U.S.

Supreme Court
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)

No. 70-110

Argued December 8, 1971

Decided May 15, 1972

406 U.S. 205

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

Syllabus

Respondents, members of the Old Order Amish religion and the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church,
were convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law (which requires a child's
school attendance until age 16) by declining to send their children to public or private school after they
had graduated from the eighth grade. The evidence showed that the Amish provide continuing informal
vocational education to their children designed to prepare them for life in the rural Amish community.
The evidence also showed that respondents sincerely believed that high school attendance was contrary
to the Amish religion and way of life, and that they would endanger their own salvation and that of their
children by complying with the law. The State Supreme Court sustained respondents' claim that
application of the compulsory school attendance law to them violated their rights under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Held:

1. The State's interest in universal education is not totally free from a balancing process when it
impinges on other fundamental rights, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of
their children. Pp. 406 U. S. 213-215.

2. Respondents have amply supported their claim that enforcement of the compulsory formal education
requirement after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of their
religious beliefs. Pp. 406 U. S. 215-219

3. Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious sect and a long history as a successful
and self-sufficient segment of American society, the Amish have demonstrated the sincerity of their
religious beliefs, the interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, the vital role that belief and daily
conduct play in the continuing survival of Old Order Amish communities, and the hazards presented by
the State's enforcement of a statute generally valid as to others. Beyond this, they have

Page 406 U. S. 206

carried the difficult burden of demonstrating the adequacy of their alternative mode of continuing
informal vocational education in terms of the overall interest that the State relies on in support of its
program of compulsory high school education. In light of this showing, and weighing the minimal
difference between what the State would require and what the Amish already accept, it was incumbent
on the State to show with more particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education
would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish. Pp. 406 U. S. 212-29, 406 U. S. 234-
236.

4. The State's claim that it is empowered, as parens patriae, to extend the benefit of secondary
education to children regardless of the wishes of their parents cannot be sustained against a free
exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, for the Amish have introduced convincing evidence
that accommodating their religious objections by forgoing one or two additional years of compulsory
education will not impair the physical or mental health of the child, or result in an inability to be self-
supporting or to discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any other way materially
detract from the welfare of society. Pp. 406 U. S. 229-234.

49 Wis.2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539, affirmed.

BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, and
BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p.
406 U. S. 237. WHITE, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BRENNAN and STEWART, JJ., joined, post, p.
406 U. S. 237. DOUGLAS, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, post, p. 406 U. S. 241. POWELL and
REHNQUIST, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Page 406 U. S. 207

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

On petition of the State of Wisconsin, we granted the writ of certiorari in this case to review a decision
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court holding that respondents' convictions of violating the State's
compulsory school attendance law were invalid under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. For the
reasons hereafter stated, we affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Respondents Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller are members of the Old Order Amish religion, and
respondent Adin Yutzy is a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church. They and their
families are residents of Green County, Wisconsin. Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law
required them to cause their children to attend public or private school until reaching age 16, but the
respondents declined to send their children, ages 14 and 15, to public school after they completed the
eighth grade. [Footnote 1] The children were not enrolled in any private school, or within any
recognized exception to the compulsory attendance law, [Footnote 2] and they are conceded to be
subject to the Wisconsin statute.

Page 406 U. S. 208

On complaint of the school district administrator for the public schools, respondents were charged,
tried, and convicted of violating the compulsory attendance law in Green County Court, and were fined
the sum of $5 each. [Footnote 3] Respondents defended on the ground that the application

Page 406 U. S. 209

of the compulsory attendance law violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
[Footnote 4] The trial testimony showed that respondents believed, in accordance with the tenets of Old
Order Amish communities generally, that their children's attendance at high school, public or private,
was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life. They believed that, by sending their children to high
school, they would not only expose themselves to the danger of the censure of the church community,
but, as found by the county court, also endanger their own salvation and that of their children. The State
stipulated that respondents' religious beliefs were sincere.

In support of their position, respondents presented as expert witnesses scholars on religion and
education whose testimony is uncontradicted. They expressed their opinions on the relationship of the
Amish belief concerning school attendance to the more general tenets of their religion, and described
the impact that compulsory high school attendance could have on the continued survival of Amish
communities as they exist in the United States today. The history of the Amish

Page 406 U. S. 210

sect was given in some detail, beginning with the Swiss Anabaptists of the 16th century, who rejected
institutionalized churches and sought to return to the early, simple, Christian life deemphasizing
material success, rejecting the competitive spirit, and seeking to insulate themselves from the modern
world. As a result of their common heritage, Old Order Amish communities today are characterized by a
fundamental belief that salvation requires life in a church community separate and apart from the world
and worldly influence. This concept of life aloof from the world and its values is central to their faith.

A related feature of Old Order Amish communities is their devotion to a life in harmony with nature and
the soil, as exemplified by the simple life of the early Christian era that continued in America during
much of our early national life. Amish beliefs require members of the community to make their living by
farming or closely related activities. Broadly speaking, the Old Order Amish religion pervades and
determines the entire mode of life of its adherents. Their conduct is regulated in great detail by the
Ordnung, or rules, of the church community. Adult baptism, which occurs in late adolescence, is the
time at which Amish young people voluntarily undertake heavy obligations, not unlike the Bar Mitzvah
of the Jews, to abide by the rules of the church community. [Footnote 5]

Amish objection to formal education beyond the eighth grade is firmly grounded in these central
religious concepts. They object to the high school, and higher education generally, because the values
they teach

Page 406 U. S. 211

are in marked variance with Amish values and the Amish way of life; they view secondary school
education as an impermissible exposure of their children to a "worldly" influence in conflict with their
beliefs. The high school tends to emphasize intellectual and scientific accomplishments, self-distinction,
competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other students. Amish society emphasizes informal
"learning through doing;" a life of "goodness," rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than
technical knowledge; community welfare, rather than competition; and separation from, rather than
integration with, contemporary worldly society.
Formal high school education beyond the eighth grade is contrary to Amish beliefs not only because it
places Amish children in an environment hostile to Amish beliefs, with increasing emphasis on
competition in class work and sports and with pressure to conform to the styles, manners, and ways of
the peer group, but also because it takes them away from their community, physically and emotionally,
during the crucial and formative adolescent period of life. During this period, the children must acquire
Amish attitudes favoring manual work and self-reliance and the specific skills needed to perform the
adult role of an Amish farmer or housewife. They must learn to enjoy physical labor. Once a child has
learned basic reading, writing, and elementary mathematics, these traits, skills, and attitudes admittedly
fall within the category of those best learned through example and "doing," rather than in a classroom.
And, at this time in life, the Amish child must also grow in his faith and his relationship to the Amish
community if he is to be prepared to accept the heavy obligations imposed by adult baptism. In short,
high school attendance with teachers who are not of the Amish faith -- and may even be hostile to it --
interposes a serious barrier to the integration of the Amish child into

Page 406 U. S. 212

the Amish religious community. Dr. John Hostetler, one of the experts on Amish society, testified that
the modern high school is not equipped, in curriculum or social environment, to impart the values
promoted by Amish society.

The Amish do not object to elementary education through the first eight grades as a general
proposition, because they agree that their children must have basic skills in the "three R's" in order to
read the Bible, to be good farmers and citizens, and to be able to deal with non-Amish people when
necessary in the course of daily affairs. They view such a basic education as acceptable because it does
not significantly expose their children to worldly values or interfere with their development in the Amish
community during the crucial adolescent period. While Amish accept compulsory elementary education
generally, wherever possible. they have established their own elementary schools, in many respects like
the small local schools of the past. In the Amish belief, higher learning tends to develop values they
reject as influences that alienate man from God.

On the basis of such considerations, Dr. Hostetler testified that compulsory high school attendance
could not only result in great psychological harm to Amish children, because of the conflicts it would
produce, but would also, in his opinion, ultimately result in the destruction of the Old Order Amish
church community as it exists in the United States today. The testimony of Dr. Donald A. Erickson, an
expert witness on education, also showed that the Amish succeed in preparing their high school age
children to be productive members of the Amish community. He described their system of learning
through doing the skills directly relevant to their adult roles in the Amish community as "ideal," and
perhaps superior to ordinary high school education. The evidence also showed that the Amish have an
excellent

Page 406 U. S. 213

record as law-abiding and generally self-sufficient members of society.

Although the trial court, in its careful findings, determined that the Wisconsin compulsory school
attendance law, "does interfere with the freedom of the Defendants to act in accordance with their
sincere religious belief," it also concluded that the requirement of high school attendance until age 16
was a "reasonable and constitutional" exercise of governmental power, and therefore denied the
motion to dismiss the charges. The Wisconsin Circuit Court affirmed the convictions. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court, however, sustained respondents' claim under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, and reversed the convictions. A majority of the court was of the opinion that the State had
failed to make an adequate showing that its interest in "establishing and maintaining an educational
system overrides the defendants' right to the free exercise of their religion." 49 Wis.2d 430, 447, 182
N.W.2d 539, 547 (1971).

I
There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to
impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education. See, e.g., Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 268 U. S. 534 (1925). Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of
the function of a State. Yet even this paramount responsibility was, in Pierce, made to yield to the right
of parents to provide an equivalent education in a privately operated system. There, the Court held that
Oregon's statute compelling attendance in a public school from age eight to age 16 unreasonably
interfered with the interest of parents in directing the rearing of their offspring, including their
education in church-operated schools. As that case suggests, the values of parental direction of the
religious upbringing

Page 406 U. S. 214

and education of their children in their early and formative years have a high place in our society. See
also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 390 U. S. 639 (1968); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923);
cf. Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728 (1970). Thus, a State's interest in universal education,
however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental
rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their
children so long as they, in the words of Pierce, "prepare [them] for additional obligations." 268 U.S. at
268 U. S. 535.

It follows that, in order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond the eighth grade against a
claim that such attendance interferes with the practice of a legitimate religious belief, it must appear
either that the State does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement or that there is
a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free
Exercise Clause. Long before there was general acknowledgment of the need for universal formal
education, the Religion Clauses had specifically and firmly fixed the right to free exercise of religious
beliefs, and buttressing this fundamental right was an equally firm, even if less explicit, prohibition
against the establishment of any religion by government. The values underlying these two provisions
relating to religion have been zealously protected, sometimes even at the expense of other interests of
admittedly high social importance. The invalidation of financial aid to parochial schools by government
grants for a salary subsidy for teachers is but one example of the extent to which courts have gone in
this regard, notwithstanding that such aid programs were legislatively determined to be in the public
interest and the service of sound educational policy by States and by Congress. Lemon v.

Page 406 U. S. 215

Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). See also Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U. S. 1, 330 U. S. 18 (1947).
The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of
religion. We can accept it as settled, therefore, that, however strong the State's interest in universal
compulsory education, it is by no means absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other interests.
E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 366 U. S. 459 (1961)
(separate opinion of Frankfurter, J.); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 321 U. S. 165 (1944).

II
We come then to the quality of the claims of the respondents concerning the alleged encroachment of
Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance statute on their rights and the rights of their children to the
free exercise of the religious beliefs they and their forebears have adhered to for almost three centuries.
In evaluating those claims, we must be careful to determine whether the Amish religious faith and their
mode of life are, as they claim, inseparable and interdependent. A way of life, however virtuous and
admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based
on purely secular considerations; to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be
rooted in religious belief. Although a determination of what is a "religious" belief or practice entitled to
constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, [Footnote 6] the very concept of
ordered liberty precludes

Page 406 U. S. 216

allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has
important interests. Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and
rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the
social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious
basis. Thoreau's choice was philosophical and personal, rather than religious, and such belief does not
rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.

Giving no weight to such secular considerations, however, we see that the record in this case
abundantly supports the claim that the traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of
personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately
related to daily living. That the Old Order Amish daily life and religious practice stem from their faith is
shown by the fact that it is in response to their literal interpretation of the Biblical injunction from the
Epistle of Paul to the Romans, "be not conformed to this world. . . ." This command is fundamental to
the Amish faith. Moreover, for the Old Order Amish, religion is not simply a matter of theocratic belief.
As the expert witnesses explained, the Old Order Amish religion pervades and determines virtually their
entire way of life, regulating it with the detail of the Talmudic diet through the strictly enforced rules of
the church community.

The record shows that the respondents' religious beliefs and attitude toward life, family, and home have
remained constant -- perhaps some would say static -- in a period of unparalleled progress in human
knowledge generally and great changes in education. [Footnote 7] The respondents

Page 406 U. S. 217

freely concede, and indeed assert as an article of faith, that their religious beliefs and what we would
today call "lifestyle" have not altered in fundamentals for centuries. Their way of life in a church-
oriented community, separated from the outside world and "worldly" influences, their attachment to
nature, and the soil, is a way inherently simple and uncomplicated, albeit difficult to preserve against
the pressure to conform. Their rejection of telephones, automobiles, radios, and television, their mode
of dress, of speech, their habits of manual work do indeed set them apart from much of contemporary
society; these customs are both symbolic and practical.

As the society around the Amish has become more populous, urban, industrialized, and complex,
particularly in this century, government regulation of human affairs has correspondingly become more
detailed and pervasive. The Amish mode of life has thus come into conflict increasingly with
requirements of contemporary society exerting a hydraulic insistence on conformity to majoritarian
standards. So long as compulsory education laws were confined to eight grades of elementary basic
education imparted in a nearby rural schoolhouse, with a large proportion of students of the Amish
faith, the Old Order Amish had little basis to fear that school attendance would expose their children to
the worldly influence they reject. But modern compulsory secondary education in rural areas is now
largely carried on in a consolidated school, often remote from the student's home and alien to his daily
home life. As the record so strongly shows, the values and programs of the modern secondary school
are in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion; modern laws
requiring compulsory secondary education have accordingly engendered great concern and conflict.
[Footnote 8]

Page 406 U. S. 218

The conclusion is inescapable that secondary schooling, by exposing Amish children to worldly
influences in terms of attitudes, goals, and values contrary to beliefs, and by substantially interfering
with the religious development of the Amish child and his integration into the way of life of the Amish
faith community at the crucial adolescent stage of development, contravenes the basic religious tenets
and practice of the Amish faith, both as to the parent and the child.

The impact of the compulsory attendance law on respondents' practice of the Amish religion is not only
severe, but inescapable, for the Wisconsin law affirmatively compels them, under threat of criminal
sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs. See
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599, 366 U. S. 605 (1961). Nor is the impact of the compulsory attendance
law confined to grave interference with important Amish religious tenets from a subjective point of
view. It carries with it precisely the kind of objective danger to the free exercise of religion that the First
Amendment was designed to prevent. As the record shows, compulsory school attendance to age 16 for
Amish children carries with it a very real threat of undermining the Amish community and religious
practice as they exist today; they must either abandon belief and be assimilated into society at large or
be forced to migrate to some other and more tolerant region. [Footnote 9]

Page 406 U. S. 219

In sum, the unchallenged testimony of acknowledged experts in education and religious history, almost
300 years of consistent practice, and strong evidence of a sustained faith pervading and regulating
respondents' entire mode of life support the claim that enforcement of the State's requirement of
compulsory formal education after the eighth grade would gravely endanger, if not destroy, the free
exercise of respondents' religious beliefs.

III
Neither the findings of the trial court nor the Amish claims as to the nature of their faith are challenged
in this Court by the State of Wisconsin. Its position is that the State's interest in universal compulsory
formal secondary education to age 16 is so great that it is paramount to the undisputed claims of
respondents that their mode of preparing their youth for Amish life, after the traditional elementary
education, is an essential part of their religious belief and practice. Nor does the State undertake to
meet the claim that the Amish mode of life and education is inseparable from and a part of the basic
tenets of their religion -- indeed, as much a part of their religious belief and practices as baptism, the
confessional, or a sabbath may be for others.

Wisconsin concedes that, under the Religion Clauses, religious beliefs are absolutely free from the
State's control, but it argues that "actions," even though religiously grounded, are outside the protection
of the First Amendment. [Footnote 10] But our decisions have rejected the idea that

Page 406 U. S. 220

religiously grounded conduct is always outside the protection of the Free Exercise Clause. It is true that
activities of individuals, even when religiously based, are often subject to regulation by the States in the
exercise of their undoubted power to promote the health, safety, and general welfare, or the Federal
Government in the exercise of its delegated powers. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437
(1971); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599 (1961); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1879). But to agree that religiously grounded conduct must
often be subject to the broad police power of the State is not to deny that there are areas of conduct
protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and thus beyond the power of the State
to control, even under regulations of general applicability. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 U. S. 303-304
(1940). This case, therefore, does not become easier because respondents were convicted for their
"actions" in refusing to send their children to the public high school; in this context, belief and action
cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments. Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.S. at 403 U. S.
612.

Nor can this case be disposed of on the grounds that Wisconsin's requirement for school attendance to
age 16 applies uniformly to all citizens of the State and does not, on its face, discriminate against
religions or a particular religion, or that it is motivated by legitimate secular concerns. A regulation
neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for
governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion. Sherbert v. Verner, supra; cf.
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664 (1970). The Court must not ignore the danger that an exception

Page 406 U. S. 221

from a general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds may run afoul of the Establishment Clause,
but that danger cannot be allowed to prevent any exception, no matter how vital it may be to the
protection of values promoted by the right of free exercise. By preserving doctrinal flexibility and
recognizing the need for a sensible and realistic application of the Religion Clauses,

"we have been able to chart a course that preserved the autonomy and freedom of religious bodies
while avoiding any semblance of established religion. This is a 'tight rope,' and one we have successfully
traversed."
Walz v. Tax Commission, supra, at 397 U. S. 672.

We turn, then, to the State's broader contention that its interest in its system of compulsory education
is so compelling that even the established religious practices of the Amish must give way. Where
fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake, however, we cannot accept such a sweeping
claim; despite its admitted validity in the generality of cases, we must searchingly examine the interests
that the State seeks to promote by its requirement for compulsory education to age 16, and the
impediment to those objectives that would flow from recognizing the claimed Amish exemption. See,
e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, supra; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308
U. S. 147 (1939).

The State advances two primary arguments in support of its system of compulsory education. It notes,
as Thomas Jefferson pointed out early in our history, that some degree of education is necessary to
prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to
preserve freedom and independence. Further, education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-
sufficient participants in society. We accept these propositions.

Page 406 U. S. 222

However, the evidence adduced by the Amish in this case is persuasively to the effect that an additional
one or two years of formal high school for Amish children in place of their long-established program of
informal vocational education would do little to serve those interests. Respondents' experts testified at
trial, without challenge, that the value of all education must be assessed in terms of its capacity to
prepare the child for life. It is one thing to say that compulsory education for a year or two beyond the
eighth grade may be necessary when its goal is the preparation of the child for life in modern society as
the majority live, but it is quite another if the goal of education be viewed as the preparation of the child
for life in the separated agrarian community that is the keystone of the Amish faith. See Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 262 U. S. 400.

The State attacks respondents' position as one fostering "ignorance" from which the child must be
protected by the State. No one can question the State's duty to protect children from ignorance, but this
argument does not square with the facts disclosed in the record. Whatever their idiosyncrasies as seen
by the majority, this record strongly shows that the Amish community has been a highly successful social
unit within our society, even if apart from the conventional "mainstream." Its members are productive
and very law-abiding members of society; they reject public welfare in any of its usual modern forms.
The Congress itself recognized their self-sufficiency by authorizing exemption of such groups as the
Amish from the obligation to pay social security taxes. [Footnote 11]

Page 406 U. S. 223

It is neither fair nor correct to suggest that the Amish are opposed to education beyond the eighth grade
level. What this record shows is that they are opposed to conventional formal education of the type
provided by a certified high school because it comes at the child's crucial adolescent period of religious
development. Dr. Donald Erickson, for example, testified that their system of "learning by doing" was an
"ideal system" of education in terms of preparing Amish children for life as adults in the Amish
community, and that "I would be inclined to say they do a better job in this than most of the rest of us
do." As he put it,
"These people aren't purporting to be learned people, and it seems to me the self-sufficiency of the
community is the best evidence I can point to -- whatever is being done seems to function well.
[Footnote 12]"

We must not forget that, in the Middle Ages, important values of the civilization of the Western World
were preserved by members of religious orders who isolated themselves from all worldly influences
against great obstacles. There can be no assumption that today's majority is

Page 406 U. S. 224

"right," and the Amish and others like them are "wrong." A way of life that is odd or even erratic but
interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is different.

The State, however, supports its interest in providing an additional one or two years of compulsory high
school education to Amish children because of the possibility that some such children will choose to
leave the Amish community, and that, if this occurs, they will be ill-equipped for life. The State argues
that, if Amish children leave their church, they should not be in the position of making their way in the
world without the education available in the one or two additional years the State requires. However,
on this record, that argument is highly speculative. There is no specific evidence of the loss of Amish
adherents by attrition, nor is there any showing that, upon leaving the Amish community, Amish
children, with their practical agricultural training and habits of industry and self-reliance, would become
burdens on society because of educational shortcomings. Indeed, this argument of the State appears to
rest primarily on the State's mistaken assumption, already noted, that the Amish do not provide any
education for their children beyond the eighth grade, but allow them to grow in "ignorance." To the
contrary, not only do the Amish accept the necessity for formal schooling through the eighth grade level,
but continue to provide what has been characterized by the undisputed testimony of expert educators
as an "ideal" vocational education for their children in the adolescent years.

There is nothing in this record to suggest that the Amish qualities of reliability, self-reliance, and
dedication to work would fail to find ready markets in today's society. Absent some contrary evidence
supporting the

Page 406 U. S. 225

State's position, we are unwilling to assume that persons possessing such valuable vocational skills and
habits are doomed to become burdens on society should they determine to leave the Amish faith, nor is
there any basis in the record to warrant a finding that an additional one or two years of formal school
education beyond the eighth grade would serve to eliminate any such problem that might exist.

Insofar as the State's claim rests on the view that a brief additional period of formal education is
imperative to enable the Amish to participate effectively and intelligently in our democratic process, it
must fall. The Amish alternative to formal secondary school education has enabled them to function
effectively in their day-to-day life under self-imposed limitations on relations with the world, and to
survive and prosper in contemporary society as a separate, sharply identifiable and highly self-sufficient
community for more than 200 years in this country. In itself, this is strong evidence that they are
capable of fulfilling the social and political responsibilities of citizenship without compelled attendance
beyond the eighth grade at the price of jeopardizing their free exercise of religious belief. [Footnote 13]
When Thomas Jefferson emphasized the need for education as a bulwark of a free people against
tyranny, there is nothing to indicate he had in mind compulsory education through any fixed age beyond
a basic education. Indeed, the Amish communities singularly parallel and reflect many of the virtues of
Jefferson's ideal of the "sturdy yeoman" who would form the basis of what he considered as the

Page 406 U. S. 226

ideal of a democratic society. [Footnote 14] Even their idiosyncratic separateness exemplifies the
diversity we profess to admire and encourage.

The requirement for compulsory education beyond the eighth grade is a relatively recent development
in our history. Less than 60 years ago, the educational requirements of almost all of the States were
satisfied by completion of the elementary grades, at least where the child was regularly and lawfully
employed. [Footnote 15] The independence

Page 406 U. S. 227

and successful social functioning of the Amish community for a period approaching almost three
centuries and more than 200 years in this country are strong evidence that there is, at best, a
speculative gain, in terms of meeting the duties of citizenship, from an additional one or two years of
compulsory formal education. Against this background, it would require a more particularized showing
from the State on this point to justify the severe interference with religious freedom such additional
compulsory attendance would entail.

We should also note that compulsory education and child labor laws find their historical origin in
common humanitarian instincts, and that the age limits of both laws have been coordinated to achieve
their related objectives. [Footnote 16] In the context of this case, such considerations,

Page 406 U. S. 228

if anything, support rather than detract from, respondents' position. The origins of the requirement for
school attendance to age 16, an age falling after the completion of elementary school but before
completion of high school, are not entirely clear. But, to some extent, such laws reflected the movement
to prohibit most child labor under age 16 that culminated in the provisions of the Federal Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938. [Footnote 17] It is true, then, that the 16-year child labor age limit may, to some
degree, derive from a contemporary impression that children should be in school until that age. But, at
the same time, it cannot be denied that, conversely, the 16-year education limit reflects, in substantial
measure, the concern that children under that age not be employed under conditions hazardous to their
health, or in work that should be performed by adults.

The requirement of compulsory schooling to age 16 must therefore be viewed as aimed not merely at
providing educational opportunities for children, but as an alternative to the equally undesirable
consequence of unhealthful child labor displacing adult workers, or, on the other hand, forced idleness.
[Footnote 18] The two kinds of statutes -- compulsory school attendance and child labor laws -- tend to
keep children of certain ages off the labor market and in school; this regimen, in turn, provides
opportunity to prepare for a livelihood of a higher order than that which children could pursue without
education, and protects their health in adolescence.
In these terms, Wisconsin's interest in compelling the school attendance of Amish children to age 16
emerges as somewhat less substantial than requiring such attendance

Page 406 U. S. 229

for children generally. For, while agricultural employment is not totally outside the legitimate concerns
of the child labor laws, employment of children under parental guidance and on the family farm from
age 14 to age 16 is an ancient tradition that lies at the periphery of the objectives of such laws.
[Footnote 19] There is no intimation that the Amish employment of their children on family farms is in
any way deleterious to their health, or that Amish parents exploit children at tender years. Any such
inference would be contrary to the record before us. Moreover, employment of Amish children on the
family farm does not present the undesirable economic aspects of eliminating jobs that might otherwise
be held by adults.

IV
Finally, the State, on authority of Prince v. Massachusetts, argues that a decision exempting Amish
children from the State's requirement fails to recognize the substantive right of the Amish child to a
secondary education, and fails to give due regard to the power of the State as parens patriae to extend
the benefit of secondary education to children regardless of the wishes of their parents. Taken at its
broadest sweep, the Court's language in Prince might be read to give support to the State's position.
However, the Court was not confronted in Prince with a situation comparable to that of the Amish as
revealed in this record; this is shown by the

Page 406 U. S. 230

Court's severe characterization of the evils that it thought the legislature could legitimately associate
with child labor, even when performed in the company of an adult. 321 U.S. at 321 U. S. 169-170. The
Court later took great care to confine Prince to a narrow scope in Sherbert v. Verner, when it stated:

"On the other hand, the Court has rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to governmental
regulation of certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles, for 'even when the action is
in accord with one's religious convictions, [it] is not totally free from legislative restrictions.' Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U. S. 599, 366 U. S. 603. The conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed some
substantial threat to public safety, peace or order. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145;
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158. . . ."

374 U.S. at 374 U. S. 402-403.

This case, of course, is not one in which any harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the
public safety, peace, order, or welfare has been demonstrated or may be properly inferred. [Footnote
20] The record is to the contrary, and any reliance on that theory would find no support in the evidence.

Contrary to the suggestion of the dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, our holding today in no
degree depends on the assertion of the religious interest of the child, as contrasted with that of the
parents. It is the parents who are subject to prosecution here for failing to cause their children to attend
school, and it

Page 406 U. S. 231

is their right of free exercise, not that of their children, that must determine Wisconsin's power to
impose criminal penalties on the parent. The dissent argues that a child who expresses a desire to
attend public high school in conflict with the wishes of his parents should not be prevented from doing
so. There is no reason for the Court to consider that point, since it is not an issue in the case. The
children are not parties to this litigation. The State has at no point tried this case on the theory that
respondents were preventing their children from attending school against their expressed desires, and,
indeed, the record is to the contrary. [Footnote 21] The state's position from the outset has been that it
is empowered to apply its compulsory attendance law to Amish parents in the same manner as to other
parents -- that is, without regard to the wishes of the child. That is the claim we reject today.

Our holding in no way determines the proper resolution of possible competing interests of parents,
children, and the State in an appropriate state court proceeding in which the power of the State is
asserted on the theory that Amish parents are preventing their minor children from attending high
school despite their expressed desires to the contrary. Recognition of the claim of the State in such a
proceeding would, of course, call into question traditional concepts of parental control over the religious
upbringing and education of their minor children recognized in this Court's past decisions. It is clear that
such an intrusion by a State into family decisions in the area of religious training would give rise to grave
questions of religious freedom comparable to those raised here

Page 406 U. S. 232

and those presented in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925). On this record, we neither reach
nor decide those issues.

The State's argument proceeds without reliance on any actual conflict between the wishes of parents
and children. It appears to rest on the potential that exemption of Amish parents from the requirements
of the compulsory education law might allow some parents to act contrary to the best interests of their
children by foreclosing their opportunity to make an intelligent choice between the Amish way of life
and that of the outside world. The same argument could, of course, be made with respect to all church
schools short of college. There is nothing in the record or in the ordinary course of human experience to
suggest that non-Amish parents generally consult with children of ages 14-16 if they are placed in a
church school of the parents' faith.

Indeed, it seems clear that, if the State is empowered, as parens patriae, to "save" a child from himself
or his Amish parents by requiring an additional two years of compulsory formal high school education,
the State will, in large measure, influence, if not determine, the religious future of the child. Even more
markedly than in Prince, therefore, this case involves the fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted
with that of the State, to guide the religious future and education of their children. The history and
culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and
upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now
established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition. If not the first, perhaps the most
significant statements of the Court in this area are found in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, in which the
Court observed:

"Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, we think it entirely plain that the Act

Page 406 U. S. 233

of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control. As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the
Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose
within the competency of the State. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in
this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to
accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations."

268 U.S. at 268 U. S. 534-535.

The duty to prepare the child for "additional obligations," referred to by the Court, must be read to
include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship. Pierce, of
course, recognized that, where nothing more than the general interest of the parent in the nurture and
education of his children is involved, it is beyond dispute that the State acts "reasonably" and
constitutionally in requiring education to age 16 in some public or private school meeting the standards
prescribed by the State.

However read, the Court's holding in Pierce stands as a charter of the rights of parents to direct the
religious upbringing of their children. And, when the interests of parenthood are combined with a free
exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more than merely a "reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the State" is required to sustain the validity of the State's
requirement under the First Amendment. To be sure, the power of the parent, even when linked to a
free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation under Prince

Page 406 U. S. 234

if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential
for significant social burdens. But, in this case, the Amish have introduced persuasive evidence
undermining the arguments the State has advanced to support its claims in terms of the welfare of the
child and society as a whole. The record strongly indicates that accommodating the religious objections
of the Amish by forgoing one, or at most two, additional years of compulsory education will not impair
the physical or mental health of the child or result in an inability to be self-supporting or to discharge
the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any other way materially detract from the welfare of
society.

In the face of our consistent emphasis on the central values underlying the Religion Clauses in our
constitutional scheme of government, we cannot accept a parens patriae claim of such all-encompassing
scope and with such sweeping potential for broad and unforeseeable application as that urged by the
State.

V
For the reasons stated we hold, with the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments prevent the State from compelling respondents to cause their children to attend formal
high school to age 16. [Footnote 22] Our disposition of this case, however, in no way

Page 406 U. S. 235

alters our recognition of the obvious fact that courts are not school boards or legislatures, and are ill-
equipped to determine the "necessity" of discrete aspects of a State's program of compulsory
education. This should suggest that courts must move with great circumspection in performing the
sensitive and delicate task of weighing a State's legitimate social concern when faced with religious
claims for exemption from generally applicable educational requirements. It cannot be overemphasized
that we are not dealing with a way of life and mode of education by a group claiming to have recently
discovered some "progressive" or more enlightened process for rearing children for modern life.

Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious sect and a long history as a successful
and self-sufficient segment of American society, the Amish in this case have convincingly demonstrated
the sincerity of their religious beliefs, the interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, the vital role
that belief and daily conduct play in the continued survival of Old Order Amish communities and their
religious organization, and the hazards presented by the State's enforcement of a statute generally valid
as to others. Beyond this, they have carried the even more difficult burden of demonstrating the
adequacy of their alternative mode of continuing informal vocational education in terms of precisely
those overall interests that the State advances in support of its program of compulsory high school
education. In light of this convincing

Page 406 U. S. 236

showing, one that probably few other religious groups or sects could make, and weighing the minimal
difference between what the State would require and what the Amish already accept, it was incumbent
on the State to show with more particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education
would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish. Sherbert v. Verner, supra.

Nothing we hold is intended to undermine the general applicability of the State's compulsory school
attendance statutes or to limit the power of the State to promulgate reasonable standards that, while
not impairing the free exercise of religion, provide for continuing agricultural vocational education
under parental and church guidance by the Old Order Amish or others similarly situated. The States have
had a long history of amicable and effective relationships with church-sponsored schools, and there is
no basis for assuming that, in this related context, reasonable standards cannot be established
concerning the content of the continuing vocational education of Amish children under parental
guidance, provided always that state regulations are not inconsistent with what we have said in this
opinion. [Footnote 23]

Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE POWELL and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or decision of this
case.

Page 406 U. S. 237

[Footnote 1]

The children, Frieda Yoder, aged 15, Barbara Miller, aged 15, and Vernon Yutzy, aged 14, were all
graduates of the eighth grade of public school.
[Footnote 2]

Wis.Stat. § 118.15 (1969) provides in pertinent part:

"118.15 Compulsory school attendance"

"(1)(a) Unless the child has a legal excuse or has graduated from high school, any person having under
his control a child who is between the ages of 7 and 16 years shall cause such child to attend school
regularly during the full period and hours, religious holidays excepted, that the public or private school
in which such child should be enrolled is in session until the end of the school term, quarter or semester
of the school year in which he becomes 16 years of age."

"* * * *"

"(3) This section does not apply to any child who is not in proper physical or mental condition to attend
school, to any child exempted for good cause by the school board of the district in which the child
resides or to any child who has completed the full 4-year high school course. The certificate of a
reputable physician in general practice shall be sufficient proof that a child is unable to attend school."

"(4) Instruction during the required period elsewhere than at school may be substituted for school
attendance. Such instruction must be approved by the state superintendent as substantially equivalent
to instruction given to children of like ages in the public or private schools where such children reside."

"(5) Whoever violates this section . . . may be fined not less than $5 nor more than $50 or imprisoned
not more than 3 months or both."

Section 118.15(1)(b) requires attendance to age 18 in a school district containing a "vocational, technical
and adult education school," but this section is concededly inapplicable in this case, for there is no such
school in the district involved.

[Footnote 3]

Prior to trial, the attorney for respondents wrote the State Superintendent of Public Instruction in an
effort to explore the possibilities for a compromise settlement. Among other possibilities, he suggested
that perhaps the State Superintendent could administratively determine that the Amish could satisfy the
compulsory attendance law by establishing their own vocational training plan similar to one that has
been established in Pennsylvania. Supp.App. 6. Under the Pennsylvania plan, Amish children of high
school age are required to attend an Amish vocational school for three hours a week, during which time
they are taught such subjects as English, mathematics, health, and social studies by an Amish teacher.
For the balance of the week, the children perform farm and household duties under parental
supervision, and keep a journal of their daily activities. The major portion of the curriculum is home
projects in agriculture and homemaking. See generally J. Hostetler & G. Huntington, Children in Amish
Society: Socialization and Community Education, c. 5 (1971). A similar program has been instituted in
Indiana. Ibid. See also Iowa Code § 299.24 (1971); Kan.Stat.Ann. § 72-1111 (Supp. 1971).

The Superintendent rejected this proposal on the ground that it would not afford Amish children
"substantially equivalent education" to that offered in the schools of the area. Supp.App. 6.
[Footnote 4]

The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ."

[Footnote 5]

See generally J. Hostetler, Amish Society (1968); J. Hostetler & G. Huntington, Children in Amish Society
(1971); Littell, Sectarian Protestantism and the Pursuit of Wisdom: Must Technological Objectives
Prevail?, in Public Controls for Nonpublic Schools 61 (D. Erickson ed.1969).

[Footnote 6]

See Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333, 398 U. S. 351-361 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result);
United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78 (1944).

[Footnote 7]

See generally R. Butts & L. Cremin, A History of Education in American Culture (1953); L. Cremin, The
Transformation of the School (1961).

[Footnote 8]

Hostetler, supra, n 5, c. 9; Hostetler & Huntington, supra, n 5.

[Footnote 9]

Some States have developed working arrangements with the Amish regarding high school attendance.
See n 3, supra. However, the danger to the continued existence of an ancient religious faith cannot be
ignored simply because of the assumption that its adherents will continue to be able, at considerable
sacrifice, to relocate in some more tolerant State or country or work out accommodations under threat
of criminal prosecution. Forced migration of religious minorities was an evil that lay at the heart of the
Religion Clauses. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 330 U. S. 9-10 (1947); Madison,
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 2 Writings of James Madison 183 (G. Hunt
ed.1901).

[Footnote 10]

That has been the apparent ground for decision in reversal previous state cases rejecting claims for
exemption similar to that here. See, e.g., State v. Garber, 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966), cert.
denied, 389 U. S. 51 (1967); State v. Hershberger, 103 Ohio App. 188, 144 N.E.2d 693 (1955);
Commonwealth v. Beiler, 168 Pa.Super. 462, 79 A.2d 134 (1951).

[Footnote 11]

Title 26 U.S.C. § 1402(h) authorizes the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to exempt members
of "a recognized religious sect" existing at all times since December 31, 1950, from the obligation to pay
social security taxes if they are, by reason of the tenets of their sect, opposed to receipt of such benefits
and agree to waive them, provided the Secretary finds that the sect makes reasonable provision for its
dependent members. The history of the exemption shows it was enacted with the situation of the Old
Order Amish specifically in view. H.R.Rep. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 101-102 (1965).

The record in this case establishes without contradiction that the Green County Amish had never been
known to commit crimes, that none had been known to receive public assistance, and that none was
unemployed.

[Footnote 12]

Dr. Erickson had previously written:

"Many public educators would be elated if their programs were as successful in preparing students for
productive community life as the Amish system seems to be. In fact, while some public schoolmen strive
to outlaw the Amish approach, others are being forced to emulate many of its features."

Erickson, Showdown at an Amish Schoolhouse: A Description and Analysis of the Iowa Controversy, in
Public Controls for Nonpublic Schools 15, 53 (D. Erickson ed.1969). And see Littell, supra, n 5, at 61.

[Footnote 13]

All of the children involved in this case are graduates of the eighth grade. In the county court, the
defense introduced a study by Dr. Hostetler indicating that Amish children in the eighth grade achieved
comparably to non-Amish children in the basic skills. Supp.App. 11. See generally Hostetler &
Huntington, supra, n 5, at 88 96.

[Footnote 14]

While Jefferson recognized that education was essential to the welfare and liberty of the people, he was
reluctant to directly force instruction of children "in opposition to the will of the parent." Instead, he
proposed that state citizenship be conditioned on the ability to "read readily in some tongue, native or
acquired." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Cabell, Sept. 9, 1817, in 17 Writings of Thomas
Jefferson 417, 423-424 (Mem. ed.1904). And it is clear that, so far as the mass of the people were
concerned, he envisaged that a basic education in the "three R's" would sufficiently meet the interests
of the State. He suggested that, after completion of elementary school,

"those destined for labor will engage in the business of agriculture, or enter into apprenticeships to such
handicraft art as may be their choice."

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr, Sept. 7, 1814, in Thomas Jefferson and Education in a
Republic 93-106 (Arrowood ed.1930). See also id. at 60-64, 70, 83, 136-137.

[Footnote 15]

See Dept. of Interior, Bureau of Education, Bulletin No. 47, Digest of State Laws Relating to Public
Education 527-559 (1916); Joint Hearings on S. 2475 and H.R. 7200 before the Senate Committee on
Education and Labor and the House Committee on Labor, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 416.
Even today, an eighth grade education fully satisfies the educational requirements of at least six States.
See Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 15-321(b)(4) (1956); Ark.Stat.Ann. § 80-1504 (1947); Iowa Code § 299.2 (1971);
S.D.Comp.Laws Ann. § 13-27-1 (1967); Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 21.1-48 (Supp. 1971). (Mississippi has no
compulsory education law.) A number of other States have flexible provisions permitting children aged
14 or having completed the eighth grade to be excused from school in order to engage in lawful
employment. E.g., Colo.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 123-20-5, 80-6-1 to 80-6-12 (1963); Conn.Gen.Stat.Rev. §§ 10-
184, 10-189 (1964); D.C.Code Ann. §§ 31-202, 36-201 to 36-228 (1967); Ind.Ann.Stat. §§ 28-505 to 28-
506, 28-519 (1948); Mass.Gen.Laws Ann., c. 76, § 1 (Supp. 1972) and c. 149, § 86 (1971); Mo.Rev.Stat. §§
167.031, 294.051 (1969); Nev.Rev.Stat. § 392.110 (1968); N.M.Stat.Ann. § 77-10-6 (1968).

An eighth grade education satisfied Wisconsin's formal education requirements until 1933. See Wis.Laws
1927, c. 425, § 97; Laws 1933, c. 143. (Prior to 1933, provision was made for attendance at continuation
or vocational schools by working children past the eighth grade, but only if one was maintained by the
community in question.) For a general discussion of the early development of Wisconsin's compulsory
education and child labor laws, see F. Ensign, Compulsory School Attendance and Child Labor 203-230
(1921).

[Footnote 16]

See, e.g., Joint Hearings, supra, n 15, pt. 1, at 185-187 (statement of Frances Perkins, Secretary of
Labor), pt. 2, at 381-387 (statement of Katherine Lenroot, Chief, Children's Bureau, Department of
Labor); National Child Labor Committee, 40th Anniversary Report, The Long Road (1944); 1 G. Abbott,
The Child and the State 259-269, 566 (Greenwood reprint 1968); L. Cremin, The Transformation of the
School, c. 3 (1961); A. Steinhilber & C. Sokolowski, State Law on Compulsory Attendance 3-4 (Dept. of
Health, Education, and Welfare 1966).

[Footnote 17]

52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219.

[Footnote 18]

See materials cited n 16, supra; Casad, Compulsory Education and Individual Rights, in 5 Religion and the
Public Order 51, 82 (D. Giannella ed.1969).

[Footnote 19]

See, e.g., Abbott, supra, n 16, at 266. The Federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 excludes from its
definition of "[o]ppressive child labor" employment of a child under age 16 by

"a parent . . . employing his own child . . . in an occupation other than manufacturing or mining or an
occupation found by the Secretary of Labor to be particularly hazardous for the employment of children
between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years or detrimental to their health or wellbeing."

29 U.S.C. § 203(1).

[Footnote 20]
Cf., e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (1905); Wright v. DeWitt School District, 238 Ark. 906,
385 S.W.2d 644 (1965); Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 118
U.S.App.D.C. 80, 87-90, 331 F.2d 1000, 1007-1010 (in chambers opinion), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978
(1964).

[Footnote 21]

The only relevant testimony in the record is to the effect that the wishes of the one child who testified
corresponded with those of her parents. Testimony of Frieda Yoder, Tr. 994, to the effect that her
personal religious beliefs guided her decision to discontinue school attendance after the eighth grade.
The other children were not called by either side.

[Footnote 22]

What we have said should meet the suggestion that the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
recognizing an exemption for the Amish from the State's system of compulsory education constituted an
impermissible establishment of religion. In Walz v. Tax Commission, the Court saw the three main
concerns against which the Establishment Clause sought to protect as "sponsorship, financial support,
and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." 397 U. S. 664, 397 U. S. 668 (1970).
Accommodating the religious beliefs of the Amish can hardly be characterized as sponsorship or active
involvement. The purpose and effect of such an exemption are not to support, favor, advance, or assist
the Amish, but to allow their centuries-old religious society, here long before the advent of any
compulsory education, to survive free from the heavy impediment compliance with the Wisconsin
compulsory education law would impose. Such an accommodation

"reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious
differences, and does not represent that involvement of religious with secular institutions which it is the
object of the Establishment Clause to forestall."

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 374 U. S. 409 (1963).

[Footnote 23]

Several States have now adopted plans to accommodate Amish religious beliefs through the
establishment of an "Amish vocational school." See n 3, supra. These are not schools in the traditional
sense of the word. As previously noted, respondents attempted to reach a compromise with the State of
Wisconsin patterned after the Pennsylvania plan, but those efforts were not productive. There is no
basis to assume that Wisconsin will be unable to reach a satisfactory accommodation with the Amish in
light of what we now hold, so as to serve its interests without impinging on respondents' protected free
exercise of their religion.

MR JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, concurring.

This case involves the constitutionality of imposing criminal punishment upon Amish parents for their
religiously based refusal to compel their children to attend public high schools. Wisconsin has sought to
brand these parents as criminals for following their religious beliefs, and the Court today rightly holds
that Wisconsin cannot constitutionally do so.
This case in no way involves any questions regarding the right of the children of Amish parents to attend
public high schools, or any other institutions of learning, if they wish to do so. As the Court points out,
there is no suggestion whatever in the record that the religious beliefs of the children here concerned
differ in any way from those of their parents. Only one of the children testified. The last two questions
and answers on her cross-examination accurately sum up her testimony:

"Q. So I take it then, Frieda, the only reason you are not going to school, and did not go to school since
last September, is because of your religion?"

"A. Yes."

"Q. That is the only reason?"

"A. Yes."

(Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear to me, therefore, that this record simply does not present the interesting and important issue
discussed in 406 U. S. JUSTICE DOUGLAS. With this observation, I join the opinion and the judgment of
the Court.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE STEWART join, concurring.

Cases such as this one inevitably call for a delicate balancing of important but conflicting interests. I join
the opinion and judgment of the Court because I cannot

Page 406 U. S. 238

say that the State's interest in requiring two more years of compulsory education in the ninth and tenth
grades outweighs the importance of the concededly sincere Amish religious practice to the survival of
that sect.

This would be a very different case for me if respondents' claim were that their religion forbade their
children from attending any school at any time and from complying in any way with the educational
standards set by the State. Since the Amish children are permitted to acquire the basic tools of literacy
to survive in modern society by attending grades one through eight, and since the deviation from the
State's compulsory education law is relatively slight, I conclude that respondents' claim must prevail,
largely because

"religious freedom -- the freedom to believe and to practice strange and, it may be, foreign creeds -- has
classically been one of the highest values of our society."

Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599, 366 U. S. 612 (1961) (BRENNAN, J., concurring and dissenting).

The importance of the state interest asserted here cannot be denigrated, however:

"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory
school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of
the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most
basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him
for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment."

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 347 U. S. 493 (1954).

Page 406 U. S. 239

As recently as last Term, the Court reemphasized the legitimacy of the State's concern for enforcing
minimal educational standards, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 403 U. S. 613 (1971). [Footnote 2/1]
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), lends no support to the contention that parents may
replace state educational requirements with their own idiosyncratic views of what knowledge a child
needs to be a productive and happy member of society; in Pierce, both the parochial and military
schools were in compliance with all the educational standards that the State had set, and the Court held
simply that, while a State may posit such standards, it may not preempt the educational process by
requiring children to attend public schools. [Footnote 2/2] In the present case, the State is not
concerned with the maintenance of an educational system as an end in itself; it is rather attempting to
nurture and develop the human potential of its children, whether Amish or non-Amish: to expand their
knowledge, broaden their sensibilities, kindle their imagination, foster a spirit of free inquiry, and
increase their human understanding and tolerance. It is possible that most Amish

Page 406 U. S. 240

children will wish to continue living the rural life of their parents, in which case their training at home
will adequately equip them for their future role. Others, however, may wish to become nuclear
physicists, ballet dancers, computer programmers, or historians, and for these occupations, formal
training will be necessary. There is evidence in the record that many children desert the Amish faith
when they come of age. [Footnote 2/3] A State has a legitimate interest not only in seeking to develop
the latent talents of its children, but also in seeking to prepare them for the lifestyle that they may later
choose, or at least to provide them with an option other than the life they have led in the past. In the
circumstances of this case, although the question is close, I am unable to say that the State has
demonstrated that Amish children who leave school in the eighth grade will be intellectually stultified or
unable to acquire new academic skills later. The statutory minimum school attendance age set by the
State is, after all, only 16.

Decision in cases such as this and the administration of an exemption for Old Order Amish from the
State's compulsory school attendance laws will inevitably involve the kind of close and perhaps repeated
scrutiny of religious practices, as is exemplified in today's opinion, which the Court has heretofore been
anxious to avoid. But such entanglement does not create a forbidden establishment of religion where it
is essential to implement free

Page 406 U. S. 241

exercise values threatened by an otherwise neutral program instituted to foster some permissible,
nonreligious state objective. I join the Court because the sincerity of the Amish religious policy here is
uncontested, because the potentially adverse impact of the state requirement is great, and because the
State's valid interest in education has already been largely satisfied by the eight years the children have
already spent in school.

[Footnote 2/1]

The challenged Amish religious practice here does not pose a substantial threat to public safety, peace,
or order; if it did, analysis under the Free Exercise Clause would be substantially different. See Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (1905); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944); Cleveland v. United
States, 329 U. S. 14 (1946); Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 118
U.S.App.D.C. 80, 331 F.2d 1000, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).

[Footnote 2/2]

"No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect,
supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend
some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain
studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is
manifestly inimical to the public welfare."

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 268 U. S. 534 (1925).

[Footnote 2/3]

Dr. Hostetler testified that, though there was a gradual increase in the total number of Old Order Amish
in the United States over the past 50 years, "at the same time, the Amish have also lost members [of]
their church," and that the turnover rate was such that "probably two-thirds [of the present Amish] have
been assimilated non-Amish people." App. 110. Justice Heffernan, dissenting below opined that "[l]arge
numbers of young people voluntarily leave the Amish community each year, and are thereafter forced
to make their way in the world." 49 Wis.2d 430, 451, 182 N.W.2d 539, 549 (1971).

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS dissenting in part.

I
I agree with the Court that the religious scruples of the Amish are opposed to the education of their
children beyond the grade schools, yet I disagree with the Court's conclusion that the matter is within
the dispensation of parents alone. The Court's analysis assumes that the only interests at stake in the
case are those of the Amish parents, on the one hand, and those of the State, on the other. The
difficulty with this approach is that, despite the Court's claim, the parents are seeking to vindicate not
only their own free exercise claims, but also those of their high-school-age children.

It is argued that the right of the Amish children to religious freedom is not presented by the facts of the
case, as the issue before the Court involves only the Amish parents' religious freedom to defy a state
criminal statute imposing upon them an affirmative duty to cause their children to attend high school.

First, respondents' motion to dismiss in the trial court expressly asserts not only the religious liberty of
the adults, but also that of the children, as a defense to the prosecutions. It is, of course, beyond
question that the parents have standing as defendants in a criminal prosecution to assert the religious
interests of their
Page 406 U. S. 242

children as a defense. [Footnote 3/1] Although the lower courts and a majority of this Court assume an
identity of interest between parent and child, it is clear that they have treated the religious interest of
the child as a factor in the analysis.

Second, it is essential to reach the question to decide the case not only because the question was
squarely raised in the motion to dismiss, but also because no analysis of religious liberty claims can take
place in a vacuum. If the parents in this case are allowed a religious exemption, the inevitable effect is to
impose the parents' notions of religious duty upon their children. Where the child is mature enough to
express potentially conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of the child's rights to permit such an
imposition without canvassing his views. As in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, it is an imposition
resulting from this very litigation. As the child has no other effective forum, it is in this litigation that his
rights should be considered. And if an Amish child desires to attend high school, and is mature enough
to have that desire respected, the State may well be able to override the parents' religiously motivated
objections.

Page 406 U. S. 243

Religion is an individual experience. It is not necessary, nor even appropriate, for every Amish child to
express his views on the subject in a prosecution of a single adult. Crucial, however, are the views of the
child whose parent is the subject of the suit. Frieda Yoder has in fact, testified that her own religious
views are opposed to high-school education. I therefore join the judgment of the Court as to respondent
Jonas Yoder. But Frieda Yoder's views may not be those of Vernon Yutzy or Barbara Miller. I must
dissent, therefore, as to respondents Adin Yutzy and Wallace Miller, as their motion to dismiss also
raised the question of their children's religious liberty.

II
This issue has never been squarely presented before today. Our opinions are full of talk about the power
of the parents over the child's education. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510; Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390. And we have in the past analyzed similar conflicts between parent and State
with little regard for the views of the child. See Prince v. Massachusetts, supra. Recent cases, however,
have clearly held that the children themselves have constitutionally protectible interests.

These children are "persons" within the meaning of the Bill of Rights. We have so held over and over
again. In Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596, we extended the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment in a
state trial of a 15-year-old boy. In In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 387 U. S. 13, we held that "neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." In In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, we
held that a 12-year-old boy, when charged with an act which would be a crime if committed by an adult,
was entitled to procedural safeguards contained in the Sixth Amendment.

Page 406 U. S. 244

In Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S. 503, we dealt with 13-year-old, 15-year-old, and 16-
year-old students who wore armbands to public schools and were disciplined for doing so. We gave
them relief, saying that their First Amendment rights had been abridged.
"Students, in school as well as out of school, are 'persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of
fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations
to the State."

Id. at 393 U. S. 511.

In Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, we held that school children whose religious beliefs
collided with a school rule requiring them to salute the flag could not be required to do so. While the
sanction included expulsion of the students and prosecution of the parents, id. at 319 U. S. 630, the vice
of the regime was its interference with the child's free exercise of religion. We said: "Here . . . we are
dealing with a compulsion of students to declare a belief." Id. at 319 U. S. 631. In emphasizing the
important and delicate task of boards of education we said:

"That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to
discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes."

Id. at 319 U. S. 637.

On this important and vital matter of education, I think the children should be entitled to be heard.
While the parents, absent dissent, normally speak for the entire family, the education of the child is a
matter on which the child will often have decided views. He may want to be a pianist or an astronaut or
an oceanographer.

Page 406 U. S. 245

To do so he will have to break from the Amish tradition. [Footnote 3/2]

It is the future of the student, not the future of the parents, that is imperiled by today's decision. If a
parent keeps his child out of school beyond the grade school, then the child will be forever barred from
entry into the new and amazing world of diversity that we have today. The child may decide that that is
the preferred course, or he may rebel. It is the student's judgment, not his parents', that is essential if
we are to give full meaning to what we have said about the Bill of Rights and of the right of students to
be masters of their own destiny. [Footnote 3/3] If he is harnessed to the Amish way of life

Page 406 U. S. 246

by those in authority over him, and if his education is truncated, his entire life may be stunted and
deformed. The child, therefore, should be given an opportunity to be heard before the State gives the
exemption which we honor today.

The views of the two children in question were not canvassed by the Wisconsin courts. The matter
should be explicitly reserved so that new hearings can be held on remand of the case. [Footnote 3/4]

III
I think the emphasis of the Court on the "law and order" record of this Amish group of people is quite
irrelevant. A religion is a religion irrespective of what the misdemeanor or felony records of its members
might be. I am not at all sure how the Catholics, Episcopalians, the Baptists, Jehovah's Witnesses, the
Unitarians, and my own Presbyterians would make out if subjected to such a test. It is, of course, true
that, if a group or society was organized to perpetuate crime, and if that is its motive, we would have
rather startling problems akin to those that were raised when, some years back, a particular sect was
challenged here as operating on a fraudulent basis. United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78. But no such
factors are present here, and the Amish, whether with a high or low criminal

Page 406 U. S. 247

record, [Footnote 3/5] certainly qualify by all historic standards as a religion within the meaning of the
First Amendment.

The Court rightly rejects the notion that actions, even though religiously grounded, are always outside
the protection of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. In so ruling, the Court departs from
the teaching of Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 98 U. S. 164, where it was said, concerning the
reach of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,

"Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions
which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order."

In that case, it was conceded at polygamy was a part of the religion of the Mormons. Yet the Court said,
"It matters not that his belief [in polygamy] was a part of his professed religion: it was still belief, and
belief only." Id. at 98 U. S. 167.

Action which the Court deemed to be antisocial could be punished even though it was grounded on
deeply held and sincere religious convictions. What we do today, at least in this respect, opens the way
to give organized religion a broader base than it has ever enjoyed, and it even promises that in time
Reynolds will be overruled.

In another way, however, the Court retreats when, in reference to Henry Thoreau, it says his "choice
was philosophical

Page 406 U. S. 248

and personal, rather than religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion
Clauses." That is contrary to what we held in United States v. Seeger 380 U. S. 163, where we were
concerned with the meaning of the words "religious training and belief" in the Selective Service Act,
which were the basis of many conscientious objector claims. We said:

"Within that phrase would come all sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a power or being, or
upon a faith to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent. The test
might be stated in these words: a sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its
possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption
comes within the statutory definition. This construction avoids imputing to Congress an intent to classify
different religious beliefs, exempting some and excluding others, and is in accord with the well
established congressional policy of equal treatment for those whose opposition to service is grounded in
their religious tenets."

Id. at 380 U. S. 176.

Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333, was in the same vein, the Court saying:

"In this case, Welsh's conscientious objection to war was undeniably based in part on his perception of
world politics. In a letter to his local board, he wrote: "

"I can only act according to what I am and what I see. And I see that the military complex wastes both
human and material resources, that it fosters disregard for (what I consider a paramount concern)
human needs and ends; I see that the means we employ to 'defend' our 'way of life' profoundly change
that way of life. I see that, in our failure to

Page 406 U. S. 249

recognize the political, social, and economic realities of the world, we, as a nation, fail our responsibility
as a nation."

Id. at 398 U. S. 342.

The essence of Welsh's philosophy, on the basis of which we held he was entitled to an exemption, was
in these words:

""I believe that human life is valuable in and of itself; in its living; therefore I will not injure or kill
another human being. This belief (and the corresponding duty' to abstain from violence toward another
person) is not `superior to those arising from any human relation.' On the contrary: it is essential to
every human relation. I cannot, therefore, conscientiously comply with the Government's insistence that
I assume duties which I feel are immoral and totally repugnant.""

Id. at 398 U. S. 343.

I adhere to these exalted views of "religion," and see no acceptable alternative to them now that we
have become a Nation of many religions and sects, representing all of the diversities of the human race.
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 380 U. S. 192-193 (concurring opinion).

[Footnote 3/1]

Thus, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, a Jehovah's Witness was convicted for having violated a
state child labor law by allowing her nine-year-old niece and ward to circulate religious literature on the
public streets. There, as here, the narrow question was the religious liberty of the adult. There, as here,
the Court analyzed the problem from the point of view of the State's conflicting interest in the welfare
of the child. But, as MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, speaking for the Court, has so recently pointed out,

"The Court [in Pierce] implicitly held that the custodian had standing to assert alleged freedom of
religion . . . rights of the child that were threatened in the very litigation before the Court, and that the
child had no effective way of asserting herself."

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 405 U. S. 446 n. 6. Here, as in Pierce, the children have no effective
alternate means to vindicate their rights. The question, therefore, is squarely before us.
[Footnote 3/2]

A significant number of Amish children do leave the Old Order. Professor Hostetler notes that "[t]he loss
of members is very limited in some Amish districts, and considerable in others." J. Hostetler, Amish
Society 226 (1968). In one Pennsylvania church, he observed a defection rate of 30%. Ibid. Rates up to
50% have been reported by others. Casad, Compulsory High School Attendance and the Old Order
Amish: A Commentary on State v. Garber, 16 Kan.L.Rev. 423, 434 n. 51 (1968).

[Footnote 3/3]

The court below brushed aside the students' interests with the offhand comment that, "[w]hen a child
reaches the age of judgment, he can choose for himself his religion." 49 Wis.2d 430, 440, 182 N.W.2d
539, 543. But there is nothing in this record to indicate that the moral and intellectual judgment
demanded of the student by the question in this case is beyond his capacity. Children far younger than
the 14- and 15-year-olds involved here are regularly permitted to testify in custody and other
proceedings. Indeed, the failure to call the affected child in a custody hearing is often reversible error.
See, e.g., Callicott v. Callicott, 364 S.W.2d 455 (Civ.App. Tex.) (reversible error for trial judge to refuse to
hear testimony of eight-year-old in custody battle). Moreover, there is substantial agreement among
child psychologists and sociologists that the moral and intellectual maturity of the 14-year-old
approaches that of the adult. See, e.g., J. Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (1948); D. Elkind,
Children and Adolescents 750 (1970); Kohlberg, Moral Education in the Schools: A Developmental View,
in R. Muuss, Adolescent Behavior and Society 193, 199-200 (1971); W. Kay, Moral Development 172-183
(1968); A. Gesell & F. Ilg, Youth: The Years From Ten to Sixteen 175-182 (1956). The maturity of Amish
youth, who identify with and assume adult roles from early childhood, see M. Goodman, The Culture of
Childhood 92-94 (1970), is certainly not less than that of children in the general population.

[Footnote 3/4]

Canvassing the views of all school-age Amish children in the State of Wisconsin would not present
insurmountable difficulties. A 1968 survey indicated that there were at that time only 256 such children
in the entire State. Comment, 1971 Wis.L.Rev. 832, 852 n. 132.

[Footnote 3/5]

The observation of Justice Heffernan, dissenting below, that the principal opinion in his court portrayed
the Amish as leading a life of "idyllic agrarianism," is equally applicable to the majority opinion in this
Court. So, too, is his observation that such a portrayal rests on a "mythological basis." Professor
Hostetler has noted that "[d]rinking among the youth is common in all the large Amish settlements."
Amish Society 283. Moreover, "[i]t would appear that, among the Amish, the rate of suicide is just as
high, if not higher, than for the nation." Id. at 300. He also notes an unfortunate Amish "preoccupation
with filthy stories," id. at 282, as well as significant "rowdyism and stress." Id. at 281. These are not traits
peculiar to the Amish, of course. The point is that the Amish are not people set apart and different.