Unit-5 Mimamsa Philosophy PDF
Unit-5 Mimamsa Philosophy PDF
Unit-5 Mimamsa Philosophy PDF
Structure
5.0 Objectives
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Epistemology
5.3 Sources of Valid Knowledge (Pramâna)
5.4 Theories of Error (Khyativâda)
5.5 Metaphysics
5.6 Nature of Self
5.7 God and Liberation
5.8 Let Us Sum Up
5.9 Key Words
5.10 Further Readings and References
5.11 Answers to Check Your Progress
5.0 OBJECTIVES
After having studied and worked through the unit, you should be able to:
• illustrate the validity of knowledge;
• discuss arthapati (postulation) as a source of valid knowledge;
• analyze khytivada (theory of error);
• explain the nature of self; and
• discuss the Mimansika’s concept of liberation.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous unit, Yoga Philosophy, we gave you an account of different forms
and modifications of citta. We had also discussed the ‘eight fold path of yoga’.
At the end, we had analyzed the concept of God and liberation.
In this unit, you will find the complete discussion on the Mimansa philosophy,
their views on epistemology and the metaphysics. Theory of error and theory of
causation are also discussed with reference to their view. Further, their arguments
on the sources of valid knowledge (pramanas) are elucidated in an elaborate
manner.
The Mimansa philosophy is one among the other schools of Indian philosophy.
The Mimansa School was founded by Jaimini in 400 B.C. He was the author of
‘Mimansa sutra’. The commentator works on Mimansa Sutra are primarily of
Kumalia Bhatta and Prabhakara Mishra. Like Nayaya-Vaisesika and Samkhya-
Yoga, Mimansa-Vedanta is considered as an allied system of Indian school of
thought. The word ‘mimansa’ means ‘revered thought’, which is to be applied
originally in the interpretation of the vedic rituals. Mimansa deals with the initial
part of the Veda and is therefore called as Purva-Mimansa. The initial part of the
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Orthodox Systems-1 Veda concerns on human action, their rituals and the sacrifices. It is thus known
as karmakanda.
Two scholars namely Kumarila Bhatta and Prabhakar Mishra wrote treatises on
the Mimansa philosophy. They aimed at giving a theistic learning to the Mimansa
philosophy.
5.2 EPISTEMOLOGY
The term epistemology deals with knowledge of an object. When we cognize an
object we possess knowledge of that object. To verify whether our knowledge of
that object is correct or not, we have to consider the below four conditions.
These are;
i) It must not arise from defective causes.
ii) It must be free from contradiction. This implies it must be self-consistent
and should not be contradicted by subsequent knowledge.
iii) It provides the experience of an object which has not experienced earlier. In
short, it provides experience of an unknown object.
iv) It must represent the object.
Once these conditions are satisfied, our cognition of an object will be treated as
valid. While considering these conditions, it is mentioned that memory can’t be
regarded as valid knowledge because it arises from the impression of a prior
cognition which contradicts the third condition/ criterion of valid knowledge.
Validity of knowledge
Kumarila regards cognition as a means of valid knowledge because of its
apprehension (anubhuti), and he regards cognizedness produced by a cognitive
act as its result. Prabhakara, on the other hand, vividly expresses that we cognize
an object by means of valid knowledge as it is an apprehension, but it is not to
the means of ‘recollection’ as it is found in case of memory. He identifies pramana
with prama or valid knowledge and regards cognition as manifesting itself but
not inferable form cognizedness of its object. Thus for him, pramana is same as
prama. On his views, all cognitions are valid and their invalidity is due to the
disagreement with the real nature of objects. So wrongness does not belong to
the cognition but to the object cognized.
With these analyses, the Mimansa philosophy discusses two theories; svatah
pramanyavada, and paratah pramanyavada. The former is translated as intrinsic
validity and the latter is translated as extrinsic validity of knowledge. To explain
svatah pramanyavada, knowledge of an object is valid by itself. Validity of
knowledge arises from the essential nature of the causes of knowledge and it is
not due to any extraneous conditions. To elucidate paratah pramanyavada,
knowledge is not self-evident but it is validated by extraneous conditions.
By doing integration (reshuffling) of these two theories, we are resulted in four
theories. These are;
i) Svatah pramanyavada (intrinsic validity)
ii) Svatah apramanyavada (intrinsic invalidity)
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iii) Paratah pramanyavada (extrinsic validity) Mimamsa Philosophy
Perception
Perception is a form of knowledge which results from the contact between the
object and the sense-organs. Generally, we believe whatever is perceived by our
senses must be true because in perception, the objects are directly known through
our sense-organs. Thus perception is an immediate knowledge. Example; by
seeing and touching a table one can acquire the knowledge of that table. Perceptual
knowledge is valid only when an object is perceived as it is.
Like Nyayikas, the Mimamsa School has classified perception in various kinds
from different perspectives. Firstly, perception is classified in two types; ordinary
(laukika) and extra ordinary (alaukika). When sense organs come into the contact
with the object in the usual way we have ordinary perception. savikalpaka
(determinate) and nirvikalpaka (indeterminate) are two forms of ordinary
perception. The detail analysis of these two perceptions are found in the unit-
1:Nyaya Philosophy of this block. In the case of extraordinary perception, the
objects are not presented to the senses in the usual way but they are conveyed to
the sense through unusal medium. On perception, the basic difference between
the Nyaya and the Mimansa philosophy is, the Naiyayikas regard the auditory
organ as proceeding form ether (akasa) while the Mimansikas regard it is
proceeding from space(dik).
Inference (Anumana)
The second kind of pramana is called anumana. Inference is a kind of knowledge,
which is based on previous cognition. In perception we have direct knowledge
of an object because there is a direct presentation of an object before our sense
organs. Therefore, perceptual knowledge is immediate or prataksa.
In anumana, there is no such direct presentation of the object and therefore it is
called paroksa jnana or mediate knowledge. In anumana, an object is inferred to
be present in a particular case because it has been invariably perceived to be
present in all such similar cases. Thus in anumana, the cognition of an object is
based on our prior knowledge of it. For example, we see smoke in a distant hill.
From the presence of smoke, we at-once infer that these must be fire in the
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Comparison (Upamana) Mimamsa Philosophy
Postulation (Arthapati)
This is a unique source of valid knowledge upholds by the Mimansikas. In other
words, the Mimansikas expressed arthapati as a valid method of cognition. The
expression “arthapati” is a combination of two words namely ‘artha’ and ‘apatti’.
The term artha means fact and apatti means ‘kalpana’ which is understood as
‘supposition’ in English. Thus, etymologically speaking, arthapati is that
knowledge which resolves the conflict between two facts. It entails a
presupposition which solves the problem that occurred between two facts.
For example, Devadatta is a fat man by fasting in the day. In this proposition we
find two facts. One, Devadatta is a human being alive and he is fat. Second, he is
not eating in day time. In order to resolve this conflict, i.e. how a person will be
fat and not eating anything in day time, we postulate the existence of third fact,
i.e. he must be eating in the night. Another example, “John is living and who is
not in home”. The problem observed here is how John alive and is not found in
his home. To resolve this conflict, we postulate the fact, i.e. he may be staying in
a rented house outside his home. Thus, postulation or presumption is a valid
source of knowledge.
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Orthodox Systems-1
Check Your Progress II
Notes: a) Space is given below for your answers.
b) Compare your answer with the one given at the end of this unit.
1) Discuss ‘arthapati’ as a valid pramana.
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Non-Apprehension (Anupalabdhi)
This is an independent source of valid knowledge subscribed by the Mimansa
Philosophy. Non-apprehension is the immediate knowledge of the non-existence
of an object. An object doesn’t exist in a particular place and a particular time.
But it exists elsewhere. To perceive the non-existent of that particular object in a
given situation/place is known as anupalabdhi.
For example, ‘there is no book on the table”. Here, an individual does not perceive
the book directly through his/her sense organs. But the knowledge of the absence
or non existence of the book on the table arises because of the non-perception of
the perceivable object. The absence of an object from the situation in which it
should be available is said to be its non-existence. And, to possess the knowledge
of non existence of objects in an existence form is called as anupalabdhi.
Error (viparyaya)
Error or bharma is reverse of valid knowledge (prama). In the case of valid
knowledge the presentation of object is found what it really is, but in case of
error, it is found in inverse mode. In case of error, we cognize object what it is
not. In error, an object is cognized as having certain characteristics that really
fall outside of its being. Thus, it is a wrong apprehension in which the object is
taken for what it is not. All error is subjective in their nature. For example; we
cognize a snake instead of a rope. This happens because the characteristics of a
snake are found in the rope. In the similar way we cognize shell erroneously as
silver.
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Mimamsa Philosophy
Check Your Progress III
Notes: a) Space is given below for your answers.
b) Compare your answer with the one given at the end of this unit.
1) What is error?
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With these backgrounds now let us discuss theories of error which are relevant
in your present study out of many. Prabhakara school of Mimansa and Advaita
Vedantins propounded ‘akhyativada’ and ‘anirvacaniya khyativada’ repectively.
Kumarila Bhatta advocates the theory of error known as ‘viparita khyativada’.
Let us discuss how they establish their theory in their own ways.
Akhyativada
This theory of error is advocated by Prabhakara school of Mimansa. It is also
called as ‘viveka khyati’. According to Prabhaka School of Mimansa, there is no
invalid cognition. A particular cognition may be less than true but it can never be
untrue. They recognize two fold classification of cognition. These are;
i) Valid cognition
ii) Memory
But they did not acknowledge delusive cognition as a third class. This is so
because delusive cognition generates out of the above two cognitions.
For example, ‘This is silver’. The ‘this’ is perceptually cognized and the ‘silver’
is remembered. The cognition of the ‘this’ is perceptual because there is sense
contact with what is present before us, i.e. shell. However, the cognition of silver
is a memory being generated by our sense-impression. In this case, the cognizer
fails to demarcate percept from smrti. As a result, our knowledge on the object is
treated as erroneous. Hence, we cognize shell as silver.
Anirvacaniya Khyativada
This theory of error is proposed by Advaita Vedantins. It states that something is
presented to our senses because of avidya or ignorance. Due to avidya the cognizer
cognizes an object something different from what it is.
For example, we cognize shell as silver. In this case our knowledge of silver is
imposed on the object ‘shell’. So it is erroneous. Further, they said that nothing
is found real in this world because knowledge of an object is altered in the next 65
Orthodox Systems-1 moment. Due to ‘I-ness’ we cognize objects in the world. But the fact is that,
there is only one reality that is eternal and unchanging is known as Brahman.
Hence, whatever we cognize is not real. Therefore, the nature of creation is
indescribable. This implies cognition of shell as well as silver is not real. Hence,
the theory of error is indescribable.
Viparita Khytivada
In regard to the theory of error, Bhatta School of Mimansa proposed a new theory
known as ‘viparita khyativada’. On their view, error lies because of the wrong
relation between the object and sense organs, but it is not due to the objects
which are real. For example, people belong to different parts of the world seeing
one and the same moon but wrongly claim that they are seeing different moon.
This theory of error is reversal of right behavior towards an object.
5.5 METAPHYSICS
The Mimansa Philosophy believes in the existence of eternal world and the
innumerable individual souls within it. They also admit the existence (presence)
of other eternal and infinite substances in the earth. They viewed that the world
is constituted of three types of elements. These are; body, sense organs and eternal
things. The self in the body enjoys the fruit of its actions. Sense organs used as
the means to experience pleasure and pain. External things are meant for
enjoyment. Apart from all these realities they also believe in many other realities
like, the existence of heaven, hell, etc. although these are not perceivable. Thus,
Mimansikas are treated as pluralistic realist.
The Mimansikas agreed upon the view that the creation and destruction of the
world is based on our karmas. Hence, they ruled out the existence of God behind
the creation of the world. For them, God is an unseen power who guides/ instructs
us to do certain karmas in certain time/period.
Theory of Causation
According to the Mimansa philosophy, theory of causation is explained through
‘theory of energy’. They explained that there are potent energies found in the
cause. As a result, a particular cause produces a particular effect and that has
been observed or known by us (human beings). Thus each phenomenon can be
explained only by the theory of potent energy in the cause. If the potent energy is
absent, no effect would be observed. An example can clarify this notion. If we
fry a seed and sown in the soil, it won’t sprout out. The reason is the potent
energy of the seed is consumed in the process of burning it.
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Mimamsa Philosophy
5.6 NATURE OF SELF
About the self, Mimansikas admit that there are innumerable selves exist in the
world. For them, souls are of two sorts. One is liberated soul and other is living
soul (individuals of the earth). This implies every living being possesses a distinct
self or soul. For Mimansikas, the self is eternal and imperishable substance.
When a living animal dies, it won’t die with it. It continues to live to reap the
fruits of its deeds. According to Mimansikas, ‘consciousness’ is not the essential
attribute of the self. Rather, it is considered as an adventitious quality that emerges
in particular situations. For example, while in deep sleep consciousness is not
found in the self. This is so because in this stage there will be no contact between
sense organs with objects.
There are two sorts of actions performed by living soul in this earth. One; actions
are performed to achieve certain worldly pleasures. Second; actions are to be
performed because the Gita prescribes it. In short, the former action is known as
duty for duty sake and later is known as duty for deity. Since, there are actions,
there are attachment with worldly objects, hence arouses sufferings and pains.
To detract from (get rid of) all sorts of sufferings, one needs to get liberation. In
this regard, Mimansikas state that the self moves in the cycle of birth and death
because of its action and attachment towards worldly pleasures. The state of
liberation can be attained only when the self gets emancipation from the bondages
of mind, body, sense organs and objects of the world. This helps the self to
remain free form the cycle of birth and death. In the state of liberation, the self
cannot enjoy the experience of pleasure and pain because it is devoid of
consciousness.
Thus, for Mimansikas, liberation is not a state of bliss. It is a state where the self
achieves its real nature and dissociated from worldly pleasure and pain.
Epistemology
A valid knowledge is one, that doesn’t arise from defective causes, it is devoid
of contradictions and dealt with object. The Mimansa philosophy states about
svatah pramanyavada (intrinsic validity) and paratah pramanyavada (extrinsic
validity). It accepts six pramanas (sources of valid knowledge). These are:
i) Perception
ii) Inference
iii) Comparison
iv) Verbal Testimony
v) Arthapati (Postulation)
vi) Aupalabdhi (non apprehension)
The first four pramanas are similar to the Nyaya philosophy but the later additions
are made by Mimansa philosophy.
Theories of Error
Error is opposed to valid knowledge. All error is subjective. To explain error, not
to cognize an object as it is. In other words, to cognize an object not as it is leads
to erroneous cognition. For example, cognizing a rope as a snake instead of
rope. There are different opinions given by different schools on theory of error.
‘Akhyativada’ is advocated by Prabhakara School of Mimansa whereas, Bhatta
School of Mimansa is subscribed ‘viparita-khyativada’. Advaita vedantins uphold
‘anirvacaniya khyativada’.
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Metaphysics Mimamsa Philosophy
The Mimansa philosophy is pluralistic realist because they suggest there are
innumerable objects existing in the world. There are infinite and eternal souls
also exist in the world. Souls are of two sorts. One is liberated soul and another
is, living soul. This implies as many body those many souls. Further, they said
that there are non-perceivable entities exist in the world, like, hell, heaven, etc.
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