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MANKAVIT LAW ACADEMY

LANDMARK JUDGEMENTS

SATISH CHANDER AHUJA v. SNEHA AHUJA 2020

(you can go through the whole notes for better understanding of the case) from page 15
you can find the shorter summary of the case)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SATISH CHANDER AHUJA (Father-in-law) v SNEHA AHUJA (Daughter-in-law)

➢ Main laws involved-

1. Domestic violence Act
2. Cpc
3. CrPc
4. Indian Evidence Act
5. Divorce Act

➢ Judgement given by-

➢ ASHOK BHUSHAN
➢ R. SUBHASH REDDY
➢ M.R. SHAH

1. FACTS

Raveen and Sneha were married and living in one floor of the house which was also inhabited by
Sneha’s in laws or Raveens’ parents. Sneha claims that the house is a joint property and the father-in-
law claims that the house was purchased by him exclusively.

After a few years of marriage, Raveen files a civil suit under Sec 13 of the Divorce Act claiming cruelty
by Sneha in the court to seek divorce. Sneha in return files a written statement saying that she was
subjected to mental harassment by Raveen and her in-laws. The trial court decides the case in favour
of Raveen.

Sneha moves to the High Court and the High Court decides that the trial court should reconsider the
case as the trial court has not taken cognizance of all the issues brought before it. The High Court
opined that the real point of determination in the appeal is not as to whether suit premises is a
shared household or not and since the domestic violence proceedings initiated by the daughter-in-
law are pending adjudication, determination of this issue in suit proceedings would result in causing
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serious prejudice to the claim of the applicant in the domestic violence proceedings. The High Court
observed that it had consciously refrained from determining the question as to whether suit premises
is shared household or not.

Thus, we find that the DV Act has aspired to bring in a sea change in the rights of persons affected by
domestic violence by ensuring that irrespective of the ownership of the suit premises where the
aggrieved person resided, she would still retain the right to reside therein as long as she was able to
prove that she had endured domestic violence while being in a domestic relationship with the owner
of such premises. The High Court opined that the Trial Court erroneously proceeded to pass decree
under Order XII Rule 6 CPC by not impleading the husband and failing to appreciate the specific
submission of the appellant while admitting the title of the respondent that the suit premises was the
joint family property but also losing the site of the DV Act.

The father-in-law moves to the Supreme Court in appeal against the orders of High Court.

2. ISSUES

1. Whether definition of shared household under Section 2(s) of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 has to be read to mean that shared household can only be that
household which is household of joint family or in which husband of the aggrieved person has
a share? (imp for exam)
2. Whether judgment of this Court in S.R. Batra and Anr. Vs. Taruna Batra, (2007) 3 SCC 169 has
not correctly interpreted the provision of Section 2(s) of Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 and does not lay down a correct law? (imp for exam)
3. Whether the High Court has rightly come to the conclusion that suit filed by the appellant
could not have been decreed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC?
4. Whether, when the defendant in her written statement pleaded that suit property is her
shared household and she has right to residence therein, the Trial Court could have decreed
the suit of the plaintiff without deciding such claim of defendant which was permissible to be
decided as per Section 26 of the Act, 2005?
5. Whether the plaintiff in the suit giving rise to this appeal can be said to be the respondent as
per definition of Section 2(q) of Act, 2005? (imp for exam)
6. What is the meaning and extent of the expression “save in accordance with the procedure
established by law” as occurring in Section 17(2) of Act, 2005?
7. Whether the husband of aggrieved party (defendant) is necessary party in the suit filed by
the plaintiff against the defendant?
8. What is the effect of orders passed under Section 19 of the Act, 2005 whether interim or final
order passed in the proceedings initiate in a civil court of competent jurisdiction?

This Court had occasion to examine the purpose of enactment of Act, 2005 in Kunapareddy
Alias NookalaShanka Balaji Vs. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari and Anr., (2016) 11 SCC 774
wherein paragraph 12 following was stated: -The court proceeded by stating the object of the
Domestic Violence Act saying that Domestic Violence Act was enacted because there was no
immediate remedy for the women especially a civil one. In cases of Domestic violence, the
first remedy should be to provide the women a place to stay and if such remedy is not followed
then the criminal aspect of the said law will apply to the husband and in-laws. So, the basic
object of this Act is to provide immediate relief of a civil nature failing which the Act will
take the character of criminality.
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This Court in Manmohan Attavar vs. Neelam Manmohan Attavar, (2017) 8 SCC 550 noticed
that Act, 2005 has been enacted to create an entitlement in favour of the woman of the right
of residence. The International Conventions were also mentioned. General
Recommendation No.XII of the United Nations Committee on Convention on Elimination of
All Forms of discrimination against women. The Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women (Articles 2, 5, 11, 12).

Under the Hindu law, the rules of succession follow i.e., a child becomes a part owner as soon as he is
born, meaning thereby that if the house is a joint property as per the claims of Sneha, then she has
a right to live in the house as per the Domestic Violence Act which provides that a woman has the
right to live at a place she has been residing with her husband and has ever lived at a place which is
rented by the husband or which is a joint property of which husband is a part owner even if daughter-
in-law has no interest or share or right on the property. This right however does not extend to a
property in which husband has no share, i.e., the property of in-laws is not included as per this section.

A property purchased by the parent -either mother or father out of the joint family property is the
exclusive property of the parents and the children do not have the share in it unless the parents want
then to have such a share. This plea is taken by the father-in-law of Sneha to exclude her from living
in that house.

These both views would be discussed in further sections.

➢ Discussion on issues No. 1 & 2. (important from exam point of view)

Sec 2(s) DV Act- shared household" means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any
stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such
a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent,
or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the
respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a
household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of
whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared
household;”

The discussion started with analysing the meaning of the word means and includes. The appellants’
lawyer Prashant Bhushan said that it is an exhaustive definition while the Respondent’s lawyer said
that it is an expansive definition.

Few cases that were considered to decide this are-

Bharat Coop. Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. vs. Coop. Bank Employees Union, (2007) 4 SCC 685

It is trite to say that when in the definition clause given in any statute the word “means” is used, what
follows is intended to speak exhaustively. When the word “means” is used in the definition, the only
meaning to be given is that which is explicitly provided and no other.

On the other hand, when the word “includes” is used in the definition, the legislature does not
intend to restrict the definition: it makes the definition enumerative but not exhaustive. That is to
say, the term defined will retain its ordinary meaning but its scope would be extended to bring within
it matters, which in its ordinary meaning may or may not comprise.

The South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers Association and Anr. vs. The State of Gujarat and
Anr., (1976) 4 SCC 601. Shri Bhushan’s submission is that use of expression ‘includes’ in Section 2(s)
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has to be read as ‘means’. Though ‘include’ is generally used in interpretation clauses as a word of
enlargement, in some cases the context might suggest a different intention. It seems to us that the
word “includes” has been used here in the sense of ‘means’. In that sense it is not a word of
extension, but limitation. It is exhaustive of the meaning which must be given to potteries industry
for the purpose of Entry 22.

After noticing the ratio of above judgments, Section 2(s), which uses both the expressions ‘means
and includes’ and looking to the context, we are of the view that the definition of shared household
in Section 2(s) is an exhaustive definition. The first part of definition begins with expression “means”
which is undoubtedly an exhaustive definition and second part of definition, which begins with word
“includes” is explanatory of what was meant by the definition.

Nidhesh Gupta, learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that even if it is accepted that the
definition of Section 2(s) is exhaustive, his case is fully covered in both the parts of the definition.
Now, reverting back to the definition of Section 2(s), the definition can be divided in two parts, first,
which follows the word “means” and second which follows the word “includes”. The second part
which follows ‘includes’ can be further sub-divided into two parts. The first part reads ‘shared
household means a household where the person aggrieved has lived or at any stage has lived in a
domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent’.

This Court in Paragraph 18, Amit Batra case observed that since the house belongs to mother-in-law
of the respondent and does not belong to the husband, hence, she cannot claim any right to live in
the said house. Here, the house in question belongs to the mother-in-law of Smt Taruna Batra and it
does not belong to her husband Amit Batra. Hence, Smt Taruna Batra cannot claim any right to live in
the said house.”

Apart from the above, we are of the opinion that the house in question cannot be said to be a “shared
household” within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act. This Court also noticed Sections 17 and 19 and the argument of respondent that household is a
shared household since aggrieved person had lived there in a domestic relationship.

If the aforesaid submission is accepted, then it will mean that wherever the husband and wife lived
together in the past that property becomes a shared household. It is well settled that any
interpretation which leads to absurdity should not be accepted. No doubt, the definition of “shared
household” in Section 2(s) of the Act is not very happily worded, and appears to be the result of clumsy
drafting, but we have to give it an interpretation which is sensible and which does not lead to chaos
in society.”

This explanation was rejected by the Supreme Court in this case and the SC stated-

The expression “at any stage has lived” has been used to protect the women from denying the
benefit of right to live in a shared household on the ground that on the date when application is
filed, she was excluded from possession of the house or temporarily absent.

We, thus, are of the considered opinion that shared household referred to in Section2 (s) is the shared
household of aggrieved person where she was living at the time when application was filed or in the
recent past had been excluded from the use or she is temporarily absent.

The definition of shared household as noticed in Section 2(s) does not indicate that a shared
household shall be one which belongs to or taken on rent by the husband. We have noticed the
definition of “respondent” under the Act. The respondent in a proceeding under Domestic Violence
Act can be any relative of the husband. (Answer to issue 1).
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In event, the shared household belongs to any relative of the husband with whom in a domestic
relationship the woman has lived, the conditions mentioned in Section 2(s) are satisfied and the said
house will become a shared household. We are of the view that this court in S.R. Batra vs. Taruna
Batra (OVERRULED BY SATISH CHANDER AHUJA v. SNEHA AHUJA) although noticed the definition of
shared household as given in Section 2(s) but did not advert to different parts of the definition which
makes it clear that for a shared household there is no such requirement that the house may be
owned singly or jointly by the husband or taken on rent by the husband. The observation of this
Court in S.R. Batra vs. Taruna Batra that definition of shared household in Section 2(s) is not very
happily worded and it has to be interpreted, which is sensible and does not lead to chaos in the society
also does not commend us. The definition of shared household is clear and exhaustive definition as
observed by us. The object and purpose of the Act was to grant a right to aggrieved person, a woman
of residence in shared household. The interpretation which is put by this Court in S.R. Batra vs.
Taruna Batra if accepted shall clearly frustrate the object and purpose of the Act. We, thus, are of
the opinion that the interpretation of definition of shared household as put by this Court in S.R.
Batra vs. Taruna Batra is not correct interpretation and the said judgment does not lay down the
correct law. (Answer to 2nd issue).

Eveneet Singh vs. Prashant Chaudhri- The definition of “shared household” emphasizes the factum
of a domestic relationship and no investigation into the ownership of the said household is necessary,
as per the definition.

Even if an inquiry is made into the aspect of ownership of the household, the definition casts a wide
enough net. It is couched in inclusive terms and is not in any way, exhaustive.

It would not be out of place to notice here that the use of the term “respondent” is unqualified in the
definition nor is there any qualification to it under Sections 12, 17 or 19. Therefore, there is no reason
to conclude that the definition does not extend to a house which is owned by a mother-in-law or
any other female relative, since they are encompassed under the definition of ‘respondent’ under
Section 2(q).”

It is apparent that clause (f) of sub section 1 of Section 19 of the Act is intended to strike a balance
between the rights of a daughter-in-law and her in-laws, if a claim to a shared residence by the
daughter-in-law pertains to a building in which the matrimonial home was set up belongs to her
mother-in-law or father-in-law.”

Preeti Satija vs. Raj Kumari and Anr., 2014 SCC Online Del 188.

Crucially, Parliament's intention by the 2005 Act was to secure the rights of aggrieved persons in the
shared household, which could be tenanted by the Respondent (including relative of the husband).
For instance, a widow (or as in this case, a daughter in law, estranged from her husband) living with
a mother-in-law, in premises owned by the latter, falls within a “domestic relationship. The
obligation not to disturb the right to residence in the shared household would continue even if the
mother-in-law does not have any right, title or interest, but is a tenant, or entitled to “equity” (such
as an equitable right to possession) in those premises. The right is not dependent on title, but the
mere factum of residence.

Another thing noted by the court was that it applies to all communities. Crucially, the mother-in law
(or a father-in-law, or for that matter, “a relative of the husband”) can also be a respondent in the
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proceedings under the 2005 Act and remedies available under the same Act would necessarily need
to be enforced against them.”

This Court held that “adult male person” restricting the meaning of respondent in Section 2(q) to only
“adult male person” is not based on any intelligible differentia having rational nexus with object
sought to be achieved. This Court struck down the word “adult male”. Hence, it is now permissible
under definition of Section 2(q) to include females also.

We, thus, are of the view that for the purposes of determination of right of defendant under Sections
17 and 19 read with Section 26 in the suit in question the plaintiff can be treated as “respondent”, but
for the grant of any relief to the defendant or for successful resisting the suit of the plaintiff necessary
conditions for grant of relief as prescribed under the Act, 2005 has to be pleaded and proved by the
defendant, only then the relief can be granted by the Civil Court to the defendant.

It may be highlighted that the Act does not confer any title or proprietary rights in favour of the
aggrieved person as misunderstood by most, but merely secures a ‘right of residence’ in the ‘shared
household.’ The broad and inclusive definition of the term ‘shared household’ in the Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is in consonance with the family patterns in India, where
married couple continue to live with their parents in homes owned by parents.”

Nevertheless, the rights of the daughter-in-law should not be allowed to weigh upon the rights of the
in laws to live peacefully who are at the dusk of their life. And Para 56 has balanced the rights of both
parties.

In view of the foregoing discussions, we answer issue Nos. 1 and 2 in following manner:-

(i) The definition of shared household given in Section 2(s) cannot be read to mean that
shared household can only be that household which is household of the joint family of
which husband is a member or in which husband of the aggrieved person has a share.
(ii) The judgment of this Court in S.R. Batra vs. Taruna Batra has not correctly interpreted
Section 2(s) of Act, 2005 and the judgment does not lay down a correct law.

Issues 3 & 4-

What is required to be considered is what constitutes the admission warranting the judgment on
admission in exercise of powers under Order XII Rule 6, CPC.

Himani Alloys Limited Vs. Tata Steel Limited, (2011) 15 SCC 273 and S.M. Asif vs. Virender Kumar
Bajaj, (2015) 9 SCC 287.

In Himani Alloys Limited, this Court had an occasion to consider the scope and ambit of judgment on
admission in exercise of powers under Order XII Rule 6, CPC.

It is observed and held in paragraph 11 that being an enabling provision, it is neither mandatory nor
pre-emptory but discretionary for the Court to pass judgment on admission in exercise of powers
under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. It is observed that the Court, on examination of the facts and
circumstances, has to exercise its judicial discretion keeping in mind that a judgment on admission is
a judgment without trial which permanently denies any remedy to the defendant by way of an appeal
on merits.

S.M. Asif vs. Virender Kumar Bajaj -It is observed and held in paragraph 8 that expression “may” in
Order XII Rule 6 CPC suggests that it is discretionary and cannot be claimed as of right.
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So, in trial court, it was seen that the plaint by the plaintiff (father-in-law) was disposed off without
taking due consideration of the facts. Thus, it was concluded that disposal of the trial case under
Order 12 Rule 6 of Cpc was inappropriate.

It was found that the plaintiff had purchased the property in 2003 only and he had not made a correct
disclosure of the facts and that they had not come before the courts with clean hands.

That a bare perusal of the documents filed alongwith the plaint and even otherwise it is amply evident
that the plaintiff as per his own version became the owner of the suit property bearing No D-1077,
New Friends Colony, New Delhi-110025 only in the year 2003. The marriage of the answering
defendant was solemnized on 4/3/1995 and the defendant started residing in the joint shared
household since then. Therefore the right of the defendant is prior in point of time that of the plaintiff.

That the suit filed by the plaintiff is directly in conflict with the right of the defendant to reside in her
matrimonial residence/shared household granted to her by the Legislature and specifically envisaged
in section 17 and 19 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and as such is
liable to be dismissed at the threshold. The defendant does not dispute that the house was recorded
in the name of the plaintiff and in her application filed under the Domestic Violence Act, she stated
that plaintiff is the owner of the suit property but in the written statement filed in the suit, she pleaded
that house has been purchased by joint family funds.

Even if we presume that the father-in-law was the sole owner of the property, the daughter-in-law
had remedy under the sec 26 of the Act as a way of getting relief under any other civil suit or legal
proceeding. (Answer to issue 4)

Sec 26 of DV Act -

(1) Any relief available under sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may also be sought in any legal
proceeding, before a civil court, family court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person
and the respondent whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the
commencement of this Act.
(2) Any relief referred to in sub-section (1) may be sought for in addition to and along with any
other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding before a civil
or criminal court.

In view of the ratio laid down by this court in the above case, the claim of the defendant that suit
property is shared household and she has right to reside in the house ought to have been considered
by the Trial Court and non-consideration of the claim/defence is nothing but defeating the right,
which is protected by Act, 2005.

Vaishali Abhimanyu Joshi vs. Nanasaheb Gopal Joshi, (2017) 14 SCC 373
The only question to be answered in this appeal is as to whether the counter claim filed by the
appellant seeking right of residence in accordance with Section 19 of the 2005 Act in a suit filed by the
respondent, her father-in-law under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 is entertain able or
not. Whether the provisions of the 1887 Act bar entertainment of such counterclaim, is the moot
question to be answered. Thus, the SC held that relief under the DV Act can be sought even in case a
civil suit is pending before the court.

Order XII Rule 6 is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. In the facts of the present
case, the Trial Court ought not to have given judgment under Order XII Rule 6 on the admission of the
defendant as contained in her application filed under Section 12 of the D.V. Act.
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We, thus, concur with the view of the High Court that the judgment and decree of the Trial Court
given under Order XII rule 6 is unsustainable. (Answer to issue 3rd).

Issue No. 5 (imp. From exam point of view)

“2(q) "respondent" means any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with
the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act.

There are two conditions for a person to be treated to be respondent within the meaning of Section
2(q), i.e., (i) in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person, and (ii) against whom the aggrieved
person has sought any relief under Act, 2005.

It is to be noticed be noticed that the expression “any adult male person” occurring in Section 2(q)
came for consideration before this Court in Hiral P. Harsora and others vs. Kusum Narottamdas
Harsora and others, (2016) 10 SCC 165 where this Court has struck down the expression “adult male”.
Hence, it is now permissible under definition of Section 2(q) to include females also.

In her pleadings she has resisted the claim of plaintiff on the ground that she has a right to reside in
the suit property it being her shared household. Thus, the question whether the suit premises is
shared household of the defendant and she has right in the shared household so as the decree before
the Trial Court can be successfully resisted were required to be determined by the Trial Court. We are
further of the view that when in the suit defendant has pleaded to resist the decree on the ground of
her right of residence in the suit property it was for her to prove her claim in the suit both by pleadings
and evidence.

For granting any relief by the Civil Court under Section 19 it has to be proved that the respondent is
committing or has committed an act of domestic violence on the aggrieved person. To treat a person
as the “respondent” for purposes of Section 2(q) it has to be proved that person arrayed as
respondent has committed an act of domestic violence on the aggrieved person. We, thus, are of
the view that for the purposes of determination of right of defendant under Sections 17 and 19 read
with Section 26 in the suit in question the plaintiff can be treated as “respondent”, but for the grant
of any relief to the defendant or for successful resisting the suit of the plaintiff necessary conditions
for grant of relief as prescribed under the Act, 2005 has to be pleaded and proved by the defendant,
only then the relief can be granted by the Civil Court to the defendant. (Answer to issue 5).

Issue No. 6

Although under the statute regulating personal law the woman has right to maintenance, every wife
has right of maintenance which may include right of residence, the right recognized by sub-section
(1) of Section 17 is new and higher right conferred on every woman.

Sub-section (2) of Section 17, thus, contemplates that aggrieved person can be evicted or excluded
from the shared household in accordance with the procedure established by law.

What is the meaning and extent of expression “save in accordance with the procedure established
by law” is a question which has come up for consideration in this appeal. Whether the suit filed by
the plaintiff for mandatory and permanent injunction against the defendant in the Civil Court is
covered by the expression “save in accordance with the procedure established by law”. The
Magistrate, thus, has provided that without the orders of Competent Court the applicant (respondent
herein) should not be dispossessed. In the present case, interim order specifically contemplates that
it is only by the order of the Competent Court respondent shall be dispossessed.
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The Act, 2005, is a special Act which provides for manner and procedure for obtaining relief by an
aggrieved person. The Act, 2005, is a special Act which provides for manner and procedure for
obtaining relief by an aggrieved person. Thus, in appropriate case, the competent court can decide
the claim in a properly instituted suit by the owner as to whether the women need to be excluded or
evicted from the shared household. One most common example for eviction and exclusion may be
when the aggrieved person is provided same level of alternate accommodation or payment of rent
as contemplated by Section 19 sub-section (f) itself.

The embargo under Section 17(2) of Act, 2005 of not to be evicted or excluded save in accordance
with the procedure established by law operates only against the “respondent”, i.e., one who is
respondent within the meaning of Section 2(q) of Act, 2005.

Issue No. 7

Learned counsel for the appellant challenging the direction issued by the High Court that the husband
of respondent be impleaded by the Trial Court by invoking suo-moto powers under Order I Rule 10
CPC, submits that no relief having been claimed against the son of the appellant, he (son) was
neither necessary nor proper party.

This Court discussing judgment of Razia Begum has laid down following in paragraphs 10 and 12:

It is firmly established as a result of judicial decisions that in order that a person may be added as a
party to a suit, he should have a direct interest in the subject-matter. Sinha, J. speaking for the
majority said that a declaratory judgment in respect of a disputed status will be binding not only upon
parties actually before the Court but also upon persons claiming through them respectively.

There can be no dispute with the preposition of law as laid down by this Court in the above two cases.
In the present case, although plaintiff has not claimed any relief against his son, Raveen Ahuja, the
husband of the respondent, hence, he was not a necessary party but in view of the fact that
respondent has pleaded her right of residence in shared household relying on Sections 17 and 19 of
the Act, 2005 and one of the rights which can be granted under Section 19 is right of alternate
accommodation, the husband is a proper party. The right of maintenance as per the provisions of
Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 is that of the husband, hence he may be a proper party
in cases when the Court is to consider the claim of respondent under Sections 17 and 19 read with
Section 26 of the Act, 2005.

Civil Procedure Code, Order 1 Rule 10 empowers the Court at any stage of the proceedings either on
an application or suo moto to add a party either as plaintiff or defendant whose presence before the
Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectively and completely adjudicate upon and
settle all the questions involved in the suit. Whether the husband of an aggrieved person in a particular
case needs to be added as plaintiff or defendant in the suit is a matter, which need to be considered
by the Court taking into consideration all aspects of the matter. Now, coming to the present case,
we have already observed that although husband of the defendant was not a necessary party but
in view of the pleadings in the written statement, the husband was a proper party.

Issue No. 8-

The Court has noticed that in complaint filed by the respondent under Section 12 of Act, 2005, an
interim order was passed in her favour directing the respondent arrayed in the complaint not to
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dispossess the applicant without orders of a competent court. What is the effect of an interim order
or a final order passed under Section 19 of the Act, 2005 on a civil proceeding initiated in a court of
competent jurisdiction, is a question, which need to be answered?

Whether in view of the pendency of proceedings under the D.V. Act any proceedings could not have
been initiated in a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction or whether the orders passed under D.V. Act
giving right of residence by interim or final order are binding in Civil Court proceedings and Civil
court could not have taken any decision contrary to directions issued in D.V. Act are the related
questions to be considered.

Section 17(2) itself contemplates eviction or exclusion of aggrieved person from a shared household
in accordance with the procedure established by law. The conclusion is inescapable that a
proceeding in a competent court for eviction or exclusion is contemplated by the Statutory Scheme of
Act, 2005. Thus, there is neither any express nor implied bar in initiation of civil proceedings in a
Court of competent jurisdiction. Further, Section 26 also contemplates grant of relief of right of
residence under Section 19 in any legal proceedings before a Civil Court or Family Court or Criminal
Court affecting the aggrieved person. There may be also instances where conflict may arise in the
orders issued under D.V. Act, 2005 as well as the judgment of Civil Court. What is the effect of such
conflict in the decision is another related issue which needs to be answered? Whether the principle
of res judicata can be pressed in respect to any decision inter parties in respect to criminal and civil
proceedings? The applicability of principle of res judicata is well known and are governed by provisions
of Section 11 C.P.C., which principle also has been held to be applicable in other proceedings.

The principle enumerated in Section 300 Cr.P.C. may be relevant with respect to two criminal
proceedings against same accused, which might have no relevance in reference to one criminal
proceeding and one civil proceeding.

The scheme of D.V. Act, 2005 does not contemplate that any judgment and order passed under
Section 19 of the said Act prevents any court from taking cognizance of a suit or holding of trial; Section
41 Cpc deals with relevancy of certain judgments in probate, matrimonial, admirality and insolvency
jurisdiction which are conclusive not only against party but against all the world. A decree of Civil
Court in exercise of matrimonial jurisdiction is also one of the judgments which had been held to be
relevant under Section 41. The orders passed under Act, 2005 cannot be held to be orders or
judgments passed in exercise of any matrimonial jurisdiction by the Court. The Act, 2005 is a special
act on the subject of providing for effective protection of the rights of women who are victims of
violence of any kind.

Even as per Section 36 of the D.V. Act, the provisions of the D.V. Act shall be in addition to, and not
in derogation of the provisions of any other law, for the time being in force. Even the magistrate can
also pass an interim order as per Section 23 of the D.V. Act. Even the Civil Court has to take into
consideration the relief already granted by the Magistrate in the proceedings under the D.V. Act
and vice versa. However, at the same time, it is to be observed that in a case any relief available under
Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 is sought by aggrieved person in any legal proceedings before a civil
court, family court or a criminal court including the residence order, the aggrieved person has to satisfy
by leading evidence that domestic violence has taken place and only on the basis of the evidence led
on being satisfied that the domestic violence has taken place, the relief available under Section 19 can
be granted.

Therefore, on conjoint reading of Sections 12(2), 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26 and 28 of the D.V. Act, it
can safely be said that the proceedings under the D.V. Act and proceedings before a civil court,
family court or a criminal court, as mentioned in Section 26 of the D.V. Act are independent
 11

proceedings like the proceedings under Section 125 of the Cr. P.C. for maintenance before the
Magistrate and/or family court and the proceedings for maintenance before a civil court/ family
court for the reliefs under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act. However, as observed
hereinabove, the findings/orders passed by the one forum has to be considered by another forum.

➢ We are called upon to examine the consequences and effect of orders passed under Section
19 of D.V. Act, 2005 on civil proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Seth Ramdayal Jat vs. Laxmi Prasad, (2009) 11 SCC 545

A civil proceeding as also a criminal proceeding may go on simultaneously. No statute puts an embargo
in relation thereto.

Vishnu Dutt Sharma vs. Daya Sapra, (2009) 13 SCC 729, this Court again reiterated that a judgment
of a criminal court in civil proceedings will have only a limited application and finding in a criminal
proceeding by no stretch of imagination would be binding in a civil proceeding.

In the plaint of suit giving rise to this appeal, the plaintiff has pleaded that the wife of the plaintiff has
been subjected to various threat and violence in the hands of the defendant on several occasions.
The suit be fully maintainable and the prayers in the suit can be covered by the reliefs as contemplated
by Section 19 read with Section 26 of the Act, 2005. The Civil Court in such suit can consider the issues
and may grant relief if the plaintiff is able to prove her case. The order passed under D.V. Act
whether interim or final shall be relevant and have to be given weight as one of evidence in the civil
suit but the evidentiary value of such evidence is limited.

The findings arrived therein by the magistrate are although not binding on the Civil Court but the order
having passed under the Act, 2005, which is an special Act has to be given its due weight.

K. Subramani vs. Director of Animal Husbandry, Chennai, (2009) 1 MLJ 363

There is no embargo in referring to or relying on an admissible evidence, be of a civil court or criminal
court both in civil or criminal proceedings.

We arrive at following conclusions:-

i). The pendency of proceedings under Act, 2005 or any order interim or final passed under D.V. Act
under Section 19 regarding right of residence is not an embargo for initiating or continuing any civil
proceedings, which relate to the subject matter of order interim or final passed in proceedings under
D.V. Act, 2005.

ii). The judgment or order of criminal court granting an interim or final relief under Section 19 of
D.V. Act, 2005 are relevant within the meaning of Section 43 of the Evidence Act and can be referred
to and looked into by the civil court.

iii). A civil court is to determine the issues in civil proceedings on the basis of evidence, which has
been led by the parties before the civil court.

iv). In the facts of the present case, suit filed in civil court for mandatory and permanent injunction
was fully maintainable.
 12

In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the considered opinion that High Court has rightly set
aside the decree of the Trial Court and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication. The appeal is
dismissed.

Some of the definitions used in the case-

➢ 2(a) “aggrieved person” means any person, who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship
with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence
by the respondent.
➢ Domestic Relationship” has been defined in Section 2(f)- "domestic relationship" means a
relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a
shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a
relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a
joint family.
➢ Section 2(q) - “respondent” means any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic
relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought
any relief under this Act: Provided that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in
the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the
male partner.
➢ Section 3 defines “domestic violence”.
➢ Sections 4 to 11 occurring in Chapter III deals with powers and duties of protection officers,
service providers etc.
➢ Section 17 provides that every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside
in the shared household. Right to reside in a shared household.-(1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law for the time being in force, every woman in a domestic relationship
shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title
or beneficial interest in the same.
➢ Section 18 deals with protection orders. Section 19 deals with residence orders. Section 20
deals with monetary reliefs. Section 23 deals with power to grant interim and ex parte
orders.
➢ Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC reads as under:
Rule 6- Judgment on admissions- (1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the
pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit,
either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the
determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such
judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions."

➢ Sec 300 CrPc- Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence.
➢ Section 36 in The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005-
Act not in derogation of any other law- The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and
not in derogation of the provisions of any other law, for the time being in force.

➢ Sec 41 of the Indian Evidence Act-

Relevancy of certain judgments in probate, etc., jurisdiction- A final judgment, order or
decree of a competent Court, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency
jurisdiction, which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character, or which
declares any person to be entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to any specific
 13

thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely, is relevant when the existence of
any such legal character, or the title of any such person to any such thing, is relevant.

➢ Section 26 in the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005-

Relief in other suits and legal proceedings.
(1)Any relief available under sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may also be sought in any legal
proceeding, before a civil court, family court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved
person and the respondent whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the
commencement of this Act.
(2) Any relief referred to in sub-section (1) may be sought for in addition to and along with
any other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding before a
civil or criminal court.
(3) In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved person in any proceedings other
than a proceeding under this Act, she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the grant of
such relief.

➢ [Difference between a necessary party and a proper party-A necessary party is one without
whom no order can be made effectively'; a proper party is one in whose absence an effective
order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the
question involved in the proceeding.

➢ Order 1, Rule 10- The court may at any stage of the proceedings,
a). either upon or
b). without the application of either party,
c). and on such terms as may appear to the court to be just,
order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be
struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as
plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to
enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions
involved in the suit, be added].

➢ Sec 11 Cpc reads as- No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and
substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the
same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the
same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue
has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. There
can be no applicability of principle of res judicata when orders of Criminal Courts are pitted
against proceedings in Civil Court.

➢ Section 17 in the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

Right to reside in a shared household.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other
law for the time being in force, every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right
to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest
in the same.
(2) The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any
part of it by the respondent save in accordance with the procedure established by law.

➢ Section 19(1) in The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
 14

(1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of section 12, the Magistrate may,
on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order—
(a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any other manner disturbing the
possession of the aggrieved person from the shared household, whether or not the
respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared household;
(b) directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared household;
(c) restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from entering any portion of the
shared household in which the aggrieved person resides;
(d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing of the shared household or
encumbering the same;
(e) restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in the shared household except
with the leave of the Magistrate; or
(f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the
aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same,
if the circumstances so require: Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed
against any person who is a woman.

➢ Section 12 in THE DIVORCE ACT, 1869

12 Court to be satisfied of absence of collusion. Upon any such petition for the dissolution of
a marriage, the Court shall satisfy itself, so far as it reasonably can, not only as to the facts
alleged, but also whether or not the petitioner has been in any manner accessory to, or
conniving at, the going through of the said form of marriage, or the adultery, or has condoned
the same, and shall also enquire into any countercharge which may be made against the
petitioner.

➢ Section 13 in THE DIVORCE ACT, 1869

13 Dismissal of petition. In case the Court, on the evidence in relation to any such petition, is
satisfied that the petitioner's case has not been proved, or is not satisfied that the alleged
adultery has been committed, or finds that the petitioner has, during the marriage, been
accessory to, or conniving at, the going through of the said form of marriage, or the adultery
of the other party to the marriage, or has condoned the adultery complained of, or that the
petition is presented or prosecuted in collusion with either of the respondents, then and in
any of the said cases the Court shall dismiss the petition.
 15

SHORTER SUMMARY OF THE CASE

1. WHAT HAS BEEN HELD IN SHORT

A wife is also entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household belonging to relatives
of the husband, the Supreme Court has held in an important judgment overruling the 2006
judgment in S.R. Batra vs Taruna Batra.

2. WHAT IS A SHARED HOUSEHOLD

The bench comprising Justices Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy and MR Shah observed the
definition of 'shared household' given in Section 2(s) of the Act cannot be read to mean that
it can only be that household which is household of the joint family of which husband is a
member or in which husband of the aggrieved person has a share.
"In the event, shared household belongs to any relative of the husband with whom in a
domestic relationship the woman has lived, the conditions mentioned in Section 2(s) are
satisfied and the said house will become a shared household.

3. WHAT WAS OBSERVED IN S.R BATRA v. TARUNA BATRA (now overruled)

In S.R. Batra vs Taruna Batra , the Supreme Court bench of Justices SB Sinha and M.Katju
had rejected the contention that the definition of shared household includes a household
where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage had lived in a domestic relationship. It held
that the wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household, and a
`shared household' would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the
husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member.
The court had further observed that claim for alternative accommodation can only be made
against the husband and not against the husband's in-laws or other relatives.

QUESTION – The supreme court in the case of Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja
overruled which judgement?
ANS - S.R. Batra vs Taruna Batra 2006

QUESTION – Which section defined “shared household”?

ANS - Section 2(s)

QUESTION – When was domestic violence act enacted?

ANS – 2005

4. ISSUES: (imp)
Whether the definition of shared household under Section 2(s) of the Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 has to be read to mean that shared household can only be
that household which is household of joint family or in which husband of the aggrieved person
has a share? &

Whether judgement of this court in S.R Batra and Anr. v. Taruna Batra, 2007 does not lay down
the correct law?
 16

Held: The court held that shared household referred to in Section 2(s) is the shared household
of aggrieved person where she was living at the time when application was filed or in the
recent past has been excluded from the use or she is temporarily absent. The living of the
woman in the household has to refer to a living which has some permanency. If the shared
household belongs to any relative of the husband with whom in a domestic relationship the
woman has lived, the conditions mentioned in Section 2(s) are satisfied then the said house
will become shared household. The right to residence under Section 19 is not an indefeasible
right of residence in shared household.

The definition of shared household given in Section 2(s) cannot be read to mean that shared
household can only be that household which is household of joint family of which husband is
member or in which the husband of the aggrieved person has share.

The court held that the interpretation of definition of ‘shared household’ as put in S.R Batra
vs. Taruna Batra does not lay down the correct law.

ISSUE: Whether the High Court has rightly come to the conclusion that suit filed by the
appellant could not have been decreed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC?

Held: The court concurred with the view of the High Court and held that power under Order
XII Rule 6 is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The Trial Court ought
not to have given the judgement under Order XII Rule 6 on the admission of the defendant as
contained in her application filed under Section under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005.

ISSUE: Whether, when the defendant in her written statement pleaded that suit property is
her shared household and she has right to residence therein, the Trial Court could have
decreed the suit of the plaintiff without deciding such claim of defendant which was
permissible to be decided as per Section 26 of the Act, 2005?

Held: The Court held that the claim of the defendant that suit property is shared household
and she has right to reside in the house ought to have been considered by the Trial Court and non-
consideration of the claim amounts to defeating the right which is protected by the DV Act, 2005.

ISSUE: Whether the plaintiff (Father-in-law) in the suit giving rise to this appeal can be said
to be the respondent as per definition of Section 2(q) of Act, 2005? (imp)

Held: The court held that to treat a person as the “respondent” for the purposes of Section
2(q) it has to be proved that person arrayed as respondent has committed an act of domestic
violence of the aggrieved person.

For the purposes of determination of rights of the defendant under Sections 17 and 19 read
with Section 26, the plaintiff can be treated as ‘respondent’ but for the grant of any relief to
the defendant or for successfully resisting the suit of the plaintiff, necessary conditions
prescribed under DV Act, 2005 has to be pleaded and proved by the defendant.
 17

NOTE: The Court in Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora, (2016) 10 SCC 165,
where the Court has struck down the expression “adult male” from the expression “any
adult male person” and held that restricting the meaning of respondent in Section 2(q) to
only “adult male person” is not based on any intelligible differentia having rational nexus
with object sought to be achieved. Hence, it is now permissible under definition of Section
2(q) to include females also.

ISSUE: What is the meaning and extent of the expression “save in accordance with the
procedure established by law” as occurring in Section 17(2) of Act, 2005?

Held: The court held that the expression “save in accordance with the procedure established
by law” in Section 17(2) of the DV Act, 2005 contemplates the proceedings in court of
competent jurisdiction. Thus, suit for mandatory and permanent injunctions/ eviction is
maintainable before a competent court. The provision contemplates adopting of any
procedure established by law by the respondent for eviction or exclusion of the aggrieved
person from the shared household. Thus, the competent court can decide the claim in a
properly instituted suit by the owner as to whether the women need to be excluded or evicted
from the shared household.

ISSUE: What is the effect of orders passed under Section 19 of the DV Act, 2005 whether
interim or final passed in the proceedings initiated in a civil court of competent jurisdiction?

Held: The court held that the pendency of proceedings under the DV Act, 2005 or any interim
or final order passed under DV Act under Section 19 regarding right of residence is not an
embargo for initiating or continuing any civil proceedings, which relate to the subject matter
of order interim or final passed in proceedings under DV Act, 2005. The judgement or order
of criminal court granting an interim or final relief under Section 19 of DV Act, 2005 are
relevant within the meaning of Section 43 of the Evidence Act and can be looked into or
referred to by the civil court.

5. OTHER RELATED CASES

1. “Unless it is satisfactorily established that domestic violence has taken place neither any
protection order under Section 18 nor any residence order under Section 19 nor any order
for monetary relief under Section 20 nor any compensation order under Section 22 of the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 should be passed.” (Calcutta HC)
– SANGITA SAHA v. ABHIJIT SAHA & OTHERS 2019

2. In Juveria Abdul Majid Patni Vs. Atif Iqbal Mansoori [2014(10) SCC 736] , the Supreme
Court was examining the correctness of an order of Sessions Court which dismissed an
application filed under the Domestic Violence Act as not maintainable. Examining the
provisions of the Act, the court held that an act of domestic violence once committed,
subsequent decree of divorce will not absolve the liability of the respondent from the
offence committed or to deny the benefit to which the aggrieved person is entitled under
the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 including monetary relief under Section 20, Child Custody
under Section 21, Compensation under Section 22 and interim or ex parte order under
Section 23 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
 18

3. The right of a woman to secure a residence order in respect of a shared household cannot
be defeated by the simple expedient of securing an order of eviction by adopting the
summary procedure under the Senior Citizens Act, the bench comprising Justices DY
Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra and Indira Banerjee observed in the case S Vanitha vs.
Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District. – Smt. S. VANITHA v. THE DEPUTY
COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU URBAN DISTRICT & ORS 2020

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