CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., VS ENRICO participate.

The contest fails to exhibit any discernible

PALOMAR in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER consideration which would brand it as a lottery. The scheme
GENERAL does not only appear to be, but actually is, a gratuitous
CONSTRUCTION distribution of property by chance.
The term “gift enterprise” is commonly applied to
Facts: a sporting artifice under which good are sold for their
market value but by way of inducement each purchaser is
In the year 1960, Caltex conceived and laid the given a chance to win a prize. As thus conceived , the term
groundwork for a promotional scheme calculated to drum clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar, for as already
up patronage for its oil products. Denominated “Caltex noted, there is no sale of anything to which the chance
Hooded Pump Contest”, it calls for participants therein to
offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser.
estimate the actual number of litters a hooded gas pump at
each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. We hold that under the prohibitive provisions of
For the privilege to participate, no fee or consideration is the Postal Law, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein
required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products required contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they
to be made. involve the element of consideration. We rule that the
petitioner may not be denied the use of the mails for
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only purposes thereof.
as amongst the media for publicising the contest but also for
the transmission of communications relative thereto,
representations were made by Caltex with postal authorities
for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing. Caltex,
justify its position that the contest, there being no THE ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC
consideration on the part of any contestant, was not under ADMINISTRATOR PF DAVAO INC.,Vs THE
any controlling authorities, condemnable as a lottery. LAND REGOSTRATION COMMISSION and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY
Postmaster general declined to grant the requested CONSTRUCTION
clearance maintaining that the contest involves
consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a “gift Facts:
enterprise” which is equally banned by the Postal Law under
Section 1982. Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of
the City of Davao, executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land
Issue: located in the same city covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 2263 in favor of the Roman Catholic
Should construction be employed in this case in Administrator of Davao, Inc., a corporation sole organized
order to ascertain if the contest violates the provisions of and existing in accordance with Philippine laws, with Msgr.
the Postal Law? Clovis Thibault, a Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent.
Held: Then the deed of sale was presented to the Register of
Deeds of Davao for registration, the latter required said
Yes. Construction of law is in order if what is in corporation sole to submit an affidavit declaring that 60%
issue is an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words of the members thereof were Filipino citizens.
used in a certain law. Construction is the art or process of
discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of The corporation failed to produce such document
the law with respect to its application of a given case, where on the reason that the totality of the Catholic population of
that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by Davao would become the owner of the property sought to
reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly be registered.
provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws). In view of the provisions of SEC 1 & 5 of Art XIII
The term ‘lottery’ extends to all schemes for the of the Philippine Constitution, the vendee was not qualified
distributions, prize, concerts, raffles at fair, etc., and various to acquire private lands in the Philippines in the absence of
forms of gambling. The three essential elements of lottery proof that at least 60% of the capital, property, or assets of
are (1) consideration; (2) prize; and (3) chance. Nowhere in the Roman Catholic Administrator of Davao, Inc., was
the rules of the said contest any requirement that any fee be actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens
paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered,
or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to
Issue: Is the corporation sole, Roman Catholic Apostolic existence or not of a vested right becomes unquestionably
Administrator of Davao, Inc., qualified to acquire and hold immaterial.
agricultural lands in the Philippines?
Thus, the Roman Catholic Administrator of Davao,
Ruling: Inc., is qualified.
A corporation sole is a special form of corporation
usually associated with the clergy. Conceived and
introduced into the common law by sheer necessity, this
legal creation was designed to facilitate the exercise of the
functions of ownership carried on by the clerics for and on
behalf of the church which was regarded as the property
owner.
According to our Corporation Law, Public Act No.
1459, a corporation sole is organized and composed of a
single individual, the head of any religious society or church,
for the administration of the temporalities of such society
or church. By “temporalities” is meant estate and properties
not used exclusively for religious worship.
In drafting the present Article XIII of the
Constitution, the delegates were goaded by the desire (1) to
insure their conservation for Filipino posterity; (2) to serve
as an instrument of national defense, helping prevent the
extension into the country of foreign control through
peaceful economic penetration; and (3) to prevent making
the Philippines a source of international conflicts with the
consequent danger to it internal security and independence.
It has been shown that: (1) the corporation sole,
unlike the ordinary corporation which are formed by no less
than 5 incorporators, is composed of only one person,
usually the head or bishop of the diocese, a unit which is not
subject to expansion for the purpose of determining any
percentage whatsoever; (2) the corporation sole is only the
administrator and not the owner of the temporalities located
in the territory comprised by said corporation sole; (3) such
temporalities are administered for and on behalf of the
faithful residing in the diocese or territory of the
corporation sole; and (4) the latter, as such, has no
nationality and the citizenship of the incumbent Ordinary
has nothing to do with the operation, management or
administration of the corporation sole, nor affects the
citizenship of the faithful connected with their respective
diocese or corporation sole.
In view of these peculiarities of the corporation
sole, it would seem obvious that when the specific provision
of the constitution invoked by respondent Commissioner
was under consideration, the framers did not have in mind
or overlooked this particular form of corporation. If it were
so, as the facts and circumstances already indicated tend to
prove it to be s, then the inescapable conclusion would be
that this requirement of at least 60% of Filipino capital was
never intended to apply to corporations sole, and the
CITY OF BAGUIO, REFORESTATION It will be noted that the title of RA 931, heretofore
ADMINISTRATION, FRANCISCO JOAQIN, JR., transcribe, authorizes “the filing in the proper court, under
and TERESITA J. BUCHHOLZ VS HON. PIO R. certain conditions, of certain claims of title to parcels of land
MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of that have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial
Baguio, BELONG LUTES and the HONOROBLE decisions rendered within the forty years preceding the approval
COURT OF APPEALS. of this Act.” The body of the statute however, in its Section
PURPOSE OF CONSTRUCTION 1, speaks of parcels of land that “have been, or about to be
declared land of the public domain, by virtue of judicial
Facts: preceding the approval of this Act”. There thus appears to
On April 12, 1912, the cadastral proceedings be seeming inconsistency between title and body.
sought to be reopened, Civil Reservation Case No. 1.
When engaged in the task of construing an obscure
GLRO Record No. 211, Baguio Townsite, were instituted expression in the law, or where exact or literal rendering of
by the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of the words would not carry out the legislative intent, the title
Baguio those declared public lands by final decision
thereof may be resorted to in the ascertainment of
rendered in that case in November 13, 1922. congressional well. The reason is that the title of the law may
On July 25, 1962, respondent Belong Lutes properly be regarded as an index of or clue or guide to
petitioned the cadastral court to reopen said Civil legislative intention.
Reservation Case No. 1 as to the parcel of land he claims. The title now under scrutiny possesses the strength
His prayer was that the land be registered in his name upon of clarity and positiveness. It recites that it authorizes court
the grounds that: (1) he and his predecessors have been in proceedings of claims to parcels of land declared public land
actual, open, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession “by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty
and cultivation of the land since the Spanish times, or before years next preceding the approval of this Act.” That the title
July 26, 1894, paying the taxes thereon; and (2) his is written in “capital letter” – by congress itself; such kind
predecessors were illiterate Igorots without personal notice of a title then “is not to be classed with words or titles used
of the cadastral proceedings aforestated and were not able by compilers of statutes” because “it is the legislature
to file their claim to the land in question within the statutory speaking”. Accordingly, it is not hard to come to a
period. deduction that the phrase last quoted from RA 931 – “by
Private petitioners Francisco G. Joaquin, Sr., virtue of judicial decisions rendered” – was but
Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita J. Buchholz inadvertently from the body. Parting from this premise,
registered opposition to the reopening on the ground that there is, at bottom no contradiction between title and body.
they are tree farm lessees upon agreements executed by the In line with views herein stated, the title belongs to that type
Bureau of Forestry in their favor. The City of Baguio of titles which should be regarded as part of the rules or
likewise opposed the reopening. provisions expressed in the body.

Issue: Does the cadastral court have power to reopen the Thus, the court allowed the reopening of the case.
cadastral proceedings upon the application of respondents
Lutes?
Ruling:
MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION
Controlling statute: RA 931, effective June 20, 1953 (MCC)
“AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE Vs SSANGYONG CORPORATION
FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, PURPOSE OF CONSTRUCTION
UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF
CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO Facts:
PARCELS OF LAND HAVE BEEN Petitioner MCC, a domestic corporation with office
DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY at Binondo, Manila, is engaged in the business of importing
VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its suppliers
RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY is the Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong), and
YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE international trading company with head office in Seoul,
APPROVAL OF THIS ACT.” South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City,
Philippines. The two corporations conducted business
through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy
transmissions. Ssangyong would send the pro forma electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram,
invoices containing the details of the steel product order to telex or telecopy.
MCC; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative
The phrase “but not limited to, electronic data
affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to
interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or
Ssangyong, again by fax.
telecopy” in the IRR’s definition of “electronic data
Ssangyong filed a civil action for damages due to message” is copied from the Model Law on Electronic
breach of contract against defendants MCC before the RTC Commerce adopted by the United Nations Commission on
of Makati City when the defendants refused to open the International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), from which
Letter of Credit (L/C) in th amount of US$170,000.00 for majority of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792 were taken.
remaining 100MT steel under Pro Forma invoices Nos. While Congress deleted this phrase in the Electronic
ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2. Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of the IRR reinstated
it. The deletion by Congress of the said phrase is significant
After Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a
and pivotal.
Demurer to Evidence alleging that Ssangyong failed to
present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on Moreover, when Congress formulated the term
which the civil action was based. Petitioner contends that “electronic data message”, it intended the same meaning as
the photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented by the term “electronic record” in the Canada law. This
respondent Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their construction of the term “electronic data message”, which
supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in evidence and excludes telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes,
do not fall within the ambit of RA 8792, because the law is in harmony with the Electronic Commerce Law’s focus
merely admits as best evidence the original fax transmittal. on “paperless” communications and the “functional
On the other hand, respondent posits that, from a reading equivalent approach” that it espouses. Facsimile
of the law and the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the transmissions are not, in this sense, “paperless”, but verily
original facsimile transmittal of the pro forma invoice is are paper based.
admissible in evidence since it is an electronic document
In an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists
and, therefore, the best evidence under the law and the
an original paper-based information or data that is scanned,
Rules. Respondent further claims that the photocopies of
sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving
these fax transmittals (specifically ST2-POSTS0401-1and
end. … In a virtual or paperless environment, technically,
ST2-POSTS0401-2) are admissible under the Rules on
there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts
Evidence because the respondent sufficiently explained the
of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are
non-production of the original fax transmittals.
considered as originals. Ineluctably, the law¡¯s definition of
“electronic data message”, which, as aforesaid, is
interchangeable with “electronic document”, could not have
Issue: Is the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile
included facsimile transmissions, which have an original
transmissions are electronic evidence and admissible as
paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy
such?
as received. These two copies are distinct from each other
and have different legal effects. While Congress anticipated
Ruling: future developments in communications and computer
technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the early
Electronic document shall be regarded as the forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and telecopy
equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer
Rule, as long as it is a printout or output readable by sight development as compared to the ordinary fax machine to
or other means, showing to reflect the data accurately. Thus, fax machine transmission), when it defined the term
to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message “electronic data message”.
or to be considered as the functional equivalent of an
original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the The terms “electronic data message” and
writing must foremost be an “electronic data message” or “electronic document”, as defined under the Electronic
an “electronic document”. Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile
transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional
R.A. No. 8792 defines the Electronic Data Message refers equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and
to information generated, sent, received or stored by is not admissible as electronic evidence.
electronic, optical or similar means, but not limited to,
GARCIA VS SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM HELD
WHEN CONSTRUCTION IS RESORTED TO
FACTS While the Court of Appeals Decision provided that
Section 28(f) refers to the liabilities pertaining to penalty for
Petitioner Immaculada L. Garcia, Eduardo de the non-remittance of SSS employee contributions, holding
Leon, Ricardo de Leon, Pacita Fernandez, and Consuelo that it is distinct from the amount of the supposed SSS
Villanueva were directors of Impact Corporation. The remittances, petitioner mistakenly concluded that Section
corporation was engaged in the business of manufacturing 28(f) is applicable only to penalties and not to the liability of
aluminum tube containers and operated two factories. One the employer for the unremitted premium contributions.
was a “slug” foundry-factory located in Cuyapo, Nueva Clearly, a simplistic interpretation of the law is untenable. It
Ecija, while the other was an Extrusion Plant in Cainta, is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the
Metro Manila, which processed the “slugs” into aluminum statute must be interpreted with reference to the context,
collapsible tubes and similar containers for toothpaste and i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered
other related products. Impact Corporation started together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
encountering financial problem around 1978.in 1983, it filed general intent of the whole enactment.23 The liability
with Securities and Exchange Commission a petition for imposed as contemplated under the foregoing Section 28(f)
Suspension of Payments. In 1985, the union of the of the Social Security Law does not preclude the liability for
corporation filed a notice of strike with the Ministry of the unremitted amount. Relevant to Section 28(f) is Section
Labor which subsequently certified the labor dispute to the 22 of the same law.
National Labor Relations Commission in an order and
noted the inability of Impact Corporation to pay wages. The The spirit rather than the letter of a law
company is directed to pay all the entitled workers unpaid determines construction of a provision of law. It is a
wages, unpaid 13th month pay and to remit to the Social cardinal rule in statutory construction that in interpreting
Security System loan amortizations and SSS premiums the meaning and scope of a term used in the law, a careful
previously deducted from the wages of the workers. In July review of the whole law involved, as well as the intendment
1985, SSS filed a case before the SSC for the collection of of the law, must be made. Nowhere in the provision or in
unremitted SSS premium contribution withheld by Impact the Decision can it be inferred that the persons liable are
from its employees. SSC ordered the investigating team of absolved from paying the unremitted premium
SSS to determine if it can still file its claim for unpaid contributions.
premium contributions against the petitioner under the Where the language of a statute is vague and
petition for Suspension of payments. The petition for ambiguous, an interpretation thereof is resorted to. An
suspension of payments was later on dismissed. interpretation thereof is necessary in instances where a
The amounts sought to be collected totaled literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd
P453,845.78 and P10,856.85 for the periods August 1980 to or would lead to an injustice.
December 1984 and August 1981 to July 1984, respectively,
and the penalties for late remittance at the rate of 3% per
month from the date the contributions fell due until fully
paid pursuant to Section 22(a) of the Social Security Law,12 FLORESCA, et al. Vs PHILEX MINING
as amended, in the amounts of P49,941.67 and CORPORATION
P2,474,662.82. Petitioner filed with SSC a motion to dismiss WHEN CONSTRUCTION IS RESORTED TO
on the grounds of prescription but was denied. In 2003, SSC
ruled in favor of SSS and declared petitioner liable to pay FACTS:
unremitted contributions and penalties. Petitioner moved
Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees
for reconsideration but was also denied. She then elevated
of PHILEX Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as
the case to CA. CA applying Section 28 (f) of the Social
Philex), who, while working at its copper mines
Security Law ruled against the petitioner.
underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967,
ISSUE: died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels
of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex,
Whether or not petitioner, as the only surviving in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently
director of Impact Corporation, can be made solely liable and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for
for the corporate obligations of Impact Corporation the protection of the lives of its men working underground.
pertaining to unremitted SSS premium contributions and
penalties.
 That for sometime prior and up to June 28,1967, out that workmen's compensation refers to liability for
the defendant PHILEX, with gross and reckless compensation for loss resulting from injury, disability or
negligence and imprudence and deliberate failure to death of the working man through industrial accident or
take the required precautions for the due protection disease, without regard to the fault or negligence of the
of the lives of its men working underground at the employer, while the claim for damages under the Civil
time, and in utter violation of the laws and the rules Code which petitioners pursued in the regular court, refers
and regulations duly promulgated by the to the employer's liability for reckless and wanton
Government pursuant thereto… negligence resulting in the death of the employees and for
which the regular court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the
Out of 48 mine workers who were then working at same.
PHILEX’s mine, 5 were able to escape; 22 were
rescued within 7 days; 21 were left mercilessly to
their fate, notwithstanding the fact that up to then,
a great many of them were still alive, entombed in ISSUE:
the tunnels of the mine, but were not rescued due Whether the lower court erred in failing to
to defendant PHILEX’s decision to abandon distinguish between the claims for damages under the Civil
rescue operations, in utter disregard of its bounden Code and claims for compensation under the Workmen’s
legal and moral duties in the premises. Compensation Act.
A motion to dismiss was filed by Philex alleging HELD:
that the cause of action of petitioners based on an industrial
accident are covered by the provisions of the Workmen’s Yes, the lower court erred in failing to distinguish
Compensation Act and that the former CFI has no between the claims for damages under the Civil Code and
jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed an opposition claims for compensation under the Workmen’s
dated May 27, 1968 to the said motion to dismiss claiming Compensation Act.
that the causes of action are not based on the provisions of It should be underscored that petitioners'
the Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of complaint is not for compensation based on the Workmen's
the Civil Code allowing the award of actual, moral and Compensation Act but a complaint for damages. Petitioners
exemplary damages. did not invoke the provisions of the Workmen's
The respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation
of jurisdiction and ruled that in accordance with the thereunder. In fact, no allegation appeared in the complaint
established jurisprudence, the Workmen's Compensation that the employees died from accident arising out of and in
Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over damage the course of their employments.
or compensation claims for work-connected deaths or In the present case, there exists between Philex
injuries of workmen or employees, irrespective of whether and the deceased employees a contractual relationship.
or not the employer was negligent, adding that if the The alleged gross and reckless negligence and deliberate
employer's negligence results in work-connected deaths or failure that amount to bad faith on the part of Philex,
injuries, the employer shall, pursuant to Section 4-A of the constitute a breach of contract for which it may be held
Workmen's Compensation Act, pay additional liable for damages.
compensation equal to 50% of the compensation fixed in
the Act. The rationale in awarding compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act differs from that in giving
In the first assignment of error, petitioners argue damages under the Civil Code. The compensation acts are
that the lower court has jurisdiction over the cause of action based on a theory of compensation distinct from the
since the complaint is based on the provisions of the Civil existing theories of damages, payments under the acts being
Code on damages, particularly Articles 2176, 2178, 1173, made as compensation and not as damages. Compensation
2201 and 2231, and not on the provisions of the Workmen's is given to mitigate the harshness and insecurity of industrial
Compensation Act. life for the workman and his family. Hence, an employer is
In the second assignment of error, petitioners liable whether negligence exists or not since liability is
asseverate that respondent Judge failed to see the distinction created by law. Recovery under the Act is not based on any
between the claims for compensation under the Workmen's theory of actionable wrong on the part of the employer.
Compensation Act and the claims for damages based on In other words, under the compensation acts, the
gross negligence of Philex under the Civil Code. They point employer is liable to pay compensation benefits for loss of
income, as long as the death, sickness or injury is work- Constitution and re-stated as a declaration of basic policy in
connected or work-aggravated, even if the death or injury is Article 3 of the New Labor Code,
not due to the fault of the employer. On the other hand,
damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the Art. 3. Declaration of basic policy.—The State shall
afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure
wrongful invasion of his rights. It is the indemnity
recoverable by a person who has sustained injury either in equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or
his person, property or relative rights, through the act or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and
employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to
default of another.
self-organization, collective bargaining, security of
The claim of petitioners that the case is not tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.
cognizable by the Workmen's Compensation Commission
The aforestated constitutional principles as
then, now Employees Compensation Commission, is
strengthened by the fact that unlike in the Civil Code, the implemented by the aforementioned articles of the
Workmen's Compensation Act did not contain any New Civil Code cannot be impliedly repealed by
the restrictive provisions of Article 173 of the New
provision for an award of actual, moral and exemplary
damages. What the Act provided was merely the right of the Labor Code. Section 5 of the Workmen's
heirs to claim limited compensation for the death plus burial Compensation Act, predecessor of Article 173 of
expenses, and medical expenses when incurred, and an the New Labor Code, has been superseded by the
additional compensation of only 50% if the complaint aforestated provisions of the New Civil Code, a
alleges failure on the part of the employer to "install and subsequent law, which took effect on August 30,
maintain safety appliances or to take other precautions for 1950, which obey the constitutional mandates of
the prevention of accident or occupational disease”. In the social justice enhancing as they do the rights of the
case at bar, the amount sought to be recovered is over workers as against their employers. Article 173 of
and above that which was provided under the the New Labor Code seems to diminish the rights
Workmen's Compensation Act and which cannot be of the workers and therefore collides with the social
granted by the Commission. justice guarantee of the Constitution and the liberal
provisions of the New Civil Code.
DIFFERENT HELD:
The guarantees of social justice embodied
Contrary to the perception of the dissenting in Sections 6, 7 and 9 of Article II of the 1973
opinion, the Court does not legislate in the instant case. Constitution are statements of legal principles to be
The Court merely applies and gives effect to the applied and enforced by the courts.
constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured
by Section 5 of Article 11 and Section 6 of Article XIV of The aforequoted provisions of Section
the 1935 Constitution, and now by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, before
and after it was amended, limited the right of
Article 11 of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
AND STATE POLICIES of the 1973 Constitution, as recovery in favor of the deceased, ailing or
amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, injured employee to the compensation
2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil provided for therein. Said Section 5 was not
Code of 1950. accorded controlling application by the
Supreme Court in the 1970 case of Pacana vs.
The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the Cebu Autobus Company (32 SCRA 442) when
State to "promote social justice to insure the dignity, welfare, and WE ruled that an injured worker has a choice of
security of all the people "... regulate the use ... and disposition of private either to recover from the employer the fixed
property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits amount set by the Workmen's Compensation Act
"establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services in, the field or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the
of education, health, housing, employment, welfare and social tortfeasor for greater damages; but he cannot
security to guarantee the enjoyment by the people of a decent standard pursue both courses of action simultaneously.
of living" (Sections 6 and 7, Art. II, 1973 Constitution); "...
afford protection to labor, ... and regulate the relations between workers It is therefore patent that giving effect to
and employers ..., and assure the rights of workers to ... just and the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as
humane conditions of work". implemented by the provisions of the New Civil
Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-
The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates
labor institutionalized in Section 9 of Article 11 of the 1973
of the fundamental law and the implementing they can do so only interstitially they are confined
legislation aforementioned. from molar to molecular motions. "
The Court, to repeat, is not legislating in To make a rule of conduct applicable to an
the instant case. individual who but for such action would be free
from it is to legislate yet it is what the judges do
It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can whenever they determine which of two competing
override a constitutional provision. principles of policy shall prevail.
The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act and of Article 173 of the New
Labor Code subvert the rights of the petitioners as
surviving heirs of the deceased mining employees.
Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and
Article 173 of the New Labor Code are
retrogressive; because they are a throwback to the
obsolete laissez-faire doctrine of Adam Smith
enunciated in 1776 in his treatise Wealth of Nations
which has been discarded soon after the close of
the 18th century due to the Industrial Revolution
that generated the machines and other mechanical
devices for production and transportation which
are dangerous to life, limb and health.
"Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of
the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit
of the law insures man's survival and ennobles
him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of
the law killeth; its spirit giveth life."
In the rhetoric of Justice Frankfurter, "the
courts breathe life, feeble or strong, into the inert
pages of the Constitution and all statute books."
It should be stressed that the liability of the
employer under Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act or Article 173 of the New Labor
Code is limited to death, ailment or injury caused
by the nature of the work, without any fault on the
part of the employers. It is correctly termed no fault
liability. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, as amended, or Article 173 of the New Labor
Code, does not cover the tortious liability of the
employer occasioned by his fault or culpable
negligence in failing to provide the safety devices
required by the law for the protection of the life,
limb and health of the workers.
Justice Cardozo warned that: "Sometimes
the conservatism of judges has threatened for an
interval to rob the legislation of its efficacy. ...
Precedents established in those items.” Justice
Holmes delivered the coup de grace when he
pragmatically admitted, although with a cautionary
undertone: "that judges do and must legislate, but
D. EXECUTIVE CONSTRUCTION Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshop, Inc. (hereafter Lhuillier)
PAFLU VS BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS demanding payment of deficiency percentage tax. Lhuillier
filed an administrative protest, contending, inter alia, that
pawnshops are different from lending investors, which are
FACTS: subject to the 5% percentage tax under the specific
provision of the Tax Code. Its protest having been unacted
On February 27, 1976, Philippine Blooming Mills
Company, Inc. held a certification election on who would upon, Lhuillier with the CTA which declared the RMO’s in
be the exclusive bargaining agent of all its employees. The question null and void insofar as they classify pawnshops as
National Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) won, lending investors subject to 5% percentage tax.
with 429 votes as against the 419 votes of the Philippine ISSUE:
Association of Free Labor unions (PAFLU). 4 votes were
cast wherein no union was preferred. The Director of Labor Whether or not the RMOs in question are valid
Relations, Carmelo Noriel, then certified NAFLU as the
exclusive bargaining agent of Philippine Blooming Mills HELD:
Company, Inc.’s employees.
NO. There are two kinds of administrative
Despite winning by a majority, which is what is issuances: the legislative rule and the interpretative rule. A
require under the Rules and Regulations implementing the legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation,
Labor Code, to be the sole and exclusive bargaining agent, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing
PAFLU sought to invoke the doctrine in Allied Workers the details thereof. An interpretative rule, on the other hand,
Association of the Philippines vs. Court of Industrial is designed to provide guidelines to the law which the
Relations, wherein spoiled ballots should be counted in administrative agency is in charge of enforcing
determining the valid votes cast. As there were 17 spoiled
ballots, PAFLU argued that there was grave abuse of When an administrative rule is merely interpretative
discretion by Director Noriel in certifying NAFLU. in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare
Issue: issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what
the law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other
W/N the construction placed by the Director of Labor hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing
Relations in certifying NAFLU is valid for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome
Held: the implementation of the law but substantially increases the
burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord
Yes. at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and
The principle that the contemporaneous thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is
construction of a statute by the executive officers of the given the force and effect of law.
government, whose duty it is to execute it, is entitled to great RMO No. 15-91 and RMC No. 43-91 cannot be
respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of
viewed simply as implementing rules or corrective measures
the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our
jurisprudence that no authorities need be cited to support it revoking in the process the previous rulings of past
(Pennoyer v. McConnaughy). Courts will and should respect Commissioners. Specifically, they would have been
the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by amendatory provisions applicable to pawnshops. Without
the executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it, and these disputed CIR issuances, pawnshops would not be
unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous will ordinarily liable to pay the 5% percentage tax, considering that they
be controlled thereby. were not specifically included in Section 116 of the NIRC
of 1977, as amended. In so doing, the CIR did not simply
interpret the law. The due observance of the requirements
D. EXECUTIVE CONSTRUCTION of notice, hearing, and publication should not have been
ignored
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS
MICHEL J. LHUILLIER PAWNSHOP
D. EXECUTIVE CONSTRUCTION
D. EXECUTIVE CONSTRUCTION
FACTS:
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AND THE
Revenue Memorandum Orders (RMOs) were DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE DISTRICT
issued imposing a 5% lending investor’s tax on pawnshop. COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF SUBIC vs.
Pursuant to this, the BIR issued an assessment against HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION
 Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court
is free to make three inquiries: (i) whether the rule is within
FACTS: the delegated authority of the administrative
On November 7, 2003, petitioner Commission on agency; (ii) whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether it was
Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under the Memorandum, issued pursuant to proper procedure. But the court is not
for tariff purposes, wheat would be classified according to free to substitute its judgment as to the desirability or
(1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation
of discharge. Depending on these factors, wheat then would of administrative judgment, has committed those questions
be classified either as food grade or feed grade. The to administrative judgments and not to judicial judgments.
corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for feed In the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into
grade, 7%. the validity but into the correctness or propriety of the rule.
As a matter of power a court, when confronted with an
On December 19, 2003, respondent filed a petition interpretative rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the
for Declaratory Relief contending that CMO 27-2003 was rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme and substitute its
issued without following the mandate of the Revised judgment; or (iii) give some intermediate degree of
Administrative Code on public Participation, prior notice, authoritative weight to the interpretative rule.
and publication or registration with the University of the
Philippines Law Center with regard to its importation of Petitioner Commissioner of Customs also went
Chinese milling wheat in transit from China. beyond his powers when the regulation limited the customs
Petitioners thereafter filed Motion to Dismiss, officer’s duties mandated by Section 1403 of the Tariff and
alleging that the CMO No. 27-2003 was an internal Customs Law, as amended.
administrative rule and not legislative in nature.
The provision mandates that the customs officer
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent must first assess and determine the classification of the
declaring the CMO 27-2003 INVALID and OF NO imported article before tariff may be imposed.
FORCE AND EFFECT on the ground that petitioners had Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified the
not followed the basic requirements of hearing and article even before the customs officer had the chance to
publication. examine it. In effect, petitioner Commissioner of Customs
diminished the powers granted by the Tariff and Customs
The appellate court dismissed the appeal and held Code with regard to wheat importation when it no longer
that, since the regulation affected substantial rights of required the customs officer’s prior examination and
petitioners and other importers, petitioners should have assessment of the proper classification of the wheat.
observed the requirements of notice, hearing and
publication.
It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which
ISSUE: are the product of a delegated power to create new and
additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should
Is the CMO No. 27-2003 valid? be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the
RULING: legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that
the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of
No, the Commissioner of Customs went beyond the law; and that it be not in contradiction to, but in
his power of delegated authority when the regulation limited conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.
the powers of customs officer to examine and assess
imported products. Petitioner Commissioner of Customs went beyond
his powers of delegated authority when the regulation
in Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. limited the powers of the customs officer to examine and
Department of Finance Secretary,17 we said: assess imported articles.

xxx [A] legislative rule is in the nature of

subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC. VS
legislation by providing the details thereof. xxx SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION
D. EXECUTIVE CONSTRUCTION
In addition such rule must be published. On the
other hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide
guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in FACTS:
charge of enforcing.
On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission
issued Circular No. 22 requiring all employers to include in
the Employee’s remuneration (salary) all bonuses and In the case at bar, Circular No. 22 of the Social Security
overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of Commission purports merely to advise employers-
remuneration (service). members of the System of what, in th light of the
amendment of the law, they should include in determining
Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling
the monthly compensation of their employees upon which
Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security the social security contributions should be based. It did not
Commission in effect protesting against the circular as add any duty or detail that was not already in the law as
contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7 dated October
amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of
7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the the Commission as to how the law should be construed.
computation of the employer’s and employees’ respective Such circular, therefore, did not require presidential
monthly premium contributions. approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its
Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for effectivity.
lack of authority on the part of the Social Security The Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the against appellant. So ordered. In favor with Social Security
President and for lack of publication in the Official Commission. Costs against Victoria’s Milling
Gazette. Company.
ISSUE:
W/N Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation, as
contemplated in Section 4 (a) of Republic Act 1161
empowering the Social Security Commission “to adopt,
amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions and purposes of this Act.”
RULING:
There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an
administrative rule or regulation and an administrative
interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to
an administrative body.

When an administrative agency promulgates rules and

regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect
of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a
statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law.
Rules and regulations when promulgated may be enforced
by a penal sanction provided therein. This is so because
statutes are usually couched in general terms, after
expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and
sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the
manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the
administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement.

In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are
the product of a delegated power to create new or additional
legal provisions that have the effect of law.
A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure
fixed for its promulgation is followed, and its scope is
within the statutory authority granted by the legislature,
even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy
stated therein or its innate wisdom. On the other hand,
administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely
advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the
law means.
ENDENCIA VS DAVID ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION;
E. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION G.R. No. L-45081;
July 15, 1936
E. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION
FACTS:
Facts:
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590, which contained a Petitioner Jose Angara and respondents Pedro Ynsua,
provision that removed all income tax exemptions of public Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted
officers, including that of judges. for the position of member of the National Assembly for
the first district of the Province of Tayabas in the September
17, 1395 election. Petitioner was proclaimed to be a
Justices Endencia and Jugo of the Court of Appeals filed a
member-elect of the National Assembly by the Provincial
case to declare it unconstitutional before the CFI of Manila.
Board of Canvassers. Thereafter, petitioner took his oath.
The CFI of Manila ruled in their favor and declared the said
provision unconstitutional. It also ordered the Collector of
The National Assembly passed a Resolution, confirming
Internal Revenue, Saturno David, to refund the income tax
proclamation of Angara. Ynsua filed before the respondent
collected from the magistrates.
Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the
election of petitioner, and praying that said respondent be
Citing Perfecto v. Meer, the trial court declared that the declared elected member, or that the election of said
collection of income taxes was a diminution of magistrates’ position be nullified.
compensation. This allegedly violated Sec. 9, Article VIII of
the 1935 Constitution, which states that “members of the The respondent denied petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the
Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall receive Protest." Petitioner argues that: the Constitution confers
compensation will not be diminished during their exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely
continuance in the office.” as regards the merits of contested elections to the National
Assembly, and that the Constitution excludes from said
jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of said
The Solicitor General argued that the Republic Act was election contests, which power has been reserved to the
promulgated precisely because of the unfavorable reception Legislative Department of the Government or the National
of the ruling in Perfecto v. Meer. Assembly.

ISSUE: The Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in

behalf of the respondent, interposing the special defense
W/N Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional that the Commission has been created by the Constitution
as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department invested
HELD: with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the
NO. election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of
The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day for the
collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, presentation of protests against the election of any member
specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after of the National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and
the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise. in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted it by
“Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential
the legislative branch may not limit or restrict the power to carry out the powers and functions conferred upon the
same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its resolution
granted to the courts by the Constitution.
of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner
Congress’ enactment of the RA 590 clearly to dismiss the election protest in question, and declaring
manifests that it has a different interpretation of of the itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it
constitutional provision. This act, however, violates the acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions
as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the
doctrine of the separation of powers among the branches of
Commonwealth Government, and hence said act is beyond
the governmentis and invades the well-defined and the judicial cognizance or control of the Supreme Court,
established province and jurisdiction of the judiciary, which among others.
is that of interpreting and applying the laws and the
Constitution. Petitioner prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of
injunction against the Commission, which petition was
denied "without passing upon the merits of the case."
Issues: Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A.
1. Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction
over the Electoral Commission Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly
2. Whether or not the Electoral Commission shall on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing
take cognizance of the controversy protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the
Held: members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing
Yes to both issues. The court has jurisdiction over of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral
the Electoral Commission with regard to the Commission might prescribe.
determination of the character, scope, and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as
"the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly." MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
G.R. No. 88211;
September 15, 1981
The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its E. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION
totality all the powers previously exercised by the National
Assembly in matters pertaining to contested elections of its Facts:
members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. The Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from
express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission the presidency via the non-violent “people power”
is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his
National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines
upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire
Constitution. Therefore, the incidental power to consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of stability of government is threatened from various
its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the
directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the
move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the
National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary
return of Marcos and his family.
implication to have been lodged also in
the Electoral Commission. Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible
threats & following supervening events:
In the case at bar, it appears that on Dec. 9, 1935,
1. Failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos
the Electoral Commission met for the first time and
leaders
approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the
filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National 2. Channel 7 taken over by rebels and loyalists

Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming 3. Plan of Marcoses to return with mercenaries
the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, aboard a chartered plane of Lebanese arms dealer.
the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither To prove that they can stir trouble from afar
does it appear that said body had actually been 4. Honasan’s failed coup
organized. 5. Communist insurgency movements
6. Secessionist movements in Mindanao
The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate 7. Devastated economy because of the accumulation
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take of foreign debt and plunder of nation by Marcos
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro
and his cronies
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which
order the respondents to issue them their travel documents is not forbidden in the Constitution, inevitable to vest
and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s discretionary powers on the President, and that the
decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. president has to maintain peace during times of emergency
Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.
country. He also questioned the claim of the President that
The rights that the Marcoses are invoking are not absolute.
the decision was made in the interest of national security,
They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The
public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the
request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
President acted outside her jurisdiction.
Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and
right to life, liberty, property without due process and equal the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case
protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them law which clearly never contemplated situations even
of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as
3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order. a matter that is appropriately addressed to those
Issues: residual unstated powers of the President which are
1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty
granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
Philippines welfare. In that context, such request or demand should
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of
excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the the President to determine whether it must be granted or
return of the marcoses to the Philippines poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare. denied.
Held:
For the second issue, the question for the court to determine
No to both issues.
is whether or not there exist factual basis for the President
Separation of power dictates that each department has to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the
exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that
1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening
vested in the President of the Philippines.” However, it does events that happened before her decision are factual.
not define what is meant by “executive power” although in The President must take preemptive measures for the
the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by self-preservation of the country & protection of the
the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive people. She has to uphold the Constitution.
departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the
laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons… Although the constitution
outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES VS
ZAMORA;
exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not G.R. No. 141284;
stated in the Constitution which include the power to August 15, 2000
E. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION
protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged
to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance Facts:
national interest. Residual powers, according to Theodore
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, under Section 18, Article privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to
VII of the Constitution, as commander in chief of the impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment
Armed Forces of the Philippines, directed the AFP Chief of and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual
Staff and the PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress
the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to and review by the Court.
assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or
lawless violence in Metro Manila in the light of the escalating In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full
cases of crime and lawlessness in the city. discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out
the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to
The President declared that the services of the Marines in show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual
the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy
for a reasonable period only, until such time when the
burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that
situation shall have improved.
there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.
Subsequently, the IBP filed a special civil action for The Court disagrees to the contention that by the
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law
temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of
constitutional grounds the order of President Estrada
the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not
commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines to
join the Philippine National Police in visibility patrols constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
around the metropolis, called as the Task Force Tulungan. calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military
assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces
Issues: are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the
1. Whether or not the President’s factual real authority belonging to the PNP.
determination of the necessity of calling the armed
forces is subject to judicial review Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP
2. Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to does not unmake the civilian character of the police force.
assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military.
over the military and the civilian character of the Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as
PNP members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to
civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the
Held: Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the
civilian character of the PNP.
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely
vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT
NETWORK, INC. VS ANTI-TERRORISM
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
COUNCIL
habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of
G.R. No. 178552;
the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such October 5, 2010
equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or E. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION
review of the President’s action to call out the armed
forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a Facts:
different category from the power to declare martial law and Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, otherwise
otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have known as the Human Security Act. Petitioners assail for
simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the
revocation and review without any qualification. definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 (the
Human Security Act of 2007) in that terms like “widespread
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace” and
powers highlights the intent to grant the President the “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand”
widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no
call out because it is considered as the lesser and more standard to measure the prohibited acts.
benign power compared to the power to suspend the
Issues:
 1. Whether or not the petitioners met the requisites of them, three years after its effectivity, belies any claim of
power of judicial review so as to prosper the imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-
petition called tagging.
2. Whether or not RA 9371 is vague and broad in
defining the crime of terrorism On the second issue, before a charge for terrorism may be
filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime
Held: actually committed to trigger the operation of the key
No to both issues. qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime,
including the coercion of the government to accede to an
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first element,
limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an any attempt at singling out or highlighting the
actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess communicative component of the prohibition cannot re-
locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be categorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of The doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case. find no application in the present case since these
doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
requisites, which are the most essential, renders the
discussion of the last two superfluous. Locus standi or
legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.

For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional

question, it must show that (1) it has personally suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely
to be redressed by a favorable action.

Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of

being suspected "communist fronts" by the government,
especially the military; whereas individual petitioners
invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine
and their status as citizens and taxpayers.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three

material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common
and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3)
it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction
of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts
may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.
Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts
evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one
not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1)
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by
resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questionable.

No ground was properly established by petitioners for

the taking of judicial notice. Petitioners’ apprehension is
insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific
charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against