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FIRST DIVISION

MA. CARMINIA C. CALDERON G.R. No. 185595

represented by her Attorney-In-
Fact, Marycris V. Baldevia,
Petitioner, Present:

SERENO C.J,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
-versus- BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
REYES,JJ.

JOSE ANTONIO F. ROXAS and Promulgated:

COURT OF APPEALS, JAN 0 9 2013 .
Respondents.
X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing

the Decision 1 dated September 9, 2008 and Resolution2 dated December 15,
2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 85384. The CA
affirmed the Orders dated March 7, 2005 and May 4, 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Parafiaque City, Branch 260 in Civil Case No. 97-
0608.

Petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and private respondent Jose

Antonio F. Roxas, were married on December 4, 1985 and their union
produced four children. On January 16, 1998, petitioner filed an Amended

Rollo. pp. 40-47. Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison and concurred in by Associate
Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Isaias P. Dicdican.
!d. at 49-50. Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison and concurred in by Associate
Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Isaias P. Dicdican.
.1'
Decision 2 G.R. No. 185595

Complaint3 for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of

psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.

On May 19, 1998, the trial court issued an Order4 granting petitioner’s
application for support pendente lite. Said order states in part:

…Accordingly, the defendant is hereby ordered to contribute to the

support of the above-named minors, (aside from 50% of their school
tuition fees which the defendant has agreed to defray, plus expenses for
books and other school supplies), the sum of P42,292.50 per month,
effective May 1, 1998, as his share in the monthly support of the children,
until further orders from this Court. The first monthly contribution, i.e.,
for the month of May 1998, shall be given by the defendant to the plaintiff
within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of this Order. The succeeding
monthly contributions of P42,292.50 shall be directly given by the
defendant to the plaintiff without need of any demand, within the first five
(5) days of each month beginning June 1998. All expenses for books and
other school supplies shall be shouldered by the plaintiff and the
defendant, share and share alike. Finally, it is understood that any claim
for support-in-arrears prior to May 1, 1998, may be taken up later in the
course of the proceedings proper.

x x x x

SO ORDERED.5

The aforesaid order and subsequent orders for support pendente lite
were the subject of G.R. No. 139337 entitled “Ma. Carminia C. Roxas v.
Court of Appeals and Jose Antonio F. Roxas” decided by this Court on
August 15, 2001.6 The Decision in said case declared that “the proceedings
and orders issued by the trial court in the application for support pendente
lite (and the main complaint for annulment of marriage) in the re-filed case,
that is, in Civil Case No. 97-0608 were not rendered null and void by the
omission of a statement in the certificate of non-forum shopping regarding
the prior filing and dismissal without prejudice of Civil Case No. 97-0523
which involves the same parties.” The assailed orders for support pendente
lite were thus reinstated and the trial court resumed hearing the main case.

3
Records, pp. 30-38.
4
Rollo, pp. 85-87. Penned by Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort.
5
Id. at 87.
6
Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139337, August 15, 2001, 363 SCRA 207, 211.
Decision 3 G.R. No. 185595

On motion of petitioner’s counsel, the trial court issued an Order

dated October 11, 2002 directing private respondent to give support in the
amount of P42,292.50 per month starting April 1, 1999 pursuant to the May
19, 1998 Order.7

On February 11, 2003, private respondent filed a Motion to Reduce

Support citing, among other grounds, that the P42,292.50 monthly support
for the children as fixed by the court was even higher than his then
P20,800.00 monthly salary as city councilor.8

After hearing, the trial court issued an Order9 dated March 7, 2005
granting the motion to reduce support and denying petitioner’s motion for
spousal support, increase of the children’s monthly support pendente lite and
support-in-arrears. The trial court considered the following circumstances
well-supported by documentary and testimonial evidence: (1) the spouses’
eldest child, Jose Antonio, Jr. is a Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman and is
already earning a monthly salary; (2) all the children stay with private
respondent on weekends in their house in Pasay City; (3) private respondent
has no source of income except his salary and benefits as City Councilor; (4)
the voluminous documents consisting of official receipts in payment of
various billings including school tuition fees, private tutorials and purchases
of children’s school supplies, personal checks issued by private respondent,
as well as his own testimony in court, all of which substantiated his claim
that he is fulfilling his obligation of supporting his minor children during the
pendency of the action; (5) there is no proof presented by petitioner that she
is not gainfully employed, the spouses being both medical doctors; (6) the
unrebutted allegation of private respondent that petitioner is already in the
United States; and (7) the alleged arrearages of private respondent was not
substantiated by petitioner with any evidence while private respondent had
duly complied with his obligation as ordered by the court through his

7
Records, p. 10058.
8
Id. at 10075-10084.
9
Id. at 1582-1586.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 185595

overpayments in other aspects such as the children’s school tuition fees, real
estate taxes and other necessities.

Petitioner’s motion for partial reconsideration of the March 7, 2005

Order was denied on May 4, 2005.10

On May 16, 2005, the trial court rendered its Decision11 in Civil Case
No. 97-0608 decreeing thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring (sic):

1. Declaring null and void the marriage between plaintiff [Ma.]

Carmina C. Roxas and defendant Jose Antonio Roxas solemnized on
December 4, 1985 at San Agustin Convent, in Manila. The Local Civil
Registrar of Manila is hereby ordered to cancel the marriage contract of
the parties as appearing in the Registry of Marriage as the same is void;

2. Awarding the custody of the parties’ minor children Maria

Antoinette Roxas, Julian Roxas and Richard Roxas to their mother herein
petitioner, with the respondent hereby given his visitorial and or custodial
rights at [sic] the express conformity of petitioner.

3. Ordering the respondent Jose Antonio Roxas to provide support

to the children in the amount of P30,000.00 a month, which support shall
be given directly to petitioner whenever the children are in her custody,
otherwise, if the children are in the provisional custody of respondent, said
amount of support shall be recorded properly as the amounts are being
spent. For that purpose the respondent shall then render a periodic report
to petitioner and to the Court to show compliance and for monitoring. In
addition, the respondent is ordered to support the proper schooling of the
children providing for the payment of the tuition fees and other school fees
and charges including transportation expenses and allowances needed by
the children for their studies.

4. Dissolving the community property or conjugal partnership

property of the parties as the case may be, in accordance with law.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor

General, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Paranaque City, and the City
Civil Registrar of Paranaque City and Manila.

SO ORDERED.12

On June 14, 2005, petitioner through counsel filed a Notice of Appeal

from the Orders dated March 7, 2005 and May 4, 2005.

10
Id. at 1593-1639. See RTC Order dated June 23, 2005 noting the typographical error in the Order dated
“May 4, 2004”, and correcting the year as 2005. Id. at 1664.
11
Rollo, pp. 89-100. Penned by Judge Fortunito L. Madrona.
12
Id. at 99-100.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 185595

In her appeal brief, petitioner emphasized that she is not appealing the
Decision dated May 16, 2005 which had become final as no appeal
therefrom had been brought by the parties or the City Prosecutor or the
Solicitor General. Petitioner pointed out that her appeal is “from the RTC
Order dated March 7, 2005, issued prior to the rendition of the decision in
the main case”, as well as the May 4, 2005 Order denying her motion for
partial reconsideration.13

By Decision dated September 9, 2008, the CA dismissed the appeal

on the ground that granting the appeal would disturb the RTC Decision of
May 16, 2005 which had long become final and executory. The CA further
noted that petitioner failed to avail of the proper remedy to question an
interlocutory order.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the

CA.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

A. DID THE CA COMMIT A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

and/or REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE RTC
ORDERS DATED MARCH 7, 2005 AND MAY 4, 2005 ARE MERELY
INTERLOCUTORY?

B. DID THE CA COMMIT A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

and/or REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED OUTRIGHT THE
APPEAL FROM SAID RTC ORDERS, WHEN IT SHOULD HAVE
DECIDED THE APPEAL ON THE MERITS?14

The core issue presented is whether the March 7, 2005 and May 4,
2005 Orders on the matter of support pendente lite are interlocutory or final.

This Court has laid down the distinction between interlocutory and
final orders, as follows:

x x x A “final” judgment or order is one that finally disposes of

a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect

13
CA rollo, pp. 126-127.
14
Rollo, p. 572.
Decision 6 G.R. No. 185595

thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the

evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment
or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res
judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as
far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of
the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court
except to await the parties’ next move (which among others, may consist
of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of
an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the
judgment once it becomes “final” or, to use the established and more
distinctive term, “final and executory.”

xxxx

Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case,

and does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’
contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards
each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be
done by the Court, is “interlocutory” e.g., an order denying a motion to
dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of
time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or
denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of
documents or things, etc. Unlike a “final” judgment or order, which is
appealable, as above pointed out, an “interlocutory” order may not be
questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may
eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.15
[Emphasis supplied]

The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendente lite

and support in arrears, as the term suggests, were issued pending the
rendition of the decision on the main action for declaration of nullity of
marriage, and are therefore interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of the
case nor did they consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioner’s
claims as to the ground of psychological incapacity and other incidents as
child custody, support and conjugal assets.

The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of support

pendente lite which may be availed of at the commencement of the proper
action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment or final order.16
On March 4, 2003, this Court promulgated the Rule on Provisional Orders17
which shall govern the issuance of provisional orders during the pendency of
cases for the declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment of voidable
15
Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-60036, January 27, 1987, 147 SCRA 334, 339-341.
16
Rule 61, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
17
A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003.
Decision 7 G.R. No. 185595

marriage and legal separation. These include orders for spousal support,
child support, child custody, visitation rights, hold departure, protection and
administration of common property.

Petitioner contends that the CA failed to recognize that the

interlocutory aspect of the assailed orders pertains only to private
respondent’s motion to reduce support which was granted, and to her own
motion to increase support, which was denied. Petitioner points out that the
ruling on support in arrears which have remained unpaid, as well as her
prayer for reimbursement/payment under the May 19, 1998 Order and
related orders were in the nature of final orders assailable by ordinary appeal
considering that the orders referred to under Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 61 of
the Rules of Court can apply only prospectively. Thus, from the moment the
accrued amounts became due and demandable, the orders under which the
amounts were made payable by private respondent have ceased to be
provisional and have become final.

We disagree.

The word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the

commencement and the end of the suit which decides some point or matter
but is not a final decision of the whole controversy.18 An interlocutory order
merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to
resolve the merits of the case. In contrast, a judgment or order is considered
final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or
terminates a particular stage of the same action.19 Clearly, whether an order
or resolution is final or interlocutory is not dependent on compliance or non-
compliance by a party to its directive, as what petitioner suggests. It is also
important to emphasize the temporary or provisional nature of the assailed
orders.

18
United Overseas Bank (formerly Westmont Bank) v. Ros, G.R. No. 171532, August 7, 2007, 529
SCRA 334, 343-344, citing Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 140576-99, December 13,
2004, 446 SCRA 166, 177.
19
Republic v. Sandiganbayan,(Fourth Division), G.R. No. 152375, December 13, 2011, 662 SCRA 152,
177.
Decision 8 G.R. No. 185595

Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during the

pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and
protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for
purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are
provisional because they constitute temporary measures availed of during
the pendency of the action, and they are ancillary because they are mere
incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action.20 The
subject orders on the matter of support pendente lite are but an incident to
the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage.

Moreover, private respondent’s obligation to give monthly support in

the amount fixed by the RTC in the assailed orders may be enforced by the
court itself, as what transpired in the early stage of the proceedings when the
court cited the private respondent in contempt of court and ordered him
arrested for his refusal/failure to comply with the order granting support
pendente lite.21 A few years later, private respondent filed a motion to
reduce support while petitioner filed her own motion to increase the same,
and in addition sought spousal support and support in arrears. This fact
underscores the provisional character of the order granting support pendente
lite. Petitioner’s theory that the assailed orders have ceased to be provisional
due to the arrearages incurred by private respondent is therefore untenable.

Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil

Procedure, as amended, appeal from interlocutory orders is not allowed.
Said provision reads:

SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a

judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:

(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;

(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion

seeking relief from judgment;

20
Florenz D. Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, Vol. I, 2005 Ed. p. 671.
21
Records, pp. 439-440.
Decision 9 G.R. No. 185595

.(£1 An interlocutory order;

(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;

(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by

consent, confession ot compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or
duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;

(f) An order of execution;

(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of

several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and
third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court
allows an appeal therefrom; and

(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice;

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is

not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special
civil action under Rule 65. (Emphasis supplied.)

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is

an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 provided that the
interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong remedy in questioning
the subject interlocutory orders ofthe RTC, petitioner's appeal was correctly
dismissed by the CA.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED, for

lack of merit. The Decision dated September 9, 2008 and Resolution dated
December 15, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 85384 are
AFFIRMED.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Decision 10 G.R. No. 185595

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

~~~~
TERESITA.J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certifY that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice