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Overview ............................................................................................................... 1
Selection ............................................................................................................... 5
Organization ....................................................................................................... 25
Resourcing .......................................................................................................... 37
Authorities ........................................................................................................... 45
Annexes .............................................................................................................. 55
The OSS Model and the Future of SOF JSOU Report of Proceedings
Executive Summary
The OSS Model and the Future of the SOF Warrior Seminar, 11-12 January
2011, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida
It has been some 70 years since the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) quietly came into
being as a small, nearly invisible, Washington, D.C.-based organization whose unique
capabilities and strategic reach resulted in decisive outcomes within World War II
European, Chinese, Southeast Asian and other theaters of operations. Today the record of
the OSS survives as far more than a topic of historical curiosity. As a result of its
dramatic successes and failures, the OSS has developed a legacy of mission
accomplishment that survives as a practical touchstone for the (SOF) Warriors of the 21st
century.
In fact, the OSS Model continues to provide fresh insights and practical relevancy
to the concept of persistent engagement as practiced by todays United States Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM). In speaking about the OSS veteran, a contemporary
Special Forces officer observed that we must understand who he is, not just what he
did.
As part of his Commanders Guidance for 2011, then USSOCOM Commander
Admiral Eric T. Olson directed that a study be undertaken to address if and how the OSS
Model could serve as a source of inspiration to incorporate into USSOCOM efforts to
select, organize, resource, and develop authorities for SOF of the future. Specifically, the
study was intended to identify ways to promote agility in the command through
leveraging the OSS selection process, modeling its streamlined organizational structure,
using the OSS simplified resourcing authorities, and adapting its charter and authorities
to conduct seamless intelligence and operations. Admiral Olson highlighted the OSS
attributes of expertise, ability to leverage networks and creativity to guide JSOUs efforts.
The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) engaged selected members of the
USSOCOM Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.
Army Special Operations Command, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare
Center and School, and the OSS Society to assist in the development of recommendations
for Admiral Olsons review. JSOU organized the participants into four study groups
addressing both OSS and USSOCOM approaches to the Selection, Organization,
Resourcing, and Authorities of SOF. The study groups began their discussions following
the Innovation Workshop conducted at USSOCOM on 16 November 2010. Three
principles guided the proceedings of that Innovation Workshop and subsequent
discussions: Understand the nature of the operational environment; recognize the need for
a small, innovative footprint for forces engaged within the operational environment; and
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The OSS Model and the Future of SOF JSOU Report of Proceedings
ensure sufficient flexibility in the relevant authorities to allow for the innovation
necessary within the operational environment.
These principles were amplified by the following thoughts: The expertise of the
OSS allowed members of the organization to understand the operational environment; to
understand the language and culture; and to understand the nature of the enemys purpose
or at least their objectives. The OSS recruited regional experts to apply their skills as
operators and to be the reach back for additional resources and knowledge as needed.
The SOF community has similar requirements today, and USSOCOM expects current
and future SOF warriors to have the same level of expertise as the OSS warrior.
The OSS members ability to leverage a multitude of personal and professional networks
was instrumental to their operational success. The OSS leadership recruited its personnel
by relying on contacts with business leaders, social elites, university academics, and other
professionals. Those operators sent overseas leveraged the networks within their areas of
operation to work against enemy networks. Todays SOF warrior is not as focused on or
as skilled in leveraging or exploiting networks for a variety of reasons, including the
relative lack of advanced language and cultural awareness skills.
Creativity enables the innovation that is required during operations for successful
outcomes. While expertise and leveraging can be taught or developed, creativity is a trait
not easily replicated. It is, however, a character trait expected in SOF warriors as they are
placed in situations where creativity means the difference between success and failure.
Each of the workgroups presented their recommendations and thoughts to those
attending the seminar on The OSS Model and the Future of the SOF Warrior on 11-12
January 2011. As a result of those contributions and subsequent discussion, the following
recommendations, organized by issue, emerged for developing SOF that demonstrate
flexibility and are able to adapt to the changing security environments SOF encounters.
Selection Process
Seek authorities for USSOCOM J-1 to monitor, influence and coordinate all personnel
issues, including recruitment and selection, related to all of SOF and not just limited to
USSOCOM command and staff as is the current situation.
Expand the Human Capital Plan so that it not only addresses the rapid acquisition of
new expertise, but one that exploits existing skill sets and experience residing in persons
now retired from the active force, but still available through the concept of SOF for
Life.
Modify and strengthen the Human Capital Plan to manage more effectively the
career tracks for SOF personnel and to develop further and harness the regional, cultural,
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and linguistic expertise of both organic SOF operators and personnel with service-
provided capabilities.
Establish a selection process for non-operator and service-provided capabilities
(formerly referred to as enablers).
Build and maintain a SOF personnel pool that is made up of varied cultural
backgrounds and races, that are capable of mastering different languages, and that are
adept of navigating cultural and ethnic boundaries.
Extend, expand and strengthen the current Military Accessions Vital to National
Interest (MAVNI) Lawsimilar to the Lodge Actto encourage the recruitment of
foreign nationals or other recent immigrants seeking U.S. citizenship through military
service.
Expand recruitment efforts in specific ethnic neighborhoods and enclaves in the
United States where immigrant groups have settled.
Review existing USSOCOM programs against OSS practices to attract native
speakers and to expedite procedures for obtaining security clearances in order to bring
their skill more rapidly into the fight.
Make even greater use of a common SOF assessment process by having candidates
complete a battery of psychological and aptitude assessments to determine the specific
characteristics required for success in todays SOF.
Apply a 360-degree feedback mechanism as part of the assessment process to add to
its effectiveness in measuring the whole man (similar to the OSS process).
Continue to strengthen recruitment efforts through the use of current SOF personnel
to get the word out to current service members, those who are considering joining the
services, and those who possess the attributes or specific skill sets that will contribute to
the SOF mission.
Organization
Compare and contrast OSS Morale Operations with current Military Information Support
Operations (MISO) and Civil Affairs (CA) structures to determine ways to increase team
integration from planning to execution and subsequent synchronization with SOF ground
units to develop a regional orientation.
Introduce on-the-job training approaches to increase CA skills for those members
engaged in sewage treatment plant, oil field operations, and other functions, similar to the
training concept employed by SOF medics.
Study the OSS employment of women in operational positions with respect to the
current gender restrictions on all SOF organizations to determine if any modifications can
be applied to todays Combat Support Team (CST) approach.
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Resourcing
Accelerate SOF-to-Service common acquisitions to reduce duplicative acquisition costs
and increase economies of scale.
Establish a SOF integrated Research and Development battle laboratory to develop
Irregular Warfare capabilities and other relevant technologies.
Develop ways to better leverage and manage existing commercial R&D capacities and
products.
Further investigate the ability to concentrate SOF resources on select persistent
engagement activities to respond more effectively within the international security
environment.
Authorities
Pursue changes in Department of Defense (DOD) oversight; manage USSOCOM more as
a Special Capability with appropriate funds as contrasted to a service-like entity, to
streamline the numbers of reviews, reports, and decision layers.
Request Congressional authority for USSOCOM to operate with appropriate
funding similar to the OSSs unvouchered funds to reduce overhead and increase
USSOCOMs ability and flexibility to meet urgent needs.
Educate relevant USSOCOM staff on Section 1206/1207/1208 funding and
authorities, thus enabling a more rapid ability to support partner nations. Seek legislative
support to expand and extend Section 1208 beyond Fiscal Year 2013.
Increase and clarify the appropriate authorities enabling USSOCOM roles in
intelligence operations.
The Authorities Group recommended seeking senior contract status at SES level for
needed civilian expertise instead of a senior-level direct commission capability. For the
ability to direct commission at any rank, USSOCOM must obtain individual service
agreements from the appropriate service to bring individuals on active duty as
commissioned officers. Furthermore, these commissions would most likely require staff
or non-line officer status. USSOCOM is interested in the authority to grant a uniformed
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commission at senior level rank (O-6) and above for specific purposes and limited
durations to meet specific urgent SOF needs. Refine USSOCOM roles and
responsibilities in synchronizing plans for global operations, and develop Joint SOF
Doctrine to support such efforts.
Summary
It is important to remember that the OSS was, in essence, an experiment that lasted only a
few years. The fact that the OSS did not reach full maturity and did not become
constrained by predictable bureaucratic limitations provides an important record of both
success and failure. This serves as a reach back as to how contemporary and future SOF
can learn from and exploit the OSS legacy. These recommendations are intended to
provide SOF Warriors with an agile, sustainable, and effective Way Ahead to confront
the inevitable uncertainties of the evolving international security environment.
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Overview
Admiral Eric T. Olson, then United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
Commander, directed a study be conducted to address one of his concerns on the future
of Special Operations. He expressed numerous times that the World War II-era Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) may be a source of inspiration to address his questions on the
future of Special Operations. The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) received
the task in late 2010 to lead a study and it engaged selected members of the USSOCOM
Staff, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), United States Army Special Operations
Command (USASOC), The United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center
and Schools (USAJFKSWCS), and the OSS Society to assist in the development of
recommendations for the USSOCOM Commanders consideration. In addition three
respected historians served as academic advisors to the project: Dr. Nancy W. Collins,
Columbia University; Dr. Troy Sacquety, USASOC historian; and Mr. Rob Townley,
OSS Society.
This directed study began in earnest with a one-day OSS Innovation Workshop on
16 November 2010. It was attended by selected USSOCOM staff members and led by
JSOU senior fellows to answer predetermined questions on OSS practices and
applications in four specific areas of interest for the USSOCOM Commander: Selection,
Organization, Resourcing, and Authorities. The workshop participants, along with select
participants from the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community participated in four
study groups and were tasked to research each of the commanders areas of interest,
answer specific questions developed for each of the four sections, and make
recommendations. This endeavor culminated with a JSOU sponsored symposium The
OSS Model and the Future of the SOF Warrior, from 11 to 12 January 2011, at MacDill
Air Force Base, Florida, where a comprehensive review of the study groups findings
were discussed and debated, and further recommendations made.
It is also noteworthy to mention that this directed study was preceded by a two-day
symposium conducted by JSOU and the OSS Society in November 2009 titled Irregular
Warfare and the OSS Model, in which OSS veterans were interviewed and their
accounts recorded. Three persistent themes from these events, previous studies, and
research on the OSS were identified: the necessity to understand the operational
environment; a penchant for innovative organizational design including small footprint
for operations; and the requirement for flexible application of authorities to adapt to
conditions in theater. These themes were embraced by the USSOCOM Commander and
underpinned the research and seminar discussions through January 2011. It should also
be noted that research focused on U.S. Army Special Forces since this community
comprises the principal land component to Special Operations and historically draws
1
The OSS Model and the Future of SOF JSOU Report of Proceedings
inspiration from the OSS experience. All research was completed using unclassified or
declassified documents and interviews. A considerable amount of data from the National
Archives was made available to the study and seminar participants by a member of the
OSS Society.
The bulk of this report is made up of the four study groups reports that summarize
responses to questions developed by JSOU for the four areas of interest directed by the
USSOCOM Commander. Each study groups summary is presented in the context of the
three themes identified earlier and highlighted at the November 2010 Innovation
Workshop. Recommendations drawn from the study and the January 2011 symposium
are presented in Annex A. A synopsis of the After Action Report from the Innovation
Workshop is enclosed in Annex B for context. Finally an OSS reading list is included in
Annex C.
The Selection Study Group dealt with not only the review of the current
USAJFKSWCS process for selecting Special Forces candidates, but also the similarities
to the CIA and that of the OSS. It also looked at the OSSs ability to directly commission
experts into the OSS. This was of great interest to the USSOCOM Commander to have
similar authorities. Another area of interest for this group was the issue of language skills.
This question dealt with both the ability to learn languages and how to recruit fully
qualified native speakers into the services. USAJFKSWCS and members of the CIA were
participants in the study and contributed with firsthand knowledge on their selection
process. It should also be noted that although USSOCOM is a joint organization, the
Selection Study Group focused on Special Forces as the cornerstone. U.S. Army Special
Forces is the principal land component to Special Operations historically and this study
uses it as a common reference point.
The Organization Study Group dealt with the areas of current structure, command
and control, and comparing them to the OSS structure. This group also looked at the
Understand and Small Footprint Themes to develop their recommendations on the future
of Special Operations. A separate USSOCOM innovation workshop team (SOF Operator
2020) was also was consulted for input. Additionally, the USSOCOM Interagency Task
Force (IATF), simultaneously conducted a study on OSS Morale Operations, and was
engaged for their input.
The Resourcing Study Group dealt with funding, education and material support.
This group examined the historical records of the OSS and Special Forces to determine
the cost of developing the organizations for manpower and material.
The Authorities Study Group investigated the OSS authorities, the enabling
authorities for the CIA and USSOCOM to determine where they disconnect and what
may be required to support USSOCOM for the future. This study, probably more so than
the others, was limited by use of only unclassified information.
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Methodology
JSOU reached out to OSS veterans, academics, and practitioners of the special operations
profession to conduct this short study. A data base on the OSS was made available, as
were the records under the control of the USSOCOM Historians Office. Components of
CIA provided limited information because of the unclassified nature of this project. The
USSOCOM U.S. State Department representative provided details on the use of selected
hiring authorities to assist in the effort as well. The OSS Society facilitated access to
veterans, who openly provided comments, participated in the review of the material, and
attended the January 2011 symposium.
This short study reflects a series of complex issues that have a long history in
constantly changing operational environments. The current and future realities have
transformed from wars between nation-states to violent conflict between loosely
configured groups of terrorists, or violent extremist organizations with elements of
criminal groups spanning the world. JSOU assembled this document as a set of findings
supported by data to serve as the basis for further discussion and possibly a more focused
study at the classified level for USSOCOM to consider. Each of the 4 sections of this
report were intended as standalone documents, and the sections collectively contribute to
the comprehensive review of potential applications of OSS-inspired models for
consideration by U.S. Special Operations Forces.
Background
The Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) and later the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS) was established in 1942 during World War II (WWII) under the direction
of Major General William J. Wild Bill Donovan to develop strategic intelligence and
carry out unconventional warfare. An enigmatic leader, General Donovan was revered by
his troops; however was also known for his poor managerial skills and his disdain for the
administrative. In contrast to the rapid growth of the OSS during the war and despite
Donovans appeal to retain a peacetime intelligence capability, the OSS was quickly
dissolved by an executive order signed by President Harry S. Truman in 1945. Activities
and components of the OSS were hurriedly divided between the State and War
Departments shortly after the conclusion of the war.1
1
Michael Warner, An End and a Beginning The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence
Agency (e-book). Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 15 March 2007;
available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-
monographs/oss/art10.htm; accessed December 2010.
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The OSS Model and the Future of SOF JSOU Report of Proceedings
In 2011, the force structure for USSOCOM was approximately 55,007 uniformed
personnel and approximately 6,467 civilians. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 the USSOCOM
estimated budget for operations and maintenance (O&M) was approximately $3.95
billion.2 In comparison, the OSS expended $43 million in FY 1945, and spent almost
$135 million over its four-year existence (equivalent to $1.1 billion in 2007). The OSS at
its zenith was made up of almost 13,000 personnel, with approximately one quarter of
that civilian.3
In his farewell address to his subordinates, General Donovan congratulated the OSS
for being an experiment to determine whether a group of Americans constituting a
cross-section of racial origins, of abilities, temperaments and talents could meet and risk
an encounter with long-established and well-trained enemy organizations.4 The efforts
and exploits of the innovative and clever men and women of the OSS enabled the Allies
to exploit economy-of-force missions throughout Europe and the Pacific theaters through
their small footprint, intelligence-gathering, and advisory methodologies. Todays
American SOF, in particular Army Special Forces, assert their heritage and lineage back
to the OSS. USSOCOM also acknowledges the inspiration of the OSS in its logo; a gold
lance head referred to as the tip of the spear.
2
Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Estimates, U. S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), USSOCOM 654,
February 2010; available at http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/budget_justification/pdfs/01
_Operation_and_Maintenance /O_M_VOL_1_PARTS/SOCOM_FY11.pdf; accessed October 2011.
3
Michael Warner, What was OSS? The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency
(e-book). Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 15 March 2007; available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-
monographs/oss/art03.htm; accessed December 2011.
4
Michael Warner, An End and a Beginning. The Office of Strategic Services: America's First
Intelligence Agency (e-book), 2007.
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The OSS Model and the Future of SOF JSOU Report of Proceedings
Selection
This section summarizes research and findings on the OSS approach toward personnel
selection and assessment, including the establishment of the first psychological
assessment program. It will highlight the current approach taken by U.S. Special Forces
(SF) and the CIA toward personnel selection and offer some recommendations for
application as it relates to the future of U.S. Special Operations Forces. Judgments
expressed are drawn from reading OSS-related literature, discussions with military
officers and civilian leaders from the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (DASD/SO/LIC), the USAJFKSWCS,
the USASOC, and current and former officers at the CIA. A set of Study Questions were
developed to guide and trigger discussion intended to yield concrete recommendations.
Colonel Louie M. Banks, the USASOC chief of psychological evaluation, offered his
personal insight in the selection and assessment process for OSS personnel and Army SF
and was a key contributor to this group in answering the study questions.
What are the criteria used for selection in the CIA (Clandestine Service and
paramilitary officers) and Special Forces today? How do they compare with and
how are they different from selection for duty with the OSS?
Current SOF and CIA recruiting processes are derived largely from the OSS and its
processes. They include strong recruiting from a variety of sources, psychological
assessments, and evaluations to determine mental and physical agility and toughness. The
OSS recruited from all ranks and strata of U.S. society. They relied upon personal
recommendations and social networks to recruit the best of the brightest, including many
captains of industry and others steeped in knowledge of technology. They also recruited
first- and second-generation Americans from mostly European ethnic groups to make
maximum use of their vast native language capability and cultural awareness.
In its first year of operations OSS leadership became concerned with reports from
the field of OSS agents inability to adapt to the challenging environments they were
operating in despite many having apparent cultural and language connections. A
psychological-psychiatric assessment entity with a formal assessment role was
established partially based on the model used by the British,5 and staffed by respected
5
Louie M. Banks, The History of Special Operations Psychological Selection, (Fort Leavenworth, KS,
1995), reprinted in Psychology in the Service of National Security, edited by Dr. A. David Mangelsdorff,
2005, http://users.idworld.net/dmangels/apampsy.htm, accessed December 2010.
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The OSS Model and the Future of SOF JSOU Report of Proceedings
psychologists throughout the U.S. 6 Over 5,000 OSS candidates were screened and
assessed in the year and half that followed, and according to Colonel Banks, this was the
precursor to modern day assessments used in civilian assessment centers and by Army
SOF.7
U.S. Army Special Forces were first assigned under the Psychological Warfare
Center at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. SF teams were originally intended to counter the
Soviet Union and its proxies in Europe by conducting guerrilla warfare and sabotage
during the Cold War. Its team-centered organization and operating tactics techniques and
procedures (TTP) were modeled after the 1st Special Service Force, the OSS, and other
specialized units during World War II (WWII). SF numbers and its missions were later
expanded by President Kennedys personal support in the early 1960s to include
counterinsurgency.8 The yearlong SF training process had a high attrition rate, and with
the increased through-put required during the Vietnam conflict, assessment and selection
issues arose.
The use of psychological assessment as part of the SF selection process was
eliminated later during the Vietnam War and was not used again until 1988. According to
Colonel Banks it has now become engrained as part of the formal assessment program,
and as of December 2010, approximately 59,404 soldiers have been screened for duty.
Army SOF psychology has greatly expanded to where it currently performs a multitude
of services within SOF, e.g., training, organizational consultation, research, and the
prevention and treatment of stress reactions, but all of the current positions have as their
basis the assessment and selection of soldiers for critical tasks.9
6
Donald W. MacKinnon, How assessment centers were started in the United States: The OSS Assessment
Program (Pittsburgh, PA: Development Dimensions International, 1974, 1980).
7
Louie M. Banks, The History of Special Operations Psychological Selection.
8
Charles M. Simpson III, Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years - A History of the U.S. Army
Special Forces (Novato CA: Presidio Press, 1983).
9
Louie M. Banks, The History of Special Operations Psychological Selection.
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Advisory Aviation unit, and is used by CIA to identify candidates for its clandestine
service. In most cases candidates are assessed for mental, physical, and psychological
qualities as well as their ability to work in a small team. The competitive selection
process, coupled with technological training and education, produces a SOF operator who
is adaptable, culturally aware, innovative, mature, self-assured, and self-reliant.10
Today SF recruiters look for many of the same attributes and qualities that the OSS
did, but the process has become much more refined over the years. A downside of the
refined process is that it comes with specific requirements for output, so the selection
process can be manipulated to meet number requirements which results in reduced
quality and violates a SOF truth that quality is more important than quantity. In addition,
another complaint includes the concept of cloning, in which the majority of SF operators
seem to display the same physical characteristics and are homogeneous, described more
directly, they are mostly all athletic-looking white guys.11 Many parts of the SOF
community are very white and conservative, according to a recent Washington Times
article on the repeal of Dont Ask Dont Tell.12 The article also cites a Rand study that
stated in 1999 that blacks are particularly underrepresented [in SOF] when compared
with their presence in the source populations.13
Selection into and participation in the Special Forces Qualification Course, also
referred to as the Q Course begins with an assessment: a battery of psychological and
experiential tests and exercises, named Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS).
They address social as well as physical abilities. SFAS, a three-week precursor course
held at a training facility near Fort Bragg, is designed to see if a soldier has what it takes
to serve on an Operational Detachment Ateam (ODA), and is designed to assess a
soldiers intellectual and physical aptitude for successful completion of Special Forces
training and suitability to serve as positive contributing member of the Special Forces
Regiment. The assessment of a soldier attending SFAS is based on the SF core attributes:
integrity, courage, perseverance, personal responsibility, professionalism, adaptability,
and team player (team work) capability. The average selection rate is 40 percent.14
10
Jessica Glicken Turnley, Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF are the way SOF are,
JSOU Report 11-1 (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, March 2011).
11
This quote was repeated by several current and former SOF operators during this study.
12
Rowan Scarborough, Special Forces Wary Of 'Don't Ask' Repeal, The Washington Times (28
December, 2010), p.1.
13
Margaret C. Harrell, et. al., Barriers to Minority Participation in Special Operations Forces (Santa
Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1999).
14
Special Forces - Shooters and Thinkers, U.S. Army, http://www.army.mil/article/29315/
Special_Forces ___Shooters_and _thinkers/, accessed December 2010.
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The OSS Model and the Future of SOF JSOU Report of Proceedings
15
L. M. Banks, The History of Special Operations Psychological Selection.
16
Ibid.
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The 75th Ranger Regiment is the U.S. Armys premier light infantry unit.
Partially based on the success of the SF assessment process, a psychological assessment
or Ranger Assessment and Selection Program (RASP) was added to an already arduous
Army Ranger selection process. The RASP has similar technical characteristics to the
SFAS.17
The Navy has also advanced its recruiting and assessment of candidates to serve as
SEAL operators under the Naval Special Warfare Command. Until recently, the Navy
SEAL recruitment process focused solely on assessing the physical fitness of potential
candidates. Candidates either passed or failed the Physical Screening Test (PST) as a
prerequisite to formal assessment into the elite force. Quoted in a recent article in USA
Today, the ideal candidate is an athlete in his early to mid-20s, plays water polo or
competes in triathlons. Once identified some SEAL candidates are personally assigned a
mentor and prepare up to a year before beginning Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL
(BUD/S), the Navys formal SEAL qualification course. In 2010 the Navy graduated a
record 277 from BUD/S.18
In 2008 the Navy added the Computerized Special Operations Resilience Test (C-
SORT) to the PST as another discriminator to determine readiness to attend BUD/S. C-
SORT is a psychological test that screens for characteristics such as a candidates ability
to function as a team player, to be motivated to withstand pain, and his ability to focus on
an end goal while dealing with the immediate situations.19
The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR)20 known as the Night
Stalkers is the Armys elite aviation regiment providing dedicated rotary-wing, special
operations aviation support to the Joint SOF community. In the early years of the units
existence it suffered from a very high accident rate during training, which also resulted in
a high number of casualties. In addition to an assessment of technical flying capabilities
all SOAR candidates were later evaluated with a formal psychological assessment. This
assessment process has also recently been expanded to assess its newly assigned support
personnel.21
17
Ibid.
18
Thomas Vanden Brook, U.S. Special Ops Forces Vital in Afghan War, USA TODAY, (December 27,
2010).
19
Discussion with Dr. Kristen E. Horgen, research scientist involved with developing the C-SORT,
December 2010.
20
In 2011 the Army Special Operations Aviation Command (ARSOAC) was established underneath U.S.
Army Special Operations Command. The 160th SOAR is assigned to ARSOAC.
21
Mathew N. Butler, A Few Good Men: Support Soldier Selection and Training, Special Warfare
Magazine Vol. 23, Issue 6 (Nov-Dec 2010).
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Combat Aviation Advisory (CAA) operators from the 6th Special Operations
Squadron (SOS) are U.S. Air Force SOF advisors specifically trained and tasked to
assess, train, advise and assist foreign aviation forces in airpower employment,
sustainment, and force integration. CAA candidates are screened and selected through a
formal process before beginning the Combat Aviation Advisor Mission Qualification
Course (CAAMQ), a challenging program intended to produce foreign language
proficient, regionally-oriented, politically astute and culturally aware aviation advisory
experts.22
22
Combat Aviation Advisor Factsheet, US Air Force, 2011, available at http://www.af.mil/information/
factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=18763, accessed December 2010.
23
Rob Townley, Conversation with OSS historian and descendant of OSS veteran, November 2010.
24
Careers, CIA, available at https://www.cia.gov/careers/index.html, accessed December 2010.
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What were the criteria for selection of the OSS and how does it compare to the
Question 1?
Selection for OSS was much less in-depth when compared to today. OSS recruited
Americans from all ranks and strata, but concentrated on those already with some
military experience to reduce the amount of basic military training required. General
Donovan surrounded himself with top administrative men, and he believed qualified
soldiers with language skills and cultural backgrounds to operate overseas could be found
among ethnic groups (first- or second-generation Americans) in the U.S. He directed his
recruiters to search for men who were calculatingly reckless with disciplined daring,
who are trained for aggressive action.25 It has been said that Donovan would refuse no
one who wanted to go overseas and do something worthwhile even if they did not fit the
regulations.26
Donovan recruited Americans who, like himself, traveled abroad or studied world
affairs and, in that age, such people often represented the best and the brightest at East
Coast (Ivy League) universities, businesses, and law firms.27 According to some
historical accounts, General Donovan told candidates to write me a memorandum saying
how you could be of service to this organization, and if I agree with you, youre hired.
Volunteers responded to advertisements looking for persons with foreign language
capabilities and who would be interested in special assignments.28 Following an interview
to determine general suitability, they reported to Washington D.C. for paramilitary
25
William J. Morgan, The OSS and I (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, 1957).
26
Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, Sub Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage (New York, NY:
Reynal and Hitchcock, 1964).
27
The Office of Strategic Services: The Forerunner of Todays CIA, 2008, available at
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2008-featured-story-archive/office-of
strategic-services.html, accessed December 2010.
28
Aron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986).
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training. Those selected for overseas deployment would then undergo additional, more
intense training in England.
The world has moved on since the 1940s and 1950s, and the student bodies of
todays Ivy League are nearly night and day from that of the first quarter of the 20th
century, statistically speaking.29 Today, if one goes into the Harvard bookstore, among
the racks and racks of clothing emblazoned with crimson and white youll find that the
rack of athletic-fit t-shirts with Harvard Business School (HBS) written across the chest
is always fulleven for less than $10, the store can hardly sell one. This small indicator
begs the same question that Donovan is reported to have asked of his recruiters, Where
are the PhDs, who can win a bar-fight?30
As a Masters program, HBS is a school now accessible to many in the corporate
world through their offering of truncated executive MBA programs and the like, and the
student body in general is far more of an amalgam of both American society and the
international business community than it once was. According to one estimate,
approximately 70 percent of the most recent executive MBA program class were not
American citizens.31
These circumstances have not always been the case. During the first half of the 20th
century, for example, the Ivy League was, by no small margin, a finishing school for
the children of the U.S. and international diplomatic communities. The children of
ambassadors and consular officers who grew up in Europe, Latin America, and Eurasia in
the 1920s, were raised speaking at least one language other than English, and attended
European universities for their undergraduate degrees, followed their parents back to the
U.S. for their twilight tours with the foreign service where many of the children
attended Ivy League schools for their graduate degree. This made the Ivy League the
most accessible location with the highest concentration of educated U.S. citizens with
practical (not school taught) foreign language proficiency who had ready made social
and political networks in Europe. By the time OSS recruiters or Donovans own network
identified them, all they needed was a short stint of paramilitary training to teach them
how to harness their networks in Europe in support of the war effort, which an
overwhelming number of them did as Jedburghs or Operations Group (OG) officers.32
29
Rob Townley, 2010.
30
Although this quote is commonly accepted and widely attributed to Donovan, its origin cannot be
confirmed.
31
Rob Townley, 2010.
32
Ibid.
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The makeup of student bodies in the Ivy League has changed dramatically, and
likewise the CIAs focus in recruiting from such schools has changed. The latter change
in focus is a function of two primary circumstances: the growth of the original OSS
network within the higher end of the U.S. academic community, and the expansion of
CIAs roles in intelligence collection and analysis. In the postwar years, many of OSSs
recruits from the Ivy League either returned to their posts in academia or stayed on to
become part of CIA. These officers wartime experience had a cascading effect on the
recruitment pools available to CIA in the following decades, as professors or graduate
students with OSS backgrounds moved on to other academic institutions and gained
access to new pools of prospective candidates. In this way, the CIAs recruitment efforts
have since gained purchase across a broad spectrum of the U.S. academic community,
riding on the coattails of the social and career progressions of Donovans original
recruits. In some fashion, this circumstance lends credence to OSSs Oh So Social
moniker, which, while it was often used to deride the services organizational character,
in fact hits on some of the very reasons OSS was effective; many times the deciding
factor in the success both in the conduct of intelligence and unconventional warfare is
who you know, not what you know.33
Was there a set of criteria in the selection process to determine grade level of
appointment? Was there a set of criteria in the selection process to determine job
specialty and assignment location? CONUS or OCONUS? Is there any evidence that
this was an effective system?
There was no formal assessment process to enter the OSS in its first year. According to
Dr. Donald MacKinnon, a psychologist who pioneered assessment and selection
programs for both the OSS and CIA, personnel entered the OSS through the following:
recruitment of military personnel by the Personnel Procurement Branch (PPB)
recruitment of civilians by the Civilian Personnel Branch (CPB)
recruitment of both military and civilian personnel through the initiative of
individual OSS members34
As stated earlier, by the middle of 1943 reports from the field indicated that there
were issues with some deployed personnel.35 According to MacKinnon, nobody knew
33
Ibid.
34
Donald W. MacKinnon, How assessment centers were started in the United States: The OSS
Assessment Program, Studies In Intelligence, 23, No. 3 (Fall 1979), available at
http://www.ddiworld.com/DDIWorld/media/whitepapers/HowAssessmentCentersWereStarted_mg_ddi.pdf
?ext=.pdf, accessed December 2010.
35
L. M. Banks, The History of Special Operations Psychological Selection.
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who would make a good spy or an effective guerrilla fighter. Consequently, large
numbers of misfits were recruited from the very beginning, and this might have continued
had it not been for several disastrous operations such as one in Italy for which, on the
assumption that it takes dirty men to do dirty works, some OSS men were recruited
directly from the ranks of Murder, Inc. and the Philadelphia Purple Gang.36
36
Donald W. MacKinnon, How assessment centers were started in the United States: The OSS
Assessment Program, Studies In Intelligence, 23, No. 3 (Fall 1979).
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Louie M. Banks, The Office of Strategic Services Psychological Selection Program (Fort Leavenworth,
KS: 1995)
40
Donald W. MacKinnon, How assessment centers were started in the United States: The OSS
Assessment Program, 1979.
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This led to a discovery that very few recruits were actually assigned to the billet they
were recruited for. People would be hired and show up in Washington only to be asked
Do you have any idea what OSS might have hired you for?41 In other cases they hired
two people for the same job, such as the case where two people were hired to head the
Research Section of the Division of Special Information, so one was given the title
Director and the other Chief. The lack of a specific system meant that there were
men who did daring missions with strategic implications and those who spent their
service doing nothing but travelling the world on a high priority at government expense.
The only thing that appeared to impact assignment location was language capability and
cultural familiarity. It was not relevant that the OSS tried to fit the right person to a
position. Training including paramilitary operations lasted up to eight months after
selection and in some instances the initial assignment would change as the needs of the
war advanced.42
In addition to establishing the psychological assessment program discussed above,
the OSS defined its human resource pool and selected personnel on the basis of three
primary sets of holistic attributes as they pertained to each service member or employee:
specific discipline or skill, ethnic or geographic background (access, experience), and
general temperament (personality). The apparent overlap, or lack thereof, with regard to
discipline and background was often a deciding factor in the selection of an individual for
service with the OSS, and furthermore informed the type and character of the assignment
for which the individual evaluated would be chosen. Though this system manifested in a
number of different forms (PPB activities, spot assessment, referral, etc), it is important
to note that the selection process was not predicated primarily upon the evaluation of
basic human predispositions or physical abilities, but on the identification and evaluation
of practical knowledge, experience, and access that the individual might provide in
support of OSSs requirements. To this end, the OSS made a point of seeking out
individuals with existing skill sets that the military did not or could not develop
organically that might be of use in military or intelligence applications.
The above assertion is borne out in a number of larger OSS or COI recruitment
efforts, but is most readily apparent in two cases: the selection of Donovans 300, and
41
Richard Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of Americas First Central Intelligence Agency
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press; First Lyons Press, paperback edition, 1972).
42
Donald W. MacKinnon, How assessment centers were started in the United States: The OSS
Assessment Program, 1979.
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43
Rob Townley, 2010.
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of more than materiel support to the British war effort, Donovan already had an
informational advantage over his more conventional counterparts in the armed services
given their comparative poverty of knowledge on many subjects germane to the analysis
of the German military industrial base that was, at the time, supporting the blitzkrieg, and
which would later become the large focus of the Allied bombing campaign in Europe.
By the time the OSS was activated, Donovan already knew the general mix of
manpower and skills that would be required to carry out his mission, and was able to
deploy trained, informed, and effective teams into combat alongside the British Special
Operations Executive (SOE) well in advance of any other American military ground
force. Without first developing the capability to maintain a measure of historical
perspective and mid-term currency in operational context regarding the European theater
of operations, the OSS may not have recruited the right sort of personnel to meet the
intellectual, as well as the physical, demands of an incredibly dynamic operational
environment.
The original recruitment and use of the 300 also helped to create another, equally
important part of the OSSs foundation: the process helped to found the service with a
reverence and reliance on the history of the populations in which it was to operate. This
reliance, in operational terms, translated culturally into one of the more deceptive traits of
the OSS. Though each OSS team (Jedburghs, OGs, Secret Intelligence detachments, etc.)
made what would be considered small moves on the battlefield when considered
independently, each small move was purposely designed to take advantage of existing
circumstance in order to produce disproportionate result, or to compliment other small
moves in order to build the critical mass necessary to achieve a large goal. At its core,
this characteristic may be superficially compared to the adage think globally, act
locally.
OSS leadership did not need to micromanage operations in the field to coordinate
these kinds of activities; rather, they occurred naturally. To consider in linear fashion
how this was possible given the relatively limited communications infrastructure of the
period, OSS personnel assigned to combat or intelligence collection duties overseas were
selected by men whose knowledge of their enemy was steeped in a holistic understanding
of their proposed operating environment.
As such, the selection teams were predisposed to choose men with a similar rich
understanding, paired with specific skill sets as necessary. Once in the field, OSS officers
did not need to communicate with each other or their headquarters constantly or over
long distances to achieve operational unity their common perspective and near native
familiarity with their operating environment produced this unity of action naturally, such
that each small move intrinsically complemented another. When considered in the
aggregate, OSS operations in Europe during WWII resembled less something regulated
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The OSS Model and the Future of SOF JSOU Report of Proceedings
by command and signal, and more something governed by common strategic purpose and
well-heeled instinct.
Donovans close collaboration with the British leading up to the beginning of
WWII provided a second and readily apparent influence on the OSSs recruitment
activities. During Donovans assignments on behalf of President Roosevelt as a special
liaison to Whitehall, Donovan gained much insight (whether arranged or objective) into
the logic behind the SOE and Special Intelligence Service (SIS) operations in Europe. In
later correspondence with his colleague Fleming during the summer of 1941, Donovan
asked him how he should initially devise the makeup of his headquarters staff. Flemings
response was somewhat flippant, but confirmed many of Donovans earlier assertions on
the nature and requirements for the prosecution of successful guerrilla warfare. Fleming
recommended that Donovan locate and enlist the services of a number of reputable
professionals from American industry or society to serve as senior officers or department
heads.
The logic behind Flemings recommendation for recruitment was twofold: first, the
proven track record of these individuals obviously indicated that each would be an asset
to the OSS from a simple managerial standpoint. However, the more important aspect of
these recommendations was that the recruitment of these individuals represented a
harnessing of the best of breed from the U.S. as a nation, and with that came expertise,
access and resources associated with the industrial or societal sector in which each
individual had distinguished himself. By adding these individuals to the ranks, the OSS
gained the ability to leverage large parts of American society in support of the war effort.
Again, these recruitments were small moves, but they had disproportionate effects when
considered in context of Americas trajectory into the war. Several of these recruitments,
such as the relationship that the OSS developed with Henry Luce (influential publisher
and creator of the Time/Life magazine empire), long outlasted the OSSs existence, and
became valuable assets to our nations national security apparatus both during and after
WWII. However, it can be conjectured that it was not the distinguished individual, but
the network in which he existed, that represented value to the OSS as an organization.
What are your recommendations for the selection process for special operations
warriors in the 21st century?
The most important thing in selection is to remember that quality (suitability) is more
important than quantity (numbers) and that SOF cannot be mass produced. Our selection
processes are sound as long as they are followed.
S1: There needs to be a selection process for non-operator service-provided
capability personnel (enablers). We spend an enormous amount of effort and money to
select the right operator but other than a few exceptions do nothing to screen the
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The OSS Model and the Future of SOF JSOU Report of Proceedings
individuals who will be supporting the operator. These support personnel are absolutely
critical to mission success, and yet SOF generally accepts whoever the service provides.
The challenge to selecting support personnel is that the services may not provide enough
candidates to allow a rigorous selection, but there should be some system to evaluate a
support persons potential for serving in a SOF unit.
S2: Target recruitment efforts in ethnic neighborhoods and enclaves in the United
States where immigrants from around the world settled. Middle Eastern and South Asian
immigrant communities can be found in the following areas:
Arabian Village, Detroit and Dearborn, Michigan
Assyrian District, northern Chicago, Illinois
Chaldean Town, Detroit, Michigan
East Dearborn, Michigan (Iraqi)
Little Arabia, Albany Park, Chicago, Illinois
Little Arabia Anaheim (Orange County), Anaheim, California
Little Kabul, Fremont, California (the largest Afghan population in the United
States in 2001)
Little Persia, Los Angeles, California (Iranian)
South Paterson/Little Ramallah, Paterson, New Jersey and Clifton, New Jersey
Little Tel Aviv, Miami, Florida44
Similar ethnic enclaves with immigrants who speak various African dialects, Asian
languages, or Spanish exist in many other areas of the U.S., such as numerous cities with
a China Town, a Little Havana, or a Little Somalia. Many immigrants are eager to prove
their patriotism and loyalty to their new nation and simply need to be asked to join the
military.
S3: Cultural awareness: To promote development of cultural awareness and
advanced language skills, a quote was extracted from a November 2010 statement made
by John R. Clapper, the Director Of National Intelligence: we need to build and
maintain a workforce that represents the rich diversity of the world we live in: a work
force that reflects different cultural backgrounds, ethnicities and heritage, languages,
races, gender, orientation, abilities, and ideas.45 Despite previous efforts that have not
44
List of Ethnic Enclaves in North America, Wikipedia, (n.d.), available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_named_ethnic_enclaves_in_North_American_cities, accessed
December 2010.
45
John R. Clapper, Statement on Intelligence Community Equal Opportunity and Diversity, Director of
National Intelligence, signed 10 November 2010.
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been as successful or effective as we would like, we should continue to look for methods
to deliberately recruit people with the desired language and cultural background.
S4: Finally, in terms of selection process, focus on recruiting or getting the word
out to current service members or those who are considering joining the services that may
potentially qualify as a special operations warrior. Extend the search across service
organizations to identify current service members, irrespective of service, who may
possess special skills of interest to SOF. Expand the recruiting effort by using current and
former SOF operators to recruit in high schools, junior and four-year colleges and
universities to better inform potential candidates about the positive and negative aspects
of SOF. In a manner similar to OSS, selecting candidates based on already acquired skill
sets (e.g., free fall sky diving, SCUBA, use of compass and orienteering, language,
cultural, computers, etc.) may be of value. Focus recruitment efforts on those who have
been successful in the scouting movement because many of them, particularly if they
have achieved the Eagle or Explorer rank, will have mastered some of the above skills
being sought. Even with such a good head start, of course the difficulty lies in the actual
training required to make a candidate SOF-qualified. Targeted recruiting efforts,
however, for potential candidates, who already possess a specific required skill set rather
than the current recruiting for generalist candidates, should result in identifying motivated
candidates ready to undergo the rigor of SOF training.
S5: One recent hurdle to recruiting has been the inability to obtain clearances for
new immigrants to the U.S., and is a significant issue in the current environment where
SOF operators routinely work with classified information. The Lodge-Philbin Act better
known as the Lodge Act was passed in 1950 and was in effect through 1959. It allowed
foreign nationals to serve in the U.S. Armed forces with the ultimate reward of US
residency and citizenship. Former OSS members and new Army SF soldiers were
common beneficiaries of the policy.46 Recommend taking another look at introducing a
new law similar to the Lodge Act to encourage the recruitment of foreign nationals or
other recent immigrants seeking U.S. citizenship through military service.
S6: USSOCOM does not normally have operational authority over deployed
forces, the plans and operations themselves are executed by the Geographic Combatant
Commanders.47 Similarly, USSOCOM will require the support from the other military
services to implement major improvements to its recruitment and selection process.
Recommend that the USSOCOM J-1 (Personnel) be granted authority to manage all
46
L. Morgan Banks, The History of Special Operations Psychological Selection.
47
Extracted from Admiral Eric Olsons testimony to the Senate Armed Service Committee as USSOCOM
commander, June 2009.
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personnel issues, including recruitment and selection, related to the entire force and not
just limited to the command level as is the current situation. This will allow the J-1 to
have visibility throughout SOF and to be able to monitor and respond to recruitment
needs across the force as well as better coordinate force-wide requests for support from
the other military services.
S7: Special Operations warriors, like OSS agents of the past, need to be of a certain
mind, body, and motivation type. In terms of mind, recommend SOF evaluators make
even greater use of the assessment process by having candidates complete a battery of
psychological and aptitude assessments to determine a host of specific characteristics
required for success in todays SOF. Assuming the selection committee knows what
characteristics are determined desirable they can add this to their consideration. Both
body and motivation type are covered in the selection and training process current
candidates undergo.
S8: Build a 360-degree feedback mechanism into the assessment process to add to
its effectiveness of measuring the whole man. In this 360-degree feedback assessment the
candidates immediate supervisor(s), colleagues, and subordinates would receive an on-
line feedback assessment for each of the identified raters. The 360-degree feedback
assessment gives a more complete view of the candidate in terms of multiple
perspectives.
48
Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) Factsheet, available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/mavni-fact-sheet.pdf, accessed December 2010.
49
Input provided by the USSOCOM J1 (personnel) representatives contributing to the OSS study.
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Similar to the Lodge Act, Section 329 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), also known as wartime naturalization allows service members who serve
during specifically designated periods of hostilities to achieve citizenship without
having to first apply for permanent residency.50 The MAVNI program derives its
authority from this section of the INA. Extension of the MAVNI program was a priority
for Admiral Olson and USSOCOM as he also included an endorsement of the program in
his September 2009 Posture Statement.51
Will there be new levels of resourcing required (not numbers of dollars rather a
description of resources-education, equipment)?
An expanded recruitment and selection effort probably would require additional
resources, recruiters and screeners, and training staff for processing them into their
respective SOF organizations. Moreover, the influx of additional personnel, especially if
they require the granting of a security clearance, would also require additional security
and other investigative personnel to process the requests for clearances. In the case of
immigrants wanting to join the military, part of the problem with clearances is that
investigators cannot look into a persons background overseas prior to their arrival in the
U.S. To successfully recruit immigrant personnel, USSOCOM might require its own
investigative branch to research an applicants background overseas. It would also require
additional training courses to prepare the applicant for existing training courses, much
like was run in the 18X program, an enlistment option which provides soldiers an
opportunity to try out for Special Forces.
Selecting support personnel would also require additional recruiters and an
organizational structure to conduct the selection. It could be minimal, as a useful
selection for support personnel could be as simple as an application, a review of the
applicants records, and an interview. The question would be whether SOF can select
enough support personnel to fill the required billets.
50
Naturalization Process for the Military (n.d.), U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services website, available at
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=858921
e54dc3f110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=8a2f6d26d17df110VgnVCM100000471819
0aRCRD, accessed December 2010.
51
Admiral Olson reiterated his continued support for the MAVNI program in his March 2011 Posture
Statement.
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Organization
This section summarizes the approach the OSS took toward the organization, the current
organizations of U.S. Army Special Forces and CIA, and offers some recommendations
for application as it relates to U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF). Judgments
expressed are drawn from reading OSS-related literature, discussions with military
officers and civilian leaders from the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Counterterrorism (DASD/SO/CT), USAJFKSWCS,
USASOC, and current and former officers at CIA. Research was organized according to a
set of Study Questions which were developed to guide and trigger discussion during the
seminar and yield concrete recommendations.
52
Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence
Agency (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1981).
53
Rob Townley, discussions with JSOU Senior Fellows on the OSS, December 2010.
54
Office of Strategic Services Field Manual No. 6, Operational Group Field Manual - Strategic Services
(Provisional), 25 April 1944, declassified on March 12, 2009, National Archives Record Service (NARS).
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respective design structure. These tactical units also had bolt on (additional function
people or teams) personnel or teams that made them non-standard from their design.
Under the Deputy Director of Strategic Services Operations were both Morale Operations
(MO, propaganda) and the OGs. These units operated in the same areas, but with
completely different missions. In spite of those operational differences they both had
similar and therefore mutual objectives. They did mutually support each other within the
AO, and at times it was synchronized to meet specific missions. OGs were regimental in
design to fit their mission of recruiting, training, and commanding local guerrilla groups.
MOs were organized by function and then by region.
By contrast, the Board of Economic Warfare and the Office of Economic Warfare
Analysis (OEWA) were more complex. However, they still were purpose-built and
maintained the small team approach. As an example, the Research and Analysis (R&A)
section had only eight personnel to cover the entire effort in Europe.
The OSS began as a small organization by design. The OSS Organization Chart55 is
depicted below.
55
Michael Warner, What was OSS? The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency
(e-book) 2007.
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This organization was Major General Donovans design based on his knowledge of
business, Europe, and understanding of guerrilla warfare. He knew that his headquarters
must remain small to be agile to apply its strategy from OSS Headquarters in
Washington, D.C. to the units in the field. There was limited two way communications
from his headquarters to the field units partly by design and partly because of the
limitation of communication equipment. This did not mean that Donovan did not
communicate or protect his commanders. Rather, he believed they were in the best
position to make decisions, even ones that were not well received in their Theater of
Operations. Donovan stood by his leaders decisions, in many cases even if they were
wrong.
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The OSS Model and the Future of SOF JSOU Report of Proceedings
Groups Field Manual56 for the OSS Special Operations units (Jedburghs and OGs). SF
operates by, through, and with using Foreign Internal Defense (FID) or Unconventional
Warfare (UW) techniques, and it still organizes, equips, and trains the locals. Direct
Action certainly plays a role today as it did during WWII, but it was not the primary role
then. The above mission tasks are part of USSOCOMs core activities and they have their
roots in the OSS.
The use of Direct Action capability is also a direct link back to the OSS. This is one
of the current SOF Core Activities, and it has become the signature of how the world sees
Special Operations today. It may be causing the concern that the SF community is losing
focus on the other Core Activities.57 Consequently, many of the other SOF Core
Activities are being challenged by the Conventional military by default and by over
commitment to this single activity. Our assets are being stressed with repeat rotations to
Iraq and Afghanistan at a very high percentage of our force structure.
Military Information Support Operations, formerly known as Psychological
Operations (PSYOP), also has strong roots in the OSS under Morale Operations. As the
COI, Donovan had control over all of the intelligence and information for the war effort
to include propaganda. However, after Pearl Harbor, the President made a critical
decision to separate White (overt, truthful, identifiable origins) and Black (covert,
feel of truth, not clearly identifiable origins) propaganda, giving half (Black) to Donovan
and half (White) to the Foreign Information Service (FIS) under Nelson Rockefeller. The
FIS conducted radio broadcasts outside of military control with the expected clashes
between conventional Services and Donovans OSS. This remains true today; there is still
separation between the types of psychological operations being conducted. Today, even
on the military side of these types of operations are clashes over turf between Public
Affairs (PAO), Information Operations (IO) and now MISO on issues of who does what
and when at which target audience.
Morale Operations, established in January 1943, had two components: radio and
printed materials. The components were intended to create havoc by the use of lies and
deception to undermine enemy morale (military or population). The OSS did have trouble
demonstrating the success of their operations, although there are cases where their
deceptions were effective enough that they were picked up and reported by the allies as
56
Office of Strategic Services Field Manual No. 6, Operational Group Field Manual - Strategic Services
(Provisional).1944.
57
Until 4 August 2011 the following were listed as SOF core activities: Foreign Internal Defense, Security
Force Assistance, and Military Information Operations, See USSOCOM Factbook, 2010, p. 7.
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true. Printed material included leaflets, false documents, false newspaper stories and
death notices (rumors) to erode the enemys will. By the end of World War II, there was
sufficient enough belief in psychological warfare that the US military would include it in
future warfare. This remains true today.
One common denominator between MISO and the OSS Morale Operations is
language skills. Morale Operations required a high level, native-born, first hand
knowledge of the particular language. This meant getting beyond the classroom and into
the business/street-smart level of knowledge and cultural awareness. This was a reason
the OSS got the Oh, So Social58 negative reputation. Early recruits and leadership came
from the part of American society that was educated overseas or was first generation US
born. There were large numbers of Ivy League educated OSS warriors which contributed
to this misunderstanding. Since the beginnings of SF, language skills and cross-cultural
awareness have remained a constant challenge to the community. MISO has a greater
challenge, because added to the language are some local cultural challenges.
MISO and Civil Affairs (CA) are being modified structurally and expanded in
manpower. However, as two of the five SOF Truths state; SOF cannot be mass
produced; Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur. 59 Like SF
soldiers, MISO and CA practitioners take time to develop and gain experience. Some of
this experience is difficult to acquire by the military. For example, where do you find a
CA guy on active duty who knows how to run a sewage plant?
The short answer for the OSS effectiveness depends on what theater and when the
question was asked and by whom. Today, there is little doubt that both the CIA and
Special Forces owe some varying degree of their existence and organization to the OSS.
The most identifiable example is the SF A-team. The Afghan UW campaign in 2001 had
its foundations built by the OSS in the 1940s.
What lessons were used from the OSS to create the CIA and SOF? Do those lessons
still apply or has the structure of those organizations changed?
The short answer is that the selection process has had some minor changes, but the basic
notions remain the same. Recruiters search for individuals with certain attributes that
appear to be constant: physical fitness, intellect, self-control, outdoor skills, inter-
personal skills, confident decision-making, and flexibility to adapt or adjust to most
58
A.B. Kongrard, executive director of the CIA in his remarks to the Conference on the 60th Anniversary of
the OSS in June 2002 put this well known accusation of the OSS into context that due to the war-driven
haste in establishing the OSS Donovan relied on his network of elites to build the organization.
59
USSOCOM Command Brief, November 2010.
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situations. In short, Donavan tasked his recruiters with finding the PhD capable of
winning the bar fight,60 better still, capable of winning the fight the indirect way using
by, through and with the occupants of the bar.
Time and technology have, of course, caused some changes to occur already in the
selection and recruitment of potential SOF warriors. The need for more technical skills
and capability in cyber warfare are constantly being raised by the field, the theaters and
by the public. Another technology that is also in high demand is the Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAV). This was not available during the OSS era, but Special Forces did have
their own aviation assets. The following organizational chart illustrates the assignment of
SOF dedicated aviation assets assigned to Special Forces Groups which had an aviation
section61 of fixed wing aircraft and included U-6 Beaver, U-10 Courier, and C-7A
Caribou.62
One of the innovations that came out of early OSS requirements was parachute
infiltration. During Vietnam, U.S. Army Special Forces developed the then new
60
Walter Mess, quoted during the JSOU OSS-Society Seminar (video and transcript), 9 November 2009.
61
Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 31-21, US Army Special Forces Operations,1969.
62
Unit history of 134th Aviation Company Website. Unfortunately the Air Force never flew the Caribou
like the Army. They were primarily interested in long-range throughput missions while the Army used
the Caribou for local support to remote Special Forces camps and similar missions. After the Air Force
takeover, this incredible short field aircraft was phased out in favor of larger, high-speed conventional air
transports. Consequently, the Special Forces and others were left without support. This was a role
subsequently assumed by helicopter units. Available at http://unitpages.military.com/unitpages/unit.do?
id=892938, accessed December 2010.
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technique of High Attitude Low Opening (HALO) insertion. This was developed by
several Special Forces soldiers to include Master Sergeant (retired) Billy Waugh in
October 1970.63
The two recent major engagements, Iraq and Afghanistan, should cause a need to
revisit the role of women in SOF organizations to include Special Forces. If our
grandmothers and mothers could be in the OSS to jump in and operate behind the lines
(e.g. Virginia Hall64 air-landed because she was missing a leg), why cant women be in
operational units today? The Marines have women units attempting to interface directly
with the women networks in Afghanistan. To be sure MISO and CA have long had
women in their Table of Organizations and Equipment (TO&E). The question is whether
there is a need for women on an SF A-team. One possible answer to this could be an old
SF experimentation, called the Special Action Force (SAF).
The SAF65 was a company of mixed specialists not found on an A-Team.
Configurations of this company included detachments like PSYOP Teams, Veterinary
teams, Military Police, Preventive Medicine, and Communication specialists for fixed
installations. This company was regionally aligned and language-qualified. The 8th
Special Forces Group was home to the SAF organization. The Groups mission was
counterinsurgency in Latin America. The deploying SF team could add bolt-ons from
that company much like the OSS concept. In essence, this was like a company team,
purposely built for the mission. This would be a way of approaching the issue of women
on the detachment.
Would a revisiting of the OSS structures be useful for the CIA and SOF for 21st
century operations?
The short answer for the SOF community is yes. The OSS again was purpose-built,
flexible in design, and more autonomous than today. Part of this was due to the nature of
the conflict and part was due to the technology of the times. Donovans selection process
63
From an interview with Billy Waugh in Las Vegas, 2004 printed in The Interview, December 2005.
Master Sergeant (ret) Waugh is a veteran of both US Army Special Forces and the CIA.
64
Troy, The Office of Strategic Services: Americas First Intelligence Agency.
65
The 8th Special Forces Group, D Company, from 1963 to1972 contained a Special Action Force (SAF),
Military Police (MP), Military Intelligence (MI), Medical, Engineers, PSYOP and Security Agency
detachments. Its primary mission was counterinsurgency in Latin America. SAF was also defined in Army
Field Manual 31-21, Special Action Force (SAF), February 1969. The SAF is a specially trained, area
oriented, partially language-qualified, ready force, available to the commander of a unified command for
the support of cold, limited, and general war operations. SAF organizations may vary in size and
capabilities according to theater requirements.
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stressed the idea that the field personnel were expected to make decisions or actions
without lots of guidance as long as it advanced the End State of winning the war.
The accountability of funding had limited visibility and oversight. This is enjoyed
by the CIA more so than USSOCOM. The resourcing and authorities reports address this
in more detail. The bottom line is there is a need for more flexibility in the resourcing
authorities.
As discussed earlier, aviation is an area that should be explored with the new SOF
Aviation Command. How much UAV and other air assets can the SF Groups count on to
be at least placed under their tactical control (TACON)?
Integration of SOF organization in support of specific missions should be re-
examined. To be sure there is a long history of Command and Control configurations
(Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, Joint Special Operations Task Force,
Joint Psychological Operations Task Force, and Special Operations Command and
Control Element, as examples). One idea developed as part of the investigation of SOF
integration into the Future Force dealt with Special Operations Command and Control
Element (SOCCE). The idea66 was to establish a cadre of SF Officers and NCOs in
regionally focused, rapidly deployable teams (SOCCE) from LNO duty with
conventional Units of Action (UA), today called Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). These
teams would be made up of SF soldiers who have returned from an overseas deployment
waiting schooling (Staff College) or a new assignment. They would be controlled by
USASOC to manage them.
Another intriguing idea relates to the OSS economic war. This was an attack or at
least leveraging of networks to influence outcomes. Clearly, we have some efforts along
this same line, for example, following the money67 as a key component of threat
financial analysis. However, this has been a reactive approach to a specific problem. The
OSS started from a system approach: how does it work, and can it be influenced for a
specific outcome? This approach is more indirect as opposed to direct action on a specific
source of funding (drug lords) or source of revenue (drug supplies).
Currently, our use of money as bullets has not been effective in the current fight.
Title 22 funding has been more about spending than producing a desired or effective
result. This lack of effectiveness is a symptom of poor integrated planning between the
66
JSOU Senior Fellow comments from personal experience as USAJFKSWCS liaison to the U.S. Armys
Unit of Action (UA) Battle Lab from 2003 to 2005.
67
Wesley J.L. Andersen, Disrupting Threat Finances, JSOU Report 08-3 (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press,
April 2008).
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host nation and supporting countries. The lack of understanding of the Internal Defense
and Development (IDAD)68 model is one reason for this lack of coordination. Insurgent
warfare is about legitimacy or governance. This means more focus on indirect action and
less on direct action. The U.S. Air Force recently circulated a draft of IDAD, which once
was a major part of SF education. This suggests that a review of operational needs should
be linked to curriculum review to determine if SOF education needs an update.
Does either the CIA or SOF need new authorities to bring experts (regional,
cultural, linguistic) into the service for short periods of time at a senior grade to
support missions?
The OSS had many advantages that are not present today. The pool of candidates
available to them was large. A national draft for the military was underway and continued
throughout the war. The national will was focused on the outcome of the war, and the
country was totally committed and engaged. The OSS looked good as a patriotic means
to support the war effort for those who either had been educated overseas, or traveled
extensively abroad and had linguistic skills that went beyond the high school and college
levels of language training. This meant that much of the initial crop of OSS members
were from well-to-do families. As the war went on, first generation Americans were
recruited to further capitalize on their culture, language and regional knowledge. More
importantly, was their willingness to think beyond the same target audience as the
conventional military. They looked to people older than 39 and were gender-blind. This
allowed them a resource pool that was broader than the military needed. They sought
experienced and knowledgeable personnel rather than just physically fit personnel.
The Research and Analysis Branch was filled with many of the best minds in the
country coming from academia, business and industry. Donovan believed that OSS
volunteers needed to come to the fight ready, not prepared to be trained to fight. The
R&A experts brought with them knowledge and networks from their civilian work ready
to fight. This afforded the operators in the field insights that they would have had to learn
on their own (reach back). The OSS was about influence and leveraging networks, which
came from the highest levels of the society. The R&A team had both influence from their
68
Joint Publication JP-3-24, Counter Insurgency Operations, October 2009. Internal Defense and
Development (IDAD) is defined as follows: The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its
growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable
institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society, also called
IDAD. Also see Joint Publication JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, July 2010. It contains a chart
depicting IDAD Strategy, page IV-5, figure IV-2.
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former jobs and networks that were developed over a longer life than the 18-year-old
draftee.
The wartime legislation and demand for skill supported Donovans needs. The
general assumption of authority and absence of oversight allowed for less scrutiny in
some areas. The initial phase of working out of the White House and using the
Presidents funds kept the bureaucrats at bay. By the same token, it created enemies in
areas that needed or would need support to achieve the OSS goals.
Current Organization
USASOC/JFKSWCS does not have all the advantages of the OSS. It does have some,
and the current levels of authority seem sufficient to meet the current needs. The
Authorities Report will explore this in more detail. However, it is clear there are some
disadvantages.
The MAVNI recruitment program was created after 9/11 to address a critical need
for people knowledgeable in certain languages. The program is healthcare-focused
(doctors and nurses), but USSOCOM has some 92 personnel in the command that are a
product of this program. The primary shortcoming is obtaining security clearances on a
timely basis. USSOCOM needs these people in sensitive areas, and the delay in obtaining
their required clearance has reduced the effectiveness of the program. The delays are
caused by the lack of proper vetting from the country of origin.
What USSOCOM needs is something like the Lodge Act of 1950 (1950-1959), to
be able to recruit persons that meet our needs for cultural awareness, advanced language
proficiency, and political and geographic knowledge of key regions. There appears to be
a need that goes beyond gray beard contractors and a cultural need for uniformed
personnel. Took a lot of time to distinguish between training and education in preparing
SOF. Afghan veteran69
As suggested within this section, there may be other authorities to permit NCOs to
fly (UAV or aircraft), add additional manpower (cyber warriors) and structure (SAF) that
will require examination. The resourcing and authority section will touch on some of
these points.
69
JSOU Report, OSS Report, Irregular Warfare and the OSS Model, 2-4 Nov 2009, ISBN 1-93374-45-8
(Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2010).
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See above and sections on resourcing and authorities for more information.
Will there be new levels of resourcing required (not numbers of dollars rather a
description of resources-education, enablers, equipment)?
This answer, of course, will depend on what is changed. For example, if a SAF unit is
created for forward deployed SF Battalions, it will have an impact on the TO&E of the
SF organization, on facilities, education/training and other expenditures.
Cyber Warfare positions would require more specialized equipment, increased
training and a probably more computer and other electronics savvy SF type soldiers.
Economic Warfare would require course development to produce more experienced
and highly educated economists or finance persons. The duty position probably would be
at Group or Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) level to be the most
effectiveregional impact, not local level.
Recommendations:
O-1: Review OSS MO with the current MISO and CA structures to determine ways to
increase team integration from the planning to execution and synchronization with SF
units on a regional orientation.
O-2: Consider on-the-job training approach to increase CA skills for selected areas
(sewage treatment plant operations) similar to the concept employed by SF medics.
O-3: Review the OSS employment of women in operations to the current gender
restrictions on all SOF organizations to determine if any modifications are required.
O-5: Review IATF plans to determine other ways to leverage economic tools (follow the
money) in the current fight against terrorism by considering how the OSS employed their
economic warfare organizations.
O-6: Conduct curriculum review of SOF education to determine relevance to the Core
Activities and current operations.
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O-7: Examine existing programs with OSS practices to bring native speakers into the
program with the need for security clearances in order to employ their skills more quickly
into the fight.
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Resourcing
This section summarizes research and findings on the OSS approach toward allocating
resources and the current approach employed by U.S. Special Forces and the CIA. It will
offer some recommendations for application as it relates to the future of U.S. Special
Operations Forces. Judgments expressed are drawn from reading OSS-related literature,
discussions with military officers, civilian leaders, and a historian at the CIA. A set of
Study Questions were developed to guide and trigger discussion intended to yield
concrete recommendations.
Before addressing the study questions directly, it is useful to review some
observations with regard to the OSS approach to allocating resources based on input from
Mr. Rob Townley,70 an OSS historian and The War Report of the OSS by Peter
Karlow.71
The OSSs Special Funds branch was responsible for financing the secret activities
of OSS through unvouchered funds. Such funds were necessary to the maintenance of
cover, whether of a corporation, a training installation, a recruiting office, or an agent or
group of agents in enemy or enemy-occupied territory. The use of unvouchered funds
supported the most secret operations in which OSS engaged, and the Special Funds
branch spent a great deal of time acquiring stockpiles of foreign currency for use in those
operations. Unvouchered funds are moneys made available to the President by Congress
to support activities of a confidential nature, are exempt from the provisions of public law
regulating the outlay of government funds, and not comprehensively audited.72
When the Coordinator of Information was established under the direction of Major
General Donavan, its original unvouchered funds were allotted from the President's
Emergency Fund in September 1941, the first allocation being $100,000. After the
creation of OSS in June 1942, an additional appropriation of $3,000,000 was granted for
the fiscal year (1942-1943). A second allotment in the amount of approximately
$10,000,000 was further supplied for the same period. In the spring of 1943 the OSS was
ultimately able to go before Congress and obtain directly its own appropriation for the
fiscal year 1943-1944. This appropriation was granted in the amount of $21,000,000, of
70
Rob Townley, December 2010.
71
Peter Karlow, The Overseas Targets: War Report of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) Volume II
(Washington, D.C.: the Walker Publishing Company, 1976).
72
Michael Warner, COI Came First The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency
(e-book). Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 15 March 2007; available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-
monographs/oss/art02.htm; accessed December 2011.
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73
David H. Berger, The Use of Covert Paramilitary Activity as a Policy Tool: An Analysis of Operations
Conducted by the United States Central Intelligence Agency, 1949-1951, (May 1995, Quantico VA)
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/berger.htm, accessed December 2010.
74
Federal Records of World War II, Volume II, Military Records, Part One, Interallied and Interservice
Military Agencies, section on The Office of Strategic Services.
75
David H. Berger, 1995.
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can just from our shoulder, what the OSS did took advantage of all other sources of force
or momentum available inside that ring or out. Even if it meant paying the brute in the
audience $20 to step in the ring and knock an opponent senseless, they would do it.
The OSS was created as a response to a national or even a global threat. Its creation
was akin to someone breaking the emergency glass that you only do as a last resort, so
as a service the OSS had a lot of ground to cover and little time to cover it. Thankfully,
General Donovan had done much of the necessary work in the late 1930s to take some of
the pressure off. Had this not been done, the resources that the OSS expended would not
have been anywhere near as effective. So you have to view the lifespan of OSS as part of
a continuum. This circumstance supports the position that it is more cost effective to
maintain a low level presence in many areas of the world in order to help manage conflict
rather than having to react to it. The activities that happened before the OSS was created
are good examples of how this philosophy is effective and saves money.
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How was the OSS resourced as a percent of war budget? What problems did they
face in resourcing during the war?
The OSS was a very small percent of the war budget. It is difficult to aggregate, but as
noted earlier, for fiscal year 1944-1945, $57 million was appropriated by Congress for
the OSS while in 1944, the U.S. defense budget topped out at $85 billion.
Overall, the OSS was well resourced during the war. There was some fraud, waste
and abuse. It is almost unavoidable that the more flexibility and speed an organization
has to use funds the more chance there is for abuse. The OSS was far to one end of this
scale where they had maximum speed and flexibility with funds, but they were at high
risk for waste.
If the CIA and SOF were reorganized, what types of resourcing issues would be
envisioned?
This is a complex question and would involve a study by itself. It is not an organization
issue as much as a utilization/employment issue. SOF is a strategic asset and should be
used accordingly. The SOF focus should be on the prevent and deter phases of conflict,
not getting bogged down in the current fight. The challenge is defining success to the
policy makers. Essentially, success of SOF would mean not having to escalate to the use
of kinetic force. In other words, if nothing happens in the region in which we are
employed we are a success. It is difficult to convince the policy makers to spend money
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If either CIA or SOF obtained new authorities for bringing experts (regional,
cultural, linguistic) into the service for short periods of time at a senior grade to
support missions, what resources would be required?
Special authorities from the Department of Defense (DOD) may be required to hire an
assortment of experts for short periods of time, with the flexibility to let them go without
incurring a career or long-term employee status (similar to contractors, but with rank and
authority to represent USSOCOM).
The OSS had to hire experts because they did not have time to develop their own
expertise in many cases. Similarly, USSOCOM will face challenges that it could address
quicker by hiring some experts either until USSOCOM can develop its own experts
(which would involve education) for enduring issues or until the expert is no longer
required for specific topics. This practice should not be overused to prevent causing the
same level of mistrust that existed between the OSS ground operatives and the largely
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civilian-oriented headquarters back in the U.S. Additionally, any experts hired should be
used only in their field of expertise and not used for leadership positions.
Special allowances would have to be made to match or compensate said personnel
for the loss in terms of personal remuneration they may endure by signing on with the
service (salary matching, compensation schemes, etc.). Real talent is not cheap.
Issues of association, such experts may lose legitimacy in their respective
professional communities if it is publicly known that they are taking on a position with
the government. There may need to be a mechanism in place to engage such talent in an
indirect fashion (CIA already does this).
An alternative to bringing experts into the service would be to capitalize on our
organic SOF operators by sending them to advanced regional, cultural, and linguistic
schools. We need to invest in talent management and develop a human capital plan. We
must source our Lawrence of Arabia strategy, not outsource it. It is more efficient and
arguably more effective to provide SOF operators with advanced education and return
them to the force instead of hiring non-military personnel for potential tactical
employment with regional impact.
Will there be new levels of resourcing required (not numbers of dollars rather a
description of resources-education, enablers, equipment)?
No, additional resources should not be required except perhaps in the requirement for
non-organic General Purpose Forces enablers, but they should be a service bill. There
will need to be reallocation of resources within the existing budget, not new levels.
USSOCOMs budget is more than adequate to accomplish the mission. There is a great
deal of redundancy to be found within the current structure that could be turned into
operational or training capacity necessary to bring on new talent. The new talent would
be brought into the service for the expertise they already possess; therefore, they should
require only some basic military training like those individuals brought into the OSS.
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We need less Congressional oversight and more flexibility with existing resources.
We need a cash-like account that can be used for operations and maintenance (O&M),
procurement, or research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) to resource in
support of the fight, similar to a combat mission needs statement (CMNS) pot of money
for the USSOCOM Commander to use in a rapid fashion. Right now, we have the purple
(MFP-11) pot, but it is not considered rapidly available funds; it is normal program
objective memorandum process funds.
Recommendations:
R1. Concentrate resources on persistent engagement activities in order to manage the
global environment.
R2. Enable SOF to operate with colorless (e.g., DERF) funding to reduce overhead and
increase USSOCOMs ability to meet urgent needs similar to OSSs unvouchered funds.
R3. Tailor DOD oversight; manage as a Special Activity with Special Funds vice a
service-like entity by reducing numbers of reviews, reports, and decision layers.
R4. Create a human capital plan (talent management plan) to develop the regional,
cultural, and linguistic expertise of our organic SOF operators and enablers.
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Authorities
This section summarizes research and findings on the OSS authorities and their approach
to resource authorities and allocation. It will highlight the current authorities granted to
SOF, the CIA, and their authorities, which are also many times tied to resourcing. The
summary will offer some recommendations for application as it relates to the future of
U.S. Special Operations Forces. Judgments expressed are drawn from reading OSS-
related literature, discussions with military officers and civilian leaders from the office of
the DASD/SO/CT, USASOC and OSS historians, and former officers at the CIA. A set of
study questions were developed to guide and trigger discussion intended to yield concrete
recommendations.
A good idea without funding is a hallucination. -Anonymous Staff Officer
What is legal authority, and why is it important? Funding and resourcing are tied to legal
authority. According to the Judge Advocate Generals Operational Law Handbook, the
expenditure of appropriated funds is governed by the established rule that the
expenditure of public funds is proper only when authorized by Congress, not that proper
funds may be expended unless prohibited by Congress. Congress defines legal
authorities via several means to include: U.S. Code Title 10, U.S. Code Title 22, DOD
Authorizations Acts, and DOD appropriations. Federal agencies also provide guidance
through regulations and Comptroller General Decision.76
Without a clear legal authority, one must be prepared to articulate a rationale for an
expenditure which is necessary and incident to an existing authority. Executing
appropriated funds without proper legal authority can lead to what is known as a Purpose
violation. Failure to correct a purpose violation obligation (of funds) can lead to a
violation of the amount which will in turn cause an Anti-Deficiency Act Violation. In
addition to all this legal jargon, more legal jargon translated below explains that Congress
imposes fiscal controls through three basic mechanisms, (each implemented by one or
more statutes):
Proper Purpose. Expenditures must be authorized by law for the intended purpose.
Time Limits. Appropriations have a life span, and must be used during their period
of availability.
76
Definition of Legal Authority, posted by USSOCOM Special Operations Financial Management SOFM-
M policy, and derived from Chapter 16 of the Judge Advocate Generals Legal Center and School,
Operational Law Handbook, (2010, MacDill Air Force base, FL).
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Without delving deeper into law, it is clear to see how todays SOF operator must
also be well versed in what is and is not authorized. USSOCOM has a one-stop
shopping portal for its staff to research authorities and what type of funding is required
for tasks. In that portal there is an authorities matrix containing detailed information on
more than 40 authorities that relate to Special Forces Activities, training, contingency
operations, and humanitarian operations. A few examples of the authorities listed are
Section 1206/1207/1208 Authorities, Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, and
Contingency Construction Authority.78 A vast difference from what the OSS was saddled
with during WWII. For example, the Operational Groups Field Manual, a 31-page
manual used by the OSS references JCS Directive 155/11/D for its authority to execute
independent operations against enemy targets.79 The JCS directive that delineated the
functions and authorities of the OSS was a document of only six pages.80
What are the authorities for the establishment of the CIA and Special Operations
Forces today? How do they link to each other? Are the authorities sufficient to
achieve their mutual tasks?
Bottom line: Overarching authorities come from civilian and political leadership
primarily the Executive Branch and more importantly Congress, since it controls the
purse strings. Authorities can be granted and expanded OR retracted and taken away
altogether by statutes, regulations, policies, and executive orders.
President Harry Truman, by executive order deactivated the OSS in 1945 and split
its activities up between the Department of State and Department of War. The 1947
National Securities Act created a new clandestine agency to replace the OSS: the CIA.81
By contrast, due to perceived military parochialism, Congress forced the Department of
Defense into action with the 1986 Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols
77
USSOCOM Special Operations Financial Management SOFM-M policy, and derived from Chapter 16 of
the Judge Advocate Generals Legal Center and School, Operational Law Handbook, (2010, MacDill Air
Force Base, FL).
78
New Matrix Puts Funding Authorities at Your Finger Tips, policy article from the USSOCOM Spear
Policy Newsletter, November 2010, (2010, MacDill Air Force Base, FL), p. 3.
79
Office of Strategic Services Field Manual No. 6, Operational Group Field Manual - Strategic Services
(Provisional), 25 April 1944, declassified on March 12, 2009, National Archives Record Service (NARS).
80
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Directive 155/11/D, Functions of the Office of Strategic Services, 27
October 1943, declassified on September 20, 1995, National Archives Record Service (NARS).
81
Michael Warner, An End and a Beginning. The Office of Strategic Services: America's First
Intelligence Agency (e-book), 2007.
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Act. President Reagan signed it into law in 1987 to establish USSOCOM. USSOCOM
acts as a unified combatant command with service-like authorities with MFP-11 funding
authority. Since 9/11 it has also evolved into the lead command in synchronizing plans
for global operations against terrorist networks.82 One critical shortfall is that USSOCOM
was not originally intended, nor funded to function independently, and was designed to
rely on other military services support. MFP-11 funds are intended to fund SOF-peculiar
requirements. Obtaining broad agreement and support on SOF-peculiar and service-
common requirements is often a challenge.
USSOCOM, in contrast to the OSS and the CIA, was not envisioned to conduct
clandestine, strategic, or operational intelligence operations. USSOCOM missions
referred to as SOF Core Activities83 include direct action (DA), special reconnaissance,
UW, FID, CA, counterterrorism (CT), MISO, information operation (IO),
counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), security force assistance
(SFA), counterinsurgency operations (COIN), and any activities specified by the
President or Secretary of Defense. Note that special reconnaissance is not considered
intelligence collection. Most SOF units have a competence and charter to carry out
several to all of the core SOF activities while some specialize.
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States also
known as the 9/11 Commission report recommended expanding the role of USSOCOM.
Recommendation 31 stated that the CIA should retain responsibility and execution of
clandestine and covert operations... That recommendation led into the next with
however, that one important area of responsibility should change[recommendation
32] The lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether
clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department. There it should be
consolidated with the capabilities for training, direction, and execution of such operations
already being developed in the Special Operations Command.84 Currently there is no
SOF Doctrine85 to address these specific concerns, and Recommendation 32 has not been
82
U.S Special Operations Hand Book (2011), produced by USSOCOM Public Affairs, Mac Dill Air Force
Base, FL: pg. 7-9.
83
The 11 SOF core activities (any activities specified by the President and SECDEF is not counted) were
accepted nomenclature until August 2011 when they were changed to Core Missions and Activities.
84
Wording of Recommendation 32 from the report, available at http://9-11commission.gov/.
85
In joint doctrine, Joint Publication 3-05 for Special Operations (April 2011) does not address it directly
but states that the Department of Defense may be placed in a supporting role to inter-organizational
partners. USSOCOM SOF Publication 1, SOF Doctrine (August 2011) also does not directly address
this issue. Both documents were in draft form during the study.
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What were the authorities for the OSS and were they sufficient for their tasks? How
did they support the military and other security organizations during the war?
Current laws and statutes regarding authorities, funding, and oversight of special
operations, covert operations, and clandestine intelligence operations, are vastly different
and more restrictive than the funding of the OSS. Congress exercised little or no
oversight in the use of unvouchered funds, and Donovan personally had unprecedented
access to and support from the President.88
The OSS operated under broad and powerful authorities to collect and analyze
strategic information and to plan and operatespecial services. The OSS also had
86
Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations issues for Congress, Congressional
Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, Order Code RS22017, Library of Congress, January 2005,
updated December 2006, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RS22017.pdf.
87
Steven C. Gregg, Major, USAF, Lessons of the OSS: Warnings and Guideposts for Modern SOF. (Air
University, 2007), p. 15.
88
Ibid, p. 2.
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authorized responsibility for being in charge of resistance.89 With such a broad mandate,
the OSS was mostly free to operate as it saw fit to accomplish its mission.
Many of the OSSs greatest successes were in how it supported the military during
the war. The OSS provided intelligence and assisted conventional forces by conducting
sabotage to degrade and disrupt enemy units morale and will to fight prior to engaging
allied military units or during their efforts to withdraw. Intelligence included providing
enemy order of battle information, such as the case where the OSS provided the location
of the German 7th Corps Headquarters so it could be strafed.90 The OSS also employed
the resistance to attack a Panzer Division en-route to Normandy so it arrived with only
3,500 of 10,000 men and all on foot with no tanks or artillery because of attacks from
guerrillas.91 General Eisenhower said I consider that the disruption of enemy rail
communication, the harassing of German road moves, and the continual and increasing
strain placed on the German war economy and internal services throughout occupied
Europe by the organized forces of the resistance played a very considerable part in our
victory.92 Lieutenant General A.M. Patch said, During the planning phase for our
landing in southern France we were constantly kept informed of the enemys strength and
activities by American agents behind the lines.93
What is the process to make changes in the structure today for USSOCOM and
CIA?
To make a change at USSOCOM or down to the division level, a request has to be
submitted to the Special Operations Command Requirements Evaluation Board
(SOCREB) for Deputy Combatant Commander approval. Three documents are included
in the package: a doctrine, organizational, training, materiel, leadership and education,
personnel, facilities change recommendation, a capability decision memorandum signed
by the director or deputy director supporting the change, and a SOCREB briefing. To
make a change to an organization below division level the same packet must be submitted
to the SOCREB but then must also go through the applicable service organizational
change process.
89
Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, Sub Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage (New York: Reynal &
Hitchcock, 1946), p. 13.
90
Ibid., p. 5.
91
Ibid., p. 4.
92
Ibid., p. 5.
93
Ibid., p. 5.
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Are there existing authorities to bring line officers (not medical or legal) directly
into the services at the rank of LTC or above? How was this done by the OSS? Is it
a tool that would be useful to USSOCOM?
Many in USSOCOM agree that it can become a more agile force if it could bring experts
into service to address specific problem sets. It takes time to grow experts, and if it is a
discrete problem that does not require an enduring capability, then creating USSOCOM-
internal experts is not efficient. The OSS had the ability to hire experts, the Group of
300, for example, because they did not have time to develop their own expertise in many
cases. The OSS also operated during the draft era and the whole nation was mobilized
and motivated to support the war effort. Direct commissions given in the OSS were a
point of contention with many career military officers in and outside the OSS.
USSOCOM will face challenges that it could address quickly by hiring experts
either until USSOCOM can develop its own experts for enduring issues or until those
experts are no longer required for specific topics. The majority of officers contributing to
this study warned that this practice should not be overused to prevent causing the same
level of mistrust that existed between the OSS ground operatives and the largely civilian-
oriented headquarters back in the U.S. Additionally, any experts hired should be used
only in their field of expertise and not used for leadership positions. The MAVNI pilot
program that permits non-citizens legally residing in the U.S. to join the military and
quickly obtain citizenship has met with mixed reviews primarily due to the applicants not
being able to pass the required security background checks.95
Some study participants questioned outright the validity of bringing outside experts
and putting rank on them. One recommendation is to in-source vice out-source our
94
Delineated in Section 1013 Joint Procedures for Operational Coordination between Department of
Defense and Central Intelligence Agency, available at www.nctc.gov/docs/pl108_458.pdf , accessed
December 2010.
95
According to input from the USSOCOM J1 OSS study participants.
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Lawrence of Arabia strategy by sending some of our SOF operators out to develop and
hone required cultural and language skill sets. Also, in this day and age of heightened
transparency it may be wiser to bring renowned experts discretely into the fold without
enlisting them or providing direct commissions into uniformed service. The
commissioned expert may lose legitimacy in his/her respective professional communities
if it is made known publicly that they are now in uniform. The CIA uses this discrete and
indirect method of hiring experts. One modern day example where the U.S. Army
brought in experts without extending field grade rank is in the area of human terrain
mapping. One assumption for direct commissioning at any level of rank would be that the
new authority would have to be faster and easier to accomplish than contracting or hiring
civil service civilians, or the authority would not be worthwhile. Regardless, the
discriminator may likely be speed of hiring a subject matter expert due to a crisis or
pressing issue, for which a line commission may be inappropriate. Study group members
indicated that the authority for bringing someone onto active service via direct
commission as field grade or above officers does not exist other than in the medical and
legal career fields.
During WWII, the OSS commissioned personnel from early 1942 to 1945, and
commissions were implied to be for the duration of the war and not to last more than 6
months following its conclusion. The JCS also gave the OSS the authority to commission
without any basic training. However, even with a global war and more than 12 million
serving in uniform, direct commissioning of civilians was a rare exception. The majority
of those commissioned entered the Army Specialist Corps, and not the Regular Army.
The other source was from commissioning enlisted to officer. The OSS was given an
officer allotment from each of the military services. If requested the OSS could direct
commission against these quotas as per Army Regulation 605-10, 10 December 1941.
OSS commissions also did not count against TO&E stateside or in theater. 96
The OSS used direct commissions primarily for three reasons. The first was to
protect civilian personnel of draft age who were already with the COI or OSS from being
drafted into the other services. The second was to allow enlisted soldiers to achieve parity
with British counterparts in enemy occupied territory, since the British policy was to
commission their enlisted in order to put the lower ranking U.S. personnel at higher risk.
Lastly, OSS civilian subject matter experts (SMEs) who were later inserted behind enemy
lines to deal with military occupation issues were commissioned through Military
Government (todays Civil Affairs). One example of this was the Monument and Fine
96
Troy Sacquety, discussion and email input from the USASOC Historian, January 2011.
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Arts Commission whose task was to preserve European history and artifacts. U.S.
citizens and later citizens of partner nations were commissioned, and the Commanding
Officer in Theater had commissioning authority. Despite the expedient manner in which
direct commissions were accomplished during the war, there were troublesome issues
that developed since no long-term plan was developed by the OSS. Difficulties with
promotions did arise due to the TO&E exceptions and recognition during separations
were also upsetting to many OSS veterans.97 According to the USASOC historian it is an
unknown whether OSS personnel could have performed many of their duties out of
uniform.
Other examples brought to the study group came from the Department of State
(DOS) representative to the USSOCOM IATF. The DOS uses Title 5 authorities, and
Personal Service Contracts (PSC) to bring SMEs and former DOS officials into the
Foreign Service. Of interest is the PSC program where the individual SME is contracted
directly by the DOS for up to 5 years to serve in overseas posts providing skills that may
not exist there. The individual is treated similar to a Foreign Service Officer (FSO) and
afforded all benefits except for participation in the Thrift Savings Plan. The Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and embassy-based
Narcotics Affairs Sections (NAS) have successfully used this program in employing
former law enforcement and military (many are former SOF) experts to equip, train, and
advise partner nations law enforcement, paramilitary and military organizations engaged
in counternarcotics activities. For USSOCOM the closest methods that can be used today
are to hire civilians through contracting companies or by creating a civil service position.
The DOS PSC concept removes the long and arduous process in hiring of civil service
employees, and reduces the sometimes exorbitant costs that companies charge for an
individual contractors work. A more detailed analysis would need to be done to
determine what benefit bringing a person into active duty service has over contracting
them or employing them as a government civilian.
97
Troy Sacquety, 2011.
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the USSOCOM staff, the angry Turks (experienced SOF operators) have spearheaded
other innovation groups and call for combining, streamlining, or doing away with
oversight committees in order to become a more effective and efficient organization of
SOF warriors. One suggestion from SF officers at Fort Bragg involved assigning more
SOF operators to CIA where they would then be covered by less restrictive CIA
authorities to carry out special operations and irregular activities. This blending of
warrior capabilities under authorities more linked to the President of the United States
would be reminiscent of the former OSS.
Will there be new levels of resourcing required (not numbers of dollars rather a
description of resources-education, colors of money, equipment)
If Recommendation 32 of the 9/11 Commission Report is to be enacted, new authorities
and funding will have to be legislated. In reference to bringing in outside experts, the
levels of resourcing should be fairly limited since they would be brought into service for
expertise or a capability they already have, so they should need fairly little training other
than some basic military training. There would be individual equipment requirements, but
those are minimal in consideration of the amount of individual equipment already
purchased annually. It would also require some type of training center to give the new
people some minimal level of military training, much like doctors going through an
Officers Basic Course. There would have to be systems in place to incorporate them into
the military personnel and health care systems. If the skill they were hired for required
specific equipment that is not organic to SOF or the military already, then there would
have to be funds to purchase the necessary equipment.
Recommendations to address authorities primarily rely on lobbying efforts to
convince civilian leadership in OSD and Congress that USSOCOM is trustworthy enough
to have less oversight. We should also be aware that the political will to make these
changes must exist. Many could argue that in order to maintain American values, such as
those that agree with the Church Committee findings, the speed bumps need to remain
in place to prevent unauthorized military operations in variance of stated U.S. policy.
Some of the recommendations for this group overlap with recommendations from the
other study groups, primarily the Resourcing Group.
Recommendations
A1. Tailor DOD oversight; manage as a Special Activity with Special Funds vice a
service-like entity by reducing numbers of reviews, reports, and decision layers.
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A3. Refocus and enhance 1206/1207/1208 Authorities. This will enable a more rapid
ability to support partner nations.
A4. Enable SOF to operate with colorless funding (e.g. DERF) to reduce overhead and
increase SOFs ability to meet urgent needs similar to the OSS unvouchered funds.
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Selection
Establish a WHAT: Critical to the support of SOF are WHAT: There is a need with in
selection process those non-SOF assets that contribute to the personnel systems to enable
for non-operator success (logistics, Admin), there is a need SOCOM to identify and retain
(enablers) to identify and retain that group of non-SOF personnel without
personnel. personnel with in SOCOM. causing harm to their careers if
they stay too long in SOCOM.
HOW: SOF leaders need to identify
personnel that SOCOM should retain in the HOW: Provide the Services with a
community. listing of critical non-SOF MOSs
to determine a methodology how
to share their services.
Target WHAT: SOCOM needs to anticipate future WHAT: DOD recruiting needs to
Recruitment efforts diversity needs from communities within review incentives for diversity
in ethnic the US as priority recruitment areas, as an groups to encourage their
neighborhoods example the 18L program. enlistment into SOF MOSs. There
and enclaves in is a need to look more like the
HOW: Identify those countries where
the United States. foreign nations that we operate in.
SOCOM sees the greatest future needs for
engagement; determine the language HOW: Focus on incentives that
requirements and where they can be found appeal to people who are
in the U.S. motivated to serve in areas where
their language skills and cultural
knowledge will benefit the nation
Build and maintain WHAT: In order to understand the WHAT: DOD should continue to
a SOF workforce complexity of the world, SOCOM needs a provide incentives for non-citizens
st
that represents the more diverse force that better appreciates and 1 or 2d generation to
rich diversity of the the cultural environments it will operate in. citizens to membership in the
st nd
world Much like the OSS selecting 1 or 2 military and also in SOF
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Introducing a new WHAT: SOCOM continues to support WHAT: SOCOM, through DoD
law similar to the MAVNI Program as a short-term method of and SOLA, should suggest the
Lodge (Bill) Act to increasing diversity. There should also be enactment of a DREAM-like Act; it
encourage recent an examination of how rapidly gain also suggests the need to
immigrants clearance for these individuals. enhance (funding) programs to
seeking U.S. have key personnel (18L/FAO) to
HOW: Coordinate with the investigative
citizenship through study overseas to learn language
services on ways to speed up the security
military service. and culture.
clearance process.
HOW: Increase the resourcing to
the existing program and expand
the numbers of personnel
selected for those programs. It
may require a review of personnel
promotion systems to prevent
these specialists from being
harmed for being in the program.
USSOCOM J-1 WHAT: SOCOM manage all SOCOM WHAT: DoD needs to formerly
(Personnel) be personnel activities (Service like endorse the SOCOM personnel
granted authority responsibility); promotions, schooling, in needs as different than the
to manage all order to retain personnel; protect them in Services; JSOFSEA should be
personnel issues, the promotion system and identify ratified by all the Services as the
including personnel for schooling (JSOFSEA); test case of this difference;
recruitment and investigate whether there is a need for a support the investigation of post
selection for the SOF Command & Staff Course like CGSC. qualification education for SOF
entire force. Warriors up to the 04/-5 level
HOW: Conduct a study how to best
rather than meeting the
approach this issue and identify those
requirements of the Services.
areas that can quickly be implemented or
reinforced (JSOFSEA) with a strategy of HOW: Coordinate with SOCOM
expanding gradually. personnel and educators to
determine what and how shifting
of some Service responsibilities
can be moved to SOCOM and
present to the Service Chiefs.
Use a complete WHAT: The selection process has served WHAT: Although, the SOF
battery of the community well since the 1940s; Service Components have some
psychological and however, warfare continues to change. unique differences, there are
aptitude The selection criteria should continue to be some attributes that are common.
assessments to evaluated to ensure the process meets the SOF Components should seek
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Organization
Consider On-the- WHAT: The highly successful On-the-Job WHAT: Coordinate with DoD
job training Training program for Special Forces legal that SOCOM has the
approach to Medics could serve as a model in the build necessary authority to enter into
increase CA skills up of Civil Affairs soldiers in those agreements with local
for selected areas technical skills areas such as public works government to conduct intern
(sewage treatment facilities (sewer and water) to provide them training (OJT) for Special
plant operations) with increased technical knowledge. Operations Personnel.
similar to the
HOW: Establish local intern-type HOW: Conduct a legal review.
concept employed
agreements with municipal governments in
by SF medics.
proximity with Special Operations units
(example-Fayetteville, NC). This will permit
the deploying soldiers a first hand
knowledge of systems that arent easily
learned from books or on the site.
Review OSS WHAT: The OSS used a variety of What: Coordinate with
Morale Operations psychological warfare techniques in ASD/SOLIC to determine if new
(MO) with the support of tactical OSS operations. SOF authorities are required to
current MISO and should review those OSS techniques to conduct a wider variety of
CA structures to determine how they were used and psychological operations to
determine ways to determine if they are consistent with support current SOF operations. If
increase team todays authorities for MISO. necessary, then assist in the
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integration from HOW: Review OSS files (after action development of those required
the planning to reports) and compare them with current authorities.
execution and doctrine and policies to determine if the
HOW: Review current authorities
synchronization necessary authorities exist to conduct
and modify them as required to
with SF units on a similar operations. May require some
ensure the maximum capability of
regional classified study.
the SOF forces.
orientation.
Examine existing WHAT: Review the language skills for WHAT: Seek ASD SOLIC, SOLA
programs with recruiting of the OSS to determine how support in obtaining new
OSS practices to they can be incorporated into existing authorities or new policies on
bring native selection programs. OSS practices also recruiting uniquely language
speakers into the need to be reviewed in reference to the qualified personnel under MAVNI
program in order security classification levels that were or other similar programs.
to employ their necessary to perform their duties.
HOW: SOCOM provides
skills more quickly.
HOW: Compare the MAVNI and other information, studies or reports on
culture/language based selection programs language qualified personnel from
to how the OSS recruited for language and priority regions or to support the
cultural skills. There should also be SOCOM Persistent Engagement
consideration given to what level of Program to support new
security classification levels are required to authorities, policies or programs.
support SOF needs. There are different
levels of security needs ranging from basic
translation of unclassified documents to
integration of High Value Targets (HVT).
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Resourcing
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Authorities
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Refocus and WHAT: Currently the funding authorities WHAT: Congressional and
enhance are a compromise between DoS and DoD, interagency coordination and
1206/1207/1208 but there needs to be better approval required to simplify the
Authorities to synchronization of the funding. use and reporting of these funds
support partner by SOF personnel.
HOW: The funding lines need to be
nations.
analyzed to simplify their use and reporting HOW: Conduct review of the
procedures. funding lines and determine
where they can be simplified and
be more flexible in their use by
SOF personnel.
Empower WHAT: Provide SOCOM with the WHAT: OSD, congressional and
USSOCOM to necessary authority to control the NCA approval required funding
operate with operational funding in a more flexible authorities and the oversight to
funding similar to manner and reduce the amount of determine how to streamline the
OSSs oversight on those funds without the loss number of oversights actions on
unvouchered of accountability of those funds. that funding.
funds in order to
HOW: Review the OSS funding and HOW: Review all oversights
reduce overhead
accountability systems to determine how to actions and compare them to
and increase
utilize that flexibility for SOCOM. The determine how they can be
ability to meet
amount of oversight and accountability for streamlined to reduce amount
urgent needs.
SOCOM consumes large amount of time time necessary for approvals and
Refine roles and and duplication of effort which should be reporting.
responsibilities in reduced while preserving fidelity of the
synchronizing funding accountability.
global operations
and develop Joint
SOF Doctrine to
support.
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Refine roles and Current Joint SOF Doctrine JP 3-05 (dated Coordination with services and
responsibilities in 1998, and revised in 2003) is outdated and DOD required.
synchronizing requires a rewrite
global operations
and develop Joint
SOF Doctrine to
support.
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DISCUSSION:
a. USSOCOM Commander, Admiral Eric T. Olson, commissioned a series of four
Innovation Workshops to encourage creative and imaginative thinking on the part of the
USSOCOM J-code staff. This Workshop, third in the series, focused on the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) and was intended to spark the participants imagination and
interest in determining which OSS practices and procedures might serve as a model to
apply in the future of SOF. Workshop participants will contribute to a follow-up study to
examine the OSS experience and potential applications. The study will concentrate on
four topics: Selection Process, Organization, Resourcing, and Authorities. Outcomes
from this total effort will influence the commanders testimony, as well as USSOCOM
doctrine, and policy recommendations. The study will conclude with a seminar on 11-12
January 2011, MacDill AFB, to validate and prioritize recommendations to be presented
to Admiral Olson.
b. The Workshop included presentations by Admiral Olson and Dr. Nancy Collins,
Columbia University, and a series of discussion topics. The blending of the presentations
and discussions resulted in the desired outcome for the study.
c. Observations:
1) Admiral Olson addressed three key points in his welcome:
a) He used the warrior-diplomats concept (3D warrior) to move into his
main point: a discussion of the SOF worldwide footprint. He showed a series of nightly
world maps that demonstrated through the use of lights to indicate where SOF is and
needs to be. However, he stated we are not prepared to be in those countries that are in
the dark. The Admiral said SOF will be successful by engaging with small teams who can
operate with the wits and have the authority to do so.
b) He charged the group to be imaginative and get outside your
organizational cocoons and be creative He strongly suggested that this effort at
initiative of thought could influence the future of USSOCOM.
c) His last point referred to how USSOCOM should be viewed. The Admiral
reminded the assembly that Dr. Dave Kilcullen, an Australian SOF expert, believes
USSOCOM should have been named Strategic and not Special. This simple name
change reflects a difference between levels of employment of the forces. He referenced a
War College paper written by LTG (ret) Jerry Boykin that also called for the name to be
Strategic Services Command. Admiral Olson believes SOF are and should be strategic
assets.
2) Dr. Maher introduced the Workshop and described the project scope which
includes this workshop, an attendant study, a concluding seminar, and a report with
recommendations to the Commander. The Workshop marked the beginning of the study
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effort that will conclude with a seminar 11-12 January 2011. The study will focus on four
topics: Selection Process, Organization, Resourcing, and Enabling Authorities. The
seminar will feature the final validation and priority ranking of the study
recommendations which have the potential to influence the future of SOF.
3) JSOU Senior Fellow, Mr. Jeff Nelson, set the conditions for approaching the
study with a review of some elements of critical thinking, a discussion of hindrances to
critical thinking, and examples were given to illustrate how they can affect operational
decisions. To further emphasize these points, Mr. Nelson offered a set of operational
terms to show linkage and to stimulate thinking about what the USSOCOM J-code staff
knows and doesnt know about operational terms and terminology.
4) Dr. Nancy Walbridge Collins, professor of contemporary history at Columbia
University, was the keynote speaker for the Workshop. She analyzed the OSS model and
its potential applicability for USSOCOM.
a) Dr. Collins outlined some of the historical links between OSS and
USSOCOM, tracing the ways in which OSS may be considered a precursor organization
to USSOCOM, and how this earlier model could be utilized as a historical force to propel
future changes.
b) She delineated some of the challenges/obstacles that could arise from
these efforts, especially noting well-established and direct linkages between the OSS
model and CIA history, which have created parallel narratives and ripple effects on the
SOF story.
c) Dr. Collins provided a brief outline of OSS
origins/development/dissolution and emphasized characteristics of OSS that could serve
as sparks for workshop dialogue:
i. OSS was established as a strategic operation, fusing operations and
intelligence at all levels, in a highly adaptive and creative environment
ii. Afforded exceptional authorities, which ensured wide latitude and
maximum flexibility
iii. Operated with both centralized and decentralized activities, led by a
charismatic leader who established high standards and then expected deputies/ operatives/
analysts to take on great individual responsibility for decision-making
iv. Emphasized a culture of experts, with focus on specific/detailed
context knowledge
v. Recruited individuals for what they already knew; there was little time
for training; focused on industry civilians who brought in elite networks and refugees,
migrs, and immigrants who offered in-depth cultural awareness and native language
capabilities
vi. Operated with small footprints, without bells and whistles, and called on
individuals who had considerable appetite for calculated risks and sophisticated cognitive
skill
vii. Focused on integrating capabilities, in response to emergency
conditions rather than creating new functions
d) Dr. Collins then addressed the potential problem of OSS nostalgia, to avoid
any suggestion that there was a SOF utopia in the past. She highlighted a few OSS
challenges during WWII, notably:
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iv. OSS learned that they needed to be there (in the area of operations)
earlier in their operations. It takes time to build relationships and to execute operations.
v. SF is learning that 12 may not be the correct number (for a team) and
augmentation may be required.
vi. Individual career-track requirements hurt SOF continuity.
c) Authorities:
i. ADM Olson did not want to use Afghanistan as a model for review.
ii. A new mindset must be how to do this not one of it cant be done.
iii. There is a need for layered authorities to support the mission.
iv. There is need for authority for teams to manage operational funds, like
the OSS was able to do.
v. Department of State has some authority to hire under Title 5 US Code,
Section 3161 to hire select experts for one year terms of service; the Admiral was
interested to learn more about this authority.
vi. More needs to be done with authorities to understand what needs to be
changed.
CONCLUSION:
a. ADM Olson closed the workshop and provided some final thoughts:
1) The 9-11 Commission had only one recommendation that was not
implemented. The recommendation had to do with USSOCOM becoming the lead
organization for paramilitary operations for the U.S. government. (CIA currently is the
lead organization.)
2) Since 9-11, we still need to practice Shoot, move and communicate. We are
better at shooting, mobility is improved, and our communication capability is
tremendous. However, we need to add, Understand to this fundamental expression of
skills. We need to be prepared for the lights out portions of the map.
3) In his last comment he noted that we spent huge energy on the bad guys but
we need to spend more energy on knowing who the good guys are.
b. JSOU will collect detailed notes and circulate to USSOCOM Components and
other stakeholders to prepare a study and recommendations for the 11-12 January 2011
seminar at MacDill AFB.
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Richard W. Cutler, I Came, I Saw, I Wrote: A Risk-Takers Life in Law, Espionage, Community
Service, Start-Ups and Writing (Milwaukee, WI: Richard W. Cutler, 2010).
Arthur B. Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 1950
(United States: Historical Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, 1989).
Helias Doundoulakis, I Was Trained to Be a Spy: A True Life Story (Philadelphia: Xlibris, 2008).
Allen Welsh Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).
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