Quasi Delict

ANNOTATION
DEATH IN A HOTEL: QUASI-DELICT

OR BREACH OF CONTRACT?
By
ATTY. ROGELIO E. SUBONG*
________________
§ I. Introduction, p. 482
§ II. Makati Shangri-la Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs. Ellen Johanne Harper,
Jonathan Christopher Harper and Rigoberto Gillera: Case Under
Annotation, p. 483
a) Rape of Singer Connie Francis in a hotel/lodging inn, p. 484
b) The money value of human life and the “Mc Donald’s Spill Coffee Case”, p.
485
§ III. The Harper Case: The Basic Facts, p. 486
§ IV. Complaint Based on Quasi-Delict, p. 489
a) Elements of Quasi-delict, p. 489
b) Salient allegations in the Complaint of the Harper heirs, p. 490
§ V. Definitions and Nature of Fault, Negligence, Contributory Negligence and
Proximate Cause, p. 491
a) Fault, p. 491
b) Negligence, p. 492
c) Contributory negligence, p. 496
d) Proximate cause, p. 498
_______________
* AB (U.P) ’62 & LL.B. ’66 (UP). He is a practicing lawyer specializing in land transportation law.
481
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 481

Death in a Hotel: Quasi-Delict or Breach of Contract?
§ VI. Decisions of the Courts on Damages, p. 499

a) Dispositive portions of the decisions of the courts, p. 499
b) Paring down of the issues, p. 500
§ VII. The Issue of Filiation, p. 501
a) Objections to the documents, p. 502
b) Arguments of the Harper heirs on these documents, p. 503
c) The CA and the High Court Rulings on these documents, p. 503
d) Admission of documents under the principle of “substantial compliance”, p.
505
§ VIII. The Issue of Fault or Negligence, p. 506
a) Uniform rulings of the RTC, the CA and the High Court, p. 506
b) The findings and conclusions of the three (3) courts, p. 507
§ IX. Questions and Comments/Observations, p. 509
§ X. Breach of Contract as Legal Basis for Action, p. 512
a) Hotel is a public utility, p. 512
b) Hotel business, like common carrier business is “imbued with public interest”,
p. 513
c) Insuring the safety, particularly of the lives and limbs of hotel guests is a
contractual commitment, p. 513
§ XI. Elements of Breach of Contract, p. 514
a) Elements, p. 514
b) Features, p. 515
§ XII. Action under Quasi-Delict Dismissible if There is Pre-Existing
Contract?, p. 516
a) Singson, et al. vs. BPI, G.R. No. 24837 dated June 27, 1968, p. 517
b) Is the ruling in Singson, et al. vs. BPI, supra, correct?, p. 518
482
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

§ XIII. Significance of the Harper Case Decision, p. 520

a) Substantial compliance re: foreign documents, p. 520
b) Latest value of human life, p. 521
c) Breach of contract as the appropriate cause of action in the Harper case or in
similar cases, p. 523
d) Effect of this view on the Harper case, p. 524
§ XIV. Conclusion: “It’s More Fun in the Philippines”?, p. 524
a) Justice to be “wooed by slow advances”, p. 524
b) Jurisprudence on tort and damages not fully adopted in our jurisdiction, p. 525
c) Need for universally accepted standard of adequate hotel security, p. 526
________________
§ I. Introduction
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once conceded that law or
specifically, “common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the
sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign
that can be identified.”1 Whether he is right or wrong does not really
make any difference because with either view, law remains effete in
forestalling its violations, at times, in determining the culprits, and
in imposing appropriate penalties. These limitations usually test the
effectiveness of the legal system. Even if law were handed down in a
threatening fashion with all its panoply of searing Draconian
sanctions, it still cannot prevent or deter the commission of crimes
or infliction of wrongs or injuries, given the dystopian mind-set of
criminals or wrongdoers.
Despite its limitations, law endeavors to effect justice, or to give
everyone his due and in another aspect, to provide redress for
wrongs and grievances. In civil law, there are re-
_______________
1 Dissenting Opinion, Southern Pacific Co. vs. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222; 1917.
483
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 483

deeming devices that address the problems of ascertaining

responsibility, defining the nature and extent of liability and fixing
appropriate indemnity for wrongs or injuries. Specifically, in quasi-
delict and breach of contract, law has come up with such doctrines
or concepts of fault, negligence, contributory negligence, proximate
cause, and the like. Upon them a devastated family from a distant
Scandinavian country reposed its hope of finding relief, justice, and
closure, over the tragic death of a close relative in a top rated hotel
in our country. Suing for damages is an option accorded to the
bereaved relatives to exact monetary recompense to somehow
assuage their grief over the loss of a loved one. “In medieval
England, redress for injury appears to have served the function of
ameliorating the desire for revenge. The kin of an injured person
were ‘rewarded’ for abstaining from clan warfare by gaining
satisfaction in damages according to the station of the victim.”2
§ II. Makati Shangri-la Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs. Ellen
Johanne Harper, Jonathan Christopher Harper and
Rigoberto Gillera: Case Under Annotation
Makati Shangri-la Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs Ellen Johanne
Harper, Jonathan Christopher Harper and Rigoberto Gillera, G.R.
No. 189998 promulgated on August 29, 2012, 679 SCRA 444
(Harper case) is about a foreign hotel guest, Mr. Christian Fredrick
Harper (Mr. Harper) who was murdered in his room in the early
morning of the first week of November, 1999 at the Makati Shangri-
la Hotel and Resort Inc. (Petitioner hotel). His widow and son
(Harper heirs) assisted by a Philippine representative sued for
damages for his death. Often stymied by distance, strict requisites or
formalities for documents from a foreign country, overseas
communications, unclear
_______________
2 Robert L. Rabin, “Perspective in Tort Law”, Little Brown and Co., 1976 ed., p.
1.
484

findings on the circumstances leading to the death of Mr Harper,

and failure to identify and apprehend the criminals, they still
succeeded in proving their case. Thus, the High Court finally wrote
finis to their quest for justice and compensation thirteen (13) years
after that tragic death. Through a more lenient application of the
rules of admissibility of public documents from a foreign land, the
Harper heirs have established their relationship with the deceased.
Through the concepts of fault and negligence, as well as proximate
cause, blame and damages were fixed and imposed upon Petitioner
Hotel which was found negligent for failure to provide adequate
security that could have prevented the misfortune upon one of its
guests, Mr. Harper.
However, some questions and views persist. Furthermore, the
High Court made a significant affirmation of what has been long
recognized in American jurisdiction that hotel business is “a
business imbued with a public interest,” or a public utility like a
common carrier. (Note: In American decisions, there is an “a” before
“public interest” e.g., see Munn vs. Illinois, 94 U.S. 221; 1877). This
holding has a crucial effect on the jurisprudence on the hospitality
business which may change the legal basis for action against a hotel
in the event of another tragedy similar to that of Mr. Harper’s. The
action/complaint of the Harper heirs was based on quasi-delict
which logically excludes the element of pre-existing contract.
However, with the holding in the decision that hotel business is akin
to a common carrier, of which the hotel has a contractual
commitment to insure the safety of its guests, not only their tranquil
lodging therein, the action against Petitioner hotel of the Harper
heirs should have been under breach of contract, instead of under
quasi-delict.
a) Rape of Singer Connie Francis in a hotel/lodging inn
Crimes do happen all the time. What makes them horrifying is
when their commission is at an unlikely venue, when their
commission is characterized with brutality, and when
485
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 485
their commission is under an atmosphere of safety and security.

What readily comes to mind is the tragic ordeal of famous singer
Connie Francis who was raped in 1974 in a hotel/lodging inn. This
did not result to her death (though she almost died) but the vicious
crime was a “night of terror she would never forget”, according to an
account of the event. It was reported that: “While she slept in a
second floor motel room after a concert appearance in Westbury,
Long Island, (New York), an intruder jimmied a lock on her balcony
door, raped her at knife point. Then left her tied to an overturned
chair and covered by a mattress (which almost suffocated her to
death). He was never caught (nor identified). Six months later she
sued Howard Johnson’s (the hotel owner and of a chain of motels
and hotel/lodging inns) for $5 million, won $2.5 million, then settled
out of court for $1,475,000. The ordeal contributed to the breakup of
her third marriage and finished her performing career.”
(http//www.people.com/people/archive/ article/0, 20078478,00.html
– Connie Francis). The basis for the suit against the owner of the
hotel/lodging inn was its failure to provide adequate security. It was
also reported that the case led to reforms in the hotel industry.
b) The money value of human life and the “Mc Donald’s Spill
Coffee Case”
Mr. Harper died while Connie Francis did not. But there were the
same failure to prevent criminal intrusion into their rooms, failure to
identify and apprehend the malefactor/s, and failure to provide
adequate security within the hotel premises. The courts in both cases
directed the owners of the establishments to pay damages. The
Connie Francis damage awards were touted as one of the largest in
the 1970’s. The Harper heirs damage awards appear to be hefty by
present standards in our jurisdiction since Philippine courts have not
been noted for generosity (read: woefully parsimonious) in awarding
damages. Our Civil Code passed by the Congress in 1949 pegged
the money value of human life at the ridiculous
486

and demeaning amount of P3,000 for civil indemnity in case of

death caused by crime or quasi-delict (Art. 2206). This legally fixed
price tag on human life must have been a millstone that invariably
weighs down upon any attempt of courts to be a little more generous
in the amounts of awards for damages. Perhaps P3,000 was a tidy
sum in 1949. Through the years the courts raised the awards from
that starting figure of P3,000 to P6,000.00, P12,000.00, P30,000.00
and now to that “princely” sum of P50,000 — not even enough to
replace a shattered windshield of a tourist bus. These fleabite
awards of damages by Philippine courts are light years away from
the amount of damages awarded to a woman in the United States,
for spilling hot coffee on her lap. This “legal icon” on damages suits
is also known as the “McDonald’s Coffee Spill Case” of 1994.
One morning in 1994, Stella Liebeck, an elderly woman of
Albuquerque, New Mexico, bought breakfast along with steaming
hot coffee from a McDonald’s drive thru in her area. Her son who
was driving the car stopped it to allow her to open the lid of the
coffee cup so as to put sugar and cream. She pressed the coffee cup
between her knees while opening its lid. In the process, the hot
coffee spilled on her lap scalding “her inner thighs, buttocks, groin
and labia.” She naturally screamed in excruciating pain for these
burns of those parts of her body. She sued McDonald’s and won,
even as her actions were described as “implicitly clumsy” (read:
negligent or careless). In other words, the patent carelessness of Ms.
Liebeck did not deter the jury from awarding a staggering $2.9
million dollars in damages. McDonald’s settled after the verdict, but
the exact figures were no longer disclosed. Certainly, what the old
woman got were more than sufficient balms to her burns—no pun
intended.
§ III. The Harper Case: The Basic Facts
a) In the first week of November, 1999, Mr. Christian Fredrick
Harper, a thirty (30) year old Norwegian Engineer,
487
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 487

arrived in the country on a business trip and checked in at Petitioner

hotel, a five star hotel in Makati City;
b) Scheduled to check out on November 6, 1999, he was
murdered inside his room (no. 1428) in the early morning of that
day; his killers were never apprehended, let alone identified, up to
now;
c) The crime was discovered that day when a credit card
company representative probably called up Mr. Harper or his family
in Oslo, Norway regarding his credit cards. As narrated in the
decision, — “x x x Harper’s family in Norway must have called him
at his hotel room to inform him about the attempt to use his
American Express card. Not getting any response from the room, his
family must have requested hotel personnel to verify. When there
was no response from his room, they opened it with a duplicate key.
They “were shocked to discover Harper’s lifeless body on the bed.”
d) It turned out that hours before the discovery of the lifeless
body of Mr. Harper, a male Caucasian of about 30-32 years old and
5’4” in height, tried to buy a Cartier lady’s watch valued then at
P320,000 at Alexis Jewelry Store at Ayala Center, Makati. He
presented credit cards in the name of Mr. Christian Fredrick Harper.
With card purchases especially involving large amounts, the sales
lady (named, Lumba) called up the credit card representative who
asked some questions which should have been within the knowledge
of the supposed holder;
e) The seeming difficulty of the would-be buyer in answering
the questions of the card representative aroused the suspicion of the
saleslady who asked for the former’s passport. She then put the
cards on hold upon the suggestion of the credit card representative;
f) Sensing possible exposure, this male Caucasian hurriedly left
the store leaving behind the passport and the three credit cards;
488

g) Police investigators reviewed the CCTV tapes of Petitioner

Hotel which yielded the following sequence of pertinent events in
the early morning of November 6, 1999: Mr. Harper entered his
room, at 12:14 a.m.; followed by a female “visitor” 3 minutes later
or at 12:17 a.m.; she was still inside Mr. Harper’s room for 2 hours
and a few minutes when a male Caucasian also entered the room at
2:28 a.m; the female “visitor” left the room at 5:33 a.m; and the
male Caucasian also left the room at 5:56 a.m;
h) The decision further narrated: “During the interview (by the
police), Lumba confirmed that the person who attempted to purchase
the Cartier lady’s watch on November 6, 1999 had been the person
whose picture was on the passport issued under the name of
Christian Fredrik Harper and the Caucasian male seen on CCTV
entering Harper’s hotel room.” (Note: It would seem that Mr. Harper
closely resembled this male Caucasian);
i) The police investigation also revealed “that Harper’s
passport, credit cards, laptop and an undetermined amount of cash
had been missing from the crime scene.” And as stated above, the
crime was unsolved then and is unsolved up to now; (Note: This
reflects on the level of police investigation of this case. The male
Caucasian could have been also a Norwegian whose identity could
have been supplied by the Bureau of Immigration (from records of
arrivals and departures during the periods close to the date of the
murder) and/or by the Norwegian Embassy; and the female “visitor”
could have been known to hotel personnel if she were seen in the
hotel premises before. But this is another matter);
j) Thus the Harper heirs sued for damages Petitioner hotel for
Mr. Harper’s death in the hands of malefactors inside one of its
rooms.
489
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 489

§ IV. Complaint Based on Quasi-Delict

As affirmed in the decision the Complaint or legal action for
damages filed by the Harper heirs before the RTC of Quezon City
was based on Quasi-delict under the New Civil Code:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,

there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual obligation between
the parties, is called quasi-delict.
The second sentence of Art. 2176 implies that it also covers act
or omission causing damage to another arising from breach of
contract, though not directly stated: “Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties, is
called quasi-delict”. Stated in another way: “Such fault or
negligence, if there is a pre-existing contractual obligation
between the parties, is called breach of contract.” In quasi-delict,
fault or negligence is direct, substantive, and independent,3 whereas
in breach of contract, fault or negligence is merely incidental to the
performance of an obligation already existing.4 Hence, the basis for
legal action for damages when there is pre-existing contract which
was breached or violated, would be called “breach of contract”
which is governed by the provisions on contracts under the Civil
Code—along with applicable provisions on Quasi-delict.
a) Elements of Quasi-delict
Before filing the Complaint, Harper heirs must have tested these
elements or requisites of quasi-delict or culpa aguiliana against the
facts and the surrounding circumstances of the case, namely:
_______________
3 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. V, 4th Edition, p. 1080, citing Rakes
vs. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 395.
4 Ibid.
490

i. act or omission—of Petitioner hotel on the matter of security to protect

the lives, limbs and properties of guests, like that of the deceased;
ii. fault or negligence (lack of due care)—attributable to Petitioner hotel
for its failure to provide adequate security to protect the lives, limbs and
properties of guests, like that of the deceased;
iii. Damage to another—the stay in the hotel of a guest, Mr. Harper
resulted to his death;
iv. Causal connection between fault or negligence and damage—that this
fault or negligence directly resulted to the death of hotel guest, Mr. Harper;
v. No pre-existing contractual relation—no prior contract or pre-existing
contract between the hotel and its guest as to the safety of his life, limb and
property. This appears to be the position of the plaintiffs or Harper heirs in
their Complaint;5
b) Salient allegations in the Complaint of the Harper heirs

The following pertinent allegations in the Complaint were
reproduced in the decision:
“7. The deceased was to check out and leave the hotel on November 6,
1999, but in the early morning of said date, while he was in his hotel room, he
was stabbed to death by an (sic) unidentified male who had succeeded to
intrude into his room. (Note: Per police investigation report, there was a
woman and a male Caucasian who entered his room at the time, one after the
other);
8. The murderer succeeded to trespass into the area of the hotel’s private
rooms area and into the room of the said deceased on account of the hotel’s
gross negligence in providing the most basic security system of its guests, the
lack of which owing to the acts or omission of its employees was the
immediate cause of the tragic death of said deceased.
xxxx
_______________
5 See Paras, “Civil Code of the Philippines”, Vol. V, 4th Edition, pp. 1076-1077.
491
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 491
10. Defendant has prided itself to be among the top hotel chains in the
East claiming to provide excellent service, comfort and security for its guests
for which reason ABB Alston executives and their guests have invariably
chosen this hotel to stay.”
§ V. Definitions and Nature of Fault, Negligence, Contributory

Negli-
gence and Proximate Cause
Legal concepts or doctrines such as fault, negligence,
contributory negligence and proximate cause are important and
determinative of the outcome of this Harper case. Except
contributory negligence, they were applied by the RTC, the CA and
the High Court in deciding in favor of the Harper heirs. There is
need to revisit and set forth anew in possible details their basic
definitions and nature, and to test them against the facts and
circumstances of the case, to accord us another perspective in this
case.
a) Fault
i) Senator Arturo M. Tolentino
“There is fault when a person acts in a manner contrary to what
should have been done. The acts, the necessary care and precaution
vary according to the matter involved; and even with respect to the
same matter, according to time. A variation in the facts, in the law, and
in the moral and social concept, may lead courts to consider as culpable
now an act which was not in the past so considered, or vice-versa.6
Only juridical fault, but not moral fault, gives rise to liability for
damages. Lack of charity or altruism, one constituting moral fault, does
not constitute a quasi-delict. Thus a person who folds his arms while
another is in danger of death, is guilty only of moral negligence, but
not of juridical negligence, and cannot be held liable for damages.”7
_______________
6 “The Civil Code of the Philippines”, 1994 ed., Vol. V, pp. 593-594 citing 6 Planiol &
Ripert 666.
7 “The Civil Code of the Philippines”, 1994 ed., Vol. V, p. 594.
492

ii) Dean Ernesto L. Pineda
Fault—“It is that condition where a person acts in a way or manner
contrary to what normally should have been done. It consists in the
execution of a positive act but the act was done contrary to the normal
way of doing it and ultimately causing damage or injury to another.”8
iii) Legal Definitions from the Web
Fault—“A breach of duty or negligence and, in some circumstances,
the errors or omissions of things under a person’s control.”9Fault—“is a
failure to take reasonable precautions to avoid causing harm to the
people that one ought reasonably to foresee will be put at risk.”10
iv) Black’s Law Dictionary
Fault—“Negligence; an error or defect of judgment or of conduct;
any deviation from prudence, duty or rectitude; any shortcoming; or
neglect of care or performance resulting from intention, incapacity or
perversity; a wrong tendency, course or act; bad faith or
mismanagement; neglect of duty. The word connotes an act to which
blame, censure, impropriety, shortcoming or culpability attaches.”11
b) Negligence
“Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury.12 It is relative or comparative, and not an absolute
term, and its application depended upon the situation of the parties and
the reasonable degree of care
_______________
8 “Torts and Damages Annotated”, 2009 Ed., Vol. I, p. 7.
9 http://www.duhaime.org./Legal Dictionary/F/Fault.aspx.
10 http://lawiki.org/lawwike/The_twisted_problem_of_fault_in-tort.
11 Abridged Fifth Edition, p. 313.
12 Tolentino, supra, p. 594, citing U.S. vs. Barrios, 23 Phil. 434.
493
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 493

and vigilance which the surrounding circumstances reasonably

impose.13
Test of Negligence: The test in determining whether a person is
negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the
person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man in the
position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to
the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to
be pursued. If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from
that course or to take precaution against its mischievous results, and the
failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision, is
the constitutive fact of negligence.”14
ii) Judge Cezar Sangco
Negligence—“want of care required by the circumstances. It is
relative or comparative, not an absolute term, and its application
depends upon the situation of the parties, and the degree of care and
vigilance which the circumstances reasonably impose. When the
danger is great a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to
observe it is a want of ordinary care.”15
“Negligence is ‘the failure to observe, for the protection of the
interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such person suffers
injury.’ ”16
Negligence is conduct, not a state of mind, or the use of sound
judgment.”
_______________
13 Tolentino, supra, p. 594, citing US vs. Juanillo, 23 Phil. 212.
14 “The Civil Code of the Philippines”, 1994 ed., Vol. V, pp. 594-595, citing Picart vs.
Smith, 37 Phil. 809.
15 Tort and Damages, 4th Edition, pp. 5 and 7, citing US vs. Juanillo, 23 Phil. 212
which also cited Ahern vs. Oregon Tel. Co., 24 Ore. 276.
16 Tort and Damages, 4th Edition, pp. 5 and 7, citing US vs. Barias, 23 Phil. 434 which
also cited a US authority, and McKee vs. IAC, G.R. No. 68102, 211 SCRA 517 (1992).
494

Xxxx
1. Standard of conduct
The whole theory of negligence presupposes some uniform
standard of behaviour. Yet, the infinite variety of situations which
may arise makes it impossible to fix in advance definite rules for all
conceivable human conduct. The most that can be done is to device
something in the nature of a formula, the application of which, in
each particular case, must be left to the court. The standard of
conduct which the community demands must be an external and
objective one, rather than the individual judgment, good or bad, of the
particular actor, and it must be, as far as possible, the same for all
persons, since the law can have no favorites. At the same time, it
must make proper allowance for risk apparent to the actor for his
capacity to meet it, and for the circumstances under which he must
act.”
Xxx
Xxx
“Degree of Negligence:
The amount of care demanded by the standard of reasonable
conduct must be proportionate to the apparent risk. As the danger
becomes greater, the actor is required to exercise caution
commensurate with it.”17
“2. Statutory Standard of Care:
A statute having for its purpose the preservation of life and
minimizing of personal injuries may validly impose a duty which is
greater than the duty of ordinary care as such duty exists at
common law, and a person who is charged by the statute with the
necessity of exercising increased diligence must perform such duty or
bear the consequences of his neglect. Xxx
Xxx
The generally accepted view is that violation of a statutory duty
constitutes negligence, negligence as a
_______________
17 Torts and Damages, 4th Edition, p. 10; Underscoring supplied.
495
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 495

matter of law, or according to decisions on the question negligence per

se. For, the non-observance of what the legislature has prescribed
as a suitable precaution is failure to observe that care which an
ordinarily prudent man would observe. Moreover, when the State
regards certain acts as injurious to justify their absolute prohibition, the
doing of said acts constitutes a breach of duty to those who may be
injured thereby; or as it has been otherwise expressed, when the
standard of care is fixed by law, failure to conform with it is
negligence, negligence per se, or negligence in and of itself.”18
iii. Black’s Law Dictionary
Negligence—“The omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those ordinary considerations which ordinarily regulate
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a reasonable
and prudent man would not do.
The failure to use such care as a reasonably prudent and careful
person would use under similar circumstances; it is the doing of some
act which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under
similar circumstances or failure to do what a person of ordinary
prudence would have done under similar circumstances. Conduct
which falls below the standard established by law for the protection
of others against unreasonable risks of harm; it is a departure from
the conduct expectable of a reasonably prudent person under like
circumstances.”
The term refers only to that legal delinquency which results
whenever a man fails to exhibit the care which he ought to exhibit,
whether it be slight, ordinary, or great. It is characterized chiefly by
inadvertence, thoughtlessness, inattention, and the like, x x x x x x The
law of negligence is founded upon reasonable conduct or reasonable
care under all circumstances of a particular case. Doctrine of
negligence rests on the duty of every person to exercise due care in his
conduct towards others from which injury may result.”19
_______________
18 Torts and Damages, 4th Edition, p. 12; Underscoring supplied.
19 Abridged Fifth Edition, p. 538; Underscoring supplied.
496

iv. Melvin Belli & Allen Wilkinson:

“Negligence can be defined simply as carelessness; failing to pay
sufficient attention under the circumstances. Some everyday examples
of negligence include automobile accidents caused by speeding,
disobeying traffic signs and signals, tailgating, making an unsafe left
turn, driving while drunk, and not keeping the brakes in good shape;
falling in a store, theatre, or even your neighbour’s house because of
loose stairs or carpet or slippery floor (‘slip and fall cases’); being
injured by the carelessness of a doctor or dentist; or being hurt when
the bus you’re riding in makes a jolting start or an unexpected sudden
stop.
“Test of Negligence:
How can you tell whether the person who hurt you was negligent or
not? The standard used is whether that person was exercising a
reasonable amount of ‘due care’ under the circumstances.”20
v. Your Introduction to Law
“Negligence is a careless or reckless act rather than an intentional
harm x x x. It is a failure in duty and responsibility: the omission of a
duty that should have been performed or the performance of an act that
should have been done.
A person is negligent when he fails to use the care which a
reasonable man would use in the same circumstance. The criterion is:
How would a reasonable man act?”21
c) Contributory negligence
i) Black’s Law Dictionary
“Contributory Negligence—The act or omission amounting to want
of ordinary care on the part of complaining party,
_______________
20 “Everybody’s Guide to the Law”, Harper & Row, 1987 ed., p. 278; Underscoring
supplied. Note: Melvin Belli was a famous American trial lawyer known as “King of Torts”
for winning huge amounts of damages from negligence cases.
21 Edited by George G. Coughlin, Barnes & Noble, 1963 ed., p. 69.
497
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 497

which, concurring with defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause

of injury. Conduct by a plaintiff which is below the standard to which
he is legally required to conform for his own protection and which is
contributing cause which cooperates with the negligence of the
defendant in causing the plaintiff’s harm.”22
Contributory Negligence—“To hold a person as having contributed
to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought
about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending
danger to health and body.”23 X x x x x x x x x x it means the plaintiff
(the injured or deceased, as the case may be) failed to use reasonable
care for his own safety and this contributed to his own damages.”24
iii) Your Introduction to Law
Contributory negligence—“The want of ordinary care which
contributes to an accident. Contributory negligence may result from the
failure of the person claiming damages to use the care which a
reasonable man would have used to avoid danger, or it may result
from his voluntarily exposing himself to danger. The latter,
sometimes called ‘assumption of risk,’ will defeat a recovery in a
negligent action.
Factors Affecting Negligent Claims
In a negligence claim, a person must prove (1) that the person
against whom the claim is made had a duty and was negligent and (2)
that he himself was not guilty of even the slightest negligence
contributing to the accident.”25
_______________
22 Abridged Fifth Edition, p. 538.
23 “Torts and Damages Annotated,” 2009 ed., p. 45 citing Ma-ao Sugar Central Co.,
Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 83491, 189 SCRA 88; MMTC vs. CA, August 1, 2002, 386 SCRA
126, G.R. No. 141089.
24 “Tort and Damages Annotated”, 2009 ed., pp. 45-46. Dean Pineda also adopted the
definition of Contributory Negligence in Black’s Law Dictionary, (5th Ed., p. 538) and he
added the above.
25 Edited by George G. Coughlin, p. 69; Underscoring supplied; In our jurisdiction,
contributory negligence “mitigates the awards” under Art. 2179 of the Civil Code.
498

d) Proximate Cause
Proximate Cause—“such adequate and efficient cause as in the
natural order of events, and under the particular circumstances
surrounding the case, would necessarily produce the event. It is one
which in natural sequence, undisturbed by any independent cause,
produces the result complained of. The result, however, must be the
natural probable consequence such as ought to have been foreseen as
likely to flow from the act complained of.
Chain of Causation—The cause of the cause is the cause of the
effect. There is liability by the original actor for all consequences
which may be attributed to his act. Thus, one who pushes another is
liable for the damages caused by the latter for having been pushed; x x
x.”26
“Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.”27
iii) Black’s Law Dictionary
Proximate cause—“An injury or damage is proximately caused by
an act, or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the
case, that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about
or in actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or
damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence
of the act or omission.”28
_______________
26 “The Civil Code of the Philippines”, Vol. V, Special Contracts, 1994 ed., pp.
607-608; Underscoring supplied.
27 “Tort and Damages Annotated,” 2009 ed., p. 43, citing BPI vs. Casa
Montessori Internationale, G.R. No. 149454, 430 SCRA 261.
28 Abridged Fifth Edition, p. 641. The above is in addition to the standard
definition of proximate cause.
499
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 499

§ VI. Decisions of the Courts on Damages

While the decisions of the RTC, the CA and the High Court were
uniform in their findings and conclusions, the latter failed to discuss
an important area in the award of damages. This pertains to the
justifications and the formula or method in the computation of
Actual and Compensatory and other damages awarded to the Harper
heirs.
a) Dispositive portions of the decisions of the courts

i) RTC dated October 25, 2005:
“WHEREFORE, finding the defendant hotel to be remiss in its
duties and thus liable for the death of Christian Harper, this Court
orders the defendant to pay plaintiffs the amount of:
PhP 43,901,055.00 as and by way of actual and compensatory
damages;
PhP 739,075.00 representing the expenses of transporting the
remains of Harper to Oslo, Norway;
PhP 250,000.00 attorneys fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.”
ii) CA dated October 21, 2009:
“WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court
dated October 25, 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Accordingly, defendant-appellant is ordered to pay plaintiffs-appellees
the amount of P52,078,702.50, as actual and compensatory damages,
P25,000.00, as temperate damages, P250,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
to pay the costs of the suit.”
iii) High Court dated August 29, 2012:
“WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the judgment of the Court of
Appeals; and orders petitioners to pay the costs of suits.”
500

b) Paring down of the issues
Petitioner hotel raised before the CA the following Assignment

of Errors from the decision of the RTC, that it erred: i) In ruling that
plaintiffs heirs were the heirs of Mr. Harper since there was no
competent evidence to support thereof;
ii) In ruling that Petitioner hotel’s negligence was the proximate
cause of the death of Mr Harper; iii) In awarding to the Harper heirs
PhP43,901,055.00 representing loss earnings of Mr. Harper, “there
being no competent proof of the earning of Mr. Harper during his
lifetime”; iv) In awarding PhP739,075.00 representing cost of
transporting the remains of Mr Harper to Oslo, Norway; v) In
awarding attorney’s fees to Plaintiffs heirs, and in directing
Petitioner hotel to pay costs of suit.
In the Petition for Review before the High Court, Petitioner hotel
opted not to question anymore the propriety of these awards and/or
the correctness of the figures. Thus it raised only three issues,
namely, i) whether or not the Harper heirs were able to prove that
they are the widow and son of the deceased, Mr. Harper; ii) whether
or not the Harper heirs were able to prove the allegations in the
complaint that there was negligence on the part of Petitioner hotel
and such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Mr.
Harper; and iii) Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of
Mr. Harper was his own negligence. Probably, the strategy was that
if Petitioner hotel succeeds in persuading the High Court to reverse
the CA findings of fault and negligence, these awards for damages
would consequently be set-aside.
Too bad that the propriety of the awards, or in the alternative,
even the correctness of their final figures was not further raised as an
issue before the High Court. The latest pronouncement by the High
Court in this case on the value of human life would have benefited
the bench and the bar. If there were significant changes in its
computation or new items factored in we will never know. Since Mr.
Harper died at a very young age with presumably a high income in
dollars
501
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 501

from a foreign company, it would have been enlightening to

know how the CA arrived at its figures and why the High Court
affirmed the awards in toto.
Actual and Compensatory damages and expenses for
transportation of the remains of Mr. Harper to Oslo, Norway were
fixed by the RTC at PhP43,901,055.00 and Php739,075.00,
respectively. The attorneys fees were fixed at P250,000.00. In the
dispositive portion of the decision of the CA, these Actual and
Compensatory damages were increased by more than
Php8,000,000.00 or to a total of Php52,078,702.50. Why was there
an increase? Even if the costs of transporting the remains were
added to Actual and Compensatory damages as part of funeral
expenses, that could not still add up to the final figures arrived at by
the CA. Then the amount of attorney’s fees was unchanged and
temperate damages in the amount of Php25,000.00 were introduced.
It would have been interesting and enlightening had we been made
privy to how and why the CA retained the numbers as to the
attorney’s fees and added temperate damages.
Petitioner hotel could have intertwined as additional issue the
propriety and/or the correctness of these awards with questions of
law for the High Court to also address. It was the call of Petitioner
hotel. As it stands, there is a hiatus in the decision on the details of
these awards of damages.
§ VII. The Issue of Filiation
The Harper case was decided on two (2) main issues: Whether or
not filiation was proved and whether or not fault or negligence on
the part of Petitioner hotel was also proved.
On the matter of filiation, the main thrust of Petitioner hotel was
to question the formalities, authenticity, admissibility and/or
probative value of the documents presented by the Harper heirs to
prove their relationship with the deceased. It would seem though
that even at the trial court level, Petitioner hotel objected to the
presentation and offer/admission
502

of these documents tending to prove filiation. Otherwise, they would

have waived that right before the CA and the High Court. It is
unlikely though that the Harper heirs, widow and son, would
undertake this legal action in a foreign country half the globe away
and spend so much just to pretend to be the persons they are not.
a) Objections to the documents
Thus, the first issue raised before the High Court by Petitioner
hotel was whether or not the Harper heirs were able to prove x x x x
“that they are the widow and son of Mr. Christian Harper.” As stated
above, it questioned the documents prepared in a foreign country
which were presented by the Harper heirs to establish filiation. It
argued that there was no testimonial evidence or witness presented
who identified and affirmed the aforesaid documents. These
documents and the objections thereto are enumerated hereunder:
i) Exh. Q—was identified as a Certificate of Marriage when it appears to

be the Birth Certificate of Mr. Harper;
ii) Exh. Q-1—translation of the Marriage Contract of the Harpers. The
original was not produced in court as well as offered in evidence; and as mere
translation it was not a competent evidence of the fact stated therein; and even
if its original was presented, it was not a public document which is admissible
without being identified or authenticated by a witness;
iii) Exh. R—identified as Probate Court Certificate when it appears as the
Birth Certificate of Mr. Harper;
iv) Exh. R-1—translation of Probate Court Certificate, the original of
which was not produced in court and offered in evidence; being a mere
translation it is an incompetent evidence;
v) Exhs. Q-1 and R-1—were not duly attested by legal custodians in the
places where they were issued as required under Secs. 24 and 25, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court; Peti-
503
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 503

tioner hotel contended that as private documents which were not duly
authenticated on the witness stand by a competent witness they are essentially
hearsay and have no probative value; and thus the Harper heirs (mother and
son) failed to prove their relationship to the deceased, Mr. Harper.
b) Arguments of the Harper heirs on these documents

Plaintiffs heirs argued for the admissibility of these documents by
claiming that: Exh. Q-1—the Marriage Certificate was duly issued
by the Vicar of the Parish of Ullern with appropriate statement that
“this certificate is a transcript from the Register of Marriage of
Ullerm Church”; its contents were translated into English by an
authorized translator “and authenticated by the Royal Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Norway, which in turn, was authenticated by the
Consul of the Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines in
Stockholm, Sweden”; Exh. Q—the Birth Certificate of Jonathan
Christopher Harper, was also issued, signed and authenticated by the
officials concerned in the area; Exh. R-1—“the Probate Court
Certificate was also authenticated by the Royal Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Norway, whose signature was also authenticated by the
Philippine consul in Stockholm, Sweden.”
The Harper heirs further contended that Exh. Q-1—Marriage
Contract issued by the vicar of Ullerm, the legal custodian of the
parish records “is considered as an exception to the hearsay rule”;
and Exh. R-1—the translation of the Probate Court Certificate from
official records of the Kingdom of Norway is “a written official act
of a foreign sovereign country.”
c) The CA and the High Court Rulings on these documents
The CA accordingly ruled in favour of the Harper heirs on these
documents. It paraphrased Secs. 24 and 25 of Rule 132 on proof of
official record and contents of attestation clause. It explained that all
the documents were kept in the Kingdom of
504

Norway; they were duly authenticated by its ministry of foreign

affairs officer, with the official seal of such office and the signature
of Ms. Tanja Sorlie who was duly authorized to legalize documents
for said office; and then these documents were all accompanied by
the authentication of the Philippine consul based in Stockholm,
Sweden, attesting that Ms. Tanja Sorlie was duly authorized to
legalize official documents of such ministry of Norway. It concluded
that the Harper heirs had “substantially complied with the
requirements set forth under the rules.” It also noted the difficulties
on the part of Harper heirs in securing these documents since they
“are residing overseas and are litigating locally through their
representative.”
The High Court upheld the position of the CA and declared that
the objections to these documentary evidence were not well-taken.
For ready reference, it reproduced the pertinent provisions of the
Rules of Court as mentioned above:
Section 24. Proof of official record.—The record of public documents

referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose,
may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by
the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a
foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state.—Whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must
state in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific
part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the seal of the
attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal,
under the seal of such court.
505
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 505

The High Court conceded that while the questioned documents

did not observe the conditions set forth under Section 24 on (Proof
of official record) and Section 25 (What attestation of copy must
state), of Rule 132 “to the effect that if the record was not kept in the
Philippines a certificate of the person having custody must
accompany the copy of the document that was duly attested stating
that such person had custody of the documents, the deviation was
not enough reason to reject the utility of the documents for the
purposes they were intended to serve.”
d) Admission of documents under the principle of “substantial
compliance”
The High Court also noted that the documents challenged set
forth the purported contents thereof. And that they were all
uniformly authenticated by Ms. Tanja Sorlie of the Royal Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Norway with official seal of such office. Then
the Philippine Consul based in Stockholm, Sweden also duly
authenticated and/or certified these documents and to the capacity of
Ms Tanja Sorlie “to legalize official documents for the Royal
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway.” The High Court concluded
at this point: “Without showing to the contrary by petitioner, Exhibit
Q, Exhibit R, Exhibit Q-1 and Exhibit R-1 should be presumed to be
themselves official documents under Norwegian law, and admissible
as prima facie evidence of the truth of their contents under
Philippine law.” It added that at minimum these exhibits
“substantially met the requirements of Section 24 and Section 25 of
Rule 132 as a condition for their admission as evidence in default of
a showing by petitioner that the authentication process was tainted
with bad faith.”
These challenged documents proving filiation were accepted
under the principle of “substantial compliance” which the High
Court supported with a host of cases although the latter did not
directly pertain to rulings on admissibility of foreign documents
issued in a foreign country.
506

§ VIII. The Issue of Fault or Negligence

a) Uniform rulings of the RTC, the CA and the High Court
The more important issue in this case was fault or negligence —
where does it lie? On this issue, Petitioner hotel contended that the
Harper heirs “failed to prove its negligence; that Harper’s own
negligence in allowing the killers into his hotel room was the
proximate cause of his own death; and that hotels were not insurers
of the safety of their guests.” To repeat, the RTC, the CA and the
High Court are one in fixing blame upon Petitioner hotel. The
dispositive portion of the RTC decision found: “x x x defendant
hotel to be remiss in its duties and thus liable for the death of
Christian Harper.” A considerable portion of the RTC decision was
reproduced with approval in the CA decision which was in turn
reproduced with approval in the High Court decision under
annotation.
Thus the final verdict ruling was that Petitioner hotel was at fault
or negligent because it provided inadequate security which was the
proximate cause of the death of hotel guest, Mr. Harper. As stated
above, this ruling may set a paradigm shift in the basis of action in
case of death, injury or loss of property of a hotel guest. And as
emphasized above, we have revisited settled definitions,
qualifications, and commentaries on the concepts of fault,
negligence, proximate cause and contributory negligence. They are
relevant in determining blame and compensability when tested
against the facts and surrounding circumstances that led to the death
of Mr. Harper in his hotel room, as well as against the preparation
and implementation of standard security mechanics or infrastructure
in Petitioner Hotel.
There are reasons and even need to commiserate with the Harper
heirs over the shocking and unexplained death of their loved one at
the prime of his life in a distant country. He went to the Philippines,
not as a mercenary to fight a war
507
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 507

in the countryside, but as an Engineer on a business trip, only to be
returned in a coffin. There are similar cases here and in foreign
lands, but there is no need to discuss them lest we be distracted. The
High Court has spoken and the matter should rest. However, in the
interest of academic inquiry, there are questions begging to be asked,
findings and conclusions inviting to be tested against the facts and
settled legal concepts of fault or negligence, etc., certain gaps in
some facts and circumstances needing to be filled, non-sequiturs and
observations/comments recommending themselves to be articulated
— for a fresh insight into the case.
b) The findings and conclusions of the three (3) courts
Let us then summarize the uniform findings and conclusions of
the three (3) courts, particularly on the security set-up of
Petitioner hotel at the time of death of Mr. Harper:
i. Former security officer of Petitioner hotel, Col. Rodrigo de Guzman,

testified that when he assumed the position as its chief of security, the set-up
was one guard covering 3 to 4 floors; he recommended at least one guard per
floor; he even opined that one guard is not enough because of the blind portion
of the hallway of each floor (L-shape configuration) of Petitioner hotel; but his
recommendation was not followed then;
ii. On cross-examination, he clarified that the hotel security system at the
time of death of Mr. Harper was adequate because the hotel then was “not
fully booked” or “not doing well”;
iii. That “the malefactors gained entry into the room by simply knocking
at Harper’s door and the latter opening it probably thinking it was hotel
personnel without an inkling that criminals could be in the premises”;
iv. The CCTV of the hotel in the early morning of Nov. 6, 1999, showed
the following time line: 12:14 a.m. – entry of Mr. Harper into his room; 12:17
a.m. – entry of a female “visitor” into Mr. Harper’s room, or 3 minutes after;
2:48 a.m. – entry of a male Caucasian into Mr. Harper’s room; 5:33 a.m. –
508

exit of female “visitor” from the room; and 5:46 a.m. – exit of male
Caucasian, from the room;
v. “The interval of three minutes in Harper’s entry and that of the alleged
female visitor belies the ‘theory of acquaintanceship’. It is most likely that that
the female ‘visitor’ was the one who opened the door to the male ‘visitor’,
undoubtedly, a co-conspirator”;
vi. The male Caucasian who even stared at the hotel camera evincing
wariness was not checked/stopped by hotel personnel;
vii. Petitioner Hotel was “remiss in its duty of exercising the required
reasonable care under the circumstances”;
viii. Petitioner Hotel was in “a better situation than the injured person to
foresee and prevent the happening of the injurious occurrence”;
ix) The failure to post one guard per floor as recommended by Col de
Guzman, rendered Petitioner Hotel “negligent in providing adequate security,
due its guests”;
x) The trial court conclusion which was adopted by the CA and the High
Court was: “In any case, the ghastly incident could have been prevented had
there been adequate security in each of the hotel floors. This, coupled with the
earlier recommendation of Col. de Guzman to the hotel management to act on
the security lapses of the hotel, raises the presumption that the crime was
foreseeable;”
xi) “Clearly, defendant’s inaction constitutes negligence or want of
reasonable care demanded of it in that particular situation”;
xii) “Such negligence is the proximate cause which set the chain of
events that led to the eventual demise of its guest. Had there been reasonable
security precautions, the same could have saved Christian Harper from a
brutal death”;
xiii) Since the CA findings in this case are not covered by the
“exceptional circumstances” which were enumerated, whereby the High Court
may review CA findings, the latter then concluded:
509
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 509

“Accordingly, the Court cannot depart from or disturb the factual findings
on negligence of petitioner made by both the RTC and the CA.
Even so, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioner failed to provide the
basic and adequate security measures expected of a five star hotel; and that its
omission was the proximate cause of Harper’s death.”
xiv) Finally the High Court restating a similar declaration of the CA,
concluded: “The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the
public, hotel keepers are bound to provide not only lodging for their guests but
also security to the persons and belongings of their guests. The twin duty
constitutes the essence of the business.”
The above recitals of facts and conclusions as well as quotes

from the decisions of the three (3) courts supported and reaffirmed
the findings and verdict of fault or negligence of Petitioner Hotel for
the death of Mr. Harper.
§ IX. Questions and Comments/
Observations
However the following questions and comments/observations
beg to be asked and to be articulated:
a) Had one guard per floor been posted at the time when the tragedy
occurred, as recommended by Col. De Guzman, would that constitute
adequate security on the part of Petitioner hotel? (Note: This is even assuming
that Col. De Guzman did not qualify on cross-examination that the security
was adequate even with one guard for 3 to 4 floors, because Petitioner hotel
was “not fully booked” or “was not doing well” then);
b) Could one guard per floor have prevented that crime from happening
inside a hotel room? Did failure to prevent that crime amount to fault or
negligence of Petitioner hotel? What constitutes “reasonable security
precautions” as stated in the decision, the posting of one guard per floor? Is
there a causal connection between the failure to post one (1) guard per floor to
the tragedy?
510

c) Was Petitioner hotel in a better situation than the injured to foresee and
prevent the tragedy, with one (1) guard posted per floor?
d) Does the three (3)-minute time-lag between the entry of Mr. Harper
into his room and that of the female “visitor” contradict Petitioner hotel’s
“theory of acquaintanceship”? Or could this 3-minute time-lag be a measure of
discreetness?
e) If the female “visitor” were not acquainted with Mr Harper, how did
she know which room to knock and how was she able to enter it, obviously
without incident?
f) What is the customary practice of guests when an unexpected and
unknown visitor or even one of the hotel personnel knocks at their doors,
especially at the wee hours of the morning? Don’t they first usually peep
through the keyholes?
g) From the CCTV, the female “visitor” entered Mr. Harper’s room
obviously without incident and appeared to have remained there for some 2
hours and a few minutes (about 2 hours and 11 minutes) until the male
Caucasian co-conspirator arrived. What does that the stay for 2 hours and a
few minutes inside imply or what is its plausible explanation? Witness the
following:
12:14 a.m. — Mr. Harper entered his hotel room;
12:17 a.m. — Mr. Harper was followed into his room by a female
“visitor” who appeared to have known the number of his room, entered
it (without incident) and remained inside for 2 hours and a few
minutes; she was still inside when at;
2:28 a.m. — a male Caucasian also entered Mr. Harper’s room.
According to the decision: “it is most likely that that the female
‘visitor’ was the one who opened the door to the male ‘visitor’,
undoubtedly, a co-conspirator”;
5:33 a.m. — female “visitor” left the room of Mr. Harper; and,
5:56 a.m. — the male Caucasian also left the room of Mr. Harper;
511
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 511

h) It is correct as per the result of the Biology Report (“Harper was found
negative of prohibited and regulated drugs”) and the Toxicology Report
(“negative of the presence of alcohol in his blood”) on Mr. Harper and as
affirmed by the High Court in the decision that no “joyous party” occurred
among Mr. Harper and the two (2) malefactors. In fact this is consistent with
what happened to Mr. Harper;
i) What is the accepted standard for an adequate security for Petitioner
hotel or for similar big hotels?
j) The definitions and explanations of the nature of negligence, set forth
earlier, adverted to some standards or guidelines or formula to be set,
delineated, in place, and accepted by the hotel industry – and wanting in that
or failure to meet that, negligence sets in.
k) What is the basis or source of the level or standard of security measure
or infrastructure to be set up at Petitioner hotel to be deemed adequate, from
law, city ordinance, rules, manuals, conventions, or guidelines from hotel
association, legislative enactment, or from the opinion of its security
personnel? Is there a need to standardize that for universal acceptance and
compliance of hotels to be a basis for what is adequate security? Or can that
be standardized?
l) Has there been unrestricted access by visitors to the rooms of
Petitioner hotel at the time? Is it a hotel practice to check/stop a person (guest
or visitor) who enters the hotel and directly proceeds to one of the rooms?
m) We agree with the High Court that Petitioner Hotel was wrong when
it contended that hotels are not insurers of the safety of the lives, limbs, and
properties of their guests. A hotel, like a common carrier, is committed (or is
even deemed to have contracted) to protect, particularly the lives and limbs of
its clientele;
n) What is required of a visitor who does not know the room number of a
guest? Can he readily get it from the desk by merely asking and then walk
upstairs to his room? Must the visitor be first required to supply the name of
the guest to the desk clerk and then the latter calls the room without disclosing
the number of his room to the visitor?
512

o) Based on the features of contributory negligence, does it enter into the

picture in this case in light of the claim of Petitioner hotel that Mr. Harper let
in his room the malefactors?
In fact the trial court conclusion which was adopted by the CA and the
High Court was that the two (2) malefactors gained entry into Mr. Harper’s
room by simply knocking:
“x x x x it is more likely, under the circumstances obtaining that the
malefactor/s gained entry into his room by simply knocking at Harper’s
door and the latter opening it probably thinking it was hotel personnel,
without an inkling that criminal/s could be in the premises.”
p) Finally, in light of the facts and some questions raised: What was
really the proximate cause of the tragedy? Petitioner hotel insisted “that
Harper’s own negligence in allowing the killers into his room was the
proximate cause of his own death.” On the other hand, the Harper heirs
maintained that the proximate cause was the negligence of Petitioner hotel
because of its inadequate security.
§ X. Breach of Contract as Legal Basis for Action

a) Hotel is a public utility
Hotel or hotel business has been considered as a public utility in
American jurisdiction: “A public utility is commonly referred to as
‘business affected with a public interest’ x x x x the following are
public utilities: common carriers of all kinds by land, water, air,
water supply, gas, electricity, bridges, warehouses, x x x x hotels, ice
plants, markets, x x x.” (http://gluedideas.com/ etc. Public Utilities
—monopoly, natural, service, business, utility; Underscoring
supplied). American Jurisprudence also held that: “Property devoted
to the business of an inn, hotel, or other place of like character held
out to the public as a place where transient persons will be received
and entertained as guests for compensation is af-
513
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 513

fected with a public interest, and the business and use are subject to
reasonable public regulation.”29
b) Hotel business, like common carrier business is “imbued with
public interest”
The pertinent portion of the decision of the CA conceded that
“hotel business like the common carrier’s business is imbued with
public interest”:
“WE are reminded of the Supreme Court’s enunciation that the hotel
business like the common carrier’s business is imbued with public interest.
Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for
hotel guests but also security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty
The High Court in full concurrence with this holding of the CA

restated and reaffirmed it:
“The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public,
hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for their guests but also
security to the persons and belongings of their guests. The twin duty
c) Insuring the safety, particularly of the lives and limbs of hotel

guests is a contractual commitment
Since a hotel or hotel business is likened to a common carrier,
these duties to provide lodging and secure the persons and properties
of its guests are raised to the level of a contractual commitment or
obligation. Thus it is provided: “Common carriers, from the nature
of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and
for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to the
circum-
_______________
29 40 Am Jur. Ed. Hotels, Motels and Restaurants, & 28, p. 919, Underscoring
supplied.
514

stances of each case.”30 Furthermore: “In case of death of or injuries

to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault
or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.”31
Thus a hotel has a contractual commitment to provide proper
accommodation and to safeguard the lives, limbs and properties of
its guests. This finds categorical support also in American
Jurisprudence:
“Where a person is received in an inn or hotel as a guest, the law implies a

contract between the proprietor and the guest that the proprietor, by
himself and by his servants and agents, in addition to furnishing proper
accommodation, will exercise proper care for the safety and tranquillity of the
guest.”32
§ XI. Elements of Breach of Contract

a) Elements
The elements of breach of contract are about similar to that of
quasi-delict, except for the addition of pre-existing contract and the
breach of such contract:
i. act or omission;
ii. damage to another;
iii. pre-existing contract;
iv. breach of such contract;
v. fault or negligence (which is presumed once there is breach).
These elements are present in the facts of the Harper case, or for
that matter when a misfortune befalls upon a guest similar to Mr.
Harper’s in any hotel or lodging establishment.
_______________
30 Art. 1733, New Civil Code.
31 Art. 1756, New Civil Code; Underscoring supplied.
32 40 Am Jur. 2d., 938; Underscoring supplied.
515
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 515

b) Features
Furthermore, an action under breach of contract has the following
features:
i) Presumption of fault or negligence on defendant
The provision of Art. 1756 on common carrier may be applied in
case of death or injury to hotel quests, whereby, fault or negligence
is presumed on the part of the hotel, as it is presumed on the part of
a common carrier if the breach of contract of carriage resulted to
death or injury of a passenger. This legal presumption is an immense
procedural advantage for the plaintiff, because there is no more need
for him to prove fault or negligence. All that plaintiff has to prove is
breach of the contract, either by proof of death or injuries or loss of
personal property in the hotel premises, then fault or negligence is
deemed presumed. In other words, in quasi-delict, fault or
negligence is the cause of action—which “should be clearly
established” per Calalas vs. CA, G.R. No. 122039, 332 SCRA 356,
as well as its causal connection to the death, injury, or loss of
property of the guest; whereas in breach of contract, the cause of
action is the breach itself, for which the presumption of fault or
negligence follows as stated above. Breach is usually far easier to
prove (e.g., death, injury or loss of property as the case may be) than
fault or negligence which may require assiduous gathering and
marshalling of evidence as well as its adroit presentation in court.
ii) Quantum of evidence
A legal action based on breach of contract requires
preponderance of evidence after which presumption follows.
However, the quantum of evidence required to overcome the
resulting presumption of fault or negligence is proof of
extraordinary diligence—a little difficult to establish by the
defendant, or by Petitioner hotel in this case. Extraordinary diligence
is a notch above ordinary diligence. On the other
516

hand, a legal action based on quasi-delict, also requires

preponderance of evidence to establish fault or negligence, but the
quantum of evidence needed to counter such proof of fault or
negligence, is ordinary diligence. These concepts seem hard to
verbally ensnare through a clear definition. It is up to the courts to
use or apply them when confronted with the problem.
iii) Logical causal nexus
Furthermore, as stated above, there is also the requirement in
quasi-delict to clearly show a logical causal nexus or connection
between fault or negligence and the resulting injury; whereas in
breach of contract, by merely showing breach, everything should fall
into place, or there should be no need to show such causal nexus. In
other words, the presumption of fault or negligence carries with it
the presumption that it was caused by the party who breached the
contract; or in the language of the Civil Code the “common carriers
(or the hotels for that matter) are presumed to have been at fault or
to have acted negligently.”33
iv) Vagaries of trials
And finally, there is also the likely pitfalls that plaintiff may
stumble into while proving fault or negligence in quasi-delict. Fault
or negligence is sometimes hard to prove. And plaintiff may suffer
set-backs in the course of the proceedings. Sometimes, he may not
be able to present sufficient or relevant evidence to convincingly
establish fault or negligence given the vagaries of trials.
§ XII. Action under Quasi-Delict Dismissible if There is Pre-
Existing Contract?
If an action were filed under quasi-delict but should have been
filed under breach of contract, may it be dismissed on
_______________
33 Art. 1756.
517
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 517

ground of lack of cause of action, upon a showing (e.g., through a

Motion to Dismiss) that the legal basis for action chosen was wrong
or improper since there was a pre-existing contract between plaintiff
and defendant? Or on the ground that plaintiff cannot recover under
an action for quasi-delict if the relationship with defendant were
contractual in nature?
a) Singson, et al. vs. BPI, No. L-24837 dated June 27, 1968, or
23 SCRA 1117.
This question was answered by the trial court in Singson, et al.
vs. BPI, supra. Mr. Julian Singson along with other defendants were
adjudged by a trial court of Manila to pay a company its money
claims. He appealed the decision while some of his co-defendants
did not. Then a writ of garnishment on the deposits of his co-
defendants (who did not appeal) was issued to a bank (Bank of the
Philippine Islands—BPI) where Singson had also an account. The
employee of the bank did not properly check whether Singson’s
account was really included in the writ after seeing his name in the
caption. Then he prepared a letter signed by the bank president
notifying Singson of this writ. Consequently, two (2) checks Singson
thereafter issued were dishonoured by the bank.
Upon formal notice by Mr. Singson to the bank that his name was
not included in the Writ of Execution and Notice of Garnishment the
bank immediately rectified the matter and apologized to him. But
Mr. Singson still sued the bank for damages under quasi-delict in
another court (then presided by Judge Montesa) which thereafter
dismissed this complaint on the ground that the relation between
Singson as depositor with BPI, as his bank was contractual. On
appeal, the High Court noted that the trial court “rendered judgment
dismissing the complaint upon the ground that plaintiffs cannot
recover from defendants upon the basis of quasi-delict, because
the relation between the parties (depositor and bank) is
contractual.” (Underscoring supplied).
518

The High Court reversed the trial court, but it opted not to rebut
or demonstrate as erroneous the ground for dismissal by the trial
court. And then it ordered the bank to pay nominal damages and
attorney’s fees to Singson, by applying the holding in Air France vs.
Carrascoso.34 It then announced that: “We have repeatedly held,
however that the existence of a contract between the parties does
not bar the commission of a tort by one against the order (other?)
and the consequent recovery of damages therefore” (Underscoring
supplied). By invoking Carrascoso supra, the High Court in this
case impliedly admitted “the existence of a contract between the
parties” yet it reversed the ruling of the trial court—which found and
based its dismissal of the complaint precisely on “the existence of a
contract between the parties.”
Note: According to the High Court in Carrascoso, supra, the
contract of carriage was breached when Mr. Carrascoso was illegally
ousted from his First Class seat in the plane and sent to tourist class
section in favour of a white man. This breach was stigmatized as
illegal, in bad faith, oppressive, malevolent, etc., which amounted to
a tort or “tortious act” for which damages are also warranted.
b) Is the ruling in Singson, et al. vs. BPI, supra, correct?
With due respect, it is submitted that the ruling of the High Court
in Singson supra seems not correct. Witness the following:
i) The trial court dismissed the complaint of Mr. Singson against the bank
for negligently dishonoring his checks, because his complaint was anchored
upon quasi-delict whereas the regime between depositor and bank is
contractual;
ii) This act of the bank in disregard or in violation of its fiduciary duty
like negligently dishonouring or allowing Singson’s checks to bounce
amounted to a breach of contract;
_______________
34 L-21438, dated Sept. 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 155.
519
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 519

iii) An action against the bank under quasi-delict for negligently

dishonouring the check of a depositor cannot be a basis for recovery due to
wrong/improper or lack of cause of action because, to repeat, depositor and
bank are under a contractual regime as to the latter’s money or deposit; the
action should have been for breach of contract;
iv) The High Court reversed the ruling of the trial court which invoked
this ground (depositor cannot sue bank under quasi-delict for a check that the
latter mistakenly dishonoured since the relationship between the two is
contractual). This means or implies that the High Court did not think the trial
court was correct in its reason for dismissing the complaint; and it awarded
damages to Singson;
v) In so awarding the damages, it applied the Carrascoso, supra, ruling
which it restated, that “the existence of a contract between the parties does
not bar the commission of a tort by one against the order (other?) and the
consequent recovery of damages therefor”; and further referring to the
Carrascoso ruling, it concluded: “although the relation between a passenger
and a carrier ‘is contractual both in origin and nature the act that breaks the
contract may also be a tort”;
vi) This implies that the High Court awarded damages for the
commission of the act that “breaks the contract” (dishonouring Singson’s
checks) which amounted to quasi-delict or tort per Carrascoso supra, ruling;
vii) Thus, the High Court in reversing the trial court ruling which
dismissed the complaint of Singson because it was filed under quasi-delict, but
still awarded damages by applying the Carrascoso, supra, ruling, unwittingly
admitted that there was breach of contract or there was the existence of
contractual regime between the parties.
In other words, the complaint in Carrascoso, supra, was filed under
breach of contract and then the Supreme Court ruled that on top of breach of
contract, damages may be awarded if the breach amounted to a quasi-delit or
tortuous act. On the other hand, the complaint in Singson, supra, was filed
under quasi-delict. By applying in this case, Carrascoso, supra, it would
result in imposing damages for acts amounting to quasi-delict or tortuous act
—on top of a quasi-
520

delict. This is not the ruling or principle enunciated in Carrascoso, supra.
§ XIII. Significance of the Harper Case Decision

Some decisions of the High Court are milestones in Philippine
jurisprudence especially when they reverse or abandon anachronistic
holdings or doctrines in response to present needs or to finally
rectify a continuing error; when they open new avenues in certain
fields of law; or when they affirm established and revered doctrines
but with novel applications or approaches in addressing various and
varied issues, thus providing apt legal remedies. The Harper case
decision bequeaths our jurisprudence with the following significant
holdings and questions that may require inquiry in the future:
a) Substantial compliance re: foreign documents—The first
issue raised in the Petition for Review of Petitioner hotel before the
High Court was the want of testimonial support, want of required
requisites and formalities, want of proper authentication, and
inadmissibility of foreign documents in support of the claimed
filiation between Mr. Harper and his heirs. Had these objections
been sustained by the High Court, and these documents tending to
prove filiation were excluded, the Harper heirs would have been
foiled in their claim as wife and son of the deceased. There would
have been awards with no “awardees”—leaving the case levitating
in a judicial limbo. To the credit of the High Court, it did not allow
this legal absurdity to happen. It rejected the objections, and ruled in
favor of admissibility and probative value of these documents even
in the face of their seeming deficiency by invoking the principle of
“substantial compliance”.
The High Court has been usually strict in admitting and giving
probative value to foreign documents under Section 24 (Proof of
official record) and Section 25 (What attestation of copy must state)
of Rule 132. Its official position as may be gleaned from an earlier
case, is that foreign laws (which should include foreign documents)
“do not prove themselves
521
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 521

in our courts” and of which they cannot take judicial notice

thereof.35 But it was also predisposed to relax its position. Justice
Francisco noted in his book such relaxation of the rule which may be
applied in an analogous manner. He said that evidence of the law of
a foreign country pertaining to reciprocity on acquisition of
citizenship:
“x x x x meeting the prescribed law of practice by Section 41, Rule 123,

(now, Section 24, Rule 132) may be allowed and used as basis for a favourable
action, if in light of all the circumstances, the court is satisfied of the
authenticity of the written proof offered.”36
After all, countries have their own protocol in authenticating their

documents.
Thus the pertinent holding of the High Court on the principle of
“substantial compliance”:
“The principle of substantial compliance recognizes that exigencies and

situations do occasionally demand some flexibility in the rigid application of
the rules of procedure and the laws. That the rules of procedure may be
mandatory in form and application does not forbid a showing of substantial
compliance under justifiable circumstances, because substantial compliance
does not equate to a disregard of basic rules.”
This gesture will sit well with foreign jurisdictions which may
also treat with liberality any plea for admission of documents in
their courts issued, certified, and/or authenticated by and in our
government.
b) Latest value of Human Life—as pointed out above, the RTC
came up with specific amount of Actual and Compensatory damages
which must have included the earnings of Mr.
_______________
35 Justice [CA] Ricardo Francisco, “Evidence”, Third Edition, 1996, p. 523
citing Fluermer vs. Hix, 54 Phil. 611.
36 Justice [CA] Ricardo Francisco, “Evidence”, Third Edition, 1996, p. 523
citing In Re Petition of Pardo, 47 O.G. 3447.
522

Harper at the time of his death, his expected capacity to earn in

reference to his life expectancy and other related factors. It would
have been enlightening had the High Court discussed how the CA
arrived at the final figures on Actual and Compensatory damages.
Relative to that benchmark case of Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. CA,37
are there some factors and changes in the computation of “loss of
capacity to earn” vis-à-vis “the formula (2/3 x [80-30] = life
expectancy) adopted in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality
or the Actuarial of Combined Experience Table of Mortality”?
There were subsequent rulings embodying computations of loss
of capacity to earn usually along the line of Villa Rey, supra.38 If
there is need to update the same to factor in new considerations in
the current valuation of human life, that will probably happen in
other cases. Given the subsequent decisions applying the
computation in Villa Rey, supra, it would seem that this case is still
in good repute, so to speak.
As stated above, the Petitioner Hotel did not anymore raise the
issue of propriety of the awards and/or the correctness of the figures.
Could the High Court have still addressed that? Usually, the High
Court would not address issues not raised or errors not assigned
since they are not on its plate, in a manner of speaking. It was a
golden opportunity missed. But as part of the review powers of the
High Court, it can still address issues not included in the Petition for
Review. This was the holding in Philippine National Bank vs.
Rabat.39 It cited the authoritative book of a former High Court
justice:
_______________
37 G.R. No. L-25499, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 511.
38 Nelen Lambert vs. Heirs of Rey Castillon, et al., G.R. No. 160709 dated Feb.
23, 2005, 452 SCRA 285 and Phil. Hawk Corp. vs. Vivian Tan Lee, G.R. No. 166869
dated Feb. 16, 2010, 612 SCRA 576.
39 G.R. No. 134406, 344 SCRA 706. Please see also Philippine Hawk Corp. vs
Vivian Tan Lee, supra.
523
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 523

“In his book, Mr. Justice Florenz Regalado commented on this section,
(Sec. 8, Questions that may be decided of Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure) thus:
xxxx
“2. The procedure in the Supreme Court being generally the same as that
in the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise indicated (See Secs. 2 and 4, Rule
56), it has been held that the latter is clothed with ample authority to review
matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case.” (Remedial
Law Compendium, Vol. 1, Sixth Revised Edition, 1997, pp. 582-583)
c) Breach of Contract as the appropriate cause of action in the

Harper case or in similar cases
As discussed above, the decision under annotation appears to
have opened the possibility of a new legal basis for action, that
should replace quasi-delict in case of death, injury or loss of
property of a guest in a hotel or in similar lodging establishments. To
repeat, any act or omission that amounts to breach of this
commitment to insure the safety of a guest and his personal property
should be appropriately pursued under breach of contract, instead of
under quasi-delict, because of a pre-existing obligation between the
parties. In the case of a common carrier, death or injury to a
passenger may give rise to an action under breach of contract
(because of pre-existing contract of carriage) and then death or
injury to a third party, who is a non-passenger hit by the vehicle may
give rise to action under quasi-delict (because there is no pre-
existing contract between that third party). In the same manner, in
the case of hotel, death or injury to a guest while in its premises may
give rise to an action under breach of contract; and death or injury to
a third party, (e.g., a visitor sipping coffee at the lobby and then a
chandelier being installed dropped onto him) may give rise to an
action under quasi-delict.
524

In fact, (insofar as applicable) breach of contract may be the basis

for legal action in case of similar death, injury or loss of property
against other public utilities wherein a contractual relationship may
be seen to exist between the latter and their clientele.
d) Effect of this view on the Harper case
“Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines.”40 The rulings and holdings in the Harper case are now
part of the law or legal system of the Philippines. A thought is
swirling in the minds of some lawyers—whether or not this view
that the complaint should have been filed under breach of contract in
this Harper case, instead of under quasi-delict, could still affect or
“un-make” the case. Perhaps, it is too late in the day to disturb this
Harper decision which has already attained finality. Besides, the
teaching of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy,41 (which ruled that laches should
set in even on questions of jurisdiction after a lapse of a long time)
will be an authentic “brooding omnipresence” and warning against
any attempt to raise that issue.
§ XIV. Conclusion: “It’s More Fun in the Philippines”?
a) Justice to be “wooed by slow advances”
“Justice is not to be taken by storm. She is to be wooed by slow
advances”—thus waxed romantic Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, a
brilliant American jurist with incomparable writing style. Law aims
at justice and the pursuit of the latter is continuing, long, and
arduous. Yale Law School professor Harold J. Berman, articulated a
view of law “as a product of the historical development of a people’s
spirit and charac-
_______________
40 Art. 8 of the Civil Code.
41 L- 21450, 23 SCRA 29 (1968).
525
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 525

ter.”42 In line with this thought, there can never be a quantum leap
for law. There are only “slow advances” into history from ancient
times when men settle their differences through combat and violence
to the now supposed modern days when they bring their
remonstrance before a forum to prove their case in accordance with
civilized rules, to determine whereof blame lies and to accept
sanctions backed by community consensus and public force.
Thus we now have a cornucopia of wide-ranging solutions to
varied and various human conflicts. Law is the current sum of all
these sanction-laden rules of conduct and reason culled from
distilled wisdom of the ages, insights of percipient commentators,
pronouncements of brilliant oracles such as jurists and judges, as
well as enlightened edicts from lawmakers and sovereign lawgivers.
We have imbibed the codes, doctrines and holdings from Rome,
France, Spain, England, the United States and as well as from other
civil law countries. However, we have also evolved and formulated
home-grown jurisprudence, doctrines and principles to suit our
peculiar needs tempered by reason and common sense.
b) Jurisprudence on tort and damages not fully adopted in our
jurisdiction
Our jurisprudence on tort and damages was developed to address
particular issues and problems of this country still developing and in
the path of industrialization. The concepts of tort and damages and
those related thereto while borrowed from the United States were
not wholly transplanted into our legal landscape. American tort
covers intentional and unintentional acts or omissions. But we only
adopted unintentional acts which we limited to quasi-delict. And
battery which is a popular ground for legal action in the United
States found no nourishment in our judicial soil.
_______________
42 Talks on American Law, “Philosophical Aspects of American Law”, edited by
Harold J. Berman, 1972 ed., p. 319.
526

But we improvise like the holding that action for breach of

contract could still include acts which may be stigmatized as quasi-
delict43 as well as the formula in assessing the value of human life
(Villa Rey, supra and related cases). Legal thinking in the
jurisprudence on tort and damages, may probably include the view
that death, injury or loss of property of a guest in a hotel or other
similar public utility services, should indeed be an action under
breach of contract and not under quasi-delict. Afterall, upon
checking in and signing the pertinent documents at the desk of a
hotel, even if not specified in these papers, a contract, particularly
for the safety of the guest and his property is deemed written therein.
c) Need for universally accepted standard of adequate hotel
security
In light of the Harper case which has come up with significant
holdings, perhaps there is a need to re-examine these concepts of
quasi-delict and breach of contract in public utilities similar to hotel
services. There is also a need to come up with a law, ordinance,
rules, or conventions for the hotel industry for a standard of security
which should be installed or observed to be considered adequate.
Woefully, there is no level or infrastructure of security that is
applicable to all hotels which may be considered as universally
accepted standard of adequate security. The inconvenient reality is
that this is subject to that elusive variables of particular situation,
time, and place. Will the posting of more than one guard on each
floor of a hotel be an accepted standard for adequate security so that
it would not be liable for fault or negligence if something untoward
or a crime is committed upon its guests within its premises or inside
its rooms? Hotels in foreign countries do not post guards on each
floor as it is viewed as intrusive. As to arriving guests and visitors
there may be “greeters” but no pat downs since that may not only be
annoy-
_______________
43 Air France vs. Carrascoso, supra.
527
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 527

ing but an invasion of privacy. This search for a universally accepted

standard of adequate security for hotels is of utmost importance to
our tourism industry which is a veritable dollar-earner for our
country. Perhaps, if this problem were successfully addressed, we
can proclaim, without being snickered at, that: “It’s more fun in the
Philippines!”
——o0o——
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

Quasi Delict

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Quasi Delict

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Quasi Delict

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

ANNOTATION

DEATH IN A HOTEL: QUASI-DELICT

VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 481

§ VI. Decisions of the Courts on Damages, p. 499

482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

§ XIII. Significance of the Harper Case Decision, p. 520

VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 483

deeming devices that address the problems of ascertaining

484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

findings on the circumstances leading to the death of Mr Harper,

their commission is under an atmosphere of safety and security.

486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

and demeaning amount of P3,000 for civil indemnity in case of

VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 487

arrived in the country on a business trip and checked in at Petitioner

488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

g) Police investigators reviewed the CCTV tapes of Petitioner

VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 489

§ IV. Complaint Based on Quasi-Delict

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,

490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

i. act or omission—of Petitioner hotel on the matter of security to protect

b) Salient allegations in the Complaint of the Harper heirs

§ V. Definitions and Nature of Fault, Negligence, Contributory

492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 493

and vigilance which the surrounding circumstances reasonably

494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 495

matter of law, or according to decisions on the question negligence per

496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

iv. Melvin Belli & Allen Wilkinson:

VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 497

which, concurring with defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause

498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 499

§ VI. Decisions of the Courts on Damages

a) Dispositive portions of the decisions of the courts

500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Petitioner hotel raised before the CA the following Assignment

VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 501

from a foreign company, it would have been enlightening to

502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

of these documents tending to prove filiation. Otherwise, they would

i) Exh. Q—was identified as a Certificate of Marriage when it appears to

VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 503

b) Arguments of the Harper heirs on these documents

504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Norway; they were duly authenticated by its ministry of foreign

Section 24. Proof of official record.—The record of public documents

VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 505

The High Court conceded that while the questioned documents

506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

§ VIII. The Issue of Fault or Negligence

VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 507

i. Former security officer of Petitioner hotel, Col. Rodrigo de Guzman,

508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 509

The above recitals of facts and conclusions as well as quotes