December 2015: DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved For Public Release Distribution Is Unlimited

TC 2-91.
Intelligence Support to Urban Operations
DECEMBER 2015
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This publication supersedes FM 2-91.4, dated 20 March 2008.
Headquarters, Department of the Army

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*TC 2-91.4
Training Circular Headquarters

No. 2-91.4 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 23 December 2015
Intelligence Support to Urban Operations
Contents
Page
PREFACE .............................................................................................................. iv
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... v
Chapter 1 INTELLIGENCE AND THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT ....................................... 1-1
Overview ............................................................................................................. 1-1
Civil Considerations (ASCOPE).......................................................................... 1-1
Terrain ................................................................................................................ 1-1
Weather ............................................................................................................ 1-16
Society (Socio-Cultural) .................................................................................... 1-17
Chapter 2 THE THREAT IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT .............................................. 2-1
Overview ............................................................................................................. 2-1
Conventional Military and Paramilitary Forces.................................................... 2-1
Insurgents or Guerrillas ...................................................................................... 2-3
Terrorists ............................................................................................................ 2-4
Crime and Criminal Organizations ...................................................................... 2-5
Information Operations ....................................................................................... 2-6
Health Issues ...................................................................................................... 2-7
Other Urban Concerns ....................................................................................... 2-8
Chapter 3 INFORMATION SOURCES IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT ......................... 3-1
Overview ............................................................................................................. 3-1
Scouts, Snipers, and Reconnaissance ............................................................... 3-1
Special Operations Forces ................................................................................. 3-2
Engineers ............................................................................................................ 3-2
Medical ............................................................................................................... 3-2
Aviation ............................................................................................................... 3-3
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear ................................................ 3-3
Air Defense Artillery ............................................................................................ 3-4
Civil Affairs .......................................................................................................... 3-4
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 2-91.4, dated 20 March 2008.
i
Contents
Military Information Support Operations .............................................................. 3-5

Military Police ...................................................................................................... 3-5
Explosive Ordnance Disposal ............................................................................. 3-6
Transportation and Logistics ............................................................................... 3-6
Civilian Linguists and Local Hires........................................................................ 3-6
Joint and Department of Defense ....................................................................... 3-6
Multinational ........................................................................................................ 3-8
International and Intergovernmental Organizations ............................................ 3-8
Nongovernmental Organizations ......................................................................... 3-9
Local National Authorities.................................................................................... 3-9
Chapter 4 OPERATIONS IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT .............................................. 4-1
Overview ............................................................................................................. 4-1
Plan ..................................................................................................................... 4-1
Prepare................................................................................................................ 4-4
Execute ............................................................................................................... 4-4
Assess ................................................................................................................. 4-4
Appendix A URBAN INTELIGENCE TOOLS AND PRODUCTS.......................................... A-1
SOURCE NOTES .......................................................................... Source Notes-1
GLOSSARY ...........................................................................................Glossary-1
REFERENCES .................................................................................. References-1
INDEX ......................................................................................................... Index-1
Figures
Figure 1-1. Keys to understanding the urban environment .................................................... 1-2
Figure 1-2. Urban layout patterns ........................................................................................... 1-4
Figure 1-3. Funnel-fan effect .................................................................................................. 1-6
Figure 1-4. The multidimensional urban battlefield ................................................................ 1-9
Figure A-1. Example pattern analysis plot sheet .................................................................... A-2
Figure A-2. Example link diagram .......................................................................................... A-3
Figure A-3. Example association matrix................................................................................. A-4
Figure A-4. Example relationship matrix ................................................................................ A-5
Figure A-5. Example activities matrix ..................................................................................... A-6
Figure A-6. Example time event chart .................................................................................... A-7
Figure A-7. Perception assessment matrix ............................................................................ A-9
Figure A-8. Population status overlay .................................................................................. A-11
Figure A-9. Example roof cover overlay ............................................................................... A-13
Figure A-10. Combined urban terrain orientation graphic/urban terrain feature overlay
(simplified example) .......................................................................................... A-14
Figure A-11. Example of imagery and urban models ........................................................... A-16
ii TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

Contents
Tables
Table 1-1. Urban pattern effects ............................................................................................. 1-6
Table 1-2. Street patterns and effects .................................................................................... 1-8
Table 1-3. Some key urban structural types ......................................................................... 1-13
Table 1-4. Example information requirements for individual buildings ................................. 1-15
Table 1-5. Example information requirements for populations ............................................. 1-20
Table 1-6. Example information requirements for transportation infrastructure—
airfields .............................................................................................................. 1-25
helicopter landing zones.................................................................................... 1-27
roadways ........................................................................................................... 1-28
railroads ............................................................................................................ 1-29
bridges .............................................................................................................. 1-30
subways ............................................................................................................ 1-31
Table 1-12. Example information requirements for transportation infrastructure—ports
and harbors ....................................................................................................... 1-32
Table 1-13. Example information requirements for communications infrastructure ............. 1-35
Table 1-14. Example intelligence requirements for energy infrastructure—general
information and power plant layout ................................................................... 1-37
Table 1-15. Example intelligence requirements for energy infrastructure—petroleum
and natural gas facilities .................................................................................... 1-38
Table 1-16. Example information requirements for water and waste disposal
infrastructure ..................................................................................................... 1-39
Table 1-17. Example information requirements for resources and material production
infrastructure ..................................................................................................... 1-40
Table 1-18. Example information requirements for a food distribution infrastructure ........... 1-40
Table 1-19. Example information requirements for medical infrastructure........................... 1-41
Table 1-20. Example of information requirements for law enforcement and firefighting
infrastructures ................................................................................................... 1-42
Table 1-21. Example information requirements for a crisis management and civil
defense infrastructure ....................................................................................... 1-42
Table 1-22. Example information requirements for a subterranean infrastructure ............... 1-43
Table 2-1. Example information requirements for conventional military and
paramilitary forces ............................................................................................... 2-2
Table 2-2. Example information requirements for insurgent and guerrilla forces ................... 2-3
Table 2-3. Example information requirements for terrorist threats ......................................... 2-4
Table 2-4. Example information requirements for criminal threats ......................................... 2-5
Table 2-5. Example information requirements for information operations threats ................. 2-7
Table 4-1. Basic intelligence consideration factors in the urban environment ........................ 4-2
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 iii

Preface
TC 2-91.4 provides intelligence professionals a basic framework within which to focus on providing
commanders with effective intelligence support for operations in the urban environment. This manual
incorporates intelligence and operational doctrine and terminology from FM 3-06 and ATTP 3-06.11.
The principal audience for TC 2-91.4 is intelligence staffs and Soldiers of units conducting intelligence support
to operations in the urban environment. It can also be used by commanders, staffs, and intelligence personnel at
all echelons.
TC 2-91.4 focuses on techniques used during offensive, defensive, and stability operations. See ATP 2-91.7 for
doctrine for defense support to civil authorities operations.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S.,
international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their
Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)
TC 2-91.4 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the
glossary and the text. For definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent
publication follows the definition. TC 2-91.4 is not the proponent publication (the authority) for any terms.
TC 2-91.4 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and
United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of TC 2-91.4 is the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence. The preparing agency is the
Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence. Send
comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank
Forms) to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, ATTN: ATZS-CDI-D (TC 2-91.4), 550
Cibeque Street, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7017; by e-mail to usarmy.huachuca.icoe.mbx.doctrine
@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.
iv TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

Introduction
URBAN AREAS AND MODERN OPERATIONS
With the continuing growth in the world’s urban areas and increasing population concentrations in urban
areas, the probability that Army forces will conduct operations in urban environments is ever more likely.
As urbanization has changed the demographic landscape, potential enemies recognize the inherent danger
and complexity of this environment to the attacker. Some may view it as their best chance to negate the
technological and firepower advantages of modernized opponents. Given the global population trends and
the likely strategies and tactics of future threats, Army forces will likely conduct operations in, around, and
over urban areas—not as a matter of fate, but as a deliberate choice linked to national security objectives
and strategy. Stability operations––where keeping the social structure, economic structure, and political
support institutions intact and functioning or having to almost simultaneously provide the services
associated with those structures and institutions is the primary mission––may dominate urban operations.
This requires specific and timely intelligence support, placing a tremendous demand on the intelligence
warfighting functions for operations, short-term planning, and long-term planning.
Providing intelligence support to operations in the complex urban environment can be quite challenging. It
may at first seem overwhelming. The amount of detail required for operations in urban environments, along
with the large amounts of varied information required to provide intelligence support to these operations,
can be daunting. Intelligence professionals must be flexible and adaptive in applying doctrine (including
tactics, techniques, and procedures) based on the mission variables: mission, enemy, terrain and weather,
troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC).
As with operations in any environment, a key to providing good intelligence support in the urban
environment lies in identifying and focusing on the critical information required for each specific mission.
The complexity of the urban environment requires focused intelligence. A comprehensive framework must
be established to support the commander’s requirements while managing the vast amount of information
and intelligence required for urban operations. By addressing the issues and considerations listed in this
manual, the commander, G-2 or S-2, and intelligence analyst will be able to address most of the critical
aspects of the urban environment and identify both the gaps in the intelligence collection effort and those
systems and procedures that may answer them. This will assist the commander in correctly identifying
enemy actions so that Army forces can focus on the enemy and seize the initiative while maintaining an
understanding of the overall situation.
FM 3-06 and ATTP 3-06.11 provide supporting material relevant to this manual.
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
The doctrine in TC 2-91.4 is essentially unchanged from the doctrine established in the publication it
supersedes. The manual has been reformatted to comply with publication standards established under
Doctrine 2015. In addition, it contains the following changes:
 Terminology has been updated.
 References have added or updated as appropriate.
 The descriptions of civil affairs and military information support operations in chapter 3 have
been revised.
 Chapter 4 has been removed. See ADRP 2-0 for an overview of the intelligence disciplines. For
doctrine on an intelligence discipline see the appropriate Army techniques publication.
 The example of a civil affairs assessment has been removed from appendix A. See ATP 3-57.60
for the formats of civil affairs products, including the civil affairs area study.
 Appendix B has been removed. Tables portraying information on threat weapons effects are
available in command publications posted on the Intelligence Knowledge Network Web site.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 v

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Chapter 1
Intelligence and the Urban Environment
OVERVIEW
1-1. The special considerations that must be taken into account in any operation in an urban environment
go well beyond the uniqueness of the urban terrain. JP 3-06 identifies three distinguishing characteristics of
the urban environment: physical terrain, population, and infrastructure. Also, FM 3-06 identifies three key
overlapping and interdependent components of the urban environment: terrain (natural and manmade),
society, and the supporting infrastructure.
CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS (ASCOPE)

1-2. Normally the factors used in the planning and execution of tactical military missions are evaluated in
terms of the mission variables: METT-TC. Due to the importance of civil considerations (the letter “C” in
METT-TC) in urban operations, those factors are discussed first in this manual. Civil considerations are the
influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders,
populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations (ADRP 5-
0). They are a factor in all types of military operations: offense, defense, stability, and civil support. If the
military’s mission is to support civil authorities, civil considerations define the mission.
1-3. An appreciation of civil considerations and the ability to analyze their impact on operations enhances
several aspects of urban operations––among them, the selection of objectives; location, movement, and
control of forces; use of weapons; and force protection measures. Civil considerations comprise six
characteristics, expressed in the acronym ASCOPE:
 Areas.
 Structures.
 Capabilities.
 Organizations.
 People.
 Events.
1-4. Civil considerations, in conjunction with the components of the urban environment, provide a useful
structure for intelligence personnel to begin to focus their intelligence preparation of the battlefield and
organize the huge undertaking of providing intelligence to operations in the urban environment. They
should not be considered as separate entities but rather as interdependent. Understanding this
interrelationship of systems provides focus for the intelligence analyst and allows the commander a greater
understanding of the urban area in question. (See figure 1-1 on page 1-2.)
TERRAIN
1-5. Terrain in the urban environment is complex and challenging. It possesses all the characteristics of
the natural landscape, coupled with manmade construction, resulting in a complicated and fluid
environment that influences the conduct of military operations in unique ways. Urban areas, the populace
within them, their expectations and perceptions, and the activities performed within their boundaries form
the economic, political, and cultural focus for the surrounding areas. What military planners must consider
for urban areas may range from a few dozen dwellings surrounded by farmland to major metropolitan cities.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-1

Chapter 1
Figure 1-1. Keys to understanding the urban environment
1-6. Prior to conducting operations in urban areas, it is critical to understand the terrain. Much of the
difficulty and confusion with planning and conducting operations in the urban environment results from a
basic lack of understanding of the common characteristics of urban terrain. Order does exist in the urban
environment and characteristics can be quantified, or at least described sufficiently, to enable planning.
1-7. Density of construction and population, street patterns, compartmentalization, affluent and poor
sections, modernization, and presence of utility systems characterize all cities of the world. The differences
in urban areas are in size, level of development, and style.
1-8. Due to the historical impact of colonization over centuries, most major cities throughout the world
have European characteristics. They have combinations of street patterns, distinct economic and ethnic
sections, and areas known as shantytowns––all of which present potential obstacles, or at least challenges,
to operations.
1-9. Variations in cities are caused mainly by differences in economic development, government policies,
and cultural needs. Some urban trends include high-rise apartments, reinforced concrete construction, truck-
related industrial storage, shopping centers, detached buildings, suburbs at outer edges, apartment
complexes, and major subterranean infrastructure that support the city.
1-10. Urban topography is an elaborate combination of horizontal, vertical, interior, and exterior forms
superimposed on a landscape’s natural relief, drainage, and vegetation. Urban areas may range from a few
dozen dwellings to major metropolitan areas. A city may be technologically advanced or developing. Most
cities feature many construction styles and building materials, each with its own texture and strength.
Concrete and steel high-rise structures may stand alongside tin or wooden shacks. Additionally, lines of
communications (LOCs) often consist of a confusing array of roads, alleys, bridges, elevated roadways,
subway tunnels, rail systems, drainage canals, and sewer networks.
1-11. In the close confines of urban areas, small arms and light weapons (such as rocket-propelled
grenades) can have a dramatic effect. Urban operations can radically alter the physical nature of the terrain.
For example, the walls and roofs may collapse on some buildings, or whole city blocks may be destroyed or
burned down, leaving only piles of rubble. These effects can be tactically significant, as some key terrain
features completely disappear and fields of fire open and close.
1-2 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

1-12. Buildings affect wave propagation, thus degrading friendly communication systems and some
information collection efforts. While streets provide the means for rapid advance or withdrawal, military
vehicles moving along streets are often channeled by buildings and have little space for maneuver. Because
they are more difficult to bypass, obstacles on streets in urbanized areas are usually more effective than
those on roads in open terrain. Forced to maneuver through congested city streets, U.S. forces must account
for the volume of vehicle and pedestrian traffic. Operating forces should expect noncombatants to
inadvertently or intentionally constrain fire and movement.
1-13. Small teams of enemy combatants can rapidly assimilate themselves within the urban population. In
order to limit the possibility of excessive collateral damage in relation to the direct military advantage
anticipated, U.S. forces may use conservative collateral estimation methodologies and fire control measures
which may limit some lethal options and require more detailed planning and coordination, as well as
authorization from higher levels of command.
1-14. Urban areas are usually regional centers of finance, politics, transportation, industry, and culture.
They have population concentrations ranging from several thousand up to millions of people. The larger the
city, the greater its regional influence. Because of their psychological, political, or logistic value, control of
regionally important cities has often led to pitched battle scenes. In the last 40 years, many cities have
expanded dramatically, losing their well-defined boundaries as they extend into the countryside.
Transportation systems (highways, canals, and railroads) are built to connect population centers. Industries
grow along these connectors, creating strip areas. Rural areas, although retaining much of their farm-like
character, are connected to towns by a network of secondary roads. Not all connecting roads are paved, let
alone depicted on maps.
1-15. Urban terrain is a unique environment that provides both attacker and defender with numerous
avenues of approach and fields of fire. Urban terrain is divided into four basic levels: air, supersurface,
surface, and subsurface. Operations can be conducted from all of these levels, and most operations will
include actions on all levels simultaneously.
URBAN AREAS
1-16. As defined in FM 3-06, urban areas are generally classified as––
 Megalopolis (population over 10 million).
 Metropolis (population between 1 to 10 million).
 City (population 100,000 to 1 million).
 Town or small city (population 3,000 to 100,000).
 Village (population less than 3,000).
URBAN PATTERNS
1-17. Manmade terrain in the urban environment is overlaid on the natural terrain of the area, and manmade
patterns are affected by the underlying natural terrain. It can be useful to keep the underlying natural terrain
in mind when analyzing the manmade patterns of the urban environment. For example, roads will often
follow the contours of the underlying terrain and parks may be built in areas unsuitable to building
construction such as flood plains. Four major urban patterns can influence operations in the urban
environment. (See figure 1-2 on page 1-4.)
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-3

Chapter 1
Figure 1-2. Urban layout patterns
Hub and Satellite Patterns

1-18. Central to two of the patterns (satellite and network) is the hub, or dominant urban area or pattern,
around which outlying urban areas or patterns radiate. (A segmented urban area, because it tends to be a
larger urban area, can often be a hub.) In offensive and defensive operations, the hub serves as a pivot or
strong point; as such, it often becomes a major obstacle to an attacker. If the attacker chooses to bypass the
urban area (hub) located along his axis of advance without first isolating the area, he may expose his flank
to attack from the hub as well as dependent urban areas or subordinate satellite patterns. Because stability
operations focus on people, commanders understand the value and influence of the hub to the economic,
political, or cultural well-being of the surrounding area. Whether or not a hub, commanders must remember
that urban areas are not islands; all are connected to the surrounding rural (and other urban) areas through
fluid and permeable boundaries and LOCs.
1-19. The satellite pattern consists of a central hub surrounded by smaller, dependent urban areas. LOCs
tend to converge on the hub. The natural terrain throughout this pattern is relatively homogenous. Outlying
areas often support the principal urban area at the hub with means of reinforcement, resupply, and
evacuation. In some instances, they may serve as mutually supporting battle positions. Commanders should
consider the effects of the outlying urban areas of operations (AOs) within the hub and, conversely, the
effects of operations within the hub on outlying urban areas. For example, military information support
operations targeted primarily at the hub of a satellite pattern may subsequently influence outlying urban
areas and achieve necessary effects without having to commit specific resources to these areas.
1-4 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

Network Pattern
1-20. The network pattern represents the interlocking of the primary hubs of subordinate satellite patterns.
Its elements are more self-sufficient and less supportive of each other, although a dominant hub may exist.
Major LOCs in a network extend more than in a satellite pattern and take more of a rectangular rather than a
convergent form. Its natural terrain may vary more than in a single satellite array. Operations in one area
may or may not easily influence, or be influenced by, other urban areas in the pattern.
Linear Pattern
1-21. Potentially a sub-element of the network and satellite patterns, the linear pattern may form one ray of
the satellite pattern or be found along connecting links between the hubs of a network. Most frequently, this
pattern results from the stringing of minor urban areas along a confined natural terrain corridor, such as an
elongated valley, a body of water, or a manmade communications route. In offensive and defensive
operations, this latter form of the linear pattern facilitates developing a series of strong defensive positions
in depth, effectively blocking or delaying an attacking force moving along the canalized terrain.
Segment Pattern
1-22. When dominant natural terrain (such as a river) divides an urban area, it creates a segmented pattern.
This pattern often makes it easier for commanders to assign AOs to subordinate commanders. However, this
pattern may fragment operations and increase risk to an operation requiring mutual support between
subordinate units. The segmented urban areas may allow commanders to isolate threats more easily in these
areas and focus operations within segments that contain their decisive points. Although an integral part of
the whole (the urban area), each segment may develop distinct social, economic, cultural, and political
characteristics. This social segmenting may benefit commanders faced with limited assets to influence or
control the urban populace. A thorough analysis of the society may allow the intelligence analyst to help the
commander focus military information support operations and populace and resources control measures
against only specific segments that affect decisive operations. Analysts should consider how isolating
segments or just monitoring segments for any significant changes in the attitudes, beliefs, or actions of the
civilians located there may aid in mission accomplishment.
PATTERN EFFECTS
1-23. There are three major urban pattern effects: blocking, funnel, and funnel-fans. (See table 1-1 on page
1-6.) The consequences of maneuvering military units within the urban patterns identified in table 1-1 will
significantly affect combat operations. In addition to the basic blocking action caused by the hub
phenomenon, other effects can be associated with urban patterns. (See figure 1-3 on page 1-6 for an
example of the funnel-fan effect.)
URBAN FUNCTIONAL ZONES

1-24. To provide an accurate depiction of an urban area, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of its
numerous physical subdivisions or zones. These zones are functional in nature and reflect “where”
something routinely occurs within the urban area. The structure of these zones will vary from country to
country. For example, a country book may describe Yongin, South Korea, as “a typical Korean city with
cities within a city, a city core, urban sprawl, and outlying industry.” Another country book might describe
Cologne, Germany, as “a typical German city with narrow streets, circular configuration, and low terrain.”
Both definitions are accurate but provide little practical use to the analyst. What is required is a more
substantial definition of these urban zones as well as employment of standardized terminology. (See FM 3-
06 for a more detailed discussion of the zones.) The following paragraphs describe the urban functional
zones.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-5

Chapter 1
Table 1-1. Urban pattern effects

Effect Description
Blocking effect Often the shape and density of the hub, width of major streets, and proximity of
side streets have, either individual or in combination, the effect of blocking or
degrading movement into and out of an urban zone.
Funnel effect Funnel or concentration and canalization of forces may occur without immediate
fanning. This occurs most frequently when the linear pattern is encountered. The
linear pattern limits the number of maneuver units that may be applied against a
series of hubs. This situation requires confronting hubs in succession and forces a
greater reliance on long-range and indirect fire weapons.
Funnel-fan effect The funnel-fan effect normally occurs when the hub is located between terrain
features that are unsuitable for mounted operations. Movement of units into the
hub area results in the unwanted concentration of units, loss of offensive
momentum, and canalization, Beyond the hub, units are required to spread or fan
out before full combat power can be achieved. The funnel-fan effect favors the
defense because it creates an accordion effect in units moving through the hub,
making control difficult and reducing operational command effectiveness.
Figure 1-3. Funnel-fan effect
Core
1-25. The core is the heart of the urban area, the downtown or central business district. It is relatively small
and compact, but contains a larger percentage of the urban area’s shops, offices, and public institutions. It
will also normally house the highest density of multistory buildings and subterranean features.
Core Periphery
1-26. This area is located at the edges of the core. Generally, it has undergone less change than the core
resulting in buildings of uniform height (generally two to three stories in towns and five to ten stories in
larger cities).
1-6 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

Industrial Area
1-27. Industrial areas often developed on the outskirts of the urban areas where commercial transportation
is easiest (along airfields and major sea, river, rail, and highway routes). The dispersed pattern of the
buildings provides sufficient space for large cargoes, trucks, and material-handling equipment. These areas
may provide ideal sites for logistic bases and maintenance sites. Multistory structures usually have
reinforced concrete floors and ceilings. Additionally, the industrial area may include large storage areas of
chemicals, petroleum products, fertilizers, and other toxic materials. In the more advanced states many of
these areas have been abandoned or have undergone change to another type of zone as the industrial areas
have moved.
High-Rise Area
1-28. High-rise areas consist of multistoried apartments, commercial offices, and businesses separated by
large open areas such as parking lots, parks, sports arenas, and smaller single-story structures. High-rise
buildings are framed, light-clad construction, with thin walls of brick, lightweight concrete, or glass.
Residential Area
1-29. Residential areas can be found dispersed throughout the urban area; however, large suburban areas
(or sprawl) normally form on the outskirts of the city proper. Residential areas often consist of row houses
or single-family dwellings set in a grid or ringed pattern within a planned development project. It may also
include many of the urban area’s supporting infrastructure (power, water, and communications).
Commercial Ribbon Area

1-30. Commercial ribbon areas include rows of stores, shops, and restaurants built along both sides of
major streets that run through and between urban areas and often serve to connect one urban area to
another. Structures here are usually smaller than those found in the industrial and high-rise areas but larger
than those found in residential areas (three to five stories).
Military Areas
1-31. Fortifications and military installations are found everywhere in the world and should be given
special consideration because they have been specifically built for military purposes. Permanent-type
fortifications can be made of earth, wood, rock, brick, concrete, steel-reinforced concrete, or any
combination of these. Some of the latest variants have been built underground and employ heavy tank or
warship armor, major caliber and other weapons, internal communications, service facilities, and chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) overpressure systems. Many of the Baltic States possess long
coastlines relative to their overall size. To meet their defensive needs, they have developed coast defense
works that include extensive subterranean facilities, many contiguous to urban areas. Other nations share
borders with potentially hostile neighbors. North Korea is a prime example, with numerous hardened
artillery, missile, and command and control facilities along both of its coasts as well as along the
demilitarized zone. The analyst should also realize that even if depicted as “inactive,” these fortifications
might be rapidly modified to their original role and even if not activated they may still serve as choke points
and obstacles. Finally, even if hardened fortifications are not present, many cities include large military
garrisons. Examples of cities with large military garrisons include Capetown, South Africa (Table
Mountain), and Seoul, South Korea.
STREET PATTERNS
1-32. The development of street patterns within a given urban environment can be attributed to an
architect’s deliberate design, natural features, and manmade structures that serve in various capacities.
Geographers have identified at least eight major street patterns with any number of variations. Table 1-2 on
page 1-8 shows these major street patterns.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-7

Chapter 1
1-33. These patterns exist for trafficability in daily life but also can be significant during military
operations. The core areas of both Paris and Washington, DC, were originally laid out in a rayed pattern to
maximize the defensibility of the government buildings. These were later modified to radial and radial-ring
patterns. During Russian operations in Grozny, the Chechnyans used the city’s street patterns to maximize
their ability to strike at Russian armor while at the same time minimizing the Russians’ ability to return
massed fires.
Table 1-2. Street patterns and effects
MULTIDIMENSIONAL BATTLEFIELD
1-34. Commanders operating in unrestricted terrain normally address their AO and area of interest in terms
of air and ground. However, operations within the urban environment provide numerous manmade
structures and variables not found in unrestricted terrain. Commanders conducting urban operations must
broaden the scope of their thinking, looking not only at the air and ground but also at the threats that may
appear from a structure’s top, exterior or interior, as well as subsurface areas.
1-8 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

1-35. FM 3-06 addresses the multidimensional battlefield and identifies the dimensions that must be
considered as air, supersurface, surface, and subsurface. Although spatially separated, each dimension is
interrelated and may be used as an avenue of approach or mobility corridor, LOC, or engagement area.
Figure 1-4 depicts the elements of the multidimensional urban battlefield.
Figure 1-4. The multidimensional urban battlefield
Supersurface and Airspace

1-36. For analytical purposes, the supersurface and airspace consist of all areas above the surface level in
an urban environment. These areas include the internal floors or levels (intrasurface areas), external roofs or
tops of buildings, stadiums, towers, or other vertical structures, and the airspace. They can provide cover
and concealment; limit or enhance observation and fields of fire; and restrict, canalize, or block movement.
However, forces can move within and between intrasurface areas creating additional, although normally
secondary, avenues of approach. Buildings––
 Provide cover and concealment.
 Limit or increase observation and fields of fire.
 Canalize, restrict, or slow movement of forces, especially mechanized forces.
 Can adversely affect the employment of special operations forces and airmobile insertion of
infantry due to the number of power lines, clotheslines, antennas, and other obstructions that may
exist, especially on rooftops.
 Provide optimal locations (via roofs and intrasurface areas) with excellent cover and
concealment for snipers, lightweight, handheld antitank weapons, and man-portable air defense
systems, enabling top-down attacks against the weakest points of armored vehicles and
unsuspecting aircraft.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-9

Chapter 1
1-37. Engineers must provide an analysis of buildings for their structural integrity and obstacles. Such
obstacles include electrical wires, antennas, and enemy emplaced mines (although personnel may be
inserted by jumping, rappelling, or fast roping from a hovering helicopter and extracted by hoist
mechanisms). Rooftops may offer ideal locations for landing helicopters for employment of anti-helicopter
mines. Some rooftops are designed as helipads. Overall, elevated firing positions reduce the value of any
cover in surrounding open areas and permit engagement at close range without risk of immediate close
assault. The supersurface and subsurface dimensions require commanders to think, plan, and execute
ground operations vertically as well as horizontally. The complex terrain aspects of urban operations share
strong similarities with mountain operations. (See FM 3-97.6.)
1-38. Aircraft and aerial munitions use the airspace as rapid air avenues of approach in urbanized areas.
Forces can use aviation assets for observation and reconnaissance, aerial attack, or high-speed insertion and
extraction of Soldiers, supplies, and equipment. Some surface obstacles, such as rubble, do not affect
aviation assets. However, buildings of varying height and the increased density of towers, signs, power
lines, and other urban constructions create obstacles to flight and the trajectory of many munitions
(masking). These obstacles can limit low-altitude maneuverability in the urban airspace. Excellent cover
and concealment afforded enemy gunners in an urban area increase aviation vulnerability to small arms and
man-portable air defense systems, particularly when supporting ground forces.
Surface
1-39. FM 3-06 defines surface areas as exterior ground level areas such as parking lots, airfields, highways,
streets, sidewalks, fields, and parks. For purposes of analysis, the ground floor of buildings should also be
considered as part of the surface dimension. Because ground vehicles can directly access a structure’s
ground floor, analysts must consider them part of the surface dimension. Analysts must also consider the
surface of waterways as part of the surface dimension.
1-40. Streets often provide primary avenues of approach and the means for rapid advance. However,
buildings and other structures often canalize forces moving along them. As such, obstacles on urban surface
areas usually have more effect than those in open terrain since bypass often requires entering and transiting
buildings or radical changes to selected routes. Where urban areas abut the ocean or sea, large lakes, and
major rivers, the surface of these bodies of water may provide key friendly and threat avenues of approach
or essential LOCs and, therefore, may be a significant consideration for Army commanders. As such,
amphibious and river-crossing operations may be an integral part of the overall urban operation.
1-41. Larger open areas––such as stadiums, sports fields, school playgrounds, and parking lots––are often
critical areas during urban operations. They can provide locations for displaced civilians, interrogation
centers, and enemy prisoner of war holding facilities, and detainee holding areas. These areas also can
afford suitable aircraft landing zones and pickup zones and artillery firing locations. They can provide
logistic support areas and aerial resupply possibilities because they are often centrally located.
Subsurface
1-42. These areas are below surface level. This dimension includes areas both below the ground and below
water. (For example, the Han River is a major avenue of approach in Seoul and can be infiltrated at the
surface level or subsurface level.) These areas may serve as secondary and, in fewer instances, primary
avenues of approach at lower tactical levels. When thoroughly reconnoitered and controlled, they offer
excellent covered and concealed LOCs for moving supplies and evacuating casualties. These areas may also
provide sites for caching and stockpiling supplies.
1-43. Subsurface areas include the subways, tunnels, sewers, drainage systems, cellars, civil defense
shelters, and other various underground utility systems. In older cities, they may include ancient hand-dug
tunnels and catacombs. Both attacker and defender can use subsurface areas to gain surprise and maneuver
against the rear and flanks of a threat and to conduct ambushes. However, these areas are often the most
restrictive and easiest to defend or block. Their effectiveness depends on superior knowledge of their
existence and overall design. Army commanders and analysts may need to consider potential avenues of
approach afforded by the subsurface areas of rivers and major bodies of water that border urban areas. This
1-10 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

particularly applies when operating as part of a joint task force task organized with special operations forces
or when opposing a threat with similar capabilities.
MOBILITY CORRIDORS
1-44. Each element of the urban environment’s multidimensional battlefield identified in figure 1-4 (on
page 1-9) may be used as avenues of approach, mobility corridors, and LOCs. They are predominantly used
as mobility corridors within a larger avenue of approach. Mobility corridors areas that are relatively free of
obstacles where a force will be canalized due to terrain restrictions allowing military forces to capitalize on
the principles of mass and speed (JP 2-01.3). In the urban environment, mobility corridors (supersurface [to
include air], surface, and subsurface) are used individually, in any combination, or simultaneously. Multiple
vertical mobility corridors can combine to form a horizontal avenue of approach. Finally, their use as
mobility corridors, either in offensive or defensive roles, can trigger other battlefield effects (either lethal or
nonlethal) across any or all dimensions. For example, Soldiers may move from the roof of one building to
that of another. Depending on the exact location of the Soldiers involved, they may acquire an extended line
of sight, be subjected to increased dead spaces, or just the opposite, be able to establish an engagement
area. This situation is enhanced if multiple mobility corridors are opened (for example, simultaneous attacks
from rooftops, through interior walls, along the street, and through access tunnels).
Creating a Mobility Corridor

During Israeli operations against the Palestine Liberation Organization in the summer
of 2002, Israel Defense Force commanders found that casualties were reduced and
operations conducted more efficiently if Soldiers breached the outer walls of
structures and entered buildings on their interior floors. This is an example of
reducing an obstacle and creating a mobility corridor.
AVENUES OF APPROACH
1-45. An avenue of approach is an air or ground route of an attacking force of a given size leading to its
objective or to key terrain in its path (JP 2-01.3). Within a single urban avenue of approach, there may
literally be hundreds of mobility corridors. This level of complexity will require analysts to develop
(through extensive analysis) a thorough understanding of the size, pattern, and types of maneuver space
available in their area of interest.
LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS
1-46. A line of communications is a route, either land, water, and/or air, that connects an operating military
force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move (JP 2-01.3). All key
LOCs bordering on or within the urban environment must be identified. Analysts must consider obstacles
and rubble that may reduce mobility within a given LOC. The advent of digital communications has further
expanded this definition to reflect telegraph and telephone lines, cell phones, radio (all types), television,
digital satellite links, the Internet, data passed to and from other satellite systems (signals intelligence and
Global Positioning System [also called GPS]), and laser communications.
1-47. In the larger cities, manmade LOCs may include hundreds of streets, alleys, rail lines, subways,
tunnels, and even canals. Analysts must prioritize their effort by focusing on those LOCs most critical to
mission success. They must identify key LOCs as they apply to friendly, enemy, and the civilian population.
1-48. LOCs often cross terrain that is relatively impractical for off-road vehicular traffic and as such are
heavily dependent on bridges, ramps, and overpasses. If these support systems (choke points) can be
destroyed, damaged, or blocked, the LOCs may become useless. LOC trafficability estimates must consider
information from all available sources to include reconnaissance reports, imagery, and combat assessments.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-11

Chapter 1
ENGAGEMENT AREAS
1-49. An engagement area is an area where the commander intends to contain and destroy an enemy force
with the massed effects of all available weapons and supporting systems (FM 3-90-1). In the
multidimensional urban environment, defenders can position forces in protected and mutually supportive
positions. This allows defending forces to maximize the effects of their combat power in the complex
terrain.
1-50. Engagement areas can be located almost anywhere in the urban environment, for example—
 Narrow streets.
 Turns in a road.
 T intersections in roads.
 Bridges.
 Tunnels.
 Split-level roads.
 Open city squares or plazas.
 Rubbled areas.
 Individual buildings.
 Individual floors in buildings.
1-51. Engagement areas can also be created in less obvious locations by using demolitions, mines, or
obstacles. These can shape an engagement area by creating impassable (countermobility) obstacles in urban
canyons as well as clearing fields of fire that may not otherwise be available.
1-52. Urban combat is often characterized by very short ranges and denser and smaller engagement areas.
Relatively few well-positioned defenders can generate significant combat power. Without the positional
advantage and the corresponding protective effects of the terrain, attacking forces often must mass numbers
to achieve necessary combat power.
LINE OF SIGHT
1-53. Line of sight is the unobstructed path from a Soldier’s/Marine’s weapon, weapon sight, electronic
sending and receiving antennas, or piece of reconnaissance equipment from one point to another.
(ATP 2-01.3/MCRP-2-3A). Digital or analog communication LOCs have important line-of-sight issues.
Depending on the situation, these LOCs may or may not be affected by line-of-sight limitations. This may
mean that because of an obstacle (hill or building) between two points, it may be impossible to acquire line
of sight on a target or communications emitter. Failure to anticipate interference with line of sight can have
catastrophic results. This occurred at Grozny where Russian forces were trapped among the city’s taller
buildings and lost their line of sight. Subsequently, they lost or experienced degraded communications with
their supporting units. Line of sight also impacts observation and fields of fire. Finally, line-of-sight
constraints within the urban environment are not one but three-dimensional and must be addressed from all
directions, both vertically and horizontally.
1-54. Unmanned aircraft systems can prove instrumental in overcoming many of the ground-based line-of-
sight restrictions. During Israel’s incursion into Lebanon in 1983, the Israel Defense Force employed
unmanned aerial vehicles as digital retransmission platforms, among other roles.
1-55. The use of satellite and landline communications may mitigate many line-of-sight problems. Satellite
phones, such as International Maritime Satellite phones, tend to provide more consistent communications in
urban areas. Additionally, suitcase digital, satellite, and burst transmission systems have proven effective in
the urban environment. Some of these systems have the added capability of allowing real-time imagery of
selected targets to be passed to the user.
1-12 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

STRUCTURAL TYPES
1-56. While the city’s structures serve as the focal point of the inhabitant’s work and living areas, religious
or cultural facilities, and sports arenas, they may also be significant to military operations conducted there.
Some of the most important structures and their importance are identified in table 1-3.
Table 1-3. Some key urban structural types
Structural type Importance
Churches, hospitals, medical These are protected places under the Geneva Conventions
facilities, and cemeteries and usually declared no-fire areas. However, intelligence
which indicates the misuse of these and other protected
places may make them lawful targets. Additionally, the
location of hospitals is important planning information for
both civilian and military casualties.
Sewer systems, subways, These underground systems can provide infiltration routes.
underground water systems, Elevated systems and mass transit routes provide exposed
elevated railways, utilities, mass lines of communications between city sectors while also
transportation routes offering points for good observation and fields for fire. Utility
facilities are key targets for insurgents, terrorists, and others;
their destruction can hinder the capabilities of defending
forces, destabilize an area and affect the civilian population.
Stadiums, sports fields, playgrounds These can provide excellent detainee holding areas. Can be
used as helipads, sheltered petroleum, oils, and lubricants
(also called POL), and ammunition storage areas.
Public baths, swimming pools, These can serve as an alternate water source in case public
cisterns and reservoirs water supplies break down. Allows water for washing and
other sanitary needs.
Construction sites, lumber yards, These can serve as machine repair, obstacle construction
other commercial operations facilities and material, and supports general engineer
operations.
Hazardous material, industrial These present a hazard to both sides in an operation and
manufacturing and storage facilities, must be accounted for. Dams, dikes, levies, and nuclear or
and other work and installations electrical generating stations need to be protected from
containing dangerous forces. attack. The attack or destruction of these facilities can cause
excessive civilian injury or damage by the release of
dangerous forces.
Purpose-built fortifications These can range from fortresses built by the Crusaders
through modern underground facilities built to survive the
Cold War’s nuclear scare. The build of these, however, will
be of the period 1870 to 1914. They may include both
missiles and heavy caliber weapons and may pose a variety
of threats to any military force.
1-57. Today, especially in many third-world nations, the mix of new and old structures could create
problems for any military force operating there. Ancient temples and fortifications may stand back-to-back
with modern skyscrapers and high rise apartments. Port facilities, unique themselves, may stand next to the
remnants of huge defensive walls that in turn may encircle all or part of the city.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-13

Chapter 1
Signal Degradation in Urban Areas

Signal degradation is proportional to structural density, the height of the buildings, and
other urban terrain factors. For purposes of audio and video line of sight, the linear
distances are less important than the structural density and disruption of the line of
sight between given points. This means it is difficult to maintain consistent
communications (for example, in the heart of a major metropolitan area). Even when
the situation does not involve armed conflict, effective use of frequency modulation
(also called FM) and ultrahigh frequency (also called UHF) radios may be impaired by
interference from trolley and other electrical lines. Some of these systems can
generate up to 300 times the interference over normal atmospheric interference on
the ultrahigh frequency band. Russian experience in Grozny showed that it was better
to dedicate one radio to communicate with each separate subunit rather than to try
communicating over a net. As for the use of wire-based systems, they are as they
have always been: effective but susceptible to intrusion, damage, or destruction—
especially in a large city where digging them in is not an option.
1-58. Structural composition is also important. Tank rounds fired into rooms occupied by snipers may pass
all the way through buildings without exploding but in the process killing and wounding noncombatants in
other rooms.
1-59. As another example, some of the ancient churches and other structures in the area, made of thick
stone blocks, proved resistant to even heavy machine gun fire while the walls of more modern business and
apartment complexes were easily penetrated by rifle fire and shrapnel.
1-60. Finally, there are differences in floor plans. Many structures, especially older ones, have intricate
passageways, underground tunnels, exceptionally low or high ceilings, and other features not common in the
United States. Local nationals––especially individuals that work in the buildings (for example, maintenance
personnel), individuals involved in city planning, individuals having access to building plans, assistance
from combat engineers, and other means––may prove valuable when obtaining information and conducting
intelligence analysis on key structures.
1-61. Detailed information is usually required when planning, preparing, and executing operations on
individual buildings. The degree of detail needed in such missions is reflected in table 1-4. The design and
construction of buildings within a particular urban area are influenced by numerous factors to include
climate, materials available, function, and cultural development of the region. Combat engineers can usually
provide information on the key characteristics of a building. Some of these key characteristics may be––
 Relative protective value offered by building construction materials.
 Level of force required to breach a building’s external and internal walls, roof, or floors.
 Availability of internal LOCs.
 Potential fire hazards.
1-62. Understanding the potential effects of threat (non-U.S.) small arms and light weapons on structures
and materials commonly found in the urban environment can be extremely important for planning purposes.
Tables portraying this information are available in command publications posted on the Intelligence
Knowledge Network Web site.
1-14 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

Table 1-4. Example information requirements for individual buildings
General building information  Identify basements and cellars.

 Provide general building information.  Location of entrance.
 Location.  Staircase location.
 Type.  Dimensions.
 Number of stories.  Use.
 Date of construction.  Identify attic spaces.
 Type of building construction.  Location.
 Ownership.  Location of staircase.
 Occupants.  Dimensions.
 Obtain building blueprints or documents.  Use.
 Obtain photographs or other imagery of the  Field of view from the attic.
outside of the building and surrounding area.  Identify ventilation system.
 Identify individuals with knowledge of the  Location.
building interior (building engineer, building  Exhaust fans.
maintenance personnel, other).  Pipes.
 Note the general proximity to other structures.  Chimney.
- Location.
Identify building specifications - Dimension.
 Identify building dimensions. - Composition.
 Identify the external and internal doors. - Opening inside.
 Location.  Identify stairwells.
 Dimensions.  Location.
 Type of material.  Type.
 Composition.  Identify roof.
 Windows.  Size.
 Location of hinges.  Material.
 Method of opening. (Determine whether  Access to interior.
the doors open outwards or inwards.)  Obstructions.
 Locks.  Identify elevators.
 Identify windows.  Location.
 Locations.  Dimensions.
 Type of construction materials.  Location of control box.
 Dimensions.  Mechanism for opening elevator inside
 Method of locking. shaft.
 Determine whether the windows open in,  Maintenance access routes.
out to the side, or up and down.  Describe the subterranean spaces.
 Mouse holes.  Sewers.
- Location.  Subways.
- Dimensions.  Basements and cellars.
 Identify hallways.  Other utility tunnels.
 Location.  Examine the building’s utility and
 Width. communication systems.
 Length.  Determine types of utilities used in the building.
 Number of doors.  Determine whether utilities can be regulated
 Overhead openings. from outside the building.
 Areas the hallway connects.  Locate the utility control box or switches.
 Identify closet spaces.  Identify the building’s telephones.
 Location.  Location.
 Dimensions.  Number.
 Method of opening.  Type.
 Identify crawl spaces.  Describe other means of communication.
 Location.  Radios.
 Dimensions.  Internet.
 Openings.  Cell phones.
 Description.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-15

Chapter 1
Table 1-4. Example information requirements or individual buildings (continued)
 Support structure.
 Examine building construction.
 Insulation used in the walls (whether it is
 Pattern of construction.
flammable).
 Composition of the outer wall (whether
small arms fire will penetrate).
 Composition of inner walls.
- Whether small arms will penetrate.
- Whether walls are reinforced.
WEATHER
1-63. Terrain analysis and weather analysis are inseparable in most situations. Operations in the urban
environment, however, present some unique concerns. Inclement weather can affect the availability of food
supplies. Mass demonstrations use good weather to get maximum turnout. Bad weather further degrades
poor road networks. Rain and heavy winds may disrupt or stop a military information support operations
(MISO) effort, such as a leaflet drop. Some common considerations include––
 Winds.
 Precipitation.
 Visibility.
 Cloud cover.
 Temperature and humidity.
WINDS
1-64. Wind patterns and effects are important concerns in nearly all environments; however, the larger
urban areas offer some unique challenges that may otherwise be found only in rugged mountain areas.
Depending on weather conditions, when compared with unrestricted terrain, the wind may be blocked,
reduced, or enhanced in areas bordered by large structures. These in turn may cause a buildup of smog (or
lethal chemicals if present), enhance the fire threat, restrict the use of helicopters (swirling winds), and
others. These factors will make downwind predictions for CBRN and toxic industrial materials difficult.
(See paragraphs 2-17 through 2-22.) Finally, there may be radical temperature changes associated with the
combination of wind, precipitation, and structures (such as tunnels or high rises). Urban operations during
cold and wet periods may be significantly affected by the wind chill factor.
PRECIPITATION
1-65. City engineers and urban sanitation workers are well aware of the artificial changes manmade
structures make on the topography. Rain or melting snow often floods basements, underpasses, tunnels,
sewers, and subway systems; streets become impassable with water, snow, or ice; and exposed or weathered
electrical systems may short out. Chemical agents and toxic industrial material are washed into underground
systems by precipitation. Some areas may in fact become impassable or “toxic corridors,” and drinking
water supplies may be affected. As a result, these systems may contain toxic concentrations higher than
surface areas and become contaminated hot spots. These effects become more pronounced as chemical
agents and toxic industrial material are absorbed by brick or unsealed concrete sewer walls. Chemical
detection and decontamination crews will be required when operating in these areas.
VISIBILITY
1-66. Visibility is critical at any time but even more so during operations in urban environments.
Traditionally, night and periods of reduced visibility favor surprise, infiltration, detailed reconnaissance,
attacks across open areas, seizure of defended strong points, and reduction of defended obstacles. There
may be some areas where the tremendous amount of artificial and background light created in even the
smallest urban areas puts unobserved movement at risk. The urban area’s numerous structures, easily
1-16 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

identifiable during the day, may not be so visible at night and compound the problem of disorientation.
Technology enhancements (such as night vision devices or Global Positioning System receivers) may be not
only desired but also essential for Soldiers operating there. Additionally, many urban areas are located
along canals or rivers which often create a potential for fog in low-lying areas. Industrial and transportation
areas are the most affected by fog due to their usual proximity to waterways. In heavy industrial areas, smog
can also limit visibility under all light conditions. Both fog and smog can affect ground operations by
limiting illumination and reflective heating as well as degrading many target acquisition systems and
limiting the use of infrared-guided artillery rounds and general aviation.
CLOUD COVER
1-67. In the urban environment, cloud cover can have some significant tactical effects. In addition to
visibility effects as stated above, cloud cover above an urban area may combine with shadows from
buildings to affect observation. Intermittent cloud cover may cause shadows on the ground which could
confuse observers. Low cloud cover over urban areas can restrict air operations due to the numerous
vertical manmade obstructions in these areas.
TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY

1-68. Air inversion layers are common over cities, especially cities located in low-lying bowls or river
valleys. Inversion layers may trap dust, pollutants, or even chemical agents and reduce visibility. These
layers can also create a greenhouse effect which may cause a rise in ground and air temperature. The
heating of buildings during the winter and the reflection and absorption of summer heat make built-up areas
warmer than surrounding open areas during both summer and winter. This difference can be as great as 10
to 20 degrees and may significantly add to the problems faced in urban operations. Summer heat, combined
with the very physical requirement of urban combat, can cause severe heat exhaustion problems and in the
winter Soldiers may fall victim to exposure in nominally protected areas such as tunnels or causeways.
Changes in temperature as a result of air inversions can also affect thermal sights during crossover periods
of warm to cold and vice versa. Air inversions can also trap pollution, smoke from fires, or gases closer to
the ground. This period should be identified, as it may differ from urban area to urban area. Extremely cold
temperatures and heavily constructed buildings many affect target identification for thermal sights. For
example, thick walls may make combat vehicle identification difficult by distorting hotspots, and increased
use of heaters and warming fires may clutter thermal sights with numerous hotspots.
WEATHER SUPPORT
1-69. Before Soldiers are sent into an urban area, especially those with an urban center composed of
numerous large structures, staff planners must have a good understanding of the weather and the effects of
the weather in the urban environment. The staff weather officer provides the basic weather forecasts for
planning purposes.
SOCIETY (SOCIO-CULTURAL)
1-70. When local support is necessary for success, as is often the case in operations in the urban
environment, the population is central to accomplishing the mission. The center of gravity for operations in
urban environments is often human. To effectively operate among an urban population and maintain their
goodwill, it is important to develop a thorough understanding of the society and its culture, to include
values, needs, history, religion, customs, and social structure.
1-71. U.S. forces can avoid losing local support for the mission and anticipate local reaction to friendly
courses of action by understanding, respecting, and following local customs when possible. The history of a
people often explains why the urban population behaves the way it does. For example, U.S. forces might
forestall a violent demonstration by understanding the significance of the anniversary of a local hero’s
death.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-17

Chapter 1
1-72. Accommodating the social norms of a population is potentially the most influential factor in the
conduct of urban operations. Unfortunately, this is often neglected. Social factors have greater impact in
urban operations than in any other environment. The density of the local populations and the constant
interaction between them and U.S. forces greatly increase the importance of social considerations. The
fastest way to damage the legitimacy of an operation is to ignore or violate social mores or precepts of a
particular population. Groups develop norms and adamantly believe in them all of their lives. The step most
often neglected is understanding and respecting these differences.
1-73. The interaction of different cultures during operations in the urban environment may demand greater
recognition than in other environments. This greater need for understanding comes from the increased
interaction with the civilian populace. Norms and values could involve such diverse areas as food, sleep
patterns, casual and close relationships, manners, and cleanliness. Understanding these differences is only a
start in developing cultural awareness.
1-74. Religious beliefs and practices are among the most important, yet least understood, aspects of the
cultures of other peoples. In many parts of the world, religious norms are a matter of life and death. In many
religious wars, it is not uncommon to find suicidal acts in the name of their god. In those situations,
religious beliefs are considered more important than life itself.
1-75. Failure to recognize, respect, understand, and incorporate an understanding of the cultural and
religious aspects of the society with which U.S. forces are interacting could rapidly lead to an erosion of the
legitimacy of the U.S. or multinational force mission. When assessing events, intelligence professionals
must consider the norms of the local culture or society. For example, while bribery is not an accepted norm
in our society, it may be a totally acceptable practice in another society. If U.S. intelligence professionals
assess an incidence of this nature using our own societal norms and values as a reference, it is highly likely
that the significance of the event will be misinterpreted.
1-76. Some U.S. military missions will require U.S. forces to operate in support of the local government.
While it is important to articulate U.S. contributions to a given mission, it is also important to highlight the
accomplishments of the local national government for long-term success. U.S. military planners must
identify key government officials early in the operation. These individuals can provide valuable information
needed for successful completion of the operations to include city infrastructure, locations of enemy
concentration, and a common picture of cultural norms.
1-77. Many developing country governments are characterized by nepotism, favor trading, sabotage, and
indifference. Corruption is pervasive and institutionalized as a practical way to manage excess demand for
city services. The power of officials is often primarily based on family and personal connections, economic,
political or military power bases and age, and only after that on education, training, and competence.
1-78. A local government’s breakdown from its previous level of effectiveness will quickly exacerbate
problems of public health and mobility. Attempts to get the local-level bureaucracy to function along U.S.
lines will produce further breakdown or passive indifference. Any unintentional or intentional threat to the
privileges of ranking local officials or to members of their families will be stubbornly resisted. Avoiding
such threats and assessing the importance of particular officials requires knowledge of family ties.
1-79. U.S. military planners must also recognize that the urban populace will behave according to their own
self-interest. The urban populace will focus on the different interests at work: those of U.S. or multinational
forces, those of elements hostile to U.S. or multinational forces, those of international or nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) that may be present; those of local national opportunities and those of the general
population. Friendly forces must be constantly aware of these interests and how the local national
population perceives them.
1-80. Another significant cultural problem is the presence of displaced persons within an urban area. Rural
immigrants, who may have different cultural norms, when combined with city residents displaced by urban
conflict, can create a significant strategic problem. Noncombatants and refugees without hostile intent can
stop an advancing unit or inadvertently complicate an operation. Additionally, there may be enemy troops,
criminal gangs, vigilantes, paramilitary factions, and factions within those groups hiding in the waves of the
displaced.
1-18 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

1-81. The enemy knows that it will be hard to identify the threat among neutral or disinterested parties.
Local combat situations can change rapidly as the seeming neutrals become the threat within close quarters
and friendly forces find themselves suddenly in an indefensible position. Chechen rebels and the Hezbollah
effectively used the cover of refugees to attack occupying forces and counted on heavy civilian casualties in
the counterattack to gain support with the local population. The goal is to place incalculable stresses on the
Soldiers in order to break down discipline and operational integrity. From Belfast to Lebanon, the constant
pressure of identifying the threat amongst nonbelligerent or disinterested parties taxed and sometimes
undermined rules of engagement, and in some cases, entire missions.
1-82. Defining the structure of the social hierarchy is often critical to understanding the population.
Identifying those in positions of authority is important as well. These city officials, village elders, or tribal
chieftains are often the critical nodes of the society and influence the actions of the population at large. In
many societies, nominal titles do not equal power––influence does. Many apparent leaders are figureheads,
and the true authority lies elsewhere.
1-83. Some areas around the world are not governed by the rule of law, but instead rely upon tradition.
Often, ethnic loyalty, religious affiliation, and tribal membership provide societal cohesion and the sense of
proper behavior and ethics in dealing with outsiders, such as the U.S. or multinational partners. It is
important to understand the complicated inner workings of a society rife with internal conflict, although to
do so is difficult and requires a thorough examination of a society’s culture and history.
1-84. Every city has discrete and discernible patterns of daily activity. The time of rush hour activity along
an LOC is one case in point. Business transactions, market sales, religious practices, governmental
functions, and criminal activity are other examples of daily behavior that can be analyzed for consistencies.
Disruptions or irregularities in these patterns serve as a warning that something is amiss in the city.
Identifying and understanding trends and patterns of activity provide critical information for intelligence
analysts and mission planners.
1-85. While certain patterns do exist, most urban centers are normally composed of a multitude of different
peoples, each with their own standards of conduct. Individuals act independently and in their own best
interest, which will not always coincide with friendly objectives. The presence or actions of the different
population components of an urban area cannot be ignored when conducting mission planning. Treating the
urban population as a homogenous entity can lead to false assumptions, cultural misunderstandings, and
poor situational understanding.
POPULATION
1-86. A population of significant size and density inhabits, works in, and uses the manmade and natural
terrain in the urban environment. Civilians remaining in an urban environment may be significant as a
threat, an obstacle, a logistics support problem (to include medical support), or a source of support and
information. The most significant problem regarding the local population is the fact each person is a
potential threat and can participate in an insurgency, terrorism, or other disruptive activity.
1-87. One of the most violent examples in U.S. military history was the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong laid
mines and demolitions, conducted ambushes and sniping, performed information collection missions for
Hanoi, and even participated in force-on-force engagements, primarily during the Tet Offensive in 1968.
The difficulty for the U.S. and coalition forces operating there lay in the fact that the Viet Cong looked like
their neighbors, often held jobs, and raised families in pro-government neighborhoods, and, in some cases,
even served in the South Vietnamese Army.
1-88. Another consideration when dealing with the local population is their ability to hinder military
operations. Regardless of causes or political affiliations, civilian casualties are often the focal point of press
coverage, often to the point of ignoring or denigrating any previous accomplishments. Within the
operational continuum, and especially during the conduct of urban operations, commanders can expect to
encounter restrictions on their use of firepower and challenges in their ability to conduct sustainment
missions. In the current operational environment, it is unacceptable to our leaders and the American
population to inflict large numbers of civilian casualties.
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Chapter 1
1-89. Another issue is the local population’s requirement for logistic or medical support. U.S. troops
deployed to Somalia and the Balkans immediately had to deal with providing logistic support to starving
populations until local and international organizations could take over those functions. Disease and wounds
were also a problem among the local population, most notably in Somalia, Haiti (disease), and Bosnia and
Kosovo (wounds). The burden of caring for the locals was initially placed on the deployed commanders
until local national and international organizations could establish treatment facilities.
1-90. From an intelligence standpoint, the local population can be a valuable information source. This was
especially effective during U.S. operations in Bosnia and Kosovo when locals told of minefields, weapon
caches, infiltration routes, mass burials, and other proof of war crimes.
1-91. Some of the key requirements to identify when analyzing the local population in an urban
environment are shown in table 1-5.
Table 1-5. Example information requirements for populations
General information  Identify the extent (if any) of anti-American

 Identify the values of the urban population. sentiment in each of the following:
 Family relations.  Individuals.
 Religious values.  Society’s privileged.
 Political views.  Lower class.
 Ethnic tribal ties.  Government.
 Nationalism.  Military.
 Identify the current issues/problems facing the  Extremists.
urban population.  The media.
 Economics.  Evaluate the city by geographic locations.
 Politics.  Slums and shantytowns.
 Religious conflict.  Areas where criminal gangs operate.
 Crime.  Areas of the city where U.S. or
 Drug or alcohol addiction. multinational forces are likely to be
 Ethnic strife. unwelcome.
 Housing.  Areas in the city where demonstration or
 Assess the history of conflict in the state. riots typically occur.
 Internal and external.  Identify the social aspects/traits of the urban
 Recent conflicts. population.
 Describe the significance of the urban area.  Family structure.
 International.  Role of elders.
 National.  Role of men.
 Religious.  Role of women.
 Military.  Role of children.
 Economic.  Opposite sex interaction.
 Historical.  Same sex interaction.
 Identify key figures in the society.  Significance of pets and animals.
 Government leaders.  Eating habits.
 Religious leaders.  Sanitary practices.
 Military leaders.  Alcohol and drug use.
 Opposition leaders.  Firearm ownership.
 Tribal chiefs/elders.
 Crime/drug figures.
 Other.
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Table 1-5. Example information requirements for populations (continued)
 Identify the influence of the media.  Males and females age 65 and older.
 By form (print, radio, television).  Males age 15 to 49 (potential military age).
 By origin (local, national, international).  Identify the trends in migration.
 Media bias.  Number of migrants.
 Groups or individuals that control the  Cause(s) of migration.
media  Average age of migrants.
 Key media personnel.  Refugee situation.
 Identify taboos or insulting social actions.  Origin of the refugees.
 Verbal.  Size of the refugee population.
 Nonverbal (such as, body gestures or  Size of the original population.
manner of dress).  Describe the relationship between refugees
 Identify significant dates. and the city populace.
 Importance.  Supporting.
 Dates or holidays significant to one portion  Hostile.
of populace but offensive to another.  Indifferent.
 Effect on city.  Identify segments of the population that fled the
 Violence. city.
 Demonstrations.  Cause.
 Types of celebrations.  Region of resettlement.
 Number of participants.  Circumstances that will afford their return.
 Identify cultural landmarks and structures.  Identify the population of the rural areas
 Location. surrounding the urban area.
 Type.  Numbers.
 Religious.  Location and distance from urban area.
 Historical.  Relationship to/with urban population.
 Stadiums.  Travel.
 Shopping centers.  Employment.
 Other.  Interdependence.
 Role in conflict (if any).
Demographics
 Assess the urban area’s demographics. Social structure
 Ethnicity.  Identify the ethnic structure.
 Race.  Percent of population by ethnic group.
 Religion.  Physical boundaries of influence.
 Economic status.  Dominant ethnic group (if any).
 Political affiliation.  Reason for dominance.
 Other.  Biases of the groups.
 Identify languages spoken.  Role of ethnicity in conflict (past and
 Official. present).
 Social.  Key personnel and location.
 Business.  Identify the racial structure.
 Dialects.  Percentage of population by race.
 Slang.  Dominant racial group (if any).
 Identify the urban population and population  Reason for dominance.
density.  Physical boundaries of influence.
 Total.  Biases of the races.
 By city area.  Role in conflict.
 Center city.  Key personnel and location.
 Residential.
 Slum and shantytown.
 Area of operations.
 Identify the age structure.
 Males and females age 0 to 14.
 Males and females age 15 to 64.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-21

Chapter 1
 Identify the religious structure.  Voting practices.

 Beliefs. - Suffrage.
 Percentage of population. - Election turnout.
 Importance and influence in society. - Election fraud.
 Practices. - Other voting irregularities.
 Physical boundaries of influence.  Physical boundaries based on political
 Biases. beliefs.
 Dominant religious group (if any).  Boundary overlap or possible areas of
 Reason for dominance. friction.
 Role of religion in conflict.  Key leaders or personnel and location.
 Key personnel and location.  Role of politics in conflict.
 Identify the tribal and clan structure.  Issues motivating the political behavior of
 Basis of affiliation. each segment of society.
 Percentage of population. - Economic benefits.
 Physical boundaries of influence. - Social prestige.
 Dominant tribe/clan (if any). - Ethnic ties.
 Reason for dominance. - Religious affiliation.
 Biases of the tribes/clans. - Other.
 Role in conflict.  Identify the city government structure.
 Key personnel and location.  Executive branch.
 Identify the economic class structure.  Legislative branch.
 Distribution of wealth.  Judicial branch.
 Per capita income.  Key personnel and location.
 Percentage of population by economic  Administrative divisions.
sector (industry, service, other).  Physical boundaries of administrative
 Percentage of population living in poverty. divisions.
 Percentage of population dependent on  Whether officials are elected or appointed.
economic aid.  Extent of the local government’s authority.
 Type of aid.  Determine whether the urban area is the seat
 Unemployment rate. of the national government.
 Underemployment rate.  Branches of the national government in the
 Status of trade unions. urban area.
 Whether membership in the unions is  Relationship between city and national
compulsory. governments.
 Influence of unions in the urban area  Key personnel and location.
(politically, economically, other).  Identify the educational structure.
 Key union personnel and location.  Literacy (percentage of total population,
 Management class. over age 15, male, female).
- Management class influence in the urban  Whether education is tuition-free and to
area. what level.
- Key management class personnel and  Percentage of total population by
location. education level (preschool or kindergarten,
 Economic elite. primary, secondary, university or college,
- Economic elite influence in the urban postgraduate).
area.  Education level by sex.
- Key economic elite personnel and  Education level by type (academic,
location. technical or vocational).
 Physical boundaries based on economics.  Whether access to education is based on
 Role of economics in the conflict. class or other social affiliation.
 Identify the political structure.  Effect that the conflict has had on
 Political parties or political factions. education.
 Percent of population belonging to a  Identify the presence of nongovernmental
political faction or party. organizations in the urban area of operations.
 Dominant political party (if any).  Organizations name and country affiliation.
 Reason for dominance.  Types of services provided.
 Political factions, parties, or beliefs in the  Food.
urban area.
1-22 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

 Medical.  Examine local law enforcement abilities and

 Infrastructure. capabilities.
 Education.  Enforce export laws.
 Government service.  Protect persons, property, and
 Religious indoctrination. environment.
 Organization’s agenda or cause.  Interdict illegal aliens.
 Influence on the population.  Enforce immigration laws.
 Organization’s structure.  Maintain arms control.
 Key personnel.  Prevent narcotics traffic and use.
 Host government liaisons.  Prevent terrorism.
 Organization’s security concerns.  Identify types of identification required or used
 Relationships between nongovernmental in the urban area.
organizations.  National.
 Assess the sentiments of the urban population  Passport or visa.
toward the various authorities (examine among  Local.
the various ethnic, racial, class, and  Government service.
factional groups).  Military.
 Popular support for the local and national  Driver’s license.
government.  Professional, trade, or union.
 Popular support for the government’s  Photo identification cards.
military forces. - Requirements.
 Popular support for the U.S. or - Offices and locations where issued.
multinational governments. - Forgeries in use.
 Active or passive.  Evaluate air, sea, and land customs
 Violent or nonviolent. procedures.
 Criteria that would change posture.  Enforcement.
 Popular support for U.S. or multinational  Susceptibility to bribery.
military forces.  Evaluate border crossing procedures.
- Active or passive. - Checkpoints.
- Violent or nonviolent. - Foot and vehicle patrols.
- If multinational, posture by country. - Aircraft.
- Factors that would change local - Searches.
support. - Documents.
• Actions U.S. forces could take to gain - Security.
maximum local support. - Other.
• Actions to avoid.
POPULATION IMPACTS ON THE MISSION

1-92. Although the population is not a part of the terrain, the populace can impact the mission in both
positive and negative ways. Individuals or groups in the population can be coopted by one side or another to
perform a surveillance and reconnaissance function, performing as moving reconnaissance to collect
information. City residents have intimate knowledge of the city. Their observations can provide information
and insights about intelligence gaps and other activities that help reach an understanding of the
environment. For instance, residents often know about shortcuts through town. They might also be able to
observe and report on a demonstration or meeting that occurs in their area.
1-93. Unarmed combatants operating within the populace or noncombatants might provide intelligence to
armed combatants engaged in a confrontation. This was readily apparent in Mogadishu, where unarmed
combatants with the ability to observe friendly force activities without the threat of being engaged
instructed hidden threat forces on where to fire.
1-94. The presence of noncombatants in a combat zone can lead to restrictive rules of engagement, which
may impact the way in which a unit accomplishes its mission. The population, groups or individuals or
sectors within an urban area can be the target audience of influence activities (such as MISO or threat
psychological operations). Specific individuals may provide a means to approach a specific target audience
when acting as a mouthpiece for an information operation.
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Chapter 1
1-95. Populations present during urban operations can physically restrict movement and maneuver by
limiting or changing the width of routes. People may assist movement if a group can be used as human
barrier between one combatant group and another. Refugee flows, for example, can provide covert
infiltration or exfiltration routes for members of a force. There may also be unintended restrictions to routes
due to normal urban activities which can impact military operations. For example, movement may be
impeded by normally heavy traffic during rush hours as people head to work or return home. Another
example would be a route that goes through a market in town that is closed to traffic only on market days,
but otherwise normally open to unimpeded traffic flow.
1-96. One of the largest challenges to friendly operations is the portion of the population that supports the
adversary. Even people conducting their daily activities may inadvertently “get in the way” of any type of
operation. For example, curiosity-driven crowds in Haiti often affected patrols by inadvertently forcing
units into the middle of the street or pushing them into a single file. While no harm was inflicted, the unit
was made more vulnerable to sniper and grenade attacks.
1-97. Captured combatants or a well-informed noncombatant can provide valuable intelligence about the
enemy. These individuals can be extremely important to the success of military operations. Information
from these sources, however, must be evaluated for accuracy and reliability before being acted upon. The
person providing the information may be intentionally providing disinformation in order to negatively
impact friendly operations or even simply be intended to manipulate friendly forces into conducting
operations that are aimed at a personal grudge rather than influencing the military situation.
1-98. Strategically, the world audience, as well as its local contingent, can create political, cultural, and
ideological impediments to a mission. Friendly forces must evaluate the local population and its potential
effects on operations based on an understanding of the local culture, norms and behaviors—not on the
accepted standards of the home countries of the friendly forces. Friendly forces can then tailor their
activities to achieve the desired effects while avoiding unintended consequences that could even result in
mission failure.
1-99. The American audience watching events unfold in Vietnam could have been perceived as an
impediment to the U.S. government’s strategy of pursuing its strategic objectives. The cultural differences
apparent when U.S. forces were deployed for Operation Desert Storm could have been an impediment if not
adequately addressed. For instance, a MISO flier produced to encourage a sense of unity among the Arab
populations included pictures of two men holding hands—a sight not common in Western cultures. A flier
designed in accordance with Western standards might not have been as effective.
1-100. Civilian populations can also provide infiltration or exfiltration routes for nonuniformed forces.
These forces operating in any urban terrain can instantly blend into any type of crowd or activity. Threat
forces can be protected from firepower by operating within a neutral group.
INFRASTRUCTURE
1-101. The infrastructure of an urban environment consists of the basic resources, support systems,
communications, and industries upon which the population depends. The key elements that allow an urban
area to function are also significant to operations, especially stability operations. The force that controls the
water, electricity, telecommunications, natural gas, food production and distribution, and medical facilities
will virtually control the urban area. These facilities may not be located within the city’s boundaries. The
infrastructure upon which an urban area depends may also provide human services and cultural and political
structures that are critical beyond that urban area, perhaps for the entire nation.
1-102. A city’s infrastructure is its foundation. It includes buildings, bridges, roads, airfields, ports,
subways, sewers, power plants, industrial sectors, communications, and similar physical structures.
Infrastructure varies from city to city. In developed countries, the infrastructure and service sectors are
highly sophisticated and well integrated. In developing cities, even basic infrastructure may be lacking. To
understand how the infrastructure of a city supports the population, it needs to be viewed as a system of
systems. Each component affects the population, the normal operation of the city, and the potential long-
term success of military operations conducted there.
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1-103. Military planners must understand the functions and interrelationships of these components to
assess how disruption or restoration of the infrastructure affects the population and ultimately the mission.
By determining the critical nodes and vulnerabilities of a city, allied forces can delineate specific locations
within the urban area that are vital to overall operations. Additionally, military planners must initially regard
these structures as civilian places or objects, and plan accordingly, until reliable information indicates they
are being used for a military purpose.
1-104. Much of the analysis conducted for terrain and society can apply when assessing the urban
infrastructure. For example, commanders, staffs, and analysts could not effectively assess the urban
economic and commercial infrastructure without simultaneously considering labor. All aspects of the
society relate and can be used to further analyze the urban work force since they are a sub-element of the
urban society. Similarly, the military aspects of terrain (see table 4-1 on page 4-2) used to evaluate terrain
may also apply to the urban infrastructure, especially considerations of key terrain.
1-105. A city’s infrastructure can directly support the military mission. Local airfields or ports are vital for
sustained operations. Host country medical facilities can become vital when allied casualties are greater
than organic medical capabilities can handle. Their continued functioning can also play a role in
maintaining the good will of the local population. Often, during stability operations, maintaining law and
order (to include prisons) becomes vital to the welfare of the general population. Success in ensuring that
law and order is maintained or reestablishing law and order will directly affect the general population’s
perceptions and possible support for U.S. operations.
TRANSPORTATION
1-106. The transportation network is a critical component of a city’s day-to-day activity. It facilitates the
movement of material and personnel around the city. This network includes roads, railways, subways, bus
systems, airports, and harbors. (See table 1-6 and tables 1-7 through 1-12 on pages 1-27 through 1-34 for
example information requirements associated with a transportation infrastructure.) In modern cities, the
transportation network supports rapid international travel, often via several avenues.
1-107. Developing cities often have little means of public transportation. Foot traffic, livestock, and
bicycles represent main sources of travel in underdeveloped cities and compete for road space with more
modern forms of transportation. Care must be taken not to disrupt the transportation system of a city.
Securing air and seaports is imperative for follow-on forces and supplies, but there are many possible
repercussions of securing all the transportation nodes and stopping all inter- and intra-city movement. While
the U.S. mission may be immediately facilitated, critical needs of the noncombatant populace could go
unmet.
Table 1-6. Example information requirements for transportation infrastructure—airfields
General airfield information  Nonoperational.

 Provide airfield location.  Auxiliary.
 Provide airfield size.  Identify the controlling authority.
 Identify airfield type.  Determine the effect that the suspension of
 Civilian. flight activities of the airfield would have on the
 Military. urban area and urban population.
 Joint.  Identify key terrain.
 Identify principal use.  Locate blueprints of the airfield and its
 Describe the construction. facilities.
 Assess security.  Assess the airfield specifications and layout.
 Evaluate access.  Airfield elevation.
 Provide status of the airfield.  Runways.
 Operational.  Identification.
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Chapter 1

airfields (continued)
 Azimuth.  Flight-line.
 Length and width.  Taxiway.
 Surface, base, subbase (material,  Terminal building.
thickness, condition).  Assess underground drainage system.
 Longitudinal grade.  Location.
 Transverse grade.  Condition.
 Shoulders, clear areas, overruns (width,  Evaluate the airfield utility system.
transverse, grade and surface material).  Electrical power source.
 Lateral safety zones (width, transverse - Master switch.
slope, obstacles. - Current characteristics.
 End clear zones (length, maximum slope). - Availability of emergency power.
 Approach zones (length, width, glide - Location of transformers.
slope, obstacles).  Natural gas source.
 Condition (ability to support aircraft  Jet starting units or auxiliary power units
weight).  Outline the enemy air defense assets (if any).
 Eight-digit grid coordinate for each end of  Type.
runway.  Location.
 Evaluate taxiways.  Capabilities and limitations.
 Identification.  Determine how the airfield is tied into the
 Azimuth. national or regional integrated air defense
 Length and width. system.
 Grade.  Type of node.
 Surface, base, subbase (thickness). - Sector operations center.
 Bearing capacity (pounds per square - Intercept operations center.
inch). - Fighter airfield.
 Shoulder and clear area (width, transverse - Auxiliary airfield.
grade, surface, obstacles).  Assess the airfield’s daily operating
 Turn radii. procedures.
 Condition (ability to support aircraft  Normal operating hours of the airfield.
weight).  Most commonly used approach path.
 Evaluate parking and warm-up aprons.  Control procedures.
 Number and location.  Primary language used by air traffic control
 Total area and individual area. personnel, ground support personnel,
 Description. back-up personnel.
 Total capacity.  Flight schedules of airlines using the
 Identify hardstands. airfield.
 Number and location.
 Aircraft capacity. Airfield support facilities
 Description.  Identify communications facilities.
 Identify hangars.  Location.
 Number and location.  Type.
 Type and material.  Equipment.
 Condition.  Capabilities and limitations.
 Size.  Identify fuel storage facilities.
 Door descriptions.  Location.
 Locate terminals.  Jet fuel.
 Identify control tower and ground control  Aviation gas.
approach (location and eight-digit  Jet oil.
coordinate).  Aviation oil.
 Evaluate navigational aids.  Lubricants, manifolds, and filters.
 Condition.  Pipelines.
 Eight-digit grid coordinate.  Above and below ground storage and
 Identify lighting aids. capacity.
 Runways.  Pumps.
 Fuel trucks.

airfields (continued)
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 Identify munitions storage areas. Determine whether surveillance devices or

 Location. capabilities are deployed.
 Type.  Types and locations.
 Condition.  Field of coverage and monitoring
 Security. locations.
 Explosives that can be handled.  Operating times and frequencies.
 Aircraft loading procedures.  Physical security measures.
 Identify emergency facilities.  Security lighting.
 Location.  Checkpoints.
 Type.  Perimeter fences.
 Equipment.  Internal fences.
 Capabilities and limitations.  Other physical security obstructions.
 Identify maintenance facilities.
 Identify meteorological support facilities. Other considerations
 Identify administration buildings.  Describe new construction at the airfield.
 Identify housing facilities.  Locate obstructions to flight.
 Type, location, and number.  Vertical obstructions, not contained in
 Capability and condition. published data, which pose a threat to
 Construction materials. helicopters or other aircraft at/under 50
feet above ground level.
Airfield security  Other obstacles to flight within 5 and 10
 Assess ground security forces. kilometers of the airfield.
 Military.  Identify radar systems and associated
 Civilian. equipment.

helicopter landing zones
 Assess the landing zone characteristics.  Determine the distance and direction from the
 Location. designated objectives.
 Dimensions.  Identify escape and evasion routes.
 Landing points.  Pickup points.
 Capacity by type of aircraft.  Routes to friendly areas.
 Surface material.  Landmarks.
 Soil trafficability.
 Determine whether the urban area canalizes
 Obstacles (existing, reinforcing).
movement to the landing zone.
 Slope (direction, degree).
 Lighting conditions.  Identify buildings with rooftops that can be
 Prevailing winds. used for helicopter landing zones.
 Seasonal variations.  Location.
 Thermals or updrafts.  Dimensions.
 Altitude above sea level.  Landing points.
 Determine the characteristics of the approach  Capacity by type.
and retirement lanes.  Obstacles.
 Altitude and heading.  Building entrances (location and number).
 Check and control points.  Identify the threats in the vicinity of the
 Obstacles. helicopter landing zone.
 Enemy dispositions.  Antiair threat.
 Determine the characteristics of the adjacent - Small arms.
terrain and exits. - Rocket-propelled grenades.
 Dominant buildings and terrain. - Man-portable air defense systems.
 Routes of ingress and egress. - Surface-to-air missiles (mobile and
 Relief and drainage. fixed).
 Obstacles (existing, reinforcing). - Antihelicopter mines.
 Identify landmarks usable as navigation aids. - Antiaircraft artillery (mobile and fixed).
 Obstacles.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-27

Chapter 1
Table 1-8. Example information requirements for transportation infrastructure—roadways
 Identify the routes in the urban area. - Width

 Highways. - Slope.
 Streets. - Condition.
 Alleys.  Curves.
 Trails. - Location.
 Bike paths. - Radius.
 Pedestrian paths. - Slope.
 Identify street patterns.  Bridges.
 Rectangular or chessboard. - Total number of segments.
 Rayed. - Load bearing capacity.
 Radial or radial-ring. - Width.
 Contour-forming.  Culverts.
 Irregular pattern. - Location.
 Combined pattern. - Type and number.
 Linear pattern. - Construction material.
 Determine the effect of roadway shut down.  Ditches.
 Evaluate roadway use. - Depth.
 Traffic patterns. - Width.
 Rush hour times. - Side slope.
 Types. - Condition.
 Importance to economy.  Median strips or dividers.
- Material.
 Possible rerouting.
- Width.
 Method of traffic control.
- Height.
 Verify that the maps correspond with the - Obstructions.
routes. - Vegetation.
 Analyze critical roadways.  Fords and ferries.
 Roadway characteristics. - Location.
- Width. - Dimensions.
- Surface material.  Tunnels, underpasses, and snow sheds.
- Base course. - Location.
- Subgrade material. - Dimensions.
- Maximum wheel load.  Road parking areas.
- Crown. - Location.
- Maximum elevation. - Vehicle capacity.
- Drainage. - Facilities.
 Length. - Surface materials.
- Kilometers.  Junctions or grade crossings.
- Miles. - Identification.
 Grades. - Location.
- Location of grades exceeding 7 percent.  Checkpoints and obstacles.
- Maximum grade in percent. - Location.
 Shoulders. - Determine whether location is favorable
- Material. for ambush.
1-28 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015


railroads
 General railway information.  Ballast and subballast.

 Identify the number of trains that run - Material.
daily. - Size.
 Type. - Condition.
- Passenger - Thickness.
 Railheads.
- Freight.
- Supply transfer points.
 Fuel.
- Characteristics (spurs, sidings, piles of
 Direction of travel. material, wagons, tents, huts, guards, supply
 Destinations. handlers).
 Cargo and capacity.  End points.
 Rolling stock. - System.
 Types of railcars and carrying capacity. - Route.
 Schedules. - Segment.
 Special equipment. - Reason for end (change in number of
 Determine the effect of railway service tracks, change in gauge, crossing point,
interruption. construction type and load-bearing capacity,
 Locate key and critical points. international borders).
 Type.  Ties.
 Location. - Material.
 Choke points. - Length.
 Vulnerabilities. - Width.
- Depth.
 Locate and describe fixed installations.
- Spacing.
 Classification yards.
 Ditches.
 Service yards. - Depth.
 Freight and loading yards. - Width.
 Passenger stations. - Side slope.
 Freight stations. - Lining.
 Analyze the track specifications and railway - Conditions.
layout. - Cross sections.
 Total length. - Structures.
- Urban.  Stations.
- Rural. - Location.
 Type. -Functions.
- Gauge. - Facilities.
- Rails. - Command and control.
- Security.
- Roadway.
 Bridges.
- Width.
- Dimensions.
- Spacing. - Characteristics.
 Axle load limit.  Culverts.
 Minimum clearances. - Characteristics.
- Horizontal. - Dimensions.
- Vertical.  Ferries.
 Maximum grades. - Dimensions.
- Direction of travel. - Characteristics.
- Location.  Tunnels, underpasses, and snow sheds.
 Radius of the tightest curve. - Characteristics.
- Location. - Dimensions.
- Radius measurement. - Mainline junctions.
 Roadbed. - Location.
- Material. - Identification of connecting lines.
- Total width. - Switch type.
- Width of shoulders.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-29

Chapter 1
railroads (continued)
 Crossovers.  Command and control.

- Location.  Water facilities.
- Type switch. - Location.
 Evaluate the railway support facilities. - Service.
 Freight handling facilities. - Type of storage.
- Location.  Evaluate track maintenance.
- Side loading platforms.  Maintenance and construction standards.
- End loading platforms.  Maintenance schedule.
- Sidings with access roads.  Sections in need of repair.
- Freight sheds. - Location.
- Turntables (number and diameter or - Nature of repair.
transfer table length). - Effort required to repair.
- Cranes (number, type, and capacity).  Planned extensions or improvements.
 Repair shops and locomotive terminals. - Type.
- Location. - Location.
- Engine house and turntable. - Characteristics.
 Manpower.  Identify signals and train control.
 Service facilities.  Location.
 Fuel facilities.  Type.
- Location.  Determine whether the railroad follows any
- Type of fuel. terrain features.
- Storage and capacity.  Roadways.
- Quantity of fuel on hand.  Waterways.
- Method of loading.  Terrain.
 Electrical facilities.  Assess the safety and security features of the
- End point of electrified sections. railroad.
- Power feed.
- Current characteristics.
- Source of power.
Table 1-10. Example information requirements for transportation infrastructure—bridges
 Identify general characteristics of the bridge.  Analyze the bridge layout.

 Location.  Approaches.
 Name and military designation.  Banks.
 Structural type.  Bypasses.
 General condition.  Abutments and piers.
 Obstacle crossed.  Spans.
 Significance.  Suspension system.
 Bridge specifications.  Intermediate supports.
- Length and width.  Walkways.
- Capacity.  Number of spans.
- Military load classifications. - Type of control (such as, mechanical or
- Under bridge clearance. electronic).
- Horizontal and vertical clearance. - Time required to move.
 Determine the result should the bridge be  Characteristics of any movable spans.
destroyed or blocked.  Safety and security features.
 Evaluate alternate routes.  Traffic control markings.
 Determine the effort required to rebuild the
bridge if destroyed.
1-30 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

Table 1-11. Example information requirements for transportation infrastructure—subways
 Assess the general layout of the subway  Evaluate traffic patterns.

system.  Daily number of passengers.
 Determine how the disruption of subway - Weekday.
service would affect the urban area and urban - Weekend.
population. - Holiday.
 Evaluate the general condition of the subway - Rush hour.
system.  Stations that receive the most traffic.
 Maintenance.  Evaluate the subway construction.
 Safety.  Type.
 Security. - Typical subway near surface with flat
 Identify the train schedule. roof and I-beams for roof and sides,
 Provide maps of the system. supported between tracks with steel bulb-
 Actual tracks. angle columns.
 Altered renditions of the lines and stations. - Flat-roof subway of reinforced between
 Copies of subway blueprints. concrete construction supported between
 Determine how the subway is operated and tracks by steel bulb-angle columns, used
managed. for short distances.
 Evaluate the subway specifications. - Concrete-lined tunnel of open cutwork
 Entrances and exits to the system. and rock tunnel work.
 Pedestrian traffic routes. - Elevated track on steel via duct.
 Stairs, escalators, elevators. - Cast iron tubes used under water.
 Security obstructions (such as, gates and  Layers of the inner subway construction.
turnstiles).  Construction of beams and shafts.
 Maintenance and utility tunnels.  Reinforcements that are part of the
 Drains. construction to add support and
 Terminals. waterproofing (such as, hard-burned brick
 Tunnels: dimensions and construction. laid in hot asphalt).
 Describe rails.  Soil, rock, or compound that the tunnels
 Dimensions. are cut through.
 Construction.  Ventilation system.
 Describe trains.  How demolition in the subway would affect
 Type. the urban area (surface structure,
 Speed. subterranean features).
 Size and capacity of cars.  Examine the subway security system.
 Describe rail bed.  Type of security.
 Grade.  Threats.
 Subgrade.  Vagrant population (if any) in the subway
 Rail embedding: crossover sections and system.
locations. - Approximate numbers.
 Location of controls. - Primary locations/concentrations.
 Turn and corner locations. - Emergency response.
 Manhole locations. - Evacuation plan.
 Electric source location.  Evaluate the decibel level around the trains.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-31

Chapter 1

ports and harbors
General information  Identify turning basins.

 Identify the local name and military designation.  Locations.
 Identify the port or harbor type.  Dimensions.
 Assess the general condition of the port or  Controlling depth.
harbor.  Identify anchorages and free-swinging moors.
 Determine the importance of the port or harbor.  Locations.
 Identify operating data.  Depth range.
 Average tonnage.  Holding ground.
 Administration.  Protection afforded.
 Labor resources.  Type and number of berths.
 Provide the total harbor area in acres.  Identify fixed mooring berths.
 Provide pilotage data.  Locations.
 Evaluate the importance of the port to the  Numbers.
urban area.  Types.
 Effect of a port shutdown.  Buoys.
 Economic.  General commercial berths.
 Military.  Tanker berths.
 Assess the adjacent terrain.  Naval berths.
 Assess port specifications and layout and port  Identify obstructions.
capacity in metric tons per day.  Overhead obstructions.
 Civil or commercial.  Surface obstructions.
 Military.  Underwater obstructions.
 Determine the largest vessel that can be  Identify navigational aids.
accommodated.  Location.
 Approaches (depth and width).  Type.
 Alongside berths.  Condition.
 Anchorage.
 Free-swinging berths. Physical/hydrographic conditions
 Vertical clearance.  Identify the tides.
 Identify tidal ranges.
Harbor characteristics  Identify currents.
 Identify approaches and entrances to the  Identify water bioluminescence.
harbor.  Identify breakwaters, moles, jetties, or sea
 Location. walls.
 Width.  Evaluate unusual geophysical conditions.
 Depth.  Location.
 Vertical clearance.  Type.
 Identify harbor divisions.  Determine the meteorological considerations.
 Designation.  Evaluate the debris in the water.
 Location.  Type.
 Dimensions.  Volume.
 Principal use.
 Characteristics. Freight handling facilities and equipment
 Controlling depth.  Identify the principal wharf.
 Identify harbor fairways.  Identification.
 Alignment.  Normal use.
 Radius of tightest turn.  Type and construction.
 Shortest tangent.  Berth length.
 Controlling depth.  Depth.
 Width.  Depth alongside.
 Overhead clearance.  Height of deck.
 Susceptibility to silting.  Total length.
 Standard berth class.
 Transit sheds.
1-32 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015


ports and harbors (continued)
 Fueling sheds.  Bulk cargo storage.

 Cargo handling sheds.  Dry products storage.
 Specialized handling equipment.  Coal storage.
 Clearance.  Petroleum products storage.
 Utilities.  Provide miscellaneous information.
 Identify cargo handling cranes.  Clearance facilities.
 Specialized handling equipment.  Railroads.
 Clearance.  Roads.
 Utilities.  Inland waterways.
 Identify general cargo wharves.  Pipelines.
 Location.
 Number. Ship building and repair facilities
 Linear meters.  Identify ship building and repair facilities.
 Identify bulk cargo wharves.  Location.
 Type.  Capabilities.
 Location.  Category.
 Use.  Identify dry-docks.
 Numbers.  Location.
 Linear meters.  Type.
 Identify supplementary wharves.  Condition.
 Type.  Type of dock.
 Location.  Crane service.
 Normal use.  Power required.
 Number.  Identify floating dry-docks.
 Linear meters.  Location.
 Identify offshore pipeline berths.  Dimensions.
 Location.  Crane service.
 Number.  Owner.
 Identify mooring and berth facilities.  Identify ship building ways.
 Maximum safe draft.  Location.
 Hard and unimproved sites usable for  Type.
cargo.  Condition.
 Identification.  Length.
 Location.  Width.
 Length.  Identify machine shops.
 Width.  Location.
 Surface composition.  Capacity.
 Identify stevedore gear (gear used for  Normal activity.
unloading and loading cargo).  Owner.
 Type.  Identify foundries.
 Quantity.  Capacity.
 Condition.  Normal activity.
 Identify cranes.  Condition.
 Type.  Owner.
 Locations.
 Number. Other considerations
 Normal use.  Assess any improvements planned or
 Owner. underway.
 Motive power.  Identify the port’s defenses.
 Size.  Identify the protective works of the harbor.
 Identify storage facilities.  Type.
 General cargo storage.  Location.
 Individual covered storage structures.  Alignment.
 Dimensions.
 Individual open storage areas.
 Construction design.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-33

Chapter 1

ports and harbors (continued)
 Identify the fire protection.

 Fire boats (type, power, location, number,  Electricity source.
pumping capacity, and condition). - Location.
 Shore fire-fighting equipment (location, - Current characteristics.
type, number, and condition). - Substations.
 Water supply (source, adequacy, and  Source of fuel.
distribution system). - Type.
 Evaluate harbor security. - Storage.
 Evaluate harbor maintenance.  Evaluate the port’s support facilities.
 Routine maintenance.  Communication facilities.
 Equipment available.  Military transportation facilities.
 Dredging requirements.  Marine railroads.
 Rehabilitation requirements. - Location.
 Evaluate the port’s utilities. - Owner.
 Water supply. - Type.
- Location. - Track length.
- Potability. - Gauge.
- Distribution. - Hauling capacity.
- Capacity. - Power system.
- Adequacy.  Handling equipment (general condition).
- Storage (location, type, and capacity).  Ordnance facilities.
COMMUNICATIONS
1-108. Communication facilities in modern cities are expansive and highly developed. Complicated
networks of landlines, radio relay stations, fiber optics, cellular service, and the Internet provide a vast web
of communication capabilities. This communication redundancy allows for the constant flow of information.
1-109. National and local engineers and architects may have developed a communication infrastructure
more effective and robust than it might first appear. Additionally, the use of cellular phones, computer
networking, and fiber-optic cable may significantly supplement or even replace the need for using frequency
modulation (also called FM) or ultrahigh frequency (also called UHF) radios.
1-110. Developing countries may have little in the way of communication infrastructure. Information flow
can depend on less sophisticated means—couriers, graffiti, rumors/gossiping and local printed media. Even
in countries with little communication infrastructure, radios, cell phones, and satellite communications may
be readily available to pass information. Understanding communication infrastructure of a city is important
because it ultimately controls the flow of information to the population and the enemy. (See table 1-13 for
example information requirements associated with a communications infrastructure.)
1-34 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

Table 1-13. Example information requirements for communications infrastructure
 Determine the status of the communication - Types of computers and locations.

facilities. - Types of networks and control centers.
 Location.  Operator requirements.
 Type (radio, television).  Operator status.
 Primary use.  Maximum reliable range.
 Importance.  Power source requirements.
 Controlling authority.  Transmitter specifications.
- Agency involved.  Receiver specifications.
- Function.  Antennae.
- Location.  Schematics or blueprints of the facility.
- Relationship to military.  Connectivity to regional and national
 Evaluate each facility’s layout. communication networks.
 Transmitting receiving equipment.  Examine the region’s entire communication
- Location. network.
- Type.  Military communications establishment.
- Frequency range. - Background.
 Control buildings. - Staff control.
- Location. - Type.
- Power source. - Other facilities under military.
- Type. - Source.
- Voltage. - Key personnel.
- Transformer requirement. - Training.
 Auxiliary power source. - Equipment.
- Type. - Production facilities.
- Voltage.  Research and development centers.
- Duration of usage. - Installation.
 Antenna fields. - Projects (type, location, and purpose).
- Location. - Performance.
- Dimensions. - Progress.
- Feed systems. - Foreign contributions.
- Use.  Intercept and direction-finding stations.
- Polarization. - Location.
- Mounting structure. - Line of communications.
- Radiation pattern. - Type of shelter.
- Support areas. - Antenna layout.
 Radio relay stations (location). - Rotating antenna (type, number, and
 Repair center. description pattern).
- Location.  Telephone and telegraph facilities.
- Status. - Line routes.
- Number and proficiency of technicians. - Construction.
- Technical details. - Exchanges and offices.
 Equipment identification. - Repair facilities.
- Frequency range. - Interconnection of system.
- Poles (materials, treatment, spacing, and - Construction line.
number of cross-arms). - Open wire line (material, spacing,
- Underground and underwater cables treatment, and conductor).
(method, type, location).  Cellular phones.
- Submarine cable facilities (if any). - Cellular tower locations.
- Cable (type, location, and description). - Cellular tower coverage.
- Terminal and operation equipment (type,  Print media.
dimension, power requirements, technical - Newspapers, periodicals, and
characteristics, and land-line connections). pamphlets.
- Regional computer networks. - Billboards.
- Postal facilities.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-35

Chapter 1
Table 1-13. Example information requirements for communications infrastructure (continued)
 Police, fire, and rescue communication  Electromagnetic activity that could hamper
systems. friendly communications.
 Emergency broadcast systems.  High voltage and electromagnetic activity
 Low-technology media (such as, car radiation hazard areas.
horns, drums, graffiti, or burning tires).  Determine key media organizations and reports.
 Local and regional television coverage.  Local.
 - Number of channels.  International.
 - Station locations.  U.S.
 Satellite earth stations (locations).  Determine the data transmission capability
through satellite communications.
ENERGY
1-111. All societies require energy (such as wood, coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear, and solar) for basic
heating, cooking, and electricity. Energy is needed for industrial production and is therefore vital to the
economy. In fact, every sector of a city’s infrastructure relies on energy to some degree. Violence may
result from energy scarcity. From a tactical and operational perspective, protecting an urban area’s energy
supplies prevents unnecessary hardship to the civilian population and, therefore, facilitates mission
accomplishment. Power plants, refineries, and pipelines that provide energy resources for the urban area
may not be located within the urban area. Energy facilities are potential targets in an urban conflict.
Combatant forces may target these facilities to erode support for the local authorities or to deny these
facilities to their enemies.
1-112. Electricity is vital to city populations. Electric companies provide a basic service that provides
heat, power, and lighting. Because electricity cannot be stored in any sizable amount, damage to any portion
of this utility will immediately affect the population. Electrical services are not always available or reliable
in the developing world.
1-113. Interruptions in service are common occurrences in many cities due to a variety of factors. Decayed
infrastructure, sabotage, riots, military operations, and other forms of conflict can disrupt electrical service.
As a critical node of the overall city service sector, the electrical facilities are potential targets in an urban
conflict. Enemy forces may target these facilities to erode support for the local authorities or friendly forces.
(See table 1-14 and table 1-15 on page 1-38 for example information requirements associated with a energy
infrastructure.)
1-36 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

Table 1-14. Example intelligence requirements for energy infrastructure—

general information and power plant layout
General information  Locate power transformers.

 Describe the type of power sources.  Locate switch yards.
 Natural gas.  Locate the power grid that services the power
 Nuclear. plant.
 Coal.  Identify the power generation system.
 Hydroelectrical.  Identify the power distribution system.
 Geothermal.  Identify the times street lights are turned on
 Oil. and off.
 Solar.  Locate the power plant step-down transformers
 Assess the significance of the power source. used for power distribution.
 Economic.  Identify the control rooms.
 Social.  Identify the condensers.
 Military.  Identify the water pumps.
 Determine the effect on the urban population  Locate the power generator backup (if any).
should power source availability be disrupted.  Locate the substation.
 Evaluate how substations are powered.
Power plant layout  Locate the water storage center.
 Determine the fuel source.  Identify the fuel storage centers.
 Type.  Location.
 Location.  Size.
 Available reserve.  Capacity.
 Usage rate.  Fuel type.
 Determine who owns and operates the power  Usage rate.
plant.  Determine which station or substation is the
 Identify the generators. primary power plant for the urban area.
 Location.  Determine the best component to disable the
 Quantity. facility and how long it would be disabled.
 Output.  Determine whether the power plant controls
 Identify the turbines. interconnected energy.
 Location.  Evaluate plant security measures.
 Quantity.  Military/civilian personnel.
 Identify the exciters.  Fencing or other physical security
 Location. obstruction.
 Quantity.  Surveillance devices/mechanisms.
 Locate the boiler (steam plant).  Evaluate the threat to the surrounding area
 Locate the compressor (gas power plant). should this facility be damaged.
 Locate the combustion chamber (gas power  Inhabitants.
plant).  Animal life.
 Locate the diesel engine (diesel power plant).  Surrounding ecosystem.
 Locate the reactor containment structures  Petroleum and natural gas facilities.
(nuclear power plant).
 Locate water intakes and outlets (nuclear and
coal power plants).
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-37

Chapter 1
Table 1-15. Example intelligence requirements for energy infrastructure—

petroleum and natural gas facilities
 Identify the facility location.  Nearest refinery (distance).

 Identify the facility type.  Transportation.
 Identify the facility product. - Method.
 Identify the size of the facility. - Identification.
 Identify the owner. - Destination.
 Describe the status of the facility.  Vapor vessels.
 Assess the general condition of the facility. - Type.
 Identify the date the facility was constructed. - Function.
 Determine the effect that the disruption of the - Location.
facility’s operation would have on the urban  Plant utilities.
area and urban population. - Water.
 Determine the easiest method for rendering the - Power.
facility inoperable.  Finished product storage areas.
 Method. - Type.
 Length of time inoperable. - Location.
 Identify the facility specifications. - Function.
 Level of production.  Administration and maintenance facilities.
- Barrels.  Critical vulnerabilities.
- Tons.  Obtain facility blueprints or sketch
- Cubic feet. diagrams.
 Percentage of national production.  Examine the fuel storage areas.
 Percentage of national refining or cracking.  Type.
 Percentage of in-field processing.  Ownership.
 Percentage of refinery processing.  Storage tanks.
 Examine the facility layout. - Location.
 Producing wells. - Displacement (above or below ground).
 Reserves. - Shape.
- Proven.  Transportation.
- Unproven. - Type.
- Location. - Number.
 Processing plants. - Characteristics.
 Refinery processing area.  Receiving and distribution facilities.
 Atmospheric distillation towers.  Support facilities.
 Crude oil feed furnaces.  Best method for rendering storage facility
- Type. inoperable.
- Location.  Identify any planned expansion at the plant.
- Number feeding towers.  Expected increase.
 Receiving facilities and crude oil storage.  Date.
 Catalyst vessels.  Method.
- Type.
- Location.
- Function.
WATER AND WASTE DISPOSAL

1-114. Water is an essential resource. As populations grow, demand for potable water increases. In some
areas of the world, the supply of fresh water is inadequate to meet these demands. By 2025, between 2.7
and 3.5 billion people may live in water-deficient countries. In developed nations, water companies provide
the population with clean water. In much of the developing world, no formal water authorities exist.
Sewage, industrial waste, and pollution pose threats to the water supply.
1-115. Deliberate acts of poisoning cannot be overlooked where access to the water supply is not
controlled. U.S. forces may gain no marked tactical advantage by controlling this system, but its protection
minimizes the population’s hardship and thus contributes to overall mission success. A buildup of garbage
on city streets poses many hazards to include health threats and obstacles. Maintenance or restoration of
urban garbage removal to landfills can minimize this threat and improve the confidence of the civilian
1-38 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

population in the U.S. friendly mission. (See table 1-16 for example information requirements associated
with a water and waste disposal infrastructure.)
Table 1-16. Example information requirements for water and waste disposal infrastructure
Water systems
 Location.
 Identify the water control center.
 Depth.
 Size and output.
 Width.
 Method of purification.
 Tide.
 Grid or pipe layout.
 Current.
 Identify substations.
 Seasonal changes (time frozen, flooded,
 Pumping stations.
dried out).
 Water filtration plant.
 Dams.
 Water supply towers.
 Wells.
 Evaluate the water quality of local streams, Sewage and waste disposal
rivers, lakes, and oceans (health risks of  Determine the adequacy of the sewage and
contact with untreated water). waste disposal system.
 Determine the effectiveness of local leak  Collection.
detection.  Transport.
 Determine whether the urban area is  Incinerators.
experiencing water shortage.  Dumps and landfills.
 Evaluate the local irrigation system and  Toxic waste.
practices.  Medical waste.
 Determine reliability of the engineering and  Identify actions that would lead to the
environmental testing. breakdown of the waste disposal system.
 Determine whether water treatment is  Identify those in charge of waste and sewage
privatized. management.
 Identify the types of pipes installed.  Locate the control center of the sewage
 Determine the types of security present at the system.
facility.  Determine procedures for the facility.
 Identify rivers/canals that run through the city.  Determine the schedule of operation.
 Evaluate the facility’s security.
RESOURCES AND MATERIAL PRODUCTION

1-116. Understanding the origination and storage sites of resources that maintain an urban population can
be especially critical in stability operations. These sites may need to be secured against looting or attack by
threat forces in order to maintain urban services and thereby retain or regain the confidence of the local
population in the U.S. mission. Additionally, military production sites may need to be secured to prevent the
population from gaining uncontrolled access to quantities of military equipment. (See table 1-17 on page 1-
40 for example information requirements associated with a resources and material production
infrastructure.)
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-39

Chapter 1
Table 1-17. Example information requirements for resources and material production
infrastructure
 Identify the urban area’s resources.  Public.

 Natural.  Military.
 Manmade.  Locate the manufacturer’s resource centers.
 Evaluate the available fuel resources.  Location.
 Storage.  Types.
 Transportation.  Transportation routes in and out.
 Emergency supply.  Types of transportation.
 Access.  Locate the material-producing factories.
 Distribution.  Location.
 Production.  Material produced.
 Types.  Size of factory.
 Evaluate the region’s mineral resources.  Number of employees.
 Types.  Sector of production.
 Use.  Identify any materials produced for military
 Storage. purpose.
 Extraction.  Type.
 Locate active mining operations.  Purpose.
 Hard.  Location of military production.
 Liquid.  Local use or export.
 Identify materials being mined.  Identify specific strengths/weaknesses of the
 Determine the primary application of these materials and products due to local production
products. methods.
 Commercial.  Identify the main supply of materials.
 Private.
FOOD DISTRIBUTION
1-117. A basic humanitarian need of the local populace is food. During periods of conflict, food supplies
in urban areas often become scarce. Maintaining and restoring normal food distribution channels in urban
areas will help prevent a humanitarian disaster and greatly assist in maintaining or regaining the good will
of the local population for U.S. forces. It may be impossible to immediately restore food distribution
channels following a conflict, and U.S. forces may have to work with NGOs that specialize in providing
these types of services. This may require friendly forces to provide protection for NGO convoys and
personnel in areas where conflict may occur. (See table 1-18 for example information requirements
associated with a food distribution infrastructure.)
Table 1-18. Example information requirements for a food distribution infrastructure
 Evaluate food production and distribution.  Determine who controls distribution of food.
 Distribution point locations (routes normally  Determine if there are groups or individuals
taken to and from distribution points). getting preferential treatment.
 Production center locations.  Determine if there are groups or individuals
 Ability to feed population. not receiving food distributions.
 Extent of the urban area’s reliance on  Determine nongovernmental organization
outside food sources. involvement in food distribution.
 Schedule of distribution.  Organization.
 Location of food warehouse or storage area  Number of personnel.
prior to distribution.  Type of support.
MEDICAL FACILITIES
1-118. While the health services infrastructure of most developed cities is advanced, medical facilities are
deficient in many countries. International humanitarian organizations may represent the only viable medical
care available. The rudimentary care provided in most developing world cities is not up to Western
1-40 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

standards. Compounding this problem is the presence of deadly parasites and diseases. Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (also called HIV) is devastating many of the urban centers in the developing world
and therefore the local blood supply must be looked upon with great suspicion. Infectious disease, famine,
and natural disasters can overwhelm a city’s medical infrastructure and create immense suffering. Offering
support to an existing medical system may augment the U.S. mission, as well as foster its legitimacy. (See
table 1-19 for example information requirements associated with a medical infrastructure.)
Table 1-19. Example information requirements for medical infrastructure
 Quality and quantity of local blood supply.

 Identify medical facilities. - Location of blood banks.
 Location. - Amount of blood stored.
 Staff. - Blood screening process and its ability to
- Doctor-to-patient ratio. adequately screen for infectious diseases.
- Support personnel.  Environmental health risk.
- Number of staff members who speak - Predicted infectious disease risk and
English. occurrence.
- Number of staff members who are - Acquired immune deficiency syndrome
Western-educated. (also called AIDS) risk.
- Hospital managers.  Availability of medical capable transport
 Number of patients. from the host nation.
 Number of beds.  Local mortuary facilities.
 Number of surgical operating rooms. - Morgues.
 Number of intensive care rooms. - Cemeteries.
 Quality of the medical care provided.
 Quality and quantity of medical supplies.
 Availability of private medical facilities.
LOCAL POLICE, MILITARY UNITS WITH POLICE AUTHORITY OR MISSIONS, AND

FIREFIGHTING UNITS
1-119. These elements can be critical in maintaining public order. Their operations must be integrated
with friendly forces in friendly forces controlled areas to ensure that stability and security are restored or
maintained. As discussed in chapter 3, the precinct structure of these organizations can also provide a good
model for the delineation of unit boundaries with the urban area. It may be necessary for friendly forces to
provide training for these elements. (See table 1-20 on page 1-42 for example information requirements
associated with a food distribution infrastructure.)
CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND CIVIL DEFENSE

1-120. Local crisis management procedures and civil defense structures can aid U.S. forces in helping to
care for noncombatants in areas of ongoing or recent military operations. Additionally, the crisis
management and civil defense leadership will often be local officials that may be able to provide structure
to help restore or maintain security and local services in urban areas under friendly control. Many larger
urban areas have significant response teams and assets to deal with crises. The loss of these key urban
“maintainers” may severely impact not only military operations within the urban environment but also
threaten the health or mobility of those living there. During periods of combat this may also affect the
ability of Soldiers to fight as fires or chemical spills remain unchecked or sewer systems back up. This is
especially true when automatic pumping stations that normally handle rising water levels are deprived of
power. It may be necessary for friendly forces to provide training for these elements. (See table 1-21 on
page 1-42 for example information requirements associated with a crisis management and civil defense
infrastructure.)
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-41

Chapter 1
Table 1-20. Example of information requirements for law enforcement and firefighting
infrastructures
Police or military units with police authority or  Limitations.

mission  Level of corruption.
 Describe police or military units with police
Firefighting units
authority or mission.
 Station locations.  Describe the firefighting units.
 Substation locations.  Station locations.
 Headquarters location.  Substation locations.
 Organizational structure.  Operating borders and areas.
 Key leaders.  Number of firefighters (active and reserve).
 Operating borders.  Full-time or volunteer.
 Jurisdiction borders.  Number and types of vehicles (pumper,
 Number of police (active and reserve). ladder, other).
 Number of administrative personnel.  Other firefighting equipment.
 Types of units (uniformed, plainclothes,  Location and condition of fire hydrants.
special).  Communications equipment, procedures,
 Weapons and equipment. and frequencies or telephone numbers.
 Communications equipment, procedures,  Training.
and frequencies or telephone numbers.  Proficiency.
 Training.  Capabilities.
 Proficiency.  Limitations.
 Capabilities.  Firefighting units outside urban area that
assist in city emergencies.
Table 1-21. Example information requirements for a crisis management and civil defense
infrastructure
Crisis management procedures Civil defense structure

 Describe crisis management procedures within  Describe the civil defense structure.
the urban area.  Civil defense plans.
 Decisionmakers.  Organization of the civil defense agency
 Status of the civil alert system. (key personnel).
- Procedures.  Location of the facilities available for civil
- Effectiveness. defense.
- Results of previous alerts or tests. - Key industry sites.
 Existence and details of the civil - Underground shelters.
evacuation plan. - Food storage sites.
- Procedures. - Potable water sites.
- Effectiveness. - Medical supplies.
- Results of previous evacuations/tests. - Hospitals.
 Warning and alert procedures.
 Evacuation routes and capacities.
SUBTERRANEAN FEATURES
1-121. Subterranean features can be extremely important in identifying underground military structures,
concealed avenues of approach, and maintaining public services. (See table 1-22 for example information
requirements associated with a subterranean infrastructure.)
1-42 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

Table 1-22. Example information requirements for a subterranean infrastructure
 Evaluate the shoring and bracing.

Subterranean features  Spacing location.
 Locate other subterranean features.
 Design.
 Describe the type of feature.
 Materials.
 Maintenance access tunnel.
 Dimensions.
 Electric grid or utility lines.
 Arrangements.
 Pedestrian passageway.
 Assess the overburden.
 Sewer drainage systems and waterways.
 Material.
 Natural underground passageway.
 Depth.
 Evaluate the characteristics of the feature.
 Evaluate the features of the lining materials.
 Shape.
 Type.
 Dimensions.
 Thickness.
 Rise of arch.
 Condition.
 Assess the significance of the feature.
 Point of change
 Connections to the tunnel/passage.
 Identify the year of construction.
 Result if use of the route is denied.
 Evaluate the effects of climate and weather on
 Alternate routes.
the structure.
 Describe the adjacent terrain.
 Provide pertinent geological data.
 Examine the surface features over the tunnel.
 Determine the structure’s susceptibilities to
 Examine the surface features over the tunnel.
above-ground demolitions.
Subterranean layout  Identify buildings in the urban area that have
 Identify the alignment. basements and subterranean spaces.
 Horizontal (position, curve, radius, curve  Residential.
location).  Government.
 Vertical (grade percent, length, location).  Military.
 Identify passageways.  Commercial.
 Dimension.  Industrial.
 Spacing.  Materials.
 Identify choke points (manmade and natural).  Dimensions.
 Location.  Arrangements.
 Dimension.  Assess the overburden.
 Describe the sewer or drainage system.  Material.
 Location.  Depth.
 Power source.  Evaluate the features of the lining materials.
 Cross section.  Type.
 Sides.  Thickness.
 Bottom.  Condition.
 Normal depth.  Point of change.
 Normal current velocity.  Identify the year of construction.
 Identify the ventilation system.  Evaluate the effects of climate and weather on
 Description. the structure.
 Adequacy.  Provide pertinent geological data.
 Describe the lighting facilities.  Determine the structure’s susceptibilities to
 Type. above-ground demolitions.
 Location.  Identify buildings in the urban area that have
 Power source. basements and subterranean spaces.
 Locate traffic control markings.  Residential.
 Government.
Subterranean construction  Military.
 Locate the horizontal and vertical  Commercial.
constructions.  Industrial.
 Type.
 Minimum clearance.
 Location from portal.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-43

Chapter 2
The Threat in the Urban Environment
OVERVIEW
2-1. The obligation of intelligence professionals includes providing adequate information to enable
leaders to distinguish threats from nonthreats and combatants from noncombatants. This legal requirement
of distinction is the initial obligation of decision makers who rely primarily on the intelligence they are
provided.
2-2. Threats in the urban environment can be difficult to identify due to the often complex nature of the
forces and the environment. In urban terrain, friendly forces will encounter a variety of potential threats,
such as, conventional military forces, paramilitary forces, insurgents or guerillas, terrorists, common
criminals, drug traffickers, warlords, and street gangs. These threats may operate independently or some
may operate together. Individuals may be active members of one or more groups. Many urban threats lack
uniforms or obvious logistic trains and use networks rather than hierarchical structures.
2-3. Little information may be available concerning threat tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) so
intelligence staffs must collect against these TTP and build threat models. The enemy situation is often
extremely fluid––locals friendly to us today may be tomorrow’s belligerents. Adversaries seek to blend in
with the local population to avoid being captured or killed. Enemy forces who are familiar with the city
layout have an inherently superior awareness of the current situation. Finally, U.S. forces often fail to
understand the motives of the urban threat due to difficulties of building cultural awareness and situational
understanding for a complex environment and operation. Intelligence personnel must assist the commander
in correctly identifying enemy actions so that U.S. forces can focus on the enemy and seize the initiative
while maintaining an understanding of the overall situation.
2-4. Potential urban enemies share some characteristics. The broken and compartmented terrain is best
suited to the use of small unit operations. Typical urban fighters are organized in squad size elements and
employ guerrilla tactics, terrorist tactics, or a combination of the two. They normally choose to attack (often
using ambushes) on terrain which canalizes U.S. forces and limits our ability to maneuver or mass while
allowing the threat forces to inflict casualties on U.S. forces and then withdraw. Small arms, sniper rifles,
rocket-propelled grenades, mines, improvised explosive devices, Molotov cocktails, and booby traps are
often the preferred weapons. These weapons range from high tech to low tech and may be 30 to 40 years
old or built from hardware supplies, but at close range in the urban environment many of their limitations
can be negated.
2-5. Urban threats may attempt to acquire more dangerous weapons such as chemical weapons, biological
weapons, thermobaric weapons, and possibly even nuclear weapons. Should a proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction occur, the dangers of urban combat greatly increase.
CONVENTIONAL MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

2-6. Conventional military and paramilitary forces are the most overt threats to U.S. and multinational
forces. Identifying the capabilities and intent of these threat forces is standard for intelligence professionals
for any type of operation in any type of environment. In the urban environment, however, more attention
must be paid to threat capabilities that support operations in the urban environment and understanding of
what, if any, specialized training these forces have received in conducting urban warfare. (See table 2-1 on
page 2-2 for example information requirements associated with conventional military and paramilitary
forces.)
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 2-1

Chapter 2
Table 2-1. Example information requirements for conventional military and paramilitary forces
 Compliance.
Conventional military  Changes to rules of engagement.
 Identify the military threat characteristics.
 Ground. Paramilitary
 Air.  Determine the nature of the paramilitary force.
 Naval.  Name.
 Electronic.  Goals.
 Defensive missile.  Ideology.
 Assess the enemy experience in an urban  Numbers.
environment.  Leadership.
 Experiences in urban combat.  Identification features.
 Last conflict. - Clothing/uniforms.
 Previous conflict. - Propaganda.
 Urban training. - Slogans, songs, and chants.
- Amount.  Determine the group’s enemy’s center of
- Quality. gravity or critical vulnerability.
- Facilities.  Determine if the paramilitary group is a threat
 Tactics, techniques, and procedures. to U.S. forces and local government forces and
 Determine the enemy’s center of gravity and police.
critical vulnerability in urban warfare.  Determine how the paramilitary group operates.
 Evaluate enemy sniper capability.  Command and control.
 Training. - Organization.
 Weapons. - Communication equipment.
 Tactics, techniques, and procedures of  Types of weapons employed.
employment. - Firearms.
 Likely sniper sites. - Explosives.
 Identify enemy mechanized assets and - Incendiary.
intended employment. - Indirect fire.
 Determine how the enemy will fight in the urban - Mechanized.
area. - Mines and booby traps.
 Attack or defend. - Chemical, biological, radiological, and
 Types of weapons. nuclear.
 Tactics. - Other weapons.
 Enemy reinforcement plan. - Technology (for example, night vision
 Force size the enemy would employ in an devices).
urban environment.  Tactics.
 Determine the relationship between the enemy  Primary targets.
and the local populace. - Location.
 Would the local populace cooperate? - Type.
- All segments of the populace.  Logistic support structure.
- Level of cooperation. - Location of equipment storage facilities.
 How the population will be employed? - Transportation.
- Intelligence collectors.  Locate the organization’s headquarters.
- Logistic support.  Identify allied forces/support groups.
- Political activists and demonstrators.  International.
- Human shields.  Local security forces.
- Other.  Other paramilitary groups.
 Determine how the enemy employs crew-  Other factions.
served weapons.  Describe training.
 Determine how the enemy employs indirect fire  Type.
support.  Duration.
 Determine whether the enemy employs mines  Quality.
and booby traps in the urban area.  Training facilities.
 Type. - Location.
 Typical locations. - Type.
 Identify the enemy’s rules of engagement.  Describe the group’s experiences in urban
 Procedures. warfare.
2-2 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

INSURGENTS OR GUERRILLAS
2-7. Several factors are important in analyzing any particular insurgency. Commanders and staffs must
perform this analysis within an insurgency’s operational environment. (See FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 for
doctrine on analyzing insurgencies. See table 2-2 for examples of information requirements associated with
analyzing insurgencies.) Under the conditions of insurgency within the urban environment, the analyst must
place more emphasis on—
 Developing population status overlays showing potential hostile neighborhoods.
 Developing an understanding of “how” the insurgent or guerrilla organization operates and is
organized with a focus toward potential strengths and weaknesses.
 Determining primary operating or staging areas.
 Determining mobility corridors and escape routes.
 Determining most likely targets.
 Determining where the threat’s logistic facilities are located and how their support organizations
operate.
 Determining the level of popular support (active and passive).
 Determining the recruiting, command and control, reconnaissance and surveillance, logistics (to
include money), and operations techniques and methods of the insurgent or guerrilla
organization.
 Locating neutrals and those actively opposing these organizations.
 Using pattern analysis and other tools to establish links between the insurgent or guerilla
organization and other organizations (to include family links).
 Determining the underlying social, political, and economic issues that caused the insurgency in
the first place and which are continuing to cause the members of the organization as well as
elements of the population to support it.
Table 2-2. Example information requirements for insurgent and guerrilla forces
 Assess the nature of the guerrilla force.  Weaponry.

 Name. - Firearms.
 Goals. - Explosives.
 Ideology or purpose. - Incendiary.
 Numbers. - Indirect fire.
 Leadership. - Mechanized.
 Identification features. - Mines and booby traps.
- Clothing or uniforms. - Chemical, biological radiological, and
- Propaganda. nuclear.
- Slogans/songs/chants. - Other weapons technology (for example,
- Symbols or graffiti. night vision devices).
 Nature of the insurgency or instability.  Tactics.
 Determine the guerrillas’ enemy’s center of  Primary targets.
gravity or critical vulnerability. - Location.
 Assess the guerillas’ strategy, tactics, and - Type.
operational procedures.  Logistic support structure (location of
 Command and control. equipment storage facilities).
- Organization.  Determine the guerrilla influence on the urban
- Operational size of units. population.
- Communication equipment.  Previous or ongoing attempts to influence
 Specialized subunits. the urban population.
- Intelligence.  Probability of attempts to influence U.S. or
- Reconnaissance. multinational forces.
- Logistics.  Identify the guerrilla reserve forces (if any)
- Recruitment. (reinforcement strategy).
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 2-3

Chapter 2
Table 2-2. Example information requirements for insurgent and guerrilla forces (continued)
 Assess the support network for the guerrilla  Operation in armed propaganda teams.
forces.  Use of cover organizations.
 Local.  Organization of demonstrations.
 National.  Describe the guerrilla training system.
 International.  Type.
 Determine how the guerrillas gain support.  Duration.
 Exploitation of social and political  Quality.
weakness of target society.  Training facilities.
 Use of propagandist-combatant guerrillas.  Locations.
 Use of armed propaganda.
TERRORISTS
2-8. The terrorism threat of is a growing concern for the U.S. military. The opportunities for terrorism are
greater in cities due to the presence of large numbers of potential victims, the likelihood of media attention,
and the presence of vulnerable infrastructure. Many terrorist cells operate in cities because they can blend
with the surrounding population, find recruits, and obtain logistic support. Terrorist cells are not confined to
the slum areas of the developing world. In fact, many of the intelligence collection, logistic support, and
planning cells for terrorist groups exist in the cities of Western Europe and even the United States. (See
table 2-3 for examples of information requirements associated with terrorist threats.)
2-9. Counterterrorism efforts will draw U.S. military forces into urban areas and require coordination with
local law enforcement authorities.
Table 2-3. Example information requirements for terrorist threats
 Examine the background of the terrorist group.  Identify the targets of the violence.
 Leaders and prominent members.  Government.
 Goals/motivation.  Civilians.
- Political.  Rival factions.
- Social.  Military.
- Criminal.  Identify the command and control structure.
- Religious.  Centralized or decentralized.
 Ideology.  Hierarchical.
 Arms.  How the terrorists communicate.
 Organization.  Methods/procedures.
 Training.  Equipment.
 Capabilities and limitations.  Affiliation with a parent terror organization.
 Support.  Identify the terrorist group’s tactics, techniques,
 Values. and procedures.
 Homeland. - Criminal type activities.
 Ethnicity. - Kidnapping and ransom.
 Identify individual terrorists. -Bombings.
 Biographical data. - Murder and assassination.
 Physical description. - Sabotage.
 Sex.  Trends and patterns.
 Photograph. - Action.
 Psychological profile. - Frequency.
 Potential informants. - Timing.
 Determine the status of incarcerated group - Geographic dispersion.
members (if any). - Duration.
 Who. - Results.
 Where.  Circumstances under which the group
 Reasons for incarceration. would likely act.
 Duration.
Table 2-3. Example information requirements for terrorist threats (continued)
2-4 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

 Types of weapons available to the group  National.

and what they are likely to use.  International.
 Capability to acquire or produce weapons - Degree of influence that a third-party
of mass destruction to include acquisition government may have on the terrorist
attempts. group.
 Employment of influence activities. - Affiliation with U.S. citizens or groups.
- Propaganda. - Ties to other terrorist organizations or
- Internet Web sites. networks.
- Intimidation tactics.  Terrorist supply network.
 Areas or approaches avoided by the - National backing.
terrorists. - Charity or nongovernmental organization
 Members of the local population avoided support.
by the terrorists. - Individual.
 Safe areas or approaches.  Feasibility of and methods for cutting off or
 Areas to avoid. seizing these supplies.
 Countermeasures.  Feasibility of and methods for cutting off,
 Security measures. freezing, or seizing financial ties and
 Identify the terrorist support network. assets.
 Local.
CRIME AND CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

2-10. These organizations can threaten the successful completion of U.S. operations both directly and
indirectly. Criminals and criminal organizations may directly target U.S. forces, stealing supplies or
extorting money or contracts. Likewise, increased criminal activity can undermine the U.S. efforts to
establish a sense of security among the local populace. Additionally, guerillas, insurgents, and terrorists may
take advantage of criminal organizations in many ways, ranging from using them to collect information on
U.S. and multinational forces to obtaining supplies, munitions, or services or using their LOCs as logistic
support channels. Terrorist organizations may even have their own separate criminal element or be
inseparable from a criminal group. An enterprise like narcoterrorism is an example of this.
2-11. Criminal activities will usually continue and may even increase during operations in the urban
environment. Criminal organizations often run black markets and illegal smuggling operations in and
around urban areas. These types of activities are often established prior to the arrival of U.S. and
multinational forces and may proliferate prior to or once U.S. and multinational forces arrive, especially if
normal urban services are disrupted by the events that resulted in the U.S. force deployment. For the local
population, these activities may be the only reliable source of jobs which allow workers to provide for their
families. (See table 2-4 for examples of information requirements associated with criminal threats.)
Table 2-4. Example information requirements for criminal threats
 Determine the urban area’s crime rate. - Illegal technology transfer.

 Identify criminal organizations in the area of - Other.
operations.  Structure and organization.
 Name.  Weapons and equipment.
 Type.  Other technology.
 Local, regional, and international.  Communications intercept capabilities.
 Activities.  Night vision devices.
- Narcotics.  Determine criminal territorial divisions.
- Arms dealing.  Determine the relationship between criminal
- Prostitution. organizations.
- Illegal immigration.  Financial ties.
- Illegal gambling.  Information sharing.
- Counterfeiting.  Training.
- Money laundering.  Operations
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 2-5

Chapter 2
Table 2-4. Example information requirements for criminal threats (continued)
 Identify the degree of cooperation between  Production and distribution procedures.

government agencies and criminal  Facility locations.
organizations.  Shipment routes.
 Determine the extent of illegal narcotics in the  Front companies involved.
urban area.  Describe any prior civilian riot activity.
 Types of drugs.  Issue or event that sparked riots.
 Quantity produced within the urban area.  Location.
 Quantity imported.  Level of violence.
 Traffic patterns of distribution.  Describe ties to legitimate businesses and
 Identify the organization’s command and political parties.
control element.
 Headquarters.
 Key leaders.
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
2-12. Adversary information operations pose a threat to friendly forces. These threats can consist of
propaganda, denial and deception, electronic warfare, computer network attack, and (although not a direct
threat), the use of the media to achieve an objective. In general, the purposes of these attacks are to––
 Erode domestic and international support for the mission.
 Deny friendly forces information on enemy disposition and strength.
 Disrupt or eavesdrop on friendly communications.
 Disrupt the U.S. and multinational information flow.
2-13. Through the use of propaganda, adversaries try to undermine the U.S. and multinational mission by
eroding popular support among the local population, the American people, and the international community.
This is accomplished through savvy public relations campaigns, dissemination of falsehoods or half-truths,
staging attacks on civilian sites and then passing the blame onto allied forces, and conducting other
operations that make public statements by U.S. leaders appear to be lies and half-truths.
2-14. Urban terrain facilitates adversary denial and deception. The urban population provides a natural
screen in which enemy forces can hide their identities, numbers, and equipment. There are other
opportunities for denial and deception in cities. Threat forces can hide military equipment in culturally
sensitive places—caching weapons in houses of worship or medical facilities. Threat forces can use decoys
in urban terrain to cause erroneous assessments of its combat capability, strength, and disposition of assets.
Decoys can be employed to absorb expensive and limited precision-guided munitions as well as cause
misallocation of limited resources.
2-15. The enemy electronic warfare threat focuses on denying friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum
to disrupt communications and radar emissions. Commercially available tactical jamming equipment is
proliferating throughout the world and threatens allied communication and receiving equipment. Ensuring
rapid and secure communications is one of the greatest challenges of urban operations. U.S. and
multinational force computer networks may be vulnerable to hackers. (See ATP 3-36 for electronic warfare
techniques.)
2-16. The media can alter the course of urban operations and military operations in general. While not a
direct threat, the increasing presence of media personnel during military operations can create special
challenges. Media products seen in real time without perspective can erode U.S. military support both
internationally and domestically. Enemy forces will attempt to shape media coverage to suit their own
needs. For example, by escorting media personnel to “civilian casualty sites,” they attempt to sway
international opinion against friendly operations. The media may also highlight errors committed by U.S.
and multinational forces. In this age of 24-hour media coverage, the death of even a single noncombatant
can negatively affect a military campaign. (See table 2-5 for examples of information requirements
2-6 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

associated with information operations threats. See JP 3-13 and FM 3-13 for information operations
doctrine.)
Table 2-5. Example information requirements for information operations threats
Denial and deception  Evaluate any previous enemy deception

 Determine whether the adversary has a denial operations.
and deception strategy.  Method.
 Determine what organizations implement denial  Level of success.
and deception policy.
 Determine the structure of the organization(s). Information and influence activities
 Determine the key personnel in the  Determine whether the enemy conducts
organizations. information and influence activities.
 Assess the enemy’s capability to perform  Type.
deception operations.  Methods.
 Type (imagery intelligence, measurement  Effect.
and signature intelligence, signals  Targets.
intelligence, human intelligence,  Identify enemy propaganda units (if any).
counterintelligence, open-source  Location and designation.
information).  Doctrine.
 Equipment (such as, concealment;  Training.
electronic warfare; decoys; dummy; derelict;  Capabilities and limitations.
radar-absorbing materials and paints; visual  Identify propaganda being disseminated.
and thermal, and radar-absorbing or  Type.
scattering camouflage nets; obscurants;  Dissemination process.
smoke; thermal paints; live vegetation;  Effect of the propaganda.
underground facilities; electrochromic Computer network operations
technology and signature management  Evaluate the enemy’s ability to conduct
materials). computer network attack and cyber attacks.
 Training (offensive and defensive). If  Capabilities and limitations.
previous denial and deception training  Training.
was noted  Doctrine.
- Determine what methods were displayed  Describe previous attempts by the enemy to
during exercises. conduct computer network attack.
- Determine the organizations involved.  Intrusion attempts.
- Determine which intelligence disciplines  Denial of service attacks.
were targeted.  Web defacements.
 Doctrine (offensive and defensive).  Propaganda.
 Determine foreign advisors/involvement.
 Determine probable denial and deception
missions and targets.
 Determine confirmed denial and deception
missions and targets.
HEALTH ISSUES
2-17. Urban centers provide favorable conditions for the spread of debilitating or deadly diseases.
Sanitation is often poor in urban areas. Local water and food may contain dangerous contaminants. During
military operations in the urban environment, sewage systems, power generating plants, water treatment
plants, city sanitation, and other services and utilities are vulnerable. When disabled or destroyed, the risk
of disease and epidemics increases, which could lead to unrest, further disease, riots, and casualties. In
Vietnam, over two-thirds of Army hospital admissions were for disease. In 1968, disease cost U.S. forces
some 943,809 man-days––roughly the equivalent of an infantry division for two months. Similarly, medical
records of one Russian brigade in Chechnya in 1995 show that 15 percent of the brigade was down with
hepatitis at one time. Dirty water was the main culprit in the transmission of hepatitis.
2-18. The closely fought nature of urban warfare causes greater psychological stress than any other type of
combat. Russian soldiers returning from fighting in Grozny suffer from abnormally high rates of
psychological disorders.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 2-7

Chapter 2
2-19. Environmental considerations are an important factor to incorporate into intelligence preparation of
the battlefield to ensure the commander has a complete picture of the urban environment. Industrial areas
may include large storage areas of chemicals, petroleum products, fertilizers and other toxic materials. The
following are some factors that should be considered:
 Hazardous material storage areas.
 Hazardous waste storage areas.
 Chemical holding tanks.
 Petroleum storage tanks.
 Sewage treatment plants.
 Cultural and historical sites.
2-20. Other types of hazards in and around urban environments are toxic industrial materials. These include
such materials as aviation fuel, pesticides, ammonia, chlorine, radioactive materials, methane, and propane.
Those fighting in or around structures housing these chemicals might see them splinter, burn, or explode if
hit by fire, creating the “toxic corridor,” a theoretical space affected by a chemical threat and one that poses
severe problems on anyone there. In such situations, even if no contaminants have been released, Soldiers
must still wear protective gear, further degrading capabilities.
2-21. Improperly stored hazardous materials and pollution can both affect operations and injure troops.
Cities in China have levels of sulfur dioxide five to ten times the level found in major Western cities, which
could adversely affect troops operating in those environments. In some parts of Poland, the land and water
is so poisoned by toxic waste that ten percent of babies are born with defects. Such toxicity affects any
military personnel deployed in such regions.
2-22. The typical urban environment includes potential biological or chemical hazards that fall outside the
realm of weapons of mass destruction. Operations within confined urban spaces may see fighting in sewers
and medical facilities and the subsequent health problems that exposure to contaminants may cause. There
may also be deliberate actions to contaminate an enemy’s food or water or infect an enemy. Today’s
biological threats include ebola, smallpox, and anthrax.
OTHER URBAN CONCERNS

2-23. There are additional concerns regarding the conduct of military operations within the urban
environment. The analyst should, to some extent, also focus on the aviation and fire hazards discussed
below.
AVIATION HAZARDS
2-24. Operations in urban environments present unique and complex challenges to aviation units. The
following factors can affect aviation operations in the urban environment:
 Restricted or limited landing zones and pickup zones.
 Increased tower, antenna, and wire hazards.
 Foreign object damage to aircraft from flying debris.
 Operating in areas with high concentrations of civilians.
 Collateral damage to property.
 Night vision system operations in the vicinity of city lights.
 Degraded communications.
2-8 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

 Irregular and unusually strong air currents, especially when flying low in and around urban
canyons. Increased risk of collateral damage to property.
 High risk to aircraft from close-range, small arms, and man-portable air defense systems fire
complicated by the proximity of noncombatants.
FIRE HAZARDS
2-25. The threat of fire has always gone hand-in-hand with combat operations. Within urban areas fire is
one the greatest hazards. During the structural analysis process, an assessment must be made of the fire
threat that a structure poses. Special attention should be paid to the type and location of storage tanks, gas
lines, and other dangerous elements as well as their proximity to other structures and threats (such as a gas
station or propane plant). Decision makers must consider increased risk and impact of fire in assessing the
potential collateral damage in an operation. Fire threats include—
 Isolated fires: Restricted to a single building or part of a building.
 Area fires: Consume from building-to-building to an entire block. Generally, streets will act as
firebreaks and help to contain this type of fire within a single block.
 Fire storms: The most violent and dangerous fire, capable of rapidly consuming large areas by
creating windstorms and intense heat. Firestorms are uncontrollable until they exhaust the
available flammables.
 Explosive hazards: Present in areas containing fuel and chemicals.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 2-9

Chapter 3
Information Sources in the Urban Environment
OVERVIEW
3-1. In the urban environment, every Soldier is an information collector. Soldiers conducting patrols,
manning observation posts, manning checkpoints, or even convoying supplies along a main supply route
serve as the commander’s eyes and ears. The challenge for the intelligence professional is to understand
what types of information Soldiers performing different tasks and missions can provide to an awareness of
the overall situation, how to get them to report, and how to leverage that information into situational
understanding.
3-2. This chapter briefly discusses some of the types of information that Soldiers on the battlefield with
different specialties can provide to the intelligence staff. It is essential to properly brief these assets so that
they are aware of the intelligence requirements prior to their missions and to debrief them immediately upon
completion of their missions; this is to ensure the information is still current in their minds and any timely
intelligence they may provide is available for further action. Some examples of debriefing techniques are
listed in chapter 4 and ATP 2-19.4. This cycle (brief–mission–debrief–intelligence/ awareness of the current
situation) is continuous throughout operations.
SCOUTS, SNIPERS, AND RECONNAISSANCE

3-3. Scouts, snipers, and other surveillance and reconnaissance assets can provide valuable information on
people and places in the urban environment. Traditionally, scouts, snipers, and reconnaissance assets are
often used in surveillance roles (passive collection) from a standoff position. Operations in the urban
environment, especially stability operations, may require a more active role (reconnaissance) such as
patrolling for some of these assets. When employed in a reconnaissance role (active collection), these assets
tend to be most useful when accompanied by an interpreter who allows them to interact with people that
they encounter, which allows them to better assess the situation.
3-4. Additionally, the presence of patrols in urban areas, particularly in stability operations, may directly
influence what they observe. Insurgent and local nationals may change their habits or actions either
consciously or subconsciously when friendly patrols are in their area.
3-5. Scouts and reconnaissance patrols can also provide grid coordinates of key locations for future use. It
is often useful to have 10-digit Military Grid Reference System (also called MGRS) coordinates for key
locations within urban areas for contingency operations. However, without a physical description of the
location, a 10-digit grid can be useless when sending personnel or delivering remote weapons fire to that
location. Because of the closeness of the urban environment, a physical description of the key location is
essential to ensure accuracy. Additionally, the use of landmarks––preferably ones that are visible from
overhead (such as road intersections)––are highly desirable in order to confirm the location.
3-6. Snipers are trained observers who can provide clear spot reports that may help clarify a situation.
Sniper teams operate in a stealthier mode with the intent that they remain unobserved. For example, in a
gathering of people, snipers can identify the probable leaders, the gender of individuals and size of the
group, and any equipment they may be carrying. Additionally, specialized optics and night vision devices
make snipers valuable information collection in a wide range of conditions. Snipers are also trained as
trackers and may be able to use those skills to give the commander valuable information on which to act
immediately.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 3-1

Chapter 3
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

3-7. Special operations forces usually enter a joint operations area prior to the deployment of conventional
Army units. They may conduct covert operations or overt operations (such as foreign internal defense
missions). Their ability to observe and report can provide invaluable intelligence on the current situation in
the AO. Special operations force personnel usually live among the local nationals and must get to know and
understand in great detail the culture of the local national population within their AO.
3-8. Special operations force liaison elements, such as a special operations command and control element
(also called a SOCCE), can provide commander and intelligence staff with access to this information as
well as valuable real-time intelligence. Additionally, U.S. Special Operations Command maintains a
historical database of after-action reviews and lessons learned––the Special Operations Debrief and
Retrieval System––for every mission that a special operations force team conducts.
ENGINEERS
3-9. Engineers can provide significant amounts of information to the intelligence staff. They support
mobility, countermobility and survivability by providing maneuver and engineer commanders with
information about the terrain, threat engineer activity, obstacles, and weather effects within the AO. During
the planning process engineers can provide specific information on the urban environment such as
information on the effects that structures within the urban area may have on the operation, bridge weight
class and conditions, and information on most likely obstacle locations and composition. Engineers can
assist in assessing potential collateral damage by analyzing risks of damage caused by the release of
dangerous forces, power grid and water source stability, and the viability of sewage networks. Engineers
provide a range of capabilities that enhance collection efforts. Each of the engineer functions may provide
varying degrees of technical expertise in support of any given assigned mission and task. These capabilities
are generated from and organized by both combat and general engineer units with overarching support from
geospatial means.
3-10. Topographic teams can provide both standard urban intelligence preparation of the battlefield
products and operational decision aids. They can create or assist staffs in creating such products as no-fire
area overlays (hospitals, churches), trafficability overlays, target packages, refugee tracking products, line-
of-sight surveys, reverse line-of-sight overlays, slope overlays, and critical infrastructure overlays.
Additionally, topographic teams can provide specialized maps in scales that are needed for operations in
urban environments. Topographic teams can also assist in creating special enemy decision support template
products in conjunction with the intelligence staff, including those that contribute to defeating improvised
explosive devices. (See ATP 3-90.37.) Topographic team products may be produced in either vector or
digital format. Vector products can be disseminated digitally, but are much smaller than digital products.
Topographic teams function as a conduit for the broader range of geospatial products that may be available
to the unit from joint, Department of Defense, and other sources.
3-11. Further information on topographic engineer products and services can be found at the Army
Geospatial Center Web site.
MEDICAL
3-12. Health issues, as described in chapter 2, are a potential threat in the urban environment, and the
commander must be advised of potential health threats that may impact operations. Outbreaks of disease
may not only affect friendly and enemy personnel directly but also require U.S. forces to provide medical
support to civilians within the AO; this can potentially cause a major drain on or even require the
reallocation of resources.
3-13. The National Center for Medical Intelligence (formerly the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence
Center) is responsible for producing finished intelligence on foreign military and civilian medical
capabilities, infectious disease and environmental health risks, and scientific and technical developments in
biotechnology and biomedical subjects of military importance. Staffs can obtain medical intelligence
3-2 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

information through their intelligence channels or directly from the center via its Web site. In an emergency,
up-to-date medical intelligence assessments can be obtained by contacting Defense Intelligence Agency,
2000 MacDill Boulevard, Washington, DC 20340-5100, Attention: NCMI, Director, MA. The message
address is DIRNCMI FT DETRICK MD. Medical intelligence elements and the center can provide the
following reports:
 Medical capabilities studies.
 Disease occurrence—worldwide reports.
 Foreign medical materiel studies.
 Disease and environmental alert reports.
 Foreign medical facilities handbooks.
 Scientific and threat intelligence studies.
 Foreign medical materiel exploitation reports.
 Quick reaction responses.
3-14. The National Center for Medical Intelligence 24-hour service/request for information telephone
number is (301) 619-7574 or Defense Switched Network 343-7574. The center’s email address is
ncmiops@ncmi.detrick.army.mil.
3-15. During the planning process, medical support personnel at individual units can provide information
on the nature of local health risks associated with the urban environment in which operations will take place
and provide preventive measures that the unit or unit personnel may take to mitigate or avoid these risks.
Medical personnel can also help coordinate a medical survey to pinpoint existing hospitals, clinics,
sanitariums, blood banks, pharmaceutical industries, medical supply warehouses, and veterinary and public
health facilities, as well as to identify key indigenous medical personnel within the urban area.
3-16. During an operation, medical personnel monitor and report any new health risks that emerge.
Intelligence on the enemy medical status is also valuable. It not only discloses enemy strengths and
weaknesses but also can alert friendly medical units of diseases and conditions that enemy prisoners of war
and detainees might require treatment for.
3-17. Medical personnel are a prime source of intelligence provided that they are trained on how to observe
and report pertinent data. Types and frequency of wounds and disease, attitudes of enemy prisoners of war
and detainees undergoing treatment, type and utility of captured enemy medical supplies, and observations
of the local populace are all important sources of information that medical personnel should provide.
3-18. Medical personnel can also be invaluable in detecting the use of chemical or biological weapons by
seeing their effects on people. These agents may be more difficult to detect in urban areas specifically
because of the closeness of the population, the sanitary problems associated with cities, and the general
breakdown of support services and infrastructure.
AVIATION
3-19. When determining enemy capabilities and courses of action, aviation units can provide intelligence
personnel with information on what air operations are feasible in any given urban environment. During
operations, gun camera video and surveillance systems carried by aircraft can provide timely, thorough, and
on-demand information to intelligence personnel. The stand-off capability of most aircraft can allow
observation of threat forces and activities from tracking individual vehicles through city streets to
determining locations of enemy obstacles in the urban environment. (See ATP 3-06.1 for TTP for aviation
urban operations.)
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR

3-20. During the planning process, chemical corps personnel can provide estimates on the effects of CBRN
use in urban environments as well as the location, types, and potential effects of toxic industrial materials.
Due to the prevalence of biological hazards and toxic industrial materials in many urban areas, chemical
corps personnel may be crucial in identifying CBRN hazards that Soldiers may not normally recognize as a
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 3-3

Chapter 3
threat. They can also assist in determining if a CBRN hazard exists as part of the urban environment or is a
deliberate weaponized attack.
AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY

3-21. Air defense artillery personnel may be assigned multiple missions in the urban environment,
especially when the enemy air threat is assessed as low or nonexistent. Air and missile defense units can
provide an awareness of the air picture either with their organic systems or indirectly through adjacent air
and missile defense units. The air picture can provide units in the urban environment with an understanding
of the current threat posed by enemy unmanned aircraft systems, cruise missiles and rockets, mortars, and
missiles. Air defense artillery personnel who are deployed in the urban environment to provide air defense
protection may have secondary missions such as observing named areas of interest or conducting urban
patrols with the units into which they are integrated.
3-22. Air and missile defense systems, such as the Avenger, have acquisition systems and capabilities that
can be used for other purposes. For example, the forward looking infrared (also called FLIR) system on the
Avenger may be employed along parts of the urban perimeter to detect unusual or unauthorized traffic into
or out of the urban area at night, such as insurgent or guerrilla infiltration and exfiltration or smuggling
operations.
CIVIL AFFAIRS
3-23. Civil affairs personnel are a key asset in any operation undertaken in the urban environment. The
missions of civil affairs personnel keep them constantly interacting with the indigenous populations and
institutions (also called IPI). Civil affairs personnel develop area studies, conduct a variety of assessments,
and maintain running estimates. These studies, assessments, and running estimates focus on the civil
component of an area or operation.
3-24. The basic evaluation of an area is the civil affairs area study. An area study is produced in advance of
the need. It establishes baseline information relating to the civil components of the area in question in a
format corresponding to the civil affairs functional areas and functional specialties. Civil affairs assessments
provide a precise means to fill identified information gaps in order to inform decisionmaking. Civil affairs
Soldiers perform three types of assessments: the initial assessment, the deliberate assessment, and the
survey. (See FM 3-57 and ATP 3-57.60 for doctrine on civil affairs area studies and assessments.)
3-25. The civil affairs operations running estimate feeds directly into the military decisionmaking process,
whether conducted during civil-affairs-only operations or integrated into the supported unit’s planning and
development of the common operational picture. During course of action development and wargaming, the
civil affairs operations staff ensures each course of action effectively integrates civil considerations (the “C”
of METT-TC). They present a summary of their running estimate to describe how their findings affect or
are affected by other staff functions. (See FM 3-57 for doctrine on civil affairs area studies and assessments.
See ATP 3-57.60 for associated techniques and formats for civil affairs products. See FM 6-0 for doctrine
on the military decisionmaking process.)
3-26. Civil affairs units conduct civil information management as a core competency. Civil information
management is the process whereby data relating to the civil component of the operational environment is
gathered, collated, processed, analyzed, produced into information products, and disseminated (JP 3-57).
Effectively executing this process results in civil information being shared with the supported organization,
higher headquarters, and other U.S. Government and Department of Defense agencies, intergovernmental
organizations, and NGOs. This process ensures the timely availability of information for analysis and the
widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to unified action partners
throughout the AO. Civil affairs personnel collect, collate, process, and analyze civil information as part of
the civil information management process. This process also includes trained analysts within the
intelligence community performing in-depth analysis of civil information for civil affairs forces in order to
provide commanders with better situational understanding. (See ATP 3-57.50 for doctrine on civil
information management.)
3-4 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

3-27. While civil affairs forces should never be used as information collection assets, the fact that civil
affairs teams constantly travel throughout the AO to conduct their missions make them good providers of
combat information, if they are properly debriefed by intelligence staffs. Intelligence personnel should ask
their local civil affairs team for their area studies and assessments.
MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

3-28. MISO units are made up primarily of Soldiers holding the psychological operations military
occupational specialty. These Soldiers must have a thorough understanding of the local populace, including
the effects of the information environment, and must fully understand the effects that U.S. operations are
having on the populace. Psychological operations Soldiers routinely interact with local populations in their
native languages, directly influence specified targets, collect information, and deliver persuasive,
informative, and directive messages. Intelligence personnel can leverage attached MISO units’ capabilities
and the information they provide to gain key insights into the current sentiments and behavior of local
nationals and other important groups. MISO units can be a tremendous resource to the intelligence staff;
however, they rely heavily on the intelligence warfighting function. Intelligence staffs must be careful not to
task MISO forces to fill information requirements that originated from a MISO request for information.
(See ATP 3-53.2 for doctrine on military information support to conventional operations.)
3-29. Another MISO resource is psychologically focused studies. As the joint proponent for MISO, the U.S
Special Operations Command manages the MISO Studies Program and coordinates MISO input to the
Defense Intelligence Production schedule. MISO studies can be of particular use to intelligence staffs. In
general, these studies—
 Profile significant features of a country and its population.
 Provide analyses of the influences that affect attitudes, values, beliefs, and behaviors by group
(social, occupational, ethnic, or demographic).
 Discuss issues that elicit strong responses from the indigenous population.
 Assess sentiments of groups.
 Identify vulnerabilities.
 Suggest ways and means to influence groups or individuals.
3-30. MISO studies are prepared primarily by cultural intelligence elements at the psychological operations
group level. Cultural intelligence elements maintain a research database hosted on the SIPRNET. This
database provides a global reachback resource for all MISO forces. The database includes a Department of
Defense message traffic archive, a MISO study collection, and a radio and television collection (location,
equipment range, and frequencies). The database facilitates research and analysis for the following tasks in
support of conventional and special operations forces:
 Target audience analysis.
 Targeting.
 Psychological action and message development.
 Operational deployments.
3-31. Requests for MISO studies are made through the unit’s MISO staff, attached MISO unit, or as an
intelligence request to the information manager (who enters the request into the intelligence system for
intelligence production requirements). Requesters should be aware that some studies require a long time
(months versus days or weeks) to prepare. If a study on a given topic is not already complete, significant
lead time may be required to meet the request. (See JP 3-13.2 for details on cultural intelligence elements
and MISO studies.)
MILITARY POLICE
3-32. Whether they are conducting area security operations, maneuver and support operations, internment
and resettlement, or law and order operations, military police personnel normally have a presence across
large parts of the battlefield. During stability operations, they will normally maintain liaison with local
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 3-5

Chapter 3
national law enforcement officials. In some cases, they may temporarily assume Customs duties, as they did
at the main airport outside Panama City during Operation Just Cause. Generally, military police are better
trained in the art of observation than regular Soldiers; with their presence at critical locations on the
battlefield, they can provide a wealth of battlefield information provided that they are properly briefed on
current intelligence requirements.
3-33. Military police conduct police intelligence operations, which ensure that information collected during
the conduct of military police functions is provided as input to the intelligence collection effort. Police
intelligence operations support, enhance, and contribute to the commander’s force protection program, the
common operational picture, and situational understanding.
3-34. Military police also maintain a detainee information database which can also track detainees in
stability operations. Information from this database can be useful to intelligence personnel, especially when
constructing link diagrams and association matrixes. Military Police personnel must be synchronized with
military intelligence personnel when determining whether or not individual detainees should be released.
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

3-35. Explosive ordnance disposal personnel can provide valuable information to intelligence personnel on
the types of munitions that threat forces may use in the urban environment as well as their effects,
recommended stand-off distances, and possible methods of employment. These munitions may range from
conventional land mines to all sorts of improvised explosive devices such as car bombs, booby-trapped
artillery shells, remotely detonated homemade bombs, and suicide vests. Explosive ordnance disposal
personnel can be a valuable asset during information collection planning, especially when improvised
explosive devices are a significant force protection issue.
TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS

3-36. Transportation and logistics personnel are constantly moving personnel and supplies up and down
LOCs and throughout the AO. For that reason they are valuable sources of current information. These
personnel provide information regarding the status of LOCs, civilian population movements, the impact of
weather on movement and notable activity in populated areas. In order to leverage these sources for
intelligence purposes, intelligence staffs must ensure that procedures are in place to brief transportation
personnel on the current intelligence picture, the intelligence requirements, reporting procedures for getting
critical information into the unit intelligence channels, and to ensure that transportation personnel are
debriefed as soon as possible upon completing their missions.
CIVILIAN LINGUISTS AND LOCAL HIRES

3-37. While not formal intelligence sources, U.S.-hired linguists and local hires can provide keen insights
into local cultural awareness and the current sentiments of the local population and local national
authorities; they can also identify key individuals or groups that are a threat to the successful completion of
the U.S. mission. (For doctrine on language support, see FM 2-0.)
3-38. As with open-source intelligence and NGO information, for example, all information provided by
these sources must be carefully evaluated and placed into context based on the reliability, credibility, and
biases of the individual.
JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

3-39. Most Army operations in urban environments are likely to be joint operations. This requires Army
intelligence staffs at all levels to make sure that they are familiar with the intelligence collection capabilities
and methods of Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps units operating in and around their AO. Joint operations
generally bring more robust intelligence capabilities to the AO; however joint operations also require
significantly more coordination to ensure resources are being used to their fullest extent. Intelligence
3-6 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

reporting procedures must be established to ensure that critical intelligence is reported to the end user in a
timely manner.
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PACKAGES

3-40. The Defense Intelligence Agency produces intelligence support packages in response to the theater or
joint task force target list or a request for information. A target summary provides data on target
significance, description, imagery annotations, node functions, air defenses, and critical nodal analysis.
These packages support targeting of specific military and civilian installations. Intelligence support
packages include—
 Graphics.
 Land satellite (also called LANDSAT) imagery.
 Land satellite digital terrain elevation data-merge (also called DTED-merge) imagery.
 Maps.
 Target line drawings.
 Photography (when available).
 Multiscale electro-optical (also called EO) imagery.
CONTINGENCY SUPPORT STUDIES AND PACKAGES

3-41. Additionally, the Defense Intelligence Agency produces contingency support studies and contingency
support packages. The contingency support study has a large format imagery product (17 by 21 inches). It
supports planning for theater operations and contingency planning. Text information includes weather and
climate data, oceanography and landing beaches (for amphibious operations), terrain analysis, and
significant facilities. An overview map and a large-scale map of the target areas are included. A contingency
support study focuses on an urban area, military facility, or significant terrain. It includes high-resolution
electro-optical and land satellite imagery.
3-42. The contingency support package is a large format (17 by 21 inches) and a small format (8 by 13
inches) imagery product. It is produced in response to a specific crisis. The contingency support package is
a mission-oriented product, typically supporting a noncombatant evacuation operation. Imagery includes the
embassy, the ambassador’s residence, evacuation routes, avenues of approach, helicopter landing zones,
beaches, ports, and airfields. The format is similar to that of the contingency support study. It includes high-
resolution imagery that supports the appropriate Department of State emergency action plan.
GRIDDED REFERENCE GRAPHICS

3-43. The Defense Intelligence Agency also produces gridded reference graphics. This large format
imagery product (17 by 21 inches) provides an overview map, a small-scale imagery mosaic, and large-
scale individual prints of a specific target area. Gridded reference graphics are typically focused on urban
areas but are also produced to cover large maneuver areas and LOCs. The gridded reference graphic
complements National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) city graphics (1:25,000 to 1:10,000 scales)
and provides excellent detail for urban mission planning.
NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PRODUCTS

3-44. NGA produces a range of products that can be useful in the urban environment. These products
include city graphics, urban features databases, gridded installation imagery (Secret-level products), the
geographic names database, terrain analysis products, imagery intelligence briefs, and annotated graphics.
(See NSG: Geospatial Intelligence Basic Doctrine Publication 1-0 for information on NGA products.)
3-45. One product that has proven to be very useful in multinational operations is the unclassified one-
millimeter resolution imagery with grid overlaid, a street names index, and an index of numbered (key)
features. Classified NGA products are available through intelligence channels and NGA representatives and
support teams on SIPRNET and JWICS. Classified image product libraries can be accessed through the
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 3-7

Chapter 3
SIPRNET and JWICS terminals. Unclassified NGA products are available through the unit supply system,
topographic teams, and NGA representatives and support teams. Some products, such as the geographic
names database (on the GEOnet Names Server) are available through the NGA Web site.
NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS HANDBOOKS

3-46. A noncombatant evacuation operation intelligence support handbook (also called a NISH) is prepared
by the combatant commands to support noncombatant evacuation operation and hostage recovery operation
planning. One is available for every American embassy. These documents are classified Secret. Contents
include small format imagery (8 by 11 inches) and a text product. The handbook includes overhead imagery
of ports, airfields, helicopter landing zones, potential evacuation routes, and beaches as well as photography
and diagrams of pertinent U.S. government facilities in the country. Intelligence personnel must consider
the currency of this information during planning.
MULTINATIONAL
3-47. Due to classification issues, sharing intelligence during multinational operations can be challenging.
It may be the case that U.S. forces are working in a multinational force that contains both member countries
with whom the United States has close intelligence ties and others with whom the United States has few or
no intelligence ties. In many cases intelligence personnel from other countries have unique skills that can
significantly contribute to the friendly intelligence effort.
3-48. Establishing methods of exchanging battlefield information and critical intelligence as well as
coordinating intelligence collection efforts can be crucial to the overall success of the mission. Reports from
multinational force members can fill intelligence gaps for the U.S. forces and the multinational force as a
whole.
3-49. The unique perspective of some of the multinational partners may provide U.S. intelligence analysts
with key insights. (For example, during the Vietnam War, Korean forces used to living in environments
similar to Vietnamese villages often noticed anomalies that Americans missed such as too much rice
cooking in the pots for the number of people visible in the village.) Likewise, few countries have the
sophisticated intelligence collection assets available to U.S. forces, and information that the U.S. may
provide could be critical both to their mission success and to their force protection.
INTERNATIONAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

3-50. International organizations (not NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations will often have a
presence in areas in which U.S. forces may conduct operations, especially if those areas experience some
type of unrest or upheaval prior to U.S. operations. International organizations and intergovernmental
organizations include such agencies as the International Criminal Police Organization (also called Interpol),
the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. When providing support or considering
offering support to the local populace, international organizations and intergovernmental organizations
usually conduct assessments of the local areas that focus on understanding the needs of the local populace,
the ability of the infrastructure to enable their support or aid to be effectively provided, and the general
security situation and stability of the area.
3-51. Understandably, urban areas will be a primary focus of these reports since they are the central
locations through which international and intergovernmental support will flow into an area. Copies of these
reports may be available upon request.
3-52. During U.S. operations in an urban environment, international organizations and intergovernmental
organizations may continue to maintain a presence. If they are willing to continue to provide copies of their
assessments, their third-party view of the situation may provide intelligence analysts with valuable insights.
This information of sharing––in both directions––could be integral for the success and legitimacy of
friendly operations. (See JP 3-08 and FM 3-07 for doctrine on interorganizational coordination.)
3-8 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
3-53. As with international organizations and intergovernmental organizations, NGOs will often have a
presence in areas in which U.S. forces may conduct operations. Since most of these organizations are
concerned with providing support to the local populace, their presence tends to be especially prominent in
areas experiencing or that recently experienced some type of unrest or upheaval prior to U.S. operations,
during U.S. operations, or following U.S. operations. These organizations include such agencies as the
International Committee of the Red Cross, Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders), and the
Red Crescent. When providing or preparing to provide support to the local populace, these organizations
usually conduct assessments of the local areas that focus on understanding the needs of the local populace,
the ability of the infrastructure to enable their support or aid to be effectively provided, and the general
security situation or stability of the area. As with international organizations and intergovernmental
organizations, NGOs usually focus on urban areas at the hubs into which their support will flow and from
which it will be distributed to the areas with the most urgent need.
3-54. NGOs strive to protect their shield of neutrality in all situations and do not generally offer copies of
their assessments to government organizations. Nonetheless, it is often in their interest to make U.S. forces
aware of their operations in areas under U.S. control. Representatives of individual NGOs operating in areas
under U.S. control may provide U.S. forces with their detailed assessments of those areas in order to gain
U.S. support either in the form of additional material aid for the local populace or for security
considerations. (See JP 3-08 and FM 3-07.)
3-55. Individual NGO members are often highly willing to discuss what they have seen during their
operations with U.S. forces personnel. Some NGOs have been used in the past as fronts for threat
organizations seeking to operate against U.S. forces. Intelligence analysts must therefore carefully evaluate
information provided by NGO personnel.
LOCAL NATIONAL AUTHORITIES

3-56. Local national authorities and former local national authorities know their populations and local
infrastructure best. Key information can be gained from cooperative local national authorities or former
authorities. Analysts must always be careful to consider that these authorities may be biased for any number
of reasons. Some examples of the types of information that local national authorities can provide are
discussed below.
3-57. Politicians usually know their populations very well or they would not be able to remain in office.
They can provide detailed socio-cultural information on the populace within their region of control (for
example, economic strengths and weaknesses or religious, ethnic, and tribal breakdowns). They are also
usually aware of the infrastructure. Obviously, intelligence analysts must be aware that information
provided by these personnel generally will be biased and almost certainly slanted in the long-term favor of
that individual.
3-58. Police can provide information on local criminal organizations, local ethnic breakdowns, and key
terrain within their AOs. During stability operations, it would be useful to pay attention to the local police
precinct boundaries when designating unit boundaries within an urban area. Dividing local national police
boundaries among multiple U.S. unit boundaries can cause liaison problems and confusion on both sides
whenever U.S. forces have to work with local national police forces. Additionally, local national police
forces will have been conducting operations in their urban environment prior to U.S. operations and will
have adjusted precinct boundaries into manageable sections based on the number of police personnel
available, areas requiring concentration based on high criminal activity or unrest, and, where applicable,
religious, ethnic, or tribal breakdowns.
3-59. Fire department personnel often have ready access to blueprints of the structures within their
precincts, information on fire escapes, and other building safety-related information as well as detailed
information on their structural composition (and the fire threat in individual buildings or whole blocks of a
city).
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 3-9

Chapter 3
3-60. Public works personnel are uniquely familiar with the infrastructure of the city. They can provide
information on the critical points in the city that must be secured in order for public services to be
maintained; they can provide key information on avenues of approach throughout the city (especially
underground service passages and sewer and drainage systems).
3-61. City halls in many parts of the world are also repositories of key records on the infrastructure of the
city. They may contain detailed maps of the city, key city infrastructure information, and blueprints of the
buildings in the city.
3-10 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

Chapter 4
Operations in the Urban Environment
OVERVIEW
4-1. In the urban environment, different types of operations (offense, defense, and stability) often occur
simultaneously in adjacent portions of a unit’s AO. Intelligence support to operations in this extremely
complex environment often requires a higher degree of specificity and fidelity in intelligence products than
required in operations conducted in other environments. Intelligence staffs have finite resources and time
available to accomplish their tasks. Realistically, intelligence staffs cannot expect to always be able to
initially provide the level of specificity and number of products needed to support commanders.
4-2. Using the mission variables (METT-TC), intelligence staffs start prioritizing by focusing on the
commander’s and operational requirements to create critical initial products. Requests for information to
higher echelons can assist lower level intelligence sections in providing critical detail for these products. As
lower level intelligence staffs create products or update products from higher, they must provide those
products to higher so that higher can maintain an awareness of the current situation. Once initial critical
products have been built, intelligence staffs must continue building any additional support products
required. Just as Soldiers continue to improve their foxholes and battle positions the longer they remain in
place, intelligence staffs continue to improve and refine products that have already been built.
4-3. When preparing for operations in the urban environment, intelligence analysts consider the three
primary characteristics of the urban environment as well as the threat. These factors are discussed
throughout this manual, but a general review is provided in table 4-1 on page 4-2. Commanders and staffs
require a good understanding of the civil considerations for the urban area as well as the situation in the
surrounding region. This includes the governmental leaders and political organizations and structures,
military and paramilitary forces, economic situation, sociological background, demographics, history,
criminal organizations and activity, and any nongovernmental ruling elite (for example, factions, families,
tribes). All are key factors although some are more important than others, depending on the situation in the
target country. Intelligence personnel must assist the commander in correctly identifying enemy actions so
U.S. forces can focus on the enemy and seize the initiative while maintaining an understanding of the
overall situation.
4-4. Since urban areas are often closely connected with other urban areas and surrounding rural areas by
physical terrain, socio-cultural factors, and infrastructure, operations within any given urban area should not
be considered in isolation. Events or activities that occur in other urban or rural areas may have a direct
impact on events or activities in the urban AOs for which a unit is responsible.
4-5. Most operations in urban environments are conducted by brigade-size or smaller units and often in a
joint context. This chapter focuses primarily on these tactical units. (See ATP 2-19.4 for brigade combat
team intelligence techniques.)
PLAN
4-6. During the planning for operations in an urban environment, intelligence plays a major role. Initial
collection of information and intelligence preparation of the battlefield are undertaken to provide
intelligence products for the military decisionmaking process. (See ATP 2-01.3/MCRP-2-3A for doctrine
on intelligence preparation of the battlefield.) During the military decisionmaking process, the intelligence
and operations staffs develop the information collection plan. This plan is published as annex L to the
operation order. (See FM 6-0 for the format.)
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 4-1

Chapter 4
4-7. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of
sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of
current and future operations (FM 3-55). This activity integrates the intelligence and operations staff
functions focused on answering the commander’s critical information requirements. At the tactical level,
intelligence operations, reconnaissance, security operations, and surveillance are the four primary tasks
conducted as part of information collection. (See FM 3-55.) The intelligence warfighting function
contributes to information collection through intelligence operations and the plan requirements and assess
collection task.
4-8. Plan requirements and assess collection is the task of analyzing requirements, evaluating available
assets (internal and external), recommending to the operations staff taskings for information collection
assets, submitting requests for information for adjacent and higher collection support, and assessing the
effectiveness of the information collection plan (ATP 2-01). It is a commander-driven, coordinated staff
effort led by the G-2 or S-2. The continuous functions of planning requirements and assessing collection
identify the best way to satisfy the requirements of the supported commander and staff. These functions are
not necessarily sequential.
4-9. Intelligence operations are the tasks undertaken by military intelligence units and Soldiers to obtain
information to satisfy validated requirements (ADRP 2-0). Intelligence operations collect information about
the activities and resources of the threat or information concerning the characteristics of the operational
environment. (See FM 2-0 for doctrine on intelligence operations.)
4-10. The basic factors that must be considered in the complex urban environment remain the same
regardless of the type of mission that U.S. forces are conducting. The priority given to individual factors,
however, will change based on the type of mission and specific situation.
Table 4-1. Basic intelligence consideration factors in the urban environment
Enemy: Snipers, Molotov cocktails, squad-size engagements, bunkers, reserves, influence activities,
health threats, threat characteristics, courses of action.
Terrain:
• Military aspects of terrain—Observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles,
key terrain, avenues of approach (also called OAKOC).
• General urban description—Large or small city, town, village, strip area.
• Zoned areas—Core, residential, high rise, industrial.
• Lines of communications—Roads, rivers or canals, railways, subways, airfields, ports, line of
sight and rubble effects.
• Urban patterns—Hub and satellite, linear, network, segment, pie-slice patterns.
• Street patterns—Type of pattern.
• Street pattern effects—Blocking, funnel-fan, funnel effect.
• Structural types—Type, construction and layout of buildings.
• Mobility corridors—Air, intrasurface (buildings and rooftops), surface, and subsurface
characteristics of the urban area.
Weather: Weather effects in the urban terrain (wind, visibility, wind chill).
Civil Considerations:
• Socio-cultural factors—Religious, ethnic, cultural, political, and demographic.
• Infrastructure—Transportation, fuel, electricity, water, communications.
MAPS
4-11. Acquisition of maps at the beginning of or prior to the planning phase is critical. While not an
intelligence function, intelligence staff personnel often are the first to obtain maps simply because they are
required in order to conduct the initial intelligence preparation of the battlefield. For urban operations, maps
4-2 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

in the normal military scales of 1:250,000, 1:100,000 or even 1:50,000 are not usually adequate given the
level of detail and specifics required in urban operations. Larger scale maps are usually required.
4-12. To meet this need, NGA produces maps at scales from 1:25,000 to about 1:10,000 for specific urban
areas. Maps are normally procured through the unit supply system. The unit supply section should have the
NGA standard products catalog on compact disk (national stock number: 7644-01-478-4783). Updates to
this catalog are sent out monthly from the Defense Logistics Agency to units. In addition, Engineer
topographic teams normally have the latest digital products for the specific AO and can produce many
specialized products. Also, the NGA representative (normally at corps and regional combat command
levels) or NGA support team––deployed to support specific operations––can obtain digital map and
imagery data on compact disks for the AO specified by the customer.
4-13. Commercially available civilian or tourist maps may show greater and more current urban detail than
military maps. While street maps and tourist maps do not normally show terrain, they often provide useful
information on current street and bridge locations, street names, shapes of prominent buildings, and cultural
features. Civilian maps usually have a reference grid overlay that, if available in sufficient quantities, may
be useful as a supplemental terrain reference during urban operations. However, these maps do not come
marked with the Military Grid Reference System (also called MGRS) or Universal Transverse Mercator
(also called UTM) references. Although marked with a common reference grid, commercial maps or charts
should not be used as a reference for employing munitions. Ensure all units disseminate any approved
nonstandard reference systems to enable proper target identification and fratricide prevention.
4-14. Always check the reference system used to prepare a map or chart (for example, World Geodetic
System 1984 [also called WGS-84], Tokyo Special). Different datum can cause significant confusion and
errors.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
4-15. When planning for intelligence support to operations in the urban environment, the following must be
accomplished:
 Define priorities for information collection.
 Coordinate for movement of information collection assets.
 Coordinate for information and intelligence flow with all military intelligence units, non-
military-intelligence units, other Service components and multinational organizations.
 Establish liaison with all elements, organizations, and local nationals necessary for mission
accomplishment and force protection.
4-16. One of the major factors when planning for most operations in urban environments is the local
population and their potential effect on U.S. operations. Intelligence personnel must be cognizant of local
national perceptions of U.S. forces, their environment, and the nature of the conflict. To engage successfully
in this dynamic, U.S. forces must avoid mirror imaging, that is, imposing their own values on the threat
courses of action. Careful study of the threat country, collaboration with country experts, and through the
use of people with pertinent ethnic backgrounds in the wargaming process all contribute to avoiding mirror
imaging.
4-17. The relative interests of population groups in and around the urban environment must be identified
and a continuous process employed to immediately identify changes in the environment that may result in
changes to the population group’s relative interests. Population groups and the relationships among them
are not static. Group intentions and relationships change as conditions and other relevant relationships
change. The local population in the urban environment will usually need to be protected and sustained by
friendly forces.
4-18. The information collection plan must be as detailed as possible and must be regularly reviewed for
changes during operations in constantly changing urban environments. The finite information collection
resources available to any command must be feasibly allocated and reallocated as often as necessary in
order to keep up with the fluid urban environment. Employing these assets within their capabilities, taking
into consideration their limitations within the urban environment, is critical to ensuring that a focused
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 4-3

Chapter 4
intelligence effort is successful. The information collection plan must be synchronized with the air tasking
order, as air platforms are coordinated on the same timeline. (See FM 3-55 and ATP 2-01 for doctrine on
developing the information collection plan.)
PREPARE
4-19. During the preparation for operations, intelligence staffs and collection assets must refine their
products, collection plans, and reporting procedures. Establishing and testing the intelligence architecture
(to include joint and multinational elements) is a critical activity during this phase. Intelligence staffs must
ensure that all intelligence personnel are aware of the current situation and intelligence priorities are fully
trained on both individual and collective tasks, and are aware of any limitations within the intelligence
architecture that are relevant to them.
4-20. Additionally, intelligence staffs must ensure that targeting procedures are well-defined and executed.
In urban environments, nonlethal targeting may be more prevalent than lethal targeting and must be fully
integrated into the process.
EXECUTE
4-21. Execution of operations in urban environments requires continuous updating and refining of
intelligence priorities and information collection plan as the situation changes in order to provide the
necessary intelligence to the commander in a timely manner. (See ATP 2-01.) Timely reporting, processing,
fusion, analysis, production, and dissemination of critical intelligence often must be done within a more
compressed timeline in the fluid and complex urban environment than in other environments.
4-22. Large amounts of information are generally available for collection within the urban environment.
Procedures must be set in place to sort the information to determine which information is relevant and
which is not.
4-23. Reported information must always be carefully assessed and verified with other sources of
intelligence and information to avoid acting on single-source reporting. In stability operations, where human
intelligence is the primary source of intelligence, acting on single-source reporting is a constant pitfall.
Situations may occur, however, where the consequences of not acting on unverified, single-source
intelligence may be worse than any potential negative consequences resulting from acting on that unverified
information.
ASSESS
4-24. As previously stated, operations in the urban environment, especially stability operations, can be
extremely fluid. The intelligence staff must constantly reevaluate the TTP of U.S. forces due to the rapid
changes in the situation and the threat’s adaptation to our TTP. New threat TTP or potential changes to
threat TTP identified by intelligence analysts must be quickly provided to the commander and operations
staff so that U.S. forces TTP can be adjusted accordingly.
4-25. Intelligence staffs must continue to evaluate and update the information collection plan based on
changes in the urban environment, changes in enemy TTP, and assessments of what information collection
operations were successful in the urban environment. Continuous intelligence preparation of the battlefield
updates and constant reevaluation of the relative interests of potential threats are essential.
4-26. It is essential to regularly brief and debrief personnel who will collect and report information of
potential intelligence value. All military personnel should be clearly briefed on intelligence collection
priorities and why those collection priorities are important so that they will be alert to these items while they
are conducting their missions. They must be encouraged to report anything they determine might be unusual
and reminded of their reporting chain of command. Critical information that intelligence staffs obtain from
this reporting must be passed up the chain of command in a timely manner so that higher maintains an
awareness of the current situation.
4-4 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

4-27. Debriefing military personnel is crucial to getting information that they obtained into intelligence
channels for evaluation and analysis. It is not necessary or even possible for military intelligence personnel
to personally debrief everyone in the unit on a regular basis; however, it is important to develop a standard
debriefing format for the unit to ensure that persons conducting debriefings are thoroughly familiar with
both the intelligence requirements and the standard debriefing format.
4-28. There are multiple methods of debriefing personnel. (See ATP 2-19.4.) One method is a walk-
through of the mission from start to finish with the persons being debriefed simply being coached by the
debriefer using checkpoints along the route taken to divide the discussion into specific terrain slices. An
example debrief format, based on the format used for patrol reports, is set up for patrols that are sent out
with digital cameras that can take pictures of relevant items (route conditions, vehicles of interest, unusual
items encountered during the patrol) and then be downloaded in the S-2 section upon completion of the
patrol.
4-29. Debriefing must occur as soon as possible after the completion of a mission to ensure that the
information is obtained while it is still fresh in the Soldiers’ minds and to ensure that time-sensitive
information is reported to intelligence channels immediately.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 4-5

Appendix A
Urban Intelligence Tools and Products
OVERVIEW
A-1. The urban environment offers the analyst many challenges normally not found in other environments.
The concentration of multiple environmental factors (high rises, demographic concerns, tunnels, waterways,
and others) requires the intelligence analyst to prepare a detailed plan for collecting information within the
urban environment.
A-2. There are numerous products and tools that may be employed in assessing the urban environment.
Due to the complex nature of the urban environment, these tools and products normally will be used to
assist in providing an awareness of the current situation and situational understanding.
A-3. The tools and products listed in this appendix are only some of the tools and products that may be
used during operations in an urban environment. For purposes of this appendix items listed as tools are ones
generally assumed to be used primarily within intelligence sections for analytical purposes. Products are
generally assumed to be items developed at least in part by intelligence sections that are used primarily by
personnel outside intelligence sections.
TOOLS
A-4. Intelligence analysis is the process by which collected information is evaluated and integrated with
existing information to facilitate intelligence production (ADRP 2-0). There are numerous software
applications available to the Army that can be used as tools to do analysis as well as to create relevant
intelligence products for the urban environment. These software applications range from such programs as
Analyst Notebook and Crimelink which have link analysis, association matrix, and pattern analysis software
tools to the Urban Tactical Planner, which was developed by the Topographic Engineering Center as an
operational planning tool and is available on the Digital Topographic Support System. The focus of this
section, however, is on the types of tool that could be used in the urban environment rather than on the
software or hardware that may be used to create or manipulate them. (See ATP 2-33.4 for doctrine on
intelligence analysis.)
PATTERN ANALYSIS
A-5. Pattern analysis includes multiple map overlays and text assessing military, terrorist, or other threat
activity in an urban area. These events can be related by any of several factors to include location and time.
These events can be analyzed by plotting them on maps over time, using multiple historical overlays
(analog or digital) that can be compared to one another over time, and using a time-event wheel or other
analysis tools. (See figure A-1 on page A-2.)
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 A-1

Appendix A
Figure A-1. Example pattern analysis plot sheet
LINK ANALYSIS TOOLS

A-6. Link analysis is used to depict contacts, associations, and relationships between persons, events,
activities, and organizations. Five types of link analysis tools are––
 Link diagrams.
 Association matrices.
 Relationship matrices.
 Activities matrices.
 Time event charts.
Link Diagrams
A-7. This tool seeks to graphically depict relationships between people, events, locations, or other factors
deemed significant in any given situation. Link diagrams help analysts better understand how people and
factors are interrelated in order to determine key links. (See figure A-2.)
A-2 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

Figure A-2. Example link diagram
Association Matrices
A-8. The association matrix is used to establish the existence of an association between individuals. Figure
A-3 on page A-4 provides a one-dimensional view of the relationships and tends to focus on the immediate
AO. Analysts can use association matrices to identify those personalities and associations needing a more
in-depth analysis in order to determine the degree of relationship, contacts, or knowledge between the
individuals. The structure of the threat organization is formed as connections between personalities are
made.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 A-3

Appendix A
Figure A-3. Example association matrix
Relationship Matries
A-9. Relationship matrices are intended to depict the nature of relationships between elements of the
operational area. The elements can include members from the noncombatant population, the friendly force,
international organizations, and an adversary group. Utility infrastructure, significant buildings, media, and
activities might also be included. The nature of the relationship between two or more components includes
measures of contention, collusion, or dependency. The purpose of this tool is to demonstrate graphically
how each component of the city interacts with the others and whether these interactions promote or degrade
the likelihood of mission success. The relationships represented in the matrix can also begin to help the
analysts in deciphering how to best use the relationship to help shape the environment.
A-10. The example relationship matrix shown in figure A-4, while not complete, is intended to show how
the relationships among a representative compilation of population groups can be depicted. This example is
an extremely simple version of what might be used during an operation in which many actors and other
population elements are present. For instance, the section marked “Population” might include considerably
more population subgroups than the two included in this sample. When used during a deployment, it is
important for the analysts to realize what groups, subgroups, and other elements should be represented in
the matrix. In addition, it should be noted that the matrix could be used to depict the perceived differences
in relationships. For example, in figure A-4 political group 3 is shown to have a dependent relationship with
economic group 1. The complementary relationship (a similar mark in the corresponding box linking
political group 3 and economic group 1) is not indicated because it might not exist.
A-11. To illustrate the usefulness of the matrix, consider the relationship of the government with the
infrastructure. In this case, the relationship is friendly, perhaps because the government is in control of the
A-4 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

infrastructure without contest from the owners or suppliers of the infrastructure. For example, this could be
considered the case when Slobodan Milosevic controlled the electricity supply for Kosovo. He apparently
used the infrastructure at his disposal to supply electricity to the population, but intermittently threatened to
deny the service in order to maintain control over a possibly hostile population. How can this information
be used by the commander and his staff? Perhaps by understanding the nature of two components of the
operational environment, the link between the two elements can either be eliminated or leveraged in order
to suit the needs of the friendly unit.
A-12. Using figure A-4, there is a relationship of possible collusion that exists between the government and
political group 3, and a friendly relationship between the government and the media. Some questions the
intelligence analyst might ask when reviewing this information include—
 How can the government use the media to its advantage?
 Will the government seek to discredit political group 3 using the media?
 Will the population view the media’s reporting as credible?
 Does the population see the government as willfully using the media to suit its own ends?
Figure A-4. Example relationship matrix
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 A-5

Appendix A
Activities Matrixes
A-13. Activities matrices help analysts connect individuals (such as those in association matrices) to
organizations, events, entities, addresses, and activities—anything other than people. Information from this
matrix, combined with information from association matrices, assists analysts in linking personalities as
well. (See figure A-5.)
Figure A-5. Example activities matrix
Time Event Chart

A-14. Time event charts are chronological records of individual or group activities designed to store and
display large amounts of information in a small space. Analysts can use time event charts to help analyze,
for example, larger-scale patterns of activity and relationships. (See figure A-6.)
A-6 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

Figure A-6. Example time event chart
LISTS AND TIMELINES OF KEY DATES

A-15. In many operations, including most stability operations, key local national holidays, historic events,
and significant cultural and political events can be extremely important. Soldiers are often provided with a
list of these key dates in order to identify potential dates of increased or unusual activity. These lists,
however, rarely include a description of why these dates are significant and what can be expected to happen
on the holiday. In some cases, days of the week themselves are significant. For example, in Bosnia
weddings were often held on Fridays and celebratory fire was a common occurrence on Friday afternoons
and late into the night. Timelines—a list of significant dates along with relevant information and analysis—
seek to provide a context to operational conditions. These timelines could include descriptions of
population movements or political shifts that are relevant to the operational area. They could also include a
brief historical record of the population or area, highlighting the activities of a certain population sector. As
analytic tools, timelines might help the intelligence analyst predict how key sectors of the population might
react to given circumstances.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 A-7

Appendix A
CULTURE DESCRIPTION OR CULTURE COMPARISON CHART OR MATRIX

A-16. In order for the intelligence analyst to avoid the common mistake of assuming that only one
perspective exists, it may be helpful to clearly point out the differences between local ideology, politics,
predominant religion, acceptable standards of living, norms and mores, and U.S. norms. A culture
comparison chart can be a stand-alone tool, listing just the different characteristics of the culture in
question, or it can be comparative—assessing the host-nation population relative to known and familiar
conditions.
PERCEPTION ASSESSMENT MATRIX

A-17. Perception assessment matrices are often used by psychological operations personnel and can be a
valuable tool for intelligence analysts. Friendly force activities intended to be benign or benevolent might
have negative results if a population’s perceptions are not considered, then assessed or measured. This is
true because perceptions––more than reality––drive decision making and in turn could influence the
reactions of entire populations. The perception assessment matrix seeks to provide some measure of
effectiveness for the unit’s ability to reach an effect (for example, maintain legitimacy) during an operation.
In this sense, the matrix can also be used to directly measure the effectiveness of the unit’s civil affairs,
public affairs, and MISO efforts.
A-18. One proposed MISO campaign developed for Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti illustrates why
perception assessment is necessary. Prior to deployment, leaflets were published informing the Haitian
populace of U.S. intentions. The original leaflet was published in French, the language of the Haitian elite.
The one actually used for the MISO campaign was published in Creole, the official language of Haiti,
because an astute psychological operations team member realized the need to publish to the wider audience.
A-19. If the French flier had been dropped on Port-au-Prince, it could have undermined the American
mission to the country in several ways. The majority of the population would have been unable to read the
flier. The subsequent deployment of U.S. forces into the country, therefore, could have been perceived to be
hostile. The mission itself, which was intended in part to restore equity within the nation’s social structure,
could have backfired if the Haitians viewed the French flier as an indication of U.S. favoritism to the
Haitian elite.
A-20. Perception can work counter to operational objectives. Perceptions should therefore be assessed both
before and throughout an operation. Although it is not possible to read the minds of the local national
population, there are several means to measure its perceptions:
 Demographic analysis and cultural intelligence are key components of perception analysis.
 Understanding a population’s history can help predict expectations and reactions.
 Human intelligence can provide information on population perceptions.
 Reactions and key activities can be observed in order to decipher whether people act based on
real conditions or perceived conditions.
 Editorial and opinion pieces of relevant newspapers can be monitored for changes in tone or
opinion shifts that can steer or may be reacting to the opinions of a population group.
A-21. Perception assessment matrices aim to measure the disparities between friendly force actions and
what population groups perceive. (See figure A-7 for a sample matrix.)
A-8 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

Alternative Acceptable Possible
Possible to
23 December 2015
Cultural proposed Population’s difference Root of Proposed consequences
Condition change
norm by friendly perception in difference solution of unchanged
perception?
force perception perception
Culturally
accepted
Just offer
norms and
potatoes
Food Meat and Inadequate standards No; logistically Starvation
Rice No Seek
potatoes Inconsiderate No known restricted Rioting
exchange
physically
for rice
detrimental
effects
Military
information
TC 2-91.4
support
All men operations
Use of guns All weapons No; Soldier
carry Unfair No Culture campaign Armed backlash
confiscated safety
weapons
Weapons
turn-in
program
Figure A-7. Perception assessment matrix

Tolerable as
Government long as needs
structure Tribal Hierarchical are filled by No History No Bargain Unknown
group in
charge
A-9
Appendix A
In addition to trying to assess the perceptions of each population group within an operational
area, it might serve the interests of the unit to assess its own perceptions of its activities. All
of the following questions can begin to be addressed by the unit’s scrutinizing its view of an
operation:
 Are members of the unit exhibiting decidedly Western or American values that are not
appreciated by the host-nation population?
 Are embedded American beliefs preventing the unit from understanding the host-nation
population or its multinational partners?
 Is what the intelligence and command staff perceives really what is going on in the operational
area?
 Does the population believe what the unit believes?
 Is there something that is part of the population’s (or a subgroup’s) perception that can be
detrimental to the unit?
CIVIL AFFAIRS PRODUCTS

A-22. As mentioned previously in chapter 3, when deployed, civil affairs teams normally create an
assessment of the AO to which they are assigned. These assessments can provide intelligence personnel
with more detailed and more up-to-date information on the local situation. Civil affairs teams begin initial
assessments upon deployment to an AO and continuously update them throughout the duration of the
mission. While the information may initially be sparse, the categories of information that the civil affairs
teams are attempting to obtain clearly coincide with information that is of interest to intelligence staffs as
well. (See FM 3-57 for doctrine on civil affairs area studies and assessments. See ATP 3-57.60 for
associated techniques and formats for civil affairs products.)
PRODUCTS
A-23. When conducting operations in the urban environment, many products may be required. These
products may be used individually or combined, as the mission requires. Many of the products listed in this
appendix will be created in conjunction with multiple staff elements.
POPULATION STATUS OVERLAYS

A-24. Population status overlays are a group of products rather than a single product. These products depict
how the population of a designated area is divided based on a single characteristic such as age, religion,
ethnicity, or income. For instance, one population status overlay can show what areas of a city are Catholic,
Protestant, Muslim, Hindu, and so on. Another overlay can indicate income levels or areas of known gang
membership. There is no limit to the number of overlays that can be created to depict the population
characteristics of a chosen area. The benefits of these overlays range from determining possible lines of
contention (that can exist between groups) or identification of the population or location in greatest need of
a certain activity or asset. (See figure A-8.)
A-25. Many examples of this type of overlay are produced by the United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and are readily available on its Web site (Relief Web). Population
status overlays and descriptions resulting from assessing the demographic characteristics of the host city
population might reveal significant differences between groups which can further enhance situational
understanding.
A-26. These overlays can be useful in identifying critical areas of the urban environment based on cultural
factors such as ethnic breakdown, tribal affiliation, or religious breakdown. One common method of
constructing these overlays is to color code sections of an urban area based on the majority identifications
of that area. This, however, can be misleading in some situations; an alternative method that more
accurately reflects the information that needs to be conveyed to the commander may be necessary. An
alternative method may entail dividing the urban area into sectors (as noted in chapter 3) using the same city
divisions used by local authorities (such as the local police precincts or municipal districts). Then insert pie
A-10 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

charts for each sector showing each group and numbers or percentages. This technique can often help
clarify the situation as well as aiding in coordination efforts with the local authorities.
A-27. Population dispersal can vary significantly throughout the day. Another type of population status
overlay could indicate the location of population groups during the day, and how this changes over time.
This could assist in identifying possibly restrictive operating conditions or reveal times that are most
conducive for completion of a given mission.
Figure A-8. Population status overlay
CONGREGATION POINTS OR MASS ASSEMBLY POINTS OVERLAYS

A-28. Congregation or mass assembly points overlays depict the numbers, types, and locations of sites
where large numbers of people can be gathered for situations such as demonstrations, protection, feeding, in
the event of a disaster. These sites may be depicted on maps of an urban area. These sites include places of
religious worship, parks, schools, restaurants, squares, recreational centers, sports facilities, or
entertainment centers. If normally used for large gatherings of people, these locations can also be coded
with information on the population group that frequents them, days and hours of operation, and type of
activity that occurs.
URBAN TERRAIN OVERLAYS

A-29. Urban terrain overlays depict specific aspects of terrain unique to the urban environment. These
overlays can depict the details of a single building, a group of buildings, a section of an urban area, or even
an entire urban area. This type of overlay can also depict the different terrain zones apparent in an urban
area. Different types of terrain could be indicated using hatch marks or other indicators on a map or aerial
photograph. Zone types may be defined as close, orderly block, or dense random construction (as they are
in FM 3-06), or by any other designated characteristics required by the mission, such as zones of threat
occupation or zones divided by the types of predicted weapons effects.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 A-11

Appendix A
A-30. A building type overlay can depict particular types of buildings, such as industrial buildings,
government buildings, military buildings, residential areas, businesses, warehouses or storage buildings,
religious centers, or media locations. Each of the buildings can be numbered or otherwise identified
depending on the needs of the commander and his staff. Additionally, entire sections of a city can be
marked depending on the construction type prevalent in a particular area. For instance, an area of dense
construction or a shantytown can be identified by appropriately labeling it on an overlay or directly onto an
aerial photograph.
A-31. Shantytowns may need to be specifically highlighted because they may be areas with notable food
shortages and where disease and pollution are most prevalent. Shantytowns may lack public utility
infrastructure (for example, plumbing and electricity). Buildings are often made from miscellaneous
materials, and there is no consistent pattern of streets or corridors, complicating military operations. These
types of conditions result in a concentration of population that is generally dissatisfied and is a potential
source of unrest.
A-32. Unoccupied locations or buildings should also be identified. These locations or buildings can be used
as shelter for troops (friendly or threat) or as locations for friendly forces to demonstrate firepower if
necessary. The latter utility was demonstrated in Kosovo when a tank round was shot into an unoccupied
building in order to quell an increasingly worrisome civil disturbance. Additionally, unoccupied locations or
buildings could be logistics storage sites or meeting sites for threat forces.
A-33. An overlay depicting street widths in terms of major weapon systems can help identify which
formations or routes are most advisable for an area. A street wide enough to allow two Abrams tanks to
advance side by side enables the vehicles to better cover upper floors on opposite sides of the street, thereby
providing security for each other. Also, depicting buildings that exceed the depression or elevation
capabilities of vehicle weapons systems can identify areas of concern and potential enemy ambush
positions. Routes with such “dead spaces” may require convoys with additional or alternative weapons
systems able to eliminate this vulnerability.
A-34. Three urban terrain related products are used primarily in air operations: the roof coverage overlay,
the vertical and lateral references urban terrain feature overlay (also called UTFO), and the urban terrain
orientation graphic (also called UTOG). (See ATP 3-06.1.) In urban terrain, roof coverage is more
meaningful to aviation operations than a ground-based horizontal visibility (fields of fire) analysis. The roof
coverage overlay depicts concealment from aerial observation and directly relates to the density of
structures. (See figure A-9.)
A-35. The vertical and lateral reference urban terrain feature overlay is used to prepare aircrews for aviation
urban operations. It annotates prominent navigation features as points (vertical structures), lines (lateral
references), or areas. The altitude in feet above mean sea level and, in parentheses, height above ground
level; for example, “1,460 feet (940 feet), follows vertical features. Elevation data, both mean sea level and
above ground level, are important for mission planning. This overlay may be combined with the urban
terrain orientation graphic detailed below. The urban terrain feature overlay identifies and plots—
 Dominant vertical features.
 Significant linear features.
 Prominent, unique structures.
 Currently known deliberate hazards or helicopter countermeasures.
A-12 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

Figure A-9. Example roof cover overlay
A-36. The urban terrain orientation graphic overlay is used for aircrew orientation. A graphical depiction of
urban terrain characteristics allows a more thorough orientation than map reconnaissance alone. The urban
terrain orientation graphic is prepared by dividing the terrain into areas classified by density of structures
and building construction. Digital feature analysis data (also called DFAD) codes may be used on overlay
products to minimize clutter. This product serves as a substitute for the traditional combined obstacle
overlay for aviation operations and may be combined with the urban terrain feature overlay. (See figure A-
10 on page A-14.) The urban terrain orientation graphic provides the following urban area general
characteristics:
 Density of structures.
 Building construction.
 Street pattern.
LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS OVERLAYS

A-37. LOC overlays identify the major LOCs within and around an urban area. This includes roads,
airfields, waterways, railroads, and foot paths. More advanced versions of these overlays can be combined
with the traffic conditions overlay and long-term surveillance of LOCs to determine what LOCs are most
heavily traveled at different times of the day. Threat forces can take advantage of higher volumes of civilian
traffic to use these LOCs for their own purposes.
A-38. These overlays can provide mobility information to assist planners and operators in determining what
equipment can move along the city’s mobility corridors. Pertinent data would include street widths, their
load capacity, sharp turns, potential ambush positions, potential sniper positions, and overhanging
obstacles.
A-39. Even though aerial surveillance can detect heavy traffic and traffic jams, it cannot predict when or
why they occur or whether or not they were part of the normal traffic pattern in the urban area. Creating an
LOC overlay that depicts normal traffic conditions can help the unit determine best times to operate. It can
also provide an indicator of an unusual event.
A-40. Waterways can play a significant role in the urban terrain. Among other things, they can be obstacles
or LOCs for illicit traffic (arms smuggling, drug smuggling, black marketeering). An overlay of local water
systems can list such important items as the width and depth of the waterway, key crossing sites (depending
on the size of the waterway), and key uses of that waterway (such as commerce, water source for crops,
drinking water source for the local population).
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 A-13

Appendix A
Figure A-10. Combined urban terrain orientation graphic/urban terrain feature overlay
(simplified example)
LINE OF SIGHT OVERLAYS

A-41. Perhaps even more important in the complex urban environment than in noncomplex terrain, line-of-
sight overlays can help define avenues of approach to an objective. Just as important are reverse line-of-
sight overlays that show the friendly avenues of approach from the enemy standpoint. The enemy can be
expected to try to cover dead space from the objective area with other positions or devices such as mines or
improvised explosive devices. However, if the enemy on the objective simply wants to flee, dead spaces
may only be covered by some type of early warning system.
A-42. Line-of-sight overlays can help pinpoint potential sniper positions along each relevant avenue of
approach based on the best possible locations given line of sight, elevation, exposure, and other pertinent
considerations. These positions are important because friendly forces can position personnel at these
locations to secure them or observe from them as readily as threat forces. (See ATP 2-01.3 for line-of-sight
overlay techniques.)
KEY INFRASTRUCTURE OVERLAYS

A-43. These overlays depict the locations of key infrastructure in an urban environment. Like population
status overlays, this type of overlay is a group of products rather than a single product. These overlays can
be produced by using a map, aerial photography, or graphic design that is appropriately marked with a
numbering or a color-coded system that indicates the type of asset as well as its specific attributes.
A-44. Key infrastructure required to sustain a city can be used as a tool of warfare both in the physical and
information domains. Securing key infrastructure from destruction will often be key to gaining and
maintaining a positive perception of friendly forces by the local populace. The most important part of the
key infrastructure is the critical infrastructure. This may include electricity generation plants, hydroelectric
A-14 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

dams, pumping stations, water purification plants, sewage treatment plants, and anything that, if harmed,
can affect the living conditions of the population.
A-45. Key infrastructure overlays can be useful for identifying protected urban terrain. Protected terrain
encompasses areas that should not be destroyed, attacked, or occupied, or that have other use restrictions
based on international treaties, rules of engagement, and common sense—such as schools, hospitals, areas
with large amounts of phone and/or electrical wiring, and buildings with many stories. For example,
medical facilities may be depicted on their own key infrastructure overlay. Medical facilities are generally
no-fire areas for friendly forces and should be protected from damage or destruction so that they can
continue to take care of the local population once friendly forces have secured the urban area. Inadequate
health care for the local population can lead to both a negative perception of friendly forces and an
uncontrolled increase in disease which can affect friendly forces personnel working in the urban
environment directly.
A-46. Other types of key infrastructure overlays may depict media facilities, transportation facilities,
resource sites, culturally significant structures, dangerous facilities or subterranean infrastructure. Media
facilities include locations of transmission stations, antennas, newspaper production and distribution sites,
and television and radio stations. Transportation facilities include rail hubs, major bus connection sites,
subway lines, freeways, major thoroughfares, and intersections that are significant to the operation. A
resource sites key infrastructure overlay can depict locations where resources or supplies can be obtained,
such as building material locations, car lots, and appliance warehouses. This can include petroleum and
natural gas processing plants. Generally, these are the resources and infrastructure that are used to support
the critical resource needs of a population.
A-47. A key infrastructure overlay could highlight culturally significant structures such as places of
religious worship (for example, churches, temples, mosques), all relevant government buildings and
internationally significant buildings (for example, embassies and consulates), and other structures or areas
of notable cultural importance. A key infrastructure overlay of dangerous facilities could depict structures
with known chemical, biological, or incendiary features. These are primarily toxic industrial material sites,
such as pharmaceutical plants, oil refineries, or fertilizer plants, but can include military-related areas like
ammunition storage sites. Finally, an overlay depicting key subterranean infrastructure can include
underground railways, sewer systems, electrical wiring, or any other underground feature of significance for
the operation.
URBAN MODELS
A-48. Operations within the urban environment follow standard Army doctrine regarding the wargaming
process. Because of the level of detail, however, there is a need for a modeling tool. These tools can range
from plastic or wooden models to overhead images to sand tables. Probably the best is the combination of
overhead imagery and three-dimensional models. Figure A-11 on page A-16 is an example of the imagery
and urban models. It reflects the Shugart-Gordon Urban training site at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and includes
an aerial imagery and a three-dimensional model with a multiple perspective view. These products should
be used together.
IMAGERY
A-49. Analysis of any urban environment would be incomplete without the use of imagery. Imagery
products for the urban environment include both aerial photography and satellite imagery. In many cases,
tasked aerial reconnaissance platforms, such as unmanned aircraft systems, respond directly to the
commander, thus ensuring timely and focused data collection. Because of technical limitations or priorities
established at the higher echelons, space-based and other national collection assets may not be available to
the commander and staff. Additionally, as each collection system has its own unique capabilities, traditional
black and white or infrared imagery may offer the best view of the target in a given situation.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 A-15

Appendix A
Figure A-11. Example of imagery and urban models
A-50. A key element in future urban operations may be the real-time imagery downlink capabilities of
space-based intelligence collection platforms. Employing state-of-the-art multispectral, infrared, electro-
optical imagery, and synthetic aperture radar (also called SAR) imaging, space-based systems can provide
important information in the urban environment. Data collected from such sources is transferred in digital
format, which then can be manipulated to address specific requirements. Intelligence staffs must be fully
aware of the capabilities and limitations of these systems as well as the procedures necessary to request this
support.
A-51. Advanced geospatial intelligence products are produced using any combination of imaging platforms:
visible, infrared, radar, or spectral depending on the requestor’s needs. Due to the versatility of these
products, they have a wide range of applications in the urban environment. Presenting imagery in an oblique
perspective by combining it with digital terrain elevation data provides a perspective view. Using spectral
imagery can accomplish discovery and identification of manmade and indigenous activity from patterns of
heat distribution and determination of changes in a scene imaged at various times. Other uses include
facility analysis, structural analysis, target detection, soil analysis, and damage assessment.
A-16 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

Source Notes
Paragraph
2-17 “In Vietnam, over two-thirds of Army hospital admissions were for disease. In 1968, disease
cost U.S. forces some 943,809 man days––roughly the equivalent of an infantry division for 2
months.” Spurgeon Neel, Medical Support of the U.S. Army-Vietnam 1965-1970, (U.S. Army
Historical Series), Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.
“Medical records of one Russian Brigade in Chechnya show that 15 percent of the brigade was
down with hepatitis at one time. Dirty water was the main culprit in the transmission of
hepatitis.” Lester W. Grau and William A. Jorgensen, “Viral Hepatitis and the Russian War in
Chechnya,” Army Medical Department Journal, May–June 1997, 2–4. Available online at the
Foreign Military Studies Office Web site: http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil. Accessed
28 October 2015.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 Source Notes-1

Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions, and other
selected terms. Where Army and joint definitions are different, (Army) follows the
term. For multi-Service terms shared with the Marine Corps (Army/Marine Corps)
follows the term
SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ADP Army doctrine publication

ADRP Army doctrine reference publication
AO area of operations
AR Army regulation
ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
ATP Army techniques publication
ATTP Army tactics, techniques, and procedures
CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological,and nuclear
DA Department of the Army
FM field manual
FMFRP Fleet Marine Force reference publication
G-2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence
JP joint publication
JWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
LOC line of communications
MCRP Marine Corps reference publication
MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, and civil considerations (mission variables) (Army)
MISO military information support operations
NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGO nongovernmental organization
S-2 battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
TC training circular
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
U.S. United States
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 Glossary-1

Glossary
SECTION II – TERMS
avenue of approach
(joint) An air or ground route of an attacking force of a given size leading to its objective or to key
terrain in its path. (JP 2-01.3)
combat information
(joint) Unevaluated data, gathered by or provided directly to the tactical commander which, due to its
highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelligence
in time to satisfy the user’s tactical intelligence requirements. (JP 2-01)
enemy
A party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. (ADRP 3-0)
intelligence
(joint) 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and
interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces
or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. 2. The activities that result in the product.
3. The organizations engaged in such activities. (JP 2-0)
intelligence preparation of the battlefield
(Army) The systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil
considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations. (ATP 2-01.3/ MCRP 2-3A)
intelligence requirement
(joint) 1. Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the collection of information,
or the production of intelligence. 2. A requirement for intelligence to fill a gap in the command’s
knowledge or understanding of the operational environment or threat forces. (JP 2-0)
intelligence warfighting function
The related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding of the enemy, terrain, and civil
considerations. (ADRP 3-0)
key terrain
(joint) Any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either
combatant. (JP 2-01.3)
liaison
(joint) That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other
agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (JP 3-08)
line of communications
(joint) A route, either land, water, and/or air, that connects an operating military force with a base of
operations and along which supplies and military forces move. (JP 2-01.3)
line of sight
(Army/Marine Corps) The unobstructed path from a Soldier’s/Marine’s weapon, weapon sight,
electronic sending and receiving antennas, or piece of reconnaissance equipment from one point to
another. (ATP 2-01.3/MCRP-2-3A)
mobility corridor
(joint) Areas that are relatively free of obstacles where a force will be canalized due to terrain
restrictions allowing military forces to capitalize on the principles of mass and speed (JP 2-01.3).
Glossary-2 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

References
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.
Most joint publications are available online: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm.
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: www.apd.army.mil.
ADRP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 2 February 2015.
ATP 3-06.1. Aviation Urban Operations: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for
Aviation Urban Operations. 19 April 2013.
ATTP 3-06.11. Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain. 10 June 2011.
FM 3-06. Urban Operations. 26 October 2006.
JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 8 November 2010.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents are cited in this publication.
JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS

JP 2-0. Joint Intelligence. 22 October 2013.
JP 2-01. Joint and National Support to Military Operations. 5 January 2012.
JP 2-01.3. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 21 May 2014.
JP 3-06. Joint Urban Operations. 20 November 2013.
JP 3-08. Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. 24 June 2011.
JP 3-13. Information Operations. 27 November 2012.
JP 3-13.2. Military Information Support Operations. 21 November 2014.
JP 3-57. Civil-Military Operations. 11 September 2013.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
ADRP 2-0. Intelligence. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 16 May 2012.
ADRP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012.
ATP 2-01. Plan Requirements and Assess Collection. 19 August 2014.
ATP 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace. 10 November 2014.
ATP 2-19.4. Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Techniques. 10 February 2015.
ATP 2-33.4. Intelligence Analysis. 18 August 2014.
ATP 2-91.7. Intelligence Support to Defense Support to Civil Authorities. 29 June 2015.
ATP 3-36. Electronic Warfare Techniques. 16 December 2014.
ATP 3-53.2. Military Information in Conventional Operations. 7 August 2015.
ATP 3-57.50. Civil Affairs Civil Information Management. 6 September 2013.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 References-1

References
ATP 3-57.60. Civil Affairs Planning. 27 April 2014.

ATP 3-90.37. Countering Improvised Explosive Devices. 29 July 2014.
FM 2-0. Intelligence Operations. 15 April 2014.
FM 3-07. Stability. 2 June 2014.
FM 3-13. Inform and Influence Activities. 25 January 2013.
FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5. Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies. 13 May 2014.
FM 3-55. Information Collection. 3 May 2013.
FM 3-57 (FM 3-05.40). Civil Affairs Operations. 31 October 2011.
FM 3-90-1. Offense and Defense Volume 1. 22 March 2013.
FM 3-97.6. Mountain Operations. 28 November 2000.
FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 5 May 2014.
FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Medical Support of the U.S. Army-Vietnam 1965-1970. U.S. Army Historical Series. Spurgeon Neel.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1972.
NSG: Geospatial-Intelligence (GEOINT) Basic Doctrine Publication 1-0. National Geospatial
Intelligence Agency. September 2006. Available online at https://www.us.army.mil. Log in to
Army Knowledge Online. Then navigate to the following folder: Files> Organizations> DOD
Organizations>Army>Headquarters, Department of the Army>Chief of Staff of the
Army>Intelligence>FOUO MI Doctrine>Related references. Accessed 23 October 2015.
“Viral Hepatitis and the Russian War in Chechnya.” Lester W. Grau and William A. Jorgensen. Army
Medical Department Journal, May–June 1997, 2–4. Available online at the Foreign Military
Studies Office Web site: http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil. Accessed 28 October 2015.
WEB SITES
Army Geospatial Center. http://www.tec.army.mil. Accessed. 23 October 2015.
GEOnet Names Server. http://geonames.nga.mil/gns/html/index.html. Accessed 2 November 2015.
Intelligence Knowledge Network. https://www.ikn.army.mil/.
Accessed 29 October 2015.
National Center for Medical Intelligence. https://www.ncmi.detrick.army.mil.
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NIPRNET). https://www.nga.mil/.
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (SIPRNET). https://globe.NGA.smil.mil.
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (JWICS). globe.nga.ic.gov. Accessed 28 October 2015.
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. http://www.reliefweb.int.
RECOMMENDED READINGS
These sources contain relevant supplemental information.
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
JP 3-13.3. Operations Security. 4 January 2012.
References-2 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

References
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
ADRP 1-03. The Army Universal Task List. 2 October 2015.
ADRP 3-07. Stability. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012.
AR 195-5. Evidence Procedures. 22 February 2013.
AR 381-10. U.S. Army Intelligence Activities. 3 May 2007.
AR 525-13. Antiterrorism. 11 September 2008.
FM 2-22.3. Human Intelligence Collector Operations. 6 September 2006.
FM 3-24.2 (FM 7-98, FM 90-8). Tactics in Counterinsurgency. 21 April 2009.
CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED PUBLICATIONS

Most Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) products are available online: https://call2.army.mil.
Army & USMC TTP—Stability Operations and Support Operations (SOSO). CALL Newsletter 03-20.
July 2003.
Interpreter Ops: Multi-Service Reference Manual for Interpreter Operations.
CALL Handbook 04-07. March 2004.
Urban Combat Operations TTP. CALL Newsletter 99-16. 1 November 1999.
Small Unit Leader’s Guide to Urban Operations. CALL Newsletter 03-4. 1 May 2003.
RAND PUBLICATIONS
Most RAND studies are available online: http://www.rand.org/publications/. Search for the document
number. Accessed 27 October 2015.
Aerospace Operations in Urban Environments: Exploring New Concepts. Alan Vick, John Stillion, et
al. RAND Document No. MR-1187-AF. 2002.
The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operations. Scott Gerwehr and Russell W. Glenn. RAND
Document MR-1132-A. 2000.
The City’s Many Faces: Proceedings of the RAND Arroyo-MCWL-J8 UWG Urban Operations
Conference, April 13-14, 1999. Russell W. Glenn. RAND Document No. CF-148-A. 2000.
Heavy Matter: Urban Operations’ Density of Challenges. Russell W. Glenn.
RAND Document MR-1239-JS/A. 2000.
Marching under Darkening Skies: The American Military and the Impending Urban Operations
Threat. Russell W. Glenn. RAND Document MR-1007-A. 1998.
Mars Unmasked: The Changing Face of Urban Operations. Sean J.A. Edwards.
RAND Document MR-1173-A. 2000.
Street Smart: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for Urban Operations. Russell W. Glenn and
Jamison Joe Medby. RAND Document MR-1287-A. 2002.
FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES OFFICE

Foreign Military Studies Office publications are available online: http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil. Select
the “Search FMSO Research” link. Accessed 27 October 2015.
Air Operations in Low Intensity Conflict: The Case of Chechnya. Timothy L. Thomas. This article was
previously published in Airpower Journal, Winter, 1997.
Bashing the Laser Range Finder with a Rock. Lester W. Grau. This article was first published in
Military Review, May–June 1997.

References
The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat. Timothy L. Thomas. This article was
previously published in Parameters, Summer, 1999.
Diehard Buildings: Control Architecture—A Challenge for the Urban Warrior. Lester W. Grau and
Geoffrey Demarest. This article was previously published in Military Review, September–
October 2003.
The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security: The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya, Part 1:
Section 1. Timothy L. Thomas. This article was previously published in Journal of Slavic
Military Studies, June 1995.
The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security: The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya, Part 1:
Section 2. Timothy L. Thomas. This article was previously published in Journal of Slavic
Military Studies, June 1995.
The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security: The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya III. The
Battle for Grozny, 1–26 January 1995. Timothy L. Thomas. This article was previously
published in Journal of Slavic Military Studies, March 1997.
Changing Russian Urban Tactics: The Aftermath of the Battle for Grozny. Lester W. Grau. This article
was previously published in INSS Strategic Forum, July 1995.
Combat in Cities: The LA Riots and Operation Rio. William W. Mendel. 1996.
A “Crushing” Victory: Fuel-Air Explosives and Grozny 2000. Lester W. Grau and Timothy Smith.
This article was previously published in Marine Corps Gazette, August 2000.
A Face of Future Battle: Chechen Fighter Shamil Basayev. Raymond C. Finch, III. This article was
previously published in Military Review, June–July 1997.
Geopolitics and Urban Armed Conflict in Latin America. Geoffrey Demarest. This article was
previously published in Small Wars and Insurgencies, Spring 1995.
Grozny 2000: Urban Combat Lessons Learned. Timothy L. Thomas. This article was previously
published in Military Review, July–August 2000.
Mars and Hippocrates in Megapolis: Urban Combat and Medical Support. Lester W. Grau and
Charles J. Gbur Jr. This article was previously published in U.S. Army Medical Department
Journal, January–March 2003.
MOUT in Iraq: Population Dependent? Timothy L. Thomas. 2002.
Night Stalkers and Mean Streets: Afghan Urban Guerrillas. Ali A. Jalali and Lester W. Grau. This
article was previously published in Infantry, January–April 1999.
Russian Lessons Learned From the Battles For Grozny. Timothy L. Thomas and Lester W. Grau. This
article was previously published in Marine Corps Gazette, April 2000.
Russian-Manufactured Armored Vehicle Vulnerability in Urban Combat: The Chechnya Experience.
Lester W. Grau. This article was previously published in Red Thrust Star, January 1997.
Russian Snipers in the Mountains and Cities of Chechnya. Lester W. Grau and Charles Q. Cutshaw.
This article was previously published in Infantry, Summer 2002.
“Soft Log” and Concrete Canyons: Russian Urban Combat Logistics in Grozny. Lester W. Grau and
Timothy L. Thomas. This article was previously published in Marine Corps Gazette,
October 1999.
Urban Warfare Communications: A Contemporary Russian View. Lester W. Grau. This article was
previously published in Red Thrust Star, July 1996.
Urban Combat: Confronting the Specter. Lester W. Grau and Jacob W. Kipp. This article was
previously published in Military Review, July–August 1999.
A Weapon For All Seasons: The Old But Effective RPG-7 Promises to Haunt the Battlefields of
Tomorrow. Lester W. Grau. This article was previously published in Infantry,
May–August 1998.
Why the Russian Military Failed in Chechnya. Raymond C. Finch. Foreign Military Studies Office
Special Study 98-16. August 1998.
References-4 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

References
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons in Twenty-First Century Warfare. John B. Alexander. New York:
Saint Martin’s Press. 1999.
How They Fight: Armies of the World, volume 4-01, MOUT–Worldwide. National Ground Intelligence
Center. August 2001. Available online (SIPRNET): https://www.ngic.army.
smil.mil/products/htf/NGIC-1122-0062-01/0062.pdf. Accessed 28 October 2015.
The Savage Wars of Peace: Soldiers’ Voices 1945-1989. London: Michael Joseph. 1990.
Small Wars Manual. FMFRP 12-15. 1 April 1987. Reprint of 1940 U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars
Manual. Available online: https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil/#.
Urban Generic Information Requirements Handbook (UGIRH). Marine Corps Intelligence Activity.
2000. Available online (SIPRNET): https://intelink.sgov.gov. Accessed 28 October 2015.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
This section contains no entries.
REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate Web site:
www.apd.army.mil.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

Index
Entries are by paragraph number unless stated otherwise.
terrain products supporting, contingency support study, 3-41.

A A-35–A-37
conventional forces
activities matrix, A-13, figure A-5
B–C information requirements for,
air operations, 1-63, 3-19, A-35 table 2-1
Balkans
airspace U.S. operations in Bosnia, crime and criminal organizations,
in urban operations, 1-35, 1-76, 1-77, A-15 2-10–2-11
1-36, 1-38 U.S. operations in Kosovo, in urban populations, table 1-5
air defense artillery, 3-21–3-22 1-76, 1-77, A-11, A-33 information requirements for,
air level. See multidimensional table 2-4
Bosnia, 1-76, 1-77, A-15
battlefield. Crimelink, A-4
boundaries, 1-106, 3-58
analysis, 1-35, 1-36, 1-41, A-8 culture, 1-70–1-85
buildings
civil considerations, 1-2–1-4 comparison chart or matrix,
analysis of, 1-27, 1-28,
demographic, A-20, table A-4 A-16
table 4-1
digital feature analysis data and social structure, 1-70,
in core, 1-25
codes, A-37 1-75, 1-84
as engagement areas, 1-43
geospatial, A-50, A-52 in urban environment, 1-14,
example information
link, 2-6, A-4, A-6–A-14 1-70, 1-73, 4-3, A-16
requirements for, table 1-4,
nodal, 3-37 1-22
pattern, A-4, A-5, figure A-1 D
as infrastructure, 1-89
plot sheet, figure A-1 overlays, A-31–A-34, A-48 debriefing, 4-26–4-29
structural, 1-37, 1-39, 1-60, types of, 1-9, 1-31, 1-49, of transportation personnel,
2-25, A-52 table 1-4 3-36
terrain, 1-5–1-15 denial and deception, 2-14
terrain and society, 1-16–1-22, CBRN, 3-20
and military areas, 1-31 information requirements for,
1-88–1-92 table 2-5
weather, 1-55–1-68 information requirements,
tools, A-4–A-23 tables 2-1 and 2-2 digital terrain elevation data, 3-40
weather effects on, 1-64 Digital Topographic Support
Analyst Notebook, A-4
civil affairs, 3-23–3-27 System, A-4
ASCOPE, 1-2–1-4, 3-25, 4-3, assessment of, A-17
figure 1-1, table 4-1 products, 3-24, A-23 E–F
association matrix, A-8, figure A-3 civil considerations, 1-2–1-4, 3- electronic warfare, 2-11, 2-15,
as software tool, A-4 25, 4-3, figure 1-1, table 4-1 table 2-5
used by military police, 3-29 engagement area, 1-49–1-52
civilians, 1-73–1-87
avenues of approach, 1-33, 1-38 as aviation hazard, 2-24 in mobility corridors, 1-44
in airspace, 1-28, 1-31 engineers, 3-9–3-11
and line of sight overlays, civil information management,
3-26 and building analysis, 1-37,
A-42, A-43 table 1-4
and mobility corridors, 1-37 combined obstacle overlay, A-37 and communications
in a multidimensional communications, 1-108–1-110, infrastructure, 1-109
battlefield, 1-26, 1-27, 1-37 table 1-13. See also
and sniper placement, A-43 engineers (continued)
infrastructure. city, 1-65
aviation, 3-19 computer network attack, 2-12, national and local, 1-109
and avenues of approach, table 2-5 topographic teams, 4-12
1-31
hazards, 2-24 contingency support package, explosive ordnance disposal
operations, 1-31, 2-24 3-42.
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 Index-1

Index
Entries are by paragraph number unless indicated otherwise.
in information collection facilities. 1-118. See also subsurface, 1-42, table 1-3
planning, 3-35 medical, facilities. water, 1-40
fire hazards. 2-25 information requirements line of sight, 1-53–1-55
for, table 1-19 and vertical mobility corridors,
food distribution, 1-117, table 1-18 overlays, A-44–A-48 1-44
Forward Looking Infrared Radar petroleum, information and LOCs, table 4-1
(also called FLIR), 3-22 requirements for, table 1-15 overlay, A-42–A-43
resource and material
G–H production, 1-116 linguists, 3-37
geospatial intelligence, 3-10, information requirements link analysis tools, A-6–A-14
3-11, 3-44–3-45, A-52 for, table 1-17
subterranean, 1-121 M
gridded reference graphic, 3-43
information requirements maps, 4-11–4-14
guerrillas, 2-7. See also and topographic teams, 3-10
for, table 1-22
insurgents. city, sources of, 3-60
systems, 1-14
detection of, 3-22
transportation, 1-106–1-107 measurement and signature
information requirements for,
information requirements intelligence, table 2-5
table 2-2
for, tables 1-6–1-12
health issues, 2-17–2-22. See medical, 3-12–3-18
overlays, A-47
also medical. assessments, 3-13, 3-15–3-16
in urban environments,
facilities, 1-118
human intelligence, 4-23, A-20 table 4-1
health issues, 2-17–2-22
water and waste, 1-114–1-115
I host-nation, 1-105
information requirements
imagery, A-50, figure A-11. See for, table 1-16
table 1-19
also geospatial intelligence. insurgents, 2-7. See also infrastructure, 1-118,
briefs, 3-44 guerillas. table 1-19
electro-optical, A-51 in criminal organizations, 2-10 intelligence information, 3-13,
and geospatial intelligence, information requirements for, 3-17
A-52 table 2-4 National Center for Medical
land satellite, 3-40, 3-41 information collection, 4-6–4-8, Intelligence, 3-13, 3-14
overhead, 3-46, A-49 4-21 local population requirements
products, 3-41–3-45, 4-9, A-50 assessing, 4-25 for, 1-86, 1-89
urban models, A-51, figure and civil affairs forces, 3-27 overlays, A-46
A-11 and explosive ordnance military information support
information operations, 2-12–2-16 disposal, 3-35 operations (MISO), 3-28–3-31
information requirements for, plan, 4-6, 4-8, 4-15, 4-18 assessment of, A-17
table 2-5 and snipers, 3-6 examples, 1-99, A-18–A-19
influence activities international/intergovernmental perception assessment matrix,
target audience for, 1-94 organizations, 3-50–3-52 A-17
infrastructure, 1-102–1-105 target audience of, 1-94
in cities, 1-12
J–K–L military police, 3-32–3-34
communications, 1-108–1-110 key infrastructure overlays, A-44–
mission variables (METT-TC):
information requirements A-48
1-2–1-4, 4-2
for, table 1-13 Kosovo. See Balkans.
crisis management and civil mobility corridors, 1-44
land satellite imagery, 3-40, 3-41 example of, 1-42
defense, 1-120
information requirements law enforcement and firefighting. in multidimensional battlefield,
for, table 1-21 See infrastructure. 1-26, 1-27, 1-37
energy, 1-111–1-113 lines of communications, 1-10, multidimensional battlefield, 1-34–
information requirements 1-46–1-48, 3-36 1-43, 1-34, figure 1-4
for, table 1-14, 1-15 building characteristics, 1-61
firefighting, information criminal, 2-10
N
requirements for, table 1-20 digital, 1-53 National Center for Medical
food distribution, 1-117 and gridded reference Intelligence, 3-13, 3-14
information requirements graphics, 3-43 National Geospatial-Intelligence
for, table 1-18 and hubs, 1-18–1-19 Agency (NGA), 3-44–3-45
law enforcement and line of sight, table 4-1 products, 4-12
information requirements and multidimensional
noncombatant evacuation
for, table 1-20 battlefield, 1-35, 1-44
operation intelligence support
medical overlay, A-38–A-41
and satellite pattern, 1-20
Index-2 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

Index
handbook (also called NISH), police intelligence operations, and infrastructure effects,
3-46 3-33 1-28, 1-36, 1-43
nongovernmental organizations population, 1-86–1-91 staff weather officer, 1-69
(NGOs), 3-53–3-55 information requirements for, street patterns, tables 1-2 and 1-7
and civil information table 1-5 radial, 1-25
management, 3-26 infrastructure, 1-101–1-105 radial-ring, 1-25
and food distribution, 1-117 status overlay, 2-7, A-25–A-28, rayed, 1-22
protection of, 1-117 figure A-8
studies, 3-13
O psychological operations. See area, 3-24
military information support civil affairs, 3-23–3-24, 3-27
observation operations. contingency support, 3-41
aerial, 1-67, 3-19, A-35
Q–R medical, 3-13
air defense, 3-20
MISO, 3-27–3-31
and line of sight, 1-53 railroads, 1-12
in aviation, 1-38, 3-18 subsurface level. 1-39–1-41,
LOC overlays, A-38, A-40
in supersurface levels, 1-36 figure 1-4. See also
military aspects of terrain, multidimensional battlefield.
table 1-9
table 4-1 information requirements for,
and structures, table 1-3 reconnaissance, 3-3–3-6 table 1-15
aerial, 1-38, A-50 mobility corridors, 1-44
obstacles assets, 3-3 subterranean features,
of buildings, 1-37–1-38 considerations, 1-55
civilians as, 1-86 subterranean features, table 1-15.
and counterinsurgency, 2-7
and digital line of sight, 1-53 See also subsurface level.
and information collection, 4-7
garbage as, 1-115 by locals, 1-92 supersurface level, 1-36–1-38.
and engagement areas, 1-51 map, A-37 See also multidimensional
hubs as, 1-18 and trafficability estimates, battlefield.
and LOCs, 1-46 1-48 mobility corridors, 1-44
locating, 3-9–3-10, 3-19 and visibility, 1-66 surface level, 1-39–1-41. See also
military areas as, 1-31 unmanned aircraft systems, multidimensional battlefield.
and overlays, A-37, A-39, A-41 A-50 mobility corridors, 1-44
on streets, 1-12, 1-40
relationship matrix, A-9–A-12 obstacles. See obstacles.
reduction of, 1-66
figure A-4
overlays, 3-10 T
congregation or mass reporting. See also debriefing.
and assessment, 4-26 terrain
assembly points, A-29 canalized, 1-18
key information, 3-10, A-44, during execution, 4-21, 4-23
and preparation, 4-19 compartmented, 2-4
A-46, A-47 Digital Terrain Elevation Data,
line of communications, A-38, timely, 3-36, 3-39
3-40
A-40 resource and material production. key, 1-11, 1-45, 1-104, 3-58
line of sight, A-42–A-43 See infrastructure. in the mission variables
population status, A-25–A-28 roof coverage overlay, A-35 (METT-TC), 1-2, 3-25, 4-2
urban terrain, A-30–A-37, military aspects of, 1-104,
figure A-10 S table 4-1
scouts, 3-3–3-6 terrain (continued)
P
snipers, 3-3–3-6 overlays, A-30–A-37
paramilitary forces. See also
cover and concealment for, terrorists. See threat.
threat.
1-29, 1-50
information requirements for, threat
table 2-1 society (socio-cultural), 1-70– criminals, 2-10–2-11, table 2-4
1-100 electronic warfare, 2-15
pattern analysis, 2-7
critical nodes, 1-82, 1-103, health, 3-12–3-18
overlays, A-5
1-113 information operations, 2-12–
plot sheet, figure A-1
cultural awareness, 1-73, 2-3, 2–16, table 2-5
software, A-4
3-37 insurgents, 2-7, 2-10, 3-4,
Urban Tactical Planner, A-4
religious aspects, 1-74–1-75, 3-22, table 2-2
perception. See also military 1-83, 1-84 paramilitary, 1-80, 2-6, 4-3,
information support operations.
special operations command and table 2-1
assessment matrix, A-17–A22,
control element (also called TTP, 2-3
figure A-7
SOCCE), 3-8 time event chart, A-14, figure A-6
planning considerations, 4-6–4-18
Special Operations Forces, 3-7– topographic teams, 4-12
3-8, 3-30
23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 Index-3

Index
toxic industrial material, 1-64, medical personnel in, 3-12– urban terrain feature overlay (also
1-65, 2-20, 3-20, A-48 3-18 called UTFO), A-35–A-37,
transportation. See infrastructure. patterns, 1-17–1-22 figure A-10
topography, 1-10
U weapons effects in, 1-53, 1-54 V–Z
unmanned aircraft system, 1-54, urban functional zones, 1-24–1-31 water and waste disposal, 1-114–
3-21, A-50 1-115. See also infrastructure.
Urban Tactical Planner, A-4. See
urban areas. See also terrain. also pattern analysis. weapons of mass destruction, 2-5,
and counterterrorism, 2-9 2-22, table 2-3
urban terrain overlay, A-30–A-37
chemical personnel in, 3-20 weather, 1-63–1-69
urban terrain orientation graphic
communications in, 1-55
(also called UTOG), A-35–
functional zones, 1-24–1-31
A-37, figure A-10
Index-4 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

TC 2-91.4
23 December 2015
By order of the Secretary of the Army:
MARK A. MILLEY
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
GERALD B. O’KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
1534202
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: Not be distributed; electronic media only.
PIN: 105881-000

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What are some of the considerations for intelligence support in the urban environment?

What are some of the considerations for intelligence support in the urban environment?

What types of threats are discussed in the urban environment?

What types of threats are discussed in the urban environment?

TC 2-91.

Intelligence Support to Urban Operations

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This publication supersedes FM 2-91.4, dated 20 March 2008.

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Training Circular Headquarters

Intelligence Support to Urban Operations

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*This publication supersedes FM 2-91.4, dated 20 March 2008.

Military Information Support Operations .............................................................. 3-5

ii TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 iii

iv TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 v

CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS (ASCOPE)

23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-1

Figure 1-1. Keys to understanding the urban environment

1-2 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-3

Figure 1-2. Urban layout patterns

Hub and Satellite Patterns

1-4 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

URBAN FUNCTIONAL ZONES

23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-5

Table 1-1. Urban pattern effects

Figure 1-3. Funnel-fan effect

1-6 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

Commercial Ribbon Area

23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-7

1-8 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

Figure 1-4. The multidimensional urban battlefield

Supersurface and Airspace

23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-9

1-10 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

Creating a Mobility Corridor

23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-11

1-12 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-13

Signal Degradation in Urban Areas

1-14 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

Table 1-4. Example information requirements for individual buildings

General building information  Identify basements and cellars.

23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-15

Table 1-4. Example information requirements or individual buildings (continued)

1-16 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY

23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-17

1-18 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-19

General information  Identify the extent (if any) of anti-American

1-20 TC 2-91.4 23 December 2015

Table 1-5. Example information requirements for populations (continued)

23 December 2015 TC 2-91.4 1-21

Table 1-5. Example information requirements for populations (continued)

 Identify the religious structure.  Voting practices.