Chapter 1: Sign, Object, Interpretant

1.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the three elements which constitute semiosis, sign, object and
interpretant, will be described. In section 1.2, a characterization of the musical sign
will be given. The musical object will be dealt with in section 1.3. The last section
of this chapter, section 1.4, will deal with the musical interpretant. The general
Peircean idea behind each element is presented, and subsequently applied to music.

1.2 THE MUSICAL SIGN

1.2.1 Introduction

The first element which together with the object and the interpretant, constitutes
semiosis, is the sign,

[...] something which stands to somebody for something in some

respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the
mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed
sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the sign. The
sign stands for something, its object. (2.228, c. 1897)

In this section, a conception of the nature of music as a sign is given. This

conception is an orientation in a controversy which exists in musicology, the
subject of which is the question whether music has ’meaning’ or not. Regarding the
meaning of the word ’meaning’, a lot of disagreement and inclarity exists. For
example, Medushevsky distinguishes between three different kinds of musical
meaning (Bedeutungen):

1. Die syntaktischen Bedeutungen verweisen auf potentielle oder

realisierte Verbindungen des gegebenen Zeichens mit anderen
Zeichen. [...]
2. Die semantischen Bedeutungen verbinden die Zeichen mit den
Erscheinungen der Welt, mit den Vorstellungen von ihnen, mit den
Beziehungen zu ihnen. [...]
3. Dei kommunikativen Bedeutungen richten die Wirkung der
Zeichen auf die Wahrnehmung. [...] (Medushevksy, 1990)

The first two kinds of musical meaning which Medushevksy distinguishes are
closely related to the common sense notion regarding ’meaning’: a musical sign is
connected with another musical sign or with extra-musical elements. However, the
third kind of musical meaning, the communicative meanings of musical signs, is of
 8
a different kind: it can be equated to to the intriguing aspects of a musical sign
which can initiate the interpretation process or semiosis because they draw the
attention of the sign-user.

Peirce too mentions the word ’meaning’ in his works. However, when it is used in a
Peircean context, we are dealing with something else than when it is used in every-
day language. As will be shown in 1.2.2, the everyday use of the word meaning
1
implies the question whether the musical sign can refer to a reality , which is, in
Peircean terminology, the question whether the musical sign has an immediate
object (an aspect of the sign) which indicates a dynamical object (an element of the
Peircean idea of reality which is represented by the sign). When meaning is used in
a Peircean context, we are dealing with what is called by Peirce the immediate
interpretant:

In regard to the Interpretant we have equally to distinguish, in the

first place, the Immediate Interpretant, which is the interpretant as it
is revealed in the right understanding of the Sign itself, and is
ordinarilly called the meaning of the sign [...]. (4.536, 1905)

The immediate interpretant is the quality of the sign which indicates the direction
2
of a semiosis , or , in other words, the meaning of a sign is that part of the sign
which provides us with some clues regarding the direction which the interpretation
process should take.

1.2.2 Orientation in a Controversy

In Chronicle of my Life, Stravinsky says:

[...] I consider that music is, by its very nature, powerless to express
anything at all, whether a feeling, an attitude of mind, a
psychological mood, a phenomenon of nature, etc. Expression has
never been an inherent property of music. That is by no means the
purpose of its existence. If, as is nearly always the case, music
appears to express something, this is only an illusion, and not a
reality. (White, 1979:566)

This statement represents one position in the controversy on musical reference, the

1 Here again differences occur between the everyday use of a word and the Peircean
use of it. Peirce distinguishes between reality and existence. Reality is everything
we have knowledge of and everything we could gain knowledge of in semiosis.
Existence is everything we have knowledge of (see 1.3). An existing object is a
reality, but not all realities are existing objects (Van Driel, 1993). In everyday
language, this distinction is not relevant: reality is equal to existence.

2 More on the interpretant and its subdivisions can be found in 1.4.

 9
topic of which is whether music can refer to extra-musical phenomena. Within this
controversy, two extreme positions can be discerned: 1) the position that music
cannot refer to extra-musical phenomena (the autonomous conception) and 2) the
position that music is a language which always refers to extra-musical elements
(the referential conception). Stravinsky belongs to the first position. His statement
regarding musical expression shows remarkable similarities with Hanslick’s
polemic Von Musikalisch-Schönen:

On the one hand it is said that the aim and object of music is to excite
emotions - i.e., pleasurable emotions; on the other hand, the emotions
are said to be the subject-matter which musical works are intended to
illustrate. Both propositions are alike in this, that one is as false as the
other. (Hanslick, 1974:18)

Hanslick wrote his polemic in the romantic era, when music was regarded as a
language of feelings, of emotions, or, to put it differently, music expresses
emotions and refers to them. This, as was generally assumed, is the essence of
music; it is its sole aesthetic property, a view which was partly based on a
misconception of Hegel who thought music to be able to express emotions,
however it does not have to. Hegel’s notion of the possibility of music to express
feelings and emotions was interpreted as an obligatory feature of music (Hegel,
1985). According to Hanslick, not the expressive qualities account for the beautiful
in music, but the structural aspect of the musical composition is the carrier of
music’s aesthetic properties:

Its nature is specifically musical. [...] it consists wholly of sounds

artistically combined. (Hanslick, 1974:66)

The essence of music is not the expression of feelings, it is not its contents, but its
form. Hanslick and Stravinsky consider music as an autonomous structure which
cannot express something of refer to something. Their conception, however,
ignores the fact that people often do try to associate certain musical structures with
certain extra-musical elements like emotions. This seems to support the view of
music as a referential language.

Ever since the baroque era, the idea that music is a referential language has
dominated music theory and practice. In the baroque, music was regarded as a
language of affects. To express affects, music was regarded as a speech which had
to be composed and performed according to the principles of rhetoric, a collection
of prescriptions which could be used in order to make a discourse as effective as
possible. Prescriptions were related to the choice of a topic (inventio), the main
structure of the discourse (dispositio), the filling out of its details and the use of
figures of speech (elaboratio), memorizing the speech (memoria) and extra-textual
instruments the orator could use when presenting his speech, such as the applica-
tion of gestures (actio) (Leussink, 1984; Ueding, 1986). Especially the inventio,
dispositio and elaboratio were of great importance to music; many music theorists
 10
in the baroque era have written about those aspects of rhetoric in regard of their
application to music, the most famous of which is Johann Mattheson with Der
vollkommene Kapellmeister from 1739 (Mattheson, 1980).

The idea that music is a language with a referential character has some significant
consequences, which have to do with the characteristics of language. Language has
a syntactic, a semantic and a pragmatic aspect. The syntactic aspect of language
deals with the structure of language. The syntactic rules are written down in a
grammar. The semantic aspect of language deals with the meaning of words and
sentences. Pragmatics refer to the study of linguistic phenomena which cannot be
fully analyzed on the level of syntax or semantics. In pragmatics, the question in
what circumstances a certain kind of language is appropriate, is the object of re-
search. Pragmatics is a general term for the study of diverging linguistic
phenomena (Renkema, 1987).

A conception of music as a referential language implies that music has a syntactic,

a semantic and a pragmatic component. Kessels (Kessels, 1986/1987) deals with
3
this problem . According to Kessels,

[...] music consists of percepts that are built from a set of basic ele-
ments: pitch, volume, duration and timbre. (Kessels, 1986/1987:209)

With regard to the semantic component, Kessels states that one should distinguish
between music that is listened to as a structure of plain percepts, like fugues,
minimal music and simple tunes, and music that is listened to as a set of referring
percepts. Kessels illustrates this second kind of music with a comparison of the first
with the second movement of Beethoven’s Moonlight Sonata (opus 27-2):

To someone who listens intently and who is susceptible to it the

music seems to be an expression of some characteristic bodily
behaviour - for instance, a slow, heavy and dragging pace and a
quick, light and skipping one. And through this it also seems to be an
expression of the corresponding mood or feeling. [...] The same
observation applies to such indication for the execution of music as

3 Kessels deals with the syntactic and semantic aspects of music. The pragmatic
aspect is not under discussion in his text. A topic of pragmatics is the influence of
context on the interpretation of language. Translated to music, pragmatics could
study the influence on semiosis of the context in which music is listened to. An
example is attending a concert in a concert hall. In psychoacoustics terms, in an
enclosed space like a concert hall, direct and indirect sound is involved. Indirect
sound adds sound energy at the position of the listener, which is perceived as an
increase in loudness. Indirect sound arrives later than direct sound because its path
is always longer. This influences the ability to distinguish and to recognize sounds.
Indirect sound also arrives from other directions than direct sound, which results
in an impression of spaciousness (Rasch and Plomp, 1982a).
 11
crescendo and decrescendo, legato and staccato, accelerando and
ritenuto, etc. or to general aspects of music like tension and release,
excitement and rest, harmony and disharmony, preparation and
fulfilment, etc. All of these seem connected to bodily behaviour and
can be expressed in posture, gestures and movements, as mime and
performances show. And all of these terms apply not only to music
but to inner emotional states as well. (Kessels, 1986/1987:210)

A similar idea regarding the semantics of music, or the referential character of

music, can be found in Deryk Cooke’s The Language of Music (Cooke, 1978).
Kessels often refers to him. Cooke considers music as a langage with its own
unambiguous vocabulary, and in his book he tries to catalogue musical structures
and their referents in what he calls a Musical Vocabulary. Cooke comes to a vast
amount of fixed combinations between particular musical structures and particular
referents. An example: according to Cooke, the structure as shown in Figure 1.1 is

an outgoing feeling of pain - an assertion of sorrow, a complaint, a

protest against misfortune. (Cooke, 1978:122)

FIGURE 1.1: THE MINOR 1-2-3-4-5 PROGRESSION

Cooke’s conception, and with it all other conceptions of music as a referential

language, starts from the principle that musical structures have a fixed meaning, or -
in Peircean terminology - that the musical sign has an immediate object which
4
determines a dynamical object . This view needs to be looked at very critically, for
it passes over the important idea that any actualization of a certain relation between
sign and object depends not only on aspects of the sign, but on one’s habits and
beliefs regarding a phenomenon, which can differ from person to person, as well.
Starting from this idea, it is rather easy to present counter examples to e.g. Cooke’s
Musical Vocabulary. Take for example the trio Suscepit Israel from Bach’s
Magnificat. The text of this trio is:

4 More on the dynamical and the immediate object can be found in 1.3.
 12
Suscepit Israel puerum suum He hath holpen his servant
recordatus misericordiae suae. Israel in remembrance of his
mercy.

Bach has set this text to music as shown in Figure 1.2:

FIGURE 1.2: BACH’S SETTING OF SUSCEPIT ISRAEL

Here we have the minor 1-2-3-4-5 progression (see Figure 1.1) on the word
5
Suscepit , according to Cooke’s vocabulary an outgoing feeling of pain, an assertion
of sorrow, a complaint, a protest against misfortune. But if Cooke is right, then why
has Bach used this progression on the word suscepit, which does not nessecarily
refer to sorrow, complaint and protest at all in the context of a canticle-like work
the Magnificat is?

Another example which can be used to criticize the notion of music as a referential
language can be found in Mozart’s symphony no. 40. This symphony begins with
an appogiatura:

FIGURE 1.3: APPOGIATURA IN MOZART’S 40TH SYMPHONY

An appogiatura (or Seufzer) gives, according to Cooke, the effect of a burst of an-
guish. Like all the other musical structures described in his vocabulary, Cooke illu-
strates his point by using excerpts of vocal music, which indeed support his case. In
the case of the appogiatura, Cooke extends his ideas about this musical structure to
instrumental music:

’ ’’
5 This motive could also be looked upon as a descending major sixth from a# to f# .
However, because the a#’ is placed on a weak beat, we consider the b’ the
beginning of the descending motive, which encompasses a perfect fifth.
 13
Having identified this term of musical language, are we not in a
position to understand the moods of the opening pages of Mozart’s
Fortieth and Vaughan Williams’s Fourth Symphony? (Cooke,
1978:150)

Cooke may be right, but why is it that this symphony is always played in a vivid,
light, exciting way which, at least for us, has more to do with happiness than with
anguish?

Only two counterexamples are presented here, more examples could be given.
Cooke’s Vocabulary, Kessel’s conception of music as a referential language and all
other attempts to uncover the referential character of music and musical structures
which result in a description of inherent ’meaning’ are the results of a projection on
those structures of one’s interpretation. Any interpretation depends on one’s habits
and beliefs regarding a musical phenomenon, as well as on characteristics of the
sign. This is an important notion which is ignored by referential approaches of
musical ’meaning’, which explicitly assume that a one-to-one relation exists
between a given musical sign and its object. Such a view which can easily lead to
statements like the following:

Hindemith is undoubtedly right in his observation that people react in

different emotional ways to a given piece of music, but his statement
that each reaction is equally justifiable fails to take a simple
psychological point into account. Could it not be that some listeners
are incapable of understanding the feeling of the music properly?
(Cooke, 1978:21)

The conception of music as a referential language totally ignores the fact that
interpretations can vary considerably from era to era, from person to person, from
hearing to hearing, and that each statement regarding the referential aspect of music
has the right to exist. Therefore, it seems logical to reject this view in favour of the
conception of music as a non-referential structure. However, we have seen that this
view cannot be held either, for it ignores the fact that it is often tried to associate
certain musical structures with certain extra-musical elements. Now the question
arises how people make this kind of connection. The musical sign plays a crucial
role in this: it contains several immediate objects which indicate several dynamical
objects. This view stands between the two extremes: on the one hand, it acknow-
ledges the existence of a musical structure, which is - to a certain extent - an
autonomous whole, on the other hand it takes into account that people now and
then try to relate music to extra-musical elements. Now let us take a closer look at
the musical sign as an autonomous system.

1.2.3 Musical Parameters

Musical semiotics differs from e.g. semiotics of film in the nature of the sign that is
involved in a semiosis. In general, a sign can be described as a perceptible artefact,
 14
the representamen, which represents in a certain way the dynamical object and
which suggests an interpretant (Van Driel, 1993:77).

The musical representamen (or percept) is the musical sign in its perceptibility. On
the one hand, it carries the immediate object and the immediate interpretant. On the
other hand, the musical representamen moulds the immediate object and the
immediate interpretant.

Each musical structure, or musical representamen, consists of parameters, a form

of Thirdness. Each parameter consists of potential variables, a form of Firstness,
which can be actualized, a form of Secondness. Each actualized variable can be
looked upon as an intriguing phenomenon which can be the beginning of semiosis.

Two characteristics can be attached to parameters (Van Driel, 1993:78/79):

a. Something is a parameter, if it is nessecarily present in each artefact of a

phenomenon. In other words, parameters indicate the uniqueness of a
phenomenon, for they are the essential conditions which have to be met
before we can talk about a certain phenomenon.

b. A parameter cannot be reduced to another parameter.

Which are the parameters of the musical representamen? Musical sound is usually
described in four categories:

1. pitch

2. duration

3. loudness

4. timbre

Problems arise when those categories are given the status of musical parameters:
the first characteristic cannot be fully met, for pitch, duration, volume and timbre
are characteristics of any sound. Even the eight parameters Miereanu mentions
(hauteurs, durées, intensités, timbres, modes d'attaque, spatialisation, densité de la
distribution, enveloppe) (Miereanu, 1987) cannot take away this problem: his
parameters are not exclusively musical parameters, they can easily be applied to
e.g. spoken language as well. We are dealing with a major problem here: what
distinguishes music from spoken language or from any other sound? What
distinguishes the musical sign from other signs? This question is very hard to
answer, if it can be answered at all (and if it must be answered at all): even the
Grove Dictionary (Sadie, 1980) avoids to define music and musical sound.
However, tools are required to analyze the musical sign, this analysis being part of
a description of a semiosis of a musical phenomenon. In this thesis, pitch, duration,
 15
loudness and timbre are used for this purpose, for they are present in each musical
phenomenon. Although they do not account for the uniqueness of music, it is
6
assumed here that pitch, duration, loudness and timbre are musical parameters .

Pitch refers to the height of a tone. The psychoacoustic dimension of pitch is

frequency, which is measured in Herz (Hz). In its musical sense, pitch has a range
of about 20 to 5000 Hz, roughly the range of the fundamental frequencies of piano
strings and organ pipes (Rasch and Plomp, 1982b). All frequencies ranging from 20
to 5000 Hz, which make up a continuum, are the variables of musical pitch.

When music is listened to, the height of tones is not perceived in terms of absolute
frequencies, but in relative terms of high and low. High and low can only be
applied to a relation of tones, for it is impossible to say that a certain tone is high or
low without relating the pitch of this tone to the pitch of another tone. Pitch can be
indicated in the printed score. It is the position of a note on a staff with a cleff.

Duration refers to the length of a tone. It is the time which passes between the
attack of a tone and its release, which is measured in seconds, the variables of
musical duration. Duration is perceived by listeners to music in terms of short and
long, not in terms of seconds. Short and long can only be applied to a relation of
tones, for it is impossible to say that a certain tone is long or short without relating
the duration of this tone to the duration of another tone. In the printed score,
duration is the value of a note.

The psychoacoustic dimension of loudness is intensity, which is usually expressed

in dB, the sound pressure level. Sound pressure levels of performed music vary
roughly from 40 dB for a pianissimo to about 90 dB for a full orchestral forte tutti
(Rasch and Plomp, 1982b). All sound pressure levels from 40 dB to 90 dB, which
make up a continuum, are the variables of musical loudness.

In the listening process, loudness is not perceived in terms of dB but in terms of

soft and loud. Soft and loud can only be applied to a relation of tones, for it is
impossible to say that a certain tone is soft or loud without relating the loudness of
this tone to the loudness of another tone. In the score, loudness is indicated with
linguistic signs like PP, P, MP, MF, F, FF.

Timbre is defined by the American Standards Association as

that attribute of auditory sensation in terms of which a listener can

judge that two steady-state complex tones having the same loudness

6 Maybe the use of categories as applied in semiology (see for instance (Speelman,
1991)) instead of parameters offers a solution to the problems which are involved
in the parameter approach. Up to now, this remains an unexplored field.
 16
7
and pitch are dissimilar. (Rasch and Plomp, 1982b) .

Timbre is the quality of the voice or instrument making a sound (Coker, 1972),
which can be expressed in waveform. With the so-called Fourier analysis, the wave
form of a tone can be decomposed into its harmonics, the simple tones that
constitute a complex tone (Rasch and Plomp, 1982b).

Timbre is a multidimensional characteristic of sound. Unlike pitch, duration and

loudness, timbre cannot be placed on a single scale with contrastive ends. In the
score, timbre is indicated with linguistic signs that indicate the instruments which
should be used (violin, oboe, timpani) and the special effects which should be used
(e.g. con sordino, pizzicato, una corda). Instruments and effects are the variables of
musical timbre, the most complex musical parameter.

The problem of the smallest element

When trying to describe the musical parameters, a problem arises: what is the
smallest element of music which can be used to describe the musical parameters?
The difference between the written composition (the score) and its performance is
important here.

In a musical composition hardly ever just one variable of a parameter is actualized.

Take e.g. Figure 1.4, an excerpt of the plainsong Tuba mirum. In this example,
several variables of the parameter pitch are actualized, which is the case with every
melody. It is generally assumed that the different shapes of the notes indicate
actualizations of different variables of the parameter duration. The Tuba mirum
example doesn’t provide us with information on loudness and timbre, but we may
expect that in a performance of the plainsong Tuba mirum many variables of those
parameters are actualized: usually different variables of loudness are used in a
performance - e.g. the end of a line is usually sung decrescendo. Timbre depends
on characteristics of the performing artist’s voice and his interpretation of the text -
there can be a difference in voice colouring if the text is Requiem aeternam instead
of Tuba mirum.

FIGURE 1.4: PLAINSONG TUBA MIRUM

7 This definition becomes rather problematic when dealing with simple tones like
sinusoids, of which can be argued that they have timbre as well.
 17

This example is meant to make clear that it makes a difference whether the written
composition is under discussion or whether we are dealing with a listener in a
situation in which the composition is performed. With regard to the score, it is
possible to make statements about the actualized variables of the parameters for
each single note (although one can wonder to what extent this is useful), which is
the written form of the smallest element of music, the tone. However, when we are
dealing with a performance of a musical phenomenon, the single tone cannot be
used to describe the musical parameters, for the single tone lacks two essential
8
characteristics of performed music: melody and motion . Furthermore, performed
music is never listened to as a sequence of single tones. For these reasons, the
single tone is not considered to be the smallest element of music which can be used
to describe the musical parameters in a performance situation.

The interval, the relation between two successive tones, is the second smallest
element. With regard to the interval, it is possible to make statements about the
pitch of the two tones (tone x is high compared to tone y, tone y is low compared to
tone x), the duration of the separate tones (x is short compared to y, y is long
compared to x), the loudness of the different tones (x is loud compared to y, y is soft
compared to x) and the timbre of the different tones (x is played pizzicato, y is
played con arco). In other words: the interval does not lack the essential
characteristics of performed music (melody and motion). This seems to validate the
use of the interval as smallest element which can be used for a description of the
musical parameters.

In music theory, the term interval is applied to describe the pitch relation between
two tones. For analytical purposes, the term interval, which is derived from the
Latin word intervallum (interspace - see [Speelman, 1991]), will be used here to
describe the pitch relation, the duration relation, the loudness relation as well as the
timbre relation between two tones. In order to avoid terminological
misunderstanding with regard to the application of the term interval, the terms
pitch-intervallum, duration-intervallum, loudness-intervallum and
timbre-intervallum will be used to describe the pitch relation, the duration relation,
the loudness relation and the timbre relation between two tones.

It is more appropriate to use the intervallum as smallest element for a description of

the musical parameters in a performance situation than to use the single tone for
this purpose. However, when music is listened to, it is not perceived as a sequence
of pitch-intervalli, duration-intervalli, loudness-intervalli and timbre-intervalli,
which are relations between two single tones, but as a flow of motives, themes and

8 Melody and motion cannot be considered as musical parameters, for they are
composed of the actualization of different variables of the musical parameters
pitch and duration. This is not consistent with the second characteristic of
parameters as formulated in 1.2.3.
 18
melodies, relations between musical elements which can be larger than the
traditional size of the intervallum. Therefore, the definition of ’intervallum’ has to
be adjusted. Here, we define the intervallum as the interspace between two musical
elements, ranging from notes via motives and themes through movements and
separate compositions. Now it is possible to speak of differences which may occur
between two musical elements in pitch (the pitch-intervallum), duration (the
duration-intervallum), loudness (the loudness-intervallum) and timbre (the
timbre-intervallum).

With the broadening of the definition of the term ’intervallum’ a problem arises
regarding the different musical elements: what different musical elements can be
discerned, how they can be discerned, and is it possible to rank them according to
size. This is a serious problem: although music theory distinguishes between
elements like motive and theme, it does not offer unambiguous criteria by which it
is possible to distinguish one theme or motive from another. Take as an example
the element theme. In the Grove Dictionary, theme is defined as

[...] the musical material on which part or all of a work is based,

usually having a recognizable melody [...]. (Drabkin, 1980b:736)

This is a rather hazy definition, for by means of this definition, it is impossible to

distinguish between different themes: what is a recognizable melody? Things
become more confusing when the motive is involved, the motive being

[...] a short musical idea, be it melodic, harmonic or rhythmic, or all

three. A motif may be of any size, though it is commonly regarded as
the shortest subdivision of a theme or phrase that still maintains its
identity as an idea. (Drabkin, 1980a:648)

This definition makes it even hard to distinguish between motive and theme: if the
motive can be of any size, then where does the motive end and where does the
theme begin? Apparently, it is difficult, if not impossible, to give an unambiguous
definition of the musical elements. Therefore, when the musical elements of a
composition are under discussion, it should be clearly argumented why a certain
musical structure is called theme, motive, part or whatever it is labelled. A
legitimate - and truly Peircean - argument can be that it is commonly accepted
within a community of musicologists that e.g. in this particular composition this
particular musical element is considered to be a theme.

1.2.4 The Relation Music - Text

The foregoing discussion on the nature of music only relates to instrumental music.
In the history of westeuropean music, however, vocal music plays an important
part. Vocal music entails a specific problem: how can the relation between text and
music be expressed in a sign model?
 19
Mosley assumes that the music is an interpretation of the text, a view which is
closely related to common sense:

a poetic representamen determines an interpretant which is at once an

equivalent or more developed sign than the poetic representamen and
able to become a musical representamen determining its own triadic
relationship. (Mosley, 1990:16)

The interpretant of the poetic sign is called a melopoetic interpretant/repre-

sentamen. It is a poetic interpretant and becomes a musical sign. The change from
word to tone is called intersemiotic transmutation, a concept Mosley derived from
Roman Jakobson. To put it differently: the poetic representamen initiates semiosis,
the interpretant of which is the composer’s musical setting of the text. Interpretation
of a song should begin with an analysis of the text, followed by an analysis of the
music. In Figure 1.5, Mosley’s conception of song as a sign is expressed in a model.

Mosley is particularly interested in the specific correspondences between the

objects of text and music, which his model should account for. For a more general
view on the relation text - music, his conception is too limited, for it does not
account for situations in which there are no correspondences between the objects of
text and music at all.

FIGURE 1.5: SONG AS A SIGN (MOSLEY)

Dougherty (Dougherty, 1993) uses a more elaborate sign model in which he tries to
account for situations of noncongruence between the objects of text and music.
According to Dougherty, we are dealing with a play of interpretants here. It is not
the poetic interpretant which becomes the more developed sign, but the interaction
between the poetic and musical interpretants (see Figure 1.6).

Beside the fact that Dougherty’s model accounts for noncongruence between poetic
and musical objects, it also has - in contrast with Mosley’s conception - the
important underlying principle that music and text are equal. This implies that any
separate analysis of the music and the text of a song is not equal to ananalysis of
the song, for the song is the conjunction of music and text. Or, as Dougherty puts it,
 20
[...] the study of the lied stands as an important test for a cross--
disciplinary methodology: the juxtaposition of music and poetry in
the art song requires that the theory guiding the analytic method must
transcend mono-disciplinary approaches, and the appropriateness of
such interdisciplinary forays can be measured in terms of their value
in explicating the supple play between music and text. (Dougherty,
1993:2)

According to Dougherty, semiotics is the theory which is suitable for this task.

As is the case with Mosley’s model, Dougherty’s model only relates to the written
composition, the score. When it is extended to a performance situation, or to be
more specific, to a situation in which the music is listened to, this model becomes
very complicated (see Figure 1.7). In the performance of a song, a multitude of
sign-systems is involved. On one hand there are the sign-systems which constitute
the song (see Figure 1.6), on the other we have the sign-systems which constitute
the performance situation, e.g. the acoustical characteristics of the hall, the
9
performing artists and the social factors which play a role in attending a concert .
Those sign-systems are important when semiosis of a live performance of a song is
being discussed. When semiosis of a mechanical reproduced performance of a song
is being discussed, e.g. listening to a compact disc, other sign-systems play a role in
semiosis, e.g. the quality of the recording, the quality of the stereo equipment and
the amount of attention one gives to the song (background music versus intense
listening). All these separate sign-systems should be taken into account when
semiosis of a situation in which a song is listened to is under discussion, which
results in a very complicated sign model. To make things not more complicated
than they already are, the influence of all aspects of the performance situation on
semiosis will be neglected in the remainder.

1.2.5 Summary

The musical sign contains several immediate objects which indicate several
dynamical objects. This view is a position within the controversy which exists in
musicology, the subject of which is whether music is a language with a definite
referential character or a non-referential structure.The musical parameters, the
elements which constitute the musical sign, are pitch, duration, loudness and
timbre. A problem with regard to those parameters is: what is the smallest element

9 In Figure 1.7, the sign-systems which constitute the performance situation are
indicated by capitals. This extended model contains a slight but important
alteration: in the original model, continuous lines were drawn between object and
interpretant, which implies a direct relation between them. However, such a direct
relation between object and interpretant is impossible. Therefore, the continuous
line is changed into a dotted line, implying a relation between object and
interpretant but not a direct relation between those two elements of semiosis (see
1.3).
 21
which can be used to describe the musical parameters? The difference between the
written composition (the score) and its performance is important here: when a
performance situation is being discussed, it is impossible to use the single tone as
smallest element, for it lacks melody and motion, two essential characteristics of
performed music. The interval, the second smallest element, does not lack those
characteristics. Instead of the term interval, the term intervallum (interspace) will
be used to describe the musical parameters, the intervallum being defined as the
interspace between two musical elements.

FIGURE 1.6: SONG AS A SIGN (DOUGHERTY)

How can the relation between text and music be expressed in a sign model? Mosley
(Mosley, 1990) assumes that the music is an interpretation of the text. Therefore,
 22
the interpretation of a song should begin with an analysis of the text, followed by
an analysis of the music. Dougherty (Dougherty, 1993)argues that music and text
are equally important, constituting the song together. This view has an important
consequence with regard to the interpretation of a song: a song is always perceived
by a listener as a unity. In this thesis, Dougherty’s model will be applied.

FIGURE 1.7: PERFORMANCE OF SONG AS A SIGN (AFTER DOUGHERTY)

 23
1.3 THE MUSICAL OBJECT

The second element which constitutes semiosis, together with the sign and the
interpretant, is the object. Peirce distinguishes two kinds of objects:

1. immediate object

2. dynamical object

The difference between those terms is expounded by Peirce as follows:

Namely, we have to distinguish the Immediate Object, which is the

Object as the Sign itself represents it, and whose Being is thus
dependent upon the Representation of it in the Sign, from the
Dynamical Object, which is the Reality which by some means
contrives to determine the Sign to its Representation. (4.536, 1905)

With regard to the term object, differences occur between its everyday use and its
use in a Peircean context. In everyday language, the range of the object is usually
restricted to the Peircean notion of existence, which is everything we have
knowledge of. In its Peircean sense, the term object has a much wider scope: it is
related to the Peircean notion of reality, which is everything we have knowledge of
(a form of secondness) and everything we could gain knowledge of in semiosis (a
10
form of firstness) . Looked upon in this way, the musical sign can refer not only to
tangible dynamical objects, such as the call of the cuckoo or a raging storm, but to
intangible dynamical objects, such as the composer’s view on life and death, the
creation process of a certain composition or the cultural context in which the
composition is written, as well. The nature of the dynamical object is indicated by
the immediate object, a quality of the sign. A sign contains several immediate
objects which refer to several dynamical objects. Which immediate object is actual-
ized, depends on one’s habits and beliefs regarding a certain phenomenon.

How can this be applied to music? It is impossible to gain knowledge of a

dynamical object directly, e.g. knowledge of the different moods within a musical
composition. Knowledge can only be expressed by means of signs, it is mediated
by signs. This implies that a direct relation between a dynamical object and its
interpretant is impossible. To the extent that a musical sign indicates the direction
of the reality to which it refers, we are dealing with an immediate object. The
immediate object is moulded by the musical representamen, which is constituted by
the musical parameters. An interpretation of the musical parameters might enable
one to make statements about a possible direction of the dynamical object, e.g. the
different moods within a musical composition, the object to which the musical sign
really refers.

10 The purpose of semiosis is to develop existence.

 24

Dougherty argues that

any attempt to examine music critically as a semeiotic phenomenon

must try to account for the object of the sign, however tentatively;
otherwise, terms such as "represents," "signifies," "stands for,"
"suggests" and their cogeners will become even more suspicious in
musicological discourse than they already are. (Dougherty, 1992:11

The terms Dougherty mentions (’represents’, ’signifies’, etcetera) are frequently used
in everyday language as well as in scientific discourse. Usually, those terms are
considered to be synonymous and as a result of this misapprehension, they are
considered to be interchangeable terms. A Peircean view on this matter can be
elucidating. When the relation sign-object is being discussed, we are dealing with
what is commonly called reference; the sign refers to an object, it stands for the
object. When the relation sign-interpretant is under discussion, we are dealing with
what is commonly called representation. The interpretant is a formulation of one’s
assumptions regarding the object to which the sign refers; although mediated by the
sign, the interpretant represents the object. Reference and representation are
different terms which are not interchangeable.

1.4 THE MUSICAL INTERPRETANT

1.4.1 Introduction

The third element which constitutes semiosis, together with the sign and the object,
is the interpretant. In Peirce’s work, two classifications of the interpretant can be
found. In the first classification, Peirce distinguishes an immediate interpretant, a
dynamical interpretant and a final interpretant:

In regard to the Interpretant we have equally to distinguish, in the

first place, the Immediate Interpretant, which is the Interpretant as it
is revealed in the right understanding of the Sign itself, and is
ordinarily called the meaning of the sign; while in the second place,
we have to take note of the Dynamical Interpretant which is the
actual effect which the Sign, as a Sign, really determines. Finally
there is what I provisionally term the Final Interpretant, which refers
to the manner in which the Sign tends to represent itself to be related
to its Object. (4.536, 1905)

In the second classification, Peirce distinguishes an emotional interpretant, an

energetic interpretant and a logical interpretant:

The first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling produced by it

[...]. This "emotional interpretant," as I call it, may amount to much
 25
more than that feeling of recognition; and in some cases, it is the only
proper significate effect that the sign produces. [...] If a sign produces
any further proper significate effect, it will do so through the
mediation of the emotional interpretant, and such further effect will
always involve an effort. I call it the energetic interpretant. [...] It
never can be the meaning of an intellectual concept, since it is a
single act, [while] such a concept is of a general nature. But what
further kind of effect can there be? [...] I will call it the logical
interpretant. (5.475/476, c. 1907)

Now the question arises how those two classifications are related to each other.
Van Driel (Van Driel, 1993) mentions two options: in the first option, the two
subdivisions are equal, in the second option, the emotional, the energetic and the
logical interpretant are considered to be a subdivision of the dynamical interpretant.
Van Driel rejects both, in favour of another option, in which the second
classification is the main subdivision: semiosis can result in a feeling, an action
and/or a proposition. This option can be derived from Peirce’s work:

a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant, the latter being that which
the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by
determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign, which
determination is the Interpretant. (4.356, 1905)

In other words: semiosis can lead to an emotional interpretant (’a feeling’), an

energetic interpretant (’an exertion’) or a logical interpretant (’a Sign’). The logical
interpretant, a third, can be subdivided into an immediate interpretant, a dynamical
interpretant and a final interpretant. The energetic interpretant, a second, can be
subdivided into a bodily interpretant and a mental interpretant. The emotional
interpretant, a first, cannot be subdivided.

1.4.2 Logical Interpretant

The nature of the logical interpretant, the cognitive effect of a sign, is indicated by
the (musical) sign, which indicates a possible direction in which semiosis could go.
This qualitative aspect of the musical sign is the immediate interpretant,

[...] the Interpretant represented or signified in the Sign. (8.343,

1908)

With regard to music, the name of the composer is a sign which contains some
qualities that indicate a possible direction of semiosis. When e.g. a new compo-
sition of Andrew Lloyd Webber is being discussed, it is not too difficult to make
preliminary statements about the nature of the composition, at least for someone
who is familiar with Lloyd Webber’s music: the name of the composer is the sign
which activates a network of habits and beliefs with regard to the music of Andrew
Lloyd Webber. These beliefs, which are the result of prior experience with Lloyd
 26
Webber’s music, are used to express expectations regarding his new composition.

The idea of the existence of a network of habits and beliefs regarding a musical
phenomenon can be compared to the schemata theory. Carroll defines a schema as

a structure in semantic memory that specifies the general or expected

arrangement of a body of information. A story schema includes all of
the information we expect to occur in a story. We have many story
schemata, with different ones for detective stories, fairy tales, and
romances. (Carroll, 1986:231)

The idea behind the schemata theory is that each event regarding a certain schema
is compared to information which is already stored in this schema. When an event
is encountered which does not match these habits and beliefs, two options come
into view: information regarding this new event is not stored in the schema or one
tries to find an explanation for the surprising phenomenon, the latter option being
the initation of semiosis. It can be assumed that schemata exist not only for stories,
but for musical phenomena as well.

The existence of a network of habit and beliefs regarding musical phenomena is

indicated by Tarasti (Tarasti, 1987a) and Meyer (Meyer, 1956). According to
Tarasti, three paradigms underlie musical consciousness: the paradigm of memory,
which is characterized by an increased recognition as the composition moves
forward, the paradigm of expectations, which is characterized by a decreasing
number of possibilities as the composition moves forward, and the paradigm of the
repertoire of intonations. The repertoire of intonations influences the easiness with
which musical elements are stored in the musical mind. A musical element is easily
stored if it fits in the repertoire of intonations. Such an element influences the
knowledge of the composition which is involved. The repertoire of intonations
makes it possible for the listener to expect certain things. It can be compared to the
network of habits and beliefs.

A similar idea regarding the existence of a network of habits and beliefs in case of
musical phenomena can be found in (Meyer, 1956). According to Meyer, musical
meaning is embodied meaning: the stimulus and what it refers to are of the same
kind. This does not mean that the meaning of music is limited to relations within
one composition: musical meaning depends on relations with compositions
previously heard as well.

The notion that musical meaning is embodied meaning is problematic, for it implies
that a musical sign can only represent musical objects, be it within a certain
composition or between different compositions, but that it cannot represent extra-
musical objects. We have seen that such a view on musical meaning ignores the
fact that listeners often do try to relate certain musical signs to extra-musical
objects on the basis of elements of the sign and particular habits and beliefs
 27
11
regarding a musical phenomenon .

Meyer distinguishes three stages regarding embodied meaning: hypothetical mean-

ings, which are construed during the musical expectation, evident meanings, which
are construed after each musical occurence, and determinate meanings, which are
construed when the musical experience is ’timeless in memory’ (Meyer, 1956). The
determinate meanings, which are forms of convetions, can be compared to Tarasti’s
repertoire of intonations and to the network of habits and beliefs.

The logical interpretant, the cognitive effect of a sign, is determined by the sign,
which in its turn is determined by the object. It may be a thought, a mental sign, yet

if this sign be of an intellectual kind [...] it must itself have a logical

interpretant; so that it cannot be the ultimate logical interpretant of
the concept. It can be proved that the only mental effect that can be
so produced and that is not a sign but is of general application is a
habit-change, meaning by a habit-change a modification of a
person’s tendencies towards action. (5.476, c. 1907)

In other words, each statement about the effect of music, each interpretation, in so
far as it is not a habit-change, is provisional: it becomes a new sign which can
12
initiate another semiosis which can result in another logical interpretant .

When semiosis leads to a statement with regard to a certain musical composition,

e.g. "In Beethoven’s Sixth, a pastoral atmosphere is expressed", we are dealing with
what Peirce calls the dynamical interpretant,

[...] the actual effect which the Sign, as a Sign, really determines.
(4.536, 1905)

The notion that a statement regarding a musical composition is a dynamical

interpretant implies that the number of dynamical interpretants is infinite, for an
infinite number of statements (interpretations) exists. However, it can be argued
that its number is not infinite but finite. According to Dougherty,

dynamic interpretants do not spin off unfettered; instead, they are

governed by the final interpretant, the goal toward which they tend
and that they reach given ideal circumstances and an indefinitely

11 More on the relation between a sign and its object can be found in 2.3.

12 With regard to this notion, Schuyt comes to two conclusions: 1) the sign or the
meaning does not exist and 2) it is impossible to speak of the one and only sign
and the one and only interpretation. (Schuyt, 1993:28). Schuyt’s conclusions can
be used to criticize the conception of music as a referential language with fixed
referents (see 1.2.2).
 28
long run. Thus, the number of dynamic interpretants is finite [...], and
the notion of the final interpretant hints at the means by which
subjective interpretations can be grounded in a broader
intersubjective framework; as such, the concept can help us account
for the relatively consistent interpretations of musical signs -
interpretations that tend to be self-corrective. (Dougherty, 1992:14)

Dougherty’s idea of the final number of dynamical interpretants makes sense, but
his argumentation needs some complementation. According to Dougherty, the final
interpretant is responsible for the fact that interpretations of musical signs are
relatively consistent. This is true, for final interpretants are added to one’s habits
and beliefs regarding a musical sign and habits and beliefs influence semiosis. But
it is not the final interpretant alone which accounts for relatively consistent
interpretations. The immediate interpretant, which is an element of the sign which
indicates the direction of the interpretation process, influences semiosis as well. It
is possible that different people come to the same interpretation because they
actualized the same immediate interpretant.

The final interpretant can be defined as the interpretant in the ideal situation in
which consensus regarding knowledge of a phenomenon is reached. It is a form of
thirdness, a notion which could easily lead to the misconception that something like
the ultimate final interpretant of a sign exists. Like all other concepts of Peirce’s
semiotic, the final interpretant is a dynamic concept. Final interpretants can be
adjusted now and then. take e.g. two different editions of a music encyclopedia,
where final interpretants regarding music can be found. It will not be hard to find
final interpretants in the latest edition which differ from previous editions. This can
lead to the conclusion that final interpretants, or knowledge, can vary in time and
culture. The final interpretant is what is commonly considered to be objective
knowledge. To avoid misunderstandings, it would be better to call this kind of
knowledge objectified knowledge: the final interpretant is primarily the result of
consensus within a certain community.

The final interpretant is a form of thirdness, which involves a dynamical

interpretant, which in its turn involves an immediate interpretant.

1.4.3 Energetic Interpretant

When semiosis results in action, we are dealing with an energetic interpretant,

which is a form of secondness. The energetic interpretant can be divided into a
physical interpretant and a mental interpretant:

The effort may be a muscular one [...] but it is much more usually an
exertion upon the Inner World, a mental effort. (5.475, c. 1907)

Peirce’s idea that the effort usually is a mental effort, differs from the notion of
Lidov, who argues that music involves mainly muscular action:
 29

Associations of somatic experience and music are so prevalent as

hardly to require demonstration. [...] Anterior to its status as a sign,
music is an action on and of the body. [...] Music is significant only if
we identify perceived sonorous motion with somatic experience.
(Lidov, 1987:69/70)

Lidov uses several examples to make his point clear:

The most common tempo indication in classical music, Allegro,

means walking, and the comparable common jazz term, swing, is
also kinesthetic in reference. [...] A skilled conductor can convey
what he requires of an orchestra by silent movements of his hands
[...]. [...] All around the globe, music commands and directs the
dance. (Lidov, 1987:69)

The idea that, regarding the musical sign, the (bodily) energetic interpretant is
rather important, makes sense; Lidov’s list of examples can be enlarged ad
infinitum. To equate musical motion with muscular action is another thing, which
involves the risk of an, as to paraphrase (Dougherty, 1992), ’overdetermined theory
of meaning based on simplistic assignments of somatic experience to musical
motion’. Lidov’s article is tending a little towards such an overdetermined theory.
Instead of elaborating his ideas regarding the energetic interpretant, Lidov switches
to the referential relation between sign and object, and he tries to show how in
Chopin’s Ballade (Opus 47) muscular action is expressed.

Despite the importance of the bodily energetic interpretant, in music, a mental

energetic interpretant is much more involved. The mental energetic interpretant, the
’exertion upon the Inner World’, is the feeling one recognizes; it is the actualized
emotional interpretant. The mental energetic interpretant bears upon the different
moods one can have when listening to music ("sad", "happy", "joy", etc.), but it
also bears upon the attitude one has towards a certain musical composition ("like",
"dislike", "beautiful", etc.).

The energetic interpretant is a form of secondness. When it leads to a statement, it

becomes a dynamical interpretant, a form of thirdness.

1.4.4 Emotional Interpretant

The emotional interpretant is

The first proper significate effect of a sign [...]. (5.475, c. 1907)

It is a feeling produced by the sign, a form of firstness. The emotional interpretant

[...] may amount to much more than that feeling of recognition; and
 30
in some cases, it is the only proper significate effect that the sign
produces. (5.475, c. 1907)

The notion that the emotional interpretant can be the only proper significate effect
of a sign, implies that in certain cases the musical sign gives no rise to a conscious
form of semiosis, simply because that particular musical sign perfectly fits into one
of our networks of habits and beliefs. An example is Muzak, music which is played
in elevators and stores. The kind of music which is used for this purpose is music of
13
which can be assumed that it is familiar to the majority of the shopping audience .

An emotional interpretant can become an energetic interpretant, which on its turn

can become a logical interpretant. A logical interpretant always involves an
energetic interpretant, which in its turn always involves an emotional interpretant.

1.5 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, the three elements which constitute semiosis, sign, object and
interpretant, have been discussed. In section 1.2, a characterization of the musical
sign was given. The musical object was dealt with in section 1.3. Section 1.4 dealt
with the musical interpretant.

The description of semiosis regarding music will be continued in chapter 2, which

will deal with three trichotomies: the sign in itself (or, to be more specific: how can
we distinguish a possible sign from a sign?), the relation sign-object and the
relation sign-interpretant.

13 The purpose of Muzak is to create a homelike environment, which can influence

the shopper’s perception of the image of the store, which on its turn can influence
sales.