G.R. No. 175540. April 7, 2014.*

DR. FILOTEO A. ALANO, petitioner, vs. ZENAIDA
MAGUD­LOGMAO, respondent.

Civil Law; Damages; Organ Transplants; Permission or

authorization to retrieve and remove the internal organs of the
deceased was being given only if the provisions of the applicable
law had been complied with. Such instructions reveal that
petitioner acted prudently by directing his subordinates to exhaust
all reasonable means of locating the relatives of the deceased.—
Petitioner instructed his subordinates to “make certain” that “all
reasonable efforts” are exerted to locate the patient’s next of kin,
even enumerating ways in which to ensure that notices of the
death of the patient would reach said relatives. It also clearly
stated that permission or authorization to retrieve and remove
the internal organs of the deceased was being given ONLY IF the
provisions of the applicable law had been complied with. Such
instructions reveal that petitioner acted prudently by directing
his subordinates to exhaust all reasonable means of locating the
relatives of the deceased. He could not have made his directives
any clearer. He even specifically mentioned that permission is
only being granted IF the Department of Surgery has complied
with all the requirements of the law. Verily, petitioner could not
have been faulted for having full confidence in the ability of the
doctors in the Department of Surgery to comprehend the
instructions, obeying all his directives, and acting only in
accordance with the requirements of the law.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Burden of Proof; Preponderance of
Evidence; In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making
allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of
evidence.—It is respondent’s failure to adduce adequate evidence
that doomed this case. As stated in Otero v. Tan, 678 SCRA 583
(2012), “[i]n civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making
allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of
evidence. The parties must rely on the strength of their own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense offered by
their opponent.” Here, there is to proof that, indeed, the period of
around 24 hours from the time
_______________ 

* THIRD DIVISION.

666

notices were disseminated, cannot be considered as reasonable

under the circumstances. They failed to present any expert
witness to prove that given the medical technology and knowledge
at that time in the 1980’s, the doctors could or should have waited
longer before harvesting the internal organs for transplantation.
Civil Law; Damages; Organ Transplants; Internal organs of
the deceased were removed only after he had been declared brain
dead; thus, the emotional pain suffered by respondent due to the
death of her son cannot in any way be attributed to petitioner.—
Finding petitioner liable for damages is improper. It should be
emphasized that the internal organs of the deceased were
removed only after he had been declared brain dead; thus, the
emotional pain suffered by respondent due to the death of her son
cannot in any way be attributed to petitioner. Neither can the
Court find evidence on record to show that respondent’s emotional
suffering at the sight of the pitiful state in which she found her
son’s lifeless body be categorically attributed to petitioner’s
conduct.
LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review
on Certiorari; View that as a general rule, only questions of law
are to be considered in a petition for review under Rule 45.—As a
general rule, only questions of law are to be considered in a
petition for review under Rule 45. There are, however, recognized
exceptions to the rule, one of which is when “the Court of Appeals
fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered,
will justify a different conclusion x x x.”
Civil Law; Quasi­Delicts; View that in order to be actionable,
the act should have been committed with the intention of injuring
the plaintiff or was committed recklessly or negligently or one
which, even when done with the proper care, held such high risk
for injury to others that it will be presumed by law to be
actionable.—In cases involving quasi­delict and torts, the plaintiff
complains that the acts of a defendant caused him or her injury.
In order to be actionable, the act should have been committed
with the intention of injuring the plaintiff or was committed
recklessly or negligently or one which, even when done with the
proper care, held such high risk for injury to others that it will be
presumed by law to be actionable.
 667

Same; Same; View on the elements of quasi­delicts.—The

elements of a quasi­delict are: (1) an act or omission; (2) the
presence of fault or negligence in the performance or non­
performance of the act; (3) injury; (4) a causal connection between
the negligent act and the injury; and (5) no pre­existing
contractual relation. Jurisprudence, however, specifies four (4)
essential elements: “(1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4)
proximate causation.”
Same; Same; Human Relations; View that Article 19 of the
Civil Code is the general rule which governs the conduct of human
relations.—Article 19 is the general rule which governs the
conduct of human relations. By itself, it is not the basis of an
actionable tort. Article 19 describes the degree of care required so
that an actionable tort may arise when it is alleged together with
Article 20 or Article 21.
Same; Same; Damages; Organ Transplants; Doctrine of
Informed Consent; View that the Supreme Court ruled that
liability may arise in cases where the physician fails to obtain the
consent of the patient before performing any medical procedure.—
The doctrine of informed consent was introduced in this
jurisdiction only very recently in Dr. Li v. Spouses Soliman, 651
SCRA 32 (2011). This court ruled that liability may arise in cases
where the physician fails to obtain the consent of the patient
before performing any medical procedure, thus: The doctrine of
informed consent within the context of physician­patient
relationships goes far back into English common law. As early as
1767, doctors were charged with the tort of “battery” (i.e., an
unauthorized physical contact with a patient) if they had not
gained the consent of their patients prior to performing a surgery
or procedure. In the United States, the seminal case was
Schoendorff v. Society of New York Hospital which involved
unwanted treatment performed by a doctor. Justice Benjamin
Cardozo’s oft­quoted opinion upheld the basic right of a patient to
give consent to any medical procedure or treatment: “Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon
who performs an operation without his patient’s consent, commits
an assault, for which he is liable in damages.” From a purely
ethical norm, informed consent evolved into a general
principle of law that a physician has a duty to disclose
what a reasonably prudent physician in the medical
community in the exercise of reasonable care would
disclose
 668

to his patient as to whatever grave risks of injury might be

incurred from a proposed course of treatment, so that a
patient, exercising ordinary care for his own welfare, and
faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment,
or alternative treatment, or none at all, may intelligently
exercise his judgment by reasonably balancing the
probable risks against the probable benefits. Subsequently,
in Canterbury v. Spence[,] the court observed that the duty to
disclose should not be limited to medical usage as to arrogate the
decision on revelation to the physician alone. Thus, respect for the
patient’s right of self­determination on particular therapy
demands a standard set by law for physicians rather than one
which physicians may or may not impose upon themselves.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that those who consent to
using their organs upon their death for the benefit of another can
make their consent known prior to their death by following the
requirements of the law.—Those who consent to using their organs
upon their death for the benefit of another can make their consent
known prior to their death by following the requirements of the
law. Should a patient die prior to making his or her informed
consent known, the law provides a list of persons who may
consent on his or her behalf, that is, “substituted” informed
consent. Since the incident in this case occurred in 1988, Republic
Act No. 349, as amended by Republic Act No. 1056, is the law that
applies. Section 2 of the law states that: SEC. 2. The
authorization referred to in section one of this Act must: be in
writing; specify the person or institution granted the
authorization; the organ, part or parts to be detached, the specific
use or uses to which the organ, part or parts are to be employed;
and, signed by the grantor and two disinterested witnesses. If the
grantor is a minor or an incompetent person, the authorization
may be executed by his guardian with the approval of the court; in
default thereof, by the legitimate father or mother, in the order,
named. Married women may grant the authority referred to in
section one of this Act, without the consent of the husband. After
the death of the person, authority to use human organs or any
portion or portions of the human body for medical, surgical or
scientific purposes may also be granted by his nearest relative or
guardian at the time of his death or in the absence thereof, by the
person or head of the hospital, or institution having custody of the
body of the deceased: Provided, however, That the said person
or head of the hospital

669
or institution has exerted reasonable efforts to locate the
aforesaid guardian or relative. A copy of every such
authorization must be furnished the Secretary of Health.

Same; Same; Same; Same; View that consent to organ

retrieval after the patient’s death may be given first and foremost
by the patient’s nearest relative or guardian at the time of death. It
is only in the event that these relatives cannot be contacted despite
reasonable efforts that the head of the hospital or institution
having custody of the body may give consent for organ retrieval on
behalf of the patient.—Under this law, consent to organ retrieval
after the patient’s death may be given first and foremost by the
patient’s nearest relative or guardian at the time of death. It is
only in the event that these relatives cannot be contacted despite
reasonable efforts that the head of the hospital or institution
having custody of the body may give consent for organ retrieval on
behalf of the patient. Failing this, liability for damages arises.
Considering that Republic Act No. 349, as amended, does not
provide a remedy in case of violation, an application of the
doctrine of informed consent vis­à­vis Article 20 of the Civil Code
may give rise to an action for damages. In this case, Dr. Alano
must first be shown to have acted willfully and negligently to the
damage and prejudice of Zenaida.

Same; Same; Negligence; Words and Phrases; View that

negligence has been defined by law as the failure to observe, for the
protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury.—Negligence has been
defined by law as “[t]he failure to observe, for the protection of the
interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury.”

Same; Same; Organ Donations; View that the organ retrieval

performed by the National Kidney Institute cannot be termed as
“disrespect to the dead.” Organ donation is allowed by law. A
sterile medical operation surely is not tantamount to grave robbery
or mutilation.—The lower courts are also in agreement that Dr.
Alano did not cause the death of Zenaida’s son. Neither is this
case analogous to any of the situations mentioned in the
provision. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, this situation
is also not covered by Article 309 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 309. Any person who

670
shows disrespect to the dead, or wrongfully interferes with a
funeral shall be liable to the family of the deceased for damages,
material and moral. The organ retrieval performed by the
National Kidney Institute cannot be termed as “disrespect to the
dead.” Organ donation is allowed by law. A sterile medical
operation surely is not tantamount to grave robbery or mutilation.

Same; Damages; Exemplary Damages; View that since

Zenaida has not proven her claim to moral damages, she is also
not entitled to exemplary damages.—Since Zenaida has not proven
her claim to moral damages, she is also not entitled to exemplary
damages. Article 2234 of the Civil Code provides: Article 2234.
While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved,
the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages before the court may consider the
question of whether or not exemplary damages should be
awarded.

Same; Same; Quasi­Delicts; Attorney’s Fees; View that since

the award of exemplary damages is not justified, there is no reason
to award attorney’s fees, in accordance with Article 2208 of the
Civil Code.—Since the award of exemplary damages is not
justified, there is no reason to award attorney’s fees, in
accordance with Article 2208 of the Civil Code, which allows the
award of attorney’s fees only “when exemplary damages are
awarded.”

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Pelaez, Gregorio, Gregorio & Lim for petitioner.
  Manuel Mendoza for respondent.

 
PERALTA, J.:
This deals with the Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the
Decision[1] of the

_______________
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon, with Associate
Justices Aurora Santiago­Lagman and Arcangelita Romilla­Lontok,
concurring; Rollo, pp. 71­96.

671
Court of Appeals (CA), dated March 31, 2006, adjudging
petitioner liable for damages, and the Resolution[2] dated
November 22, 2006, denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration thereof, be reversed and set aside.
The CA’s narration of facts is accurate, to wit:
Plaintiff­appellee Zenaida Magud­Logmao is the mother
of deceased Arnelito Logmao. Defendant­appellant Dr.
Filoteo Alano is the Executive Director of the National
Kidney Institute (NKI).
At around 9:50 in the evening of March 1, 1988, Arnelito
Logmao, then eighteen (18) years old, was brought to the
East Avenue Medical Center (EAMC) in Quezon City by
two sidewalk vendors, who allegedly saw the former fall
from the overpass near the Farmers’ Market in Cubao,
Quezon City. The patient’s data sheet identified the patient
as Angelito Lugmoso of Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong.
However, the clinical abstract prepared by Dr. Paterno F.
Cabrera, the surgical resident on­duty at the Emergency
Room of EAMC, stated that the patient is Angelito
[Logmao]. Dr. Cabrera reported that [Logmao] was drowsy
with alcoholic breath, was conscious and coherent; that the
skull x­ray showed no fracture; that at around 4:00 o’clock
in the morning of March 2, 1988, [Logmao] developed
generalized seizures and was managed by the neuro­
surgery resident on­duty; that the condition of [Logmao]
progressively deteriorated and he was intubated and ambu­
bagging support was provided; that admission to the
Intensive Care Unit (ICU) and mechanical ventilator
support became necessary, but there was no vacancy at the
ICU and all the ventilator units were being used by other
patients; that a resident physician of NKI, who was
rotating at EAMC, suggested that [Logmao] be transferred
to NKI; and that after arrangements were made, [Logmao]
was transferred to NKI at 10:10 in the morning.
At the NKI, the name Angelito [Logmao] was recorded
as Angelito Lugmoso. Lugmoso was immediately attended
to and given the necessary medical treatment. As Lugmoso
had no relatives around, Jennifer B. Misa, Transplant
Coordinator, was asked to locate his family by enlisting
police and media assistance. Dr. Enrique T. Ona, Chairman
of the Department of Surgery, observed that the severity

_______________
[2] Id., at pp. 98­101.

672
of the brain injury of Lugmoso manifested symptoms of
brain death. He requested the Laboratory Section to
conduct a tissue typing and tissue cross­matching
examination, so that should Lugmoso expire despite the
necessary medical care and management and he would be
found to be a suitable organ donor and his family would
consent to organ donation, the organs thus donated could
be detached and transplanted promptly to any compatible
beneficiary.
Jennifer Misa verified on the same day, March 2, 1988,
from EAMC the identity of Lugmoso and, upon her request,
she was furnished by EAMC a copy of the patient’s date
sheet which bears the name Angelito Lugmoso, with
address at Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong. She then contacted
several radio and television stations to request for air time
for the purpose of locating the family of Angelito Lugmoso
of Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong, who was confined at NKI
for severe head injury after allegedly falling from the
Cubao overpass, as well as Police Station No. 5, Eastern
Police District, whose area of jurisdiction includes Boni
Avenue, Mandaluyong, for assistance in locating the
relatives of Angelito Lugmoso. Certifications were issued
by Channel 4, ABS­CBN and GMA attesting that the
request made by the NKI on March 2, 1988 to air its appeal
to locate the family and relatives of Angelito Lugmoso of
Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong was accommodated. A
Certification was likewise issued by Police Station No. 5,
Eastern Police District, Mandaluyong attesting to the fact
that on March 2, 1988, at about 6:00 p.m., Jennifer Misa
requested for assistance to immediately locate the family
and relatives of Angelito Lugmoso and that she followed up
her request until March 9, 1988.
On March 3, 1988, at about 7:00 o’clock in the morning,
Dr. Ona was informed that Lugmoso had been pronounced
brain dead by Dr. Abdias V. Aquino, a neurologist, and by
Dr. Antonio Rafael, a neurosurgeon and attending
physician of Lugmoso, and that a repeat
electroencephalogram (EEG) was in progress to confirm the
diagnosis of brain death. Two hours later, Dr. Ona was
informed that the EEG recording exhibited a flat tracing,
thereby confirming that Lugmoso was brain dead. Upon
learning that Lugmoso was a suitable organ donor and that
some NKI patients awaiting organ donation had blood and
tissue types compatible with Lugmoso, Dr. Ona inquired
from Jennifer Misa whether the relatives of Lugmoso had
been located so that the necessary consent for organ
donation could be obtained. As the extensive search for the
relatives of Lugmoso
673

yielded no positive result and time being of the essence in

the success of organ transplantation, Dr. Ona requested
Dr. Filoteo A. Alano, Executive Director of NKI, to
authorize the removal of specific organs from the body of
Lugmoso for transplantation purposes. Dr. Ona likewise
instructed Dr. Rose Marie Rosete­Liquete to secure
permission for the planned organ retrieval and
transplantation from the Medico­Legal Office of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), on the assumption
that the incident which lead to the brain injury and death
of Lugmoso was a medico legal case.
On March 3, 1988, Dr. Alano issued to Dr. Ona a
Memorandum, which reads as follows:
 

This is in connection with the use of the human

organs or any portion or portions of the human body of
the deceased patient, identified as a certain Mr.
Angelito Lugmoso who was brought to the National
Kidney Institute on March 2, 1988 from the East
Avenue Medical Center.
As shown by the medical records, the said patient died
on March 3, 1988 at 9:10 in the morning due to
craniocerebral injury. Please make certain that your
Department has exerted all reasonable efforts to locate the
relatives or next of kin of the said deceased patient such as
appeal through the radios and television as well as through
police and other government agencies and that the NBI
[Medico­Legal] Section has been notified and is aware of the
case.
If all the above has been complied with, in accordance
with the provisions of Republic Act No. 349 as amended and
P.D. 856, permission and/or authority is hereby given to the
Department of Surgery to retrieve and remove the kidneys,
pancreas, liver and heart of the said deceased patient and to
transplant the said organs to any compatible patient who
maybe in need of said organs to live and survive.

 
A Certification dated March 10, 1988 was issued by Dr.
Maximo Reyes, Medico­Legal Officer of the NBI, stating
that he received a telephone call from Dr. Liquete on
March 3, 1988 at 9:15 a.m. regarding the case of Lugmoso,
who was declared brain dead; that despite efforts to locate
the latter’s relatives, no one responded;
674

that Dr. Liquete sought from him a second opinion for

organ retrieval for donation purposes even in the absence
of consent from the family of the deceased; and that he
verbally agreed to organ retrieval.
At 3:45 in the afternoon of March 3, 1988, a medical
team, composed of Dr. Enrique Ona, as principal surgeon,
Drs. Manuel Chua­Chiaco, Jr., Rose Marie Rosete­Liquete,
Aurea Ambrosio, Ludivino de Guzman, Mary Litonjua,
Jaime Velasquez, Ricardo Fernando, and Myrna Mendoza,
removed the heart, kidneys, pancreas, liver and spleen of
Lugmoso. The medical team then transplanted a kidney
and the pancreas of Lugmoso to Lee Tan Hoc and the other
kidney of Lugmoso to Alexis Ambustan. The transplant
operation was completed at around 11:00 o’clock in the
evening of March 3, 1988.
On March 4, 1988, Dr. Antonio R. Paraiso, Head of the
Cadaver Organ Retrieval Effort (CORE) program of NKI,
made arrangements with La Funeraria Oro for the
embalmment of the cadaver of Lugmoso good for a period of
fifteen (15) days to afford NKI more time to continue
searching for the relatives of the latter. On the same day,
Roberto Ortega, Funeral Consultant of La Funeraria Oro,
sent a request for autopsy to the NBI. The Autopsy Report
and Certification of Post­Mortem Examination issued by
the NBI stated that the cause of death of Lugmoso was
intracranial hemorrhage secondary to skull fracture.
On March 11, 1988, the NKI issued a press release
announcing its successful double organ transplantation.
Aida Doromal, a cousin of plaintiff, heard the news aired on
television that the donor was an eighteen (18) year old boy
whose remains were at La Funeraria Oro in Quezon City.
As the name of the donor sounded like Arnelito Logmao,
Aida informed plaintiff of the news report.
It appears that on March 3, 1988, Arlen Logmao, a
brother of Arnelito, who was then a resident of 17­C San
Pedro Street, Mandaluyong, reported to Police Station No.
5, Eastern Police District, Mandaluyong that the latter did
not return home after seeing a movie in Cubao, Quezon
City, as evidenced by a Certification issued by said Station;
and that the relatives of Arnelito were likewise informed
that the latter was missing. Upon receiving the news from
Aida, plaintiff and her other children went to La Funeraria
Oro, where they saw Arnelito inside a cheap casket.
675

On April 29, 1988, plaintiff filed with the court a quo a

complaint for damages against Dr. Emmanuel Lenon,
Taurean Protectors Agency, represented by its Proprietor,
Celso Santiago, National Kidney Institute, represented by
its Director, Dr. Filoteo A. Alano, Jennifer Misa, Dr.
Maximo Reyes, Dr. Enrique T. Ona, Dr. Manuel Chua­
Chiaco, Jr., Dr. Rose Marie O. Rosete­Liquete, Dr. Aurea Z.
Ambrosio, Dr. Ludivino de Guzman, Dr. Mary Litonjua, Dr.
Jaime Velasquez, Dr. Ricardo Fernando, Dr. Myrna
Mendoza, Lee Tan Koc, Alexis Ambustan, Dr. Antonio R.
Paraiso, La Funeraria Oro, Inc., represented by its
President, German E. Ortega, Roberto Ortega alias Bobby
Ortega, Dr. Mariano B. Cueva, Jr., John Doe, Peter Doe,
and Alex Doe in connection with the death of her son
Arnelito. Plaintiff alleged that defendants conspired to
remove the organs of Arnelito while the latter was still
alive and that they concealed his true identity.
On January 17, 2000, the court a quo rendered
judgment finding only Dr. Filoteo Alano liable for damages
to plaintiff and dismissing the complaint against the other
defendants for lack of legal basis.[3]
After finding petitioner liable for a quasi­delict, the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC) ordered
petitioner to pay respondent P188,740.90 as actual
damages; P500,000.00 as moral damages; P500,000.00 as
exemplary damages; P300,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
costs of suit. Petitioner appealed to the CA.
On March 31, 2006, the CA issued its Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
 

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED,

with MODIFICATION by DELETING the award of P188,740.90
as actual damages and REDUCING the award of moral damages
to P250,000.00, the award of exemplary damages to P200,000.00
and the award of attorney’s fees to P100,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[4]

_______________
[3] Id., at pp. 73­79. (Citations omitted)
 [4] Id., at p. 95. (Emphasis in the original)

 
 
676

Petitioner then elevated the matter to this Court via a

petition for review on certiorari, where the following issues
are presented for resolution:
A. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS
DISREGARDED EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE
PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT IN HOLDING PETITIONER DR. FILOTEO
ALANO LIABLE FOR MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE ACT OF THE PETITIONER IS NOT
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE NOR IS THERE ANY
FINDING THAT THE ACT OF THE PETITIONER WAS
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY OR
DAMAGE ALLEGEDLY SUSTAINED BY RESPONDENT
ZENAIDA MAGUD­LOGMAO.
B. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN REFUSING AND/OR FAILING TO DECLARE
THAT PETITIONER DR. ALANO ACTED IN GOOD
FAITH AND PURSUANT TO LAW WHEN HE ISSUED
THE AUTHORIZATION TO REMOVE AND RETRIEVE
THE ORGANS OF ANGELITO LUGMOSO (LATER
IDENTIFIED TO BE IN FACT ARNELITO LOGMAO)
CONSIDERING THAT NO NEGLIGENCE CAN BE
ATTRIBUTED OR IMPUTED ON HIM IN HIS
PERFORMANCE OF AN ACT MANDATED BY LAW.
C. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN AWARDING RESPONDENT ZENAIDA
MAGUD­LOGMAO MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES THAT ARE NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH AND ARE CONTRARY TO
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.[5]
The first two issues boil down to the question of whether
respondent’s sufferings were brought about by petitioner’s
alleged negligence in granting authorization for the
removal or retrieval of the internal organs of respondent’s
son who had been declared brain dead.
Petitioner maintains that when he gave authorization
for the removal of some of the internal organs to be
transplanted to other patients, he did so in accordance with
the letter of the
_______________
[5] Id., at pp. 408­409.

677

law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 349, as amended by

Presidential Decree (P.D.) 856, i.e., giving his subordinates
instructions to exert all reasonable efforts to locate the
relatives or next of kin of respondent’s son. In fact,
announcements were made through radio and television,
the assistance of police authorities was sought, and the
NBI Medico­Legal Section was notified. Thus, petitioner
insists that he should not be held responsible for any
damage allegedly suffered by respondent due to the death
of her son and the removal of her son’s internal organs for
transplant purposes.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding
that there was negligence on petitioner’s part when he
failed to ensure that reasonable time had elapsed to locate
the relatives of the deceased before giving the
authorization to remove said deceased’s internal organs for
transplant purposes. However, a close examination of the
records of this case would reveal that this case falls under
one of the exceptions to the general rule that factual
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate
court, are binding on this Court. There are some important
circumstances that the lower courts failed to consider in
ascertaining whether it was the actions of petitioner that
brought about the sufferings of respondent.[6]
The Memorandum dated March 3, 1988 issued by
petitioner, stated thus:
 

As shown by the medical records, the said patient died on

March 3, 1988 at 9:10 in the morning due to craniocerebral injury.
Please make certain that your Department has exerted all
reasonable efforts to locate the relatives or next­of­kin of
the said deceased patient, such as appeal through the radios
and television, as well as through police and other government
agencies and that the NBI [Medico­Legal] Section has been
notified and is aware of the case.

_______________
[6] E.Y. Industrial Sales, Inc. vs. Shen Dar Electricity and Machinery Co., Ltd.,
G.R. No. 184850, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 363.

 
 678

If all the above has been complied with, in accordance

with the provisions of Republic Act No. 349 as amended
and P.D. 856, permission and/or authority is hereby given
to the Department of Surgery to retrieve and remove the kidneys,
pancreas, liver and heart of the said deceased patient and to
transplant the said organs to any compatible patient who maybe
in need of said organs to live and survive.[7]

 
A careful reading of the above shows that petitioner
instructed his subordinates to “make certain” that “all
reasonable efforts” are exerted to locate the patient’s next
of kin, even enumerating ways in which to ensure that
notices of the death of the patient would reach said
relatives. It also clearly stated that permission or
authorization to retrieve and remove the internal organs of
the deceased was being given ONLY IF the provisions of
the applicable law had been complied with. Such
instructions reveal that petitioner acted prudently by
directing his subordinates to exhaust all reasonable means
of locating the relatives of the deceased. He could not have
made his directives any clearer. He even specifically
mentioned that permission is only being granted IF
the Department of Surgery has complied with all the
requirements of the law. Verily, petitioner could not have
been faulted for having full confidence in the ability of the
doctors in the Department of Surgery to comprehend the
instructions, obeying all his directives, and acting only in
accordance with the requirements of the law.
Furthermore, as found by the lower courts from the
records of the case, the doctors and personnel of NKI
disseminated notices of the death of respondent’s son to the
media and sought the assistance of the appropriate police
authorities as early as March 2, 1988, even before
petitioner issued the Memorandum. Prior to performing the
procedure for retrieval of the deceased’s internal organs,
the doctors concerned also

_______________
[7] Exhibits “19” and “33,” Records, p. 1019. (Emphasis supplied)

 
679
sought the opinion and approval of the Medico­Legal
Officer of the NBI.
Thus, there can be no cavil that petitioner employed
reasonable means to disseminate notifications intended to
reach the relatives of the deceased. The only question that
remains pertains to the sufficiency of time allowed for
notices to reach the relatives of the deceased.
If respondent failed to immediately receive notice of her
son’s death because the notices did not properly state the
name or identity of the deceased, fault cannot be laid at
petitioner’s door. The trial and appellate courts found that
it was the EAMC, who had the opportunity to ascertain the
name of the deceased, who recorded the wrong information
regarding the deceased’s identity to NKI. The NKI could
not have obtained the information about his name from the
patient, because as found by the lower courts, the deceased
was already unconscious by the time he was brought to the
NKI.
Ultimately, it is respondent’s failure to adduce adequate
evidence that doomed this case. As stated in Otero v. Tan,
[8] “[i]n civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making
allegations has the burden of proving them by a
preponderance of evidence. The parties must rely on the
strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness
of the defense offered by their opponent.”[9] Here, there is
to proof that, indeed, the period of around 24 hours from
the time notices were disseminated, cannot be considered
as reasonable under the circumstances. They failed to
present any expert witness to prove that given the medical
technology and knowledge at that time in the 1980’s, the
doctors could or should have waited longer before
harvesting the internal organs for transplantation.
Verily, the Court cannot, in conscience, agree with the
lower court. Finding petitioner liable for damages is
improper. It should be emphasized that the internal organs
of the de­

_______________
[8] G.R. No. 200134, August 15, 2012, 678 SCRA 583.
[9] Id., at p. 598.

680

ceased were removed only after he had been declared brain

dead; thus, the emotional pain suffered by respondent due
to the death of her son cannot in any way be attributed to
petitioner. Neither can the Court find evidence on record to
show that respondent’s emotional suffering at the sight of
the pitiful state in which she found her son’s lifeless body
be categorically attributed to petitioner’s conduct.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 2006, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint against
petitioner is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Abad and Mendoza, JJ.,

concur.
Leonen, J., See Concurring Opinion.

CONCURRING OPINION
“What you leave behind is not what is
engraved in stone monuments, but what is
woven in the lives of others.”
Pericles

LEONEN, J.:
On February 28, 2014, the Philippines broke the
Guinness World Record for the most number of people
signing up to be organ donors within an hour on a single
site. A total of 3,548 people trooped to the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines to pledge their organs as part
of the “I’m a Lifeline” campaign of the Philippine Network
for Organ Sharing under the Department of Health.[1]

_______________
[1] PH beat world record for most number of organ donors in one hour,
February 28, 2014, Philippine Daily Inquirer, <http://global­

681

This court is now faced with the opportunity to confront

the issues concerning organ donation and transplantation
for the first time since the procedure was introduced in this
country in 1983.
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the decision[2] of the Court of
Appeals dated March 31, 2006 and its resolution dated
November 22, 2006 in CA­G.R. CV No. 67399 entitled
Zenaida Magud­Logmao v. Dr. Emmanuel Lenon, et al. The
appellate court affirmed the decision[3] dated January 17,
2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
100, which found Dr. Filoteo A. Alano, then the Executive
Director of the National Kidney Institute,[4] liable for
damages to Zenaida Logmao.
The facts, as found by the lower courts, are as follows:
On March 1, 1988, at 9:50 p.m., Arnelito Logmao, 18
years old, was brought to the East Avenue Medical Center
in Quezon City by two sidewalk vendors who allegedly saw
him fall from the overpass near Farmer’s Market, Cubao.[5]
The security guards of the hospital noted in their blotter
that when he was admitted to the hospital, he was drunk.
[6] He gave his name as Arnelito Logmao and his address
as Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong.[7]
In the emergency room, Arnelito Logmao was conscious
and was interviewed by Dr. Paterno Cabrera, the duty resi­

_______________
nation.inquirer.net/99654/ph­beat­world­record­for­most­number­oforgan­
donors­in­one­hour> (visited April 3, 2014).
[2] Rollo, pp. 71­96, penned by Justice Marina L. Buzon and concurred
in by Justice Aurora Santiago­Lagman and Justice Arcangelita Romilla­
Lontok.
 [3] Id., at pp. 103­111, penned by Hon. Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo,
then the Presiding Judge of the Branch 100 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City.
 [4] This hospital is now known as the National Kidney and Transplant
Institute or NKTI.
 [5] Rollo, p. 73; CA Decision, p. 3.
 [6] Id., at p. 103; RTC Decision, p. 1.
 [7] Id.

682

dent physician.[8] The patient’s data sheet, prepared by Dr.

Cabrera, identified the patient as Angelito Lugmoso (and
not Arnelito Logmao) of Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong.[9] He
was subjected to an x­ray examination, but the
examination did not show him suffering from any skull
fractures or head injuries.[10]
At around 4:00 a.m. on March 2, 1988, the patient
developed generalized seizures, and his condition
progressively deteriorated.[11] Admission to the Intensive
Care Unit (ICU) and mechanical ventilatory support
became necessary, but there was no vacancy at the East
Avenue Medical Center ICU.[12] A resident physician at
National Kidney Institute, Dr. Emmanuel Lenon, who was
then conducting rounds at East Avenue Medical Center,
suggested that the patient be transferred to the National
Kidney Institute.[13] After arrangements were made, the
patient was transferred to the National Kidney Institute at
10:10 a.m. on the same day.[14]
When the patient arrived at the National Kidney
Institute, his name was recorded as Angelito Lugmoso.[15]
As the patient was admitted without any relatives by his
side, Jennifer B. Misa, Transplant Coordinator, was asked
to locate the patient’s family by enlisting police and media
assistance.[16] Dr. Enrique T. Ona, Chairman of the
Department of Surgery, observed that the patient’s brain
injury was so severe that it manifested symptoms of brain
death.[17] Upon his request, the Laboratory Section
conducted a tissue typing and tissue cross­

_______________
 [8] Id.
 [9] Id., at p. 73; CA Decision, p. 3.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Id., at p. 74.
[16] Id.
[17] Id.

 
683

matching examination on the patient.[18] The request was

done on the basis that if the deceased patient is found to be
a suitable organ donor and has his family’s consent, the
organs could be harvested and transplanted promptly to
any of the compatible beneficiaries.[19]
Jennifer Misa verified the identity of the patient with
the East Avenue Medical Center on the same day or March
2, 1988.[20] Upon her request, the hospital furnished her a
copy of the patient’s data sheet which bore the name
Angelito Lugmoso with Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong, as his
address.[21] She then contacted several radio and television
stations and requested for airtime in her search for the
family of Angelito Lugmoso.[22] Her request was granted by
Channel 4, ABS­CBN, and GMA.[23] Police Station No. 5,
Eastern Police District, Mandaluyong, issued a certification
attesting that on March 2, 1988, at about 6:00 p.m.,
Jennifer Misa requested for assistance to immediately
locate the family and relatives of Angelito Lugmoso and
that she followed up her request until March 9, 1988.[24]
On March 3, 1988 at about 7:00 a.m., Dr. Ona was
informed that the patient was pronounced brain dead by
Dr. Abdias V. Aquino, a neurologist, and Dr. Antonio
Rafael, the attending physician of the patient, and that
another electroencephalogram (EEG) was in progress to
confirm the diagnosis.[25] At about 9:00 a.m., Dr. Ona was
informed that the EEG recording showed a flat tracing,
confirming that the patient was brain dead.[26]

_______________
[18] Id.
[19] Id.
[20] Id.
[21] Id.
[22] Id.
[23] Id.
[24] Id., at p. 75; CA Decision, p. 5.
[25] Id.
[26] Id.

 
684

Upon learning that the patient was a suitable organ

donor and that there were some National Kidney Institute
patients who were compatible donees, Dr. Ona inquired
from Jennifer Misa whether the patient’s relatives have
been located so that the necessary consent for organ
donation could be obtained.[27]
Since no relatives of Angelito Lugmoso could be found
despite the ongoing search, Dr. Ona requested Dr. Filoteo
A. Alano, Executive Director of the National Kidney
Institute, to authorize the removal of specific organs from
the body for transplantation purposes.[28] Dr. Ona likewise
requested Dr. Rose Marie Rosete­Liquete to secure
permission from the National Bureau of Investigation’s
Medico­Legal Office for organ retrieval and
transplantation, on the assumption that the incident which
led to the death of the patient was a medico­legal case.[29]
 On March 3, 1988, Dr. Alano issued to Dr. Ona a
memorandum which states:
 

This is in connection with the use of the human organs or any

portion or portions of the human body of the deceased patient,
identified as a certain Mr. Angelito Lugmoso who was brought to
the National Kidney Institute on March 2, 1988 from the East
Avenue Medical Center.
As shown by the medical records, the said patient died on
March 3, 1988 at 9:10 in the morning due to craniocerebral injury.
Please make certain that your Department has exerted all
reasonable efforts to locate the relatives or next of kin of
the said deceased patient such as appeal through the
radios and television as well as through police and other
government agencies and that the NBI Medicolegal
Section has been notified and is aware of the case.
If all the above has been complied with, in accordance
with the provisions of Republic Act No. 349 as amended
and P.D. 856, permission and/or authority is hereby given
to the

_______________
[27] Id.
[28] Id.
[29] Id.

685

Department of Surgery to retrieve and remove the

kidneys, pancreas, liver and heart of the said deceased
patient and to transplant the said organs to any
compatible patient who maybe in need of said organs to
live and survive.[30] (Emphasis supplied)

 
Dr. Maximo Reyes, Medico­Legal Officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation, issued a certification dated March
10, 1988, stating that he received a telephone call from Dr.
Liquete on March 3, 1988 at 9:15 a.m. regarding the case.
[31] He certified that despite efforts to locate Angelito
Lugmoso’s relatives, no one responded. Dr. Liquete also
sought from Dr. Reyes a second opinion on organ donation
even in the absence of consent from the family of the
deceased patient, and Dr. Reyes verbally agreed to the
organ retrieval.[32]
 On March 3, 1988 at 3:45 p.m., a medical team led by
Dr. Ona removed the heart, kidneys, pancreas, liver, and
spleen of the deceased patient.[33] The medical team then
transplanted a kidney and the pancreas to Lee Tan Koc
and the other kidney to Alexis Ambustan.[34] The
transplant operation was completed around 11:00 p.m. on
the same day.[35]
On March 4, 1988, Dr. Antonio R. Paraiso, Head of the
Cadaver Organ Retrieval Effort (CORE) program of the
National Kidney Institute, made arrangements with La
Funeraria Oro for the embalming of the cadaver for up to
15 days to give the National Kidney Institute more time to
continue searching for the relatives of the deceased patient.
[36]
On March 11, 1988, the National Kidney Institute
issued a press release announcing its first successful
double organ

_______________
[30] Id., at p. 76; CA Decision, p. 6.
[31] Id., at pp. 76­77; CA Decision, pp. 6­7.
[32] Id., at p. 77; CA Decision, p. 7.
[33] Id.
[34] Id.
[35] Id.
[36] Id.

686

transplantation.[37] Aida Doromal, a relative of Arnelito’s

mother, Zenaida Logmao, saw the news on television that
the donor was an 18­year­old boy whose remains were laid
at La Funeraria Oro in Quezon City.[38] Since the name of
the donor sounded like Arnelito Logmao, Aida informed
Zenaida.[39] Upon receiving the news from Aida, Zenaida
and her other children went to La Funeraria Oro where
they were able to retrieve Arnelito’s body.[40]
On April 29, 1988, Zenaida filed with the Regional Trial
Court a complaint for damages against Dr. Lenon, Taurean
Protectors Agency, National Kidney Institute, Jennifer
Misa, Dr. Alano, Dr. Reyes, Dr. Ona, Dr. Liquete, the entire
medical team that conducted the transplant, Lee Tan Koc,
Alexis Ambustan, Dr. Paraiso, La Funeraria Oro, Dr.
Mariano B. Cueva, Jr., John Doe, Peter Doe, and Alex Doe
in connection with the death of her son, Arnelito.[41] She
alleged that all of them conspired to remove the organs of
Arnelito when he was still alive and that they concealed his
true identity.[42]
On January 17, 2000, the Regional Trial Court rendered
judgment[43] dismissing the complaint against all
defendants but finding Dr. Alano liable for damages. The
trial court found Dr. Alano negligent under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code for authorizing the retrieval of the deceased
patient’s organs without first exerting reasonable efforts to
locate his relatives, in direct violation of the law. According
to the trial court:

x x x. In the natural course of things, a search or inquiry of

anything requires at least two days of probing and seeking
to be actually considered as having made said earnest
efforts.

_______________
[37] Id., at p. 78; CA Decision, p. 8.
[38] Id.
[39] Id.
[40] Id.
[41] Id., at pp. 78­79.
[42] Id., at p. 79; CA Decision, p. 9.
[43] Id., at pp. 103­111.

687

But a one­day campaign, especially with regard to a subject

matter as important as a person’s disposal into the afterlife
certainly warrants a longer time for investigation. Indeed, what is
“reasonable” is a relative term, dependent on the attendant
circumstances of the case (Philippine Law Dictionary, citing
Katague vs. Lagana, CV 70164, March 7, 1986). Here, what was
involved was the detachment of the vital organs of plaintiff’s 18­
year[­]old son from his body without her knowledge and consent,
and which act was upon the authority issued by defendant Dr.
Alano as head of the hospital. The matter at hand was of a very
sensitive nature that an inquiry of less than one day cannot be
deemed as sufficient and reasonable to exculpate him from
liability. x x x.[44] (Emphasis supplied)

Dr. Alano appealed[45] the ruling with the Court of

Appeals.
 On March 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision[46] affirming the ruling of the Regional Trial Court
with modifications.
The appellate court deleted the award for actual
damages representing the expenses for autopsy fees, and
wake and funeral services, since Arnelito’s family would
have still incurred those expenses even if no organ retrieval
was done on the body.[47] It also deleted the award of
compensatory damages of P50,000.00 per organ retrieved
since it was not shown that Dr. Alano was the recipient of
the organ transplants or that he received any consideration
from the transplant patients.[48] Finally, it affirmed the
award of damages but reduced moral damages from
P500,000.00 to P250,000.00, exemplary damages from
P500,000.00 to P200,000.00, and attorney’s fees from
P300,000.00 to P100,000.00.[49]

_______________
[44] Id., at p. 106; RTC Decision, p. 4.
[45] Id., at pp. 112­144.
[46] Id., at pp. 71­96.
[47] Id., at p. 92; CA Decision, p. 22.
[48] Id.
[49] Id., at pp. 93­95; CA Decision, pp. 23­25.

 
688

Dr. Alano now comes before this court via a petition for
review on certiorari. He argues[50] that there was no legal
basis for the Court of Appeals to hold him liable for
damages since there was no finding that he was the
proximate cause of the injury or damage sustained by
Zenaida. He also argues that he acted in good faith and
pursuant to law when he issued the authorization for the
organ retrieval.
Thus, the issue before this court is whether Dr. Alano
should be held liable for his alleged negligence in
authorizing the removal and retrieval of Arnelito’s internal
organs without Zenaida’s consent.
I agree with the ponencia that Dr. Alano should not be
found liable, but I take this opportunity to further expound
on the issues presented to this court.
As a general rule, only questions of law are to be
considered in a petition for review under Rule 45. There
are, however, recognized exceptions to the rule, one of
which is when “the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a
different conclusion x x x.”[51]
Dr. Alano’s acts were not reckless, negligent or
unreasonable. It was not his acts that caused the alleged
injury to the deceased patient’s relatives. Considering the
circumstances that he had to face, the search he ordered for
the deceased patient’s relatives were all that ordinary
prudence required. His retrieval of the deceased patient’s
organs was done legally and after allowing a reasonable
time to lapse. The conclusions of the trial court and the
appellate court were, therefore, correctly reversed and set
aside.

_______________
[50] Id., at pp. 401­459, Memorandum for the petitioner.
[51] Spouses Alcazar v. Evelyn Arante, G.R. No. 177042, December 10,
2012, 687 SCRA 507, 516 [Per J. Peralta, Third Division], citing Vallacar
Transit, Inc. v. Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 281,
294 [Per J. Leonardo­De Castro, First Division].

689

The elements of a quasi­delict

In cases involving quasi­delict and torts, the plaintiff
complains that the acts of a defendant caused him or her
injury. In order to be actionable, the act should have been
committed with the intention of injuring the plaintiff or
was committed recklessly or negligently or one which, even
when done with the proper care, held such high risk for
injury to others that it will be presumed by law to be
actionable.
The lower courts are all in agreement that Dr. Alano’s
participation in the organ retrieval constituted a quasi­
delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code for which he
should be liable for damages.
This conclusion is erroneous.
Article 2176 may not be the proper legal basis for the
cause of action. This article defines a quasi­delict as:

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to

another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre­existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi­delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

 
 The elements of a quasi­delict are: (1) an act or omission;
(2) the presence of fault or negligence in the performance or
non­performance of the act; (3) injury; (4) a causal
connection between the negligent act and the injury; and
(5) no pre­existing contractual relation. Jurisprudence,
however, specifies four (4) essential elements: “(1) duty; (2)
breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate causation.”[52]
As a general rule, any act or omission coming under the
purview of Article 2176 gives rise to a cause of action under

_______________
[52] Garcia, Jr. v. Salvador, 547 Phil. 463, 470; 518 SCRA 568, 575
(2007) [Per J. Ynares­Santiago, Third Division]; Lucas v. Tuaño, 604 Phil.
98, 121; 586 SCRA 173, 199­200 (2009) [Per J. Chico­Nazario, Third
Division].

690

quasi­delict. This, in turn, gives the basis for a claim of

damages. Verily, Article 1157 of the Civil Code provides as
follows:

Article 1157. Obligations arise from:

(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi­contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi­delicts. (Emphasis supplied)

 
Article 2176 is not an all­encompassing enumeration of
all actionable wrongs which can give rise to the liability for
damages. Under the Civil Code, acts done in violation of
Articles 19, 20, and 21 will also give rise to damages. The
provisions state as follows:

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter
for the same.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Baksh v. Court of Appeals[53] elaborates on the distinctions:
x  x  x. Quasi­delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa
aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo­American
or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa
aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but
international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery,
false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the
Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible
for drafting the New Civil Code, inten­

_______________
[53]  G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993, 219 SCRA 115 [Per J. Davide, Third
Division].

691

tional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be

governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In
between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts
which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been
beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is
even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of
the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope
of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more
supple and adaptable than the Anglo­American law on
torts.[54] (Emphasis supplied)

 
Yuchengco v. Manila Chronicle Publishing
Corporation[55] further elaborates on tort based on the
concept of abuse of right:
 

The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of

the Civil Code provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.
This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in
the exercise of one’s rights as well as in the performance of its
duties, to wit: to act with justice; give everyone his due; and
observe honesty and good faith.
In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, it was elucidated that while Article 19 “lays down a
rule of conduct for the government of human relations and
for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a
remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages
under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.” The
Court said:

_______________
[54] Id., at pp. 127­128, citing Report of the Code Commission, pp. 161­162, and
A.M. TOLENTINO, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE

PHILIPPINES 72 (Vol. 1, 1985).

[55]  G.R. No. 184315, November 28, 2011, 661 SCRA 392 [Per J. Peralta,
Special Third Division].

692

One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is

the codification of “some basic principles that are to be observed
for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order.” [REPORT ON THE CODE
COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy
the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the
law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain
fundamental precepts which were “designed to indicate certain
norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience” and
which were also meant to serve as “guides for human conduct
[that] should run as golden threads through society, to the end
that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and
dominance of justice.” (Id.) Foremost among these principles is
that pronounced in Article 19 which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise
of one’s rights, but also in the performance of one’s duties.
These standards are the following: to act with justice; to
give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good
faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial
limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A
right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted
by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of
some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner
which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong
is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of
conduct for the government of

693

human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does

not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
Corollarily, Article 20 provides that “every person who,
contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another shall indemnify the latter for the same.” It speaks
of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law
which do not especially provide for its own sanction. When
a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the
standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible. Thus, if the provision does not
provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under
either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.
[56] (Emphasis supplied)

 
Article 19 is the general rule which governs the conduct
of human relations. By itself, it is not the basis of an
actionable tort. Article 19 describes the degree of care
required so that an actionable tort may arise when it is
alleged together with Article 20 or Article 21.
Article 20 concerns violations of existing law as basis for
an injury. It allows recovery should the act have been
willful or negligent. Willful may refer to the intention to do
the act and the desire to achieve the outcome which is
considered by the plaintiff in tort action as injurious.
Negligence may refer to a situation where the act was
consciously done but without intending the result which
the plaintiff considers as injurious.
Article 21, on the other hand, concerns injuries that may
be caused by acts which are not necessarily proscribed by
law. This article requires that the act be willful, that is,
that there

_______________
[65] Id., at pp. 402­403, citing GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona, 501 Phil.
153, 164; 462 SCRA 466, 479­480 (2005) [Per J. Carpio­Morales, Third
Division]; Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
257 Phil. 783; 176 SCRA 778 (1989) [Per J. Cortes, Third Division];
Manuel v. People, 512 Phil. 818, 847; 476 SCRA 461, 491­492 (2005) [Per
J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].

694

was an intention to do the act and a desire to achieve the

outcome. In cases under Article 21, the legal issues revolve
around whether such outcome should be considered a legal
injury on the part of the plaintiff or whether the
commission of the act was done in violation of the
standards of care required in Article 19.
Article 2176 covers situations where an injury happens
through an act or omission of the defendant. When it
involves a positive act, the intention to commit the outcome
is irrelevant. The act itself must not be a breach of an
existing law or a pre­existing contractual obligation. What
will be considered is whether there is “fault or negligence”
attending the commission of the act which necessarily
leads to the outcome considered as injurious by the
plaintiff. The required degree of diligence will then be
assessed in relation to the circumstances of each and every
case.
Article 2176 should not have been the basis for the cause
of action in this case. Rather, it should have been Article
20, which is applicable when there is a violation of law.
The law that is applicable is the third paragraph of
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 349,[57] as amended by
Republic Act No. 1056,[58] which provides for a way to
determine substituted informed consent for deceased
patients for purposes of organ donation.

_______________
[57] Entitled “AN ACT TO LEGALIZE PERMISSIONS TO USE HUMAN ORGANS OR

ANY PORTION OR PORTIONS OF THE HUMAN BODY FOR MEDICAL, SURGICAL, OR

SCIENTIFIC PURPOSES, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS,” approved on May 17,

1949. This law has since been superseded by Republic Act No. 7170 or
“The Organ Donation Act of 1991,” approved on January 7, 1992. Section 9
of Republic Act No. 7170 now specifically provides that the search for the
donor’s relatives must be done within 48 hours.
[58] Entitled “AN ACT TO AMEND REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THREE HUNDRED
AND FORTY­NINE, ENTITLED ‘AN ACT TO LEGALIZE PERMISSIONS TO USE HUMAN
ORGANS OR ANY PORTION OR PORTIONS OF THE HUMAN BODY FOR MEDICAL,
SURGICAL, OR SCIENTIFIC PURPOSES, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS,’” approved on
June 12, 1954.

695
The doctrine of informed consent
The doctrine of informed consent was introduced in this
jurisdiction only very recently in Dr. Li v. Spouses Soliman.
[59] This court ruled that liability may arise in cases where
the physician fails to obtain the consent of the patient
before performing any medical procedure, thus:
The doctrine of informed consent within the context of
physician­patient relationships goes far back into English
common law. As early as 1767, doctors were charged with
the tort of “battery” (i.e., an unauthorized physical contact
with a patient) if they had not gained the consent of their
patients prior to performing a surgery or procedure. In the
United States, the seminal case was Schoendorff v. Society
of New York Hospital which involved unwanted treatment
performed by a doctor. Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s oft­
quoted opinion upheld the basic right of a patient to give
consent to any medical procedure or treatment: “Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a
surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s
consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in
damages.” From a purely ethical norm, informed consent
evolved into a general principle of law that a
physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably
prudent physician in the medical community in the
exercise of reasonable care would disclose to his
patient as to whatever grave risks of injury might be
incurred from a proposed course of treatment, so
that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own
welfare, and faced with a choice of undergoing the
proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or
none at all, may intelligently exercise his judgment
by reasonably balancing the probable risks against
the probable benefits.
Subsequently, in Canterbury v. Spence[,] the court
observed that the duty to disclose should not be limited to
medical usage as to

_______________
[59] G.R. No. 165279, June 7, 2011, 651 SCRA 32 [Per J. Villarama, En
Banc, CJ. Corona, JJ. Perez and Abad, concurring; JJ. Brion, Nachura,
Leonardo­De Castro, Bersamin, and Mendoza, concurring in the result;
JJ. Carpio, Carpio­Morales, Velasco, Peralta, and Sereno, dissenting].

696
arrogate the decision on revelation to the physician alone.
Thus, respect for the patient’s right of self­determination
on particular therapy demands a standard set by law for
physicians rather than one which physicians may or may
not impose upon themselves. x x x.[60]
Those who consent to using their organs upon their
death for the benefit of another can make their consent
known prior to their death by following the requirements of
the law. Should a patient die prior to making his or her
informed consent known, the law provides a list of persons
who may consent on his or her behalf, that is, “substituted”
informed consent.
Since the incident in this case occurred in 1988,
Republic Act No. 349, as amended by Republic Act No.
1056, is the law that applies. Section 2 of the law states
that:
 

SEC. 2. The authorization referred to in section one of this Act

must: be in writing; specify the person or institution granted the
authorization; the organ, part or parts to be detached, the specific
use or uses to which the organ, part or parts are to be employed;
and, signed by the grantor and two disinterested witnesses.
If the grantor is a minor or an incompetent person, the
authorization may be executed by his guardian with the approval
of the court; in default thereof, by the legitimate father or mother,
in the order, named. Married women may grant the authority
referred to in section one of this Act, without the consent of the
husband.
After the death of the person, authority to use human organs or
any portion or portions of the human body for medical, surgical or
scientific purposes may also be granted by his nearest relative or
guardian at the time of his death or in the absence thereof, by the
person or head of the hospital, or institution having custody of the
body of the deceased: Provided, however, That the said person
or head

_______________
[60] Id., at pp. 56­57, citing Schoendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105
N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914); Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 701, citing Ze
Barth v. Swedish Hospital Medical Center, 81 Wash.2d 12, 499 P.2d 1, 8;
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 C.A.D.C., 1972.

697

of the hospital or institution has exerted reasonable efforts

to locate the aforesaid guardian or relative.
A copy of every such authorization must be furnished the
Secretary of Health. (Emphasis supplied)

 
Under this law, consent to organ retrieval after the
patient’s death may be given first and foremost by the
patient’s nearest relative or guardian at the time of death.
It is only in the event that these relatives cannot be
contacted despite reasonable efforts that the head of the
hospital or institution having custody of the body may give
consent for organ retrieval on behalf of the patient. Failing
this, liability for damages arises.
Considering that Republic Act No. 349, as amended,
does not provide a remedy in case of violation, an
application of the doctrine of informed consent vis­à­vis
Article 20 of the Civil Code may give rise to an action for
damages. In this case, Dr. Alano must first be shown to
have acted willfully and negligently to the damage and
prejudice of Zenaida.
 
Petitioner did not willfully
or negligently, in a manner
contrary to law, authoriz
the retrieval of the organs
Dr. Alano did not violate the provisions of the law
willfully or negligently. In accordance with the
requirements of the third paragraph of Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 349, as amended, he caused the discharge
of “reasonable efforts” to locate the relatives, allowed for a
reasonable time to pass, and harvested the organs with
care and prudence.
Negligence has been defined by law as “[t]he failure to
observe, for the protection of the interests of another
person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which
the cir­

698

cumstances justly demand, whereby such other person

suffers injury.”[61]
In Picart v. Smith,[62] the test for negligence is as
follows:
 

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a

particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would
have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed
to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet
paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a
given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in
the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines
liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a
prudent man in a given situation must of course be always
determined in the light of human experience and in view of the
facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculation cannot
here be of much value but this much can be profitably said:
Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which
are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not
supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be
expected to take care only when there is something before them to
suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case
under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course
actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take
precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of
harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this
prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to
exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining
the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said
to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the
tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another
was sufficiently

_______________
[61] United States v. Barias, 23 Phil. 434, 437 (1912) [Per J. Carson, En Banc],
citing Judge Cooley in his work on Torts, 3rd ed., 1324.
[62] 37 Phil. 809 (1918) [Per J. Street, En Banc].

699

probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against

its consequences.[63] (Emphasis supplied)

 
As correctly found by the majority, Zenaida failed to
prove that Dr. Alano did not exercise the reasonable care
and caution of an ordinarily prudent person.
In compliance with the duty reposed on him by the law,
Dr. Alano, as the Executive Director of the National Kidney
Institute, directed Jennifer B. Misa, Transplant
Coordinator, to locate Arnelito’s relatives. Radio
announcements over Radyo ng Bayan and DZMM Radio,
televised notices on Channels 2, 7, 9, and 13, and a police
blotter in the Eastern Police District No. 5, Mandaluyong,
were done on March 2, 1988, with a published
advertisement also appearing on the People’s Journal on
March 20, 1988.[64] Assistance was also sought from the
National Bureau of Investigation. These findings were, in
fact, adopted by the trial court. Dr. Enrique T. Ona also
testified that the search for the deceased patient’s relatives
continued even after the organ retrieval, thus:
 
Q:      After the retrieval of the organs from the patient and the
transplantation of the organs to Mr. Ambustan and Tan [K]oc Lee, did
the hospital stop in its effort to locate the family of the patient, Mr.
Witness?
A:   Since this patient is a John Doe and even after we had retrieved the
organs and transplanted it to the 2 recipients, I was also made aware
that no relatives could still be located. Specific instruction were
[sic] given to the transplant coordinator to continue looking
for the relatives.[65] (Emphasis supplied)

 
The trial court and the appellate court, however, took
exception to the period of time taken by Dr. Alano in
conducting

_______________
[63] Id., at p. 813.
[64] Rollo, p. 106; RTC Decision, p. 4.
[65] Id., at pp. 323­324; TSN, October 2, 1995, pp. 35­36.

700

the search for the deceased patient’s relatives before he

authorized the organ retrieval.
What the lower courts failed to consider was that this
was an unusual situation wherein time was of the essence.
Organ retrieval must always take into account the viability
of the organs.
As explained by Dr. Ona in his testimony before the trial
court:

 
 Q:       Does the time have any factor also with respect to the viability of
these organs, Mr. Witness[?]
A:       Yes, sir.
Q:       Will you please explain this, Mr. Witness?
A:            When we remove the organs say, the kidney from the
cadaver we put that into [a] special solution for preservation
and ideally we would like to transplant that kidney within 24
hours although oftentimes we extend it to 48 hours and even
stretching it to 72 hours, sir.
Court: I just want to clarify this issue.
Q:       Is there any particular reason why the retrieval of the organs have
to be done even when the patient is not yet dead, as what we know
heart beating [sic] stops but even at that stage when classified as
brain dead, why the rush to open it up, is there any particular reason
or could it refer perhaps to the successful operation maybe for the
organs to fit well to the rec[i]pient?
A:      Yes, Your Honor. The viability of the organ as I mentioned
earlier the kidney is viable for several hours, as I mentioned 24
hours, 48 hours up to 72 hours but for the liver, Your [Honor],
during that time in 1988 the liver can be preserved only for
about 6 to 8 hours and for the heart it should be connected for
4 hours, Your Honor.
Q:            So, in this particular case, the kidney, how many hours more or
less?

701

A:            At that time it was stretched into 24 hours, Your Honor and the
pa[n]creas maybe 4 hours so that it is the leng[th] of time when the
organs most likely to be viable after that most likely did not function
anymore [sic].
Q:       But you do retrieval also to those dead on arrival, is that not?
A:       In this particular case, Your Honor, it is possible for example the
dead on arrival is brought to the emergency room, the preparation of
the operating room and the getting of [sic] the consent it will take
time, Your Honor, so in this particular case, Your Honor there is no
more heart beat that cannot be viable anymore[.][66] (Emphasis
supplied)

 
This testimony is supported by several studies, which
tend to show that the viability of organs in an organ
donation may depend on the length of time between the
declaration of brain death and organ retrieval.
One study shows that widespread physiological changes
occur during brain death. “In addition to acute changes,
which if untreated lead to rapid deterioration and cardiac
arrest (even if ventilation is continued), there are ongoing
generalized inflammatory and hormonal changes
associated with brain death which adversely affect donor
organ function and propensity to rejection.”[67] Another
study[68] shows that the time period between declaration of
brain death and organ retrieval was a “significant
predictive factor”[69] in recipient mortality for
 

_______________
[66] Id., at pp. 375­379; TSN, October 2, 1995, pp. 87­91.
[67]  D. W. McKeown, R. S. Bonser, and J. A. Kellum, Management of
the heartbeating brain­dead organ donor, British Journal of Anaesthesia
108 (S1): i96­i107 (2012).
[68] S. Ramjug, N. Hussain, and N. Yonan, Prolonged time between
donor brain death and organ retrieval results in an increased risk of
mortality in cardiac transplant recipients, Interactive CardioVascular and
Thoracic Surgery 12, pp. 938­942 (2011).
[69] Id., at p. 939.

702

cardiac transplants. There is also a study[70] that shows

that “[t]here are clear data that both [brain death] and
prolonged [brain death duration] result in [kidney] graft
damage, and successful organ retrieval after [brain death]
definitely relies on intensive donor management.”[71]
Upon a showing by the Transplant Coordinator that the
deceased patient’s relatives could not be found despite all
her efforts in locating them, Dr. Alano exercised his
professional judgment and ordered the retrieval bearing in
mind the short length of time the organs could be viable
after the declaration of brain death. He exercised all the
reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent
man would have exercised in the same situation.
Dr. Alano, therefore, should not have been found to be
negligent. He did not violate Article 20 of the Civil Code
because he complied with all his duties in Republic Act No.
349, as amended.
 
There is no causal connection
between the alleged negligent
act and the damage suffered by
respondent
The trial court, by using the codal definition of a quasi­
delict, identified the act or omission as that of authorizing
the retrieval of the deceased patient’s organs without
seeking permission from his relatives; the presence of
negligence as the failure to exert reasonable efforts in
searching for the deceased patient’s relatives; and the
damage pertaining to Zenaida’s discovery of her son’s
lifeless body “mangled, robbed

_______________
[70] K. Kunert, S. Weiß, K. Kotsch, and J. Pratschke, Prolonged brain
death duration — does it improve graft quality?, Transplant International
2010 European Society for Organ Transplantation 24, pp. 12­13 (2011).
[71] Id., at p. 13.

703

of its vital organs and x  x  x sewn up like x  x  x a rag

doll.”[72] The court also found no pre­existing contractual
relation.
The trial court is mistaken. Clearly, there is no causal
connection between the alleged negligent act of Dr. Alano
and the damage suffered by Zenaida.
First, Zenaida alleged before the trial court that the
damage she suffered was the loss of her son’s life. The trial
court, however, conceded that “the extent of Logmao’s
injuries were such that the possibility of survival would
have been highly improbable, if not impossible x x x.”[73] It
then concluded that there was still damage suffered by
Zenaida, in that her son’s lifeless body was “mangled,
robbed of its vital organs and x x x sewn up like some rag
doll, without her knowledge, much more her consent.”[74]
The Court of Appeals agreed, stating that “the pain and
anguish of a mother in seeing the lifeless body of her son
like a slaughtered pig in the funeral parlor x x x is more
than one can take.”[75]
The “pain and anguish”[76] of Zenaida indeed may have
resulted from the loss of her son. However, Dr. Alano or any
of his subordinates did not cause the loss of her son’s life.
Even if Dr. Alano did not order the organ retrieval, Zenaida
would still find the body of her son lifeless.
It was, therefore, erroneous to impute the emotional
suffering of Zenaida as being caused by Dr. Alano’s failure
to exert reasonable efforts to locate her before ordering the
organ retrieval.
Second, the failure to locate Zenaida to secure her
permission for the organ retrieval was not caused by Dr.
Alano.
 The records show that the difficulty in locating Zenaida
stemmed from the erroneous information found on the de­

_______________
[72] Rollo, p. 107; RTC Decision, p. 5.
[73] Id.
[74] Id.
[75] Id., at pp. 93­94.
[76] Id., at p. 93.

704

ceased’s patient data sheet, which indicated his name as

Angelito Lugmoso, not Arnelito Logmao. It was the staff of
East Avenue Medical Center, not Dr. Alano and the staff of
the National Kidney Institute, which provided the
erroneous information on the patient data sheet.
It can be conceded that there was a duty on the part of
the National Kidney Institute to verify the information on
the patient data sheet with the patient himself. However,
when Arnelito was transferred from East Avenue Medical
Center to the National Kidney Institute, he was already
“intubated and ambu­bagging support was provided
x x x.”[77] This means that he would not have been coherent
enough or even conscious enough to be able to answer any
query by the medical staff. The staff of the National Kidney
Institute would have had no choice but to rely on the
information provided to them by East Avenue Medical
Center considering the urgency of Arnelito’s situation.
The erroneous information on the patient data sheet was
eventually the cause of the failure of the Transplant
Coordinator to locate Zenaida. The radio and television
announcements, together with the newspaper
advertisements, were rendered futile by the fact that they
were simply looking for the wrong person. Even if the
Transplant Coordinator spent more than 24 hours looking
for the deceased patient’s relatives, it was doubtful
whether they could have been found, considering that they
were looking for the relatives of Angelito Lugmoso, not
Arnelito Logmao.
 
Respondent should not
be awarded damages
Moral damages were awarded by the lower courts on the
basis that it was Dr. Alano’s alleged negligence which
caused the emotional suffering of Zenaida. This is
erroneous.

_______________
[77] Id., at p. 73.

705

The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code on moral

damages are:

Article 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering,

mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant’s wrongful act or omission.
Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following
and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi­delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused,
referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral
damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters
may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the
order named.

 
It has already been established that Zenaida’s emotional
suffering was not caused by the acts of Dr. Alano. He also
did not commit any act in violation of Articles 19, 20 or 21
of the Civil Code. This is also not a case wherein the
alleged quasi­delict resulted in physical injuries. The lower
courts are also in agreement that Dr. Alano did not cause
the death of Zenaida’s son. Neither is this case analogous to
any of the situations mentioned in the provision. Contrary
to the ruling of the trial court, this situation is also not
covered by Article 309 of the Civil Code, which states:
706

Article 309. Any person who shows disrespect to the dead, or

wrongfully interferes with a funeral shall be liable to the family of
the deceased for damages, material and moral.

The organ retrieval performed by the National Kidney

Institute cannot be termed as “disrespect to the dead.”
Organ donation is allowed by law. A sterile medical
operation surely is not tantamount to grave robbery or
mutilation.
Since Zenaida has not proven her claim to moral
damages, she is also not entitled to exemplary damages.
Article 2234 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages

need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to
moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may
consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages
should be awarded. x x x.

Since the award of exemplary damages is not justified,

there is no reason to award attorney’s fees, in accordance
with Article 2208 of the Civil Code, which allows the award
of attorney’s fees only “when exemplary damages are
awarded.”
ACCORDINGLY, I CONCUR and vote to GRANT the
petition.

Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.

Notes.—Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court

defines “burden of proof” as “the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his
claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by
law.” (De Leon vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 710
SCRA 443 [2013])
He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation
by preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible
evidence. (Dela Llana vs. Biong, 711 SCRA 522 [2013])
——o0o——

 
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