WORKING PAPER NO.

44

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN INDIAN AGRICULTURE

JAYASHREE WATAL
INDIAN COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

JULY, 1998

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Core-6A, 4th Floor, India Habitat Centre, Lodi Road, New Dlehi-110 003
 Table Of Content

FOREWORD .............................................................................................................. 3

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN INDIAN AGRICULTURE.................... 4

I. INTRODUCTION:.............................................................................................. 4

II. IPRs RELEVANT TO AGRICULTURE:............................................................ 5

III. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:........................... 8

IV. INDIA's INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ON IPRs: .............................. 11

V. THE PUBLIC DEBATE IN INDIA ON LEGISLATIVE CHANGES ON

IPRs: .............................................................................................................. 13

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS:.................................... 21

REFERENCES ......................................................................................................... 25

PARTICIPANTS AT THE SEMINAR ON ............................................................... 30

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN INDIAN AGRICULTURE.................. 30

2
FOREWORD

Following the Agreement on Trade related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights

(TRIPS) in the World Trade Organization (WTO), most countries are committed
to the provision of certain minimum standards for the protection of intellectual
property. Such intellectual property rights (IPRs) raise crucial issues for the
future development of agriculture and are particularly important for a developing
country like India. These issues are being extensively debated in India and have
contributed to the preparation of legislation on IPRs with respect to plant variety
protection, patents and geographical indications.

This paper by Jayashree Watal sets the public debate on IPRs in Indian
agriculture in the framework of India's international commitments on TRIPS and
at the same time provides an overview of the state of play on implementing IPR
legislation in agriculture in India. It also makes some specific suggestions on
how to resolve some of these important issues.

ICRIER scheduled a Seminar on 9 July, 1998 to discuss this study. Participants

in the Seminar included representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture,
Research Institutions, NGOs and the Private Sector (A list of participants is
included at the end). The discussion confirmed the importance of the issues
raised in the paper and a number of points of view emerged. The paper has
been revised in the light of the discussion. A summary of the discussion is also
presented separately at the end of the paper.

It is hoped that this paper will help readers understand the context of the debate
on intellectual property rights in Indian agriculture.

Isher Judge Ahluwalia

Director & Chief Executive
ICRIER

3
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN INDIAN AGRICULTURE

Jayashree Watal1

I. INTRODUCTION:

Intellectual property rights (IPRs) can be broadly defined as legal rights

established over creative or inventive ideas. Such legal rights generally allow
right holders to exclude the unauthorized commercial use of their
creations/inventions by third persons. The rationale for the establishment of a
legal framework on IPRs is that it is a signal to society that creative and inventive
ideas will be rewarded. This does not mean that there is no other way of
rewarding such ideas or that this system is absolutely necessary, even less
sufficient, to reward inventiveness or creativity. Nevertheless, it would be difficult
to deny that IPRs do have a role to play in setting up of any such reward system.

There are two broad categories of IPRs: one, industrial property2 covering IPRs
such as patents, trademarks, geographical indications and industrial designs;
two, copyright and related rights covering artistic and literary works,
performances, broadcasts and the like. IPRs that do not fit into this classical
division are termed sui generis, meaning one-of-its-kind. Such sui generis rights
include those covering lay-out designs of semi conductor chips and plant
breeders’ rights.

This paper will in the next section distinguish the IPRs relevant to agriculture and
explain these rights. In Section III the international intellectual property law for
these rights will be described. Section IV sets out India's international obligations
vis-a-vis her own IPR laws and Section V goes on to an analysis of the public
debate in India on the controversial IPRs and the status of the legislation on
these. This paper concludes in Section VI with prescriptions for public policy on
IPRs and agriculture in India.

1
The author has worked in the government of India, dealing with TRIPS, in the Ministry of Industry and in the Ministry of
Commerce at New Delhi. The views expressed here are based on publicly available material, including newspaper
reports, and are not attributable to any institution or organization with which the author is or has been associated. The
author gratefully acknowledges, with the usual disclaimers, material and useful comments received from C. Niranjan
Rao of Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), New Delhi. This paper has greatly
benefitted from useful comments made at a seminar held at ICRIER, New Delhi on 9.7.1998 and is a revised version of
the draft presented at that Seminar. A gist of the discussion is at Annex-I.
2
The term industrial property covers protectable ideas in both industry and agriculture.
II. IPRs RELEVANT TO AGRICULTURE:

Several of the IPRs mentioned above are relevant to the agricultural sector in
that they can be used to protect goods or services produced in the agricultural
sector.3 These are mainly patents, plant breeders’ rights, trademarks,
geographical indications and trade secrets. It is possible to include lay-out
designs for chips that are designed to perform certain functions related to
agriculture, but these are assumed to be incorporated in machines produced in
the industrial sector. Similarly, scientific papers or television programmes
covering ideas related to agriculture are not seen as directly being produced in
this sector. The relevant IPRs are dealt with below.

Patents are probably the most important IPR today for agricultural goods and
services as they provide, wherever these are available, the strongest protection
for patentable plants and animals and biotechnological processes for their
production. Patents universally give the patentee the right to prevent third parties
from making, using or selling the patented product or process. Patents, however,
have to be disclosed to the public through the patent documents. This enables
researchers to develop further useful products or services. Patentable products
have to meet the criteria of patentability, viz., novelty, i.e. that which is not known
in the prior art, non-obviousness i.e. that which involves an inventive step and
usefulness i.e. that which is industrially applicable. With some nuanced
differences the patent laws of all countries follow these criteria. However, not all
countries allow the patenting of plants and animals or even microorganisms or
biotechnological processes.

Biotechnology is the sector that holds the most potential for advances in
agriculture to improve productivity. Biotechnology R&D is mostly concentrated in
the hands of large multinational enterprises in the US, Europe and Japan. It is in
this field of technology more than others, that proprietary rights over knowledge
is getting increasingly important. Today, in the United States, patents are even
granted to animal inventions and human gene sequences, if these are eligible for
such protection. The case law in the United States developed rapidly since the
early ‘80’s with the grant of a patent for a bacteria that ‘ate’ oil spills. This gave
rise to the patenting of micro-organisms found in nature, if it involved a new,

3
It was felt at the ICRIER Seminar that IPRs which were originally formulated to cover industrial products could not blindly
be used for biological materials. However, the jurisprudence and practice has evolved to take care of some technical
issues as, for instance, in the case of deposit of micro organisms.
5
inventive and useful technical intervention by man. Another landmark case was
the patent granted to the ‘Harvard oncomouse’, useful in research on cancer.
The European Union has been slower to follow suit on the patenting of plants
and animals due to the opposition it faced from environmental activists in the
European Parliament. This has now been largely overcome with the imminent
finalization of the new Biotechnology Directive by the European Parliament,
authorizing the grant of patents to plants and animals, with limited exceptions.
Thus, research on the cloning of animals, which is advancing rapidly, would be
eligible for patents in at least some developed countries.

Many countries have developed plant breeders' rights to reward conventional

plant breeding efforts. Such sui generis protection is weaker than patent
protection in that the right holders can only prevent third parties from
commercially exploiting the protected material. The criteria used to grant such
protection is also lower than that used to determine patentability as these are
distinctness, i.e. distinguishable from earlier known varieties, uniformity i.e.
display of the same essential characteristics in every plant and stability i.e. the
retention of the essential characteristics on reproduction. Such protection
encourages breeding efforts in the private sector. Historically, in developing
countries, such efforts have emanated from the public sector or from international
research institutions. It is only in recent years that developing countries have
begun to institute such protection.

Marks used in commerce can be applied to both agricultural and industrial

products and services. For instance, trademarks are used to market seeds or
spraying services. The essential purpose of a trademark is to distinguish the
goods and services of one enterprise from another, thus preventing deception of
the consumer. Such protection prevents the wrongful use of commercial marks
and is not limited in time, although registration may have to be renewed from
time to time. Almost all countries in the world protect trademarks.

One category of commercial marks more often used in agriculture than industry
are geographical indications, including appellations of origin. These are marks
associated with products originating from a country, region or locality where the
quality, reputation or other characteristics of the product are essentially
attributable to its geographical origin. Most geographical indications relate to
agricultural products or those derived from them, as in the case of wines and
spirits. Protection of such marks prevents third parties from passing off their
products as those originating in the given region. Famous examples are
6
‘Champagne’ for sparkling wine and ‘Roquefort’ for cheese from areas of these
names in France or ‘Darjeeling’ for tea from this district in India. It is not
necessary for these indications to be geographical names as in the case of ‘Feta’
for cheese from Greece or ‘Basmati’ for rice from India and Pakistan as there are
no places, localities or regions with these names. Plant varieties developed with
traditional knowledge and associated with a particular region can also be
protected as geographical indications. The advantage in such protection is that it
is not time-limited, unlike the case of plant patents or plant breeders’ rights.
However, needless to say, commercial benefits can be derived from the
protection of geographical indications only when the name becomes reasonably
famous.

Trade secret protection can be used by the agricultural sector to protect, for
instance, hybrid plant varieties. Thus, even in countries that do not recognize
plant breeders’ rights, the use of hybrids gives a certain degree of appropriability
as long as it can be kept secret. Trade secrets can be protected against third
party misappropriation through laws relating to unfair competition or to restrictive
trade practices or to contract law. In the United States there are separate trade
secret laws at the State level. Protection of trade secrets is not limited in time
but, unlike patents, the disadvantage of this type of protection is that it is lost the
moment it is discovered independently by a third party4. The advantage, at least
to the proprietor, is that, unlike patents, there is no obligation to disclose the
inventive or creative ideas to society.

Some developed countries protect test data submitted for obtaining marketing
approval of agricultural chemicals from use by third parties for a limited period of
time, generally 5 or 10 years. Such protection gives exclusive marketing rights to
the originators as an incentive to recover the investment made in testing such
agricultural chemicals. Although developing countries also require the
submission of such test data, no exclusivity is conferred on the originator for any
period of time.

4
At the ICRIER Seminar, several participants felt that since there was no separate legislation on the subject, the parent
lines of the hybrids were not legally protected in India. However, the protection provided for trade secrets or confidential
information under common law and jurisprudence can be used against the unfair misappropriation of confidential
information, although this would not, unlike plant breeders' rights, protect against independent discovery.
7
III. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:

Until recently the multilateral and plurilateral treaties administered by the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) constituted the bulk of the
international law on intellectual property. The relevant treaties for IPRs related to
agriculture are the Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Property,
1883 as revised up to 1967, and related plurilateral treaties which deal with
areas such as patents, trademarks, appellations of origin or unfair competition.
The Paris Convention established certain minimum agreed standards and
procedures for the treatment of industrial property, the most important of which
were national treatment i.e. the same treatment for nationals and foreigners and
the right of priority or the according of a grace period in the filing of industrial
property applications in member states. However, it still left considerable
freedom to individual members to tailor their laws according to their
developmental and technological requirements.

The Union Internationale pour la Protections des Obtentions Vegetables (UPOV)

or the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants has a
multilateral treaty for the protection of new plant varieties which it administers in
cooperation with the WIPO. The UPOV Convention facilitates a uniform
formulation of the extent and scope of plant breeders’ rights. The UPOV
Convention was signed in 1961, came into force in 1968 and was revised in
1972, 1978, and 1991. The 1978 version was in force till April 1998, when the
1991 version entered into force. There are at present 38 members of UPOV.
The 1991 version substantially enlarges the scope of breeders’ rights and
restricts farmers’ and researchers' exemptions, provides for a longer term of
protection for the universe of species/genera of plants, although this can be
introduced in a phased way. Very few developing countries have instituted plant
variety protection and fewer are members of UPOV5.

Much of the freedom given under the Paris Convention was taken away by the
Agreement on Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of
the newly formed World Trade Organization (WTO). There are presently 132
members of WTO, with 30 more, including China and Russia, seeking accession.
While TRIPS obliges the adherence to the substantive provisions of the Paris
Convention, it goes further in limiting the freedom of countries on several aspects

5
Developing country members of UPOV are Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, South Africa and
Uruguay (Source: Diversity Vol. 13, No. 2 and 3, 1997, p.3).
8
of their intellectual property laws. This agreement is a part of the single package
of the results of the Uruguay Round that are binding on all members of the WTO
and is intrinsically linked to the most important advantage of the multilateral
trading system, namely, the most-favoured-nation (m.f.n.) treatment. TRIPS
obliges non-discriminatory treatment in terms of national treatment between
nationals and others as well as m.f.n. treatment among nationals of all WTO
members. TRIPS also lays down stringent standards for the protection and
enforcement of intellectual property. The TRIPS Agreement of the WTO obliges
members to either provide protection for plant varieties either through patents or
through an effective sui generis law or through any combination of the two. While
TRIPS calls for the institution of an effective sui generis system of plant variety
protection, there is no reference to UPOV or a call to adhere to any version of it,
making it the only exceptional case in TRIPS where the current international
treaty on the subject is not referred to.

More importantly, TRIPS obliges the patenting of micro-organisms and

microbiological and non-biological processes for the production of plants and
animals. It, however, presently allows the exclusion from patents of plants and
animals and essentially biological processes for their production. Considerable
freedom is, however, given in interpreting the criteria for patentability viz. novelty,
non-obviousness and industrial applicability. Narrow or narrowly interpreted
patent claims can resolve some of the issues arising from broad, blocking
patents.

It must be noted that TRIPS calls for "strong" process patents, strong in the
sense that the rights of the patentee extend to the product made by the patented
process and that there is a provision for the reversal of the burden of proof in any
infringement proceedings. Such process patents are very similar in effect to
product patents. It is yet unclear whether such an extension of rights would imply
rights over the product, if where such products are explicitly excluded, as is the
case of plants and animals. In other words, would a process patent for a
genetically engineered animal extend to the animal itself? The provisions of
Article 273 (b) of TRIPS concerning on biotechnological patents are to be
reviewed by 1999 when it can be expected that pressure will build up to delete
the exclusion for plants and animals.

The TRIPS Agreement also ensures a universal, minimum level of protection of

commercial marks such as trademarks and geographical indications.
Geographical indications used on wines and spirits are given an absolute level of
9
protection where use, even without the likelihood of deception of the consumers,
is prohibited.

For the first time in international law, trade secrets have also been accorded the
status of IPRs. The TRIPS Agreement goes beyond the provisions of the Paris
Convention on unfair competition, explicitly introducing in Section 7, trade secret
protection in international law and considerably strengthening it by extending the
liability to third parties that induced breach of a trade secret. Under Section 7
protecting undisclosed information in the TRIPS Agreement, test data submitted
for obtaining marketing approvals of new pharmaceutical and agricultural
chemical products is protected against unfair commercial use. The provisions of
this section lend themselves to various interpretations.6

Under the TRIPS Agreement, the protection granted for IPRs can be tempered
by appropriate provisions in competition law, particularly relating to practices or
conditions of licensing of IPRs which have an adverse effect on trade or transfer
and dissemination of technology7.

In addition to international Intellectual property law, the Convention on Biological

Diversity (CBD), concluded at 'Rio Earth Summit' in 1992, is an important
landmark relevant to a discussion of IPRs and agriculture. The stated objectives
of the CBD are the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its
components and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits. There are two
provisions relating to IPRs in the CBD. Much is made of the provision on
compulsory access to and transfer of technologies relevant to conservation under
'fair and most favourable terms' given in Article 16 of this treaty. However, with
the proviso that such access and transfer shall be consistent with the adequate
and effective protection of IPRs, there is no cause to imagine that this treaty will
force transfer of technology on any terms other than those set commercially in
the market. Even the provision to cooperate to ensure that IPRs are supportive
of and do not run counter to the objectives of the CBD is subject to international
law, which now includes the TRIPS Agreement. Unfortunately, the fair and
equitable sharing of benefits from the commercial use of genetic/biological
resources or traditional/indigenous knowledge would remain as a good intention

6
See Watal, Jayashree `The TRIPS Agreement and Developing Countries'. Strong, Weak or Balanced Protection?,
Journal of World Intellectual Property, Vol. 1 No.2, March 1998, pp. 281-304, for a detailed discussion on this provision
of the TRIPS Agreement.
7
See ibid for a detailed discussion of these issues.
10
till there are internationally accepted legal instruments to implement these
provisions. Material Transfer Agreements (MTAs) are in the nature of bilateral
contracts which are to be voluntarily concluded and do not, by themselves
ensure fairness.

There are also as yet no internationally accepted ways to reward what are
sometimes called community IPRs or CIRs i.e. indigenous or traditional
knowledge passed down, usually orally, over many generations. Many feel that
traditional knowledge should be registered so that it is not incorporated into
patents without the knowledge or consent of the concerned communities.
Consent would be given only after ensuring fair and equitable sharing of benefits.
Others view rural, contemporary innovations as important for progress in
agriculture and advocate the institution of new kind of IPRs, like some kind of a
global registration system to cover these8.

IV. INDIA's INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ON IPRs:

India is not yet a Member of the Paris Convention or the UPOV. However, India
is a founder member of the WTO and is therefore party to the TRIPS Agreement
which came into force on 1.1.1995. Being a developing country, India is entitled
to a transition period of five years up to 1.1.2000 for most provisions of TRIPS.
An important exception is the introduction of product patents in areas of
technology not covered so far, for which time is available up to 1.1.20059.
Nevertheless, the so-called process-by-product patents with the reversal of
burden of proof would have to be in place by 1.1.2000.

At present the Patents Act, 1970 does not allow the patenting of plants or
animals or micro-organisms. Although it does not contain any such specific
exclusion, the definition of an invention seems to exclude these10. Even
microbiological processes are excluded if they involve a method of agriculture or

8
See for instance the writings of Anil Gupta of the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, such as, 'Technologies,
Institutions and Incentives for Conservation of Biodiversity in non-OECD Countries: Assessing Needs for Technical
Cooperation' in OECD Proceedings of the Cairns Conference on Investing in Biodiversity, 25-28 March, 1996.
9
In the areas of pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals, product patent applications must be accepted from 1.1.1995
itself and exclusive marketing rights must be granted for a period of five years or till the product patent is granted or
rejected, on the fulfillment of the required conditions.
10
See Section 2(j) of the Patents Act, 1970.
11
horticulture, as such methods are specifically excluded11. However, such
applications have sometimes been granted patents, at least since the mid-80's as
is evidenced by the process patent granted to Agracetus, a US company, on
genetically engineered cotton cells and lines. This patent was later revoked in
public interest by the government of India12.

India is thus, obliged to either introduce patents for new plant varieties or have an
effective sui generis law to protect them by 1.1.2000. In addition India must
make available strong patents on microbiological and non-biological processes
for the production of plants and animals by 1.1.2000. However, India has time up
to 1.1.2005 to introduce product patents on micro-organisms.

India must also bring the protection of trademarks, geographical indications and
trade secrets up to TRIPS standards also by 1.1.2000. The current law on
trademarks, the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 and the current
jurisprudence, particularly under the common law tort of passing-off, is, by and
large, in line with TRIPS. However, marginal amendments are required, as in
the case of the registration of service marks and the recognition of well-known
marks.

In the case of geographical indications, the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act,
1958, allows for the registration of certification marks, certifying quality or origin
of a product. Such certification marks can be registered by any body not
producing the particular product, as, for instance, any association of producers or
traders. In addition, geographical indications are protected under the common
law tort of passing-off. Marks such as 'Champagne' for sparkling wine from
France and 'Scotch' for whisky from Scotland have been successfully protected
under this. However, India would need to legislate in order to give the higher
level of absolute protection to wines and spirits required under TRIPS. In doing
so, other Indian products or those of interest to India's trading partners can also
be given this higher level of protection, perhaps on the basis of reciprocity13.

Although trade secret protection is available under common law and also laws on
restrictive trade practices, India may have to introduce the legal basis to extend

11
See Section 3(h) of the Patents Act, 1970.
12
See Rao, Niranjan, C., 'Plant Variety Protection and Plant Biotechnology Patents: Options for India', Policy Paper no. 29,
for UNDP funded Project LARGE, UNDP New Delhi, 1997, pp. 36-37 for a discussion on this patent.
13
This suggestion is developed further in the last section of this paper.
12
such protection to cover third parties who directly or indirectly induce the breach
of trade secrets. India would also have to legislate to protect undisclosed test
data submitted for obtaining marketing approvals for new agricultural chemicals.

India also proposes to introduce national legislation to implement the CBD

through the Biodiversity Act, under which the terms of access to in situ genetic
and biological resources would be governed14.

V. THE PUBLIC DEBATE IN INDIA ON LEGISLATIVE CHANGES ON

IPRs:

Given the importance of agriculture in the Indian economy, there has been
extensive public debate of an intensely political nature, on certain legislative
changes required to implement TRIPS as related to the agricultural sector. These
relate to the institution of plant breeders' rights, patents for biotechnological
inventions and geographical indications. In addition, the implementation of the
CBD to establish the so-called 'farmers' rights'15 and the fair and equitable
sharing of benefits on commercialization of biological/genetic resources and
traditional knowledge and practices originating from India, has also been
controversial. This public debate has been characterized by some degree of
confusion in intermingling these various issues. Guided by NGO activists,
political parties or at least some leading political personalities, cutting across
political affiliations ranging from the left to the right, have taken entrenched
positions, forcing policy makers to consult such activists while finalising the
legislation on IPRs.

It has been well recognized that the initiatives for introducing plant breeders'
rights were made by the private seed companies in India in the late '80's after the
adoption of the New Seed Policy in 1988. With this policy the government of
India liberalized the import of seed for joint ventures, including hybrid seeds, for a
number of important crops. Empirical studies have shown that such

14
See Business Standard of 5 March 1998, 'Elections Cast a Shadow on biodiversity law'.
15
Throughout this paper the expression `farmers' rights' has been used in the sense given in the FAO undertaking of May
1989 as "rights arising from the past, present and future contributions of farmers in conserving, improving and making
available plant genetic resources". This is distinguished from the term `farmers' privilege' which is used to denote the
freedom of farmers to save seed as planting material or for limited commercial exchanges i.e. the so-called `across-the-
fence' sales.
13
liberalization, including the development of hybrids, does have a positive impact
on private research and development in this sector16. However, others forecast
that the increasingly proprietary nature of plant biotechnologies and the
decreasing role of International Agricultural Research Centres (IARCs) and
national research centres will adversely affect the diffusion of such
technologies17. The two aspects of incentives for generation of and for the
diffusion of IPRs are not irreconcilable18.

In some circles in India the new policies were seen as a victory for multinational
enterprises (MNEs) in spite of the fact that there were certain conditions
regarding the transfer of the parent lines and critical breeding materials to the
Indian partner of the joint venture19. In particular, the TRIPS negotiations of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations where US, Europe and Japan
were demanding stronger Intellectual property protection, especially in the area
of biotechnology, was seen as an attempt by Northern MNEs to privatize the
genetic diversity of the South20. There were vociferous protests by some NGO
activists against India's manner of conducting trade negotiations.21 The TRIPS
proposals were seen as patenting of life itself, raising ethical as well as socio-
economic questions22.

16
See Pray, Carl and Tim Kelley, 'Impact of Liberalization and Deregulation on Technology Supply by the Indian Seed
Industry', draft of a World Bank financed project, dated 27 October, 1997 (available on file with author). At the ICRIER
Seminar, the representative of Monsanto categorically stated that despite policies to encourage private sector
investment in the seed sector since 1989, such investment was forthcoming only in hybrids and not in self-pollinated
crops. IPR protection was required not so much to protect against theft by farmers but against misuse by other private
sector seed companies.
17
See Buttel FH, M Kenney and J Kloppenberg Jr. 'From Green Revolution to Biorevolution: Some Observations on the
Changing Technological Basis of Economic Transformation in the Third World', Economic Development and Cultural
Change, 1985, pp. 31-55.
18
Discussed in the last section of this paper.
19
See Bhattacharjee, Abhijit, 'New Seed Policy: Whose Interest Would It Serve?', Economic and Political Weekly, October
8, 1988, pp. 2089-2090.
20
See, for instance, Menon, Usha, 'Intellectual Property Rights and Agricultural Development', Economic and Political
Weekly, July 6-13, 1991, pp. 1660-1667 and Shiva, Vandana, 'Biotechnology Development and Conservation of
Biodiversity'. Economic and Political Weekly, November 30, 1991, pp. 2740-2746.
21
It was felt in the ICRIER Seminar that such negotiating teams should have included experts in agriculture and
biotechnology. However as the author is aware, such experts were consulted in government in formulating position for
the negotiations in WTO, although the adequacy of such consultations can be the subject of debate. Another aspect
raised was the continuity of trade negotiators to ensure continuity in negotiating strategies, a problem not unique to India
alone.
22
See Sahai, Suman: 'Patenting of Life Forms: What It Implies', Economic and Political Weekly, April 25, 1992, pp. 878-
14
 An association of farmers in the Southern Indian state of Karnataka attacked the
US multinational seed company, Cargill Seeds, in early 1993, protesting the entry
of multinationals in the domestic seed industry. It was feared that the prices of
seed would skyrocket and threaten the food security of the country. This incident
and the subsequent farmers' rally on March 3 1993 at Delhi marked the height of
the protest against the plant variety clauses of the TRIPS Agreement (the so-
called Dunkel Draft). The Bharatiya Kisan Union (an all-India farmers'
organization) even drew a parallel between these clauses and the take over of
the country historically by the British East India Company23. The case of the
patent on products derived from the 'neem' plant was used to demonstrate the
theft of traditional knowledge by multinationals and the consequent disastrous
consequences for Indian farmers who would not be able to use 'neem' seeds. It
is only much later that some of the myths on the neem based patents of W.R.
Grace were adequately clarified24.

The attempts made by the Ministry of Commerce to clarify that India did not
have to accept the patenting of plants and that the sui generis system could be
devised to take care of national interests25 did not convince the NGOs and
activists as they suspected that the term 'effective' would be strictly interpreted to
ensure patent-like protection26. Even an article written by the then Director
General of GATT, Mr. Peter Sutherland, clarifying that standards contained in
UPOV, 1978, which allowed both the farmers' and the breeders' privilege, could
reasonably be said to constitute effective sui generis protection, failed to
assuage these fears27.

879. At the ICRIER Seminar Dr. Sahai opined that the provisions of Article 27.2 of TRIPs could be used to exclude
patenting of life forms. However, it was pointed out that in such a case there could be no commercial exploitation either
of such inventions.
23
Evidence given by Mahender Singh Tikait, President Bharatiya Kisan Union on 15.9.1993 before the Parliamentary
Standing Committee on Commerce, 1993-94, Third Report on Draft of Dunkel Proposals, Evidence, Rajya Sabha
Secretariat, New Delhi, December, 1993.
24
See essays by Prof. Anil Gupta and Dr. Thomas W. MacAllister in the Biotechnology Law Report, No. 1, January-
February, 1996.
25
See evidence of the officials of the Ministry of Commerce, particularly that of Shri Anwarul Hoda, now DDG, WTO,
before the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Commerce (1993-94) as cited above.
26
See Shiva, Vandana, 'Farmers' Rights, Biodiversity and International Treaties', Economic and Political Weekly, April 3,
1993, pp. 555-560.
27
See Sutherland, Peter, "Seeds of Doubt: Assurance on 'Farmers' Privilege'", Times of India, 15 March 1994.
15
Nevertheless, not all stakeholders were in agreement as agricultural scientists
and some farmer activists were expressing different ideas on this subject. They
opined that India was capable of turning the TRIPS proposals to its advantage
due to the huge skilled manpower, variety in agro-climatic zones and facilities in
agricultural research and that the farmers had nothing to fear and may only
benefit from the implementation of these proposals28.

The M.S. Swaminathan Research Foundation, Madras, and the Research

Foundation for Science, Technology and Natural Resource Policy, New Delhi
(later changed to RFSTE, for Research Foundation for Science, Technology and
Ecology) were consulted on the 1993 draft legislation on the protection of plant
varieties by the Ministry of Agriculture29. The Swaminathan Foundation prepared
an alternative draft legislation relating to plant breeders' and farmers' rights
which was discussed at a workshop conducted by that organization in late 1993
and sent to the government of India after some modification. This draft attempted
to reconcile the TRIPS Agreement with the CBD and the FAO's International
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, 1989. It called for the setting up of a
National Community Gene Fund as a mechanism for rewarding farmers. It
recognized that it was difficult to deal nationally with the issue of farmers' rights
and that it was necessary to evolve an international consensus on this issue.
India must show the way by attempting to include this concept in national law first
and then later attempt to do so in UPOV30. The Research Foundation for
Science, Technology and Ecology went further and suggested that farmers'
rights should set the limits to the IPRs generated by the seed industry.

Given the public outcry on plant variety protection, the government of India
decided to make the draft legislation open for debate in early 1994. This draft
was bitterly criticized for following UPOV, 1978, even when TRIPs did not require
this and its attempt to balance this aspect with the inclusion of provisions on

28
See, for instance, the evidence of ICAR and IARI scientists, including Dr. M.S. Swaminathan, ex-Director, ICAR, and
that of Sharad Joshi, farmer activist, before the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Commerce (1993-94) cited Supra
note 21.
29
See Shiva, Vandana, 'Agricultural Biodiversity, Intellectual Property Rights and Farmers' Rights', Economic and Political
Weekly, June 22, 1996, pp. 1621-1631.
30
See M.S. Swaminathan Research Foundation, 'Methodologies for Recognizing the Role Informal Innovation in the
Conservation and Utilization of Plant Genetic Resources: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue', Madras, 1994.
16
community rights and farmers' rights and extensive provisions on compulsory
licenses failed to assuage the fears raised31.

The Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF) in the government of India,

which deals with the CBD, came under tremendous pressure from public action
groups to institute implementing legislation for the CBD. It proposed legislation
on biodiversity to regulate the access to in situ genetic and biological resources,
on conditions of prior informed consent, on fair and equitable sharing of benefits
and on transfer of technology on fair terms. Given the experience on the
legislation for plant variety protection, it was decided to constitute a committee
headed by Dr. M.S. Swaminathan and comprising of all the major stakeholders,
including scientists, NGOs, environmentalists and other relevant government
departments/ministries. Regional seminars are being held to discuss the various
issues involved in the legislation although the draft bill itself has not been made
public32. The issue of community rights is sought to be resolved now in the
proposed Biodiversity Act and not in the legislation on plant variety protection,
although there is still considerable confusion on this issue.33 This is, however,
being strongly opposed by NGOs that have been active in this debate, such as
the RFSTE and the Gene Campaign. The process of consultation is still on in
the MOEF.

A revised legislation on plant variety protection, removing the issue of farmers'

rights, as drafted earlier but retaining clauses on farmers' privilege and breeders'
exemption, was attempted in 1997. This revised draft has been criticized as
being modelled on UPOV 1991 and as deleting the farmers' rights altogether34.
Either there seems to be little awareness that the draft biodiversity legislation
intends to tackle this issue and thus, it is being concluded that India has given
up the concept of farmers' rights or there is a conviction that farmers' rights have

31
See Srinivas, Ravi, K , 'Power Without Accountability: Draft Bill on Plant Breeders' Rights', Economic and Political
Weekly, March 26, 1994, pp. 729-730 and Sahai, Suman 'Government Legislation on Plant Breeders' Rights',
Economic and Political Weekly, June 25, 1994, pp. 1573-1574.
32
The author participated in the Policy Dialogue on Access to Biodiversity and Benefit Sharing: Incentives, Innovations
and Institutions from April 10-12, 1998 at the Indian Institute of Ahmedabad.
33
Evidence of such confusion was seen at the ICRIER Seminar where many were confusing farmers' rights with the
farmers' privilege. While it is yet not clear whether the farmers' rights will from part of India's legislation on plant variety
protection, the latter is clearly within its ambit. However, with the Monsanto Corporation's purchase of the terminator
technology (reported on RAFI's website www.rafi.ca) the utility of the farmers `exemption clause is being questioned.
34
See Dhar, Biswajit and Sachin Chaturvedi, 'Introducing Plant Breeders' Rights in India: A Critical Evaluation of the
Proposed Legislation', The Journal of World Intellectual Property, Vol.1, No.2, March 1998, pp. 245-262.
17
to necessarily be juxtaposed against the IPRs granted to seed companies in the
same legislation. It is as yet not clear how this issue is going to play out in India.

In the meanwhile, it has been reported that some major European plant breeders
have threatened to deny access of new rose varieties to Indian floriculturists if
there is no protection of breeders' rights. The concern expressed was not just on
the royalties lost but on the effect on the quality of the flower if illegal propagation
and multiplication of the variety was allowed35.

Similar exercises to involve the stakeholders in the drafting of legislation on

biotechnological inventions have not yet been initiated by the Department of
Industrial Development charged with the task of amending the Patents Act, 1970
to bring it in line with TRIPS by 1.1.2000. The public debate on this subject has
not so far dealt with the detail required to implement legislation in this area. This
is also the case for the protection of undisclosed information, whether trade
secrets or test data.

An area of IPRs related to the agriculture sector that has raised considerable
controversy in India recently is geographical indications. This issue occupied the
centre stage in the context of the patent granted in the US in September 1997 to
Ricetec, a US company, on the claim of novel basmati rice lines and grains. In
this case most Indians believe that India should have a strong law on the
protection of geographical indications so that Indian names are not patented and
misused for economic gain in India's export markets.

35
Reported in Economic Times on 24 February, 1998, 'Protect Breeders' Rights Else No New Roses: MNCs'.
18
THE CASE OF THE PATENT ON BASMATI RICE:

The facts of this case are that in September, 1997, Ricetec was granted a
patent for allegedly novel basmati lines and grains which were created from the
crossing of the basmati germplasm (of Pakistani origin) taken from an ex situ
gene bank in the US with American long grained variety of rice. Ricetec has
claimed that the new varieties have the same or better aroma, grain length and
other characteristics than the original basmati variety grown in India and
Pakistan and can be grown successfully in specified geographical areas in North
America. This came to the notice of the government of India in February 1998,
and an Inter-Ministerial Committee was set up under the Secretary, Department
of Industrial Development, to examine this issue. The Agricultural Export
Development Agency (APEDA) of the Ministry of Commerce in the government
of India has been entrusted with the task of representing the rice exporters in
any re-examination of the patent in the US Patent and Trademarks Office
(USPTO), if it is decided that there are sufficient grounds for the eventual
revocation of the patent. The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
(CSIR) which successfully opposed and obtained the revocation of a patent on
turmeric in 1997 in the USPTO is assisting in this exercise too. In 1996-97, India
exported about 490,000 MTs of basmati rice valued at about $ 358 million,
constituting over 60 per cent of the value of India's total exports of rice.

Irrespective of what is decided in the USPTO on the revocation of the

basmati patent, the question is can Ricetec or any other company use the name
basmati to sell rice that does not originate from India or Pakistan? In other
words, can basmati be protected as a geographical indication? There is no
unequivocal answer as Ricetec has claimed that basmati is a generic name
denoting a variety of rice. Moreover, if Ricetec or any other company sells rice
similar to basmati and labels or advertises this as 'American made basmati type
rice' or 'basmati style rice', with a clear indication that the product originates from
the US, there is no deception of the public even while the reputation and
goodwill attached to the name basmati is diluted. The TRIPS Agreement
accords absolute protection against the use of geographical indications with the
words 'type', 'style', 'kind' etc. only to wines and spirits and to no other
commodity. In addition, if the Courts in the US finally rule that the name
'basmati' is already generic, as it is understood to denote a variety of rice not
necessarily associated with any geographical region, there would be no
protection available for it. This is not yet tested in the Courts in US, although
APEDA is opposing the registration of the trademark 'Texmati' by Ricetec in the
19
 UK on the grounds that it would deceive the consumers as rice originating from
India and Pakistan. That the GAFTA of UK strictly enforces its labelling
requirements where `basmati' can only be used for rice originating from India
and Pakistan should help India's case. As on date the case has not yet been
finally decided in the UK Trademarks Registry.

Some have opined that taking a patent derived from the basmati
germplasm amounts to biopiracy by Ricetec. However, it must be noted that the
germplasm was taken from an ex situ collection in the US and that the CBD had
skirted the issue of ownership of genetic resources in international collections.
Thus, in the current international law there is no prohibition on the exchange or
use of such germplasm even if this is for commercial purposes.

Source : Various reports in the media from February to April, 1998 and the
TRIPs Agreement.

There is a widespread belief in India that unless there is a domestic sui generis
legislation to protect geographical indications, these marks cannot be protected
in other countries. TRIPS does allow WTO Members to deny protection to
geographical indications that are not protected in the country of origin. This,
however, has to be translated into domestic law, unless the Agreement is directly
applicable in that country. It is not widely recognised that India already permits
the protection of such marks through certification marks as well as under the
common law tort of passing off, provided it can be proved that the consumer
would be deceived. The problem is that the certification mark system or even
any sui generis legislation requires the definition of the particular product. For
instance, what are the agreed characteristics of 'basmati' rice? Today, the delay
in according domestic recognition to the mark 'basmati' probably is more
because the rice producers of India are unable to come to an agreement on the
definition of the mark 'basmati', than because the government has not passed a
sui generis legislation on this subject. In any event the government has under its
consideration a draft legislation to protect geographical indications in order to
meet its TRIPS obligations. The relevant provisions of TRIPS on geographical
indications need to be implemented by 1.1.2000.

20
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS:

The classical IPRs relevant to agriculture are patents, particularly on

biotechnological inventions, plant breeders' rights, trademarks and geographical
indications. Trade secrets and the protection of undisclosed test data are also
considered to be part of IPRs now and these are relevant to the agricultural
sector also. Farmers' rights and community IPRs are the forms of intellectual
property at the stage of initial conceptualisation at the international or national
level. India is not a member of the Paris Convention or UPOV but is a member of
the WTO and is therefore, obliged to implement the TRIPS Agreement within the
time limits set out therein. Most of the TRIPS obligations on these relevant IPRs,
including strong process patents for biotechnological inventions, have to be in
place by 1.1.2000, and it is only for product patents on micro-organisms that
India has time up to 1.1.2005.

Although legislative exercises on a sui generis system of plant variety protection

began almost five years back, in 1993, the draft legislation is yet to be finalized.
More recently, India has proposed the enactment of a biodiversity law to
implement the CBD and this is in the process of being debated and finalized. An
important question is whether the farmers' rights and community rights need to
be included in the plant variety protection law or in the biodiversity law or both.

Since the government of India wants to encourage investment by private seed

companies, as evidenced from its policies since the mid-'80'S, plant breeders'
rights would help in giving incentives for private research. The issue of whether
public sector research institutions should be allowed proprietary rights over their
research is still controversial, although having such rights and yet disseminating
these technologies at reasonable prices are not necessarily contradictory36.
More importantly, steps would have to be taken to ensure the diffusion of the
results of this research such that reasonable compensation is allowed to plant
breeders. The deployment of skillfully drafted provisions on compulsory licensing
and government use and the recognition of the mutual interdependence between
public sector and private sector research efforts, may resolve the dilemma of
incentives for generation and the subsequent diffusion of such technologies.

36
At the recent ICRIER seminar many participants agreed that such proprietary rights would enable public sector research
institutions to pre-empt private sector seed companies from not sharing commercial benefits on varieties derived from
them and also maintain advantages in cross-licensing the results of their research.
21
The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and the
International Agricultural Research Centres (IARCs) can play a constructive role
in the two-way transfer of technologies between the (National Agricultural
Research Systems (NARs) and private sector seed companies. Several
modalities have already been envisaged such as Material Transfer Agreements,
licensing or cross-licensing, joint ventures or private funding of basic research in
the public sector.37

On the issue of patents being taken out on the basis of traditional knowledge
without acknowledging that this was already known before, there seems to be no
other way but to document all such knowledge. The National Bureau of Plant
Genetic Resources has set up a base collection of 1.60 lakh samples of germ
plasm of various crop species in a National Gene Bank, aimed at being one of
the largest ex-situ collections in the world38. The state government of Karnataka,
in collaboration with the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, has also launched
a plan to map the biodiversity and traditional knowledge in its jurisdiction. In
addition, the CSIR in India has already begun with a programme to
systematically document at least 400 species of plants whose therapeutic,
agricultural and other uses39. However, much more needs to be done as this is a
stupendous task.

India has suggested in the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment that
under TRIPS, there should be an obligation on patent applicants of
biotechnological inventions based on genetic/biological resources or on
traditional/indigenous knowledge, to disclose the country of origin and to reveal
whether the applicant has prior informed consent40. This suggestion was also
made in the European Parliament for inclusion in the proposed Biotechnology
Directive but was rejected by the European Commission as going beyond its
international obligations41. Such a solution is necessary in international

37
See Lesser, W.H., Gesa Harskotte-Wesseler, Uma Lele and Derek Byerlee, `An Issues Paper : Possible Future
Rolesfor the World Bank in Agriculturally-Related Intellectual Property Rights : Assisting Borrowers and Member
Countries', Draft, World Bank, June 1998.
38
See policy paper on `Conservation, Management and use of Agro-biodiversity, National Academy of Agricultural
Sciences, India, April, 1998.
39
See "IICSIR goes into documenting drive after turmeric patent triumph", Indian Express of 28 August, 1997.
40
See Report (1996) of the Committee on Trade and Environment, document no. WT/CTE/W/40 dated 7 November 1996,
available on the WTO web site, www.wto.org.
41
Information taken from the web site of the European Commission.
22
intellectual property law if developing countries are to be notified and fairly and
equitably compensated for resources and knowledge taken from them for
commercial benefit. There is an urgent need to build international consensus on
this issue.

The legislative exercises on amending the Patents Act, 1970, particularly on the
patenting of biotechnological inventions should be made more transparent, with
the involvement of all stakeholders such as agricultural and other scientists,
farmer groups, private sector seed companies, lawyers, experts and NGO
activists. Similar exercises are required to implement the TRIPs provisions on
undisclosed information. This would not only require the conduct of workshops
and the setting up of drafting committees but also the building up of mutual trust
and respect, without which these would remain empty exercises.

Recently, there has been a vocal demand made by sections of the media to
introduce sui generis legislation for the domestic protection of geographical
indications such as basmati rice. However, the important issue here is seeking
protection for Indian marks in the markets of India's major trading partners, a
possibility which is open under the laws of these countries, In addition a
conscious effort needs to be made to invest in and build up the brand equity of
Indian markets in order to ensure that such marks do not become generic. In
addition, India should seek to conclude bilateral agreements with interested WTO
members within the framework of the TRIPs Agreement, to give higher protection
to products of mutual interest on a reciprocal basis. As long as this is done for
specific geographical indications and as long as India is willing to conclude such
agreements with other WTO members too, there appears to be no inconsistency
with the m.f.n. clause of TRIPS.

The CSIR has begun laudable efforts to improve patent literacy amongst its
scientists. These efforts are being made by the ICAR too as there is a crying
need to increase IPR literacy, not only in terms of laws, rules and procedures but
also in terms of increasing the awareness on the long term benefits for the
country, particularly from increased domestic R&D and productivity.

While a full discussion and debate on legislation on IPRs relevant to agriculture is

necessary both in the media and in civil society, TRIPS-compatible laws will
mostly have to be in place within the next one year and a half or so. It is clearly
time to enact the required legislation and the implementing rules and regulations,
incorporating all the flexibility allowed under TRIPS, before time runs out. At the
23
same time this exercise should be done with as much transparency as possible
to allay the fears raised so far in the public debate.

This paper does not make any claim to a complete or exhaustive list of all that
needs to be done for IPRs in agriculture in India. It merely emphasises the
immensity of the tasks that remain to be done in the light of the sharp differences
of opinion amongst the stakeholders and underlines the fact that both national
and international organizations have to gear up to contribute to this exercise in
an urgent and meaningful way.

24
REFERENCES

Bhattacharjee, Abhijit, (1988), `New Seed Policy: Whose Interest Would It

Serve?', Economic and Political Weekly, October 8, pp. 2089-2090.

Buttel FH, M Kenney and J Kloppenberg Jr., (1985), `From Green Revolution to
Biorevolution: Some Observations on the Changing Technological Basis of
Economic Transformation in the Third World', Economic Development and
Cultural Change, pp. 31-55.

Gupta, Anil, (1996), `Technologies, Institutions and Incentives for Conservation

of Biodiversity in non-OECD Countries: Assessing Needs for Technical
Cooperation' in OECD Proceedings of the Cairns Conference on Investing in
Biodiversity, March 25-28.

Lesser, W.H., Gesa Harskotte-Wesseler, Uma Lele and Derek Byerlee, (1998),
`An Issues Paper : Possible Future Roles for the World Bank in Agriculturally-
Related Intellectual Property Rights : Assisting Borrowers and Member
Countries', Draft, World Bank, June.

Menon, Usha, (1991), `Intellectual Property Rights and Agricultural

Development', Economic and Political Weekly, July 6-13, pp. 1660-1667.

M.S. Swaminathan Research Foundation, (1994) `Methodologies for

Recognizing the Role Informal Innovation in the Conservation and Utilization of
Plant Genetic Resources: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue'.

National Academy of Agricultural Sceicnes, (1998), Policy paper on

`Conservation, Management and use of Agro-biodiversity', National Academy of
Agricultural Sciences, India, April.

Parliamentary Standing Committee on Commerce, (1993), Third Report on Draft

of Dunkel Proposals, Evidence, Rajya Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi December.

Pray, Carl and Tim Kelley, (1997), 'Impact of Liberalization and Deregulation on
Technology Supply by the Indian Seed Industry', draft of a World Bank financed
project, October 27.
25
Rao, Niranjan, C., (1997), `Plant Variety Protection and Plant Biotechnology
Patents: Options for India', Policy Paper no. 29, for UNDP funded Project
LARGE, UNDP New Delhi.

Sahai, Suman, (1992), `Patenting of Life Forms: What It Implies', Economic and
Political Weekly, April 25, pp. 878-879.

Sahai, Suman, (1994), `Government Legislation on Plant Breeders' Rights',

Economic and Political Weekly, June 25, pp. 1573-1574.

Shiva, Vandana, (1991), `Biotechnology Development and Conservation of

Biodiversity'. Economic and Political Weekly, November 30, pp. 2740-2746.

______________, (1993), `Farmers' Rights, Biodiversity and International

Treaties', Economic and Political Weekly, April 3, pp. 555-560.

______________, (1996) `Agricultural Biodiversity, Intellectual Property Rights

and Farmers' Rights', Economic and Political Weekly, June 22, pp. 1621-1631.

Srinivas, Ravi, K., (1994), `Power Without Accountability: Draft Bill on Plant
Breeders' Rights', Economic and Political Weekly, March 26, pp. 729-730.

Sutherland, Peter, (1994) "Seeds of Doubt: Assurance on 'Farmers' Privilege'",

Times of India, March 15.

Watal, Jayashree, (1998), `The TRIPS Agreement and Developing Countries'.

Strong, Weak or Balanced Protection?, Journal of World Intellectual Property,
Vol. 1 No.2, March, pp. 281-304.

WTO, (1996), `Report of the Committee on Trade and Environment', (document

no. WT/CTE/W/40), November 7, available on the WTO web site, www.wto.org.

26
 Annex - 1

SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF SEMINAR AT ICRIER ON

"INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN INDIAN AGRICULTURE"
HELD ON JULY 9, 1998

ICRIER held a seminar on "Intellectual Property Rights in Indian Agriculture" on

July 9, 1998 where a first draft of the paper by Ms. Jayashree Watal was
presented. The principal points raised in the discussion at the seminar are
summarised below.

I. General

The political economy context of the debate regarding intellecutal property rights
in Indian agriculture as against such rights in industry, has to be incorporated.
While analyzing the public debate we have to discuss, how and why these issues
originated, who mobilized them and what was their impact on policy.

II. PVP/UPOV/Biodiversity Legislation

A point was raised whether utility patents which originally applied to industrial
products can be relevant for biological materials. Similarly, there was discussion
on whether the UPOV model of sui generis protection is suitable one or whether
India should define its own sui generis system. It was felt that the evolution of
UPOV system was based on developed countries in a different context, with their
greater reliance on the private sector in plant breeding and with their larger size
of farms. This is very different from the situation in developing countries, where
there is a large public sector presence in plant breeding and small land holding
patterns.

There was much discussion on what constitutes farmers' privilege, farmers' rights
and community rights. One participant expressed the view that farmers'
privileges gives the impression that it is optional and hence the term farmers'
rights should be used. It was observed by some that it is not entirely correct to
say that farmers' rights are being excluded from the Plant Variety Protection
(PVP) legislation to be dealt only in Biodiversity legislation. To substantiate this
point, it was stated that the title itself was 'Plant Variety Protection and Farmers'
Rights'. However, in further discussion it was clear that this legislation dealt with
farmers' privileges. While some expressed the view that farmers' rights should
27
be included in the biodiversity law others said that it should be included in PVP.
Yet others felt that there should be only a single legislation to deal with farmers'
rights and community rights. Those arguing that farmers rights should be dealt
with in the biodiversity law were of the opinion that as plant variety protection and
biological diversity are two separate issues they should be dealt with in separate
legislations.

As far as farmers rights are concerned they should be rewarded at the national
level rather than at community level, the experience of communities entering into
agreements with corporate entities not having been satisfactory. The modalities
of benefit sharing between corporations and communities should be worked out
carefully.

The point was raised that the Community Gene Fund by imposing a levy on sale
of seeds will increase the cost of seeds to farmers, as seed coporations were
likely to pass on these costs in the final prices to farmers.

Since the opening up of the seed sector for private sector participation in 1989,
research in self-pollinated varieties has not picked up because of lack of PVP.
The seed companies are concentrating on research on hybrid varieties. These
companies are much less bothered about farmers' privilege than about the
copying of technology by rival seed companies.

While some were of the opinion that the TRIPs Agreement gives enough
flexibility to incoporate issues of public interest, others ruled it out completely.

Indian seed companies going in for collaboration with seed MNEs, would have to
contend with the fact that the research agenda would be set by these MNEs and
not by Indian companies.

III. Trade Secrets

It was felt that it was inaccurate to state that trade secrets protected hybrids as
there was no seperate legislation on this subject in India. It was clarified that the
common law and jurisprudence governing trade secrets and confidential
information could be used by seed companies to protect hybrids in India,
although this would not protect against independent discovery of the parent lines.

28
IV. Geographical Indications

Having a seperate law on geographical indications would not be detrimental to

India's interests. GAFTA, UK has codified rules on international labelling, which
should be used to India's advantage. In spite of India not having a law on
geographical indications, it has a strong case in protecting basmati rice. Under
geographical indications it was felt that a better alternative would be to have
multilateral agreements rather than bilateral agreements. It was clarified that the
suggestion was to negotiate bilateral agreements within the framework of the
TRIPs Agreement and these would be compatible with it.

V. Role of the Public Sector and the CGIAR System

The public sector in India has been playing a predominant role in plant breeding
efforts. While some felt that the public sector should be mainly oriented towards
rendering service to the small farmers and should not be motivated by profit,
others felt IPRs should be taken by such institutions to reward individual
scientists' efforts. Some felt that IPRs would help in public sector research
institutions staking their claim on their research and preventing the private sector
seed companies from appropriating such research.

On the suggestion of the technology rights bank, it was felt that CGIAR system is
facing a resource crunch and hence does not have a role to play. Further the
CGIAR dominates the weak National Agricultural Research Systems and hence it
was better for change to come from within the countries rather than through the
CGIAR.

On the other hand, others expressed the opinion that the CGIAR has a role to
play because of its vast holdings of germplasm collections. The understanding
between CGIAR and FAO will end in October 1998 and India should work
towards modifications to this agreement.

29
PARTICIPANTS AT THE SEMINAR ON

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN INDIAN AGRICULTURE

JULY 9, 1998
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
1 Dr. R.S. Paroda, - Chairperson
Director General ICAR
and Secretary (DARE)
Indian Council of Agricultural Research
New Delhi

2. Dr. Suman Sahai - Principal Discussant

Convener
Gene Campaign
New Delhi

3. Dr. Isher Judge Ahluwalia

Director & Chief Executive
ICRIER
New Delhi

4. Ms Jayshree Watal - Author

Fellow
ICRIER
New Delhi

5. Mr. Dinesh Abrol

Scientist
National Institute of Science, Technology and
Development Studies (NISTADS)
New Delhi

6. Dr. P.K. Agarwal

Managing Director
Greentech Seeds Int'l Pvt. Ltd.
Gurgaon
30
7. Ms. A.K. Ahuja
Joint Secretary
Ministry of Environment & Forests
New Delhi

8. Mr. Bipin Bihari

Monsanto
New Delhi

9. Dr. Sachin Chaturvedi

Research and Information System for the
Non-Aligned and other Developing Countries
New Delhi

10. Dr. Kanchan Chopra

Professor
Institute of Economic Growth
Delhi

11. Dr. P.L Gautam

Director
National Bureau of Plant Ginetic Resources
New Delhi

12. Mr. Sudhir Kumar

Managing Director
Small Farmers' Agri Business Consortium
New Delhi

13. Dr. Mangala Rai

Deputy Director General (Crop Science)
Indian Council of Agricultural Research
New Delhi-110 001

14. Mr. J.K. Rana

Manager
Monsanto
New Delhi

31
15. Dr. S. Bala Ravi
Principal Scientist, ICAR
Hyderabad

16. Mr. C. Niranjan Rao

Associate Fellow
ICRIER
New Delhi

17. Mr. Devender Sharma

Forum of Biotechnology
and Food Security
Noida

18. Prof. S.K. Sinha

National Professor,
Water Technology Centre
Indian Agricultural Research Institute
New Delhi

19. Professor J. S. Sindhu

Director
International Business Division
Pro-Agro

20. Dr. S.P. Tiwari

Additional Director General
Indian Council of Agricultural Research
New Delhi

21. Mr. R.K. Trivedi

Assistant Commissioner (Seeds)
Ministry of Agriculture
New Delhi

32