ST 31-201

SPECIAL FORCES
OPERATIONS

US ARMY
JOHN F. KENNEDY
SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER
NOVEMBER 1978
 ST 31-201

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1-1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1-1
1-2. RECOMMENDATIONS 1-1
CHAPTER 2. INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
Section I. INTRODUCTION 2-1
2-1. GENERAL 2-1
2-2. INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS IN AN
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREA (UWOA) 2-1
Section II. AREA STUDY/AREA INTELLIGENCE/AREA ASSESS
MENT 2-2
2-3. GENERAL 2-2
2-4. AREA STUDY 2-2
Source of Information 2-2
Preparation 2-2
Preparation by Operational Detachments 2-3
2-5. OPERATIONAL AREA INTELLIGENCE AND BRIEFBACK 2-3
Operational Area Intelligence Study 2-3
The "Asset" 2-4
Briefback 2-4
Briefback Guide 2-5
Training Aids 2-5
2-6. AREA ASSESSMENT 2-5
Section III.INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION WITHIN THE UWOA 2-6
2-7. GENERAL 2-6
2-8. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION COLLECTION 2-6
2-9. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS 2-7
Internal Operations 2-7
Higher Headquarters 2-7
Section IV. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE UWOA 2-7
2-10. GENERAL 2-7
2-11. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS 2-8
Screening of Personnel and Potential
Recruits 2-8
Surveillance of the Local Populace 2-8
Penetration of Enemy Intelligence
Systems 2-8
Internal Security 2-8
Operational Security 2-8
i
 Section V. TACTICAL SECURITY WITHIN THE UWOA 2-9
2-12. GENERAL 2-9
2-13. PRINCIPLES 2-9
Security System 2-9
Inner security zone 2-9
Outer security zone 2-11
Dispersion and Tactical Security 2-11
Mobility of Units and Installations 2-12
Camouflage, Cover, and Deception 2-12
March Security 2-12
CHAPTER 3. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP)
Section I. INTRODUCTION 3-1
3-1. GENERAL 3-1
3-2. COORDINATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS 3-1
Section II. TARGET AUDIENCE 3-2
3-3. TYPES OF TARGET AUDIENCES 3-2
Enemy Military Forces 3-2
Persons Sympathetic to the Enemy 3-2
The Uncommitted 3-3
Persons Sympathetic to the Resistance
Movement 3-3
Section III.THE MESSAGE 3-3
3-4. MESSAGE DEVELOPMENT 3-3
3-5. MESSAGE FORMS 3-4
3-6. TYPES OF MEDIA 3-4
Radio 3-4
Printed Material 3-4
Symbolic Devices 3-5
Face-to-Face Communications 3-5
Entertainment 3-6
Gifts 3-6
3-7. ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS 3-6
3-8. CONSIDERATIONS 3-6
3-9. REFERENCE 3-7
CHAPTER 4. INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION
Section I. INFILTRATION 4-1
4-1. GENERAL 4-1
4-2. FACTORS CONSIDERED IN SELECTING METHOD
OF INFILTRATION 4-1
Mission 4-1
Enemy Situation 4-1
Weather 4-1
Topography 4-1
Hydrography 4-1
Training 4-1
Accompanying Equipment/Supplies 4-2
ii
 Distance 4-2
4-3. INITIAL ENTRY REPORT 4-2
4-4. AIR INFILTRATION 4-3
Advantages 4-3
Disadvantages 4-3
General 4-3
Specific Considerations 4-4
Drop zone (DZ) selection 4-4
Drop zone identification and
authentication procedures 4-4
Jump procedures 4-5
Blind-Drop Infiltration 4_5
Free-Fall Operations 4-6
Equipment/Supplies/Reception Committee 4-6
Control and Assembly Procedures 4-7
Control procedures 4-7
Assembly procedures 4-7
Emergency Procedures 4-7
Final Ground Procedures 4-7
4-5. WATER INFILTRATION 4-8
Advantages 4-8
Disadvantages 4-8
General 4-8
Considerations for Water Infiltration 4-8
Craft limitations 4-8
Equipment/supplies/reception
committee 4-9
Ship-to-shore movement 4-9
Rehearsals 4-9
4-6. LAND INFILTRATION 4-9
Advantages 4-9
Disadvantages 4-9
General 4-9
Section II. EXFILTRATION 4-10
4-7. GENERAL 4-10
4-8. METHODS 4-10
General 4-10
By Air and Water 4-10
Recovery areas 4-10
Recovery methods 4-11
Recovery times 4-11
By Land 4-11
Section III. INFILTRATION CHECKLIST 4-12
4-9. GENERAL 4-12
4-10. AIR INFILTRATION 4-12
iii
 Planning at the Special Forces
Operational Base 4-12
Actions Prior to Drop 4-13
Action on DZ 4-14
4-11. SEA INFILTRATION 4-14
Planning at the SFOB 4-14
Actions Prior to Embarking 4-15
Actions En Route to Operational Area 4-16
Action During Ship-to-Shore Movement 4-16
Action at Landing Site 4-16
4-12. LAND INFILTRATION 4-17
Planning at the SFOB 4-17
Action Prior to Departure 4-18
Action After Departure 4-18
4-13. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL
METHODS OF INFILTRATION 4-19
Contact Plan 4-19
Infiltration and Contact Site 4-19
Movement to Safe Area 4-19
CHAPTER 5. ORGANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT (BUILDUP) OF THE
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREA
Section I.PLANNING THE INITIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREA 5-1
5-1. GENERAL 5-1
5-2. SELECTION OF OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS 5-1
Character of the Resistance Movement
Within the Area 5-1
Environment and Tactical Situations 5-1
Subdivided "A" Detachment 5-2
Assessment Teams 5-3
Tailoring 5-3
Unilateral Missions 5-3
5-3. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND SUPPORT 5-3
General 5-3
Possible UWOA-SFOB Communications 5-4
Area Command, Control, and Support 5-4
5-4. THE AREA COMMAND 5-5
General 5-5
Composition 5-5
Command group 5-5
Resistance forces 5-5
5-5. SPECIAL FORCES OBJECTIVES IN THE UWOA 5-5
General 5-5
Special Forces-Resistance Force
Relations 5-5
iv
 5-6. CONSIDERATIONS IN ESTABLISHING RELATIONS 5-6
5-7. GENERAL AREA ORGANIZATION 5-7
General 5=7
Major Considerations 5-7
Internal Area Organization 5-7
The area complex 5-7
The guerrilla base 5-8
Locations 5-8
Section II. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE UWOA 5-9
5-8. GENERAL 5-9
5-9. UNIT ORGANIZATION 5-10
General 5-10
Principles of Organizations 5-10
Command and control 5-10
Basic organization 5-10
Size of Units 5-11
Area 5-11
Missions 5-11
Political considerations 5-11
Enemy control 5-11
Available personnel 5-11
Supply and support capability 5-11
Social tradition 5-12
5-10. THE AUXILIARY AND THE UNDERGROUND 5-12
General 5-12
Membership 5_13
Organization 5-13
Method of Operation 5-14
The Underground 5-15
Section III.ORGANIZATION OF RESISTANCE FORCE
SUPPORT SYSTEMS 5-15
5-11. GENERAL 5-15
5-12. CONSIDERATIONS IN ESTABLISHING SUPPORT
FUNCTIONS AND SYSTEMS 5-16
Security and Warning 5-16
Intelligence 5-16
Counterintelligence 5-17
Logistics 5-17
Recruiting 5-17
Psychological Warfare 5-17
Civilian Control 5-17
Evasion and Escape 5-17
Other Missions 5-17
Section IV. ADMINISTRATION, LAW, AND ORDER 5-18
5-13. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 5-18
v
 5-14. RECORDS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 5-19
Operation Journal 5-19
Command Structure 5-19
Personnel Roster 5-19
Personnel Records 5-19
Oath of Enlistment 5-20
Casualty Records 5-20
Graves Registration Information 5-20
Medical Records 5-20
Payrolls 5-20
Claims 5-20
Awards and Decorations 5-20
5-15. DISCIPLINE 5-21
Section V. TRAINING OF THE RESISTANCE FORCE 5-22
5-16. GENERAL 5-22
5-17. CHARACTERISTICS OF GUERRILLA TRAINING 5-23
5-18. THE TRAINING PLAN 5-23
General 5-23
Analysis of the Mission 5-24
Analysis of the Local Training Situation 5-24
Essential training to be conducted 5-24
Personnel 5-24
Time 5-24
Training facilities 5-24
Training aids 5-25
System and Organization for Training 5-25
5-19. OPERATIONS TO SUPPORT TRAINING 5-25
CHAPTER 6. AIR OPERATIONS
Section I. GENERAL 6-1
6-1. BASIC CRITERIA IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 6-1
6-2. TYPES OF AIR OPERATIONS 6-1
6-3. SEQUENCE OF AIR RESUPPLY MISSION 6-2
Operational Element 6-2
SFOB 6-2
Air Support Unit 6-3
Operational Element 6-3
Section II. DROP ZONE SELECTION 6-3
6-4. GENERAL 6-3
6-5. CONSIDERATIONS FOR SELECTING DZ's 6-3
Terrain 6-3
Weather 6-5
Obstacles 6-5
Shape and Size 6-5
Dispersion 6-5
vi
 Surfaces6-6
Security6-7
Section III. DROP ZONE REPORTING 6-7
6-6. REPORTS AND MISSION REQUESTS 6-7
6-7. ALTERNATE DROP ZONES 6-9
6-8. MISSION CONFIRMATION FOR AIR DROP 6-9
6-9. AREA DROP ZONE 6-9
Section IV. DROP ZONE MARKING 6-12
6-10. DROP ZONE IDENTIFICATION 6-12
6-11. BEACONS/TRANSPONDERS 6-12
6-12. COMPUTING GROUND RELEASE POINT 6-12
Dispersion 6-12
Wind Drift 6-12
Forward Throw 6-14
High-Velocity and Free-Drop Loads 6-14
6-13. DZ MARKING 6-14
6-14. PLACEMENT OF MARKINGS 6-15
6-15. UNMARKED DROP ZONES 6-16
6-16. DROP ZONE AUTHENTICATION 6-17
Air to Ground 6-17
Ground to Air 6-17
Section V.RECEPTION COMMITTEES 6-17
6-17. GENERAL 6-17
Air to Ground 6-17
Ground to Air 6-18
Marking Party 6-18
Security Party 6-18
Recovery Party 6-19
Transport Party 6-19
6-19. DZ/LZ STERILIZATION 6-19
Section VI. LANDING ZONE OPERATIONS 6-20
6-20. GENERAL 6-20
6-21. SELECTION CRITERIA FOR LANDING ZONES (LZ's) 6-20
Basic Considerations 6-20
Aircraft Limitations 6-20
LZ Requirements- 6-21
Terrain Features 6-21
Weather 6-21
Sizmitations 6-21
LZ Requirements 6-21
Terrain Features 6-21
Weather 6-21
Size 6-21
Surface 6-23
vii
 Approach and Takeoff Clearance 6-23
6-22. DIMENSIONS AND LAYOUT 6-23
6-23. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 6-26
Section VII. LANDING ZONES (WATER) 6-27
6-24. GENERAL 6-27
Section VIII. LANDING ZONES (ROTARY-WING AIRCRAFT) 6-27
6-25. GENERAL 6-27
6-26. SELECTION CRITERIA 6-28
Surface 6-28
Size 6-28
6-27. DISPLAY AND AUTHENTICATION 6-30
6-28. DIMENSIONS 6-30
6-29. MARKING 6-31
Section IX. MISCELLANEOUS AIR OPERATIONS 6-32
6-30. GENERAL 6-32
Section X. CHECKLIST FOR RECEPTION OPERATIONS
(DZ/LZ/RZ/BLS) 6-32
6-31. GENERAL 6-32
Training 6-32
Conduct of Operations 6-33
Alternate Sites 6-33
CHAPTER 7. COMBAT EMPLOYMENT OF RESISTANCE FORCES
Section I. GENERAL 7-1
7-1. PURPOSE 7-1
7-2. PLANNING 7-2
7-3. GUERRILLA WARFARE MISSIONS 7-3
Section II. MISSIONS TO SUPPORT THE UNIFIED COMMAND 7-4
7-4. TYPE MISSIONS 7_4
7-5. INTERDICTION 7-4
7-6. TYPES OF INTERDICTION OPERATIONS 7-5
Raid 7-5
Ambush 7-5
Mines and Boobytraps 7-5
Sniping 7-6
7-7. TARGET ANALYSIS 7-6
7-8. TARGET SYSTEMS 7-7
7-9. TACTICAL CONTROL MEASURES 7-9
General 7-9
Common Control Measures 7-9
Target assignment 7-10
Zones of action 7-10
Routes of movement 7-10
Mission support site (MSS) 7-10
viii
 Other Control Measures 7-10
7-10. INTELLIGENCE 7-10
7-11. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP) 7-11
Section III.MISSIONS TO SUPPORT CONVENTIONAL COMBAT
FORCES 7-11
7-12. GENERAL
7-13. OFFENSE 7-11
7-14. DEFENSE 7-11
7-15. RETROGRADE 7-13
Section IV. LINKUP OPERATIONS 7-13
7-16. GENERAL 7-13
7-17. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS 7-14
7-18. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 7-14
Liaison 7-14
Contact Points 7-14
Coordination of Schemes of Maneuver 7-14
Fire Coordination Measures 7-15
Communications Coordination 7-15
Employment Following Linkup 7-15
7-19. AIRBORNE OPERATIONS 7-15
7-20. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS 7-15
Section V. POST LINKUP OPERATIONS 7-16
7-21. GENERAL 7-16
7-22. MISSIONS7-16
Conventional Combat Operations 7-17
Reconnaissance 7-17
Counterguerrilla Operations 7-17
Rear Area Security 7-17
Civil Support 7-17
Retrain Host Country Conventional
Military Units 7-13
Section VI. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS 7-19
7-23. GENERAL 7-19
7-24. INDICATORS COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS 7-19
7-25. DEFENSIVE TACTICS 7-20
Diversion Activities 7-20
Defense of Fixed Positions 7-20
Delay and Harassment Activities 7-20
Withdrawal 7-21
7-26. DEFENSIVE MEASURES THAT THE GUERRILLAS,
MAY EMPLOY 7-21
7-27. GUERRILLA BREAKOUT OPERATIONS 7-22
Section VII.STAY-BEHIND OPERATIONS 7-24
7-28. GENERAL 7-24
ix
 7-29. ADVANTAGES OF STAY-BEHIND OPERATIONS 7-24
7-30. DISADVANTAGES OF STAY-BEHIND OPERATIONS 7-25
7-31. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 7-25
7-32. ACTIVITIES 7-25
Section VIII.THE RAID 7-25
7-33. PURPOSE 7-25
7-34. ORGANIZATION OF THE RAID FORCE 7-26
Command Element 7-26
Assault Element 7-26
Support Element 7-26
Security Element 7-27
7-35. PREPARATION 7-27
Planning Considerations 7-27
Intelligence 7-28
Rehearsals of Participants 7-28
Final Inspection 7-28
7-36. MOVEMENT7-29
7-37. ACTION IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA 7-29
7-38. WITHDRAWAL 7-30
7-39. LARGE RAIDS 7-31
General 7-31
Movement to Objective Area 7-32
Control 7-32
Training 7-32
Fire Support 7-32
Timing 7-33
Withdrawal 7-33
Section IX. AMBUSHES 7-33
7-40. INTRODUCTION 7-33
7-41. PURPOSE 7-34
Destruction 7-34
Harassment 7-34
7-42. TYPES OF AMBUSHES 7-34
7-43. DESCRIPTIVE TERMS/DISCUSSIONS OF AMBUSH
OPERATIONS 7-34
Ambush Site 7-34
Killing Zone 7-34
Ambush Force 7-34
Attack Force 7-35
Security Element 7-35
"Rise From the Ground" Ambush 7-35
Near Ambush 7-35
Far Ambush 7-35
Harassing Ambush 7-35
Destruction Ambush 7-35
x
 Deliberate Ambush 7-35
Ambush of Opportunity 7-35
Line, L, Z, T, V, Triangle,
(Open and Closed) and Box 7-36
7-44. FUNDAMENTALS OF SUCCESSFUL AMBUSH 7-36
Surprise 7-36
Coordinated Fires 7-36
Control 7-36
7-45. POINT AMBUSH 7-37
General 7-37
Point Ambush Formations 7-37
Line 7-37
The L 7-39
The Z 7-41
The T 7-42
The V 7-44
Triangle 7-46
Box 7-50
7-46. AREA AMBUSH 7-52
Background 7-52
Area Ambush (British Version) 7-52
Area Ambush (Baited Trap Version) 7-53
7-47. UNUSUAL AMBUSH TECHNIQUES 7-55
General 7-55
"Rise from the Ground" Ambush 7-55
Demolition Ambush 7-57
Special Ambush Situations 7-57
7-48. AMBUSH PATROLS 7-58
General 7-58
Planning and Preparation 7-58
Simplicity 7-59
Type of ambush 7-59
Deployment 7-59
Manner of attack 7-59
Size of ambush force 7-59
Organization 7-59
Equipment 7-59
Routes 7-61
Site 7-61
Occupation of the site 7-61
Positions 7-61
Camouflage 7-62
Movement, noise, and light discipline 7-62
Execution 7-62
Signals 7-62
Fire discipline 7-63
xi
 Withdrawal to the objective rallying
point 7-63
Section X. MINING AND SNIPING 7-63
7-49. GENERAL 7-63
7-50. MINING 7-63
7-51. SNIPING 7-64
General 7-64
The Sniper 7-64
Missions 7-64
Selection and Training 7-64
Planning for Their Use 7-65
Sniper Teams 7-65
The Individual Sniper 7-65
Equipment 7-65
7-52. OBSTACLES 7-65
Security of Base Operations 7-65
Raids and Ambushes 7-66
CHAPTER 8. LOGISTICS
Section I. INTRODUCTION 8-1
8-1. GENERAL 8-1
8-2. RESISTANCE FORCE SUPPORT 8-1
8-3. SUPPLY OF OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS 8-1
8-4. RESISTANCE FORCE LOGISTICS 8-2
Section II. INTERNAL SUPPORT 8-2
8-5. GENERAL 8-2
8-6. LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS 8-3
Necessities of Life 8-3
Equipment for Operations 8-3
Medical 8-4
Transportation 8-4
Storage 8-4
Maintenance and Repairs 8-5
8-7. LOGISTICS ORGANIZATION 8-5
8-8. SOURCES OF SUPPLY 8-6
Offensive Operations and Battlefield
Recovery 8-6
Purchase 8-7
Levy 8-7
Barter 8-7
Confiscation 8-7
Production 8-7
Section III. EXTERNAL SUPPORT 8-8
8-9. GENERAL 8-8
8-10. PHASES OF SUPPLY 8-9
xii
 Phase A - Accompanying Supply 8-9
Phase B - Resupply 8-9
Phase C - On-Call/Routine 8-11
8-11. DELIVERY 8-11
8-12. ACCOUNTABILITY 8-12
8-13. CLASSES OF SUPPLY 8-12
8-14. CATALOG SUPPLY SYSTEM 8-13
8-15. PACKING AND RIGGING 8-13
8-16. REQUEST PROCEDURES 8-14
Section IV. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS IN ESTABLISHING
SUPPLY SYSTEMS 8-17
8-17. GENERAL 8-17
8-18. AREAS OF CONSIDERATION 8-17
Ammunition 8-17
Weapons 8-18
Explosives 8-19
Individual Equipment 8-20
Medical Supplies 8-20
Food Supplies 8-20
8-19. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF SUPPLY SYSTEMS 8-21
CHAPTER 9. COMMUNICATIONS
Section I. GENERAL 9-1
9-1. GENERAL 9-1
9-2. EXTENT AND TYPE OF COMMUNICATIONS 9-1
Communications Within Friendly
Territory 9-1
Communications To and From the UWOA 9-1
Communications Within the UWOA 9-1
9-3. COMMUNICATION MEANS 9-2
Messenger 9-2
Radio 9-2
Telephone 9-2
Audible Signals 9-3
Visual Signals 9-4
Local Communication Systems 9-4
Pigeons or Trained Animals 9-4
Section II. COMMUNICATION TRAINING 9-4
9-4. GENERAL 9-4
9-5. CODE SPEED AND PROCEDURES 9-5
9-6. MAINTENANCE AND USE OF EQUIPMENT 9-5
9-7. RADIO PROPAGATION 9-5
9-8. MESSAGE WRITING 9-5
Section III.ANTENNAS 9-7
xiii
 9-9. GENERAL 9-7
Field Expedient Insulators 9-7
Quarter-Wavelength Antenna 9-8
Half-Wave Doublet Antenna 9-9
Slant-Wire Antenna 9-10
Fourteen Percent Off-Center Fed Antenna 9-11
Indoor Antennas 9-11
Other Antennas 9-14
CHAPTER 10. MEDICAL
Section I. INTRODUCTION 10-1
10-1. GENERAL 10-1
10-2. TRAINING 10-2
10-3. INTELLIGENCE 10-2
Medical Area Study/Area Assessment 10-2
Veterinary Information 10-3
10-4. SUPPLY 10-3
10-5. HOSPITALIZATION 10-3
10-6. EVACUATION 10-4
10-7. VETERINARY MEDICAL SUPPORT IN A UWOA 10-5
10-8. THE SPECIAL FORCES GUERRILLA HOSPITAL 10-7
General 10-7
Staffing 10-8
Organization 10-8
Command Relationships 10-9
Employment 10-9
Section II. DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICAL SUPPORT IN
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREAS10-10
10-9. GENERAL 10-10
10-10. MEDICAL REQUIREMENT DURING THE BUILDUP PHASE 10-11
10-11. MEDICAL SUPPORT DURING EMPLOYMENT PHASE 10-12
10-12. MEDICAL SUPPORT DURING DEMOBILIZATION
PHASE 10-12
CHAPTER 11. FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE
Section I. INTRODUCTION 11-1
11-1. GENERAL 11-1
11-2. CONCEPT 11-1
Section II. OPERATIONS 11-2
11-3. GENERAL 11-2
11-4. TYPES OF OPERATIONS 11-2
Intelligence Operations 11-2
Psychological Operations 11-2
Civil Affairs Operations 11-3
Populace and Resources Control Operations 11-3
xiv
 Operations Against Insurgent Base Areas 11-3
Operations Against Interior
Infiltration Routes 11-3
Remote Area Operations 11-3
Urban Operations 11-4
Border Operations 11-4
Section III.INTELLIGENCE 11-4
11-5. INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS 11-4
11-6. AREA STUDY 11-5
Preparation 11-5
Preparation Methods 11-5
Operational Area Intelligence 11-5
Section IV. INFILTRATION TECHNIQUES 11-6
11-7. GENERAL 11-6
Section V. COMMUNICATIONS 11-6
11-8. SYSTEMS AND TECHNIQUES 11-6
11-9. WIRE COMMUNICATIONS 11-6
11-10. TRAINING 11-7
Section VI. POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL 11-7
11-11. GENERAL 11-7
11-12. CONTROLS11-8
Section VII.FIELD ENGINEERING 11-9
11-13. GENERAL 11-9
11-14. CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS 11-9
Section VIII.MEDICAL REQUIREMENTS 11-10
11-15. GENERAL 11-10
11-16. PREVENTIVE MEDICINE IN FID 11-10
11-17. VETERINARY PROCEDURES IN FID 11-12
APPENDIX A - AREA STUDY GUIDE, AREA INTELLIGENCE STUDY
GUIDE, AND BRIEFBACK GUIDE A-1
APPENDIX B - AREA ASSESSMENT B-1
APPENDIX C - FIELD-EXPEDIENT PRINTING METHODS C-1
APPENDIX D - EXAMPLES OF MASTER TRAINING PROGRAM FOR
RESISTANCE FORCES D-1
APPENDIX E - IMMEDIATE ACTION DRILLS FOR FOOT PATROLS E-1
APPENDIX F - DEFENSE AGAINST AMBUSH F-1
APPENDIX G - PATROL BASES G-1
APPENDIX H - COMBAT INTELLIGENCE AND TRACKING H-1

xv
 CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1-1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this special text (ST) is to describe Special Forces

(SF) operational techniques. Material in this text is structured to
meet the requirements of students and instructors of the Special
Forces School.

1-2. RECOMMENDATIONS

Users of this text are encouraged to submit recommended changes or

comments for improvement. Recommendations should be keyed to specific
page, paragraph,and line of text. All recommendations should be
addressed to:

The use of the words "he," "his," "himself," etc., in this special
text is intended to include both the masculine and feminine
genders. Any exception to this will be so noted.
1-1
1-2
 CHAPTER 2

INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

Section I. INTRODUCTION

2-1. GENERAL
This chapter provides information andguidance to Special Forces
operational detachments in planning for unconventional warfare (UW)
operations and in analyzing areas of operation through area study and
area assessment. Itdiscusses intelligence collection,
counterintelligence, and security aspects of concern to an
operational detachment during theorganization, buildup, and combat
employment phases of developing an unconventional warfare operational
area (UWOA).
2-2. INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS IN AN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
OPERATIONAL AREA (UWOA)

a. Intelligence, counterintelligence, and security operations

become extremely significant to the survival, effectiveness, and
success of Special Forces elements operating in areas controlled by
the enemy and in association with elements of the population regarded
as criminals or traitors by the enemy.
b. A much broader understanding and ability in all aspects of
intelligence are required for unconventional warfare than for
conventional combat operations.

(1) Guerrilla operations require thorough knowledge and careful

application of all combat intelligence and security techniques common
to infantry operations. However, the distance from the guerrilla base
of both targets and enemy units usually makes it necessary to rely
heavily on clandestine nets of the auxiliary and underground for
intelligence and security information.

(2) Other UW missions require support or direct participation in

clandestine activities. Therefore, in addition to their ability to
employ sound conventional combat intelligence techniques, Special
Forces personnel must possess a basic understanding of clandestine
organization, operations, and techniques. (For application of
operational intelligence techniques see FM 30-17, FM 30-18, FM 31-20,
and Defense Intelligence Agency Manual (DIAM) 58-11.)

c. Once deployed, the Special Forces detachment is ideally

situated to contribute to the overall theater intelligence plan. By
using resistance force sources subordinate to the area command, it
can assemble and relay to the Special Forces operational base (SFOB)
intelligence information of value to the unified and component
commanders.Security of the Special Forces detachment and the

2-1
resistance efforts may restrict radio traffic, thus limiting the
amount of intelligence information that can be relayed.

Section II. AREA STUDY/AREA INTELLIGENCE/AREA ASSESSMENT

2-3. GENERAL
Special Forces operational detachments (SFOD) committed into
operational areas to support the US Army's role in any intensity of
conflict will usually find that activities in the area are supported
and accompanied by extensive political and economic activities. These
activities, conducted by individuals or groups integrated or acting
in concert with recognized resistance forces, may be overt or
clandestine. In order for Special Forces detachments to improve their
chances for success, they require more predeployment intelligence
than conventional Army combat units. To obtain this, SFOD's conduct
general area studies of assigned countries and specific intelligence
studies of areas of operations. Although area studies are normally
prepared and provided by special research agencies, the detachments
assemble their own studies in a format appropriate for operational
use.

2-4. AREA STUDY

An area study is the prescribed collection of specific information
pertaining to a given area developed from sources available prior to
entering the area (AR 310-25). For a sample area study guide and
format, see appendix A.

a. Source of Information. The Special Forces group intelligence

section (S2) procures the necessary intelligence documents from which
the detachment's general area studies are prepared. Coordination is
effected through prescribed intelligence with all appropriate theater
intelligence agencies for the continuous procurement of timely
intelligence.

b. Preparation. The area study may be prepared by:

(1) Operational detachments.

(2) Group S2. Entire area study may be prepared by the S2 based
on available information concerning the operational missions and
areas of operations.
(3) Area specialist teams (AST's). These teams are assigned
operational responsibilities based on geographic or mission
consideration.

(4) A combination of the operational detachments, group S2, and

area specialist teams.

2-2
 c. Preparation by Operational Detachments. Although unit training
requirements limit the time available for operational detachments to
prepare a detailed comprehensive general area study, preparation by
the operational detachments has the following advantages:
(1) The extensive research required enables the detachments to
learn more about their area of interest, and once placed in
isolation, the detachments can quickly assimilate the data for their
respective areas of operation based on mission requirements.

(2) The detachment commander can assign specific areas of

interest to selected personnel in keeping with their particular
specialty. For example:

(a) The detachment operations and intelligence sergeants can

conduct extensive research and study on the political structure of
the area of operations, on groups in opposition to the recognized
government, and on order of battle of a real or potential enemy.

(b) The detachment engineer sergeant and the combat demolition

specialist can prepare studies on the major lines of communication
and bridges throughout the country by gathering pictures and data on
bridge structures, rail yards, tunnels, and highway nets. This
includes information on both primary and secondary roads--surfaces,
gradients, and traffic capabilities during any kind of weather.

(c) By assigning both members of a specific specialty within a

detachment to a specific area of interest, the detachment commander
is assured of having personnel with intimate knowledge of the
operational area in the event the split-team concept must be used. In
either case, the detachment will have depth within each specialist's
area of responsibility.
(3) Once these studies have been completed and the detachment
personnel responsible for specific sections have prepared their
summaries, extensive briefings and orientations can be conducted for
the remainder of the detachment. These should be continued daily
until each member of the detachment is intimately familiar with the
assigned area and its peoples.

2-5. OPERATIONAL AREA INTELLIGENCE AND BRIEFBACK

a. OperationalArea Intelligence Study. This detailed intelligence
of a specific area of operation. It includes information acquired
from:

(1) Selected personnel exfiltrated from objective area.

(2) Existing resistance elements.

(3) Recent conventional operations conducted in the area.

2-3
 (4) Reaction to active propaganda programs.

(5) Conduct of intelligence operations.

(6) Intelligence studies prepared by other DOD and governmental

agencies.
(7) Libraries, periodicals, universities, travel agencies, etc.

b. The "Asset." When a detachment is selected for commitment into

a specific UWOA, it will be placed in isolation at the SFOB. At this
time, the operational area intelligence briefing will be given. The
latest and best available information from all agencies and sources
is contained in this briefing and is the basis for operational
planning. During the intelligence briefing, one source of information
referred to as an "asset" may be introduced. The preferable "asset"
is a person native to the assigned area of operations who (1) has
recently been exfiltrated from that area, (2) has been thoroughly
interrogated for intelligence information, and (3) volunteered or was
recruited to assist in the Special Forces mission. As such, the asset
would have a comprehensive background knowledge of the objective
area; also, it is desirable that he be a member of the resistance
movement. If the situation warrants, he may be infiltrated back into
the operational area with the detachment to assist in contacting
members of the resistance movement. For a sample format of an area
intelligence study guide see appendix A.

c. Briefback. The purpose of a briefback is to assure the Special

Forces group commander, his staff, representatives of the SFOB, and
other interested agencies and services that all aspects of the
assigned mission are understood and that the detachment is ready for
deployment. After the detachment completes its preparation for
deployment and concludes its studies of the area in relation to its
operational mission, it presents the briefback to demonstrate its
operational readiness in:

(1) Detachment functioning.

(a) Teamwork.

(b) Attitude.

(c) Morale.
(d) Use of available time.

(e) Rehearsals of initial classes.

(f) Equal distribution of loads among detachment members.

(g) Rigging of equipment.

2-4
 (h) Responsibilities in each phase of operation.

(2) Detachment knowledge.

(a) Area study.

(b) Background of movement and leaders.

(c) Mission of the SFOD.

(d) Enemy situation.

(e) Infiltration plan.

(f) Alternate plans.

(g) Contact plans.

(h) Emergency plans.

(i) Emergency resupply.

(j) Automatic resupply.

(k) Evasion and escape (E&E) operations.

(l) Concepts of operations.

(m) Detachment brevity code systems.

(n) Location of sensitive items of equipment in the event of

injury (SOI, SSI, crystals, radio equipment, explosives).

d. Briefback Guide. A recommended format is presented in appendix

A.
e. Training Aids. Maximum use of simply constructed training aids
(i.e., maps, overlays, blackboards, and sand-tables, if applicable)
should be used to support briefback.

2-6. AREA ASSESSMENT

a. Area assessment is the prescribed collection of specific

information by the Special Forces detachment to update the area
study. It commences immediately upon entering the area of operations
and is a continuous process that confirms, corrects, refutes, or adds
to previous intelligence acquired before commitment. It is also the
basis for changing detachment operational and logistical plans that
were made before commitment into the area.

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 b. Assessment may assume two degrees of urgency—immediate and
subsequent. Matters of immediate urgency are included in the
"initial" assessment; the "principal" assessment is a continuous
collection 'of information conducted until exfiltration or evacuation
from the operational area. (See appendix B for sample format.)

c. Major changes in the area study indicated by area assessments

will be furnished to the Special Farces operational base/forward
operational base (SFOB/FOB) via normal communications. These changes
provide the latest intelligence information to the AST's.

Section III. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION WITHIN THE UWOA

2-7. GENERAL

The nature and locale of UW operations require that Special Forces

and supported resistance forces have accurate, timely information and
intelligence in planning and conducting operations, securing bases,
and preventing compromise by enemy forces. Intelligence systems in
the UWOA are primarily geared to support (1) Special Forces and
unconventional warfare forces in planning support functions and (2)
the underground in planning and conducting subversive operations to
disrupt enemy activities. But they are also organized to support and
answer essential elements of information (EEI) of higher
headquarters.

2-8. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION COLLECTION

a. The deployed detachment may be required to obtain information

within the UWOA or adjoining areas to support conventional
operations. The area command is frequently in a position to provide
intelligence which is otherwise unavailable to forces operating
outside the UWOA. In the assignment of intelligence tasks, the area
command considers the impact on the detachment's primary missions and
security and communications limitations. When requirements exceed the
capability or degree of skill possessed by the detachments, Special
Forces operational detachments may be augmented by intelligence
specialists.

b. In addition to the Special Forces personnel, the area command

has three primary sources for collecting and producing intelligence:
the guerrilla force, the auxiliary, and the underground. A guerrilla
force normally employs conventional, unsophisticated information-
gathering techniques such as patrols, area and target reconnaissance,
and surveillance. Information gathered in this manner is supplemented
by information provided by the auxiliary and underground components
of the resistance.

c. Intelligence from theater collection and production agencies

may be procured from the theater UW command through the SFOB.

2-6
2-9. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

Through its three primary sources for intelligence information, the

area command can support its intelligence requirements for:

a. Internal Operations. The intelligence system of the area

command is designed for and oriented towards the support of its own
requirements. As a result, most of the intelligence is produced for
use of the guerrilla, auxiliary, and underground elements.

b. Higher Headquarters. The area command may be required to

provide:

(1) Order of battle data.

(2) Information to support psychological operations (PSYOP).

(3) Targets of opportunity.

(4) Poststrike assessments.

(5) Information on political, sociological, and economic matters.

(6) Intelligence information to support specific air, ground, and

naval operations.

(7) Technical information.

(8) Identification, location, and affiliation of all known or

suspected supporters and sympathizers to the government in power.
Section IV. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE UWOA

2-10. GENERAL

a. Another basic function of the area command is the establishment

of a sound counterintelligence system designed to:

(1) Neutralize or reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's

intelligence gathering systems.

(2) Prevent penetration of the resistance force by enemy agents

and informants.
b. For detailed information on intelligence nets and
counterintelligence operations, see FM 30-17, FM 30-18, FM 31-20, and
DIAM 58-11.

2-7
2-11. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS

a. Screening of Personnel and Potential Recruits. As a protective

measure against enemy penetration, personnel trained in
counterintelligence carefully screen all members of the resistance
force.

b. Surveillance of the Local Populace. In order to uncover enemy

agents, counterintelligence programs include continual checks of the
civilian population. That segment of the population which does not
support the guerrilla force is one of the most potent dangers to the
guerrilla. These people, willingly or by coercion, act as informants
for the enemy. All resistance personnel must be thoroughly
indoctrinated in safeguarding information and resisting
interrogation.

c. Penetration of Enemy Intelligence Systems. Counterintelligence

measures are also used (1 to determine enemy counterguerrilla
techniques and operations and (2) to identify enemy intelligence
personnel and indigenous informants. Such information may be obtained
from defectors or through penetration of enemy intelligence and
counterintelligence organizations.
d. Internal Security. Within the UWOA or elsewhere in the theater,
information concerning present or planned UW operations is
disseminated only on a need-to-know basis. Specific safeguards
appropriate to UWOA's should include:

(1) Minimizing the number of administrative and operational

records. Records should be reviewed frequently to determine need for
retaining, and unnecessary records should be destroyed. Retained
records should be cached and the cache location revealed only to
personnel with a need to know.

(2) Coding of names and places, and the key to the code
disseminated on a need-to-know basis only.

(3) Developing resistance force organization and communication

systems to minimize penetration; e.g., cellularization,
compartmentation, and employing secure interface.

e. Operational Security.
(1) Strict security measures must be enforced. Minimum measures
required are:

(a) Camouflage discipline.

(b) Isolation of units from each other and from the civilian
population. Contact with civilians is held to the minimum and is made
solely by designated individuals or groups.
2-8
 (c) Proper selection and rigid supervision of courier routes
between headquarters and units.

(d) Controlled entry and exit from campsites and

installations.
(e) Control of movement.

(f) Compartmentation of information to prevent possible

identification of personnel or planned missions.

(g) Separation of encryption cells and communication

cells/drop-maintenance cells.

(2) Requirements for security are continually impressed on

resistance personnel. Commanders at all levels constantly strive to
improve security measures. Particular attention is given to those
units and elements which have recently been inactive or which are
located in relatively safe areas.

(3) Premature or unnecessary movement of guerrilla units tends to

disrupt their operations, reduce their security, and unnecessarily
expose them to the enemy or informants. The decision to move should
be made only on actual threat of enemy counterguerrilla operations.

Section V. TACTICAL SECURITY WITHIN THE UWOA

2-12. GENERAL

Security procedures of the area command are designed to prevent the

enemy (1) from identifying organizational structures or missions arid
(2) from neutralizing or destroying the guerrilla organization. Such
procedures include both active and passive measures to increase
overall security.

2-13. PRINCIPLES

a. Security System. Guerrilla units normally employ an inner and

outer zone in establishing a security system. Specific delineations
of security responsibilities must be made and coordination procedures
established if more than one resistance element is involved.

(1) Inner security zone (fig. 2-1). The guerrilla force is

responsible for this zone, and its security system depends on
standard military practice (i.e., patrols, outguards and outposts, a
guardpost system, detection and warning devices, and camouflage and
deception techniques).

2-9
 Figure 2-1
Inner security zone.

2-10
 Figure 2-2
Outer security zone

a. Outer security zone (fig. 2-2). Normally, the auxiliary and the
underground are responsible for furnishing guerrilla forces timely
information of enemy activity within this zone. The guerrilla force
should not fully rely on such supplementary warning systems. The
auxiliary and underground elements may be required to harass arid
delay the enemy, thus allowing the guerrilla force time to disperse.

b. Dispersion and Tactical Security.

(1) Guerrilla forces must avoid concentrating on the march, in

camps, or in bivouacs. Even though the tactical and logistical
situations may favor concentrating the guerrilla force, security
requirements dictate that the guerrilla force organize into smaller
units and tactically disperse. A large force may be concentrated to
conduct a specific operation, but upon completion of the operation it
quickly reverts to the original organizational and dispersion
pattern.

(2) The principle of dispersion should be applied to command as

well as to tactical and support elements.

2-11
 (3) In the event of large-scale enemy operations against the
guerrilla force, the area commander may be forced to divide units
into even smaller elements to achieve greater dispersion or to
facilitate escape. This extreme dispersion will reduce the
effectiveness of command and control, lower the morale of the
guerrilla force, and hinder the ability of the auxiliaries to render
support. Therefore, excessively dispersed units roust be reassembled
as quickly as possible. Operational plans must provide for such
contingencies and include post-operation assembly areas (rallying
points).

c. Mobility of Units and Installations.

(1) Guerrilla installations and forces must maintain a high

degree of mobility. Emergency evacuation plans for guerrilla
installations and forces should include actions to eliminate all
traces of guerrilla activity prior to departure from an area.

(2) Mobility may be facilitated by preparing equipment to be

moved in one-man loads and by caching less mobile equipment.

d. Camouflage, Cover, and Deception. Another principle of security

is the use of cover and camouflage and the execution of deception
operations. These operations are planned to conceal the nature and
extent of guerrilla operations and to provide the enemy with
misleading or false information. Such operations are an integral part
of all resistance activities.

e. March Security.

(1) Tactical security on the march is based on knowledge of the

enemy's location and strength. The intelligence section of the area
command provides this vital information for security of movement and
operations.

(2) Units are briefed on the local enemy situation, primary and
alternate routes, dispersal and reassembly areas along the way, and
security measures to be observed en route. Areas through which the
guerrilla force plans to pass may require assistance from the
auxiliary to provide security for the guerrilla force.

(3) The guerrilla forces employ standard march security

techniques such as advance, rear, and flank guards. Preselected
bivouacs are reconnoitered by patrols prior to the arrival of
guerrilla units. As feasible, contact is established with local
auxiliary units in order to obtain the latest information on enemy
forces in the area.

2-12
 CHAPTER 3

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP)

Section I. INTRODUCTION

4-1. GENERAL
a. Psychological operations (PSYOP) are applicable to guerrilla
warfare as well as all other aspects of UW, and must be integrated
into all tactical planning. PSYOP is salesmanship used to develop a
weak cause and make a strong cause stronger. The cause must be sold
and taught to others to sell. If this is not done, chances for
success are slim.

b. Special Forces must have a thorough knowledge of PYSOP

fundamentals and capabilities, and the imagination to adapt to the
operational environment. In the UWOA, the Special Forces element must
be prepared to advise the area command on PSYOP programs, to train
selected resistance members in the application of PSYOP, and to
initiate its own PSYOP programs.

c. Intelligence is the life blood of effective psychological

operations. Special Forces deployed in contact with guerrilla forces
are in a position to gather the kind of intelligence that bears most
intimately upon the attitudes of the people at grass-roots level.
Propaganda programs which are shaped without extensive knowledge of
feelings and persuasions of human target groups are not likely to
succeed.

d. The presence of Special Forces in a UWOA has a psychological

impact on the resistance and on segments of the population. The
psychological effect of every action or activity on all segments of
the population is an important planning consideration. Action
programs include those area command operations which are designed to
have a psychological effect on a specific target audience. Some
combat actions may be initiated solely to raise the morale of the
guerrillas or to demonstrate guerrilla support of the people.

4-2. COORDINATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Psychological operations (PSYOP) are supportive of all activities

within the conduct of UW. PSYOP are basically planned operations
conducted alone or in conjunction with other tactical operations and
have as their purpose the influencing of behavior through
modification or reinforcement of attitudes and beliefs. PSYOP
programs, when properly coordinated and applied by the United States
and it sallies, can:

a. Maintain morale among the resistance forces.

3-1
 b. Add to the determination of the resistance forces.

c. Disassociate the people from the government or occupying power.

d. Create common goals between the resistance forces and the

population.
e. Elicit active assistance from the people for the resistance
forces.

f. Demoralize the government or occupying armed forces and police

forces.

Section II. TARGET AUDIENCE

4-3. TYPES OF TARGET AUDIENCES

Propaganda and information efforts are directed at the target

audience to maintain or change existing favorable/unfavorable
attitudes and behavior. Target audiences are selected based on
theater guidance provided through the SFOB/FOB and evaluation of
potential by Special Forces in conjunction with resistance forces.
PSYOP efforts are aimed at producing specific desirable actions and
attitudes. Target audiences in the UWOA are:

a. Enemy Military Forces. Enemy military forces may be of the same

nationality as the population or they may represent an occupying
foreign power. Psychological operations programs are directed against
this group to cause its members to feel isolated, improperly
supported, doubtful of the outcome of the struggle, and unsure of the
morality of their cause. By focusing on the enemy soldier's
frustrations, PSYOP can lower his morale, reduce his effectiveness,
and create a feeling of inadequacy, insecurity, and fear. This
feeling of inadequacy and fear tends to increase his susceptibility
to psychological operations, and may make him more vulnerable to
persuasion, surrender, malingering, disaffection, or desertion.

b. Persons Sympathetic to the Enemy. Enemy supporters include

those civilians in an operational area w o willingly collaborate with
the enemy, those who collaborate with the enemy under duress, and
those civilians whose actions may be passive but whose sympathies are
with the occupying power. Psychological operations programs directed
against this group must be carefully oriented. The broad
psychological objectives, however, are the same as for those directed
against enemy military forces. A program to instill doubt and fear
may be conducted in conjunction with a positive political action
program. Programs are conducted to identify and discredit the
collaborator, or weaken the collaborator's belief in the strength and
power of the enemy military forces. Punitive action against
collaborators may result in reprisals by the enemy and consequent
loss of broad civilian support for psychological operations
objectives; however, overreaction by the enemy can, when skillfully

3-2
exploited, build popular support for the guerrilla cause. Special
Forces will not take part in nor condone those punitive actions which
are contrary to the rules of land warfare or US national policy.

c. The Uncommitted. In the initial stage of hostilities, the

population may be neutral or even actively opposed to the resistance
effort because of fear or uncertainty about the aims of the movement
or its eventual success. Under the best of conditions, therefore, the
populace is caught between the demands and controls of the enemy
force and those of the guerrillas. Accordingly, the psychological
operations programs must stress that the guerrillas share the
political and social goals of the population, that the United States
and its allies in supporting the guerrilla force support these same
goals, and that the resistance movement will be successful.

d. Persons Sympathetic to the Resistance Movement.

Resistance supporters include those civilians who are sympathetic
toward the goals of the movement but who are not active members of
some element of the resistance force. The abject here is to provide
moral support and tactical instruction on what is to be done and how
to do it. PSYOP programs directed at this target audience stress
appeals for the populace to support or cooperate passively with the
resistance force in achieving common objectives. The members of the
movement must follow a code of conduct which insures that the people
and their reeds are always respected; that the people can always
count on the movement for help and protection from all enemies,
natural and human; and that the movement is the instrument of
political, social, and economic progress.

Section III. THE MESSAGE

4-4. MESSAGE DEVELOPMENT

When writing a message for the various target audiences, the theme of
the message, as well as the objectives of the PSYOP campaign, must be
carefully considered. Each message is created with a distinct purpose
in mind and is skillfully designed to accomplish that purpose. In
developing the message, it should be:

a. Based on the social values and experiences of the specific

target audience, not those of the writer.

b. Directed to specific audiences within the target country rather

than to the public at large.

c. Designed to exploit the existing attitudes of the audience

rather than attempt to effect a complete change in attitudes.

d. Realistic; claims should not exceed the limits of belief of the

audience.

3-3
4-5. MESSAGE FORMS

A message can take many forms. Some common ones are:

a. Words, spoken or written.

b. Music, arrangements and vocals.

c. Pictures.

d. Gifts.

e. Theatrical performances, pantomime or dance.

f. Combinations of several of these forms.

Section IV. THE MEDIA

4-6. TYPES OF MEDIA

In directing a message at a target audience, the communications media

available and the level of literacy must first be determined. Some
media which should be considered are:

a. Radio.

(1) External radio broadcasts may be directed to various

audiences within a target country. Within the country, the resistance
may use clandestine radio to broadcast for short periods on popular
channels. It may also interrupt or jam enemy radio broadcasts.

(2) One important advantage of radio is, of course, that one does
not have to be literate in order to hear and understand radio
broadcasts. This medium, however, has some disadvantages. To be sure
that the target group listens, the resistance must find a way to
inform the audience of the time and channel on which the illicit
broadcast will be made. Furthermore, broadcasts by low-power portable
transmitters have limited range. Enemy radio-locating equipment can
pinpoint the position of a transmitter, forcing the resistance to
change the frequency and the site of the transmitter frequently.
b. Printed Material.

(1) The advantage of printed material is that it can be used and

reused by passing it on from person to person. Clandestine newspapers
and leaflets can be used to disseminate information concerning
collaborators and traitors, techniques of sabotage, war aims and
policies of the resistance, and a variety of other messages.

(2) Written materials do present certain problems. Large

quantities of paper, ink, and other supplies are required for
3-4
continuing publication, and strict controls are usually imposed on
printing materials and presses. Also, the distribution of printed
matter requires a complex and coordinated effort if the material and
the distributors are not to be intercepted. Finally, the possession
of subversive literature is hazardous to readers as well as
distributors. The most difficult problems in running an underground
newspaper are staffing it with reporters, printers, and distributors,
and finding a safe place to print it. In some cases, newspapers may
be printed outside the country. News is often obtained from foreign
broadcasts via shortwave. Where presses and printing materials are
licensed or under close surveillance, chain letters have been used
effectively to communicate information to a large segment of the
population.

(3) Within the UWOA, guerrilla forces may not have the facilities
to produce large amounts of printed material. However, Special Forces
may supply lightweight, portable printing equipment or devise field
expedients (see appendix D) that can produce a limited number of
leaflets, posters, or bulletins for the guerrilla force.

c. Symbolic Devices. Another way to transmit information and

harass the enemy is by symbolic devices such as slogans or symbols
written on walls or in public places which are convenient to the
target groups. Antigovernment slogans and messages can be displayed
on walls in such a way that they cannot easily be eradicated. Jokes
and cartoons carry great impact and are an effective way of conveying
disrespect and resistance in a socially acceptable manner.

d. Face-to-Face Communications.

(1) In countries where a large portion of the population is

illiterate and few radio receivers are available, word-of-mouth
messages are the principal means of communication. Agitators
circulating in crowds, spreading rumors, and appealing for aid to the
resistance can be effective. Face-to-face communications have the
advantage that the message is usually spread by people who know each
other, and, therefore, it gains credibility. Another advantage is the
fact that the messages, though subversive in content, may not sound
subversive when presented by the agent, and there are no materials to
incriminate the agent. A big disadvantage, however, is that the
message may be distorted or may never reach the target group.

(2) In effect, all members of the Special Forces operational

element and the resistance force are used as active propagandists
within the limits of security. Depending on the situation and the
target audience, face-to-face communications can be the most
effective means of communicating propaganda messages. It enables the
psychological operator to design his appeals for specific targets and
to fudge by direct observation, the response to, and effect of, his
propaganda appeals. Thus, he can respond immediately to audience
reaction.

3-5
 (3) Rumor cap be an effective propaganda device, but requires
extreme skill and care in its use. Although rumors are difficult to
control and are virtually impossible to trace, the target audience
can never be specifically isolated. Since rumors may also be used by
the enemy, those which are detrimental to the guerrilla effort may be
countered by leaflets or face-to-face meetings with selected members
of the civilian populace.

e. Entertainment. Forms of entertainment which are traditional or

popular in the area of operations are excellent potential media. They
usually draw full audience attention, are well received, and lend
themselves to the communication of PSYOP messages. Such forms as
pantomime, dance, and music employ universal sounds and symbols. When
Special Forces sponsor such performances, the good will and favorable
attitudes created can lead to desired actions. In this case, the
target audience must identify with the host government and not
Special Forces.

f. Gifts. Gifts can be used to carry propaganda messages. Such

items as soap, matches, salt, needles and thread, seeds, clothing,
and other items of value make suitable gifts which are acceptable for
general distribution. These gifts should be printed on or be wrapped
in a piece of paper containing a propaganda message or symbol which
conveys the meaning desired. In selecting the gifts, be sure that the
gifts are useful and that the use of symbols or messages do not
antagonize the receiver. For example, it may be poor taste to have a
piece of soap wrapped in a leaflet containing a copy of the
recipient's national flag. The sender must be aware of
countermeasures which the enemy may take, such as giving gifts of
food which are poisonous and attributing the gifts to the resistance.

4-7. ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS

The effectiveness of PSYOP must be continually assessed to provide a

basis for future operations. In Special Forces operations, partial or
complete estimates of PSYOP effectiveness can be based on
conferences, conversations, and personal observations. The most
significant indicator of an effective PSYOP effort is the degree to
which the people support the resistance force. Support can be
measured by the amount of intelligence, recruits, food, and materials
furnished by the people.

4-8. CONSIDERATIONS

a. The level of support (effectiveness) must be considered in the

light of the freedom of action available to the target audience.
Where PSYOP missions require a series of actions over a long period
of time, the desired audience behavior normally will be extremely
difficult to discern and estimate. In these instances, PSYOP
intelligence requirements for assessing effectiveness are extensive
and continuing. Assessments provide the basis for adjusting and

3-6
improving methods, developing and revising plans, and setting new
PSYOP objectives.

b. Lessons from past history show that resistance movements have

used coercion, threats, and terrorism to obtain the support of
undecided or uncommitted people when persuasion alone had failed.
Special Forces must understand that these techniques are not
sanctioned by the US government. In advising guerrilla forces,
Special Forces must make every effort to persuade them against the
use of these techniques.

c. Potential enemies nave made extensive use of government

controlled terrorism as an integral part of population control.
Special Forces should be prepared to assess the effectiveness of
these measures and to influence resistance forces to exploit the
counterproductive elements of these measures.

4-9. REFERENCE

For PSYOP planning, use FM 33-1, Psychological Operations.

3-7
3-8
 CHAPTER 4

INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION

Section I. INFILTRATION

4-1. GENERAL

The success of a Special Forces operational detachment's infiltration

into a designated UWOA depends primarily on detailed planning and
preparation. Method of infiltration—air, water, or land—and the
procedures and techniques used will depend on certain factors.

4-2. FACTORS CONSIDERED IN SELECTING METHOD OF INFILTRATION

a. Mission. The operational mission of the alerted detachment is

the prime consideration in determining the method of infiltration.
For example, the mission may require rapid deployment into the
operational area, thereby dictating the most expeditious method of
infiltration.
b. Enemy Situation. Enemy capabilities and security measures
affect the selection of infiltration method. A heavily guarded
border, for example, may preclude land infiltration; a strongly
defended and patrolled coastline may eliminate water as a means of
infiltration. The capability of the enemy air defense systems will
reduce air delivery potential.

c. Weather. Certain weather conditions may adversely affect air or

water infiltration, yet favor land infiltration. Bad weather with
storms, high winds, or protracted periods of reduced visibility is an
example.

d. Topography. Land formations must also be considered. Land

infiltration will have a better chance for success if the chosen
routes pass through mountainous, swampy, or heavily forested areas.
On the other hand, the presence of mountains could force aircraft to
fly at higher altitudes resulting in greater exposure to enemy
detection and air defense systems.

e. Hydrography. Hydrographic factors, i.e., tides, depth of

offshore water, beach gradients, currents, and the location of reefs
and sandbars influence the selection of water as a means of
infiltration.

f. Training. The training given Special Forces is usually

sufficient to prepare them for any means of infiltration/
exfiltration. However, it is not anticipated that all members of a
selected operational element will be equally proficient in a given
4-1
skill or technique at any given time. Should areas be discovered in
which weaknesses exist, added emphasis is placed on such areas. A
properly balanced training program will produce a reasonably
proficient team member. Special training programs are required to
attain and maintain proficiency for:

(1) Surface and open water swimming.

(2) Self-contained underwater breathing apparatus (SCUBA).

(3) Military free-fall (MFF) parachuting.

(4) Submarine operations.

(5) Inflatable boat handling.

(6) Insertion/extraction techniques.

(7) Survival, evasion, resistance, and escape.

g. Accompanying Equipment/Supplies. The quantity and types of

accompanying equipment/supplies carried on initial infiltration are
influenced by:

(1) The situation in the UWOA.

(2) The size of the resistance force.

(3) The enemy threat.

(4) The capabilities/limitations of the mission air/naval craft.

h. Distance. The distance to the objective area must be considered

in selection of infiltration means.
4-3. INITIAL ENTRY REPORT

a. Infiltration of the detachment into its operational area is not

complete until the Initial Entry Report is made to the SFOB. The
Initial Entry Report is submitted as soon as practical after
infiltration whether or not contact has been made with the local
resistance.

b. The following is an example of an Initial Entry Report.

(1) Proword. Designated in accordance with the CEOI. The proword

designates the type of report being submitted.

4-2
 (2) Paragraph A. Code Word. Designated in accordance with the
CEOI. The code word identifies the operational detachment making the
report.

(3) Paragraph B. Location. Complete military coordinates to

nearest 1,000 meters and designation of the location from which
reporting.

(4) Paragraph C. Casualties. Report last name and whether

fatality or injury. Also, report missing personnel.

(5) Paragraph D. Contact. Report whether contact was made with

local resistance.

(6) Paragraph E. Strength. Report strength of resistance force as

known at time of report.

(7) Paragraph F. Additional information, such as a request to

cancel or modify the automatic resupply drop.
4-4. AIR INFILTRATION

a. Advantages.
(1) Flexibility.

(2) Speed and accuracy of delivery.

(3) Short exposure to enemy countermeasures.

(4) Precise navigation.

(5) Capability of delivering supplies in excess of individual
loads.

b. Disadvantages.

(1) Vulnerability to enemy, air detection and defense systems.

(2) Affected by weather conditions.

(3) Possible injury to personnel and damage/loss of equipment.

(4) Requires specially trained aircrews.

(5) Requires sterilization of infiltration site.

c. General. Air delivery by parachute is one of the most practical
and rapid means available for the infiltration of SFOD's. In most
instances standard troop carrier aircraft are well equipped and
satisfy airdrop requirements. Some situations may require an aircraft
4-3
capable of parachute delivery of personnel and equipment from high
altitudes using free-fall parachute techniques. In scene instances
assault-type aircraft as well as amphibious and utility types used by
other services may be available, and certain situations may require
that these aircraft have the capability of using relatively short,
unprepared airstrips and conduct air landing operations during
infiltration. Under other circumstances, longer-range tactical
aircraft may be used. (See TM 57-210 for dimensions, flight
characteristics, and data on US Army and US Air Force aircraft.)
Support for UW operations requires aircraft that:
(1) Can paradrop the required number of operational personnel and
accompanying equipment/supplies.

(2) Carp operate at varying altitudes during darkness or adverse

weather conditions.
(3) Possess the required navigational aids to allow the aircrew
to locate and deliver personnel and equipment on small DZ's with no
terminal guidance and ground contact.
(4) Have sufficient combat radius to reach the operational area
and return to a friendly base,

(5) Can land and take off from short, unprepared airstrips.

(6) Can, under certain circumstances, land and take off from
water.

(7) Possess the capability of parachute delivery of personnel and

equipment from high altitudes.

d. Specific Considerations.
(1) Drop zone (DZ) selection. DZ requirements for clandestine
parachute entry differ from those for normal airborne operations.
Security of the entry operation and survival of those infiltrated are
the overriding considerations. Obviously, ideal DZ's may be under
either continuous or periodic surveillance by security forces or by
technical means. Therefore, populated areas and areas occupied or
patrolled by enemy security forces muse be avoided. These
considerations, in combination with the topography of the remaining
area, may dictate the use of small, rough-terrain DZ's or deliberate
tree landings in densely forested or jungle areas. Use of such DZ's
may require special equipment and training in specialized techniques.
(2) Drop, zone identification and authentication procedures.
Although proper identification and authentication of the primary DZ
selected for the initial infiltration is the joint responsibility of
the aircraft commander and the Special Forces element commander,
other factors must be discussed:

4-4
 (a) For the initial infiltration, the decision to proceed with
or abort the drop if improper markings or authentication signals are
displayed is the responsibility of the joint commanders for the
overall mission and is normally contained in the operation order.
There are two courses of action that may be employed:

1. A complete abort of the mission and return to the

operational base.

2. Abort the primary DZ and proceed to the preselected,

alternate DZ.

(b) Whatever the decision, it must be known to the aircraft

commander and the Special Forces commander. Each of the aircrew and
operational members will also be notified of the impending changes.

(3) Jump procedures.

(a) Whenever a visual ground signal is not available, the

aircrew determines the point of exit of personnel from the aircraft.
The drop will be made on a computed air release point (CARP) or on a
visible preselected release point.
(b) When the ground release point marking system is used for
personnel drops, the following procedure is used:

1. Upon spotting the designated drop zone markings, the

pilot will align his aircraft to pass over the release point at the
proper altitude and track.

2. Once the above has been accomplished and the pilot

considers conditions safe for the drop, he will turn on the "green
light" to notify the jumpmaster.
3. The jumpmaster will give the command for exit of bundles
and/or personnel over the release point.

e. Blind-Drop Infiltration.

(1) Blind-drop infiltrations into preselected DZ's are conducted

where reception committees are not available or the ground situation
precludes prior occupation.

(2) Once the DZ is selected in the operational area, the Air

Force has responsibility for flight planning, initial point (IP)'
selection, and crew procedures throughout the flight. Normally, the
drop will be made .on a CARP or a visible, preselected release point.
If free-fall techniques are employed and the ground is not visible,
the high-altitude, free-fall release system is used.

4-5
 f. Free-Fall Operations. Parachute entry from high altitudes may
be necessary in certain situations. Whenever a free-fall operation is
planned in hostile areas protected by enemy radar and other detection
devices, a system of jamming or disruption of these devices must be
established. In addition, the availability of aircraft and capability
of aircrews trained to work in depressurized aircraft at extremely
high altitudes must be considered. Once free-fall parachutists have
exited the aircraft, they maintain a stable free-fall position in the
air, falling to a designated altitude before opening their
parachutes. Parachutists then manipulate their parachutes to assemble
in the air and to insure landing close to each other on the ground.
Operational free-fall parachute techniques are contained in FM 31-19,
Special Forces Military Free-Fall Parachuting.
g. Equipment/Supplies/Reception Committee.

(1) The detachment must have in its possession the equipment with
which to accomplish initial tasks. These items normally consist of
radios, individual arms, and operational TOE equipment (medical kits,
photographic equipment, binoculars, compasses, etc.).

(2) The presence of a reception committee on the DZ influences

the amount of accompanying equipment and supplies as well as the
initial actions of the Special Forces element. When a reception
committee is available, sterilization of the DZ and disposal of
parachute equipment is a lesser problem than when a "blind-drop"
infiltration is conducted. When serviced by a reception committee,
additional equipment and supplies, beyond immediate requirements, may
be dropped with the element.
(3) The equipment and supplies to accompany the element may be
dropped using one of the following techniques:

(a) Air delivery containers. All element equipment and

supplies are rigged in air-delivery containers. They may be dropped
as door bundles or by some mechanical means. This technique permits
the individual parachutist to jump unencumbered by excess equipment;
however, it may result in the loss of equipment if containers are not
recovered. This technique should be used only when an adequate
reception committee is assured, or in low-level drops (500-700 ft)
where dispersion is less of a problem, and there is little time to
release a rucksack in the air. Detailed information on container
sizes is listed in TM 55-450-15 and TM 10-500.
(b) Individual loads. Essential items such as radios are
jumped on element members while less important items may be rigged in
air-delivery containers as outlined above. All element equipment and
supplies, however, may be jumped as individual loads. This restricts
the amount that can be dropped but reduces the loss of items through
failure, to recover containers. This method is best suited for
"blind-drop" infiltration or when a reception committee is not

4-6
available. The present method of dropping individual loads consists
of packing all items in a rucksack; the jumper suspends the rucksack
a safe distance below himself and then releases it before he lands.

h. Control and Assembly Procedures.

(1) Control procedures. The Special Forces element commander

places himself in the optimum position in the stick to control his
element. Special signals and emergency procedures are set for each
situation that may arise. These include emergency abort procedures,
ground assembly procedures, and contact procedures with the
resistance force. Rehearsals are conducted to insure that signals are
clearly understood and properly employed. Prior to departure,
electronic equipment used by the element in assembly is carefully
checked to insure proper functioning.

(2) Assembly procedures. Each member of the element is thoroughly

briefed on assembly procedures. This includes:

(a) Location of an assembly (contact) point.

(b) Actions of the individual when approached by guerrillas

(i.e., exchange of recognition signals).

(c) Location of primary and alternate assembly points if

contact is not made with the reception committee. The primary
assembly point should be referenced to an easily recognized terrain
feature located 200 to 300 yards off the DZ, and should provide
sufficient concealment. The alternate assembly point should also be
near an easily recognized terrain feature and provide sufficient
concealment, but it should be located 3 to 5 miles from the DZ.
(d) Disposal of individual parachute equipment and the
techniques of erasing signs of the drop.

i. Emergency Procedures. In-flight abort plans are developed

before infiltration.
(1) Simple ground assembly plans and rally points along the
flight route are selected. The Special Forces element receives a
preflight briefing on the route to be flown and during flight is
informed periodically on progress.

(2) A plan is also prepared for enemy contact on the DZ.

j. Final Ground Procedures. Once on the ground, personnel move to

and secure the selected assembly area. They then attempt to make
contact with the local resistance, or they continue with the assigned
mission if it is of a unilateral nature. From his assessment of the
area, the element commander recommends the organization of the area
and commitment of additional Special Forces units.

4-7
4-5. WATER INFILTRATION

a. Advantages.
(1) Long-range delivery capability.

(2) Relatively unaffected by weather up to the point of

debarkation.

(3) Operational briefings and rehearsals can be continued en

route.

(4) Large quantities of supplies can be transported with surface

craft.

b. Disadvantages.
(1) Time-consuming unloading and transshipment from offshore
drop-off points.

(2) Vulnerability to enemy shore defenses during landing

operations.
(3) Possible loss of personnel and supplies during ship-to-shore
movement.

(4) Limited cargo capacity of submarines.

(5) Special training is necessary.

(6) Additional packaging is required to waterproof equipment.

(7) High winds which affect surf conditions.

c. General. Water infiltration either by undersea craft or surface

craft may frequently be employed in UWOA's having exposed coastlines,
coastal river junctions, and harbors. Water infiltration using
seaplane landings on large bodies of water, rivers, or coastal waters
may be possible; in such eases, the element commander considers the
ship-to-shore movement and subsequent land-movement characteristics o
f a normal water infiltration operation.

d. Considerations for Water Infiltration.

(1) Craft limitations. The characteristics and limitations of the

landing craft largely determine the landing techniques. Another
consideration, however, is the capability of the naval support craft
to carry and off-load the landing craft to be used for the ship-to-
shore movement phase of the operation.

4-8
 (2) Equipment/supplies/reception committee. Adequate water-
proofing should be provided to protect supplies and equipment from
the effects of salt water. As in air operations, the presence of a
reception committee influences the element's action before and after
the landing, and the amount of equipment and supplies it transports.
When fleet-type submarines are used, all items are packaged in a size
and configuration that will allow them, to pass through the narrow
access openings into the pressure hull. Size, configuration, and
packaging must be coordinated with the ship's personnel prior to
embarking.
(3) Ship-to-shore movement. Assignment of boat teams,
distribution of equipment and supplies, methods of debarkation, and
means of navigation to the landing beach are carefully planned. In
addition, consideration is given to methods of recognizing the
reception committee and disposing of the landing craft.

(4) Rehearsals. As in air operations complete rehearsals must be

conducted frequently. In water infiltration operations the major
advantage lies in the fact that continuous rehearsals and debarking
procedures can be conducted en route to the operational area.

4-6. LAND INFILTRATION

a. Advantages.
(1) Minimum logistical support.

(2) Concurrent area familiarization and intelligence

collection.

(3) Flexibility of movement and timing.

(4) Minimum interservice coordination.

b. Disadvantages.

(1) Time consuming.

(2) Increased vulnerability to enemy detection and

interdiction.

(3) Limited capability for carrying supplies and equipment.

c. General. Land infiltration is conducted similar to that of a

long-range patrol into enemy territory. Generally, guides are
required. If guides are not available, the detachment must have
detailed intelligence of the route, particularly if borders are to be
crossed. Routes are selected to take maximum advantage .of cover and
concealment and to avoid enemy outposts, patrols, and installations.
The location and means of contacting selected individuals who will
furnish assistance are provided to the detachment. The individuals
4-9
may be used as local guides and as sources of information, food, and
shelter. Equipment and supplies to be carried will necessarily be
restricted to individual arms and equipment and communication
equipment.

Section II. EXFILTRATION

4-7. GENERAL
Exfiltration is the extraction or evacuation of personnel, documents,
or equipment from an operational area.

4-8. METHODS

a. General. The planning considerations, preparations, tactics,

and techniques for exfiltration are basically the same as those used
for infiltration; however, here we are concerned with the recovery
methods. Since Special Forces operations are normally conducted deep
in enemy or hostile areas, the distance involved will generally
preclude an all-land exfiltration. The initial phase of the
exfiltration will normally be by land, terminating in an air or water
recovery. Aircraft, surface craft, and submarines, or various
combinations of these three methods can be used for the recovery of:

(1) Seriously ill or wounded Special Forces personnel.

(2) Operational elements following mission completion.

(3) Operational elements under direct enemy pressure.

(4) Selected personnel, documents, or equipment, as directed by
the SFOB.

(5) Military personnel and other selected individuals who become

isolated in hostile areas or who escape from captivity.
b. By Air and Water.

(1) Recovery areas.

(a) The area selected for recovery should be easily identified

to both the Special Forces element and the recovering unit. It should
permit the secure exchange of recognition signals. The recovery area
should meet these additional criteria:

1. Allow the undetected approach and departure of the

recovery vehicle.

2. Allow the secure use of beacons when required.

4-10
 3. Allow the maneuver or landing of the recovery vehicle.

4. Allow for errors in predicted drift of swimmer or boat

teams.

(b) Alternate recovery areas are selected to provide for the

possibility of enemy activity in the primary area. They are selected
in the same manner as the primary recovery area and usually lie along
the same route to be used by the recovery vehicle.

(2) Recovery methods. The recovery method selected should permit

a simple and rapid recovery with the least probability of detection.
Recovery may be made by:
(a) Embarking directly aboard a surface ship or submarine.

(b) Aircraft landing in operational area.

(c) Aircraft equipped with Fulton Surface-To-Air Recovery

(STAR) system.
(d) Water landings by fixed-wing amphibious aircraft or
properly prepared helicopters.

(e) Helicopters, equipped with winches, rope ladders, or the

STABO extraction system. (The STABO system requires special personnel
harnesses which may be carried into the operational area on initial
infiltration, delivered during resupply, or dropped at the recovery
site.)
(3) Recovery times.

(a) The exact recovery time selected must be late enough to

permit the element to move to the recovery area under cover of
darkness, but early enough to allow the recovery prior to dawn.
Precise execution and good tinning will insure minimum time on
station.

(b) Alternate recovery times to provide for changes in weather

or surf conditions are selected in the same manner as primary tunes,
and usually occur at approximately 24-hour intervals.

c. By Land. Special Forces may exfiltrate over predetermined land

routes all the way to friendly control. This is the least desirable
method and would be used only in exceptional circumstances. Here,
major emphasis is placed on employing evasive tactics and techniques
and patrol procedures when passing through enemy lines. Land
exfiltration is favored when:

4-11
 (1) The distance to friendly lines is relatively short.

(2) The terrain provides cover and concealment for movement on

foot and limits the employment of enemy mobile units against the
exfiltrating force.

(3) The exfiltrating force is lightly equipped and is not

encumbered by captured personnel or material.
(4) The exfiltrating force moves through an area occupied by
friendly civilians who can assist the withdrawal.

(5) Areas along exfiltration routes are uninhabited.

(6) The enemy force:

(a) Is widely dispersed or is under such pressure that it is
difficult for it to concentrate against the exfiltrating force.

(b) Has a capability that makes air or water recovery

prohibitive.
Section III. INFILTRATION CHECKLIST

4-9. GENERAL

The checklist (para 4-10 - 4-13) is provided as a guide to assist in

operational planning. Although this checklist does not cover complete
details of all missions that may be assigned to Special Forces, it
does give a broad coverage in problem areas that may be overlooked.

4-10. AIR INFILTRATION

a. Planning at the Special Forces Operational Base (SFOB).

(1) Selection of primary and alternate DZ's.

(2) Assembly plans (to include actions in the event of :injury on

DZ).
(3) Assembly areas (primary and alternate).

(4) Primary contact plan.

(5) Alternate contact plan.

(6) Pertinent information concerning time of loading, time of

drop, stick assignments, equipment assignments, and designation of
jumpmaster and alternate.

4-12
 (7) Communication procedures (en route and after drop).

(8) In-flight abort plan:

(a) Line of flight.

(b) Check points en route.

(c) Safe areas.

(d) Contingency plans.

1. Element evasion plan.

2. No contact with resistance forces.

3. No contact with SFOB.

4. Enemy contact on DZ.

(9) Land movement to secure area plan.

(10) Initial entry report (IER).

(11) DZ sterilization plan.

b. Actions Prior to Drop.

(1) Departure from isolation area to marshalling area at
scheduled tine.

(2) Final briefing of element.

(3) Jumpmaster inspection of aircraft.

(4) Final briefing of pilot.

(5) Inspection of personnel.

(6) Inspection of equipment.

(7) Meeting station time.

(8) Orientation during flight.

(9) Jump commands.

(10) Final check with pilot for proper DZ recognition signals.

(11) Execute drop.

4-13
 c. Action on DZ.

(1) Noise discipline.

(2) Light discipline.

(3) Rapid assembly.

(4) Assembly plan followed:

(a) Equipment accounted for.

(b) Personnel accounted for.

(5) Actions in the event of injury.

(6) Time on DZ.

(7) Action if there is no reception party.

(8) Action in case of enemy contact.

(9) Sterilize the DZ.

4-11. SEA INFILTRATION

a. Planning at the SFOB.

(1) Selection of landing site.

(2) Selection of alternate landing site.

(3) Selection of landing craft.

(4) Landing site reconnaissance (reports, maps, aerial photos).

(5) Authentication signal.

(6) Contact plan.

(7) Alternate contact plan.

(8) Contingency plans.

(a) No contact with resistance forces.

(b) No contact with SFOB.

(c) Enemy contact on landing site.

(9) Communications (en route and after landing).

4-14
 (10) Initial entry report (IER).

(11) Pertinent information concerning time of loading, departure,

and debarking.

(12) Training (loading, unloading, stowing equipment).

(13) Type of launching (wet or dry).

(14) Rehearsals.
(15) Equipment preparation.

(16) Equipment waterproofing.

(17) Equipment identification marking.

(18) Embarkation procedures.

(19) Debarkation procedures.

(20) Sea movement plan to designated operational area.

(21) Navigational checks.

(22) Information concerning antiswimmer detection or other

security measures.

(23) Information concerning hydrographic data.

(24) Landing procedures.

(25) Disposal of landing craft.

(26) Land movement to secure area.

b. Actions Prior to Embarking.

(1) Movement from isolation area to embarking site on time.

(2) Briefing of element.

(3) Inspection of watercraft.

(4) Final briefing with watercraft commander.

(5) Inspection of personnel.

(6) Ship assignments (to include bunks, messing, restricted area,
naval customs).

4-15
 (7) Assignment of boat landing teams.

(8) Distribution of equipment and supplies.

(9) Inspection of equipment.

(10) Meeting embarkation time.

c. Actions En Route to Operational Area.

(1) Orientation during movement.

(2) Continuous rehearsals on debarking procedures.

(3) Continuous rehearsals on landing procedures, contact plans,

assembly procedures, and actions in the event of no reception
committee.
(4) Maintain physical training program.

(5) Keep element informed on latest changes and up--to-date

intelligence.

d. Action During Ship-to-Shore Movement.

(1) Noise discipline.

(2) Light discipline.

(3) Debarking rapidly and efficiently.

(4) Debarkation plan followed.

(5) Equipment and personnel accounted for.

(6) Launching.

(7) Paddling (crew procedures and steering).

(8) Maintaining course.

(9) Dispatching of swimmer reconnaissance teams outside of surf.

(10) Signal "all clear" by reconnaissance party.

(11) Landing procedures.

e. Action at Landing Site.

(1) Noise discipline.

4-16
 (2) Light discipline.

(3) Unloading rapidly and efficiently.

(4) Landing plan followed:

(a) Equipment accounted for.

(b) Personnel accounted for.

(c) Actions in the event of injury sustained during landing.

(5) Disposal of landing craft.

(6) Time on landing site.

(7) Action if there is no reception committee.

(8) Action in case of enemy contact.

4-12. LAND INFILTRATION

a. Planning at the SFOB.

(1) Selection of point-of-departure.

(2) Alternate point-of-departure.

(3) Coordination:

(a) Movement in friendly area.

(b) Departure from friendly area.

(c) Fire support.

(d) Guides.

(4) Route selection.

(5) Reconnaissance.
(6) Equipment preparation.

(7) Movement to departure point.

(8) Movement through departure point.

(9) Medical coverage.

4-17
 (10) Location of assets and identities.

(11) Asset contact procedures.

(12) Communications (in friendly area; after departure from
friendly lines).

(13) Caches en route.

(14) Guides en route.

(15) Safe areas en route.

(16) Control measures.

(17) Contact areas (primary and alternates).

(18) Contact procedures.

b. Action Prior to Departure.

(1) Movement from isolation to departure point on time.

(2) Final briefing of element.

(3) Reconnaissance of departure point.

(4) Inspection of personnel and equipment.

(5) Coordination with friendly unit.

(6) Challenges and password.

(7) Guides.

(8) Meeting departure time.

(9) Formation for departure.

c. Action After Departure.

(1) Departure from friendly area.

(2) Actions at rallying points.

(3) Noise discipline.

(4) Light discipline.

(5) Actions on enemy contact.

4-18
 (6) Actions at danger areas.

(7) Navigation.
(8) Control during movement.

(9) Security during movement.

(10) Security during halts.

(11) Communications en route.

(12) Surveillance of contact areas.

(13) Action at contact points.

4-13. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL METHODS OF INFILTRATION

a. Contact Plan.
(1) Contact made by minimum or selected personnel. (Air
infiltration--all personnel must be prepared to initiate contact if
man-to-man coverage is available on DZ.)

(2) Proper security procedures.

(3) Signals (i.e., verbal signals, light signal, visual signal)
correct.

(4) Noise discipline during contact.

(5) Minimum time used.

(6) Actions if contact area, signal, or person is suspected of

being compromised.

(7) Alternate plan.

b. Infiltration and Contact Site.

(1) Sterilization plan put into effect.

(2) Insure security of site is adequate and in effect.

(3) Execute continuous surveillance of infiltration or contact

site for a significant period of time.

(4) Execute deception plans if required.

c. Movement to Safe Area.

4-19
 (1) Noise discipline.

(2) Light discipline.

(3) March security.

(4) Selection of rallying points.

(5) Element's reaction to resistance leader's orders.

(6) Resistance force reaction to element's presence and initial

requirements and actions.

(7) Element commander's observation and checks used during

movement.

(8) Element commander attempts to keep element oriented, during

route movement, as to location and immediate actions to be taken in
the event of enemy interference.

(9) Location and rotation of heavy equipment in column.

(10) Rapid movement.

(11) Security during halts.

(12) Plans for recontact with resistance force in event of

separation.
(13) Medical check of physical condition during march.

(14) Initial assessment begins.

(15) Establish initial communications with SFOB and render

initial entry report (IER).

4-20
 CHAPTER 5

ORGANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT (BUILDUP) OF THE

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREA

Section I. PLANNING THE INITIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREA

5-1. GENERAL
The organization of a UWOA involves initial area organization and
buildup of the resistance force. Initial organization includes
establishing the required command and administrative structure,
taking necessary security precautions, and training a nucleus of
guerrilla personnel. Buildup is the expansion of the original nucleus
into an operational unit capable of accomplishing the assigned
mission. No matter what degree of organization is encountered, in
order to organize support functions and systems for the guerrilla
force, the basic organizational objectives discussed in this section
must exist or must be organized and implemented immediately.

5-2. SELECTION OF OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS

Once the UWOA has been designated, any Special Forces element may be
selected for initial infiltration. Some factors influencing type and
size selected are:

a. Character of the Resistance Movement Within the Area. The size

and composition of the resistance movement may not be known, or it
may be known to be extremely small and unorganized but with a
potential for expansion under proper guidance and with logistical
support. In either event, the immediate infiltration of an
operational element to begin the initial organization and development
of the resistance movement may be necessary. On the other hand, the
resistance movement may be highly organized and, except for
logistical support and coordination of -resistance force activities,
will require little additional assistance from Special Forces units.
Situations may develop whereby a known leader of the resistance
movement is of such importance or caliber that a senior Special
Forces officer and a staff will be required to effect the necessary
coordination and future development of the force. At this time, an
appropriate command and control element may be chosen for
infiltration.
b. Environment and Tactical Situations. The terrain, the enemy
situation, complex political problems, or the ethnic groupings with
the resistance movement ray require that two or more elements be
infiltrated simultaneously. If the UWOA is relatively large and
compartmented for security, it may be preferable to have several
elements in the area initially to form two independent sector
commands and to organize, develop, train, equip, direct, and
5-1
coordinate the efforts of scattered resistance forces. Regardless of
the number of detachments initially infiltrated into a specified
area, infiltration of additional operational elements may be
necessary because of increased operations, expanding of existing
guerrilla elements, or for political reasons.

Figure 5-1
Two independent sector commands.

c. Subdivided "A" Detachment. The operational detachment "A" may

be subdivided into two similar teams which retain a mixture of the
basic skills.
(1) Subdivision would be appropriate:

(a) Where the size and state of training of a guerrilla force

make it desirable to split the force and subdivide the operational
area into two sectors.
(b) When enemy pressure forces dispersal of the guerrilla
force by subunit for separate movement to areas of temporary refuge.

(c) To exploit an unforeseen resistance potential in an

adjacent area.

5-2
 (2) Initial deployment as a subdivided element would also be
appropriate to:

(a) Compartment a sensitive operation for security reasons.

(b) Situations which require Special Forces presence to

provide liaison and communications only.

(c) Supervise reception and distribution of logistical

support.

d. Assessment Teams. Under certain circumstances initial

infiltration may be made by a small, carefully selected "Pilot Team"
composed of individuals possessing specialized skills. The mission of
this team is to assess designated areas to determine the feasibility
of developing the resistance potential and to establish contact with
indigenous leaders. Once a determination has been made by the theater
command or JUWTF as to the feasibility of developing the area,
additional Special Forces elements may be infiltrated. The assessment
team may remain with the operational elements or be exfiltrated as
directed.

e. Tailoring. When the requirement exists to conduct special

operations using Special Forces personnel only to accommodate a
particular task or mission or to meet an unusual requirement in an
area, a provisional or composite operational element may be formed
from the Special Forces group resources. Because forming this type
unit would probably deplete several organic operational detachments,
planners or commanders should consider this solution only after
carefully weighing all alternatives.

f. Unilateral Missions. Only the number of Special Forces

personnel required to perform the unilateral mission are used. This
number will vary depending on the type and duration of the mission.
In some instances, this element may be infiltrated into UWOA's
already containing Special Forces elements; however, upon successful
completion of the mission, operational control and final disposition
of the element rests with the SFOB.
5-3. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND SUPPORT

a. General. For planning purposes, a Special Forces operational

element has the capability to organize, equip, train, and direct the
operations of a battalion-size force. However, the size of the
resistance force, which Special Forces may organize and employ, will
vary. It may be affected by the size and differences in ethnic
groups, by the political factions, and by the general educational
level and previous military experience of resistance personnel. Of
significant importance are the capability and motivation of
resistance leaders and how much guidance they will accept. Command
and control measures to be employed in operational areas will differ
5-3
from those normally employed when working with conventional forces.
Special Forces elements usually establish a communications system to
insure adequate command, control, and support for operations that are
widespread, varied, and, in most instances, sporadic.

b. Possible UWOA-SFOB Communications. Once committed into the

UWOA, operational elements may have _the use of one channel of
communication for both operational control and logistical support or,
if deemed advisable and in accordance with SOP's, have two channels
of communications--one for logistical support and one for operational
command and control. Communications between the Special Forces
element and the SFOB can be organized in any one of several ways.

(1) Operational elements committed individually are directly

responsible to the SFOB for all operations; however, the element
contacts the logistical support element directly to request necessary
supplies and materials.

(2) All Special Forces operational elements communicate directly

with the SFOB and have no established lateral link with each other.
The SFOB relays required information between operational elements.

(3) In a well-established area containing several operational

elements, a command and control headquarters may be formed using
Special Forces group resources. In this case, subordinate elements
normally communicate directly with the command and control
headquarters on all matters, but they may communicate directly with
the SFOB on administrative or supply matters. Emergency
communications, however, may be conducted between all operational
elements and the SFOB at any time.

c. Area Command, Control, and Support.

(1) Normally, a guerrilla force will communicate with its

respective area command and not directly with the SFOB.

(2) Dispersion to reduce the vulnerability of resistance elements

to enemy countermeasures may preclude continuous, direct control of
subordinates in an area command. Command direction may be
accomplished by periodic meetings or by messenger. Accordingly,
specific guidance to subordinate units is contained in operation
orders to cover extended periods of time.

(3) Maximum use is made of SOP's which include long-term guidance

on such matters as psychological operations, security, intelligence,
guerrilla/civilian relations, targets, logistical support, evasion
and escape, and emergency procedures.

5-4
5-4. THE AREA COMMAND

a. General. As discussed in chapter 4, the area command normally

is a combined organization designed to integrate the Special Forces
element and the resistance organization in a UWOA. Details of
organization vary according to the situation, mission, size of the
resistance organization, and the relationship between the resistance
force and the Special Forces elements.

b. Composition. The area command usually is composed of two basic

subdivisions:

(1) Command group. The command group may consist: of the Special
Forces element/ selected members, the resistance leader and his staff
and, as appropriate, representatives from the auxiliary, underground,
and guerrilla force in the area. Either a formal staff is organized
or the command group meets periodically or "on call." The purpose of
the command group is to provide centralized control and coordination
of all resistance activities in the UWOA.

(2) Resistance forces. The resistance force may include three

components: the guerrilla force, the auxiliary, and the underground.

5-5. SPECIAL FORCES OBJECTIVES IN THE UWOA

a. General. A well organized UWOA insures close coordination

between operational elements and resistance elements. After
infiltration, the major task facing operational elements is to
develop all resistance elements into an effective operational force
to achieve the unified commander's guerrilla warfare objectives.
There are several tasks that may be completed separately or
concurrently as the organization and development of the area
progresses.

b. Special Forces-Resistance Force Relations.

(1) The Special Forces element commander must impress on the

resistance leaders that all personnel involved have a common goal
against a common enemy and that it is to their mutual benefit, for
the guerrillas to accept sponsorship and operational guidance from
the United States.

(2) Once the guerrillas have been convinced of the advantages of

close cooperation, the Special Forces commander in conjunction with
the resistance leader develops a command structure. This structure,
called the area command, integrates the Special Forces and the
resistance organizations.

5-5
 (3) In some situations, the nucleus ;of resistance elements may
be recruited from exiled or liberated personnel currently located in
friendly territory. These personnel may be infiltrated using normal
infiltration techniques discussed in chapter 4.

5-6. CONSIDERATIONS IN ESTABLISHING RELATIONS

a. Although the military advantages of close cooperation among

various elements of the resistance force are obvious, political
considerations may encourage guerrilla units to resist Special Forces
efforts to unify them. Opposition may stem from many causes (e.g.,
personal antagonisms, religious beliefs, or ethnic differences). The
Special Forces commander and his subordinates must have a knowledge
and appreciation of these attitudes and of the personalities
concerned. They must know the extent of the initial psychological
preparation, including any promises made and commitments to be
honored. Without specific guidance from authorized US officials,
political commitments in the name of the US Government cannot be
made. Guidance in political matters will normally emanate from the
unified commander through the SFOB. At some point prior .to linkup
with conventional US forces, political responsibilities may be
assumed by Army Civil Affairs (CA), and at that time a Civil Affairs
liaison officer may be assigned to Special Forces within the UWOA.
b. Perhaps the most delicate part of a Special Forces commander's
responsibility is insuring that competent indigenous personnel occupy
key positions. If leaders and staff members of the resistance
organization do not appear qualified to fill positions held, the
Special Forces commander should endeavor to increase their
effectiveness. Increasing the effectiveness of these personnel will
normally increase the influence of the Special Forces commander. If
this effort fails and tie future effectiveness of the resistance
force is in doubt, he should discreetly attempt to influence the
selection of new leaders. It is mandatory that the Special Forces
commanders exercise extreme caution in this potentially explosive
area, lest he jeopardize his mission or even the survival of his
element.

c. Special Forces should have a working knowledge of the local

language. When an interpreter is needed, he must be carefully
selected and cautiously used. The interpreter is in a very sensitive
and powerful position as he is the only one who knows what both
parties are saying.. Also, considerable difficulty may be experienced
in gaining the confidence of the guerrillas who may either dislike or
distrust the interpreter. Special Forces personnel must know and
respect local traditions, customs, and courtesies. They must abide by
the resistance code and, in so doing, encourage the guerrillas to
display loyalty to their own nation's future.
d. To facilitate the control and influence of resistance elements,
all Special Forces members must display a high degree of professional
competence.
5-6
5-7. GENERAL AREA ORGANIZATION

a. General. An initial requirement is the establishment of a good

working relationship between Special Forces and the resistance
elements. This relationship helps to develop a high degree of
cooperation and some degree of control over the resistance force.
Control over the resistance force is achieved when resistance leaders
are receptive to orders and requirements necessary to accomplish
mission requirements.

b. Major Considerations. The command structure and the physical

organization of the area are priority tasks of the Special Forces
commander. Whether the organization of the area is well established,
incomplete, or lacking, some improvement in physical area
organization will probably be necessary. Organization of the UWOA is
dictated by a number of requirements and depends more on local
conditions than on any fixed set of rules. Factors for consideration
include:

(1) Area command organization.

(2) Guerrilla force organization.

(3) Cooperation of local population.

(4) Tactical situation.

(5) Geography.
(6) Future missions.

c. Internal Area Organization. The ultimate shape, size, and

organization of an operational area follow no definite pattern.
Administrative divisions, terrain, enemy activities, targets,
population patterns, and attitudes clearly influence internal
organization of the area.

(1) The area complex.

(a) An area complex consists of guerrilla operational base(s),

safe areas, and various supporting elements and facilities. Normally
included in the area complex are security and intelligence systems,
communication systems, mission support sites (MSS), supply
installations, training areas, DZ's, LZ's (landing zones), reception
sites, and evasion and escape (E&E) mechanisms as required.

(b) The complex is not a continuous pattern of tangible

installations but a series of intangible lines of communications
emanating from the guerrilla bases) connecting all other resistance
elements. The main guerrilla force base is the hub of a spider-like
complex which is never static, but constantly changing. The command
group is normally located in the guerrilla base.

5-7
 (2) The guerrilla base.

(a) A guerrilla base is a temporary site wherein command and

control headquarters, installations, facilities, and operational
units are located. There is usually more than one guerrilla base in
the sector/area.

(b) From one base, lines of communication connect; other bases

and various elements of the area complex. Installations and
facilities normally found at a guerrilla base are command posts,
training areas, supply caches, and communications and medical
facilities. Both occupants and facilities must be capable of rapid
displacement with little or no warning.

(3) Locations. Remote inaccessible areas are ideal for the

location of guerrillas; however, the lack of remote areas does not
prevent the organization and development of operational base areas.
All approaches to base areas and facilities should be well guarded
and concealed. The approaches to selected base facilities such as
communication centers, caches, and certain supply depots are revealed
only an a need-to-know basis. Alternate base areas must always be
established to give mobility and flexibility to guerrilla forces and
to provide them safe areas. These sanctuaries offer relief from enemy
pressure and offensive operations. Alternate bases must have the same
characteristics and requirements as a primary base.

Figure 5-2
Guerrilla base.

5-8
 Section II. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE UWOA

5-8. GENERAL
a. Under close supervision and guidance in the early phases of
development and based on tentative organizational plans, limited
recruiting and training of personnel previously spotted and selected
by resistance leaders may be conducted. Based on the Special Forces
element's mission and the extent of training of the existing
resistance force, small-scale operations may be continued and
intensified. Most of the guerrilla actions undertaken should be
widely dispersed and of the simple harassment type (i.e., cutting of
telephone wires, putting tire puncturing devices on roads and
highways, contaminating gasoline and oil in vehicles and exposed
storage facilities, and attacking small, remote outposts and
facilities of the enemy). Of paramount importance is the fact that
the enemy is in full control: no activity should be undertaken that
will bring the enemy down in force on the guerrilla organization,
possibly wiping out or destroying its effectiveness.
b. A large part of the activity of this period may be directed
toward creating a political and psychological climate that will
induce resisters, or potential resisters, to risk their lives for the
"common cause." Under a strong leadership exerted by the area
command, these resistance groups will ultimately grow larger, become
better equipped, and become better trained. "Natural leaders," such
as former military personnel, clergymen, local officeholders, and
neighborhood spokesmen, will usually emerge. These provide the area
command with a potential resource on which to plan the growth and
expansion of the resistance force and the operational area.

c. Regardless of the degree of organization of the resistance

force, primary consideration should be given to insuring that certain
basic functions and operations exist. These are established
concurrently and developed as required. These functions include:

(1) Unit organization.

(2) Security and intelligence systems.

(3) Communication systems.

(4) Administrative systems.

(5) Logistical support systems.

(6) Training programs and facilities.

(7) Planning and execution of combat operations.

(8) Expanding the resistance force.

5-9
5-9. UNIT ORGANIZATION

a. General. The most important point to be made about guerrilla

organizations is that they cannot be categorically described.
Guerrilla force missions and tactics are primary organization
considerations. These are strongly influenced in turn by available
manpower and material assets. Direction and control are made easier
when units are organized along military lines. At the same time, a
too-rigid adherence to military form reduces the flexibility which
guerrilla organizations must have. Generally there are two approaches
to this problem of organization:
(1) From the beginning, the effort is coordinated by a high
command and by regional or district commands as dictated by
geographic and other factors.

(2) The effort begins with the independent, uncoordinated

activities of relatively small guerrilla units. As these ,separate
activities grow in size and scope, district and higher commands
necessarily develop.
b. Principles of Organizations.

(1) Command and control. Simplicity and flexibility are

essential. Leaders must delegate authority to capable and loyal
subordinates. Each person, from the highest to the lowest member, of
the unit, must know to whom he is responsible and who is responsible
to him. No person should be responsible to more than one superior. No
superior officer should have more subordinate units than he can
effectively direct.
(2) Basic organization. The basic structure of the unit must
correspond to the conditions of the terrain, the climate, and the
area command's objectives. When organizing guerrilla units, consider
the following:
(a) Self-containment is essential in a guerrilla unit. Each
unit must have its own communication system, must be able to obtain
its own local supplies, must conduct its own reconnaissance, and must
establish a means of procuring additional information and
intelligence as operations require.

(b) Strong firepower and offensive armament capable of

inflicting great losses within a short period of time are imperative
(speed, effectiveness, destruction).

(c) Heavy weapon units should be easily divided to provide

support for subordinate elements.

(d) Smaller units should be able to act independently.

5-10
 (e) The merging of small units into the larger organization
should be done without causing disharmony.
(f) Knowledge of the location and activities of other units
must be limited to the persons responsible for internal liaison.

c. Size of Units. During early development, unit size may be fewer

than 75 men, perhaps as few as 15 to 20. In the latter stages, units
will rarely exceed battalion size with personnel numbering from 200
to 500. The following factors influence unit size:

(1) Area. The size and physical aspects of the area of operations
and the availability of suitable bases will limit the number of
guerrillas that can be employed successfully and will restrict the
types of operations.

(2) Missions. A guerrilla unit should include no more men than

needed to accomplish its overall mission. No more than two primary
missions should be given to a small unit at any one time.

(3) Political considerations. Although the leader is the focal

point of the resistance effort, the mission objectives of the unified
command and the Special Forces element are foremost. Political
ambitions should never influence the leader to build up his
organization beyond the point of efficiency just for the sake of
sheer numbers. When this situation occurs, the element commander
through judicious use of supplies may control its expansion. He
should influence the guerrilla leader by making him aware that his
political stature is enhanced more by success in operations than by
the number of followers.
(4) Enemy control. Where population control measures are
stringent and the enemy is strong, security, mobility, and dispersion
strongly favor small units.

(5) Available personnel. The size of guerrilla units depends on

the availability of personnel. Included in the preliminary planning
phase is the spotting of potential volunteers. In determining the
availability of personnel, the area command must consider the ratio
of men to be recruited to the total male population of a town or
village. The wholesale disappearance of the town's able-bodied men
would arouse the enemy's suspicions and provoke reprisals.

(6) Supply and support capability.

(a) Guerrillas should not be assembled in such numbers that
supplying and supporting them becomes a major problem. Sufficient
food and water resources should exist within the base area itself or
should be available from readily accessible sources (i.e., local
auxiliary or support units).

5-11
 (b) The equipment of the guerrillas must be based, at least
initially, on what is available and not on what the guerrilla wants
or needs. The enemy may be the principal source of supply until a
sound external logistical system can be established.

(c) A guerrilla commander who allows his organization to

become burdened with too many personnel to feed, shelter, or equip
will soon have major problems. If his supply and support capability
is exceeded, lie will probably lose control of his personnel. Even if
control is not lost, supply gathering will replace training and
tactics against the enemy.
(7) Social tradition. Strong family or ethnic traditions may make
it difficult to persuade the guerrillas that their wives and children
should be left behind. Traditions may also have a bearing on the
suitability of certain tactics, weapons, and disciplinary principles.
These, in turn, may affect the size of the unit as well as the
planning for future development, operations, and support.

5-10. THE AUXILIARY AND THE UNDERGROUND

a. General.

(1) Resistance membership includes persons whose principal

function is to conduct operations against the enemy and persons who
support the operational elements. Here, we are primarily concerned
with the auxiliary--the internal support element of the resistance
movement. Its organization and operation are clandestine in nature
and its members do not openly indicate their sympathy or involvement
with the resistance movement. The auxiliary's primary mission is to
provide support for the guerrilla force by organizing civilian
supporters of the resistance movement.

(2) Clandestine support functions can be organized on a regional,

district, or sector basis depending on the degree to which guerrilla
units are organized. All functions should be compartmented from each
other as well as from the guerrilla unit or group of units which they
support. Support functions needed by the guerrilla unit to supplement
its own capabilities are:

(a) Air or maritime reception support.

(b) Systems for internal acquisition of supplies.

(c) Systems for the acquisition of operational information and

intelligence.

(d) Medical facilities for "hospitalization," treatment, and

rehabilitation of sick and wounded.

5-12
 (e) Counterintelligence systems to counter enemy penetration
attempts and provide external and internal security.
(f) Systems and procedures for recruitment of personnel.

(g) Compartmented communication systems for various support

functions.

(h) Manufacture/maintenance of equipment.

(i) Transportation systems.

b. Membership.

(1) It is possible for segments of the population to continue

participating in the life of their community, appearing concerned
only with their normal occupations but engaging in resistance
operations. Such personnel are leading double lives, and their
success in guerrilla warfare depends on their ability to keep that
side of their lives secret from their fellow citizens as well as from
the enemy. The "farmer by day, fighter by night," commonly referred
to as a "part-time guerrilla," often is the forerunner to the full-
time guerrilla who later will disappear from the public scene to live
in guerrilla encampments and undertake more extensive operations.

(2) On the other hand, some "part-time guerrillas" may remain in

that status for the duration of hostilities. Functions or tasks are
assigned to groups or individuals according to their capability,
their dependability, and the degree to which they are willing and
able to participate. Those who unwittingly furnish support or are
coerced into doing so are not considered auxiliaries. The normal
daily activities of many auxiliaries can serve as a cover for their
guerrilla support mission.

(3) Functions which require travel or transportation might be

accomplished by such persons as foresters, farmers, fishermen,
truckers, or transportation workers. Other functions, such as
security and warning, require persons with a valid reason for
remaining at a given location; housewives and shopkeepers are
examples. Some members of the community may sympathize strongly with
the resistance but be under such close surveillance by the enemy that
they would be of little value as an auxiliary. Open contact with
former political leaders or technicians employed by the enemy, for
example, might prove more dangerous than profitable.
c. Organization.

(1) Auxiliary forces normally organize to coincide with or

parallel the existing political administrative divisions of the
country. This method of organization insures that each community and
the surrounding countryside are the responsibility of an auxiliary
5-13
unit. It is relatively simple to initiate since auxiliary commands
may be established at each administrative level, for example,
regional, country, district, or local (communities and villages).
This organization varies from country to country depending upon the
existing political structure. Organization of auxiliary units can
commence at any level or at several levels simultaneously and is
either centralized or decentralized.

(2) A command committee at each level controls and coordinates

auxiliary activities within its area of responsibility. In this
respect it resembles the command group and staff of a military unit.
Members of a command committee are assigned specific duties such as
supply, recruiting, transportation, communications, security,
intelligence, and operations. At the lowest level, one individual may
perform two or three of these duties.
(3) A command committee may organize civilian sympathizers into
subordinate elements or employ them individually. When possible,
these subordinate elements are organized functionally into a
compartmented structure. However, because of a shortage of loyal
personnel, it is often necessary for each subordinate auxiliary
element to perform several functions.

d. Method of Operation.
(1) Auxiliary units derive their protection in two principal
ways—a compartmented structure and operating under cover. While enemy
counterguerrilla activities often force the guerrillas to cove
temporarily away from given areas, the auxiliaries survive by
remaining in place and conducting their activities so as to avoid
detection. Individual auxiliary members carry on their normal, day-
to-day routine, while secretly carrying out the many facets of
resistance activities.
(2) Auxiliary units frequently use passive or neutral elements of
the population to provide active support to the common cause. Usually
this is done on a one-time basis because of the security risks
involved in repeated use of such people. The ability of auxiliary
forces to manipulate large segments of the neutral population is
further enhanced by the demonstrated success of friendly forces.

5-14
 The population is your greatest friend. Without their sympathy
and active support you cannot exist for extended periods of
time. As a result, you cannot afford to alienate them by
brutal behavior or lack of discipline.

If you have to requisition something, appeal to the common

goal and patriotism; do not demand it.

Do not forget that the laws of land warfare are valid even
though they do not specifically cover every possible
situation.
For better or worse, you are practically dependent upon the
good will of the population. You also depend upon their steady
"I-do-not-know, I-have-not-heard-nor-seen-anything" replies to
enemy interrogators, even though this attitude might mean
their deportation or death.

Even if the population should act only half-heartedly in your

behalf, you will always find some people willing to help you
as observers, scouts, and messengers.
You must be extremely cautious in your contact with elements
of the civilian resistance movement, even in liberated areas.
You must not expose their "cover" for a temporary advantage
since they will be captured and liquidated by the enemy after
your departure.

Figure 5-3
Keys to good relations and support.

e. The Underground. The underground extends resistance operations

in areas normally denied to guerrilla forces and/or conducts
operations not suitable for guerrillas. The underground is a covert,
compartmented organization whose members make every effort to conceal
their participation. It is largely self-contained and performs most
of its own support functions; however, requirements beyond its
capability may be procured through other resistance channels or from
a sponsoring power. The success of an underground depends on its
careful selection of members and a superior security system.
Section III. ORGANIZATION OF RESISTANCE FORCE SUPPORT SYSTEMS

5-11. GENERAL

Once the area and unit organizations are underway the area command
must establish support functions and systems. These support functions

5-15
and systems include security and warning, logistics, communications,
medical support, recruiting, and, in some instances, providing part-
time guerrillas for diversionary operations.

a. Normally, auxiliary units are assigned direct-support missions

for guerrilla units in their area of responsibility.

b. In specific missions, selected tasks assigned to the auxiliary

force may be coordinated directly with the supported guerrilla
command while others are controlled by the auxiliary's own higher
headquarters.

c. In the assessment of the area, it may be determined that enemy

security measures or attitudes of certain segments of the population
deny portions of operational areas to the guerrilla force or the
auxiliary. Since these areas are usually essential to support enemy
operations, the resistance force attempts to extend its influence
into them. In such cases, the underground may be employed to achieve=
these objectives.

d. When considering using the underground, the area command must

be made to realize that in many respects the underground closely
resembles the auxiliary force. The major differences are:

(1) The underground is tailored to conduct operations in areas

normally denied the auxiliary force and the guerrilla force.
(2) The underground is not dependent on control or influence over
the civilian populace for its success; however, the degree to which
the underground achieves its objectives is a byproduct of other
operations.
5-12. CONSIDERATION IN ESTABLISHING SUPPORT FUNCTIONS AND SYSTEMS

The support missions discussed herein are the principal ones

performed by auxiliary forces to support the area command. Some of
these tasks are coordinated directly with guerrilla units while
others are controlled by their own headquarters. Normally, auxiliary
units are assigned direct support missions for guerrilla units in
their area.
a. Security and Warning. Auxiliary units provide a physical
security and warning system for guerrilla forces. They organize
extensive systems of civilian sympathizers who keep enemy forces
under surveillance and provide early warning of enemy movements.
These civilians are selected because of their advantageous location
which permits them to monitor the enemy.

b. Intelligence. Auxiliary units collect information to support

their own operations and those of the area command. They provide
direct intelligence support .to guerrilla units operating within the
area of responsibility.

5-16
 c. Counterintelligence. The auxiliary assists the area command
counterintelligence effort by maintaining watch over transitory
civilians, by screening recruits for guerrilla units, and by
monitoring refugees and other non-inhabitants of the area. Because of
their intimate knowledge of local people, auxiliaries should be able
to report attempts by enemy agents to infiltrate the area. They can
also name those inhabitants whose loyalty to the resistance might be
suspect.
d. Logistics. The auxiliary supports guerrillas in all phases of
logistical operations. They provide transportation and/or porters for
the movement of supplies and equipment. Auxiliaries often care for
the sick and wounded, provide medical supplies, and arrange for
doctors and other medical personnel. They collect food, clothing, and
other supplies through a controlled system of levy, barter', or
contribution. Sometimes auxiliaries provide essential services such
as repair of clothing, shoes, and certain items of equipment.
Auxiliaries also furnish personnel to assist at reception sites. They
distribute supplies throughout the area. The extent of logistical
support furnished by the auxiliary depends upon the resources of the
area, the degree of influence it exerts on the population, and enemy
activities.
e. Recruiting. Guerrilla units depend upon the local population
for recruits to replace operational losses and to expand their
forces. Auxiliaries spot, screen, and recruit personnel for active
guerrilla units. If recruits are provided from reliable auxiliary
sources, the enemy's chances for placing agents in the guerrilla
force are greatly reduced.
f. Psychological Warfare. A very important mission in which
auxiliary units assist is psychological warfare. The spreading of
rumors, leaflets, and posters is timed with guerrilla tactical
missions to deceive the enemy. Leaflets can mislead the enemy
regarding guerrilla intentions, capabilities, and location. The
spreading of this propaganda is very difficult for the enemy to
control.
g. Civilian Control. To control the population and give the enemy
are impression of guerrilla power, auxiliary units establish a legal
control system to assist in preventing black marketing and
profiteering. Collaborators may be terrorized or punished by the
auxiliaries.
h. Evasion and Escape. Auxiliary units are ideally suited for the
support of evasion and escape mechanisms. Their contact with and
control over segments of the civilian population provide the area
command with a means of assisting evaders.
i. Other Missions. Auxiliary units may be called upon to perform a
number of other guerrilla support missions such as:
(1) Coordinated actions with the guerrillas against other targets
(e.g., cutting of telephone lines between enemy installations and
reserve forces prior to a guerrilla attack).
5-17
 (2) Furnishing guides.

(3) Operation of courier systems.

(4) Conducting active guerrilla type operations on a part-time
basis.

(5) Raising funds.

Section IV. ADMINISTRATION, LAW, AND ORDER

5-13. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

a. When planning and preparing for commitment into operational

areas to support a resistance force in the conduct of unconventional
warfare, the Special Forces commander will, based on preinfiltration
intelligence, make tentative plans for the formalization of
administrative machinery to support this force. The SFOB should,
prior to infiltration and based on contact made by the unified
unconventional warfare command with the government in exile (if one
exists), provide guidance for the establishment of pay scales, rank
structure, and codes and legal systems. This will provide uniformity
in all operational areas throughout a country and will preclude
inflated rank structures, unrealistic pay scales, and "drumhead" or
"kangaroo" courts. Necessary administrative forms to support this
administrative machinery may be drafted and printed during the
isolation phase. Final decisions pertaining to the administrative
organization must be delayed until post infiltration and the details
have been resolved by the resistance leader in concert with the
Special Forces commander. Flocks of personnel serial numbers may be
assigned by the SFOB to the various UWOA's prior to infiltration for
assignment to guerrillas.
b. Administrative systems should be established early in the
stages of development. They should be simple and effective and, as a
minimum, include:
(1) Supply accountability of sensitive items (e.g., weapons,
radios, drugs).

(2) Personnel rosters.

(3) Registers of sick, wounded, and deceased.

(4) Awards and decorations.

(5) A daily journal. (Written operation orders and reports will

be kept to a minimum and issued on a need-to-know basis.)
c. An administrative section is established within the command
group of the area command to maintain essential records. As the area
develops, it may become feasible to decentralize administration to
5-18
subordinate echelons. In such cases duplicate information and records
that can compromise the operation should be forwarded to the
administrative section of the area command for miniaturization and
disposition.

5-14. RECORDS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

a. Operation Journal. Because of its ultimate historical

importance, an operation journal should be maintained. Reports of
combat engagements should include the designation and commander of
the guerrilla force, the type of action, approximate strength of the
guerrilla force, and guerrilla casualties. This data should be made
available to PSYOP personnel.

b. Command Structure. This record should reflect the designation

of the various units within the guerrilla force, the auxiliary, the
underground, and the names and designation of key personnel.
c. Personnel Roster. The personnel roster should list members of
the various organizations within the area command, and it must be
kept current. In the initial stages of organization and development,
such rosters may be maintained by the individual unit, with duplicate
copies forwarded to the area command when feasible.

d. Personnel Records.

(1) Personnel records should be maintained on guerrillas as well

as the other personnel in the resistance movement in order to
substantiate or refute posthostility claims for wartime service.
Opposition may be expected when a recommendation is made to the
resistance leader that all personnel be photographed and
fingerprinted. This can be overcome, however, when assurances are
given that a viable, secure system can be established, and that the
records will be exfiltrated from the UWOA and maintained at the SFOB.
Records may be microfilmed and placed in a secure cache in the UWOA
as an alternate means to exfiltration. Photographing these documents
and subsequently caching or exfiltrating the negatives provides a
method of preserving and securing records not obtainable by other
means. Special Forces operational elements will find their organic
photographic equipment important in making identification photographs
for populace control and for organization and control of resistance
forces. To avoid having a large amount of sensitive material on hand,
items may be photographed at frequent intervals. After processing the
negatives and determining their acceptability, the originals of unit
records may be destroyed.

(2) The information placed on personnel records should include

the individual's full name, home village or city, date he joined the
resistance force, whether or not an oath of enlistment was taken,
date discharged, promotions, demotions, acts of bravery, awards and
decorations, rank or position attained in the resistance force, and
any disciplinary action taken against the individual.

5-19
 (3) Postings to the initial record may be by serial number. In
this manner, there is no reference to individuals by name nor is
there incriminating data that would associate them with the
resistance movement. A sample initial record 'is shown as an
inclosure to the Master Training Schedule (app D).

e. Oath of Enlistment.
(1) Resistance leaders should be convinced of the need for a
formal oath of loyalty to the resistance movement. At an appropriate
ceremony, the local indigenous leader should administer an oath of
enlistment to each new member of the resistance force. This may
provide a basis for recognition by the local government, after
hostilities, of the jurisdictional authority exercised b y guerrilla
unit commanders over individual guerrillas.

(2) Personnel should be required to sign the oath, and the oath
should become a part of the initial personnel record and secured
accordingly. Ideally, the oath should make reference to the guerrilla
code and to punishments for violation.
f. Casualty Records. This information includes records of
personnel killed, wounded, missing in action, or separated from the
guerrilla force because of illness or for other reasons.

g. Graves Registration Information. This information, as a

minimum, should include name, date and cause of death, and location
of the remains.

h. Medical Records. These records should include data as to type

of prevalent diseases, preventive medicine actions taken, types of
wounds and general information on the organization of the medical
structure for the area command.

i. Payrolls. Appropriate records must be maintained to support any

commitment made to members of the resistance force for services
rendered.

j. Claims. The area command should maintain sufficient records to

assist in settling claims after hostilities.
k. Awards and Decorations. Valorous acts, meritorious acts, and
meritorious service should be formalized within the guerrilla force
and systems established to support the program. In some instances, US
awards may be recommended; however, guidance in this area is the
responsibility of the group S1, and should be provided in the
isolation phase. A government in exile may wish to act as the final
approving authority and may provide general guidelines for the
establishment; of an awards and decorations program. Once an award or
decoration has been approved, it should be awarded at an appropriate
ceremony, consistent with security regulations.

5-20
5-15. DISCIPLINE

a. Strict discipline is an integral part of command and control

procedures instigated over any paramilitary force. Without it, no
force can survive, let alone carry out effective operations against
the enemy. Since guerrillas are usually not uniformed, and they
appear dirty or bedraggled, an impression persists that discipline is
loose in guerrilla units. Discipline must be extremely harsh but fair
in guerrilla units, and orders must be executed without delay or
question. Minor infractions of orders, especially during the conduct
of operations, have far-reaching consequences for guerrillas and
supporting resistance elements.

b. More often than not, a guerrilla force will have a code,

possibly not in writing, but certainly an understanding of what is
expected of all guerrillas. A code, in writing, however, should be
developed by the resistance leader with advice by the Special. Forces
commander; each new recruit should be required to know and understand
its provisions as well as the penalties for treason, desertion, and
dereliction of duty. Codes for guerrilla forces are usually simple,
but call for extreme punishments for what would be minor infractions
in conventional forces.

(1) Any legal code for guerrilla forces should, if possible, be

generally in line with that which existed for the regular military
forces of that country. When this is impractical, the guerrilla chief
and his officers may draft a code.
(2) There should be provisions for punishments similar to those
imposed under Article 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice, as well
as provisions for more severe punishments. The guerrilla chief should
be advised to establish a court-martial or tribunal to try cases,
rather than arbitrarily make decisions as to the fate of an accused.
(3) As soon as possible after infiltration, an understanding must
be reached with guerrilla leader concerning the exercise of
disciplinary and judicial authority over the Special Forces unit. The
Special Forces commander will not cede his disciplinary or judicial
authority to the guerrilla leader or to any other resistance official
unless directed by competent authority.

c. With decentralization of command and widely dispersed

operations, individuals are habitually given mission-type orders with
little guidance or supervision, and they are expected to accomplish
their missions: no excuses are accepted. Therefore, guerrillas must
understand that their personal conduct has to be above reproach when
dealing with the civilian populace. Every act which loses civilian
supporters is harmful to the resistance movement.

d. Although maintaining discipline is the responsibility of the

resistance leader, the Special Forces is normally expected to
5-21
recommend measures which will insure proper discipline. The culture
of a group is instrumental, since what encourages discipline within
one group may not work with other groups.

Section V. TRAINING OF THE RESISTANCE FORCE

5-16. GENERAL

a. Training requires a maximum and continuous effort. The level of

resistance force training must be determined, and training programs
must be designed to provide and improve common levels of training.
Training programs should be simple but effective with training areas
secure from enemy observation and action.
b. Before commitment into operational areas, Special Forces
elements simplify their task of training the forces by developing
tentative training programs. Guided by area studies and intelligence,
the element prepares and collects training aids and other equipment
that may be required. When committed into a UWOA, these items can be
delivered with the automatic supply.

c. Although maximum improvisation must be used in all phases of

operations, the following items accompanying deployed detachments may
prove useful in conducting training:

(1) Grease pencils and colored chalk.

(2) Target cloth or ponchos (blackboard substitutes).

(3) Basic manuals on weapons generally found in the area (in the
language of the country if possible).

(4) Lesson plans for basic subjects as outlined in Master

Training Schedule (app D).
(5) GTA's improvised from parachutes or other such material.

(6) Other similar items that are of particular value in training

the indigenous force and that can be used to support training
outlined in appendix D.
d. Guerrilla personnel must receive training in the tactics,
techniques, and skills peculiar to guerrilla warfare. Command, staff,
and support echelons of the guerrilla forces must attain proficiency
and flexibility in order to accomplish the assigned mission.

e. The primary training mission of Special Forces is to develop a

selected guerrilla cadre into competent trainers of guerrilla
personnel and units.

5-22
5-17. CHARACTERISTICS OF GUERRILLA TRAINING

a. In each situation the Special Forces commander decides which of

the following training systems will be the most beneficial to
resistance force personnel: (1) centralized training, (2)
decentralized training, (3) individual or on-the-job training, or (4)
specialized training for selected personnel. In most instances one or
all of the systems noted above will be used. To expedite training
programs and to provide effective instruction to dispersed units, a
centralized training course may be designed and presented to selected
resistance personnel, who in turn act as instructor cadres to
dispersed units. When this occurs, a decentralized training system is
put into effect.

b. Other characteristics of training resistance forces that must

be considered are:
(1) A wide range of education and capability levels of resistance
personnel.

(2) Divergences of motivation for joining resistance forces.

(3) Variance in the extent of previous military experience.

(4) Possible language barriers requiring training through

interpreters.

(5) Probability of limited training material available.

(6) Use of combat engagements as a training device.

c. Examples of a toaster training program for a leadership school

and a 30-day master training program for preparing individual
training are shown in appendix D,
5-18. TIDE TRAINING PLAN

a. General.

(1) The training plan is an outline of the manner in which the

commander determines he can best accomplish the training mission. It
results from his estimate of the training situation reflecting the
state of training of the guerrilla force, the personnel available,
the weather and climate, and the training objective. The mission is
the most important element in any training situation.

(2) The development of a training plan consists of:

(a) Analyzing the mission.

(b) Analyzing the local training situation.

5-23
 (c) Determining a system for training.

(3) After the training estimate, the training plan is developed.

These training steps may have been completed prior to infiltration
and require only refinement in the UWOA. Training is then programed
into units of instruction which will facilitate accomplishment of the
training objectives.
b. Analysis of the Mission.

(1) Based on directives from higher authority, Special Forces

recommend specific tasks for the guerrilla force to accomplish.

(2) If the guerrilla force has been assigned multiple missions,

priorities of training must be established.

(3) If implied missions are derived from the specified mission,

it must be determined if all requirements can be met within the time
specified and with the facilities and personnel available.

(4) The mission and operational objectives must be specifically

delineated for the guidance of all concerned. The shorter the
training time, the greater the care that must be taken in defining
the training mission or objectives.

c. Analysis of the Local Training Situation. The element

must evaluate all aspects of the local training situation to
determine shortcomings. This analysis may reveal obstacles that
cannot be resolved or which dictate the selection of another
organization or program for training. Personnel recruited for
the guerrilla force may have little or no previous military
training. Evaluation of resistance personnel capabilities and
state of training is made by personal observation, inspections,
and the results of limited operational missions. Principal
factors to be considered are:

(1) Essential training to be conducted. Priorities of training

subjects must be established. Lesson plans brought on infiltration
may have to be modified.

(2) Personnel. Special training in techniques and tactics of

guerrilla warfare may have to be presented to resistance leaders.

(3) Time. Available training time is one of the more critical

factors to be considered. Initially, the operational element will
estimate the time required to accomplish the training mission. Makeup
training is an integral part of the training program.

(4) Training facilities. Requirements for ranges, rehearsal

areas, improvised classrooms, and other training facilities must be
determined. Physical security is a prerequisite for all training

5-24
areas. Ranges and rehearsal areas should be located away from the
guerrilla base to avoid enemy detection.
(5) Training aids. Consistent with the situation, training aids
and equipment may accompany the operational element at the time of
infiltration. Initially equipment available for training will be
limited, and improvised training aids and mockups should be used.

d. System and Organization for Training. The requirement for

physical security in the UWOA generally dictates that guerrilla
forces be dispersed over a wide area. Consequently, the system and
organization for training normally is decentralized. Training should
be planned, organized, and inspected by Special Forces members and
their counterparts. Each major training area should be supervised by
Special Forces members during the conduct of training. Training, even
the conduct of combat operations, is accomplished primarily by
practical applications.

5-19. OPERATIONS TO SUPPORT TRAINING

a. Throughout the organization, development, and training of the
guerrilla force, small combat operations are conducted to test its
readiness. The goals of these operations are to:
(1) Attract additional recruits to the resistance forces.

(2) Assist in gaining support of the civilian populace.

(3) Give the area command an evaluation of the training

conducted.
(4) Increase the morale and esprit de corps of the resistance and
guerrilla force.

b. The selection, planning, and execution of combat action should

strive for maximum success with a minimum of casualties. Combat
operations should be commensurate with the status of training and
equipment available to the resistance force. As training is completed
and units are organized, more complex and larger operations can be
planned and executed. Typical training operations may be
reconnaissance patrols, ambushes, raids, and limited demolitions
missions, and surveillance of future objectives.

5-25
5-26
 CHAPTER 6

AIR OPERATIONS
This chapter is a guide; in actual operations, local approved
Standing Operating Procedures (SOPS) must be followed.

Section I. GENERAL

6-1. BASIC CRITERIA IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE (UW)

a. In conventional military operations, the selection of drop
zones/landing zones (DZ's/LZ's) is a joint responsibility of the Air
Force and Army. The marking of these sites (in conventional warfare)
is an Air Force responsibility. The nature of UW makes Air Force
marking impracticable and Special Forces assumes the functions of
selecting, reporting, and marking DZ's/LZ's and of organizing and
conducting reception operations.

b. Before infiltration, Special Forces planners will select

DZ's/LZ's by using all available intelligence sources and maps.
Following infiltration, Special Forces operational elements select
and report additional DZ's/LZ's. They also confirm or make changes to
the DZ/LZ data on file at the SFOB.

c. UW joint airborne operations are small-scale operations. Basic

considerations for these operations are low detection of aircraft by
enemy, security of the objective area, exact timing, precise
execution, and full coordination of mission. In a UW environment,
airborne operations will normally be conducted at night.

6-2. TYPE OF AIR OPERATIONS

a. An activity requiring the integration of air support (i.e.,

planes, crew, personnel, and facilities of the Army, Air Force, or
civilians) with Special Forces operational elements, assets, or
commands is generally termed an air operation. Air operations are
usually a sub-element of a greater operation/mission.
b. A complete list of types of air operations would be almost
endless and beyond the scope of instructional requirements or
capabilities. Therefore, this chapter will address those air
operations which will be a primary concern to the student. These air
operations (i.e., DZ's, LZ's, and reception committees) will form a
foundation for knowledge later gained in unit training, experience,
and self-study.
c. Other common air operations used by Special Forces include:

6-1
 (1) Snow LZ's.

(2) Water LZ's.

(3) Helicopter cast and recovery.

(4) Message pickup.

(5) Recovery operations.

d. Techniques and procedures for these air operations are

discussed in (C) TC 31-20-3, Special Forces Air and Maritime
Operations (U).

6-3. SEQUENCE OF AIR RESUPPLY MISSION

A typical air resupply mission involves a particular sequence of

actions (figure 6-1).

Figure 6-1
Sample UW Air Resupply Mission.

a. Operational Element.

(1) Identifies and reports DZ/LZ sites.

(2) Transmits DZ/LZ data and resupply requests to SFOB.

b. SFOB.

(1) Processes DZ/LZ data and resupply requests.

6-2
 (2) Coordinates mission with air support unit.

(3) Transmits mission confirmation message to operational

element.

(4) Prepares and delivers supplies/personnel to departure site.

(Supplies are packed and rigged in aerial delivery containers which
have a capacity of 500 pounds or less. To facilitate rapid clearance
of the DZ/LZ, the contents of each container are further packaged in
50-pound man-portable increments.)

c. Air Support Unit.

(1) Prepares mission confirmation data for SFOB.

(2) Receives and loads supplies/personnel.

(3) Executes air delivery mission.

d. Operational Element.

(1) Organizes reception committee.

(2) Establishes DZ/LZ.

(3) Receives personnel/supplies.

(4) (u) Removes and distributes incoming supplies.

Section II. DROP ZONE SELECTION

6-4. GENERAL

Special Forces is responsible for selecting, reporting, and marking

DZ's. The selection of a DZ must satisfy the requirements of both the
aircrew and the reception committee. The aircrew must be able to
locate and identify the DZ. The best site is one that is accessible,
reasonably secure, and safe for delivery of incoming
personnel/supplies.
6-5. CONSIDERATIONS FOR SELECTING DZ's

a. Terrain.

(1) The general area surrounding the site should be relatively

free from obstacles which may interfere with safe flight. Flat or
rolling terrain is desirable. However, in mountainous or hilly
terrain, broad ridges and level plateaus can be used. Small valleys
or pockets completely surrounded by hills are difficult to locate and
normally will not be selected.

6-3
 (2) It is desirable that the aircraft be able to approach the DZ
from any direction, and that there is an open approach quadrant of at
least 45 degrees to allow the aircrew flexibility to assume the
appropriate approach track.

(3) DZ's having a single clear line of approach are acceptable,

provided there is a level turning radius (2 nautical miles on each
side of the site for medium aircraft—figure 6-2 (1 nautical mile for
STOL aircraft—figure 6-3).

(4) Rising ground or hills of more than 1000 feet/300 meters

should normally be no closer than 2 nautical miles to the DZ. (In
areas where the above criteria cannot be met, the deviation will be
noted in the mission request and forwarded by the SFOB to the air
support unit for decision/consideration.)

Figure 6-2
Level turning radius required for one-approach
DZ’s and LZ’s (medium aircraft)
6-4
 Figure 6-3
Level turn radius for STOL aircraft.

b. Weather. The seasonal weather conditions in the drop area must

be considered. Ground fogs, mists, haze, smoke, and low-hanging
clouds may interfere with the pilot's observation of DZ markings.
Excessive winds also hinder operations.

c. Obstacles. Due to the low altitudes at which operational drops

are conducted, obstacles in excess of 300 meters above the level of
the DZ and within a radius of 2 nautical miles must be identified and
reported. When operational drops are scheduled for altitudes of less
than 400 feet, obstacles in -excess of 30 meters must be identified
and reported.
d. Shape and Size.

(1) The most desirable shapes for DZ's are square or round. The
width of rectangular-shaped DZ's should allow for minor errors in
computation of wind drift.
(2) The required length of a DZ depends primarily on the number
of units to be dropped and the length of their dispersal pattern.

e. Dispersion.

(1) Dispersion occurs when two or more personnel or containers

are released consecutively from an aircraft in flight. The long axis
of the landing pattern generally parallels the direction of the
flight.

6-5
 (2) Dispersion is computed using this rule-of-thumb formula: 1/2
speed of aircraft (knots) X exit time (seconds) - dispersion
(meters). Exit time is the elapsed time between the exits of the
first and last items (fig. 6-4).

(3) The length of the dispersal pattern represents the minimum

desirable length for DZ's. If personnel are to be dropped, a
desirable safety factor of at least 100 meters is added to each end
of the dispersal pattern to ascertain minimum DZ length required.

Figure 6-4
Computation of dispersion.
f. Surfaces.

(1) The ground surface of the DZ should be reasonably level and

relatively free from obstructions such as rocks, trees, fences, and
powerlines. Tundra and pastures are ideal terrain for both personnel
and cargo reception.

(2) Personnel DZ's located at comparatively high elevations

(6,000 feet or higher) will, where possible, be on soft snow or
grasslands. The increased rate of parachute descent at these
altitudes make these DZ's less desirable than those at or near sea
level.

(3) Swamps, paddies, and marshy ground are marginally suitable

for personnel and bundles in the wet season. The presence of water
compounds recovery problems and is hazardous. Frozen paddies present
a rough, hard surface, marginally suitable for personnel drops.

(4) Water depth will be no less than 4 feet for a personnel drop
on a water DZ. There will be no underwater obstructions to a depth of
6-6
4 feet, and the surface will be clear of floating debris or moored
craft and without protruding boulders, ledges, or pilings. Minimum
safe water temperature for personnel drops is 50 degrees F. (+ 10
degrees C.).

(a) Water reception points will not be near shallows or where

currents are swift.
(b) Arrangements must be made for rapid pickup.

g. Security.

(1) The DZ should provide maximum freedom from enemy ground

interference and be accessible to the reception committee by routes
which are concealed from enemy observation or which can be secured
against interdiction or ambush.

(2) Additionally, the DZ should be near areas suitable for the

caching of supplies and the disposition of air delivery equipment.
Section III. DROP ZONE REPORTING

6-6. REPORTS AND MISSION REQUESTS

a. As soon as practicable after infiltration, each Special Forces

operational element will reconnoiter its operational area. The
purpose of this reconnaissance is to select sites for DZ's and to
confirm, reassess, or refute the sites selected during premission
isolation.
b. The operational element transmits information on DZ locations
back to the SFOB. The importance of DZ reporting is to identify these
sites to the SFOB for current or future use. DZ information can be
transmitted in this manner or as a component of a specific mission
request from the Special Forces operational element wherein the
delivery site, if a DZ, is or can be identified.

c. For brevity purposes, the communications from operational

elements to the SFOB are concise and utilize precise message formats.
Each Special Forces operational element, using its own unique
communications-electronics operating instructions (CEOI), reports
data on each DZ site whether as a mission request or an information
report. DZ information most likely would include code name (from
CEOI, or as appropriate), physical location (i.e., grid coordinates,
including grid designations, to the center of the DZ), track of
recommended aircraft approach (fig. 6-5), obstacles (fig. 6-6), and
reference point(s).

d. DZ information in a mission request could contain additional

items of information such as the time of drop, services/items
desired, and alternate DZ(s). Prevailing requirements as stated in
the respective CEOI determine actual information items, message
formats, and message contents.
6-7
 Figure 6-6 Figure 6-6
Computation of open Reporting obstacles and
(desired heading) reference points.

6-8
6-7. ALTERNATE DROP ZONES

Alternate DZ 's will be designated for every mission requested;

however, separate drop times are established and the alternate DZ is
manned by a skeleton reception committee. If the primary DZ is not
suitable for reception due to unfavorable conditions, the aircraft
proceeds to the alternate DZ. This DZ should be as close to the
aircraft primary heading as possible to preclude turn around and
possible enemy detection of the operation. Drop times for alternate
DZ's are determined by the air support unit based on flight time and
are included in the mission confirmation message.
6-8. MISSION CONFIRMATION FOR AIR DROP

Following the processing of the DZ report and resupply request at the

SFOB, a confirmation message is transmitted to the operational
detachment, usually in a blind transmission broadcast (BTB). The
confirmation message format, content, and codes will be found in the
respective CEOI of each SF operational element.

6-9. AREA DROP ZONE

a. An area DZ consists of a prearranged flight track over a series
of acceptable drop sites. This establishes a line of flight between
two points, "A" and "B" (fig. 6-7). The distance between these points
should not exceed 15 miles and have no major changes in ground
elevation in excess of 90 meters. Drop sites may be selected not more
than 1 mile to the left or right of the established line of flight.
The aircraft arrives at point "A" at the scheduled time and proceeds
towards point "B" observing for the DZ markings. Once the markings
are located, the drop is conducted in a normal manner. The area DZ
system is particularly well adapted for use in conjunction with
preplanned, automatic resupply operations where DZ's are frequently
selected on the basis of map reconnaissance. The DZ is illuminated a
total of 10 minutes (starting 2 minutes prior to ETA over point "A")
or until the first deployed parachute is observed.

b. Area DZ's are reported by using the normal DZ report format,

with the following exceptions:

(1) Locations of both point "A" and "B", including reference

points (fig. 6-7).

(2) The open quadrant is not reported.

(3) Obstacles over 90 meters above the level of the terrain along
the line of flight, within 2 nautical miles ,on either side, and not
shown on the issued map (fig. 6-8). These obstacles are reported in
reference to either points "A" or "B."

6-9
 Figure 6-7
Area DZ (reference points)
6-10
 Figure 6-8
Obstacles and reference points (area DZ).
6-11
 Section IV. DROP ZONE MARKING

6-10. DROP ZONE IDENTIFICATION

a. The purpose of DZ marking is to identify the site, indicate the
point over which personnel/cargo will be released, and provide visual
terminal guidance for the aircraft. The patterns for marking DZ's are
included in the CEOI. Marking of DZ's during the hours of darkness or
periods of low visibility is accomplished by using lighting devices
such as flashlights, flares, and small wood, oil, or gas fires. For
daylight operations a satisfactory marking method is a Panel Marking
Set. If panels are not available, sheets, strips of colored cloth, or
other substitutes can be used provided there is sharp contrast with
the background.

b. The light source selection by the ground reception committee

must consider security requirements and atmospheric and terrain
conditions. From a security standpoint the flashlight is the best
light source. Light sources other than flashlights may be required to
penetrate haze or ground fog, or to form a distinctive light pattern
which can be more readily identified than a flashlight pattern. If
local conditions dictate use of other light sources, all lights in a
pattern must be of the same type. Light sources other than
flashlights will be screened on three sides or placid in pits with
sides sloping toward the direction of the approaching aircraft.

6-11. BEACONS/TRANSPONDERS

The use of electronic homing devices (called beacons or transponders)

permits reception operations during conditions of low visibility.
Such devices may also be used in conjunction with the visual marking
systems. (See TC 31-20-3.)

6-12. COMPUTING GROUND RELEASE POINT

The ground release point is determined to ensure delivery of

personnel or cargo within the usable limits of the DZ. Computing the
ground release point for personnel and low-velocity cargo drops
involves (fig. 6-9)
a. Dispersion. Dispersion is the length of the pattern formed by
the impact of the parachutists/containers. The desired point of
impact for the first parachutist/container depends on how the
calculated dispersal pattern is fitted into available DZ space.
b. Wind Drift. Wind drift is the horizontal distance traveled from
the point of parachute deployment to the point of impact as a result
of wind conditions. The release point is located a calculated
distance upwind from the desired impact point. To determine the
amount of drift, use the following formulas:

6-12
 Figure 6-9
Computation of ground release point (RP).

(1) Personnel using parachutes with 35-foot canopies: Multiply

the wind velocity (knots) by each 100 feet to drop altitude. Multiply
this product by 4.1 (the constant or K factor for a 35-foot canopy)'.
The formula is: Wind (V) times altitude (A) times 4.1 (K) equals
drift (D) in yards, Thus: D = VAK. Example: Drop altitude is 800 feet
and wind velocity is 10 MPH; drift is 10 x 8 x 4.1 or 329 yards.

(a) An anemometer is used to measure wind velocity. Some

anemometers give readings in knots, others in miles-per-hour. To
convert to knots, miles-per-hour is multiplied by .86, but for
practical purposes, the direct substitution of miles-per-hour for
knots in wind drift formulas gives sufficiently accurate results for
winds below 10 knots.
6-13
 (b) Since anemometers will not always be available, or may
have been damaged or destroyed, Special Forces personnel manning DZ's
must be able to estimate wind velocity with acceptable accuracy.
Detachment personnel can learn to do this during training by
observing the effect of winds of varying strengths on grass, dust,
bushes, small pieces of paper, small pieces of cloth or handkerchiefs
held at arms length, and then comparing these effects with those
associated with anemometer reading.

(2) Low-velocity types of parachute drops (using G-13 cargo

parachutes): Use the same formula; however, substitute a constant
factor of 2.6 for 4.1.

(3) Static line deployed, maneuverable personnel parachute: The

maneuverable parachute is the same as the T-10 (35-foot canopy)
parachute except material has been removed from the rear of the
parachute near the lower lateral band to form an oval-shaped orifice
to assist in maneuvering. When the canopy is manipulated in such a
manner that the orifice faces into the wind, the rate of drift is
greater than that of other 35-foot canopies; when the orifice is
faced away from the wind, considerably less drift results. Thus, when
computing wind drift formula for the maneuverable parachute, use the
same formula as noted above but substitute a constant factor of 4.0
for 4.1.

(4) Personnel and cargo drop: When receiving both personnel and
cargo in the same drop, use the same formula as noted above, but use
the constant factor of 4.0.
c. Forward Throw. Forward throw is the horizontal distance
traveled by the parachutist or cargo container between the point of
exit and the opening of the parachute. This factor, combined with
reaction time of the personnel in the aircraft, is compensated for by
moving the release point an additional 185 meters in the direction of
the aircraft approach.

d. High-Velocity and Free-Drop Loads. High-velocity and free-drop

loads are not materially affected by wind conditions; therefore, wind
drift is disregarded. Dispersion is computed the same as for low-
velocity drops. On the other hand, without the restraint of a
parachute, forward throw is compensated for by moving the ground
release point marking in the direction from which the aircraft will
approach a distance equal to the altitude of the aircraft above the
ground (e.g., if altitude of aircraft is 600 feet, move ground
release marking 600 feet in the direction of the aircraft approach).
6-13. DZ MARKING

a. Primarily, marking employs lights or panels in a distinctive

configuration according to the unit's CEOI. In addition to marking
the ground release point (RP), this configuration serves to identify
the DZ to the aircrew.

6-14
 (1) The number of markers used seldom exceeds six.

(2) The distance between markers is usually 50 yards.

(3) The drop zone markings will normally form a distinctive shape
(square, rectangle, or triangle) or letter ("T," "L," or "X").

(4) In executing drops, the aircraft is aligned as accurately as

possible 50 meters to the right of the right hand row of markers. The
drop is made when the aircraft becomes adjacent to the last light in
the right hand row.

b. The standard marking method employs a standard four-marker

pattern (fig. 6-9) positioned in the form of an inverted “L.°’
6-14. PLACEMENT OE MARKINGS

a. Markings must be clearly visible to the pilot of the

approaching aircraft. The formula for determining mask clearance is
15 units of horizontal distance to 1 unit of vertical distance (a
ratio of 15 to 1, for each unit of obstruction). As an example,
markings shown in figure 6-10 are placed 1500 feet from a 100-foot
mask of vegetation and a terrain feature.

Figure 6-10
“Mask” clearance ration 15:1

b. Precautions must be taken to insure that the markings can be

seen only from the direction of the aircraft approach. All
flashlights should be hooded for security (side glow) and aimed in
the direction of the expected aircraft approach. Fires or improvised
flares are screened on three sides or placed in pits with sides
sloping toward the direction of the aircraft's approach (fig. 6-11).

6-15
 Figure 6-11
Security of DZ markings.
c. When panels are used for daylight DZ marking they are
positioned at an angle of approximately 450 from the horizontal to
present the maximum surface toward the approaching aircraft. If the
drop is taking place during the period of sunrise or sunset, and the
sun is in the eyes of the pilot during the approach to the DZ or LZ,
smoke grenades or simple smudge fires should be used in conjunction
with panel markings to assist in sighting the DZ markings on the
approach.

6-15. UNMARKED DROP ZONES

a. Drop zones cannot always be marked. A DZ site which has no

marking (either visual or electronic) is referred to as an unmarked
DZ. Personnel and equipment may be dropped on unmarked DZ's when
necessary. This technique is generally limited to specific moon
phases or daylight because of the need for visibility. A DZ selected
for this purpose should be located in an isolated or remote area and
free from possible enemy interference.

b. Drops on unmarked DZ's may be preplanned for specific periods

of time. The receiving unit is required to keep the DZ under constant
surveillance during the time the drop is scheduled. As soon as the
6-16
cargo is delivered, observers alert the receiving unit, measures are
taken to dispose of the items received, and the DZ is sterilized
(elimination of all signs of the drop). To aid in recognition, the
DZ's should be of odd configuration and size and have specific,
recognizable landmarks. Unmarked DZ's are also used to support
emergency resupply procedures.
6-16. DROP ZONE AUTHENTICATION

a. Air to Ground. The aircraft is scheduled to arrive over the DZ

within a specified time limit (usually extending from 2 minutes
before to 2 minutes after scheduled drop time). DZ markings are
displayed within this time frame. Arrival of the aircraft during this
specific time period, approach on the designated track, and flying at
designated altitude are factors that authenticate (identify) the
aircraft to the reception committee.
b. Ground to Air.

(1) No standard authentication system(s) exists for UW reception

operations. Each mission is considered separately and an
authentication system determined dependent upon the situation. An
authentication system to be used is mutually agreed upon during
mission planning by commanders concerned with the mission.

(2) Authentication between the aircraft pilot/navigator and the

reception committee leader (RCL) may be accomplished by using a coded
light source, panel signal, radio contact, beacon/transponder, or
combinations thereof. These may be employed individually or in
conjunction with the marking pattern.
(3) The DZ markings, identification, and authentication signals
are contained in the CEOI. As frequently as necessary for security,
these authentication factors are changed.

Section V. RECEPTION COMMITTEES

6-17. GENERAL

Once established in the operational area, Special Forces organize,

train, and supervise indigenous reception committees to conduct
future air reception operations. The functions of a reception
committee are to

a. Provide security for the reception operation„

b. Emplace markings and identification equipment;.

c. Maintain surveillance of the site (before and after the
reception operations).

d. Recover incoming personnel/supplies.

6-17
 e. Move supplies to distribution or cache sites.

f. Sterilize the site.

6-18. COMPOSITION AND DUTIES

The reception committee normally is organized into five parties.

Small reception committees may combine the functions of two or more
parties (e.g., the command and marking parties may be consolidated).
a. Command Party.

(1) Includes the reception committee leader (RCL), communication

personnel (consisting of messengers and a radio operator), and the
Special Forces advisor.
(2) Controls and coordinates all committee actions.

(3) Provides medical support when necessary.

b. Marking Party.

(1) Size is governed by the type marking system to be used.

(2) Emplaces/operates the marking system.

(3) Lights and extinguishes lights as directed.

(4) Assists in recovery of personnel/supplies.

(5) Assists in sterilizing DZ/LZ.

c. Security Party.

(1) Prevents or delays interference with the operation.

(2) Consists (normally) of inner and outer security elements. The

inner security element is positioned in the immediate vicinity of the
site and is prepared to fight delaying or holding actions. The outer
security element consists of outposts established along approaches to
the area. They may prepare ambushes and roadblocks to prevent enemy
movement toward the site.

(3) May be supplemented by auxiliary personnel to maintain

surveillance over enemy activities, keep the security party informed
of enemy movements, and conduct limited objective attacks or ambushes
to divert or prevent enemy movement toward a site.

(4) Provides march security for transport of supply/personnel.

d. Recovery Party.
(1) Recovers cargo and air-delivery equipment from the DZ.
6-18
 (2) Consists of at least two men for each parachutist or cargo
container. The recovery party is dispersed along the length of the
anticipated impact area, spots each parachute as it descends, and
moves to the impact point.

(3) Locates bundle. (One man must stay with it while the second
takes the parachute to the recovery collection point and guides a
detail back to carry off the packages. Another technique is to divide
the recovery party into two-man teams which have been assigned a
parachute number coinciding with the sequence of exit from the
aircraft. If personnel are available, the recovery party leader
stations a separate recovery detail at the far end of the DZ to track
and locate bundles if the exit is delayed or disrupted. Recovery
party personnel must have a simple signaling means, such as a metal
cricket or tone sticks, to preclude shouting or unnecessary movement.
When the first bundle, or parachutist, exits from the aircraft, the
recovery party leader should station a man directly under the point
of exit. This man remains in place until all bundles or parachutists
are recovered. He serves as a reference for the point of exit and can
subsequently indicate the aircraft's exact line of flight if a bundle
is lost and a sweep of the DZ must be made.)

e. Transport Party.
(1) Consists of part, or all, of the members of the command,
marking, and recovery parties.

(2) Transports supplies to distribution or cache sites.

6-19. DZ/LZ STERILIZATION

a. To insure sterilization, the reception committee:

(1) Must police or obliterate cigarette butts, candy and gum

wrappers, equipment, and other signs of occupancy, (crushed
undergrowth, heel scuffs, trails, human waste).
(2) Recover all rigging straps and other air delivery equipment.

(3) Assign an individual at the recovery collection point to be

responsible for accounting for air items and packages as recovery
teams bring them off the DZ/LZ.

(4) Provide a two- or three-man surveillance team, preferably

from the supporting auxiliary element to maintain a close watch on
the DZ/LZ area for enemy activity during the 48 hours following the
drop.

6-19
 b. To assist in sterilization, the individual parachutist:

(1) Recovers all parachute items, straps, bundles, and equipment,

which he wore on the drop.

(2) Buries unwanted air items separately, preferably at the base

of thick bushes.

(3) Erases drag marks, footprints, and impact marks. So far as

possible, he disguises freshly cut tree branch stubs with mud.

(4) Avoids trampling or crushing vegetation; bypasses plowed

areas and grass fields when moving off the DZ/LZ.

(5) Prevents accidental compromise of the operation by avoiding

paths and roads and by moving cross-country to the assembly point.

Section VI. LANDING ZONE OPERATIONS

6-20. GENERAL

a. Landing zone operations are a speedy and efficient means to

insert or recover personnel and cargo from an operational area. Such
operations are difficult and require highly trained aircrews and
reception committees. Normally, landing zone operations are conducted
at night but may be conducted in daylight if conditions permit.

b. A landing zone operation entails an actual landing on a

previously selected site, aided by the reception committee leader
(RCL) from the ground. As a general rule, DZ selection considerations
also apply to LZ selection, with the exception that site size and
approach features are far more important factors. Certain specified
minimums must be met to assure safe landing and takeoff.

6-21. SELECTION CRITERIA FOR LANDING ZONES (LZ's)

a. Basic Considerations. The basic selection criteria for a LZ
fall into four categories:

(1) Aircraft limitations.

(2) The mission at hand (i.e., the secure reception or dispatch

of personnel or cargo, and importance of mission).

(3) Ease of identification of the LZ from the air.

(4) LZ size and terrain features.

b. Aircraft Limitations. In LZ operations, limitations of the
aircraft are primary factors in site selection. When performing
landings on unprepared terrain, the aircrew's safety is entirely in
the hands of the RCL. The LZ personnel insure the safety necessary
6-20
for landing operations by being familiar with and executing the basic
LZ requirements.
c. LZ Requirements. The selection of LZ's and the coordination
activities required prior to implementation of an LZ operation
closely parallel the procedures used in DZ operations. However, the
physical requirements for an LZ are more exacting (i.e., site size,
ground surface conditions, and approach features). The LZ should not
be near a heavily defended area. Low-flying aircraft are extremely
vulnerable to light flak and ground fire. Physical security of the LZ
area is of paramount importance in that enemy observation during the
operation could result in the capture of the aircraft or failure of
the mission.

d. Terrain Features.

(1) LZ's should be located in flat or rolling terrain or located

on ridges or plateaus in mountainous terrain.

(2) Pockets or small valleys, completely surrounded by hills, are

usually unsuitable for landing operations by fixed-wing aircraft.
(3) Although undesirable, sites with only a single approach can
be used. When using such sites, it is mandatory that:

(a) There is sufficient clearance at both ends of the LZ to

permit a 1800 turn to either side within a radius of 2 nautical miles
for medium aircraft and 1 nautical mile for light aircraft (fig. 6-2
and 6-3).

(b) All landings and takeoffs are made into the wind.

e. Weather. Prevailing weather in the landing area should be

favorable. In particular, there must be a prior determination of
prevailing wind direction and velocities and of conditions
restricting visibility (i.e., ground fog, haze, or low hanging cloud
formations).
f. Size. The required size of LZ's varies with each type and model
of aircraft used in air operations. LZ size and dimensions for each
type and model of aircraft are determined by a complex and scientific
mathematical process. This process weighs performance and environment
facts to produce dimensions. Such a weighty process is not acceptable
for use in LZ operations and certainly not feasible for the UWOA.
Therefore, the LZ sizes for different types of aircraft have been
grouped into two categories--STOL and medium aircraft.

(1) STOL aircraft:

(a) U-6

6-21
 (b) Twin Otter

(c) Porter
(d) U-10

(e) C-7

(2) Medium aircraft:

(a) C-123
(b) C-46

(c) C-47

(d) C-130

(e) C-119
(3) In addition to the basic dimensions, extra clearances to
provide a safety factor are required.

(a) A cleared surface or safe area of 10 percent of the

minimum required length is added to each end of the runway. (These
safe areas are never less than 100 feet/30 meters.)

(b) A 25-foot/8-meter area, extending along both sides of the

strip is added. It must be free of obstacles over 3-feet/1 meter
high.

(c) Owing to decreased air density, landings at higher

elevations require increased LZ dimensions. If the LZ is located on
terrain above 4000 feet/1220 meters with a very high temperature, the
minimum length must be increased.

1. Add 10 percent to. LZ minimum for each 1000 feet/305

meters of altitude above 4000 feet/1220 meters, or fraction thereof.

2. Add 10 percent to LZ minimums for temperature between 90-

100 degrees F (30 degrees C and 38 degrees C). Add 20 percent for
temperatures above 100 degrees F (38 degrees C).

(4) It is important to remember that the 10 percent safe area is

added to each end of the runway after the altitude and temperature
increase has been added.

6-22
 g. Surface.

(1) The surface of the LZ must be level and free of obstructions

such as ditches, deep ruts, logs, fences, hedges, rocks larger than a
man's fist, low shrubbery, or grass over 1 foot/1 /3 meter in height.

(2) The subsoil must be firm to a depth of 2 feet or 2/3 meter.

(3) A surface containing gravel and small stones or thin layers

of loose sand over a firm layer of subsoil is acceptable. However, if
a JATO-assisted takeoff is made, such surface is not suitable. Plowed
fields or fields containing crops should not be used.

(4) LZ 's that are not suitable in summer may be ideal in winter.
Ice with a thickness of 8 inches will support a STOL aircraft. Ice 24
inches thick will support medium aircraft. Unless the aircraft is
equipped for snow-landing, snow in excess of 4 inches must be packed
or removed from the strip.
(5) The surface gradient of the LZ should not exceed 2 percent
(applicable to both length and width).

h. Approach and Takeoff Clearance. The approach and takeoff

clearances are based on the glide/climb ratio of the aircraft (figure
6-10). For STOL aircraft the glide/climb ratio is 1 to 11 (e.g., 1
foot of gain or loss of altitude for every 11 feet of horizontal
distance traveled). The ratio for medium aircraft is 1 to 40. As a
further precaution, any obstruction in approach and departure lanes
must conform to these specifications:

(1) A 2-meter obstruction may not be nearer than 22 meters for

STOL aircraft or 80 meters for medium aircraft.
(2) A 15-meter obstruction may not be nearer than 165 meters for
STOL aircraft or 620 meters for medium aircraft.

(3) A 153-meter obstruction may not be nearer than 1 nautical

mile for STOL aircraft or 3 nautical miles for medium aircraft.
(4) The heights of obstacles are computed from the level of the
landing strip. Where landfalls away from the LZ, objects of
considerable height may be ignored provided they do not cut the line
of ascent or descent. This condition is most likely to exist in
mountainous terrain where plateaus are selected for LZ's.

6-22. DIMENSIONS AND LAYOUT

Illustrations in figure 6-12 and 6-13 show how to lay out LZ markings
for both STOL and medium aircraft. Use of these dimensions are
appropriate for most Special Forces LZ operations.

6-23
 a. A cleared surface (called a safe area) must be added to each
end of the LZ. Each safe area is cleared of all obstacles over 1
meter high.

*Figure 6-12
Land LZ for STOL aircraft.

*Dimensions used in this figure are simulated for SF S instructional

purposes. Simulated dimensions are satisfactory for actual operations
in a training environment. See (C) TC 31-20-3, Special Forces Air and
Maritime Operations, for SF unit use.

6-24
 *Figure 6-13
Land LZ for medium aircraft.

*Dimensions used in this figure are simulated for SFS instructional

purposes. Simulated dimensions are satisfactory for actual operations
in a training environment. See (C) TC 31-20-3, Special Forces Air and
Maritime Operations, for SF unit use.

6-25
 b. The marking pattern which outlines the limits of the LZ
consists of (1) Five (5) marker stations for STOL aircraft. (2) Seven
(7) or more marker stations for medium aircraft. For LZ's longer than
the depicted minimum length, the number of left-hand markers beyond
station "C" will be increased to retain a marker spacing of 505 feet.

c. Stations "A" and "B" always mark the downwind end and provide
the entrance "gate" for aircraft approach. These stations represent
the first point at which the aircraft should touch the ground.

d. Station "B" is the aircraft offload/load position. The RCL

station is located, as depicted, 15 meters to the right of marker
station "B".

e. Station "C" marks the very last point at which the aircraft can
touch down and still complete a safe landing.

f. Stations "D" and "E" or "F" and "G" mark the upwind extreme
of the landing area.

6-23. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

a. Two minutes before scheduled arrival time, the RCL directs all
marker stations to be displayed. The RCL flashes the authentication
code signal toward the direction of expected aircraft approach
(track).

b. When the aircraft arrives in the area (within 15 degrees to

either side of the approach track and below 1,000 feet altitude), and
when the RCL determines the aircraft is on final approach, he will
cease flashing the code signal and aim a continuous signal in the
direction of the landing aircraft.

c. The pilot will attempt to make a straight-in landing on initial

approach. When this is not possible due to a sudden change in wind
direction/conditions, a modified landing pattern will be flown at
minimum altitude for security purposes.

d. If a "go-around" is required, all lights will follow the

aircraft until it has landed safely.

e. All lights continue to follow the aircraft during touchdown and

landing roll, and are extinguished as the aircraft passes each
successive marker station.

f. After touchdown and landing roll, the aircraft will turn right
and taxi back to the offload/load position guided by the RCL
6-26
continuous light source at station “B” One or more engines will
remain running during the entire operation.
g. To eliminate confusion and insure rapid handling, incoming
personnel/material are offloaded first. To insure safety, all off/on
loading will be from the rear behind the running engine(s).

h. After off/on-loading is completed, the aircraft prepares for

immediate takeoff. The RCL moves to a vantage point clear of the
aircraft, directs the LZ to be illuminated, and signals the pilot to
take off by flashing his light toward ground level in front of the
aircraft.

i. The LZ illumination is extinguished as soon as the aircraft is

airborne.
j. The aircraft pilot will not land when:

(1) There is a lack of or improper identification/ authentication

received from the LZ.

(2) An abort signal is given by the RCL (e.g., extinguishing the

LZ markings).

(3) Any condition that, in his opinion, makes it unsafe to land.

Section VII. LANDING ZONES (WATER)

6-24. GENERAL

The selection criteria, LZ marking, and dimensions and layout are

similar to those for land LZ's. However, water LZ criteria,
dimensions, and concept of operation are more complex and require
more precise planning and execution than land LZ's. To gain a
workable knowledge of the selection and execution of water LZ's
requires greater study using TC 31-20-3, Special Forces Air and
Maritime Operations.
Section VIII. LANDING ZONES (ROTARY-WING AIRCRAFT)

6-25. GENERAL

a. Within their range limitations, helicopters provide an

excellent means of infiltration, exfiltration, and evacuation from
operational areas. Their advantages include the ability to:

(1) Ascend and descend almost vertically.

(2) Land in relatively small areas of ground.

6-27
 (3) Hover nearly motionless and take on or discharge personnel
and cargo without landing.
(4) Fly safely and efficiently at low altitudes.

b. Sane unfavorable characteristics of helicopters are:

(1) Engine and rotor noise compromise security.

(2) Icing, or high gusty winds, make flying difficult or

sometimes impossible.

(3) Changes in atmospheric conditions affect the aircraft's lift

capability.

(4) Dust clouds caused by the rotor compromise security of

location.

c. For the maximum effective use of helicopters, LZ's should be

located to allow landings and takeoffs into the wind.

d. During night operations, helicopters usually must land to

transfer personnel or cargo.

e. A decrease in normal air density limits the helicopter payload

and requires lengthened running distances for landing and takeoff.
Air density is largely determined by altitude and temperature. Low
altitudes and moderate to low temperatures result in increased air
density. Conversely, high altitudes and high temperatures cause
decreased air density.
6-26. SELECTION CRITERIA

a. Surface.

(1) The surface should be relatively level and free of

obstructions such as rocks, logs, tall grass, ditches, and fences.
(2) The maximum ground slope permitted is 15 ,percent.

(3) The ground must be firm enough to support the aircraft.

(4) Heavy dust or loose snow will interfere with pilot vision
just before touchdown. This effect can be reduced by clearing,
wetting down, or using improvised landing mats or platforms.

b. Size.

(1) Under ideal conditions, and provided the necessary clearance

for the rotors exists, a helicopter can land on ground slightly
larger than the spread 'of its landing gear.

6-28
 (2) Landing platforms may be prepared in swamp or marsh areas by
building platforms of locally available materials (fig. 6-14). Such
LZ's normally are used for daylight operations only. The size of the
clearing, and the approach and takeoff requirements for this type of
LZ are discussed below with the following additional requirements for
the platform:
(a) The area should be large enough to accommodate the spread
of the landing gear plus 10 feet.

(b) The surface should be capable of supporting the weight of

the aircraft.
(c) The LZ should be of firm construction that will not move
when the helicopter touches down and rolls slightly forward.

(d) The LZ should be level.

(e) If logs or bamboo are used, the LZ should be constructed

so that the top layer of poles is at right angles to the touchdown
direction.

(3) Landing pads can also be prepared on mountains or hillsides

by cutting and filling (fig. 6-15). Caution should be exercised to
insure there is adequate clearance for the rotors.

(4) Helicopters with a flotation capability present no problem in

landing zone preparation. They are equipped to land in water of any
depth. However, helicopters can land in water without the use of
special flotation equipment provided:

(a) The water depth does not exceed 12 inches.

(b) A firm bottom such as gravel or sand exists.

Figure 6-14
Examples of platform LZ’s for rotary-wing aircraft.

6-29
 Figure 6-15
Preparing landing pads for rotary-wing aircraft
in mountainous terrain.
6-27. DISPLAY AND AUTHENTICATION

a. LZ markings will be displayed for 4 minutes -- beginning 2

minutes before until 2 minutes past the scheduled arrival time or
until off/on-loading is completed and the helicopter departs.
b. Authentication procedures/code signals will be prescribed in
the CEOI; however:

(1) Arrival at the LZ within the specified time block, on or near

the designated approach track, will serve to authenticate the mission
aircraft.

(2) At night, the RCL displays the proper authentication code

signal by flashing a green light (or other designated signal) aimed
toward the approach track of the oncoming aircraft. When the
helicopter is on its final approach, the RCL then displays a
continuous green light aimed at the underside of the fuselage to
assist pilot ground orientation.
(3) In daylight, a distinctive panel or smoke signal is
displayed. When smoke is used, the LZ must be planned to preclude the
prevailing wind from causing the smoke to obscure the LZ.

6-28. DIMENSIONS
The criteria depicted below represent the minimum dimensions of each
LZ. Helicopter units will designate Size 1, 2, 3, or 4 circular LZ's
or Size 3 or 4 rectangular LZ's, to be used for specific operations.
Numerous considerations such as helicopter type, unit proficiency,
nature of loads, climatic conditions and day or night operations may
apply to size of landing points used.
6-30
 Figure 6-16
Dimensions for Landing Zones.

6-29. MARKING

Visual ground markings for helicopter LZ's provide the wind

directions, identification, direction of approach, and the designated
touchdown area. Visible light sources are used at night and panels in
daylight as prescribed in the CEOI.

a. In order not to disclose the LZ to the enemy, markings should

be kept to a minimum and be displayed only when required. They should
be firmly secured or removed before the helicopter hovers so they
will not blow into the rotors or engine intakes.

b. LZ markers should be adjusted for existing winds. When surface

winds are a factor (10 knots or more for infiltrations under load and
15 knots or more for exfiltration under load), the markers will be
6-31
positioned to insure landing is made into the wind, regardless of the
approach track established in the mission request and confirmation
message. The helicopter will make its initial approach to the LZ
along the designated track and, if necessary, will adjust to the
final approach track indicated by the LZ markings. The following
illustration shows the helicopter LZ "Y" marking pattern used for
night operations:

Figure 6-17
Night Markings for Helicopter Landing Zones.
6-30. GENERAL

Exfiltration is the means employed to return or bring personnel out

of operational areas to friendly territory. Exfiltration and
evacuation techniques normally employed in support of unconventional
warfare operations are discussed in TC 31-20-3, Special Forces Air
and Maritime Operations.

Section X. CHECKLIST FOR RECEPTION OPERATIONS (DZ/LZ/RZ/BLS)

6-31. GENERAL
a. Training.

6-32
 (1) Guerrillas and auxiliaries for their mission.

(2) Rehearsal.
(3) Security measures stressed during training to avoid
compromise.

b. Conduct of Operations.

(1) Surveillance prior to, and after, operation.

(2) Outer security established.

(3) Close security established.

(4) Assembly points.

(5) Marking conforms with CEOI.

(6) Recovery parties.

(7) Transport parties.

(8) Determining release point.

(9) Time lights on and extinguished.

(10) Noise discipline.

(11) Sterilization of site.

(12) Site cleared rapidly and in an orderly manner.

(13) Movement from the site.

(14) Sensitive items secured and controlled.

c. Alternate Site(s).

(1) Identification and reporting.

(2) Security.

(3) Marking party.

(4) Provisions for temporary caching.

(5) Security of cache.

(6) Sterilization of site.

6-33
6-34
 CHAPTER 7

COMBAT EMPLOYMENT OF RESISTANCE FORCES

Section I. GENERAL

7-1. PURPOSE

a. Guerrilla warfare is a series of tactical strikes designed to

weaken an enemy that is superior in total resources. Rather than
attempting to overwhelm the enemy in combat, the guerrilla inflicts
as much damage as he can in successively paralyzing blows,
withdrawing after each action before the enemy recovers.

b. It is impossible for an enemy to guard everything, everywhere;

therefore, guerrillas should attempt to keep the enemy off balance by
continually striking at targets, day after day, month after month, in
widely dispersed patterns so that the enemy will become confused,
demoralized, and frustrated. To accomplish this, guerrillas use
various methods of interdiction.

c. Responsibility for the various aspects of unconventional

warfare has been delegated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to that
service having primary concern. The US Army is responsible for
guerrilla warfare and related ground activities. Guerrilla warfare is
defined in JCS Pub 1 as "military and paramilitary operations
conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular,
predominantly indigenous forces."

d. During World War II, guerrilla forces were organized and used
extensively. Basically, their operations behind enemy lines applied
old principles and techniques to modern warfare. Nevertheless, many
factors impeded the efficient organization and conduct of guerrilla
operations. Military professionals generally did not understand the
art of guerrilla warfare and many of them regarded it as illegal and
dishonorable. The strategic and tactical relationships of guerrilla
forces to conventional forces were rarely appreciated. Special
operations organizations, shrouded in secrecy, were erroneously
judged by many as "cloak and dagger outfits" engaged in wild
exploits.

e. Adding to the confusion that often existed, the responsibility

for organizing, supplying, and exploiting guerrilla forces was often
shifted from intelligence to operations staffs or, when problems
became too large for each in turn to handle, to a special agency. The
command relationships between guerrilla forces and a theater
headquarters often remained vague and caused confusion within and
between guerrilla forces. The logistical support of guerrilla forces
was, often neglected or ill-timed with the operation plans of
conventional forces. Because of these major factors, the potentials
of guerrilla warfare were never fully developed and exploited.
7-1
 f. To conduct successful guerrilla operations, the following must
be considered:
(1) The people.

(2) Strengths and weaknesses.

(3) Planning.

(4) Intelligence.
(5) Tactics.

(6) Mobility.

(7) Surprise.

(8) Areas of operation.

(9) Time and space.

7-2. PLANNING

a. Guerrilla operations feature centralized planning and

decentralized execution. The actions of all resistance elements are
directed and coordinated by the underground resistance committee
through an area command. However, within the guidance furnished by
the area commander, subordinate leaders are allowed the widest
possible latitude in the conduct of their operations.

b. Planning provides for the attack of selected targets and for

subsequent operations designed to exploit the advantage gained.
Additionally, alternate targets are designated to allow subordinate
units flexibility in taking advantage of sudden changes in the
tactical situation. Once committed to an operation, the large zone of
action or lack of communication equipment within a small guerrilla
unit may reduce the area command's capability to rapidly divert
subordinate units to other missions. Therefore, plans must be
thorough and flexible to allow subordinate leaders to adopt alternate
predetermined courses of action when contingencies arise.

c. Planning must consider the exploitation of successes by

psychological operations and propaganda programs. Also, if an attack
is unsuccessful, psychological operations will be required to lessen
adverse effects on the resistance movement.
d. Once a target has been selected for attack, a plan is
developed; it must be simple, understood by all, and well rehearsed.
The attack must be timed with precision and it should move rapidly.
There must be total surprise, thorough execution, and 'a planned
withdrawal.

7-2
7-3. GUERRILLA WARFARE MISSIONS

a. To gain a military decision against strong and, determined

enemy opposition, guerrilla forces may have to adopt the tactics of
conventional forces. When guerrillas adopt these tactics, they
sacrifice many of their inherent advantages, primarily their
mobility.
b. Guerrilla forces increase their chance for success when they
coordinate their activities with those of conventional forces. In an
established theater of operations where significant conventional
military actions are to take place, guerrilla warfare can be
implemented to complement, support, or extend conventional
operations. Where conventional forces are not to be deployed,
guerrilla warfare may be conducted as an economy of force measure.

Figure 7-1
Special Forces Missions.

7-3
Guerrilla warfare missions (figure 7-1) which contribute to the land
battle may be described as:
(1) Missions to support the unified command (section II).

(2) Missions to support conventional combat forces (section III).

(3) Linkup operations (section IV).

(4) Post linkup operations (section V).

(5) Defensive operations (section VI).

(6) Stay-behind operations (section VII).

(7) Raid (section VIII).

(8) Ambush (section IX).

(9) Sniping and mining (section X).

Section II. MISSIONS TO SUPPORT THE UNIFIED COMMAND

7-4. TYPE MISSIONS

Special Forces-supported guerrillas give the unified commander more

course-of-action options and enable him to influence activities far
in advance of conventional forces and beyond the range of most Army-
controlled weapons systems. These missions which are strategic in
nature and have both long-range and immediate effects on the enemy
include:

a. Interdiction.

b. Intelligence.
c. Psychological operations.

7-5. INTERDICTION

Interdiction planning is begun during the preinfiltration time

period. The area study and operational area intelligence may well
indicate a weak link in an entire system that may be attacked with
optimum results.

a. During combat employment, major emphasis is placed on

interdiction operations which include denying the enemy the use of
selected areas through the partial or complete destruction of
facilities, military installations, and equipment. Interdiction
operations are basic to guerrilla warfare and range from the
destruction of one vehicle by one individual to attacks by larger
groups or forces against strategic and tactical industrial targets or
7-4
sites. When properly coordinated and conducted with other activities,
interdiction operations can make significant contributions to the
destruction of enemy combat power and his will to fight. Although
tactical in execution, interdiction operations have a strategic
objective and have both long-range and immediate effects on the
enemy, his military force, and ultimate population support.

b. Interdiction operations are conducted against an enemy to

hinder or interrupt lines of communication; to deny use of certain
key areas; and to destroy industrial facilities, military
installations, equipment, and resources. When properly coordinated
with other unified command operations, interdiction can help destroy
enemy combat power and the will to fight. Of all guerrilla
operations, interdiction has the greatest impact on the enemy and,
consequently, is considered the basic guerrilla warfare operational
mission.

c. Normally, operations are directed against targets on a broad

scale using all available resistance forces capable of accomplishing
the task. Guerrilla units conduct overt attacks against the enemy,
his supply and production facilities, and his sources of power and
lines of communications. Attacks are timed to achieve maximum results
from surprise and confusion and often to coincide with operations of
other theater forces. Closely coordinated with these guerrilla
operations, the underground and the auxiliary may conduct widespread
programs of sabotage, strikes, and disaffection.

d. The enemy reaction to large-scale UW operations is usually

violent, immediate, and may result in reprisals against the civilian
population. Losses among civilian support elements (auxiliaries and
the underground) and a concentration of operations against the
guerrilla forces may result. To relieve pressure being exerted by the
enemy, a reduction in the number of guerrilla operations may be
ordered in particular areas, or the theater UW command may direct
that guerrilla operations in contiguous areas be intensified to help
dissipate enemy retaliation efforts.

7-6. TYPES OF INTERDICTION OPERATIONS

a. Raid. A raid is an operation, usually small scale, involving a

swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse
the enemy, or destroy his installations. It ends with a planned
withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.

b. Ambush. An ambush is a surprise attack used against moving or

temporarily halted targets such as railroad trains, truck convoys,
individual vehicles, and dismounted troops.

c. Mines and Boobytraps. Standard or unproved mines and boobytraps

afford a means of interdicting enemy routes of communication and key
areas with little expenditure of manpower. The use of these items as
7-5
an interdiction technique can be planned to produce a demoralizing
effect on enemy forces. Mines and boobytraps may be effectively used
in defensive operations.

d. Sniping. Sniping tends to impede enemy operations and to

demoralize personnel. A few snipers can cause casualties among enemy
personnel, deny or hinder use of certain routes, and require
employment of a disproportionate number of troops to neutralize the
snipers. These reasons make snipers effective for defensive
operations for covering a mined area, as part of a raiding or ambush
force, or for a separate operation.

7-7. TARGET ANALYSIS

a. Targets are not attacked indiscriminately; they are part of an

overall plan to destroy an entire system. Interdiction is based on
the assigned mission which directs, as a minimum, the results desired
and the priorities of attack for specific systems. Based on this
mission, the area commander selects the specific targets and those
elements to conduct the attack.

b. Target selection requires detailed intelligence, thorough

planning, and is based on these factors:

(1) Criticality. A target is critical when its destruction or

damage will have a significant influence upon the enemy's ability to
conduct or support operations. Each target is considered in relation
to other elements of the particular target system designated for
interdiction. The criticality of a target changes with the situation.
For example, when the enemy has few locomotives, a railroad bridge is
less critical; however, its safeguarding may be critical when
friendly conventional force plans require its use.

(2) Accessibility. A target is accessible when a resistance

element can infiltrate the target area either physically or by direct
or indirect weapons fire (if and when that particular, target can be
destroyed/damaged by indirect fire methods).

(3) Recuperability. A target's recuperability is measured in

time; i.e., how long will it take the enemy to replace, repair, or
bypass the damage/destruction of that particular target..

(4) Vulnerability. A target is vulnerable if the detachment has

the means (i.e., explosives, weapons, manpower) and expertise to
destroy that target.

(5) Effect. Enemy reaction to interdiction operations may result

in reprisals against the civilian population. The possible political,
economic, and sociological impact of operations on friendly civilians
must always be considered. Guerrilla forces seek to destroy the core
of enemy power, while at the same time conserving the energy, unity,
7-6
and fighting spirit of the friendly civilian population. Conversely,
the objective of the operation may be purposely designed to cause a
violent reaction by the enemy against the civilian population. If
properly handled by the PSYOP operators, these reactions can be
exploited to further alienate the population and the government.
7-8. TARGET SYSTEMS

a. A target system is a series of interrelated functions which

together serve a common purpose. Specifically:

(1) A target is one element, installation, or activity identified

for attack such as a locomotive, a train, a bridge, or a prison.

(2) A target complex is several or numerous targets in the same

general area such as a railway marshaling yard, an airfield, or
port/dock facilities.

(3) A target system consists of an industrial system and its

sources of raw materials; the rail, highway, waterway, or airway
systems over which these materials are transported; the source of
power and method of transmission; the factory complex itself; and the
means by which the finished product is transported to the user.

b. Major target systems ideal for guerrilla interdiction

operations include:

(1) Railway systems.

(a) Rail networks are one of the most profitable target

systems for attack by guerrilla forces. Railroad tracks are easily
interdicted because it is almost impossible to effectively guard long
stretches of track. Rolling stock may be simultaneously attacked with
track interdiction. Loosening tie mountings, removing fishplates,
offsetting track, and using demolitions or special devices on curved
sections of track or switches to cause train derailment result in
captured or destroyed supplies, elimination of enemy personnel, or
liberation of prisoners. Repair facilities and equipment are usually
guarded and may be more difficult to attack. This difficulty can be
overcome by- careful planning and precise execution. Results expected
from these operations are weighed against the probability of
increased guerrilla casualties.
(b) Limited operations against rail way systems and related
facilities only cause harassment; therefore, widespread operations
are needed to severely affect the enemy. Harassment of repair crews
by snipers and ambushes reduces their morale and willingness to work.
Primarily, early railway interdiction interferes with the enemy's
offensive momentum by disrupting his flow of supplies, movement of
troops, and industrial production. Secondary effects include:

7-7
 1. Disruption of daily dispatch and control procedures for
rail movements; causes delays, erratic time schedules, and
misrouting; and causes trains to accumulate at rail terminals,
junctions, and marshaling yards. This presents lucrative targets for
attack by other theater forces.

2. Destruction of reserve repair materials to cause the

dismantling of secondary rail lines for the repair of primary lines.

3. Transfer of rail traffic to overload roads and highways,

which are vulnerable to guerrilla and air attack.

4. Increasing the burden upon enemy security forces and

repair crews.

(c) The primary and secondary effects of railway interdiction

generally apply to the interdiction of other lines of communication;
i.e., highway, waterway, and airway systems.
(2) Highway systems. Damaged highways are easily repaired and
require less critical materials and skilled labor than railway
systems. Therefore, points selected for interdiction should be in
areas where the enemy cannot easily reestablish movement by making a
short detour. Since highways have fewer vulnerable spots, these
points will likely be heavily defended. Where highways cannot be
destroyed, traffic can be disrupted by successive roadblocks, real
and dummy mines, boobytraps, sniping, misdirection of route signs, or
by spreading tetrahedrons for puncturing tires. Ambushes are
conducted when suitable terrain is available. Small bridges, tunnels,
culverts, and levees may be lightly protected and thereby vulnerable
to guerrilla attacks. As these attacks increase in frequency and
effect, the enemy will be forced to commit additional reserves for
control and security of the roads, occupy all important points
simultaneously at all times, and at the same time conduct
counterguerrilla operations.

(3) Waterway systems. The most critical facilities of waterway

systems are ports, dams, canals, locks, and related repair equipment.
They are usually well guarded since their destruction can disrupt
water traffic for long periods. Waterway control and navigational
equipment such as signal lights, beacons, microwave communication
systems, and channel markers can be attacked effectively. Sinking
vessels in restricted channels, dropping bridges into waterways,
creating slides, and destroying levees can block waterway traffic.
Because of security and the amount of explosives required, destroying
a dam will often be beyond the capability of resistance forces. One
solution, if approved, is to use atomic demolitions munitions.
Another solution is to cause a lesser degree of damage; i.e., destroy
floodgates, sluice gates, etc.

(4) Airway systems. The enemy's military/commercial. airway

systems can be disrupted by interdicting airfields, parked aircraft,
7-8
and related ground facilities, such as terminals, hangars, repair
shops, field depots; radar, radio, navigation, control, lighting,
telephone communications, and defense systems; and by 'eliminating
flight and ground personnel. Also, modern weapons systems give the
guerrilla force a capability to attack and destroy low flying
aircraft.
(5) Communication systems. Widely dispersed communication systems
present excellent targets. Cutting telephone wires, damaging
telephone terminals, destroying radio antennas, or destroying the
radio station usually results in a loss of communications. Alternate
and emergency means of communication are usually available. However,
destruction of any part of a communication system harasses an enemy
and creates an overload on remaining facilities. In addition,
guerrillas may temporarily capture radio stations to broadcast
announcements to the population and communicate with friendly foreign
nations.

(6) Power systems. Electrical power nets can be interdicted by

destroying large cross-country or local high tension and distribution
powerlines, transmission towers or poles located in remote areas and
difficult terrain which make repair/replacement difficult, or
transformer substations. Substations, although critical, can be
bypassed in a relatively short time by improvising wiring. Also,
interdiction of power nets can be accomplished by destroying power
generating stations and related equipment. These interdiction
operations are carried out by individual raid techniques or by using
long-range weapons.

(7) Water supply systems. Water systems supplying industry can be

disrupted by attacks against reservoirs, pipelines, and purification
plants. However, these attacks may impact adversely on the friendly
civilian population and must be weighed against the tactical
advantages to be gained.

(8) Fuel supply systems. Attacks against an enemy's fuel supply

system have far-reaching effects on his economy as well as his
ability to conduct and support military operations. Surface and
underground fuel storage tanks, depots, pipelines, refueling systems
for tank trucks, rail tank cars, transport vehicles, and vessels all
provide profitable targets.

7-9. TACTICAL CONTROL MEASURES

a. General. In interdiction operations against a target complex,

committing and coordinating all elements of the area command, which
includes the guerrilla force, underground, and auxiliary, in
widespread activities will produce a maximum effect. The area
commander uses appropriate control measures to aid in directing and
coordinating resistance force tactical operations.
b. Common Control Measures.

7-9
 (1) Target assignment. Targets or objectives are designated for
attack. These targets are usually lines of communication, military
installations and units, and industrial facilities. Normally, targets
or objectives for guerrilla forces are not held for any length of
time, nor are they cleared of determined enemy resistance.

(2) Zones of action. Zones of action are used to designate area

of responsibility for offensive operations by subordinate units.
Within the zone of action, the subordinate commander exercises
considerable freedom in the conduct of operations. Movement of other
guerrilla units through an adjacent zone of action is coordinated by
the area command. The auxiliary units within a zone of action provide
support to the guerrilla unit responsible for the area. Boundaries of
zones of action are changed as required.

(3) Routes of movement. Guerrilla force commanders may prescribe

routes of movement in order to control movement to targets. Guerrilla
units approach the objective area either by single or multiple
routes.
(4) Mission support site (MSS). The MSS is a preselected area
used as a temporary storage site or stopover point and is normally
located in areas not controlled by the guerrilla force. Guerrilla
units use an MSS to increase their operational range and to enable
them to remain away from their bases for longer periods of time.
MSS's can be used prior to and after an operation. They are occupied
for short periods of time, seldom longer than a day. As in an
assembly area, the using unit prepares for further operations and may
be provided with supplies and intelligence by the auxiliary. Prior to
occupation by the main guerrilla force, the MSS should be
reconnoitered and outposted.

c. Other Control Measures. Additional control measures, such as

rallying points, direction of attack; assault positions, and lines of
departure, may be employed by smaller guerrilla units. These control
measures are employed in a manner similar to that of a conventional
military unit.

7-10. INTELLIGENCE

Special Forces, although not primarily an intelligence collection

agency, may be required to support information gathering tasks of a
special nature. Special Forces located deep behind enemy lines are
ideally situated to contribute to the overall intelligence plan of
the unified command. However, security restricts radio traffic, thus
limiting the amount of intelligence information which can be relayed.
Special tasks may require information pertaining to:

a. Order of battle data.

b. Support of psychological operations.

7-10
 c. Targets of opportunity.

d. Poststrike assessments.
e. Political, sociological, and economic matters.

f. Support of specific air, ground, and naval operations.

g. Technical intelligence.

h. Identification, location, and affiliation of all known or

suspected enemy collaborators.

7-11. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP)

Guerrilla operations are conducted in a manner that creates a

favorable impact on the indigenous population since adverse
psychological effects of guerrilla operations may outweigh the
tactical results. The ability of guerrilla forces to influence the
population and elicit civilian support is dependent largely upon the
psychological impact of the resistance movement upon the populace.
Guerrilla forces operating in enemy territory psychologically
demoralize the enemy. This benefits the resistance movement and
should be fully exploited by Special Forces. Normally, psychological
operations conducted by guerrilla forces support the needs of the
operational area and are governed by the overall objectives of the
unified command.

Section III. MISSIONS TO SUPPORT CONVENTIONAL COMBAT FORCES

7-12. GENERAL

a. Unconventional warfare operations may be ongoing before the

decision to commit conventional military combat forces. Special
Forces-supported guerrilla missions may be expanded, once
conventional forces are committed, to assist the tactical commander's
scheme of maneuver. These missions can complement, support, or extend
conventional force offensive, defensive, and retrograde operations,
and usually occur when the conventional force's area of interest
encompasses a UWOA or when its area of influence approaches a UWOA
prior to linkup.

b. To fight outnumbered, survive, and accomplish these missions,

the Special Forces and guerrilla commander must know and understand
the enemy--his usual tactics, his organization and equipment, and his
capabilities and limitations.

7-13. OFFENSE
a. Missions which may be assigned to guerrilla units to assist
conventional offensive operations are designed to:

(1) Destroy enemy forces or their will to fight.

7-11
 (2) Secure key terrain.

(3) Deprive enemy of resources.

(4) Demoralize the enemy.

(5) Deceive the enemy.

(6) Divert enemy forces.

(7) Obtain intelligence information.

(8) Destroy key command, control, and communications systems.

(9) Interdict lines of communications.

(10) Prevent movement of reserves.

b. Special Forces-supported guerrilla forces can enhance the

tactical commander's ability to:

(1) See the battlefield—by conducting reconnaissance and

maintaining surveillance of critical routes, areas, installations,
and dispositions to provide highly accurate and timely intelligence
information.

(2) Concentrate overwhelming combat power--by conducting

deception operations to allow the commander to concentrate his combat
power for the attack. False rumors, a sudden increase in resistance
activities, or a shifting of such activities to other areas assists
in deceiving the enemy as to the actual time and place of attack.

(3) Suppress the enemy's defensive fires--by attacking enemy

weapon systems to support the commander's fire suppression plan.

(4) Shock, overwhelms and destroy the enemy--by:

(a) Interdicting and blocking approaches to or

sealing exit routes from an objective area.
(b) Occupying and holding key terrain features for a
limited time.

(c) Seizing key installations, such as bridges,

tunnels, dams, and power facilities, to prevent destruction
by the enemy.

(d) Conducting supporting attacks against enemy

forces and facilities.
(e) Assisting in containing/ eliminating bypassed
enemy units.

7-12
 (5) Attack deep into the enemy rear--by attacking at every
opportunity and destroying vulnerable command posts, communication
centers, supply and maintenance facilities, ammunition and POL
depots, and reserve elements. This aggressive, relentless destruction
paralyzes the enemy and disintegrates his overall system of defense.
These operations spread fear, demoralize, and achieve
disproportionate results as rear echelon elements, not trained nor
equipped for battle, succumb to confusion, indecision, and panic.

c. Guerrilla forces may also assist conventional forces conducting

airborne, air assault, or amphibious raids on objectives deep in the
enemy's rear. Timing for employment of guerrilla forces is extremely
important. Premature commitment may alert the enemy and lead to the
destruction of both the guerrilla and raid force. Conversely, late
employment may not have the desired effect upon the enemy. Another
factor which must be considered is the adverse effect of enemy
reaction on resistance elements and the friendly civilian populace
following the withdrawal of the raiding force.
7-14. DEFENSE

Tactical commanders must have prompt, accurate information to

anticipate and react to an enemy attack. In the active defense,
accurate, timely intelligence is essential to concentrate combat
power at the critical time and place. Special Forces-supported
guerrilla forces deep within enemy territory can provide this
intelligence. These forces operating within enemy rear echelons may
also divert enemy reserves and resources from tactical employment by
interdiction, by blocking approaches to an objective area, or by
direct attack:

7-15. RETROGRADE

Special Forces-supported guerrilla forces may be tasked to assist

conventional force retrograde operations. The tactical commander's
ability to see the battlefield is critical during delay, withdrawal,
or retirement operations. The guerrilla force is uniquely situated to
provide him with real-time intelligence.

Section IV. LINKUP OPERATIONS

7-16. GENERAL

Many offensive operations in which guerrilla forces assist

conventional combat forces involve a linkup between elements of the
two forces. This linkup may occur in ground, airborne, or amphibious
operations. As linkup becomes imminent, coordination and control are
intensified and positive restrictions are placed on the forces
involved.

7-13
7-17. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

When linkup becomes imminent, operational control of UW forces is

passed to the conventional force commander (normally a corps).
Initial passage of such control will be coordinated and directed by
the headquarters exercising control over both forces. The tactical
commander exercises operational control of UW forces through a
Special Forces liaison party which is provided to him by the SFOB.
For a detailed discussion of command relationships in various
situations, see chapter 4, TC 31-20-1.

7-18. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Regardless of the conditions under which linkup is effected, the
following considerations govern linkup planning:

a. Liaison.

(1) A transfer of operational control of UW forces from the

unified command level to tactical commands requires the exchange of
liaison personnel. The SFOB attaches a Special Forces liaison party
to the corps headquarters being assigned operational control of UW
forces. If operational control is passed to division level; the
Special Forces liaison party provides the necessary liaison to the
division headquarters.

(2) The SFOB may direct that a liaison party consisting of

Special Forces and resistance representatives be exfiltrated from the
UWOA to assist in linkup planning. This party can provide timely
information concerning the latest resistance and enemy situations,
and recommend linkup coordination measures and missions for guerrilla
forces.

(3) The tactical commander may infiltrate a liaison party into

the UWOA. This liaison party may include representatives from the G3
section, Special Forces liaison personnel, tactical air control
parties, forward observer teams, and communications personnel and
equipment. This liaison party must be knowledgeable of the scope and
purpose of the linkup plan and appropriate missions for the guerrilla
force.

b. Contact Points. Specific locations must be established for the

two forces to effect contact. Usually these points are well-defined
terrain features.
c. Coordination of Schemes of Maneuver. Tactical control measures
must be established to assist linkup. Guerrilla forces are usually
dispersed over a large area; consequently, linkup may take place at
several widely separated points and at different times. Not all
guerrilla forces may be involved in linkup with tactical units. For
example, during a raid or area interdiction operation by airborne
forces or when conducting operations as part of a cover and deception
7-14
plan for an amphibious force, it is often undesirable to linkup all
guerrilla forces with the attacking force.
d. Fire Coordination Measures. Fire coordination measures such as
fire support coordination lines (FSCL) must be established to protect
both the linkup and guerrilla force. Because of the wide dispersion
of guerrilla forces and the fact that civilian support organizations
are a part of the UW force, thorough coordination of targets selected
for nuclear and conventional weapon attack is required. Provisions
must be made to warn friendly elements of the population who may be
endangered by these fires.
e. Communications Coordination. Radio communication equipment with
the guerrilla forces is normally limited. The tactical commander must
provide the guerrilla force equipment with a voice capability which
can link them to his headquarters. Visual recognition signals are
selected to assist in linkup. Pyrotechnics and other required items
not available to the guerrilla force should be provided by the
conventional force.
f. Employment Following Linkup. The unified commander, in
coordination with US and allied officials, determines the disposition
or further use of UW forces following linkup. Within this guidance,
the tactical commander may employ recovered guerrilla forces.
7-19. AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

a. Guerrilla units may be given the mission of securing drop and

landing zones, seizing objectives within the airhead line; occupying
reconnaissance and security positions, or delaying or harassing enemy
movements toward the objective area. Concurrent with the landing of
the airborne elements, guerrillas can furnish current intelligence
data, provide guides, conduct reconnaissance and security missions,
interdict approaches into the objective area, control lightly
defended areas between separate airheads and dispersed units, attack
enemy reserve units and installations, conduct diversionary attacks,
and assist in controlling the civilian populace within the objective
area.

b. Precise timing of the airborne operation with the supporting

guerrilla operations is essential. Premature commitment of guerrilla
forces may nullify the surprise effect of the operation and, in turn,
lead to their defeat. If committed late, the effects desired from the
guerrilla force employment may not materialize.

7-20. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

a. Guerrilla forces may be used to interdict approaches into the

area; to attack artillery positions and reserves; to destroy command
posts, communication facilities, logistical installations, and
airfields which can support the enemy; to temporarily seize
helicopter landing areas; and to assist airborne and heliborne

7-15
operations which may be conducted in conjunct- ion with or
complementary to the amphibious assault.
b. If the selected beachhead is lightly defended or unoccupied,
guerrilla units may seize and hold portions of the beachhead. Landing
force planning must provide for early relief of guerrilla units.
Plans for naval gunfire support to guerrilla forces must include
provisions for the conduct and adjustment of fires. Naval gunfire
liaison personnel, shore fire-control parties, and tactical air
control parties should be provided as required.

c. Guerrillas may be employed in a tactical cover and deception

role to assist amphibious assaults. Guerrilla forces intensify
operations in selected areas to deceive the enemy as to the exact
location of the main landings. Air defense radar and coastal
detection stations are targets for attack to reduce the enemy's early
warning capability. A sudden increase in resistance activities or a
shifting of such activities to other areas assists deception.

d. Timing of the use of guerrilla forces in support of an

amphibious operation is extremely important. Premature commitment
alerts the enemy and may lead to the defeat of the guerrilla force.
Late employment may not produce the desired effect.

Section V. POST LINKUP OPERATIONS

7-21. GENERAL

a. When the United States retains control of guerrilla forces,

these forces may be further employed on missions in support of and
under control of conventional combat forces. For this role, a period
of retraining and reequipping is usually required prior to commitment
to combat.

b. In addition, US Army Special Forces-advised indigenous forces

may be employed to augment conventional forces conducting combat
operations or to conduct operations behind friendly lines.

c. Until command relationships can be established with the

appropriate command, Special Forces should remain with indigenous
forces to help them adapt to becoming a combat unit operating in a
strange environment under unknown higher commanders. Indigenous
forces employed in support of conventional forces should be commanded
by their own officers.
7-22. MISSIONS

Missions which may be assigned to guerrilla, paramilitary, or

irregular forces supporting conventional US units include:

7-16
 a. Conventional Combat Operations.

(1) Indigenous -forces may be employed to augment, relieve, or

replace conventional units in the main battle area; e.g., to contain
or destroy bypassed enemy units.

(2) The strength, organization, leadership, training, equipment,

background of personnel,, and extent of civilian support of
indigenous forces affect their combat capability. Consequently,
indigenous units may not be able to accomplish comparable missions of
like-size conventional units. The tactical commander, therefore, must
carefully consider their capabilities and take advantage of their
light infantry characteristics and area knowledge.

(3) Shortage of adequate voice communications equipment and

transportation may severely limit the employment of indigenous forces
on conventional combat operations. The tactical commander must
overcome this disadvantage by providing them the necessary equipment.

b. Reconnaissance. Familiarity with the terrain and people makes

indigenous forces unique for reconnaissance missions. They may
provide the principal sources of intelligence on dissident elements
opposing friendly forces and can move in difficult terrain to locate
enemy elements. They can detect enemy sympathizers in villages and
towns and implement control measures in unfriendly areas.
c. Counterguerrilla Operations. The experience and training of
indigenous forces make them useful in counterguerrilla operations.
They can patrol difficult terrain and gaps between tactical units,
establish roadblocks and observation posts, screen flanks, and
provide guides. Their knowledge of guerrilla techniques, the
language, terrain, and population can be exploited by tactical
commanders. When properly supported, indigenous forces may be given
complete responsibility for counterguerrilla operations in selected
areas.

d. Rear Area Security. Indigenous forces may be used as security

forces within the theater army area command (TAACOM). In assigning
these forces to a rear area security role, their area knowledge
should be the governing factor, and whenever possible, they should be
employed on an area basis. They may guard lines of communications,
supply depots, airfields, pipelines, rail yards, or port facilities;
patrol terrain which contains bypassed enemy units or stragglers;
assist in recovery of prisoners and stragglers, and in control of
civilians and refugees; and police towns and cities. When provided
with appropriate transportation, indigenous forces may be used as a
mobile security force reserve.

e. Civil Support. Because of their area knowledge and experience,

indigenous forces may assist to restore the area to its normal-
state. They can perform refugee collection and control duties, civil
police duties, assist psychological operation campaigns in rear
7-17
areas, apprehendcollaborators and spies, recruit labor, and guard
key installations and public buildings.
f. Retrain Host Country Conventional Military Units. Special
Forces may be used to retrain and reconstitute host country
conventional military units which have suffered reversals in combat
actions. The emphasis is to rapidly train unit cadres in leadership,
operations, and combat tactics and techniques. 'This is a significant
mission which may be assigned to Special Forces after completion of
their involvement with resistance forces.

ADVICE TO CONVENTIONAL FORCE COMMANDERS

When employing guerrilla units following linkup:

Know the guerrillas, their organization, concepts of operation,

capabilities, and limitations.
Insure that subordinate leaders appreciate the value of
guerrilla forces and know how to use them.

Anticipate the problems of providing administrative, logistical,

and operational support to attached guerrilla units.

Anticipate possible language and political problems in

establishing liaison.

The value of guerrilla units is limited to those operations

which are conducted in areas familiar to them.

Maintain guerrilla unit integrity as much as possible.

Work through existing channels of guerrilla command. Imposing a

new organizational structure may destroy the responsiveness of
the unit.

Respect guerrilla ranks. Except in cases where the rank of a

guerrilla officer is clearly out of order, give him the same
consideration given regular officers of the same rank.
Maintain guerrilla morale by awarding decorations and letters of
commendation and by expressing appreciation whenever such action
is justified.
Do not make political commitments or promises to guerrilla units
unless authorized by higher headquarters.

Recognize when the value of guerrilla units is ended and

promptly return them to the control of the unified commander or
host country.
Figure 7-2
7-18
 Section VI. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

7-23. GENERAL
Guerrilla units are normally inferior to organized enemy forces in
strength, firepower, mobility, and communications. Therefore,
guerrilla operations are primarily offensive; they do not undertake
defensive operations unless forced or ordered to. Usually when the
enemy attacks, guerrillas defend themselves by movement, dispersion,
withdrawal, or diversions. Defensive operations are accompanied
whenever possible by offensive actions against the enemy's flanks and
rear. On this basis, Special Forces always plan offensive operations
and security within the UWOA.

7-24. INDICATORS OF COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

a. Security of the UWOA requires guerrilla intelligence measures

to identify indications of impending counterguerrilla action,
population control measures, and guerrilla reaction to enemy
counterguerrilla actions. Some activities and conditions which may
indicate impending enemy counterguerrilla actions are:
(1) Suitable weather.

(2) New enemy commander.

(3) Changes in battle situation elsewhere.

(4) Arrival of new enemy units with special training.

(5) Extension of enemy outposts, increased patrolling, and aerial
reconnaissance.

(6) Increased enemy intelligence effort.

(7) Civilian pacification or control measures employed.

(8) Increased PSYOP against guerrillas.

b. Some ac activities, conditions, and measures which may be used

to control the population of an area may include:

(1) Mass registration.

(2) Curfews

(3) Intensive propaganda.

(4) Compartmentalization, with cleared buffer zones.

(5) Informer net.

7-19
 (6) Party membership drives.

(7) Land and housing reform.

(8) Relocation of individuals, groups, and towns.

(9) Rationing of food and goods.

7-25. DEFENSIVE TACTICS

The existence or indication of counterguerrilla operations requires

the Special Forces and guerrilla commanders to plan and use defensive
tactics. Some of the defensive tactics applicable against
counterguerrilla operations may include:

a. Diversion Activities. A sudden increase in guerrilla activities

or a shifting of such activities to other areas assists in diverting
enemy attention. For example, intensified operations against enemy
lines of communications and installations require him to divert
troops from counterguerrilla operations to security roles. Full use
of underground and auxiliary capabilities assists in creating
diversions.

b. Defense of Fixed Positions. The principles for a guerrilla

defense of fixed positions are the same as those applicable to
conventional forces except that there are few supporting fires and
counterattacks are generally not practicable. In conjunction with
their position defense, elements of the guerrilla force conduct
raids, ambushes, and attacks against the enemy's lines of
communication, flanks, reserve units, supporting arms, and
installations. Routes of approach are mined and camouflaged snipers
engage appropriate enemy targets. Diversionary actions by all
elements of the resistance movement are intensified in adjacent
areas.

c. Delay and Harassment Activities.

(1) The objective of delay and harassment tactics is to make the

attack so expensive that the enemy eventually terminates his
operations. Maximum use is made of the defensive characteristics of
the terrain, mines and snipers are employed to harass the enemy, and
ambushes are positioned to inflict maximum casualties and delay.

(2) As the enemy overruns various strong points, the guerrillas

withdraw to successive defensive positions to again delay and harass.
When the situation permits, the guerrilla force attacks the enemy's
flanks, rear, and lines of communication. If the enemy continues his
offensive, the guerrilla forces should disengage and evacuate the
area. Under no circumstances does the guerrilla force become so
engaged that it loses its freedom of action and permits enemy forces
to encircle and destroy it.

7-20
 d. Withdrawal.

(1) In preparing to meet enemy offensive action, the Special

Forces and guerrilla commanders may decide to withdraw to another
area not likely to be included in the enemy offensive. Key
installations within a guerrilla base are moved to alternate bases,
and essential records and supplies may be transferred to new
locations; less essential items would be destroyed or cached in
dispersed locations. If the commander receives positive intelligence
about the enemy's plans for a major counterguerrilla operation, he
may decide to evacuate his main base without delay and withdraw.
(2) When faced with an enemy offensive of overwhelming strength,
the commander may disperse his force, either in small units or as
individuals, to avoid destruction. This course of action, however,
renders the guerrilla organization ineffective for an undetermined
period of time and therefore should not be taken unless absolutely
necessary.

7-26. DEFENSIVE MEASURES THAT THE GUERRILLAS MAY EMPLOY

In the process of selecting defensive tactics, Special Forces and
guerrilla leaders must fully consider and evaluate available
measures. While a total list of defensive measures is endless,
measures to be considered should include:
a. Having auxiliaries and underground increase counterintelligence
activities.

b. Initiating diversionary activities in other areas.

c. Intensifying operations against lines of communication.

d. Preparing to implement guerrilla base evacuation plan.

e. Instituting delay and harassing tactics.

f. Exploiting guerrillas' inherent advantages of fluidity and

intimate knowledge of terrain.
g. Preparing to initiate "breakout" operations (see para 7-27).

h. Withdrawing to more favorable terrain.

i. Increasing frequency of ambush operations.

j. Preparing for the enemy's use of chemical and biological
weapons.

k. Establishing caches in potential withdrawal areas.

7-21
 l. Emphasizing passive air defense measures.

m. Planning for employment of concentrated fires of automatic and

semiautomatic weapons against helicopters and low-performance
aircraft.

n. Planning counteractions against enemy heliborne and airborne

operations.
o. Taking adequate communication security measures.

p. As a last resort, implementing dispersal plan. This plan must

include instructions covering interim conduct and ultimate
reassembly.
7-27. GUERRILLA BREAKOUT OPERATIONS

a. As discussed earlier, encirclement by counterguerrilla forces

poses the greatest threat to guerrilla forces. The Special Forces and
guerrilla commanders must be constantly on the alert for indications
of an encirclement. When they receive indications that an encircling
movement is in progress, the guerrillas immediately maneuver to
escape while enemy lines are still thin and spread out and
coordination between advancing units is not yet well established. If
escape is not accomplished and the enemy completes his encirclement,
the guerrilla force attempts a breakout.

b. If an encirclement is a difficult operation, a breakout from

encirclement is equally difficult. Unless the encircled guerrilla
force has explicit orders to defend in place, the decision should be
made to break out and the operation executed before the enemy is able
to establish an organized containment. The need for quick decision
making, however, should not lead to an attempted breakout without
adequate planning. The plan should include consideration of the
following factors

(1) Area for the attack. The main attack should be launched
against enemy weakness in a direction which will insure breakthrough
in the shortest possible time. The direction of attack may be
indicated by designating objectives and an axis of advance.
Objectives are assigned to insure penetration of the encircling force
and preservation of the gap created.

(2) Time of attack. Since deception and secrecy are essential to

a successful breakout, the Special Forces and guerrilla commanders
may decide to attack during darkness or other periods of limited
visibility. The effectiveness of enemy air must also be considered in
selecting the time for the breakout. When the enemy has local air
superiority, it may be necessary to conduct the breakout at night or
when weather conditions reduce the effectiveness of his air.

(3) Organization. An encircled guerrilla force is usually

organized into four distinct tactical groups for the breakout.
7-22
 (a) A rupture force--which may vary in sire from one-third to
two-thirds of the total encircled force is assigned the mission of
penetrating the enemy encirclement widening the gap, and holding the
shoulders of the gap until all other encircled forces can move
through. After all other encircled forces have passed through the
penetrated area, the rupture force may be employed as a rear guard.

(b) A reserve force--provides rear and flank security and may

assist the rupture force by conducting diversionary attacks. When
freedom of action is gained, this force may become the advance guard
for further movement.

(c) A rear guard--covers the withdrawal of other forces from

the perimeter. It withdraws on order after all other units have
cleared the perimeter. After passing through the penetrated area,
they rejoin their parent units.

(d) A main body—consisting of all guerrilla forces not

assigned to one of the other three elements.

(4) Deception. Effective deception may be achieved by employing

feints, diversionary attacks, or demonstrations. These measures are
designed to deceive the enemy as to the location of the main attack.
If sufficient guerrilla forces are available, it may be effective to
break out at more than one point.

(5) Concentration of forces. Prior to the breakout., there must

be a gradual change of emphasis from the defense of the perimeter to
the formation of a strong breakout force. As the situation permits,
every element that can be spared from the perimeter must be assembled
for employment in the breakout.

(6) Communication. Since secrecy is essential to the success of

breakout operations, messengers should be used within the encircled
unit. Radio and wire may be used, but transmissions must be closely
guarded.

(7) Logistics.

(a) Plans must be made to relieve the guerrillas of all

equipment and supplies not essential for the fighting during the
breakout. Nonessential equipment and supplies will be destroyed or
cached.

(b) Once the planning is completed, the breakout is executed.

Since secrecy and security are essential, a strict sequence of events
for the operation must be followed. Guerrilla scouts are employed to
locate a weak point in the enemy's line of encirclement along an axis
of movement that will benefit the guerrillas following the breakout.
Elements on the defensive perimeter which are to participate in the
breakout as a part of the rupture force, reserve force, or main body
7-23
are released from their defense mission. These elements are assembled
with their respective tactical groups at the latest practicable time
before the breakout is to be initiated.
(c) At the scheduled time of attack, the rupture force,
supported by indirect fires (and tactical air when available),
effects the penetration, widens the gap, and holds the shoulders of
the penetration. The main body and reserve force then pass through
the gap and continue the attack to the assigned objective. The rear
guard withdraws on order and follows the reserve force through the
gap. When all encircled forces have passed through the gap, the
rupture force withdraws, prepared to fight a rear guard action. The
guerrillas attempt to break contact with the enemy as rapidly as
possible and proceed to mission support sites or alternate bases
where they can prepare for future operations.

Section VII. STAY-BEHIND OPERATIONS

7-28. GENERAL

a. Stay-behind operations involve the positioning of Special

Forces operational elements within their proposed operational areas
prior to enemy advances through, or enemy occupation of, general
areas. This type of operation enables the Special Forces elements to:

(1) Organize a nucleus of resistance forces, or

(2) Pre-position themselves for employment in a unilateral role.

b. Stay-behind operations should be considered when the civil

populace indicates it will support stay-behind operations.

7-29. ADVANTAGES OF STAY-BEHIND OPERATIONS

a. Operations may be planned and rehearsed prior to hostilities.

b. Less external support is required.

c. e. Personnel are familiar with operational area.

d. A high degree of security is possible.

e. Previously established civilian contacts may be exploited.

f. Caches of supplies and equipment can be established.

g. Immediate intelligence is available.

7-24
7-30. DISADVANTAGES OF STAY-BEHIND OPERATIONS

a. Enemy troops are nearby during occupation of the operational

areas.

b. Movement and communications are greatly restricted.

c. Special Forces members may be compromised by informers.

7-31. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

a. Stringent precautions must be taken to preserve security,
particularly at refuge areas or at other safe sites to be used during
the initial period of occupation. Information concerning locations
and identities within the organization must be kept on a need-to-know
basis. Contacts between the various elements involved in a stay-
behind operation are held to a minimum.

b. Consideration should be given to pre-positioning personnel.

This consists of placing highly trained and selected personnel in
areas to function as intelligence agents and to establish and
maintain contact with underground elements. When stay-behind
operations are attempted, the Special Forces elements may be
completely dependent on the indigenous organization for security,
contacts required for expansion, and buildup of the effort.

7-32. ACTIVITIES

Initially, stay-behind elements may be used for intelligence missions

and for demolitions which the withdrawing force was unable to execute
or which are contingent upon certain courses of enemy action.
Subsequent activities begin at an appropriate time when civilian or
military leaders call upon the population of the occupied area to
continue resistance against the enemy. These subsequent activities
include all forms of guerrilla warfare, subversion, and sabotage.

Section VIII. THE RAID

7-33. PURPOSE.
A raid is an operation, usually small scale, involving a swift
penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the
enemy, or destroy his installations. It ends with a planned
withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. It is used to:

a. Destroy or damage fixed installations/facilities.

b. Destroy or capture weapons, ammunition, equipment, and

supplies.
c. Eliminate or capture enemy personnel.

7-25
 d. Liberate friendly personnel.

e. Harass and demoralize the enemy.

f. Distract attention from other operations.

g. Force the enemy to deploy additional units to protect rear

areas.

7-34. ORGANIZATION OF THE RAID FORCE

The size of the raid force depends on the mission, the nature and
location of the target, and the enemy situation. The raid force may
vary from a few personnel attacking a checkpoint to a battalion
attacking a large supply depot. Regardless of size, the raid force
consists of four basic elements: command, assault, security, and
support.

a. Command Element. This element is normally composed of the raid

force commander and personnel providing general support for the raid,
such as medical aidmen, radio operations, and, if a fire support
element is part of the raid, a forward observer. Command elements are
not normally assigned specific duties with any element. The command
element may be placed with any of the major elements of the raid
force, and wherever the raid force commander may best influence and
control the action. When personnel who normally comprise a command
element perform specific duties with an element, they are assigned to
that element, and no separate command element is organized.

b. Assault Element. The assault element is organized as determined

by the mission and, specifically, by what is needed to accomplish the
major objectives of the raid.

(1) If the raid objective is to attack and render unusable a

critical element of a target system, such as a bridge or tunnel, it
assaults and overcomes the key security functions; this is followed
immediately by the special task party which places and detonates the
demolition charges.

(2) If the target is enemy personnel, it may conduct its attack

with a high proportion of automatic weapons, covered by supporting
fire from the support element. In most instances the assault element
moves physically on or into the target; in other instances it is able
to accomplish its task from a distance.

c. Support Element. The support element of the raid force may be

committed in diversionary or coordinated attacks at several points on
the target to permit the assault element to gain access to the
target. It also executes such complementary tasks as eliminating
guards, breaching and removing obstacles to the objective, conducting
7-26
diversionary or holding actions, assisting where necessary by
providing fire support, and acting as demolition teams to set charges
to neutralize, destroy, or render elements of the target unusable.
Normally, the support element covers the withdrawal of the assault
element from the immediate area of the objective, withdrawing itself
on order.

d. Security Element. The security element supports the raid by

securing rallying points, giving early warning of enemy approach,
blocking avenues of approach into the objective area, preventing
enemy escape from the objective area, and acting as the rear guard
for the raid force. The size of the security element depends on the
enemy's capability to intervene and disrupt the operations.

(1) As the assault element moves into position, security elements

keep the command group informed of all enemy activities, firing only
if detected and on order from the command group.

(2) Once the assault element has begun its action, the security
element prevents enemy entry into or escape from the objective area.

(3) As the raid force withdraws, the security element conducts a

rear guard action designed to disrupt and ambush enemy movement and
pursuit and to create confusion by leading the enemy away from the
main force's avenue of withdrawal.

7-35. PREPARATION

a. Planning Considerations.

(1) The nature of the terrain and the combat efficiency of the
raiding force must be considered. The first step in the selection of
the target is based on its criticality, accessibility, vulnerability,
and recuperability. The criticality and recuperability of various
targets can be assessed prior to infiltration during the course of
the area study and operational area intelligence study. Accessibility
and vulnerability are situation dependent and these assessments must
be supported by current intelligence.

(2) Additionally, the Special Forces and resistance force

commanders must consider any possible adverse effects on their units
and the civilian populace as a result of the raid.' The objective is
to diminish the enemy's military potential, but an improperly timed
operation may provoke enemy counteraction for which resistance units
and the populace are unprepared. Every precaution must be taken to
insure that civilians are not needlessly subjected to harsh reprisals
because of raid actions. An unsuccessful attack often may have
disastrous effects on troop morale; successful operations, on the
other hand, raise morale and increase the units' and their leaders'
prestige in the eyes of the civilians, making them more willing to
7-27
provide support. The impact of successful raids can be exploited in
detachment psychological and propaganda programs; before such action
is taken, however, any possible unfavorable repercussions from the
population and the enemy military forces must be considered. If a
raid is unsuccessful, psychological operations will be required to
lessen any adverse effects on the friendly indigenous force.

(3) Although detailed, the plan for a raid must be simple and not
depend on too many contingencies for success. Activities are planned
so that the target installation is not alerted. This means that
activities in the objective area will conform to normal patterns.
Times and space are carefully considered--time is allowed for
assembly and movement. All factors are considered to determine
whether movement and attack should be made during daylight or
darkness. Darkness naturally favors surprise and normally is the best
time when the operation is simple and physical arrangement of the
installation is known. Early dawn or dusk is favored when inadequate
knowledge of the installation or other factors necessitates tight
control of the operation. A withdrawal late in the day or at night
makes close pursuit by the enemy more difficult.

b. Intelligence. The raid force commander must have maximum

intelligence of the target, of enemy forces capable of intervening,
of the civilian population's attitude and support, and of the terrain
to be traversed en route to and from the objective area; therefore,
an intensive intelligence effort precedes the raid. Resistance force
intelligence and reconnaissance elements conduct premission
reconnaissance of the route to the target and of the target itself.
In guerrilla operations, local auxiliary sources are exploited, and
the auxiliaries may act as guides. Surveillance of the target begins
early and continues up to the time of attack. The raid force
commander exercises extreme caution to insure the secrecy of the
impending operation; he carefully assigns missions to resistance
force reconnaissance elements so that the local population will not
become alerted and alarmed.

c. Rehearsals of Participants. Realistic rehearsals for the

operation are conducted by all participants; terrain similar to that
found in the target area is used when available. Sand tables,
sketches, photographs, and target mockups are used to assist in
briefings. Contingency and emergency actions are practiced, and final
rehearsals are conducted under conditions of visibility expected in
the objective area.

d. Final Inspection. The raid force commander conducts a final

inspection of personnel and equipment before moving to the objective
area. If' possible, weapons are test fired, faulty equipment is
replaced, and the physical condition of each man is checked. Personal
belongings are checked to insure that no incriminating documents are
carried during the operation. This inspection assures the raid force
7-28
commander that his unit is equipped and ready for operation.
7-36. MOVEMENT

Movement to the objective area is planned and conducted to allow the

raid force to approach the target undetected. Movement may be over
single or multiple routes. The preselected route or routes may
terminate in or near one or more MSS's. Every effort is made to avoid
contact with the enemy during movement. Upon reaching the designated
rendezvous and MSS, security parties are deployed and final
coordination takes place before moving to the attack position.

Figure 7-3
Movement to the objective.
7-37. ACTION IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA

Special parties move to their positions and eliminate sentries,

breach or remove obstacles, and execute other assigned tasks. The
assault element quickly follows the special parties into, the target
area. Once the objective of the raid has been accomplished, the
assault element and special parties withdraw, covered by fire support
elements with preselected fires. If the attack is unsuccessful, the
action is terminated to prevent undue loss of personnel and the
special parties withdraw according to plan. The assault and support
elements die at one or more rallying points while the security
elements cover the withdrawal according to plan. The assault element
withdraws on signal or at a prearranged time.

7-29
 Figure 7-4
Action in the objective area.

7-38. WITHDRAWAL

a. Withdrawal is designed to achieve maximum deception of the

enemy and minimum danger to the raid force.

(1) The various elements of the raid force withdraw, on order,

over predetermined routes to the base area, through a series of
rallying points.

(2) Should the enemy organize a close pursuit of the assault

element, the security element assists by fire and movement,
distracting the enemy, and slowing him down.

(3) If other elements of the raid force are closely pursued by

the many, they do not attempt to reach the initial rallying point;
but, on their own initiative, they lead the enemy away from the
remainder, of the force and attempt to lose him by evasive action in
difficult terrain.

(4) Specific instructions must be issued to the raiding force

concerning such contingencies. Time-distance to be traveled; fire
support and firepower, and the physical condition of the raiding
force personnel will determine what course of action to follow. An
7-30
attempt may be made to reestablish contact with the main force at
other rallying points, to continue to the base area as separate
groups, to reach selected areas for evacuation, or, as a last resort,
to hold up in a selected MSS until such time as relief can be
effected by the main force or a local auxiliary element.
(5) The raid force, or elements of it, may separate and proceed
as small groups or individuals to evade close pursuit.
b. Frequently in withdrawal operations, the raid force may
disperse in smaller units, withdrawing in different directions and
reassembling later at a predesignated place to conduct further
operations. Elements of the raid force can conduct other operations,
such as an ambush or pursuing the enemy force, during the withdrawal.

Figure 7-5
Withdrawal from the objective area.
7-39. LARGE RAIDS

a. General. When a target is large and well guarded, a larger raid

force is required to insure a successful attack. Large raids may
involve using a battalion-size unit; and, though conduct is similar
to that for smaller raids, additional problems must be considered.

7-31
 b. Movement to Objective Area. Surprise is just as desirable as in
a smaller raid, but it is usually harder to achieve. In operational
areas, the number of troops to be assembled and deployed may require
additional MSS's at a greater distance from the target to preserve
secrecy; this will necessitate a longer move to the attack position.
A large raid force usually moves by small components over multiple
routes to the objective area.

Figure 7-6
Movement to the objective area—large raid force.

c. Control. Another problem inherent in a large raid is that of

control. Units without extensive radio communication equipment or
units operating in an active EW environment will find coordination of
widespread elements difficult to achieve. Pyrotechnics, audible
signals, runners, or predesignated times may be used to coordinate
action. In any event, even under optimum conditions massing of the
raid force at the objective is extremely difficult. The resultant
complexity of the plan and the possibility of overall failure if
subordinate elements do not arrive on time must be carefully
considered during the planning phase.
d. Training. A high degree of training and discipline is required
to execute a large raid. Extensive rehearsals assist in preparing the
force for the mission. In particular, commanders and staffs must
learn to use large numbers of troops as a cohesive fighting force.

e. Fire Support. Additional fire support is usually required. Ira

UWOA's this may mean secretly caching ammunition in MSS's over a
7-32
period of time before the raid. Guerrillas may each carry a mortar,
recoilless rifle round, rocket or box of machinegun ammunition, and
leave them at the MSS or firing position for fire support units.

f. Timing. Timing is usually more difficult for a large raid. More

time is required to move units, and the main action element needs
more time to perform its mission. This requires stronger security
elements to isolate the objective for longer periods. The time of the
raid takes on increased importance because of the large numbers of
personnel involved. Movement to the objective is usually accomplished
during periods of low visibility; however, because of fire support
coordination requirements and large numbers of personnel, the action
may take place during daylight hours.

g. Withdrawal. In a UWOA, withdrawal from a large raid usually is

by smaller groups over multiple routes in order to deceive the enemy
and dissipate his pursuit. Dispersed withdrawal also denies a
lucrative target to enemy air and fire support elements. However, the
raid force commander must consider the possibility of an alert and
aggressive enemy defeating the dispersed elements of the force. All
factors must be carefully weighed before deciding on how to conduct
the withdrawal.

Section IX. AMBUSHES

7-40. INTRODUCTION

a. An ambush is a surprise attack from a concealed position upon a

moving or temporarily halted target. It is one of the oldest and most
effective types of military operations.
b. Ambush may include assault to close with and decisively engage
the target, or the attack may be by fire only.

c. Ambush is highly effective in conventional operations and even

more suitable and effective in guerrilla and counterguerrilla
operations.

(1) It is a favorite tactic of guerrilla forces because:

(a) It does not require that ground be seized and held.

(b) It enables small forces with limited weapons and equipment
to harass or destroy larger, better armed forces.

(2) It is an effective counterguerrilla measure because:

(a) It forces the guerrillas to engage in decisive combat at

unfavorable times and places.

(b) It denies the guerrillas the freedom of movement on which

their success so greatly depends.

7-33
 (c) It deprives the guerrillas of weapons, ammunition, and
equipment that is very difficult to replace.
(d) The death or capture of "hard core" personnel greatly
weakens the guerrilla force.

7-41. PURPOSE

Ambushes are executed to reduce the enemy's overall combat

effectiveness, to destroy, and to harass.

a. Destruction is the primary purpose because loss of men killed

or captured and loss of equipment and supplies destroyed or captured
critically affects the enemy. The capture of equipment and supplies
may assist our forces.

b. Harassment, a secondary purpose, is also very important.

Frequent ambushes force the enemy to divert men from other missions
to guard convoys, troop movements, and carrying parties. When patrols
fail to accomplish their missions because they are ambushed, the
enemy is deprived of the valuable contributions these patrols would
make to his combat effort. A series of successful ambushes causes the
enemy to be less aggressive and more defensive minded. His men become
apprehensive and overly cautious. They become reluctant to go on
patrols, to move in convoys, or, to move in small groups. They seek
to avoid night operations, are more subject to confusion and panic if
ambushed, and, in general, decline in effectiveness.

7-42. TYPES OF AMBUSHES

There are three types of ambush: point, area, and hasty.

a. A point ambush is one where elements are deployed to support

attack of a single killing zone.

b. An area ambush is one where elements are deployed as multiple

related point ambushes.

c. A hasty ambush is an immediate action drill (appendix E).

7-43. DESCRIPTIVE TERMS/DISCUSSIONS OF AMBUSH OPERATIONS

a. Ambush Site--The terrain on which a point ambush is

established.
b. Killing Zone--The portion of an ambush site where fires are
concentrated to isolate, trap, and destroy the target.

c. Ambush Force--The patrol, squad, platoon, or other unit which

establishes an ambush.

7-34
 d. Attack Force--The fire and maneuver portion of a point ambush.
In a patrol, the assault and support elements are the attack force.
e. Security Element--The early warning and/or security portion of
a point ambush. In a patrol, the security element is the security
force.

f. "Rise From the Ground" Ambush--A point ambush in which the

attack element is completely concealed in the "spider hole" type of
covered foxholes. When the ambush is initiated, the assault element
throws back the covers and "rises from the ground" to attack the
target. This ambush is usually the "near" ambush described below.
This ambush is appropriate in open terrain, seemingly void of good
cover and concealment, and otherwise lacking the features considered
desirable in a good ambush site.

g. Near Ambush--A point ambush whose assault element is located

within reasonable assaulting distance of the killing zone (50 meters
is a guide figure). Close terrain, such as jungle and heavy woods,
may require this positioning. It may also be appropriate in open
terrain in a "rise from the ground" ambush.

h. Far Ambush--A point ambush whose assault element is located

beyond reasonable assaulting distance of the killing zone (beyond 50
meters is a guide figure). This location may be appropriate in open
terrain offering good fields of fire or when attack is by fire only
(harassing ambush).

i. Harassing Ambush--An ambush in which attack is by fire only.

j. Destruction Ambush--An ambush which includes assault to close

with and decisively engage the target.

k. Deliberate Ambush--An ambush planned as a specific action

against a specific target. Detailed information of the target is
required: size, nature, organization, armament, equipment, route of
movement, and times the target will reach or pass certain points on
its route. Deliberate ambushes are planned when:

(1) Reliable information is received on the intended movement of

a specific force.

(2) Patrols, convoys, carrying parties, or similar forces

establish patterns of size, time, and movement sufficient to perm it
detailed planning for their ambush.
l. Ambush of Opportunity--The ambush of a target of opportunity,
often the action of a search and attack patrol.

(1) When available information does not permit the detailed

panning required for deliberate ambush, an ambush of opportunity is

7-35
planned.In his case, the ambush force plans and prepares for the
ambush and attacks the first suitable target appearing.
(2) A search and attack patrol, before departing, plans and
rehearses the ambush of the types of targets it may encounter. It
establishes and executes ambushes as opportunities arise.

m. Line, L, Z, T, V, Triangle (Open and Closed), and Box--Ambush

formations are discussed herein.

7-44. FUNDAMENTALS OF SUCCESSFUL AMBUSH

Surprise, coordinated fires, and control are the basic elements

essential to successful ambush.
a. Surprise. Surprise must be achieved, otherwise the attack is
not an ambush; it is surprise that distinguishes ambush from other
forms of attack. It is surprise that allows the ambush force to seize
and retain control of the situation. If complete surprise cannot be
achieved, it must be so nearly complete that the target is not aware
of the ambush until too late for effective reaction. Surprise is
achieved by careful planning, preparation, and execution. Targets are
attacked when, where, and in a manner for which they are least.,
prepared.

b. Coordinated Fires. All weapons, including mines and

demolitions, must be positioned, and all fires, including those of
available artillery and mortars, must be coordinated to achieve

(1) The isolation of the killing zone to prevent escape or

reinforcement.

(2) The surprise delivery of a large volume of highly

concentrated fires into the killing zone. These fires must inflict
maximum damage so that, when desired, the target can be speedily
assaulted and completely destroyed.

c. Control. Close control must be maintained during movement to,

occupation of, and withdrawal from the ambush site.

(1) The ambush commander must effectively control all elements.

Control is most critical at the time of approach of the target.
Control measures must provide for:

(a) Early warning of target approach.

(b) Withholding fire until the target has moved into the
killing zone.
(c) Opening fire at the proper time.

7-36
 (d) Initiating appropriate actions if the ambush is
prematurely detected.

(e) Lifting or shifting supporting fires when the attack

includes assault of the target.

(f) Timely and orderly withdrawal to an easily recognized

rallying point.

(2) Personnel conducting the ambush must control themselves so

that the ambush is not compromised. They must remain still and quiet
while waiting for the target to appear. They may have to forego
smoking, endure insect bits and thirst in silence, and resist
sleeping, easing cramped muscles, and performing normal body
functions. When the target approaches, they must not open fire before
the signal is given.

7-45. POINT AMBUSH

a. General.

(1) A point ambush, whether independent or part of an area

ambush, is positioned along the target's expected route of approach.
Formation is important because, to a great extent, it determines
whether a point ambush can deliver the heavy volume of highly
concentrated fire necessary to isolate, trap, and destroy the target.

(2) The formation to be used is determined by carefully

considering possible formations and the advantages and disadvantages
of each in relation to terrain, conditions of visibility, forces,
weapons, and equipment; ease or difficulty of control; target to be
attacked; and overall combat situation.

(3) This manual discusses a few formations which have been

developed for the deployment of point ambushes. Those discussed are
identified by giving them names which correspond to the general
pattern formed on the ground by deployment of the attack element.

b. Point Ambush Formations.

(1) Line. The attack element is deployed generally parallel to

the target's route of movement (road, trail, stream). This positions
the attack element parallel to the long axis of the killing zone and
subjects the target to heavy flanking fire. The size of the target
which can be trapped in the killing zone is limited by the area which
the attack element can effectively cover with a heavy volume of
highly concentrated fire. The target is trapped in the killing zone
by natural obstacles, mines (Claymore, anti-vehicular,
antipersonnel), demolitions, and direct and indirect fires (1, fig.
7-7). A disadvantage of the line formation is the chance that lateral
dispersion of the target may be too great for effective coverage.
7-37
Line formation is appropriate in close terrain which restricts target
maneuver and in open terrain where one flank is restricted by mines,
demolition's, mantraps, or sharpened stakes. Similar obstacles can be
placed between the attack element and the killing zone to provide
protection from the target's counterambush measures. When a
destruction ambush is deployed in this manner, access lanes are left
so that the target can be assaulted (2, fig. 7--7). The line
formation can be effectively used by a "rise from the ground" ambush
in terrain seemingly unsuitable for ambush. An advantage of the line
formation is its relative ease of control under all conditions of
visibility.

Figure 7-7
Ambush formations.

7-38
 Figure 7-7 – Continued.

(2) The L. The L-shaped formation is a variation of the line

formation. The long side of the attack element is parallel to the
killing zone and delivers flanking fire. The short side of the attack
element is at the end of, and at right angles to, the killing zone
and delivers enfilading fire which interlocks with fire from the
other leg. This formation is very flexible. It can be established on
a straight stretch of a trail or stream (3, fig. 7-7), or at a sharp
bend in a trail or stream (4, fig. 7-7). When appropriate, fire from
the short leg can be shifted to parallel the long leg if the target
attempts to assault or escape in the opposite direction. In addition,
the short leg prevents escape in its direction and reinforcement from
its direction (5, fig. 7-7).

7-39
 Figure 7-7 – Continued

7-40
 Figure 7-7 – Continued.

(3) The Z. The Z-shaped formation is another variation of the

line formation. The attack force is deployed as in the L formation,
but with an additional side so that the formation resembles the
letter Z. The additional side (6, fig. 7-7) may serve:

(a) To engage a force attempting to relieve or reinforce the

target.

(b) To seal the end of the killing zone.

(c) To restrict a flank.

7-41
 Figure 7-7 – Continued.

(4) The T. In the T-shaped formation the attack element is

deployed across, and at right angles to, the target's route of
movement so that it and the target form the letter T. This formation
can be used day or night to establish a purely harassing ambush and
at night to establish an ambush to interdict movement through open,
hard-to-seal areas (such as rice paddies).

(a) A small group of persons can use the T formation to

harass, slow, and disorganize a larger force. When the lead elements
of the target are engaged, they will normally attempt to maneuver
right or left to close with the ambush. Mines, mantraps, and other
obstacles placed to the flanks of the killing zone slow, the enemy's
movements and permit the ambush force to deliver heavy fire and
withdraw without becoming decisively engaged (7, fig. 7-7).

7-42
 Figure 7-7 – Continued.

(b) The T formation can be used to interdict small groups

attempting night movement across open areas. For example, the attack
element is deployed along a rice paddy dike with every second person
facing in the opposite direction. The attack of a target approaching
from either direction requires only that every second person shift to
the opposite side of the dike. Each person fires only to his front
and only when the target is at very close range. Attack is by fire
only and each person keeps the target under fire as long as it
remains on his front. If the target attempts to escape in either
7-43
direction along the dike, each than takes it under fire as it comes
to his vicinity. The T formation is very effective at halting
infiltration. But it has one chief disadvantage: there is a
possibility that while spread out the ambush will engage a superior
force. Use of this formation must, therefore, fit the local enemy
situation (8, fig. 7-7).

Figure 7-7 – Continued.

(5) The V. The V-shaped attack element is deployed along both

sides of the target's route of movement so that it forms the letter
V; care is taken to insure that neither group (or leg) fires into the
other. This formation subjects the target; to both enfilading and
interlocking fire. The V formation is best suited for fairly open
terrain but can also be used in jungle. When established in jungle,
the legs of the V close in as the head elements o f the target
approach the apex of the V; they then open fire from close range.
Here, even more than in open terrain, all movement and fire must: be
carefully coordinated and controlled to insure that the fire of one
leg does not endanger the other. The wider separation of elements
makes this formation difficult to control and there are fewer sites
that favor its use. Its main advantage is that it is difficult for
the target to detect the ambush until well into the killing gone (g,
10, fig. 7-7).

7-44
Figure 7-7 – Continued. 7-45
 (6) Triangle. This is a variation of the V formation and can be
varied in three ways.

(a) Closed triangle. (11, fig. 7-7). The attack element is

deployed in three groups or parties, positioned so that they form a
triangle (or closed V). An automatic weapon is placed at each point
of the triangle, and positioned so that it can be shifted quickly to
interlock with either of the others. Men are positioned so that their
fields of fire overlap. Mortars may be positioned inside the
triangle. When deployed in this manner, the triangle ambush becomes a
small unit strongpoint which is used to interdict night movement
through rice paddies and other open areas, when target approach is
likely to be from any direction. The formation provides all-round
security, and security parties are deployed only when they can he
positioned so that, if detected by an approaching target, they will
not compromise the ambush. Attack is by fire only, and the target is
allowed to approach within close range before fire is opened.

Figure 7-7 – Continued.

7-46
 1. Advantages.

• Ease of control.

• All-round security.

• A target, approaching from any direction, can be brought

under fire of at least two automatic weapons.

2. Disadvantages.

• Requires an ambush force of platoon size or larger to

reduce the danger of being overrun by an unexpectedly large target.

• One or more legs of the triangle may come under enfilade

fire.

• Lack of dispersion, particularly at the points, increases

danger from enemy mortar fire.

(b) Open triangle (harassing ambush). This variation of the

triangle ambush is designed to enable a small force to harass, slow,
and inflict heavy casualties upon a larger force without itself being
decisively engaged. The attack element is deployed in three parties,
positioned so that each party becomes a corner of a triangle
containing the killing zone. When the target enters the killing zone,
the party to the target's front opens fire on the leading element.
When the target counterattacks, the group withdraws and an assault
party to the flank opens fire. When this party is attacked, the party
to the opposite flank opens fire. This process is repeated until the
target is pulled apart. Each party reoccupies its position, if
possible, and continues to inflict the maximum damage possible
without becoming decisively engaged (12, fig. 7-7).

(c) Open triangle (destruction ambush). The attack element is

again deployed in three parties, positioned so that each party is a
point of the triangle, 200-300 meters apart. The killing zone is the
area within the triangle. The target is allowed to enter the killing
zone; the nearest party attacks by fire. As the target attempts to
maneuver or withdraw, the other groups open fire. One or more assault
parties, as directed, assault or maneuver to envelop or destroy the
target (13, fig. 7-7). As a destruction ambush, this formation is
suitable for platoon size or larger forces. A unit smaller than a
platoon would be in too great a danger of being overrun.

7-47
 Figure 7-7 – Continued.

7-48
 Figure 7-7 – Continued.

1. Control, in assaulting or maneuvering, is very difficult.

Very close coordination and controls are necessary to insure that
assaulting or maneuvering assault parties are not fired on by another
party.

7-49
 2. The ambush site must be a fairly level, open area which
provides (around its border) concealment for the ambush element
(unless it is a "rise from the ground" ambush).

(7) Box. This formation is similar in purpose to the open

triangle ambush. The attack element is deployed in four parties,
positioned so that each party becomes a corner of a square or
rectangle containing the killing zone. It can be used for harassing
or destruction ambush in the same manner as the two variations of the
open triangle ambush (14, 15, fig. 7-7).

Figure 7-7 – Continued.

7-50
Figure 7-7 – Continued.

7-51
7-46. AREA AMBUSH

a. Background.

The origin of the type of ambush now called area ambush is not known.
It was used by Hannibal against the Romans in the second century B.C.
More recently, it was modified and perfected by the British Army in
Malaya and, with several variations, used in Vietnam. The British
found that point ambushes often failed to produce heavy casualties.
When ambushed, the Communist guerrillas would immediately break
contact and disperse along escape routes leading away from the
killing zone. The British counteracted this tactic by blocking
escape routes with point ambushes. They called these multiple related
point ambushes the area ambush.

b. Area Ambush (British Version).

(1) The British Army version of the area ambush is as follows:

(a) A point ambush is established at a site having several

trails or other escape routes leading away from it. The site may be a
water hole, an enemy campsite, a known rendezvous point, or along a
frequently traveled trail. This site is the central killing zone.

(b) Point ambushes are established along the trails or other

escape routes leading away from the central killing zone.

(c) The target, whether a single group or several groups

approaching from different directions, is permitted to move to the
central killing zone. Outlying ambushes do not attack (unless
discovered).

(d) The ambush is initiated when the target moves into the
central killing zone.

(e) When the target breaks contact and attempts to disperse,

escaping portions are intercepted and destroyed by the outlying
ambushes.

(f) The multiple contacts achieve increased casualties,

harassment, and confusion (1, fig. 7-8),

(2) This version of the area ambush is best suited to

counterguerrilla operations in terrain where movement is largely
restricted to trails. It produces best results when established as a
deliberate ambush.

7-52
 Figure 7-8.
Area ambush.

(3) When there is not sufficient intelligence for a deliberate

ambush, an area ambush of opportunity may be established. The
outlying ambushes are permitted to attack targets approaching the
central killing zone, if within their capability. If too large for
the particular outlying ambush, the target is allowed to continue and
is attacked in the central killing zone.

c. Area Ambush (Baited Trap Version).

(1) A variation of the area ambush is the "baited trap" version

(2, fig. 7-8).

7-53
 Figure 7-8 – Continued.

(a) A central killing zone is established along the target's

route of approach.

(b) Point ambushes are established along the routes over which
relieving or reinforcing units will have to approach.

(c) The target in the central killing zone serves as "bait" to

lure relieving or reinforcing units into the killing zones of the
outlying ambushes.

(d) The outlying point ambushes need not be strong enough to

destroy their targets. They may be small harassing ambushes which
delay, disorganize, and "eat away" the target by successive contacts.

(2) This version can be varied by using a fixed installation as

"bait" to lure relieving or reinforcing units into the killing zone
of one or more of the outlying ambushes. The installation replaces
the central killing zone and is attacked. The attack may intend to
overcome the installation or may be only a ruse.

(3) These two variations are best suited for situations where
routes of approach for relieving or reinforcing units are limited to
those favorable for ambush.

7-54
 (4) They are also best suited for use by guerrilla forces, rather
than counterguerrilla forces. Both variations were extensively used
by Communist guerrilla forces in Vietnam.

7-47. UNUSUAL AMBUSH TECHNIQUES

a. General. The ambush techniques described above are so well

known and widely used that they are considered "standard." Other,
less well known, less frequently used techniques are considered
"unusual." Two such techniques are described below.

b. "Rise from the Ground" Ambush.

(1) This point ambush is designed (1, fig. 7-g) to be established

in open areas which lack the good cover and concealment., and other
features normally desirable in a "good" ambush site. The attack
element is deployed in the formation best suited to the overall
situation.

(a) The attack element is completely concealed in the "spider

hole" type of covered foxhole. Soil is carefully removed and
positions expertly camouflaged.

(b) When the ambush is initiated, the attack element throws

back the covers and literally "rises from the ground" to attack.

(2) This ambush takes advantage of the tendency of patrols, and

other units, to relax in areas which do not appear to favor ambush.

(3) The chief disadvantage is that the ambush element is very

vulnerable if prematurely detected.

7-55
 Figure 7-9.
Unusual ambush techniques.

7-56
 c. Demolition Ambush.

(1) Electrically detonated mines or demolition charges, or both,

are planted in an area (2, fig. 7-9) over which a target is expected
to pass. This may be a portion .of a road or trail, an open field, or
any area which can be observed from a distance. Activating wires are
run to a concealed observation point sufficiently distant to insure
safety of the ambushers.

(2) As large a force as desired or necessary can be used to mine

the arms. Two men remain to initiate the ambush; others return to the
unit.

(3) When a target enters the mined area (killing zone) the two
men remaining detonate the explosives and withdraw immediately to
avoid detection and pursuit.

d. Special Ambush Situations.

(1) Columns protected by armor. Attacks against columns protected

by armored vehicles depend on the type and location of armored
vehicles in a column and the weapons of the ambush force. If
possible, armored vehicles are destroyed or disabled by fire of
antitank weapons, landmines, Molotov cocktails, or by throwing hand
grenades into open hatches. An effort is made to immobilize armored
vehicles at a point where they are unable to give protection to the
rest of the convoy and where they will block the route of other,
supporting vehicles.

Figure 7-9 – Continued.

7-57
 (2) Ambush of trains. Moving trains may be subjected to harassing
fire, but the most effective ambush is derailment. Derailment on a
grade, at a sharp curve, or on a high bridge will cause most of the
cars to overturn and result .in extensive casualties among the
passengers. It is desirable to derail trains so that the wreckage
remains on the tracks to delay traffic for long periods of time. Fire
is directed on the exits of overturned coaches; and designated
parties, armed with automatic weapons, rush forward to assault
coaches or cars still standing. Other parties take supplies from
freight yards and then set fire to the train. Rails are removed from
the track at some distance from the ambush site in each direction to
delay the arrival of reinforcements by train. In planning the ambush
of a train, remember that the enemy may include armored railroad cars
in the train for its protection and that important trains may be
preceded by advance guard locomotives or inspection ears to check the
track.

(3) Ambush of waterway traffic. Waterway traffic, such as barges

or ships, may be ambushed similar to a vehicular column. The ambush
party may be able to mine the waterway and thus stop traffic. If
mining is not feasible, fire delivered by recoilless weapons can
damage or sink the craft. Fire should be directed at engine room
spaces, the waterline, and the bridge. Recovery of supplies may be
possible if the craft is beached on the banks of the waterway or
grounded in shallow water.

7-48. AMBUSH PATROLS

a. General.

(1) An ambush patrol is a combat patrol whose mission is to

establish and execute an ambush to-

(a) Harass a target.

(b) Destroy a target.

(c) Capture personnel or equipment.

(d) Any combination of these.

(2) An ambush patrol is planned and prepared in the same general

manner as other patrols--by using Patrol Steps (Troop Leading
Procedures).

b. Planning and Preparation. Planning must first consider whether

the ambush is to be a deliberate ambush or an ambush of opportunity.
In a deliberate ambush the greater amount of target intelligence
available permits planning for every course of action at the target.
Planning for an ambush of opportunity must include tentative plans
not only for the types of targets which may be ambushes, but for
varying situations as well. In both, plans must be flexible enough to
7-58
allow modifying, as appropriate, at the ambush site. All plans must
be rehearsed in detail. Planning must provide for the following:

(1) Simplicity. Every person must thoroughly understand what he

is to do at every stage of the operation. In ambush, more so than in
other operations, failure of even one person to perform exactly as
planned can cause failure.

(2) Type of ambush. Type of ambush (point or area) affects

organization, number of men required, equipment and communications
required, and all other aspects of the patrol.

(3) Deployment. Each possible formation must be considered for

its advantages and disadvantages.

(4) Manner of attack. Attack may be by fire only (harassing

ambush) or may include assault of the target (destruction ambush).

(5) Size of ambush force. The patrol is tailored for its mission.
Two men may be adequate for an harassing ambush. A destruction ambush
may require the entire unit (squad, platoon, company).

(6) Organization. An ambush patrol is organized in the same

manner as other combat patrols to include a patrol headquarters, an
assault element, a support element, and a security element. The
assault and support elements are the attack force; the security
element is the security force. When appropriate, the attack force is
further organized to provide a reserve force. When an ambush site is
to be occupied for an extended period, double ambush forces may be
organized. One ambush force occupies the site while the other rests,
eats, and tends to personal needs at the objective rallying point or
other concealed location. They alternate each 8 hours. If the waiting
period is over 24 hours, three ambush forces are organized (fig. 7-
10).

(7) Equipment. The selection of accompanying equipment/ supplies

is based on:

(a) The mission.

(b) The enemy threat.

(c) The size of the resistance force.

(d) The means of transportation.

(e) The distance and terrain.

(f) The weight and bulk of equipment.

7-59
 Figure 7-10 – Continued.

7-60
 (8) Routes.

(a) A primary route is planned which will allow the patrol to

enter the ambush site from the rear. The killing zone is not entered
if entry can be avoided. If the killing zone must be entered to
place-mines or explosives, great care must; be taken to remove any
tracks and signs that might alert the target and compromise the
ambush. If mines, mantraps, or explosives are to be placed on the far
side, or if the appearance of the site from the target's viewpoint is
to be checked, a wide detour around the killing zone is made. Here,
too, great care must be taken to remove any traces which might reveal
the ambush.

(b) An alternate route from the ambush site is planned, as in

other patrols.

(9) Site. Maps and aerial photographs are used to analyze the
terrain. When possible, an on-the-ground reconnaissance is made. As
far as possible, so-called "ideal" ambush sites are avoided. An alert
enemy is suspicious of these areas, avoids them if possible, and
increases vigilance and security when they must be entered. Surprise
is even more difficult to achieve in these areas. Instead, apparently
unlikely sites are chosen when possible. Considering this, an ambush
site must provide

(a) Favorable fields of fire.

(b) For occupation and preparation of concealed positions.

(c) Canalization of the target into the killing zone.

(d) Covered routes of withdrawal to enable the ambush force to

break contact and avoid pursuit by effective fire.

(10) Occupation of the site. As a general rule, the ambush

force occupies the ambush site at the latest possible time
permitted by the tactical situation and the amount of site
preparation required. This not only reduces the risk of
discovery but also reduces the time men must remain still and
quiet in position.

(11) Positions. The patrol moves into the ambush site from
the rear ((8) above. Security elements are positioned first to
prevent surprise while the ambush is being established.
Automatic weapons are then positioned so that each can fire
along the entire killing zone. If this is not possible, they are
given overlapping sectors of fire so that the entire killing
zone is covered. The patrol leader then selects his position, located
where he can tell when to initiate the ambush. Riflemen and
grenadiers are then placed to cover any dead space left by the
automatic weapons. All weapons are assigned sectors of fire to
7-61
provide mutual support. The patrol leader sets a time by which
positions are to be prepared. The degree of preparation depends on
the time allowed. All men work at top speed during the allotted time.

(12) Camouflage. Camouflage is of utmost importance. Each man

must be hidden from the target. During preparation for the patrol,
each man camouflages himself and his equipment and secures his
equipment to prevent noise. At the ambush site, positions' are
prepared with minimum change .in the natural appearance of the site.
All debris resulting from preparation of positions is concealed.

(13) Movement, noise, and light discipline. Movement is kept to a

minimum and the number of men moving; at a time is closely
controlled. Every man is as quiet as possible, especially a?: night.
Light discipline is rigidly enforced at night. Smoking is forbidden
at night and is closely controlled in the day.

c. Execution.

(1) Signals. Three signals, often four, are needed to execute the
ambush. Audible and visual signals, such as whistles and
pyrotechnics, must be changed often to avoid establishing patterns.
Too frequently, use of the same signals may result, in their becoming
known to the enemy. A target might recognize a signal and be able to
react in time to avoid the full effects of an ambush. For example, if
a white star cluster is habitually used to signal withdrawal in a
night ambush, an alert enemy might fire one and cause premature
withdrawal.

(a) A signal by the security force to alert they patrol leader

to the target's approach may be given by-

1. Arm-and-hand signals.

2. Radio, as a quiet voice message, by transmitting a

prearranged number of taps, or by signaling with the push--to-talk
switch.

3. Field telephone, when there is no danger that wire

between positions will compromise the ambush.

(b) A signal to initiate the ambush, given by the patrol

leader or a designated individual, may be a shot or the detonation of
mines or explosives.

(c) A signal for lifting or shifting fires, if the target is

to be assaulted may be given by voice; command, whistles, or
pyrotechnics. All fire must stop immediately so that the assault; can
be made before the target can react.

7-62
 (d) A signal for withdrawal may also be by voice command,
whistles, or pyrotechnics.

(2) Fire Discipline. This is a key part of the ambush. Fire must
be withheld until the signal is given, then immediately delivered in
the heaviest, most accurate volume possible. Properly timed and
delivered fires contribute heavily to the achievement of surprise as
well as to destruction. of the target. When the target is to be
assaulted, the lifting or shifting of fires must be equally precise.
Otherwise, the assault is delayed and the target has opportunity to
recover and react.

(3) Withdrawal to the Objective Rallying Point.

(a) The objective rallying point is located far enough from

the ambush site that it will not be overrun if the target attacks the
ambush. Routes of withdrawal to the objective rallying point are
reconnoitered. Situation permitting, each person walks the route he
is to use and picks out checkpoints. When the ambush is to be
executed at night, each person must be able to follow his route in
the dark.

(b) On signal, the patrol quickly but quietly withdraws to the

objective rallying point, reorganizes, and begins its return march.

(c) If the ambush was not successful and the patrol is

pursued, withdrawal may be by bounds. The last group may arm mines,
previously placed along the withdrawal route, to further delay
pursuit.

Section X. MINING AND SNIPING

7-49. GENERAL

Mines, boobytraps, and snipers can be used to interdict enemy lines

of communication and key areas. They may also be used to support
raids and ambushes.

7-50. MINING

Mining affords the Special Forces and resistance force commander a

means of interdicting enemy routes of communication and key areas
with little expenditure of manpower. Mines may be used in support of
specific tactical operations or for general harassment of the enemy
by emplacement along routes of enemy movement. They may be emplaced
around installations to cause casualties, limit movement, and induce
low morale among enemy troops. For detailed information on use and
installation of mines, boobytraps, and other devices, see (C) FM 5-
31.

7-63
7-51. SNIPING

a. General. Sniping as an interdiction technique has a

demoralizing effect on the enemy. A few personnel, well-trained in
sniper operations and properly deployed, can cause numerous
casualties, hinder or temporarily deny enemy use of certain routes or
areas, and may require him to employ a disproportionate number of
troops to rid the area of snipers. Detachment commanders and
resistance force commanders selecting, training, and deploying
snipers throughout their area must be completely familiar with their
use, be able to train them properly, and plan for logistical support
in acquiring special sniper equipment to make them effective in all
types of operations.

b. The Sniper. A sniper is an expert rifleman, physically and

mentally hardened to endure long periods of loneliness and hardship.
Ire must be able to:

(1) Estimate ranges.

(2) Search areas systematically.

(3) Locate and identify sounds.

(4) Use cover, concealment, and camouflage.

(5) Use maps, sketches, aerial photographs, and the compass.

(6) Recognize enemy personnel and equipment quickly.

(7) Move without detection.

(8) Endure long periods of waiting (patience).

c. Missions. Snipers assigned areas of responsibility should have

mission-type orders outlining priority targets that may include
killing key enemy personnel such as patrol leaders, gunners of crew-
served and automatic weapons, communication personnel, observers, and
enemy snipers. In the absence of these priority targets, they may
fire on any enemy personnel. Snipers may cover an area that has been
reined to prevent removal or exploitation of the minefield. They may
be used as part of a raid or ambush to stop enemy personnel escaping
the area under attack. In addition to their sniping mission, they may
collect information for intelligence sections of the area command or
guerrilla units. In their constant search for targets, they become
thoroughly familiar with the terrain, enemy actions, and movements,
routes of communications, and other activities.

d. Selection and Training. Detachment commanders and resistance

force commanders select snipers from their outstanding guerrilla
force personnel, specifically the rifleman in operational units.
7-64
Additional training should be given in maintenance and operation of
electronic night firing devices, viewing devices such as telescopic
sights, and other types of firing devices as the commanders deem
necessary or as time permits.

e. Planning for Their Use. Plans must be made to properly locate

individual snipers or sniper teams. The use of snipers should be
incorporated into the tactical plan of the area commander, and their
use should be coordinated with individual guerrilla units and
subsector commanders. When snipers are being employed in specific
areas, all operations should be curtailed in that area or conducted
on a limited basis. Special provisions must be made for the sniper's
rest and recuperation after strenuous tours of duty. This may require
a special unit, tightly controlled by the area command.

f. Sniffer Teams. Snipers are best employed in pairs, particularly

when operating from a stationary post. Remaining in one position for
long periods of time, and the constant use of binoculars, places a
heavy strain on one man. By working in pairs, snipers can alternate
duties, thus keeping their post in continuous operation. One observes
and estimates ranges, while the other fires. The first shot should be
a hit.

g. The Individual Sniper. The individual sniper is normally used

when two might be detected. He can often cover a large area by moving
from one firing position to another as often as required in the
search for worthwhile targets and good fields of fire. Close
coordination between sector and subsector commanders is required in
these cases.

h. Equipment. The individual sniper carries only the equipment and

supplies needed to complete the mission within an estimated time. In
some instances, he may have to rely on MSS's or caches to replenish
supplies and equipment for either his operational role or his
survival. The decision to release the location of these sites to the
sniper or sniper teams rests with the area commander. The sniper may
need, as a minimum, his weapon; binoculars; watch; compass; map;
camouflaged clothing; telescope sight and, if available, infrared
weapon sight or ametascope; and individual rations. Other equipment
to support assigned missions should be obtained as required.

7-52. OBSTACLES

Obstacles and expedient devices can be used to the fullest extent

against many personnel to support security operations of base camps,
installations, and facilities.

a. Security of Base Operations. Guerrilla units and other

resistance forces operating as military units normally establish base
camps, installations, and facilities in remote areas not easily
accessible to the enemy except for foot troops. Special Forces and
resistance force commanders should support their inner security zone
7-65
by the use of expedient devices to interdict enemy foot patrols, and
early warning nets to prevent penetration of security. Such devices
can be used to fill voids or gaps between outpost, listening posts,
and lookouts. Natural obstacles such as swamps, cliffs, and rivers
are used to impede enemy movement. These obstacles should be
considered when planning the employment of expedient devices.
Consideration should be given to:

(1) Heavy emplacement of antipersonnel obstacles versus anti-

vehicle obstacles.

(2) Installation of mine fields and barbed wire concealed in

brush areas.

(3) Utilizing impenetrable brush and nuisance items (i.e.,

sharpened stakes, nails, or other impaling devices).

(4) Installing, in trails and in ravines, mantraps such as

camouflaged pits with sharpened stakes or impaling devices in the
bottom.

(5) All types of boobytraps (see (C) FM 5-31).

b. Raids and Ambushes. When supporting such operations,

antipersonnel mines and anti-vehicle mines may be placed in ditches
and on the sides of roads to prevent enemy personnel from escaping
the killing zone of the objective. Such devices may be liberally
strewn over routes into and out of the objective area. They act a s
nuisance items to a reinforcing enemy unit. If friendly civilians in
the area use the area of operation, they will be exposed to the
danger. Tight control is required in employing expedient devices.

7-66
 CHAPTER 8

LOGISTICS

Section I. INTRODUCTION

8-1. GENERAL

a. Logistical support to UW forces includes the same functions as

those of conventional forces (i.e., labor, maintenance, construction,
hospitalization, evacuation, supply, transportation, and other
services). UW forces located in operational areas usually depend on
local sources for logistical support. The logistical support of UW
forces is complicated by the problems of transporting supplies and
equipment over or through territory under enemy control. This creates
a requirement for clandestine delivery which limits the amount of
external logistical support for UWOA's.

b. Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) provides logistical support

for Special Forces units located in the COMMZ. This support follows
conventional logistical support procedures, and provision for it is
included in existing unified command UW plans. The JUWC/JUWTF serves
as the agency to prepare UW logistical support estimates.

8-2. RESISTANCE FORCE SUPPORT

a. External logistical support is provided by TAACOM. It is

coordinated by and processed through the SFOB/FOB.

b. The logistical support to UW forces located in denied areas is

usually limited to mission essential supplies. Normally, extensive
transportation, maintenance, hospitalization and evacuation,
construction, and other services to UWOA's cannot be furnished from
external sources. The nature and extent of external logistical,
support is largely dependent on the delivery means available.

8-3. SUPPLY OF OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS

a. The quantity and types of supplies and equipment carried by

Special Forces on infiltration (accompanying supply) are determined
by:

(1) Capabilities.

(2) Responsiveness to friendly control.

(3) Contacts existing with resistance forces.

(4) Size of resistance forces.

(5) Enemy capabilities.

8-1
 (6) Method of infiltration (i.e., land, sea, or air).

(7) Requirements for survival.

(8) Available resources in the UWOA.

b. Based on the above data, the SFOB establishes tentative supply

levels for each operational area and predetermines a sequence and
method of delivery. These supply levels are plans and may be altered
by recommendation of the SF element based on the area assessment
(made after infiltration).

8-4. RESISTANCE FORCE LOGISTICS

a. There is no standard resistance force logistics system. Each

system is developed to meet the specific needs and peculiarities of
the situation. As resistance force requirement, and the local
situation change, the logistics system must be modified accordingly
1,o insure optimum overall system effectiveness.

b. A resistance force has two sources of logistical support.:

(1) Internal -- the UWOA.

(2) External -- the sponsor.

Section II. INTERNAL SUPPORT

8-5. GENERAL

a. The UWOA will normally provide the bulk of the required

logistical support. Special Forces must convince the area command
that all supplies will not be provided by the sponsor. The area
command must develop an effective internal logistical system tailored
to their specific needs and operations.

b. In dealing with the civilian population, the area command must

balance its support requirements against the need to gain and
maintain civilian cooperation. Imposing excessive demands on the
civilian populace may adversely affect this cooperation. This will
limit tactical operations and increase reliance on external supply.

c. Support for indigenous personnel is affected by three, primary

considerations:

(1) Geographical locations. The geographical location determines

the type and extent of agriculture dominant in the area. To some
extent it also influences the diet of the local population. In
addition, it influences the type and amount of personal clothing and
equipment required and life expectancy of these items. It also has a

8-2
bearing on diseases and noncombat injuries. The geography of an area
and the enemy situation influence the type of targets to be attacked.

(2) Size of the force. The size of the force to be supported is

important. If local food procurement is adequate only for the present
force, then food supply problems will limit the size of forces to be
developed. Available information in the UWOA enables the Special
Forces and resistance force commanders to forecast needs and plan
appropriate procurement well in advance. Reasonably accurate
experience factors to guide supply planning can be developed if
detailed issue records are maintained.

(3) Type of operations. Support for operations can range from

minor (i.e., a rifle for one sniper) to very large (i.e., weapons,
communications, food, medicine, etc., for a large raid on an enemy
supply or troop installation). The type of operation which can be
conducted depends directly upon the available support. Indirectly,
the expected unavailability of logistics in the early phases will
dictate small and relatively simple operations.

8-6. LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS

When compared to a similar sized conventional force, a resistance

force has less but more basic logistical requirements. These
generally consist of:

a. Necessities of Life.

(1) Food. Most areas suitable for guerrilla base camps will have
some natural foods such as berries, edible plants, and small game.
These foods, however, are not sufficient to sustain the energy of
active guerrillas, and high-calorie foods such as grains, sugar, and
certain types of meats must be provided.

(2) Clothing. Where radical climatic changes take place, seasonal

changes of clothing are necessary. Waterproof clothing is desirable.
A guerrilla depends largely on his feet for transportation;
therefore, stout, well-fitting shoes are the most important clothing
item.

(3) Shelter. Shelters, such as natural or constructed caves,

offer the best protection from both the elements and enemy
observation. Sturdy, weatherproof buts can be constructed from boughs
and branches, but they should be built under growing foliage for
protection against air observation.

b. Equipment for Operations.

(1) Weapons. Captured enemy weapons provide the primary source of

weapons resupply and replacement parts. In addition, facilities may
be established to manufacture or repair weapons. Weapons
8-3
accountability by type and quantity must be established to determine
they rate of ammunition consumption and resupply.

(2) Ammunition. In the early stages of organization and

development, a guerrilla force has minimal physical contact with the
enemy, and ammunition requirements are limited. Since guerrillas rely
on maximum use of automatic weapons, strict fire discipline must be
imposed to conserve ammunition. Once committed to full-scale
operations, ammunition consumption and resupply rates can be
determined. A decentralized cache system should be used to control
ammunition for tactical operations.

(3) Demolitions. The amount of demolitions required depends on

the types of missions to be accomplished in a given period of tie,
The interdiction of complex target systems by multiple attacks at
different locations throughout the UWOA requires vast amounts of
explosives. Again, a decentralized control system of caches should be
used to support these missions.

c. Medical. Medical treatment is a strong morale factor. Basic

medicines and supplies are required to treat sick and wounded
guerrillas as well as the local populace. The most important medical
supplies are preventive medicines such as antimalaria pills, sulfa
and iodine powders, and various serums for protection against;
disease. In addition, at least one first-aid kit should be supplied
for each platoon-sized operational unit and a first-aid packet issued
to each individual.

d. Transportation. Transportation support of resistance forces is

provided from local resources. In remote or underdeveloped areas, the
primary means of transportation will be on foot or by animal. More
sophisticated environments will normally have modern forms of
transportation available. In most situations, transportation will be
provided by the auxiliary on a mission basis; however, the guerrilla
force may find it advantageous to acquire and operate its own
transport system. All types and sources of available transportation
should be considered.

e. Storage.

(1) The protected storage and cache of supplies and equipment

play an important role in the area command logistical plan. Caches
may be used to support current or future operations, or reserved far
specified emergencies. Supplies in excess of current requirements are
carefully packaged to prevent damage from exposure and then cached in
a number of isolated locations known only to the commander and key
personnel.

8-4
 (2) Caches are established and secured by both guerrilla and
auxiliary units in friendly areas prior to their being overrun or in
enemy-held areas after hostilities have commenced. They may be
located in caves, swamps, forests, cemeteries, or lakes. Dispersed
cache systems permit the guerrilla force to operate throughout the
UWOA independent of their base areas.

(3) Major considerations for caches are:

(a) The probability that the cache will be needed.

(b) The storage life of the items) involved.

(c) The problems of providing adequate security for the cache.

(4) Caches are not established haphazardly; they result from

requirements generated to support specific operational missions.
Caches should be located at planned or likely mission support sites
(MMS's). An MSS is a temporary base used by personnel who are away
from their base camp during an operation for periods in excess of 2
days. The MSS may provide food, shelter, medical support, ammunition,
or demolitions.

(5) The use of an MSS eliminates unnecessary movement of supplies

and allows the indigenous force to move more rapidly to and from
target sites. When selecting an MSS, consideration is given to cover
and concealment, distance to the objective, distance to supply
sources, and the presence of enemy security forces in the area.

(6) Although transportation problems will be increased, security

dictates that the DZ's and LZ's be a considerable distance from
caches, MSS 's, and base camps.

f. Maintenance and Repairs. Initially, basic maintenance and minor

repair of equipment are primarily limited to operator maintenance.
Materials are obtained from the local civilian economy or through
combat operations against the enemy. As the movement expands,
clandestine, makeshift ordnance and repair facilities are
established. Necessary maintenance and repair items such as tools,
small arms repair kits, replacement parts, and oil and cleaning
materials are included in sponsor-provided supply packages. Careful
consideration must be given to the introduction of special or
sophisticated equipment which may complicate the maintenance system
and require trained technicians.

8-7. LOGISTICS ORGANIZATION

a. The area command plans, develops, operates, and controls the

resistance force logistics system. Each element of the area command
has a specific role in the logistics system.

8-5
 (1) The guerrilla force. The logistics system's primary purpose
is to provide support to guerrilla units. Usually guerrilla units are
satellited on an auxiliary region and receive direct logistical
support from auxiliary units within its operational area. In addition
to support from the auxiliary, the guerrilla unit may take overt
actions to satisfy its logistics requirements.

(2) The auxiliary. Since members of- the auxiliary live a normal
lifestyle, they are logistically self-sufficient. Normally, an
auxiliary unit is assigned responsibility for providing direct
logistical support to the guerrilla units) operating within its area
of responsibility. Common auxiliary-guerrilla areas of responsibility
simplify relationships by allowing direct coordination between the
auxiliary and supported guerrilla units.

(3) The underground. The underground's logistics role is largely

one of self-support. This support normally provides for real or
facsimile documentation such as identification and ration cards,
money, safe living quarters, and special equipment or supplies. The
underground may provide the area command with items not available
from other sources--medicines, radios, photographic equipment and
supplies, and repair items.

b. As the indigenous force grows in size, subordinate units are

assigned a sector or zone of operations, and they are responsible for
establishing a separate procurement system for their sectors. This
greatly reduces transportation needs since the supplies are procured
near the consumer. This also improves security since the compromise
or destruction of the procurement system in one sector will not
destroy the entire procurement apparatus. Another advantage of this
decentralized system is that it permits a more equitable distribution
of the logistical burden on the civilian population. Movement of
supplies between sectors is kept to a minimum, and names, storage
sites; and caches are not passed from sector to sector.

8-8. SOURCES OF SUPPLY

a. Offensive Operations and Battlefield Recovery. By conducting

offensive operations against the enemy, the guerrilla force is able
to satisfy many of its logistical requirements and at the same time
deny the use of these supplies to the enemy. Capturing supplies from
the enemy has the advantage of not alienating civilians. With
adequate intelligence and proper planning, raids and ambushes are
conducted against installations and convoys containing the items
needed by the guerrilla force. Prior to an operation, each guerrilla
is instructed to secure those priority materials required by the
guerrilla force. In areas where conventional operations have been
conducted, guerrillas can obtain certain quantities of supplies by
collecting abandoned equipment.

8-6
 b. Purchase. Currency for support of operations may be provided
from external or internal sources. Currency may be the money of the
area or some suitable substitute such as gold or promissory notes.'
Procurement through purchase is normally restricted to critical or
scarce items not available through other forms of procurement. Care
should be exercised to insure that the excessive injection of outside
currency does not disrupt the local economy unless economic
disruption is also a resistance force objective. General guidance on
fiscal administration is contained in AR 37-1.03 and AR 37-103-1.

c. Levy. To insure an equitable system for obtaining supplies from

the local population, a levy system based on the ability of each
family or group of families to contribute may be organized. This
system is established and operated by the various auxiliary units.
Such a system provides a means whereby the burden of supplying the
guerrilla force is distributed equitably throughout the civilian
population. The population can be told that payment will eventually
be made for the supplies taken. Receipts may be given to individuals,
or records of the transactions may be kept by the area command supply
officer. In establishing the levy system, the commander must consider
a number of obstacles which might affect procurement in his
operational area. Among them

(1) Chronic food shortages.

(2) Enemy interference and/or competition for supplies.

(3) Possible impact of combat actions, such as "scorched earth"

policies and radioactive contamination.

(4) Competition from rival guerrilla units.

d. Barter. It may not be desirable for the area command to engage

in outright barter with the civilian population because of possible
adverse effects upon the levy system. However, in some eases it is
mutually beneficial to exchange critical items, such as medical
supplies for food, clothing, or services.

e. Confiscation. Confiscation is a method which may be used to

fulfill those requirements which cannot. be met by other methods of
internal supply. Confiscation is often employed in cases where
certain groups refuse to cooperate or are actively collaborating with
the enemy. Naturally, confiscation tends to alienate the civilian
population and, therefore, should be used only in emergencies or to
punish collaborators. In all cases, confiscation must be strictly
controlled to insure that it does not deteriorate into indiscriminate
looting.

f. Production. Guerrilla forces, who may be cut off from most

civilian production facilities and support, often find it necessary
to improvise their own field expedients; theft might actually have to
8-7
plant and raise sane of their own foodstuff and livestock. Based on
the percentage of supplies available from external sources and those
available internally, the area commander may consider establishing
farms and even factories for the production and repair of
unobtainable items.

Section III. EXTERNAL SUPPORT

8-9. GENERAL

a. Supply of the area command from external sources is normally

limited to those essential logistical services which are not; readily
available within the operational area. Usually this consists of arm,
ammunition, demolitions, and communications equipment—the essentials
to support combat operations. Under certain conditions, sponsor
logistical support is expanded to include evacuation of the sick and
wounded, food, clothing, and other essential survival items
unavailable in the area.

b. Supply is one means of external support to resistance forces

within the UWOA. It is usually phased to enhance planning, delivery,
and use. Figure 8-1 illustrates the relationship of these phases.

Figure 8-1
Phases of supply from external support.

8-8
8-10. PHASES OF SUPPLY

a. Phase A - Accompanying Supply. These are the supplies which are

taken into an operational area by Special Forces elements at the time
of infiltration. Accompanying supplies are issued to the Special
Forces elements in isolation at the SFOB. While undergoing mission
preparation in isolation, the Special Forces element must prepare and
rig their accompanying supply for delivery. The situation in the
operational area (as determined from area study, available
intelligence, assets, etc.) dictates the quantity and type of
supplies and equipment to be included in the accompanying supply. The
accompanying supply is delivered in conjunction with infiltration.
The quantity and type of supplies and equipment in the accompanying
supply are also influenced by:

(1) Capabilities, responsiveness to friendly control, and size of

resistance forces.

(2) Enemy capabilities and situation.

(3) Method of infiltration (i.e., land, air, or sea).

(4) Requirements for survival.

(5) Available resources in the UWOA.

(6) Size and availability of reception committee.

(7) Requirements for sustaining operations (for a given number of

days) pending receipt of an automatic resupply.

(8) Need for selected items of equipment (to partially equip a

nucleus of the resistance force if a reception committee is
expected).

(9) Necessity for other items of equipment and supplies (to help
establish rapport with resistance personnel).

b. Phase B - Resupply.

(1) These are preselected supplies (selected by the Special

Forces element in isolation), which replenish or supplement consumed
supplies (i.e., resupply). These forms of resupply are delivered
after the infiltration of elements. Historically, these forms of
resupply are called follow-up supplies because they follow the
infiltration. Resupply is delivered automatically (on a time basis)
or by contingency (something does or does not happen).

(2) The SFOB (or FOB when appropriate) schedules the delivery of
automatic and emergency resupply to deployed Special Forces elements.
Preplanned automatic and emergency resupply provides the UW force
with immediate supplies and equipment until on-call/routine resupply
8-9
procedures can be established. To facilitate handling and
transportation within the UWOA, equipment and supplies are normally
packed and rigged in appropriate aerial delivery containers which
have a cargo capacity of 500 pounds or less. To allow rapid clearance
of the DZ, the contents of each container are further packaged in
man-portable units of approximately 50 pounds each.

(a) Automatic resupply.

1. Planned before infiltration as to delivery time,

location, contents, and the identification marking system and
authentication.

2. Delivered automatically after successful infiltration and

established radio contact unless cancelled, modified, or rescheduled
by the deployed Special Forces element.

3. Replaces lost or damaged equipment items and augments

equipment which could not be carried in on the initial infiltration.

4. Serves to reinforce US support of the resistance

movement.

(3) Fulfills the need for selected items of equipment (to equip a
nucleus of the resistance force if a reception committee was not
expected on infiltration).

(a) Emergency resupply.

1. Planned before infiltration as to delivery time,

provisional location to be confirmed, contents, and the
identification marking system and authentication.

2. Initiated when radio contact has not been established

between the deployed Special Forces element and the SFOB/FOB within a
predesignated period of time after infiltration.

3. Initiated on the loss of communications between a

deployed Special Forces element and the SFOB/FOB for a predetermined,
consecutive number of scheduled radio contacts,. When the Special
Forces element is forced into continuous movement;, emergency DZ's
must be selected and reported at the first opportunity. If, during
this situation, a predetermined number of radio contacts are missed,
the resupply is delivered on the last reported DZ.

4. Contains mission-essential equipment/supplies to restore

operational capability and survivability of the Special Forces
element and indigenous assets. As a minimum, it should consist of
communications equipment; homing beacons/devices; survival and
medical supplies; and selected weapons, ammunition, and demolition
items.

8-10
 c. Phase C - On-Call/Routine.

(1) When communications have been established between the

SFOB/FOB and the Special Forces element, external supply begins as an
on-call situation. The request for supplies, based on operational
need, is made using an abbreviated code system as the catalog supply
system (CSS) (usually contained in the CEOI).

(2) These supplies consist of major equipment items which are not
consumed at a predictable rate. They are held in readiness at theater
army area command (TAACOM) depots or at the SFOB/FOB for immediate
delivery on a specified mission request basis.

(3) In determining the quantity to be requested, the rate of

expansion of the resistance force, anticipated tempo of operations,
and the capability to receive, transport, store, and secure the
incoming supplies must be considered.

(4) Special Forces elements may also anticipate (when in

isolation) operational needs for supplies and equipment for their
operational area. If these needs can be anticipated, supplies can be
packed and rigged by the SFOB/FOB prior to infiltration. If these are
code named, they can be expeditiously delivered to predetermined
locations by code name request.

(5) As the resistance movement grows, the need for external

supply will normally outgrow the on-call basis of requesting
supplies.

d. As the guerrilla force develops and expands, its logistical

requirements will increase to a point where the internal popular
support base can no longer provide subsistence without creating
hardships or lowering living standards of the populace. When this
situation occurs logistical support must be obtained from an external
source. This necessary dependence on the external source will require
establishment of a routine supply system.

8-11. DELIVERY

a. As a general rule, sponsor-provided supplies are delivered

directly to the individual user. The situation may be such .that
direct delivery to the user is not desirable or possible. In this
case, supplies are delivered to a designated location and their
contents distributed to the various users. Although this system takes
much time and effort, it permits centralized control over sponsor-
provided supplies and may be the preferred method.

b. Initially, aerial delivery by parachute is the most common

means of supply delivery to UWOA's. Free-drop techniques may be used
for certain hardy items. Later, as UWOA's expand and come under some
degree of friendly control, air landed supply missions are used.
UWOA's adjacent to sea or water surfaces may be supplied by surface
8-11
ships or submarines. After linkup, supplies are delivered to
resistance forces by conventional surface means, such as trucks and
rail. Initial supply missions usually require secrecy of movement to
protect the receiving UW force; therefore, single air or water craft
missions conducted during periods of :low visibility are normally the
rule.

8-12. ACCOUNTABILITY

The Special Forces commander is responsible for all supplies and

equipment delivered to the UWOA. It is essential that sensitive items
such as weapons, ammunition, demolitions, radios, drugs, or special
equipment be controlled. A Special Forces representative should be
present at all deliveries of external supplies to insure positive
control and accountability. The Special Forces commander should
attempt to determine the quantities and location of sensitive items
procured from other than the sponsor. This information will assist in
effecting proper distribution, maintaining control, assessing the
capabilities and limitations of the resistance force, and effecting
demobilization or reorganization upon completion of the resistance
mission. The judicious control and use of sponsor provided supplies
and equipment can strengthen the detachment commander's ability to
influence resistance operations.

8-13. CLASSES OF SUPPLY

For planning and administrative purposes, military services divide

supplies into general classes. These are:

a. Class I – Subsistence.

b. Class II – Clothing, individual equipment, tentage,

organizational tool sets and tool kits, handtools, administrative and
housekeeping supplies, and equipment.

c. Class III – POL: petroleum fuels, lubricants, hydraulic and

insulating oils, preservatives, liquid and compressed gases, bulk
chemical products, coolants, deicing and antifreeze compounds
together with components and additives of such productions, and coal.

d. Class IV – Construction. Construction materiels, to include

installed equipment and all fortification/barrier materials.

e. Class V – Ammunition. Ammunition of all types (including

chemical, biological, radiological, and special weapons), bombs,
rockets, propellants, and other associated items.

f. Class VI – Personal demand items (nonmilitary sales items).

g. Class VII – Major end items. A final combination of end

products (e.g., launchers, tanks, mobile machine shops; vehicles)
ready for intended use.
8-12
 h. Class VIII – Medical materiel, including medical peculiar
repair parts.

i. Class IX – Repair parts (less medical-peculiar repair parts).

All repair parts and components, to include kits, assemblies, and
subassemblies, reparable and non-reparable, required for maintenance
support of all equipment.

j. Class X – Materiel to support nonmilitary programs (e.g.,

agricultural and economic development not included in classes I
through

8-14. CATALOG SUPPLY SYSTEM

Special Forces uses a brevity code system, known as the Catalog

Supply System (CSS), to expedite on-call resupply requests, insure
accurate identification of equipment/supply items, and minimize radio
transmission time. To permit maximum user flexibility; the CSS
identifies single major equipment items or several associated items
by code words. It is catalogued by class of supplies and grouped in
individual packaged items or several associated unit items packed
together. The CSS is:

a. Based on mission requirements, contingency plans, and standing

operating procedures.

b. Prepared under the staff supervision of the Special Forces

group S4.

c. Reproduced in miniature form for operational missions and

published in the CEOI by the Special Forces group C E officer.

8-15. PACKING AND RIGGING

The preparation of supplies and equipment for delivery to a UWOA is

the responsibility of the SFOB support center. The packaging system
is based on manportable packages weighing approximately 50 pounds.
This facilitates transportation from the UWOA reception site by
carrying parties. The following factors are also considered in
preparing supplies for delivery:

a. The mission delivery method, i.e., aircraft, surface ship, or

submarine, determines the physical size of the package as well as the
number of packages which can be transported.

b. Each package is waterproofed. to permit above ground and

limited underground/underwater cache.

c. Each package is marked with a prearranged code to identify the

contents.

8-13
 d. An inventory list is included in each delivery container to aid
in identifying lost or damaged material.

e. Manportable packages are equipped with carrying straps or

mounted on pack boards.

f. Clothing, blankets, or other items which are useful may be used

to pad sensitive items.

g. Instructions, printed in the appropriate language, are packed

with all equipment.

h. Morale and barter items may be included in the packages.

i. Ancillary supplies should be included with individual items,

e.g., ammunition and cleaning equipment with weapons, batteries with
flashlights. Additional ammunition may be included as an individual
package.

8-16. REQUEST PROCEDURES

a. The CSS is not secure by itself, but serves to reduce message

length and transmission time when a variety of supplies are
requested., Examples of a CSS used here are for illustrative purposes
and brevity, and do plot provide any degree of security. The CEOI
will prescribe those code designations for actual operational
missions.

b. Each broad classification of supply is listed in sequence by an

assigned code letter designation:

SECTION DESIGNATION
Chemical ALPHA ALPHA through
DELTA ZULU
Demolitions and Mines ECHO ALPHA through
HOTEL ZULU
Medical INDIA ALPHA through
LIMA ZULU
Weapons and Ammunition MIKE ALPHA through
PAPA ZULU
Quartermaster QUEBEC ALPHA through
TANGO ZULU
Signal UNIFORM ALPHA through
WHISKEY ZULU
Special XRAY ALPHA through
ZULU ZULU

8-14
 c. Some units and packages are followed by a numbered list showing
the contents of the package or unit. The unit or package can be
ordered complete, or any numbered item may be ordered separately. For
example:

(1) Six radio sets AN/PRC-77 are required.

(2) Under Signal appears the code designation UNIFORM HOTEL.

(3) Item 1 under Unit Data Contents reads "Two AN/PRC 77

complete."

(4) Your request would read THREE UNIFORM HOTEL ONE indicating
six radios are required.

d. Items not listed in the CSS are requested by nomenclature in

sufficient detail to insure thorough understanding at the SFOB.

e. FM 101-10-3, Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data—

Classified Data (U) (S), provides guidance concerning the types and
amounts of rations, arms; and equipment suitable for guerrilla
warfare operations. Special Forces planners should follow this
guidance in developing a resistance force logistics system.

8-15
8-16
Section IV. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS IN ESTABLISHING SUPPLY SYSTEMS

8-17. GENERAL

Special Forces detachment commanders must consider all of the

different methods available for procuring supplies in formulating
their supply systems. With proper planning and understanding of the
methods for procuring supplies, the area command can fulfill much of
its supply requirements.

8-18. AREAS OF CONSIDERATION

In planning, consideration must be given to formulating a well-

organized procurement system which obtains its supplies from the best
sources available. The Special Forces detachment commander and area
commander should consider how much is required and its best use to
support operations. Examples are:

a. Ammunition.

(1) How much ammunition is required? Considerations:

(a) Guerrillas use less ammunition than conventional forces

since guerrillas use hit-and-run tactics.

(b) Guerrillas do not have the firepower of conventional

forces although they do, and should, rely on maximum use of automatic
weapons.

(2) Can guerrillas be limited to the amount of ammunition they

can expend in any one engagement? Considerations:

(a) While rates of fire cannot be arbitrarily limited, strict

fire discipline should be imposed so that supplies will not be
wasted.

(b) For each engagement, based on requirement, a basic load of

ammo may be issued to each participant.

(c) Resupply may be accomplished by establishing caches at

preselected rallying points. These may be used as required in the
event of heavy engagement during withdrawals.

(3) Is there a rule-of-thumb for calculating the amount of

ammunition required by guerrillas? Considerations: Amounts of
ammunition may be calculated by assuming that:

(a) No month will have more than 10 full combat days.

(b) No more than one-third of the total force should 'be

engaged constantly in actions in which ammunition is expended.

8-17
 (4) How much ammunition may be expected to be lost during
resupply operations? Considerations:

(a) In the initial stages, losses in ammunition should run

between 10 and 20 percent of the amount resupplied by aircraft.

(b) In later stages as the guerrilla force's efficiency in

conducting air operations increases, losses should be entirely
eliminated.

(c) With area supremacy, consideration should be given to air

landing supplies to preclude any risk of loss.

(5) Should more ammunition or explosives be requested in the

initial stages of organization and development? Considerations:

(a) Normally, in the initial stages, guerrilla operations

avoid combat with conventional forces.

(b) More explosives and less ammunition should be considered

in the initial stage.

(c) Interdiction operations to include attacks on bridges,

power lanes, train derailment, and other such denial missions using
demolitions will avoid physical contact with an enemy force.

(6) How does weather affect supply procurement?

Considerations:

(a) High winds causing rough seas can make resupply difficult
by sea.

(b) Rainy weather with limited visibility and low cloud cover
could preclude resupply by air.

(c) Peculiar weather conditions in certain areas may, require

that ammunition be stockpiled.

(d) Based on the above, ammunition caches—a decentralized

system of controlling supplies—should be established to support
operations.

b. Weapons.

(1) What is planned regarding lost or damaged weapons?

Considerations:

(a) There is usually no replacement of weapons except for

captured many weapons and those provided by the SFOB.

8-18
 (b) Procedures may be set up to replace worn out gun barrels,
provided armorer repair kits and personnel to train are available.

(c) Simple weapon accountability procedures should be

established. These would affect the ammo support requirements and
requests.

(2) (2) Can breakable parts be replaced on weapons?

Considerations:

(a) Breakable parts of weapons may be replaced at a set

percentage to be coordinated at SFOB level.

(b) Cannibalization of damaged weapons for replacement parts

may be required.

c. Explosives.

(1) What is the basis for determining the amount of explosives to

be requisitioned and to be allocated for each type operation?
Considerations: Calculations on the amount of explosives required are
made:

(a) Depending on types of missions to be accomplished for a

given period of time.

(b) So that charges are sufficient to accomplish the mission.

For example, an estimated 40 pounds of explosives may be required to
destroy 1 mile of single-track railroad and one-third more for each
mile of double track.

(2) How much explosive can be expected to be lost or damaged

during resupply operations? Considerations:

(a) In the initial stages, losses run from 10 to 20 percent of

quantities resupplied by air.

(b) In later stages, as the guerrilla force's efficiency

increases, there should be no losses.

(c) See a(4)(c) above.

(3) Are explosive reserves necessary for the same reasons as

ammunition reserves? Considerations:

(a) More explosives per man, or per unit, are necessary in the
initial stages than later as discussed in paragraph a(5) above and
chapter 5.

8-19
 (b) Caches should be established on a decentralized control
system.

d. Individual Equipment.

(1) What equipment should receive a high priority?

Considerations:

(a) Establishing priorities for individual equipment selected

is a difficult task. Climatic conditions, topography, ethnic groups,
and the state of morale of the guerrillas must, be examined to
determine priorities.

(b) Some items that may be considered a high priority are

appropriate footgear, warm clothing, ponchos, first aid kits, safety-
razor kits, headgear, and guerrilla insignia.

(c) Intermediate priority items may be uniforms, extreme

weather clothing, sleeping gear, load bearing equipment, and
canteens.

(d) The lowest priority may be items such as eating utensils,

gloves, sewing kits, extra shirts, and comfort items.

(2) What is the basis for resupply? Considerations: Normally, 6

months after infiltration replacement can be expected for 1 pair of
appropriate footgear, 2 or 3 pairs of woolen socks and 1 pair of
trousers per guerrilla; 12 months after infiltration--1 pair of
footgear, 2 or 3 pairs of woolen socks, and 1 uniform per guerrilla
carp be expected.

e. Medical Supplies.

(1) What must be planned concerning medical supplies?

Considerations:

(a) Medical treatment is a strong morale factor with

guerrillas.

(b) Care of the sick and wounded should be emphasized and a

first-aid kit should be issued to each individual.

(c) Needs of the local population should be foreseen and basic

medicines provided for them.

(2) What is the basis for resupply? Considerations: Replacement

medical supplies may be made on the following basis: 33 percent of
basic issue after 6 months and 33 percent of total issue after 12
months in the operational area.

f. Food Supplies.
8-20
 (1) What must be planned regarding food supplies? Considerations:

(a) All staple foods may be supplied from the operational

area.

(b) Salt and sugar are important items and should be supplied
from the SFOB if they cannot be procured locally.

(2) Are staple foods the only foodstuffs that are to be

considered? Considerations: For morale and psychological effect,
coffee and cigarettes should be provided occasionally or, if
possible, regularly on a 2 pounds of coffee and three cartons of
cigarettes per man per month.

8-19. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPPLY SYSTEMS

a. The considerations discussed are not the only factors that the
detachment and area commanders must take into consideration.
Continuing area assessment may disclose other areas of concern not
readily apparent at the time of initial infiltration.

b. Considerations developed, and guidance received from the SFOB

as to the percentage of logistical support that can be expected from
external sources, will assist the area commander in formulating plans
for the internal procurement of supplies.

c. Based on the percentage of supplies available from external

sources and those available internally, the area commander may
consider the establishment of farms, or even factories, for the
production and repair of unobtainable items.

8-21
8-22
 CHAPTER 9

COMMUNICATIONS

Section I. GENERAL

9-1. GENERAL

The communication systems and techniques employed by Special Forces

in unconventional warfare vary from conventional signal operations.
Special Forces communications may range from supporting activities
located within friendly territory to using clandestine systems and
techniques between the SFOB and the deployed detachments in the UWOA
(see (C) TC 31-20-5).

9-2. EXTENT AND TYPE OF COMMUNICATIONS

a. Communications Within Friendly Territory. Communications

required between the SFOB and other headquarters or activities in
friendly territory generally are the same as those required by any
headquarters of comparable size. Normally, facilities of the theater
army area signal system are used as much as possible; however, when
backup or special circuits are necessary, they are provided by radio
or radio-teletype operated by the Special Forces group.
Communications in this area present no unique operational or
technical signal problems. (See (C) TC 31-20-5.)

b. Communications To and From the UWOA. When an element is

committed, the primary and often the only means of communications
with the SFOB is by radio. Clandestine communication techniques are
employed. Other methods, such as infiltration of couriers, exchange
of messages during resupply, or existing communication facilities,
may be used when practical.

c. Communications Within the UWOA.

(1) Communications within the UWOA generally progress from

clandestine to conventional systems as the guerrilla movement gains
strength. The extent and type of system depend on factors such as:

(a) Size of the area,

(b) Size of the guerrilla force, activities of the enemy and

the guerrillas,

(c) Technical proficiency of both the enemy and the guerrilla

communication system,

(d) The required speed of response to the orders of the area

command.
9-1
 (2) Any and all means which satisfy the requirement for
communications and provide the required security are used. Certain
clandestine communications systems may be used, but these should be
tightly controlled by the commander (see FM 31-20). All the following
are considered:

(a) Messenger.

(b) Radio.

(c) Telephone.

(d) Audible signals.

(e) Visual signals.

(f) Local communication systems.

(g) Pigeons or trained animals.

9-3. COMMUNICATION MEANS

a. Messenger. In the early developmental stages of a UWOA,

messengers may be the only secure means of communication. Messenger
(courier) service is organized using clandestine, nontechnical
communication techniques. Because security remains a major
consideration, communication means are dictated by the status of
training and capability of the resistance force.

b. Radio. Radio can provide instantaneous, generally reliable

communications; but any radio transmission can be intercepted or
jammed by an enemy. The advantage of its speed must be balanced
against the probable loss of security. Under sane conditions, low-
powered, frequency-modulated radios operating in the VHF or UHF band
can be used with little risk. Generally, the deciding factors for
using radio are the nature of the message text and the probable enemy
reaction time if the message is intercepted. For example, enemy
reaction to last-minute control instructions during a raid or ambush
would not be rapid enough to affect the operation. But the
interception of plans or instructions involving future actions could
result in disastrous compromise Within a UWOA the availability of
radio equipment may be the governing factor. Maintenance, spare
parts, and resupply of batteries are important considerations. The
use of even the simplest radio requires training of operators and
maintenance personnel.

c. Telephone. In the early developmental stages of a

UWOA, telephones may be used extensively, possibly between
a security outpost and a base camp or during an ambush to
warn of the approach of a convoy or train. When using a
telephone under these conditions, a ground-return circuit
can be used, allowing the telephones to be operated with a
9-2
single metallic conductor connecting them. A section of
barbed wire fence, unused power line, unused telephone
line, or one side of a railroad track already in place can
be used as the conductor. The conductor must be insulated
from the ground and the other terminal of the telephone
must be connected to a good ground connection (fig. 9-1).

Figure 9-1
Expedient Ground return circuit.

d. Audible Signals. Audible signals are useful for short

distances. Church bells, vehicle horns, musical
instruments, sirens, dogs barking, or voices may be used as
audible signals. Quite often, audible signals can be
planned so that 'the sound scans routine and is
recognizable as a signal only to someone grained in the
system.

9-3
 e. Visual Signals. Visual signals are limited only by the
equipment available. Normal actions are the guide for developing
visual signals. Visual signals include:

(1) Flashlight signals at night or sunlight; reflected from a

mirror during daylight. The use of any flashing light requires some
prearranged code.

(2) A housewife hanging laundry on a clothesline in a

predesignated pattern to serve as a warning; light, smoke, a fire; or
a person walking over a given road at a specified time.

(3) Flags used to transmit messages either by means of semaphore

or wigwag. In semaphore two flags are used. The position of the flags
designate a certain letter. Wigwags can be used to send a message by
Morse code. The flag on one side of the body indicates a dash, on the
other side a dot (see FM 21-60).

f. Local Communication Systems. Many areas of the world have

extensive, local communication systems. Without any special
equipment, part or all of these systems may be used. When considering
the use of the local communication systems, security must be
considered. The local language or dialect must be used in apparently
innocent conversation.

g. Pigeons or Trained Animals.

(1) Homing pigeons, obtained locally or from the SFOB, may be

used for the rapid, secure transmission of messages within the
operational area. Since they require a few days to become acquainted
with the home loft area, they should be used only when the guerrilla
base is relatively static. Extremely cold weather, limits the use of
pigeons.

(2) Locally-procured, trained animals (usually dogs) may also be

used as a means of communication; dogs, however, are more susceptible
to interception or diversion than homing pigeons.

Section II. COMMUNICATION TRAINING

9-4. GENERAL

Radio personnel assigned to Special Forces operational detachments

face problems different from those of radio operator’s assigned to a
conventional military unit. When committed to a UWOA, operators must
be able to communicate over long distances using low-powered
equipment with minimum loss of security. Technical assistance and
maintenance support are not readily available. Messages are encrypted
using per and pencil cryptographic systems. On progressing from
clandestine to overt operations within the UWOA, machine crypto
systems may be employed. The radio operators must also be prepared to
9-4
assist and advise the detachment commander on any communication
problem with the area, including communication training of the
resistance force.

9-5. CODE SPEED AND PROCEDURES

A Special Forces radio operator must be able to transmit; and receive

Morse code at the rate of 18 words per minute. He must be thoroughly
familiar with radio-telegraph procedure as described in ACP-1248.
Before infiltration, the actual radio-telegraph procedure (an SOP) to
be used in the operational area is established. Sufficient time must
be allocated for radio operators to become familiar with this
specific procedure. Other members of the detachment must also be
familiar with this procedure (usually taught by radio operators in
isolation).

9-6. MAINTENANCE AND USE OF EQUIPMENT

Normal maintenance support is not available within a UWOA. In the

detachment deployed in a UWOA, any repair of signal equipment is done
by the operator, assigned signal maintenance man, or when feasible,
by friendly members of the local populace or resistance elements.
Radio operator training includes sufficient theory and practice so
that the operator can perform direct support, maintenance on the
primary detachment radio set. He is sufficiently schooled in theory
so that he can make sound recommendations on the use of enemy
equipment captured within the operational area.

9-7. RADIO PROPAGATION

The radio frequencies are determined before infiltration based on

published radio frequency prediction charts and tables. Detailed
information on selecting frequencies for long-range communications
can be found in TM 11-666 and radio propagation charts procured from
the US Army Strategic Communications Command, Communications
Engineering Department, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613- These charts,
published monthly, mast be requested for the particular area of
operations.

9-8. MESSAGE WRITING

a. The writer of a message must express his thoughts clearly and

concisely. Additional transmission time caused by unnecessary message
length gives the enemy a better opportunity for interception and
radio direction-finding, and furnishes more traffic for analysis.

b. The following basic rules are applied to all messages:

9-5
 (1) Preparation. All outgoing messages to the SFOB are prepared
or reviewed by the detachment commander or his executive officer
before transmission.

(2) Content. Write the message and then read it back:. First
consider each portion. Can any portion be eliminated; many times the
bulk of a message is used to say something already obvious by just
sending the message. Does each portion tell the addressee something
or could that whole sentence or thought be eliminated? Then consider
whether the thought of the message is expressed as clearly and
concisely as possible.

(3) Writing. Print carefully to avoid any misunderstanding. An

encrypted message may be made completely useless by one misunderstood
letter.

(4) Abbreviations. Use authorized abbreviations and only when

they will not be misunderstood (see AR 310-50).

(5) Punctuation. Do not punctuate unless necessary for clarity.

Do not use the expression STOP in message. If punctuation is
necessary, use authorized abbreviations such as QUES, CLN, PAREN, PD,
CMM, PARA, and QUOTE-UNQUOTE.

(6) Repetition. Repeat only to avoid errors, not for emphasis.

For example, repeat unusual names to insure correct spelling.

(7) Numbers. Numbers may be written as digits o r spelled out.

When spelled out, they are expressed in words for each digit except
in exact hundreds or thousands, when the word hundred or, thousand is
used. Some cryptographic systems require the numbers to be encoded
without spelling. As a general rule, numbers should be spelled out
before encrypting. If the message is completely understood the first
time it is transmitted, the result will be less time on the air.
Example: 123.E is written as ONE TWO THREE POINT FOUR; 500 is written
FIVE HUNDRED; and 20,000 as TWO ZERO THOUSAND.

(8) Isolated letters. If necessary to use isolated letters, use

the phonetic alphabet for each isolated letter.

c. Codes are normally used for brevity. Extensive brevity codes

can be developed by proper planning which can greatly enhance message
brevity and clarity. Codes that may be employed by Special Forces
detachments in their operations are:

(1) The Catalog Supply System (CSS) which provides an operational

detachment with a brevity code in which single or several associated
logistics items may be requested on resupply operations.

9-6
 (2) The Q and Z signals used by radio operators (ACP 131).

(3) Operation codes CEOI.

Section III. ANTENNAS

9-9. GENERAL

Special Forces radio operators use field expedients to insure

reliable communications. Because of rigid limitations on size and
weight of equipment, the radio used by Special Forces is not, issued
with a prefabricated antenna. Only antenna wire is issued. Although
there is little the radio operator can do to increase the designed
power output of his transmitter, he can maximize the propagation of
his signal by use of an efficient antenna system. Antenna theory and
construction are presented in FM 24-18 and TM 11-666. The Special
Forces radio operator must understand the material covered in the
manuals in order to provide long-range communications. Various types
of antennas which can be used with Special Forces-issued radio
equipment are shown in figures 9-3 through 9-10.

a. Field Expedient Insulators. When constructing an antenna, it is

important to insulate the antenna from its supports or from the
ground. Often the radio operator must make use of whatever materials
are available. Almost any kind of wire can be used when constructing
an antenna. Although glass and porcelain may be the best materials
for insulators, it is better to use a second best (such as wood)
rather than none at all. The antenna diagrams shown in this manual
cannot be understood without a basic knowledge of antenna theory.
These diagrams picture antenna configurations which can be used in
limited space with issued radio equipment (see fig. 9-2).

9-7
 Figure 9-2
Expedient insulator.

b. Quarter-Wavelength Antenna. The quarter-wavelength antenna is

normally erected vertically. Its length (in feet) is computed by
dividing 234 by the operating frequency in megahertz. It is
omnidirectional, making it an ideal antenna for .a net; control
station (NCS) when operating with different; teams and the exact team
locations are not known. It can be used with any type of radio and is
normally used when a groundwave is desired. In the case of standard
FM radios it makes use of space waves (Line-of-sight). When a
quarter-wavelength antenna is used, a good ground system is essential
(fig. 9-3).

9-8
 Figure 9-3
One-quarter-wavelength antenna (vertical).

c. Half-Wave Doublet Antenna. A typical half-wave antenna is the

doublet, or dipole antenna. It is constructed by using one-quarter
wavelength wire for each side; this wire is fed in the center by
coaxial cable or, as a field expedient, by twisted pair of field
wire. It can be used with any type of radio and can be constructed in
a horizontal or vertical plane. When in a horizontal position (fig.
9-4), it radiates broadside at a goo angle from the antenna. When it
is constructed in a vertical plane, it has a radiation pattern of
360°. This antenna is superior to the quarter-wavelength antenna.
When connecting this antenna to the radio set, one lead goes to the
antenna binding post; the other goes to the ground binding post. No
additional ground is necessary.

9-9
 Figure 9-4
Half-wave doublet antenna.

d. Slant-Wire Antenna. The slant-wire antenna as an efficient

radiating system using only a single antenna support. Two pieces of
wire, each one a quarter-wavelength long, are used to make up the
antenna. One piece is slanted down from the antenna support at an
angle of 300 to 600 and is connected to the antenna post on the
transmitter. The other wire is used as a counterpoise lust above the
ground and laid out from the transmitter away from the slanting wire.
If the wire used as a counterpoise is not insulated, it must be
insulated from the ground; the counterpoise is connected to the radio
ground post. Maximum radiation occur, in the direction of the
counterpoise (see fig, 9-5).

9-10
 Figure 9-5
Slant-wire antenna.

e. Fourteen Percent Off-Center Fed Antenna. If no suitable

transmission line such as coaxial cable or twisted pair is available,
a suitable antenna can be constructed using; an antenna one-half
wavelength long and feeding it with a single wire at a point 14
percent of a one-half wavelength, or the total length of the antenna.
This antenna is suitable for use with radios such as the AN/GRC-109
and AN/GRC-87. Maximum radiation occurs at g0° from the antenna (see
fig. 9-6).

f. Indoor Antennas. There are times when a Special Forces radio

operator must operate from inside a building. When this is necessary,
a suitable antenna can still be constructed. Any of the antennas
mentioned in this chapter can be used where there is space available
inside the building.

(1) If space is limited, a loop antenna may be constructed (fig.

9-7). This antenna is a full wavelength long and is fed directly in
the center. It is limited to frequencies whose wavelengths will not
exceed the dimensions of the room.

9-11
 Figure 9-6
Fourteen percent off-center fed antenna.

Figure 9-7
Full-wave square-loop antenna.

9-12
 (2) For operation on lower frequencies, a half-wave square-loop
antenna (fig. 9-8) may be used inside a building with excellent
results if care is taken in constructing and tuning the antenna. When
operating the AN/GRC-109, the indicator lamp of the antenna will not
glow brightly with either the full-wave loop or the half-wave open
loop. Although these antennas may be used indoors, best results are
obtained when operating with an outdoor system.

Figure 9-8
Half-wave square-loop antenna.

9-13
 g. Other Antennas. It may be necessary to have patrols operating
outside the normal range of FM radio sets. If so, an antenna system
that will allow communications beyond the normal range of current
radios can be constructed by using the jungle antenna (fig. 9-9) or
the half-rhombic antenna (fig. 9-10). When operating on frequencies
above 30 MHz, the transmission range can be increased by improved
antennas. The use of any one these antennas should more than double
the range of standard radio sets.

Figure 9-9
Jungle antenna.

9-14
 Figure 9-10
Half-rhombic antenna.

9-15
9-16
 CHAPTER 10

MEDICAL

Section I. INTRODUCTION

10-1. GENERAL

a. The goals of medical operations in unconventional warfare are

to conserve the fighting strength of the guerrilla forces and to
assist in securing the support of the local populace for the US and
resistance forces operating within the UWOA. Resistance medical
support must be mobile, responsive, and effective in preventing
disease and restoring the sick and wounded to duty. For the
guerrilla, there is no safe "rear" area where he may take his
casualties for treatment; wounded and ill personnel become a tactical
rather than a logistical problem. The Special Forces commander will
find that medical support is a major tactical consideration in all
operations.

b. The initial area assessment determines the actual extent of

guerrilla medical training, availability of medical supplies and
facilities, and the state of sanitation and health within the UWOA.
On a continuing basis, the area assessment will include consideration
of the diseases and local medical customs within the area of
operations. Prior to offering medical assistance or acknowledgement o
f a request for medical treatment, consideration should be given to
.the customs and taboos of the ethnic group concerned and the medical
support available.

c. The first medical activity, after infiltration, may be the most

effective means to establish rapport with resistance elements. Upon
initial contact, the medic by his actions affords an almost;
immediate entry into the less-than-hospitable environment in which
Special Forces may find itself. Each medical act can be an effective
presentation of credibility. The success of all future missions of
the Special Forces element will depend on the rapport initially
established with the resistance force.

d. A broad range of medical support may be available in the UWOA.

Within guerrilla base areas, treatment may initially be limited to
rudimentary medical procedures such as first aid and personal
hygiene. Historically, some guerrilla forces have developed highly
organized and effective medical support units and installations.
Their organizations have paralleled those of conventional forces and
have included field hospitals located in inaccessible areas. They
have recruited doctors, nurses, and technical personnel from the
civilian population, and have obtained medical supplies from the
local populace, from raids, and from external sources. In addition,
facilities staffed by members of the auxiliary may be located where
10-1
the local population is sympathetic to the resistance movement and
patients may be held in a convalescent status or may be given
supportive care until they can be evacuated to more advanced
treatment facilities.

10-2. TRAINING

a. Medical training is important. The Special. Forces medical

specialist must select and begin to train unit level medics at the
earliest opportunity. He must develop training programs for all the
different working skills that will be needed in the guerrilla medical
system. All guerrilla members must be indoctrinated with they
principles of "self-help and buddy aid."

b. The guerrilla force must also be trained in preventive medicine

procedures which include basic sanitation, personal hygiene, and
individual protective measures. Specific attention wit:L be given to
the use of drugs to suppress disease, immunizations, food and water
sanitation, individual methods of protection against :insect, and
snake bites, and the sanitary disposal of human wastes.

10-3. INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence collection is an inherent capability of medical

personnel. The activities of medical personnel in treating members of
the local population and ministering to the sick and wounded,
including PW's, provide many opportunities to collect combat
intelligence; for example, information on the effects of the
environmental improvement program, the Affects of propaganda on the
populace; and information on weapons, equipment, medical supply, and
morale.

a. Medical Area Study/Area Assessment.

(1) The deployment of small units to remote areas provides a

unique opportunity to investigate the military disease problems of
true area by using deployed personnel as "sentinel,." An appropriate
battery of screening examinations has been devised for any given area
which is administered before deployment to obtain baseline data. The
same examinations, accomplished on the return from a mission;, serve
the dual functions of detecting those individuals who have acquired
disease requiring treatment, and the delineation of the major disease
problems of the area. This effort requires the support of
sophisticated medical laboratory facilities in rear areas.

(2) Epidemiologic surveillance, conducted in this manner, serves

two functions:

(a) It provides the basis for recommending preventive measures

to be taken by units to be deployed in these areas in the future.

10-2
 (b) It brings to attention those disease problems of military
importance which require further investigation within operational
areas by teams of trained personnel in order to devise techniques for
their prevention.

b. Veterinary Information.

(1) Collection and evaluation of veterinary medical information

is an essential and integral part of the principal medical area
assessment. The following information is of interest to the staff
veterinarian of the Special Forces group in the accomplishment of
such an assessment.

(a) Animal diseases endemic to the area.

(b) Animal diseases transmissible to man.

(c) Agricultural production.

(d) Methods of food procurement, processing, and preservation.

(e) Nutritional status of the local population.

(f) Food resources of animal origin.

(2) Such information will be of value in planning during the

buildup phase of unconventional warfare operations.

10-4. SUPPLY

a. Prior planning to provide the minimum essential medical

supplies and equipment for current, planned, and contingent
operations is mandatory. Based on the area assessment, and as the
development of the resistance force medical organization progresses,
medical supplies are phased into the UWOA by the Special Forces
element. Excess medical stocks should be maintained at the SFOB to
expedite prompt resupply or delivery for unexpected requirements.
Medical items are ordered through use of the Catalog Supply System.

b. There should be minimum dependence on the local economy.

Although it may be possible to purchase some medical supplies on the
civilian economy, such items will probably be scarce and in great
demand. The use/storage of medical supplies must be strictly
controlled since they are potential black market items. Captured
medical supplies should be returned to the guerrilla base for
redistribution.

10-5. HOSPITALIZATION

a. As the resistance movement expands, it may be more efficient

from a medical standpoint to establish. a centralized system to
provide advanced medical care. Small, isolated, and well-hidden
10-3
treatment and holding facilities should be established in relatively
secure areas. These will, of necessity, impose tactical limitations
on the commander. There must be alternate sites for all facilities.
All facilities must be protected by a warning net. For hospital
operations, the guerrilla will again depend on the auxiliary. Simple,
battle-tested, basic surgical principles will be practiced.

b. When necessary, the auxiliary and the underground may assist in

the infiltration of civilian medical personnel and equipment into
guerrilla base areas. Coercion may be applied to nonsympathetic
medical personnel if their services are absolutely necessary. In some
instances, the auxiliary may arrange hospitalization in widely
scattered private homes where periodic visits can be made by medical
personnel. As the UWOA expands, the services of civilian professional
medical personnel and the medical facilities located in villages and
towns within the UWOA may be available during certain hours, if not
for complete and continued hospitalization.

10-6. EVACUATION

a. Since evacuation within and from the UWOA is normally

difficult, guerrilla commanders must rely on their own resources, as
well as auxiliary and underground support in planning the evacuation
of casualties. All plans must include instructions for emergency
treatment and evacuation.

b. Every effort is made to evacuate wounded personnel from the

scene of action. Evacuation to forward aid stations must be rapid,
because the presence of wounded severely limits the guerrillas'
ability to clear the battlefield swiftly. The condition of wounded
guerrillas, however, may preclude movement with the unit to the base.
In this event, the wounded are hidden in a covered location and the
local auxiliary unit is notified. The local auxiliary then cares for
and hides the wounded until they can be returned to their own
organizations. In no ease should a disabled patient be admitted to an
evasion arid escape net. For such a net to function, it requires a
high degree of compartmentalization and individual agent, ignorance
as to its organization. A disabled man would not be able to negotiate
each segment of the net by himself, and requiring assistance, he
could compromise the whole net.

c. The evacuation of dead from the acme of action is most

important for security reasons. The identification of the dead by the
enemy may jeopardize the safety of their families as well as that of
their units. The bodies of those killed in action are evacuated,
cached until they can be recovered for proper burial, or disposed of
by whatever means is consistent with the customs of the local
population.

10-4
 d. As the operational area develops and the overall situation
favors the sponsor, evacuation of the sick and wounded to friendly
areas may be feasible. This lightens the burden upon the meager
facilities available to the area command and provides a higher
standard of medical care for the patient. Whenever possible, wounded
or sick Americans should be evacuated to a safe area for possible
exfiltration from the UWOA. The same is true of key guerrilla and
resistance leaders. Each case will have to be evaluated against the
risk of compromising the overall resistance force mission. A strict;
system of priorities for evacuation from the UWOA will be established
by the SFOB.,

e. In some cases the local population may not be able to support

the area command with qualified medical personnel. As the requirement
for doctors and specialized personnel increases, the SFOB may have to
provide a Special Forces medical team, over and above the operational
element's organic medics, to establish and operate a Special Forces
guerrilla hospital.

10-7. VETERINARY MEDICAL SUPPORT IN A UWOA

a. Veterinary specialists normally will not accompany a detachment

into the UWOA, but will support the deployed detachment with advisory
assistance from the SFOB. Veterinary medical techniques applicable to
Special Forces operations in the UW situation may be considered
according to the phase of the operation.

(1) During periods of garrison duty and field training,

veterinary activities are directed toward the preparation of area
medical studies and individual and unit training on the subject of:

(a) Wholesomeness and sanitation of subsistence.

(b) Care and management of pack animals.

(c) Food inspection procedures.

(d) Animal diseases transmissible to man.

(e) Techniques for using animals for pack and transportation.

(f) Survival techniques.

(g) An initial area assessment to determine the extent of

indigenous training, organization, and effectiveness of veterinary
resources and availability of veterinary supplies and facilities.

(2) Immediately before deployment, veterinary activities are

directed toward:

10-5
 (a) Briefings on the veterinary medical situation in areas of
planned deployment to include endemic and potential epidemic animal
diseases transmissible to man, and individual and small-unit measures
for their prevention.

(b) Briefings on diseases of animals in areas of planned

deployment that may directly or indirectly influence the outcome of
unit deployment.

(3) During the buildup phase of unconventional warfare

operations, veterinary activities will include area assessments which
are designed to determine the veterinary requirements for support of
combined US and resistance forces within the UWOA. Areas o f emphasis
should include:

(a) Rations and the nutritional requirements of resistance

force personnel.

(b) Animal diseases transmissible to man.

(c) Availability of animals for transportation and evacuation.

(d) Identification and location of sources of production and

channels of supply of biological immunizing agents against those
animal diseases peculiar to the UWOA. Third country sources of supply
should be considered since some agents are not produced in the United
States.

(4) Programs based on the above information will usually be

implemented as expansion of the resistance force occurs and will
include:

(a) The establishment of suitable facilities in which to

receive, store, and issue rations.

(b) The establishment of standards of acceptability for

partisan-supplied foods.

(c) Stockpiling US-supplied rations and the supervision of

preparation of operational rations. (Composition of rations will be
based on the previous assessment of nutritional requirements of
guerrilla personnel.)

(d) The establishment of preventive medicine procedures for

the control of animal diseases and those animal diseases
transmissible to man.

(e) The procurement of pack animals.

(f) Training for guerrilla personnel in:

10-6
 1. Survival techniques to be used by individual and small,
operational units.

2. The selection and preparation of indigenous foods.

3. The care and handling of pack animals.

(g) Recommendations to appropriate resistance force commanders

with respect to veterinary preventive measures which must be
initiated and enforced to control endemic and potentially epidemic
diseases of animals and those animal diseases transmissible to man.

b. During the employment phase of unconventional warfare

operations, veterinary activities will consist of continued
evaluation of veterinary data and the formulation of plans to improve
environmental sanitation, the provision of food supplies, and the
control of animal diseases and diseases transmissible to man within
the UWOA. Emphasis will be on providing assistance and technical
information to deployed operational detachments. Emphasis should be
placed on the importance of livestock to families in a transitional
society. Because of this, maximum use of veterinary capabilities can
be instrumental in favorably influencing the populace.

c. During the demobilization phase, veterinary activities are

redirected toward assisting the logistic effort in providing an
adequate food supply for large numbers of displaced persons,
refugees, and evacuees. Secondary efforts are directed toward the
control of animal diseases of public health significance. The major
veterinary programs, formulated at theater level, will be directed at
redevelopment of food production and processing.

10-8. THE SPECIAL FORCES GUERRILLA HOSPITAL

a. General. A Special Forces guerrilla hospital is a medical

treatment facility, or complex of facilities, providing in-patient
medical support to guerrilla troops and other members of the
resistance movement. The hospital is usually located in the UWOA it;
supports. The guerrilla hospital will rarely, if ever, outwardly
resemble a conventional hospital. The requirements for strict
security, flexibility, and rapid mobility preclude visible comparison
with conventional military or civilian medical facilities. Medical
capabilities will vary from the primitive to the sophisticated
depending on:

(1) Mission of the unconventional warfare forces.

(2) Availability of personnel, equipment and supplies; and

facilities.

(3) Enemy counterguerrilla activities.

10-7
 (4) Training and experience of medical officers assigned to the
guerrilla hospital facility.

b. Staffing. The guerrilla's medical complement; will vary in

number and type depending on the mission and the level of desired
medical sophistication. Non-medical personnel must be attached to
provide security, communications, and logistical support,. Personnel
are obtained in one of three ways:

(1) Solely from indigenous resistance forces.

(2) Solely from the sponsoring power.

(3) From both indigenous forces and the sponsoring power.

c. Organization.

(1) The organization must be tailored to meet the requirements

of, and conditions within, the UWOA. However, two requirements must
be met:

(a) The assignment of fully qualified enlisted Special Forces

medical specialists. The entire guerrilla hospital concept is
predicated on the multiple capabilities of the Special Forces medical
specialist.

(b) The assignment of a minimum of two Special Forces

qualified medical officers.

(2) A guerrilla hospital consists of a number of sections. These

sections are normally not all physically collocated, but may be
widely dispersed. The sections include, but are not limited to:

(a) Command and control section. Provides command over

hospital personnel, supervision of hospital functions, possesses
communications with the tactical commander exercising operational
control, and provides hospital security.

(b) Logistics section. Provides logistical support to include

transportation and graves registration.

(c) Sorting section. Establishes and maintains one or more

sites which serve as staging areas for limited medical care and
movement of patients and supplies to the treatment section. For
security, these sites are the only geographic contact the guerrilla
has with the guerrilla hospital.

(d) Treatment section. Provides medical and surgical care as

well as immediate postoperative care.

10-8
 (e) Convalescent section. Establishes sites at which care is
provided to guerrillas no longer requiring the more intensive support
provided by the treatment section. Such sites increase the dispersion
of patients. Depending on the condition of guerrillas placed in
convalescent sites, guerrilla hospital personnel may not be required
to continually staff the sites.

(f) Outstaging section. Establishes a site or sites to which

guerrillas may be transported once they have received maximum benefit
from hospitalization. Such sites are basically unmanned geographic
points used as drop-off locations from which patients may return to
their units.

d. Command Relationships.

(1) The senior Special Forces tactical commander in the UWOA

supported by the guerrilla hospital exercises operational control
over the hospital. The hospital itself is normally commanded by the
senior Special Forces medical officer assigned.

(2) The guerrilla hospital is not; a Special Forces TOE

organization. It is staffed by Special Forces medical personnel
provided by the SFOB. Whenever possible, indigenous resistance forces
must be used to augment the Special Forces staff to the maximum
feasible extent.

e. Employment.

(1) The guerrilla hospital should be infiltrated early during the

organization and buildup stages of a sponsored resistance movement.
It must be ready for maximum operation upon the start of combat
employment of guerrilla forces and continue to provide medical
support until directed otherwise.

(2) The decision to employ a guerrilla hospital is made by the

SFOB based on the request and area assessment of the Special Forces
commander in the UWOA. This assessment should include the
availability of local medical facilities, supplies, and auxiliary
forces for augmentation of the hospital staff.

(3) After infiltration, the guerrilla hospital staff conducts a

reconnaissance for possible hospital sites and coordinates the
training of resistance members who will support hospital operations.
The following factors must be considered:

(a) Location. The guerrilla hospital should be located in the

most secure area accessible to all guerrilla casualties in the
supported UWOA. Preexisting structures may be used when feasible.
Selection of locations must be made within the constraints of
security, topography, distance, mobility, facilities, and enemy
counterguerrilla activities. Normally, the guerrilla hospital will
10-9
not be collocated with the Special Forces or guerrilla operational
base camps. Use of sanctuary nation territory should be considered.

(b) Security. Strict security, measures must be implemented to

protect the covert or clandestine nature of hospital operations.
Adequate cover may be required for hospital personnel, especially in
urban situations. Security compromises not only lead to apprehension
of guerrilla hospital staff, patients, and. supplies, but may
compromise members of the auxiliary, the underground, and the entire
Special Forces operation. The hospital's treatment section is to be
considered the hospital center. Individual’s staffing sorting sites
should not be privy to the location of the treatment center. For
example, patients in the sorting site will be transported to the
treatment section only by permanent staff members of that section.

(c) Communications. To maintain adequate medical. support and

insure survival, rapid communications between the hospital commander
and the Special Forces commander exercising operational control are
essential. This facilitates the coordination of hospital movement,
reception of casualties and supplies, requests for support, and
dissemination of intelligence. Communication security is of utmost
importance.

(d) Supplies. Adequate medical supplies for initial hospital

operation must accompany the Special Forces medical team upon
infiltration. Prior plans must provide for automatic and on-call
medical resupply. The maximum use of locally available supplies is
advised. Coordination with indigenous resistance forces must be made
to obtain rations for patients treated by the hospital.

(4) The guerrilla hospital must be prepared to respond to any

contingency. It must depend upon innovative approaches, field
expedients, and local resources to accomplish its mission.

Section II. DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICAL SUPPORT IN UNCONVENTIONAL

WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREAS

10-9. GENERAL

During the buildup phase of unconventional warfare operations, an

initial area assessment is conducted to determine the actual extent
of guerrilla medical training, availability of medical supplies and
facilities, and the state of sanitation and health within the UWOA.
On a continuing basis, the area assessment will include consideration
of the diseases and local medical customs within the area of
operations. In certain areas of the world, the local population may
not be receptive to Western medical practices and concepts. Before a
medical program can be initiated in such an area, it will be
necessary to persuade the populace to accept a medical program or to
modify one to best fit the situation.

10-10
10-10. MEDICAL REQUIREMENT DURING THE BUILDUP PHASE

a. Medical training is an important part, of the tactical

training;, it must be instituted as early as possible. The SF medical
specialist must select and begin to train unit-level medics at the
earliest opportunity. He must develop training programs for a11 the
different working skills that will be needed in the insurgent
hospital system. He must indoctrinate all members of the fighting;
force with the principles of "self-help and buddy aid." Guerrilla
medical personnel need not function without backup, but may require
assistance in organization. The partisans may have a military
physician among their ranks. Civilian physicians may be sympathetic
to the guerrilla cause and may render assistance in emergencies. Both
should be fully utilized. Coercion may be applied to nonsympathetic
medical personnel if their services are absolutely necessary.

b. It is during the buildup phase that the guerrilla force is

thoroughly indoctrinated not only in first aid and the care of the
sick and wounded, but also in preventive medicine procedures which
must be strictly enforced during active operations. This
indoctrination will be directed toward first aid, basic sanitation,
personal hygiene, and individual protective measures. Specific
attention will be given to the use of drugs to suppress disease,
immunizations, food and water sanitation, individual methods of
protection against bites from insects and snakes, and the sanitary
disposal of human wastes. Recommendations are made to individual
commanders with respect to the measures to be enforced in all
localities of the UWOA. The scope of they preventive medicine effort
must be adequate to encompass the probable expansion of the guerrilla
force, and must include requirements for the civilian population
(i.e., the dependents of the guerrillas) as well as the guerrilla
force itself.

(1) The guerrilla force may comprise both foreign and local
personnel. Differences in immunity to the endemic diseases will exist
between ethnic groups. Certain preventive measures may be applicable
to one group and not to the other. For instance, the use of
chloroquineprimaquine for the prevention of malaria is not equally
feasible in all populations. While it may be necessary to administer
routine malaria prophylaxis to those recently introduced to 'the
area, it may or may not be desirable to treat local resistance forces
with the same drugs, e.g., primaquine may be poorly tolerated by the
local personnel. Further, the members of the resistance force may
exhibit diseases uncommon to US forces, such, as serious nutritional
deficiencies and cases of active tuberculosis.

(2) Rigorous preventive medicine and sanitation practices are

necessities in the guerrilla camp. An outbreak of disease limits
effectiveness and endangers security. Sanitary principles are also
basic to the guerrilla medical civic action effort.

10-11
10-11. MEDICAL SUPPORT DURING EMPLOYMENT PHASE

During the period of employment of the guerrilla force in active

operations against the enemy, plans for the care of sick and wounded
as well as preventive medicine activities must be directed toward the
members of small, highly mobile, operational units which, will .be
deployed throughout the UWOA. The operational order for every
guerrilla mission must include plans for collecting points for the
wounded and dead, as well as the location of aid stations and routes
of evacuation from the area of engagement to clandestine treatment
facilities. Preventive medicine techniques within the UWOA will be
determined by local and immediate requirements. Plans must be made to
meet problems such as epidemics. Prior to offering medical assistance
or acknowledgement of a request for medical treatment, consideration
should be given to the customs and taboos of the ethnic group
concerned and the medical support available. Medical treatment given
to dependents or civilians, in cases that the local midwife or
"doctor" cannot handle, could be beyond the capabilities of the SF
medic.

10-12. MEDICAL SUPPORT DURING DEMOBILIZATION PHASE

a. The demobilization phase begins when linkup between friendly

conventional forces and the guerrilla force is completed. Following
linkup, the importance of clandestine and overt resistance forces in
support of the theater military mission diminishes. This phase is
characterized by social disorganization created by relocation and
resettlement of large numbers of displaced persons, refugees, and
evacuees. Disorganization of civil government, the disruption of
public utilities, and mass migrations all contribute to the potential
for epidemics. The trained auxiliary and guerrilla force aidmen and
hospital attendants, as well as local resistance force medical
personnel, must be phased into the national health plan of the new
government. Medical supplies and equipment must be collected,
audited, and integrated into the overall plan. Medical facilities
which, by the close of guerrilla activities, may be highly
sophisticated, should be turned over to regional or governmental
health agencies so they may continue to contribute to the national
medical economy.

b. The role of the preventive medicine section organic: to the

Special Forces group now changes from one of support for the
guerrillas, to one of assisting civil government and military civil
affairs units to implement public health measures within the areas of
guerrilla operations.

10-12
 CHAPTER 11

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

Section I. INTRODUCTION

11-1. GENERAL

a. Foreign internal defense is defined as participation by civilian and

military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by
another government to free and protect its society from subversion,
lawlessness, and insurgency. (JCS Pub 1)

b. The Special Forces role in foreign internal defense is directed and

undertaken within the framework of US security assistance programs under
the following conditions:

(1) When the mission is necessary because of a threat to US national

interests.

(2) When the threatened country is capable of using US assistance.

(3) When the threatened country requests US assistance.

11-2. CONCEPT

a. A Special Forces group may be augmented with highly specialized

skills needed to assist a host country to develop internal defense; i.e.,
civil affairs, psychological operations, medical, military police, and
engineer. A Special Forces group so augmented can provide mobile training
teams (MTT's) to:

(1) Train, advise, and assist host country:

(a) Regular forces.

(b) Paramilitary or irregular forces.

(c) Government agencies.

(2) Temporarily expand and complement US security assistance efforts.

b. Special Forces foreign internal defense missions must support the

host country's internal defense and internal development (IDAD) plans.
Internal defense and internal development are defined as:

(1) Internal defense – The full range of measures taken by a

government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness,
and insurgency. (JCS Pub 1)

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 (2) Internal development – Actions taken by a nation to promote its
growth by building viable institutions (political, military, economic, and
social) that respond to the needs of its society. (JCS Pub 1)

Section II. OPERATIONS

11-3. GENERAL

Special Forces' conduct of foreign internal defense places major emphasis

on interdiction operations and harassment of insurgent guerrilla units,
training areas, and logistical installations. Major goals of these
operations are to:

a. Destroy and damage insurgent supply routes and depots.

b. Capture insurgent equipment and key personnel.

c. Create confusion and weaken insurgent morale.

d. Force the insurgent to keep on the move.

e. Fragment the insurgent force.

f. Relieve villages of the insurgent threat.

g. Deny the insurgent the support of the local populace.

11-4. TYPES OF OPERATIONS

US Army Special Forces, in conjunction with host country forces, can

conduct:

a. Intelligence Operations. Military intelligence operations, in

coordination with other host country government agencies, must be started
as early as possible during an expected or actual insurgency. Intelligence
provides the basis for all military operations. Of particular importance
are intelligence operations devoted to neutralizing or destroying the
effectiveness of the insurgent infrastructure.

b. Psychological Operations. Since both government forces and insurgent

forces need the support of the people to accomplish their programs,
psychological operations are a major factor in IDAD operations. Military
units plan and conduct PSYOP in consonance with national level guidance.

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 c. Civil Affairs Operations.

(1) Civil affairs operations include every activity of command

concerned with relationships between the military, civil authorities, and
the population. They range from the informal, day-to-day, community
relations activities of individuals to the planned and organized operations
of entire units. Military forces may perform specified functions of
government or may exercise certain authority that is normally the
responsibility of the local government.

(2) One aspect of civil affairs is military civic action. To improve

the image of the military with the civilian population, indigenous military
forces can contribute to economic and social development by undertaking
projects such as education, training, public works, agriculture,
transportation, communications, health, and sanitation. US Army Special
Forces may, at times, advise or engage in military civic actions in
overseas areas.

d. Populace and Resources Control Operations. Essential populace and

resources control measures that conform to legal codes must be established
and enforced justly and firmly. Basically police-type operations, they are
designed to protect the populace and deny resources to the insurgent.
Included are measures to deny infiltration of arms and equipment into the
country. These operations may include population control measures such as
documentation of individuals and families, curfews, and movement control.
Resources may be controlled through rationing and price controls and also
movement controls such as licensing and checkpoint operations. Controls
should be limited to critical items and closely supervised and enforced in
a wary that does not alienate the populace.

e. Operations Against Insurgent Base Areas. These operations are

designed to separate the insurgent force from its support, destroy
facilities and forces, and interrupt training, rest, and reequipping.
Operations against insurgent base areas are frequently conducted in
conjunction with combat operations by regular forces.

f. Operations Against Interior Infiltration Routes. Operations are

conducted to deny or limit insurgent movement. Detection of enemy movement
or the location of infiltration routes, crossing sites, and support
facilities are followed by attack, ambush, or destruction, as appropriate.

g. Remote Area Operations.

(1) Operations may be undertaken in contested areas, or areas under

insurgent control, populated by ethnic, religious, or other isolated
minority groups. The purpose of operations in these areas is to establish
islands of popular support for the government. When government strength and
authority are present, security and governmental services can be provided
for the population. These areas are expanded into larger areas where the
people can defend themselves and deny support to the insurgents.

(2) Operations may also be conducted in unpopulated areas where

insurgent forces have established training bases, mission support sites,

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rest areas, arms factories, sources of food, or major infiltration routes.
The purpose of operations in these areas is to interdict the insurgent
movement and destroy its support facilities.

h. Urban Operations. One of the primary functions of Special Forces in

urban areas is to assist the local government in neutralizing the insurgent
political leadership and infrastructure. Intelligence and rapid response
are keys in identifying, locating, and then apprehending the hard-core
insurgent leaders. This is the first step in neutralizing the insurgent
infrastructure and eliminates its centralized direction and control,
creates disunity, and eventually destroys the insurgent underground
apparatus.

i. Border Operations. Border surveillance or control is usually a

function of civilian-controlled police or paramilitary forces. When
requirements exceed the capabilities of established border forces,
paramilitary or irregular units advised by Special Forces may be directed
to assume this responsibility or to reinforce existing border forces which
are inadequate for the mission. Border operations serve to:

(1) Separate insurgents from external support.

(2) Separate insurgents from an external sanctuary.

(3) Separate insurgents from support of the local population.

(4) Destroy insurgent forces and facilities existing; in areas

adjacent to the border.

(5) Locate and establish surveillance on insurgent infiltration

routes.

(For a more detailed coverage of internal defense and internal development

doctrine, see FM 100-20, Internal Defense and Development—US Army
Doctrine.)

Section III. INTELLIGENCE

11-5. INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS

a. To accomplish assigned missions successfully, Special Forces elements

require accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence. Collection,
processing, and dissemination of information concerning all aspects of an
area of operations susceptible to, or undergoing, an insurgency are vital
Particularly important are those aspects of intelligence activities devoted
to neutralizing or destroying the insurgent infrastructure and
counterintelligence activities to protect the host country against
espionage, subversion, and sabotage. Foreign internal defense (FID)
missions depend on intelligence and counterintelligence due to the
insurgent reliance on the populace for success. The populace is both a
target for the insurgent and a source for intelligence, recruitment, and
logistical support. The populace thus becomes a major consideration of

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intelligence in addition to the traditional ones of enemy, weather, and
terrain.

b. It may not be possible for Special Forces to obtain sufficient

information through overt means from the populace. The release of
information to Special Forces by the people could result; in retaliation by
the insurgent, thereby destroying the usefulness of the people as
informants. The commander must consider the use of clandestine intelligence
and counterintelligence operational techniques.

11-6. AREA STUDY

a. Preparation. Basically the same preparations are made for FID as for
UW. However, the Special Forces element is required, because of the nature
of the activities in FID, to make extensive studies of local customs,
religious beliefs, languages, cultural backgrounds, and personalities.
Special Forces need to exploit, to the maximum, local law enforcement
agencies; security and intelligence elements and organizations; and
interpreters, guides, and trackers.

b. Preparation Methods. The SF element itself may desire to prepare the

area studies; however, the basic difference in preparing the study for FID
is that primary emphasis is placed on the study of propaganda appeals,
symbols, and their uses and techniques of propaganda dissemination in
support of all military operations. Gaining attention, understanding, and
credibility among the people of the selected area is of primary
consideration. Additionally, area handbooks dealing with the sociological,
political, economic, and military aspects of the area are researched
thoroughly to increase the background knowledge of Special Forces before
commitment.

c. Operational Area Intelligence. This information normally is provided

by the US Military Advisor's staff and other elements of the Military
Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) to Special Forces upon arrival in the host
country. It covers specific areas of operation, targets, missions, military
operations, civil affairs operations, organization and training of
paramilitary forces and their employment, border operations, air
operations, and other missions designed to solidify host country programs
to gain the support of the populace in its fight against insurgency.

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 Section IV. INFILTRATION TECHNIQUES

11-7. GENERAL

Infiltration techniques employed in the conduct of operations will depend

on assigned mission, number of personnel committed, and availability of
suitable transportation. Consideration will be given to air infiltration
that will include rappelling from helicopters, free-fall parachute
operations, and the employment of both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft
of the aviation company for air drops or air landings; water infiltration
in areas contiguous to coastal areas; land infiltration, including long-
range patrol actions; and stay-behind operations.

Section V. COMMUNICATIONS

11-8. SYSTEMS AND TECHNIQUES

In establishing an SFOB in an FID environment, the same signal

considerations apply as in an unconventional warfare environment. Under the
supervision of the Special Forces group signal officer, the signal company
will establish the following communications, as directed:

a. Installation, maintenance, and operation of an internal wire system

for the SFOB.

b. Termination of landline circuits from higher, adjacent, and lower

headquarters.

c. Entry into radio nets of higher and adjacent headquarters as

required.

d. Installation, maintenance, and operation of an appropriate

cryptographic facility and communication center.

e. Installation, operation, and maintenance of communications to

subordinate units.

11-9. WIRE COMMUNICATIONS

Long distance wire communications are not normally feasible in an FID

environment. Local wire systems in established Special Forces camps are
highly desirable to provide:

a. Immediate contact with key personnel for radio-wire integration

calls.

b. Control and coordination of camp defenses.

c. Intracamp administration and operations.

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 d. Communications with observation posts.

11-10. TRAINING

a. The reorganization of the Special Forces group communication

structure to accomplish an FID mission requires that Special Forces
personnel at all echelons be trained in the functioning of the signal
communication systems.

b. Signal training also will be required for the paramilitary forces

that are established under control of the Special Forces operational
elements. The Special Forces radio operators are we'll qualified to
establish tactical communication systems within company-sized paramilitary
units. Training will emphasize the following aspects of signal
communications:

(1) Radio installation.

(2) Voice radio procedure.

(3) Communication security.

(4) Concept of communications.

c. The type of signal equipment provided to the-paramilitary forces may

be standard, obsolete, or current US military equipment or civilian
procured equipment designed for use in the particular area concerned. The
equipment should be simple to operate and maintain.

d. Maintenance training beyond operator level should be conducted for

selected indigenous personnel at a central location for the entire country
or political subdivision.

Section VI. POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL

11-11. GENERAL

Their training and extensive study of their, operational areas enable

Special Forces elements to determine the availability of war supporting
materials for the local populace as well as for the insurgent force. The
Special Forces element commander is able to advise his counterparts on
resources control measures to deny the insurgent access to such materials.
The commander must exploit all available means to help the local law
enforcement agencies prevent essential resources from falling into the
hands of the insurgent. The police and paramilitary forces in operational
areas must be properly oriented and indoctrinated for this task.

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11-12. CONTROLS

a. When establishing resources control, priorities must be assigned to

items to be denied the insurgent. Restrictions on certain items may be
injurious to the attitude of the populace, such as the control of
fertilizer in a primarily agrarian area. Two methods that may be employed
in controlling materials are price regulations and rationing.

b. Additional controls must be put into effect for materials that can be
used in medical treatment of insurgents and in manufacturing improvised
explosives. Adequate control of these items will depend upon properly
trained security personnel positioned at the production and distribution
facilities for these sensitive items.

(1) Physical security. Physical security could include checkpoints for

searching personnel and vehicular and waterborne traffic entering and
leaving installations, detection devices for certain items that react to
electronic devices, clothing change points requiring personnel to shower
and change clothes on entering or, leaving installations.

(2) Personnel security. Personnel, security is more difficult.

However, Special Forces personnel, working in close conjunction with local
police and security elements, may instigate limited personnel security
investigations to insure that personnel selected for work are reasonably
clear of implications with known insurgent members. Additional procedures
may be through the use of:

(a) Informers.

(b) Offers of rewards for information.

(c) Erroneous information concerning activities.

(d) Surveillance of after-duty-hour activities.

(e) Curfews.

c. The use of populace and resources control measures is sensitive and

must be carefully planned and capable of enforcement. The need for
restrictive measures must be made known to the people. Controls should be
relaxed as the threat diminishes. Needless restrictions, violence, and
oppression may further sway the populace to support of the insurgent.
Activities of the local enforcement agencies must be closely coordinated
with the spirit, intent, and techniques of other operational activities in
the area.

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 Section VII. FIELD ENGINEERING

11-13. GENERAL

When supporting internal development operations, the SF element commander

and the combat engineer specialist will place primary importance on those
actions designed to win the willing and active cooperation, assistance, and
support of the people. In remote areas where Special Forces elements will
normally operate, only basic structures may exist and the construction of
buildings may well be the assigned mission of the element. Extensive area
studies conducted before commitment will reveal additional information on
which to prepare plansand details of operation. In preparing for
commitment, the engineer specialist will receive extensive retraining in
the field of expedient engineering, such as:

a. Road expedients.

b. Expedient crossings and bridges.

c. Land clearing for farming.

d. Construction of lifting devices.

e. Construction of simple sanitation projects.

f. Use of tools and materials for simple engineering.

g. Training and advising indigenous construction and combat engineering

units in general construction tasks and in the preparation of defensive
fortifications for security of the local villages.

h. Water supply and irrigation.

11-14. CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS

Special Forces personnel should employ the technical skills and

capabilities of engineer units of the host country forces, if available,
for projects supporting internal development, programs. However, tyre
Special Forces element must adhere to fundamentals and avoid the more
advanced techniques and procedures, particularly those that are not
compatible with local equipment, terrain, size of host forces, and
mobility. Special Forces personnel must improvise when standard equipment
is not available. An assessment and evaluation of units' and, local
villagers' capability and availability will dictate projects to be,
undertaken.

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 Section VIII. MEDICAL REQUIREMENTS

11-15. GENERAL

Medical requirements in FID differ in that medical activities are conducted

openly, using existing medical organization and facilities. The medical
organization should provide for training and operational assistance to
military and paramilitary forces of the host country, with particular
emphasis on the development of civic action programs. Civilian personnel
selected from the community and called village health workers are trained,
in cooperation with existing civilian health agencies and US AID missions,
to improve health and sanitary conditions in local villages. They are
trained in basic first aid and health and sanitation, either at centrally
located medical training facilities or in the village. These indigenous
personnel will carry out self-help programs in sanitation within the
village under the supervision, and with the advice, of medical technical
personnel organic to Special Forces.

11-16. PREVENTIVE MEDICINE IN FID

a. In contrast to UW operations, the effort in FID is directed toward

improvements in health and sanitation among indigenous; civilian
populations. The general steps for implementing such programs are:

(1) Establish liaison with existing health authorities„

(2) Accomplish an initial area assessment.

(3) Attempt to secure the support of the village leaders.

(4) Establish a training program for village health workers.

(5) Establish health and sanitation measures based on priorities and

the desires of the villagers.

(6) Establish a roving village/hamlet sick call program.

b. The success of FID at a village level requires tangibles

evidence that the central government is responsible for efforts
to improve the lot of the villager. Early liaison with
appropriate local representatives of existing health agencies
is, therefore, essential in order to achieve support, approval,
and participation in plans for health programs to be implemented
in the village.

c. The success of health programs will depend largely upon

the ability to motivate the villager to undertake changes in
habits that have been practiced for generations. To accomplish
this, knowledge of the social structure of the village and the
local beliefs, customs, taboos, and mores is required. In many
primitive societies the occurrence of disease is associated with
visitations by evil spirits. The collection of this type
information is part of the process of area assessment. Once some
insight into these matters has been gained, an intelligent plan

A-10
can usually be developed to attack basic health problems in the
village.

d. Efforts are then directed toward motivating and training

local villagers to accomplish these objectives. Local support is
usually best achieved through the village leaders or the village
council or similar governing body, to include the unofficial
leaders or opinion formers who, although not acting in an
official capacity, exert great influence within the community.

e. Training programs in basic health subjects must be

initiated for individuals who can successfully use their
knowledge to help the people help themselves toward better
health. It is usually wise to permit the village council to
select those who will undertake such training. The prestige
associated by the villagers with this activity will usually
result in the selection of individuals who are already in a
position of influence within the community, thereby giving
additional emphasis to the program. The subjects recommended for
such training programs are:

(1) Germs and parasites as causes of disease.

(2) Food and water sanitation.

(3) Personal hygiene.

(4) Village sanitation, latrine, and bath facilities.

(5) Pre- and post-natal care.

(6) Nutrition and health.

(7) Insect and rodent-borne disease control.

f. Although initial emphasis is placed on enlisting the

support of selected leaders and training village health workers,
active participation by the villagers must be obtained in order
to accomplish the goals of improving and maintaining village
health. Some suggested projects for general village
participation might include:

(1) General village improvement teams.

(2) Waste disposal inspection teams.

(3) Food and water inspection teams.

(4) Rodent and vector control teams.

A-11
 g. Priorities for programs are based upon the initial area assessment as
well as upon the desires or "felt needs" of the community. In initiating
programs, consider these basic rules:

(1) Know the community and its leaders.

(2) Do, not unnecessarily interfere with the people's customs.

(3) Get the people to help themselves.

(4) Keep programs simple and practical.

(5) Build and maintain momentum.

(6) Build trust.

(7) Make it fun and convenient.

(8) Plan for permanence.

11-17. VETERINARY PROCEDURES IN FID

a. A major effort in veterinary support to assist in civic action

programs is directed toward improving animal health in the host country.
Host country veterinarians or veterinary organizations may be found at
province or lower level. Assistance to the existing organization in terms
of communications, transportation, supply, and security will often enable
it to function effectively. Prevention of disease losses among animals is
the most economical and fastest single means of increasing production.

b. In rural areas, self-help programs will be directed toward increasing

agricultural and livestock production in order to improve and increase food
supplies. Such program's should be realistic and not overlook the
development of protein food sources; for example, the raising of small
animals and fowl and the cultivation of fish.

c. Programs to establish high sanitary standards and provisions for

quality control in food processing, storage, and handling can eventually
provide opportunities for competition in world markets.

A-12
 APPENDIX A

AREA STUDY GUIDE, AREA INTELLIGENCE STUDY GUIDE,

AND BRIEFBACK GUIDE:

Section I. AREA STUDY GUIDE

The purpose of the area study guide is to provide a systematic

means for compiling and retaining essential information to
support operations. Although the basic outline is general in
nature, it is flexible enough to permit detailed coverage of a
given area. As time is made available for further study, various
subjects should be subdivided and assigned to selected
detachment members to produce a more detailed analysis of
specified areas of interest.

OUTLINE

A-1. POLITICAL FACTORS

a. Occupying power.

(1) Number and status of nonnational personnel.

(a) Number of nonnational personnel.

(b) Status of nonnational personnel.

(2) Their influence, organization, and mechanisms of

control.

(a) Influence.

(b) Organization.

(c) Mechanisms of control.

b. National government (indigenous).

(1) Government, international political orientation, and

degree of popular support.

(a) Government.

(b) International political orientation.

(c) Degree of popular support.

(2) Attitudes and probable behavior of identifiable segments

of the population toward the United States, its allies, and the
enemy.

A-1
 (a) Toward the United States.

(b) Toward its allies.

(c) Toward the enemy.

(3) National historical background.

(a) Significant B.C. history.

(b) Significant A.D. history.

(c) Significant contemporary history.

(d) Significant recent/current chronological event's.

(4) Foreign dependence or alliances.

(a) Foreign dependence.

(b) Foreign alliances.

(5) National capital and significant political, military,

and economic concentrations.

(a) National capital.

(b) Significant political, military, and economic

concentrations.

1. Political concentrations.

2. Military concentrations.

3. Economic concentrations.

c. Political parties/factions.

(1) If formed around individual leaders or based on

established organizations.

(2) If a single dominant party exists, is it nationalistic

in origin or does it have foreign ties?

(3) Major legal parties with their policies and goals.

(4) Illegal or underground parties and their motivation.

(5) Violent opposition factions within major political

organizations.

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 d. Control and restrictions.

(1) Documentation.

(2) Rationing.

(3) Travel and movement restrictions.

(4) Blackouts and curfews.

(5) Political restrictions.

(6) Religious restrictions.

A-2. ECONOMY

a. Technological standards.

b. Natural resources and degree of self-sufficiency.

(1) Natural resources.

(2) Degree of self-sufficiency.

c. Financial structure and dependence on foreign aid.

(1) Financial structure.

(2) Dependence on foreign aid.

d. Current value of money, wage scales.

(1) Current value of money.

(2) Wage scales.

e. The extent and effect of the black market.

f. Agriculture and domestic food supply.

(1) Agriculture.

(2) Domestic food supply.

g. Industry and level of production.

(1) Industry.

(2) Level of production.

h. Manufacture and demand for consumer goods.

A-3
 (1) Manufacture of consumer goods.

(2) Demand for consumer goods.

i. Foreign and domestic trade and facilities.

(1) Foreign trade and facilities.

(2) Domestic trade and facilities.

j. Fuels and power.

(1) Fuels.

(2) dower.

k. Telecommunication and radio systems.

(1) Telecommunication system.

(a) Telephone system.

(b) Telegraph system.

(c) Television system.

(2) Radio system.

(3) Microwave (telephone/radio) systems.

(4) Satellite and laser systems.

l. Transportation adequacy by US standards.

(1) Railroads.

(2) Highways.

(3) Waterways.

(4) Commercial air installations.

m. The control and operation of industry, utilities,

agriculture, and transportation.

(1) Control and operation of industry.

(2) Control and operation of utilities.

(3) Control and operation of agriculture.

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 (4) Control and operation of transportation.

A-3. GEOGRAPHY

(NOTE: Divide the country into its various definable

subdivisions and analyze each subdivision using the following
outline.)

a. Subdivision (e.g., coastal plain, mountain plateau, or

province/state, etc.).

(1) Areas and dimensions.

(2) Strategic location.

(a) Neighboring countries and boundaries.

(b) Natural defense including frontiers.

(c) Points of entry and strategic routes.

(3) Climate. Variations from the normal and the months in

which they occur. Any extremes in climate that would affect
operations.

(a) Temperature.

(b) Rainfall and snow.

1. Rainfall.

2. Snow.

(c) Wind and visibility.

1. Wind.

2. Visibility.

(d) Light data (BMNT, EENT, sunrise, sunset, moonrise, and

moonset).

(e) Seasonal effect of the weather on terrain and

visibility.

1. Effect on terrain.

2. Effect on visibility.

(4) Relief.

(a) General direction of mountain ranges or ridge lines

and whether hills and ridges are dissected.

A-5
 (b) General degree of slope.

(c) Characteristics of valleys and plains.

(d) Natural routes for, and natural obstacles to, cross-

country movement.

1. Routes for cross-country, movement.

2. Obstacles to cross-country movement.

(e) Location of areas suitable for guerrilla bases, units,

and other installations.

(f) Potential landing and drop zones, and other reception

sites.

(5) Land use. Note any peculiarities, especially:

(a) Former heavily forested areas subjected to widespread

cutting or dissected bypaths and roads.

(b) Pasture or waste land which has been reforested.

(c) Former waste or pasture land that has been resettled

and cultivated and is now being farmed.

(d) Former rural countryside that has been depopulated and

allowed to return to waste land.

(e) Former swamp or marsh land that has been drained.

(f) Former desert or waste land now irrigated and

cultivated.

(g) Lakes created by dams.

(6) Drainage (general pattern).

(a) Main rivers, direction of flow. (Characteristics of

rivers and streams such as width, current, banks, depths, kinds
of bottoms and obstacles, etc.)

(b) Seasonal variation, such as dry beds and flash floods.

(c) Large lakes or areas of many ponds or swamps

(potential LZ's for amphibious aircraft).

(7) Coast. Examine primarily for infiltration, exfiltration,

and resupply points.

A-6
 (a) Tides and waves.

(b) Winds and current.

(c) Beach footing.

(d) Covered exit routes.

(e) Quiet coves and shallow inlets or estuaries.

(8) Geological basics. Types of soil and rock formations

(include areas for potential LZ's for light aircraft).

(9) Forests and other vegetation.

(a) Natural and cultivated.

(b) Types, characteristics, and significant variations

from the norm at different elevations.

(c) Cover or concealment to include density; seasonal

variation.

(10) Water. Ground surface; seasonal, potability.

(11) Subsistence.

(a) Seasonal or year-round.

(b) Cultivated (vegetables, grains, fruits, and nuts).

(c) Natural (berries, fruits, nuts, and herbs).

(d) Wildlife (animals, fish, and fowl).

b. Subsequent subdivision with annotated paragraphs as

reflected above (where applicable).

A-4. CIVILIAN POPULACE

(NOTE: Particular attention should be given to those areas in a

country where the local inhabitants have peculiarities, and are
at considerable variance in one or more ways from the normal
national way of life.)

a. Total and density.

(1) Total population:

(2) Density per square kilometer/mile:

b. Basic racial stock and physical characteristics.

A-7
 (1) Types, features, dress, and habits.

(2) Significant variations from the norm.

c. Ethnic/religious groups. These groups should be analyzed

only if of sufficient size, strength, and established bonds to
constitute a dissident minority of some consequence. (NOTE:
Delineate whether a national religion definitely shapes the
actions and attitudes of the individual.)

(1) Location or concentration.

(2) Basis for discontent and motivation for change.

(3) Opposition to majority or the political regime.

(4) Any external or foreign ties of significance.

d. Attitudes. Toward the:

(1) Existing regime or occupying power.

(2) Resistance movement.

(3) United States and its allies.

e. Division between urban, rural, or nomadic groups.

(1) Large cities and population centers.

(a) Large cities including population. figures and census

date.

(b) Identify large population centers by name or area

dimensions, including population figures and census date.

(2) Rural settlement patterns.

(3) Areas and movement patterns of nomads or migratory

workers/factions.

f. Standard of living levels.

(1) Primarily note the extremes away from average.

(2) Class structure (degree of established social

stratification and percentage of populace in each class).

g. Cultural (educational) levels.

(1) Primarily note the extremes away from average.

A-8
 (2) Class structure (degree of established social
stratification and percentage of populace in each class).

h. Health and medical standards.

(1) General health and well-being.

(2) Common diseases.

(3) Standard of public health.

(4) Medical facilities and personnel.

(a) Medical facilities.

(b) Medical personnel.

(5) Potable water supply.

(6) Sufficiency of medical supplies and equipment.

i. Traditions and customs (particularly taboos). (Note

wherever they are sufficiently strong and established that they
may influence an individual's actions or attitude even during a
war situation.)

A-5. ENEMY/NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

(NOTE: Conventional military forces (army, navy, and air force)

and internal security forces (including border guards).
Nonnational or occupying forces as well as national (indigenous)
forces are analyzed using the following outline.)

a. National (indigenous) forces.

(1) Power potential statistics.

(a) Area (square miles/kilometers):

(b) Population:

(c) Military service: Army years, Navy years,

Air Force years.

(d) Total armed forces:

(e) Gross national product or estimated GNP (date):

(f) Defense expenditure (date):

(2) Strategic nuclear forces.

A-9
 (a) Offensive.

(b) Defensive.

(3) Army.

(a) Army total personnel strength:

(b) Organization.

1. Total number of DIVISIONS by type (e.g.,

tank/armored, motorized/mechanized, infantry airborne,
airmobile/assault/attack).

2. _Total number of BRIGADES/REGIMENTS

(independent/separate) by type (e.g., same as in above example).

3. _Total number of SPECIAL TROOPS/UNITS/ORGANIZATIONS

by type (e.g., commando, fusilier, ranger, special forces,
etc.).

4. Major equipment inventory.

a. Total number of TANKS by nomenclature (e.g., T-62,

M-60A3, etc.).

b. Total number of COMBAT INFANTRY VEHICLES by

nomenclature (e.g., BMP, M-113, etc.).

c. Total number of CANNON/MORTORS/MISSILES/ROCKETS

SYSTEMS by nomenclature (e.g., 180mm Field Gun S-23, 155mm SP
How M-109A1, etc.).

d. _Total number of AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS by

nomenclature (e.g., ZSU-23-4SP, SA-9, ROLAND II, etc.).

(c) Total number of RESERVES.

(4) Navy.

(a) Navy total personnel strength:

(b) Total number of MAJOR SYSTEMS by type (e.g.,

aircraft/helicopter carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers,
minesweepers, guided missile ships/boats, submarines, torpedo
boats, patrol gunboats, etc.).

(c) Total number of RESERVES.

(5) Air Force.

A-10
 (a) Air Force total personnel strength:

(b) Total aircraft strength:

(c) Major aircraft types.

1. Total number of INTERCEPTORS by nomenclature (e.g.,

MiG-25, F-14, F-16, etc.).

2. Total number of FIGHTER BOMBERS .by nomenclature

(e.g., MiG-23, MiG-21, F-4E, A-7D, etc.).

3. _Total number of BOMBERS by nomenclature (e.g.., I1-

28, B-52; etc.).

4. Total number of TRANSPORTS by nomenclature (e.g., An-

24, C-141, etc.).

5. Total number of HELICOPTERS by nomenclature (e.g..,

Mi-24, AH-1S, ete.).

(d) Total number of RESERVES.

(6) Marines.

(a) Marine total personnel strength:

(b) Organization (address as in Army above).

(c) Total number of RESERVES.

(7) Paramilitary forces (type and strength).

(8) Morale, discipline, and political reliability.

(9) Organization and basic deployment.

(10) Uniforms and unit designations.

(11) Ordinary and special insignia.

(12) Overall control mechanism.

(13) Chain of command and communication.

(14) Leadership (officer corps).

(15) Nonnational surveillance and control over indigenous

security forces.

(16) Training and doctrine.

A-11
 (17) Tactics (seasonal and terrain variations).

(18) Equipment, transportation, and degree of mobility.

(19) Logistics.

(20) Effectiveness (any unusual capabilities or weaknesses).

(21) Vulnerabilities in the internal security system.

(22) Past and current reprisal actions.

(23) Utilization and effectiveness of informers.

(24) Influence on and relations with the local populace.

(25) Psychological vulnerabilities.

(26) Recent and current activities of the unit.

(27) Counterguerrilla activities and capabilities with

particular attention to reconnaissance units, special troops
(airborne, mountain, ranger), rotary-wing or vertical-lift
aviation unit, counterintelligence units, and units having a
mass CBR delivery capability.

(28) The location of all known guardposts or expected

wartime security coverage for all types of installations,
particularly along main lines of communication (LOC) (railways,
highways, and telecommunication lines) and along electrical
power and POL lines.

(29) Exact location and description of the physical

arrangement and particularly of the security arrangements of all
forced labor or concentration camps and any potential PW
inclosures.

(30) All possible details, preferably by localities, of the

types and effectiveness of internal security controls, including
checkpoints, identification cards, passports, and travel
permits.

b. Nonnational (occupying) forces (address same as 5a above).

A-6. RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

a. Guerrillas.

(1) Disposition, strength, and composition.

(2) Organization, armament, and equipment.

(3) Status of training, morale, and combat effectiveness.

A-12
 (4) Operations to date.

(5) Cooperation and coordination between various existing

groups.

(6) General attitude toward the United States, the enemy,

and various elements of the civilian populace.

(7) Motivation of the various groups and their receptivity.

(8) ($) Caliber of senior and subordinate leadership.

(9) Health of the guerrillas.

b. Auxiliaries and the underground.

(1) Disposition, strength, and degree of organization.

(2) General effectiveness and type of support.

(3) Motivation and reliability.

(4) Responsiveness to guerrilla or resistance leaders.

(5) General attitude toward the United States, the enemy,

and various guerrilla groups.

c. Logistical capability.

(1) Availability of food stocks and water to include any

restrictions for reasons of health.

(2) Agricultural capability.

(3) Type and availability of transportation of all

categories.

(4) Types and location of civilian services available for

manufacture and repair of equipment and clothing.

(5) Supplies locally available to include type and amount.

(6) Medical facilities to include personnel, medical

supplies, and equipment.

(7) Enemy supply sources accessible to the resistance.,

A-7. TARGETS

(The objective in target selection is to inflict maximum damage

on the enemy with minimum expenditures of men and material.
Initially, the operational capabilities of a guerrilla force may
be limited in the interdiction or destruction of enemy targets.
The target area and specific points of attack must be studied,

A-13
carefully analyzed, and priorities established. In general,
targets are listed in order of priority in accordance with
mission requirements.)

a. Railroads.

(1) Considerations in the selection of a particular lane:

(a) Importance, both locally and generally.

(b) Bypass possibilities.

(c) Number of tracks and electrification.

(2) Location of maintenance crews, reserve repair rails, and

equipment.

(3) Type of signal and switch equipment.

(4) Vulnerable points:

(a) Unguarded small bridges or culverts.

(b) Cuts, fills, overhanging cliff's, or undercutting

streams.

(c) Key junctions or switching points.

(d) Tunnels.

(5) Security system.

(NOTE: Targets listed below are divided into subsections

generally as shown above. Differences in subsections are based
on peculiarities of the particular target system.)

b. Telecommunications.

c. POL.

d. Electric power.

e. Military storage and supply.

f. Military headquarters and installations.

g. Radar and electronic devices.

A-14
 h. Highways.

i. Inland waterways - canals.

j. Seaports.

k. Natural and synthetic gas lines.

l. Industrial plants.

Section II. AREA INTELLIGENCE STUDY GUIDE

A-8. GENERAL

The following guide is designed to bring the essential elements

of intelligence for the operational area into focus. Based on
the area study guide, it narrows the factors that apply to a
relatively small and specific area, refines the critical
elements, and places them into proper perspective of an actual
operation at a given time.

A-9. PURPOSE

To outline the development of detailed intelligence on an

assigned UWOA to support the commitment of a Special Forces
operational detachment.

A-10. FORMAT

a. Select from the area study guide those elements that are
applicable to the situation and the assigned UWOA.

b. Eliminate nonessential data and prepare a brief, concise

summation of basic facts.

c. Note serious gaps in data as processed in b above arid

take immediate action to fill these gaps with the most current
reliable information.

d. Prepare or request graphics, large-scale sheets and

special maps covering the assigned area, the latest photography
and illustration or information sheets on targets in the area,
town plans, sketches of installations, and air and hydrographic
charts-related to the area.

e. Assemble the material for ready reference. Then proceed to

plot on maps or overlays, wherever feasible, the following:

(1) Recommended initial locations of operational bases and

alternate bases.

(2) Primary and alternate DZ's, LZ's, or points for other

forms of infiltration.

A-15
 (3) Possible direction and orientation points for
infiltration vehicles (aircraft or 'goat); i.e., landmarks or
reference points.

(4) Routes from infiltration point to preselected bases with

stopover sites.

(5) Points for arranged or anticipated contacts with

friendly elements.

(6) Enemy forces known or anticipated, to include Location,

strength, and capabilities.

(7) Estimate of enemy operations or movements during the

infiltration period.

(8) Settlements or built-up areas in the vicinity of the

infiltration point and tentative operational bases.

(9) All railroads, highways, telecommunications, and other

lines of communication in the UWOA.

(10) All important enemy installations and facilities.

(11) Significant terrain features.

(12) Off-road routes and conditions (:depending on the

season) for movement in all directions.

(13) Distances between key points.

(14) Recommended points of attack on assigned target system

and selection of other potential target areas.

f. As time permits, continue to collect; information and

revise estimates in keeping with more current intelligence.
Develop increasing details one through (14) above, with special
emphasis on:

(1) Local inhabitants:

(a) Local traditions, customs, and dress.

(b) Food, rationing, and currency„

(c) Attitudes toward the enemy regime, the United States,

and for or against existing political ideologies.

(d) Peculiarities or variances among individuals or small

groups.

(e) Resistance force group leadership and systems of

control or influence employed.

A-16
 (2) Enemy—military forces and installations.

(3) Other security forces and police.

(a) Organizations, locations, and strengths.

(b) Unit designations, insignia, and uniforms.

(c) Areas covered and unit responsibilities.

(d) Checkpoints, controls, and current documentation.

(e) Patrols and mobile units.

(4) Geographic features of the operational area in greater

detail.

(5) Approaching seasonal climatic changes and their effect

upon weather and terrain.

(6) Target categories and target areas in greater detail.

Section III. BRIEFBACK GUIDE
A-11. GENERAL

a. Prior to its departure from the isolation area, each SFOD

will be required to present a briefback. The purpose of this
briefback is:

(1) To provide the assembled staff an opportunity to

evaluate the degree that the SFOD has absorbed all pertinent
briefing data.

(2) To insure the SFOD is properly prepared to accomplish

its mission by allowing the SFOD commander to demonstrate that:

(a) He understands his assigned mission.

(b) He is familiar with the area of operation and all

available intelligence.

(c) He has made a detailed and workable plan of operation.

(d) His detachment members are thoroughly familiar with

all essential elements of the operation.

b. To assist each SFOD in the presentation of its briefback,

the following guide is a suggested order of presentation, with a
suggested list of items that each SFOD member should cover. The
final decision as to who gives a specific portion of the
briefback is up to the detachment commander and will be based on
the personality, appearance, staff capability, briefing ability,
etc., of each SFOD staff member.

A-17
 c. SFOD Commander.

(1) General description and location of the operational area

(not a terrain analysis--very brief such as in what country and
what general region).

(2) Mission of the SFOD.

(3) Concept of operations.

(4) Staff organization of the SFOB and the plan for

formulation and training of a combined/joint staff in the area
of operations.

d. SFOD Executive Officer.

(1) Background on the area, to include:

(a) Geography.

(b) Sociological aspects.

(c) Economics.

(d) Religion.

(e) Political situation.

(f) Transportation nets.

(g) Utilities and telecommunication nets.

(2) History of resistance and guerrilla activities.

e. SFOD S2 or Assistants.

(1) Intelligence of the enemy to include:

(a) Location of the enemy front limes, if applicable.

(b) Description and location of enemy combat forces.

(c) Description and location of enemy security and

counterguerrilla forces.

(d) Information concerning intelligence, security, and

other auxiliary nets already established.

(e) Target analysis (demolition requirements).

f. S3 or Assistants.

A-18
 (1) Infiltration plan to include:

(a) DZ and alternate DZ (LZ and alternate LZ for water

infiltration).

(b) Assembly plan.

(c) Pertinent information concerning time o f loading,

time of drops, stick assignments, etc.

(2) Aircraft in-flight abort plans (or water en route abort

plans), to include:

(a) Time of flight.

(b) Zones and assembly areas.

(c) Action to be taken in the event of an abort.

(3) Ground contact plan and alternate contact plan.

(4) Contingent plan.

(5) Estimate of present guerrilla situation, to include:

(a) Composition and organization.

(b) Level of training.

(c) Availability of interpreters.

(d) Strengths.

(e) Weaknesses.

(6) Plan for individual and unit training on a basic,

advanced, and specialized basis.

(7) Tentative plan for operations, to include E&E.

g. SFOD S1.

(1) Discipline, law, and order (SFOD).

(2) Guerrilla processing, to include:

(a) Oath of allegiance.

(b) Guerrilla code.

(c) Personnel data records.

A-19
 (d) Photographs.

(3) Administration of the guerrillas.

(4) Prisoners of war.

(5) Graves registration.

(6) Morale and personal services (SFOD), to include:

(a) Chaplain services.

(b) Decorations and awards.

(c) Mail.

(d) Pay and allowance.

(e) Comfort items.

(7) Promotions, demotions, and assignments.

(8) Reports to SFOB.

(9) Demobilization procedures.

(a) Recovery of equipment.

(b) Pay and allowances.

(c) Decorations and awards.

(d) Postwar use of guerrilla forces.

h. SFOB S4 or Engineer SGT.

(1) Equipment to accompany SFOD in the infiltration (use of

door bundles if used).

(2) Emergency resupply.

(3) Automatic resupply (time, location, recognition signal,

equipment to be received, etc.).

(4) Estimate of the guerrilla logistical requirements

present and future.

(5) Evaluation of auxiliary systems as pertains to

logistical potential, to include:

(a) Food.

A-20
 (b) Weapons.

(c) Demolitions.

(d) Equipment.

(6) Accounting for supplies and equipment.

(7) Possible promises and contract stipulations to include

agreements for obtaining supplies.

i. SFOD Medical Specialist.

(1) Evaluation of the medical situation in the area and

possible medical problems.

(2) Medical equipment accompanying SFOD in the infiltration.

(3) Medical equipment in the automatic resupply.

(4) Estimate of the medical potential of the area to

include:

(a) Hospitals.

(b) Doctors.

(c) Medical supplies.

(5) Plans for the medical training of guerrilla and

auxiliary personnel.

j. SFOD Radio Operator Supervisor.

(1) Existing facilities and communication nets in the area.

(2) Communication plans and procedures.

(3) Communication equipment accompanying SFOD in the

infiltration.

(4) Communication equipment in the automatic; and emergency

resupply.

k. SFOD Commander.

(1) Linkup plans.

(2) Assembly plan.

A-21
 (a) Notification system.

(b) Assembly plan.

(c) Plan for movement to SFOB.

(3) Entertain questions.

A-22
 ANNEX A to Appendix A

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. SOVIET ARMY

a. Notes on the Soviet Ground Forces (U), DIA (British Crown

Copyright British Defense Intelligence Staff (DIS) publication),
1974 (CONFIDENTIAL). A concise readable synopsis of the Soviet
Ground Forces. (Organization, Weapons, Equipment, Doctrine,
Tactics.)

b. Handbook on the Operations and Tactics of the Soviet Army

(U), ACSI DA, Apr 75 (SECRET). A compendium of intelligence data
on Soviet tactical ground and Air Force tactics and doctrine.
(Organization, Doctrine, Tactics.)

c. Radio Electronic Combat Capability (U), ACSI, DA, AST-

1731S-001-75, Jul 75 (SECRET). A discussion of the Soviet use of
the principles of war in planning radio electronic combat (EW).
(Organization, Doctrine, Tactics.)

d. Soviet Ground Forces Organization Guide (U), DIA, DI-220-

96-75 (SECRET). Provides estimated tables of organization and
equipment for the Soviet Army with emphasis upon the line
divisions. Echelons covered are from front down to squad.
(Organization, Weapons, Equipment.)

e. The Soviet Intelligence Threat to the US Army (U), ACSI

DA, Jun 75 (SECRET). Discusses the Soviet intelligence threat
against the US Army. (Organization, Doctrine.)

2. MIDEAST

a. Arab-Israeli Handbook (U), CIA, Sep 75 (SECRET). A

discussion of the Mideast situation and developments with a look
at the opposing forces involved. (Weapons, Equipment, Doctrine,
Political.)

b. Analysis of Combat Data - 73 Mid-East War (U), USACAC, Jul

74 (SECRET). An 8-volume report on material, doctrine, tactics,
techniques, and-procedures used by both sides in the 73 Mideast
War.

3. PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC)

a. Notes on the Armed Forces of China (U), DIA (British Crown

Copyright -British Defense Intelligence Staff (DIS)
publication), 1972 (CONFIDENTIAL). A concise readable synopsis
of the Armed Forces of the Peoples Republic of China.
(Organization, Weapons, Equipment, Doctrine, Tactics.)

A-23
 b. Handbook on the Chinese Communist Armed Forces (U), DIA,
Apr 66 (SECRET). Describes the Chinese Communist military
system, including ground forces, Navy, Air Force, and
paramilitary forces. (Organization, Doctrine, Personnel and
Training, Logistics, Weapons and Equipment.)

c. A Type People's Republic of China Army - 1975-85 (U),

USADC, Oct 70, ACN 15397, AD 511-742L (SECRET). Organization,
doctrine, tactics and equipment are projected for the PRC army
during the 1975-85 time period.

4. NORTH KOREA

a. Handbook on the North Korean Armed Forces (U), DIA, AP-

220-3-13 (SECRET). Background information on North Korea, its
people, and its armed forces. (Organization, Equipment,
Weapons.)

b. Intelligence Estimate 1-74, North Korea, G2 ((J), Eighth

US Army, Apr 74 (SECRET). An intelligence estimate of the
military capabilities and probable courses of action. Detailed
information on tree North Korean army. (Organization,
Equipment.)

5. UNITED STATES

a. ST-157 FY 75 USA Infantry Reference Guide, Vol I, USA

:Infantry School, 75. Designed to show the organization,
personnel, and significant equipment contained in selected US
Army Infantry, Mech Inf. Armor, Abn divisions. (Organization,
Equipment, Weapons.)

b. ST 17-1-1 Armor Reference Data, Volumes 1 & 2, US Army

Armor School, 7. Reference handbook containing data on
organization, details of equipment, and tables pertinent to
armor operations. (Organization, Equipment, Weapons.)

c. SIS 80030 - Characteristics of Infantry Weapons, USAICS,

Mar 73. Lists US infantry weapons from small arms to tanks and
reconnaissance vehicles to include basic nomenclature on each
weapon. (Weapons.)

d. Janes' Infantry Weapons - 1975, Danes' USA, 75. Detailed

information on all types of infantry weapons used by armies of
the world. (Weapons.)

6. GENERAL

a. DIA Factbook - Communist World Forces (U), DDI-2680-13-75

(SECRET) (CONTROLLED DISSEM). An up-to-date summary of essential
information on Communist military forces. (Disposition,
Equipment, Weapons.)

A-24
 b. Tactics of Soviet Ground Forces (DIA) (CONFIDENTIAL) DDI-
1100-123-75 (U). Soviet Tank Company Tactics (DIA) DDI-1120-129-
76. Military Operations of the Soviet Army - U-9AITAD Report No.
14-U-76 United States Army Intelligence Threat Analysis
Detachment.)

c. DIA Military Intelligence Summary (U), AP-210-6 (Vol) V -

(Year) - INT (12 sections by geographic area SECRET). An
assessment of the military capabilities of Free World and
Communist countries. Summarizes information on ground, naval,
air, missile, and paramilitary forces. It also evaluates
governmental stability and the extent of insurgency and
Communist influence. (Political, Organization, Geography.)

d. DIA Register of Intelligence Publications and Scientific

and Technical Intelligence Register (RIP/STIR), DS-733 T-74, 28
Jun 74. The RIP and the T have been combined into one
publication. The RIP publication lists selected current general
intelligence studies. The STIR portion primarily lists current
DIA-approved scientific and technical products of the Department
of Defense.

e. National Basic Intelligence Factbook (U), CIA, Jul 75

(SECRET). A compilation of basic data on political entities
worldwide.

f. Register of Intelligence Products (FRIP) (U), FORSIG, Dec

'T5 (CONFIDENTIAL). An accession list of products available from
the FORSCOM Intelligence Group.

g. Register of Intelligence Publications (RIP), DDS-2600-37-

78 (SECRET).

h. Intelligence Users Guide, DDM-2600-397-78 (CONFIDENTIAL).

NOTE: Requisition through classified library or intelligence

publication channels.

A-25
 ANNEX B to Appendix A

REFERENCES

ARMY REGULATIONS (AR's)

(C) 10-122 United States Army Security Agency (U)

40-2 Army Medical Treatment Facilities General
Administration
50-5 Nuclear Surety
58-1 Joint Procedures for Management of
Administrative Use Motor Vehicles
65-75 Unit Mail Service
190-11 Physical Security of Weapons, Ammunition,
and Explosives
210-10 Administration
310-25 Dictionary of United States Army Terms
310-50 Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes
340-15 Preparing Correspondence
340-16 Safeguarding "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY"
Information
380-5 Department of the Army Supplement to DOD
5200.1-R (DODISPR)
380-200 Armed Forces Censorship
381-12 Subversion and Espionage Directed Against
US Army and Deliberate Security Violations
381-20 US Army Counterintelligence (CI)
Activities
(C)530-1 Operations Security (U)
(C)530-2 Communications Security (U)
(C)530-3 Electronic Security (U)
(C)530-4 Control of Compromising Emanations (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLETS (DA PAMS)

108-1 Index of Army Motion Pictures and Related

Audio-Visual Aids
310-1 Index of Administrative Publications
310-2 Index of Blank Forms
310-3 Index of Doctrinal Training and
Organizational Publications
310-4 Index of Technical Manuals, Technical
Bulletins, Supply Manuals (types 7,8 & 9),
Supply Bulletins, and Lubrication Orders

FIELD MANUALS (FM's)

3-1 Chemical, Biological and Radiological

(CBR) Support
19-30 Physical, Security
21-6 How to Prepare and Conduct Military
Training

A-26
21-75 Combat Training of they Individual Soldier
and Patrolling
24-1 Tactical Communications Doctrine
30-5 Combat Intelligence
30-15 Intelligence Interrogation
30-16 Technical Intelligence
30-17 Counterintelligence Operations
30-20 Aerial Surveillance-Reconnaissance Field
Army
30-35 Military Intelligence Battalion, Aerial
Reconnaissance Support.
30-40 Handbook on Soviet Ground Forces
(C)31-20 Special Forces Operations (U)
(C)32-5 Signal Security (SIGSEC) (U)
(S)32-10 USASA in Support of Tactical Operations
(U)
100-5 Operations
100-26 The Air-Ground Operations Systems
101-5 Staff Officers' Field Manual: Staff
Organization and Procedure
101-31-1 Staff Officers' Field Manual: Nuclear
Weapons Employment, Doctrine, and
Procedures

TRAINING CIRCULARS (TC's)

6-4-1 The Threat

6-4-2 The Threat - Organization, Tactics, &
Equipment
24-2 Communications-Electronics Operations
Instructions
30-3 Soviet Equipment Recognition Guide
30-4 Motorized Rifle Regiment
30-11 Army Tactical Weather
30-19 The Division Intelligence System
30-21 A Guide for Scenarios and Intelligence
Plans
30-23 Ground Surveillance Radars (GSR)
30-24 Tactical Counterintelligence
30-25 Ground Reconnaissance and Surveillance and
the Tactical Surveillance Officer
30-26 Remote Sensors (REMS)
30-28 S2 Reference Guide
30-79 OV-1 Mohawk Survivability
30-102 The Motorized Rifle Company
31-20-1 The Role of US Army Special Forces
(C)31-20-3 Special Forces Air and Maritime Operations
(U)
(C)31-20-5 Special Forces Communications (U)
100-1 OPSEC (Operations Security)

TO BE PUBLISHED

30-27 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

A-27
MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS

DOD 5200.I-R Information Security Program Regulations

TRADOC BULLETINS

1 Range and Lethality of US and Soviet Anti

Armor Weapons
2 (C) Soviet ATGM's Capabilities and Counter
measures (U)
3 (C) Soviet RPG-7, Antitank Grenade
Launcher (U)
4 (C) Soviet ZSU-23-4; Capabilities and
Countermeasures (U)
5 Training with LAW Countersurveillance and
Camouflage (U)
6 Improving (C) Combined Arms Combat
Effectiveness

A-28
 ANNEX C to Appendix A

GRAPHIC TRAINING AIDS

The United States Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS)

is the proponent agency for the production of Department of the
Army intelligence series graphic training aids (LTA's). These
GTA's are developed to support intelligence training for all
components of the Army and may be in the form of wall charts,
posters, flip charts, Vu-Graph transparencies, or pocket cards.

GTA charts (44 x 33 inches), cards, and similar training aids

may be obtained from training aids centers. Transparencies (8 x
10 itches) and 35mm slides (2 x 2 inches) are available at
audiovisual support centers. GTA's are of a particular value to
brigades and smaller units where the more sophisticated training
aids may not be available.

USAICS desires to produce GTA's that will meet unit training

needs and improve support to intelligence training in the field.
Your recommendations for changes or additions to the
intelligence series GTA's are solicited and should be forwarded
to Commander, United Stages Army Intelligence Center and School,
ATTN: ATSI-TD-IT, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613.

GTA TITLE
30-1-9 Production of Intelligence
30-1-10 Essential Elements of Information and Collection
Plan
30-1-11 Intelligence Cycle
30-1-12 Combat Intelligence
30-i-13 Journal, Workbook, and Situation Map
30-1-14 Introduction to Intelligence Reports
30-1-16 Military Intelligence Responsibilities for
Surveillance and Reconnaissance
30-1-17 Intelligence Officers Responsibility for
Surveillance and Reconnaissance
30-1-18 National Intelligence Community
30-1-19 Analysis of the Area of Operation
30-1-20 Interrogation Approach Techniques
30-1-21 Order of Battle Elements
30-1-22 Radar Surveillance Card and Plotter
30-1-23 Soldier's Guide to Combat Intelligence
30-3-7 Historical Development of Soviet Intelligence
30-3-8 Soviet Ordnance
30-3-10 Warsaw Treaty Organization
30-3-11 Soviet Antitank Weapons
30-3-13 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
30-3-14 Warsaw Pact and Nato Tank Recognition Guide
30-3-15 Soviet Weapons Whiz Wheel
30-3-16 Soviet Army and Navy Uniforms, Ranks and Insignia
30-3-17 Intelligence Documents for Field Training

A-29
A-30
 APPENDIX B

AREA ASSESSMENT

B-1. IMMEDIATE--INITIAL ASSESSMENT

Initial assessment includes those items deemed essential to the

operational detachment immediately following infiltration. These
requirements must be satisfied as soon as possible after the
detachment arrives in the operational area and should include:

a. Location and orientation.

b. Detachment's physical condition.

c. Overall security:

(1) Immediate area.

(2) Attitude of the local populace.

(3) Local enemy situation.

d. Status of the local resistance element:.

B-2. SUBSEQUENT--PRINCIPAL ASSESSMENT

Principal assessment, a continuous operation, includes those

collection efforts which support the continued planning and conduct
of operations. It forms the basis for all of the detachment's
subsequent activities in the operational area.

a. The Enemy.

(1) Disposition.

(2) Composition, identification, and strength.

(3) Organization, armament, and equipment.

(4) Degree of training, morale, and combat

effectiveness.

(5) Operations:

(a) Recent and current activities of the unit.

(b) Counterguerrilla activities and capabilities with

particular attention to reconnaissance units, special
troops (airborne, mountain, ranger), rotary-wing or
vertical-lift aviation units, counterintelligence units,
and units having a mass CBR delivery capability.
B-1
 (6) Unit areas of responsibility.

(7) Daily routine of the units.

(a) Logistical support to include:

(b) Installations and facilities.

(c) Supply routes.

(d) Methods of troop movement.

(8) Past and current reprisal actions.

b. Security and Police Units.

(1) Dependability and reliability to the existing

regime or the occupying power.

(2) Disposition.

(3) Composition, identification, and strength.

(4) Organization, armament, and equipment.

(5) Degree of training, morale, and efficiency.

(6) Utilization and effectiveness of informers.

(7) Influence on, and relations with, the local

populace.

(8) Security measures over public utilities and

government installations.

c. Civil Government.

(1) Control and restrictions, such as:

(a) Documentation.

(b) Rationing.

(c) Travel and movement restrictions.

(d) Blackouts and curfews.

(2) Current value of money, wage scales.

(3) The extent and effect of the black market.

(4) Political restrictions.

B-2
 (5) Religious restrictions.

(6) The control and operation of industry, utilities,

agriculture, and transportation.

d. Civilian Populace.

(1) Attitudes toward the existing regime or occupying

power.

(2) Attitudes toward the resistance movement.

(3) Reaction to US support of the resistance.

(4) Reaction to enemy activities in the country,

specifically that portion in the UWOA.

(5) General health and well being.

e. Potential Targets.

(1) Railroads.

(2) Telecommunication.

(3) POL.

(4) Electric power.

(5) Military storage and supply.

(6) Military headquarters and installations.

(7) Radar and electronic devices.

(8) Highways.

(9) Inland waterways and canals.

(10) Seaports.

(11) Natural and synthetic gas lines.

(12) Industrial plants.

(13) Key personalities.

f. Weather.

(1) Precipitation, cloud cover, temperature,

visibility, and seasonal changes.

B-3
 (2) Wind speed and direction.

(3) Light data (BMNT, SENT, sunrise, sunset;, moonrise,

and moonset).

g. Terrain.

(1) Location of areas suitable for guerrilla bases,

units, and other installations.

(2) Potential landing and drop zones, and other

reception sites.

(3) Routes suitable for:

(a) Guerrillas.

(b) Enemy forces.

(4) Barriers to movement.

(5) The seasonal effect of the weather on terrain and

visibility.

h. Resistance Movement.

(1) Guerrillas.

(a) Disposition, strength, and composition.

(b) Organization, armament, and equipment.

(c) Status of training, morale, and combat

effectiveness.

(d) Operations to date.

(e) Cooperation and coordination between various

existing groups.

(f) General attitude toward the United States, the

enemy, and various elements of the civilian populace.

(g) Motivation of the various groups and their

receptivity.

(h) Caliber of senior and subordinate leadership.

(i) Health of guerrillas.

(2) Auxiliaries and the underground.

B-4
 (a) Disposition, strength, and degree of
organization.

(b) General effectiveness, and type of support.

(c) Motivation and reliability.

(d) Responsiveness to guerrilla or resistance

leaders.

(e) General attitude toward the United States, the

enemy, and various guerrilla groups.

i. Logistical Capability of the Area.

(1) Availability of food stocks and water to include

any restrictions for reasons of health.

(2) Agricultural capability.

(3) Type and availability of transportation of all

categories.

(4) Types and location of civilian services available

for manufacture and repair of equipment and clothing.

(5) Supplies locally available to include type and

amount.

(6) Medical facilities to include personnel, medical

supplies, and equipment.

(7) Enemy supply sources accessible to the resistance.

j. Preventive Medicine.

(1) Weather.

(a) Is the weather cold enough to put emphasis on

causes, treatment, and prevention of cold weather injuries?

(b) Is the weather hot enough to put emphasis on

causes, treatment, and prevention of heat injuries?

(2) Terrain. How does the terrain affect evacuation and

medical resupply?

(3) Indigenous personnel.

(a) Physical characteristics. Describe endurance,

ability to carry loads, and to perform other physical
feats.
B-5
 (b) Dress. What symbolism is attached to various
articles of clothing and jewelry, such as amulets, if any.

(c) Attitudes.

1. What taboos and other psychological attributes

are present in the society?

2. Describe rites and practices by witch doctors

during illness. What do these rites symbolic? Does the
practitioner use Western medicines?

3. How do indigenous personnel respond to events

such as fear, happiness, anger, and sadness?

(4) Housing.

(a) Analyze physical layout of the community.

(b) Determine infestation with ectoparasites and

vermin.

(5) Food.

(a) Is food cultivated for consumption? What foods?

(b) How do the seasons of your operational area

influence diet? Does migration in search of food occur?

(c) What foods provided by US personnel do the

indigenous personnel prefer or reject?

(d) What cash crops are raised?

(6) Water supply, urban. What; kind of water treatment

plants are used (if any)?

(7) Water supply, rural.

(a) What are the numbers and types of rural water

supplies?

(b) What treatment is given to water in rural areas?

Give attitudes of the indigenous personnel toward standard
US purification methods.

(8) Sewage disposal (when applicable),,

(a) What are the types and locations of sewage

treatment plants?

B-6
 (b) In remote areas, what; system is used for
disposal of human excrement, offal, and dead animals or
humans?

(c) What are the attitudes of the indigenous

personnel to standard US methods, such as the use of
latrines?

(9) Epidemiology. What specific diseases in each of the

three following major categories are present among the
guerrillas, their dependents, or their animals?

(10) Domestic animals.

(a) What domestic animals are present?

(b) Describe the normal forage.

1. Do owners supplement the food supply? What food

supplements are given, if any?

2. Are animals penned, or allowed to roam?

(c) Is any religious symbolism or taboo associated

with animals ("sacred cows")? Are animals sacrificed for
religious purposes?

(d) Are local veterinarians available for animal

treatment and ante- and post-mortem inspections of meats?
What is their training?

(11) Local fauna. Record species of birds, large and

small mammals, reptiles, and arthropods present in the
area. If names are unknown, describe (survival purposes).

(12) Poisonous plants. Record those species which are

known to be toxic to roan through contact with the skin,
inhalation of smoke from burning vegetation, or through
ingestion (survival).

B-7
B-8
 APPENDIX C

FIELD-EXPEDIENT PRINTING METHODS

C-1. INSTRUCTIONS FOR MAKING AND USING THE SILK SCREEN

a. Tools For the Job. Six items of equipment are necessary for
printing in the field and make it possible to have printed matter
available for use at any time anywhere. The field-expedient printer
can carry these items along whenever he expects to do printing in the
field; but a good workable substitute can be found for all of these
items in the forests, swamps, and deserts of the world. The field-
expedient printer can often do his job through the use of substitute
items. The six essential tools for printing in the field are:

(1) A silk screen.

(2) A stencil.

(3) Ink.

(4) A stylus.

(5) Paper.

(6) A squeegee or ink roller.

(a) The silk screen (fig. C-1) consists of a frame over which
a piece of cloth is stretched. This frame is attached to a base to
provide a flat working space. The cover is not necessary for printing
but simply makes the silk screen easy to carry from one place to
another.

Figure C-1
Silk screen with carrying case.

C-1
 (b) The stencil is a device which allows the ink to
pass through the screen and onto the paper where it is
needed anti blocks out the ink where it is not needed.

(c) The ink used in silkscreen printing should be

thick and have an oil base. Many kinds of ink can be used
for printing in the field.

(d) A stylus is a device used to etch the stencil. A

pointed piece of wood or metal can be used for this
purpose.

(e) Paper, or a good substitute, is an essential item

for printing in the field. Many good substitutes for paper
have been found, but it is best to have a good supply of
paper whenever possible. Often paper which has been used
can be reused by the printer for a new mission.

(f) The squeegee, or ink roller, is a tool used to

spread the ink evenly and to force the ink through the
stencil and onto the paper.

b. Making a Silk Screen (fig. C-2). The field-expedient;

printer can construct a silkscreen printing press by
following the instructions below. Remember that the
silkscreen and all of the other items mentioned can be made
by using materials found in the field. A good serviceable
silk screen can be made by using wooden pegs instead of
nails, a rock instead of a hammer, a knife instead of a
saw, and bamboo instead of pieces of wood for the frame.
Three tools used for making a silk screen are:

(1) A hammer or heavy object for driving tacks and

small nails.

(2) A knife for cutting the cloth and canvas hinge.

(3) A saw or hatchet for cutting the wood. Materials

for constructing the frame are:

(a) 4 pieces of wood, 1 1/4 x ?./4 x 15 1/11 inches.

(b) 4 pieces of wood, 1 1/4 x 3/4 x 21 inches.

(c) Sixteen 1-inch nails.

(d) Two 1 1/4-inch nails.

(e) Nails must be very thin so they will not split the
wood. It is best to use "soft" wood in making the frame.
When you have made the frame, you are ready to attach the
cloth. Many kinds of material can be used to make the
C-2
screen. Silk cloth is a material which gives the best
results, it is strong and can be cleaned and used many
times. Parachute nylon or a cotton handkerchief will also
serve in an emergency, even an undershirt can be used; however,
remember that only finely woven cloth will allow a fine line to be
printed.

c. Directions for Attaching the Cloth to the Frame (fig. C-3).

(1) Cut the piece of cloth so that it is several inches larger

than the dimensions of the frame.

Figure C-2
Dimensions for construction of silk screen frame.

(2) Soak the cloth in water so that it will shrink tightly over
the frame when it dries.

(3) Place the cloth over the wooden frame and place one tack in
each corner as shown in A, figure C-3. Either small 1/4-inch tacks or
staples can be used. You will need about 90 tacks or staples to
attach the cloth securely.

(4) Next, place a row of tacks along one side of the frame as
shown in B, figure C-3. Ten evenly spaced tacks or staples will be
enough.

(5) Place a row of tacks along the opposite edge of the frame as
shown in C, figure C-3. The cloth must be pulled tight before driving
each of these 10 tacks.

(6) Continue to drive the tacks around the inside as shown in D.

This will give added strength to the screen.

C-3
 Figure C-3
Tacking cloth to underside of frame.

d. Materials for Constructing the Base and Cover.

(1) 4 pieces of wood, 1 x 1 x 17 inches.
(2) 4 pieces of wood, 1 x 1 x 28 inches.
(3) 2 pieces of cardboard or plywood, 19 x 28 inches.
(4) 1 piece of canvas or heavy cloth, 2 x 28 inches.
(5) Eight 1 1/4-inch nails.
(6) One hundred forty 1 1/4-inch tacks.

e. Directions for Making the Base and cover (fig. C-4).

(1) The four pieces of cardboard or plywood is then placed over

the wood frame and tacked around the edge with tacks. Space the tacks
evenly 1 inch apart.

Figure C-4
Dimensions for construction of base and cover.

C-4
 f. The Hinge Nails. You are now ready to hinge. the silk screen to
the base. Place the frame in the base with the cloth side down. The
silk screen is now flat against the cardboard or plywood. The end of
the silkscreen frame should be 1 1/2 inches from the end of the base.
This will permit the frame to be raised. The two 1 1/4-inch nails are
driven through the side of the base from the outside and into the end
of the silkscreen frame. Figure C-1 shows where these hinge nails are
placed. These two nails form a hinge which allows the screen to be
raised and lowered. The final step in making your silk screen is the
hinging of the base to the cover. This is done by using the 2- x 28-
inch'piece of canvas as a hinge. This piece of cloth is tacked along
one side of the base and cover. You now have a carrying case for the
silk screen, making the screen portable.

g. The Ink to Be Used. Many different kinds of ink can be used for
printing with the silk screen. Ink with an oil base, such as
mimeograph ink, is best. Paint with an oil base is the best
substitute or printer's ink can also be used. Ink that is used for
silkscreen printing should be thick; oil base paints are almost the
right thickness. A little practice with the silk screen will teach
the printer what to look for in a good printing ink. The field-
expedient printer can practice by using many kinds of ink and paints.
In an emergency, berries or any stain producing material can be
crushed and an ink substitute produced.

h. How to Use the Stencil and Silk Screen.

(1) The first step is to make sure that you have all six of your
tools. They should be clean and in good working order, and you should
have enough paper to finish the job.

(2) Place the words, picture, or symbols on the stencil. If you

are using the standard printing stencil, scratch the words onto the
stencil with the pointed stylus. If you are using the cut-out
stencil, remove the parts with a knife or sharp object.

(3) Lift the silkscreen frame up from the base as in figure C-1.
Place the stencil on the bottom of the screen. Tacks, tape, or glue
can be used to hold the stencil in place.

(4) Place a piece of paper on the base under the stencil. This
piece of paper will protect the base from ink while you are preparing
to print.

(5) Lower the silk screen onto the base. Place enough ink on the
silk to cover the screen. Use the squeegee to spread the ink evenly
and to force the ink through the opening in the stencil. The squeegee
must have a straight edge; another tool which will do the same job is
a roller. A roller made of hard rubber is best for spreading the ink
on the silk screen. A stiff brush is another tool which can be used.

C-5
 (6) You are now ready to print. Place the piece of paper to be
printed on the base and lower the silk screen on top of the paper.
Slide the squeegee firmly over the silk, forcing the ink through the
stencil, lift the screen, remove the paper, and allow the paper to
dry. If the printing is not dark enough, add more ink to the screen.

(7) When the printing job is finished, remove the stencil and
clean the screen and all other tools. Also, be sure that the squeegee
is clean.

C-2. INSTRUCTIONS FOR MAKING AND USING THE ROCKER-TYPE MIMEOGRAPH

MACHINE

a. General Instructions. Cover any smooth, curved surface with a

heavy (thick), porous fabric. Saturate fabric with mimeograph ink.
Cover ink pad with desired stencil and apply to appropriate paper
with a rocker-type movement of the apparatus.

b. Specific Instructions. A frame or base for this aid can be

cheated, on the spot, by using many ordinary items. A wooden block,
tin can, or glass bottle can be used as a frame. The machine can be
made with crude tools; or, in some cases, the article may be used as
it is. A frame may be made from a wooden block, using a chopping axe
and a penknife. The surface can also be hollowed out to carry ink,
styli, and stencil paper for supply purposes. Size can be increased
by fastening a piece of sheet metal to the block.

(1) A cover can be made using thick, porous material such as a

coat, blanket, felt, or burlap; a cover also may be made of many
layers of thin fabric. Wrap the fabric around the smooth, curved
surface of the printing frame to make an inkpad. The pad can be held
in position with tape, string, thumbtacks, or glue.

(2) Saturate the pad with mimeograph ink. This ink: can be a
composite of almost any grease and carbon scraped from a fireplace or
grating. Color can be achieved by mixing pigments of color to the
grease instead of carbon. Mimeograph ink, commercial grade, is a
universal item and is available in any civilized country. Shoe
polish, thinned with kerosene or other solvent, is generally
available and usable.

(3) Stencils can be made from thin, tough tissue or thin airmail
paper by applying a coat of wax (paraffin) to one side. This wax can
be rubbed on, then gently warmed to insure uniformity of thickness
and penetration of the paper. Only partial penetration is desirable;
not saturation.

(4) For a stylus, you may use a ballpoint pen, a slender stick of
hard wood, or even a heavy piece of wire with the ends rounded and
smoothed enough to etch the wax without tearing the paper. The stylus
is used to inscribe the desired message or to sketch on the wax
coating of the paper. The paper is then applied to the inkpad with
C-6
the wax next to the ink. Some of the ink will penetrate through the
lines made by the stylus, thus "printing" the blank paper. The
undisturbed wax prevents the ink from penetrating the paper in
unwanted places.

(5) If no mimeograph paper is available, substitute paper chosen

for printing should be of quality equal to newsprint; but, almost any
paper will suffice.

C-3. INSTRUCTIONS FOR MAKING AND USING A GELATIN PRINTING DEVICE

a. General Instructions. This reproduction method is more commonly

known as the hectograph technique, a commercial technique used
worldwide. All necessary materials are commercially known by the name
"hectograph" and are available in several variations from gelatin
plates to prepared plates which are fiber-backed, wrap-around models
for machine use (Ditto). The Ditto machines are similar in appearance
to mimeograph machines. Emergency or field conditions will probably
dictate the use of the simple gelatin plate described below.

b. Specific Instructions. Gelatin, the base for this technique,

can be purchased as a hectograph product, made from gelatin powder
produced by food concerns (such as Knox), or made by boiling the
bones and skin of animals. (Pulverizing the bone will speed the
boiling down process.) Enough gelatin powder should be added to make
a semisolid plate. The warm, liquid gelatin is poured into a shallow,
wide container or on a tabletop where it is allowed to cool and set.
When properly prepared, it becomes a glass-smooth plate which feels
like sponge rubber to the touch. This will be soft enough to absorb
the ink but firm enough not to bleed the ink on the master copy. The
addition of a little animal glue will toughen the plate and a little
glycerin will keep it from drying out too quickly. The effects of
these additions are in direct proportion to the quantity, used; both
are desirable, but not absolutely necessary. Both should be added and
well-mixed during the liquid stage of the gelatin.

(1) The master copy is made on a good grade of smooth, tough,

hard-finish paper. The material to be reproduced is typed or written
using Hectographor Ditto carbon paper, ribbon, ink, or pencil; all
are commercially available. In an emergency, trial and error testing
will unveil numerous ink pencils (indelible), writing inks, and
stamped inks that will reproduce. When the ink has been applied to
the master copy, do not blot. If pencil is used, be sure that the
copy is strong and uniform.

(2) When the gelatin plate is set and ready for work, sponge the
plate thoroughly with cold water and allow it to set for an
additional minute or two. Using a sponge, remove all excess moisture
and apply the master copy, face down, on the gelatin plate. Carefully
smooth the copy to insure complete and uniform contact with prepared
plate. Do not remove for at least 2 minutes. Lift one corner of the
master for a gripping point and smoothly and carefully lift the
C-7
master copy from the gelatin plate. The gelatin plate now bears a
negative copy of the desired material and is ready to reproduce the
copy.

(3) Begin reproduction immediately after the master copy has been
removed from the gelatin plate. Reproduction is accomplished by
placing a blank sheet of smooth surface paper on the gelatin plate
and smoothing it into total contact by using the hand (or a rubber
roller, if available), then lifting the sheet from the gelatin
surface. This is done rapidly to obtain as many copies as possible
from one inking of the plate. One good inking of the plate may
produce from 100 to 200 copies by this method, while a commercial
Ditto machine may produce as many as 700 copies. To speed this
process, one small corner of the sheet of reproduction paper is left
free for gripping. This can be accomplished by permanently affixing a
small piece of paper to the place on the gelatin plate where a corner
of the reproduction paper would fall. This piece of paper acts as a
guide and a buffer to keep that one corner of the reproduction paper
from sticking. When removing the reproduction paper, lift the sheet
by the loose corner; do not attempt to roll it away. The rolling
action will cause the reproduction paper to curl as it dries.

(4) After completing the reproduction job, sponge the gelatin

plate thoroughly with cold water and allow it to set for 48 hours or
until the ink has been assimilated by the gelatin. The plate is now
ready to be used on a new and different job. The only way to shorten
this time span is to dissolve the gelatin plate in hot water; boil
off the superfluous water until the liquid is thickened to the
desired consistency, and pour a new gelatin plate. Of course, two or
more gelatin plates may be prepared to increase production
capabilities.

C-8
 APPENDIX D

EXAMPLES OF MASTER TRAINING PROGRAM FOR RESISTANCE FORCES

Section I. EXAMPLE OF MASTER TRAINING PROGRAM FOR A

10-DAY LEADERSHIP SCHOOL

The master training program for the 10-day leadership school was developed to provide the indigenous
leaders and potential leaders with a general knowledge of the subjects to be taught to all indigenous
personnel. Primary emphasis is placed on the role of the leader or commander in order to prepare these
leaders to supervise the activities of their subordinates. It is assumed that most of these personnel
have had prior military service and, therefore, should already possess a basic knowledge of the subjects
to be covered. Upon completion of the 10-day leadership school, the leaders will return to their units
of work and train with their units, thus expanding their own knowledge of the subject covered. Following
an example of a 10-day master training program for a leadership school for selected indigenous
personnel. HOURS
Subject Scope Day Night Total PE
Map Reading and Compass Same general scope as in 30-day program. Include how 4 2 6 (4)
to read scale and coordinates.
Field Aid, Field Same general scope as in 30-day program. Emphasis on 4 4 (1)
Sanitation, and Survival field sanitation and responsibility of commanders.
Individual Tactical Same general scope as in 30-day program. Emphasis on 10 9 19 (16)
Training (Day and Night) security of operational bases, movements,
formations, control measures at night, and duties
and responsibilities of commanders.
Patrols, Small-Unit Same general scope as in 30-day program. Emphasis on 10 29 30 (25)
Tactics, Raids, Ambushes planning, organization, preparation, command,
(Day and Night) control, security, execution of patrols, ambushes
and raids.
Weapons (US and Foreign) Same general scope as in 30-day program. 8 2 10 (7)
Familiarization firing. Primary emphasis on
employment of weapons.
Intelligence Same general scope as in 30-day program. Primary and 6 4 10 (8)
counterintelligence. Night visions.
Air Operations Same general scope as in 30-day program. Primary 6 8 14 (11)
emphasis on selection and reporting of DZ's,
organization of reception committee, duties and
responsibilities of commanders.
Demolition Familiarization with demolition procedures; 5 5 (3)
demonstrating, planning, safety.
Communications Communication means, available systems, 4 4 (2)
communication security, simple cryptographic
systems.
Leadership Principles and Military leadership, traits, principles, 6 6 (4)
Techniques indications, actions, and orders. Responsibilities
and duties of the commander. Human behavior problem
areas and problem-solving process. Selection of
junior leaders. Span of control and chain of
command. Combat leadership.
Tactics and Operations Characteristics of guerrilla warfare, guerrilla 7 5 12 (9)
operations, principles, capabilities, and
limitations, organization of operational bases,
security, civilian support, logistics,
counterintelligence, combat employment, missions,
tactical control measures, target selection, mission
support site, and defensive measures.
Responsibilities and duties of indigenous leaders.
Total hours in master program 70 50 120 (90)
Notes:
1. Identify those personnel whose leadership ability, knowledge, skill, or desire is below acceptable
standards.
2. Upon completion of leadership school one additional day may be scheduled for coordinating and
planning future operations.
3. A suggested arrangement of scheduling is as follows:
29 April - 4 May: Preparation for training and selection of leaders.
5 - 14 May: Leadership training.
16 May - 14 June: Troop training.
 Section II. EXAMPLE OF A 30-DAY MASTER TRAINING PROGRAM

Following is an example of a 30-day master training program which may be used as a

basis for preparing individual master training programs for each separate indigenous
unit.
HOURS
Subject Scope Day Night Total PE
Map Familiarization and How to read a map, orientation of map with compass, 14 10 24 (20)
Use of Compass how to locate oneself, determine azimuth, and day
and night use of compass.
First Aid, Field Basic treatment of wounds, prevention of infection 6 4 10 (7)
simple bandaging, pressure points, prevention of
shock, splints, litter construction, and use; field
sanitation measures regarding water supply, waste
disposal, and personal hygiene.
Individual Tactical Camouflage, cover, concealment, movement, 26 9 45 (41)
Training (Day and Night) observation, reporting, discipline, sounds, hand-
to-hand combat, combat formations, night movement,
night camouflage, preparation of equipment and
clothing, night visions, sounds and observation,
night security and formations, message writing,
immediate action drills, and security of
operational bases.
Patrols, Small-Unit Planning, organization, preparation, formations, 26 44 70 (60)
Tactics, Raids, Ambushes commands, control, security, communications and
(Day and Night) reporting of patrols; objectives, target selection,
organization of raid forces; reconnaissance and
intelligence; planning, preparation, movement,
deployment, conduct of raids, disengagement, and
withdrawal of raiding forces; characteristics,
definition, objectives of ambushes, selection of
ambush sites, organization of ambush forces, phases
of ambush operation, planning, preparation
movement, deployment, execution, disengagement, and
withdrawal of ambush forces. All subjects covered
for both day and night operations.
Weapons (Foreign and US) Carbine, M1, SMG; AR; Pistol, .45: machineguns; 28 10 38 (32)
foreign weapons to include care and cleaning,
loading, aiming, stoppages, range firing;
familiarization firing of all weapons; and day and
night firing.
Intelligence Security measures, how to obtain and report 8 8 (5)
information, captured documents, and material;
interrogation and handling of prisoners; and
counterintelligence procedures.
Air Operations Establishment of drop zone, marking and 16 15 31 (25)
identification of DZ, security of DZ, receiving and
transporting supplies and equipment.
Demolitions Nonelectric and electric firing systems, 21 8 29 (24)
calculation and placement of charges, rail and
bridge destruction, boobytraps, and expedient
devices.
Squad Tests Review and exercise covering all instruction 23 16 39 (37)
Platoon Tests Review and exercise covering all instruction 42 24 66 (63)
Total hours in master training program 210 150 360 (314)
Notes:
1. Maximum number of trained, indigenous personnel will be used to assist in training others. Identify
those personnel who may qualify as potential cadre or potential leaders.
2. Intelligence, compass, map familiarization, observing and reporting, tactical training of the
individual, patrolling, weapons, demolitions, and field sanitation will be integrated whenever possible.
3. Classes to be broken down into platoon-size groups whenever possible.
4. Practical work exercise, demonstrations, and conferences to be used in lieu of lectures to the
maximum extent possible.
5. Stress small-unit training (patrol, squad, and platoon). Develop teamwork and esprit de corps.
 Section III. DATA CARD--PERSONNEL AND TRAINING RECORD

The following is an example of a personnel data card that may, also

serve as a training record. This simplifies and holds to a minimum the
number of records that may be required to be maintained in an operational
area. The type and amount of information to be recorded will vary with each
operational area to include the degree of security to be afforded
resistance personnel.

1. Personnel Data:

a. UWOA FULL NAME SN

b. RANK DOB POB

c. UNIT DATE OF ENLISTMENT

d. LAST CIVILIAN ADDRESS

e. CIVILIAN OCCUPATION

f. LANGUAGES

g. SPECIAL SKILLS AND APTITUDES (CIVILIAN)

h. FINANCIAL DATA:

DATE AMOUNT PAID

DATE AMOUNT PAID

DATE AMOUNT PAID

i. LEFT THUMB PRINT RIGHT THUMB PRINT

j. PHOTOGRAPH

k. DATE OF DISCHARGE OR DEMOBILIZATION

D-5
2. Training Record: SUBJECTS DATES

a. Basic Training

Advanced/specialist training:

b. MOS specialties: AREA OF DEGREE OF

INTEREST
PROFICIENCY

DEGREE OF
WEAPON SKILL

c. Weapon qualifications:

D-6
 d. Combat operations:

e. Awards and decorations:

f. Wounds or injuries: Type Date

Disciplinary actions:

Date Offense Type of Trial Punishment

D-7
D-8
 APPENDIX E

IMMEDIATE ACTION DRILLS FOR FOOT PATROLS

Section I. INTRODUCTION

E-1. GENERAL

a. A patrol may make contact with the enemy at any time. This
is especially true in guerrilla operations. Contact may be by
chance, by air observation or attack, or by ambush. It may beg
visual only: the patrol sights the enemy but is undetected by
him. In this case, the patrol leader can decide whether to make
or avoid physical contact, basing his decision on the patrol's
assigned mission and capability to successfully engage the
potential target.

b. When a patrol's assigned mission prohibits physical

contact, except that necessary to accomplish the mission, its
actions are defensive in nature. It avoids being seen by the
enemy. Physical contact, if unavoidable, is broken as quickly as
possible and the patrol, if still capable, continues its
mission.

c. When a patrol's assigned mission permits or requires it to

seek or exploit opportunities for contact (as in the case of a
search and attack patrol), its actions are offensive in nature
and are immediate and positive.

d. In foot patrolling, especially in guerrilla operations,

contacts (visual or physical) are often unexpected, at very
close ranges, and short in duration. Effective fire, or the
threat of effective fire, often gives leaders little or no time
to fully estimate situations and issue orders. In these
situations, immediate action drills provide a means for swiftly
initiating positive offensive or defensive action, as
appropriate.

E-2. IMMEDIATE ACTION DRILLS

a. Immediate action drills are drills designed to provide

swift and positive small unit reaction to enemy visual or
physical contact. They are simple courses of action in which all
men are so well trained that minimum signals or commands are
required to initiate action.

b. Immediate action drills

(1) Can be designed, developed, and used by any unit, no

matter how it is organized.

(2) Are designed and developed as needed for the combat

situation.

E-1
 (3) Can, in many cases, be initiated by any member of the

(4) Can also be designed, developed, and used by mounted and

airmobile units.

c. Immediate action drills are appropriate

(1) When ambushed, regardless of terrain.

(2) When contact, including ambush, is at very close range

and maneuver is restricted because of close terrain, such as
mountains, jungle, or heavy woods.

(3) When detection by air observation is a threat.

(4) When under low level air attack.

d. It is not feasible to attempt to design an immediate

action drill to cover every possible situation. It is better to
know one immediate action drill for each of a limited number of
situations occurring in a combat area.

E-3. SIGNALS

a. Some immediate action drills, such as the counter-ambush

immediate action drills described below, are initiated without
signals or commands, as pre-arranged automatic reactions to
enemy contact. Others, such as the chance contact immediate
action drill, immediate assault, are initiated on silent (arm-
and-hand) signals. When appropriate, standard silent signals are
used; special silent; signals are developed for use-at other
times.

b. There are no standard silent signals for freeze, hasty

ambush, and all clear. The standard silent signals for halt and
enemy in sight (with direction indicated) require exaggerated
arm motions which increase the danger of detection.

c. The special silent signals shown in figure E-1 may beg

used to halt a patrol in place, to indicate detection and
direction of the enemy, to initiate the drills discussed here,
and to indicate that all is clear.

d. Units designing other immediate action drills should

devise and use special silent signals only when there are not
appropriate standard signals.

E-2
E-4. SCOPE

a. This appendix describes seven immediate action drills: one

for any situation requiring immediate halt, one for avoiding air
observation, one for air attack, two for chance contact, and two
for countering ambush. It is a guide to users in designing and
developing immediate action drills appropriate to their
situations. The drills and other actions described and discussed
are examples which illustrate the application of principles;
they are no more considered as standardized reactions which fit
every situation.

b. Normal small unit tactics and techniques are used in

executing immediate action drills and are not discussed in
detail.

Figure E-1
Special silent signals.

E-3
 Section II. EXAMPLE IMMEDIATE ACTION DRILLS

E-5. IMMEDIATE HALT DRILL

When the situation requires the immediate, in-place halt of the

patrol, the immediate action drill freeze is used. This is the
situation when the patrol detects the enemy but is undetected by
him. The first man detecting the enemy (visually or otherwise)
gives the special silent signal, FREEZE. Every man halts in
place, weapon at the ready, and remains absolutely motionless
and quiet until further signals or orders are given.

E-6. AIR OBSERVATION AND/OR ATTACK DRILLS

These drills are designed to reduce the danger, of detection by

aircraft and casualties from low level air attack.

a. Air Observation. When an aircraft, enemy or unidentified,

which may detect the patrol, is heard or observed, the
appropriate immediate action drill is FREEZE. The first man
hearing or sighting such an aircraft signals FREEZE. Every man
freezes in place until the patrol leader identifies the aircraft
and gives further signals or orders.

b. Air Attack. When an aircraft detects a patrol and makes a

low level attack, the immediate action drill air attack is used.
The first man sighting an attacking aircraft shouts "Aircraft;
t; Front (Left, Rear, or Right)." Patrol moves quickly into line
formation, well spread out, at right angles to the aircraft's
direction of travel. As each man comes on line, he hits the
ground, using available cover, and positions his body at right
angles to the aircraft's direction of gravel, to present the
shallowest target possible.

(1) Between attacks (if the aircraft returns or if more than

one aircraft attacks) men seek better cover.

(2) Attacking aircraft are fired on only on command of the

patrol leader.

E-7. CHANCE CONTACT DRILLS

a. Hasty Ambush. This immediate action drill is both a

defensive measure used to avoid contact and an offensive measure
to make contact. It may often be a subsequent action freeze.
When special silent signal hasty ambush is given (by point,
patrol leaders, or another authorized man), the entire patrol
moves quickly to the right or left off line of movement, as
indicated by signal, and takes up the best available concealed
firing positions. The patrol leader initiates ambush by opening
fire and shouting, "Fire." This insures initiation of the ambush
if his weapon misfires. If the patrol is detected before this,
the first man aware of detection initiates ambush by firing and
shouting.

E-4
 (1) When used as a defensive measure to avoid contact,
ambush is not initiated unless the patrol is detected.

(2) When used as an offensive measure, the enemy is allowed

to advance until he is in the most vulnerable position before
the ambush is initiated.

(3) An alternate means for initiating the ambush is to

designate an individual (for example, point or last man) to open
fire when a certain portion of the enemy reaches or passes him.

b. Immediate Assault. This immediate action drill is used,

defensively, to make and quickly break undesired but unavoidable
contact (including ambush), and, offensively, to decisively
engage the enemy (including ambush). When used in chance
contact, men nearest the enemy open fire and shout, "Contact,
Front (Right, Left, or Rear)." The patrol moves swiftly into
line formation and assaults.

(1) When used defensively, the assault is stopped if the

enemy withdraws and contact is broken quickly. If the enemy
stands fast, the assault is carried through enemy positions and
movement is continued until contact is broken.

(2) When used offensively, the enemy is decisively engaged.

Any one attempting to escape is pursued and destroyed.

E-8. COUNTERAMBUSH DRILLS

When a patrol is ambushed, the immediate action drill used is

determined by whether the ambush is near or far (see ch 7 for
discussion of near and far ambushes).

a. In a near ambush, the killing zone is under very heavy,

highly concentrated, close-range fires. There is little time or
space for men to maneuver or seek cover. The longer they remain
in the killing zone, the more certain their destruction.
Therefore, if attacked by a near ambush, react as-follows:

(1) Men in the killing zone, without order or signal,

immediately assault directly into the ambush position, occupy
it, and continue the attack or break contact, as directed. This
action moves them out of the killing zone, prevents other
elements of the ambush from firing on them without firing on
their own men, and provides positions from which other actions
may be taken.

(2) Men not in the killing zone maneuver, as directed,

against the attack force and other elements of the ambush.

E-5
 (3) The attack is continued to eliminate the ambush or to
break contact as directed.

b. In a far ambush, the killing zone is also under very

heavy, highly concentrated fires, but from a greater range. This
greater range provides men in the killing zone some space for
maneuver and some opportunity to seek cover at a lesser risk of
destruction. Therefore, if attacked by a far ambush, react as
follows:

(1) Men in the killing zone, without order or signal,

immediately return fire, take the best available positions, and
continue firing until directed otherwise.

(2) Men not in the killing zone maneuver, as directed,

against the ambush force.

(3) The attack is continued, as directed to eliminate the

ambush or to break contact.

c. In each situation, the success of the counter-ambush drill

employed is dependent on the men being well trained in
recognizing the nature of an ambush and well rehearsed in the
proper reaction.

E-9. TYPICAL SITUATIONS, APPROPRIATE IMMEDIATE ACTION DRILLS

AND SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS

In chance contact and in ambush, the immediate action drills

that a patrol uses and the patrol's subsequent actions are
determined largely by whether the assigned mission prohibits or
permits contact (except that necessary to accomplish the
mission). The immediate action drill FREEZE, however, can be
used in either circumstance and not affect the assigned mission.

a. Mission requires patrol to avoid contact, if possible, and

to quickly break any contact made.

(1) Situation. Patrol sees enemy approaching. Possibility

appears good that enemy will not detect patrol. Enemy is so
close that there is not time to establish a hasty ambush.

(a) Immediate action drill. FREEZE. Patrol opens fire only

if detected.

(b) Subsequent action. If no contact, patrol continues

after enemy passes. If contact is made, it is broken by assault
or by clock system after initial fire, and patrol continues (1,
.2, fig. E-2).

E-6
 Figure E-2
Immediate action drills.

(2) Situation. Patrol sees enemy approaching. Contact

appears unavoidable.

(a) Immediate action drill. FREEZE, followed by HASTY

AMBUSH. Patrol executes ambush only if detected.

E-7
 Figure E-2
Continued.

(b) Subsequent action. If no contact, patrol continues

after enemy passes. If ambush is executed, patrol assaults by
fire only, withdraws quickly, and continues (3, 4, fig. E-2).

E-8
Figure E-2
Continued.

E-9
 (3) Situation. Patrol and enemy detect each other at same
time and at such close range that breaking by clock system or
fire and maneuver is not appropriate.

(a) Immediate action drill. IMMEDIATE ASSAULT, to enemy,

if he withdraws; through enemy if he stands fast (5, 6, fig. E-
2).

(b) Subsequent action. Continue mission.

Figure E-2
Continued.

E-10
 Figure E-2
Continued.

(4) Situation. Patrol is ambushed (near ambush).

(a) Immediate action drill. COUNTERAMBUSH. Men in killing

zone assault attack force. Other men attack, as directed, to
permit entire patrol to break contact (7,8, fig. E-2).

E-11
 Figure E-2
Continued.

(b) Subsequent action. Reorganize and continue mission.

(5) Situation. Patrol is ambushed (far ambush).

(a) Immediate action drill. COUNTERAMBUSH. Men in killing

zone return fire, seek cover, continue firing. Other men attack,
as directed, to permit patrol to break contact (9, 10, fig. E-
2).

(b) Subsequent action. Reorganize and continue mission.

E-12
 Figure E-2
Continued.

b. Mission requires patrol to engage targets of opportunity

and otherwise exploit opportunities to engage in decisive
combat.

(1) Situation. Patrol sees enemy approaching. Possibility

appears good that enemy will not detect patrol. Enemy is so
close that there is not time to establish a hasty ambush.

(a) Immediate action drill. FREEZE.

E-13
 (b) Subsequent action. Patrol allows enemy to advance as
close as possible. Patrol leader opens fire when enemy is in
most vulnerable position (any patrol member opens fire if
detected). Patrol assaults with great violence and heavy fire;
destroys enemy; pursues if appropriate (11, 12, fig. E-2).

Figure E-2
Continued.

E-14
 (2) Situation. Patrol sees enemy approaching. Contact
appears unavoidable.

(a) Immediate action drill. FREEZE, followed by HASTY

AMBUSH.

(b) Subsequent action. Patrol executes ambush when enemy

is in most vulnerable position; assaults with great violence and
heavy fire; destroys enemy; pursues if appropriate (13, 14, fig.
E-2).

Figure E-2
Continued.

E-15
 (3) Situation. Patrol and enemy detect each other at same
time.

(a) Immediate action drill. IMMEDIATE ASSAULT.

(b) Subsequent action. Patrol continues assault until

enemy is destroyed. Escaping enemy is pursued and destroyed
(15,fig. E-2).

Figure E-2
Continued.

E-16
 (4) Situation. Patrol is ambushed (near ambush).

(a) Immediate action drill. COUNTERAMBUSH. Men in killing

zone assault to destroy attack force. Other men attack, as
directed, to eliminate ambush.

(b) Subsequent action. Escaping enemy is pursued and

destroyed (16, fig. E-2.)

(5) Situation. Patrol is ambushed (far ambush).

(a) Immediate action drill. COUNTERAMBUSH. Men in killing

zone return fire, seek cover, continue firing. Other men attack,
as directed, to enable men in killing zone to maneuver. All
attack, as directed, to eliminate ambush.

(b) Subsequent action. Escaping enemy is pursued and

destroyed (17, 18, fig. E-2).

Figure E-2
Continued.

E-17
 Figure E-2
Continued.

E-18
 Figure E-2
Continued.

c. Immediate action drill used not affected by assigned

mission.

(1) Situation. Aircraft (enemy or unidentified) which may

observe patrol is sighted or heard.

(a) Immediate action drill. FREEZE, initiated by first man

sighting or hearing aircraft.

(b) Subsequent action. As directed by patrol leader.

(2) Situation. Enemy aircraft makes low level attack.

(a) Immediate action drill. AIRCRAFT ATTACK, initiated by

first man detecting aircraft approach.

(b) Subsequent action.

1. Continue mission, if aircraft does not repeat attack.

2. Continue dispersion and seek more cover if aircraft

returns or if more than one aircraft attacks (1y, fig. E-2).

E-19
 Figure E-2
Continued.

E-10. USE OF IMMEDIATE ACTION DRILLS

a. Some immediate action drills may be used repeatedly with

little danger that frequent use will enable the enemy to develop
effective countermeasures. FREEZE and HASTY AMBUSH are in this
category. The situations in which their use is appropriate do
not lend themselves to easy conversion by the enemy into a
baited trap.

b. Habitual use of some immediate action drills can be very

dangerous, however. For example, too frequent use of IMMEDIATE
ASSAULT can lead the enemy to expose a small force to an
apparently undetected patrol, causing the patrol to launch an
IMMEDIATE ASSAULT into the massed fires of a larger, concealed
force. This countermeasure has been very effectively used by the
Viet Cong guerrillas in South Vietnam.

c. Any immediate action drill must be carefully studied to

detect any potential dangers which may arise from frequent use.
If these dangers cannot be eliminated, the drills must be varied
to avoid setting patterns.

E-20
 APPENDIX F

DEFENSE AGAINST AMBUSH

Section I. GENERAL.

F-1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

a. This appendix provides the small unit leader guidance in

developing and employing counterambush tactics and techniques.
It discusses tactics and techniques which will assist dismounted
units in avoiding, reducing vulnerability to, and countering
ambushes. Much of the material is also applicable to mounted
units. Material is presented as infantry company, platoon,
squad, and patrol actions, but when modified for size,
organization, and equipment, can be applied to any type unit.

b. The tactics and techniques described are guides only. Each

situation in combat must be resolved by intelligent application
of principles and skillfull employment of techniques.

F-2. DEFENSE AGAINST AMBUSH

a. The very nature of ambush, ". . . a surprise attack from a

concealed position," places an ambushed unit at a disadvantage.
Obviously, the best defense is to avoid being ambushed, but this
is not always possible. A unit must, therefore, take all
possible measures to reduce its vulnerability to ambush—to
reduce the damage it will sustain if ambushed. These are passive
measures and must be supplemented by active measures to be taken
to destroy or escape from an ambush.

b. No single defensive measure, or combination of measures,

will prevent or effectively counter all ambushes in all
situations. Tile effectiveness of counterambush measures is
directly related to the state of training of the troops and the
leadership ability of the leaders.

Section II. AVOIDING AND REDUCING VULNERABILITY TO AMBUSH

F-3. GENERAL

a. In avoiding ambush, dismounted units have an advantage over mounted

units. They are less bound to roads, trails, and (as in armored units) the
more obvious routes of movement.

b. This advantage is lost, however, when—

F-1
 (1) Terrain, such as heavy jungle, restricts or prohibits cross-
country movement.

(2) The need for speed requires movement on roads, trails, or

waterways.

F-4. SCOPE

This section discusses procedures to assist at dismounted unit to avoid

ambush, reduce likelihood of being ambushed, and reduce damage sustained if
ambushed.

F-5. PREPARING FOR MOVEMENT

a. Map. The leader studies a map of the terrain over which he will move
his unit. He first checks the map's marginal data to determine reliability
at the time the map was made. If reliability is not good, or if the map is
old, he evaluates its reliability in Light of all other information he can
obtain. For example, a 20-year old map may not show several nearby roads
and trails; more recent; building and development in the area will not be
shown. The leader considers the terrain in relation to all available
information of known or suspected enemy positions and previous ambush
sites. His map study includes evaluation of the terrain from the enemy's
viewpoint. How could the enemy use this terrain? Where could the enemy
position troops, installations, and ambushes?

b. Aerial Reconnaissance. If possible, the leader makes an aerial

reconnaissance. This enables him to compare the map and the terrain. He
also obtains current and more complete information of roads, trails, and
manmade objects, type and density of vegetation, and seasonal condition of
streams.

(1) Additional information. Aerial reconnaissance also reveals:

(a) Movement, lack of movement, in an area (friendly, enemy,

civilian).

(b) Indications of enemy activity. For example:

1. Smoke. Smoke may indicate locations of campsites, patrols, or

patrol bases.

2. Soil. Freshly dug soil may indicate positions or ambush sites.

3. Shadows. Shadows may aid in identifying objects.

4. Unusual objects. Unusual shapes, sizes, shadows, shades, or

colors may indicate faulty camouflage.

F-2
 (2) Limitations. Despite its many advantages, aerial reconnaissance
has limitations.

(a) Strength of bridges cannot the determined.

(b) Terrain surface may be misinterpreted.

(c) Mines and boobytraps cannot be seen.

(d) Presence of aircraft may warn enemy,

c. Route Selection. The factors the leader considers are the same
whether he is selecting his route or studying a route he has been directed
to follow.

(1) Cover and concealment. Cover and concealment are desirable, but a
route with these features may obstruct movement. Terrain which provides a
moving unit cover and concealment also provides the enemy increased
opportunities for ambush. Identification of areas where ambushes may be
concealed allows the Leader to develop plans for clearing these areas.

(2) Observation and fields of fire. How the terrain affects

observation and fields of fire available to the unit and to the enemy will
influence the selection of and movement over a route, formations, rates of
movement, and methods of control.

(3) Key terrain. Key terrain is an earth feature that has a

controlling effect on the surrounding terrain. It must be identified and
actions planned accordingly. If, for example, a hill provides observation
and fields of fire on any part of a route, the leader must plan for
neutralizing enemy that may occupy the hill.

(4) Obstacles. Obstacles may impede movement along a route or limit

maneuver, but they may also limit enemy action.

d. Current Intelligence. All available information is considered. This

includes:
(1) Known, suspected, and previous ambush sites.
(2) Weather and light data.
(3) Reports of units or patrols that have recently operated in the
area.
(4) Size, location, activity, and capabilities of guerrilla forces in
the area.

(5) Attitude of the civilian population; the extent to which they can
be expected to cooperate or interfere.

F-3
 e. Counterintelligence. In counterguerrillaoperations,in particular, a
key feature of preparing for movement is denying the enemy information. A
unit is especially vulnerable to ambush if the enemy knows the unit is to
move, what time it is to depart, where it is to go, the route it is to
follow, and the weapons and equipment; it is to carry. The efforts made to
deny or delay enemy acquisition of this information comprise the
counterintelligence plan.As a minimum, the plan restricts dissemination of
information.

(1) Mission information is disseminated only on a need-to-know basis.

This is especially important when the native personnel operating with the
unit might possibly be planted informers. Once critical information is
given, personnel are isolated so that nothing can be passed out.

(2) If it is likely that the enemy, or enemy informers, will observe

the departure of a unit, deception plans may be used. Two examples are
shown in figure F-1.

Figure F-1
Examples of deception plans.

F-4
 Figure F-1 – Continued.

f. Communications. The leader plans how he will communicate with

elements of his unit; with artillery, air, or other supporting units; and
with higher headquarters. On an extended move, it may be necessary to
establish a radio relay and/or erect a field expedient antenna. An aircraft
might be used to communicate with air or artillery support.

g. Fire Support. Artillery and mortar fires are planned so they will
deceive, harass, or destroy the enemy. They may be planned as scheduled or
on-call fires.

(1) Fires are planned:

(a) On key terrain features along the route. These can serve as
navigation aids or to deceive, harass, or destroy enemy on them.

F-5
 (b) On known enemy positions.

(c) On known or suspected ambush sites.

(d) On the flanks of identified danger areas.

(e) Wherever a diversion appears desirable. For example, if the unit

must pass near an identified enemy position, artillery or mortar fires on
the position may distract the enemy's attention and permit the unit to pass
undetected.

(f) At intervals along the route, every 500 or 1,000 meters for
example. With fires so planned, the unit is never far from a plotted
concentration from which a shift can be quickly made.

(2) Coordination with the supporting unit includes:

(a) Route to be followed.

(b) Scheduled and on-call fires.

(c) Call signs and frequencies.

(d) Checkpoints, phase lines, and other control measures.

(e) Times of departure and return„

F-6. MOVEMENT

a. Intelligence. The unit must provide its own intelligence support.

Members must be alert to report information, and leaders must be able to
evaluate the significance of this information in relation to the situation.

(1) Obvious items from which intelligence may be gained are:

(a) Signs of passage of groups, such as crushed grass, broken

branches, footprints, cigarette butts, or other discarded trash. These may
reveal identity, size, direction of travel, and time of passage.

(b) Workers in fields. This may indicate absence of the enemy.

(c) Apparently normal activities in villages. These may indicate

absence of the enemy.

(2) Less obvious items from which "negative information" may be gained
are:

F-6
 (a) The absence of workers in fields. This may indicate that the
enemy is near.

(b) The absence of children in a village. This may indicate that

they have been hidden to protect them from action which may be about to
take place.

(c) The absence of young men in a village. This indicates that the
village is controlled b y the enemy.

(3) A knowledge of enemy signaling devices is very helpful. Those

listed below are some that have been used by Communist guerrillas in
Vietnam.

(a) A farm cart moving at night shows one lantern to indicate that
no government troops are on the road or trail behind. Two lanterns means
that government troops are close behind.

(b) A worker in the fields stops to put on or take off his shirt.
Either act can signal the approach of government troops. This is relayed by
other informers.

(c) A villager fishing in a rice paddy holds his pole out straight
to signal all clear up at an angles to signal that troops are approaching.

b. Security. Security is obtained through organization for movement,

manner of movement, and by every man keeping alert at all times.

(1) Organization for movement.

(a) A two-man patrol can maintain security by organizing into a

security team with sectors of responsibility as shown in figure F-2.

Figure F-2
Security in a two-man patrol.

F-7
 (b) A larger unit can use any standard formation (file, column, vee)
and establish a reaction force. This reaction force can be separated from
the main body so that it will not come under, the fires of an ambush of the
main body, and can maneuver to destroy the ambush.

(c) Any unit of squad size or larger, regardless of formation used,

must have security forces to the front, flanks, and rear. A rifle company
organized in this manner is shown in figure F-3.

Figure F-3
Security organization of a rifle company.

(2) Manner of movement. A dismounted unit moves by the same methods as

a motorized patrol—continuous movement, successive bounds, or alternate
bounds.

F-7. COUNTERAMBUSH IMMEDIATE ACTION DRILLS

If ambushed, the unit reacts with the appropriate counterambush immediate

action drill.

F-8
 APPENDIX G

PATROL BASES

G-1. GENERAL

a. When a patrol is required to halt for an extended period it must take

active and passive measures to provide maximum security. The most effective
means is to select, occupy, and organize an area which, by its location and
nature, provides passive security from enemy detection. An area so
selected, occupied, and organized is termed a patrol base.

b. Establishment of a patrol base is usually a part of the overall plan

for a patrol's operation. In some circumstances, however, establishment of
a patrol base may be an on-the-spot decision.

c. The maximum length of time a patrol base may be occupied depends on

the need for secrecy. In most situations, occupation should not exceed 24
hours except in an extreme emergency. In all situations, a patrol base is
occupied the minimum time necessary to accomplish its purpose. The same
patrol base is not usually eased again.

(1) In guerrilla operations secrecy of the patrol base is mandatory. A

patrol base is evacuated if discovery is even suspected.

(2) In counterguerrilla operations, secrecy of the patrol base is

always desirable, but is not always as essential as in guerrilla
operations. The need for secrecy, and evacuation if discovered, depend on
the degree of control the guerrilla force has of the area, their capability
to react to the discovery of a patrol base, and their capability to
adversely affect the patrol's operation. When the guerrilla force is
relatively small and weak, secrecy of the patrol base may not be an
essential counterguerrilla consideration; and if discovered, evacuation may
not be required. In an area controlled by a large guerrilla force with a
relatively high degree of combat capability, secrecy of the patrol base is
mandatory; and if discovered, evacuation is usually required.

G-2. PURPOSES

a. Typical situations that require planning for the establishment of a

patrol base include those where there will be:

(1) A requirement to cease all movement to avoid detection.

G-1
 (2) A requirement to hide the patrol during a lengthy, detailed
reconnaissance of the objective area.

(3) A need to prepare food, maintain weapons and equipment, and rest
after extended movement.

(4) A need to formulate a final plan and issue necessary orders prior
to actions at the objective.

(5) A requirement for reorganization after a patrol has infiltrated

the enemy area in small groups (used in conjunction with a rendezvous
point).

(6) A need for a base from which to conduct several. consecutive or

concurrent operations such as ambush, raid, reconnaissance, or surveillance
patrols.

b. Any unforeseen situation occurring during conduct of a patrol. could

lead to an on-the-spot decision to establish a patrol base.

G-3. SELECTION

a. The location for a patrol base is usually selected by map

reconnaissance during patrol planning. Selection may also be by aerial
reconnaissance or may be based on prior knowledge of a suitable location.

b. A patrol base established as the result of an on-the-spot decision

may be the reconnaissance, securing, expansion, and organization of the
area occupied during a security halt.

c. A patrol base location selected by map or aerial reconnaissance or by

prior knowledge of an area is tentative. Its suitability must be confirmed
and it must be secured before occupation.

d. Plans to establish a patrol base must include an alternate location,

a rendezvous point, and a rallying point.

(1) The alternate location is for uses if the initial location proves
unsuitable or if the patrol is required to evacuate the initial location
prematurely. In guerrilla operations, reconnaissance and surveillance of
the alternate location until occupied or no longer needed are usually
desirable. Reconnaissance and surveillance are not needed as much in
counterguerrilla operations and are less likely to be possible or
practical.

(2) The rendezvous point is for use if the patrol evacuates the patrol
base by exfiltration of groups. The rendezvous point will not have been
reconnoitered.

G-2
 (3) The rallying point is for use if the patrol is dispersed from the
patrol base. It is a point over which the patrol has previously passed, it
has been found suitable, and it is known to all.

G-4. CONSIDERATIONS.

When planning for a patrol base, mission and both passive and active
security measures must be considered.

a. Mission. A patrol base must be located in the best place for the
patrol to accomplish its mission.

b. Passive Security Measures.

(1) Select-

(a) Terrain which is considered of little tactical value.

(b) Difficult terrain which will impede foot movement.

(c) An area of dense vegetation, preferably bushes and trees that

spread out close to the ground.

(d) An area remote from human habitation.

(e) An area near a water source.

(2) Avoid-

(a) Known or suspected enemy positions.

(b) Built-up areas.

(c) Ridgelines and topographic crests, except as necessary for

maintaining adequate communications.
(d) Roads, trails, and natural lines of drift.
(e) Wet areas, steep slopes, and small valleys which may be lines of
drift.
c. Active Security Measures. Plan for—
(1) Outpost and listening post systems covering avenues of approach
into the area.
(2) Communications with outposts and listening posts.
(3) Defense of the patrol base, if required.

(4) Withdrawal, if required, to include multiple withdrawal routes.

G-3
 (5) Ad alert plan.

(6) Enforcement of camouflage, noise, and light discipline.

(7) The conduct of necessary activities with minimum movement and

noise.

G-5. OCCUPATION AND OPERATION OF A PATROL BASE;

A patrol base may be occupied in either of two ways: (1) by moving to the
selected site and expanding into and organizing the area in the same manner
as an on-the-spot establishment, or (2) by halting near the selected site
and sending forward reconnaissance farces. The method used must be
thoroughly planned and rehearsed. The establishment and use of patrol base
drills in these methods will assist in the swift and efficient
establishment of patrol bases. Occupation, using an example patrol base
drill, and subsequent operation are described below (1, figure G-1).

Figure G-1
Patrol base establishment.

G-4
 a. Approach.

(1) Patrol is halted at a suitable position within about 200 meters of

the tentative patrol base location.

(2) Close-in security is established.

(3) Previously designated individuals (preferably leaders of patrol's

major subdivisions) join patrol leader.

b. Reconnaissance.

(1) Patrol leader designates point of entry into patrol base location
as 6 o'clock; assigns areas by clock system; designates center of base as
patrol headquarters; moves to patrol headquarters.

(2) Subordinate leaders reconnoiter assigned areas for suitability and

return to patrol leader.

(3) Two men are dispatched to bring patrol forward.

c. Occupation (2, 3, figure G-1).

(1) Patrol leaves line of march at right angles and enters base in
single file, moving to center of base. Designated men remove signs of
patrol's movement.

(2) Each leader peels off his unit and leads it to the left flank of
the unit sector.

(3) Each unit occupies its portion of perimeter by moving clockwise to

left flank of next sector.

(4) Patrol leader checks perimeter by meeting each leader at left

flank of his sector and moving clockwise.

(5) Each leader reconnoiters forward of his sector by moving a

designated distance out from the left flank of his sector, moving clockwise
to tae right limit of his sector, and reentering at the right flank of his
sector. He reports indications of enemy or civilians, suitable observation
post and listening pests 'positions, rallying points, and withdrawal
routes.

(6) Patrol leader designates rallying points, positions for OPs and
listening posts, and withdrawal routes.

(7) Each unit puts out one two-man OP (day) and one three-man
listening post (night) and establishes communications.

G-5
 Figure G-1.
Continued.

G-6
Figure G-1.
Continued.

G-7
 d. Operation (figure G-2).

(1) Security.

(a) Only one point of entry and exit is used. It is camouflaged and
guarded at all times.

(b) Fires are built only when necessary and, as a general rule, only
in daylight. Whether day or night, only necessary fires are built and they
are kept as small as possible. Where terrain permits, fires are built in
pits and, if built at night, are carefully covered and shielded. Building
fires in pits reduces the danger of visual detection and facilitates
extinguishing the fires and camouflaging the sites. The driest and hardest
wood available is used (to reduce smoke). In most areas, the best time for
building fires is when the air is thin and smoke dissipates quickly
(usually around noon); early morning may be appropriate, however, in areas
where there is ground fog. The risk of detection, because of lingering
odor, must be weighed against the risk of detection due to visible smoke.

Figure G-2
Typical patrol base layout.

G-8
 (c) Noisy tasks, such as cutting branches, are accomplished only at
designated times, as early as possible after occupation but never at night
nor during the quiet periods of early morning and late evening. When
possible, noisy tasks are performed when other sounds will cover them, such
as the sounds of aircraft, artillery, or distant battle noises.

(d) Movement, both inside and outside the patrol base, is restricted
to the minimum necessary.

(e) Civilians who discover the location of tire patrol base are
detained until the base is moved or until they can be evacuated to higher
headquarters. Care is taken to prevent the detained civilians from learning
about the base, its operation, and future plans. If necessary, they are
tied and blindfolded and their ears are covered.

(f) When sufficient personnel are available, OPs are manned by at

least two individuals so they can alternate and insure alertness at all
times. This also removes the need for traffic between the OP and the patrol
base.

(g) When sufficient personnel are available, listening posts are

manned by at least two, preferably three, individuals so they too can
alternate and remain alert.

(h) A 1-hour stand-to is observed morning and evening: 30 minutes

before and 30 minutes after light in the morning,, and 30 minutes before
and 30 minutes after dark in the evening. This insures that every man is
acclimated to changing light conditions, and is dressed, equipped, and
ready for action.

(i) Each man makes certain that, he knows the locations of men and
positions to his flanks, front, and rear, and that he knows the times and
routes of any expected movement within, into, and out of the patrol base.

(2) Defense. Defensive measures are planned but a patrol base is

usually defended only when evacuation is not; possible.

(a) Elaborate firing positions Eire not constructed.

(b) Camouflage and concealment are stressed.

(c) Artillery and mortar fires may be planned, if available. Early

warning devices may be placed on avenues of approach. If the base will
definitely be defended, mines, trip flares, and boobytraps may be placed on
avenues of approach and in areas which cannot be covered by fire. The value
of these devices must be weighed against the fact that their discovery
automatically compromises the patrol base.

G-9
 (d) An alert plan is established. This includes plans for evacuation
and defense. All members must know these plans and the signals or orders
for their implementation. Plans for defending the base include pursuit and
destruction of the attacking force.

(3) Communications. Communications are established with higher

headquarters, subordinate units, OPs, and listening posts. The system must
provide for every man to be alerted quickly and quietly.

(a) Radios are an excellent means, but must be carefully controlled.

(b) Wire can be used within the patrol base if its bulk and weight
and the time required to lay and pick up are not disadvantages.

(c) Tug, or pull, wires may be used for signaling. They are quiet
and reduce radio or telephone traffic.

(d) Messengers may be used within the patrol base.

(4) Maintenance. Weapons and equipment are cleaned and maintained as

required.

(5) Sanitation and personal hygiene.

(a) In daylight, catholes outside the perimeter are used. The user
must be guarded.

(b) At night, catholes are located inside the perimeter.

(c) Men wash, shave, and brush their teeth as needed, consistent
with the situation (including availability of water).

(d) Cans, food, and other trash are buried and the site is
concealed.

(6) Messing. Men eat at staggered times, as planned and controlled.

Preparation of meals is planned, if required.

(7) Water. Guarded water parties provide water. Lone individuals do

not visit the water source. No more than two visits to the source are made
in a 24-hour period. Use of water is controlled as closely as required.

(8) Rest. Rest and sleep are permitted only after a11 work is done.
Rest periods are staggered so that proper security is maintained.
Consistent with work and security requirements, as much sleep and rest as
possible are scheduled for each man.

G-10
 (9) Resupply. If the patrol is to be resupplied by air, the flight
path, drop and/or landing zone, and cache are located so that neither the
base nor possible objectives are compromised.

(10) Planning and conduct of operations.

(a) Details of operations planned must be made known to all men

without assembling all at one time and thus endangering the security of the
base. Rehearsals are limited to terrain models, with part of the patrol
rehearsing while the remainder provides security. Weapons are not test
fired.

(b) If part of the patrol is absent on an operation, the perimeter

is adjusted, if necessary, to insure security.

(c) Orders are as brief as possible. Maximum practical use is made

of fragmentary orders and references to SOPs.

(11) Departure.

(a) All signs of the patrol's presence are removed or concealed.

This may prevent the enemy from learning of your presence in the area,
prevent pursuit, or prevent the enemy from learning your methods for
operating patrol bases.

(b) If possible, night evacuation (in case of attack) is avoided.

(c) When possible, the patrol evacuates as a unit.

G-11
G-12
 APPENDIX H

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE AND TRACKING

Section I. INTRODUCTION

H-1. GENERAL

a. In counterguerrilla operations, the success of a unit depends upon

its finding and fixing the guerrilla. Unfortunately, the guerrilla cannot
often be encountered unless he wants to make contact. As a result, the
guerrilla often gains the initiative and can, to a certain extent, control
the battle.To overcome this, problem, the, counterguerrilla unit must seek
out, find, and fight the enemy in areas which he normally considers "safe."

b. Combat intelligence is necessary to find the enemy force, his

capabilities and vulnerabilities, and determine when and how, to engage
him. This can be gained through tracking„ the importance of which cannot be
underestimated. Tracking is necessary when searching for the guerrilla and
when trying to maintain contact.

c. In order to carry out successful, operations against the guerrilla,

the small unit leader and individual members of patrols must have an
appreciation for the collective roles that combat intelligence and tracking
play.

d. The purpose of this appendix is to emphasize the role of the patrol

member and small unit leader in gathering intelligence. The subject of
indicators will be covered in detail since they are indexes to enemy
activity or the lack of it.

Section II. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE IN A COUNTERGUERRILLA ENVIRONMENT

H-2. ROLE OF COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

a. Combat intelligence is extremely important in a counterguerrilla

environment because the enemy is normally more elusive and less frequently
seen than he would be in the conventional situation. Combat intelligence
collected by the members of patrols or the small unit leader is of utmost
importance. These are the personnel who will have direct contact with the
guerrilla, anal they must be properly trained to gain the most intelligence
out of a small or chance contact.

b. Combat intelligence, essential elements of information, methods of

recording information, and methods of processing information are topics
covered in FM 30-5, Combat Intelligence.

H-1
H-3. INDICATORS

a. Many sources of information are available to the patrol member and

the small unit leader. Sources present in both the conventional and
counterguerrilla environment include enemy activity, prisoners of war,
civilians, captured enemy materiel and documents, and recovered military
personnel. However, due to the nature of guerrilla warfare, the patrol
member and the small unit leader must rely heavily on small and sometimes
seemingly unimportant details. These small details, or hints, are termed
indicators. Indicators may be physical sign, such as footprints, feces, or
campfire smoke, or just as easily the lack of these items. Indicators may
also be the actions and reactions of people in a certain area. For example,
the disappearance of military age youth or the sudden appearance of strange
people in an area might indicate, to the observer, a change or increase of
enemy activity indicators cannot be definitely defined since in the final
sense they are any and all factors in a given area which aid the commander
in evaluating the situation and making a decision.

b. For the purpose of instruction, indicators can be categorized into

two types: general indicators and specific indicators of value in a
counterguerrilla environment.

(1) General indicators might be caches, bicycle tracks, wildlife,

debris, or the sixth sense. For example, from a cache of weapons or
supplies one could learn of guerrilla strengths or shortages, or from whom
or where his supplies come. Bicycle tracks along well used roads or trails
may not be indicators; however, the same bicycle tracks into or out of a
suspected base area, or along an infrequently used trail, might indicate an
enemy supply route or access route.

(2) Wildlife can be another indicator, or the lack o f wildlife in an

area could tell the observant soldier something. Only lack of wildlife
would not necessarily tell one anything, but when considered with other
factors, it might become an important indicator. On the other hand,
abundant wildlife in a particular area might indicate that the area is not
frequented by large groups of men.

(3) Debris is not often encountered in the guerrilla environment,

because the guerrilla is very cautious of his movements and actions. As a
result, any debris will probably be in small quantity. It will take a sharp
eye to find it and a well-trained mind to interpret correctly or draw
conclusions. Debris such as blood and bandages or feces would indicate the
health, diet, and disposition of the enemy. It could also indicate the rate
of movement and, of course, direction. (Simple debris and footprints reveal
more information, and this information will be covered in greater detail in
the tracking portion of this appendix.)

H-2
to anti of the other five physical sense. It is a feeling or a premonition.

c. There are other more specific indicators which apply to the

counterguerrilla environment. These indicators deal mostly with the
people's actions and the soldiers' actions with the people. These
indicators are classified into three categories: indicators of an attack,
indicators of a defense, and indicators of guerrilla control of an area.

(1) Indicators of a possible guerrilla attack.

(a) Systematic assassination of government officials.

(b) Abduction of young men for training, indoctrination, and labor.

(c) Increase of sabotage in a particular area.

(d) Sudden absence of guerrilla activity and/or civilian population.

(Also sudden increase of same.)

(e) Shortage of a particular, type of supply, e.g., ammunition or

medical supplies, frequently, indicates an attack on installations stocking
such items.

(f) Increased demonstrations by minority groups.

(g) Increased propaganda in a certain area.

(h) Local population will not associate with friendly troops.

(i) Concentration of modes of mobility; i.e., boats and bicycles.

(j) High rate of defection of local friendly forces.

(k) Visits in villages by strange persons.

(l) Disappearance of known insurgents, who normally spend all of

their time in one particular area.

(m) Low morale; guerrillas need to boost morale with a victory.

(n) The occurrence of national and religious holidays and birthdays

of the guerrilla or his sponsoring power and key leaders.

H-3
 (o) Increased reconnaissance and radio traffic, demonstrations,
feints, massing of forces, or change in location of headquarters, medical
facilities, and other supporting forces.

(2) Indicators of a possible guerrilla defense.

(a) Detection of a high proportion of heavy weapons among

guerrillas.

(b) Establishment of combat or fortified villages.

(c) An increase in kidnapping and the capture and retention of

prisoners.

(d) Gradual withdrawal of guerrillas from aggressive action against

counterguerrilla force.

(e) Supply ambushes designed to obtain arms and ammunition.

(f) Presence of foottraps, spikes, and the like in the area.

(g) Establishment of agricultural areas.

(h) Location of large, permanent-type field headquarters or training

area.

(i) Presence of infiltration routes in the area. This is a dual

indicator of defense and control.

(j) Roadblocks, canal blocks, occupation of good terrain, and

stockage of supplies.

(3) Indicators of possible guerrilla control of area.

(a) Failure of village officials to take strong precautions against

being kidnapped or murdered indicates a compromise might have been made
with guerrilla force.

(b) Refusal of local population to furnish intelligence to

government forces.

(c) Evidence of foodstuffs being stocked for, or delivered to, the

guerrillas.

(d) Inability of constituted government to collect taxes.

(e) Cessation of guerrilla raids on inhabited areas.

H-4
 (f) New homes, fields, roads, trails, or canals in areas other than
those controlled by the government.

(g) Absence of people, but signs of inhabitation.

(h) Imposition of taxes on landowners or operators.

d. It must be remembered that these indicators are not fixed signposts

which point the way to the enemy. They must be considered in view of all
other gathered information.

e. Indicators, combat intelligence, and tracking are all closely

related. Indicators coupled with the physical signs found in tracking build
strong combat intelligence. But it must never be forgotten that these two
subjects are interrelated.

Section III. TRACKING

H-4. QUALITIES OF A TRACKER

To qualify as a combat worthy tracker, certain traits and qualities must be

developed and refined. A tracker must have patience. He must be able to
proceed slowly, quietly, yet steadily while observing and interpreting
available indicators. He must avoid using reckless speed that may cause him
to overlook important, signs, lose the trail completely, or blunder into an
enemy force. A good tracker must be persistent. He must have the ability
and the desire to continue his mission even though indicators are scarce or
conditions of weather or terrain are difficult. If he loses a trail, he
must nave the determination and persistence to find it. He must be keenly
observant. He must be able to see things that are not obvious at a glance
(fig. H-1). He must have the ability to use his senses of smell and hearing
to supplement his observation. A good tracker must also develop a sixth
sense. He may often be led to inspect an area simply because it "does not
look right." This ability often enables a tracker to regain a lose trail or
discover new or additional indicators. An effective tracker must also know
the enemy he is fighting. He cannot properly interpret the indicators he
has found unless he has some knowledge of the enemy, his habits, equipment,
or level of training. A good tracker must also have an, understanding of
nature, a good memory, intelligence, and he must be physically able to
accomplish his mission.

H-5
 Figure H-1
Area surveyed by tracker for indicators.

H-5. CONCEPTS OF TRACKING

a. As a tracker moves along the ground following a trail, he begins to

build a picture in his mind of the enemy he is following. To do this, he
asks himself such questions as: How many persons am I following? What is
their state of training? How are they equipped? Are they healthy? What is
their state of morale? Do they know they are being followed? To answer
these questions, the tracker, uses, available indicators—anything that
indicates a certain action gook place at a particular place and time. For
instance, a footprint in soft sand is an excellent indicator. The tracker
can determine that at a particular time a person walked on this spot.

b. By comparing indicators, the tracker begins to get answers to his

questions. If he finds a footprint and a scuff on a tree about waist high,
for example, it may indicate that; an armed man passed this particular
spot.

c. There are six concepts that apply to tracking. They are—

(1) Displacement.
(2) Staining.
(3) Weathering.
(4) Littering.
(5) Camouflage.

H-6
 (6) Interpretation and/or immediate use intelligence.

d. Any indicator that the tracker discovers can be defined by one or

more of the first five concepts. For the sixth concept, the tracker
combines all indicators and interprets what he has seen to form a composite
picture. He can then use this composite picture as on-the-spot
intelligence. For example, indicators may point out that contact is
imminent and extreme stealth may be required.

H-6. DISPLACEMENT

Displacement takes place when anything is moved from its original,

position. A well-defined footprint in soft, moist ground is a good example
of displacement. The shoe or foot of the individual that left the print
displaced the soil by compression, thus leaving the indentation in the
ground. By studying this indicator, the tracker can determine several
important facts. The print left by worn footwear or by a barefooted person
may indicate lack of proper equipment.

H-7. ANALYZING FOOTPRINTS

Footprints may indicate direction and rate of movement, number of persons

in the moving party, whether or not heavy loads are being carried, sex of
members of the party, and whether the members of the party realize that,
they are being followed. If footprints are deep and the pace is long, rapid
movement is apparent. Extremely long strides, deep prints with toe prints
deeper than heel prints, indicate running. Prints can be counted to
determine numbers. If the prints are deep, short, and widely spaced, with
indications of scuffing or shuffling, a heavy load is being carried by the
person who left the sprint. The sex of a member of the party being
followed can be determined by studying the size and position of the
footprints. Women tend to be pigeon-toed, while men walk with their feet
straight ahead or pointed slightly to the outside. Prints left by women are
usually smaller and the stride is shorter than that taken by men. If the
party realizes that, they are being followed, an attempt to hide their
tracks may be made. Persons walking backwards have a short, irregular
stride. The prints have persons unnaturally deep toe. Soil will be kicked
in the direction of movement.

H-8. DETERMINING "KEY" PRINTS

a. Since the last man in a file will normally leave the clearest
footprints, his will be the key set of prints. A stick can be cut to match
the length of the key print and notched to indicate width at the widest
part of the sole. The tracker should study the angle o f the key print to
the direction of march. Also he should look for an identifying mark or
feature on the print, such as a worn or frayed part of footwear, to help
him identify the key print. In case the trail becomes vague or obliterated,

H-7
or the trail being followed merges with another, the tracker can use his
stick measuring devices and with close study be able to identify the key
print. This will aid him to stay on the trail of the group being followed.

b. The box method can be used to count up to 18 persons. There are three
ways the tracker can employ the box method.

(1) The first and most accurate is to use the stride as a unit of
measure. This is used when a key print can be determined (1, figure H-2).
By identifying the key print on a trail and drawing a line from the heel of
the foot across the trail or road, then moving forward to the opposite
print made by the same person, and drawing a line through the instep, the
tracker forms a box with the edges of the road or trail forming the sides
and the lines he has drawn as the front and back. The tracker then counts
every print inside the box to determine the number of persons in the party
being followed. Any person walking normally would have stepped in the box
at least one time. The key print should be counted as one.

(2) The second way the tracker can employ the box method is the 18-
inch box (2, figure H-2). The 18-inch box is used when there is no key
print distinguishable. In this method, the sides of the road, trail, or
open area again form the sides of the box. This time, however, the tracker
finds an average section of trail and marks off a cross section 18 inches
in length. By counting each indentation in the box, the tracker can
determine approximately how many persons used this particular trail. This
system is not as accurate as the stride measurement. One can readily see
that a person walking with a long stride may step completely over the
18 inch box. Another fault in this method is that a soldier may not have a
measuring device with him.

(3) The third way a tracker may use the box method is the 36 inch box.
The 36-inch box is roughly the same as the 18-inch system. The tracker
marks off a 36-inch cross section of the trail, counts the prints or
indentations in the box, then divides by 2 to determine the number of
persons that used the trail. This system has the same drawbacks as the 18-
inch box but may be useful under the right circumstances (3, fig. H-2).
(The M16 rifle is 36 inches long and may be used as a measuring device.)

H-9. OTHER SIGNS OF DISPLACEMENT

Footprints are only one example of displacement,. Anything; that has been
moved from its original position by a moving person is an example of
displacement.

a. Foliage, moss, vines, sticks, or rocks that are scuffed or snagged

from their original place form valuable indicators. Clines can be dragged,
dew droplets can be displaced from leaves, or stones and sticks may be

H-8
 Figure H-2.
Box methods of determining number of footprints.

H-9
turned over to indicate a different color underneath. Grass or other
vegetation may be bent or broken in the direction of movement.

b. Bits of clothing, threads, or dirt from boots can be displaced from a

person's uniform and deposited on thorns, snags, or the ground. Thorns
should be inspected for bits of clothing or other matter ripped from the
uniform of the person being tracked.

c. Wild animals and birds flushed from their natural habitat by the
person being tracked are examples of displacement. Cries of birds excited
by unnatural movement is an indicator. Tops of talc grass or brush moving
on a windless day indicates that someone is moving the vegetation.

d. Displacement can result from clearing a trail by either breaking or

cutting one's way through heavy vegetation with a machete. These trails are
obvious to the most inexperienced tracker. Some individuals may
unconsciously, break additional branches as they move behind the person who
is cutting. Displacement indicators can be made while stopping to rest with
heavy loads. Prints made by the edges of boxes can help to identify the
load carried. When loads are set down at a rest halt or campsite, grass and
twigs may be crushed. A man sleeping will also flatten the vegetation.

e. In almost any area, there will be insects and spiders. The

observation of any changes in the normal life of these insects may indicate
that someone has recently passed. Bees that are stirred up, ants that have
had their holes covered by someone moving over them, or spiders that have
had their webs torn down are valuable clues. Spiders often spin webs across
open areas, trails, or roads to trap flying insects. If someone is careless
and does not move under these webs, he is leaving an indicator to an
observant tracker.

f. If the party being followed attempts to use a streams to cover their

trail, the trackers may still be able to follow successfully. Algae and
other water plants may be displaced by slippery footing or by someone who
walks carelessly. Rocks may be displaced from their original position, or
turned over to indicate a lighter or darker color on the opposite side. The
party entering or exiting the stream may create slide marks, footprints, or
scuff bark off of roots or sticks. Normally a person or animal will seek
the path of least resistance; therefore, when searching the stream for
indications of departures, open areas along the banks may often yield
results.

H-10. STAINING

Staining occurs when any substance from one organism or article is smeared
or deposited on something else.

H-10
 a. The best example of staining is blood from a profusely bleeding
wound. Blood signs often will be in the form of spatters o f drops. Blood
indicators are not always on the ground. Blood can be smeared on leaves or
twigs from a man's height to the ground.

b. By studying the bloodstains left by a wounded individual, the tracker

can determine:

(1) The location of the wound on the individual.

(a) If the blood seems to be dripping steadily, it probably came

from a wound on the trunk.

(b) If the blood appears to be slung to the front, rear, or to the

sides, the wound is probably in an extremity.

(c) Arterial wounds will appear to pour the blood at regular

intervals as if it were poured from a pitcher. If the wound :is venous, the
blood will pour steadily.

(d) A wound in a lung will deposit bloodstains that are pink,

bubbly, and frothy.

(e) A bloodstain from a head wound will appear heavy, wet, and
slimy, like gelatin.

(f) Abdominal wounds often mix blood with digestive juices so that
the deposit will have an odor and be light in color.

(2) The seriousness of the wound and how far the individual can move
unassisted. This process could lead the tracker to enemy bodies or further
indications as to where they have been carried.

H-11. OTHER EXAMPLES OF STAINING

a. Staining can also occur when muddy footgear is dragged over grass,
stones, and shrubs. Thus, staining and displacement combine to indicate
movement and the direction taken.

(1) Crushed leaves may stain rocky ground that; is too hard to leave
footprints.

(2) Roots, stones, and vines may be stained where leaves or berries
are crushed on them by moving feet.

b. In some instances it may be hard to determine the difference between

staining and displacement. Both terms can be applied to some indicators.
For example, water that has been muddied may indicate recent movement. The
mud has been displaced and it is staining the water. Stones in streams may

H-11
be stained by mud from footwear. Algae can be displaced from stones in
streams and can stain other stones or the bank.

c. Water collecting in footprints in swampy ground can be muddied if the

tracks are recent. With time, however, the mud will settle and the water
will clear. This can be used by the tracker to indicate time. Normally, the
mud will clear in approximately 1 hour. This, of course, will vary with the
terrain.

H-12. WEATHERING

Weather may either aid or hinder the tracker. It affects indicators in

certain ways so that the tracker may determine their relative ages. Wind,
snow, rain, or sunlight may, however, obliterate indicators entirely, thus
hindering the tracker.

a. By studying the effects of weather on indicators, the tracker can

determine the age of the sign. For example, when bloodstains are fresh,
they are bright red. Air and sunlight change blood first; to a deep 'ruby
red color, then to a dark brown crust when the moisture evaporates. Scuff
marks on trees or bushes darken with time, sap oozes, then hardens when it
makes contact with the air.

b. Footprints are greatly affected by weather. When a person's foot

displaces soft, moist soil to form a print, moisture initially holds the
edges of this print intact. As sunlight and air dry the edges of the print,
small particles that were held in place by moisture fall into the print. By
carefully studying this process, the tracker can determine the approximate
age of the print. If particles are just beginning to fall into the print,
the tracker should become a stalker. If the edges of the print are dried
and crusty, the prints are probably at least an hour old. This will vary
with terrain and should be taken as a general guide.

H-13. HOW WEATHERING EFFECTS TRACKING

a. Alight rain may round out the edges of the print. The tracker must
remember when the last rain occurred in order to place these prints into a
proper time frame. A heavy rain may erase all signs.

b. Wind also affects tracks. Besides drying out the print, litter,
sticks, or leaves may be blown into the print. By remembering wind
activity, the tracker may guess the age of the tracks. For example, the
tracker may think, "It is calm at the present, but the wind blew hard about
an hour ago. These tracks have litter blown into them, so they must be over
an hour old." The tracker must be sure, however, that the litter was blown
into the print, and was not crushed into the print when it way made.

H-12
 c. Trails exiting streams may appear to have, been weathered by rain
because of water running from clothing or equipment into the tracks. This
is particularly true if the party exits the stream in a file. This will
permit each person to deposit water into the tracks. The existence of a
wet, apparently weathered trail slowly fading into a dry trail indicates
the trail is fresh.

d. Wind affects sounds and odors. If the wind is blowing from the
direction of the trail the tracker is following, sounds and odors may be
carried to him. If the wind is blowing in the same direction as the trail
being followed, the tracker must be extremely cautious since the wind will
carry his sounds towards the enemy. Wind direction can be determined by
dropping a handful of dry dust or grass from shoulder height. By pointing in
the same direction the wind is blowing, sounds can be localized by cupping
the hands behind the ears and slowly turning. When the sounds are loudest,
the tracker is facing the origin of the sound.

e. In calm weather, when no wind is blowing, the air currents that may
carry sounds to the tracker may be too light to feel. The tracker must
remember that the air cools in the evening and moves downhill to the valleys.
If a tracker is moving uphill late in the day or at night, air currents will
probably be moving toward him, provided no other wind is blowing. As the sun
warms the air in the valleys in the morning, it moves uphill. These factors
should be considered when plotting routes for patrols or other operations. If
a tracker or a commander can keep the wind in his face, sounds and odors will
be carried to him from his objective or the party being tracked.

f. The sun should also be considered by a tracker. It is difficult to

shoot directly into the sun. If the tracker, has the sun at his back and
the wind in his face, he has a slight advantage.

g. The tracker should know and understand how the weather effects soil,
vegetation, and other indicators in his area. He cannot properly determine
the age of indicators until he understands the effects that weather has on
trail signs (fig. H-3).

H-14. LITTERING

A poorly trained or poorly disciplined unit moving over a piece o f terrain

is likely to leave a clear trail of litter. Gum or candy wrappers, ration
cans, cigarette butts, remains of fires, or even piles of human feces are
unmistakable signs of recent movement. Weathering must be taken into
consideration when estimating the age of litter. Rain flattens or washes
litter away, and turns paper into pulp. Ration cans, exposed to weather,
will rust first at the exposed edge where it is opened. Rust then moves in
toward the center. Again the tracker must use his memory to properly
determine the age of litter. The last rain or strong wind can be the basis
for a time frame.

H-13
 Figure H-3,
Weather effects on footprints.

H-14
H-15. CAMOUFLAGE TECHNIQUES USED TO CONFUSE TRACKERS

Camouflage applies to tracking when the party being followed employs

techniques to baffle the tracker or slow him down. Walking backwards to
leave confusing prints, brushing out trails, moving over rocky ground or
through streams are examples of techniques that can be employed to confuse
the tracker.

a. The party being followed may employ "most used" and "least used"
routes to cover their movement.

(1) Movement on lightly traveled sandy or soft trails is easily

trailed. However, a guerrilla may attempt to confuse the tracker by moving
on hard-surfaced, frequently traveled roads. He may even attempt to merge
with the civilians. These routes should be examined carefully, because if a
well-defined approach leads to the enemy, it will probably be mined,
ambushed, or covered by snipers.

(2) Least-used routes are taken in an attempt to confuse the tracker

by avoiding all manmade trails or roads. These routes are normally magnetic
azimuths between two points. The tracker can, however, by using the proper
concepts, follow the party if he is experienced and persistent.

b. The individual or party being followed may use several methods to

minimize trail signs. Footwear wrapped with rags or soft-soled tennis shoes
may make footprints more rounded on the edges and less distinct. The party
may exit a stream in column or line; this reduces the chance of leaving a
well-defined exit.

c. A careful, observant tracker can, by studying signs, determine if an

attempt is being made to confuses him. If individuals attempt-to throw off
their tracker by walking backwards, their footprints will be deepened at
the toe soil will be scuffed or dragged in the direction of movement. By
following carefully, the tracker can normally find a turnaround point.

d. A trail can be brushed out, but rarely without leaving signs. This
technique should be easily recognized by the experienced tracker.

e. If the trail leads across rocky or hard ground, the tracker should
attempt to circle the area to pack up the exit trail. On rocky ground, moss
or lichens growing on the stones could be displaced by even the most
careful evader. If these methods fail, the tracker should return to the
last visible indicators and then head in the direction of movement i4 ever-
widening circles until he again falls upon visible signs.

H-15
 f. Remember that an individual who attempts to hide his trail moves at a
reduced speed. Therefore, an experienced tracker, who is not fooled by
these attempts, gains time on the person being followed.

H-16. INTERPRETATION OF IMMEDIATE USE INTELLIGENCE

a. As stated before, as the tracker moves along, he asks himself certain

questions. As he finds indicators treat answer these questions, he begins
to form a picture of the enemy in his mind. The tracker must avoid
reporting his interpretations as facts. He should report that he has seen
indications of certain things instead of stating to the commander that
these things actually exist. The commander may have additional sources of
information available to assist him in his estimate of the enemy he is
facing.

b. There are many ways a tracker can make interpretations, as discussed

above, relating to size of the party, sex, load, equipment, and many more
things. Time frames can be determined by the effects of weathering on the
indicators.

H-17. ORGANIZATION OF A TRACKING TEAM

a. A tracking team can be any size unit, whether it is a rifle company

or a long-range reconnaissance patrol team. The point team of a large unit
can be designated as a tracking team, or the tracking team can be a
separate; distinct unit. There can be numerous organizations for a tracking
team, as long as there is a leader, one or more trackers, and security is
provided for the trackers. One type organization is to have the unit's best
tracker, a bodyguard or security man, two other trackers, each with
security, and a team commander with his radiotelephone operator.

b. When moving in column, the best tracker should be in the lead

followed by his security; the two other trackers on the flanks, each
followed by their security; the commander where he can best control; and
the radiotelephone operator, if one is used, either in the center or to the
rear. When in file, the best tracker should lead, his security should
follow. Next should come the commander, radiotelephone operator, then other
trackers and security (fig. H-4).

H-16
 Figure H-4.
Rifle squad employed as tracker team.

H-18. SUMMARY

a. A good tracker must be patient, persistent, determined, and

physically fit. He must have the ability to see things that are not
apparent at first glance. He should always be alert. These are the six
concepts of tracking: displacement, staining, weathering, littering,
camouflage, and interpretation of immediate use intelligence. Any indicator
can be defined by one or more of these classifications.

b. It should be mentioned that while the tracker is following a trail,

it is possible for him to become the one being tracked. Constant attention
to the concepts of tracking and the mistakes being made by the enemy should
enable the tracker to move his unit more carefully than any other small
unit leader. For example, he should be conscious of the way his unit exits
a stream, crosses a trail, or moves cross country. The tracker should be
security conscious at all times.

c. While tracking, the tracker should also remember that if he and the
party being followed are moving at the same speed, the gap will never be
closed. The tracker should practice reading and interpreting trail signs so
that while he tracks, time can be made up and he can gain on his enemy.

H-17
 H-18

( U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1988 52—084/85009