Alquizola Vs Ocol

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 132413 August 27, 1999
RAMON ALQUIZOLA, SR., MARISSA C. DOROMAL and ADELO SECO, petitioners,

vs.
GALLARDO OCOL, CAMILO P. PENACO, SATURNINO MENDOZA, RAFAEL R. ARDIENTE,
VICENTE C. CASERES, RICARDO B. ZOSA III and SIRAD M. UMPA, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a
reversal of the decision, dated 19 November 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Lanao Del Norte,
Branch 04, Iligan City, that has ordered petitioner Ramon Alquizola, Sr., to cease and desist from
dismissing respondents and replacing them with his co-petitioners.
Petitioner Ramon Alquizola, Sr., won the post of Punong Barangay of Barangay Tubod, Iligan City,
in the 12th May 1997 barangay elections. Respondents Gallardo Cool, Camilo Penaco, Saturnino
Mendoza, Rafael Ardiente, Vicente Caseres, Ricardo Zosa. III, and Sirad Umpa were appointees of
the former punong barangay of Barangay Tubod, the first two occupying the positions of barangay
treasurer and barangay secretary, respectively, with the rest being barangay utility workers.
After the elections, petitioner Alquizola terminated the services of respondents and appointed his co-
petitioners, Marissa Doromal and Adelo Seco, respectively, as barangay treasurer and as barangay
secretary. In consonance with Section 394 and Section 395 of the Local Government Code, he
submitted both appointments to the Sangguniang Barangay for approval. The Sanggunian rejected
the appointments.
Following the action taken by the Sangguniang Barangay, respondents filed a complaint for quo
warranto, mandamus and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao Del Norte to enjoin
petitioner from terminating the services of the former. The trial court found in favor of respondents
and ordered petitioner Ramon Alquizola, Sr., to cease and desist from dismissing respondents on
the ground that their dismissal had been effected without the corresponding approval of the
Sangguniang Barangay. It held that Section 389(b) (5) limited the power of a barangay captain to
remove appointive barangay officials by requiring an approval of such act by a majority of the
Sangguniang Barangay. A motion for reconsideration was denied.
The Court finds no merit in the instant petition for certiorari.
The issue involved, purely a question of law, relates to the proper application of the following
provisions of the Local Government Code; viz:
Sec. 389. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, and Function. — . . .
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance, the purpose of which is the general
welfare of the barangay and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the punong
barangay shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Upon approval by a majority of all the members of the sangguniang barangay,
appoint or replace the barangay treasurer, the barangay secretary, and other
appointive barangay officials;
The term "replace" would obviously embrace not only the appointment of the replacement but also
the prior removal of, or the vacation by, the official currently occupying the appointive position
concerned. "To replace" is to take the place of, to serve as a substitute for or successor of, to put in
place of, or to fill the post of an incumbent.1 In order to provide a replacement to an office, the prior
holder must have first been removed or the office must have, otherwise, been previously rendered
vacant.
Aside from what may be implicit in Section 389, there is no other provision in the Local Government
Code that treats of the power of the Punong Barangay to remove the barangay secretary, the
barangay treasurer, or any other appointive barangay official from office. The duration of the term of
office of these barangay officials have not been fixed by the Local Government Code. Where the
tenure of the office is not fixed by law, it is a sound and useful rule to consider the power of removal
as being an incident to the power of appointment.2 Elsewise stated, the power to remove is deemed
implied in the power to appoint.
The Code explicitly vests on the punong barangay, upon approval by a majority of all the members
of the sangguniang barangay, the power to appoint or replace the barangay treasurer, the barangay
secretary, and other appointive barangay officials. This provision is reinforced, in the case of the
secretary and the treasurer, by the provisions of Section 394 and Section 395 of the Local
Government Code; to wit:
Sec. 394. Barangay Secretary: Appointment, Qualifications, Powers and Duties. — (a) The
barangay secretary shall be appointed by the punong barangay with the concurrence of the
majority of all the sangguniang barangay members. The appointment of the barangay
secretary shall not be subject to attestation by the Civil Service Commission.
Sec. 395. Barangay Treasurer: Appointment, Qualifications, Powers and Duties. — (a) The
barangay treasurer shall be appointed by the punong barangay with the concurrence of the
majority of all the sangguniang barangay members. The appointment of the barangay
treasurer shall not be subject to attestation by the Civil Service Commission.
Verily, the power of appointment is to be exercised conjointly by the punong barangay and a majority
of all the members of the sangguniang barangay. Without such conjoint action, neither an
appointment nor a replacement can be effectual.
Applying the rule that the power to appoint includes the power to remove, one that the Court finds no
cogent reason to now depart from, the questioned dismissal from office of the barangay officials by
the punong barangay without the concurrence of the majority of all the members of the Sangguniang
Barangay cannot be legally justified. To rule otherwise could also create an absurd situation of the
Sangguniang Barangay members refusing, like here, to give their approval to the replacements
selected by the punong barangay who has unilaterally terminated the services of the incumbents. It
is likely that the legislature did not intend this absurdity to flow from its enactment of the law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the decision, dated 19 November 1997, of the
Regional Trial Court of Lanao Del Norte is AFFIRMED. No costs. 1âwphi 1.nêt

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 132413 August 27, 1999

RAMON ALQUIZOLA, SR., MARISSA C. DOROMAL and ADELO SECO, petitioners,

The Court finds no merit in the instant petition for certiorari.

Sec. 389. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, and Function. — . . .

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