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A589281 PDF
A589281 PDF
Learning Organizations
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14. ABSTRACT
In today’s volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environment, leaders will be called upon to
deal with multifaceted emerging threats within a global context. Leaders will be required to understand,
learn and adapt certain requirements to properly perform their duties. The purpose of this paper is to
examine military leadership and determine the desired qualities that allow a leader to lead organizations
through difficult and challenging environments to solve complex problems. This paper will explore the
characteristics and competencies of future leaders in context with Army leadership doctrine and investigate
the need for adaptive military leaders and their ability to transform organizations into learning
organizations. The paper will also look at shared leadership and the power of the group to solve complex
problems. The concepts and approaches described within this paper provide leaders a direction to
transform their organizations into learning organizations using the collective systems to change specific
Army practices that allow rapid growth, change, and innovation.
by
The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author
and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army,
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Page Count: 36
Classification: Unclassified
In today’s volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environment, leaders will
be called upon to deal with multifaceted emerging threats within a global context.
Leaders will be required to understand, learn and adapt certain requirements to properly
perform their duties. The purpose of this paper is to examine military leadership and
determine the desired qualities that allow a leader to lead organizations through difficult
and challenging environments to solve complex problems. This paper will explore the
doctrine and investigate the need for adaptive military leaders and their ability to
transform organizations into learning organizations. The paper will also look at shared
leadership and the power of the group to solve complex problems. The concepts and
approaches described within this paper provide leaders a direction to transform their
organizations into learning organizations using the collective systems to change specific
It is neither the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most
intelligent, but the one most responsive to change.
—Charles Darwin1
leaders will be called upon to deal with multifaceted emerging threats within a global
context. Leaders will be required to understand, learn, and adapt certain requirements
to properly perform their duties. The purpose of this paper is to examine military
leadership and determine the desired qualities that allow a leader to lead organizations
This document will define and discuss the characteristics and competencies of
future leaders in the context of Army leadership doctrine as well as look at the initiative
to develop the Army’s leaders of the future. Mission Command explores the need for
adaptive military leaders and their ability to transform organizations into learning
organizations that allow rapid growth, change, and innovation. The paper will also
investigate shared leadership and the power of the group to solve complex problems.
Finally, the paper will examine the changes a Battalion Commander implemented to a
traditional Army Recruiting Battalion to fully leverage the organization and allow it to
The concern with the implementation and training of the strategies and theories
discussed below for developing future leaders may prove to be difficult with the
within the services. This period could potentially lead the Army into a state of leadership
survival at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. As the force continues to draw-
down in Afghanistan and troop strengths decline, this may create a sense of instability.
Leaders may be forced to move away from the concept of Mission Command and the
organizations and assume risk in order to discover new efficiencies. The military may
slip back into a zero-defects mentality, in which leaders cannot make mistakes without
time of draw-down and resource constraints, leaders must take the appropriate
measures to prevent the force from slipping back into a military culture of control and
processes. It is the individual leaders in the coming days, months, and years who must
prevent the force from slipping back into a top down, zero-defects military. This is the
afternoon. Without capable leaders, the military cannot face the challenges of a
multifaceted VUCA environment. The leaders of today must be agile, creative, adaptive,
and multi-skilled. The Army leadership field manual 6-22 describes “an Army leader as
anyone by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility who inspires and influences
people to accomplish organizational goals. Leaders motivate people both inside and
outside the chain of command to pursue actions, focus thinking and shape decisions for
2
Army doctrine offers viewpoints about adaptive leadership, the elements to meet
the challenges of a VUCA environment, and the importance for a leader to adapt. The
and skills. These characteristics are developed and refined throughout the lifetime of a
leader by the environment, through his education, and from his experiences. Attributes
describe who a leader is.4 Traits are recurring qualities of a person.5 Beliefs are those
things ingrained and what we hold to be true. Values are important as they consist of
those qualities that allow a person to make the right decision in any situation.6 Skills are
the knowledge and abilities gained to perform the required duties to complete a task.
There are two fundamentals to adaptability. First the leader must develop, in
each new circumstance, the ability to recognize the central tasks vital for successful
minimizing weaknesses.8 In order to do this, leaders must test formerly held thoughts
mindedness, which is defined here as the ability to analyze different alternatives before
moving toward a conclusion; 2) prudence in evaluating and taking risk; and 3) resilience
Concept defines an adaptive leader as “a leader who can influence people by providing
uncertainty, and ambiguity to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.”11
3
Leaders at all levels must cultivate the aforementioned specific competencies in order to
Military Academy in February 2011 in which he expressed the importance and the need
for adaptive leaders who would have a broad understanding and range of skills to
Indeed, the Army has always needed entrepreneurial leaders with a broad
perspective and a diverse range of skills. As President Kennedy put it,
speaking on these grounds half a century ago, “your military
responsibilities will require versatility and adaptability never before
required in war or in peace.” And for an era of full spectrum conflict, when
we confront security dilemmas that Kennedy called “new in intensity,
ancient in origin,” America can succeed only with leaders who are
themselves full-spectrum in their thinking. The military will not be able to
train or educate you to have all the right answers – as you might find in a
manual – but you should look for those experiences and pursuits in your
career that will help you at least ask the right questions.12
monitor, assess, and understand the situational environment.13 Adaptive leaders need
the skills to adjust rapidly in a changing situation.14 This explanation suggests that a
Leaders base their knowledge on experiences, education, and insight that they have
acquired over the years. ADRP 6-22 also implies that there are critical competencies for
ambiguity, a willingness to accept prudent risk, and ability to adjust rapidly while
Stephen J. Gerras defines “critical thinking as the use of those cognitive skills or
the consideration and makeup of those essential thoughts that are inherent in all ways
of thinking and is integrated into a unit of connected systems that include scientific
Creative thinking is defined as the ability to produce new ideas that are valued by
others.18 Leaders at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels must facilitate creative
thinking within their formations to adapt rapidly to changing situations and to solve
complex problems to remain viable in today’s VUCA environment.19 The key to success
is the leader’s ability to facilitate dialogue both inside and outside the organization to
synthesis (rearrangement of ideas into a new whole) and evaluation (judgment based
on evidence).20
uncertain or vague environment to accomplish an assigned task. This occurs when the
leader realizes the problem and visualizes how to best integrate ends (objectives to be
capabilities to address the problem. General George W. Casey Jr. expressed in Army
Magazine in 2009 the role of the Army of the Twenty-first Century and the importance of
The leader’s ability and willingness to accept prudent risk is defined as knowing
wisdom, and conceptual abilities to make a sound judgment.22 As a result, leaders must
5
consider second- and third-order effects and have a clear understanding of the
analysis to mitigate the probable dangers in order to seize the initiative.23 When faced
with an equally adaptive enemy, leaders must have the mental capacity to cope with the
Finally, the leader’s ability to adjust rapidly while continuously assessing the
situation requires flexibility. The leader can quickly analyze the situation and decide on
the proper course of action.25 Today’s leaders must be agents of change and know
when and how to adapt for success, especially when adaptations may produce the
desired results.26 This flexibility allows leaders to contend with situations in front of them
with the assets available to them. They are able to manage a variety of tasks with
The Army is re-engineering the methods and procedures needed to produce the
environment. The lessons learned from the past eleven years of conflict and the
potential uncertain security environment of the 21st century has guided the Army to
make “adaptability” an essential attribute for each of its leaders.27 The Army’s 38th Chief
of Staff, General Ray Odierno, spoke to the Army War College student body on August
13, 2012 about strategic leadership and the strategic environment. He stated that the
education and development of present and future leaders will be essential for dealing
with the challenges that we will face. General Odierno also laid out the future
6
Action” in which he outlines his intent for a versatile, agile, and responsive force to meet
the future security challenges in a VUCA environment.28 One enhancement to come out
of this re-engineering is a concept called Mission Command, which will serve as the
The Army defines Mission Command as “the exercise of authority and direction
by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the
commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified
land operations.”29 Mission Command employs the task and systems to integrate and
synchronize the war-fighting functions that enable leaders and organizations to achieve
a desired end-state.30 Leaders are empowered to make their own decisions on how they
will accomplish the commander’s intent within given boundaries. Joint doctrine defines
“commander’s intent” as “a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation
and the desired military end-state that supports mission command, provides focus to the
staff and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the
commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not
principles:
7
With the proper application of the above principles, leaders should have the ability to
adapt to fast changing, complex, poorly structured problems in order to shape the
Command (TRADOC) and U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) in Fort
(MC CoE) in late 2010. The purpose of MC CoE is to integrate mission command
personnel, and facility (DOTMLPF) solutions across the entire Army.33 MC CoE is
essentially a one-stop shop for leaders to either provide lessons learned in order to
transfer knowledge back to the force or to hone individual leader skills in the art and
science of Mission Command. Not yet fully operational, MC CoE is moving toward
doctrine, empowering leaders and giving them the freedom to make decisions and solve
complex problems while acting within the senior commander’s intent to achieve mission
success, it will provide these future leaders a competitive edge in dealing in today’s
VUCA environment. The past eleven years of persistent conflict leaders have adjusted
to the environment in which they found themselves handling a whole host of situations
continue to serve the Army well as it transitions out of Afghanistan and becomes the
8
As the operational environment continues into an era of uncertainty and
complexity, leaders must work both inside and outside their organizations to develop the
best possible solutions to confront the challenges of the future. A military organization is
hierarchy, and the acceptance of general rules in order to accomplish a task. The next
section of the paper will focus on organizational leadership, the importance for
intermediate sized units such as “battalion through corps levels, civilian leaders at the
directorate through installation levels and Army civilians at the assistant through
undersecretary of the Army levels.”34 These organizations set policies and institute the
as the process to achieve a “desirable and clearly understood vision by influencing the
consensus.”37 Operational and strategic leader attributes and competencies are the
same as those of the direct level leader with differences being in the inherent duties and
In this era of persistent conflict, leadership at both the operational and strategic
levels requires that leaders understand that they, themselves, are systems as complex
as the one they are moving forward.39 The higher the leader rises in responsibility, the
9
greater the uncertainty, and risks. Leaders will rarely, if ever, have a complete picture of
all the factors in a situation. This lack of intelligence will cause them and their
order for our organizations to remain relevant in the twenty-first century, we must
complex situation.
Peter Senge best describes learning organizations in his book The Fifth
capacity to create its future.”41 Simply put, it is a group of people creating, acquiring,
transferring, and retaining knowledge and then acting to modify behavior to respond to
those insights. Peter Senge proposed the following five disciplines that make up the
The first discipline, personal mastery, is defined “as the discipline of continually
clarifying and deepening our personal vision, of focusing our energies, of developing
patience, and of seeing reality objectively.”43 This commitment by the individual does not
cannot occur.44 Personal mastery goes beyond competence and skills. It is the ability to
learn from experiences and identifying what is significant to us and being capable of
seeing reality more clearly.45 Peter Senge refers to personal visions as the results one
wants.46 Individuals realize what matters most to them because they are committed to
their own learning. Peter Senge says the strategy is simple. Just be a model for the
organization and things will change moving you toward a learning organization. 47
10
The second discipline Senge describes is mental models. He defines it “as
influence how we understand the world and how we take action.”48 These models must
be challenged by altering our way of thinking in order to shape behaviors and principles.
In creating a learning organization, members of the team will need to open up and
expose their thinking to the other members in order to find the best possible solution to
a complex problem.49 To achieve this, a future learning organization will need to make
key decisions based on collective understanding of its members to remain relevant and
organization will look like in the future.50 Every member of the organization must be an
effective advocate of the vision and share it with others. The leader must understand
and share the desired end state in order to provide direction and purpose.51 A vision’s
company; to build a place where people can come to find and discover anything they
might want to buy online.”53 To be valuable, a vision should be clear and concise. It
should convey a sense of purpose, goals, plans, and programs, which are mutually
shared within the organization.54 When successful, a vision will generate enthusiasm,
commitment, and direction.55 A shared vision can lead people to do great things.
However, the vision must be continually reinforced to ensure that the message stays
alive within the organization. Generally speaking, a vision is perceived to be long lasting
11
from inception. However, due to changes in the VUCA environment, it may become
In the fourth discipline Senge expresses that “team learning is the process of
aligning and developing the capacity of a team to create the results its members truly
desire.”56 “Dialogue” is the key word to team learning in that it suspends assumptions of
its members and allows the team to think together.57 A learning organization uses its
team members to share information and the lessons from experiences to accomplish
The fifth and final discipline, described by Senge, conveys that “systems thinking
is a systems approach to create a general theory that could identify the existence of
discipline for seeing wholes.”59 “It is a framework for seeing interrelationships rather than
things, for seeing patterns of change rather than static snapshots.”60 In short, systems’
thinking is a compilation of thoughts which are applied within a structure and are based
on a principle that the individual elements incorporated in the framework influence one
another throughout the whole system and interact with other systems rather than in
Peter Senge points out that systems’ thinking is the fifth discipline that combines
the other disciplines into a coherent body of theory and practice.62 The ability to
understand and see the whole system will illuminate reality as it is and how it can be
changed. When the five disciplines are merged, they do not necessarily produce a
12
learning organization but instead, open a path that allows an organization a new
systems, and practices. Leaders will need to build a coalition of core team members to
help with vision and communication. Hierarchical organizations with inflexible authorities
importance of centralized vs. decentralized organization and the importance for leaders
relevant results and develop a capacity to handle a complex changing environment will
force decisions to lower echelons, moving the Army to a more decentralized philosophy
and leaving higher echelons free to work critical decisions that only they can address. A
centralized organization is best defined as a structure where you have a clear leader
who is in charge and has decision making authority, whose decisions are
have a structure where there is no single decision making authority; rather you have a
structure that empowers decisional influence at all levels within the hierarchy. 65
In the book, The Starfish and the Spider,66 the authors describe decentralized
13
ocean, if an arm is removed from most starfish they are capable of regenerating an
entirely new organism from a single arm.67 Each of these will develop a neural network
On the other hand, a spider is an organism that has eight legs similar to a starfish
with multiple arms. However, they are completely different. The spider is so centralized
that if its head is removed, the entire organism dies because there is no regeneration of
vital parts.68 For the most part, the spider is capable of functioning with one leg missing,
In the new Army framework, leaders will empower their subordinates to construct
the most effective organizations. Leading through others does not signify that the
However, at any time, he can step in and temporarily take control in order to get the
they function.70 The first concept, “strict hierarchical decision-making,” does not work
because organizations are not capable of directing other organizations. However, what
ineffective when personnel withhold information from the organization and elect not to
share it. Instead, organization should implement the open systems concept where there
is constant flow and sharing of information throughout the organization.72 The third
14
concept, “organizational equity,” fails because individuals have their own ideas on how
to execute a plan. What is effective occurs when individuals operate within the context
of the larger idea.73 The fourth concept, “command and control,” is inadequate when
leader’s micro-manage and force their will upon the organization. What is successful is
The concepts and theories mentioned above are at a critical junction as the Army
contends with new challenges while attempting to implement a new doctrine of how
leaders will be required to lead in the future. General Odierno, the Chief of Staff of
United States Army, testified to the Armed Services Committee on February 12, 2013
and articulated the impacts of both the continuing resolution and sequestration on the
force.75 He indicated that the Army faces unprecedented budget reductions caused by
the 2013 defense budget continuing resolution and the potential implementation of
sequestration under the 2011 budget control act and articulated that these cuts would
affect the professional development, training, and readiness across the force.76
professional development programs as well as its ability to change the culture will be in
jeopardy, potentially preventing the future development of adaptive leaders that have
the capability to promote learning organizations. Leaders at all echelons may slip back
to the Army of the 90’s where leaders were faced with a zero-defects mentality that
stifled imagination and adaptability. This new initiative is critical to the success of how
the Army intends to grow its leaders and create organizations that are capable of
learning.
15
Additionally, if General Odierno’s concerns become reality, implementation of
assumptions and would remain firm on current organizational structures and hierarchies
that stifle innovation and prevent the necessary dialogue required to come up with new
ideas. In the Army, the culture defaults to predictability and leaders avoid risk, and stick
to the status-quo in addressing decisions in order to keep a low profile and not be
implemented several of the concepts described above using adaptive leadership, and
making fundamental changes within the organization to achieve mission success. The
Battalion success directly relates to the organization’s ability to see all aspects of its
on the organization’s collective thinking and its ability to share effectively pertinent
information (open system), which ensures the right Recruiter is at the right place at the
right time and properly resourced and supported to gain the best qualified applicant for
The task organization of the unit directly affects its ability to communicate,
coordinate, and synchronize its efforts. The organization of the Battalion provides each
of the functional areas a collaborative approach to planning. This allows the functional
area to integrate and synchronize the wide range of capabilities into full spectrum
16
recruiting operations. The synergy of the organization depends in large part on a shared
ensuring this common understanding of the situation and communicating that vision to
the individual Company Command Groups (CCG) and higher headquarter elements.
compartmented structure (See Figure 1) into three functional areas that operate in a
all recruiting operations across the battalion’s area of operation. The functional areas
are Command Group, Operations Center (OPCEN) and the Support Center (SUPCEN)
communication that allows rapid growth, change, and innovation in support of the
mission. The success of this proposed battalion structure is contingent on its ability to
leadership ensuring that the organization maintains focus on mission goals and
section focus and significantly increases the communication of each individual section,
thus creating a more effective, proactive, and efficient organization. This refined
framework of the recruiting battalion streamlines the activities and functions under two
primary directorates: the Operations Center (OPCEN) and the Support Center
(SUPCEN). The reorganization provides a higher level of focus on the critical support
17
Figure 1. Standard Recruiting Battalion Organizational Chart78
18
Function’s of the recruiting battalion. This structure provides an enhanced ability to
well as forecasted changes of the market area in support of the commander’s vision and
mission success.
The Commander provides the vision and intent to the staff. The staff conducts a
thorough analysis and synchronizes efforts to achieve the desired effects. Following the
commander’s review and approval, the staff issues the appropriate directives to its
organization and the span of control of each of the units. Company Command Teams
subordinates must have confidence that they can take the initiative to accomplish their
The Battalion Executive Officer directs the staff planning under the guidance of
the Battalion Commander and the OPCEN and SUPCEN staff sections. The OPCEN
develops the battalion campaign plan. The campaign plan consists of the school year
plan, marketing plan, and annual training plan. The SUPCEN staff verifies that there are
sufficient resources to support operations and conduct parallel planning to make certain
all support requirements are identified and planning timelines are established to
guarantee feasibility and completeness. Critical to the success of recurring events is the
the operation and to ensure adequate time to make necessary adjustments to achieve
mission accomplishment.
19
A predictable and continuous communication plan is critical to the successful
establishes the foundation for all communication and planning meetings in support of
the commander’s vision and intent. These critical meetings ensure all key personnel
within the battalion have the ability to gain direct guidance from the Battalion
Commander and that all sections are represented in the short-range, mid-range, and
long-range planning and operational updates. The Battalion Executive Officer maintains
responsibility for synchronization and prioritization of efforts for each of the staff
directorates.
with each of their staff personnel. The OPCEN meeting provides the opportunity to
synchronize the efforts of the CUOPS, FUOPS, and master trainer’s section. The
SUPCEN meeting reviews all long and mid-range planning support functions within the
battalion. Each of the meetings review the updated priorities from the commander’s
huddle and provide the opportunity for each of the staff members to present his updated
The command and staff serves as a Battalion staff update to the CCG’s on
administrative and logistic support issues. The fusion meeting focuses on operations six
weeks out for BN staff and CCG detailed synchronization. The Monday, Wednesday,
and Friday conference calls focus on production, seventy-two hour projections, tasking,
and training updates as needed. The Executive Officer huddle occurs once a week and
serves as a review of both the status of the staff section priorities established during the
20
The above transformation of the recruiting battalion, which took place over a two-
year period, allowed efficiencies, innovation, and adaptation through learning and
collective knowledge permitting the organization to achieve its goals. The battalion was
successful in its ability to recruit the best and brightest using precision because it
adapted and learned how to switch from a traditional command and control organization
in which everything was top driven to a collaborative leadership organization in which all
subordinate leaders in the organization were able to provide feedback to the system
that allowed the organization to adjust to the environment creating the conditions for
success. This degree of freedom and trust allowed flexibility for individuals to make
decisions in line with the overall vision of the battalion, balancing the individual and
The United States Army has begun a transition from a top-down command
late in the Twentieth Century. The concept has resonated throughout the Armed
Services and has been effectively employed in Afghanistan for several years. Today,
training is going on at the basic level and in the spirit of sharing, a consensus is formed
In order for the army to implement the abovementioned concepts, both senior
and junior leaders must establish a mutual respect and trust for one another. The
combined leadership, at all echelons, will be essential if the Army is to move together in
this era of uncertainty with reducing budgets, constrained resources, and an emphasis
move their formations forward. This is the time for leaders at all levels to step-up and
21
take charge and implement these new concepts of leading even when faced with
uncertainty.
Even in this time of ambiguity, there are mechanisms that the Army can
implement to assist with changing the culture. The first step is to reengineer the officer
evaluation system (OER) so that it addresses the characteristics, values, and skills that
reward adaptive behavior and sensible risk taking. Second, tie promotions and key
assignments to those OERs, giving them to those leaders who have displayed the
adaptive characteristics and skills identified through the OER system. Third,
immediately incorporate the adaptive leadership concepts discussed above into the
These three steps, while not all inclusive, provide a powerful tool for initiating change to
The tough leadership challenges that lay ahead and the need to change the
approach will be significant in changing the culture of the Army. Leaders must transition
to this new dynamic way of executing leadership where leading is shared and uses the
collective whole of the organization. Future leaders must view their organizations as
systems working as a community that shapes and influences the environment in which
they find themselves. The concepts and approaches described in this paper provide a
growth, change, and innovation. Until this new way of thinking about leadership is
institutionalized across the force, it will be left up to individual leaders to implement the
22
power of the organizational system from which they command to comprise all of the
environment.
Endnotes
1
“Charles Darwin Quotations,” http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/Charles_Darwin/
(accessed April 25, 2013).
2
Richard H. Kohn, “Tarnished Brass: is the U.S. Military Profession in Decline?,” World
Affairs, Spring 2009, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/tarnished-brass-us-military-
profession-decline (accessed February 24, 2013).
3
U.S. Department of the Army, Army Leadership, Army Field Manual 6-22 (Washington,
DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2006), 1-1.
4
U.S. Department of the Army, Army Leadership, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-
22 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 2012), 1-5.
5
Richard L. Hughes, Robert C Ginnett, and Gordon J. Curphy, Leadership: Enhancing the
Lessons of Experience, 3rd ed. (Boston, Mass: McGraw Hill Companies, 1999), 201.
6
U.S. Department of the Army, Army Leadership, 3-1.
7
Ibid., 9-5.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), Organizational and Operational (O&O) Concept,
ver 4.0 (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC], June, 30
2000).
12
Secretary Of Defense Robert M. Gates, “U.S. Military Academy West Point”, Speech,
West Point, NY, February 25, 2011
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1539 (accessed November 24,
2012).
13
U.S. Department of the Army, Army Leadership, 9-5.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
23
16
Stephen J. Gerras, Thinking Critical about Critical Thinking: A Fundamental Guide for
Strategic Leaders (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, August 2013), C3.
17
Joint Staff and Coalition Warfighting, Planner’s Handbook for Operational Design
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 7, 2011), II-3.
18
Charles D. Allen, “Creative Thinking for Senior Leaders,” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S.
Army War College, August 2013), 64.
19
Ibid.
20
Joint Staff and Coalition Warfighting, Planner’s Handbook for Operational Design, II-3.
21
George W. Casey, “The Army of the 21st Century,” Army Magazine, vol. 59, no. 10
(October 2009): 30.
22
U.S. Department of the Army, Army Leadership, 11-10.
23
U.S. Department of the Army, Mission Command, Army Doctrine Reference Publication
6-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, MAY 2012), 2-5.
24
U.S. Department of the Army, Army Leadership, 9-5.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Combined Arms Center, Mission Command Center of Excellence, “Adaptability Through
Mission Command (MC)," February 12, 2012, http://www.tradoc.army.mil/index.asp (accessed
November 7, 2012).
28
Ray Odierno, Marching Orders: America’s Force of Decisive Action, January 2012,
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2012).
29
U.S. Department of the Army, Mission Command, Army Doctrine Reference Publication
6-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, May 2012), Glossary-2.
30
Martin E. Dempsey, Mission Command, White Paper (Washington, DC: U.S. Department
of the Army, April 3, 2012).
31
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), GL-7.
32
U.S. Department of the Army, Mission Command, 2-1.
33
Mission Command Center of Excellence, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/MCCOE/ (accessed
November 7, 2012).
34
U.S. Department of the Army, Mission Command, 2-5.
35
Ibid.
24
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid., 11-1.
38
Ibid., 2-4.
39
Ronald Heifitz, Alexander Grashow, Marty Linsky, Practice of Adpative Leadership: Tools
and Tactics for Changing Your Organization and the World: A Fieldbook for Practitioners
(Boston, MA Harvard Business Press, 2009), 181.
40
Milan Vego, Joint Operational Warfare Theory and Practice and V. 2, Historical
Companion, (United States Depart of Defense, 2009), X-52.
41
Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of the Learning Organization
(New York: Currency Doubleday, 2006), 14.
42
Ibid., 6-11.
43
Ibid., 7.
44
Ibid., 129.
45
Ibid., 131-132.
46
Ibid., 139.
47
Ibid., 162.
48
Ibid., 8.
49
Ibid., 185.
50
Ibid., 9.
51
Charles D. Allen and Andrew A. Hill, Vision (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War
College, 2012), 27.
52
Ibid., 28.
53
Diane Hamilton, “Top 10 Company Mission Statements in 2012,”
http://drdianehamilton.wordpress.com/2011/01/13/top-10-company-mission-statements-in-2011/
(accessed October 6, 2012).
54
Allen and Hill, Vision, 22.
55
Stephen J Gerras, ed, Strategic Leadership Primer, 3rd ed. (Carlisle Barracks, PA:
United States Army War College, 2010), 21.
56
Senge, The Fifth Discipline, 218.
57
Ibid., 10.
25
58
Charles D. Allen and G.K. Cunningham, Applying Clausewitz and Systems Thinking
Design. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, August 2013), 84.
59
Senge, The Fifth Discipline, 68.
60
Ibid.
61
Wikepedia, “Systems Thinking,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systems_thinking (accessed
August 14, 2012).
62
Senge, The Fifth Discipline, 12.
63
John P. Kotter, Leading Change (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996),
161.
64
Business Dictionary, “Centralized Organization,”
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/centralized-organization.html (accessed December
1, 2012).
65
Business Dictionary, “Decentralized Organization,”
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/decentralized-organization.html (accessed
December 1, 2012).
66
Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom, Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of
Leaderless Organizations (Decentralized Revolution, LLC, 2006), 33-34.
67
Ibid., 35.
68
Ibid., 34.
69
U.S. Department of the Army, Army Leadership, 1-4.
70
Kim Bhasin, “General McChrystal: Here's What Does and Doesn't Work in an
Organization,” Business Insider, April 18, 2012, http://www.businessinsider.com/general-
mcchrystal-on-organizational-structure-2012-4 (accessed December 2, 2012).
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid.
73
Ibid.
74
Ibid.
75
Chief of Staff United States Army, General Raymond T. Odierno, “Statement to the U.S.
Senate Armed Services Committee”, Testimony, Washington, DC, February 12, 2013
http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2013/02%20February/Odierno%2002-12-13.pdf
(accessed February 21, 2013).
76
Ibid.
26
77
U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Recruiting Operations, USAREC Manual 3-0, (Fort
Knox, Kentucky, September 24, 2009), 8-1.
78
U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Recruiting Brigade and Recruiting Battalion Operations,
USAREC Manual 3-03, (Fort Knox, Kentucky, February 11, 2009), 1-8.
27