1977 Coup D’etat in Pakistan

Dr. Tahir Amin∗

“I have been reading about Napoleon. I am also reading two books on

Hitler. I wanted to see how Hitler controlled his generals and how 1 could
not control mine”.1 The former prime minister of Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto told the journalists ten days after the army staged a successful coup
d’etat in the country on July 5, 1977 and deposed him from the office. The
main purpose of this research paper is to discover why Mr. Bhutto could
not control his generals and what led the army to take over the country for
the third time in its troubled history.
Considerable theoretical literature has appeared which claims to
explain the phenomenon of frequent occurrences of military coups in the
developing countries. Before we proceed to explain the recent Pakistani
coup d’etat, we shall give a brief overview of the literature in order to
utilize some of the theoretical insights in our case-study.
Two dominant approaches are found in the literature: societal
perspective and soldiers’ perspective. Societal perspective claims that the
military establishments do not operate in a vacuum, therefore, much of the
explanation for military ought to be found in the general state of society.
According to this approach low level of institutionalization of a political
system and high level of political participation, low level of social
mobilization, low level of economic development, political chaos,
disorder and loss of legitimacy of government are the main factors which

∗ Professor & Chairman, Department of International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam

University, Islamabad.
1 Michael Richardson, “Pakistan. Bhutto puts it on the line”, Far Eastern Economic Review,
July 29, 1977.
32 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)

provoke a coup d’etat. 2 The other approach, soldiers’ perspective,

attempts to explain the coup d’etat by emphasising on the ‘coup-makers’
grievances’. Various authors consider them as the ‘triggers’ to coups.3
They mainly emphasize the corporate interests of the military
establishments such as adequate budgetary support, autonomy in
managing their internal affairs, continuity of institution itself, personal
interests of the military elite, sectional, communal and regional interests of
the various segments within military and officers’ attitudes and
perceptions towards societies. A factor common to both approaches is
external influence. It may be in the form of interference or encouragement
to particular groups in the society by a foreign power, or it may simply be
the contagious effect on the military of coups occurring elsewhere.
Theoretically, the purpose of this article is to show that
above-mentioned, apparently alternative explanations of military coups
d’etat are infact integrally related to each other. Our thesis is that the
understanding of societal perspective is the key to the explanation of a
coup d’etat and officers” attitudes, perceptions and grievances, which
determine their behaviour in any given situation, are mostly generated and
perpetuated because of societal factors. And external influences also
become effectively operative only when a regime experiences internal
strains and a crisis of legitimacy. We shall elaborate our thesis further in
our conclusion in the light of this case-study.

A Case-Study of Pakistan
Background: The leaders of the newly born state were faced with
gigantic problems in 1947. The problems were innumerable: development
of a national identity, formation and institutionalization of a political

2 S.P. Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay”, XVII, April 1965;
Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), S.E.
Finer, The Man on the Horseback (NEW YORK:, Praeger, 1973), J.J. Johnson (ed) The
Role of Military in Under-Development Countries (Princeton: Princeton University
Press. 1968), R.D. Putnam, “Towards Explaining Military Intervention in 1967”, E.
Luttwak, Coup D’etat (London: Penguin 1968), D.A. Hibbs. Mass Political Violence: A
Cross-National Casual Analysis. (NEW YORK: John Wily & Sons, 1973), E. Fosum,
“Factors influencing the occurrences of Military Coup d’etat in Latin America”,
Journal of Peace Research, Vol.4 (1967); H. Bienen, The Military Intervenes (NEW
YORK: Russell Sage Foundations. 1968). A. Wells, “The Coup d’etat in the theory
and Practice”, American Journal of Society Vol.79, No.4 (Jan., 1974).
3 W.R. Thompson, The Grievances of Military Coupe-makers (Beverly Hills Sage, 1973);
E.A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics (N.J. Prentice Hall 1977), M. Janowitz, The
Military in the Political Development of New Nations”, (Chicago: University Press, 1964).
1977 Coup D’etat in Pakistan 33

system, creation of a new administrative structure, laying down the

foundation of national economy and building a national army. Beside
these basic problems, traumatic events of the partition had burdened the
decision-makers with many other problems to be dealt with immediately
such as the refugees’ resettlement, war with India over Kashmir and
problems with Afghanistan.
Pakistan started its journey with the British type of parliamentary
political system. But the crisis of identity, the death of leaders of national
stature (M.A. Jinnah in September 1948 and Liaqat Ali Khan in October,
1951) the weak organizational structure of the Muslim League and the
growth of secular and provincial outlooks paved the way for the anarchic
polity in the parliamentary system of Pakistan. In the absence of any
permanent constitution and the democratic traditions, one author aptly
noted that at the end of its first decade “Pakistan was very much like
Hobbes’ state of nature where every political or provincial group fought
against every other group. It was a ceaseless and ruthless struggle for
power”.4
Pakistan inherited a weak, disorganized and disarrayed military
establishment from British India in 1947.5 Because of external threats
from India and Afghanistan (real or imaginary) and the geographic
separateness of the country’s two wings (West Pakistan and East
Pakistan)with one thousand miles of hostile territory of India in between,
defence of the state became the ‘foremost consideration’ dominating all
other governmental activities.6 The defence expenditure remained as high
as 70 per cent of the total public expenditures in the early years.7 The
Pakistan Army, true to its British training patterns, remained largely aloof
from politics in the early years.8 However, chaotic political situation did
not let them remain a silent spectator. Rather, it drew them in as a separate
powerful and influential actor. The political vacuum within the country

4 K.B. Sayeed, “The Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan”, Middle East

Journal., Vol.XIII, No.4, (Autumn 1959) Fertile details of some of the basic
problems laced by the leaders in early years, see E.L. Tepper, “Pakistan in
Retrospect”, International Journal, 3 (1972).
5 F.M. Khan, The Story of Pakistan Army, Lahore, 1966.
6 H.A. Rizvi, The Military and Politic in Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publisher
1974), p.53.
7 Ibid.
8 Sec an excellent article for the structural characteristics of Pakistan Army. D.V.
Jacques (ed) Armed Forces and Society, pp.247-68.
34 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)

combined with the external threat perception paved the way for the
increasing influence of the army in shaping the domestic and foreign
policy of the country. Under the strong pressure of the military command,
the civilian government entered into Mutual Defence Agreement with the
U.S. in May, 1954, joined SEATO in September, 1954 and Baghdad Pact
(later CENTO) in 1955.9 Domestically, the integration of the provinces of
West Pakistan in the form of one unit was also the brainchild of Ayub
Khan, first Pakistani commander-in-chief of the Pakistan army. 10 The
military establishment was the only cohesive and disciplined national
institution in chaotic, turbulent and unstable Pakistani society.
General Ayub Khan led the first coup d’etat in the country in October,
1958. The coup d’etat was influenced by several factors; break down of
the political system, government’s overwhelming reliance on military for
maintaining public law and order, deteriorating socio-economic
conditions, high prestige of the military among the public, self images of
the military elite as the guardian of national integrity and finally the
external influences notably the U.S. encouragement and the contagious
effects upon the military elite of the coups occurring in Egypt (July 1952),
Iraq (July 1958) and Burma (September 1958).11 This coup d’etat marked
the ascendancy of the military over the civilian for the coming twelve
years. Pakistan under General Ayub Khan’s leadership closely resembled
a ‘modernizing oligarchy’.12 The decision-making was restricted to the
senior military elites around Ayub and the bureaucracy. Pakistan between
1958-69 was an administrative state run by bureaucracy with the support
of military. Ayub Khan also tried to create a new political system of Basic
Democracies, but his ten years’ rule created much more complex
problems. Political suppression, bureaucratic high handedness, economic
growth without social justice and inter-regional disparities finally resulted
in the breakdown of his political system. And Ayub Khan had to resign in
March 1969 in the wake of a prolonged, intense and wide-spread
agitational campaign against his regime.
Ayub Khan handed over power to General Yahya Khan, the
commander-in-chief of Pakistan army, chosen by him mainly because of

9 Wayne Wilcos, “Coup d’etat of 1958 in Pakistan”, Pacific Affairs (Jan., 1965).
10 Ibid.
11 H.A. Rizvi (1974), p.258.
12 See a detailed account of Ayub’s regime Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era –
Politics in Pakistan 1958-1969 (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1971).
1977 Coup D’etat in Pakistan 35

non-political reasons.13 He called for the general elections in December

1970, but he neither had any intentions to transfer power to the civilian
representative nor had the ability to understand complex political and
economic problems of the country. Two political parties emerged
victorious out of December 1970 General Elections, the Awami League
led by Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman in East Pakistan’ and the Pakistan
Peoples’ Party leg by Zulfiqar All Bhutto in West Pakistan.14 The lack of
reconciliation between Sheikh Mujib’s Awami League and Zulfiqar AH
Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples’ Party and General Yahya Khan’s unfortunate
military action in East Pakistan finally led to the 1971 War with India and
the dismemberment of Pakistan.15 With the defeat in 1971 war from India
and the creation of Bangladesh, the military rule came to an end in
Pakistan. In the face of massive public demonstration against the military
elite, one faction within the military Junta was instrumental in the
withdrawal of the military from the government and the restoration of the
civilian regime in Pakistan.16

Societal Perspective: Political System during Bhutto Regime

The political system established by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto after
assuming power in 1971 was potentially unstable, leading towards chaos
and disorder in the long run, thus providing a precondition for a potential
coup d’etat. Bhutto had similar type of problems before him as its
predecessors had, such as search for national identity, development of
political rules of the game, framing of the new constitution and
determining of the role of political parties, civil services and military.17
It is necessary to know Bhutto’s own background and the context of
his party’s emergence in order to understand his regime properly. 18

13 Robert Laporte Jr., “Succession in Pakistan: Continuity and Change in a Garrison

State’’, Asian Survey, No.11 (Nov., 1969).
14 See for a detailed analysis Craig Baxter, “Pakistan Votes - 1970” Asian Survey,
Vol.XI, No.3 (March 1971).
15 Robert Laporte Jr., “Pakistan in 1971: The Disintegration of a Nation”, Asian Survey,
Vol.XII, No.3 (February 1972): Robert V. Jackson, South Asian Crisis (London:
Chatto and Windus, 1975).
16 The Army Chief of Staff, General Gul Hasan and the Air Force Commander Air
Marshal Rahim virtually threatened Yahya Khan and forced him to resign. H.A.
Rizvi (1974).
17 Khalid Bin Sayeed, “Pakistan in 1971”, Asian Survey (Jan., 1972), pp.280-86.
18 See two recent books which explain Bhutto’s personality and his regime in detail
Shahid Javaid Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-77 (London: Ithaca Press, 1979).
36 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)

Heger’s remarks was quite apt during his regime that ‘Pakistan’s political
debility can be explained in terms of Bhutto his background, his views of
power, his performance, his preoccupation with his personal destiny’.19
Bhutto belonged to a traditional landlord family of Sindh acquired
advanced education at British and American Universities and emerged as
an ambitious and volatile figure on the Pakistani political scene. During
Ayub’s period he served as his foreign minister and became his leading
opponent after the Tashkent Declaration when Ayub Khan dismissed him
from the government. During 1967-69, he acquired charisma, propounded
his theory “of Islamic socialism, played upon the themes of social and
economic injustices and organized his political party the Pakistan Peoples’
Party. Organizationally, his political party was a very weak and incoherent
political party which owed its existence to its founder.20 Party elections
were never held and the local office bearers were always nominated by
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto himself. He was often proud to declare: “1 am the
Peoples’ Party and they are all my creatures.”21
Mr. Bhutto’s personality had a deep imprint on the political system,
he reconstituted. The constitution, though, approved with consensus, was
tailored to the maximum advantage of the ruling junta. It was further
changed through subsequent, arbitrary amendments in order to enhance
the powers of the executive and reduce the powers of judiciary.
Structurally, it was a federal parliamentary system, but in practice it was a
highly personalized system of governance. Bhutto kept martial law in
effect for more than a year after assuming control, thereby allowing
himself extra-ordinary powers as the chief martial law administrator. He
instituted a number of structural reforms in civilian and military
bureaucracies which considerably enhanced his personal control over
these institutions.22

19 A.G. Heeger. “Politics in the Post-Military State: Some Reflections on the Pakistani
Experience, World Politics, 2 (Jan., 1977), pp.242-62.
20 For a concise analysis of PPP’s structure see Heeger (1977).
21 Far Eastern Economic Review, June 13, 1977.
22 Zia-ul-Haq’s government has issued a white papers in four volumes, covering
various aspects of the performance of the Bhutto regime See White Paper on the
Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Vol.I, II, III, IV, Government of Pakistan,
Islamabad, January, 1979 Also see White Paper on the Misuse of Media. Government
of Pakistan, August, 1978. William Richter also briefly mentions the style of Bhutto
regime, through the focus of the articles is “Persistent Practonanism Pakistan’s Third
Military Regime”, Pacific Affairs, Vol 51, No 3, Fall 1978.
1977 Coup D’etat in Pakistan 37

Bhutto, well aware of the political position of the military, tried to

restructure the pattern of civil-military relations in Pakistan. In the context
of 1971 defeat, he shrewdly utilized the unfavourable position of the
military among the public. He declared his intention to root out
‘Bonapartism’ from the military, holding them responsible for most of the
political problems of the country.23 Also suggested the idea of replacing
the present army by ‘the people’s army’ once, but did not repeat it again.24
In the first four months he removed forty three senior military officers. He
also introduced organizational changes in order to strengthen the civilian
supremacy. He abolished the system of commanders-in-chief and
instituted a system of having chiefs of staff. The chiefs of three services
worked under the authority of a joint board of chiefs of staff with the head
of the state as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Secondly, the
chiefs of staff were given a fixed tenure and it was decided that no
extension of the term would be granted. Thirdly, constitutional checks
were placed on the military. The function of the military was clearly
specified that it would “defend Pakistan against external aggression or
threat of war, and, subject to law, act in aid of civil power when called
upon to do so.” The act of take over by army was specifically mentioned a
“High treason”.25
Mr. Bhutto ruled the country with an iron hand. Being a landlord
himself and trained in Ayub Khan’s system it was characteristic of Mr.
Bhutto’s personality that he was extremely intolerant of any opposition to
him. He struck hard upon his political rivals. The provincial governments
of National Awami Party (NAP) and Jamiat Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) in
N.W.F.P. and Balochistan were dismissed and their leaders were put
behind the bars on various charges. The opposition leaders were harassed
by all means. Several of them were detained and subjected to inhuman
type of tortures.26 They were threatened that their wives and daughters
will be abducted if they did not stop opposing Mr. Bhutto.27 Twenty four
eminent opposition leaders were murdered during his regime.28 According

23 H.A. Rizvi (1974), p.251.

24 Ibid.
25 Article 245 of the Constitution enforced on August 14, 1973.
26 Based upon personal interviews.
27 Infact some of the cases were reported to the police but the cases were hushed up on
the orders of the government.
28 See the report “Torture claims in India and Pakistan’’, Far Eastern Economic Review,
(June 13, 1977).
38 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)

to one Amnesty International report, the number of political prisoners

during Bhutto regime (1971-77) was 2,000.29 It docs not include those
20,000 arrested during the political crisis which started after March 1977
elections. A strict censorship was imposed on the press during his regime.
The independent role of the judiciary was also criticized by the regime and
finally its powers were curtailed through constitutional amendments.
Institutions created by the constitution had mere paper value. The whole
political system revolved around one personality Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.
What Huntington calls the ‘institutional decay’, was at its peak.30
Mr. Bhutto’s major contribution to Pakistani politics was that he
ushered in an era of social mobilization. During his 1970 election
campaign he brought structural social injustices into limelight and created
an awareness of the basic issues among the public. Through his catchy
slogans and charismatic personality he was able to break traditional
patterns of politics and to give new hopes and expectations to the
oppressed classes. But unfortunately, having assumed power he was a
changed man. Now all his efforts were directed towards consolidating his
own power rather than bringing a social revolution. The land reforms,
industrial reforms, educational reforms and advertisement reforms, though
publicized with much fanfare had nominal effect because of hall-hearted
attempts to implement them.31 The process of implementing these reforms
rather alienated the people from the regime. A contemporary analyst
rightly points out “it was the failure to comprehend that in implementing a
number of the economic and social measures adopted by his
administration he needed the full backing of the broad coalitions that had
helped him into power”.32 Middle classes were particularly affected by the
economic policies of the regime as their share in the total wealth
declined. 33 This alienated middle class formed the backbone of
anti-Bhutto movement later.34 His political party PPP was also of little
help as it was source of further weakness because of its heterogeneous
ideological groups (ranging from extreme right to extreme left) and loose

29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Khalid Bin Sayeed, “How Radical is Pakistan Peoples’ Party”, Pacific Affairs
(January 1974).
32 Shahid Javaid Burki (1980), p.4.
33 Ibid., p.67.
34 Khalid Bin Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan. The Nature and Direction of Change (NEW
YORK: Praeger, 1980), p.159.
1977 Coup D’etat in Pakistan 39

organizational structure. Within PPP he played one faction against the

other in order to keep a balance and to keep his position supreme. He
combined the government offices with the party offices and disassociated
himself from the masses. With the passage of time his party, the Pakistan
Peoples’ Party was shaped into a “relatively limited, minister focused
party”. As a result, police and intelligence agencies became the mainstay
of power. Huge resources were allocated for strengthening these agencies
and their directors were given wide powers to work for the PPP.
According to one estimate expenditure on the FSF (Federal Security Force)
increased from Rs.36.4 million for 1976-77 — Expenditure on civil armed
forces increased from Rs.192.5 million to Rs.388.2 million. And total
expenditure on police and security were as high as Rs.521.8 million for
1976-77. These figures reveal growing dependence of Bhutto regime on
security agencies.35 Bhutto wanted to demobilize the people through his
autocratic measures as this appeared to him the only alternative to the
institutionalization of the political system.

General Elections of March 1977

Many researchers agree that when civilian government loses its
legitimacy, it is most vulnerable to the incidence of coup d’etat.36 The
government is considered to b e “less than legitimate when many
politically aware citizens do not accept its authority: a sizeable proportion
of the politicized populations, ranging from those whore merely in
national politics to the leaders of political parties believe that the
government is not deserving its allegiance.”37 Bhutto regime also lost its
legitimacy in the wake of general elections held in March 1977 in
Pakistan.
On 7 January 1977, it was announced by the government that the
general elections would be held on 7 March and 10 March for the national
assembly and the provincial assemblies respectively. Bhutto perceived the
situation favourable for him. The major opposition parties were in a
disarray, divided by sharp ideological cleavages, political differences and
personality clashes; the anti-regime movements in Balochistan and NWFP
seemed well controlled; press, radio and television had already been
tamed; and apparently there did not seem any effective political opponent
in the field. But quite unexpectedly, within 48 hours of the announcement

35 Khalid Bin Sayeed (1980), p.107.

36 Nordlinger (l977), p.45.
37 Ibid., p.92.
40 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)

of elections, nine opposition parties formed the Pakistan National Alliance

(PNA) in order to confront the PPP.38 The PNA was a conglomerate of
heterogeneous parties ranging from extreme right to left. The Muslim
League (Muslim League) the Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), the
Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI), the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP), the
Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), the National Democratic Party (NDP), the
Tehrik-i-Istiqlal-i-Pakistan (TIP), the Khaksars and the All Jammu and
Kashmir Muslim Conference. The only common basis among the PNA’s
political parties was their opposition to Mr. Bhutto.
Once the date for elections was announced, the genie of masses’
feelings was out of the battle and the PNA was able to capitalize on it.
Politically conscious voters were expressing their genuine feelings against
the loss of civil liberties, wide spread corruptions, excesses of PPP’s
MNAs (Member National Assembly) and MPAs (Member of Provincial
Assemblies), rising prices, and the high-handedness of the police, the
Federal Security Force (FSF) and the PPP guards. The turn-out of people
at the PNA’s meetings was surprising. As compared to the PPP, the PNA
attracted the huge crowds in the public meetings and processions. 39
Despite the PNA’s successful campaign most observers believed that the
PPP could win a marginal victory. Even the PNA’s candidates would be
able to win 80 to 90 seats out of 200 National Assembly seats.40 The
general impression was that a strong opposition would emerge which
would serve as an effective check on the unbridled activities of the PPP.
The results of the general elections were surprising. The PPP claimed
to gain an overwhelming victory by winning 155 seats and 36 went to the
PNA. The PNA leaders immediately denounced the elections, calling it
completely ‘rigged and farce’ and demanded fresh elections and the
resignation of an ‘illegal Prime Minister’.41 The PPP maintained that the

38 Bhutto in his book “If I am assassinated” blamed that the spontaneity in the
formation of the PNA’s alliance was mainly due to the U.S involvement but there
does not exist any concrete evidence to support his assertion Infact that opposition
parties deliberately kept on giving an impression to Bhutto that they were deeply
divided and Bhutto fell into their trap and visualizing an overwhelming victory over
the divided opponents, he announced the date of elections. See for Bhutto’s charge,
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, If I Am Assassinated (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House,
1979), p.87.
39 For the detailed account of election campaign, see, Lawrence Ziring, “March 1977
Elections in Pakistan”, Asian Survey (May 1977), pp.60-80.
40 Based on interviews with the PNA leaders.
41 The Pakistan Times. March 10, 1977.
1977 Coup D’etat in Pakistan 41

elections were fair and there was no question of fresh elections.42 Some
foreign correspondents also reported that the electoral malpractices were
confined to limited constituencies. 43 But infact, the rigging was well
planned and at a very large scale. The PPP had been preparing for the
elections for quite a long time. The government machinery, at all levels
was mobilized at least one year prior to the elections. 44 The Prime
Minister’s Secretariat, the Intelligence Agencies and the information
ministry were almost totally devoted in preparing estimates for the
forthcoming elections, making recommendations for candidates,
‘suitable’ for the PPP and suggesting various measures in order to ensure
the success of the ruling party in elections.45
The district administration, which was to play a key role in the
conduct of the elections, was thoroughly scrutinized and ‘undependable’
Deputy Commissioners and the Superintendents of Police were either
transferred or sent on leave.
The PNA’s candidate opposing Mr. Bhutto from Larkana, Maulana
Jan Mohammad Abbasi was abducted and detained all night in order to
prevent him from filing his nomination papers. Other PNA candidates,
opposing the chief ministers also met the same fate. The Prime Minister
and all four chief ministers were declared elected uncontested in order to
make an impression. On the polling day, the police FSF and the civil
service along with PPP workers did their job faithfully.46 Bogus voting
was done at a large scale, the women’s polling stations wee special targets
of the PPP workers.47 At several places the oppositions’ polling agents
were locked in separate rooms until the counting was over. At many places
the votes polled were found more than the actual voters registered in those
polling stations. Several PPP ministers themselves were seen harassing the

42 Ibid.
43 Keesings Contemporary Archives, pp.28301-6.
44 Following information is mostly based on the personal interviews with the
government officials who wish to remain unidentified.
45 See an organ of PPP Mahmood Sham ‘Hookamran Party Ki Intikhabi Mohim Ya
Siasi Party Ki Moham’ Weekly Meyyar, (Karachi) March 5, 1977, pp.36-44.
46 1 myself visited several polling stations in and around Rawalpindi and interviewed a
number of people from different constituencies in Punjab.
47 Mukhtar Hassan ‘Satt March Ka Drama – Purdah Utha Ha’, Weekly Islami
Jamhoorivya, Lahore, March 14, 1977.
42 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)

voters and stamping the ballot papers themselves.48 The state controlled
radio and T.V. started announcing landslide victories for the PPP
candidates even before the counting was over.
It is difficult to assess the exact scope of rigging in the elections, but
these were by no means ordinary or confined to limited number of
constituencies.49 The Chief Election Commissioner, Mr. Sajjad Ahmad
Jan made three public statements about massive rigging in the elections
and showed his helplessness in preventing it.50 After examining the results
of 24 constituencies 51 later he said that he was ‘shocked’ and was
convinced that elections were massively rigged in more than half of the
constituencies and suggested ‘re-elections instead of further enquiries’.52
His powers were withdrawn and he was sent abroad on medical leave
when he unseated six PPP members of the National Assembly and was
busy in examining the results of 80 other seats.53 The PPP’s position was
that the national assembly’s election was a settled matter and it was not
open to negotiations, however, the opposition’s complaints may be
given a sympathetic hearing. Mr. Bhutto kept insisting on the
legitimacy of the elections simultaneously offering the PNA leaders to
negotiate, but they outrightly rejected his offer until the acceptance of
their basic demands.54

48 Walter Schwarz, ‘Why Bhutto’s power is crumbling’, The Guardian, London, May 1,
1977.
49 Zia-ul-Haq’s government issued a voluminous white paper on the general elections
of March 1977, releasing innumerable official documents which throw light on the
conduct of General Elections Obviously the government did have the propagandist^
motive as well which makes the document clumsy, inconsistent and
self-contradictory at various places Nevertheless, it is an important document to
understand the process of organized rigging by Bhutto regime. It is interesting to
note that Bhutto in his reply to this white paper calls these documents “one-sided”
and “part of character assassination campaign’, but he does not challenge the
authenticity of these documents. See White Paper on the Conduct of the General
Elections in March, 1977, Government of Pakistan, July 1978. And for Bhutto’s
reply Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, If 1 Am Assassinated... (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979).
50 Hassan (1977).
51 Daily Millat, Karachi, June 13, 1977.
52 The Pakistan Times, June 23, 1977.
53 Ibid., Karachi 10, 1977.
54 The Pakistan Times. March 10, 1977.
1977 Coup D’etat in Pakistan 43

The boycott of provincial assemblies’ elections was a complete

success. The agitational movement started growing gradually. The
movement was more successful in the urban areas of Sindh in the
beginning, but after 9th April’s violent demonstration in Lahore, the
movement quickly engulfed the Punjab as well. By 20th April all the major
urban centres of Punjab, Sindh and NWFP were under curfew. The
movement acquired a religious colour when the PNA leaders declared that
it was a ‘Tehreek-i-Nizam-i-Mustafa’ i.e. the movement for establishment
of Islamic system of life as given by Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon
him). Despite massive use of force by the government, the movement was
extremely fierce and continued unabated. The PNA’s appeal to the masses
for the withdrawal of money from the banks, non-payment of taxes and
regular weekly strikes had a considerable success.55 “The Wheel Jam’
strike launched by the PNA was also a complete success: the trains were
stopped, the means of communication were blocked, factories and
educational institutions remained closed and the whole country came to a
standstill for one day.56 This strike was the catalyst to partial martial law in
three major cities, accompanied by a presidential proclamation of a state
of emergency, suspending citizens’ constitutional rights, placing a long
list of penal offenders under the jurisdiction of military courts, making the
verdict of these courts final and amending the army laws to grant the
troops wider powers.57
Mr. Bhutto conceded that some irregularities and malpractices were
committed by certain individuals, but he maintained that it was not a
deliberate plan of the government to manipulate the elections. 58 His
position was characteristic of his personality. He said, “I don’t want to go
down in history as a rigger of the elections, which I am not. If 1 have
re-elections, I would be conceding their false charge that I am a
manipulator and rigger of elections... What the hell is office of Prime
Minister? I am more concerned about my place in history”.59 But as the

55 Long queues of people were seen before the banks after the PNA call to withdraw
money from the banks.
56 See for the details, Salamat Ali, ‘Bhutto Weathers Storm’, Far Eastern Economic
Review, May 6, 1977.
57 Ibid.
58 The Pakistan Times, March 28, 1977. Bhutto, replying to the charges of rigging
writes: “1 will stand by that statement I did not rig the elections. I am not responsible
for the individuals who indulged in electoral malpractices in their individual
capacity”, Bhutto, If I Am Assassinated... (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979), p.9.
59 The Pakistan Times, April 9, 1977.
44 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)

crisis prolonged, Mr. Bhutto, blowing hot and cold at the same time,
changed his position vis-à-vis PNA. He offered them several alternatives:
formation of special tribunal in order to investigate the allegations of
rigging: re-election of provincial assemblies and the holding of new
general elections in case the opposition wins the provincial elections,
special announcement regarding the enforcement of Shariat laws within
six months, immediate prohibition on the use of Alcohol, gambling and
night clubs and holding of a nation-wide referendum whether people want
him as a Prime Minister or not.60 The PNA leaders rejected all of these
proposals declaring that these were irrelevant to their basic demands. On
April 29, 1977 Mr. Bhutto revealed an international conspiracy against
him and alleged that his opponents were seeking assistance from the U.S.
in order to topple his regime.61
The mistrust among the politicians was so high that they were not
prepared to talk to each other. The political dialogue between the PNA and
the PPP which started on June 3, 1977 were facilitated mainly by the Saudi
envoy to Pakistan, Mr. Raizul Khatib. Playing the crucial role of an
intermediary, he was successful in persuading both the parties to soften
their positions and hold negotiations to resolve three-month old political
crisis. There were other factors as well which forced both the parties to
come to terms. More than 300 people had been killed and over 20,000
arrested but still the intensity of the movement was not on the wane.62
There was fear that it might get out of control of even the PNA leaders.
Secondly, the national economic situation was also deteriorating seriously
because of prolonged crisis. Estimated losses during the previous three
months were more than $ 730 million.63 Finally, besides Saudi Arabia,
emissaries from Libya U.A.E. and P.L.O. frequently visited Pakistan and
communicated grave concern of their governments over Pakistan’s
political deadlock. And Pakistan’s leading financiers’ voice could not be
ignored.64
The negotiations started on June 3, 1977 and an agreement was
reached between the PPP and the PNA on June 16, 1977. Thanks to the
Saudi envoy’s efforts, even before the formal negotiations started both

60 See for the details of these proposals, The Pakistan Times, May 1977 issue.
61 The Pakistan Times, April 29, 1977.
62 The New York Times, June 1955.
63 Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.28301-6.
64 Salamat Ali, ‘Arab Wail and See’, Far Eastern Economic Review, June 6, 1978.
1977 Coup D’etat in Pakistan 45

parties had softened their basic positions. The PPP had agreed to the
holding of fresh elections and the PNA had shelved its main demand for
Bhutto’s resignation. The agreement included several clauses regarding
the fool proof arrangements for new elections such as the dissolution of
present national and provincial cabinets and assemblies, reappointment of
provincial governors in consultation with the PNA, association of election
commission and formation of a national level committee in order lo
supervise the conduct of elections. The task of working out the details of
the agreement were left to a two-member sub-committee.65
Despite the negotiations and the agreement, there still existed an
unbridgeable credibility gap between the two opponents. Both continued
exercising pressure tactics upon each other. Before the agreement was
signed, Bhutto left the country for the tour of Middle Eastern countries,
apparently to ‘thank them’, but infact to show the strength of his power
base by illustrating that he could remain absent for five days without
fearing his opponents.66 The second rate leadership of both the parties kept
threatening each other and some violent skirmishes also occurred. In the
meanwhile, the sub-committee talks were bogged down on the question of
powers of the implementation committee. The PPP wanted to give it the
status of an advisory council while the PNA wanted to give it all possible
powers to conduct an impartial election. Mr. Bhutto said that he could not
accept a ‘super-government’ while Mufti Mahmood, the PNA’s President
alleged that the government was trying to wriggle out of the agreement.67
The dispute was resolved on July 3, 1977 when a new accord was reached
between the PPP and the PNA regarding the powers of committee.68 But
the situation became more complicated when the PNA’s general council
refused to accept the new accord and presented 10 new demands in order
to ensure a fair election. Air Marshal (R) Asghar Khan, head of the
Tehrik-i-Istiqlal-i-Pakistan (a component of PNA) openly rebuked the
PNA’s negotiating team and charged them of ‘over-reaching’.69 Bhutto
accused the PNA for violating the accord in his last press conference on

65 The Pakistan Times, June 16, 1977.

66 Far Eastern Economic Review, July 15, 1977.
67 The Pakistan Times, July 29. 1977.
68 The Committee, consisting of equal number of PPP and PNA members was given
review powers over government decisions In the case of dispute the matter would be
referred to the supreme court which would give its verdict within 72 hours, The
Pakistan Times, July 3, 1977.
69 Dawn, July 3, 1977.
46 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)

July 4, 1977 and said that ‘he will reopen as many issues as they want’.70
He expressed his willingness to talk to the PNA leaders again, but the
army’s patience was over by then. Keeping in view the recurrent
deadlocks among the politicians, highly volatile political situation
characterized by violence and civil war and continuously deteriorating
economic conditions, the army staged the coup d’etat on July 5, 1977 and
Bhutto regime came to an end in Pakistan.

Soldiers’ Perspective
There do not seem to be any dominant motives of the coup-makers in
this case. The army’s intervention was not designed; rather, it was
‘reactive’. It is evident from the fact that at the height of the agitational
movement, when the rumours were common that the military is going to
take over the country, one of the prominent leaders of the PNA Air
Marshal (retired) Asghar Khan, through his signed letter, virtually invited
the army to take-over the country. He called on the officers to distinguish
between ‘lawful’ and ‘unlawful’ commands and not to support ‘the illegal
government of the day. 71 Furthermore, the army commanders received
thousands of telegrams from the people cursing them for the support of an
unpopular regime and for the killing of innocent people instead of taking
power themselves.72 Despite these appeals the chiefs of staff of army,
navy and air force came with a clear declaration in favour of the
government in the following words: “We wish to make it absolutely clear
that Pakistan army, navy and air force are totally united to discharge their
constitutional obligations in support of the present legally constituted
government”. 73 This sort of statement was unique in the history of
civil-military relations of Pakistan.
The main motivation which led General Zia-ul-Haq from this
perspective seems to be his concern of army’s prestige and image in the

70 Dawn, July 5, 1977.

71 See for the ext of the letter, The Pakistan Times, May 5. 1977.
72 Based on personal interviews.
73 The Pakistan Times, April 28, 1977. Later during his imprisonment Bhutto alleged
that the army and PNA had collaborated to topple his regime he wrote: “since
February 1977, PNA and the Chief Martial Law Administrator have been in league
with each other. The agitation was a common affair. Jawans dressed in civilian
clothes or in Muftis were sent to PNA demonstrations to swell the crowds and incite
public provocation.” Bhutto (1979), p. 145. Bhutto’s allegation is totally baseless as
the army chiefs were completely supporting him at that time and the army was
battling with the people on streets.
1977 Coup D’etat in Pakistan 47

society. The army had suffered a serious loss of prestige for supporting a
highly unpopular regime. People used to taunt the army officers in the
streets, and several times refused to sell them eatables. General Zia in his
first address, talking about the role of the armed forces during the political
crisis also mentioned this point: “The Armed Forces were subjected to
criticisms and ridicules in the hope that it was a passing phase”.74 General
Zia also alleged that during the cabinet meeting on July 3, 1977 the
political advisers of the Prime Minister were pressing hard to ‘exterminate
ten or twelve leaders of PNA’.75 According to General Zia, General Tikka
Khan (Prime Minister’s adviser on national security) advised him “you
can shoot down between 10000 to 20000 people. That is nothing; it is in
the national interest. You must do your duty.”76 Even if this statement may
be considered exaggerated, there is no denying the fact that a new spiral of
frenzy and violence was in the offing.77
Another factor which was very pinching for the army generals was
that Bhutto had used them very crudely against the opposition parties.
During the negotiations, he used to call the generals to explain ‘the
dangers to the national security’ as a result of the PNA’s agitation. The
generals used to explain to the PNA leaders that because of internal
agitation India are amassing troops on the Punjab borders and Iran on the
Balochislan border.
The establishment of Federal Security Force during Bhutto’s regime
was also very resenting for the army officers. In the words of The Times
(London) it was ‘Bhutto’s personal army to coerce the political
opponents”.78 It was equipped with the modern light arms and very good
transport facilities and it was always perceived by the army officers as a
functional rival. On the very second day of the coup, General Zia
dismantled this organization.

External Influences
The patterns of events leading towards this coup d’etat show the
United States’ concern and influence in this event. On April 29, 1977 at
the height of PNA’s agitational movement Prime Minister Bhutto

74 The Pakistan Times, July 6, 1977.

75 New York Times, July 6, 1977.
76 Far Eastern Economic Review, October 14, 1977.
77 Ibid.
78 The Times, London, July 5, 1977.
48 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)

disclosed an ‘international conspiracy’ against him in the parliament. He

alleged the U.S. ‘flooding the money into the country’, backing up his
political opponents and U.S. attempts to topple his regime. He stressed
that Americans were unhappy over his policies, in particular his
independent stance over getting ‘Nuclear Reprocessing Plant” from
France and efforts to unite the third world.79
Although a large pan of the speech was propagandistic in nature and
an attempt to divert public attention, yet there seems to be an element of
truth in some of his allegations Pakistan had very bad relations with U.S.
over her ‘Nuclear Reprocessing Plant Deal with France. In view of her
global interests of nuclear non-proliferation and strategic interest in
South Asian region the U.S. was exercising massive pressure upon
Pakistan. In August 1976, Kissinger had talked of ‘punitive measures’
in terms of cutting off military and economic aid to Pakistan, if
Pakistan did not abandon the plant.80
The Pakistani government remained adamant, speeding up the work
for the actual instalment of the nuclear reprocessing plant. First signs of
pressure appeared when Canada cut-off her supplies, fuels and spare parts
for the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant. The major point in this controversy
between the Canadian and Pakistani governments was that Canada wanted
to extend the safeguards to Pakistan’s entire nuclear programme (not
merely Canadian supplied reactor) including the nuclear reprocessing
plant deal of Pakistan with France, and Pakistan was unwilling.81
United States clearly denied any involvement in Pakistan’s internal
affairs and Cyrus Vance made it clear that ‘we have given no assistance to
any organization or individual in Pakistan’.82 His suggestion to have
talks “quietly and dispassionately’ was exploited by Bhutto, who made

79 The Pakistan Times, April 29, 1977.

80 See Pakistan’s foreign minister’s statement, Pakistan Times, June 11, 1977, and Far
Eastern Economic Review, July 1, 1977 Kissinger also warned ‘Carter’ if he comes
to power, will make a horrible example of your country.
81 Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.28301.
82 Pakistan Times, May 5, 1977. The charge was seriously lacking in evidence Bhutto
only referred to the talks of two American diplomats on the telephone ‘the man is
gone, the party is over’, Pakistan Times, April 29, 1977.
1977 Coup D’etat in Pakistan 49

it public as an evidence of his charge. As a protest America withdrew

the nomination of George Vest as Ambassador to Pakistan.83
During the political crisis, there occurred a chain of seemingly
unrelated events in US-Pakistan relations, which had its impact on the
domestic situation. At the peak of the crisis on April 25th, the State
department refused to deliver tear-gas consignments against her March 15
decision to provide them. This was interpreted as an indication of the shift
in the American government’s policy towards the Bhutto regime.84 On
June 5, 1977, the U.S. revoked A-7 aircraft deal worth $ 700 million with
Pakistan.85 Bhutto told the parliament that it came as no ‘surprise’ because
‘A-7 was dangled before our eyes’ by the former Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger ‘in exchange of certain other things’ and cancellation of some
other contracts. 86 One June 20, 1977 when Pakistan’s economic
difficulties were growing, the scheduled meeting of the International aid
Consortium helping Pakistan (primary consisting of Western countries)
was postponed.87 The American active concern is also reflected by the fact
that the American Ambassador remained very close and watchful of the
political process.88
Although these events do not provide any definitive evidence of US
involvement, yet if taken together these seemingly unrelated events do
show that the US gave the green signal to the Pakistan army that it did not
like Bhutto regime any more. The powerful signals from the external
environment were definitely encouraging for the coup-makers.

Coup D’etat
“The army had watched political wrangling in the country for a
long time”,89 General Zia-ul-Haq told the journalists after the coup.

83 The New York Times, April 29, 1977. See a recent book, Latif Ahmad Sherwani,
Pakistan China & America, (Karachi: D.Y. Printers, 1980).
84 Washington Post, April 22, 1977.
85 Pakistan Time, June 7, 1977.
86 Ibid.
87 Christian Science Monitor, July 6, 1977.
88 American Ambassador Arthur Hummel requested an urgent meeting with the Prime
Minister one day before the coup which he did grant despite his political
preoccupations, Pakistan Times, July 4, 1977.
89 New York Times, July 6. 1977.
50 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)

Keeping in view the growing violence in the country and the Prime
Minister’s inability to reach the political settlement, the chiefs of
staff of three forces had prepared a secret ‘contingency plant”,
‘Operation Fair-play’ in the early period of political turmoil when
the generals thought that ‘the Prime Minister was not going on
sound lines.90 Bhutto had been very watchful of the army generals
throughout the political crisis. He thought that General Zia was
advantageous for him because he was ‘mediocre, non-political and
professional man’. 91 The military decided to act after Prime
Minister Bhutto disclosed in the afternoon of July 4, that the final
compromise over the question of new elections had again broken
down.92
The timing of the coup was very surprising. Few were
anticipating the coup at that time, because the armed forces had
shown their unqualified support for the regime at the height of the
agitational movement. They had not hesitated in opening fire on the
demonstrators. The masses perceived General Zia-ul-Haq as highly
‘submissive, unimaginative and yes-man commander-in-chief. 93
The military started its ‘Operation Fairplay’ early in the morning at
3 O’ clock on July 5, 1977. By 5 O’ clock, they had arrested the
Prime Minister, the Federal Ministers and all the PNA leaders.94
The coup was bloodless, and the military met no resistance from any
quarter. The coup was so peaceful that within twenty four hours, the
military was withdrawn from all the installations except very critical
one.95 Most of the people in the capital city did not believe that it
was a real coup. They thought that Prime Minister Bhutto had done
a new manoeuvre against the opposition. General Zia himself had to
explain in his first address to the nation that he had not secretly

90 Far Eastern Economic Review, October 8, 1977.

91 Ibid.
92 New York Time, July 8, 1977.
93 Based on personal talk with the people in Rawalpindi and Lahore.
94 Pakistan Times, July 8. 1977.
95 New York Times. July 8. 1977.
1977 Coup D’etat in Pakistan 51

‘concerted’ with the former Prime Minister and Zulfiqar Ali

Bhutto’s Government has ceased to exist.96
The public reaction to the coup d’etat was favourable in general;
however, the intelligentsia was sad that the country had
back-tracked to 1958 again.

Conclusion
Our argument set out in the beginning of the paper was that
societal factors basically explain the occurrence of a coup d’etat and
alternative explanatory factors arc, infact, related to, or better
understood only in the context of societal perspective. Our case
study shows that it was essentially the crisis of legitimacy of Bhutto
regime which set the ball rolling. Erosion of legitimacy was long in
process. The political system established by Zulfiqar Ah Bhutto was
potentially unstable. It depended mainly on his personality. Instead
of taking an institutional path, Bhutto opted for a personal style of
politics. The political, social and economic policies adopted by him
frustrated most sections of society and particularly alienated the
middle class. The political system collapsed and lost its legitimacy
in the wake of massive rigging in the general elections of March
1977. The agitational movement launched by the opposition was in
full swing by the end of May 1977. The credibility of Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto’s government was at its lowest ebb; the civil disorder and
violence was at its height and the whole country was almost
paralyzed as a result of continuous strikes, processing and fierce
skirmishes between the police and the people. Even the army was
unable to control the situation at several places. Although the
dialogue started between the government and the opposition in June
1977 and an agreement was also achieved but the credibility gap
between the ruling party and the opposition appeared unbridgeable.
The agreement broke finally while settling the details regarding its
implementation. Now the stage was set for the army’s intervention.
The military hesitated for a long time. Although some of the
opposition leaders openly invited the military to take over the
country, yet the military kept on supporting the regime even at the

96 See General Zia-ul-Haq’s speech in Pakistan Times, July 6, 1977.

52 Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007)

peak of the political crisis. Most of the military’s grievances were

peripheral, but as the political crisis deepen the attitudes and
perceptions of the officers and jawans began changing. Those who
have seen the political crisis could realize a distinct change in them.
Many of them defied the orders to shoot down the people. The
military elites were greatly concerned with their tarnished public
image during the prolonged political crisis. They hated their role of
being used by the regime like police. There was much frustration
and resentment in the junior ranks of the army. When the politicians
were unable to reach any political settlement even within five
months, the generals, keeping in view the mood of the army and
fearing a new spiral of frenzy and violence emerging in the country
after the break-up of final political talks, thought it proper to take
over the country rather than supporting unpopular regime. The
deteriorating relationship between the United States government
and Bhutto government was a further source of encouragement for
the coup-makers as they perceived both internal and external
environment favourable for staging the coup d’etat.