THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. GREGORIO SANTIAGO, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. 17584 March 8, 1922

Nature of the Action: Appeal from the decision of the trial

court

Facts: Defendant was driving his car when he ran over Porfiro
Parondo, a 7-year-old boy, which instantly caused the latter’s
death. He was then found guilty of homicide with reckless
imprudence, was sentenced to suffer one year and one day
or prision correccional, as well as to pay the costs of the trial.
However, defendant contended that Act No. 2886 is
unconstitutional, and therefore, the trial court did not have
jurisdiction over his person and the complaint itself.

Issue: Is Act No. 2886 constitutional?

Ruling: The sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed, the

appellant being furthermore sentenced to the accessory
penalties prescribed in article 61 of the Penal Code, and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and
to the payment of the costs of both instances.

Ratio Decidendi: Yes. Act No. 2996 is not violative of any

constitutional provision, nor does it partake of the same
character as that of the provisions of the constitution; thus,
the court did not commit any of the errors assigned.
Furthermore, its main purpose is limited to criminal procedure
inasmuch as its intention is to give to its provisions the effect
of law in criminal matters.
United States v. Pablo
625 F.3d 1285 (10th Cir. 2010)

RULE:
Fed. R. Evid. 703 authorizes an expert to testify to an opinion
she formed even if she based that opinion on otherwise
inadmissible facts or data, which at times may include out-
of-court testimonial statements. Such hearsay is admitted for
the limited purpose of informing the jury of the basis of the
expert's opinion, not for proving the truth of the matter
asserted. Therefore, where an expert witness discloses
otherwise inadmissible out-of-court testimonial statements on
which she based her opinion, the admission of those
testimonial statements under Rule 703 typically will not
implicate a defendant's confrontation rights because the
statements are not admitted for their substantive truth.
FACTS:
This appeal arises out of Jonathan Pablo's conviction by a jury
for vaginal rape, kidnapping, assault resulting in serious bodily
injury, and carjacking. Pablo was tried with a codefendant,
Isaac Gordo, whom the jury convicted on similar counts. On
Pablo's appeal, he raised three challenges to his convictions:
(1) that the district court deprived him of his confrontation
rights under the Sixth Amendment by admitting testimony of
a DNA expert, who relied on reports prepared by analysts not
called to testify and conveyed the contents of those reports
to the jury; (2) that the prosecutor and district court
impermissibly interfered with his right to present a defense by
raising the specter of self-incrimination to dissuade two
defense witnesses from testifying; and (3) that the district
court erred by excluding certain evidence under Federal
Rule of Evidence 412.
ISSUE:
DoesFed. R. Evid. 703allow an expert to testify to an opinion
that was formed on otherwise inadmissible data, which could
include out-of-court testimonial statements?
ANSWER:
Yes.
CONCLUSION:
The court of appeals found no plain error. Fed. R. Evid.
703allowed an expert to testify to an opinion that was formed
on otherwise inadmissible data, which could include out-of-
court testimonial statements. Because the DNA and serology
reports were not part of the record, it could not be
determined that the testimony parroted the reports. The
prosecution did not improperly dissuade two defense
witnesses from testifying by raising the potential for self-
incrimination, and the district court responded properly by
informing the witnesses of the Fifth Amendment privilege,
which they invoked after conferring with independent
counsel. Evidence alleging that the victim was seen partially
undressed with two other men on the night of the rape and
made sexual advances toward the co-defendant was
properly excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 412
In Re. Kay Villegas Kami, Inc. 1970

G.R. No. L-32485 October 22, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF THE

PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER SEC. 8 OF R.A. No.
6132.

KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC., petitioner.

MAKASIAR, J.:.

Facts of the Case:

Petitioner intends to pursue its purposes by supporting

delegates to the Constitutional Convention who will
propagate its ideology. However, Under Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No.
6132 states:

No candidate for delegate to the Convention shall represent

or allow himself to be represented as being a candidate of
any political party or any other organization, and no political
party, political group, political committee, civic, religious,
professional, or other organization or organized group of
whatever nature shall intervene in the nomination of any such
candidate or in the filing of his certificate of candidacy or
give aid or support, directly or indirectly, material or
otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election…
 A petition for a declaratory relief was filed by Kay
Villegas Kami, Inc., claiming to be a duly recognized and
existing non-stock and non-profit corporation created under
the laws of the land, and praying for a determination of the
validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 and a declaration of
petitioner's rights and duties thereunder to pursue its purposes
by supporting delegates to the Constitutional Convention.

Issues: 1. Whether or not R.A. No. 6132 is an ex post facto law.

2. Whether or not the R.A No. 6132 is constitutional.

Held:

1. No. R.A. No. 6132 is not an ex post facto law. Though

Section 18 of R.A. No. 6132, provides for a penalty clause, the
penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the approval
of the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto.

2. Yes. It does not violate freedom of expression,

freedom of association, freedom of assembly and equal
protection clauses. It is designed to prevent the clear and
present danger of the prostitution of electoral process and
denial of the equal protection of the laws.
Pp v Villaraza Digest 1978

G.R. No. L-46228 January 17, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ROLANDO R. VILLARAZA (as City Judge of Cagayan de
Oro City), and CAESAR PUERTO, respondents.

Francisco P. Rabanes, Edgardo Y. Raagas, Casiano A.

Gamotin, Jr., Office of the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City
for petitioner.

Eric Menchavez for respondent Caesar Puerto.

AQUINO, J.:

Facts of the Case:

On October 16, 1974, Caesar Puerto issued two

bouncing checks for the total sum of P4,966.63.

City Judge Rolando R. Villaraza in his order March 31,

1976 noted that the accused had waived the second stage
of the preliminary investigation. He directed that the case be
elevated, for trial, to the Court of First Instance or the Circuit
Criminal Court. His view is that the case falls within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
because estafa committed by the accused is punishable by
prision mayor medium under Presidential Decree No. 818
which amended article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

Upon petition of the prosecution, the Court of first

Instance of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro Branch VIII
returned the case to the city court because in its opinion the
case falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of the two courts
and, the city court, as the first court which took cognizance
of the case, should try it.
Issue: 1. Whether or not the Presidential Decree No. 818 is
applicable to the Puerto’s case.

2. Whether or not the case can be elevated for trial to

the Court of First Instance.

Held:

1. No. The penalty of prision mayor medium, or eight

years and one day to ten years, imposed by Presidential
Decree No. 818, applies only to swindling by means of issuing
bouncing checks committed on or after October 22, 1975.
That increased penalty does not apply to estafa committed
on October 16, 1974 because it would make the decree an
ex post facto law.

2. No. City courts shall try parties charged with an offense,

in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision
correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or
fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both. Since the case
of estafa imputed to Caesar Puerto is punishable under
Article 325 of the Revised Penal Code by arresto mayor
maximum to prision correctional minimum or four months
and one day to two years and four months, the case shall be
returned to the city court.

Pp v Diaz Conde Digest 1922

G.R. No. L-18208 February 14, 1922

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VICENTE DIAZ CONDE and APOLINARIA R. DE CONDE,
defendants-appellants.

Araneta & Zaragoza for appellants.

Attorney-General Villareal for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

Facts of the Case:

On December 30, 1915, Bartolome Oliveros and Engracio

Liaco borrowed from Vicente Diaz-Conde and Apolinaria R.
De Conde the sum of P300. They obligated themselves to pay
the defendants 5% per month, payable within the first ten
days beginning on January 1916.
On May 1, 1916, Act No. 2655 (Usury Law) took effect.
Issue: Whether or not the defendants violated Act No. 2655.

Held:

No. If a contract is legal at its inception, it cannot be

rendered illegal by any subsequent legislation. The obligation
of the contract is the law which binds the parties to perform
their agreement if it is not contrary to the law of the land,
morals or public order. That law must govern and control the
contract in every aspect in which it is intended to bear upon
it, whether it affect its validity, construction, or discharge.
In the present case, making Act No. 2655 applicable to the
act complained of which had been done before the law was
adopted, a criminal act, would give it an ex post facto
operation.

An ex post facto law, is a law that makes an action,

done before the passage of the law, and which was innocent
when done, criminal. Ex post facto laws are absolutely
prohibited unless its retroactive effect is favorable to the
defendant.

The decision of the lower court is revoked and the

complaint dismissed.
People vs Ferrer
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972
CASTRO, J.:p

FACTS:

On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section

4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against the respondent
Feliciano Co, as he became an officer of the Communist
Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization
aimed to overthrow the government.

Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion

Act is a bill of attainder.

Meanwhile, on May 25, 29170, another criminal complaint

was filed with before Nilo Tayag and fiver others with
subversion, as they were tagged as officers of the
KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization
instigating and inciting the people to organize and unite for
the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines.

Tayag also moved to quash the complaint on the grounds

that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces
more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and
(4) it denied him the equal protection of the laws.
ISSUE: Whether RA 1700 otherwise known as Anti-Subversion
Act is a bill of attainder.

RULING: No, the Supreme Court said it is only when a statute

applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable
members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on
them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder.

In this case, when the act is viewed in its actual operation, it

will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of
the Philippines or the member thereof for the purpose of
punishment. What it does is simple to declare the party to be
an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for the purposes of the prohibition.

The term "Communist Part of the Philippines" issues solely for

definitional purposes. In fact the act applies not only to the
Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any
organisation having the same purpose and their successors."
Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.

FACTS:

Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelino Pesigan, carabao

dealers, transported in a 10-wheeler truck in April 1982, 26
carabaos and a calf, from Camarines Sur to
Batangas. Despite the health certificate, permit to transport,
and certificate of inspection issued to them by the provincial
veterinarian, provincial commander and constabulary
command, respectively, while petitioners were negotiating
the town of Basud, Camarines Norte, the carabaos were
confiscated by private respondents, Police Station
Commander Lt. Zanarosa, and provincial veterinarian Dr.
Miranda. The confiscation was based on Executive Order
626-A which prohibited the transport of carabaos from one
province to another. Pursuant to EO 626-A, Dr Miranda
distributed the carabaos to 25 farmers of Basud. Petitioners
filed for recovery of the carabaos and damages, against
private respondent Judge Angeles who heard the case in
Daet and later transferred to Caloocan City, and dismissed
the case for lack of cause of action.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 626-A be enforced before its
publication in the Official Gazette.

HELD:

Said executive order should not be enforced against the

Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a
penal regulation published more than two months later in the
Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective
only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil
Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.

The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code)

includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties.
Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents
of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
persons affected thereby.

Tañada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446
(December 29, 1986)
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of

public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid
and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations
and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved

for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have
no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required

before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.
HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of

publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this
provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct
as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would
be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis
nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish
or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall

be published in the Official Gazette…. The word “shall”
therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of
the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to
be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or

of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is
a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.
The Court declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no force
and effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision

promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when
it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared
that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of

general applicability and laws which are not as to their
publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications
of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date

of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its
previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of

general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the
people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to
them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would
be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or
as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law
must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the
people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private

laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its

purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws

must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as
a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not
called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon

as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun
instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to
make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint,
parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
FACTS: Sweet was employed by the United States military who
committed an offense against a POW. His case is filed with
the CFI, who is given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases
for
which a penalty of more than 6 months is imposed. He is now
contending that the courts are without jurisdiction because
he was “acting in the line of duty.”

ISSUES:
1. WON this case is within the jurisdiction of the CFI.

Yes. By Act No. 136 of the US-Phil Commission, the CFIs are
given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which a
penalty more than 6 months imprisonment or a fine greater
than $100 may be imposed. Furthermore, CFIs have
jurisdiction to try offenders charged with violation of the Penal
Code within their territorial limits, regardless of the military
character of the accused. The defendant and his acts are
within the jurisdiction of the CFI because he failed
to prove that he was indeed acting in the line of duty.

2. WON an assault committed by a soldier or military

employee upon a prisoner of war is not an offense under the
penal code?

Yes. Though assault by military officer against a POW is not in

the RPC, physical assault charges may be pressed under the
RPC.
3. Assuming that it is an offence under the penal code,
whether or not the military character sustained by the person
charged with the offence at the time of its commission
exempts him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil
tribunals?

No. The application of the general principle that the

jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or
other special character brought before them for trial (R.A.
No. 7055). Appellant claims that the act was servicebut this
cannot affect the right of the Civil Court to takes jurisdiction
of the case.”

Judgment: Judgment thereby affirmed “An offense charged

against a military officer in consequence of an act done in
obedience to an order is clearly shown on the face, where
such offense is against the military law, is not within the
jurisdiction of the courts of the Civil Government.” ––Per
Cooper, J., concurring

Raquiza v Bradford Digest 1945

G.R. No. L-44 September 13, 1945

LILY RAQUIZA, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
LT. COL. L.J. BRADFORD, ET AL., respondents.

Guillermo B. Guevarra for petitioners.

J.A. Wolfson for respondents.
HILADO, J.:

Facts of the Case:

Petitioners, Lily Raquiza, Haydee Tee Han Kee and Emma

Link Infante were arrested for charges of “Espionage activity
for Japanese” and “Active collaboration with the enemy” by
virtue of the proclamation issued by General of the Army
MacArthur on December 29, 1944.

Petitioners pray that the Officers, Lt. Col. L.J. Bradford

and Capt. Inez L. Twindle of the CIC, U.S. Army, be directed
to appear before the court and produce the bodies of
petitioners, and to show cause why they should not forthwith
be set at liberty.

Issue: Whether or not the foreign military has the legal power
to detain the petitioners.

Held:

Yes. The Commonwealth Government asked, and the

United States Government agreed, that the United States
Army come and be stationed in the Philippines, for the very
realization of the overruling and vehement desire and dream
of the Filipino to be freed from the shackles of Japanese
tyranny. The grant of a free passage, therefore, implies a
waiver of all jurisdiction over the troops during their passage,
and permits the foreign general to use that discipline and to
 inflict those punishments which the government of this army
may require.

Crim Law 1 Case Digest: Liang V. People

Liang v. People
G.R. No. 125865 March 26, 2001

Lesson: Criminal acts not immune

Laws Applicable: Vienna Convention

FACTS:
· 2 criminal informations for for grave oral defamation were
filed against Jeffrey Liang, a Chinese national who was
employed as an Economist by the Asian Development Bank
(ADB), by Joyce V. Cabal, a member of the clerical staff of
ADB
· MTC: dismissed the complaint stating that Liang enjoyed
immunity from legal processes
· RTC: Upon a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by
the People of the Philippines annulled and set aside the order
of MTC
· SC: Denied petition for review on the ground that the
immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not
absolute and is limited on the official capacity and immunity
CANNOT cover the commission of a crime such as slander or
oral defamation in the name of official duty
· A motion of reconsideration is filed
 ISSUE: W/N the crime of oral deflamation enjoys immunity

HELD: NO

· slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act

performed in an official capacity
· issue of whether or not petitioner's utterances constituted
oral defamation is still for the trial court to determine

PUNO, J., concurring:

· the nature and degree of immunities vary depending on
who the recipient is
· Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a
diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal jurisdiction of the
receiving State for all acts, whether private or official, and
hence he cannot be arrested, prosecuted and punished for
any offense he may commit, unless his diplomatic immunity is
waived. On the other hand, officials of international
organizations enjoy "functional" immunities, that is, only those
necessary for the exercise of the functions of the organization
and the fulfillment of its purposes.
o officials and employees of the ADB are subject to the
jurisdiction of the local courts for their private acts,
notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of immunity
o If the immunity does not exist, there is nothing to certify by
the DFA

A perusal of the immunities provisions in various international

conventions and agreements will show that the nature and
degree of immunities vary depending on who the recipient
is. Thus:

1. Charter of the United Nations

"Article 105 (1): The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of

each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are
necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.

Article 105 (2): Representatives of the Members of the United

Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy
such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the
independent exercise of their functions in connection with
the Organization."

2. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the

United Nations

"Section 2: The United Nations, its property and assets

wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy
immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as
in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity. It
is, however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall
extend to any measure of execution.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 11 (a): Representatives of Members to the principal

and subsidiary organs of the United Nations . . shall . . . enjoy
. . . immunity from personal arrest or detention and from
seizure of their personal baggage, and, in respect of words
spoken or written and all acts done by them in their capacity
as representatives, immunity from legal process of every
kind.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 14: Privileges and immunities are accorded to the

representatives of Members not for the personal benefit of the
individuals themselves, but in order to safeguard the
independent exercise of their functions in connection with
the United Nations. Consequently, a Member not only has the
right but is under a duty to waive the immunity of its
representative in any case where in the opinion of the
Member the immunity would impede the course of justice,
and it can be waived without prejudice to the purpose for
which the immunity is accorded.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 18 (a): Officials of the United Nations shall be immune

from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and
all acts performed by them in their official capacity.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 19: In addition to the immunities and privileges

specified in Section 18, the Secretary-General and all
Assistant Secretaries-General shall be accorded in respect of
themselves, their spouses and minor children, the privileges
and immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to
diplomatic envoys, in accordance with international law.

Section 20: Privileges and immunities are granted to officials

in the interest of the United Nations and not for the personal
benefit of the individuals themselves. The Secretary-General
shall have the right and the duty to waive the immunity of any
official in any case where, in his opinion, the immunity would
impede the course of justice and can be waived without
prejudice to the interests of the United Nations.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 22: Experts . . . performing missions for the United

Nations . . . shall be accorded: (a) immunity from personal
arrest or detention and from seizure of their personal
baggage; (b) in respect of words spoken or written and acts
done by them in the course of the performance of their
mission, immunity from legal process of every kind."

3. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations

"Article 29: The person of a diplomatic agent shall be

inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or
detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect
and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on
his person, freedom, or dignity.

xxx xxx xxx

Article 31 (1): A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from

the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also
enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction,
except in certain cases.

xxx xxx xxx

Article 38 (1): Except in so far as additional privileges and
immunities may be granted by the receiving State, a
diplomatic agent who is a national of or permanently a
resident in that State shall enjoy only immunity from
jurisdiction, and inviolability, in respect of official acts
performed in the exercise of his functions."

4. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations

"Article 41 (1): Consular officials shall not be liable to arrest or

detention pending trial, except in the case of a grave crime
and pursuant to a decision by the competent judicial
authority.

xxx xxx xxx

Article 43 (1): Consular officers and consular employees shall

not be amenable to the jurisdiction of the judicial or
administrative authorities of the receiving State in respect of
acts performed in the exercise of consular functions.

Article 43 (2): The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall

not, however, apply in respect of a civil action either: (a)
arising out of a contract concluded by a consular officer or a
consular employee in which he did not contract expressly or
impliedly as an agent of the sending State; or (b) by a third
party for damage arising from an accident in the receiving
State caused by a vehicle, vessel or aircraft."

5. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the

Specialized Agencies
"Section 4: The specialized agencies, their property and
assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall
enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except in so
far as in any particular case they have expressly waived their
immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of
immunity shall extend to any measure of execution.

Section 13 (a): Representatives of members at meetings

convened by a specialized agency shall, while exercising
their functions and during their journeys to and from the place
of meeting, enjoy immunity from personal arrest or detention
and from seizure of their personal baggage, and in respect of
words spoken or written and all acts done by them in their
official capacity, immunity from legal process of every kind.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 19 (a): Officials of the specialized agencies shall be

immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or
written and all acts performed by them in their official
capacity.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 21: In addition to the immunities and privileges

specified in sections 19 and 20, the executive head of each
specialized agency, including a any official acting on his
behalf during his absence from duty, shall be accorded in
respect of himself, his spouse and minor children, the
privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities
accorded to diplomatic envoys, in accordance with
international law."
6. Charter of the ADB

"Article 50 (1): The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form
of legal process, except in cases arising out of or in
connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow money,
to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the
sale of securities, in which cases actions may be brought
against the Bank in a court of competent jurisdiction in the
territory of a country in which the Bank has its principal or a
branch office, or has appointed an agent for the purpose of
accepting service or notice of process, or has issued or
guaranteed securities.

xxx xxx xxx

Article 55 (i): All Governors, Directors, alternates, officers and

employees of the Bank, including experts performing
missions for the Bank shall be immune from legal process with
respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity,
except when the Bank waives the immunity."

7. ADB Headquarters Agreement

"Section 5: The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of

legal process, except in cases arising out of or in connection
with the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to guarantee
obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of
securities, in which cases actions may be brought against the
Bank in a court of competent jurisdiction in the Republic of
the Philippines.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 44: Governors, other representatives of Members,
Directors, the President, Vice-President and executive
officers as may be agreed upon between the Government
and the Bank shall enjoy, during their stay in the Republic of
the Philippines in connection with their official duties with the
Bank: (a) immunity from personal arrest or detention and from
seizure of their personal baggage; (b) immunity from legal
process of every kind in respect of words spoken or written
and all acts done by them in their official capacity; and (c)
in respect of other matters not covered in (a) and (b) above,
such other immunities, exemptions, privileges and facilities as
are enjoyed by members of diplomatic missions of
comparable rank, subject to corresponding conditions and
obligations.

Section 45 (a): Officers and staff of the Bank, including for the
purposes of this Article experts and consultants performing
missions for the Bank, shall enjoy . . . immunity from legal
process with respect to acts performed by them in their
official capacity, except when the Bank waives the
immunity."

II

There are three major differences between diplomatic and

international immunities. Firstly, one of the recognized
limitations of diplomatic immunity is that members of the
diplomatic staff of a mission may be appointed from among
the nationals of the receiving State only with the express
consent of that State; apart from inviolability and immunity
from jurisdiction in respect of official acts performed in the
exercise of their functions, nationals enjoy only such
privileges and immunities as may be granted by the
receiving State. International immunities may be specially
important in relation to the State of which the official is a
national. Secondly, the immunity of a diplomatic agent from
the jurisdiction of the receiving State does not exempt him
from the jurisdiction of the sending State; in the case of
international immunities there is no sending State and an
equivalent for the jurisdiction of the Sending State therefore
has to be found either in waiver of immunity or in some
international disciplinary or judicial procedure. Thirdly, the
effective sanctions which secure respect for diplomatic
immunity are the principle of reciprocity and the danger of
retaliation by the aggrieved State; international immunities
enjoy no similar protection.14

The generally accepted principles which are now regarded

as the foundation of international immunities are contained
in the ILO Memorandum, which reduced them in three basic
propositions, namely: (1) that international institutions should
have a status which protects them against control or
interference by any one government in the performance of
functions for the effective discharge of which they are
responsible to democratically constituted international
bodies in which all the nations concerned are represented;
(2) that no country should derive any financial advantage by
levying fiscal charges on common international funds; and
(3) that the international organization should, as a collectivity
of States Members, be accorded the facilities for the conduct
of its official business customarily extended to each other by
its individual member States. The thinking underlying these
propositions is essentially institutional in character. It is not
concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals,
but with the elements of functional independence necessary
to free international institutions from national control and to
enable them to discharge their responsibilities impartially on
behalf of all their members.15

III

Positive international law has devised three methods of

granting privileges and immunities to the personnel of
international organizations. The first is by simple conventional
stipulation, as was the case in the Hague Conventions of 1899
and 1907. The second is by internal legislation whereby the
government of a state, upon whose territory the international
organization is to carry out its functions, recognizes the
international character of the organization and grants, by
unilateral measures, certain privileges and immunities to
better assure the successful functioning of the organization
and its personnel. In this situation, treaty obligation for the
state in question to grant concessions is lacking. Such was
the case with the Central Commission of the Rhine at
Strasbourg and the International Institute of Agriculture at
Rome. The third is a combination of the first two. In this third
method, one finds a conventional obligation to recognize a
certain status of an international organization and its
personnel, but the status is described in broad and general
terms. The specific definition and application of those general
terms are determined by an accord between the
organization itself and the state wherein it is located. This is
the case with the League of Nations, the Permanent Court of
Justice, and the United Nations.16

FACTS:
The petitioner, an honorary consul of Uruguay in the
Philippines, was charged with the crime of falsification of a
private document before the CFI of Manila. He objected to
the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both under the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the
Philippines the court below had no jurisdiction to try him. He
filed this petition for a writ of prohibition with a view to
preventing the CFI from taking cognizance of the criminal
action filed against him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CFI of Manila has jurisdiction to try the

petitioner.

RULING:

This case involves NO question of diplomatic immunity. It is

well settled that a consul is not entitled to the privileges and
immunities of an ambassador or minister, but is subject to the
laws and regulations of the country to which he is accredited.
A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations
of the laws of the country where he resides.

In the exercise of its powers and jurisdiction, this court is

bound by the provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution
provides that the original jurisdiction of this court “shall
include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls.” In deciding the instant case this court
cannot go beyond this constitutional provision.

It remains to consider whether the original jurisdiction thus

conferred upon this court by the Constitution over cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is
exclusive.

The Constitution provides that the original jurisdiction of this

court “shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers, and consuls.”

It results that the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised

by the Supreme Court at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of
the CFI. Inasmuch as this is the same original jurisdiction
vested in this court by the Constitution and made to include
all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls, it follows that the jurisdiction of this court over such
cases is not exclusive.

Indeed, the CFI of Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner.

Hence, the petition for a writ of prohibition must be denied.

CASE DIGEST: US vs Bull, 15 Phil 7

Case Title: US vs Bull, 15 Phil 7
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal
Code
Facts:

On December 2, 1908, a steamship vessel engaged in the

transport of animals named Stanford commanded by H.N.
Bull docked in the port of Manila, Philippines. It was found that
said vessel from Ampieng, Formosa carried 674 heads of
cattle without providing appropriate shelter and proper
suitable means for securing the animals which resulted for
most of the animals to get hurt and others to have died while
in transit.

This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts No. 55

and No. 275 of the Philippine Constitution. It is however
contended that cases cannot be filed because neither was it
said that the court sitting where the animals were
disembarked would take jurisdiction, nor did it say about
ships not licensed under Philippine laws, like the ships
involved.

Issue:

Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense

committed on board a foreign ship while inside the territorial
waters of the Philippines.

Held:

Yes. When the vessel comes within 3 miles from the headlines
which embrace the entrance of Manila Bay, the vessel is
within territorial waters and thus, the laws of the Philippines
shall apply. A crime committed on board a Norwegian
merchant vessel sailing to the Philippines is within the
jurisdiction of the courts of the Philippines if the illegal
conditions existed during the time the ship was within the
territorial waters - regardless of the fact that the same
conditions existed when the ship settled from the foreign port
and while it was on the high seas,

In light of the above restriction, the defendant was found

guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty
pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs.

CASE DIGEST: US vs Ah Sing, 36 Phil 978

Case Title: US vs Ah Sing, 36 Phil 978
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal
Code

Facts:

Ah Sing is a fireman at the steamship Shun Chang, a foreign

vessel which arrived in the port of Cebu from Saigon. He
bought 8 cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board
and had them in his possession during the said trip. The 8 cans
of opium were found in the ashes below the boiler of the
steamer's engine by authorities who made a search upon
anchoring on the port of Cebu. The defendant confessed that
he was the owner of the opium and that he had purchased it
in Saigon. He dis not confess, however, as to his purpose in
buying the opium. He did not say that it was his intention to
import the prohibited drug.

Issue:

Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into

the Philippine Islands is criminally liable in the Philippines.

Held:

Yes. As stated in the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any

person who unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug
into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is found
under this person's control on a vessel which has come direct
from a foreign country and is within the jurisdiction limits of
the Philippines, is guilty of the crime of illegal importation of
opium, unless contrary circumstances exist or the defense
proves otherwise

CASE DIGEST: People vs Wong Cheng, 46 Phil 729

Case Title: People vs Wong Cheng, 46 Phil 729
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal
Code
Facts:

The appellant, in representation of the Attorney General, filed

an appeal that urges the revocation of a demurrer sustained
by the Court of First Instance of Manila presented by the
defendant. The defendant, accused of having illegally
smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of
English nationality while the said vessel was anchored in
Manila Bay, two and a half miles from the shores of the city.
In the said demurrer, the defendant contended the lack of
jurisdiction of the lower court of the said crime, which resulted
to the dismissal of the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the

crime committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our
jurisdictional waters.

Held:
Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed in our
internal waters thus the Philippine courts have a right of
jurisdiction over the said offense. The Court said that having
the opium smoked within our territorial waters even though
aboard a foreign merchant ship is a breach of the public
order because it causes such drugs to produce pernicious
effects within our territory. Therefore, the demurrer is revoked
and the Court ordered further proceedings.

CASE DIGEST: People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19

Title: People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19
Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code

Facts:

On June 30, 1920, sixer vintas intercepted two Dutch boats

which were on its way in the midst of the islands of Buang and
Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. The six vintas were manned by
24 armed Moros. The said Dutch boats were carrying men,
women and children. At first, the Moros asked for food. But
when they got on the Dutch boats, they asked for themselves
all the vessel’s cargo, attacked nearly all of the men and
brutally violated two of the women by methods too
tremendous to be described. All of the persons on the Dutch
boat, except the two young women, were again placed on it
and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge.
The Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two
of the Moro marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the
women, and Saraw. At Maruro, the two women were able to
escape.

Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian,

Tawi-Tawi, Sulu. They were arrested there and were charged
in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy.

Issue:

Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the

crime of piracy alleged in this case.

Held:

Yes, the Philippine courts have jurisdiction on the case. Piracy

is a villainy not against any particular state but against all
mankind. It should be tried and punished in the sufficient
tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or
into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy,
unlike all other crimes, has no territorial limits.

Miquibas vs. Commanding General, 80 Phil. 267 (1948)

NATURE: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Habeas
corpus.

FACTS: Miquiabas is a Filipino citizen and civilian employee

of the US army in the Philippines who had been charged of
disposing in the Port of Manila Area of things belonging to the
US army in violation of the 94th article of War of the US. He was
arrested and a General Court-Martial was appointed. He was
found guilty. As a rule, the Philippines being a sovereign
nation has jurisdiction over all offenses committed within its
territory but it may, by treaty or by agreement, consent that
the US shall exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses
committed within said portions of territory.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the offense has been committed within a US
base thus giving the US jurisdiction over the case.

No. The Port of Manila Area where the offense was committed
is not within a US base for it is not names in Annex A or B of
Article XXVI of the Military Base Agreement (MBA) and is
merely part of the temporary quarters located within
presented limits of the city of Manila. Moreover,
extended installations and temporary quarters are not
considered to have the same jurisdictional capacity as
permanent bases and are governed by Article XIII
paragraphs 2 and 4. The offence at bar, therefore is in the
beyond the jurisdiction of military courts.

2. WON the offender is a member of the US armed forces

No. Under the MBA, a civilian employee is not considered as

a member of the US armed forces. Even under the articles of
war, the mere fact that a civilian employee is in the service
of the US Army does not make him a member of the armed
forces.
GUMABON vs DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
G.R. No. L-30026 January 30, 1971

FERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:
After pleading guilty for complex crime of rebellion
with multiple murder, robbery, arson, and kidnapping,
Mario Gumabon and five others were sentenced to
reclusion perpetua.
Each of the petitioners has been since then
imprisoned by virtue of the above convictions and has
served more than 13 years.

Subsequently, the Supreme Court negated the

complex crime stating that rebellion cannot be
complexed with other crimes. Thus, the accused in the
Hernandez case was only sentenced to 10 years of
imprisonment.
Petitioners now seek for the retroactive application of
the Hernandez doctrine which was promulgated after
their conviction.

ISSUE:

Whether the Hernandez doctrine be given a

retroactive application to the petitioners.
RULING:

Yes, as stated in Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code,

"Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as
they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal."

The Civil Code also provides that judicial decisions

applying or interpreting the Constitution forms part of
our legal system.

Moreover, one effect of repeal of penal law states

that if the repeal makes the penalty lighter in the new
law, the new law shall be applied, except when the
offender is a habitual delinquent.

People of the Philippines vs Mamerto Narvaez

121 SCRA 389

Facts:

Mamerto Narvaez awoke to the sounds of construction of a fence that would

prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice and rice mill. Narvaez asked
David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia if they could talk things over. The latter
refusing, Narvaez shot Fleischer with a shotgun as well as Rubia who was running
towards a jeepney where Fleischer's gun was kept. Narvaez was convicted of
homicde, but Narvaez pleaded that the shooting was justified because he was
defending his person and property.

Issue: WON Narvaez should be acquitted on the grounds that he was defending
his person and property.
Held: No. The victim merely violated his property and not his person which in not
under the requisites of self-defense

People vs. Ringor, 320 SCRA 342 (1999)

FACTS: The accused (Ringor) on the night of June 23, 1994 was
seen entering People’s Restaurant. A witness Fely Batanes
saw the accused approach a table where the victim was
sitting, pulled his hair, and poked a knife at the latter’s throat.
After, leaving the restaurant, the accused returned with a
gun, entered the kitchen of the restaurant, stealthily
approached the victim from behind and shot him six times
successively. The defendant was later apprehended and
caught in his possession was an unlicensed weapon. Upon
verification in Camp Crame, it was found out that Ringor is not
a licensed firearm holder and that the gun was not licensed.
Ringor put up self-defense but he failed to prove Florida’s
unlawful aggression. He was found guilty of murder qualified
by treachery and was sentenced to death. He was found
guilty of a separate charge of possession of an unlicensed
firearm with a sentence of 17 to 20 years.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the amendatory law RA 8294 (which took
effect in 1997: crime occurred in 1994) is applicable

No. At the time of the commission of the crime the use of an

unlicensed firearm was still not an aggravating circumstance
in murder to homicide. To apply it to Ringor would increase
his penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. Hence, RA 8294
cannot retroact as it is unfavorable to the accused, lest it
becomes an ex post facto law.
2. Whether or not RTC erred in convicting appellant for simple
illegal possession of firearms and sentenced him to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of 17 to 20 years.

Yes. In cases where murder or homicide is committed with

the use of an unlicensed firearm, there can be no separate
conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms under
PD No. 1866. t is simply considered as an aggravating
circumstance, no longer as a separate offence.
According to the article 22 of RPC, retroactivity of the law
must be applied if it is favourable to the accused.

3. Whether or not trial court erred in convicting accused of

murder

No. For self-defence to prosper, unlawful aggression,

proportionality of methods to fend said aggression, and lack
of sufficient provocation from defender must be proven. In
this case, defendant failed to prove unlawful aggression. The
statement that the victim approached him with a bolo was
inconsistent to the witness’ statement of the victim being in a
prone position in the table. This does not constitute the
requisite quantum of proof for unlawful aggression. With the
first requirement missing, the last two requisites have no basis.

4. WON RTC erred in sentencing the accused to death for

muder which was not proven and that the alleged murder
committed by the appellant, the appropriate penalty for the
offense is reclusion perpetua due to to the absence of an
aggravating circumstance.

Yes. In the absence of mitigating or aggravating

circumstances to a crime of murder as described by art 248
of RPC, a lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua has to be
imposed in according to article 63(2) of RPC

People v. Pimentel
Full Text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/apr1998/100210.htm

Facts:

As early as 1983, Tujan was charged with Subversion under RA 1700 ( Anti-
Subversion Law) as amended before the RTC Manila. A warrant for his arrest was
issued on July 1983 but was unserved as he could not be found.
Seven years after, Tujan was arrested on the basis of warrant of arrest in the
subversion case. When arrested, an unlicensed revolver and six rounds of live
ammunition was found in his possession. On June 1990, Tujan was charged with
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition in furtherance of Subversion under
PD No. 1866 before RTC Makati. Tujan filed a motion to quash the information
invoking protection versus double jeopardy since he claims that alleged
possession of firearms was absorbed in subversion. It was granted by RTC and CA.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 7363 (An Act Repealing RA 1700) should be applied
retroactively to Tujan.

Held:
Yes, RA 7363 should be applied retroactively. The repeal by said law of RA 1700,
as amended was absolute. There was no saving clause in the repeal.
Where, as here, the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the act which
was penalized by a prior law ceases to be criminal under the new law, the
previous offense is obliterated. It is a recognized rule in this jurisdiction that a total
repeal deprives the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons
charged with violation of the old law prior to the repeal.
With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of subversion against the
accused-private respondent has no more legal basis and should be dismissed.

Facts:
the respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple
murder for the shooting and killing of eleven male person... bandied
as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang.
The Court also held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be given retroactive effect,
there is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its...
application are attendant.
It emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize the State
for... its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in court
In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend
that (a) Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689;
and (b) the time-bar in said rule should not be applied... retroactively.
The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689 because the essential requirements for its
application were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his
resolution of
March 29, 1999.
The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the
respondent expressly consented to a provisional dismissal of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 and all the heirs of the victims
were notified of the respondent's motion before the hearing thereon
and were... served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the eleven cases, the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be applied
prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To apply the
time limit... retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent
and his co-accused would violate the right of the People to due
process, and unduly impair, reduce, and diminish the State's
substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder.
They submit that in case of conflict between the Revised Penal Code
and the new rule, the former should prevail. They also insist that the
State had consistently relied on the prescriptive... periods under Article
90 of the Revised Penal Code. It was not accorded a fair warning that
it would forever be barred beyond the two-year period by a
retroactive application of the new rule.[
For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8
of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure may be applied
retroactively since there is no substantive right of the State that may
be impaired by its application to the criminal cases in question... since
'[t]he State's witnesses were ready, willing and able to provide their
testimony but the prosecution failed to act on these cases until it
became politically expedient in April 2001 for them to do so.'[29]
According to the respondent, penal laws,... either procedural or
substantive, may be retroactively applied so long as they favor the
accused.[30] He asserts that the two-year period commenced to run
on March 29, 1999 and lapsed two years thereafter was more than
reasonable opportunity for the State... to fairly indict him.[31] In any
event, the State is given the right under the Court's assailed Resolution
to justify the filing of the Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102
to 01-101112 beyond the time-bar under the new rule.
The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be
applied retroactively. As applied to criminal law, procedural law
provides or regulates the steps by which one who has committed a
crime is to be punished.
further
It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied
retroactively if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate
problems of due process or impair the independence of the Court.
Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court
designed to enhance and implement the constitutional rights of
parties in criminal proceedings may be applied retroactively or
prospectively depending upon several factors, such as the history of
the new rule,... its purpose and effect, and whether the retrospective
application will further its operation, the particular conduct sought to
be remedied and the effect thereon in the administration of justice
and of criminal laws in particular
Issues:
whether the 2-year period to revive it has already lapse... whether
there is any... justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year
period
Ruling:
In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of
two years under the new rule should not be applied retroactively
against the State.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar
retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on
March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the
resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is
inconsistent with the... intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving
the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State
had considerably less than two years to do so.
If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would
have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within
which to revive these criminal cases.
The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the
State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced
by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein
provided merely to benefit the accused. For to do so would cause an
"injustice of hardship" to the State and adversely affect the
administration of justice in general and of criminal laws in particular.
the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.
Principles:
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed
except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to
the offended party.
In a per curiam... decision in Stefano v. Woods,[49] the United States
Supreme Court catalogued the factors in determining whether a new
rule or doctrine enunciated by the High Court should be given
retrospective or prospective effect:
"(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of
the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and
(c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive
application of the new standards."

JOEMAR ORTEGA v. PEOPLE, GR No. 151085, 2008-08-20

Facts:
Petitioner, then about 14 years old,[5] was charged with the crime of
Rape in two separate informations both dated April 20, 1998, for
allegedly raping AAA,[6] then about eight (8) years of age.
Upon arraignment on September 10, 1998, petitioner pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged.[9] Thus, trial on the merits ensued. In the
course of the trial, two varying versions arose.
On May 13, 1999, the RTC held that petitioner's defenses of denial
cannot prevail over the positive identification of petitioner as the
perpetrator of the crime by AAA and BBB, who testified with honesty
and credibility. Moreover, the RTC opined that it could not perceive
any... motive for AAA's family to impute a serious crime of Rape to
petitioner, considering the close relations of both families.
ggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.
On October 26, 2000, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC,
holding that the petitioner's defense of denial could not prevail over
the positive identification of the petitioner by the victim AAA and her
brother BBB, which were categorical, consistent and without any...
showing of ill motive. The CA also held that the respective medical
examinations conducted by the two doctors were irrelevant, as it is
established that the slightest penetration of the lips of the female
organ consummates rape; thus, hymenal laceration is not an element
of... rape. Moreover, the CA opined that petitioner acted with
discernment as shown by his covert acts. Finally, the CA accorded
great weight and respect to the factual findings of the RTC,
particularly in the evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses.
Issues:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS OVERLOOKED CERTAIN
FACTS OF SUBSTANCE AND VALUE WHICH IF CONSIDERED MIGHT
AFFECT THE RESULT OF THE CASE.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR
WHEN IT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF DR.
LUCIFREE KATALBAS.
III.
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT, AFFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE
COURT, THAT PETITIONER-APPELLANT IN FACT COMMITTED AND IS
CAPABLE OF COMMITTING THE ALLEGED RAPE WITHIN THE RESIDENCE
OF THE VICTIM WHERE SEVERAL OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM'S FAMILY
MEMBERS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE MOTHERS WERE
PRESENT IS IMPROBABLE AND CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE.
IV.
THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FACTS
SET FORTH BY THE ALLEGED VICTIM REGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES
ATTENDING THE COMMISSION OF RAPE SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1996.
whether the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344 apply to petitioner's
case, considering that at the time he committed the alleged rape, he
was merely 13 years old.
Ruling:
However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting
circumstances, although he commits a crime, by the complete
absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or
voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arises.[48] Therefore,...
while there is a crime committed, no criminal liability attaches.
Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15
years old and below, at the time of the commission of the crime, shall
immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the
appropriate local social welfare and development officer
(LSWDO). What is... controlling, therefore, with respect to the
exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL's age at
the time of the promulgation of judgment but the CICL's age at the
time of the commission of the offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No.
9344, the age of criminal... irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15
years old.
Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that this Court
accord retroactive application to the aforequoted provisions of R.A.
No. 9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal law -
favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which... are
favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect.
he legislative intent for R.A. No. 9344's retroactivity is even patent from
the deliberations on the bill in the Senate, quoted as follows:
Sections 67-69 On Transitory Provisions
Senator Santiago. In Sections 67 to 69 on Transitory Provisions, pages
34 to 35, may I humbly propose that we should insert, after Sections 67
to 69, the following provision:
ALL CHILDREN WHO DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER THIS LAW
PENDING THE CREATION OF THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE WELFARE AND
RESTORATION (OJWR) AND THE LOCAL COUNCIL FOR THE PROTECTION
OF CHILDREN (LCPC) WITHIN A YEAR, SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY
TRANSFERRED TO DSWD INSTITUTIONS, AND DSWD
SHALL UNDERTAKE DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR THEM, PRIORITIZING THE
YOUNGER CHILDREN BELOW 15 YEARS OF AGE AND THE LIGHTER
OFFENSES.
The Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent, which is the
dominant factor in interpreting a statute. Significantly, this Court has
declared in a number of cases, that intent is the soul of the law,
Principles:
[I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the
exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the
complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on
the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. In...
expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus, Albert
has stated:
"The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power,
necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit
from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because . . . the infant (has)
no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal... liability."
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly provides:
SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. -- A child fifteen
(15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense
shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be
subjected to an intervention program pursuant to
Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age
shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate...
proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not
include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws.

PRESCILLA TUATES v. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN, GR No. 138962, 2002-10-04

Facts:
Convicted by the MTC-Quezon City (Branch 38) of the crime of
Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 or the Anti-Squatting Law,
petitioners Prescilla Tuates and Andres de la Paz, appealed to the RTC
of Quezon City (Branch 96).
Pending resolution of their motion for reconsideration, however,
Republic Act No. 8368, "An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772,
entitled 'Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar Acts'" was enacted.
In its Order, dated January 28, 1998, the RTC ruled that only petitioners'
criminal convictions were extinguished by R.A. 8368, and the civil
aspect, i.e., the removal of petitioners' illegally constructed house and
improvements, shall remain executory against... them
Petitioners argue that the repeal of P.D. 772 by R.A. 8368 carries with
it the extinction of both the criminal and civil aspects of the crime.
Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondents, agrees
with petitioners that both the criminal and civil liability were rendered
extinct with the repeal of P.D. 772, and recommended that the
assailed issuances be reversed and set... aside.
Issues:
That petitioners, being charged with Violation of Presidential Decree
No. 772, the express repeal of said decree absolves the petitioners of
any criminal or civil liability;
Ruling:
In the same vein, the absolute repeal of P.D. 772 has the effect of
depriving a court of its authority to punish a person charged with
violation of the old law prior to its repeal. This is because an unqualified
repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act of rendering... legal
what had been previously declared as illegal, such that the offense
no longer exists and it is as if the person who committed it never did
so.
Considering that prosecution for criminal as well as civil liability under
P.D. 772 has been rendered nugatory with the passage of R.A. 8368,
both criminal and civil aspects of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-97-70428 and
Q-97-70429 in the RTC as well as Criminal Cases Nos. 38-0130 and
38-0131 in the MTC filed against petitioners should be dismissed.
ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO v. CA, GR No. 125359, 2001-09-04
Facts:
On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Messrs. Benedicto
and Rivera were indicted for violation of Section 10 of Circular No.
960[1] in relation to Section 34[2] of the Central Bank Act (Republic
Act No. 265, as amended) in five
Informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila
That same day, nine additional Informations charging Mrs. Marcos
and Benedicto with the same offense, but involving different
accounts,... l
On January 3, 1992, eleven more Informations accusing Mrs. Marcos
and Benedicto of the same offense, again in relation to different
accounts, were filed with the same court
On the same day that Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969
were filed, the Central Bank issued Circular No. 1318[5] which revised
the rules governing non-trade foreign exchange transactions. It took
effect on January 20, 1992.
On September 19, 1993, the government allowed petitioners
Benedicto and Rivera to return to the Philippines, on condition that
they face the various criminal charges instituted against them,
including the dollar-salting cases. Petitioners posted bail in the latter
cases.
On February 28, 1994, petitioners Benedicto and Rivera were
arraigned. Both pleaded not guilty to the charges of violating Central
Bank Circular No. 960. Mrs. Marcos had earlier entered a similar plea
during her arraignment for the same offense on February 12, 1992.
On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved to quash all the Informations
filed against them
On September 6, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners' motion.
On November 21, 1994, petitioners moved for leave to file a second
motion for reconsideration. The trial court, in its order of November 23,
1994, denied petitioners' motion and set the consolidated cases for
trial on January 5, 1995.
The assailed
September 6, 1994 Order, in so far as it denied the Motion to Quash
Criminal Case No. 91-101884 is hereby nullified and set aside, and said
case is hereby dismissed. Costs against petitioners.
1. Allowed to return to the Philippines on September 19, 1993...on
the condition that he face the criminal charges pending in
courts, petitioner-appellant Benedicto, joined by his co-
petitioner Rivera, lost no time in attending to the pending
criminal charges by... posting bail in the above-mentioned
cases.
2. Not having been afforded a real opportunity of attending the
preliminary investigation because of their forced absence from
the Philippines then, petitioners-appellants invoked their right to
due process thru motions for preliminary investigation
3. Thus, instead of remanding the Informations to the Department
of Justice...respondent Judge set the case for pre-trial in order to
afford all the accused access to the records of the prosecution.
In the instant case, it must be noted that despite the repeal of Circular
No. 960, Circular No. 1353 retained the same reportorial requirement
for residents receiving earnings or profits from non-trade foreign
exchange transactions.[26]
In the instant case, it must be noted that despite the repeal of Circular
No. 960, Circular No. 1353 retained the same reportorial requirement
for residents receiving earnings or profits from non-trade foreign
exchange transactions.[26] Second, even the... most cursory glance
at the repealing circulars, Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 shows that both
contain a saving clause, expressly providing that the repeal of Circular
No. 960 shall have no effect on pending actions for violation of the
latter Circular.
Issues:
the charge sheets alleged that the trio failed to submit reports of their
foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or failed to register with
the Foreign Exchange
Department of the Central Bank within the period mandated by
Circular No. 960.
On the first issue, petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court. They aver that the dollar-salting charges filed against them
were violations of the Anti-Graft Law or Republic Act No. 3019, and
the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive... jurisdiction over their
cases.
first issue, petitioners next contend that the filing of the cases for
violations of Circular No. 960 before the RTC of Manila constitutes
forum shopping.
With respect to the RTC cases, the receipt of the interest earnings
violate Circular No. 960 in relation to Republic Act No. 265 because
the same was unreported to the Central Bank. The act to be
penalized here is the failure to report the interest earnings from the
foreign... exchange accounts to the proper authority.
on the first issue, petitioners contend that the preliminary investigation
by the Department of Justice was invalid and in violation of their rights
to due process.

5. On the basis of disclosures at the pre-trial, the petitioners-

appellants Benedicto and Rivera moved for the quashing of the
informations/cases...

On the second issue, petitioners contend that they are being

prosecuted for acts punishable under laws that have already been
repealed.
Petitioners, however, insist that the repeal of Republic Act No. 265,
particularly Section 34,[29] by Republic Act No. 7653, removed the
applicability of any penal sanction for violations of any non-trade
foreign exchange transactions previously penalized... by Circular No.
960.
Petitioners, however, point out that Section 36 of Republic Act No.
7653, in reenacting Section 34 of the old Central Act, increased the
penalty for violations of rules and regulations issued by the Monetary
Board. They claim that such increase in the penalty would give
Republic
Act No. 7653 an ex post facto application, violating the Bill of Rights.[
On the third issue, petitioners ask us to note that the dollar interest
earnings subject of the criminal cases instituted against them were
remitted to foreign banks on various dates between 1983 to 1987.
The fourth issue involves petitioners' claim that they incurred no
criminal liability for violations of Circular No. 960 since they were
exempted from its coverage.
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.[53] Laws
of foreign jurisdictions must be alleged and proved.
Anent the fifth issue, petitioners insist that the government granted
them absolute immunity under the Compromise Agreement they
entered into with the government on November 3, 1990.
Ruling:
As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving
a court of its authority to punish a person charged with violation of the
old law prior to its repeal.
Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, except when they are
favorable to the accused.[39] Nowhere in Republic Act No. 7653, and
in... particular Section 36, is there any indication that the increased
penalties provided therein were intended to operate retroactively.
There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.
The offenses for which petitioners are charged are penalized by
Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 "by a fine of not more than Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and by imprisonment of not more than
five years."
During the pendency of this petition, counsel for petitioner Roberto S.
Benedicto gave formal notice to the Court that said petitioner died
on May 15, 2000. The death of an accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability as well as the... civil liability based solely
thereon.
Principles:
A comparison of the old Central Bank Act and the new Bangko
Sentral's charter repealing the former show that in consonance with
the general objective of the old law and the new law "to maintain
internal and external monetary stability in the Philippines and preserve
the... international value of the peso
In construing contracts, it is important to ascertain the intent of the
parties by looking at the words employed to project their intention.