Plaintiffs-Appellees vs. vs. Defendants Defendant-Appellant: en Banc

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-26127. June 28, 1974.]

(Civil Case No. 3621)
VICTOR BENIN, ET AL. , plaintiffs-appellees, v s . MARIANO SEVERO

TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL. , defendants. J. M. TUASON & CO., INC. ,
defendant-appellant.
[G.R. No. L-26128. June 28, 1974.]

JUAN ALCANTARA, ET AL. , plaintiffs-appellees, vs. MARIANO SEVERO
TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL. , defendants. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC. ,
[G.R. No. L-26129. June 28, 1974.]
DIEGO PILI, ET AL. , plaintiffs-appellees, vs. MARIANO SEVERO

TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL. , defendants. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC. ,
Jose Palarca Law Offices for plaintiffs-appellees.

Manuel O. Chan & Rodolfo M. Caluag for defendant-appellant.
DECISION
ZALDIVAR , J : p
Appeal from the decision, dated January 18, 1965, of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, the Hon. Judge Eulogio Mencias, presiding, in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and
3623. 1
On May 19, 1955 three sets of plaintiffs led three separate complaints
containing substantially the same allegations. 2
In Civil Case No. 3621, the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and
possessors of three parcels of agricultural lands, described in paragraph V of the
complaint, located in the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality
(now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an aggregate area of approximately
278,928 square meters: that they inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor
Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they and
their predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels of land openly,
adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits
harvested therefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiffs' grandfather, had said parcels of
land surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894; that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of
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Lands of the lands in barrio San Jose in 1933 Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs
registered their claims of ownership over said parcels of land; that they declared said
lands for taxation purposes in 1940 under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after the
outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter,
evacuees from Manila and other places, after having secured the permission of
plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs.
In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and
possessors of two parcels of agricultural land, described in paragraph V of the
complaint, located in the Barrio of La Loma (now Barrio San Jose) in the municipality of
Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an aggregate area of approximately 148,118 square
meters; that these parcels of land were inherited by them from their deceased father
Bonoso Alcantara, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Juan Alcantara; that
plaintiffs Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara were the children of Bonoso Alcantara;
that these two brothers inherited the land from their father, and they and their
predecessors in interest had been in open, adverse and continuous possession of the
same, planting therein palay and other agricultural products and exclusively enjoying
said products; that on March 28, 1894 plaintiffs' grandfather, Juan Alcantara, had said
lands surveyed; that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in
Barrio San Jose in 1933 Bonoso Alcantara and the plaintiffs led and registered their
claims of ownership over said lands; that plaintiffs had said lands declared for taxation
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2390, of Quezon City; that after the outbreak of the
last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from
Manila and other places, after having secured permission from plaintiffs, settled and
constructed their houses on said lands and plaintiffs collected monthly rentals from
them.
In Civil Case No. 3623, plaintiffs alleged that they are the owners and possessors
of a parcel of agricultural land located in the Barrio of La Loma (now San Jose),
municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an area of approximately 62,481
square meters; that this parcel of land was inherited by plaintiffs from their ancestor
Candido Pili who in turn inherited the same from his parents; that Candido Pili and his
predecessors in interest owned, possessed, occupied and cultivated the said parcel of
land from time immemorial; that upon the death of Candido Pili his children Luisa Pili,
Pascual Pili, Diego Pili and Manuel Pili succeeded to the ownership and possession and
cultivation of said land; that plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest, as owners and
possessors of said land, had openly, adversely an continuously cultivated the land,
planting thereon palay and other agricultural products and enjoying exclusively the
products harvested therefrom; that during his lifetime, Candido Pili ordered the survey
of said land sometime on March 11, 1894, and when the cadastral survey of said land
was conducted by the Bureau of Lands in 1933 Candido Pili and plaintiffs led and
registered their claim of ownership over the said parcel of land; that plaintiffs had the
land declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2597, Quezon City,
Philippines; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and
subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after securing
permission from plaintiffs, settled and constructed their houses in said land and
plaintiffs collected monthly rentals from their lessees or tenants.
The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged, in their respective
complaint, that sometime in the year 1951 while they were enjoying the peaceful
possession of their lands, the defendants, particularly the defendant J.M. Tuason and
Co. Inc., through their agents and representatives, with the aid of armed men, by force
and intimidation, using bulldozers and other demolishing equipment, illegally entered
and started defacing, demolishing and destroying the dwellings and constructions of
plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the improvements consisting of rice paddies (pilapiles),
bamboos and fruit trees, and permanent improvements such as old roads, old bridges
and other permanent landmarks within and outside the lands in question, disregarding
the objections of plaintiffs, and as a result plaintiffs were deprived of the rentals
received from their lessees; that plaintiffs made inquiries regarding the probable claim
of defendants, and in 1953 they discovered for the rst time that their lands, as
described in their respective complaint, had either been fraudulently or erroneously
included, by direct or constructive fraud, in what appears as Parcel No. 1 (known as
Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the
province of Rizal in the names of the original applicants for registration, now
defendants, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz,
Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto
Huberto Tuason y de la Paz.
The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also alleged that the registered
owners mentioned in Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 had applied for the
registration of two parcels of land (known as the Santa Mesa Estate and the Diliman
Estate), located in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte, province of
Rizal, of which parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) contained an area of 8,798,617 square
meters; that the registration proceedings were docketed as LRC No. 7681 of the Court
of Land Registration; that the application for registration in LRC No. 7681, containing
the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas of parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate)
and parcel No. 2 (Diliman Estate) was published in the O cial Gazette; that before the
decision was handed down in LRC No. 7681, the area, boundaries and technical
descriptions of parcel No. 1 were altered and amended; that the amendments and
alterations, which were made after the publication of the original application, were
never published; that on March 7, 1914 a decision was rendered in LRC No. 7681 based
on the amended plan; that pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 a decree of
registration was issued on July 6, 1914, known as Decree No. 17431, decreeing the
registration in the names of the applicants of the two parcels of land (Santa Mesa
Estate and Diliman Estate); that the decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is
null and void because the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to render the
decision for lack of publication; that Decree No. 17431 issued pursuant to the decision
of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is likewise null and void from the beginning, because
it was issued pursuant to a void decision and because the boundaries, technical
descriptions and areas appearing in the decree are different and not identical with the
boundaries, technical descriptions and areas in the application for registration as
published in the O cial Gazette; that the area of parcel No. 1 as mentioned in Decree
No. 17431 is bigger than the area of parcel No. 1 appearing in the application for
registration as published in the O cial Gazette; that Original Certi cate of Title No.
735, referring to parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate), is also null and void from the beginning
because it was issued pursuant to a void decree of registration; that the area,
boundaries and technical description of Parcel No. 1 appearing in Decree of
Registration No. 17431 and in the Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 are different from
the area, boundaries and technical description appearing in the application for
registration as published in the O cial Gazette; that the plaintiffs had not been noti ed
of the proceedings in LRC No. 7681 although the applicants knew, or could have known,
by the exercise of necessary diligence, the names and addresses of the plaintiffs and
their predecessors in interest who were then, and up to the time the complaints were
led, in possession and were cultivating the lands described in paragraph V of their
respective complaint; and that during, before, and even after the issuance of Original
Certi cate of Title No. 735 the defendants had tacitly recognized the ownership of the
plaintiffs over their respective lands because said defendants had never disturbed the
possession and cultivation of the lands by the plaintiffs until the year 1951; and that all
transfer certi cates of title issued subsequently, based on Original Certi cate of Title
No. 735, are also null and void. 3
The plaintiffs in each of the three cases prayed the court: (1) to declare them
owners and entitled to the possession of the parcel, or parcels, of land described in
their respective complaint, as the case may be; (2) to revoke the decision of the Court
of Land Registration, dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681, and to declare Decree No.
17431, dated July 6, 1914 null and void from the beginning with respect to Parcel No. 1
(Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 which include the lands of
the plaintiffs; (3) to declare Original Certi cate of Title No. 735, particularly as it refers
to Parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) also null and void; (4) to declare null and void all
transfer certificates of titles issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal and of Quezon City
subsequent to, and based on, Original Certi cate of Title No. 735; (5) to order the
defendants, in the event Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 is declared valid, to
reconvey and transfer title over the land described in their respective complaint in favor
of the plaintiffs in each case, as the case may be; (6) to order the defendants to pay the
plaintiffs the market value of the lands in question in case of defendants' inability to
reconvey the same; (7) to order the defendants to pay damages to the plaintiffs; (8) to
issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendants, their lawyers, their agents
and representatives from disturbing the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs
during the pendency of these cases.
The plaintiffs, in the three cases, were allowed by the trial court to litigate as
paupers.
Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was actually served with summons. The
other defendants were ordered summoned by publication in accordance with Sections
16 and 17 of the Rules of Court. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared. The
other defendants were all declared in default.
On June 23, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. led a motion to dismiss in
each of the three cases. This motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court on July 20,
1955.
On July 18, 1955 the trial court issued an order granting the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for by the plaintiffs in their complaints. The preliminary injunction,
however, was lifted by order of the trial court on October 3, 1955, upon the posting by
defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. of bonds in the total amount of P14,000.00 pursuant
to the order of the court of September 26, 1955.
On August 11, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. led in the three cases a
motion for reconsideration of the order of July 20, 1955 denying the motion to dismiss.
This motion for reconsideration was denied by order of the court of September 26,
1955.
On November 29, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. led an answer in each
of the three cases. In its answer, this defendant, among others, speci cally denied
plaintiffs' claim of ownership of the lands involved in each case. The answer contains
special and a rmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the plaintiffs' cause of action is barred
by prior judgment and res judicata in view of the judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal in its Civil Case No. Q-156 which was subsequently elevated to the Supreme
Court as G.R. No. L-4998, in which latter case the Supreme Court a rmed in toto the
order of the lower court dismissing the case; (2) that the complaints failed to state
facts su cient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants; (3) that the
plaintiffs' action, assuming that their complaints state su cient cause of action, had
prescribed either under Act No. 496 or under statutes governing prescription of action;
(4) that defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is a buyer in good faith and for valuable
consideration of the parcels of land involved in the three cases; (5) that the registration
proceedings had in LRC No. 7681 instituted by the defendant's predecessors in interest
was in accordance with law, and the requirements for a valid registration of title were
complied with. By way of counterclaim the defendant prayed that the plaintiffs be
ordered to pay damages as therein specified.
The plaintiffs, amended their complaints in the three cases by including
additional parties as plaintiffs, and the amended complaints were admitted by the trial
court. The defendant, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., led a manifestation that it was
reproducing and realleging its answers to the original complaints as its answers to the
amended complaints in view of the fact that the amendments to the complaints consist
merely in the inclusion of additional indispensable as well as necessary parties-
plaintiffs. 4
On June 7, 1962, after the plaintiffs had presented their evidence, defendant J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. presented a motion to dismiss the cases upon grounds that (1) the
actions were barred by the statute of limitations; (2) that the actions were barred by a
prior judgment; and (3) that plaintiffs had not presented any evidence to prove their
claim of ownership. The defendant later led a motion to withdraw the third ground of
its motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs led their opposition to the motion to dismiss, as
well as to the motion of defendant to withdraw its third ground to dismiss. The trial
court, in an order dated December 3, 1962, granted defendant's motion to withdraw the
third ground of its motion to dismiss but denied the motion to dismiss. 5
After trial, on January 18, 1965, the lower court rendered a decision for the three
cases, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants as follows:
"A — Declaring that the decision, the decree and the title issued in LRC No.
7681, are null and void, ab initio, and of no effect whatsoever;
"B — Declaring that Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 found on page 136
Vol. A-7 of the Registration Book of Rizal is null and void from the very beginning
(and) of no effect whatsoever;
"C — Declaring that all Transfer Certi cates of Title emanating or allegedly
derived from Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 of the Province of Rizal are
likewise null and void;
"D — Declaring that the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623
are the owners and entitled to the possession of the parcels of land claimed and
described in paragraph V of their respective complaints;
"E — Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them to
vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possession of the parcels of land
described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No. 3621 and indicated as
Parcel A, Parcel B and Parcel C, in SWO-40187 (Exh. "UU" and Exh. "VV");
"F — Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them to
described in paragraph V of the complaint, in Civil Case No. 3622 and indicated
as Parcel D and Parcel F in SWO-40187 (Exh. "UU" and Exh. "VV");
"G — Ordering the Defendants and all persons claiming under them to
described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No. 3623 and indicated as
Parcel E, in SWO-491187 (Exh. "UU and Exh. "VV");
"H — Ordering the defendants to pay to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 the
sum of P600.00 a month as actual damages for uncollected rentals from 1951
until such possession is restored to them;
"I — Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622 the
sum of P600.00 a month, as actual damages for uncollected rentals from 1951
until such possession is restored to them;
"J — Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623
the sum of P150.00 a month as actual damages for uncollected rentals from
1951 until such possession is restored to them;
"K — Ordering the defendants to pay the costs;

"L — The defendants' counterclaim is hereby declared dismissed for lack of
merit." 6
A motion for new trial was led by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. on January
30, 1965. However, before the motion for new trial was resolved by the court, said
defendant, on February 11, 1965, led a notice of appeal to this Court and an appeal
bond, and on February 12, 1965 he led the record on appeal. 7 The record on appeal,
after it had been corrected and amended, as ordered and/or authorized by the trial
court, was approved on September 29, 1965. 8
Appellant J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., in this appeal, contends that the trial court
committed the following errors:
I. The lower court erred in holding that the Land Registration Court in GLRO
No. 7681 lacked or was without jurisdiction to issue decree No. 17431 for the
alleged reason that:
(1) The amendment to the original plan was not published;
(2) The description of Parcel 1 in the decree is not identical with the
description of Parcel 1 as applied for and as published in the O cial
Gazette;
(3) Parcel 1 as decreed is bigger in area than Parcel 1 as applied for;
(4) A. Bonifacio Road is the only boundary on the West of Parcel 1.
II. The trial court erred in nding that the transcription of the decree No.
17431 was not in accordance with the law and that. therefore, said OCT 735 was
a complete nullity and the land remains unregistered.
III. The trial court erred in taking cognizance of these cases despite its lack
of jurisdiction to hear and decide the same.
IV. The trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the grounds of
prescription and laches, and in denying the motions to dismiss led on said
grounds.
V. The trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the ground of res
judicata and in denying the motion to dismiss filed on said ground.
VI. The trial court erred in declaring null and void all certi cates of title
emanating from OCT 735.
VII. The trial court erred in holding that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is not a
purchaser in good faith and for value.
VIII. The trial court erred in awarding ownership of the lands claimed by,
and in awarding damages to, the appellees.
IX. The trial court erred in denying and in dismissing appellant's
counterclaim and in sentencing appellant to pay the costs of these suits.
As stated by the trial court in its decision, "These cases involve the validity of the
decision and the decree issued in LRC No. 7681 resulting in the issuance of Original
Certi cate of Title No. 735, and the ownership and possession of several parcels of
land, claimed by the plaintiffs in their respective complaints . . . ."
The lower court, summarizing its ndings, among others, concluded that: (1) the
decision and the decree in LRC No. 7681 are null and void ab initio, having been
rendered by a court without jurisdiction; (2) Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 issued
pursuant to the decree in LRC No. 7681 is null and void, having been issued pursuant to
a void decree; (3) Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 is null and void because the
Decree No. 17431 in LRC No. 7681, assuming the decree to be valid, had not been
inscribed in accordance with the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496; (4) all Transfer
Certi cates of Title allegedly emanating and derived from the void Original Certi cate
of Title No. 735 are likewise null and void; and (5) the plaintiffs in these three civil cases
are the owners and entitled to the possession of the parcels of land described in their
respective complaints.
We have carefully examined and studied the voluminous records, and the
numerous documentary evidence, of these three cases, and We nd that the
conclusions of the trial court are not supported by the evidence and the applicable
decisions of this Court.
The Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 that had been declared null and void ab
initio by the trial court covers two big parcels of land, mentioned in said title as Parcel
1, having an area of 8,778,644.10 square meters more or less, known as the Santa
Mesa Estate; and Parcel 2, having an area of 15,961,246 square meters more or less,
known as the Diliman Estate. The three parcels of land involved in Civil Case No. 3621,
having an aggregate area of 278,853 square meters, more or less; the two parcels of
land involved in Civil Case No. 3622 having an aggregate area of 154,119.7 square
meters, more or less; and the one parcel of land involved in Civil Case No. 3623, having
an area of 62,481 square meters, more or less, are all included in the area of Parcel 1. 9
The trial court, in its decision, states that the identity of the parcels of land claimed by
the plaintiffs is not disputed, and that both the plaintiffs and the defendant admit that
the parcels of land litigated are found within the boundaries of the present Sta. Mesa
Heights Subdivision (Parcel 1) covered by Original Certi cate of Title No. 735. 1 0 It is
shown in the survey plans, presented by both the plaintiffs and the defendant, that the
six parcels of lands involved in these three cases are located at the northwestern
portion of Parcel 1. (Exhs. UU, VV; and Exh. 29).
The records show, and it is established by the evidence, that sometime in 1911
Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose
Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto
Tuason y de la Paz, led with the Court of Land Registration an application for the
registration of their title over two parcels of land, designated in the survey plans
accompanying the application as Parcel 1 with an area of 8,798,617 square meters, and
Parcel 2 with an area of 16,254,037 square meters. The application was docketed as
LRC No. 7681. There was another application covering three other parcels of land,
docketed as LRC No. 7680. The application in LRC No. 7681 was set for hearing on
November 20, 1911 (Exh. X). The application and the notice of hearing, containing the
technical descriptions of the two parcels of land applied for, were published in the
issue of the O cial Gazette of October 25, 1911 (Exh. YY). On November 20, 1911 the
Court of Land Registration issued an order of general default against the whole world
except the Insular Government, the Director of Lands and the municipalities of
Caloocan and San Juan del Monte (Exh. 28). On December 23, 1911 the court issued an
order authorizing the amendment of the plan in LRC No. 7681 (Exh. 23). On November
11, 1913 the applicants and the Government entered into an agreement whereby the
Government agreed to withdraw its opposition to the application for registration of title
over the portion known as Hacienda Diliman (Parcel 2) on condition that the roads
existing on said tract of land be allowed to remain, and it was further agreed "that the
issuance of the title to applicants shall be made subject to all the exceptions
established by Section 39 of Act 496 as amended by Section 1 of Act 2011" (Exh. 21).
On December 29, 1913 the Court of Land Registration rendered a decision (Exh. 24) in
both LRC No. 7680 and LRC No. 7681 which, among others, stated that during the
registration proceedings the plans accompanying the two applications were amended
in order to exclude certain areas that were the subject of opposition, that the order of
general default was con rmed, that the Chief of the Surveyor's Division of the Court of
Land Registration was ordered to submit a report as to whether or not the new
(amended) plans had included lands which were not covered by the original plans, and
whether or not the new plans had excluded the lands that had already been covered by
the decree in LRC No. 3563. The decision further stated that in the event that the new
plans did not include new parcels of land and that the lands that were the subject of the
proceedings in LRC No. 3563 had been excluded, an additional decision would be made
decreeing the adjudication and registration of the lands that were the subject of the
registration proceedings in favor of the applicants, as follows: To Mariano Severo
Tuason y de la Paz, two sixths (2/6) undivided portion; to Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la
Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion; to Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6)
undivided portion; to Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided
portion; and to Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion.
In compliance with the order contained in the decision of December 29, 1913, the
Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration, on January 24, 1914,
submitted a report (Exh. 22) to the court which, among others, stated that the new plan
of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did not include any land that had not been previously
included in the original plan.
On March 7, 1914 the Court of Land Registration rendered a supplemental
decision declaring that, on the basis of the decision of December 29, 1913 and of the
report of the Surveyor of Court of Land Registration, the applicants Mariano Severo
Tuason y de la Paz and others were the owners of the land applied for, as described in
the amended plan, in the proportion mentioned in the decision, and ordering that the
land applied for be registered in the names of the applicants and that a decree of
registration be issued in accordance with the decision and the amended plan. On March
27, 1914 the Chief of the Survey Division addressed a communication to the
registration court, in connection with LRC No. 7681, suggesting that the decision of the
court of March 7, 1914 be modi ed such that the decree of registration he based upon
the original plan as published and not upon the amended plan (Exh. Z-3). The Court of
Land Registration did not follow the recommendation of the Chief of the Survey
Division. On July 6, 1914 Decree of Registration No. 17431 was issued by the Chief of
the General Land Registration O ce pursuant to the decision of the Court of Land
Registration of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681. The decree contains the technical
description of the two parcels of land in accordance with the plan as amended. It
appears in the decree that Parcel 1 has an area of 8,798,644.10 square meters more or
less, or an increase of 27.10 square meters over the area of 8,798,617 square meters
that was stated in the application for registration and in the notice of hearing which
were published in the O cial Gazette of October 25, 1911; and that Parcel 2 has an
area of 15,961,246 square meters, more or less, or a decrease of 292,791 square
meters from the area of 16,254,037 square meters that was stated in the application
and in the notice of hearing that were published in the O cial Gazette (Exhs. 25 and
YY). All in all, there is a decree of 292,763.90 square meters in the aggregate area of the
two parcels of land sought to be registered.
Subsequently, on July 8, 1914, the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal
issued Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 in the names of the applicants, Mariano
Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la
Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz
(Exh. 30).
1. We, shall now deal with the first error assigned by the appellant.
The lower court declared Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 null and void ab
initio because, according to said court, that title was based on Decree of Registration
No. 17431 in LRC No. 7681 that was null and void, said decree having been issued
pursuant to a decision of the Court of Land Registration in LRC No. 7681 which had no
jurisdiction to render said decision.
As We have adverted to, Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 covers two big
parcels of land: Parcel 1, known as the Santa Mesa Estate, and Parcel 2, known as the
Diliman Estate. The records show that these two parcels of land had been subdivided
into numerous lots, and most of those lots had been sold to numerous parties — Parcel
1 having been converted into a subdivision known as the Santa Mesa Heights
Subdivision, and the lots had been sold to private individuals and entities, such that in
that subdivision now are located the National Orthopedic Hospital, the station of
Pangasinan Transportation Co. (Pantranco), Sto. Domingo Church, Lourdes Church and
others. Necessarily, as a result of the sales of the lots into which Parcel 1 was
subdivided, transfer certi cates of title were issued to the purchasers of the lots, and
these transfer certi cates of title were based upon transfer certi cates of title that
emanated from Original Certi cate of Title No. 735. The trial court declared null and
void all transfer certi cates of title emanating, or derived, from Original Certi cate of
Title No. 735.
The decision of the trial court declaring null and void ab initio Original Certi cate
of Title No. 735 would invalidate the title over the entire area included in Parcel 1 —
which admittedly includes the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs — and also
the title over the entire area included in Parcel 2. Let it be noted that Parcel 1 has an
area of 8,798,644.10 square meters, more or less, and Parcel 2 has an area of
15,961,246 square meters, more or less; while the six parcels of land claimed by the
plaintiffs have an aggregate area of only 495,453.7 square meters, more or less. In
other words, the area of the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs is only a little
over two per cent (2%) of the aggregate area of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. But the decision
of the trial court nullified Original Certificate of Title No. 735, without any qualification.
The trial court held that the Court of Land Registration had no jurisdiction to
render the decision in LRC No. 7681 because during the registration proceedings, after
the original application and notice of hearing had been duly published, the plan of Parcel
1 was amended and no publication regarding the amended plan was made. The trial
court pointed out that the area and the description of Parcel 1 in Decree of Registration
No. 17431 are not identical with the area and description of Parcel 1 applied for and
published in the O cial Gazette. The trial court stressed on the point that publication is
one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide an
application for registration and to order the issuance of a decree of registration, as
provided in Act 496 (Land Registration Act).
We believe that the lower court erred when it held that the Land Registration
Court was without jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681. Under Section 23
of Act 496, the registration court may allow, or order, an amendment of the application
for registration when it appears to the court that the amendment is necessary and
proper. Under Section 24 of the same act the court may at any time order an
application to be amended by striking out one or more parcels or by severance of the
application. The amendment may be made in the application or in the survey plan, or in
both, since the application and the survey plan go together. If the amendment consists
in the inclusion in the application for registration of an area or parcel of land not
previously included in the original application, as published, a new publication of the
amended application must be made. The purpose of the new publication is to give
notice to all persons concerned regarding the amended application. Without a new
publication the registration court can not acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of
land that is added to the area covered by the original application, and the decision of
the registration court would be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly
included land. 1 1 The reason is because without a new publication, the law is infringed
with respect to the publicity that is required in registration proceedings, and third
parties who have not had the opportunity to present their claim might be prejudiced in
their rights because of failure of notice. 1 2 But if the amendment consists in the
exclusion of a portion of the area covered by the original application and the original
plan as previously published, a new publication is not necessary. 1 3 In the latter case,
the jurisdiction of the court over the remaining area is not affected by the failure of a
new publication. 1 4
In the case at bar We nd that the original plan covering Parcel 1 and Parcel 2
that accompanied the application for registration in LRC No. 7681 was amended in
order to exclude certain areas that were the subject of opposition, or which were the
subject of another registration case; and the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of
Land Registration was ordered to determine whether the amended plan included lands
or areas not included in the original plan. In compliance with the order of the
registration court said Chief of the Survey Division informed the court that no new
parcels were included in the new (or amended) plan. Thus, in the decision of the Court
of Land Registration in LRC Nos. 7680 and 7681, dated December 29, 1913 (Exh. 24),
We read the following:
"Despues de las noti caciones y avisos de las dos solicitudes en ambos
expedientes, se enmerdaron los planos unidos los mismos para excluir ciertas
porciones que habian sido objeto de oposicion." . . .
"POR TANTO, rati cando como por la presente se rati ca la declaracion de
rebeldia general, se ordena:
"1.o Que el Jefe de la Division de Agrimensores de este Tribunal terreno
que no haya sido comprendido en los planos originales . . ." 1 5
On January 24, 1914 the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land
Registration made a report to the court (Exh. 22), from which report We read the
following:
"Cumpliendo lo mandado por el Tribunal en el No. 1 de la parte dispositiva
de su Decision de fecha 29 de Diciembre proximo pasado, el que suscribe,
despues de un detenido estudio de los planos unidos los Expedientes arriba
citados, tiene el honor de informar:
"1.o Que los nuevos planos presentados por los solicitantes corresponden
a las parcelas 1.a 2.a, y 3.a, del Expediente No. 7680 y la 1.a parcela del No. 7681,
que son las mismas que se refiere el plano Exhibito A del No. 7680.
xxx xxx xxx
"4. Que los nuevos planos presentados de las parcelas 1.a, 2.a y 3.a del
Expediente 7680, y de la 1.a del 7681 no incluyen terreno alguno que no haya
sido comprendido en los planos originales. 1 6
And so, in the supplemental decision of the Court of Land Registration in LRC No.
7681, dated March 7, 1914 (Exh. 24-A), the report of the Chief of the Survey Division
was taken into consideration and the court ordered the registration of the lands applied
for by the applicants as described in the amended plan ("como esta descrito en el
plano enmendado"). It is thus shown that the amended plan in LRC No. 7681 did not
cover parcels, or areas, that were not previously included in the original plan which
accompanied the application that had been published in the O cial Gazette. There was,
therefore, no necessity for a new publication of the amended plan in order to vest the
Court of Land Registration with jurisdiction to hear and decide the application for
registration in LRC No. 7681 and to order the issuance of Decree of Registration No.
17431 upon which Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was based.
Way back in 1933, this Court had occasion to rule on the validity of the very same
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which the trial court had declared null and void in the
three cases now before this Court. In the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands vs.
Acuña (59 Phil. 183) the validity of Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 was assailed by
the appellants (Pascual Acuña and others) precisely upon the ground that during the
registration proceedings, which brought about the issuance of Original Certi cate of
Title No. 735, the original plan of the applicants was ordered amended, and no new
publication was made of the amended plan and so it was urged that the registration
court did not have jurisdiction to order the issuance of the decree of registration in
favor of the applicants. The action in this case was instituted by the Bank of the
Philippine Islands as receiver of the Tuason Entail for the purpose, among others, of
recovering from Pascual Acuña and others certain lands included in the Santa Mesa and
Diliman hacienda located in the barrios of Bagobantay and Diliman, in the municipalities
of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte, Province of Rizal. Upon hearing the Court of First
Instance of Rizal declared that none of the defendants owned any part of the land in
controversy. On appeal, this Court observed that the character in which the plaintiff
sued was not open to question, and the material facts were as follows: The heirs of the
Tuason estate, referred to as the Tuason Entail, held a Torrens title to a tract of land
with an area of about 1,600 hectares located in the province of Rizal. This property was
then covered by Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 3792 issued in lieu of older certi cates
dating from July 8, 1914. This Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 3792 emanated from
Original Certificate of Title No. 735. 1 7 The appellants precisely sought to nullify the title
of the heirs of the Tuason estate, which emanated from Original Certi cate of Title No.
735, upon the ground, as now urged by the appellees in the three cases at bar, that
during the registration proceedings the original plan of the lands known as the Sta.
Mesa and Diliman estates was amended, and no publication was made of the amended
plan. Regarding the question of the non-publication of the amended plan, this Court
said:
"Among the arguments made by the appellants of the Bagobantay group, it
is alleged that the Torrens title relied upon by the plaintiff is void, and in support
of this contention it is stated that, during the course of the registration
proceedings, an order was made by the court for the amendment of the original
plan of the applicants and that this order was not followed by new publication,
wherefore, it is supposed the court was without jurisdiction to decree the title to
the applicants. In this connection reliance is placed upon the doctrine stated in
the Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial (49 Phil. 122). But the brief for the
appellants fails to call attention to the fact that the rule stated in the case cited
has reference to an amendment of the plan by which additional land, different
from that included in the original survey, is intended to be brought within the
process of registration. In the case before us, the order referred to was for the
exclusion of certain portions of the land covered by the original survey, and the
doctrine of the case cited cannot apply. Apart from this it does not appear that the
portion intended to be excluded comprehended any part of the land which had
been usurped." 1 8
The appellees, however, asserts that the case of the Bank of the Philippine
Islands vs. Acuña, supra, is not applicable to the three cases now before this Court
because what was involved in said case was Parcel 2 of Original Certi cate of Title No.
735, and not Parcel 1 which is the land involved in these cases. This assertion of the
appellees is not correct. The decision in that case states that the action was instituted
by the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as receiver of the Tuason Entail, for the purpose,
among others, of recovering from Pascual Acuña and others "certain lands contained in
the Sta. Mesa and Diliman Hacienda located in the barrios of Bagobantay and Diliman in
the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte." 1 9 But what matters is the
doctrine that was laid down by this Court in that case, that is: that when the original
survey plan is amended, after the publication of the application in order to include land
not previously included in the original survey, a new publication of the amended plan is
necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the registration court to order the
registration of the land that is added to what was included in the original survey plan.
The ruling of this Court in the Bank of the Philippine Islands case has a decisive
application in the three cases now before this Court.
The trial court laid stress on the point that publication of the amended plan of
Parcel 1 should have been made because it appears in the Decree of Registration No.
17431, and as reproduced in Original Certi cate of Title No. 736, that the area of said
parcel is "bigger" than the area stated in the application as published in the O cial
Gazette; and, also, that the boundaries of Parcel 1 stated in the decree are not identical
with the boundaries stated in the application as published in the O cial Gazette. We
paid particular attention on this point of the lower court's decision, and our impression
is that the trial court had exploited certain minor discrepancies between the description
of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration and its description in the original application, in
order to bolster its ruling that "to render a decision on the amended plan, boundary
descriptions, and additional lands comprised within Parcel 1 in Decree No. 17431, a
republication of such amended plan, boundary description, technical description and
additional areas is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the Court." 2 0
Oddly enough, when the lower court said that the area of Parcel 1 in the decree of
registration is bigger than the area of Parcel 1 in the application as published, it did not
mention the fact that the difference in area is only 27.10 square meters. We believe that
this difference of 27.10 square meters is too minimal to be of decisive consequence in
the determination of the validity of Original Certi cate of Title No. 735. It was error on
the part of the lower court to lay stress on this circumstance and made it a basis for
ruling that because in the amended plan there is this increase in area as compared to
the area appearing in the application as published, the Land Registration Court did not
have jurisdiction to render the decision decreeing the registration of Parcel 1 in LRC No.
7681. The Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration, in his report to
the court of January 24, 1914 (Exh. 22), stated that the new plan of Parcel 1 did not
include any land that was not included in the original plan. That report was made
precisely in compliance with the order of the registration court, in the decision of
December 29, 1913 in LRC No. 7681, to inform the court "si los nuevos planos incluyen
o no terreno que no haya sido comprendido en los planos originales". That report was
submitted by the Chief Surveyor "despues de un detenido estudio de los planos unidos
a los expedientes". Under the foregoing circumstances, our inference is that the area of
27.10 square meters was already included in the original plan, and that the computation
of the area in the original survey must have been inaccurate; and the error was
corrected in the recomputation of the area when the amended plan was prepared. We
made a careful study and comparison of the technical description of Parcel 1
appearing in the application as published, and the technical description appearing in
Decree of Registration No. 17431 (Exhs. 19, 19-A and Z-6), and We accept the
explanation of counsel for the appellant that this seeming increase of 27.10 square
meters had been brought about "by the fact that when the amendment of the plan was
made, the distances and bearings in a few points along the southwestern boundary
(Please see Exh. 19) were brought to the nearest millimeter and to the nearest second
respectively; whereas, the computation of the survey in the original plan was to the
nearest decimeter and to the nearest minute only". 2 1 We believe that this very slight
increase of 27.10 square meters would not justify the conclusion of the lower court
that "the amended plan .. included additional lands which were not originally included in
Parcel 1 as published in the O cial Gazette." It being undisputed that Parcel 1 has an
area of more than 8,798,600 square meters (or 879.86 hectares), We believe that this
difference of 27.10 square meters, between the computation of the area when the
original plan was made and the computation of the area when the amended plan was
prepared, can not be considered substantial as would affect the identity of Parcel 1.
Moreover, no evidence was presented to identify this area of 27.10 square
meters, nor to show its location, in relation to the entire area of Parcel 1. The appellees
did not even attempt to show that this excess area of 27.10 square meters is included
within the parcels that they are claiming. We cannot, therefore, consider this area of
27.10 square meters as an area that was separate and distinct from, and was added to,
the land that was covered by the original survey plan, such that the publication of the
amended plan would be necessary in order that the registration court could acquire
jurisdiction over that area. As We have pointed out, this increase of 27.10 square
meters was simply the result of the recomputation of the area when the original plan
was amended. There is no showing that the recomputation is incorrect. Neither is there
a showing that this small area of 27.10 square meters belongs to any person and that
person had been deprived of his property, or had failed to claim that particular area
because of the non-publication of the amended plan. On the other hand, there is the
report of the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration (Exh. 22)
stating that the amended plan of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did not include any land
which was not included in the original plan.
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that only in cases where the original survey
plan is amended during the registration proceedings by the addition of lands not
previously included in the original plan should publication be made in order to confer
jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of the area that was added after the
publication of the original plan. 2 2
The settled rule, further, is that once the registration court had acquired
jurisdiction over a certain parcel, or parcels, of land in the registration proceedings in
virtue of the publication of the application, that jurisdiction attaches to the land or lands
mentioned and described in the application. If it is later shown that the decree of
registration had included land or lands not included in the original application as
published, then the registration proceedings and the decree of registration must be
declared null and void insofar — but only insofar — as the land not included in the
publication is concerned. This is so, because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the land not included in the publication the publication being the basis of the
jurisdiction of the court. But the proceedings and the decree of registration, relating to
the lands that were included in the publication, are valid. Thus, if it is shown that a
certi cate of title had been issued covering lands where the registration court had no
jurisdiction, the certificate of title is null and void insofar as it concerns the land or lands
over which the registration court had not acquired jurisdiction. 2 3
And so in the three cases now before this Court, even granting that the
registration court had no jurisdiction over the increased area of 27.10 square meters
(as alleged by appellees), the most that the lower court could have done was to nullify
the decree and the certi cate of title insofar as that area of 27.10 square meters is
concerned, if that area can be identi ed. But certainly, the lower court could not
declared, and should not have declared, null and void the whole proceedings in LRC No
7681; and, certainly, the lower court erred in declaring null and void ab initio Original
Certi cate of Title No. 735 which covers not only the supposed excess area of 27.10
square meters but also the remaining area of 8,798,617 square meters of Parcel 1 and
the entire area of 15,961,246 square meters of Parcel 2. The trial court, in its decision,
declared Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 null and void from the very beginning and
of no effect whatsoever' without any quali cation. This declaration by the lower court, if
sanctioned by this Court and given effect, would nullify the title that covers two big
parcels of land (Parcels 1 and 2) that have a total area of 24,759,890.10 square meters,
or almost 2,476 hectares. And not only that. The trial court declared null and void all
transfer certi cates of title that are derived, or that emanated, from Original Certi cate
of Title No. 735, regardless of whether those transfer certi cates of title are the results
of transactions done in good faith and for value by the holder of those transfer
certificates of title.
It must be noted that the appellees in the present cases claim six parcels that
have an area of some 495,453.7 square meters (about 49.5 hectares), whereas the
combined area of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 is 24,759,890.10 square meters (about 2,476
hectares). It must also be noted that both Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 have been subdivided
into numerous lots (Exhs. 14 and 14-B) which have already been acquired by numerous
persons and/or entities that are now holding certi cates of title which can be traced
back to Original Certi cate of Title No. 735. The decision of the lower court, however,
would render useless Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 and all transfer certi cates of
title emanating, or derived, therefrom. The decision of the lower court would certainly
prejudice the rights of the persons, both natural and juridical, who had acquired
portions of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2, relying on the doctrine of the indefeasibility of
Torrens title. The decision of the lower court would, indeed, prejudice the rights of
persons who are not parties in the present cases. And this is so, because the trial court,
in its decision, did not adhere to the applicable decisions of this Court in resolving the
pertinent issues in these cases.
Another reason mentioned by the lower court to support its ruling that Decree of
Registration No. 17431 is null and void is that the description of Parcel 1 in the decree
of registration is different from the description of the same parcel in the notice of
hearing of the original application for registration as published in the O cial Gazette.
The different description that appears in the decree of registration, according to the
lower court, is an amendment to the Original survey plan that accompanied the
application and the amended survey plan should have been republished; and because
there was no such republication the registration court was without jurisdiction to issue
the decree of registration. The lower court also committed an error in making this
ruling. We nd that the lower court incorrectly laid stress on differences in the names of
the owners, and on differences in the designations, of the lands that adjoin Parcel 1
along its southwestern boundary. We nd, however, that these differences are well
explained in the record.
In the notice of hearing in LRC No. 7681 (Exhibits YY and YY-2) the boundaries of
Parcel 1 are stated as follows:
"Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario Negrao and others (Maysilo
Estate); E. by the San Juan River; SW. by Parcel 3, properties of Benito Legarda,
Hospital de San Juan de Dios, by Parcel 2, Santa Clara Monastery, by Parcel 1;
and W. by a road, Cementerio del Norte and the Roman Catholic Church"
As described in Decree of Registration No. 17431 (Exh. 25), the boundaries of

Parcel 1 are as follows:
"PARCEL 1. Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario Negrao y Escobar, et
al., (Maysilo Estate): On the E. by San Juan River; on the SW. by properties of
Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan
de Dios and C.W. Rosenstock & Co.; and on the W. by a road, Cementerio del Norte
and property of the Roman Catholic Church . . ."
It will thus be noted that the boundaries of Parcel 1 on the northern, eastern, and
western sides, as they appear in the notice of hearing that was published and in Decree
of Registration No. 17431, are the same. It is in the southwestern boundary where there
appear some differences in the names of the owners, or in the designations, of the
adjoining lands. Thus, in the published notice of hearing, it appears that the names of
the owners, or the designations, of the lands that bound Parcel 1 (of LRC No. 7681) on
the Southwest are parcel 3, properties of Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios,
parcel 2, Monasterio de Santa Clara and parcel 1; while in the decree of registration it
appears that the lands that bound Parcel 1 (of LRC No. 7681) on the Southwest are the
properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., Benito Legarda, Hospital de San
Juan de Dios and C.W. Rosenstock & Co. Upon a careful examination of the records, We
nd that the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 at its southwestern boundary, as indicated in the
notice of hearing that was published in the O cial Gazette, are the same lands that are
indicated in the decree of registration as the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 at its
southwestern boundary. There is simply a change in the names of the owners or in the
designations, of the lands. We nd that parcels 3, 2 and 1, appearing as the boundary
lands on the southwestern side of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681, as published, are in fact
parcels of land that are owned, and had been applied for registration, by Mariano
Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al. in LRC No. 7680. This LRC No. 7680 was heard and
decided jointly with LRC No 7681 by the Land Registration Court (Exh. 24). These
parcels 3, 2 and 1 of LRC No. 7680, being lands owned by Mariano Severo Tuason y de
la Paz, et al., it may as well be stated in the decree of registration that those lands on
the southwestern side of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 are the properties of Mariano Severo
Tuason y de la Paz, et al., instead of designating them as parcel 3, parcel 2, and parcel 1
(of LRC 1680) And so, what appears in Decree of Registration No. 17431 as the
properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., at the southwestern side of
Parcel 1 are no other than those very parcels 3, 2 and 1 that appear in the notice of
hearing as the lands that bound Parcel 1 on the southwest.
In the description of Parcel 1 as published, it appears that one of the boundaries
on the southwestern side is Santa Clara Monastery, while in the decree of registration
the words "Santa Clara Monastery" do not appear but, instead, are replaced by the
words "C. W. Rosenstock & Co." It will be remembered that during the registration
proceedings the plan of Parcel 1 was ordered amended, and the surveyor who prepared
the amended plan must have found that what used to be the property of the Santa Clara
Monastery at the time of the original survey was already the property of C. W.
Rosenstock & Co. when the amended plan was prepared. This can simply mean that
there was a change of ownership from Santa Clara Monastery to C.W. Rosenstock &
Co. It must be considered that the original survey took place from December, 1910 to
June, 1911 (Exhibits 8 and 19), while the registration case was decided on March 7,
1914.
Under Section 40 of Act 496, the decree of registration "shall contain a
description of the land as nally determined by the court." Evidently, the Court of Land
Registration acted in consonance with this provision of the law when, in its decision in
LRC 7681, it took into consideration the actual description of Parcel 1 as shown in the
amended survey plan, and when it disregarded the recommendation of the Chief of the
Survey Division, dated March 27, 1914, that the decision of the court of March 7, 1914
"be based upon the original plans, as published, and not upon the amended plan." It may
well be said that Decree of Registration No. 17431 simply contains the correct area of
Parcel 1 and the correct names of the owners of the lands that bound Parcel 1 in LRC
No. 1681 as of the time when the decision of the land registration court was rendered.
In this connection, the following pronouncement of this Court in the case of
Domingo vs. Ongsiako, 55 Phil. 361, 373-4, is pertinent:
"We may further observe that underlying the contention of the plaintiffs is
the idea that errors in the plans nullify the decrees of registration. This is
erroneous. It is the land and not the plan which is registered. Prior to the
enactment of Act No. 1875, practically all plans for land registration were
defective especially in regard to errors of closures and areas, but so far no such
errors have been permitted to affect the validity of the decrees. If the boundaries
of the land registered can be determined, the technical description in the
certi cate of title may he corrected without cancelling the I decree. Such
corrections have been made in this case by approved surveys which embrace all
of the land here in question. To nullify and cancel nal decrees merely by reason
of faulty technical descriptions would lead to chaos."
We have taken note of the fact that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the
plaintiffs in the three cases now before this Court are on the northwestern portion of
Parcel 1 (parcels labelled A, B, C, D, E and F, in Exh. UU; and Exhs. 17, 29 and 29-B). They
are far from the southwestern boundary. The circumstance, therefore, regarding the
dissimilarity in the names of the owners, or the designations, of the lands that adjoin
the southwestern side of Parcel 1 is of no moment insofar as the lots claimed by
appellees are concerned. What matters is that the lots claimed by the appellees are
included in Parcel 1 of LRC No. 1681 and are located at the northwestern portion of
said Parcel 1. Indeed, it was error on the part of the lower court to make as one of the
bases in declaring Decree of Registration No. 17431 and Original Certi cate of Title No.
735 null and void and of no effect whatsoever the aforestated dissimilarities in the
names of the owners, or in the designations, of the lands on the southwestern side of
Parcel 1, because those dissimilarities are well explained in the records of these cases.
The lower court committed still another error when it made the nding that the
only boundary of Parcel 1 on the western side is "A. Bonifacio road" and then declared
that the lands situated west of the A. Bonifacio road were never the subject of the
registration proceedings in LRC No. 7681. The lower court declared the lands west of
A. Bonifacio road as unregistered lands and awarded the ownership of those lands to
the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622 (appellees in G.R. Nos. L-26127 and L-
26128). This nding of the lower court is contrary to the evidence presented by the
parties in these cases. Both the appellees and the appellant submitted as their
evidence the notice of hearing of the application as published in the O cial Gazette
(Exhibit X, YY and YY-2; and Exhibit 26) and the decree of registration No. 17431
(Exhibit Y, and Exh. 25) wherein are clearly stated that the boundaries of Parcel 1 on the
West are: (1) a road, (2) Cementerio del Norte and (3) Roman Catholic Church (Exhs. Z-
6, UU, and Exhs. 6, 18, 19 and 20). But the lower court considered the A. Bonifacio road
as the only boundary on the West, and ignored the two other boundaries on the West
that are mentioned both in the notice of hearing as published and in the decree of
registration. The sketches and the survey plans, forming part of the evidence on record,
show that the road, labelled as "A. Bonifacio", goes alongside the western boundary of
Parcel 1 (separating Parcel 1 and the Cementerio del Norte), until it reaches a point
where it traverses the northwestern portion of Parcel 1, such that from the point where
it enters the area of Parcel 1 what is left as the boundaries on the western side are the
Cementerio del Norte and the Roman Catholic Church (Exhibits UU, W, 17, 19 and 29).
Ignoring the existence of the Cementerio del Norte and the Roman Catholic Church as
the other boundaries of Parcel 1 on the West, the lower court declared that the lands
west of the A. Bonifacio road, which form part of the lands that are claimed by the
plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622, are outside the boundary of Parcel 1 on
the west and that those particular areas had remained as unregistered lands and are
not covered by Original Certi cate of Title No. 735. This nding of the lower court is
contrary to the very admission of the appellees in these three cases that all the lands
(six parcels in all) that they claim are included in the area of Parcel 1 mentioned in
Original Certi cate of Title No. 735. In paragraph XIV of the original, as well as in the
amended complaint, in each of these three cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the lands
that they claim "had either been fraudulently or erroneously included .. in Parcel 1
(known as Santa Mesa Estate) of the Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 of the Land
Records of the Province of Rizal." 2 4 In their appeal brief, the appellees categorically
stated that "Both the appellees and the appellant admit that these parcels of land
claimed by the plaintiffs in these three (3) civil cases are located within Parcel 1 (Santa
Mesa Estate) covered by Original Certi cate of Title No. 735". 2 5 In the pre-trial order of
the lower court of December 18, 1957, it was stated that the parcels of land litigated in
these cases are portions of the lands covered by OCT No. 735. 2 6 The lower court itself,
at the earlier part of its decision, stated that "both the plaintiffs and the defendants
admit that the parcels of land litigated in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are
found within the boundaries of the present Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision covered by
Original Certi cate of Title No. 735" 2 7 The appellees in these two cases had never
asserted that part of the lands that they claim are outside the boundaries of Parcel 1,
nor did they assert that part of the lands that they claim have remained unregistered
and not covered by Original Certi cate of Title No. 735. The lower court had made a
nding not only contrary to the evidence of the appellees but even more than what the
appellees asked when it said in its decision that the western boundary of Parcel 1 is
only the A. Bonifacio road and that the lands claimed by the appellees west of this road
had never been registered. This Court certainly can not give its approval to the ndings
and rulings of the lower court that are patently erroneous.
2. The lower court also erred when it declared Original Certi cate of Title No. 735
null and void upon the ground that the decree of registration was not transcribed in the
Registration Book in accordance with the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496. In its
decision, the lower court said:
"During the trial, the Book of Original Certi cate of Title was brought to the
Court. The Court had occasion to see and examine the `ENTRY' made in the
Registration Book. The Court found that the Face of the Title which, under
ordinary circumstances, should be Page 1 is found as Page 2. The sheet
containing the technical description which should be page 2 is Page 1. The FACE
of the Title, which should have been Page 1, contained the last portion of the
description of the land described in the decree. The sheet containing the bulk of
the description of the lands decreed should have been Page 2. The so-called
Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 found on Page 138, Book A-7 of the Register
of Deeds of Rizal is, therefore, null and void because the provisions of Section 41
of the Land Registration Law have not been complied with. Said Section requires
that the entry in the Registration Book must be a transcription of the Decree and
the paging should consist of a leaf or leaves in consecutive order . . ." 2 8
The pertinent provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 reads, as follows:

"SEC. 41. Immediately after nal decision by the court directing the
registration of any property, the clerk shall send a certi ed copy of such decision
to the Chief of the General Land Registration O ce, who shall prepare the decree
in accordance with section forty of Act numbered four hundred and ninety-six,
and he shall forward a certi ed copy of said decree to the register of deeds of the
province or city in which the property is situated. The register of deeds shall
transcribe the decree in a book to be called the "Registration Book' in which a leaf,
or leaves in consecutive order, shall be devoted exclusively to each title. The entry
made by the register of deeds in this book in each case shall be the original
certi cate of title, and shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal of his
office. . . ."
The pertinent provisions of Section 40 of Act 496 reads, as follows:

"SEC. 40. Every decree of registration shall bear the day of the year, hour,
and minute of its entry, and shall be signed by the clerk. It shall state whether the
owner is married or unmarried, and if married, the name of the husband or wife. If
the owner is under disability, it shall state the nature of the disability, and if a
minor, shall state his age. It shall contain a description of the land as nally
determined by the court, . . . The decree shall be stated in a convenient form for
transcription upon the certificates of title hereinafter mentioned."
Section 29 of Act 496 provides that as soon as the decree of title has been
registered in the o ce of the register of deeds, as provided in Section forty-one, the
property included in said decree shall become registered land under the Act. Section 42
of Act 496 provides that the certi cate shall take effect upon the date of the
transcription of the decree.
This Court has held that as de ned in Section 41 of Act 496, the certi cate of
title is the transcript of the decree of registration made by the register of deeds in the
registry. 2 9
The appellant presented as evidence a photostat of Original Certi cate of Title
No. 735, as found in the Registration Book in the o ce of the register of deeds of Rizal
(Exhibit 50). 3 0 We have examined this document very carefully, and We nd that it is a
copy of the original that satis es all the requirements of a valid Torrens title as
provided for in Sections 40 and 41 of Act 496.
On the face, or on the rst page, of this title, there is the certi cation of the Chief
of the Land Registration O ce that the decree of registration was registered in Manila
on July 6, 1914 at 7:41 a.m.; and the certi cation of the Register of Deeds of Rizal that
the decree was received for transcription in his o ce an July 8, 1914 at 3:30 P .M. It is
also stated on the face of this title that it was entered pursuant to Decree No. 17431 of
the Court of Land Registration, dated at Manila on the 7th day of March 1914, in Case
No. 7681 of said court. The names of the declared owners, their civil status, their
spouses if married, and their respective interest or share in the lands covered by the
title are stated on the face of this title. We have noted that the technical descriptions of
the lands (Parcels 1 and 2) covered by the title are copied on the sheets constituting
the title. We have compared the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 as they
appear on this photostat of Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 (Exhibit 50) with the
technical descriptions of these lands as they appear in the decree of registration
(Exhibit Y for the plaintiffs, and Exhibit 25 for the defendant), and We nd that the
technical descriptions appearing on the title are the complete and faithful reproduction,
or transcription, of the technical descriptions appearing in the decree of registration.
We have noted what the lower court found, that the technical descriptions of
Parcels 1 and 2 do not begin on the face, or on the rst page, of this title, as a technical
description is ordinarily copied on the certi cate of title. What appears on the face of
this title is the last part of the technical description of Parcel 2. The technical
descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 begin on the second page and end on the rst page.
This circumstance, that is, that the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 do not
begin on the face, or on the rst page, of the title, is the basis of the lower court in ruling
that the decree of registration was not transcribed in the registration book in
accordance with Section 41 of Act 496, and so Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 is
null and void. We have noted, however, that in its decision the lower court made no
mention that in the transcription of the decree in the registration book any of the data
that is required in Section 40 of Act 496 to be included had been omitted. We have also
noted — and this fact is undenied — that the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2
as they appear in Decree of Registration No. 17431 are fully and faithfully transcribed
on the photostat of Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 (Exhibit 50). There is no
showing that the manner of transcribing the decree, as it appears on that photostat,
was done for a fraudulent purpose, or was done in order to mislead. Considering that
the decree of registration is fully transcribed in the Registration Book, and also as
copied in Original Certi cate of Title No. 735, the circumstance that the beginning of
the technical descriptions is not found on the face, or on the rst page, of Original
Certi cate of Title No. 735 is not a ground to nullify the said certi cate of title. We
agree with the lower court that the transcription of the technical descriptions should
begin, or should have been started, on the face, or on the rst page, of the title. We hold,
however, that the fact that this was not so done in the case of Original Certi cate of
Title No. 735 should not be taken as a factor in determining the validity of Original
Certi cate of Title No. 735. This defect in the manner of transcribing the technical
descriptions should be considered as a formal, and not a substantial, defect. What
matters is that the original certi cate of title contains the full transcription of the
decree of registration, and that the required data provided for in Section 40 of Act 496
are stated in the original certi cate of title. The lower court made a literal construction
of the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 and strictly applied its construction in the
determination of the validity of Original Certi cate of Title No. 735. We believe that the
provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 should be interpreted liberally, in keeping with
Section 123 of said Act which provides that "This Act shall be construed liberally so far
as may be necessary for the purpose of effecting its general intent." If We adopt a
literal construction of the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496, as was done by the lower
court, such that the defect in the manner or form of transcribing the decree in the
registration book would render null and void the original certi cate of title, then it can
happen that the validity or the invalidity of a certi cate of title would depend on the
register of deeds, or on the personnel in the o ce of the register of deeds. The register
of deeds, or an employee in his o ce, can wittingly or unwittingly render useless a
decree of registration regularly issued pursuant to a decision of a registration court and
thus nullify by the error that he commits in the transcription of the decree in the
Registration Book an original certi cate of title that has been existing for years. This
strict interpretation or construction of Section 41 of Act 496 would certainly not
promote the purpose of the Land Registration Law (Act 496), which generally are: to
ascertain once and for all the absolute title over a given landed property 3 1 ; to make, so
far as it is possible, a certi cate of title issued by the court. to the owner of the land
absolute proof of such title 3 2 ; to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any
question of legality of title 3 3 ; and to decree that land title shall be nal, irrevocable and
indisputable. 3 4
We, therefore, hold that the formal defect in the transcription of Decree of
Registration No. 17431 in the Registration Book did not render null and void Original
Certi cate of Title No. 735. Consequently, We declare that the two parcels of land
(Parcel 1 which includes the lands claimed by the appellees, and Parcel 2) covered by
Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 are properly registered under the Torrens System of
registration.
3. The principal issue that has to be resolved in the present appeal is whether or
not the lower court had correctly declared that "Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 . . .
is null and void from the very beginning and of no effect whatsoever." 3 5
In the preceding discussions, We have held that the lower court erred when it
declared null and void Original Certi cate of Title No. 735. We have found that the
registration proceedings that brought about the decree of registration upon which was
based the issuance of Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 were in accordance with the
provisions of Act 496, as amended. We have held that the Land Registration Court that
ordered the issuance of the decree of registration had jurisdiction to hear and decide
the application for registration led by Mariano Severo, Teresa Eriberta, Juan Jose,
Demetrio Asuncion, and Augusto Huberto, all surnamed Tuason y de la Paz. The records
show that the notice of hearing of the application, which embodied the technical
descriptions of the two parcels of land (Parcel 1, known as the Sta. Mesa Estate, and
Parcel 2, known as the Diliman Estate), was duly published as required by law. The
records show that the hearing on the application was regularly held, and that the
registration court had seen to it that no land which was not included in the original
survey plan and not covered by the original application was made the subject of the
registration proceedings. We have found that the decree of registration was properly
issued by the Land Registration O ce pursuant to the decision of the Land Registration
Court, and that said decree of registration was fully transcribed in the Registration
Book in the o ce of the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal. We have found also
that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the appellees in the three cases now
before Us are all included in Parcel 1 that is covered by Original Certi cate of Title No.
735.
In view of Our ndings and conclusion that Original Certi cate of Title No. 135
was issued in accordance with the provisions of Act 496, and that the six parcels of
land that are claimed by the appellees in the present cases are covered by said
certi cate of title, what is left for this Court to decide is whether or not the appellees
still have any legal right over the six parcels of land that they claim.
Let it be noted that, as maintained by counsel for the appellees, the action of the
appellees is principally to recover the ownership and possession of the six parcels of
land mentioned and described in their complaints. The appellees would accomplish
their objective through alternative ways: (1) secure the nulli cation of the decision of
the Land Registration Court in LRC No. 6781, the nulli cation of the Decree of
Registration No. 17431 and the nulli cation of Original Certi cate of Title No. 735; (2) if
they fail in their efforts to secure the desired nulli cations, with Original Certi cate of
Title No. 735 being considered valid and effective, they seek the reconveyance to them
by the defendants named in their complaints, including herein appellant J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc., of the six parcels of land that they claim; and (3) if they cannot secure a
reconveyance, they seek to secure payment to them by the defendants named in their
complaints of the actual value of the six parcels of land that they claim.
It appears to Us that the appellees are not sure of their stand, or have not
adopted a definite stand, in asserting the rights that they claim.
It is the settled rule that a party seeking the reconveyance to him of his land that
he claims had been wrongly registered in the name of another person must recognize
the validity of the certi cate of title of the latter. It is also the rule that a reconveyance
may only take place if the land that is claimed to be wrongly registered is still
registered in the name of the person who procured the wrongful registration. No action
for reconveyance can take place as against a third party who had acquired title over the
registered property in good faith and for value. And if no reconveyance can be made,
the value of the property registered may be demanded only from the person (or
persons) who procured the wrongful registration in his name. 3 6
The lower court accepted, and sustained, the assertion of the appellees that the
proceedings in LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration were null and void and
that Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 is null and void ab initio and of no effect. The
trial court even went to the extent of declaring that some of the parcels of land claimed
by the appellees in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622 (now G.R. Nos. L-26127 and L-
26128 before this Court) were not covered by Original Certi cate of Title No. 735. The
lower court forthwith declared the appellees the owners of the parcels of land claimed
by them, as described in their complaints. Strangely enough, the lower court, upon
declaring Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 null and void, did not make any statement,
or observation, regarding the status or situation of the remaining lands (Parcels 1 and
2) covered by Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 after adjudicating to the appellees the
six parcels of land claimed by them in their complaints.
In the present appeal counsel for the appellees had maintained, and has
endeavored to show, that the lower court was correct in annulling Original Certi cate of
Title No. 735 and in adjudicating in favor of the appellees the ownership and
possession of the six parcels of land claimed by them in their complaints.
But, as hereinbefore held by Us, the lower court erred in declaring Original
Certi cate of Title No. 735 void and of no effect. We have held that Original Certi cate
of Title No. 735 was issued as a result of the registration proceedings in LRC No. 7681
which was regular and that said certi cate of title is valid and effective. The
proceedings in LRC 7681 being in rem, the decree of registration issued pursuant to the
decision rendered in said registration case bound the lands covered by the decree and
quieted title thereto, and is conclusive upon and against all persons, including the
government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the
application, notice or citation, or included in the general inscription "To whom it may
concern", and such decree will not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or
other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceedings in any court for
reversing judgment or decree. Such decree may only be reopened if any person
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained
by fraud would le in the competent court of rst instance a petition for review within
one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value had
acquired an interest on the land, and upon the expiration of said period of one year, the
decree, or the certi cate of title issued pursuant to the decree, is incontrovertible (Sec.
38, Act 496). In the case now before Us, the Decree of Registration No. 17431 in LRC
7681 was entered on July 8, 1914. It is undisputed that no person had led any petition
for review of the decree of registration in LRC 7681 within the period of one year from
July 8, 1914. That decree of registration, and Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 issued
pursuant thereto, therefore, had been incontrovertible since July 9, 1915.
Moreover, innocent purchase. 9 for value had acquired interest in the lands
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. 3 7
The Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 was issued on July 8, 1914 in the names
of the original applicants for registration, namely, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz,
Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion
Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz. Herein appellant J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. is not one of those who were registered as the original owners
mentioned in Original Certi cate of Title No. 735. When the original complaints were
led in these three cases in the Court of First Instance of Rizal the Parties named
defendants in each of the three cases were Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa
Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y
de la Paz, Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, the heirs of each one of these
defendants (without naming them), and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Of all the defendants
named in the three complaints only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared and
led its answer to the complaints. All the other defendants did not appear, and so they
were all declared in default. 3 8 It had to happen that way because as of the time when
the three complaints were led on May 19, 1955 the ownership of Parcel 1 that was
originally covered by Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 had already passed to
defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. In fact this defendant had caused Parcel 1 to be
subdivided and had sold the subdivision lots.
The records show that Parcel 1 in Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 was part of
the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason (Tuason Entail) which became involved in a
litigation in the Court of First Instance of Manila. 3 9 During the pendency of the case the
properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason were administered by the Bank of the Philippine
Islands as the judicial receiver. In the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
dated May 5, 1938, in Civil Case No. 24803, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as
receiver, was authorized, directed and ordered to execute, upon payment to it of the
sum of P763,925.75, a deed of transfer and assignment in favor of the Heirs of D.
Tuason, Inc. of the property covered by Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 31997, which
was originally Parcel 1 included in Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 (Exh. 13-B). On
June 13, 1938 the receiver Bank of the Philippine Islands executed the deed of transfer
and assignment (Exh. 13-A). Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 34853 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal was forthwith issued in the name of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. (Exhs.
12-b and 36). The deed of transfer and assignment was approved by the court in an
order dated June 17, 1938. This conveyance to the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. took place
at a time when the Supreme Court had already decided the case of Bank of the
Philippine Islands vs. Acuña (59 Phil. 183) wherein this Court upheld the validity of
Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 and also the validity of the transfer certi cate of
title emanating therefrom. 4 0
The circumstances attending the acquisition by the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. of the
land covered by Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 31997 — which was formerly Parcel 1
covered by Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 — clearly indicate that said corporation
acquired its title in a regular transaction as purchaser in good faith and for value. On
June 15, 1938 the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. in turn sold the same property to J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc., and Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 35073 was issued in the name of the
latter (Exhs. 12-c and 37).
The lower court declared that herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was a
purchaser in bad faith. We do not nd any evidence in the record that would sustain
such a nding of the lower court. One reason given by the lower court in declaring
appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a purchaser in bad faith is the fact that the
incorporators of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. and the incorporators of J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. were practically the same persons belonging to the same Tuason family. We
do not see anything wrong if some incorporators of the Heirs of D. Tuason Inc. are also
incorporators of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. During these days when businesses are
promoted, operated, and managed, through corporate entities, it is not surprising to
see two or more corporations organized by the same persons or group of persons,
with different purposes, for different lines of business and with distinct or separate
assets and interests. Besides, as has been shown, the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. acquired
the land (Parcel 1 in Original Certi cate of Title No. 735) from the Bank of the Philippine
Islands, the receiver of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason, in a sale that was
authorized, and subsequently approved, by the court. The Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. paid
the sum of P763,950.80 for the property. Certainly if the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. had
acquired the land originally covered by Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 in a
transaction that was authorized by the court, for a valuable consideration, thereby
acquiring a good title over the property as a purchaser in good faith and for value, the
title that it transferred to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. when it sold same property to the
latter was also a good title, and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was also a purchaser in good
faith and for value — even if it appears that the incorporators of the two corporations
belong to the same Tuason family. The records of these cases are bereft of any
evidence which would indicate that the sale of Parcel 1 in question by the Heirs of D.
Tuason, Inc. to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was fraudulent.
Another reason given by the lower court in declaring appellant J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. a buyer in bad faith is that when said appellant bought Parcel 1 originally covered
by Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 it was aware of the fact that the appellees or
their predecessors in interest were in possession of, and were cultivating, the six
parcels of land that they now claim in these cases. The conclusion of the lower court is
too strained. It should be remembered that the registered property bought by J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. had an area of some 879 hectares. It could happen that certain
relatives or ancestors of appellees had been squatting on some portions of the land
and claimed certain areas as their own, to the extent of having the areas claimed by
them declared for taxation purposes in their names. Thus the appellees presented in
evidence tax declarations that appear to have taken effect as of 1941. We have noted,
however, that at the back of those tax declarations are written the words "This parcel is
a duplicate of the land under Tax No. 764-J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc." (Exhs. E-Alcantara, F-
Alcantara, FF-1-Benin, GG-Benin, HH-Benin BBB-Pili, and BBB,1-Pili). 4 1 These
annotations simply reveal that when the predecessors of the appellees had those tax
declarations made to cover the lands that they claim, those lands were already included
in the tax declaration of appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Appellant J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. had been exercising, and asserting, its proprietary rights over the land in question
after it bought the same from the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. 4 2 This is borne by the
statement in the order, dated September 26, 1955, issued by Judge Juan P. Enriquez
who at the time was presiding the branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal where
these three cases were pending, as follows:
"3. It having been shown that J. M. Tuason & Co. had title covering the land
in question which they are subdividing into small lots for sale and in view of the
observation under paragraph 2 hereof the Court nds that there is no justi able
reason to maintain the writ of preliminary injunction that has been issued. This is
particularly true in Civil Case No. 2622, defendants having secured a nal
judgment against plaintiffs Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara for ejectment
before the Municipal court of Quezon City; and such injunction would annul the
order of the execution issued by the Quezon City courts. It should be noted that
the herein plaintiffs at the beginning pleaded to the Court that the area on which
their respective houses stand be not touched and their possession thereof be
respected by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co. In other words, each plaintiff is merely
asking for about 250 square meters each which represents the land on which the
house stands and their immediate yard, and not the whole land covered by these
three cases or 68 hectares. On the other hand, the Court requires J. M. Tuason &
Co. to put up a bond of P2,000 in favor of each of the defendant (sic) to answer
for whatever damages he may suffer by reason of the continuance during the
action of the acts complained of." 4 3
Besides, the possession by the appellees, either by themselves or through their

predecessors in interest, if there was such possession at all, would be unavailing
against the holder of a Torrens certi cate of title covering the parcels of lands now in
question. From July 8, 1914 when Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 was issued, no
possession by any person of any portion of the lands covered by said original
certi cate of title, or covered by a subsequent transfer certi cate of title derived from
said original certi cate of title, could defeat the title of the registered owner of the
lands covered by the certi cate of title. In this connection, let it be noted that appellant
J. M. Tuason & Co, Inc. became the registered owner of Parcel 1, which was originally
covered by Original Certi cate of Title No. 735, only on June 15, 1938, or almost 24
years after Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued.
It can well be said that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had relied on the title of the Heirs
of D. Tuason, Inc. when it bought the land covered by Transfer Certi cate of Title No.
34853, and the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. likewise had relied on the title of the Mayorasgo
Tuason (Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al.) when it bought the land covered by
Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 31997 from the judicial receiver, duly authorized and
approved by the court. We, therefore, can not agree with the lower court when it
declared appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a purchaser on bad faith.
The evidence shows that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had converted the
land originally covered by Original Certi cate of Title No. 735, including the six parcels
claimed by appellees into a subdivision, and numerous persons and entities had
purchased the subdivision lots, and the purchasers in turn were issued transfer
certi cates of title covering the lots that they bought, based on the transfer certi cate
of title in the name of J. M Tuason & Co., Inc. The buyers of the lots necessarily relied
upon the certi cate of title in the name of J. M. Tuason & Co., and because they paid for
the lots they certainly are purchasers in good faith and for value. The purchasers of
these lots have built thereon residential houses, o ce buildings, shops, hospital, even
churches. But the lower court, disregarding these circumstances, declared null and void
all transfer certi cates of title that emanated, or that were derived, from Original
Certi cate of Title No. 735. This is a grave error committed by the lower court. And the
error is compounded when the lower court ordered appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
and all those claiming under said appellant, to vacate and restore to the appellees the
possession of the parcels of lands that are claimed by them in the present cases. The
possessors of the lots comprised within the six parcels of land in question, and who
hold certi cates of title covering the lots that they bought, are not parties in the present
cases, and yet the decision of the lower court would annul their titles and compel them
to give up the possession of their properties. To give effect to the decision of the lower
court is to deprive persons of their property without due process of law. 4 4 The
decision of the lower court would set at naught the settled doctrine that the holder of a
certi cate of title who acquired the property covered by the title in good faith and for
value can rest assured that his title is perfect and incontrovertible. 4 5
In view of the foregoing discussions, it is obvious that the action of the appellees
in the three cases now before this Court must fail.
It has been shown that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had acquired a valid title
over the land which includes the six parcels that are claimed by the appellees. The fact,
that the predecessors in interest of the appellees — or any person, for that matter —
had not led a petition for the review of the decree of registration in LRC No. 7681
within a period of one year from July 8, 1914 when the decree of registration was
issued, is a circumstance that had forever foreclosed any proceeding for the review of
said decree. As We have adverted to, that decree of registration had become
incontrovertible. An action, similar to one brought by the appellees in each of the
present cases, which attack collaterally the said decree of registration cannot be
entertained. 4 6 Neither may the action of the appellees for reconveyance of the lands in
question be entertained because such action bad already prescribed, and barred by
laches, considering that Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 had been issued way back
in 1914 and the complaint in the present cases were led only on May 19, 1955, or after
a lapse of some 41 years. Moreover, as of the time when these complaints were led
the six parcels of land claimed by the appellees are no longer covered by the certi cate
of title in the names of the persons who procured the original registration of those
lands. The title to Parcel 1, which includes the six parcels of land claimed by the
appellees, had passed to the hands of parties who were innocent purchasers for value.
This Parcel 1 which was one of the two parcels originally covered by Original Certi cate
of Title No. 735, was subsequently covered by Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 31997.
As has been shown, this Parcel 1 was part of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason
and it was conveyed by order of the court in Civil Case No. 24803 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila to the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc., and the latter in turn conveyed the
same to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 34853 in the name of
the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. was cancelled and transfer Certi cate of Title No. 35073
was issued in the name of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. It has also been shown that J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. had converted Parcel 1 to a subdivision. Numerous persons and
entities bought those subdivision lots, and to those buyers were issued transfer
certi cates of title covering the lots that they acquired. It is very clear, therefore, that an
action for reconveyance cannot prosper against appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., much
less against the registered owners of the lots that form parts of the six parcels of land
that are claimed by the appellees. 4 7
Neither may the appellees have a cause of action for damages against appellant
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., considering that said appellant is not one of the original
registered owners that procured the registration of the land. There is no evidence that
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had anything to do with the registration proceedings which
brought about the issuance of Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 — even supposing
that the registration was procured fraudulently.
4. Numerous cases have been decided by this Court, dealing on questions
regarding the validity and effectiveness of Original Certi cate of Title No. 735. The
rulings of this Court in those cases are necessarily relevant to, and of decisive hearing
in, the resolution of the issues involved in the three cases now at bar.
(a) We have earlier cited the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acuña
(59 Phil., 183), where the jurisdiction of the Court of Land Registration that issued the
decree which was the basis of Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 was questioned, and
this Court upheld the jurisdiction of the registration court and categorically pronounced
the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
(b) There is the case of Jose Alcantara, et al., versus Mariano Tuason y de la Paz,
et al. (G.R. No. L-4998, Mar. 13, 1953, 92 Phil. 796), where this Court declared that
Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 is incontrovertible and is conclusive against all
persons claiming, either by themselves or by their predecessors in interest, rights over
the lands covered by said certificate of title.
We nd that the Alcantara case is intimately related to the three cases at bar, and
the rulings of this Court in that former case are of decisive application to these three
cases.
On August 29, 1950 a complaint was led in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Quezon City Branch) by Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, Pascual Pili, Alejandro de Dios,
Tomas Bagagonio, Quintina Sandoval, and Tomasa Lazaro against Mariano Tuason y de
la Paz, Heirs of Mariano Tuason, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc. This
case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-156. It will be noted that three of the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. Q-156, namely, Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, and Pascual Pili, are among
the original plaintiffs in the three cases now before this Court; Elias Benin, in Civil Case
No. 3621; Jose Alcantara, in Civil Case. No. 3622; and Pascual Pili, in Civil Case No.
3623. Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in that Civil Case No. Q-
156 claimed that they were the lawful owners of six (of the ten) parcels of land
described in paragraph 2 of their complaint - Jose Alcantara claiming two parcels, Elias
Benin claiming three parcels, and Pascual Pili claiming one parcel. Substantially, it is
alleged in the complaint 4 8 that each plaintiff, by himself and by his predecessors in
interest, as lawful owner, had been in the actual, open and continuous possession of his
own respective parcel, or parcels, of land from time immemorial until January 1950
when the defendants by force and by the use of armed men started to convert their
lands into a subdivision; that on July 8, 1914 the defendants had obtained Original
Certi cate of Title No. 735 over a parcel of land which included the lands possessed by
them (plaintiffs) and which they and their ancestors had been enjoying as owners, for
more than thirty years before the issuance of the title; that the silence and inaction of
the defendants since the date of their original certi cate of title showed that said
certi cate of title did not express the status of the their claim to the said parcels, that
plaintiffs were not given formal notice by the defendants of the registration of the
lands, such that defendants' certi cate of title No. 735 was not in accordance with law,
and that defendants did not have proper title for registration to the parcels of land
owned by the plaintiffs, as described in the complaint; and that because the certi cate
of title issued by the register of deeds was still in the names of the defendants,
successors in interest of the Tuasons y de la Paz, and has not passed to innocent
parties for valuable consideration, the conveyance of the same to the plaintiffs was in
order. The plaintiffs prayed that therein defendants be ordered to execute deeds of
conveyance of the parcels of land described in their complaint in favor of the plaintiffs
that the defendants' certi cate of title be cancelled and the corresponding certi cate
be ordered issued in the names of the plaintiffs. We quote from the decision:
"The material allegations of the complaint are: that plaintiffs are owners of
the parcels of land set forth in their complaint, which parcels are situated along
Bonifacio street, barrio of San Jose, Quezon City, and that they have been in
actual, open, and continuous possession and enjoyment thereof without
molestation from defendants from time immemorial to the present; that on July 8,
1914, defendants obtained a certi cate of title (No. 735) over a parcel of land,
which included the lands possessed by plaintiffs, and which they and their
ancestors had been enjoying as owners more than 30 years before the issuance
of said title; that on June 23, 1950, defendants caused the removal of two houses
of plaintiffs on the land; and that defendants did not le any action against
plaintiffs before the inclusion of the lands in their title, in violation of the `due
process of law' clause of the Constitution. There are other allegations which really
are arguments of legal discussion, thus: that defendants could not acquire title by
the registration proceedings against the lawful holder, especially without formal
notice, because registration is to con rm title, not to acquire it; that the silence of
the defendants since the issuance of their title shows that this does not express
the lawful status of their claim, etc. The defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action and that, if it does, the
same is barred by the statute of limitations. The court sustained this motion on
the second ground. Subsequently, plaintiffs led an amended complaint with the
same substantial allegations, but with new ones, i.e., that it was in January, 1950,
that they learned that their lands were included in the registration proceedings
which culminated in the issuance of defendants' title; that defendants never
claimed ownership to the lands, but directly or indirectly allowed plaintiffs to
continue exercising their rights of ownership over the same. This amended
complaint was denied admission, and the motion for the reconsideration of the
order of dismissal was also denied. Hence the appeal."
In a rming the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint, this Court
held:
"Without considering whether the trial court's refusal to admit the amended
complaint is erroneous or not, we are constrained to hold that the dismissal of the
action, even with the amended complaint is a basis thereof, is correct. From the
allegations of both the original and amended complaints, it appears that the
defendants are holders of a certi cate of title issued on July 8, 1914 as a
consequence of registration proceedings. There is no allegation in both original
and amended complaints that the plaintiffs were not noti ed, or were not aware,
of the registration proceedings. It is presumed, therefore, that as occupants proper
notices thereof were served on them and that they were aware of said
proceedings. If this is so, then the plaintiffs, who were, or whose predecessors in
interest were, on the land during the registration proceedings, were bound by said
proceedings. The latter are in rem and bind the whole world, whether served with
notice personally or not. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49). And the decree of
registration, in pursuance of which defendants' title was issued, binds the land
and quiets title thereto, and is conclusive against the plaintiffs, (Section 38, Land
Registration Act). The supposed right of plaintiffs by reason of their alleged
continued possession for thirty years was, therefore, destroyed fully and
completely by the registration proceedings, and their supposed ignorance of the
inclusion of the lands can not exclude them from the effects of the registration
proceedings, and the supposed conduct of defendants in allowing plaintiffs to
continue on the land after registration can not serve as basis of any title or right
thereto, because acts of a possessory character by tolerance of an owner does
not constitute possession (Article 1942, Spanish Civil Code), and because no title
to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired
by prescription or adverse possession (Section 46, Land Registration Act)".
Thus, in the Alcantara case, as in the Bank of the Philippine Island vs. Acuña case,
supra, this Court upheld the validity of the registration proceedings which culminated in
the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This Court declared that "the decree
of registration, in pursuance of which defendants' title was issued, binds the land and
quiets title thereto and is conclusive against the plaintiffs." In other words, in virtue of
that decision, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156, among them Jose Alcantara, Elias
Benin and Pascual Pili, and their successors-in-interest, could no longer question the
validity of Original Certi cate of Title No. 735, nor claim any right of ownership over any
portion of the land that is covered by said certificate of title.
But Elias Benin, Jose Alcantara, and Pascual Pili again came to court to claim
ownership over portions of the land covered by Original Certi cate of Title No. 735. On
May 19, 1955 Elias Benin, joined by his brother Victor Benin and his sister Marta Benin,
led Civil Case No. 3621; Jose Alcantara joined by his brother Juan Alcantara, led Civil
Case No. 3622; and Pascual Pili, joined by his sister Luisa Pili, led Civil Case No. 3623.
These are the three cases which originated in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Quezon City Branch) which are now before this Court on appeal.
In the earlier part of this decision, We have pointed out that the complaints in
these three cases had been amended so as to include as parties plaintiffs all the heirs
of the persons who were alleged to be the owners of the parcels of land claimed by the
plaintiffs in each case. Thus, the complaint in Civil Case No. 3621 was amended to
include all the heirs of Sixto Benin the alleged owner of the three parcels of land
described in the complaint and the common predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs
in the case. The complaint in Civil Case No. 3622 was amended to include all the heirs
of Bonoso Alcantara, the alleged owner of the two parcels of land described in the
complaint and the common predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case. The
complaint in Civil Case No. 3623 was amended to include all the heirs of Candido Pili,
the alleged owner of the one parcel of land described in the complaint and the common
predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case.
In those three cases, in the court below, herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
(defendant therein) led a motion to dismiss upon the principal ground "that the cause
of action (assuming there is one) is barred by prior judgment, or by the statute of
limitation". In its motion to dismiss J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. contended that the decision
of the Supreme Court in the Alcantara case is a bar to the action of the plaintiffs in Civil
Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The lower
court, however, denied the motion to dismiss. In its answer to the complaint in each of
these three cases, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. set up as a rmative defenses the very
grounds of its motion to dismiss. After the plaintiffs had closed their direct evidence,
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. led another motion to dismiss upon the ground that the action
was barred by the statute of limitations and by a prior judgment, and that the plaintiffs
had not presented evidence to prove their claim of ownership. This second motion to
dismiss was also denied by the lower court. 4 9
In its decision, which is now on appeal before this Court, the lower court held that
the decision in the Alcantara case was not a bar to the action in these three cases,
ruling that there is no identity, of the parties, of the subject matter, and of the cause of
action, between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622,
and 3623, on the other.
It is now contended by appellant J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., in the present appeal,
that "the trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the ground of res judicata
and in denying the motion to dismiss filed on said ground." 5 0
Does the judgment in the aforementioned Alcantara case operate as a bar to the
action of the appellees in the three cases at bar?
In order that the rule of res judicata may apply, the following requisites must be
present: (a) the former judgment must be nal; (b) it must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the rst and the second
actions, identity of parties, of subject-matter, and of cause of action (San Diego vs.
Cardona, 70 Phil. 281-283).
We nd that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998) is a nal
judgment on the merits that was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and over the parties. The only requisite for res judicata which we have to
determine is whether between Civil Case Q-156 (G.R. No. 4998), on the one hand. and
Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 (G.R. Nos. L-26127, 26128 and 26129), on the
other, there is identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.
In our examination of the records and the evidence, We nd that there is identity
of subject matter. In the lower court's pre-trial order, dated December 18, 1957, which
was based on the agreement of the parties, it is stated
"That the parcels of land in litigation in Case No. Q-156 are substantially
identical to the same parcels of land litigated in these cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and
3623." 5 1
We also nd that there is identity of cause of action. It is apparent, upon reading

the original complaint (Exhibit 1) in Civil Case Q-156 and the decision in the Alcantara
case (G.R. No. L-4998), that the cause of action in Civil Case Q-156 was based on the
alleged fact that the defendants had dispossessed and deprived the plaintiffs therein
of the parcels of land described in the complaint, which were claimed by the plaintiffs
as their own and of which they had been in actual, open and continuous possession
from time immemorial, and that said lands were wrongly included in Certi cate of Title
No. 735 that was obtained by the defendants. In the three cases at bar, plaintiffs (now
appellees) also complain of having been dispossessed and deprived by the defendants
of the parcels of land of which they were absolute owners and possessors, by
themselves and through their predecessors in interest, since time immemorial and that
their said lands wrongly included in Parcel 1 of Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 that
was obtained by the defendants. In Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and in the
three cases now at bar, on the other, the plaintiffs therein seek the nulli cation of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, and the reconveyance to them of the parcels of land
that they claim as theirs. 5 2 It appears clear to Us that in Civil Case No. Q-156 and in the
three cases at bar, the object or purpose of the plaintiffs is to recover the ownership
and possession of the same parcels of land.
As far as the parties are concerned, We nd that there is no exact identity of
parties between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622
and 3623, on the other. It appears that of the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622
and 3623 only Elias Benin, Jose Alcantara and Pascual Pili were plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. Q-156. In Civil Case No. Q-156, the defendants were Mariano Tuason y de la Paz,
Heirs of Mariano Tuason, J.M. Tuason, & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc. while in
Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 the defendants were Mariano Severo, Teresa
Eriberta, Juan Jose, Demetrio Asuncion, Augusto Huberto, all surnamed Tuason y de la
Paz (the persons appearing as registered owners in Original Certi cate of Title No.
735), their heirs, and J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. We nd that the natural persons
surnamed Tuason, and the heirs, refer to the persons who belong to the Tuason family
that secured the registration of Parcel 1 in Original Certi cate of Title No. 735. The
defendant Gregorio Araneta Inc. in Civil Case No. Q-156 is the administrator of the
Tuason properties. So, the parties defendants in all these cases are practically the
same. We nd, however, that in Civil Case No. Q-156 as well as in Civil Cases Nos. 3621,
3622 and 3623, it was the defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. that actually controverted
the claims of the plaintiffs.
After a careful study, We are of the considered view that the judgment in the
Alcantara case is a bar to the action of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Elias Benin in
Civil Case No. 3621 (G.R. No. 26127), of plaintiff Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No. 3622
(G.R. No. 26128), and of plaintiff Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. 3623 (G. R. No. 26129)
under the doctrine of res adjudicata. We are likewise of the considered view that the
decision in the Alcantara case would serve to rule out the action of the other plaintiffs in
Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 under the doctrine of stare decisis.
In Civil Case No. 3621 the original plaintiffs were Victor Benin, Marta Benin, and
Elias Benin — two brothers and a sister. In the amended complaint it was alleged that
these three original plaintiffs had another brother, and another sister, namely Esteban
Benin and Felipa Benin. But because all the ve Benin brothers and sisters died, they
were all substituted by their heirs, such that as of the time when Civil Case No. 3621
was decided the Plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Victor Benin; (2) the heirs of Marta
Benin; (3) the heirs of Elias Benin; (4) the heirs of Esteban Benin, and (5) the heirs of
Felipa Binin.
In Civil Case No. 3622 the original plaintiffs were Juan Alcantara and Jose
Alcantara. Juan Alcantara died, and he was substituted by his heirs, such that as of the
time Civil Case No. 3622 was decided the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Juan
Alcantara, and (2) Jose Alcantara.
In Civil Case No. 3623 the original plaintiffs were Pascual Pili and Luisa Pili. In the
amended complaint, it was alleged that Luisa Pili and Pascual Pili had two brothers who
were already dead, namely, Diego Pili and Manuel Pili, so they were substituted by their
heirs. Luisa Pili died, and she was substituted by her heirs, such that as of the time Civil
Case No. 3623 was decided, the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Diego Pili; (2) the heirs
of Manuel Pili; (3) the heirs of Luisa Pili, and (4) Pascual Pili.
It would thus appear that of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 Elias Benin is the
only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156; of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
3622 Jose E. Alcantara, who is still living, is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case
No. Q-156; of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 Pascual Pili, who is still living, is the
only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156.
It being Our nding that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q156 (G.R. No. L-4998 —
the Alcantara case) is a nal judgment on the merits that was rendered by a court that
had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties, and that there is identity of
subject matter and cause of action between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and
Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623, on the other; and it appearing that Elias Benin is
a party-plaintiff both in Civil Case Q-156 and Civil Case No. 3621, that Jose Alcantara is
a party-plaintiff in both Civil Case No. Q-156 and Civil Case No. 3622; that Pascual Pili is
a party-plaintiff in both Civil Case No. Q-156 and Civil Case No. 3623; and that the
defendants in Civil Case No. Q-156 and in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are
practically the same persons and/or entities, We hold that the doctrine of bar by a
previous judgment or res adjudicata squarely applies to Elias Benin, or to his heirs and
successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3621; to Jose Alcantara and his heirs or
successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3622; and to Pascual Pili and his heirs or
successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3623. 5 3
We now consider the case of the other plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622
and 3623.

It will be noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffs base their claim of
ownership of the three parcels of land described in the complaint on their being heirs or
successors in interest of Sixto Benin who died in 1936 . In Civil Case No. 3622 the
plaintiffs base their claim of ownership over the two parcels of land described in their
complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara who
died in 1934. In Civil Case No. 3623 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the
one parcel of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors
in interest of Candido Pili who died in 1931 .
When Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, alleged in their complaint in
Civil Case No. Q-156 (which was led in 1950) that they were the owners of the parcels
of land speci ed in their complaint, having inherited the same from their ancestors and
had been in possession of the same from time immemorial, each was claiming a right
as an heir of Bonoso Alcantara, Sixto Benin, and Candido Pili, respectively. Similarly, in
Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, the source of the rights claimed by the plaintiffs
Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili and all the other plaintiffs were their
respective ancestor, or predecessor in interest, namely Bonoso Alcantara, Sixto Benin
and Candido Pili, as the case may be.
Inasmuch as Sixto Benin died in 1936, Bonoso Alcantara died in 1934, and
Candido Pili died in 1931, it is obvious that during all the time when the registration
proceedings in LRC No. 7681 were taking place before the Court of Land Registration,
which culminated in the issuance of Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 on July 8, 1914,
Sixto Benin, Bonoso Alcantara, and Candido Pili were living. The records show that no
one of these three persons, or their representative, had led any opposition to the
application for registration in said LRC 7681, nor did any one of them, or their
representative, le any petition for review of the decree of registration No. 17431 that
was issued in said LRC No. 7681.
It is Our view, therefore, that the decision of this Court, in G.R. No. L-4998, which
a rmed the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing the complaint of
Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili (along with four other plaintiffs) in Civil
Case No. Q-156 should apply not only against the heirs, of Elias Benin, against Jose
Alcantara, and against Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and
3623, respectively, but also against all the other plaintiffs in those cases. We nd that
the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 do not claim a right which is different from that
claimed by Elias Benin in Civil Case No. Q-156. Likewise, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
3622 do not claim a right different from that claimed by Jose Alcantara in Civil Case,
No. Q-156. And, also, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 do not claim a right different
from that claimed by Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q-156. They all claim the same right,
based on the alleged ownership of their respective common predecessor in interest - in
Civil Case No. 3621 the common predecessor in interest being Sixto Benin; in Civil Case
No. 3622 the common predecessor in interest being Bonoso Alcantara; and in Civil
Case No. 3623 the common predecessor in interest being Candido Pili. In Civil Case No.
Q-156 Elias Benin based his claim of ownership upon the ownership of his predecessor
in interest who necessarily must be Sixto Benin; Jose Alcantara, upon the ownership of
his predecessor in interest who necessarily must be Bonoso Alcantara; and Pascual
Pili, upon the ownership of his predecessor in interest who necessarily must be
Candido Pili. It follows, therefore, that the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-4998 (Civil
Case No. Q-156i, which held untenable the cause of action of the successors in interest,
of Sixto Benin, of Bonoso Alcantara and of Candido Pili, to recover the ownership and
possession of any land covered by Original Certi cate of Title No. 735, would also
foreclose a similar cause of action of all other persons who claim to be successors in
interest of Sixto Benin, of Bonoso Alcantara and of Candido Pili over any land covered
by said certi cate of title. As We have adverted to, Sixto Benin died in 1936, Bonoso
Alcantara died in 1934, and Candido Pili died in 1931. These three predecessors in
interest of the appellees died long after the issuance of Original Certi cate of Title No.
735, which took place on July 8, 1914.
And so, even if there are plaintiffs (now appellees) in these three cases who are
not privies to plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, and Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q-
156 (G.R. No. L-4998 — the Alcantara case) and were not parties in that case, still the
ruling of this Court in that former case, to the effect that therein plaintiffs or their
predecessors in interest were bound by the proceedings in the registration court which
culminated in the issuance of Original Certi cate of Title No. 735, holds and applies to
those plaintiffs in these three cases, because the claim of ownership of these plaintiffs
is based on the same predecessors in interest of plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin
and Pascual Pili in said Civil Case No. Q-156. 5 4 It may well be said that the interests of
the appellees in G.R. No. L-26127 (Civil Case No. 3621) who claim rights as heirs or
successors in interest of Sixto Benin were represented by Elias Benin in Civil Case No.
Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998); the appellees in G.R. No. 26128 (Civil Case No. 3622) who
claim rights as heirs or successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara were represented
by Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998); the appellees in G.R. No.
26129 (Civil Case No. 3623) who claim rights as heirs or successors in interest of
Candido Pili were represented by Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998).
(c) In the case of Albina Santiago, et al. vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. (G.R. No. L-
14223, November 23, 1960) 5 5 , where Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 was also in
question, this Court ruled on issues akin to the issues involved in the three cases now at
bar. Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs led a complaint in the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-2918, against J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
alleging, substantially, that their ancestor, Inocencio Santiago, was the owner of a
parcel of land, evidenced by a document (attached to their complaint as Annex A)
issued by the Spanish government on May 12, 1848 5 6 ; that Inocencio Santiago had
since then been in possession of the aforesaid land as owner, publicly, continuously and
adversely until his death, when his two children, Isaias and Albina, succeeded and
continued to own and possess said land pro indiviso in the same character as that of
their predecessor; that upon the death of Isaias Santiago his one-half share of the land
was inherited by his eleven children who, together with their aunt Albina, continued to
own and possess the land in the same character as that of their predecessors; that
Albina and her co-plaintiffs came to know that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had previously
led in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City Civil Case No. Q27 for "quieting of title
and recovery of possession" against ve of the children of Isaias Santiago involving the
parcel of land of which they were co-owners; that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had claimed
that parcel to be part of the land covered by its Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 119;
that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-27, in which they (Albina Santiago, et al.) were
never impleaded as parties, had already become nal 5 7 ; that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
had executed the judgment against them, excluding and ousting them from the
enjoyment and possession of the land. Albina and her co-plaintiffs also alleged that
Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 119 (37679) of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., as well as
Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 from which the former was derived, did not include
the parcel claimed by them; that even granting that Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 119
included the parcel claimed by them the inclusion of that parcel in the certi cate of title
of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was done through fraud because they, nor their predecessors,
were not actually noti ed of the registration proceedings. As ground for cancellation of
the certi cate of title of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs
further alleged that the technical description in Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 had
been falsi ed to include areas never brought within the jurisdiction of the Land
Registration Court, since they were areas not included in the application and publication
in the registration proceedings; that long before the predecessors of J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. applied for, and secured, registration of the land which included their parcel of
land they had already acquired ownership thereof not only by the document, Annex A of
their complaint, but also by acquisitive prescription. Albina Santiago and her co-
plaintiffs prayed, that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. be ordered to desist from enforcing Civil
Case No. Q-27 against them; that a resurvey be ordered to determine whether or not
Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 119 (37679) included the land described in their
complaint; that a reconveyance to them be ordered of whatever portion of the land
claimed by them may be found included in Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 119; that
Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 119 and Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 be ordered
cancelled and substituted with a new certi cate of title embracing only those lands
included in the application, publication and/or decree in LRC No. 7681 of the Court of
Land Registration.
Upon motion of defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City dismissed the complaint of Albina Santiago, et al., upon the grounds that
there was no cause of action, that the case was barred by a prior judgment in Civil Case
No. Q-27 which was a rmed by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-5079, and that the
action of the plaintiffs, if they had any, had prescribed.
This Court a rmed the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint of
Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs. 5 8 Regarding the contention of Albina Santiago
and her co-plaintiffs that the judgment in the previous case (Civil Case No. Q-27,
a rmed in G.R. No. L-5079) would not operate as res judicata against them because
they were not parties in that suit, and that they did not derive their title from the
defendants in the previous suit, this Court held:
"We agree with appellants that the decision in the preceding suit to quiet
title, prosecuted by the appellee Tuason & Co. against other heirs of Ynocencio
Santiago (99 Phil., 615; 50 Off. Gaz. 11, 5727), can not constitute res judicata
against these appellants who were not parties to that suit and do not derive their
title from the defendants in the previous litigation (Rule 39, sec. 44 (b). There is
authority for the proposition that a judgment may be made binding in a
subsequent litigation upon one who, although not a formal party to a previous
suit, has actually conducted or controlled the action or defense therein (65 ALR
1134), or who was adequately represented in such previous litigation but no clear
proof of the existence of such exceptional circumstances is before us in the
present case. On the other hand, the rule is that co-owners are not privies inter se
in relation to the property owned in common.
xxx xxx xxx
"But granting that the plaintiffs-appellants herein are not privies of the
defendants Santiago in the former litigation over this same property (S.C.G.R. No.
L-5079), still the pronouncement of this Court, made in the former case, to the
effect that the Spanish document (Annex A) issued in favor of Ynocencio
Santiago (ancestor of appellants herein) was neither a titulo de informacion
posesoria nor a title by composicion con el estado, and, therefore, vested no
ownership over the land therein described in favor of Ynocencio Santiago, holds
and applies to herein appellants, since the quality or the legal effect of the
document does not depend upon the person who invoke it.
"If the late Ynocencio Santiago did not become the owner of the disputed
property by virtue of the document Annex A, then appellants herein, as heirs of
Ynocencio, have not acquired such ownership either. It follows that the rst and
second causes of action of their complaint, predicated as they are on the
assumption that such ownership and its consequential rights resulted from Annex
A, must necessarily fail. Not being owners, they can complain of no invasion of
dominical rights."
It will thus be noted that in the afore-mentioned decision in the Santiago
case, even if Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs were not considered privies to
the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-27, and even if they were not parties in that
previous case, this Court nevertheless applied to them the judgment (G. R. No. L-
5079) in that previous case where it was pronounced that the document, Annex A
of the complaint of Albina Santiago, et al., was neither a titulo de informacion
posesoria nor a title by composicion con el estado, and it did not establish the
right of ownership of their predecessor in interest, Inocencio Santiago, Albina
Santiago and her co-plaintiffs had based their claim of ownership on that
document (Annex A). 5 9 This Court held in that previous case that the
document was unavailing against Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 119 of J,
M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and against Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
And so, following the logic of this Court in its decision in the Santiago case, in the
three cases at bar We hold that even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621, except the
heirs of Elias Benin, are not privies to Elias Benin and were not parties in Civil Case No.
Q-156; even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622, except Jose Alcantara, are not privies
to Jose Alcantara and were not parties in Civil Case No. Q-156; and even if the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 3623, except Pascual Pili, are not privies to Pascual Pili and were not
parties in Civil Case No. Q156, still the pronouncement of this Court in the judgment in
that previous case (G.R. No. L-4998), to the effect that the plaintiffs in that case and
their predecessors in interest were bound by the registration proceedings which
culminated in the issuance of Original Certi cate of Title No. 735, holds and applies to
all the plaintiffs (now appellees) in these three cases. In that judgment this Court ruled
out, or did not sustain, the rights claimed by the predecessors in interest of herein
appellees over the land covered by Original Certi cate of Title No. 735. These
appellees, therefore, have not succeeded to any right that can derrogate the validity and
conclusiveness of Original Certi cate of Title No. 735, and of the certi cates of title
that are derived from said original certificate of title.
Coming back to the Santiago case, as regards the contention of Albina Santiago
and her co-plaintiffs that the registration proceedings which resulted in the issuance of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 were irregular and fraudulent, this Court held:
"(T)he mere fact that appellants herein were not personally noti ed of the
registration proceedings that resulted in a decree of registration of title in favor of
the Tuasons in 1914 does not constitute in itself a case of fraud that would
invalidate the decree. The registration proceedings, as proceedings in rem, operate
as against the whole world and the decree issued therein is conclusive
adjudication of the ownership of the lands registered, not only against those
parties who appeared in such proceedings but also against parties who were
summoned by publication but did not appear. The registration by the appellee's
predecessors-in-interest freed the lands from claims and liens of whatever
character that existed against the lands prior to the issuance of the certi cates of
title, except those noted in the certi cate and legal encumbrances saved by law
(Yumol vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17 and cases cited therein). In addition,
there being no allegation that the registered owners procured the non-appearance
of appellants at the registration proceedings, and very much more than one year
having elapsed from the issuance of the decree of registration in 1914, neither
revocation of such decree nor a decree of reconveyance are obtainable any more."
Regarding the claim of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that they had
acquired title by prescription over the parcel of land claimed by them, this Court held:
"It follows also that the allegation of prescriptive title in favor of plaintiffs
does not su ce to establish a cause of action. If such prescription was
completed before the registration of the land in favor of the Tuasons, the resulting
prescriptive title was cut off and extinguished by the decree of registration. If, on
the contrary, the prescription was either begun or completed after the decree of
registration, it conferred no title because, by express provision of law, prescription
cannot operate against the registered owner (Act 496, section 46)."
Thus, in this Santiago case, as in the Alcantara case, this Court declared
conclusive and indefeasible Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 which was issued as a
result of the registration proceedings in L.R.C. No. 7681 of the Court of Land
Registration. There are many other cases where this Court has made a similar
pronouncement regarding Original Certificate of Title No. 735. 6 0
In view of the ndings, and the rulings, that We have hereinbefore made, it follows
that, as contended by the appellant, the lower court also erred when it declared the
appellees the owners of the lands claimed by them and in awarding damages to them,
in these three cases. 6 1
We consider it unnecessary to rule on the counterclaim of appellant J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc., for damages and attorneys fees against the appellees 6 3 We believe that the
appellees had led their complaints in the honest, but mistaken, belief that they have a
good cause of action against the appellant corporation and not because they meant to
embarrass or humiliate the persons who are identified or connected with the appellant.
WHEREFORE, the joint decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon
City Branch) in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, appealed from, is reversed and
set aside. The bond led by appellant in the three cases in the court below for the lifting
of the writ of preliminary injunction is ordered cancelled. No pronouncement as to
costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C. J. , Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra,
Fernandez, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., did not take part.
Footnotes
1. The three cases were tried together, and decided in one joint decision, by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal were jointly appealed directly to the Supreme Court because of the
value of the property involved in each case; and are now decided jointly by the Supreme
Court.

2. The original plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 were Victor Benin, Marta Benin and Elias Benin.
In the second amended complaint, dated June 18, 1959, it was there alleged that Sixto
Benin, who died in 1936, left ve (5) children, namely, Victor Benin, Elias Benin, Esteban
Benin, Felipa Benin and Marta Benin. When the original complaint was led on May 19,
1955, Esteban Benin and Felipa Benin were dead, but their heirs were not included as
parties plaintiffs. At the time the second amended complaint was led, of the three (3)
original plaintiffs, only Victor Benin and Elias Benin were living - Marta Benin having died
after the original complaint was led; and so the complaint was amended, naming as
parties plaintiffs Victor Benin and Elias Benin (two of the three original defendants);
Mercedes Zamora y Benin, Leocadio Zamora y Benin, Roman Zamora y Benin, Eduardo
Zamora y Benin, Pablo Zamora y Benin, Antonio Zamora y Benin and Ru no Zamora y
Benin (in substitution of original plaintiffs Marta Benin); Ines Benin, Estanislawa Benin,
and Irineo Benin, representing their deceased father Esteban Benin; and Felipe Manuel,
Ricardo Manuel, and Virginia Manuel, representing their deceased mother Felipa Benin.
During the pendency of this case in the court below, original plaintiff Elias Benin died,
and he was substituted by his heirs, namely, Isabel Rivera Vda. de Benin, Hermenegildo
R. Benin, Mamerto R. Benin, Celerina Cruz, Ceferino Cruz, Mario Cruz, and Cora Cruz
(these last four being children of the deceased Margarita Benin who was one of the
children of Elias Benin), Ester R. Benin, Elisa R. Benin and Apolinario R. Benin. Likewise,
during the pendency of this case in the court below, original plaintiff Victor Benin died,
and he was substituted by his heirs, namely, Agripina Rivera Vda. de Benin, Rosario
Benin, Teotimo Benin, Miraldo Benin, Eufrocio Benin, Gloria Benin, Jose Benin, and Elino
Benin. In resum, therefore, at the time when Civil Case No. 3621 was decided by the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, the plaintiffs in the said case were (1) VICTOR BENIN,
represented by his heirs, Agripina Rivera Vda. de Benin, Rosario Benin, Teotimo Benin,
Miraldo Benin, Eufrocio Benin, Gloria Benin, Jose Benin, and Elino Benin; (2) MARTA
BENIN, represented by her heirs, Leocadio Zamora y Benin, Mercedes Zamora y Benin,
Roman Zamora y Benin, Eduardo Zamora y Benin, Pablo Zamora y Benin, Antonio
Zamora y Benin, and Ru no Zamora y Benin; (3) ELIAS BENIN, represented by his heirs,
Isabel Rivera Vda. de Benin, Hermenegildo Benin, Mamerto Benin, Ester Benin, Elisa
Benin, Apolinario Benin, Celerina Cruz y Benin, Ceferino Cruz y Benin, Mario Cruz y Benin,
and Cora Cruz y Benin; (4) ESTEBAN BENIN, represented by his heirs, Ines Benin,
Estanislawa Benin, and Irineo Benin; and (5) FELIPA BENIN, represented by her heirs,
Felipe Manuel y Benin, Ricardo Manuel y Benin, and Virginia Manuel y Benin. (R.A., Vol. I,
pp. 37, 423, 427, 476, 477; R.A., Vol. II, pp. 718-719, 751-752).
The original plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622 were the two brothers, Juan E. Alcantara and
Jose E. Alcantara. During the pendency of this case in the court below, Juan Alcantara
died, and he was substituted by his heirs, namely, Victoria Alcantara, Marcelina
Alcantara, Cresencia Alcantara and Victor Alcantara. Therefore, at the time when Civil
Case No. 3622 was decided by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the parties-plaintiffs
were (1) JOSE E ALCANTARA, and (2) JUAN E. ALCANTARA, represented by his heirs,
Victoria Alcantara, Marcelina Alcantara, Cresencia Alcantara, and Victor Alcantara. (R.A.
Vol. II, pp. 644-646).
In Civil Case No. 3623, the original plaintiffs were Pascual Pili and Luisa Pili, who were brother
and sister. In the second amended complaint, dated June 18, 1959, it is stated that the
two original plaintiffs, Pascual Pili and Luisa Pili, were the children of Candido Pili who
died in 1931. The other children of Candido Pili were Diego Pili and Manuel Pili, both
deceased at the time of the ling of the original complaint but their heirs were not
included as parties plaintiffs. When the second amended complaint was led on June
18, 1959, those named plaintiffs were Pascual Pili, Luisa Pili, Domingo Pili, Florentina
Pili and Felicidad Pili (these last three being the children of Diego Pili), Tarcila Pili and
Julia Pili (these last two being the children of Manuel Pili). During the pendency of Civil
Case No. 3623 in the court below, original plaintiff Luisa Pili died, and she was
substituted by her heirs, namely, Elisa de los Santos y Pili, Salud de los Santos y Pili,
Teodorico Manalili y Pili, Mateo Manalili y Pili, Tomas Manalili y Pili and Leogarda
Manalili y Pili. At the time when Civil Case No. 3623 was decided by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, therefore, the parties plaintiffs were: (1) PASCUAL PILI (2) LUISA PILI,
represented by her heirs Elisa de los Santos y Pili Salud de los Santos y Pili, Teodorico
Manalili y Pili, Mateo Manalili y Pili, Tomas Manalili y Pili, and Leogarda Manalili y Pili;
(3) DIEGO PILI, represented by his heirs Domingo Pili, Florentina Pili, and Felicidad Pili;
and (4) MANUEL PILI, represented by his heirs Tarcila Pili and Julia Pili. (R.A. Vol. II, pp.
754-756).
The parties named defendants in each of the three cases (Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and
3623) were Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz,
Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, Augusto Huberto
Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz Heirs of Teresa Eriberta
Tuason y de la Paz; Heirs of Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz; Heirs of Demetrio Asuncion
Tuason y de la Paz; Heirs of Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz; and J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. In the complaint in each of these three cases the plaintiffs alleged that
defendants Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz,
Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, Augusto Huberto
Tuason y de la Paz appeared in the Original Certi cate of Title No. 735 of the O ce of
the Register of Deeds of Rizal as having their address in the City of Manila, and that if
those defendants were still living, their whereabouts were unknown, and if these
defendants were dead, the plaintiffs had no knowledge of such facts; and so the
plaintiffs prayed that if those defendants were still living they he served with summons
by means of publication. The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants, Heirs of
Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of
Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of
Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, were being sued in the alternative as additional
defendants, and the fact of their being alive or dead was also unknown to the plaintiffs,
and if those defendants were living they could likewise he served with summons by
means of publication. (R.A. Vol. I, pp. 3 4).
3. See pp. 3-52, Amended Record on Appeal, Vol. I.
4. Amended Record on Appeal, Vol. II, pp. 525 and 526.
5. Amended Record on Appeal, Vol. II, pp. 599-636, 647-697, 698, 715.
6. Amended Record on Appeal, Vol. II, pp. 953-958.

7. The motion for new trial was not resolved by the trial court.
8. Amended Record on Appeal, Vol. II, p. 1038.
9. Appellee's brief, p. 16-17.

10. Lower court's decision, p. 963, Record on Appeal, Vol. II.
11. Juan and Chuongco vs. Ortiz Luis, 49 Phil. 252-256, 259; Phil. Manufacturing Co. vs.
Imperial, 49 Phil. 122-125; Lichauco, et al., vs. Herederos de Corpus, 60 Phil. 211-214.
12. Escueta vs. Director of Lands, 16 Phil. 482 487.

13. Phil. Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial, 49 Phil. 122; Dir. of Lands, et al. vs. Benitez, et al., L-
21368, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 557, 561.

14. Bank of P.I. vs. Acuña, 59 Phil. 183-186.
15. Emphasis supplied.

17. In Exhibit VV-5, presented by the appellees in the court below, the Register of Deeds of Rizal
certi ed that OCT No. 735 was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. 2680 was issued
on August 9, 1915; and that TCT 2680 was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT 3792 was
issued on October 15, 1917.
19. Parcel 1 in OCT No. 735 is the Hacienda Sta. Mesa.

20. Decision of Lower Court, page 969, Vol. II, Record on Appeal.
21. Appellant's Brief, pages 33-34.
22. Philippine Manufacturing Co., vs. Imperial, 49 Phil. 122; Juan and Chuongco vs. Ortiz, 49
Phil. 252; Bank of the P.I. vs. Acuña, 59 Phil. 183; Lichauco vs. Herederos de Corpus, 60
Phil. 211; Director of Lands vs. Benitez, 16 SCRA 557.
23. Philippine Manufacturing Co., vs. Imperial, 49 Phil. 122; Juan and Chongco vs. Ortiz, 49
Phil. 252; Lichauco vs. Herederos de Corpus, 60 Phil. 211.
24. Record on Appeal, Vol. I, pages 10, 35, 59, 445, 480 & 503.
25. Appellee's Brief, pages 16-17; See Footnote 9. ante.
26. Record on Appeal, Vol. I, page 421.

27. Decision of the lower court, page 963, Vol. II, Record on Appeal. See footnote 10, ante.
28. Lower court's decision, pp. 970-971, Record on Appeal, Vol. II.
29. Philippine National Bank vs. Tan Ong Zse, 51 Phil. 317, 321.
30. Exhibit 50 consists of three pages. The rst page is the photostat of the face of OCT No.
735. The second page is the photostat of four small sheets which had been joined
together and photographed as one whole page. Attached, or stapled, to this page is the
photostat of another small sheet more or less similar in size to each of the four sheets
that were joined together and photographed as one whole page. This second page
together with the small sheet attached to it contain the technical descriptions of Parcels
1 and 2 in LRC No, 7681. The third page is the photostat of the page containing the
memorandum of the encumbrances affecting the property described in the certi cate.
The records show that this photostat of OCT No. 735 (Exh. 50) was taken before the
present cases were instituted.
The appellees presented as evidence also a photostat of OCT No. 735 consisting of three
pages (Exhibit WW). The rst page is the face of OCT No. 735 which is similar to the
face of the photostat of the same title presented by appellant as Exh. 50, except that this
face of Exh. "WW" appears-deteriorated and the portion at the lower right hand corner is
mutilated. The second page (which is at the back of the rst page) is the memorandum
of the encumbrances affecting the property described in the title. (This page is similar to
the third page of Exhibit 50). The third page of Exh. WW consists of the photostat of four
small sheets had been joined together and photographed together as one page. These
four small sheets that had been photographed together contain the greater portion of the
technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2, similar to what appear on page 2 of Exh. 50 of
the appellant, except that this page 3 of Exh. "WW" appears deteriorated and mutilated.
Then there is attached, or stapled, to this page 3 a photostat of a small sheet (marked
Exh. WW-2) which contains the technical description of a parcel of land situated in
Muntinglupa, Rizal, along the shore of lake Laguna de Bay.
It appears that the photostat of the small sheet that is attached to the second page of Exh. 50
contains part of the descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2, while the photostat of the small
sheet attached to the third page of Exh. "WW" contains the technical description of a
parcel of land in Muntinglupa, Rizal.
We nd that what is written on the photostat of the small sheet (Exh. WW-2) attached to Exh.
"WW" has no connection to what are written on the third page of Exhibit "WW"; while the
photostat of the small sheet attached to page two of Exh. 50 contains part of the
technical description of Parcel 2 which is continued on the face of Exh. 50. The records
show that Exhibit "WW" was taken in July, 1961 when these cases were already pending
in the lower court (Exhibit WW-3). The original complaints in these three cases were led
on May 19, 1955.
Counsel for the appellees made capital of this sheet (Exh. WW-2) which contains the technical
description of a land in Muntinglupa in his claim that the transcription of Decree of
Registration No. 17431 in the Registration Book was not properly done. Counsel for the
appellant explains that at the time of the trial of these cases the record of OCT No. 735
in the o ce of the Register of Deeds of Rizal was not only badly mutilated but was also
in a very deteriorated condition, and the inclusion of a sheet of paper which contains the
technical description of a parcel of land situated in Muntinglupa, Rizal could have been
due to mishandling of the records in the course of the frequent handling of those
records, not to mention the several transfers of the o ce of the Register of Deeds since
1914 to its location at the time of the trial. It could have happened that his sheet
containing the technical description of a lot in Muntinglupa Exh. WW-2) was mistakenly
attached to the record (or pages) of OCT No. 735 in the Registration Book, while the true
and correct sheet which contains part of the technical description of Parcel 2 was
detached from the record or pages of OCT No. 735 in the Registration Book and
misplaced somewhere.
Counsel for the appellant further points out that the best evidence that Decree of Registration
No. 17431 was correctly transcribed in the Registration Book is the fact that TCT No
2680 (Exh. 31) which was issued in lieu of OCT 735 on August 9, 1915 contains the
technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 of LRC No. 7681 as lifted from OCT 735, and
the technical description in TCT No. 2680 does not make mention of any parcel of land
located in Muntinglupa; and TCT No. 3792 (Exh. 32) which was issued on October 15,
1917 in lieu of TCT No. 2680 also does not contain the description of any parcel of land
located in Muntinglupa, Rizal (Appellant's Reply Brief, pp. 23-25).
We have noted that the lower court did not give importance to this stray sheet (Exh. WW-2)
attached to Exhibit "WW" containing the description of the land in Muntinglupa, because
in its decision it did not say that this sheet is an indication of an irregularity in the
transcription of the technical description in the registration book (pp. 970-971, Record on
Appeal, Vol. II).
This Court believes that Exh. 50 of the appellant is more authentic, and more reliable, than
Exh. "WW" (and WW-2) of the appellees. (See Galves, et al., vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.,
10 SCRA 344).
31. Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil 31, 34.
32. Maloles and Malvar vs. Director of Lands, 25 Phil. 548, 552.
33. Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 593.
34. Government vs. Abural, 39 Phil. 996, 1000.
35. As quoted from the lower courts decision, p. 983, Vol. II, Record on Appeal.
36. Sec. 55, Act 496; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 348, 357; Dizon vs. Lacap, 59 Phil. 193, 196;
Director of Lands vs. Register of Deeds of Rizal, 92 Phil. 826. See pp. 113-117, "Land
Titles and Deeds," by Noblejas, 1965 addition; and Caladiao, et al., vs. Vda. de Blas 10
SCRA 691, 695, 695.
37. De los Reyes vs. De Villa, 48 Phil. 227-228; Soroñgon vs. Makalintal, 80 Phil. 259; Tiburcio,
et al., vs. PHHC, 106 Phil. 477; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Vibat, 8 SCRA 54, 57; Baldoz
vs. Papa, 14 SCRA 691; Ilarde, et al., vs. Lichauco, 42 SCRA 641; Libunan vs. Gil, 45
SCRA 17, 27.
38. The plaintiffs alleged that the individual defendants Tuason y de la Paz, and their heirs,
were either living or dead, or if they were living their whereabouts were unknown, so they
were summoned by publication.
39. Civil Case No. 24803, entitled "Antonio Barretto, et al, vs. Augusto H. Tuason, et al.." The
case was later brought up to the Supreme Court (See 50 Phil. 888).
40. The ease of Bank of the P.I. vs. Acuña was decided on December 21, 1933.
41. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. bought Parcel 1 from the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. on June 15, 1938
(Exh. 12-C).
42. Exhibit 3; See pp. 48-57 t.s.n. of Dec. 15, 1956. See also pp. 227245, Vol. I of Record on
Appeal.
43. Record on Appeal, Vol. I, pp. 290, 293-294. "defendant (sic)" should be "plaintiff".
44. Bolaños vs. J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., 37 SCRA 223, 229.
45. Secs. 45 and 46, Act 496; Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590; De la Cruz vs. Fabie, 35 Phil.
144.
46. Domingo vs. Santos Ongsiako, 55 Phil. 361.
47. Palet vs. Tejedor, 55 Phil. 790, 798. See Tiburcio, et al., vs. PHHC, et al., 106 Phil. 477; J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, 4 SCRA 84, 88.
48. Exhibit 1 (Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-156).

49. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. moved to withdraw the third ground of the motion to dismiss and
was granted by the trial court, but the court denied the second motion to dismiss just the
same. (Pages 559, 698, 715, Vol. II, Record on Appeal).
50. Fifth assignment of error, page 3, Appellant's brief.
51. Record on Appeal, Vol. I, pp. 421-425.
52. Exh. 1 page 8; Amended record on appeal, Vol. I, pages 49-51; Vol. 2, pages 522-524; 595-
596.
53. Peñalosa vs. Tuason, 22 PHIL. 303; Boncairen vs. Diones, 98 Phil. 122, 126.
54. Agregado vs. Muñoz, 36 Phil. 465; Varsity Hills, et al., vs. Navarro, et al., 43 SCRA, 503.

55. 110 Phil. 16; Exhibit 49.
56. As erroneously reported in Vol. 110 of the Phil. Reports, p. 18, the date is "May 12, 1.948";
but in the original of the decision, a certi ed copy of which is Exhibit 49, the date is "May
12, 1848".
57. G.R. No. L-5079, July 31, 1956 (J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Geronimo Santiago, et al.,); 99 Phil.
617. In this case this Court also upheld the validity of OCT No. 735.
58. G.R. No. L-14223. November 23, 1960. See footnote 56, ante.
59. In G.R. No. L-5079 (J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Geronimo Santiago), 99 Phil. 617, Geronimo
Santiago and his co-defendants who were co-owners with Albina Santiago and her co-
plaintiffs, also based their claim of ownership on the document (Annex A to the
complaint of Albina Santiago, et al.).
60. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaños, 95 Phil. 106; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Geronimo
Santiago, 99 Phil. 615 J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. De Guzman, et al., 99 Phil. 281;
Tiburcio, et al., vs. PHHC, et al., 106 Phil. 477; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Register of
Deeds, 2 SCRA 1018; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, 4 SCRA 84; J M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. vs. Aguirre, 7 SCRA 109; Galvez, et al. vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. 10 SCRA 344;
PHHC, et al. vs. Mencias, et al., 20 SCRA 1031; Varsity Hills vs. Navarro, 43 SCRA 503.
61. Eight Assignment of error of appellant.
62. Ninth Assignment of error of appellant.
63. The appellees are prosecuting their cases as paupers.

Plaintiffs-Appellees vs. vs. Defendants Defendant-Appellant: en Banc

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-26127. June 28, 1974.]

VICTOR BENIN, ET AL. , plaintiffs-appellees, v s . MARIANO SEVERO

[G.R. No. L-26128. June 28, 1974.]

DIEGO PILI, ET AL. , plaintiffs-appellees, vs. MARIANO SEVERO

Jose Palarca Law Offices for plaintiffs-appellees.

"K — Ordering the defendants to pay the costs;

As described in Decree of Registration No. 17431 (Exh. 25), the boundaries of

The pertinent provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 reads, as follows:

The pertinent provisions of Section 40 of Act 496 reads, as follows:

Besides, the possession by the appellees, either by themselves or through their

We also nd that there is identity of cause of action. It is apparent, upon reading

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com

6. Amended Record on Appeal, Vol. II, pp. 953-958.

9. Appellee's brief, p. 16-17.

12. Escueta vs. Director of Lands, 16 Phil. 482 487.

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15. Emphasis supplied.

19. Parcel 1 in OCT No. 735 is the Hacienda Sta. Mesa.

26. Record on Appeal, Vol. I, page 421.

48. Exhibit 1 (Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-156).

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63. The appellees are prosecuting their cases as paupers.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com

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