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The Court held that under Section 17(1) of the Act wife is only entitled to
claim a right to residence in a shared household, and a ‘shared
household’ would only mean the house belonging to or taken on
rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint
family of which the husband is a member. In the case, the property
in question neither belonged to the husband nor was it taken on rent by
him nor was it a joint family property of which the husband was a
member. It was the exclusive property of mother of husband and not a
shared household.
1. Both the parties must behave as husband and wife and are recognized as husband
and wife in front of society
2. They must be of a valid legal age of marriage
3. They should qualify to enter into marriage eg. None of the partner should have a
souse living at the time of entering into relationship.
4. They must have voluntarily cohabited for a significant period of time
5. They must have lived together in a shared household
In this case, the Court also referred to the term “palimony” which means
grant of maintenance to a woman who has lived for a substantial period
of time with a man without marrying and is then deserted by him.
The Bench explained that the provisions contained in Section 3(a) of the
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 which defines the term “domestic violence”
also constitutes “economic abuse” as domestic violence. The Court further
opined that under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, the
victim i.e. estranged wife or live-in-partner would be entitled to
more relief than what is contemplated under Section 125 of the
CrPC i.e. to a shared household also.
In the case, the issue that fell for consideration before the High Court of
Bombay was the interpretation of provision of Section 2(f) of the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (Domestic
Violence Act).
The couple must hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses.
They must be of legal age of marry.
They must be otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage;
They must have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves out to the world as
being akin to spouses for a significant period of time
This issue has often remained a controversial one as Section 2(q) of the
Domestic Violence Act defines “respondent” as any adult male person
who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person
and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this
Act:
However, the Supreme Court in the aforementioned case put to rest the
issue by holding that the proviso to Section 2(q) does not exclude
female relatives of the husband or male partner from the ambit of
a complaint that can be made under the provisions of
the Domestic Violence Act. Therefore, complaints are not just
maintainable against the adult male person but also the female relative of
such adult male.
In this case, the Supreme Court has held that a wife cannot implicate one
and all in a Domestic violence case. In this case, the complainant apart
from arraying the husband and in-laws in the complaint, had also included
all and sundry as parties to the case, of which the complainant didn’t
even know names.
It is the duty of the Court to scrutinise the facts from all angles whether a plea
advanced by the respondent to nullify the grievance of the aggrieved person is
really legally sound and correct.
The principle “justice to the cause is equivalent to the salt of ocean” should be
kept in mind. The Court of Law is bound to uphold the truth which sparkles when
justice is done.
Before throwing a petition at the threshold, it is obligatory to see that the person
aggrieved under such a legislation is not faced with a situation of non-
adjudication, for the 2005 Act as we have stated is a beneficial as well as
assertively affirmative enactment for the realisation of the constitutional rights of
women and to ensure that they do not become victims of any kind of domestic
violence.
It was held in this case, that when it comes to maintenance of wife under
the Domestic Violence Act read with the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance
Act, 1956 it is the personal obligation of the husband to maintain his wife.
Property of mother-in-law can neither be subject matter of attachment
nor during the life time of husband can his personal liability to maintain
his wife be directed to be enforced against such property.
In the case, the Apex Court upheld the Delhi High Court’s view that -
“even a wife who had shared a household before the Domestic
Violence Act came into force would be entitled to the protection of
the Domestic Violence Act”.
Hence, the Domestic Violence Act entitles the aggrieved person to file
an Application under the Act even for the acts which have been
committed prior to the commencement of the Domestic Violence Act.
The Bombay High Court elaborated on the right of women to reside in her
matrimonial home or shared household. The Court observed that the
‘Statement of Objects and Reasons’ of the Act makes it clear that,
this Domestic Violence Act is enacted to secure the right of a woman to
reside in her matrimonial home or shared household, irrespective of the
question ‘whether she has any right, title or interest in the said household
or not’.
In this case, the Bombay High Court held that no matter that a man
may alone own a particular house, he has no right to be violent
against his wife or the woman he lives with and if the Court sees
any violence he must be restrained from entering upon the
residence essentially to secure the wife and children against
further violence and similar disputes.
In this aforementioned case, the wife was awarded interim protection and
respondent was restrained from perpetrating any kind of domestic
violence on the aggrieved person during the proceedings. However, the
respondent breached the said order on two occasions. He continued
perpetrating domestic violence on the aggrieved person despite the
protection order granted in favour of the aggrieved person. Hence,
considering the facts of the case, the Court passed directed the
respondent husband to remove himself from the shared household
under Section 19(1)(b) of Domestic Violence Act.
No, the Proviso to Section 19 clearly states that no order under Section
19(1)(b) of Domestic Violence Act can be passed against any person who
is a woman.
In this case it was held that in the guise of passing an order
under Section 19(1)(b) of Domestic Violence Act, such women members
of the family cannot be directed to be removed from the shared
household.
A similar observation was made by the High Court of Madras in the case
of Uma Narayanan vs Mrs. Priya Krishna Prasad, wherein the Court
observed that under Section 19(1)(b) of Domestic Violence Act, the
Magistrate is empowered to pass an order directing the respondent to
remove himself from the shared household. While enumerating the
directions that could be passed under Section 19(1)(b) of Domestic
Violence Act and with particular reference to the direction that could be
issued under Section 19(1)(b) of Domestic Violence Act the said proviso
has been incorporated just to protect the interest of a woman member of
the family who is living in such a shared household. Such a provision in
the proviso has been incorporated only for the aforesaid limited purpose.
In a shared household which may belong to a joint family women
members may also be living and in the guise of passing an order
under Section 19(1) (b) of the Act, such women members of the
family cannot be directed to be removed from the shared
household but such a direction can be issued only against male
members.
Section 19(1)(f) of Domestic Violence Act states that the respondent can
be directed to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the
aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household.
In the aforesaid case, the Court observed that a wife cannot have right to
live in a particular property and the same cannot become a clog on the
property denying the right of the husband to deal with the property when
he is willing to provide an alternative matrimonial home to her. It was
also held that she cannot insist on residing in the suit property alone
when the husband had offered a suitable alternative arrangement for her.
The Court noted that action of the Mother-in-Law in selling the subject
property, though not strictly illegal, had caused loss to the Daughter- in-
Law. Accordingly, one would also have balance the corresponding rights
of the parties. In this context, the Court made reference to Section 19(1)
(f) of the Domestic Violence Act which stipulates that the Magistrate
shall secure same level of alternative accommodation for the
aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or
direct payment of rent for the same, if the circumstances so
require.
In this very interesting case of 2018, High Court of Karnataka held that a
petition under the Domestic Violence Act by the husband or an adult male
can be entertained. To arrive at its decision, the High Court placed
reliance on Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Hiral P. Harsora v.
Kusum Narottamdas Harsora, wherein the Supreme Court while
striking down a portion of Section 2(a) of the Act (defining “aggrieved
person”) on the ground that it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution
of India and the phrase “adult male” as appearing in Section 2(q) of the
Act stood deleted.
In view of the aforesaid ruling of Apex Court, the High Court opined that
If the said sub-section is read after deleting the expression ‘adult male’, it
would appear that any person, whether male or female, aggrieved
and alleging violation of the provisions of the Act could invoke the
provisions under the Act. In that view of the matter, the
petitioner’s complaint could not have been trashed on the ground
that the Act does not contemplate provision for men and it could only be
in respect of women.
In a recent case, the High Court of Delhi analyzed the issue of quashing
of FIR/Complaint on the grounds of limitation in matrimonial offences.
The Court was of the view that in such cases the victim is subjected to
such cruelty repeatedly and it is more or less like a continuing offence.
Thus, courts while considering the question of limitation for an offence
under Section 498-A should be careful and take into consider the
interests of justice.
The High Court reiterated Supreme Court’s view in Arun Vyas Vs. Anita
Vyas, wherein it was held that the essence of the offence in Section
498-A is cruelty and is a continuing offence and on each occasion
on which the respondent was subjected to cruelty a new starting
point of limitation arises.
Thus, the High Court in the case held that there is nothing which debars
the magistrate to pass such order with regard to property situated
outside State.