distribution or said rules by the mails�.

STATUTORY CASES The respondent then appealed.

Case Title: G.R. No. L-19650 (September 2) Issue(s)

29, 1966)
Caltex (Philippines), Inc. vs. Enrico Palomar a) Whether or not the petition states a
in his capacity as The Postmaster General sufficient cause of action for declaratory
relief?
1) Facts
b) Whether or not the proposed “Caltex
The case before us now is a petition for Hooded Pump Contest� violates the
declaratory relief against Postmaster Postal Law?
General Enrico Palomar, parying “that
judgment be rendered declaring its ‘Caltex 3) Ruling
Hooded Pump Contest’ not to be violative
of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent Recapitulating, we hold that the petition
to allow petitioner the use of the mails to herein states a sufficient cause of action for
bring the contest to the attention of the declaratory relief, and that the “Caltex
public”. Hooded Pump Contest” as described in the
rules submitted by the appellee does not
In 1960, Caltex launched a promotional transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.
scheme called “Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest� which calls for participants to ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed
“estimate the actual number of liters a from is affirmed. No costs.
hooded gas pump at each Caltex station
will dispense during a specified period.� 4) Ratio
The contest is open to all “motor vehicle
owners and/or licensed drivres�. There is Declaratory Relief is the interpretation of
neither a fee or consideration required nor several constitutional provisions. Based on
a purchase required to be made. The forms Section 1 Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an
are available upon request at each Caltex action for declaratory relief should be filed
station and there is also a sealed can where by a person interested under a deed, a will,
accomplished entry stubs may be a contract or other written instrument, and
deposited. whose rights are affected by a statute, an
executive order, a regulation or an
Caltex wishes to use mails amongst the ordinance.
media for publicizing about the contest,
thus, Caltex sent representatives to the Requisites for Declaratory Relief:
postal authorities for advance clearing for - There is justiciable controversy
the use of mails for the contest. However, - The controversy is between persons
the postal authorities denied their request whose interests are adverse
in view of sections 1954 (a), 1982, and - The party seeking the relief has a legal
1983 of the Revised Administrative Code interest in the controversy
(Anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law), - The issue is ripe for judicial determination
which prohibits the use of mail in conveying
any information concerning non-mailable * The “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest�
schemes, such as lottery, gift enterprise, or is a mere “gratuitous distribution of
similar scheme. property by chance�. It does not qualify
as a lottery due to the lack of
Caltex sought for a reconsideration and consideration. An act to be deemed as a
stressed that there was no consideration lottery must constitute a (1) prize, (2)
involved in the part of the contestant(s) but chance, and (3) consideration. The
the Postmaster General maintained their participants are not required to do anything
view and even threatened Caltex that if the or purchase anything from Caltex in order
contest was conducted, “a fraud order to participate in the contest. The true test
will have to be issued against it (Caltex) for having consideration is “whether the
and all its representatives�. This leads to participant pays a valuable consideration
Caltex’s filing of this petition for declaratory for the chance, and not whether those
relief. conducting the enterprise receive
something of value in return for the
The court ruled that the “petitioner does distribution of the prize.�
not violate the Postal Law and the
respondent has no right to bar the public
1
 incidents of picketing are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter
pursuant to Batas Pambansa 227 (Labor
Code, Article 217) and not to the Court of
First Instance. The motion was denied.
Hence, the petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether construction of the law is

required to determine jurisdiction.

Held: The first and fundamental duty of

courts is to apply the law. Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible
or inadequate without them.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a

judicial proceeding is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organizes the
court; and it is given only by law.
Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be
conferred by law in words that do not admit
of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts
and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively
from the statutes of the forum, the issue
National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. should be resolved on the basis of the law
Eisma or statute in force. Therefore, since (1) the
GR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA original wording of Article 217 vested the
419) labor arbiters with jurisdiction; since (2)
En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 concur Presidential Decree 1691 reverted the
with comments, 1 took no part, 1 on leave jurisdiction with respect to money claims of
workers or claims for damages arising from
Facts: On 5 March 1982, the National employer-employee relations to the labor
Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry arbiters after Presidential Decree 1367
of Labor and Employment (Labor Relations transferred such jurisdiction to the ordinary
Division, Zamboanga City), a petition for courts, and since (3) Batas Pambansa 130
direct certification as the sole exclusive made no change with respect to the
collective bargaining representative of the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor
monthly paid employees at the Lumbayao Arbiters with respect to money claims of
manufacturing plant of the Zamboanga workers or claims for damages arising from
Wood Products, Inc. (Zambowood). On 17 employer-employee relations; Article 217 is
April 1982, such employees charged the to be applied the way it is worded. The
firm before the same office for exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor
underpayment of monthly living arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It
allowances. On 3 May 1982, the union means, it can only mean, that a court of
issued a notice of strike against the firm, first instance judge then, a regional trial
alleging illegal termination of Dionisio court judge now, certainly acts beyond the
Estioca, president of the said local union; scope of the authority conferred on him by
unfair labor practice; nonpayment of living law when he entertained the suit for
allowances; and “employment of damages, arising from picketing that
oppressive alien management personnel accompanied a strike.
without proper permit. The strike began on
23 May 1982. The Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ
of certiorari, and nullified and set aside the
On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a 20 July 1982 order issued by the court a
complaint with the trial court against the quo. It granted the writ of prohibition, and
officers and members of the union, for enjoined the Judge of said court, or
“damages for obstruction of private whoever acts in his behalf in the RTC to
property with prayer for preliminary which this case is assigned, from taking any
injunction and/or restraining order.” The further action on the civil case (Civil Case
union filed a motion for the dismissal and 716 [2751]), except for the purpose of
for the dissolution of the restraining order, dismissing it. It also made permanent the
and opposition to the issuance of the writ of restraining order issued on 5 August 1982.
preliminary injunction, contending that the
2
 Paat v. CA Held: The construction that conveyances
GR 111107, 10 January 1997 (266 SCRA are subject of confiscation by the courts
167) exclusively (pursuant to Section 28,
Second Division, Torres Jr. (p): 4 concurring paragraph 2) unduly restricts the clear
intention of the law and inevitably reduces
Facts: On 19 May 1989, Victoria de the other provision of Section 68-A, aside to
Guzman’s truck was seized by Department the fact that conveyances are not
of Environment and Natural Resources mentioned nor included in the former
personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya while on provision. In the construction of statutes, it
its ways to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, must be read in such a way as to give
Cagayan because the driver could not effect to the purpose projected in the
produce the required documents for the statute. Statutes should be construed in the
forest products found concealed in the light of the object to be achieved and the
truck. On 23 May 1989, Aritao CENRO’s evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they
Jovito Layugan issued an order of should be given such construction as will
confiscation of the truck. Its owner, De advance the object, suppress the mischief,
Guzman, failed to submit the required and secure the benefits intended. In the
explanation within the reglementary period case at bar, the phrase “to dispose of the
set by Layugan. On 22 June 1989, DENR same” is broad enough to cover the act of
Regional Executive Director Rogelio forfeiting conveyances in favor of the
Baggayan sustained the Alitao CENRO’s government. The only limitation is that it
action of confiscation and ordered the should be made “in accordance with
forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A pertinent laws, regulations or policies on
of Presidential Decree 705, as amended by the matter.”
Executive Order 277. De Guzman filed for
reconsideration but was denied. Further, when the statute is clear and
explicit, there is hardly room for any
The case was appealed to the Secretary of extended court ratiocination or
DENR. Pending resolution, however, a suit rationalization of the law. The language of
for replevin (Civil Case 4031), was filed by the amendatory executive order, when it
De Guzman and company against Layugan eliminated the phrase “shall be guilty of
and Baggayan with the RTC Cagayan qualified theft as defined and punished
(Branch 2), contending that the only the under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit Penal Code “ and inserted the words “ shall
conveyances used in the transporting be punished with the penalties imposed
illegal forest products, pursuant to the under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised
second paragraph of Section 68. De Penal Code,” meant that the act of cutting,
Guzman further contended that the seizure gathering, collecting, removing, or
is illegal, as she did not use the truck in the possessing forest products without
commission of the crime (of qualified theft authority constitutes a distinct offense
under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised independent now from the crime of theft
Penal Code, punishable under Section 68), under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
as allegedly admitted by the Regional Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed
Executive Director, releasing her from is that provided for under Article 309 and
criminal liability. The trial court thereafter 310 of the Revised Penal Code.
issued a writ ordering the return of the
truck to De Guzman. The petitioners filed a The Supreme Court granted the petition,
petition for certiorari with the Court of reversed and set aside the 16 October
Appeals. The appellate court sustained the decision and 14 July 1992 resolution of the
trial court’s order ruling that the question CA, made permanent the restraining order
involved is purely a legal one. Hence, the promulgated on 27 September 1993, and
petition. directed the DENR secretary to resolve the
controversy with utmost dispatch.
Issues:
People v. Mapa
 Whether construction admits that the GR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA
authority to confiscate or to forfeit 1164)
conveyances belongs to the courts En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur
 Whether the truck was used in the
commission of an offense under Facts: Mario M. Mapa was charged for
Section 68 of Presidential Decree illegal possession of firearm and
705, as amended by Executive Order ammunition in an information dated 14
277 August 1962 in violation of Section 878 of
the Revise Administrative Code in
3
connection with Section 2692 of the Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San
Revised Administrative Code, as amended Nicolas
by CA 56 and as further amended by RA 4. GR L-34568, 28 March 1988 (159 SCRA
Accused admits to possession of firearm on 369)
ground of being a secret agent of Governor Second Division, Padilla (p): 4 concurring
Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. On 27
November 1963, the lower court rendered a Facts: On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero
decision convicting the accused of the and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with
crime and sentenced him to imprisonment the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos
for one year and one day to two years. As Norte seeking the adoption of minors
the appeal involves a question of law, it Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos.
was elevated to the Supreme Court. However, minors Roderick and Rommel
Daoang, assisted by their father and
Issue: Whether or not a secret agent duly guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein
appointed and qualified as such of the filed an opposition to the said adoption.
governor is exempt from the requirement of They contended that the spouses Antero
having a license of firearm and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate
daughter named Estrella Agonoy,
Held: The law is explicit that it is unlawful oppositors mother, who died on 1 March
for any person to possess any firearm, 1971, and therefore said spouses were
detached parts of firearms or ammunition disqualified to adopt under Article 335 of
therefor, or any instrument or implement the Civil Code, which provides that those
used or intended to be used in the who have legitimate, legitimated,
manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, acknowledged natural children or children
or ammunition except when such firearms by legal fiction cannot adopt.
are in possession of such public officials
and public servants for use in the Issue: Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy
performance of their official duties; as and Amanda Ramos are disqualified to
those firearms and ammunitions which are adopt under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of
regularly and lawfully issued to officers, the Civil Code.
soldiers, sailors or marines, the Philippines
Constabulary, guards in the employment of Held: The words used in paragraph (1) of
the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, Article 335 of the Civil Code, in
provincial governors, lieutenant governors, enumerating the persons who cannot
provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, adopt, are clear and unambiguous. When
municipal mayors, and guards of provincial the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed
prisoners and jails. It is the first and the word “descendant,” found in the
fundamental duty of courts to apply the Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil
law; Construction and interpretation come Code was patterned, to “children.” The
only after it has been demonstrated that children thus mentioned have a clearly
application is impossible or inadequate defined meaning in law and do not include
without them. The law cannot be any grandchildren. Well known is the rule of
clearer, there being no provision made for a statutory construction to the effect that a
secret agent. statute clear and unambiguous on its face
need not be interpreted. The rule is that
Reliance in the decision in People v. only statutes with an ambiguous or
Macarandang is misplaced, and the case no doubtful meaning may be the subjects of
longer speaks with authority to the extent statutory construction. In the present case,
that the present decision conflicts with. It Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the
may be note that in People v. Macarandang, grandchildren of Antero Agonoy and
a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the
the assumption that the appointment of the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson
accused as a secret agent to assist in the Marcos by the Agonoys.
maintenance of peace and order campaigns
and detection of crimes sufficiently put him The Supreme Court denied the petition, and
within the category of a ‘peace officer’ affirmed the judgment of the Municipal
equivalent even to a member of the Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Special
municipal police expressly covered by Proceedings 37), wthout pronouncement as
section 879, Thus, in the present case, to costs.
therefore, the conviction must stand.
Paras v. Comelec (Resolution)
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed GR 123169, 4 November 1996 (264 SCRA
judgment.

4
 49) intention is usually found not in “the letter
En Banc, Francisco (p): 14 concurring that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth”.
In the present case, Paragraph (b) of
Facts: Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Section 74 construed together with
Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City paragraph (a) merely designates the period
who won during the 1994 barangay when such elective local official may be
election. A petition for his recall as Punong subject of a recall election. The
Barangay was filed by the registered voters Sangguniang Kabataan elections cannot be
of the barangay, which was approved by considered a regular election, as this would
the Comelec. Petition signing was render inutile the recall provision of the
scheduled on 14 October 1995, where at Local Government Code. It would be more
least 29.30% of the registered voters in keeping with the intent of the recall
signed the petition, well above the 25% provision of the Code to construe regular
requirement provided by law. The Comelec local election as one referring to an election
also set the recall election on 13 November where the office held by the local elective
1995, but which was deferred to 16 official sought to be recalled will be
December 1995 due to the petitioner’s contested and be filled by the electorate.
opposition. To prevent the holding of the
recall election, petitioner filed before the The Supreme Court, however, has to
RTC Cabanatuan City a petition for dismiss the petition for having become
injunction (Special Proceeding Civil Action moot and academic, as the next regular
2254-AF), with the trial court issuing a elections involving the barangay office
restraining order. After conducting a concerned were seven months away. Thus,
summary hearing, the trial court lifted the the Temporary Restraining Order issued on
restraining order, dismissed the petition 12 January 1996, enjoining the recall
and required petitioner and his counsel to election, was made permanent.
explain why they should not be cited for
contempt for misrepresenting that the Floresca v. Philex Mining
barangay recall election was without GR L-30642., 30 April 1985 (136 SCRA 142)
Comelec approval. En Banc, Makasiar (p): 7 concurring, 1 on
leave, 2 took no part, others dissenting
In a resolution dated 5 January 1996, the
Comelec, for the third time, re-scheduled Facts: Several miners were killed in a
the recall election on 13 January 1996; cave-in at one of Philex Mining
hence, the instant petition for certiorari Corporations’ mine sites. The heirs of the
with urgent prayer for injunction. The miners were able to recover under the
petitioner contends that no recall can take Workman’s Compensation Act (WCA).
place within one year preceding a regular Thereafter, a special committee report
local election, the Sangguniang Kabataan indicated that the company failed to
elections slated on the first Monday of May provide the miners with adequate safety
1996. He cited Associated Labor Union v. protection. The heirs decided to file a
Letrondo-Montejo to support the argument, complaint for damages before the Court of
the Court in which case considered the SK First Instance (CFI) of Manila. Philex filed a
election as a regular local election. Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
action was based on an industrial accident
Issue: Whether the Sangguniang Kabataan which is covered under the WCA and,
election is to be construed as a regular therefore, the CFI has no jurisdiction over
local election in a recall proceeding the case. Philex argues that the work
connected injuries are compensable
Held: It is a rule in statutory construction exclusively under Sections 5 and 46 of the
that every part of the statute must be WCA; and that the WCA covers work-
interpreted with reference to the context, connected accidents even if the employer
i.e., that every part of the statute must be was negligent as the WCA under Section 4-
considered together with the other parts, A imposes a 50% additional compensation
and kept subservient to the general intent in the event that the employer is negligent.
of the whole enactment. Further, the spirit, The heirs, however, contend that the CFI
rather than the letter of a law determines has jurisdiction, as their complaint is not
its construction; hence, a statute must be based on the WCA but on the Civil Code
read according to its spirit and intent. The provisions on damages arising out of
too literal interpretation of the law leads to negligence. The CFI dismissed the
absurdity which the Court cannot complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs
countenance. A too-literal reading of the questioned the dismissal before the
law constrict rather than fulfill its purpose Supreme Court.
and defeat the intention of its authors. That
5
Amici curiae submitted their respective the Declaration of Principles and State
memoranda, pursuant to the resolution of Policies of the 1973 Constitution, as
26 November 1976, involving the issue amended, and as implemented by Articles
whether the action of an injured employee 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231
or worker or that of his heirs in case of his and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950.
death under the Workmen’s Compensation Further, it reiterated its ruling in People vs.
Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative; Licera: that judicial decisions of the
i.e. (1: Exclusive) whether an injured Supreme Court assume the same authority
employee or his heirs’ action is exclusively as the statute itself, pursuant to Article 8 of
restricted to seeking the limited the Civil Code of the Philippines which
compensation provided under the decrees that judicial decisions applying or
Workmen’s Compensation Act, (2: interpreting the laws or the Constitution
Selective) whether an injured employee or form part of this jurisdiction’s legal system.
his heirs have a right of selection or choice It argues that the application or
of action between availing of the worker’s interpretation placed by the Court upon a
right under the Workmen’s Compensation law is part of the law as of the date of the
Act and suing in the regular courts under enactment of the said law since the Court’s
the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, application or interpretation merely
moral and/or exemplary) from the employer establishes the contemporaneous
by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the legislative intent that the construed law
employer or of his other employees, or (3: purports to carry into effect. Yet, the Court
Cumulative) whether an injured employee argues that the Court can legislate,
or his heirs may avail cumulatively of both pursuant to Article 9 of the New Civil Code,
actions, i.e., collect the limited which provides that “No judge or court shall
compensation under the Workmen’s decline to render judgment by reason of
Compensation Act and sue in addition for the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the
damages in the regular courts. The opinions laws.” Thus, even the legislator himself
of the amici curiae are diverse. recognizes that in certain instances, the
court “do and must legislate” to fill in the
The Court in this same decision agreed with gaps in the law; because the mind of the
the argument that the action is selective, legislator, like all human beings, is finite
i.e. that the injured worker or his heirs have and therefore cannot envisage all possible
the choice of remedies, but that they cases to which the law may apply.
cannot pursue both courses of action
simultaneously and balance the relative
advantage of recourse under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act as against an Republic v. CA and Molina
ordinary action. It further held that the GR 108763, 13 February 1997
petitioners who had received the benefits En Banc, Panganiban (p): 8 concur, 3
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, concur in result
such may not preclude them from bringing
an action before the regular court, as the Facts: Roridel Olaviano was married to
choice of the first remedy was based on Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila,
ignorance or a mistake of fact, which and gave birth to a son a year after.
nullifies the choice as it was not an Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and
intelligent choice, but that upon the irresponsibility” on the early stages of the
success of such bids before the lower court, marriage, observed from his tendency to
the payments made under the Workmen’s spend time with his friends and
Compensation Act should be deducted from squandering his money with them, from his
the damages that may be decreed in their dependency from his parents, and his
favor. dishonesty on matters involving his
finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job
Issue: Whether the Supreme Court, in in 1986, Roridel became the sole
determining the action to be selective, is breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987,
guilty of judicial legislation. Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and
proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her
Held: The Court, through its majority, and their child a week later. The couple are
defended itself by holding that the Court separated-in-fact for more than three years.
does not legislate but merely applies and
gives effect to the constitutional On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified
guarantees of social justice then secured by petition for declaration of nullity of her
Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for
Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and Roridel consisted of her own testimony,
later by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article II of that of two of her friends, a social worker,
6
and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General (2) the root cause of psychological
Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did incapacity must be medically or clinically
not present any evidence as he appeared identified, alleged in the complaint,
only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly
May 1991, the trial court rendered explained in the decision; (3) The
judgment declaring the marriage void. The incapacity must be proven existing at the
Solicitor General appealed to the Court of time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the
Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the incapacity must be clinically or medically
appeals and affirmed in toto the RTC’s permanent or incurable; (5) such illness
decision. Hence, the present recourse. must be grave enough; (6) the essential
marital obligation must be embraced by
Issue: Whether opposing or conflicting Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as
personalities should be construed as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220
psychological incapacity to 225 of the same code as regards parents
and their children; (7) interpretation made
Held: The Court of Appeals erred in its by the National Appellate Matrimonial
opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the
intended to liberalize the application of trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-
Philippine civil laws on personal and family General to appeal as counsels for the State.
rights, and holding psychological incapacity
as a broad range of mental and behavioral The Supreme Court granted the petition,
conduct on the part of one spouse and reversed and set aside the assailed
indicative of how he or she regards the decision; concluding that the marriage of
marital union, his or her personal Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina
relationship with the other spouse, as well subsists and remains valid.
as his or her conduct in the long haul for
the attainment of the principal objectives of Aisporna v. CA
marriage; where said conduct, observed GR L-39419, 12 April 1982 (113 SCRA 459)
and considered as a whole, tends to cause First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur, 1
the union to self-destruct because it took no part
defeats the very objectives of marriage,
warrants the dissolution of the marriage. Facts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969,
a Personal Accident Policy was issued by
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Perla Compania de Seguros, through its
Court of Appeals, where psychological authorized agent Rodolfo Aisporna, for a
incapacity should refer to no less than a period of 12 months with the beneficiary
mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at designated as Ana M. Isidro. The insured
the time the marriage is celebrated, and died by violence during lifetime of policy.
that there is hardly any doubt that the
Mapalad Aisporna participated actively with
intendment of the law has been to confine
the aforementioned policy.
the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to
the most serious cases of personality For reason unexplained, an information was
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
filed against Mapalad Aisporna, Rodolfo’s
insensitivity or inability to give meaning
wife, with the City Court of Cabanatuan for
and significance to the marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be violation of Section 189 of the Insurance
characterized by gravity, juridical Act on 21 November 1970, or acting as an
antecedence, and incurability. In the agent in the soliciting insurance without
present case, there is no clear showing to securing the certificate of authority from
us that the psychological defect spoken of the office of the Insurance Commissioner.
is an incapacity; but appears to be more of Mapalad contends that being the wife of
a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped
“neglect” in the performance of some him in his work, as clerk, and that policy
marital obligations. Mere showing of was merely a renewal and was issued
“irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting because Isidro had called by telephone to
personalities” in no wise constitutes renew, and at that time, her husband,
psychological incapacity. Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note
on top of her husband’s desk to renew. On
The Court, in this case, promulgated the 2 August 1971, the trial court found
guidelines in the interpretation and Mapalad guilty and sentenced here to pay a
application of Article 36 of the Family Code, fine of P500.00 with subsidiary
removing any visages of it being the most imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) pay the costs. On appeal and on 14 August
The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff;
7
1974, the trial court’s decision was affirmed of money. The trial court declared the
by the appellate court (CA-GR 13243-CR). defendants in default for failure to answer
Hence, the present recourse was filed on 22 within the reglementary period, and
October 1974. On 20 December 1974, the rendered its decision on 20 January 1970.
Office of the Solicitor General, representing
the Court of Appeals, submitted that To satisfy the judgment, Acaban sought the
Aisporna may not be considered as having garnishment of the bank deposit of B & B
violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. Forest Development Corporation with the
China Bank. However, Tan Kim Liong, the
Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an bank’s cashier, disallowed the same
insurance agent within the scope or intent invoking the provisions of Republic Act
of the Insurance Act 1405, which prohibit the disclosure of any
information relative to bank deposits. On 4
Held: Legislative intent must be March 1972, Tan Kim Lion was ordered to
ascertained from a consideration of the inform the Court if there is a deposit by B &
statute as a whole. The particular words, B Forest Development in the China Bank,
clauses and phrases should not be studied and if there is, to hold the same intact and
as detached and isolated expressions, but not allow any withdrawal until further order
the whole and every part of the statute from the Court. Tan Kim Liong moved to
must be considered in fixing the meaning reconsider but was turned down. In the
of any of its parts and in order to produce same order he was directed to comply with
harmonious whole. In the present case, the the order of the Court, otherwise his arrest
first paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a and confinement will be ordered. Resisting
person from acting as agent, subagent or the 2 orders, the China Bank and Tan Kim
broker in the solicitation or procurement of Liong instituted the petition. Petitioners
applications for insurance without first argue that the disclosure of the information
procuring a certificate of authority so to act required by the court does not fall within
from the Insurance Commissioner; while any of the four (4) exceptions enumerated
the second paragraph defines who is an in Section 2 ([1] upon written permission of
insurance agent within the intent of the the depositor, [2] or in cases of
section; while the third paragraph impeachment, [3] or upon order of a
prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its competent court in cases of bribery or
violation. The appellate court’s ruling that dereliction of duty of public officials, [4] or
the petitioner is prosecuted not under the in cases where the money deposited or
second paragraph of Section 189 but under invested is the subject matter of the
its first paragraph is a reversible error, as litigation), and that if the questioned orders
the definition of insurance agent in are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be
paragraph 2 applies to the paragraph 1 and criminally liable under Section 5 and the
2 of Section 189, which is “any person who bank exposed to a possible damage suit by
for compensation shall be an insurance B & B Forest Development Corporation.
agent within the intent of this section.” Specifically referring to the case, the
Without proof of compensation, directly or position of the petitioners is that bank
indirectly, received from the insurance deposit of judgment debtor B and B Forest
policy or contract, Mapalad Aisporna may Development Corporation cannot be
not be held to have violated Section 189 of subject to garnishment to satisfy a final
the Insurance Act. judgment against it in view of the
aforementioned provisions of law.
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed
judgment and acquitted the accused of the Issue: Whether or not a banking institution
crime charged, with costs de oficio. may validly refuse to comply with a court
process garnishing the bank deposit of a
China Bank v. Ortega (J) judgment debtor, by invoking the
GR L-34964, 31 January 1973 (49 SCRA provisions of Republic Act 1405.
355)
Second Division, Makalintal (p): 7 concur, 2 Held: From the discussion of the
took no part conference committee report of the two
houses of Congress that the prohibition
Facts: On 17 December 1968, Vicente against examination of or inquiry into a
Acaban filed a complaint against B & B bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does
Forest Development Corporation and not preclude its being garnished to insure
Mariano Bautista for the collection of sum satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed, there is
8
no real inquiry in such a case, and if the Later on, Republic Act 5753 was approved
existence of the deposit is disclosed, the on 22 June 1969, providing for an increase
disclosure is purely incidental to the in the basic pension and additional pension
execution process. Importantly, it was not for the wife and each of the unmarried
the intention of the lawmakers to place minor children. Gasilao’s monthly pension
bank deposits beyond the reach of was, however, increased only on 15 January
execution to satisfy a judgment. In the 1971, and by 25% of the increases
present case, the lower court did not order provided by law, due to the fact that it was
an examination of or inquiry into the only on said date that funds were released
deposit of B & B Forest Development for the purpose, and the amount so
Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It released was only sufficient to pay only
merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the 25% of the increase. On 15 January 1972,
court whether B & B Forest Development more funds were released to implement
Corporation had a deposit in the China fully Republic Act 5753 and allow payment
Banking Corporation only for purposes of in full of the benefits thereunder from said
the garnishment issued by it, so that the date.
bank would hold the same intact and not
allow any withdrawal until further order. In 1973, Gasilao filed an action against the
Board to recover the pension, which he
The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of claims he is entitled to, from July 1955,
the lower court dated 4 and 27 March when he first filed his application for
1972, with costs against the petitioners. pension, up to 1968 when his pension was
finally approved. The Board contends,
Board of Administrators of the PVA v. however, based on Section 15 of Republic
Bautista Act 65, that since the section impliedly
GR L-37867, 22 February 1982 (112 SRCA requires that the application filed should
59) first be approved by the Board of
First Division, Guerrero (p): 5 concurring Administrators before the claimant could
receive his pension, therefore, an award of
Facts: Calixto Gasilao was a veteran in
pension benefits should commence from
good standing during the last World War
the date of approval of the application.
that took active participation in the
liberation drive against the enemy, and due Issue: Whether Gasilao is entitled to the
to his military service, he was rendered pension from 1955 instead of from 1968.
disabled. The Philippine Veterans
Administration, formerly the Philippine Held: As it is generally known, the purpose
Veterans Board, (now Philippine Veterans of Congress in granting veteran pensions is
Affairs Office) is an agency of the to compensate a class of men who suffered
Government charged with the in the service for the hardships they
administration of different laws giving endured and the dangers they
various benefits in favor of veterans and encountered, and more particularly, those
their orphans/or widows and parents. On who have become incapacitated for work
July 23, 1955, Gasilao filed a claim for owing to sickness, disease or injuries
disability pension under Section 9 of sustained while in line of duty. A veteran
Republic Act 65, with the Philippine pension law is, therefore, a governmental
Veterans Board, alleging that he was expression of gratitude to and recognition
suffering from Pulmonary Tuberculosis of those who rendered service for the
(PTB), which he incurred in line of duty. Due country, especially during times of war or
to Gasilao’s failure to complete his revolution, by extending to them regular
supporting papers and submit evidence to monetary aid. For this reason, it is the
establish his service-connected illness, his general rule that a liberal construction is
claim was disapproved by the Board on 18 given to pension statutes in favor of those
December 1955. On 8 August 1968, Gasilao entitled to pension. Courts tend to favor the
was able to complete his supporting papers pensioner, but such constructional
and, after due investigation and processing, preference is to be considered with other
the Board of Administrators found out that guides to interpretation, and a construction
his disability was 100% thus he was of pension laws must depend on its own
awarded the full benefits of section 9 of particular language. In the present case,
Republic Act 65. Republic Act 65 is a veteran pension law
which must be accorded a liberal
construction and interpretation in order to
9
favor those entitled to rights, privileges, an “Extrajudicial Partition with Confirmation
and benefits granted thereunder, among of Sale” was executed by and among the
which are the right to resume old positions surviving legal heirs and descendants of
in government, educational benefits, the Enrique Salvatierra. After the partition,
privilege to take promotion examinations, a Venancio owned 1041 square meters
life pension for the incapacited, pension for consisting of Lot 27 and portion of Lot 26
widow and children, and hospitalization and (which is approximately 749 square
medical benefits. Upholding the Board that meters), Anselmo owned 405 square
the pension awards are made effective only meters of Lot 26, while the heirs of Tomas
upon approval of the application, this would owned 1,116 square meters, the whole of
be dependent upon the discretion of the Lot 25. Thereafter on 15 June 1970,
Board which had been abused in this case Venancio sold the whole of Lot 27 and a
through inaction extending for 12 years. 149 square meter portion of Lot 26 to
Such stand, therefore does not appear to spouses Lino Longalong and Paciencia
be, or simply is not, in consonance with the Mariano. It was discovered in 1982 through
spirit and intent of the law. Gasilao’s claim a relocation survey that the 149 square
was sustained. meter portion of Lot 26 was outside
Longalong’s fence as Anselmo Salvatierra
The Supreme Court modified the judgment was able to obtain a title in his name
of the court a quo, ordering the Board of (Original Certificate of Title 0-4221)
Administrators of the Philippine Veterans covering the whole of Lot 26). Efforts to
Administration (now the Philippine Veterans settle the matter at the barangay level
Affairs Office) to make Gasilao’s pension proved futile because Purita Salvatierra
effective 18 December 1955 at the rate of (widow of Anselmo) refused to yield to the
P50.00 per month plus P10.00 per month demand of Lino Longalong to return to the
for each of his then unmarried minor latter the 149 square meter portion of Lot
children below 18, and the former amount 26.
increased to P100.00 from 22 June 1957 to
7 August 1968; and declaring the Longalong filed a case with the Regional
differentials in pension to which said Trial Court for the reconveyance of the said
Gasilao, his wife and his unmarried minor portion of Lot 26. The court a quo
children below 18 are entitled for the period dismissed the case on the grounds that
from 22 June 1969 to 14 January 1972 by Longalong failed to establish ownership of
virtue of Republic Act 5753 subject to the the portion of the land in question, and that
availability of Government funds the prescriptive period of four years from
appropriated for the purpose. discovery of the alleged fraud committed
by defendants’ predecessor Anselmo
Salvatierra within which plaintiffs should
have filed their action had already elapsed.
Salvatierra v. CA On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed
GR 107797, 26 August 1996 (261 SCRA 45) the decision, ruling that a vendor can sell
First Division, Hermosisima (p): 3 concur, 1 only what he owns or what he is authorized
on leave to sell; and as to the co-owner of a piece of
land, he can of course sell his pro indiviso
Facts: In 1930, Enrique Salvatierra died
share therein to, but he cannot sell more
intestate and without any issue. He was
than his share therein. Hence, the appeal.
survived by his legitimate brothers: Tomas,
Bartolome, Venancio and Macario, and Issue: Whether Longalong is entitled to
sister Marcela, all surnamed Salvatierra. His reconveyance of the 149 square meters in
estate consisted of three parcels of land Lot 26
(Cadastral Lot 25, covered by Tax
Declaration 11950, Cadastral Lot 26, Held: When the terms of the agreement
covered by Tax Declaration 11951, and are clear and unequivocal, the literal and
Cadastral Lot 27, covered by Tax plain meaning thereof should be observed,
Declaration 11949). On 4 May 1966, pursuant to Article 1370 of the Civil Code
Macario Salvatierra sold Lot 26 to his son, (“If the terms of a contract are clear and
Anselmo Salvatierra by means of a deed of leave no doubt upon the intention of the
sale, and in consideration of P1,000.00. contracting parties, the literal meaning of
Meanwhile, Marcela sold her share to its stipulation shall control.”) Contracts
Venancio. Bartolome’s share was sold by which are the private laws of the
his heirs to Tomas. On 24 September 1968, contracting parties, should be fulfilled
10
according to the literal sense of their present case, the applicable provision of
stipulations, if their terms are clear and Republic Act 2023 speaks for itself; there
leave no room for doubt as to the intention being no ambiguity, it is to be applied. If
of the contracting parties, for contracts are the legislative intent in enacting
obligatory, no matter what their forms paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section 62 of RA
maybe, whenever the essential requisites 2023 were to give first priority in the
for their validity are present. In the present matter of payments to the obligations of
case, there is no ambiguity in the terms employees in favor of their credit unions,
and stipulations of the extrajudicial then, the law would have so expressly
partition (Extrajudicial Partition with declared. There is nothing in the provision
Confirmation of Sale). Since Macario’s share of Republic Act 2023 which provides that
(later Anselmo’s) is only 405 of the 749 obligation of laborers and employees
square meters comprising Lot 26, Venancio payable to credit unions shall enjoy first
was entitled to the remaining 344 square priority in the deduction from the
meters of Lot 26, 149 square meters of employees’ wages and salaries.
which was sold to Longalong.
Supplemented by the holding that the The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed
prescriptive period on reconveyance is ten decision, without pronouncement as to
years and not four years, as held in Caro v. costs.
CA, Longalong is entitled to reconveyance
as his complaint was filed five years after
the constitution of Anselmo’s fraudulent Abellana v. Marava [GR L-27760, 29
Original Certificate of title. May 1974]
Second Division, Fernando (p): 4 concur, 1
The Supreme Court denied the petition for
concur based on paragraph 2 & 3 of opinio
want of merit, with costs against
petitioners. Facts: Francisco Abellana was charged with
the City Court of Ozamis City with the crime
Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v.
of physical injuries through reckless
Manila Railroad Company
imprudence in driving his cargo truck,
GR L-25316, 28 February 1979 (88 SCRA
hitting a motorized pedicab resulting in
616)
injuries to its passengers, namely, Marcelo
Second Division, Fernando (p): 5 concur, 1
Lamason, Maria Gurrea, Pacienciosa Flores,
took no part
and Estelita Nemeño. Abellana was found
Facts: There are no antecedent facts guilty as charged, damages in favor of the
available for this case. offended parties likewise being awarded.

The union seeks reversal of decision of the Abellana appealed such decision to the CFI.
lower court dismissing its petition for At this stage, Lamason et.al. filed with
mandamus. The court determined Republic another branch of the CFI of Misamis
Act 2023 was enacted only to compel the Occidental a separate and independent civil
employer to make the deduction of the action for damages allegedly suffered by
employees’ debt from the latter’s salary them from the reckless driving of
and turn this over to the employees’ credit Abellana. In such complaint, Crispin
union; but which does not convert the Abellana, the alleged employer, was
credit union’s credit into a first priority included as defendant. Both of them then
credit. sought the dismissal of such action
principally on the ground that there was no
Issue: Whether, indeed, the law does not reservation for the filing thereof in the City
give first priority in the matter of payments Court of Ozamis. It was argued by them
to the obligations of employees in favor of that it was not allowable at the stage where
their credit unions. the criminal case was already on appeal.
The judge in the latter CFI ordered on 28
Held: Where the statutory norm speaks April 1967 that the City Court judgment is
unequivocally, there is nothing for the vacated and a trail de novo be conducted.
courts to do except to apply it. The law, He noted that the offended parties failed to
leaving no doubt as to the scope of its expressly waive the civil action or reserved
operation, must be obeyed. The express their right to institute it separately in the
provisions of the New Civil Code, Articles City Court; but which they filed in the CFI.
2241, 2242 and 2244 show the legislative In view of the waiver and reservation, the
intent on preference of credits. In the Court would be precluded from judging civil
11
damages against the accused and in favor prey to the vice of literalness. The law as
of the offended parties. the motion to an instrument of social control will fail in its
dismiss is denied. A motion for function if through an ingenious
reconsideration was likewise denied. construction sought to be fastened on a
Hence, the petition. legal norm, particularly a procedural rule,
there is placed an impediment to a litigant
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition being given an opportunity of vindicating
with costs against petitioners. an alleged right.

1. Appeal of judgment in municipal PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor Relations

trial court, new trial as if originally GR L-43760, 21 August 1976 (72 SCRA 396)
instituted in the CFI Second Division, Fernando (p): 4 concurring
The rule in the jurisdiction of the Court is
that upon appeal by the defendant from a Facts: In the certification election held on
judgment of conviction by the municipal February 27, 1976, respondent Union
court, the appealed decision is vacated and obtained 429 votes as against 414 of
the appealed case shall be tried in all petitioner Union. Again, admittedly, under
respects anew in the CFI as if it had been the Rules and Regulations implementing
originally instituted in that court (Section 7 the present Labor Code, a majority of the
of Rule 123, People v. Jamisola). So it is in valid votes cast suffices for certification of
civil cases under Section 9 of Rule 40. An the victorious labor union as the sole and
interpretation that an independent civil exclusive bargaining agent. There were four
action is barred absent a reservation under votes cast by employees who did not want
Section 1 of Rule 111 is a non-sequitur, as any union. On its face therefore,
the inference does not per se arise from the respondent Union ought to have been
wordings of the rule and ignores what is certified in accordance with the above
explicitly provided in Section 7, Rule 123. applicable rule. Petitioner, undeterred,
would seize upon the doctrine announced
2. A statute must not be construed in the case of Allied Workers Association of
in a manner giving rise to a the Philippines v. Court of Industrial
constitutional doubt Relations that spoiled ballots should be
A court is to avoid construing a statute or counted in determining the valid votes cast.
legal norm in such a manner as would give Considering there were seventeen spoiled
rise to a constitutional doubt. The grant of ballots, it is the submission that there was
power to the Court, both in the present a grave abuse of discretion on the part of
Constitution and under the 1935 Charter, respondent Director.
does not extend to any diminution, increase
or modification of substantive right. Thus, Issue: Whether Director Noriel acted with
substantive right cannot to be frittered grave abuse of discretion in granting NAFLU
away by a construction that could render it as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the
nugatory, if through oversight, the offended employees in the Philippine Blooming Mills
parties failed at the initial stage to seek
recovery for damages in a civil suit. Article Held: Director Noriel did not act with grave
33 of the Civil Code is quite clear when it abuse of discretion. Certiorari does not lie.
provides that in cases of . physical injuries, The conclusion reached by the Court
a civil action for damages, entirely separate derives support from the deservedly high
and distinct from the criminal action, may repute attached to the construction placed
be brought by the injured party. Such civil by the executive officials entrusted with the
action shall proceed independently of the responsibility of applying a statute. The
criminal prosecution, and shall require only Rules and Regulations implementing the
a preponderance of evidence. present Labor Code were issued by
Secretary Blas Ople of the Department of
3. Assurance of parties justice Labor and took effect on 3 February 1975,
according to law must not be ignored the present Labor Code having been made
in the pursuit of serving the interest known to the public as far back as 1 May
of a client; Construction should be 1974, although its date of effectivity was
based on legal norm, not literalness postponed to 1 November 1974,. It would
A counsel must not ignore the basic appear then that there was more than
purpose of a litigation, which is to assure enough time for a really serious and careful
parties justice according to law, in serving study of such suppletory rules and
the interest of his client. He is not to fall regulations to avoid any inconsistency with

12
the Code. This Court certainly cannot implementation of the negotiated wage
ignore the interpretation thereafter increase of P0.80 as provided for in the
embodied in the Rules. As far back as In re collective bargaining agreement. The
Allen,” a 1903 decision, Justice McDonough, company alleges that it has opted to
as ponente, cited this excerpt from the consider the P0.80 daily wage increase
leading American case of Pennoyer v. (roughly P22 per month) as partial
McConnaughy, decided in 1891: “The compliance with the requirements of PD
principle that the contemporaneous 1123, so that it is obliged to pay only the
construction of a statute by the executive balance of P38 per month, contending that
officers of the government, whose duty it is that since there was already a meeting of
to execute it, is entitled to great respect, the minds between the parties as early as 2
and should ordinarily control the April 1977 about the wage increases which
construction of the statute by the courts, is were made retroactive to 1 April 1977, it
so firmly embedded in our jurisprudence fell well within the exemption provided for
that no authorities need be cited to support in the Rules Implementing PD 1123. The
it.” There was a paraphrase by Justice Union, on the other hand, maintains that
Malcolm of such a pronouncement in Molina the living allowance under PD 1123
v. Rafferty,” a 1918 decision: “Courts will (originally PD 525) is distinct from the
and should respect the contemporaneous negotiated daily wage increase of P0.80.
construction placed upon a statute by the
executive officers whose duty it is to On 13 February 1978, the Union filed a
enforce it, and unless such interpretation is complaint for unfair labor practice and
clearly erroneous will ordinarily be violation of the CBA against the company.
controlled thereby.” Since then, such a On 30 May 1978, an Order was issued by
doctrine has been reiterated in numerous the Labor Arbiter dismissing the complaint
decisions. As was emphasized by Chief and referred the case to the parties to
Justice Castro, “the construction placed by resolve their disputes in accordance with
the office charged with implementing and the machinery established in the Collective
enforcing the provisions of a Code should Bargaining Agreement. From this order,
he given controlling weight.” both parties appealed to the Commission.
On 1 September 1978, the Commission
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, (Second Division) promulgated its decision,
with costs against petitioner PAFLU. setting aside the order appealed from and
entering a new one dismissing the case for
Philippine Apparel Workers’ Union v. obvious lack of merit, relying on a letter of
NLRC the Undersecretary of Labor that
GR L-50320, 31 July 1981 (105 SCRA 444) agreement between the parties was made
First Division, Makasiar (p): 3 concurring 2 April 1977 granting P27 per month
retroactive to 1 April 1977 which was
Facts: In anticipation of the expiration of squarely under the exceptions provided for
their 1973-1976 collective bargaining in paragraph k of the rules implementing
agreement, the Union submitted a set of PD 1123. The union filed for
bargaining proposals to the company. reconsideration, but the Commission en
Negotiations were held thereafter, but due banc dismissed the same on 8 February
to the impasse, the Union filed a complaint 1979. Hence, the petition.
with the Department of Labor praying that
the parties be assisted in concluding a Issue: Whether the Commission was
collective agreement. Notwithstanding the correct in determining the agreement falls
complaint, the parties continued with under the exceptions.
negotiations. Finally, on 3 September 1977,
the parties signed the agreement providing Held: The collective bargaining agreement
for a three-stage wage increase for all rank was entered into on 3 September1977,
and file employees, retroactive to 1April when PD 1123 was already in force and
1977. Meanwhile, on 21 April 1977, effect, although the increase on the first
Presidential Decree 1123 was enacted to year was retroactive to 1 April 1977. There
take effect on 1 May 1977 providing for an is nothing in the records that the
increase by P60.00 in the living allowance negotiated wage increases were granted or
ordained by Presidential Decree 525. This paid before May 1977, to allow the
increase was implemented effective 1 May company to fall within the exceptions
1977 by the company. The controversy provided for in paragraph k of the rules
arose when the petitioner union sought the implementing PD 1123. There was neither a
13
perfected contract nor an actual payment certified for arbitration on 7 July 1975. On
of said increase. There was no grant of said 25 August 1975, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T.
increases yet, despite the contrary opinion Soriano rendered a decision in the above-
expressed in the letter of the entitled case, granting petitioner’s
Undersecretary of Labor. It must be noted complaint for payment of holiday pay.
that the letter was based on a wrong Respondent bank did not appeal from the
premise or representation on the part of said decision. Instead, it complied with the
the company. The company had declared order of the Labor Arbiter by paying their
that the parties have agreed on 2 April holiday pay up to and including January
1977 in recognition of the imperative need 1976.
for employees to cope up with inflation
brought about by, among others, another On 16 December 1975, Presidential Decree
increase in oil price, but omitting the fact 850 was promulgated amending, among
that negotiations were still being held on others, the provisions of the Labor Code on
other unresolved economic and non- the right to holiday pay. Accordingly, on 16
economic bargaining items (which were February 1976, by authority of Article 5 of
only agreed upon on 3 September 1977). the same Code, the Department of Labor
(now Ministry of Labor) promulgated the
The Department of Labor had the right to rules and regulations for the
construe the word “grant” as used in its implementation of holidays with pay. The
rules implementing PD 1123, and its controversial section thereof reads as
explanation regarding the exemptions to PD “Status of employees paid by the month. —
1123 should be given weight; but, when it Employees who are uniformly paid by the
is based on misrepresentations as to the month, irrespective of the number of
existence of an agreement between the working days therein, with a salary of not
parties, the same cannot be applied. There less than the statutory or established
is no distinction between interpretation and minimum wage shall be presumed to be
explaining the extent and scope of the law; paid for all days in the month whether
because where one explains the intent and worked or not.” On 23 April 1976, Policy
scope of a statute, he is interpreting it. Instruction 9 was issued by the then
Thus, the construction or explanation of Secretary of Labor (now Minister)
Labor Undersecretary is not only wrong as interpreting the above-quoted rule. The
it was purely based on a misapprehension bank, by reason of the ruling laid down by
of facts, but also unlawful because it goes the rule implementing Article 94 of the
beyond the scope of the law. Labor Code and by Policy Instruction 9,
stopped the payment of holiday pay to an
The writ of certiorari was granted. The its employees.
Supreme Court set aside the decision of the
commission, and ordered the company to On 30 August 1976, the Union filed a
pay, in addition to the increased allowance motion for a writ of execution to enforce
provided for in PD 1123, the negotiated the arbiter’s decision of 25 August 1975,
wage increase of P0.80 daily effective 1 which the bank opposed. On 18 October
April 1977 as well as all other wage 1976, the Labor Arbiter, instead of issuing a
increases embodied in the Collective writ of execution, issued an order enjoining
Bargaining Agreement, to all covered the bank to continue paying its employees
employees; with costs against the their regular holiday pay. On 17 November
company. 1976, the bank appealed from the order of
the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. On 20 June
IBAA Employees Union v. Inciong 1978, the NLRC promulgated its resolution
GR L52415, 23 October 1984 (132 SCRA en banc dismissing the bank’s appeal, and
663) ordering the issuance of the proper writ of
Second Division, Makasiar (p): 3 concur, 2 execution. On 21 February 1979, the bank
concur in result, 1 took no part filed with the Office of the Minister of Labor
a motion for reconsideration/appeal with
Facts: On June 20, 1975, the Union filed a
urgent prayer to stay execution. On 13
complaint against the bank for the payment
August 1979,s the NLRC issued an order
of holiday pay before the then Department
directing the Chief of Research and
of Labor, National Labor Relations
Information of the Commission to compute
Commission, Regional Office IV in Manila.
the holiday pay of the IBAA employees from
Conciliation having failed, and upon the
April 1976 to the present in accordance
request of both parties, the case was
with the Labor Arbiter dated 25 August
14
1975. On 10 November 1979, the Office of Chartered Bank Employees Association
the Minister of Labor, through Deputy v. Ople
Minister Amado G. Inciong, issued an order GR L-44717, 28 August 1985 (138 SCRA
setting aside the resolution en banc of the 273)
NLRC dated 20 June 1978, and dismissing En Banc, Gutierrez, Jr. (p): 10 concur, 1
the case for lack of merit. Hence, the concur in result, 1 took no part, 1 on leave
petition for certiorari charging Inciong with
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or Facts: On 20 May 1975, the Chartered
excess of jurisdiction. Bank Employees Association, in
representation of its monthly paid
Issue: Whether the Ministry of Labor is employees/members, instituted a
correct in determining that monthly paid complaint with the Regional Office IV,
employees are excluded from the benefits Department of Labor, now Ministry of Labor
of holiday pay. and Employment (MOLE) against Chartered
Bank, for the payment of 10 unworked legal
Held: From Article 92 of the Labor Code, as holidays, as well as for premium and
amended by Presidential Decree 850, and overtime differentials for worked legal
Article 82 of the same Code, it is clear that holidays from 1 November 1974.
monthly paid employees are not excluded
from the benefits of holiday pay. However, Both the arbitrator and the National Labor
the implementing rules on holiday pay Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled in favor
promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor of the petitioners ordering the bank to pay
excludes monthly paid employees from the its monthly paid employees the holiday pay
said benefits by inserting, under Rule IV, and the premium or overtime pay
Book Ill of the implementing rules, Section differentials to all employees who rendered
2, which provides that: “employees who are work during said legal holidays.
uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of
the number of working days therein, with a On appeal, the Minister of Labor set aside
salary of not less than the statutory or the decision of the NLRC and dismissed the
established minimum wage shall be petitioner’s claim for lack of merit basing
presumed to be paid for all days in the its decision on Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of
month whether worked or not.” Even if the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction
contemporaneous construction placed upon 9, claiming the rule that “If the monthly
a statute by executive officers whose duty paid employee is receiving not less than
is to enforce it is given great weight by the P240, the maximum monthly minimum
courts, still if such construction is so wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from
erroneous, the same must be declared as January to December, he is presumed to be
null and void. So long, as the regulations already paid the 10 paid legal holidays.
relate solely to carrying into effect the However, if deductions are made from his
provisions of the law, they are valid. Where monthly salary on account of holidays in
an administrative order betrays months where they occur, then he is still
inconsistency or repugnancy to the entitled to the 10 paid legal holidays.”
provisions of the Act, the mandate of the
Act must prevail and must be followed. A Issue: Whether the Ministry of Labor is
rule is binding on the Courts so long as the correct in maintaining that monthly paid
procedure fixed for its promulgation is employees are not entitled to the holiday
followed and its scope is within the pay nor all employees who rendered work
statutory authority granted by the during said legal holidays are entitled to
legislature, even if the courts are not in the premium or overtime pay differentials.
agreement with the policy stated therein or
Held: When the language of the law is
its innate wisdom. Further, administrative
clear and unequivocal the law must be
interpretation of the law is at best merely
taken to mean exactly what it says. An
advisory, for it is the courts that finally
administrative interpretation, which
determine what the law means.
diminishes the benefits of labor more than
The Supreme Court granted the petition, what the statute delimits or withholds, is
set aside the order of the Deputy Minister obviously ultra vires. In the present case,
of Labor, and reinstated the 25 August the provisions of the Labor Code on the
1975 decision of the Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay
Soriano. are clear and explicit, it provides for both
the coverage of and exclusion from the

15
benefit. In Policy Instruction 9, the of other media of remuneration. All these
Secretary of Labor went as far as to will comprise the Employee’s remuneration
categorically state that the benefit is or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-
principally intended for daily paid 1/2% contributions will be based, up to a
employees, when the law clearly states maximum of P500 for any one month.”
that every worker shall be paid their regular Upon receipt of a copy thereof, Victorias
holiday pay. Milling Company, Inc., wrote the SSC in
effect protesting against the circular as
While it is true that the contemporaneous contradictory to a previous Circular 7 (7
construction placed upon a statute by October 1957) , and further questioned the
executive officers whose duty is to enforce validity of the circular for lack of authority
it should be given great weight by the on the part of the SSC to promulgate it
courts, still if such construction is so without the approval of the President and
erroneous, the same must be declared as for lack of publication in the Official
null and void. It is the role of the Judiciary Gazette. Overruling these objections, the
to refine and, when necessary, correct SSC ruled that Circular 22 is not a rule or
constitutional (and/or statutory) regulation that needed the approval of the
interpretation, in the context of the President and publication in the Official
interactions of the three branches of the Gazette to be effective, but a mere
government, almost always in situations administrative interpretation of the statute,
where some agency of the State has a mere statement of general policy or
engaged in action that stems ultimately opinion as to how the law should be
from some legitimate area of governmental construed. Not satisfied with this ruling,
power. Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the petitioner comes to the Supreme Court on
Rules to implement the Labor Code and appeal.
Policy Instruction was declared null and
void in IBAAEU v. Inciong, and thus applies Issue: Whether Circular 22 is a rule or
in the case at bar. Since the private regulation.
respondent premises its action on the
invalidated rule and policy instruction, it is Held: There is a distinction between an
clear that the employees belonging to the administrative rule or regulation and an
petitioner association are entitled to the administrative interpretation of a law
payment of 10 legal holidays under Articles whose enforcement is entrusted to an
82 and 94 of the Labor Code, aside from administrative body. When an
their monthly salary. They are not among administrative agency promulgates rules
those excluded by law from the benefits of and regulations, it “makes” a new law with
such holiday pay the force and effect of a valid law, while
when it renders an opinion or gives a
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside statement of policy, it merely interprets a
the Labor Minister’s 7 September 1976 pre-existing law Rules and regulations when
order, and reinstated with modification promulgated in pursuance of the procedure
(deleting the interest payments) the 24 or authority conferred upon the
March 1976 decision of the NLRC affirming administrative agency by law, partake of
the 30 October 1975 resolution of the Labor the nature of a statute, and compliance
Arbiter. therewith may be enforced by a penal
sanction provided in the law. This is so
because statutes are usually couched in
general terms, after expressing the policy,
Victorias Milling v. Social Security purposes, objectives, remedies and
Commission sanctions intended by the legislature. The
GR L-16704, 17 March 1962 (4 SCRA 627) details and the manner of carrying out the
En Banc, Barrera (p): 9 concurring law are often times left to the
administrative agency entrusted with its
Facts: On 15 October 1958, the Social
enforcement. In this sense, it has been said
Security Commission (SSC) issued its
that rules and regulations are the product
Circular 22 providing that “effective 1
of a delegated power to create new or
November 1958, all employers in
additional legal provisions that have the
computing the premiums due the System,
effect of law. A rule is binding on the courts
will take into consideration and include in
so long as the procedure fixed for its
the Employee’s remuneration all bonuses
promulgation is followed and its scope is
and overtime pay, as well as the cash value
within the statutory authority granted by
16
the legislature, even if the courts are not in confirmation, and thus, the latter is entitled
agreement with the policy stated therein or the full authority and functions of the office
its innate wisdom On the other hand, and receive all the salaries and
administrative interpretation of the law is at emoluments pertaining thereto. Thus, the
best merely advisory, for it is the courts Supreme Court dismissed the petition and
that finally determine what the law means. the petition in intervention, without costs.

While it is true that terms or words are to 1. Standing to file suit / Prohibition
be interpreted in accordance with their as proper remedy: Procedural
well-accepted meaning in law, questions set aside due to demands of
nevertheless, when such term or word is public interest
specifically defined in a particular law, such Because of the demands of public interest,
interpretation must be adopted in enforcing including the need for stability in the public
that particular law, for it can not be service, the Court resolved to give due
gainsaid that a particular phrase or term course to the petition and decide, setting
may have one meaning for one purpose aside the finer procedural questions of
and another meaning for some other whether prohibition is the proper remedy to
purpose. RA 1161 specifically defined what test Mison’s right to the office of
“compensation” should mean “For the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
purposes of this Act”. RA1792 amended and of whether the petitioners have a
such definition by deleting some exceptions standing to bring this suit.
authorized in the original Act. By virtue of
this express substantial change in the 2. Constitutional Construction
phraseology of the law, whatever prior The fundamental principle of constitutional
executive or judicial construction may have construction is to give effect to the intent of
been given to the phrase in question should the framers of the organic law and of the
give way to the clear mandate of the new people adopting it. The intention to which
law. force is to be given is that which is
embodied and expressed in the
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed constitutional provisions themselves. (Gold
resolution, with costs against appellant. Creek Mining v. Rodriguez) The Court will
thus construe the applicable constitutional
provisions, not in accordance with how the
executive or the legislative department
Sarmiento v. Mison [GR L-79974, 17 may want them construed, but in
December 1987] accordance with what they say and
En Banc, Padilla (p): 8 concur provide.
Facts: Petitioners, who are taxpayers, 3. President’s power to appoint
lawyers, members of the IBP and professors Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin Constitution empowers the President to
Salvador Mison from performing the appoint 4 groups of officers: (1) the heads
functions of the Office of Commissioner of of the executive departments,
the Bureau of Customs and Guillermo ambassadors, other public ministers and
Carague, as Secretary of the Department of consuls, officers of the armed forces from
Budget, from effecting disbursements in the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
payment of Mison’s salaries and other officers whose appointments are
emoluments, on the ground that Mison’s vested in him in this Constitution; (2) all
appointment as Commissioner of the other officers of the Government whose
Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by appointments are not otherwise provided
reason of its not having been confirmed by for by law; (3) those whom the President
the Commission on Appointments. The may be authorized by law to appoint; and
respondents, on the other hand, maintain (4) officers lower in rank 4 whose
the constitutionality of Mison’s appointment appointments the Congress may by law
without the confirmation of the Commission vest in the President alone. The first group
on Appointments. is clearly appointed with the consent of the
The Supreme Court held that the President Commission on Appointments.
has the authority to appoint Mison as Appointments of such officers are initiated
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by nomination and, if the nomination is
without submitting his nomination to the confirmed by the Commission on
Commission on Appointments for Appointments, the President appoints. The
17
second and third groups of officers can be 6. Construction of “also” in second
made by the President without the consent sentence; consideration of different
(confirmation) of the Commission on language of proximate sentences to
Appointments, as can be determined determine meaning
through the recorded proceedings of The word “also” could mean “in addition; as
Constitutional Commission. well; besides, too” besides “in like manner”
which meanings could stress that the word
4. Express enumeration excludes “also” in said second sentence means that
others not enumerated the President, in addition to nominating
It is an accepted rule in constitutional and and, with the consent of the Commission on
statutory construction that an express Appointments, appointing the officers
enumeration of subjects excludes others enumerated in the first sentence, can
not enumerated. In the case at bar, it would appoint (without such consent or
follow that only those appointments to confirmation) the officers mentioned in the
positions expressly stated in the first group second sentence, contrary to the
require the consent (confirmation) of the interpretation that the President shall
Commission on Appointments. appoint the officers mentioned in said
second sentence in the same manner as he
5. Constitutional provision presumed appoints officers mentioned in the first
to have been framed and adopted in sentence. Rather than limit the area of
light of prior laws consideration to the possible meanings of
A constitutional provision must be the word “also” as used in the context of
presumed to have been framed and said second sentence, the Court has chosen
adopted in the light and understanding of to derive significance from the fact that the
prior and existing laws and with reference first sentence speaks of nomination by the
to them. Courts are bound to presume that President and appointment by the President
the people adopting a constitution are with the consent of the Commission on
familiar with the previous and existing laws Appointments, whereas, the second
upon the subjects to which its provisions sentence speaks only of appointment by
relate, and upon which they express their the President. And, this use of different
judgment and opinion in its adoption. In the language in 2 sentences proximate to each
1935 Constitution, almost all presidential other underscores a difference in message
appointments required the consent conveyed and perceptions established.
(confirmation) of the Commission on Thus, words are not pebbles in alien
Appointments. Under the 1935 juxtaposition.
Constitution, the commission was
frequently transformed into a venue of 7. Power to appoint fundamentally
“horse-trading” and similar malpractices. executive in character; Limitations
On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, construed strictly
consistent with the authoritarian pattern in The power to appoint is fundamentally
which it was molded and remolded by executive or presidential in character.
successive amendments, placed the Limitations on or qualifications of such
absolute power of appointment in the power should be strictly construed. Such
President with hardly any check on the part limitations or qualifications must be clearly
of the legislature. Given the above two in stated in order to be recognized. In the
extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution case at bar, the first sentence of Sec. 16,
and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is Art. VII clearly stated that appointments by
not difficult for the Court to state that the the President to the positions therein
framers of the 1987 Constitution and the enumerated require the consent of the
people adopting it, struck a “middle Commission on Appointments.
ground” by requiring the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on 8. The use of word “alone” after
Appointments for the first group of “President” in third sentence is a
appointments and leaving to the President, lapse in draftsmanship, a literal
without such confirmation, the appointment import deemed redundant
of other officers, i.e., those in the second After a careful study of the deliberations of
and third groups as well as those in the the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the
fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank. The Court found the use of the word “alone”
proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional after the word “President” in said third
Commission support this conclusion. sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more
than anything else, a slip or lapsus in
18
draftmanship. In the 1987 Constitution, the Bureau of Customs. After the effectivity of
clear and expressed intent of its framers the 1987 Constitution, however, RA 1937
was to exclude presidential appointments and PD 34 have to be read in harmony with
from confirmation by the Commission on Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while
Appointments, except appointments to the appointment of the Commissioner of
offices expressly mentioned in the first the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves
sentence. Consequently, there was no on the President, as an appointment he is
reason to use in the third sentence the authorized by law to make, such
word “alone” after the word “President” in appointment, however, no longer needs the
providing that Congress may by law vest confirmation of the Commission on
the appointment of lower-ranked officers in Appointments.
the President alone, or in the courts, or in
the heads of departments, because the Perfecto v. Meer
power to appoint officers whom the GR L-2348, 27 February 1950 (85 Phil 552)
President may be authorized by law to First Division, Bengzon (p): 8 concur.
appoint is already vested in him, without
Facts: The 1935 Constitution provides in its
need of confirmation by the Commission on
Article VIII, Section 9, that the members of
Appointments, in the second sentence. The
the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior
word “alone” in the third sentence, as a
courts “shall receive such compensation as
literal import from the last part of par. 3,
may be fixed by law, which shall not be
section 10, Article VII of the 1935
diminished during their continuance in
Constitution, appears to be redundant in
office”. It also provides that “until Congress
the light of the second sentence. This
shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of
redundancy cannot prevail over the clear
the Supreme Court shall receive an annual
and positive intent of the framers of the
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos,
1987 Constitution that presidential
and each Associate Justice, fifteen
appointments, except those mentioned in
thousand pesos”. When Justice Perfecto
the first sentence, are not subject to
assumed office, Congress had not
confirmation by the Commission on
“provided otherwise”, by fixing a different
Appointments.
salary for associate justices. He received
9. President authorized salary at the rate provided by the
Commissioner of Bureau of Customs; Constitution, i.e., fifteen thousand pesos a
Commissioner not included with the year.
first group of appointment
The Collector of Internal Revenue required
The position of Commissioner of the Bureau
Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax
of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of
upon his salary as member of the judiciary.
those within the first group of appointments
The latter paid the amount under protest.
where the consent of the Commission on
He contended that the assessment was
Appointments is required. The 1987
illegal, his salary not being taxable for the
Constitution deliberately excluded the
reason that imposition of taxes thereon
position of “heads of bureaus” from
would reduce it in violation of the
appointments that need the consent
Constitution.
(confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments. Moreover, the President is Issue: Whether the imposition of an
expressly authorized by law to appoint the income tax upon the salary of a member of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs the Judiciary amount to a diminution
(RA 1937, Tarifff and Customs Code of the thereof., and thus violate the Constitution.
Philippines, Section 601, as amended by
PD34 on 27 October 1972). Held: The imposition of an income tax
upon the salary of a member of the
10. Laws approved during the judiciary amounts to a diminution thereof.
effectivity of previous constitution If said imposition would not be considered
must be read in harmony with the new as a diminution, it would appear that, in the
one matter of compensation and power and
RA 1937 and PD 34 were approved during need of security, the judiciary is on a par
the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, with the Executive. Such assumption
under which the President may nominate certainly ignores the prevailing state of
and, with the consent of the Commission on affairs. Further, the Constitution provides
Appointments, appoint the heads of that judges shall hold their offices during
bureaus, like the Commissioner of the good behavior, and shall at stated times
19
receive for their services a compensation and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
which shall not be diminished during their respectively. The lower court held that
continuance in office. Thus, next to under the doctrine laid down in the case of
permanency in office, nothing can Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the
contribute more to the independence of the collection of income taxes from the salaries
judges than a fixed provision for their of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a
support. In the general course of human diminution of their compensation and
nature, a power over a man’s subsistence therefore was in violation of the
amounts to a power over his will. The Constitution of the Philippines, and so
independence of the judges as of far ordered the refund of said taxes.
greater importance than any revenue that Respondent, through the Solicitor General
could come from taxing their salaries. contended that the collection was done
pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act 590
Exemption of the judicial salary from which Congress enacted to authorize and
reduction by taxation is not really a gratuity legalize the collection of income tax on the
or privilege. It is essentially and primarily salaries of judicial officers, if not to
compensation based upon valuable counteract the ruling on the Perfecto Case.
consideration. The covenant on the part of
the government is a guaranty whose Issue: Whether the Legislature may
fulfillment is as much as part of the lawfully declare the collection of income tax
consideration agreed as is the money on the salary of a public official, specially a
salary. The undertaking has its own judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary,
particular value to the citizens in securing after the Supreme Court has found and
the independence of the judiciary in crises; decided otherwise.
and in the establishment of the
compensation upon a permanent Held: The Legislature cannot lawfully
foundation whereby judicial preferment declare the collection of income tax on the
may be prudently accepted by those who salary of a public official, specially a judicial
are qualified by talent, knowledge, integrity officer, not a decrease of his salary, after
and capacity, but are not possessed of such the Supreme Court has found and decided
a private fortune as to make an assured otherwise. The interpretation and
salary an object of personal concern. On application of the Constitution and of
the other hand, the members of the statutes is within the exclusive province
judiciary relinquish their position at the bar, and jurisdiction of the judicial department,
with all its professional emoluments, sever and that in enacting a law, the Legislature
their connection with their clients, and may not legally provide therein that it be
dedicate themselves exclusively to the interpreted in such a way that it may not
discharge of the onerous duties of their violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby
high office. So, it is irrefutable that the tying the hands of the courts in their task of
guaranty against a reduction of salary by later interpreting said statute, specially
the imposition of a tax is not an exemption when the interpretation sought and
from taxation in the sense of freedom from provided in said statute runs counter to a
a burden or service to which others are previous interpretation already given in a
liable. The exemption for a public purpose case by the highest court of the land. In the
or a valid consideration is merely a nominal case at bar, Section 13 of Republic Act 590
exemption, since the valid and full interpreted or ascertained the meaning of
consideration or the public purpose the phrase “which shall not be diminished
promoted is received in the place of the during their continuance in office,” found in
tax. section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution,
referring to the salaries of judicial officers.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. This act of interpreting the Constitution or
any part thereof by the Legislature is an
Endencia v. David invasion of the well-defined and established
GR L-6355-56, 31 August 1953 (93 Phil province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
696) The Legislature under our form of
En Banc, Montemayor (p): 6 concur government is assigned the task and the
power to make and enact laws, but not to
Facts: Saturnino David, as a Collector of interpret them. This is more true with
Internal Revenue collected income taxes regard to the interpretation of the basic
from Justices Endencia and Jugo, as law, the Constitution, which is not within
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals the sphere of the Legislative department.
20
Allowing the legislature to interpret the law the issue through judicial pronouncement,
would bring confusion and instability in even if it had dealt with the matter
judicial processes and court decisions. administratively.

Further, under the Philippine system of Issue: Whether the intention of the
constitutional government, the Legislative framers of the 1987 Constitution is to
department is assigned the power to make exempt justices and judges from taxes as it
and enact laws. The Executive department was in the 1935 Constitution.
is charged with the execution or carrying
out of the provisions of said laws. But the Held: The ascertainment of the intent is
interpretation and application of said laws but in keeping with the fundamental
belong exclusively to the Judicial principle of constitutional construction that
department. And this authority to interpret the intent of the framers of the organic law
and apply the laws extends to the and of the people adopting it should be
Constitution. Before the courts can given effect. The primary task in
determine whether a law is constitutional or constitutional construction is to ascertain
not, it will have to interpret and ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
the meaning not only of said law, but also purpose of the framers and of the people in
of the pertinent portion of the Constitution the adoption of the Constitution. It may
in order to decide whether there is a also be safely assumed that the people in
conflict between the two, because if there ratifying the Constitution were guided
is, then the law will have to give way and mainly by the explanation offered by the
has to be declared invalid and framers. In the present case, Section 10,
unconstitutional. Therefore, the doctrine Article VIII is plain that the Constitution
laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing
to the effect that the collection of income another rate of compensation of Justices
tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a and Judges but such rate must be higher
diminution thereof and so violates the than that which they are receiving at the
Constitution, is reiterated. time of enactment, or if lower, it would be
applicable only to those appointed after its
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, approval. It would be a strained
affirming the ruling in Perferto v. Meer and construction to read into the provision an
holding the interpretation and application exemption from taxation in the light of the
of laws belong to the Judiciary. discussion in the Constitutional
Commission. Thus, the debates,
Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal interpolations and opinions expressed
Revenue (Resolution) regarding the constitutional provision in
GR L-78780, 23 July 1987 question until it was finally approved by the
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 12 concur, 1 Commission disclosed that the true intent
on leave of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in
adopting it, was to make the salaries of
Facts: The Chief Justice has previously members of the Judiciary taxable.
issued a directive to the Fiscal Management
and Budget Office to continue the The Supreme Court dismissed the petition
deduction of withholding taxes from for prohibition.
salaries of the Justices of the Supreme
Court and other members of the judiciary. Aglipay v. Ruiz
This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)
banc on 4 December 1987. First Division, Laurel (p): 5 concur.

Petitioners are the duly appointed and Facts: In May 1936, the Director of Posts
qualified Judges presiding over Branches announced in the dailies of Manila that he
52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the RTC, would order the issuance of postage
National Capital Judicial Region, all with stamps commemorating the celebration in
stations in Manila. They seek to prohibit the City of Manila of the 33rd International
and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner Eucharistic Congress, organized by the
of Internal Revenue and the Financial Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner,
Officer of the Supreme Court, from making Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of
any deduction of withholding taxes from the Philippine Independent Church, in the
their salaries. With the filing of the fulfillment of what he considers to be a
petition, the Court deemed it best to settle civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq.,

21
member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce of the issuing of the stamps was to take
the matter to the President of the advantage of an event considered of
Philippines. In spite of the protest of the international importance to give publicity to
petitioner’s attorney, the Director of Posts the Philippines and its people and attract
publicly announced having sent to the more tourists to the country. Thus, instead
United States the designs of the postage of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp
for printing. The said stamps were actually contained a map of the Philippines, the
issued and sold though the greater part location of the City of Manila, and an
thereof remained unsold. The further sale inscription that reads “Seat XXXIII
of the stamps was sought to be prevented International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,
by the petitioner. 1937.”

Issue: Whether the issuance of the The Supreme Court denied the petition for
postage stamps was in violation of the a writ of prohibition, without
Constitution. pronouncement as to costs.

Held: Religious freedom as a constitutional Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

mandate is not inhibition of profound GR 122156, 3 February 1997
reverence for religion and is not a denial of En banc, Bellosillo (p): 6 concur, others
its influence in human affairs. Religion as a dissent
profession of faith to an active power that
binds and elevates man to his Creator is Facts: The Government Service Insurance
recognized. And, in so far as it instills into System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization
the minds the purest principles of morality, program of the Philippine Government
its influence is deeply felt and highly under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December
appreciated. When the Filipino people, in 1986, decided to sell through public bidding
the preamble of their Constitution, implored 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding
“the aid of Divine Providence, in order to shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close
establish a government that shall embody bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
their ideals, conserve and develop the two bidders participated: Manila Prince
patrimony of the nation, promote the Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation,
general welfare, and secure to themselves which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
and their posterity the blessings of 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and
independence under a regime of justice, Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
liberty and democracy,” they thereby Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for
manifested their intense religious nature the same number of shares at P44.00 per
and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
who guides the destinies of men and petitioner. Pending the declaration of
nations. The elevating influence of religion Renong Berhard as the winning
in human society is recognized here as bidder/strategic partner and the execution
elsewhere. of the necessary contracts, the Manila
Prince Hotel matched the bid price of
Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose P44.00 per share tendered by Renong
in view. What it gives the Director of Posts Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28
is the discretionary power to determine September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a
when the issuance of special postage manager’s check to the GSIS in a
stamps would be “advantageous to the subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused
Government.” Of course, the phrase to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps
“advantageous to the Government” does apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the
not authorize the violation of the tender of the matching bid and that the
Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened
apply of public money or property for the by GSIS and consummated with Renong
use, benefit or support of a particular sect Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the
or church. In the case at bar, the issuance Court on prohibition and mandamus.
of the postage stamps was not inspired by
any sectarian feeling to favor a particular Issue(s):
church or religious denominations. The
stamps were not issued and sold for the  Whe
benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor ther
were money derived from the sale of the the
stamps given to that church. The purpose provisi

22
 ons of not necessarily an indication that it was not
the intended to be self-executing. The rule is
Constit that a self-executing provision of the
ution, constitution does not necessarily exhaust
particul legislative power on the subject, but any
arly legislation must be in harmony with the
Article constitution, further the exercise of
XII constitutional right and make it more
Section available. Subsequent legislation however
10, are does not necessarily mean that the subject
self- constitutional provision is not, by itself,
executi fully enforceable. As against constitutions
ng. of the past, modern constitutions have
 Whe been generally drafted upon a different
ther principle and have often become in effect
the extensive codes of laws intended to
51% operate directly upon the people in a
share manner similar to that of statutory
is part enactments, and the function of
of the constitutional conventions has evolved into
nationa one more like that of a legislative body.
l Hence, unless it is expressly provided that
patrim a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
ony. constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution
Held: A provision which lays down a are self-executing. If the constitutional
general principle, such as those found in provisions are treated as requiring
Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually legislation instead of self-executing, the
not self-executing. But a provision which is legislature would have the power to ignore
complete in itself and becomes operative and practically nullify the mandate of the
without the aid of supplementary or fundamental law. In fine, Section 10,
enabling legislation, or that which supplies second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987
sufficient rule by means of which the right Constitution is a mandatory, positive
it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is command which is complete in itself and
self-executing. Thus a constitutional which needs no further guidelines or
provision is self-executing if the nature and implementing laws or rules for its
extent of the right conferred and the enforcement. From its very words the
liability imposed are fixed by the provision does not require any legislation to
constitution itself, so that they can be put it in operation.
determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term
language indicating that the subject is patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
referred to the legislature for action. In self- Constitution speaks of national patrimony,
executing constitutional provisions, the it refers not only to the natural resources of
legislature may still enact legislation to the Philippines, as the Constitution could
facilitate the exercise of powers directly have very well used the term natural
granted by the constitution, further the resources, but also to the cultural heritage
operation of such a provision, prescribe a of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipino’s
practice to be used for its enforcement, intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In
provide a convenient remedy for the the present case, Manila Hotel has become
protection of the rights secured or the a landmark, a living testimonial of
determination thereof, or place reasonable Philippine heritage. While it was
safeguards around the exercise of the right. restrictively an American hotel when it first
The mere fact that legislation may opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it
supplement and add to or prescribe a has since then become the venue of
penalty for the violation of a self-executing various significant events which have
constitutional provision does not render shaped Philippine history. In the granting of
such a provision ineffective in the absence economic rights, privileges, and
of such legislation. The omission from a concessions, especially on matters
constitution of any express provision for a involving national patrimony, when a
remedy for enforcing a right or liability is choice has to be made between a “qualified
23
foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,” the day following its publication — but not
latter shall be chosen over the former. when the law itself provides for the date
when it goes into effect. This is correct
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws
Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee with the fact of publication. Article 2
on Privatization and the Office of the however, considered in the light of other
Government Corporate Counsel to cease statutes applicable to the issue does not
and desist from selling 51% of the Share of preclude the requirement of publication in
the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to accept the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at provides for the date of its effectivity. The
P44 per shere and thereafter execute the clear object of the such provision is to give
necessary agreements and document to the general public adequate notice of the
effect the sale, to issue the necessary various laws which are to regulate their
clearances and to do such other acts and actions and conduct as citizens. Without
deeds as may be necessary for the such notice and publication, there would be
purpose. no basis for the application of the maxim
“ignorantia legis non excusat.” It would be
Tanada v. Tuvera the height of injustice to punish or
GR L-63915, 24 April 1985 (136 SCRA 27) otherwise burden a citizen for the
En Banc, Escolin (p): 1 concur, 2 concur transgression of a law of which he had no
with reservation, 1 took no part, 1 on leave notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one. Further, publication is necessary to
Facts: Invoking the people’s right to be
apprise the public of the contents of
informed on matters of public concern
regulations and make the said penalties
(Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine
binding on the persons affected thereby. In
Constitution) as well as the principle that
the present case, Presidential issuances of
laws to be valid and enforceable must be
general application, which have not been
published in the Official Gazette or
published, shall have no force and effect.
otherwise effectively promulgated,
The implementation/enforcement of
petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
presidential decrees prior to their
compel respondent public officials to
publication in the Official Gazette is an
publish, and or cause the publication in the
operative fact, which may have
Official Gazette of various presidential
consequences which cannot be justly
decrees, letters of instructions, general
ignored. The past cannot always be erased
orders, proclamations, executive orders,
by a new judicial declaration that an all-
letter of implementation and administrative
inclusive statement of a principle of
orders. They maintain that since the
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
subject of the petition concerns a public
justified.
right and its object is to compel the
performance of a public duty, they are The Supreme Court ordered the
proper parties for the petition. The respondents to publish in the Official
respondents alleged, however through the Gazette all unpublished presidential
Solicitor-General, that petitioners have no issuances which are of general application,
legal personality or standing to bring the and that unless so published, they shall
instant petition. They further contend that have no binding force and effect.
publication in the Official Gazette is not a
sine qua non requirement for the Tanada v. Tuvera (Resolution)
effectiveness of laws where the laws GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA
provide for their own effectivity dates. Thus 446)
publication is not indispensable. En Banc, Cruz (p) : 8 concurring

Issue: Whether publication is an Facts: On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed

indispensable requirement for the the necessity for the publication to the
effectivity of laws Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application,
Held: Publication in the Official Gazette is and unless so published, they shall have no
necessary in those cases where the binding force and effect. Decision was
legislation itself does not provide for its concurred only by 3 judges. Petitioners
effectivity date — for then the date of move for reconsideration / clarification of
publication is material for determining its the decision on various questions. Solicitor
date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth General avers that the motion is a request

24
for advisory opinion. February Revolution Ordinance is patterned after and based on
took place, which subsequently required Section 53, 5 paragraph 4 of Act 3992, as
the new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder amended (Revised Motor Vehicle Law). On
on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of 20 June 1964, RA 4136 (Land
the Rules of Court). Transportation and Traffic Code) became
effective. Section 63 explicitly repealed Act
Issue: Whether publication is still required 3992.
in light of the clause “unless otherwise
provided”. On 8 February 1965, Juan Augusto B.
Primicias was driving his car within
Held: The clause “unless it is otherwise Urdaneta when a member of Urdaneta’s
provided,” in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Municipal Police asked him to stop. He was
refers to the date of effectivity and not to told, upon stopping, that he had violated
the requirement of publication itself, which Municipal Ordinance 3 (S. 1964), for
cannot in any event be omitted. This clause overtaking a truck.” The policeman then
does not mean that the legislature may asked for plaintiff’s license which he
make the law effective immediately upon surrendered, and a temporary operator’s
approval, or on any other date, without its permit was issued to him. This incident took
previous publication. The legislature may in place about 200 meters away from a school
its discretion provide that the usual fifteen- building, at Barrio Nancamaliran, Urdaneta.
day period shall be shortened or extended. Thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed in
Publication requirements applies to (1) all the Municipal Court of Urdaneta against
statutes, including those of local application Primicias for violation of Ordinance 3 (S.
and private laws; (2) presidential decrees 1964).
and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative Due to the institution of the criminal case,
powers whenever the same are validly Primicias initiated an action for the
delegated by the legislature or directly annulment of said ordinance with prayer for
conferred by the Constitution; (3) the issuance of preliminary injunction for
Administrative rules and regulations for the the purpose of restraining defendants
purpose of enforcing or implementing Municipality of Urdaneta, Mayor Perez,
existing law pursuant also to a valid Police Chief Suyat, Judge Soriano and
delegation; (4) Charter of a city Patrolman Andrada from enforcing the
notwithstanding that it applies to only a ordinance. The writ was issued and Judge
portion of the national territory and directly Soriano was enjoined from further
affects only the inhabitants of that place; proceeding in the criminal case. On 29
(5) Monetary Board circulars to “fill in the June 1966, the Court of First Instance
details” of the Central Bank Act which that Lingayen held in its decision that the
body is supposed to enforce. Further, ordinance was null and void and had been
publication must be in full or it is no repealed by RA 4136. The writ of
publication at all since its purpose is to preliminary injunction against Judge
inform the public of the contents of the Soriano definite and permanent. It also
laws. restrained Perez, Suyat, and Andrada from
enforcing said ordinace throughout
The Supreme Court declared that all laws Urdaneta, ordering them to return the
as above defined shall immediately upon plaintiff’s driver’s license, and to pay the
their approval, or as soon thereafter as cost of the suit. The public officials
possible, be published in full in the Official appealed to the Supreme Court.
Gazette, to become effective only after 15
days from their publication, or on another Issue: Whether the ordinance is valid.
date specified by the legislature, in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. Held: The general rule is that a later law
prevails over an earlier law. The ordinance’s
Primicias v. Urdaneta validity should be determined vis-a-vis RA
GR L-26702, 18 October 1979 (93 SCRA 4136, the “mother statute” (not Act 3992),
462) which was in force at the time the criminal
First Division, de Castro (p): 8 concurring, 1 case was brought against Primicias.
on leave, 1 did not take part. Further, when the Municipal Council of
Urdaneta used the phrase “vehicular
Facts: On 13 March 1964, Ordinance 3 traffic” (Section 1, Ordinance) it did not
(Series of 1964) was enacted by the distinguish between passenger cars and
Municipal Council of Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
25
motor vehicles and motor trucks and buses. Auditor General of the Philippines. On 18
Considering that this is a regulatory January 1957, the Auditor General affirmed
ordinance, its clearness, definiteness and the ruling of the Auditor of the Central Bank
certainty are all the more important so that upon the ground that the importation of the
an average man should be able with due fertilizers does not fall within the scope of
care, after reading it, to understand and the exempting provisions of Section 2 of RA
ascertain whether he will incur a penalty for 601, as amended by RA 1375; and thus
particular acts or courses of conduct. Thus, affirming the decision of the Auditor,
as the Municipal Council of Urdaneta did Central Bank of the Philippines. The Central
not make any classification of its and Elizalde filed the petition for review in
thoroughfares, contrary to the explicit the Supreme Court.
requirement laid down by Section 38, RA
4136. The Ordinance refers to only one of Issue: Whether upon the importation of the
the four classifications mentioned in fertilizers are covered by the exemption
paragraph (b), Section 35. The (provided by Section 1 and 2 of Republic
classifications which must be based on Act No. 601, as amended by Republic Acts
Section 35 are necessary in view of Section 1175, 1197 and 1375).
36 which states that no provincial, city or
municipal authority shall enact or enforce Held: The law is, therefore, clear that
any ordinance or resolution specifying imported fertilizers are exempt from the
maximum allowable speeds other than payment of the 17% tax only if the same
those provided in this Act. The ordinance, were imported by planters or farmers
therefore in view of the foregoing, is void. directly or through their cooperatives. The
exemption covers exclusively fertilizers
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed imported by planters or farmers directly or
decision. through their cooperatives. The word
“directly” has been interpreted to mean
“without anything intervening”.
Consequently, an importation of fertilizers
La Carlota Sugar Central v. Jimenez made by a farmer or planter through an
GR L-12436, 31 May 1961 (2 SCRA 295) agent, other than his cooperative, is not
En Banc, Dizon (p): 10 concurring, 1 took imported directly as required by the
no part. exemption.

Facts: Sometime in September, 1955 La When the issue is whether or not the
Carlota Sugar Central, which was under the exemption from a tax imposed by law is
administration of Elizalde, imported 500 applicable, the rule is that the exempting
short tons of ammonium sulphate and 350 provision is to be construed liberally in
short tons of ammonium phosphate. When favor of the taxing authority and strictly
the fertilizers arrived in the Philippines, the against exemption from tax liability, the
Central Bank imposed 17% exchange tax result being that statutory provisions for
from the Central in accordance with the the refund of taxes are strictly construed in
provisions of Republic Act 601. On 18 favor of the State and against the taxpayer.
November 1955 the Central filed, through Exempting from the 17% tax all fertilizers
the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking imported by planters or farmers through
Corporation, a petition for the refund of the any agent other than their cooperatives,
P20,872.09 paid (the 17% tax), claiming this would be rendering useless the only
that it had imported the fertilizers exception expressly established in the case
mentioned heretofore upon request and for of fertilizers imported by planters or
the exclusive use of 5 haciendas owned farmers through their cooperatives.
and managed by Elizalde, and therefore the
importation was exempt from the 17% CIR v. CA
exchange tax in accordance with Section 2, GR 115349, 18 April 1997 (271 SCRA 605)
RA 601, as amended by RA 1375. Third Division, Panganiban (p): 4 concurring

On 2 July 1956, the Auditor of the Central Facts: Private respondent, the Ateneo de
Bank denied the petition. The Central Manila University, is a non-stock, non-profit
requested the Auditor to reconsider his educational institution with auxiliary units
ruling, but after a re-examination of all and branches all over the Philippines. One
pertinent papers the reconsideration was auxiliary unit is the Institute of Philippine
denied. The Central then appealed to the Culture (IPC), which has no legal

26
personality separate and distinct from that of
of private respondent. The IPC is a proof in
Philippine unit engaged in social science the tax
studies of Philippine society and culture. case.
Occasionally, it accepts sponsorships for its  Whe
research activities from international ther
organizations, private foundations and the
government agencies. On 8 July 1983, private
private respondent received from respon
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) a dent is
demand letter dated 3 June 1983, assessing taxable
private respondent the sum of P174,043.97 as an
for alleged deficiency contractor’s tax, and indepe
an assessment dated 27 June 1983 in the ndent
sum of P1,141,837 for alleged deficiency contrac
income tax, both for the fiscal year ended tor.
31 March 1978. Denying said tax liabilities,
private respondent sent petitioner a letter- Held: The Commissioner erred in applying
protest and subsequently filed with the the principles of tax exemption without first
latter a memorandum contesting the applying the well-settled doctrine of strict
validity of the assessments. On 17 March interpretation in the imposition of taxes. It
988, petitioner rendered a letter-decision is obviously both illogical and impractical to
canceling the assessment for deficiency determine who are exempted without first
income tax but modifying the assessment determining who are covered by the
for deficiency contractor’s tax by increasing aforesaid provision. The Commissioner
the amount due to P193,475.55. should have determined first if private
Unsatisfied, private respondent requested respondent was covered by Section 205,
for a reconsideration or reinvestigation of applying the rule of strict interpretation of
the modified assessment. laws imposing taxes and other burdens on
the populace, before asking Ateneo to
At the same time, it filed in the respondent prove its exemption therefrom, following
court a petition for review of the said letter- the rule of construction where “the tax
decision of the petitioner. While the petition exemptions are to be strictly construed
was pending before the respondent court, against the taxpayer”.
petitioner issued a final decision dated 3
August 1988 reducing the assessment for The doctrine in the interpretation of tax
deficiency contractor’s tax from laws is that a statute will not be construed
P193,475.55 to P46,516.41, exclusive of as imposing a tax unless it does so clearly,
surcharge and interest. On 12 July 1993, expressly, and unambiguously. Tax cannot
the respondent court set aside be imposed without clear and express
respondent’s decision, and canceling the words for that purpose. Accordingly, the
deficiency contractor’s tax assessment in general rule of requiring adherence to the
the amount of P46,516.41 exclusive of letter in construing statutes applies with
surcharge and interest for the fiscal year peculiar strictness to tax laws and the
ended 31 March 1978. No pronouncement provisions of a taxing act are not to be
as to cost. On 27 April 1994, Court of extended by implication.” In case of doubt,
Appeals, in CA-GR SP 31790, affirmed the such statutes are to be construed most
decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. Not in strongly against the government and in
accord with said decision, petitioner came favor of the subjects or citizens because
to Supreme Court via a petition for review. burdens are not to be imposed nor
presumed to be imposed beyond what
Issues: statutes expressly and clearly import. In the
present case, Ateneo’s Institute of
 Whe Philippine Culture never sold its services for
ther a fee to anyone or was ever engaged in a
the business apart from and independently of
private the academic purposes of the university.
respon Funds received by the Ateneo de Manila
dent University are technically not a fee. They
has the may however fall as gifts or donations
burden which are “tax-exempt” as shown by
27
private respondent’s compliance with the On 29 December 1994, MCIAA filed a
requirement of Section 123 of the National Petition of Declaratory Relief with the Cebu
Internal Revenue Code providing for the Regional Trial Court contending that the
exemption of such gifts to an educational taxing power of local government units do
institution. not extend to the levy of taxes or fees on
an instrumentality of the national
The Supreme Court denied the petition and government. It contends that by the nature
affirmed the assailed Decision of the Court of its powers and functions, it has the
of Appeals. The Court ruled that the private footing of an agency or instrumentality of
respondent is not a contractor selling its the national government; which claim the
services for a fee but an academic City rejects. On 22 March 1995, the trial
institution conducting these researches court dismissed the petition, citing that
pursuant to its commitments to education close reading of the LGC provides the
and, ultimately, to public service. For the express cancellation and withdrawal of tax
institute to have tenaciously continued exemptions of Government Owned and
operating for so long despite its Controlled Corporations. MCIAA’s motion for
accumulation of significant losses, we can reconsideration having been denied by the
only agree with both the Court of Tax trial court in its 4 May 1995 order, the
Appeals and the Court of Appeals that petitioner filed the instant petition.
“education and not profit is motive for
undertaking the research projects. Issue: Whether the MCIAA is exempted
from realty taxes.
Mactan Cebu (MCIAA) v. Marcos
GR 120082, 11 September 1996 (261 SCRA Held: Tax statutes are construed strictly
667) against the government and liberally in
Third Division, Davide Jr. (p): 4 concurring. favor of the taxpayer. But since taxes are
paid for civilized society, or are the
Facts: Mactan Cebu International Airport lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns
Authority (MCIAA) was created by virtue of against exemptions from taxation and
Republic Act 6958. Since the time of its statutes granting tax exemptions are thus
creation, MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of construed strictissimi juris against the
exemption from payment of realty taxes in taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing
accordance with Section 14 of its Charter. authority. A claim of exemption from tax
However on 11 October 1994, the Office of payments must be clearly shown and based
the Treasurer of Cebu, demanded for the on language in the law too plain to be
payment of realty taxes on several parcels mistaken. Elsewise stated, taxation is the
of land belonging to the petitioner. rule, exemption therefrom is the exception.
Petitioner objected to such demand for However, if the grantee of the exemption is
payment as baseless and unjustified. It also a political subdivision or instrumentality,
asserted that it is an instrumentality of the the rigid rule of construction does not apply
government performing a governmental because the practical effect of the
functions, which puts limitations on the exemption is merely to reduce the amount
taxing powers of local government units. It of money that has to be handled by the
nonetheless stands in the same footing as government in the course of its operations.
an agency or instrumentality of the national Further, since taxation is the rule and
government by the very nature of its exemption therefrom the exception, the
powers and functions. The City refused to exemption may be withdrawn at the
cancel and set aside petitioner’s realty tax pleasure of the taxing authority. The only
account, insisting that the MCIAA is a exception to this rule is where the
government controlled corporation whose exemption was granted to private parties
tax exemption privilege has been based on material consideration of a
withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 and mutual nature, which then becomes
234 of the Local Government Code (LGC), contractual and is thus covered by the non-
and not an instrumentality of the impairment clause of the Constitution.
government but merely a government
owned corporation performing proprietary Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority
functions. MCIAA paid its tax account (MCIAA) is a “taxable person” under its
“under protest” when City is about to issue Charter (RA 6958), and was only exempted
a warrant of levy against the MCIAA’s from the payment of real property taxes.
properties. The grant of the privilege only in respect of
this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative
28
intent to make it a taxable person subject payment of the plaintiff PNB the loan of
to all taxes, except real property tax. Since spouses Serfinos secured by said land. Both
Republic Act 7160 or the Local Government parties appealed from this decision of the
Code (LGC) expressly provides that “All trial court. Ruling on the assignment of
general and special laws, acts, city errors, the appellate court affirmed the
charters, decrees [sic], executive orders, judgment of the trial court with
proclamations and administrative modification in its decision setting aside the
regulations, or part of parts thereof which decision of the trial court declaring plaintiff
are inconsistent with any of the provisions liable to PNB for payment, however,
of this Code are hereby repealed or ordering the plaintiff to reimburse the
modified accordingly.” With that repealing Serfino spouses of the sum P1,839.49,
clause in the LGC, the tax exemption representing the unpaid taxes and
provided for in RA 6958 had been expressly penalties paid by the latter when they
repealed by the provisions of the LGC. repurchased the property. Hence, the
Therefore, MCIAA has to pay the assessed appeal by the spouses Serfino and PNB to
realty tax of its properties effective after the Supreme Court.
January 1, 1992 until the present.
Issue: Whether the auction sale of the
The Supreme Court denied the petition, and disputed property was null and void.
affirmed the challenged decision and order
of the RTC Cebu; without pronouncement as Held: The assailed decision of the
to costs. appellate court declares that the prescribed
procedure in auction sales of property for
Serfino v. CA tax delinquency being in derogation of
GR L-40858, 15 September 1987 property rights should be followed
Second Division, Paras (p): 4 concurring. punctiliously. Strict adherence to the
statutes governing tax sales is imperative
Facts: On 25 August 1937, a parcel of land not only for the protection of the tax
was patented in the name of Pacifico payers, but also to allay any possible
Casamayor (OCT 1839). On 14 December suspicion of collusion between the buyer
1945, he sold said land in favor of Nemesia and the public officials called upon to
D. Balatazar (TCT No. 57-N, 18 January enforce such laws. Notice of sale to the
1946). OCT 1839 was lost during the war delinquent land owners and to the public in
and upon petition of Nemesia Baltazar, the general is an essential and indispensable
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental requirement of law, the non-fulfillment of
ordered the reconstitution thereof. Pursuant which vitiates the sale. In the present case,
thereto, OCT 14-R (1839) was issued on 18 Lopez Sugar Central was not entirely
January 1946 in the name of Pacifico negligent in its payment of land taxes. The
Casamayor. On that same day, TCT 57-N record shows that taxes were paid for the
was issued in the name of Nemesia years 1950 to 1953 and a receipt therefor
Baltazar but after the cancellation of OCT was obtained in its name. The sale
14-R (1839). On 15 August 1951, Nemesia therefore by the Province of Negros
Baltazar, sold said property to Lopez Sugar Occidental of the land in dispute to the
Central Mill Co., and the latter did not spouses Serfinos was void since the
present the documents for registration until Province of Negros Occidental was not the
17 December 1964 to the Office of the real owner of the property thus sold. In
Registry of Deeds. Said office refused turn, the spouses Serfinos title which has
registration upon its discovery that the been derived from that of the Province of
same property was covered by another Negros Occidental is likewise void.
certificate of title, TCT 38985, in the name However, the fact that the public auction
of Federico Serfino. On 19 November 1964, sale of the disputed property was not valid
the spouses Serfinos mortgaged the land to cannot in any way be attributed to the
the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to mortgagee’s fault. The inability of the
secure a loan in the amount of P5,000.00; Register of Deeds to notify the actual owner
which was inscribed in TCT No. 38985. or Lopez Sugar Central of the scheduled
public auction sale was partly due to the
The Lopez Sugar Central instituted an failure of Lopez Sugar Central to declare
action to recover said land; and the lower the land in its name for a number of years
court rendered a decision ordering the and to pay the complete taxes thereon.
cancellation of TCT No. 38985; issuance of PNB is therefore entitled to the payment of
a new TCT in the name of plaintiff; and the the mortgage loan as ruled by the trial
29
court and exempted from the payment of applied the provisions of the Workmen’s
costs. Compensation Act, as amended, on passing
upon petitioner’s claim.. The illness that
The Supreme Court affirmed the assailed claimed the life of the deceased may had
decision, with modification that PNB its onset before 10 December 1974, thus,
mortgage credit must be paid by Lopez his action accrued before 10 December
Sugar Central. 1974. Still, In any case, and case of doubt,
the same should be resolved in favor of the
Manahan v. ECC
worker, and that social legislations — like
GR L-44899, 22 April 1981 (104 SCRA 198)
the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the
First Division, Fernandez (p): 4 concurring.
Labor Code — should be liberally construed
to attain their laudable objective, i.e., to
Facts: Maria E. Manahan, the petitioner, is
give relief to the workman and/or his
the widow of Nazario Manahan, Jr., who
dependents in the event that the former
died of “Enteric Fever” while employed as
should die or sustain an injury. Pursuant to
classroom teacher in Las Piñas Municipal
such doctrine and applying now the
High School, Las Piñas, Rizal, on 8 May,
provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation
1975. The deceased was in perfect health
Act in this case, the presumption of
when he entered government service on 20
compensability subsists in favor of the
July 1969, and that in the course of his
claimant.
employment in 1974, he was treated for
epigastric pain. He succumbed to enteric
The Supreme Court set aside the decision
fever on May 8, 1975. Thus, the petitioner
of the ECC and ordered the GSIS to pay the
filed a claim with the Government Service
petitioner the amount of P6,000.00 as
Insurance System (GSIS) for death benefit
death compensation benefit and P600.00
under Presidential Decree 626. In a letter
as attorney’s fees, to reimburse the
dated 19 June 1975, the GSIS denied the
petitioner’s expenses incurred for medical
claim on a finding that the ailment of
services, hospitalization and medicines of
Nazario Manahan, Jr., typhoid fever, is not
the deceased Nazario Manahan, Jr., duly
an occupational disease, and that enteric
supported by proper receipts, and to pay
fever or paratyphoid is similar in effect to
administrative fees.
typhoid fever, in the sense that both are
produced by Salmonella organisms. Villavert v. ECC
GR L-48605, 14 December 1981 (110 SCRA
The petitioner appealed to the Employees 233)
Compensation Commission (ECC), which First Division, Fernandez (p): 4 concurring
affirmed the decision of the GSIS on a
finding that the ailment of the deceased, Facts: Domina N. Villavert, the petitioner,
enteric fever, was not induced by or is the mother of the late Marcelino N.
aggravated by the nature of the duties of Villavert who died of acute hemorrhagic
Nazario Manahan, Jr. as a teacher. Thus, the pancreatitis on 12 December 1975
appeal. employed as a Code Verifier in the
Philippine Constabulary. The deceased also
Issue: Whether the Workmen’s performed the duties of a computer
Compensation should be resolved in favor operator and clerk typist. On 11 December
of the worker 1975, the deceased reported as usual to
the Constabulary Computer Center in Camp
Held: The Transitory and Final Provisions of
Crame. He performed his duties not only as
the New Labor Code provides that all
Code Verifier but also handled
actions and claims accruing prior to the
administrative functions, computer
effectivity of this Code shall be determined
operation and typing jobs due to shortage
in accordance with the laws in force at the
of civilian personnel. Although he was
time of their accrual and under the third
complaining of chest pain and headache
paragraph of Article 292, Title II
late in the afternoon of said day, he was
(Prescription of Offenses and Claims),
required to render overtime service until
workmen’s compensation claims accruing
late in the day, typing voluminous classified
prior to the effectivity of this Code and
communications, computing allowances
during the period from 1 November 1974
and preparing checks for the salary of PC-
up to 31 December 1974 shall be
INP personnel throughout the country for
processed and adjudicated in accordance
distribution on or before 15 December
with the laws and rules at the time their
1975. Gasping for breath, perspiring
causes of action accrued Hence, this Court
30
profusely, and mumbling incoherent words The Supreme Court set aside the decision
while asleep, and when he was not able to of the ECC and ordered the GSIS to pay the
regain consciousness, he was rushed to the petitioner death benefits in the amount of
University of the East-Ramon Magsaysay P6,000.00.
(UERM) Memorial Hospital where he died at
5:30 am. The NBI stated that the exact Del Rosario & Sons v. NLRC
cause of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is GR L-64204, 31 May 1985 (135 SCRA 669)
still unknown, although most research data First Division, Melencio-Herrera (p): 5
agree that physical and mental stresses are concurring, 1 on leave
strong causal factors in the development of
the disease. Facts: On 1 February 1978, Del Rosario
and Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. entered
On 18 March 1976, she filed a claim for into a “Contract of Services” with Calmar
income benefits for the death of her son Security Agency whereby the latter
under PD 626, as amended, with the undertook to supply the former with
Government Service Insurance System security guards at the rate of P300.00 per
(GSIS). GSIS denied the claim on the month for each guard. Thereafter, Paulino
ground that acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis Mabuti, Napoleo Borata and Silvino Tudio
is not an occupational disease and that the filed a Complaint against the Security
petitioner had failed to show that there was Agency and petitioner, for underpayment of
a causal connection between the fatal salary, non-payment of living allowance,
ailment of Marcelino N. Villavert and the and 13th month pay. Thereafter, five other
nature of his employment. The petitioner guards filed their complaint for the same
appealed to the Employees Compensation causes of action. Petitioner contended that
Commission (ECC). On 31 May 1978, the complainants have no cause of action
ECC affirmed the decision of GSIS denying against it due to absence of employer-
the claim. Hence, the petition. employee relationship between them. They
also denied liability alleging that due to the
Issue: Whether the petitioner is entitled to inadequacy of the amounts paid to it under
her son’s death benefits. the Contract of Services, it could not
possibly comply with the payments
Held: The Medico Legal Officer of the NBI required by labor laws.
stated that the exact cause of acute
hemorrhagic pancreatitis (acute Assigned for compulsory arbitration, the
inflammation with hemorrhagic necrosis of Labor Arbiter rendered a decision
the pancreas) is still unknown despite dismissing the complaint for want of
extensive researches in this field, although employer-employee relationship. When the
most research data are agreed that case was appealed to the NLRC, the
physical and mental stresses are strong decision was modified by holding that
causal factors in the development of the petitioner is liable to pay complainants,
disease. There is no evidence at all that jointly and severally, with the Security
Marcelino N. Villavert had a “bout of Agency on the ground that the petitioner is
alcoholic intoxication” shortly before he an indirect employer pursuant to Articles
died, neither is there a showing that he 106 and 107. Hence, the appeal. The
used drugs; negating the association petitioner contended that NLRC erred in
provided by Principles of Internal Medicine giving due course to the appeal despite the
(by Harrison 7th Edition, p. 1571). From the fact that it was not under oath and the
foregoing facts of record, it is clear that required appeal fee was not paid; in holding
Marcelino N. Villavert died of acute it jointly and severally liable with the
hemorrhagic pancreatitis which was directly Security Agency; and in refusing to give
caused or at least aggravated by the duties due course to its Motion for
he performed as code verifier, computer Reconsideration.
operator and clerk typist of the Philippine
Constabulary. Further, Article 4 of the Labor Issue(s):
Code of the Philippines, as amended,
provides that “all doubts in the  Whe
implementation and interpretation of this ther
Code, including its implementing rules and the
regulations shall be resolved in favor of formal
labor.” defects
of the

31
 appeal Further, Articles 106 of the Labor Code
of the provides that “in the event that the
securit contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the
y wages of his employees in accordance with
agency this Code, the employer shall be jointly and
invalid severally liable with his contractor or
ate the subcontractor to such employees to the
appeal. extent of the work performed under the
 Whe contract, in the same manner and extent
ther that he is liable to employees directly
the employed by him,” and Article 107 provides
securit that “the provisions of the immediately
y preceding Article shall likewise apply to any
guards person, partnership, association or
from corporation which, not being an employer,
the contracts with an independent contractor
agency for the performance of any work, task, job
are or project.” In the case at bar, petitioner
entitled became an indirect employer of
to respondents-complainants when petitioner
benefit entered into a Contract of Services with the
s Security Agency and the latter hired the
claime complainants to work as guards for the
d from former. However, the petitioner’s liability
the should be without prejudice to a claim for
compa reimbursement against the Security Agency
ny for such amounts as petitioner may have to
pay to complainants. The Security Agency
may not seek exculpation by claiming that
Held: The formal defects in the appeal of petitioner’s payments to it were
the Security Agency were not fatal defects. inadequate. As an employer, it is charged
The lack of verification could have been with knowledge of labor laws and the
easily corrected by requiring an oath. The adequacy of the compensation that it
appeal fee had been paid although it was demands for contractual services is its
delayed. Failure to pay the docketing fees principal concern and not any other’s.
does not automatically result in the
dismissal of the appeal. Dismissal is The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
discretionary with the Appellate Court and under review, without prejudice to
discretion must be exercised wisely and petitioner’s right to seek reimbursement
prudently, never capriciously, with a view from Calmar Security Agency for such
to substantial justice. Failure to pay the amounts as petitioner may have to pay to
appeal docketing fee confers a directory complainants. Costs against the private
and not a mandatory power to dismiss an respondent.
appeal and such power must be exercised
Ty v. First National Surety
with sound discretion and with a great deal
GR L-16138, 29 April 1961 (1 SCRA 1324)
of circumspection, considering all attendant
En Banc, Labrador (p): 8 concurring
circumstances.” Moreover, as provided for
by Article 221 of the Labor Code “in any Facts: At different times within a period of
proceeding before the Commission or any two months prior to 24 December 1953,
of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence Diosdado C. Ty, employed as operator
prevailing in Courts of law or equity shall mechanic foreman in the Broadway Cotton
not be controlling and it is the spirit and Factory insured himself in 18 local
intention of this Code that the Commission insurance companies, among which being
and its members and the Labor Arbiters the 8 above-named defendants, which
shall use every and all reasonable means to issued to him personal accident policies.
ascertain the facts in each case speedily Plaintiff’s beneficiary was his employer,
and objectively and without regard to Broadway Cotton Factory, which paid the
technicalities of law or procedure, all in the insurance premiums. On 24 December
interest of due process. 1953, a fire broke out which totally
destroyed the Broadway Cotton Factory.

32
Fighting his way out of the factory, plaintiff The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed
was injured on the left hand by a heavy decision, with costs against the plaintiff-
object. He was brought to the Manila appellant.
Central University hospital, and after
receiving first-aid, he went to the National De la Cruz v. Capital Insurance
Orthopedic Hospital for treatment of his GR L-21574, 30 June 1966 (17 SCRA 559)
injuries (fractures in index, middle, fourth, En Banc, Barrera (p): 8 concurring
and fifth fingers of left hand). From 26
December 1953 to 8 February 1954, he Facts: Eduardo de la Cruz was the holder
underwent medical treatment in the of an accident insurance policy. In
hospital. The above-described physical connection with the celebration of the New
injuries have caused temporary total Year, the insured, a non-professional boxer,
disability of plaintiff’s left hand. Plaintiff participated in a boxing contest. In the
filed the corresponding notice of accident course of his bout with another person,
and notice of claim with all of the above- likewise a non-professional, of the same
named defendants to recover indemnity. height, weight and size, Eduardo slipped
Defendants rejected plaintiff’s claim for and was hit by his opponent on the left part
indemnity for the reason that there being of the back of the head, causing Eduardo to
no severance of amputation of the left fall, with his head hitting the rope of the
hand, the disability suffered by him was not ring. The insured died with the cause of
covered by his policy. death reported as hemorrhage intracranial,
left. The insurer refused to pay the
Plaintiff sued the defendants in the proceeds of the policy on the ground that
Municipality Court of this City, which the death of the insured in a boxing
dismissed his complaints. Thereafter, the contest, was not accidental and, therefore,
plaintiff appealed to the Court of First not covered by the insurance.
Instance Manila, presided by Judge Gregorio
S. Narvasa, which absolved the defendants Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured
from the complaints. Hence, the appeal. and beneficiary under the policy, filed a
claim with the insurance company for
Issue: Whether Diosdado Ty is entitled to payment of indemnity under the insurance
indemnity under the insurance policy for policy. Denied, De la Cruz instituted the
the disability of his left hand. action in the CFI Pangasinan (Civ. Case No.
U-265)) for specific performance.
Held: The agreement contained in the Defendant insurer set up the defense that
insurance policies is the law between the the death of the insured, caused by his
parties. As the terms of the policies are participation in a boxing contest, was not
clear, express and specific that only accidental and, therefore, not covered by
amputation of the left hand should be insurance. After due hearing, the court
considered as a loss thereof, an rendered the decision in favor of the
interpretation that would include the mere plaintiff; ordering the insurance company to
fracture or other temporary disability not indemnify plaintiff for the death of the
covered by the policies would certainly be latter’s son, to pay the burial expenses, and
unwarranted. In the case at bar, due to the attorney’s fees. Hence, the appeal.
clarity of the stipulation, distinction
between “temporary disability” and “total Issue: Whether the death of the insured is
disability” need not be made in relation to covered by the policy.
one’s occupation means that the condition
of the insurance is such that common Held: The terms “accident” and
prudence requires him to desist from “accidental” have not acquired any
transacting his business or renders him technical meaning, and are construed by
incapable of working. While the Court the courts in their ordinary and common
sympathizes with the plaintiff or his acceptation. The terms mean that which
employer, for whose benefit the policies happen by chance or fortuitously, without
were issued, it can not go beyond the clear intention and design, and which is
and express conditions of the insurance unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. An
policies, all of which define partial disability accident is an event that takes place
as loss of either hand by a amputation without one’s foresight or expectation: an
through the bones of the wrist.” There was event that proceeds from an unknown
no such amputation in the case at bar. cause, or is an unusual effect of a known
cause and, therefore, not expected. There

33
is no accident when a deliberate act is by other persons in connivance with him.
performed unless some additional, Qua Chee Gan, his brother Qua Chee Pao,
unexpected, independent, and unforeseen and some employees of his were indicted
happening occurs which produces or brings and tried in 1940 for the crime of arson but
about the result of injury or death. Where were acquitted by the trial court in a final
the death or injury is not the natural or decision on 9 July 1941.
probable result of the insured’s voluntary
act, which produces the injury, the resulting With the civil case, Qua Chee Gan instituted
death is within the protection of policies the action in 1940 with the Court of First
insuring against the death or injury from Instance of Albay, seeking to recover the
accident. In the present case, while the proceeds of certain fire insurance policies
participation of the insured in the boxing totalling P370,000, issued by the Law Union
contest is voluntary, if without the & Rock Insurance Co., Ltd., through its
unintentional slipping of the deceased, agent, Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., upon
perhaps he could not have received that certain bodegas and merchandise of the
blow in the head and would not have died. insured that were burned on 21 June 1940.
Further, death or disablement resulting The records of the original case were
from engagement in boxing contests was destroyed during the liberation of the
not declared outside of the protection of region, and were reconstituted in 1946.
the insurance contract (What was included After a trial that lasted several years, the
was death or disablement consequent upon CFI rendered a decision in favor of the
the Insured engaging in football, hunting, plaintiff, ordering the insurance company to
pigsticking, steeplechasing, polo-playing, pay Qua Chee Gan the sum of P146,394.48
racing of any kind, mountaineering, or (1st cause of action), P150,000 (2nd),
motorcycling). Failure of the defendant P5,000 (3rd), P15,000 (4th) , and P40,000
insurance company to include death (5th), each bearing 80% interest per annum
resulting from a boxing match or other in accordance with Section 91 (b) of the
sports among the prohibitive risks leads Insurance Act from 26 September 1940,
inevitably to the conclusion that it did not until each is paid, with costs against the
intend to limit or exempt itself from liability defendant. It also dismissed the complaint
for such death. in intervention of PNB without costs. The
Insurance Company appealed directly to
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed the Supreme Court. It contends that a
decision, with costs against appellant. warranty in a fire insurance policy
prohibited the storage in the premises of
Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union and Rock oils (animal and/or vegetable and/or
Insurance mineral and their liquid products having a
GR L-4611, 17 December 1955 (52 OG flash point below 300 degrees Fahrenheit.
1982) Gasoline, which has a flash point below 300
First Division, Reyes JBL (p): 7 concurring. degrees Fahrenheit was stored therein.

Facts: Before WWII, Qua Chee Gan, a Issue: Whether gasoline may be construed
merchant of Albay, owned 4 warehouses in as oil to warrant the forfeiture of claims
Tabaco, Albay used for the storage of under the insurance policy.
stocks of copra and of hemp in which he
dealt extensively. They had been, with their Held: The Hemp Warranty provisions relied
contents, insured with the Insurance upon by the insurer speaks of “oils (animal
Company since 1937, and the lose made and/or vegetable and/or mineral and/or
payable to the Philippine National Bank as their liquid products having a flash point
mortgage of the hemp and copra, to the below 300° Fahrenheit”, and is decidedly
extent of its interest. On 21 July 1940, fire ambiguous and uncertain; for in ordinary
of undetermined origin that broke out and parlance, “Oils” mean “lubricants” and not
lasted almost one week, gutted and gasoline or kerosene. By reason of the
completely destroyed Bodegas Nos. 1, 3 exclusive control of the insurance company
and 4, with the merchandise stored therein. over the terms and phraseology of the
Plaintiff-appellee informed the insurer by contract, the ambiguity must be held
telegram on the same date. The insurance strictly against the insurer and liberally in
Company resisted payment, claiming favor of the insured, specially to avoid a
violation of warranties and conditions, filing forfeiture. There is no reason why the
of fraudulent claims, and that the fire had prohibition of keeping gasoline in the
been deliberately caused by the insured or premises could not be expressed clearly
34
and unmistakably, in the language and for reimbursement of the aforesaid amount
terms that the general public can readily but each refused to pay the same. (A case
understand, without resort to obscure “Home insurance v. NV Nedlloyd Lijnen”
esoteric expression. If the company consolidated with this case is of the same
intended to rely upon a condition of that nature).
character, it ought to have been plainly
expressed in the policy. Still, it is well Filing its cases in court, Home Insurance
settled that the keeping of inflammable oils avers that it is a foreign insurance company
on the premises, though prohibited by the authorized to do business in the Philippines
policy, does not void it if such keeping is through its agent, Victor Bello (who holds
incidental to the business and according to office at Makati) in both cases. In L-34382,
the weight of authority, even though there Eastern Shipping Lines denies the
are printed prohibitions against keeping allegation of plaintiff’s capacity to sue for
certain articles on the insured premises the lack of knowledge or information sufficient
policy will not be avoided by a violation of to form a belief as to the truth thereof,
these prohibitions, if the prohibited articles while Angel Jose Transportation admits the
are necessary or in customary use in allegation. In L-34383, NV Nedlloyd Lijnen,
carrying on the trade or business Columbian Philippines, and Guacods denied
conducted on the premises. In the present plaintiff’s capacity to sue. The court
case, no gasoline was stored in the burned dismissed the complaints in the two cases
bodegas, and that “Bodega No. 2” which on the same ground, that the plaintiff failed
was not burned and where the gasoline was to prove its capacity to sue, even if the
found, stood isolated from the other petitioner had already secured the
insured bodegas. necessary license to conduct its insurance
business in the Philippines during the filing
The Supreme Court found no reversible of the case. Hence, the petition.
error in the judgment appealed from, thus
affirming it; with costs against the Issue: Whether a foreign corporation doing
appellant. business in the Philippines initially without
a license can claim indemnity through
Home Insurance v. Eastern Shipping Philippine Courts.
Lines
GR L-34382, 20 July 1983 (123 SCRA 425) Held: The objective of the law was to
First division, Gutierrez (p): 4 concurring, 2 subject the foreign corporation to the
on leave. jurisdiction of our courts. The Corporation
Law must be given a reasonable, not an
Facts: On 13 January 1967, S. Kajita & Co., unduly harsh, interpretation which does not
on behalf of Atlas Consolidated Mining & hamper the development of trade relations
Development Corporation, shipped on and which fosters friendly commercial
board the SS ‘Eastern Jupiter’ from Osaka, intercourse among countries. A harsh
Japan, 2,361 coils of ‘Black Hot Rolled interpretation would disastrously embarrass
Copper Wire Rods.’ The vessel is owned and trade, unlike if the law is given a
operated by Eastern Shipping Lines. The reasonable interpretation, it would
shipment was insured with Home Insurance markedly help in the development of trade.
against all risks in the amount of The law simply means that no foreign
P1,580,105.06. 53 of the 2361 coils corporation shall be permitted ‘to transact
discharged from the vessel were in bad business in the Philippine Islands,’ as this
order. The Consignee ultimately received phrase is known in corporation law, unless
the 2,361 coils with 73 coils loose and it shall have the license required by law,
partly cut, and 28 coils and partly cut, and, until it complies with the law, shall not
which had to be considered as scrap. The be permitted to maintain any suit in the
weight also had a net loss/shortage of local courts. A contrary holding would bring
593.15 kgs, or 1,209.56 lbs. For the the law to the verge of unconstitutionality,
loss/damage suffered by the cargo, Home a result which should be and can be easily
Insurance paid the consignee under its avoided. In the present case, the lack of
insurance policy the amount of P3,260.44, capacity at the time of the execution of the
by virtue of which Home Insurance became contracts was cured by the subsequent
subrogated to the rights and actions of the registration. Such is also strengthened by
Phelps Dodge. Home Insurance made the procedural aspects of these cases.The
demands for payment against Eastern petitioner sufficiently alleged its capacity to
Shipping and the transportation company sue when it averred in its complaints that it
35
is a foreign insurance company, that it is practice, polygamy. Since his birth, he has
authorized to do business in the Philippines, never gone abroad. He mingles with the
that its agent is Mr. Victor H. Bello, and that Filipinos. He prefers a democratic form of
its office address is the Oledan Building at government and stated that if his petition is
Ayala Avenue, Makati; as required by granted he would serve the government
Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. either in the military or civil department. He
General denials inadequate to attack the is a merchant dealing in the buy and sell of
foreign corporations lack of capacity to sue tobacco. He also is part owner of a store in
in the light of its positive averment that it is Bangued. In his tobacco business, he has a
authorized to do so. Nevertheless, even if working capital of P10,000.00 which he
the plaintiff’s lack of capacity to sue was claims to have been accumulated thru
not properly raised as an issue by the savings. He contributes to civic and
answers, the petitioner introduced charitable organizations like the Jaycees,
documentary evidence that it had the Rotary, Red Cross and to town fiestas. He
authority to engage in the insurance likes the customs of the Filipinos because
business at the time it filed the complaints. he has resided in the Philippines for a long
time. During the year 1956, he claims to
The Supreme Court consolidated and have earned P1,000.00 in his tobacco
granted the petitions, reversed and set business. With respect to the store of which
aside the CFI decisions. In L-34382 (Civil he claims to be a part owner, he stated that
Case 71923), Eastern Shipping Lines and his father gave him a sum of less than
Angel Jose Transportation Inc. are ordered P3,000.00 representing one-fourth of the
to pay the Home Insurance Company the sales. Aside from being a co-owner of said
sum of P1,630.22 each with interest at the store, he receives a monthly salary of
legal rate from 5 January 1968 until fully P120,00 as a salesman therein. He took a
paid. Each shall also pay one-half of the course in radio mechanics and completed
costs. The Court dismissed the the same in 1955. He has no vice of any
counterclaim of Angel Jose Transportation kind. He claims that he has never been
Inc. In L-34383, N. V. Nedlloyd Lijnen or its delinquent in the payment of taxes. But he
agent Columbian Phil. Inc. was ordered to admitted that he did not file his income tax
pay the petitioner the sum of P2,426.98 return when he allegedly received an
with interest at the legal rate from 1 amount of not less than P3,000 from his
February 1968 until fully paid, the sum of father which he claims to have invested in
P500.00 attorney’s fees, and costs. The his tobacco business.
Court dismissed the complaint against
Guacods, Inc. Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization
in the trial court. After hearing, the court
ordered that a certificate of naturalization
be issued to petitioner after the lapse of
Co v. Republic
two years from the date the decision
GR L-12150, 26 May 1960 (108 Phil 775)
becomes final and all the requisites
First Dvision, Bautista Angelo (p): 6
provided for in RA 503. The government
concurring
appealed the decision of the trial court,
raising the facts that did not state what
Facts: Petitioner was born in Abra and his
principles of the Constitution he knew,
parents are both Chinese. He owes his
although when asked what laws of the
allegiance to the Nationalist Government of
Philippines he believes in, he answered
China. He is married to Leonor Go, the
“democracy.; that he stated that his father
marriage having been celebrated in the
had already filed his income tax return,
Catholic church of Bangued. He speaks and
when asked why he did not file his income
writes English as well as the Ilocano and
tax returns; and that he presented his alien
Tagalog dialects. He graduated from the
certificate of registration, but not the alien
Abra Valley College, and finished his
certificates of registration of his wife and
primary studies in the “Colegio” in
child.
Bangued, both schools being recognized by
the government. He has a child two months
Issue: Whether petitioner failed to comply
old. He has never been accused of any
with the requirements prescribed by law in
crime involving moral turpitude. He is not
order to qualify him to become a Filipino
opposed to organized government, nor is
citizen.
he a member of any subversive
organization. He does not believe in, nor

36
Held: The scope of the word law in capital in the business and at present the
ordinary legal parlance does not actual worth of his share is about
necessarily include the constitution, which P20,000.00. Petitioner is receiving a
is the fundamental law of the land, nor monthly salary of P400.00 and realizes a
does it cover all the principles underlying profit share worth P10,000.00 every year.
our constitution. Further, Philippine law He has no tax liability to the government.
requires that an alien to conducted himself He possesses all the qualifications and
in a proper and irreproachable manner none of the disqualifications prescribed by
during the entire period of his residence in law. As to his family, he married one Sy
the Philippines in his relation with the Siok Bin on 8 December 1929 with whom
constituted government as well as with the he had 13 children, all born in the Cebu
community in which he is living. In the City. All these children had been issued the
present case, in so stating that he believes corresponding alien certificate of
merely in our laws, he did not necessarily registration, with the exception of Lourdes
refer to those principles embodied in our Lee who married a naturalized Filipino
constitution which are referred to in the citizen named Lim Kee Guan. With the
law; the belief in democracy or in a exception of William Lee who is not of
democratic form of government is not school age, Angelita who reached 5th grade
sufficient to comply with the requirement of and Lourdes who stopped in 3rd year high
the law that one must believe in the school, the other children are at present
principles underlying our constitution. studying in private schools and colleges
Further, petitioner failed to show that he recognized by the government.
has complied with his obligation to register
his wife and child with the Bureau of Lee Cho filed a petitioner for naturalization
Immigration as required by the Alien before the Court of First Iinstance of Cebu.
Registration Actl; and further failed to file On 30 August 1956, the court rendered
his income tax return despite his fixed decision finding petitioner qualified to be a
salary of P1,440.00 a year and his profit of Filipino citizen. On 2 October 1957,
P1,000.00 in his tobacco business, and however, the government filed a motion for
received an amount less than P3,000 from new trial on the ground of newly discovered
his father as one-fourth of the proceeds of evidence which if presented may affect the
the sale of the store, the total of which is qualification of petitioner, and finding the
more than what is required by law for one same well founded, the court entertained
to file an income tax return. the motion. After hearing, the court again
rendered decision reaffirming its holding
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed that petitioner is qualified to become a
decision, hold that the trial court erred in Filipino citizen. The government interposed
granting the petition for naturalization, an appeal.
without pronouncement as to costs.
Issue: Whether petitioner was able to
Lee Cho (@ Sem Lee) v. Republic comply with the requirements for
GR L-12408, 28 December 1959 (106 Phil naturalization.
775)
En Banc, Bautista Angelo (p): 9 concurring Held: The provisions of the Naturalization
Law should be strictly construed in order
Facts: On 22 September 1907, petitioner that its laudable and nationalistic purpose
was born in Amoy, China, of Chinese may be fully fulfilled. In the present case,
parents. He came to the Philippines the petitioner has not filed any declaration
sometime in February 1921 and was given of intention to become a Filipino citizen
the corresponding alien certificate of because, as he claims, he has resided
residence and registration. He settled in continuously in the Philippines for a period
Cebu City (where he as continuously of more than 30 years and has given
resided up to the present time). Petitioner primary and secondary education to all his
studied 1st to 7th grade in Cebu Chinese children in private schools recognized by
High School, a private institution the government. Angelita Lee has only
recognized by the government. He speaks reached grade five and no explanation was
and writes English and the Cebu dialect. given why no secondary education was
He, having associated with some Filipinos, afforded her. Lourdes Lee has studied only
engaged in the corn business in Cebu City as far as 3rd year high school and then
(1921-WWII) and in the lumber business allegedly stopped allegedly because of poor
(1946-present). He invested P5,000.00 health. Lourdes admitted in open court,
37
however, that she continued her studies in In July 1973, he was again refrained from
a Chinese school, which employs strictly gathering nuts from the 10-hectare portion
Chinese curriculum, despite her illness. This of the plantation with threats of bodily
circumstance betrays the sincerity of harm if he persists to gather fruits
petitioner to become a Filipino citizen for if therefrom. The Guerreros assigned Rogelio
his motive were proper he should not have and Paulino Latigay to do the gathering of
tolerated such deviation from the the nuts and the processing thereof into
educational requirement of the law. The copra. Defendants Guerreros also caused to
petitioner, thus, has failed to qualify to be demolished a part of the cottage where
become a Filipino citizen. Benitez and his family lived, thus, making
the Benitez feel that they meant business.
The Supreme Court ruled that appealed Hence, the case for reinstatement with
decision is reversed, with costs against damages.
petitioner.
Issue: Whether Benitez is a tenant within
Guerrero v. CA the meaning of the tenancy law to warrant
GR L-44570, 30 May 1986 (142 SCRA 136) reinstatement to the plantation
Second Division, Gutierrez (p): 4
concurring, 1 taking no part. Held: Longstanding possession is an
essential distinction between a mere
Facts: On 8 August 1963, RA 3844 agricultural laborer and a real tenant within
abolished and outlawed share tenancy and the meaning of the tenancy law, a tenant
put in its stead the agricultural leasehold being one who has the temporary use and
system. In 1969, Apolinario Benitez was occupation of land or tenements belonging
taken by Manuel and Maria Guerrero to take to another for the purpose of production. A
care of their 60 heads of cows which were hired laborer who built his own house at his
grazing within their 21-hectare coconut expense at the risk of losing the same upon
plantation situated at the Subprovince of his dismissal or termination any time, is
Aurora, Quezon. Benitez was allowed for more consistent with that of an agricultural
that purpose to put up a hut within the tenant who enjoys security of tenure under
plantation where he and his family stayed. the law. Cultivation is another important
In addition to attending to the cows, he was factor in determining the existence of
made to clean the already fruitbearing tenancy relationships. Cultivation is not
coconut trees, burn dried leaves and grass limited merely to the tilling, plowing or
and to do such other similar chores. harrowing of the land but also includes the
Harvest time which usually comes every 3 promotion of growth and the care of the
months. For his work related to the plants, or husbanding the ground to
coconuts, he shared 1/3 of the proceeds forward the products of the earth by
from the copra he processed and sold in general industry. Agreement to share the
the market. For attending to the cows he produce or harvest on a “tercio basis” that
was paid P500 a year. is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing in favor of the
landowners bolsters the tenancy claim. The
On 10 September 1971, RA 6389 amending
agricultural laborer works for the employer,
RA 3844 declared share tenancy
and for his labor he receives a salary or
relationships as contrary to public policy.
wage, regardless of whether the employer
Sometime in the early part of 1973, Benitez
makes a profit. On the other hand, the
was refrained from gathering nuts from the
share tenant participates in the agricultural
10-hectare portion of the 16-hectare part of
produce. His share is necessarily dependent
the plantation from where he used to
on the amount of harvest. Once a tenancy
gather nuts. He felt aggrieved by the acts
relationship is established, the tenant has
of defendants and he brought the matter to
the right to continue working until such
the attention of the Office of Special Unit in
relationship is extinguished according to
the Office of the President in Malacañang,
law. In the present case, besides these
Manila. This led to an execution of an
indications, the agreement made on 2 May
agreement whereby defendants agreed to
1973 is clear and categorical term that the
let plaintiff work on the 16-hectare portion
Benitez is a tenant. Arguing that the intent
of the plantation as tenant thereon and that
was different, being that of a hired
their relationship will be guided by the
farmhand, the law existing at that time the
provisions of RA 1199 (Agricultural Tenancy
agreement was made militate against the
Act of the Philippines).
claim. Benitez did not commit any of the
causes that would warrant his ejectment,
38
and thus, was unlawfully deprived of his the city court’s judgment was directly
right to security of tenure and the Court of appealable to it. Although recognizing that
Agrarian Reforms did not err in ordering the the CFI instead of dismissing appeal, could
reinstatement of respondent as tenant and have in the exercise of its inherent powers
granting him damages therefor. directed appeal to be endorsed to the Court
of Appeals, it held that since petitioners did
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition not implead the CFI as principal party
for lack of merit, and affirmed the CA respondent it could not grant any relief at
decision. No costs. all even on the assumption that petitioners
can be said to deserve some equities. With
Bello v. CA their motion for reconsideration denied,
GR L-38161, 29 March 1974 (56 SCRA 509) petitioners filed the petition for review.
En Banc, Teehankee (p): 10 concurring.
Issue: Whether the formal impleading of
Facts: On 25 August 1970, spouses Juan the Court of First Instance is indispensable
and Filomena Bello were charged for estafa and the procedural infirmity of misdirecting
before the City Court of Pasay for allegedly the appeal to Court of First Instance are
having misappropriated a lady’s ring with a fatal to the appellees’ cause
value of P1,000.00 received by them from
Atty. Prudencio de Guzman for sale on Held: The construction of statutes is
commission basis. After trial, they were always cautioned against narrowly
convicted. Petitioners filed their notice of interpreting a statute as to defeat the
appeal of the adverse judgment to the purpose of the legislator and it is of the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pasay City, essence of judicial duty to construe
but the prosecution filed a “petition to statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable
dismiss appeal” on the ground that since result (of injustice or absurdity” and
the case was within the concurrent therefore a literal interpretation is to be
jurisdiction of the city court and the CFI and rejected if it would be unjust or lead to
the trial in the city court had been duly absurd results. Thus, in the construction of
recorded, the appeal should have been its own Rules of Court, the Court is all the
taken directly to the Court of Appeals as more so bound to liberally construe them to
provided by section 87 of the Judiciary Act, avoid injustice, discrimination and
Republic Act 296, as amended. The CFI per unfairness and to supply the void by
its order of 29 October 1971 did find that holding that Courts of First Instance are
the appeal should have been taken directly equally bound as the higher courts not to
to the Court of Appeals but ordered the dismiss misdirected appeals timely made
dismissal of the appeal and remand of the but to certify them to the proper appellate
records to the city court “for execution of court.
judgment.” Thereafter, the City court
denied petitioners’ motion “for having been The formal impleading of the CFI which
erroneously addressed to this court” issued the challenged order of dismissal
instead of to the CFI ignoring petitioners’ was not indispensable and could be
predicament that the CFI had already “overlooked in the interest of speedy
turned them down and ordered the adjudication. The Court of Appeals ‘ act of
dismissal of their appeal without notice to dismissing the petition and denying the
them and that as a consequence it was relief sought of endorsing the appeal to the
poised to execute its judgment of proper court simply because of the non-
conviction against them. impleader of the CFI as a nominal party was
tantamount to sacrificing substance to form
Petitioners spouses then filed on 14 January and to subordinating substantial justice to a
1972 their petition for prohibition and mere matter of procedural technicality. The
mandamus with the Court of Appeals procedural infirmity of petitioners
against the People and City Court. The misdirecting their appeal to the CFI rather
Solicitor General did not interpose any than to the Court of Appeals, which they
objection whichever viewpoint is adopted had timely sought to correct in the CFI itself
by the Honorable Court in resolving the two by asking that court to certify the appeal to
apparently conflicting or clashing principles the Court of Appeals as the proper court,
of law, i.e.. finality of judicial decision or should not be over-magnified as to totally
equity in judicial decision. The Court of deprive them of their substantial right of
Appeals, however, dismissed the petition appeal and leave them without any remedy.
on 17 December 1973, after finding that

39
The Supreme Court set aside the CA must exist conferring the power upon it.
decision dismissing the petition and in lieu When the courts come to determine the
thereof, judgment was rendered granting question, they must not only find (a) that a
the petition for prohibition against City law or authority exists for the exercise of
court, enjoining it from executing its the right of eminent domain, but (b) also
judgment of conviction against petitioners- that the right or authority is being
accused and further commanding said city exercised in accordance with the law. In the
court to elevate petitioners’ appeal from its present case there are two conditions
judgment to the CA for the latter’s imposed upon the authority conceded to
disposition on the merits; without costs. the City of Manila: First, the land must be
private; and, second, the purpose must be
City of Manila v. Chinese Community of public. If the court, upon trial, finds that
Manila neither of these conditions exists or that
GR 14355, 31 October 1919 (40 Phil either one of them fails, certainly it cannot
First Division, Johnson (p): 4 concurring. be contended that the right is being
exercised in accordance with law. It is a well
Facts: On the 11th day of December, 1916, known fact that cemeteries may be public
the city of Manila presented a petition in or private. The former is a cemetery used
the Court of First Instance of said city, by the general community, or
praying that certain lands, therein neighborhood, or church, while only a
particularly described, be expropriated for family, or a small portion of the community
the purpose of constructing a public or neighborhood uses the latter. Where a
improvement, specifically for the purpose emetery is open to the public, it is a public
of extending Rizal Avenue. The Chinese use and no part of the ground can be taken
Community opposed the said expropriation, for other public uses under a general
contending that there was no necessity of authority. And this immunity extends to the
taking, that it already had public character unimproved and unoccupied parts, which
and that it would it would disturb the are held in good faith for future use. It is
resting places of the dead. alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery
in question may be used by the general
The trial court decided that there was no
community of Chinese, which fact, in the
necessity for the expropriation of the strip
general acceptation of the definition of a
of land and absolved each and all of the
public cemetery, would make the cemetery
defendants from all liability under the
in question public property. If that is true,
complaint, without any finding as to costs.
then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff
From the judgment, the City of Manila
must be denied, for the reason that the city
appealed.
of Manila has no authority or right under
Issue: Whether the Chinese cemetery may the law to expropriate public property. But,
be validly expropriated by the City of whether or not the cemetery is public or
Manila private property, its appropriation for the
uses of a public street, especially during
Held: The exercise of the right of eminent the lifetime of those specially interested in
domain, whether directly by the State, or its maintenance as a cemetery, should be a
by its authorized agents, is necessarily in question of great concern, and its
derogation of private rights, and the rule in appropriation should not be made for such
that case is that the authority must be purposes until it is fully established that the
strictly construed. No species of property is greatest necessity exists therefor. In this
held by individuals with greater tenacity, case there is no necessity of taking since
and none is guarded by the constitution there are other ways by which Rizal Avenue
and laws more sedulously, than the right to may be expanded to ease the traffic
the freehold of inhabitants. When the situation.
legislature interferes with that right, and,
for greater public purposes, appropriates The Supreme Court held that there is no
the land of an individual without his proof of the necessity of opening the street
consent, the plain meaning of the law through the cemetery from the record. But
should not be enlarged by doubtly that adjoining and adjacent lands have
interpretation. been offered to the city free of charge,
which answers every purpose of the City.
The right of expropriation is not an inherent The Supreme Court, thus, affirmed the
power in a municipal corporation, and judgment of the lower court, with costs
before it can exercise the right some law against the appellant.
40
 and purposes, such withdrawal should
therefore be considered as having been
made substantially and in truth after the
last day, even going by the literal reading
Villanueva v. Comelec (Resolution)
of the provision by the Comelec. Further,
GR L-54718, 4 December 1985
the will of the electorate should be
En Bank, Teehankee (p): 9 concurring, 2 on
respected, it should not be defeated
leave
through the invocation of formal or
Facts: On 4 January 1980, the last day for technical defects. The will of the people
filing of certificates of candidacy, one cannot be frustrated by a technicality that
Narciso Mendoza, Jr. filed his sworn the certificate of candidacy had not been
certificate of candidacy as independent for properly sworn to. This legal provision is
the office of vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon mandatory and non-compliance therewith
in the 30 January 1980 local elections. Later before the election would be fatal to the
that day, however, Mendoza filed an status of the candidate before the
unsworn letter in his own handwriting electorate, but after the people have
withdrawing his said certificate of expressed their will, the result of the
candidacy “for personal reasons.” His election cannot be defeated by the fact
unsworn withdrawal had been accepted by that the candidate has not sworn to his
the election registrar without protest nor certificate or candidacy. The legal
objection. Later on 25 January 1980, requirement that a withdrawal be under
petitioner Crisologo Villanueva, upon oath will be held to be merely directory and
learning of his companion Mendoza’s Mendoza’s failure to observe the
withdrawal, filed his own sworn “Certificate requirement should be considered a
of Candidacy in substitution” of Mendoza’s harmless irregularity. The bona fides of
for the said office of vice mayor as a one- petitioner Villanueva as a substitute
man independent ticket. The results candidate cannot be successfully assailed.
showed petitioner to be the clear winner The votes cast in his favor must be
over respondent with a margin of 452 counted.
votes. The Municipal Board of Canvassers,
The Supreme Court resolved to reconsider
however, disregarded all votes cast in favor
and sets aside the questioned Resolutions
of petitioner as stray votes on the basis of
of Comelec and annuls the proclamation of
the Provincial Election Officer’s opinion that
Lirio as elected vice-mayor of Dolores,
petitioner’s name does not appear in the
Quezon and instead declares petitioner as
certified list of candidates. The canvassers
the duly elected vice-mayor of said
accordingly proclaimed respondent
municipality and entitled forthwith to
Vivencio G. Lirio as the only unopposed
assume said office, take the oath of office
candidate and as the duly elected vice
and discharge its functions. The resolution
mayor of Dolores.
is made immediately executory.
On 21 February 1980, Comelec denied the
In RE Tampoy: Diosdada Alberastine,
petition of Villanueva, stating that
petitioner
Mendoza’s withdrawal was not under oath
GR L-14322, 25 February 1960 (107 Phil
as required by Section 27 of the 1978
100)
Election Code, and that his withdrawal was
En Banc, Bautista Angelo (p): 10 concurring
not made after the last day for filing of
certificate of candidacy, as contemplated Facts: On 19 November 1939, Petronila
by Section 28, but on the same day. Tampoy, a widow and without children,
requested with Bonifacio Minoza to read a
Issue: Whether the informal withdrawal of
testament and explain its contents to her in
Mendoza invalidates the election of
her house in San Miguel street, municipality
Villanueva as vice mayor.
of Argao, province of Cebu in 19 November
1939, which he did in the presence of tree
Held: Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code
instrumental witnesses, Rosario K. Chan,
provides for such substitute candidates in
Mauricio de la Pena, and Simeona Omboy.
case of death, withdrawal or
After confirming the contents of the
disqualification up to mid-day of the very
testament, she requested Bonifacio Minoza
day of the elections. Mendoza’s withdrawal
to write her name at the foot of the
was filed on the last hour of the last day for
testament in the second page, which he
regular filing of candidacies, which he had
did, and after which she stamped her
filed earlier that same day. For all intents
41
thumbmark between her name and comply with the law and therefore cannot
surname in the presence of all three be admitted to probate.
instrumental witnesses. Bonifacio Minoza
also signed at the foot of the testament, in The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed
the second page, in the presence of the order, without pronouncement as to costs.
testator and all three abovenamed
witnesses. However, the testator, just like Matabuena v. Cervantes
Bonifacio Minoza, did not sign on the left GR L-28771, 31 March 1971 (38 SCRA ___)
margin or any part of the first page of the En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 took no
testament, composed of two pages. All the part
three instrumental witnesses signed at the
Facts: On 20 February 1956, Felix
foot of the acknowledgment written in the
Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation
second page of the testament, and the left
inter vivos in favor of Petronila Cervantes
margin of the first and second page, in the
during the time they were living as
presence of the testator, Bonifacio Minoza,
husband and wife in a common law
Atty. Kintanar, and the others. The
relationship. They were later married on 28
testament was executed freely and
March 1962. Felix died intestate on 13
spontaneously, without having been
September 1962. Cornelia Matabuena,
threatened, forced and intimidated, and not
being the sole sister and nearest and
having exercised on her (the testator)
nearest relative to Felix, questioned the
undue influence, being the same in full use
validity of the donation claiming that the
of her mental faculties and enjoying good
ban on donation between spouses during a
health. On 22 February 1957, the testator
marriage applies to a common-law
died in here house in Argao.
relationship. She had the land declared on
On 7 March 1957, or two weeks after, the her name and paid the estate and
heir found in the testament, Carman inheritance taxes thereon on virtue of an
Aberastine died, leaving her mother, the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by
petitioner Diosdada Alberastine. After trial her in 1962. On 23 November 1965, the
on the probate o a document purportedly to lower court upheld the validity of the
be the last and testament of Petronila donation as it was made before Cervantes’
Rampoy, the trial court denied the petition marriage to the donor. Hence, the appeal.
on the ground that the left hand margin of
Issue: Whether the Article 133 of the civil
the first page of the will does not bear the
code apply to donations between live-in
thumbmark of the testatrix. Petitioner
partners.
appealed from this ruling. The Court of
Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Held: While Article 133 of the Civil Code
Court because it involves purely a question considers as void a “donation between the
of law. spouses during the marriage,” policy
considerations of the most exigent
Issue: Whether the absence of the
character as well as the dictates of morality
testator’s thumbmark in the first page is
require that the same prohibition should
fatal to render the will void
apply to a common-law relationship, as it is
Held: Statutes prescribing the formalities contrary to public policy. The law prohibits
to be observed in the execution of wills are donations in favor of the other consort and
very strictly construed. A will must be his descendants because of fear of undue
executed in accordance with the statutory and improper pressure and influence upon
requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in
In the present case, the contention that the ancient law. Whatever omission may be
petition for probate is unopposed, and that apparent in an interpretation purely literal
the three testimonial witnesses testified of the language used must be remedied by
and manifested to the court that the an adherence to its avowed objective. It is
document expresses the true and voluntary a principle of statutory construction that
will of the deceased, cannot be sustained what is within the spirit of the law is as
as it runs counter to the express provision much a part of it as what is written.
of the law. Since the will suffers the fatal Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in
defect, as it does not bear the thumbmark such codal provision would not be attained.
of the testatrix on its first page even if it
The Supreme Court (1) reversed the 23
bears the signature of the three
November 1965 decision of the lower court;
instrumental witnesses, the same fails to
(2) declared the questioned donation void
42
and recognized the rights of plaintiff and the doctrine in the Macarandang case, this
defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the was made only on 30 August 1967, years
property; and (3) remanded the case to the after the accused was charged. Under the
lower court for its appropriate disposition in Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at
accordance with the current decision; the time of appellant’s appointment as
without pronouncement as to costs. secret agent, he incurred no criminal
liability for possession of the pistol in
question.
People v. Santayana The Supreme Court reversed the appealed
GR L-22291, 15 November 1976 (74 Phil decision, conformably with the
25) recommendation of the Solicitor General,
Second Division, Concepcion Jr. (p): 4 and acquitted Jesus Santayana, canceling
concur, 1 took no part, 1 designated to sit the bond for his provisional release; with
in 2nd division costs de oficio.
Facts: On 19 February 1962, Jesus
Santayana y Escudero, was appointed as
“Special Agent” by then Colonel Jose C. People v. Estenzo
Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On 9 March GR L-35376, 11 September 1980 (99 SCRA
1962, Col. Maristela issued an undated 651)
certification to the effect that the accused First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur
was an accredited member of the CIS and
the pistol described in the said Facts: In a decision dated 28 September
Memorandum Receipt was given to him by 1940 by the Cadastral Court, Lot 4273 of
virtue of his appointment as special agent the Ormoc Cadastre was declared public
and that he was authorized to carry and land. Respondent Aotes filed on23 February
possess the same in the performance of his 1972 a petition to reopen the decision of
official duty and for his personal protection. the Cadastral Court under Repuplic Act 931
On 29 October 1962, the accused was as amended by Republic Act 6236. Aotes
found in Plaza Miranda in possession of the claim that since the time limit for filing
firearms and ammunition without a license applications for free patents and
to possess them. An investigation was applications for judicial confirmation of
conducted and thereupon, a corresponding incomplete and imperfect titles have been
complaint was filed against the accused. extended up to 31 December 1980, the
The case underwent trial after which the reopening of cadastral cases is also
accused was convicted of the crime extended until 31 December 1980. The
charged. Hence, the case was appealed to judge denied the opposition for lack of
Supreme Court. sufficient merit on 9 May 1972, and
rendered decision on 22 July 1972 after due
Issue: Whether Santayana, a secret agent, hearing, declaring Lot 4273 public land and
was liable for illegal possession of firearms adjudicating said lot in favor of the Aoetes
in undivided interest in equal share of ¼
Held: The appointment of a civilian as each. Dissatisfied with the decision of the
“secret agent to assist in the maintenance lower court, petitioners filed the instant
of peace and order campaigns and petition.
detection of crimes sufficiently puts him
within the category of a peace officer Issue: Whether the extension provided for
equivalent even to a member of the under RA 6263 also applies to Re-opening
municipal police expressly covered by of Cadastral Proceedings.
Section 879 (People v. Macarandang). In
the present case, Santayana was appointed Held: Under the legal maxim of statutory
as CIS secret agent with the authority to construction, expressio unius est exclusio
carry and possess firearms. He was issued alterius (Express Mention is Implied
a firearm in the performance of his official Exclusion), the express mention of one
duties and for his personal protection. thing in a law, as a general rule, means the
Application of license was unnecessary, exclusion of others not expressly
according to Col. Maristela, as the firearm is mentioned. This rule, as a guide to
government property. No permit was probable legislative intent, is based upon
issued, according to Capt. Adolfo Bringas as the rules of logic and the natural workings
he was already appointed as a CIS agent. of the human mind. If RA 6236 had
Even if the case of People vs. Mapa revoked intended that the extension it provided for
43
applies also to reopening of cadastral made it unlawful for candidates “to
cases, it would have so provided in the purchase, produce, request or distribute
same way that it provided the extension of sample ballots, or electoral propaganda
time to file applications for free patent and gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of
for judicial confirmation of imperfect or whatever nature), flashlights, athletic
incomplete title. The intention to exclude goods or materials, wallets, bandanas,
the reopening of cadastral proceedings or shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the
certain lands which were declared public like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.”
land in RA 6236 is made clearer by It was its contention that the jingle
reference to RA2061 which includes the proposed to be used by petitioner is the
reopening of cadastral cases, but not so recorded or taped voice of a singer and
included in RA 6236. Thus, RA 6236, the therefore a tangible propaganda material,
very law on which Aotes bases his petition under the phrase “and the like.”
to reopen the cadastral proceedings fails to
supply any basis for respondents’ Issue: Whether the taped jingles fall under
contention. It will be noted that while RA the phrase “and the like.”
2061 fixed the time to reopen cadastral
cases which shall not extend beyond 31 Held: Under the well-known principle of
December 1968, no similar provision is ejusdem generis, the general words
found in RA 6236 expressly extending the following any enumeration are applicable
time limit for the reopening of cadastral only to things of the same kind or class as
proceedings on parcels of land declared those specifically referred to. It is quite
public land. As correctly pointed out by apparent that what was contemplated in
petitioners, the extension as provided for the Act was the distribution of gadgets of
by the RA 6236 makes no reference to the kind referred to as a means of
reopening of cadastral cases as the earlier inducement to obtain a favorable vote for
law, RA2061, expressly did. Truly, the the candidate responsible for its
extension provided for by RA 6236 applies distribution. The Constitutional Convention
only to the filing of applications for free Act contemplated the prohibition on the
patent and for judicial confirmation of distribution of gadgets of the kind referred
imperfect or incomplete titles and not to to as a means of inducement to obtain a
reopening of cadastral proceedings like the favorable vote for the candidate
instant case, a proceeding entirely different responsible for its distribution (distribution
from “filing an application for a free patent of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention
or for judicial confirmation of imperfect or being made of pens, lighters, fans,
incomplete titles.” flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches,
The Supreme Court set aside the 22 July and cigarettes, and concluding with the
1972 decision of the respondent Judge and words “and the like.”). Taped jingles
reiterating the 28 September 1940 decision therefore were not prohibited.
of the Cadastral Court; without
pronouncement as to costs. The Supreme Court decision was made to
expound on the reasons behind the minute
Mutuc v. Comelec resolution of 3 November 1970. The
GR L-32717, 26 November 1970 (36 SCRA Supreme Court permanently restrained and
228) prohibited the Comelec from enforcing or
First Division, Fernando (p): 7 concur, 2 on implementing or demanding compliance
leave, 1 concur in separate opinion with its order banning the use of political
taped jingle, pursuant to the SC resolution
Facts: The Commission on Elections of 3 November 1970; without
(COMELEC) prohibited petitioner Amelito pronouncement as to costs.
Mutuc, a candidate for the position of a
delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
from using “jingles in his mobile units
People v. Manantan
equipped with sound systems and loud
GR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684)
speakers” on 22 October 1970. Petitioner
En Banc, Regala (p): 7 concur, 1 took no
impugned the act of respondent as
part, 1 on leave
violative of his right to free speech.
Respondent however contended that the Facts: In an information filed by the
prohibition was premised on a provision of Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court
the Constitutional Convention Act, which of First Instance (CFI) of that Province,
44
Guillermo Manantan was charged with a Instance, judges of the courts of Agrarian
violation of Section 54 of the Revised Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial
Election Code. A preliminary investigation Relations, and justices of the peace.
conducted by said court resulted in the
finding of a probable cause that the crime The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal
charged was committed by the defendant. order entered by the trial court and
Thereafter, the trial started upon remanded the case for trial on the merits.
defendant’s plea of not guilty, the defense
moved to dismiss the information on the
ground that as justice of the peace, the
Lopez vs. CTA
defendant is not one of the officers
GR L-9274, 1 February 1957 (100 Phil 850)
enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised
En Banc, Montemayor (p): 10 concur
Election Code. The lower court denied the
motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of Facts: Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal
the peace is within the purview of Section wire netting from Hamburg, Germany. The
54. A second motion was filed by defense Manila Collector of Customs assessed the
counsel who cited in support thereof the corresponding customs duties on the
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in importation on the basis of consular and
People vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that supplier invoices. Said customs duties were
a justice of the peace is excluded from the paid and the shipments were released.
prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Subsequently, however, the Collector
Election Code. Acting on various motions reassessed the dollar value of the cost and
and pleadings, the lower court dismissed freight of said wire netting and as a result
the information against the accused upon of the reassessment, additional customs
the authority of the ruling in the case cited duties in the amount of P1,966.59 were
by the defense. Hence, the appeal by the levied and imposed upon petitioner. Failing
Solicitor General. to secure a reconsideration of the
reassessment and levy of additional
Issue: Whether the justice of the peace
customs duties, Lopez & Sons appealed to
was excluded from the coverage of Section
the Court of Tax Appeals. Acting upon a
54 of the Revised Election Code
motion to dismiss the appeal, filed by the
Held: Under the rule of Casus omisus pro Solicitor General on the ground of lack of
omisso habendus est, a person, object or jurisdiction, the Tax Court, by its resolution
thing omitted from an enumeration must be of 23 May 1955, dismissed the appeal on
held to have been omitted intentionally. the ground hat it had no jurisdiction to
The maxim “casus omisus” can operate review decisions of the Collector of
and apply only if and when the omission Customs of Manila, citing section 7 of RA
has been clearly established. The 1125, creating said tax court. From said
application of the rule of “casus omisus” resolution of dismissal, Lopez & Sons
does not proceed from the mere fact that a appealed to the Supreme Court, seeking
case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reversal of said resolution of dismissal.
reasonable certainty that a particular
Issue: Whether the decision of the
person, object or thing has been omitted
Collector of Customs is directly appealable
from a legislative enumeration. Substitution
to the Court of Tax Appeal.
of terms is not omission. For in its most
extensive sense the term “judge” includes Held: Section 7 of Republic Act 1125
all officers appointed to decide litigated specifically provides that the Court of Tax
questions while acting in that capacity, Appeals (CTA) has appellate jurisdiction to
including justice of the peace, and even review decisions of the Commissioner of
jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts. Customs. On the other hand, section 11 of
The intention of the Legislature did not the same Act in lifting the enumerating the
exclude the justice of the peace from its persons and entities who may appeal
operation. In Section 54, there is no mentions among others, those affected by
necessity to include the justice of peace in a decision or ruling of the Collector of
the enumeration, as previously made in Customs, and fails to mention the
Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Commissioner of Customs. While there is
Code, as the legislature has availed itself of really a discrepancy between the two
the more generic and broader term sections, it is more reasonable and logical
“judge,” including therein all kinds of to hold that in section 11 of the Act, the
judges, like judges of the courts of First Legislature meant and intended to say, the
45
Commissioner of Customs, instead of Issue: Whether the accused is considered
Collector of Customs. If persons affected resigned from the latter’s filing of a
by a decision of the Collector of Customs certificate of candidacy for the Batasan.
may appeal directly to the Court of Tax
Appeals, then the supervision and control Held: Although it may be that Section
of the Commissioner of Customs over his 13(2), Batas Pambansa 697, admits of more
Collector of Customs, under the Customs than one construction, taking into
Law found in sections 1137 to 1419 of the sconsideration the nature of the positions
Revised Administrative Code, and his right of the officials enumerated therein, namely,
to review their decisions upon appeal to governors, mayors, members of the various
him by the persons affected by said sanggunians or barangay officials, the
decision would, not only be gravely legislative intent to distinguish between
affected but even destroyed. The Courts elective positions in section 13(2), as
are not exactly indulging in judicial contrasted to appointive positions in
legislation but merely endeavoring to section 13(l) under the all-encompassing
rectify and correct a clearly clerical error in clause reading “any person holding public
the wording of a statute, in order to give appointive office or position,” is clear. It is
due course and carry out the evident a rule of statutory construction that when
intention of the legislature. the language of a particular section of a
statute admits of more than one
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed construction, that construction which gives
order, holding that under the Customs Law effect to the evident purpose and object
and RA 1125, the CTA has no jurisdiction to sought to be attained by the enactment of
review by appeal decision of the Collector the statute as a whole, must be followed. A
of Customs; with costs. statute’s clauses and phrases should not be
taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part
thereof must be considered in fixing the
Sanciangco v. Rono meaning of any of its parts. The legislative
GR L-68709, 19 July 1985 (137 SCRA ___) intent to cover public appointive officials in
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 10 concur, 1 subsection (1), and officials mentioned in
dissents in separate opinion, 1 took no part subsection (2) which should be construed
to refer to local elective officials, can be
Facts: Petitioner was elected Barangay
gleaned from the proceedings of the
Captain of Barangay Sta. Cruz, Ozamiz City,
Batasan Pambansa. Since petitioner is
in the 17 May 1982 Barangay elections.
unquestionably an appointive member of
Later, he was elected President of the
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz
Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of
City, as he was appointed by the President
Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of the
as a member of the City’s Sangguniang
said Association. As the President of the
Panlungsod by virtue of his having been
Association, petitioner was appointed by
elected President of the Association of
the President of the Philippines as a
Barangay Councils, he is deemed to have
member of the City’s Sangguniang
ipso facto ceased to be such member when
Panlungsod. On 27 March 1984, petitioner
he filed his certificate of candidacy for the
filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the 14
14 May 1984 Batasan elections.
May 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections for
Misamis Occidental under the banner of the The Supreme Court dismissed the petition
Mindanao Alliance. He was not successful in and denied the writs prayed for, holding
the said election. Invoking Section 13(2), that there was no grave abuse of discretion
Article 5 of BP 697, petitioner informed on the part of the officials; without costs.
Vice-Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes, Presiding
Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, Capati v. Ocampo [GR L-28742, 30
that he was resuming his duties as member April 1982]
of that body. The matter was elevated to Second Division, Escolin (p): 4 concur, 2 on
the Minister of Local Government Jose A. leave.
Roño, who ruled that since petitioner is an
appointive official, he is deemed to have Facts: Virgilio Capati, a resident of Bacolor,
resigned from his appointive position upon Pampanga was the contractor of the Feati
the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy. Bank for the construction of its building in
Iriga, Camarines Sur. On 23 May 1967,
Capati entered into a sub-contract with the

46
Dr. Jesus Ocampo, a resident of Naga City, the CFI Naga. They merely agreed to
whereby the latter, in consideration of the submit their disputes to the said court,
amount of P2,200.00, undertook to without waiving their right to seek recourse
construct the vault walls, exterior walls and in the court specifically indicated in Section
columns of the said Feati building in 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court (See
accordance with the specifications related case in Nicolas v. Reparations
indicated therein. Ocampo further bound Commission: “May” is not mandatory).
himself to complete said construction on or Since the complaint has been filed in the
before 5 June 1967. Ocampo, however, was CFI Pampanga, where the plaintiff resides,
only able to finish the construction on 20 the venue of action is properly laid in
June 1967. accordance with Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court.
Due to the delay, Capati filed in the CFI
Pampanga an action for recovery of Alfon v. Republic [GR L-51201, 29 May
consequential damages (Civil Case 3188) in 1980]
the sum of P85,000.00 with interest, plus Second Division, Abad Santos (p): 4 concur
attorney’s fees and costs. Ocampo filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the Facts: Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
ground that venue of action was improperly Duterte was born on 15 May 1952 at the
laid. The motion was premised on the UST Hospital to Filomeno Duterte and
stipulation printed at the back of the Estrella. She was registered at the Local
contract which provides that all actions Civil Registrar’s Office as Maria Estrella
arising out, or relating to this contract may Veronica Primitiva Duterte. On 15 June
be instituted in the CFI of the City of Naga. 1952, she was baptized as Maria Estrella
The lowe court dismissed the complaint. Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the St.
Hence the appeal. Anthony de Padua Church, Singalong,
Manila. Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte
The Supreme Court set aside the appealed has been taken cared of by Mr. and Mrs.
order, and ordered the return of the records Hector Alfon. She lived in Mandaluyong for
to the court of origin for further 23 years with her uncle, Hector Alfon. When
proceedings, with costs against defendant- Maria Estrella started schooling, she used
appellee Ocampo. the name Estrella S. Alfon. She attended
her first grade up to fourth year high school
1. Where personal actions may be at Stella Maris College using the name
filed Estrella S. Alfon. After graduating from high
The rule on venue of personal actions school she enrolled at the Arellano
cognizable by the CFI is found in Section University and finished Bachelor of Science
2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, which in Nursing. Her scholastic records from
provides that such actions may be elementary to college show that she was
commenced and tried where the defendant registered by the name of Estrella S. Alfon.
or any of the defendants resides or may be Petitioner has exercised her right of
found, or where the plaintiff or any of the suffrage under the same name. She has not
plaintiffs resides, at the election of the committed any felony or misdemeanor.
plaintiff. Said section is qualified by Section
3 of the same rule, providing that by She filed a verified petition on 28 April
written agreement of the parties the venue 1978 praying that her name be changed
of an action may be changed or transferred from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
from one province to another. Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon. The CFI (Branch
XXIII) partially denied petitioner’s prayer on
2. “May” only permissive 29 December 1978, granting the change of
The word “may” is merely permissive and first name but not the surname.
operates to confer discretion upon a party.
Under ordinary circumstances, the term The Supreme Court modified the appealed
“may be” connotes possibility; it does not order in as much as that petitioner is
connote certainty. “May” is an auxillary allowed to change not only her first name
verb indicating liberty, opportunity, but also her surname so as to be known as
permission or possibility. In the case at bar, Estrella S. Alfon; without costs.
the stipulation as to venue in the contract
in question is simply permissive. By the 1. Principally is not equivalent to
said stipulation, the parties did not agree to exclusively
file their suits solely and exclusively with The word “principally” as used in article

47
364 of the Civil Code is not equivalent to probation. A motion for reconsideration was
“exclusively” so that there is no legal likewise denied. Hence the instant petition.
obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child
should choose to use the surname of its The Supreme Court granted the probation
mother to which it is equally entitled. In the and directed the judge to give due course
case at bar, the lower court erred in to the petitioner’s application for probation;
reasoning that as legitimate child of without costs.
Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she
should principally use the surname of her 1. “Previous” applies to date of
father. conviction, not to date of commission
of a crime
2. Grounds for change of name The statute relates “previous” to the date
The following may be considered, among of conviction, not to the date of the
others, as proper or reasonable causes that commission of the crime. When the
may warrant the grant of a petitioner for accused applied for probation he had no
change of name; (1) when the name is previous conviction by final judgment.
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is When he applied for probation the only
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; conviction against him was the judgment
(2) when the request for change is a which was the subject of his application.
consequence of a change of status, such as Conviction does not retroact to the day of
when a natural child is acknowledged or the commission of the crime.
legitimated; and (3) when the change is
necessary to avoid confusion (1 Tolentino
660, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed;
Haw Liong v. Republic). In the case at bar,
to avoid confusion, the petition of name
should be granted as the petitioner has
been using the name of Estrella S. Alfon
since childhood.

Rura v. Lopena [GR L-69810-14, 19

June 1985]
Second Division, Abad Santos (p): 5 concur

Facts: Teodulo Rura was accused, tried and

convicted of five (5) counts of estafa
committed on different dates in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-
Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol, denominated as
Criminal Case 523, 524, 525, 526 and 527.
The 5 cases were jointly tried and a single
decision was rendered on 18 August 1983.
Rura was sentenced to a total prison term
of 17 months and 25 days. In each criminal
case the sentence was 3 months and
fifteen 15 days.

Rura appealed to the RTC Bohol but said

court affirmed the decision of the lower
court. When the case was remanded to the
court of origin for execution of judgment,
Rura applied for probation. The application
was opposed by a probation officer of Bohol
on the ground that Rura is disqualified for
probation under Section 9 (c) of PD 968 or
the Probation Law (i.e. applicable to those
who have previously been convicted by
final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than 1 month and
1 day and/or a fine of not less than P200).
The court denied the application for

48