SemV - Labour Law II - Nayan.project.102
SemV - Labour Law II - Nayan.project.102
SemV - Labour Law II - Nayan.project.102
HON’BLE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
VERSUS
NAYAN JAIN
Semester- V (A)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………………..………1
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS……………………………………………………………...……2
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES………………………………………………………...………….3
STATEMENT OF FACTS…………………………………………………………………...…6
ISSUES RAISED………………………………………………………………………………...7
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS………………………………………………………………..8
PLEADINGS/ARGUMENTS ADVANCED…………………………………………………..9
ISSUE A: THAT THE EMPLOYEES’ STATE INSURANCE ACT IS NOT APPLICABLE TO ROYAL
A.1. - That ‘turf club’ doesn’t fall under the category of establishment……………...9
A.2. - That ‘turf club’ doesn’t fall within the common parlance of the term ‘shop’..10
ISSUE B: THAT CASUAL WORKERS ARE NOT COVERED UNDER DEFINITION OF EMPLOYEE
B.2. - That ‘temporary staff’ does not qualify engage test. .…………....................... 12
1. & And
3. Art. Article
4. Ed. Edition
5. Hon’ble Honourable
6. Ors. Others
7. SC Supreme Court
12. S. Section
15. v. Versus
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED-
BOOKS REFERRED-
S. NO. NAME
1. S.N. Mishra, Labour and Industrial Laws, Central Law Publications (27th ed. 2013).
2. Dr. D.D. Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India, LexisNexis (21st ed. 2013)
3. Black’s Law Dictionary, Bryan A. Garner, 8th edition
4. Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition
1. S.N. Mishra, Labour and Industrial Laws, Central Law Publications (27th ed. 2013).
STATUTES REFERRED-
S. NO. NAME
1. Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948
2. The Constitution of India, 1950
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA IS EMPOWERED TO HEAR THIS CASE BY THE VIRTUE
OF ARTICLE 133 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950. THIS CIVIL APPEAL ARISES FROM THE
JUDGEMENT DATED 21ST OCTOBER, 2005 PASSED BY THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY.
133. Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in appeals from High Courts in regard to
civil matters
(1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order
in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court certifies
under Article 134A-
(a) that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance; and
(b) that in the opinion of the High Court the said question needs to be decided by
the Supreme Court.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in Article 132, any party appealing to the Supreme Court
under clause (1) may urge as one of the grounds in such appeal that a substantial
question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution has been wrongly decided
(3) Notwithstanding anything in this article, no appeal shall, unless Parliament by law
otherwise provides, lie to the Supreme Court from the judgment, decree or final order
of one Judge of a High Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Royal Western India Turf Club Ltd. (Appellant) is an Indian sports club, into horse racing,
established in 1802, which runs the Mahalaxmi Racecourse in Mumbai, and the Pune Race
Course.
2. The main question involved in the present appeal is whether the Employees’ State
Insurance Act is applicable to Royal Western India Turf Club Ltd.
3. The appellant employed temporary staff engaged on race-days for issue of tickets.
4. The next questions involved for decision in this appeal is whether casual workers are
covered under definition of employee as defined in Section 2(9) of the Employees State
Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as 'ESI Act') and whether the appellant is
obliged to pay contribution in respect of them.
ISSUES RAISED
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE A: THAT THE EMPLOYEES’ STATE INSURANCE ACT IS NOT APPLICABLE TO ROYAL
WESTERN INDIA TURF CLUB LTD.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that Section 1 of the Employees’ State Insurance
Act, 1948 define application and scope of the Act. Under Section 1(5) of the said Act, all
establishments are not automatically covered by the said Act but only such establishments as are
mentioned in the notification issued by the appropriate Government under Section 1(5). It is
humbly submitted that the Appellant-club is not a shop within the meaning of the Act or the
notification issued by the appropriate government
ISSUE B: THAT CASUAL WORKERS ARE NOT COVERED UNDER DEFINITION OF EMPLOYEE AS
It is humbly submitted that Section 2(9) of the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 defines
‘employee’ under the said Act. A person who is employed for wages in the factory or establishment
on any work of, or incidental or preliminary to or connected with the work is covered under this
definition. It is, however, submitted that temporary staff engaged on race-days for issue of tickets
falls under the category of casual workers and hence they are not covered under the definition of
employee as defined under the aforesaid section.
WRITTEN SUBMISSION
ISSUE A: THAT THE EMPLOYEES’ STATE INSURANCE ACT IS NOT APPLICABLE TO ROYAL
WESTERN INDIA TURF CLUB LTD.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that Section 11 of the Employees’ State Insurance
Act, 1948 define application and scope of the Act. Under Section 1(5)2 of the said Act, all
establishments are not automatically covered by the said Act but only such establishments as are
mentioned in the notification issued by the appropriate Government under Section 1(5). This
provision is not like Sub-section (4) of Section 1 by which all factories are automatically covered
by the ESI Act.
A.1. That ‘turf club’ doesn’t fall under the category of establishment under ESI Act.
The Government of Maharashtra issued a Notification3 dated 18.09.1978 whereby the State,
exercising its power under Sub-section (5) of Section 1 of the ESI Act, extended the provision of
the ESI Act to certain classes of establishments as found mentioned therein. The relevant portion
of the notification reads as under-
The notifications issued Under Section 1(5) in these cases use the word 'shop' and it has been held
in Employees State Insurance Corporation v. Hyderabad Race Club4 that 'race-club' is an
'establishment' within the meaning of the ‘said expression’ as used Under Section 1(5) of the ESI
Act.
1
Section 1- Short title, extent, commencement and application.
2
Section 1(5)- “The appropriate Government may, in consultation with the corporation and where the appropriate
Government is a State Government, with the approval of the Central Government], after giving one month's notice of
its intention of so doing by notifi-cation in the Official Gazette, extend the provisions of this Act or any of them, to
any other establishment or class of establis-hments, industrial, commercial, agricultural or otherwise..”
3
Notification No. ESI. 1677/3910/PH-15.
4
Employees State Insurance Corporation v. Hyderabad Race Club, (2004) 6 SCC 191.
It is humbly submitted that this decision was reconsidered in The Bangalore Turf Club Ltd. v.
Regional Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation5 and it was stated in this case that-
“The word 'shop' has not been defined either in the ESI Act or in the notification issued by the
appropriate government Under Section 1(5). Hence, in our opinion, the meaning of 'shop' will be
that used in common parlance. In common parlance when we go for shopping to a market, we do
not mean going to a racing club. Hence, prima facie, we are of the opinion that the Appellant-club
is not a shop within the meaning of the Act or the notification issued by the appropriate
government.”
A.2. That ‘turf club’ doesn’t fall within the common parlance of the term ‘shop’.
It is further submitted that the meaning of 'shop' must be understood in common parlance, i.e., as
per its traditional meaning. It is submitted that in M/s. Hindu Jea Band v. ESIC6 it was stated
that the Court should not prefer a liberal or expansive interpretation to ascertain the meaning of a
'shop', and that the literal rule of construction would be best suited to the given case. The common
thread for ascertaining whether a premises may be called a shop, would be that such a place is
commonly used for the sale of goods or services or to facilitate the same.
It is submitted that a 'shop', in its traditional meaning, would necessarily be a building where goods
are sold or kept for sale and therefore it would require a well-defined and enclosed premises. It is
stated that a permanent structure consisting of four-walls and a roof would be essential for any
premises or establishment to be called a 'shop'. “The race-club had large open area for conducting
the actual race, that is the track, stables, etc. and it cannot be called a 'shop' by any stretch of
imagination as it lacked the necessary enclosed space or roof.”7
5
The Bangalore Turf Club Ltd. v. Regional Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation, AIR 2015 SC
221.
6
M/s. Hindu Jea Band v. ESIC, (1987) 2 SCC 101; M/s. Cochin Shipping Co. v. ESIC, (1992) 4 SCC 245;
Transport Corporation of India v. ESIC (2000) 1 SCC 332.
7
The Bangalore Turf Club Ltd. v. Regional Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation, AIR 2015 SC
221.
8
Southern Agencies, Rajamundry v. Andhra Pradesh Employees’ State Insurance Corporation, AIR 2000 SC
3718.
premises any economic activity is being carried on leading to sale and purchase than that premises
will be held as a shop. However, one of the condition precedent to this is that there must be actual
giving and taking of goods in such premises. In the present facts, appellant is an Indian sports club,
into horse racing and in no way it can fall within the common parlance of the term ‘shop’.
Hence, on these grounds, it is most humbly submitted that the Employees’ State Insurance Act is
not applicable to the Appellants.
ISSUE B: THAT CASUAL WORKERS ARE NOT COVERED UNDER DEFINITION OF EMPLOYEE AS
DEFINED IN SECTION 2(9) OF THE EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE ACT, 1948.
It is humbly submitted that Section 2(9) of the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 defines
‘employee’ under the said Act. A person who is employed for wages in the factory or establishment
on any work of, or incidental or preliminary to or connected with the work is covered under this
definition. It is, however, submitted that temporary staff engaged on race-days for issue of tickets
falls under the category of casual workers and hence they are not covered under the definition of
employee as defined under the aforesaid section.
In E.S.I. Corpn. v. Gnanambikai Mills Ltd.9, Madras High Court took the view that the casual
workmen concerned were not employees under Section 2(9) of the Act. Further, in Regional
Director ESI Corporation v. P.R. Narahari Rao10, it was stated that a person engaged casually in
connection with processes which are not integral parts of or incidental or preliminary to or
connected with the operations of the establishment, though such engagement may be for longer
periods, other than casual employment on a contract of service, such casual workman may not be
employee as defined in the Act.
9
E.S.I. Corpn. v. Gnanambikai Mills Ltd., (1974) 2 LLJ 530.
10
Regional Director ESI Corporation v. P.R. Narahari Rao, 1986 KLJ 994.
In Regional Director ESI Corporation v. P.R. Narahari Rao11, the Hon’ble court enunciated
engage test to find the inclusion of casual labour under the definition of the ‘employee’. It stated
that, “if a person is engaged casually for a process unconnected with the operations of the
establishment, or some work which does not form the integral part of such operations, he may not
be an employee since there would be no employer-employee relationship between them only in
consequence of the casual engagement for purposes unconnected with the main operations of the
establishment.” This test was reaffirmed in the case of Regional director, Employees State
Insurance Corporation v. Suresh Trading Company12.
It is humbly submitted that in the present case, ‘temporary staff engaged on race-days’ are just
engaged casually and they in no way integral part of any operations of the ‘’turf club’. Further,
they are just ticket vendors and such vending cannot be termed as the integral part of horse racing.
This vending has a remote connection with horse racing and therefore these casual employees does
not fulfill the engagement test as enunciated in the aforementioned case.
It is humbly submitted that the object of Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 is “to provide for
certain benefits to employees in case of sickness, maternity, and employment injury and to make
provision for certain other matters in relation thereto.” Section 49 of the aforesaid Act provides
for sickness benefit.
However, in Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. Gnanambikai Mills Ltd.13 it was stated
that under Section 2(9) of the Act, casual employees may not be entitled to sickness benefits in
case their employment is less than the benefit period or contribution period and that it does not
appear from the Act that casual employee should be brought within its purview.
11
Regional Director ESI Corporation v. P.R. Narahari Rao, 1986 KLJ 994.
12
Regional director, Employees State Insurance Corporation v. Suresh Trading Company, (1990) I LLJ 348
(Kerala); Cemendia Company Limited v. Employees State Insurance Corporation, (1995) II LLJ 519 (Bom.);
Regional director, Employees State Insurance Corporation v. Vijaya Mohini Mills, (1990) II LLJ 464 (Kerala).
13
Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. Gnanambikai Mills Ltd, (1974) 2 LLJ 530 (Mad.).
It is therefore submitted that even legislature did not intended to bring casual employees under the
purview of this Act.
Hence, on these grounds, it is most humbly submitted that casual workers are not covered under
definition of employee as defined in section 2(9) of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948.
1. That the Employees’ State Insurance Act is not applicable to the appellants.
2. That ‘turf club’ doesn’t fall under the category of establishment under ESI Act.
3. That ‘turf club’ doesn’t fall within the common parlance of the term ‘shop’.
4. That casual workers are not covered under definition of employee as defined in section
2(9) of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948.
5. That ‘temporary staff’ does not qualify engage test.
THE COURT MAY ALSO BE PLEASED TO PASS ANY OTHER ORDER, WHICH THE COURT MAY
DEEM FIT IN LIGHT OF JUSTICE EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE.
AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS THE APPELLANTS SHALL DUTY BOUND EVER PRAY.