Emmforce Inc.

Plot No. 3 & 5, Phase I, EPIP, Jharm

For Design FMEA

Item / Process Step
Enter the items, interfaces or parts which have been identified through block diagrams, P-diagrams, schematics
and other drawings, and other analysis conducted by the team.
The terminology used should be consistent with customer requirements and with those used in other design
development documents and analysis to ensure traceability.

Special Characteristics (Requirem

Customer specific requirements may identify special product or process characteristic symbols and their usage.

A characteristic designated in the design record as special without an associated design failure mode identified
in the DFME is an indication a a weakness in the design process.

Part / Process Function

Enter the function(s) of the item(s) or interface(s) being analyzed which are necessity to meet the design intent
based on customer requirements and the team's discussion. If the item(s) or interface has more than one
function with different potential modes of failure, it is highly recommended that each of these functions and
associated failure mode(s) is listed separately.

Potential Failure Mode

Potential failure mode is defined as the manner in which a component, subsystem, or system could potentially
fail to meet or deliver the intended function described in the item column.
Identify the potential failure mode(s) associated with the function(s)/requirement(s). Potential failure modes
should be described in technical terms, and not necessarily as a symptom noticeable by the customer.

Each function may have multiple failure modes. A large number of failure modes identified for a single function
may indicate that the requirement is not well defined.
The assumption is made that the failure could occur, but may not necessarily occur, consequently the use of
the word "potential".
Potential failure modes that could occur only under certain operating conditions (i.e., hot, cold, dry, dusty, etc.)
and under certain iusage conditions (i.e., above-average mileage, rough terrain, city driving only, etc.) whould
be considered.

After determining all the failure moders, a validation of the completeness of the analysis can be made through
a review of past things-gone-wrong, concerns, reports, and group brainstrorming.
The potential failure mode may also be the cause of a potential failure mode in a higher level subsystem or
system, or lead to the effect of one in a lower level compoenent.

Potential Effects of Failure

Potential effects of failure are defined as the effects of the failure mode, as perceived by the customer(s).
Describe the effects of the failure in terms of what the customer might notice or experience, remembering that the customer m
as the ultimate End User. State clearly if the failure mode could impact safety or non-compliance to regulations.
The effects should always be stated in terms of the specific system, subsystem, or component being analyzed.
Remember that a hierarchical relationship exists between the component, subsystem, and system levels. For
example, a part could fracture, which may cause the assembly to vibrate, resulting in an intermittend system
operation. The intermittent system operation could cause performance to degrade and ultimately lead to
customer dissatisfaction. The intent is to predict the potential failure effects to the team's level of knowledge.
Typical failure effects should be stated in terms of product or system performance.

Severity
Severity is the value associated with the most serous effect for a given failure code. Severity is a relative ranking within the sco
The team should agree on evaluation criteria and a ranking system and apply them consistently, even if modified for individual
It is not recommended to modify criteria ranking values of 9 and 10. Failure modes with a rank of severity 1 should not be anal

Potential Cause(s)/Mechanism(s) of F
In the development of the FMEA, the identification of all potential causes of the failure mode is key to
subsequent analysis. Although varied techniques (such as brainstorming) can be used to determine the
potential cause(s) of the failire mode, it is recommended that the team should focus on an understanding of
the failure mechanism for each failure mode.

A failure mechanism is the physical, chemical, electrical, thermal, or other process that results in the failure
mode. It is important to make the distinction that a failure mode is an "observed" or "external" effect so as not
to confuse failure mode with failure mechanism, the actual physical phenomenon behind the failure mode or
the process of degradation or chain of events leading to and resulting in a particular mode.
To the extent possible, list every potential mechanism for each failure mode. The mechanism should be listed
as concisely and completely as possible.
For a system, the failure mechanism is the process of error propagation following a component failure which
leads to a system failure.
A product or a process can have several failure modes which are correlated to each other because of a
common failure mechanism behind them.
Ensure that process effects are considered as part of the DFMEA process.
Potential cause of failure is defined as an indication of how the design process could allow the failure to occur,
described in terms of something that can be corrected or can be controlled. Potential cause of failure may be
an indication of a design weakness, the consequence of which is the failure mode.
Causes ate the ciscumstances that induce or activate a failure mechanism.
In identifying potential causes of failure, use concise descriptions of the specific causes of failures, e.g.,
specified bold plating allows for hydrogen embrittlement. Ambiguous phrases such as, poor design of improper
design, should not be used.

Investigation of causes needs to focus on the failure mode and not the effect(s). In determining the cause(s),
the team should assume the existence of the cause under discussion will result in the failure mode (i.e., the
failure mode does not require multiple causes to occur).
Typically, there may be several causes each of which can result in the failure mode. This results in multiple lines
(cause branches) for the failure mode.

To the extent possible, list every potential cause for each failure mode/failure mechanism. The cause should be
listed as concisely and completely as possible. Separating the causes will result in a focused analysis for each
cause and may yield different measurement, controls, and action plans.

In preparing the DFMEA, assume that the design will be manufactured and assembled to the design intent.
Exception can be made at the team's discretion where historical data indicate defifiencies in the manufacturing
process.

Occurrence
Occurrence is the likelihood that a specific cause/mechanism will occur resulting in the failure mode within the design life.
The likelihood of the occurrence ranking number has a relative meaning rather than an absolute value.
A consistent occurrence ranking system should be used to ensure continuity. The occurrence number is a relative ranking withi
The team should
not reflect agree
the actual on evaluation
likelihood criteria and a ranking system and apply them consistenly, even if modified for individual p
of occurrence.
be estimated using a 1 to 10 scale.
In determining this estimate, questions such as the following should be considered:
* What is the service history and field experience with similar components, subsystems, or systems?
* Is the item a carryover or similar to a previous level item?
* How significant are changes from a previous level item?
* Is the item radically different from a previous level item?
* Is the item completely new?
* What is the application or what are the environmental changes?
* Has an engineering analysis (e.g., reliability) been used to estimate the expected comparable
occurrence rate for the application?
* Have preventive controls been put in place?

Current Design/Process Cont

Current Design Controls are those activities conducted as part of the design process that have been completed or committed t
adequacy for the
There are two design
types functional
of design andto
controls reliability
consider:requirements under consideration.
Prevention: Eliminate (prevent) the cause of the mechanism of failure or the failure mode from occuring, or reduce its rate of r
Detection: identify (detect) the existence of a cause, the resulting mechanism of failure or the failure mode, either by analytica
item is released for production.
The preferred approach is to first use prevention controls, if possible. The initial occurrence rankings will be affected by the pre
integrated as part should
Detection control of the design
includeintent.
identification of those activiteis which detect the failure mode as well as those that detect th
The team should consider analysis, testing, reviews, and other activities that will assure the design/process adequacy such as:
Prevention Controls
 * Benchmarking studies
* Fail-safe designs
* Design and Material standards (internal and external)
* Documentation - records of best practices, lessons learned, etc.
* Error-proofing
Detection Controls
* Design reviews
* Prototype testing
* Validation testing
* Simulation studies - validation of design
* Mock-up using similar parts
Preventing the causes of the failure mode though a design change or design process change is the only way a reduction in the

Detection
Detection is the rank associated witht the best detection control listed in the Current Design Control Detection column. When
control be included as part of the description of the control. Record the lowest ranking value in the Detection column.
A suggested approach to Current Design Control Detection is to assume the failure has occurred and then assess the capabilitie
Do not automatically presume that the detection ranking is low because the occurrence is low. It is important to assess the cap
them going further in the design release process.
Detection is a relative ranking within the scope of the individual FMEA. In order to achieve a lowe ranking, generally the design
activities) has to be
The team should improved.
agree on evaluation criteria and a ranking system and apply them consistently, even if modified for individual
be estimated using the following table as a guideline:
Detection
The ranking value of one (1) is reserved for failure prevention through proven design solutions.
The initial focus of the team should be oriented towards failure modes with the highest severity rankings. When the severity is
design controls or recommended actions (as documented in FMEA).
For failure modes with severities 8 or below the team should consider causes having higherst occurrence or detaction rankings
approach, and determine how to best prioritize the risk reduction efforts that best serve their organization and customers.

Risk Priority Number (RPN

RPN = Severity x Occurrence x Detection
Within the scope of the individual FMEA, this value can range between 1 and 1000.
The use of RPN threshold is NOT a recommended practice for determining the need for actions.
Applying thresholds assumes that RPNs are a measure of relative risk (which they often are not) and that continuous improvem
Use of the RPN index in the discussions of the team can be a useful tool. The limitations of the use of RPN need to be understo
thresholds to determine action priority is not recommended.

Criteria for RPN Reduction

During every review ,Suitable Action shall be taken on the reduction of RPNs(if Possible). Top Five RPNs shall be consider

Recommended Actions
In general, prevention actions (i.e., reducing the occurrence) are preferable to detection actions. An example of this is the use o
design freeze.
The intent of recommended actions is to improve the design. Identifying these actions should consider reducing rankings in the
occurrence, and detection.
* To reduce severity ranking: only a design revision can bring about a reduction in the severity ranking.
For maximum effectiveness and efficiency of this approach, changes to the product and process design should be implemented
* To reduce occurrence ranking: A reduction in the occurrence ranking can be accepted by removing or controlling one or mor
but not limited to, the following should be considered:
o Error proof the design to eliminate the failure mode
o Revised design geometry and tolerances
o Revised design to lower the stress or replace weak (high failure probability) components
o Add redundancy
o Revised material specification
* To reduce detection ranking: the preferred method is the use of error/mistake proofing. An increase in design validation/ver
design change to a specific part may be required to increase the likelihood of detection (i.e., reduce the ditection ranking). Add
o Revised test plan
If the assessment leads to no recommended actions for a specific failure mode/cause/control combination, indicate this by ent
especially in case of high severity.
For design actions consider using the following:
* Results of reliability testing
* Design analysis (reliability, structural or physics of failure) that would confirm that the solution is
effective and does not introduce new potential failure modes
* Drawing, schematics, or model to confirm physical change of targeted feature
* Results from a design review
* Changes to a given Engineering Standards or Design Guidelines
* Reliability analysis results

Responsibility & Target Completio

Enter the name of the individual and organization responsible for completing each recommended action including the target co
that all actions recommended have been implemented or adequately addressed.

Action Results
This section identifies the results of any completed actions and their effect on Severity, Occurrence and Detection rankings and

Action(s) Taken and Completion

After the action has been implemented, enter a brief description of the action taken and actual completion date.

Severity, Occurrence, Detection a

After the preventive/corrective action has been completed, determine and record the resulting severity, occurrence, and detec
Calculate and record the resulting action RPN.
All revised rankings should be reviewed. Actions alone do not guarantee that the problem was solved (i.e., cause addressed), th
considered necessary, repeat the analysis. The focus should always be on continuous improvement.

Prepared By Approved By.

Date Date
 Document No.
Revision No.
Date
On any complaint
Frequency
EPIP, Jharmajri. or Once in Yearly
Responsibility CFT
Document / Format Ref.
For Process FMEA
m / Process Step
Enter the identification of the process step or operation being analyzed, based on the numbering process
and terminology. Process numbering scheme, sequencing, and terminology used should be consistent
with those used in the process flow diagram to ensure tracibility and relationship to other documents.
Repair and repork operations should also be included.

cteristics (Requirements)
List the requirements for each process function of the process step or operation being analyzed.
Requirements are thus inputs to the process specified to meet design intent and other customer
requirements. If there are multiple requirements with respect to a given function, each should be
aligned on the form with the respective associated failure modes in order to facilitate the analysis.

Process Function
List the process function that corresponds to each process step or operation being analyzed. The process
function describes the purpose or intent of the operation. A risk analysis recommended in order to limit
the number of steps to be included to only those that add value or otherwise are seen as likely to have a
negative impact on the product. If there are multiple process functions being analyzed with respect to a
given operation, each should be aligned on the form with its respective "Requirements" to aid in the
development of the associated failure modes.

tial Failure Mode

Potential failure mode is defined as the manner in which the process could potentially fail to meet the
process requirements (including the design intent).
In preparing the FMEA, assume that the incoming parts/materials are correct. Exceptions can be made
by the FMEA team where historical data indicate deficiencies in incoming part quality. The team should
also assume that the basic design of the product is correct; however, if there are design issues which
result in process concerns, those issues should be communicated to the design team for resolution.
List the potential failure mode(s) for the particular operation in terms of the process requirements.

Assume that the failure could occur but may not necessarily occur. Potential failure modes should be
described in technical terms, not as a symptom noticeable by the customer.
If the requirements have been well defined, then the potential failure mode is readily identifiable by
determining the condition when a specific requirement is not met. Each requirement may have multiple
failure modes. A large number of failure modes identified for a single requirement usually indicates that
the requirement is not well defined.
The assumption is made that the failure could occur but may not necessarily occur - consequently the
used of the word "potential".
Verification of completeness of the potential failure modes can be made through a review of past things-
gone-wrong, concerns, reports, and group brainstrorming. Sources for this should also include a
comparison of similar processes and a review of customer (End User and subsequent operation) claims
relating to similar components.
 failure modes. A large number of failure modes identified for a single requirement usually indicates that
the requirement is not well defined.
The assumption is made that the failure could occur but may not necessarily occur - consequently the
used of the word "potential".
Verification of completeness of the potential failure modes can be made through a review of past things-
gone-wrong, concerns, reports, and group brainstrorming. Sources for this should also include a
comparison of similar processes and a review of customer (End User and subsequent operation) claims
relating to similar components.

al Effects of Failure
s).
ring that the customer may be an internal customer as well
ulations.
The product effects in the PFMEA should be consistent with those in the corresponding DFMEA.
For the End User, the effects should be stated in terms of product or system performance. If the
customer is the next operation or subsequent operation(s)/location(s), the effects should be stated in
terms of process/operation performance.
In order to determine the Potential Effect(s), the following questions should be asked:
1. Does the Potential Failure Mode physically prevent downstream processing or cause potential harm
to equipment or operators? (The location, station or operation at which the effect occures should be
identified. If at a customer's facility, this should be stated).
2. What is the potential impact on the End User?
3. What would happen if an effect was detected prior to reaching the End User?

Severity
e ranking within the scope of the individual FMEA.
modified for individual process analysis.
rity 1 should not be analyzed further.

Mechanism(s) of Failure Mode

Potential cause of failure mode is defined as an indication of how the failure could occur, and isdescribed
in terms of something that can be corrected or can be controlled. Potential cause of failure may be an
identification of a design or process weakness, the consequence of which is the failure mode.

To the extent possible, identify and document every potential cause for each failure mode. The cause
should be detailed as concisely and completely as possible. Separating the causes will result in a focused
analysis for each and may yield different measurements, controls, and action plans. There may be one or
more causes that can result in the failure mode being analyzed.
In preparing the PFMEA, the team should assume that the incoming part(s)/material(s) are correct.

Exceptions can be made at the team's discretion where historical data indicate deficiencies in incoming
part quality.
Only specific errors or malfunctions (e.g., seal not installed or seal installed inverted) should be listed,
Ambiguous phrases (e.g., operator error or seal mis-installed, etc) should not be used.
 Occurrence
ithin the design life.

s a relative ranking within the scope of the FMEA and may

modified for individual process analysis. Occurrence should

esign/Process Controls
mpleted or committed to and that will assure the design

ng, or reduce its rate of reoccurrence.

mode, either by analytical or physical methods, before the

ill be affected by the prevention controls provided they are

l as those that detect the cause.
cess adequacy such as:
 way a reduction in the occurrence ranking can be effected.

Detection
etection column. When more than one control is identified, it is recommended that the detection ranking of each
tection column.
en assess the capabilities of the current design controls to detect this failure mode.
portant to assess the capability of the design controls to detect low frequency failure modes or reduce the risk of

ng, generally the design control (analysis or verification

modified for individual process analysis. Detection should

gs. When the severity is 9 or 10, it is imperative that the team must ensure that the risk is addressed through existing

ce or detaction rankings. It is the team's responsibility to look at the information identified, decide upon an
tion and customers.

ority Number (RPN)

at continuous improvement is not required (which it is).

PN need to be understood. However, th euse of RPN

for RPN Reduction

RPNs shall be consider for review. In case of same RPNs, highest severity level shall be taken into consideration.

mmended Actions
ample of this is the use of proven design standard or best practice rather than product verification/validation after

reducing rankings in the following order: severity,

 should be implemented early in the development process.
r controlling one or more of the causes of mechanisms of the failure mode though a design revision. Actions such as,

in design validation/verification actions should result in a reduction of the detection ranking only. In some cases, a
e ditection ranking). Additionally, the following should be considered:

tion, indicate this by entering "None" in this column. It may be useful to also include a rational if "None" is entered,

& Target Completion Date

on including the target completion date. The design-responsible engineer/team leader is responsible for ensuring

ction Results
d Detection rankings and RPN.

en and Completion Date

etion date.

rrence, Detection and RPN

y, occurrence, and detection rankings.

i.e., cause addressed), thus an appropriate analysis or test should be completed as verification. If further action is

Approved By. Issued By

Date Date
 EMMFORCE INC. DOCUMENT
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS - FMEA

Prepared by: S P Dhiman

FMEA
RISK PRIORITY NUMBER = S x O x D
Within each FMEA shall be continuously worked on the reduction of the highest RPN numbers.
Special attention shall be given to the RPNs where the Severity Score is ≥ 8,

SEVERITY (S)
Effect Ranking
DESIGN FMEA PROCESS FMEA (Manufacturing/Assembly
PROCESS FMEA (Customer Effect) Effect)
Hazarduous without Potential failure mode effects safe Failure may endanger operator (machine or 10
warning
Hazarduous with warning operation and/ormode
Potential failure non-compliance
effects safe assembly)
Failure maywithout
endangerwarning.
operator (machine or 9
Very High operation and/or non-compliance
Item inoperable (loss of primary assembly) with warning.
Major disruption to production line. 8
High function). 100%line.
Item operable but at reduced level of Minor disruption to production of product may
7
Moderate performance.
Item operable but comfort/ Product may have to
Minor disruption to production line. 6
Low convenience
Item operableitem(s)
but inoperable. No sorting,
Minor disruption to production line. les than 5
Very Low comfort/convenience
Fit & Finish item doesoperable at
not conform. 100 % may have to be
Minor disruption to production line. 4
Minor Fit & Finish item does not conform. Product
Minor disruption to production to be sorted,
line. 3
Very Minor Fit & Finish item does not conform. Less than
Minor disruption to production line.100% may 2
None Less than or
Slight inconvenience to operation 100% may
operator,
No discernible effect 1
or no effect.

OCCURRENCE (O)
Probability of Failure Ranking
DESIGN/PROCESS PROCESS
Possible failure rates CPK When
Very High: Persistent >100 per thousand vehicles/items < 0,55 Always 10
Failures
50 per thousand items >= 0,55 9
High: Frequent Failures 20 per thousand items >= 0,78 Daily 8
10 per thousand items >= 0,86 7
Moderate: Occasional 5 per thousand items >= 0,94 Weekly 6
failures
2 per thousand items >= 1,00 5
1 per thousand items >= 1,10 4
Low: Relatively few 0,5 per thousand items >= 1,20 Monthly 3
failures
Very Low: Isolated failures 0,1 per thousand items >= 1,30 Yearly 2
Remote: Failure is unlikely < 0,010 per thousand items >= 1,67 Never 1

DETECTION (D)

Probability of PROCESS Ranking

detection
Inspection Type
DESIGN
A B C
Error-Proofed Gauging Manual Insp.
 Control will not or can not detect a X
Absolutely Impossible potential cause and subsequent Control can not detect or there is no control 10
failure mode.Or there is no control.
Current control will probably not X
Very Remote detect potential cause and Control is achieved with random checks only 9
subsequent failure mode.

Current control has poor chance of X

Remote detection. Visual inspection only. 8

Very low chance current control will

detect potential cause and X
Very low 7
subsequent failure mode. Double visual inspection only.

Low chance current control will X X

Low detect potential cause and Control is achieved with charting methods 6
subsequent failure mode. (SPC).
Moderate chance current control will X
Moderate detect potential cause and Control is based on variable gauging after 5
subsequent failure mode. parts have left the station
Controls have a good chance to X X
detect. Error detection in subsequent operations or
Moderately High 4
gauging performed on setup & first piece
check.
High chance current control will X X
detect potential cause and Error detection in-station or in subsequent
High 3
subsequent failure mode. operations by multiple layers of acceptance.
Very high chance current control will X X
Very High detect potential cause and Error detection in station. Automatic gauging. 2
subsequent failure mode. Cannot pass discrepant part.
Design control will almost certainly X
detect potential cause and Discrepant parts cannot be made because
Almost certain 1
subsequent failure mode. error-proofed by process/product design.
 Enter Dim number in this field
Piece Measured #REF! Fill in Blue cells

1 5 Average 5.20
2 5.2
3 5 Std Dev 0.17
4 5
5 5.5 Nominal dim
6 5.2 Lower level tol
7 5.3 Upper level tol
8 5.3
9 5.2 Cp 0.00
10 5.1
11 5.4 Cpo 10.36
12 Cpb -10.36
13
14 Cpk -10.36
15
16
17 PPM Over ULT 1000000
18
19 PPM Over LLT 0
20
21 PPM total 1000000
22
23
24
25 Only blue cells to fill out
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
 43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

CORP SQADOC 004 SUPPLIER PPAP WORKBOOK #REF!

 EMMFORCE INC
Rev. 0 dd 11/07/2018 GAGE REPEATABILITY & REPRODUCIBILITY STUD

GAGE NUMBER PART NUMBER #REF!

GAGE NAME PART NAME #REF!

CHARACTERISTIC CONTROL PLAN

SPECIFICATION LSL USL TOL. 0

APPRAISERS TRIALS PARTS

GAGE USAGE FOR (mark) Product Control Process Control

APPRAISER A APPRAISER B APPRAISER C

PARTS
Appraiser/Trial #

AVG'S

Range

AVG'S

Range

AVG'S

Range

Part average

RANGE VARIATION:
Ra No. Trials D4 R x (D4)

Rb 2 3.267 #N/A
Rc 3 2.575 Note: LCLR is zero with < 7 trials

R No. Trials A2 X + ( R x A2)

2 1.880 #N/A
3 1.023 X - ( R x A2)
 #N/A

Max X 0.000
Min X 0.000 Note:
X Diff. 0.0000

DATE

STUDY PERFORMED BY

MEASUREMENT UNIT ANALYSIS % TOTAL VARIATION (TV)

REPEATABILITY - EQUIPMENT VARIATION (EV) % EV = 100 (EV/TV)

EV = R x K1 % EV =
EV = Trail K1
EV = 0 #N/A

REPRODUCIBILITY - APPRAISER VARIATION (AV) % AV= 100(AV/TV)

AV = {(xDIFF x K2) - (EV /nr)} % AV=
2 2 1/2
n=Parts r=Trials
AV =
AV = Appraiser K2
0 #N/A

REPEATABILITY & REPRODUCIBILITY (R&R) % R&R= 100(R&R/TV)

R&R = {(EV2 + AV2)}1/2 % R&R= #VALUE!
R&R =
Note: Guidelines for Acceptance of System Based on %
R&R = Under10% = Measurement system is acceptable.
10%-30% = May be acceptable based on gauge cost.
Over 30% = Measurement system not acceptable.

PART VARIATION (PV) % PV= 100(PV/TV)

PV = RP x K3 % PV=
PV = Parts K3
PV = 0 #N/A

TOTAL VARIATION (TV) %TV=

TV = {(GRR2 + PV2)}1/2
TV =
TV = NUMBER OF DISTINCT CATEGORIES (nd
ndc= 1.41(PV/R&R)
ndc= #VALUE!
Note: Guidelines for Acceptance: ndc greater then or equal

Components of variations

1200%
1000%
800%
NaN NaN
600%
400%
200%
0%
 800%
NaN NaN
600%
400%
200%
0%

Average Average chart

Col umn X Col umn Y Col umn Z UCL Col umn AA

Range chart

12.000
10.000
Range

8.000
6.000
4.000
2.000
0.000
1 2 3 Column
4 R 5 6 7 8 Column
9 S 10 11 12 13Column
14 T 15 16 17 18Column
19V 20 21 22 23Column
24U 25 26 27 28 2

For information on the theory and constants used in the form see MSA Reference Manual, Third edition.
ODUCIBILITY STUDY ✘ Obrazec v ANG jeziku
1

#REF!

#REF!

rocess Control

Xa
Ra

Xb
Rb

Xc
Rc
X
RP

= UCLR

= #N/A

= UCLX

= #N/A
= LCLX
 = #N/A

AL VARIATION (TV) % TOLERANCE (Tol)

100(EV/Tol) Trials K1
Repeat. 2 0.8862 0.1
3 0.5908

100(AV/Tol)
Reprod. Appraisers K2
2 0.7071
3 0.5231

100(R&R/Tol) Gage R&R 10.00%

#VALUE! 9.90%

s for Acceptance of System Based on %GRR

easurement system is acceptable. 30.00%
y be acceptable based on gauge cost.
easurement system not acceptable. 31.00%
Parts K3
100(PV/Tol) 2 0.7071
Part-to-part 3 0.5231
4 0.4467
5 0.4030
6 0.3742
7 0.3534
100(TV/Tol) 8 0.3375
9 0.3249
10 0.3146
OF DISTINCT CATEGORIES (ndc)

for Acceptance: ndc greater then or equal to 5=OK.

Rbar
Appraiser AAppraiser B Appraiser C Mean
#N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
 #N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
Col umn Y Col umn Z UCL Col umn AA LCL

#N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
2 23Column
24U 25 26 27 28 29 30
#N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
#N/A #N/A
ŠT. VREDNOSTI, KI PADE IZVEN
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UCL VREDNOSTI IZVEN UCL IN LCL Appraiser A Appraiser B Appraiser C Mean. UCL LCL
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REDNOSTI, KI PADE IZVEN 0

0
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0 šteje vrednosti izven UCL in LCL
0 šteje vrednosti znotraj UCL in LCL
#DIV/0! #DIV/0! % KI PADE IZVEN (pogoj: vsaj 50% mora pasti izven)