natural system by attempting to regulate the floods of
the Indus.

NWFP's Concerns:

Despite lowering of the height of Kalabagh from 935 to 915 (Please check in
WAPDA's glossy cover booklet or Engr. Iftikhar's report), political leaders
and affected communities in the NWFP are not convinced by WAPDA's
arguments in favour of the project. They are of the view that flooding could
still cause damage despite construction of diskes around Nowshera. They
believe that the construction of diskes would disturb the ecological balance
and social life in the area. The Tarbela experience is still fresh in the minds
of many people who have seen their lands being ruined by water logging
after the reservoir was built at Tarbela. Moreover the poor
record of the government in terms of compensating the Tarbela affectees
has made the people of the NWFP wary of promises made by WAPDA.

Recommendations:
Noted South Asian water engineer, Ajaya Dixit, notes that "many of the
storage projects in India were built after the British left but the technology
should never have been transplanted blindly". This is because "the North
American terrain and society where the model was developed is quite
different from South Asia's and the rivers there carry less silt than the
Himalayan torrents, the demography of water and electricity consumers
itself was different, and the New World was hardly likely to see anti-dam
activism when the native populations had been decimated". The Pakistani
dam industry would be well advised to re-think their approach to large
dams in view of this theory.

In addition to the above, a recent study carried out by TAMS-Wallingford

(March 1998) shows that a de-silted Tarbela would yield the same irrigation
benefits as Kalabagh but at one-seventh the cost in net present value terms.
Even if a thermal power plant with capacity equivalent to Kalabagh were
constructed, the cost would still be lower by one-third. The study concludes
that the replacement of irrigation and energy benefits by constructing a
new dam and reservoir downstream is feasible, but will be expensive,
environmentally damaging, and socially harmful. One alternative option to
construct new outlets at the Tarbela Dam which will enable sediment to be
flushed from the reservoir". Based on computer simulations of sediment
flows, the proposed Tarbela Action Plan suggests that if the reservoir level
were raised to 1, 365 feet in 1998 and by 4 feet in each subsequent year, if
the drawdown period were limited to a maximum of 15 days, if a rockfill
underwater dike were constructed to protect intakes of tunnels 1-4 from
sedimentation and if a flushing bypass were constructed which would be
operated over a 30 day period then the estimated retention of 6 MAF is
exactly what Kalabagh is designed to hold. Although flushing would reduce
energy benefits, the long-term energy production potential of Ghazi-
Barotha would be assured since it depends on a de-silted Tarbela.
Moreover, purely financial and economic cost comparison also clearly
favour Tarbela rehabilitation over Kala bagh. It has been estimated that we
are presently losing three to four times the planned Kalabagh reservoir
storage capacity is system losses in our extremely inefficient irrigation
system. If these could be plugged we could ensure that water gets to the
farm gate at a fraction of the cost of Kalabagh.

Conclusions:

Kalabagh dam does not present itself as a win-win situation. Its viability is
premised on water availability figures that are highly questionable. The
land constraint precludes substantive increases in cultivable area,
additional water notwithstanding. Crop yield increases based on additional
water do not account more, higher doses of water are associated with high
input use, which degrades both soil, and water quality. Using existing water
more efficiently is clearly a better option. Hydel energy is not unequivocally
cheaper, given the growing propensity to factor in displacement and
environmental costs. Also, borrowing costs are likely to be higher as donors
have indicated a clear preference for thermal power projects. Kalabagh
would exacerbate ecosystem degradation, adding to mangrove and species
losses and impoverishing communities, which depend on the ecosystem's
resources. As an instrument of flood control Kalabagh is poorly supported
by the historical evidence. In view of these facts, the option of
implementing a sedimentation management project on Tarbela appears a
clear winner on all grounds-financial, economic, social and environmental.
In the long run we need to explore the development of alternative to big
dams to meet our energy and irrigation needs such as wind and solar as far
as energy needs are concerned, and the development of traditional small
scale surface and underground irrigation systems.

The ADN Demands:

 That the Kalabagh dam project be shelved by the Government of

Pakistan and other options to large dams be proactively pursued.

 That all water diversion projects that affect any community or

province be discussed in the provincial assembly of the affected
province. There should then be discussed in the Senate. Public
hearings of the
assembly and Senate Standing Committee should be held to which
public interest organizations and representatives of dam affected
communities be invited.

 That affected communities must be consulted through proper scoping

sessions in the affected areas and proper notice should be given for
such consultations. The outcomes of these public consultations
should be brought into the public domain.

 That resources be invested in developing alternative energy and

irrigation options as well as measures taken to make distribution and
use of irrigation water and energy more equitable and efficient.

 That National Commission consisting of community leaders and

specialists be set u to formulate a national water policy in view of the
plans of the government to build dams/reservoirs on Indus.

What is ADN:
Advocacy and Development Network (ADN) is a voluntary association of
nine leading nongovernmentalorganizations of Pakistani. The Network was
formed in May 1995 with the objective of providing a forum for advocacy on
issues of national importance, sharing information and experiences related
to development and providing solidarity and support to members and other
NGOs engaged in advocacy campaigns. Its founding members conceived
ADN with the view that the Network will proactively take up issues for
advocacy-the main aim being streamlining advocacy into the development
process. Since its formation, the ADN has been involved in a variety of
collective advocacy efforts ranging from lobbying the government and
NGOs on the proposed NGO Bill, hosting joint workshops on civil society
related issues, critiquing the Pakistan Country Reports for the Social
Summit and World Food Summit and sending teams for participation in
workshops/seminars hosted at the South Asian level. Food security,
sustainable agriculture, NGOs and the development debate have so far
emerged as the main themes on which ADN has consistently focussed.