LECTURE PRESENTATION

FOR LAW STUDENTS

ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

BASED ON

PHIL. POLITICAL LAW

2002 EDITION

BY
ISAGANI A. CRUZ
RETIRED ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES
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A. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION:

SEC. 1, ART. VI – “THE LEGISLATIVE POWER SHALL BE VESTED

IN THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES WHICH SHALL
CONSISTS OF A SENATE AND A HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT RESERVED TO THE PEOPLE BY THE
PROVISION ON INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM.”
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B. THE SENATE

1. COMPOSITION:

SEC. 2, ART. VI – “THE SENATE SHALL BE COMPOSED OF TWENTY

FOUR SENATORS WHO SHALL BE ELECTED AT LARGE BY THE
QUALIFIED VOTERS OF THE PHIL, AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY
LAW.”
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2. QUALIFICATIONS:

SEC. 3, ART. VI – NO PERSONS SHALL BE A SENATOR UNLESS HE IS A 1)

NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHIL, 2) ON THE DAY OF THE ELECTION,
MUST BE AT LEAST 35 YEARS OF AGE, 3) MUST BE ABLE TO READ AND
WRITE, 4) A REGISTERED VOTER, AND 5) A RESIDENT OF THE PHIL FOR
NOT LESS THAN 2 YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE DAY OF THE
ELECTION.
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2. QUALIFICATIONS:

2.1 NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN – ARE THOSE WHO ARE

CITIZENS OF THE PHIL FROM BIRTH WITHOUT HAVING TO
PERFORM ANY ACT TO ACQUIRE OR PERFECT THEIR PHIL
CITIZENSHIP. THOSE WHO ELECT PHIL CITIZENSHIP IN
ACCORDANCE WITH PAR. (3), SEC. 1 HEREOF SHALL BE
DEEMED NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN. (SEC. 2, ART. IV,
CONSTITUTION)
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2. QUALIFICATIONS:
2.2 AGE QUALIFICATION – THE AGE IS FIXED AT 35 AND MUST BE
POSSESSED ON THE DAY OF ELECTION, THAT IS, WHEN THE POLLS ARE
OPENED AND THE VOTES ARE CAST, AND NOT ON THE DAY OF THE
PROCLAMATION OF THE WINNERS BY THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS. THIS
NULLIFIES THE RULING IN THE CASE OF ESPINOSA V. AQUINO
(ELECTORAL CASE NO. 9, SET), WHICH UPHELD THE LATE SEN. BENIGNO
AQUINO JR WHO WAS LESS THAN THE REQUIRED AGE ON THE DAY OF
ELECTION BUT CELEBRATED HIS 35TH BIRTHDAY BEFORE HIS
PROCLAMATION AS ONE OF THE SENATORIAL WINNERS.
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2. QUALIFICATIONS:
2.3 RESIDENCE – IS DEFINED AS THE PLACE WHERE ONE HABITUALLY
RESIDES AND TO WHICH, WHEN HE IS ABSENT, HE HAS THE INTENTION
OF RETURNING (LIM V. PELAEZ, ELECTORAL CASE NO. 36, HET &
BRILLIANTE V. REYES, HET CASE NO. 31, 1988). A PERSON CANNOT HAVE
TWO RESIDENCES AT THE SAME TIME; ACQUISITION OF NEW RESIDENCE
RESULTS IN FORFEITURE OF THE OLD. HOWEVER, AN INTENTION TO
ABANDON HIS OLD RESIDENCE CANNOT LEGALLY BE INFERRED FROM HIS
ACT IN ESTABLISHING A HOME ELSEWHERE OR OTHERWISE
CONDUCTING HIS ACTIVITIES THEREIN, IN THE ABSENCE OF A CLEAR
SHOWING THAT HE HAS DECIDED TO ADOPT A NEW RESIDENCE.
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2. QUALIFICATIONS:
2.3 RESIDENCE:
THUS, A LEGISLATOR WHO BUILT A HOUSE AND ESTABLISHED A LAW
PRACTICE IN MANILA BUT OCCASIONALLY VISITED HIS RELATIVES AND
HIS PROPERTIES IN HIS HOME PROVINCE WAS DEEMED NOT TO HAVE
FORFEITED HIS LEGAL RESIDENCE IN THE LATTER PLACE (Ibid).

RESIDENCE IS IN ANY PART OF THE PHIL, UNLIKE IN THE CASE OF

MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REP WHO MUST RESIDE IN THE DISTRICT
WHERE HE IS RUNNING.
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2. QUALIFICATIONS:
2.4 CONTINUITY OF QUALIFICATIONS - THE QUALIFICATIONS PRESCRIBED
ARE CONTINUING REQUIREMENTS, THAT IS, THEY MUST BE POSSESSED
FOR THE ENTIRE DURATION OF THE MEMBER’S INCUMBENCY.

2.5 EXCLUSIVITY OF QUALIFACTIONS - THEY ARE ALSO EXCLUSIVE

UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS;
HENCE, CONGRESS IS NOT COMPETENT TO ENACT LAW FOR ADDITIONAL
QUALIFICATIONS, LIKE, MUST BE A COLLEGE GRADUATE.
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3. TERM OF OFFICE:

“THE TERM OF THE SENATORS SHALL BE 6 YEARS AND SHALL

COMMENCE , UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW, AT NOON ON THE
30TH DAY OF JUNE NEXT FOLLOWING THEIR ELECTION.

NO SENATOR SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN 2 CONSECUTIVE TERMS.

VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME
SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY
OF HIS SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED” (SEC.
4, ART. VI, CONSTITUTION).
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C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

1. COMPOSITION
SEC. 5 (1), ART. VI – “THE HOUSE OF REP SHALL BE COMPOSED OF NOT
MORE THAN 250 MEMBERS, UNLESS OTHERWISE FIXED BY LAW, WHO
SHALL BE ELECTED FROM (a) LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS APPORTIONED
AMONG THE PROVINCES, CITIES, AND THE METRO MANILA AREA IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE NUMBER OF THEIR RESPECTIVE INHABITANTS,
AND ON THE BASIS OF A UNIFORM AND PROGRESSIVE RATIO, AND
THOSE WHO, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, SHALL BE ELECTED THROUGH A (b)
PARTY-LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL,AND
SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS.”
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C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

1. COMPOSITION
SEC. 5(2), ART. VI – “THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL
CONSTITUTE 20% OF THE TOTAL MEMBERSHIP OF THE HOUSE OF REP.
FOR 3 CONSECUTIVE TERMS AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, ½ OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY-LIST SHALL BE
FILLED, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION FROM THE
LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL
COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE
PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR.”
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C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

1. COMPOSITION
SEC. 5(2), ART. VI – THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES:
1. ENABLING LAW – RA 7941 (THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT;
2. LANDMARK CASES:
2.a) ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY V.
ANG BAONG BAYANI-OFW GO! Go! Phils., et. Al. (GR
No. 147589, June 26, 2001); and
2.b) ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. V. COMELEC (GR NO.
203766, April 2, 2013)
NOTE: FOR REPORT
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C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

1. COMPOSITION

SEC. 5(3), ART. VI – “EACH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT SHALL COMPRISE, AS

FAR AS PRACTICABLE, CONTIGOUS, COMPACT AND ADJACENT
TERRITORY. EACH CITY WITH A POPULATION OF AT LEAST 250,000 OR
EACH PROVINCE, SHALL HAVE AT LEAST ONE REPRESENTATIVE.”
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C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

1. COMPOSITION

SEC. 5(4), ART. VI – “WITHIN 3 YEARS FOLLOWING THE RETURN OF EVERY

CENSUS, THE CONGRESS SHALL MAKE A REAPPORTIONMENT OF
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS BASED ON THE STANDARDS PROVIDED IN THIS
SECTION.”
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C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

1.1) THE DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVES:

GERRYMANDERING – IS THE ARRANGEMENT OF DISTRICTS IN SUCH A

WAY AS TO FAVOR THE ELECTION OF PREFERRED CANDIDATE (USUALLY
RE-ELECTIONISTS) THROUGH THE INCLUSION THEREIN ONLY OF THOSE
AREAS WHERE THEY EXPECT TO WIN, REGARDLESS OF THE RESULTANT
SHAPE OF SUCH DISTRICTS. (*****)
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C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

1.1) THE DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVES:

GERRYMANDERING (CON’T):

THIS PRACTICE WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN INITIATED BY ELDRIDGE

GERRY, FORMER GOVERNOR OF MASSACHUSETTES AND 5TH VP OF USA.

COMPACT MEANS SOLID, CONTIGOUS, IN PHYSICAL CONTACT; AND

ADJACENT, CLOSE BY OR NEAR.
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C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

1.1) THE DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVES:
MACIAS V. COMELEC (3 SCRA 1)–IS THE AUTHORITY FOR THE VIEW THAT
THE VALIDITY OF A LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT MEASURE IS A
JUSTICIABLE QUESTION, INVOLVING AS IT DOES CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS
THE INTERPRETATION OF WHICH DOES NOT CALL FOR THE EXERCISE OF
LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION. THE SC IN FACT ANNULLED THE CHALLENGED
LAW IN THAT CASE WHEN IT WAS SHOWN THAT THE APPORTIONMENT
WAS NOT BASED ON THE NUMBER OF INHABITANTS IN THE VARIOUS
REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICTS. THE SC NOTED THAT SOME BIG PROVINCES
WERE GIVEN LESS REP THAN CERTAIN RELATIVELY SMALLER ONES, E.G.,
CEBU GOT 7 WHILE RIZAL WITH A BIGGER POPULATIONS THEN GOT ONLY
4.
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C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

2. QUALIFICATIONS (*****)

SEC. 6, ART. VI – NO PERSON SHALL BE A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REP

UNLESS HE 1) IS A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHIL, 2) ON THE DAY
OF ELECTION, IS AT LEAST 25 YEARS OLD, 3) IS ABLE TO READ AND WRITE,
AND 4) EXCEPT THE PARTY-LIST REP, MUST BE A REGISTERED VOTER IN
THE DISTRICT IN WHICH HE SHALL BE ELECTED, AND 5) A RESIDENT
THEREOF FOR A PERIOD OF NOT LESS THAN ONE YEAR IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE DAY OF THE ELECTION.
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C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

3. TERM *****
SEC. 7, ART. VI – “THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REP SHALL BE
ELECTED FOR A TERM OF 3 YEARS WHICH SHALL BEGIN, UNLESS
OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW, AT NOON ON THE 30TH DAY OF JUNE
FOLLOWING THEIR ELECTION.

NO MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REP SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN 3

CONSECUTIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR
ANY LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION
IN THE CONTINUITY OF HIS SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE
WAS ELECTED.”
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C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

3. TERM

3.1) BORJA V. COMELEC (GR NO. 133495, SEPT. 3, 1998) :

FACTS: JUAN WAS ELECTED IN A SPECIAL ELECTION TO FILL UP THE

VACANCY CREATED BY THE DEATH OF PEDRO IN CONGRESS. HE RAN
AGAIN, AND WON TWICE THEREAFTER.

ISSUE: CAN JUAN STILL RUN FOR THE SAME POSITION AFTER THE
EXPIRATION OF THE THIRD TERM?
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C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

3. TERM
3.1) BORJA V. COMELEC (GR NO. 133495, SEPT. 3, 1998) :
HELD: NO. AS HELD IN THE BORJA CASE, THE CONSTITUTION BARS
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REP FROM SERVING FOR MORE THAN 3
CONSECUTIVE TERMS. IT WAS SAID THAT IF ONE IS ELECTED
REPRESENTATIVE TO SERVE THE UNEXPIRED TERM OF A DECEASED
MEMBER, NO MATTER HOW SHORT, IT WILL BE CONSIDERED ONE TERM
FOR THE PURPOSE OF COMPUTING THE NUMBER OF SUCCESSIVE TERMS
ALLOWED. (Political Law Reviewer, p. 470, 2008 ed., Albano, Albano, Jr.,
Albano-Pua, & Albano III)
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C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

3. TERM

3.2 BORJA V. COMELEC (GR NO. 133495, SEPT. 3, 1998)

QUESTION:

WHERE LIES THE DIFFERENCE IF A VICE-MAYOR SUCCEEDS THE MAYOR IF

THE LATTER DIES AND IF A PERSON IS ELECTED TO THE UNEXPIRED
PORTION OF THE TERM OF A MEMBER OF CONGRESS?
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C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

3. TERM
3.2 ANSWER:
THE DIFFERENCE IS THAT THE VICE-MAYOR SUCCEEDS TO THE
MAYORSHIP BY OPERATION OF LAW, WHILE A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE IS
ELECTED TO FILL THE VACANCY. IN THAT REAL SENSE THEREFORE, SUCH
REPRESENTATIVE SERVES A TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED. AS THE
PURPOSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION IS TO LIMIT THE RIGHT
TO BE ELECTED AND SERVE IN CONGRESS, HIS SERVICE OF THE
UNEXPIRED TERM IS RIGHTLY COUNTED AS HIS FIRST TERM. (Political
Law Reviewer, p. 471, 2008 ed., Albano, Albano, Jr., Albano-Pua, &
Albano III)
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C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

4. ELECTION

SEC. 9, ART. VI – “IN CASE OF VACANCY IN THE SENATE OR IN THE HOUSE

OF REP, A SPECIAL ELECTION MAY BE CALLED TO FILL SUCH VACANCY IN
THE MANNER PRESCRIBED BY LAW, BUT THE SENATOR OR MEMBER OF
THE HOUSE OF REP THUS ELECTED SHALL SERVE ONLY FOR THE
UNEXPIRED TERM.”
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C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

5. SALARIES

SEC. 10, ART. VI – “THE SALARIES OF SENATORS AND MEMBERS OF THE

HOUSE OF REP SHALL BE DETERMINED BY LAW. NO INCREASE IN SAID
COMPENSATION SHALL TAKE EFFECT UNTIL AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF
THE FULL TERM OF ALL MEMBERS OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF
REP APPROVING SUCH INCREASE.”
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C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

5. SALARIES

SEC. 20, ART. VI – “THE RECORDS AND BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS OF THE

CONGRESS SHALL BE PRESERVED AND BE OPEN TO THE PUBLIC IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW, AND SUCH BOOKS SHALL BE AUDITED BY THE
COA* WHICH SHALL PUBLISH ANNUALLY AN ITEMIZED LIST OF AMOUNTS
PAID TO AND EXPENSES INCURRED FOR EACH MEMBER.”

*NOTE BENE: NOT THROUGH CERTIFICATIONS ISSUED BY

LEADERS OF BOTH HOUSES.
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D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: (*****)

SEC. 11, ART. VI – “A SENATOR OR MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REP

SHALL, IN ALL OFFENSES PUNISHABLE BY NOT MORE THAN 6 YEARS
IMPRISONMENT, BE PRIVILEGED FROM ARREST WHILE THE CONGRESS IS
IN SESSION. NO MEMBER SHALL BE QUESTIONED NOR BE HELD LIABLE
IN ANY OTHER PLACE FOR ANY SPEECH OR DEBATE IN THE CONGRESS OR
IN ANY COMMITTEE THEREOF.”
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D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:

1. PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST (*****)

THE 1935 CONSTITUTION ON PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY FROM ARREST

EXCEPTED ALL CRIMINAL OFFENSES REGARDLESS OD DEGREE, WITH THE
RESULT THAT THE LEGISLATOR COULD CLAIM SAME ONLY AGAINST CIVIL
ARRESTS. FOR ANY CRIMINAL OFFENSE, HE WAS SUBJECTED TO ARREST
AT ANY TIME, EVEN DURING THE SESSIONS.
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D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:
1. PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST (CON’T):
UNDER THE 1973 AND 1987 CONSTITUTION, THE SCOPE OF THIS
IMMUNITY HAS BEEN EXPANDED TO COVER NOT ONLY CIVIL ARRESTS
BUT ALSO ARRESTS FOR CRIMINAL OFFENSES PUNISHABLE BY NOT
MORE THAN SIX YEARS IMPRISONMENT. ACCORDINGLY, THE IMMUNITY
MAY NOT BE INVOKED IF THE CRIME IS MURDER BUT IS AVAILABLE IN
CASE OF, SAY, SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES.
THE IMMUNITY NOW APPLIES ONLY WHILE THE CONGRESS IS IN
SESSION. “SESSION” DOES NOT REFER TO THE DAY-TO-DAY MEETINGS
OF THE LEGISLATURE BUT TO THE ENTIRE PERIOD FROM ITS INITIAL
CONVENING UNTIL ITS FINAL ADJOURNMENT.
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D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:

2. PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH AND DEBATE

THERE ARE TWO REQUIREMENTS THAT MUST CONCUR IN ORDER THAT
THE PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH AND DEBATE CAN BE AVAILED OF BY THE
MEMBER OF THE CONGRESS:
1) THAT THE REMARKS MUST BE MADE WHILE LEGISLATURE
OR THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE IS FUNCTIONING, THAT IS IN
SESSION; AND

2) IS THAT THEY MUST BE MADE IN CONNECTION WITH THE

DISCHARGE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES.
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D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:

2. PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH AND DEBATE (*****)

2.1 COFFIN V. COFFIN (A MASS. 1) – THESE CONDITIONS WERE FIRST

LAID DOWN IN THIS LEADING CASE WHERE THE PRIVILEGE WAS DENIED
A LEGISLATOR WHO UTTERED SLANDEROUS REMARKS IN THE COURSE
OF A PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH A CONSTITUENT DURING A LULL IN
THE SESSION.
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D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:
2. PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH AND DEBATE (CON’T):

2.2 JIMENEZ V. CABANGBANG (17 SCRA 876) – APPLYING THE RULE

ANNOUNCED IN COFFIN V. COFFIN, OUR OWN SC DECLARED IN JIMENEZ
V. CABANGBANG THAT THE PRIVILEGE COULD NOT BE INVOKED BY A
LEGISLATOR WHO HAD ALLEGEDLY MALIGNED THE PLAINTIFF IN AN
OPEN LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHIL COURSED THROUGH AND
PUBLISHED IN NEWSPAPERS. THE FINDING WAS THAT HE HAD WRITTEN
THE LETTER AT A TIME WHEN CONGRESS WAS IN RECESS AND IN HIS
PRIVATE CAPACITY ONLY.
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D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:
2. PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH AND DEBATE (CON’T):

2.3 OSMENA V.PENDATUN (L-17144, OCT. 28, 1960) - IT IS IMPORTANT

TO NOTE THAT THE PRIVILEGE IS NOT ABSOLUTE ALTHOUGH IT IS USALLY
SO CALLED. THE RULE PROVIDES THAT THE LEGISLATOR MAY NOT BE
QUESTIONED “IN ANY OTHER PLACE,” WHICH MEANS THAT HE MAY BE
CALLED TO ACCOUNT FOR HIS REMARKS BY HIS OWN COLLEAGUES IN
THE CONGRESS ITSELF AND, WHEN WARRANTED, PUNISHED FOR
“DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR”.
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D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:

2. PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH AND DEBATE (CON’T):

2.3 OSMENA V.PENDATUN (L-17144, OCT. 28, 1960)

THUS, IN THE CASE OF OSMENA V. PENDATUN, THE PRESIDENT OF THE

PHIL HIMSLEF WHO HAD BEEN VILIFIED BY THE PETITIONER COULD NOT
FILE ANY CIVIL OR CRIMINAL ACTION AGAINST HIM BECAUSE OF THIS
IMMUNITY.
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D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:
2. PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH AND DEBATE (CON’T):

2.3 OSMENA V.PENDATUN (L-17144, OCT. 28, 1960)

NONETHELESS, THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REP

IN WHICH THE QUESTIONED SPEECH WAS DELIVERED WERE NOT
PRECLUDED FROM DEMONSTRATING THEIR LOYALTY TO THE CHIEF
EXECUTIVE BY DECLARING OSMENA GUILTY OF DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR
AND SUSPENDING HIM IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR DISCIPLINARY POWER
UNDER WHAT IS NOW ART. VI, SEC. 16(3) OF THE CONSTITUTION.
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D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:
3. CONFLICT OF INTEREST
SEC. 12, ART. VI – “ALL MEMBERS OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF
REP SHALL UPON ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE, MAKE A FULL DISCLOSURE OF
THEIR FINANCIAL AND BUSINESS INTERESTS*. THEY SHALL NOTIFY THE
HOUSE CONCERNED OF A POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST THAT MAY
ARISE FROM THE FILING OF A PROPOSED LEGISLATION OF WHICH THEY
ARE AUTHORS.”

*NOTE: WHY DISCLOSE ONLY? WHY NOT REQUIRE THEM

TO UNLOAD THEIR STOCKHOLDINGS, LIKE IN SOME COUNTRIES.
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D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:
4. INCOMPATIBLE AND FORBIDDEN OFFICES (*****)
SEC. 13, ART. VI – “NO SENATOR OR MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REP
MAY HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT IN THE GOV’T, OR ANY
SUBDIVISION, AGENCY, OR INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCLUDING
GOCC OR THEIR SUBSIDIARIES, DURING HIS TERM WITHOUT FORFEITING
HIS SEAT. NEITHER SHALL HE BE APPOINTED TO ANY OFFICE WHICH MAY
HAVE BEEN CREATED OR THE EMOLUMENTS THEREOF INCREASED
DURING THE TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.”

THE FIRST PART IS CALLED INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE; WHILE THE SECOND

PART IS CALLED FORBIDDEN OFFICE.
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D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:
4. INCOMPATIBLE AND FORBIDDEN OFFICES (*****)
4.1 ADAZA V. PACANA (135 SCRA 431) - IN THIS CASE, THE PETITIONER
AND RESPONDENT WERE ELECTED GOVERNOR AND VICE-GOVERNOR,
RESPECTIVELY, OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL. BOTH SUBSEQUENTLY RAN FOR
THE BATASAN PAMBANSA, BUT ONLY THE PETITIONER WON. ADAZA
THEN QUALIFIED AS MEMBER OF THE LAWMAKING BODY, WHEREUPON,
PACANA ASSUMED THE GOVERNORSHIP AS STATUTORY SUCCESSOR.
ADAZA CHALLENGED PACANA’S TAKEOVER, CONTENDING THAT UNDER
THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM A LEGISLATOR COULD CONCURRENTLY
SERVE AS GOVERNOR; HENCE,
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D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:
4. INCOMPATIBLE AND FORBIDDEN OFFICES (*****)

4.1 ADAZA V. PACANA (135 SCRA 431) (CON’T):

THERE WAS NO VACANCY IN THE GOVERNORSHIP THAT PACANA COULD
FILL. THE SC UNANIMOUSLY REJECTED THIS ARGUMENT AND HELD THAT
ADAZA AUTOMATICALLY FORFEITED THE GOVERNORSHIP THE MOMENT
HE TOOK HIS OATH AS A MEMBER OF THE BATASANG PAMBANSA.
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D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:
4. INCOMPATIBLE AND FORBIDDEN OFFICES (*****)

4.2 CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION

NOT EVERY OTHER OFFICE IS TO BE REGARDED AS INCOMPATIBLE WITH

THE LEGISLATIVE POSITION. FOR EXAMPLE, MEMBERSHIP IN THE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS IS PERMITTED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.
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D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:
4. INCOMPATIBLE AND FORBIDDEN OFFICES (*****)

4.3 EX-OFFICIO MEMBERS – MOREOVER, IF IT BE SHOWN THAT THE

SECOND OFFICE IS AN EXTENSION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POSITION OR IS IN
AID OF LEGISLATIVE DUTIES, THE HOLDING THEREOF WILL NOT RESULT IN
THE LOSS OF THE LEGISLATOR’S SEAT IN CONGRESS.

ACCORDINGLY, THE CHAIRMEN OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REP ON

EDUCATION RETAIN THEIR SEATS IN CONGRESS WHILE SITTING
CONCURRENTLY AS EX-OFFICIO MEMBERS IN THE UP BOARD OF
REGENTS.
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D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:

4. INCOMPATIBLE AND FORBIDDEN OFFICES (*****)

4.4 FORBIDDEN OFFICE

EVEN IF THE MEMBER OF CONGRESS IS WILLING TO FORFEIT HIS

LEGISLATIVE SEAT THEREIN, HE MAY NOT BE APPOINTED TO ANY OFFICE
IN THE GOVERNMENT THAT HAS BEEN: 1) CREATED, OR 2) EMOLUMENTS
THEREOF HAVE BEEN INCREASED, DURING HIS TERM.
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D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:
5. INHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS:

SEC. 14, ART. VI

“NO SENATOR OR MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REP MAY PERSONALLY
APPEAR AS COUNSEL BEFORE ANY COURT OF JUSTICE OR BEFORE THE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS, OR QUASI-JUDICIAL AND OTHER
ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES. NEITHER SHALL HE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
BE INTERESTED FINANCIALLY* IN ANY CONTRACT WITH,

* NOTA BENE – IS THIS NOT A MANDATE TO DIVEST

THEIR BUSINESS HOLDINGS?
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D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:

5. INHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS:

SEC. 14, ART. VI (CON’T):

OR IN ANY FRANCHISE OR SPECIAL PRIVILEGE GRANTED BY THE

GOVERNMENT, OR ANY SUBDIVISION, AGENCY, OR INSTRUMENTALITY
THEREOF, OR ITS SUBSIDIARY, DURING HIS TERM OF OFFICE. HE SHALL
NOT INTERVENE IN ANY MATTER BEFORE ANY OFFICE OF THE GOV’T FOR
HIS PECUNIARY BENEFIT OR WHERE HE MAY BE CALLED UPON TO ACT
ON ACCOUNT OF HIS OFFICE.”
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D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:

5. INHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS:

APPEARANCE OF THE LEGISLATOR IS NOW BARRED BEFORE ALL COURTS

OF JUSTICE, ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS, AND TO ALL ADMINISTRATIVE
BODIES, LIKE THE SEC, NLRC, COURT MARTIALS AND MILTARY
TRIBUNALS.

THE PURPOSE OF DISQUALIFICATION IS TO PREVENT THE LEGISLATOR

FROM EXERTING UNDUE INFLUENCE, DELIBERATELY OR NOT, UPON
THE BODY WHERE HE IS
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D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:

5. INHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS:

APPEARING. THE PRESSURE MAY NOT BE INTENDED; NORMALLY, THE

APPEARANCE IS ENOUGH, CONSIDERING THE POWERS AVAILABLE TO
THE LEGISLATOR WHICH HE CAN EXERCISE TO REWARD OR PUNISH A
JUDGE DECIDING HIS CASE OR, IN THE CASE OF ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS,
HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH ITS MEMBERS.
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D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:
5. INHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS:

THIS IS THE REASON WHY THE PROHIBITED APPEARANCE MUST BE

PERSONAL. THE LAWYER-LEGISLATOR MAY STILL ENGAGE IN THE
PRACTICE OF HIS PROFESSION EXCEPT THAT WHEN IT COMES TO TRIALS
AND HEARINGS BEFORE THE BODIES ABOVE-MENTIONED, APPEARANCE
MAY BE MADE NOT BY HIM* BUT BY SOME OTHER MEMBER OF HIS LAW
OFFICE.

* NOTA BENE: COME AGAIN? THIS IS A MYIOPIC VIEW

(WRR).
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D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:

5. INHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS:

5.1 PUYAT V. DE GUZMAN (113 SCRA 33)- ON PERSONAL APPEARANCE –

A LEGISLATOR ENTERED HIS APPERANCE AS COUNSEL FOR ONE OF THE
PARTIES TO AN INTRA-CORPORATE DISPUTE BEFORE THE SEC. HE
DESISTED WHEN HIS REPRESENTATION WAS CHALLENGED UNDER THE
ABOVE-MENTIONED SECTION. THEREAFTER, HE PURCHASED P200.00
WORTH OF STOCKS IN THE CORPORATION FROM THE FACTION HE WAS
REPRESENTING AND SOUGHT TO INTERVENE IN THE SAID
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D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:

5. INHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS:

5.1 PUYAT V. DE GUZMAN (113 SCRA 33)- ON PERSONAL APPEARANCE

(CON’T) - SAID DISPUTE, THIS TIME AS A STOCKHOLDER. THE SC DID NOT
ALLOW HIM TO DO SO AS HIS EVIDENT PURPOSE WAS TO CIRCUMBENT
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION.

THE SC DECLARED: “UNDER THOSE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES, WE

ARE CONSTRAINED TO HOLD THAT
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D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:
5. INHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS:

5.1 PUYAT V. DE GUZMAN (113 SCRA 33)- ON PERSONAL APPEARANCE

(CON’T) - THERE HAS BEEN AN INDIRECT APPEARANCE* AS COUNSEL
BEFORE . . . AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY’ AND, IN OUR OPINION, THAT IS
A CIRCUMVENTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION.

* NOTA BENE: IS IT NOT THAT THE APPEARANCE OF OTHER MEMBERS

OF THEIR LAW OFFICES CONSIDERED AS AN INDIRECT APPERANCE ALSO?
IF SO, IT SHOULD BE PROHIBITED (MY COMMENT-WRR).
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E. SESSIONS:

SEC. 15, ART. VI – “THE CONGRESS SHALL CONVENE ONCE EVERY YEAR
ON THE 4TH MONDAY OF JULY FOR ITS REGULAR SESSION, UNLESS A
DIFFERENT DATE IS FIXED BY LAW, AND SHALL CONTINUE TO BE IN
SESSION FOR SUCH NUMBER OF DAYS AS IT MAY DETERMINE UNTIL 30
DAYS BEFORE THE OPENING OF ITS NEXT REGULAR SESSION, EXCLUSIVE
OF SATURDAYS, SUNDAYS, AND LEGAL HOLIDAYS. THE PRESIDENT MAY
CALL A SPECIAL SESSION AT ANY TIME.”
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E. SESSIONS:

SEC. 15, ART. VI (CON’T) – WHEN THE PRESIDENT CALLS FOR SPECIAL
SESSION, CONGRESS IS MANDATED TO COMPLY WITH IT. HOWEVER, THE
PRESIDENT CALL IS NOT NECESSARY IN SOME INSTANCES, AS WHEN THE
CONGRESS MEETS TO CANVASS THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (SEC. 4,
ART. VII), OR TO CALL A SPECIAL ELECTION WHEN BOTH THE PRESIDENCY
AND THE VICE-PRESIDENCY ARE VACATED (SEC. 10, ART. VII), OR WHEN IT
DECIDES TO EXERCISE THE POWER OF IMPEACHMENT (ART. XI),
PARTICULARLY WHERE THE RESPONDENT IS THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF.
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E. SESSIONS:

1. KIND OF SESSIONS:

1.1) REGULAR SESSION – GENERAL LEGISLATION

1.2) SPECIAL SESSION – SPECIFIC LEGISLATION
1.3 SINE DIE SESSION – IT IS ONE HELD WITHOUT DAY, BY
STAYING THE HANDS OF THE CLOCK DEFINITELY AT A
CERTAIN TIME AND CONTINUING THE SESSION INDEFINITELY
(U.S. VS. PONS, 34 PHIL. 729).
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F. QUORUM:

SEC. 16(2), ART. VI – “A MAJORITY OF EACH SHALL CONSTITUTE A

QUORUM TO DO BUSINESS, BUT A SMALLER NUMBER MAY ADJOURN
FROM DAY TO DAY AND MAY COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE OF ABSENT
MEMBERS IN SUCH MANNER, AND UNDER SUCH PENALTIES, AS SUCH
HOUSE MAY PROVIDE.”
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F. QUORUM:

1. QUORUM - IS DEFINED AS ANY NU8MBER SUFFICIENT TO

TRANSACT BUSINESS (JAVELLANA V. TAYO, 6 SCRA 1048), WHICH
MAY BE LESS THAN THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERSHIP. IN OUR
CONSTITUTION, IT IS REQUIRED THAT THE QUORUM BE A
MAJORITY OF EACH HOUSE.

2. AVE;INO V. CUENCO (83 PHIL 17) - IN THIS CASE, THE PETITIONER,

WHO WAS THEN SENATE PRESIDENT, MOTU PROPIO, ADJOURNED A
SESSION OF THE SENATE AND WALKED OUT WITH THIS FOLLOWERS,
LEAVING TWELVE
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F. QUORUM:

1. QUORUM - IS DEFINED AS ANY NU8MBER SUFFICIENT TO

TRANSACT BUSINESS (JAVELLANA V. TAYO, 6 SCRA 1048), WHICH
MAY BE LESS THAN THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERSHIP. IN OUR
CONSTITUTION, IT IS REQUIRED THAT THE QUORUM BE A
MAJORITY OF EACH HOUSE.

2. AVELINO V. CUENCO (83 PHIL 17) (CON’T) - OTHER MEMBERS WHO

CONTINUED MEETING AND REPLACED HIM WITH THE RESPONDENT AS
ACTING PRESIDENT. AVELINO, THEREUPON, FILED A QUO
WARRANTO
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F. QUORUM:

2. AVELINO V. CUENCO (83 PHIL 17) (CON’T) – PROCEEDINGS AGAINST

CUENCO, CONTENDING THAT THE LATTER HAD NOT BEEN VALIDLY
ELECTED BECAUSE 12 MEMBERS DID NOT CONSTITUTE A QUORUM,
THAT IS MAJORITY OF THE 24-MEMBER SENATE. THE SC FINALLY RULED
THAT THE 12 MEMBERS IS SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A QUORUM,
BEING A MAJORITY OF THE 23, NOT 24.
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G. DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS:

SEC. 16(3), ART. VI – “EACH HOUSE MAY DETERMINE THE

RULES OF ITS PROCEEDINGS, PUNISH ITS MEMBERS FOR DISORDERLY
BEHAVIOR, AND WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF 2/3 OF ALL ITS MEMBERS,
SUSPEND OR EXPEL A MEMBER. A PENALTY OF SUSPENSION,
WHEN IMPOSED, SHALL NOT EXCEED 60 DAYS.”
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G. RULES OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS:

1. RULES OF PROCEEDINGS - RULES OF PROCEEDINGS ARE

NEEDED FOR THE ORDERLY CONDUCT OF THE SESSIONS OF THE
CONGRESS. UNLESS SUCH RULES VIOLATE FUNDAMENTAL OR INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS, THEY ARE WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE DISCRETION OF EACH HOUSE
TO FORMULATE AND INTERPRET, AND MAY NOT BE JUDICIALLY
REVERSED.
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G. RULES OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS:

2. DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS - EVEN WITHOUT THE ABOVE PROVISION,

THE AUTHORITY TO DISCIPLINE ITS MEMBERS CAN STILL BE
EXERCISED BY EACH HOUSE AS AN INHERENT POWER, WITH THE
CONCURRENCE OF ONLY A MAJORITY VOTE, CONFORMABLY TO THE
GENERAL RULE ON THE WILL OF THE MAJORITY.

WITH THIS PROVISION, THE DISCIPLINARY POWER IS NOT

SO MUCH EXPRESSLY CONFERRED AS LIMITED BECAUSE OF THE
SPECIFIC CONDITIONS LAID DOWN FOR ITS PROPER EXERCISE.
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G. RULES OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS:

2. DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS (CON’T) -THUS, THE COURTS MAY

ANNUL ANY EXPULSION OR SUSPENSION OF A MEMBER THAT IS
NOT CONCURRED IN BY AT LEAST 2/3 OF THE ENTIRE BODY
OR ANY SUSPENSION METED OUT BY THE LEGISLATURE, EVEN
WITH THE REQUIRED 2/3 VOTE, AS TO ANY PERIOD IN
EXCESS OF THE 60-DAY MAXIMUM DURATION. THESE ARE
PROCEDURAL MATTERS AND THEREFORE JUSTICIABLE.
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G. RULES OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS:

2. DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS (CON’T) – BUT THE INTERPRETATION OF THE
PHRASE “DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR” IS THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CONGRESS
AND CANNOT AS A RULE BE JUDICIALLY REVIEWED. THE MATTER COMES IN
THE CATEGORY OF A “POLITICAL QUESTION”. ACCORDINGLY, THE SC DID
NOT INTERFERE WHEN THE LEGISLATURE DECLARED THAT THE PHYSICAL
ASSAULT BY ONE MEMBER AGAINST ANOTHER (ALEJANDRO V. QUEZON, 46
PHIL 83), OR THE DELIVERY OF A DEROGATORY SPEECH WHICH THE
MEMBER WAS UNABLE TO SUBSTANTIATE (OSMENA V. PENDATUN, 109 PHIL
863), CONSTITUTED “DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR” AND JUSTIFIED THE
ADOPTION OF DISCIPLINARY MEASURES.
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H. ADJOURNMENT:

SEC. 16(5), ART. VI – “NEITHER HOUSE DURING THE SESSIONS OF

THE CONGRESS SHALL, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE OTHER,
ADJOURN FOR MORE THAN 3 DAYS, NOR TO ANY OTHER PLACE THAN
THAT IN WHICH THE TWO HOUSES SHALL BE SITTING.”

THE “PLACE” AS USED HERE REFERS NOT TO THE BUILDING BUT

TO THE POLITICAL UNIT WHERE THE TWO MAY BE SITTING
(JEFFERSON MANUAL).
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H. ADJOURNMENT:

1. KIND OF ADJOURNMENTS:

1.1) SINE DIE OR FINAL ADJOURNMENT – MEANS

ADJOURNMENT MADE WITHOUT ASSIGNING A DAY FOR A
FURTHER MEETING OR HEARING. ONE MADE UNTIL THE
OPENING OF THE NEXT CONGRESS.

1.2) TEMPORARY ADJOURNMENT – ADJOURNMENT MADE

DAY TO DAY OR WITH A DAY FOR THE NEXT MEETING. THIS IS
ADJOURNMENT MADE DURING THE DURATION OF THE SESSION OF
THE CONGRESS.
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I. THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS:

SEC. 17, ART. VI – “THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REP SHALL EACH HAVE
AN ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL WHICH SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL
CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS, AND QUALIFICATIONS OF
THEIR RESPECTIVE MEMBERS. EACH ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL SHALL BE
COMPOSED OF 9 MEMBERS, 3 OF WHOM SHALL BE JUSTICES OF THE SC TO
BE DESIGNATED BY THE SC, AND THE REMAINING 6 SHALL BE MEMBERS OF
THE SENATE OR THE HOUSE OF REP, AS THE CASE MAY BE, WHO SHALL BE
CHOSEN ON THE BASIS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION FROM THE
POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE PARTIES OR ORGANIZATION REGISTERED
UNDER THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM REPRESENTED THEREIN. THE SENIOR
JUSTICE IN THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL SHALL BE ITS CHAIRMAN.”
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I. THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS:

1.1) POSITION OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL - ALTHOUGH

THE ET’S ARE PREDOMINANTLY LEGISLATIVE IN MEMBERSHIP AND THE
PROVISION CREATING THEM IS FOUND IN ARTICLE VI ON THE
LEGISLATIVE DEPT, IT IS NOT CORRECT TO SAY THAT THEY ARE
MERE ADJUNCTS OF CONGRESS. IN FACT, IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL DUTIES, THEY ARE INDEPENDENT OF THE
LEGISLATURE, AND ALSO OF THE OTHER DEPARTMENTS FOR
THAT MATTER.
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I. THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS:

1.2) ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION (63 PHIL 139) AS

AFFIRMED IN LAZATIN V. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (168 SCRA
391):

IN THIS CASE, IT WAS HELD THAT THE RESPONDENT BODY

(PREDECESSOR OF ELETORAL TRIBUNALS) HAD THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT
TO PRESCRIBE ITS OWN RULES OF PROCEDURE, AS AGAINST THOSE
EARLIER ADOPTED BY THE LEGISLATURE ITSELF, IN CONNECTION
WITH THE ELECTION CONTESTS UNDER ITS JURISDICTION.
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I. THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS:

1.3) SUANES V. DISBURSING OFFICER OF THE SENATE (L-

2480, OCT. 26, 1948):
IN THIS CASE, THE SC FURTHER BOLSTERED THE
INDEPENDENCE OF THESE BODIES BY HOLDING THAT “THE
EMPLOYEES OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS ARE ITS OWN, AND NOT
OF THE SENATE NOR THE HOUSE OF REP NOR OF ANY OTHER ENTITY, AND
IT STANDS TO REASON THAT THE APPOINTMENT, THE SUPERVISION,
AND THE CONTROL OVER THE SAID EMPLOYEES ARE WHOLLY
WITHIN THE TRIBUNAL ITSELF”.
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I. THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS:

1.4) MORRERO V. BOCAR (66 PHIL 429); AZNAR V HRET (GR NO. 65000, JAN.
9, 1990)l:
THE DECISIONS RENDERED BY THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS IN THE CONTESTS
MENTIONED IN THIS SECTION, OF WHICH THEY ARE THE SOLE JUDGE, ARE
NOT APPEALABLE TO THE SC, EXCEPT IN CASES WHERE THERE IS A CLEAR
SHOWING OF A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION”.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE ET’S AS THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL ELECTION

CONTESTS INVOLVING THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WAS AFFIRMED IN
ROBLES V. HRET (181 SCRA 780).
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I. THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS:

1.5) BONDOC V. PINEDA (201 SCRA 792) - IN THIS CASE A DIFFERENT
QUESTION WAS RAISED TO WIT, WHETHER THE HOUSE OF REP COULD, AT
THE REQUEST OF THE DOMINANT PARTY THEREIN, CHANGE ITS
REPRESENTATIVE IN THE HET, PRESUMABLY TO “THWART THE
PROMULGATION OF A DECISION FREELY REACHED BY THE TRIBUNAL”.
WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE TRIBUNAL AS THE
“SOLE JUDGE” OF ELECTION CONTESTS INVOLVING THE MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE OF REP, THE SC ASSUMED JURISDICTION, PRECISELY TO PROTECT
THAT INDEPENDENCE.
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I. THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS:

1.5) BONDOC V. PINEDA (201 SCRA 792) (CON’T):

THE SC DECLARED: “THE RESOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF REP REMOVING

CONG. CAMASURA FROM THE HET FOR DISLOYALTY TO THE LDP, BECAUSE
HE CAST HIS VOTE IN FAVOR OF THE NACIONALISTA PARTY’S CANDIDATE,
BONDOC, IS A CLEAR IMPAIRMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVE
OF THE HET TO BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF THE ELECTION CONTEST BETWEEN
PINEDA AND BONDOC”. . . ITS RESOLUTION OF EXPULSION AGAINST CONG.
CAMASURA IS, THEREFORE, NULL AND VOID”.
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J. THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

SEC. 18, ART. VI – “THERE SHALL BE A COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT

CONSISTING OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, AS EX-OFFICIO CHAIRMAN,
TWELVE SENATORS AND TWELVE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REP, ELECTED
BY EACH HOUSE ON THE BAIS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATIONS FROM
THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS REGISTERED
UNDER THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM REPRESENTED THEREIN. THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE COA SHALL NOT VOTE, EXCEPT IN CASE OF A TIE.
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J. THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

SEC. 18, ART. VI (CON’T):

THE COMMISSION SHALL ACT ON ALL APPOINTMENTS SUBMITTED TO IT

WITHIN 30 SESSION DAYS OF THE CONGRESS FROM THEIR SUBMISSION. THE
COMMSISSION SHALL RULE BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL THE MEMBERS.”

LANDMARK CASES:
1. DAZA V. SINGSON, 180 SCRA 496
2. CUNANAN V. TAN, 5 SCRA 1
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K. ORGANIZATION OF ET’S AND COA:

SEC. 19, ART. VI - “THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS AND THE COA SHALL BE
CONSTITUTED WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REP
SHALL HAVE BEEN ORGANIZED WITH THE ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND
THE SPEAKER. THE COA SHALL MEET ONLY WHILE THE CONGRESS IS IN
SESSION, AT THE CALL OF ITS CHAIRMAN OR A MAJORITY OF ALL ITS
MEMBERS, TO DISCHARGE SUCH POWERS AND FUNCTIONS AS ARE HEREIN
CONFERRED UPON IT.”

THE RULE THAT THE COA CAN MEET ONLY DURING SESSIONS OF CONGRESS
IS THE REASON WHY AD INTERIM APPOINMENTS ARE PERMITTED UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION.
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QUESTIONAIRES:

1. WHAT COMPOSES THE CONGRESS OF THE

PHILIPPINES?
 CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

2. SHOULD MANNY PACQUIAO DECIDES TO RUN FOR

THE SENATE AS SUGGESTED BY SOME PEOPLE,
WHAT QUALIFICATIONS MUST HE POSSESS?