INTERPLEADER

An interpleader complaint may be filed by a lessee against

those who have conflicting claims over the rent due for the
PASRICHA VS. DON LUIS DISON REALTY INC. property leased.135 This remedy is for the lessee to protect
him or her from "double vexation in respect of one
What was, instead, clearly established by the evidence was liability."136 He or she may file the interpleader case to
petitioners’ non-payment of rentals because ostensibly they extinguish his or her obligation to pay rent, remove him or
did not know to whom payment should be made. However, her from the adverse claimants’dispute, and compel the
this did not justify their failure to pay, because if such were parties with conflicting claims to litigate among themselves.
the case, they were not without any remedy. They should
have availed of the provisions of the Civil Code of the In this case, Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case to
Philippines on the consignation of payment and of the Rules extinguish its obligation to pay rent. Its purpose in filing the
of Court on interpleader. interpleader case "was not defeated"137 when the Makati
trial court declared Lui Enterprises in default.
Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at
the disposal of a judicial authority, before whom the tender of At any rate, an adverse claimant in an interpleader case may
payment shall be proved in a proper case, and the be declared in default. Under Rule 62, Section 5 of the 1997
announcement of the consignation in other cases.57 Rules of Civil Procedure, a claimant who fails to answer
within the required period may, on motion, be declared in
In the instant case, consignation alone would have produced default. The consequence of the default is that the court may
the effect of payment of the rentals. The rationale for "render judgment barring [the defaulted claimant] from any
consignation is to avoid the performance of an obligation claim in respect to the subject matter."138 The Rules would
becoming more onerous to the debtor by reason of causes not not have allowed claimants in interpleader cases to be
imputable to him.58 Petitioners claim that they made a declared in default if it would "ironically defeat the very
written tender of payment and actually prepared vouchers for purpose of the suit."139
their monthly rentals. But that was insufficient to constitute a
valid tender of payment. Even assuming that it was valid The Regional Trial Court of Makati declared Lui Enterprises
tender, still, it would not constitute payment for want of in default when it failed to answer the complaint within the
consignation of the amount. Well-settled is the rule that required period. Lui Enterprises filed a motion to set aside
tender of payment must be accompanied by consignation in order of default without an acceptable excuse why its counsel
order that the effects of payment may be produced.59 failed to answer the complaint. It failed to prove the
excusable negligence. Thus, the Makati trial court did not err
Moreover, Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court in refusing to set aside the order of default.
provides:X....X....X......
III
Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper when
the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals should The nullification of deed in dation in payment case did not
be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the bar the filing of the interpleader case. Litis pendentia is not
right to collect).60 The remedy is afforded not to protect a present in this case.
person against double liability but to protect him against
double vexation in respect of one liability.61 Lui Enterprises allegedly filed for nullification of deed of
dation in payment with the Regional Trial Court of Davao. It
Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, sought to nullify the deed of dation in payment through
petitioners opted to refrain from making payments. which the Philippine Bank of Communications acquired title
over the leased property. Lui Enterprises argued that this
=========================================== pending nullification case barred the Regional Trial Court of
Makati from hearing the interpleader case. Since the
LUI ENTERPRISES, INC vs. ZUELLIG PHARMA interpleader case was filed subsequently to the nullification
CORPORATION
case, the interpleader case should be dismissed.
Lui Enterprises argued that Zuellig Pharma filed the Under Rule 16, Section 1, paragraph (e) of the 1997 Rules of
interpleader case to compel Lui Enterprises and the
Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the
Philippine Bank of Communications to litigate their claims. ground of litis pendentia:
Thus, "[d]eclaring the other claimant in default would
ironically defeat the very purpose of the suit."134 The The requisites of litis pendentia are:
RegionalTrial Court of Makati should not have declared Lui
Enterprises in default. (1)Identity of parties or at least such as represent the same
interest in both actions;
(2)Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs subject matters to be tested in a petition for declaratory relief
being founded on the same facts; and are exclusive, viz:

(3)The identity in the two cases should be such that the This means that the subject matter must refer to a deed, will,
judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of contract or other written instrument, or to a statute or
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. ordinance, to warrant declaratory relief. Any other matter not
144 mentioned therein is deemed excluded. This is under the
principle of expressio unius est exclussio alterius. (Emphasis
All of the requisites must be present.145 Absent one supplied.)
requisite, there is no litis pendentia.146
The foregoing holding was reiterated in Natalia Realty, Inc.
In this case, there is no litis pendentia since there is no v. Court of Appeals,45 wherein this Court stressed that court
identity of parties in the nullification of deed of dation in orders or decisions cannot be made the subject matter of a
payment case and the interpleader case. Zuellig Pharma is declaratory relief
not a party to the nullification case filed in the Davao trial
court. Then again in a recent ruling of this Court, it was
emphasized:
There is also no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for. Lui Enterprises filed the first case to nullify the deed of A petition for declaratory relief cannot properly have a court
dation in payment it executed in favor of the Philippine Bank decision as its subject matter
of Communications. Zuellig Pharma subsequently filed the
interpleader case to consign in court the rental payments and In the instant case, petitioners Erlinda Reyes and Rosemarie
extinguish its obligation as lessee. The interpleader case was Matienzo assailed via Declaratory Relief under Rule 63 of
necessary and was not instituted to harass either Lui the Rules of Court, the orders of the trial courts denying their
Enterprises or the Philippine Bank of Communications. motions to suspend proceedings. This recourse by petitioners,
unfortunately, cannot be countenanced since a court order is
Thus, the pending nullification case did not bar the filing of not one of those subjects to be examined under Rule 63.
the interpleader case.
The proper remedy that petitioner Erlinda Reyes could have
=========================================== utilized from the denial of her motion to suspend proceedings
in the Caloocan City MeTC was to file a motion for
DECLARATORY RELIEF reconsideration and, if it is denied, to file a petition for
certiorari before the RTC pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of
REYES vs.ORTIZ Court. On the other hand, petitioner Matienzo should have
filed a special civil action on certiorari also under Rule 65
Petitioners insist that this is mainly a petition for declaratory
with the Court of Appeals from the denial of her motion by
relief. Section 1, Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Court the Caloocan City RTC. The necessity of filing the petition to
provides:X.....X.....X..... the RTC in the case of Erlinda Reyes and to the Court of
Appeals in the case of Matienzo is dictated by the principle
The foregoing section can be dissected into two parts. The
of the hierarchy of courts.48
first paragraph concerns declaratory relief, which has been
defined as a special civil action by any person interested
Finally, while a petition for declaratory relief may be treated
under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument or as one for prohibition if it has far reaching implications and
whose rights are affected by a statute, ordinance, executive
raises questions that need to be resolved, there is no
order or regulation to determine any question of construction allegation of facts by petitioner tending to show that she is
or validity arising under the instrument, executive order or entitled to such a writ. The judicial policy must thus remain
regulation, or statute and for a declaration of his rights and that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it, except
duties thereunder. The second paragraph pertains to (1) an when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper
action for the reformation of an instrument; (2) an action to
courts or when exceptional and compelling circumstances
quiet title; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership in a warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the
sale with a right to repurchase.43
exercise of this Court's primary jurisdiction. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 63 enumerates the
subject matter to be inquired upon in a declaratory relief
To make matters worse, petitioner Matienzo obviously
namely, deed, will, contract or other written instrument, a availed of the instant declaratory relief to substitute for a
statute, executive order or regulation, or any government petition for certiorari, a remedy which she sadly lost by
regulation. This Court, in Lerum v. Cruz,44 declared that the inaction. From this, it can be inferred that petitioner
Matienzo’s recourse is a belated attempt designed to salvage Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have
her lost opportunity to assail the order denying her motion to become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has
suspend proceedings. no original jurisdiction.

=========================================== It is well to note that private respondents also lack the

required locus standi to mount their constitutional challenge
REPUBLIC vs. ROQUE against the implementation of the above-stated provisions of
RA 9372 since they have not shown any direct and personal
Case law states that the following are the requisites for an interest in the case.42 While it has been previously held that
action for declaratory relief: transcendental public importance dispenses with the
requirement that the petitioner has experienced or is in actual
first , the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, danger of suffering direct and personal injury,43 it must be
will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive
stressed that cases involving the constitutionality of penal
order or regulation, or ordinance; legislation belong to an altogether different genus of
constitutional litigation.44
second , the terms of said documents and the validity thereof
are doubtful and require judicial construction; To rule otherwise, would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of
locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by
third , there must have been no breach of the documents in
the general public.46
question;
As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief,
fourth , there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the
neither can it be inferred that the controversy at hand is ripe
"ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are
for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on the
adverse;
above-discussed allegations in private respondents’ petition,
fifth , the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and remain highly-speculative and merely theorized.1âwphi1 It is
well-settled that a question is ripe for adjudication when the
sixth , adequate relief is not available through other means or act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
other forms of action or proceeding.34 individual challenging it.47 This private respondents failed to
demonstrate in the case at bar.
Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court
observes that while the first,35 second,36 and Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it
third37requirements appear to exist in this case, the fourth, irrelevant to proceed with a discussion on the availability of
fifth, and sixth requirements, however, remain wanting. adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the
private respondents exists in the first place.
As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual
justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one exists All told, in view of the absence of the fourth and fifth
in this case. requisites for an action for declaratory relief, as well as the
irrelevance of the sixth requisite, private respondents’
Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing petition for declaratory relief should have been dismissed
case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial
determination, not one that is conjectural or merely ===========================================
anticipatory.38 Corollary thereto, by "ripening seeds" it is
meant, not that sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed AQUINO, vs.

with, but that a dispute may be tried at its inception before it MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN
has accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion,
We deny the petition.
and violence of a full blown battle that looms ahead.
Certiorari, not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy
A perusal of private respondents’ petition for declaratory
relief would show that they have failed to demonstrate how a. Declaratory relief no longer viable
they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain
some direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the Resolving first the procedural aspect of the case, We find
assailed provisions of RA 9372. merit in petitioner’s contention that the special writ of
certiorari, and not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy for
As held in Southern Hemisphere:
assailing EO 10

An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has

been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of the
rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions
declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of
the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with
or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an amended.
alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained before the
breach or violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical Court does not categorically require that an action to quiet
remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word
state where another relief is immediately available; and "may" – that an action for quieting of title "may be brought
supplies the need for a form of action that will set under [the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief, and a
controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x
obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court."
wrongs.4 The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that the
provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere
In the case at bar, the petition for declaratory relief became possibility, an opportunity or an option.23
unavailable by EO 10’s enforcement and implementation.
The closure and demolition of the hotel rendered futile any In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary
possible guidelines that may be issued by the trial court for Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word
carrying outthe directives in the challenged EO 10. "shall" and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive
Indubitably, the CA erred when it ruled that declaratory relief original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title
is the proper remedy given such a situation. to or possession of real property where the assessed value
does not exceed P20,000.00
===========================================
As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject
MALANA vs. TAPPA property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is
only P410.00; therefore, petitioners’ Complaint involving
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person title to and possession of the said property is within the
interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an
executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that
sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved
determination of the validity of the written instrument and or of rights arising thereunder.24 Since the purpose of an
the judicial declaration of the parties’ rights or duties action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative
thereunder.21 statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a
statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the
The RTC correctly made a distinction between the first and enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to
the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be
Court. entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute,
deed, or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that
Court, describes the general circumstances in which a person have not reached the state where another relief is
may file a petition for declaratory immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of
action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a
As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a
declaratory relief under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule
commission of wrongs.25
63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.
Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts can
Court specifically refers to (1) an action for the reformation no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words,
of an instrument (2) an action to quiet title and (3) an action
a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for
to consolidate ownership in a sale with a right to repurchase declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or
transgressed before the institution of the action.26
. These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory
relief because they also result in the adjudication of the legal In the present case, petitioners’ Complaint for quieting of title
rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to was filed after petitioners already demanded and respondents
carry the judgment into effect.22
refused to vacate the subject property. In fact, said Complaint
was filed only subsequent to the latter’s express claim of of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.51 In the case of the
ownership over the subject property before the Lupong COMELEC, this would limit the provision's coverage to the
Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners’ title. decisions, orders, or rulings issued pursuant to its authority to
be the sole judge of generally all controversies and contests
Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of
already been deprived of the possession of their property, the elective offices.52

proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana 

or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. Consequently, Rule 64, should likewise be read in the same
An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, sense—that of excluding from its coverage decisions, rulings,
filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or and orders rendered by the COMELEC in the exercise of its
from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An administrative functions. In such instances, a Rule 65 petition
accion reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object one’s for certiorari is the proper remedy.
recovery of possession over the real property as owner.
271avvphi1 We ruled in Elpidio M. Salva, et al. vs. Hon. Roberto L.
Makalintal, et al. (340 SCRA 506 (2000) that Rule 64 of the
Petitioners’ Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an Rules applies only to judgments or final orders of the
accion reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such an action would COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
depend on the value of the property involved. Given that the The rule does not apply to interlocutory orders of the
subject property herein is valued only atP410.00, then the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions or
MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an action to recover to its administrative orders. Rule 64, a procedural device for
the same. The RTC, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of the review of final orders, resolutions or decision of the
discretion in dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners’ COMELEC, does not foreclose recourse to this Court under
Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868 for lack of jurisdiction. Rule 65 from administrative orders of said Commission
issued in the exercise of its administrative function.
===========================================
As applied herein, recall that the instant petition revolves
REVIEW OF COMELEC OR COA JUDGMENT around the issue on whether or not Smartmatic JV is eligible
to participate in the bidding process for the COMELEC's
QUERUBIN VS. COMELEC procurement of 23,000 units of optical mark readers. The
case does not stem from an election controversy involving


the election, qualification, or the returns of an elective office.
Rule 64 is not applicable in assailing the COMELEC en
Rather, it pertains to the propriety of ihe polling
banc's Decision granting Smartmatic JV's protest

commission's conduct of the procurement process, and its


initial finding that Smartmatic JV is eligible to participate
petitioners claim that under Rule 64, Sec. 2 of the Rules of
therein.
Court, "[a] judgment or final order or resolution of the
Commission on Elections x x x may be brought by the 

aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under
The subject matter of Smartmatic JV's protest, therefore,
Rule 65."50 They postulate that the June 29, 2015 Decision does not qualify as one necessitating the COMELEC's
of the COMELEC en banc declaring Smartmatic JV as the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers that
eligible bidder with the lowest calculated responsive bid is a could properly be the subject of a Rule 64 petition, but is, in
"judgment" within the contemplation of the rule, and is, fact, administrative in nature. Petitioners should then have
therefore, a proper subject of a Rule 64 petition.
 sought redress via a petition for the issuance of the

 extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 to assail the
The argument fails to persuade.

COMELEC en banc's June 29, 2015 Decision granting the

 protest. As a caveat, however, the writ will only lie upon
a. Rule 64 does not cover rulings of the COMELEC in the
showing that the COMELEC acted capriciously or
exercise of its administrative powers
 whimsically, with grave abuse of discretion amounting to


lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Decision, such as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. 

Though the provision appears unambiguous and unequivocal,


the Court has consistently held that the phrase "decision,
It goes without saying that petitioners' action, having been
order, or ruling" of constitutional commissions, the
lodged through an improper petition, is susceptible to
COMELEC included, that may be brought directly to the
outright dismissal. 

Supreme Court on certiorari is not all-encompassing, and that
b. Jurisdiction of the RTC over rulings of the head of the
it only relates to those rendered in the commissions' exercise
procuring entity relating to procurement protests


 MITRA VS. COMELEC
Guilty of reiteration, the COMELEC en banc was not
resolving an election controversy when it resolved the The COMELEC’s submission in this regard – that the
protest, but was merely performing its function to procure the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is limited to corrections of
necessary election paraphernalia for the conduct of the 2016 questions of law and that the factual issues raised in the
National and Local Elections. present petition are not appropriate for a petition for review
on certiorari – is wholly erroneous. This submission appears
Section 58. Resort to Regular Courts; Certiorari. - Court to have confused the standards of the Court’s power of
action may be resorted to only after the protests contemplated review under Rule 65 and Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
in this Article shall have been completed. Cases that are filed leading the COMELEC to grossly misread the import of
in violation of the process specified in this Article shall be Mitra’s petition before the Court.
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The regional trial
court shall have jurisdiction over final decision of the head of To recall, Mitra brought his case before us via a petition for
the procuring entity. Court actions shall be governed by Rule certiorari, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64, in relation to Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
 65, of the Rules of Court. Thus, in our July 2, 2010 Decision,

 we emphasized that our review (under the Rule 65 standard
This provision is without prejudice to any law conferring on of grave abuse of discretion, and not under the Rule 45
the Supreme court the sole jurisdiction to issue temporary question of law standard) is based on a very limited ground,
restraining orders and injunctions relating to Infrastructure i.e., on the jurisdictional issue of whether the COMELEC
Projects of Government. (emphasis added) acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
Thus, under Sec. 58, the proper remedy to question the ruling jurisdiction.
of the head of the procuring entity is through a Rule 65
petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The basis for the Court’s review of COMELEC rulings under
The term "procuring entity" is defined under the RA 9184 as the standards of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is Section 7,
"any branch, department, office, agency, or instrumentality of Article IX-A of the Constitution which provides that
the government, including state universities and colleges, "[U]nless otherwise provided by [the] Constitution or by law,
government-owned and/or -controlled corporations, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
government financial institutions, and local government units brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
procuring Goods, Consulting Services and Infrastructure party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." For
Projects."64 This statutory definition makes no distinction as this reason, the Rules of Court provide for a separate rule
to whether or not the procuring entity is a constitutional (Rule 64) specifically applicable only to decisions of the
commission under Article IX of the Constitution. It is broad COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. This Rule
enough to include the COMELEC within the contemplation expressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the filing of a
of the term. Hence, under the law, grievances relating to the petition for certiorari, subject to the exception clause –
COMELEC rulings in protests over the conduct of its project "except as hereinafter provided."6
procurement should then be addressed to the RTC.


 In Ocate v. Commission on Elections,9 we further held that:

The purpose of a petition for certiorari is to determine

Additionally, even if the Court treats the protest proceeding whether the challenged tribunal has acted without or in
as part of the procuring agency's adjudicatory function, the excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
Court notes that Sec. 58 of RA 9184 would nevertheless amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.1avvphi1 Thus,
apply, and the RTC would still have jurisdiction, pursuant to any resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation
the proviso "unless otherwise provided by law" as appearing to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to
in Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution. In this case, the resolution of jurisdictional issues.
the pertinent law provides that insofar as rulings of the
COMELEC in procurement protests are concerned, said The COMELEC should likewise be aware that the
Constitution itself,10 in defining judicial power, pointedly
rulings can be challenged through a Rule 65 certiorari with
the RTC.
 states that –


Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
This provision, more than anything else, identifies the power Regarding to the second requisite, it is well-settled that a
and duty of this Court in grave abuse of discretion situations, petition for certiorari against a court which has jurisdiction
and differentiates this authority from the power of review by over a case will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is
appeal that Rule 45 of the Rules of Court defines. manifested. The burden is on the part of the petitioner to
prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of
Based on these considerations, we cannot accept the discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
COMELEC’s position that patently confuses the mode of part of the public respondent issuing the impugned order.
review in election cases under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. The
of Court, with the appellate review that Rule 45 of the same term grave abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious and
Rules provides. whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
=========================================== perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of
SALIGUMBA VS. COA passion or hostility.5

The petition has to be dismissed for the following reasons: Petitioner herself disproved the absence of the required
statements. She questioned the trial court’s appreciation of
1. Our power to review COA decisions refers to money
her arguments and defenses; the sufficiency of evidence to
matters and not to administrative cases involving the
prove encroachment; and the existence of a clear title to the
discipline of its personnel.
alleged encroached properties in Errors (I), (II), and (III).
2. Even assuming that We have jurisdiction to review Errors (IV), (V), and (VI) pertain to legal questions such as
decisions on administrative matters as mentioned above, We whether there was violation of forum-shopping; whether the
can not do so on factual issues; Our power to review is award of attorney’s fees is proper; and the validity of the
counterclaims. A petition for the writ of certiorari does not
limited to legal issues.
deal with errors of judgment. Nor does it include a mistake in
Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. the appreciation of the contending parties' respective
evidence or the evaluation of their relative weight.7 Verily,
=========================================== the errors ascribed by petitioner are not proper subjects of a
petition for certiorari.
CERTIORARI
Anent the third requisite, a writ of certiorari will not issue
TAN vs.. ANTAZO where the remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved
party. The party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of
The pivotal issue in this case is the correctness of a special Appeals is proscribed from assailing the decision or final
civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals as a order of said court via Rule 65 of the Rules of Court because
remedy against the Decision and Resolution of the Regional such recourse is proper only if the party has no plain, speedy
Trial Court. and adequate remedy in the course of law.8 Furthermore,
certiorari cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court remedy of an ordinary appeal.9
is a pleading limited to correction of errors of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of In this case, the remedy of appeal under Rule 42 of the Rules
jurisdiction. Its principal office is to keep the inferior court of Court was clearly available to petitioner. She however
within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from chose to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. It may issue only when the ===========================================
following requirements are alleged in and established by the
petition: (1) that the writ is directed against a tribunal, a CAWAD vs. ABAD,
board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) that such tribunal, board or officer has acted The petition is partly meritorious.
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) At the outset, the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed
that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate by petitioners is not the appropriate remedy to assail the
remedy in the ordinary course of law.4 validity of respondents' circulars.

Only the first requisite is here present. Petitioner correctly Thus, on the one hand, certiorari as a special civil action is
available only if: (1) it is directed against a tribunal, board, or
impleaded the trial court judge in her certiorari petition.
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the
tribunal, board, or officer acted without or in excess of Based on the foregoing, certiorari and prohibition do not lie
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to against herein respondents' issuances. It is beyond the
lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal nor province of certiorari to declare the aforesaid administrative
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary issuances illegal because petitions for certiorari seek solely to
course of law.11 correct defects in jurisdiction, and not to correct just any
error committed by a court, board, or officer exercising
On the other hand, prohibition is available only if: (1) it is judicial or quasi-judicial functions unless such court, board,
directed against a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or or officer thereby acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or
person exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial, or with such grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
ministerial; (2) the tribunal, corporation, board or person jurisdiction.19
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of It is likewise beyond the territory of a writ of prohibition
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any other plain, since generally, the purpose of the same is to keep a lower
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain
12 Based on the foregoing, this Court has consistently the administration of justice in orderly channels. It affords
reiterated that petitions for certiorari and prohibition may be relief against usurpation of jurisdiction by an inferior court,
invoked only against tribunals, corporations, boards, officers, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction, the inferior court
or persons exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial transgresses the bounds prescribed by the law, or where there
functions, and not against their exercise of legislative or is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of
quasi-legislative functions.13 law.20

Judicial functions involve the power to determine what the ===========================================

law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then
undertaking to determine these questions and adjudicate upon PROHIBITION
the rights of the parties.14 Quasi judicial functions apply to
the actions and discretion of public administrative officers or BELMONTE VS. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
bodies required to investigate facts, hold hearings, and draw OMBUDSMAN
conclusions from them as a basis for their official action, in
their exercise of discretion of a judicial nature.15 Ministerial We rule in favor of public respondent.
functions are those which an officer or tribunal performs in
The petition for prohibition filed by petitioners is
the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and
inappropriate.
without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done.16 For a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must
establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or
against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising
quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that
functions, judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal,
gives rise to some specific rights under which adverse claims
corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of
are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought
its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c)
before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with authority to
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the
remedy in the ordinary course of law.10 A cursory reading of
contending parties.17 In this case, respondents did not act in
the records of the case readily reveals the absence of the
any judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial capacity in their
second and third requisites.
issuance of the assailed joint circulars. In issuing and
implementing the subject circulars, respondents were not
First, the Court does not find that public respondent gravely
called upon to adjudicate the rights of contending parties to abused its discretion in issuing the subject Decision.
exercise, in any manner, discretion of a judicial nature. The
issuance and enforcement by the Secretaries of the DBM, the Court observes that in arriving at the assailed Decision,
CSC and DOH of the questioned joint circulars were done in public respondent carefully weighed the rights and interests
the exercise of their quasi-legislative and administrative of the parties vis-à-vis the evidence they presented to
functions. It was in the nature of subordinate legislation, substantiate the same. It ruled that Sandra submitted
promulgated by them in their exercise of delegated power. substantial evidence, such as hotel receipts, to support her
Quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative allegations that petitioners demanded and received favours
agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations from her as consideration for the processing of the macro-
within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of etching examination of the subject vehicle. Thus, that public
non-delegation of powers from the separation of the branches respondent’s ruling was unfavourable to petitioners’ interests
of the government.18 does not necessarily mean that it was issued with grave abuse
of discretion, especially so when such ruling was aptly his choice. The petitioner has not advanced any special or
corroborated by evidence submitted by the parties. important reason which would allow a direct resort to this
Court. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal
Second, petitioners filed the instant action when they clearly to this Court only on pure questions of law.
had some other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. A remedy is considered plain, speedy Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy demands
and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from that where the issuance of the extraordinary writs is also
the injurious effects of the judgment or rule, order or within the competence of the CA or the RTC, the special
resolution of the lower court or agency.12 As public action for the obtainment of such writ must be presented to
respondent pointed out, the remedy of a motion for either court. As a rule, the Court will not entertain direct
reconsideration was still available to petitioners resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate lower courts; or where exceptional and
In fact, as borne by the records, petitioners actually availed compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest
of the same when they filed their Motion for Reconsideration and with serious implications, justify the availment of the
with public respondent on July 18, 2011. extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or
mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.
Moreover, the mere fact that the Ombudsman’s decision The judicial policy must be observed to prevent an
imposing the penalty of dismissal from service is imposition on the precious time and attention of the Court.16
immediately executory, alone, does not justify the issuance of
an injunctive writ to stay the implementation thereof. Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a
judgment be rendered directing the defendant to desist from
The nature of appealable decisions of the Ombudsman was, continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be
in fact, settled in Ombudsman v. Samaniego, where it was illegal. Its proper function is to prevent the doing of an act
held that such are immediately executory pending appeal and which is about to be done. When, however, under the
may not be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance circumstances, the act sought to be restrained can no longer
of an injunctive writ. be committed, resort to such recourse is rendered futile for
prohibition is not intended to provide a remedy for acts
xxxx
already accomplished.18
Thus, petitioner Villaseñor’s filing of a motion for ===========================================
reconsideration does not stay the immediate implementation
of the Ombudsman’s order of dismissal, considering that "a MANDAMUS
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases shall be executed as a matter of course" under Section DE LIMA VS REYES
7.
The determination by the Department of Justice of the
In view of the foregoing, therefore, the Court cannot give existence of probable cause is not a quasi-judicial
credence to petitioners’ assertion that given the immediate proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of Justice
effectivity of the assailed Decision, a Writ of Prohibition and in affirming or reversing the findings of prosecutors may still
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary be subject to judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse
Injunction must be issued to stay the implementation thereof. of discretion.
As clearly held by the Court, they have no vested right which
stands to be violated by the execution of the subject decision. A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be
taken only to review the decisions, resolutions or awards by
At this point, it must be observed that the instant petition is the quasi-judicial officers, agencies or bodies, particularly
likewise dismissible for its violation of the doctrine of those specified in Section 1 of Rule 43. In the matter before
hierarchy of courts. As previously mentioned, petitioners, us, however, the Secretary of Justice was not an officer
without awaiting public respondent’s action on their Motion performing a quasi-judicial function. In reviewing the
for Reconsideration, immediately filed the instant petition findings of the OCP of Quezon City on the matter of
before this Court, instead of the appellate court, as required probable cause, the Secretary of Justice performed an
by said doctrine. essentially executive function to determine whether the crime
alleged against the respondents was committed, and whether
True, the Court, the CA and the RTC have original there was 'probable cause to believe that the respondents
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition _were guilty thereof.60
and mandamus. The concurrence of jurisdiction, however,
does not grant the party seeking any of the extraordinary A writ of prohibition, on the other hand, is directed against
writs the absolute freedom to file a petition in any court of "the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ===========================================
ministerial functions."61 The Department of Justice is not a
court of law and its officers do not perform quasi-judicial QUO WARRANTO
functions. The Secretary of Justice's review of the resolutions
of prosecutors is also not a ministerial function. DIVINAGRACIA, v s . C O N S O L I D AT E D
BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.
An act is considered ministerial if "an officer or tribunal
performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed There is in fact a more appropriate, more narrowly-tailored
manner and without regard for the exercise of his or its own and least restrictive remedy that is afforded by the law. Such
judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act remedy is that adverted to by the NTC and the Court of
done."62 In contrast, an act is considered discretionary "[i]f Appeals – the resort to quo warranto proceedings under Rule
the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him 66 of the Rules of Court.
the right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed."63 Considering that "full discretionary authority Under Section 1 of Rule 66, "an action for the usurpation of a
has been delegated to the executive branch in the public office, position or franchise may be brought in the
determination of probable cause during a preliminary name of the Republic of the Philippines against a person who
investigation,"64 the functions of the prosecutors and the usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises public
office, position or franchise."61 Even while the action is
Secretary of Justice are not ministerial.
maintained in the name of the Republic62, the Solicitor
However, even when an administrative agency does not General or a public prosecutor is obliged to commence such
perform a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial function, the action upon complaint, and upon good reason to believe that
Constitution mandates the exercise of judicial review when any case specified under Section 1 of Rule 66 can be
there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion.65 In Auto established by proof.63
Prominence Corporation v. Winterkorn:66
The special civil action of quo warranto is a prerogative writ
In ascertaining whether the Secretary of Justice committed by which the Government can call upon any person to show
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public
jurisdiction in his determination of the existence of probable franchise.64 It is settled that "[t]he determination of the right
cause, the party seeking the writ of certiorari must be able to to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy
establish that the Secretary of Justice exercised his executive such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto,
passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must the right to assert which, as a rule, belongs to the State ‘upon
be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a complaint or otherwise,’ the reason being that the abuse of a
unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in franchise is a public wrong and not a private injury."65 A
contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion is not forfeiture of a franchise will have to be declared in a direct
enough; it must amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. proceeding for the purpose brought by the State because a
Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction over franchise is granted by law and its unlawful exercise is
the case, but (he) transcended the same or acted without primarily a concern of Government.66 Quo warranto is
authority.67 specifically available as a remedy if it is thought that a
government corporation has offended against its corporate
Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of Justice charter or misused its franchise.67
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or modifying Petitioners argue that since their prayer involves the
the resolutions of prosecutors may be the subject of a petition cancellation of the provisional authority and CPCs, and not
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. the legislative franchise, then quo warranto fails as a remedy.
The argument is artificial. The authority of the franchisee to
engage in broadcast operations is derived in the legislative
mandate. To cancel the provisional authority or the CPC is, in
effect, to cancel the franchise or otherwise prevent its
exercise. By law, the NTC is incapacitated to frustrate such
mandate by unduly withholding or canceling the provisional
authority or the CPC for reasons other than the orderly
administration of the frequencies in the radio spectrum.

What should occur instead is the converse. If the courts

conclude that private respondents have violated the terms of
their franchise and thus issue the writs of quo
warranto against them, then the NTC is obliged to cancel any EXPROPRIATION
existing licenses and CPCs since these permits draw strength
from the possession of a valid franchise. If the point has not B A R A N G AY S I N D A L A N , S A N F E R N A N D O ,
already been made clear, then licenses issued by the NTC PAMPANGA, 

such as CPCs and provisional authorities are junior to the vs.

legislative franchise enacted by Congress. The licensing COURT OF APPEALS,
authority of the NTC is not on equal footing with the
franchising authority of the State through Congress. The The petition lacks merit.
issuance of licenses by the NTC implements the legislative
In general, eminent domain is defined as "the power of the
franchises established by Congress, in the same manner that
the executive branch implements the laws of Congress rather nation or a sovereign state to take, or to authorize the taking
of, private property for a public use without the owner’s
than creates its own laws. And similar to the inability of the
executive branch to prevent the implementation of laws by consent, conditioned upon payment of just
Congress, the NTC cannot, without clear and proper compensation."10 It is acknowledged as "an inherent
delegation by Congress, prevent the exercise of a legislative political right, founded on a common necessity and interest
franchise by withholding or canceling the licenses of the of appropriating the property of individual members of the
community to the great necessities of the whole
franchisee.
community."111ªvvphi1.nét
And the role of the courts, through quo
The exercise of the power of eminent domain is constrained
warranto proceedings, neatly complements the traditional
separation of powers that come to bear in our analysis. The by two constitutional provisions: (1) that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation
courts are entrusted with the adjudication of the legal status
of persons, the final arbiter of their rights and obligations under Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 9 and (2) that no
under law. person shall be deprived of his/her life, liberty, or property
without due process of law under Art. III, Sec. 1.
===========================================
However, there is no precise meaning of "public use" and the
DE CASTRO, vs.. CARLOS, term is susceptible of myriad meanings depending on diverse
situations. The limited meaning attached to "public use" is
Nature of the AGMO Position "use by the public" or "public employment," that "a duty
must devolve on the person or corporation holding property
Even assuming that petitioner’s direct resort to this Court is appropriated by right of eminent domain to furnish the public
permissible, the Petition must still be dismissed for lack of with the use intended, and that there must be a right on the
merit. part of the public, or some portion of it, or some public or
quasi-public agency on behalf of the public, to use the
"A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the property after it is condemned."12 The more generally
right of a person to use or exercise a franchise or an office accepted view sees "public use" as "public advantage,
and to oust the holder from the enjoyment, thereof, if the convenience, or benefit, and that anything which tends to
claim is not well-founded, or if his right to enjoy the enlarge the resources, increase the industrial energies, and
privilege has been forfeited."21 Where the action is filed by a promote the productive power of any considerable number of
private person, in his own name, he must prove that he is the inhabitants of a section of the state, or which leads to the
entitled to the controverted position, otherwise, respondent growth of towns and the creation of new resources for the
has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.22 employment of capital and labor, [which] contributes to the
general welfare and the prosperity of the whole
In a quo warranto proceeding, the person suing must show community."13 In this jurisdiction, "public use" is defined as
that he has a clear right to the office allegedly held "whatever is beneficially employed for the community."14
unlawfully by another. Absent a showing of that right, the
lack of qualification or eligibility of the supposed usurper is It is settled that the public nature of the prospective exercise
immaterial.41 of expropriation cannot depend on the "numerical count of
those to be served or the smallness or largeness of the
All the foregoing considered, the petition merits an outright community to be benefited."15 The number of people is not
dismissal for disregarding the hierarchy of courts and determinative of whether or not it constitutes public use,
petitioner’s lack of cause of action against respondent for provided the use is exercisable in common and is not limited
failure to sufficiently show that he has undisturbed rights to to particular individuals.16 Thus, the first essential
the position of AGMO of the MMDA. requirement for a valid exercise of eminent domain is for the
expropriator to prove that the expropriation is for a public
use. In Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, this Court explicated
that expropriation ends with an order of condemnation Subdivision owner to acquire a right-of-way for them.
declaring "that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the However, the failure of the subdivision owner to provide an
property sought to be condemned, for the public use or access road does not shift the burden to petitioner. To deprive
purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just respondents of their property instead of compelling the
compensation."17 subdivision owner to comply with his obligation under the
law is an abuse of the power of eminent domain and is
In the case at bar, petitioner harps on eminent domain as an patently illegal. Without doubt, expropriation cannot be
inherent power of sovereignty similar to police power and justified on the basis of an unlawful purpose.
taxation. As a basic political unit, its Sangguniang Barangay
is clothed with the authority to provide barangay roads and Thirdly, public funds can be used only for a public purpose.
other facilities for public use and welfare In this proposed condemnation, government funds would be
employed for the benefit of a private individual without any
Petitioner’s delegated power to expropriate is not at issue. legal mooring. In criminal law, this would constitute
The legal question in this petition, however, is whether the malversation.
taking of the land was for a public purpose or use. In the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, it is basic that the Lastly, the facts tend to show that the petitioner’s proper
taking of private property must be for a public purpose. A remedy is to require the Davsan II Subdivision owner to file
corollary issue is whether private property can be taken by a complaint for establishment of the easement of right-of-
law from one person and given to another in the guise of way under Articles 649 to 656 of the Civil Code.
public purpose. Respondents must be granted the opportunity to show that
their lot is not a servient estate. Plainly, petitioner’s resort to
the factual milieu of the case reveals that the intended use of expropriation is an improper cause of action.
respondents’ lot is confined solely to the Davsan II
Subdivision residents and is not exercisable in common. One last word: the power of eminent domain can only be
27Worse, the expropriation will actually benefit the exercised for public use and with just compensation. Taking
subdivision’s owner who will be able to circumvent his an individual’s private property is a deprivation which can
commitment to provide road access to the subdivision in only be justified by a higher good—which is public use—and
conjunction with his development permit and license to sell can only be counterbalanced by just compensation. Without
from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, and also these safeguards, the taking of property would not only be
be relieved of spending his own funds for a right-of-way. In unlawful, immoral, and null and void, but would also
this factual setting, the Davsan II Subdivision homeowners constitute a gross and condemnable transgression of an
are able to go to the barrio road by passing through the lot of individual’s basic right to property as well.
a certain Torres family. Thus, the inescapable conclusion is
that the expropriation of respondents’ lot is for the actual For this reason, courts should be more vigilant in protecting
benefit of the Davsan II Subdivision owner, with incidental the rights of the property owner and must perform a more
benefit to the subdivision homeowners. thorough and diligent scrutiny of the alleged public purpose
behind the expropriation. Extreme caution is called for in
The intended expropriation of private property for the benefit resolving complaints for condemnation, such that when a
of a private individual is clearly proscribed by the serious doubt arises regarding the supposed public use of
Constitution, declaring that it should be for public use or property, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the
purpose. property owner and against the State.

. WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the May 30, 2001 Decision and

the October 26, 2001 Resolution of the CA, with costs
Secondly, a compelling reason for the rejection of the against petitioner.
expropriation is expressed in Section 29, PD 957, which
provides: SO ORDERED.

Sec. 29. Right of Way to Public Road.—The owner or

developer of a subdivision without access to any existing
public road or street must secure a right of way to a public
road or street and such right of way must be developed and
maintained according to the requirement of the government
authorities concerned.

Considering that the residents who need a feeder road are all
subdivision lot owners, it is the obligation of the Davsan II
ANUNCIACION VDA. DE OUANO
 predominantly for that citizen’s own private gain, is offensive
vs.
 to our laws.42
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to
The Court’s Ruling the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing
which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said
taking of private property, consequent to the Governments property to its private owner, if the latter so desires. The
exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to government cannot plausibly keep the property it
the condition that the property be devoted to the specific expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process,
public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this dishonor the judgment of expropriation. This is not in
particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all keeping with the idea of fair play,
pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former
owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the The notion, therefore, that the government, via expropriation
property, subject to the return of the amount of just proceedings, acquires unrestricted ownership over or a fee
compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the simple title to the covered land, is no longer tenable. We
power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of suggested as much in Heirs of Moreno and inTudtud and
the required factual justification.39(Emphasis supplied.) more recently in Lozada, Sr. Expropriated lands should be
differentiated from a piece of land, ownership of which was
Clinging to Fery, specifically the fee simple concept absolutely transferred by way of an unconditional purchase
underpinning it, is no longer compelling, considering the and sale contract freely entered by two parties, one without
ensuing inequity such application entails. Too, the Court obligation to buy and the other without the duty to sell. In
resolved Fery not under the cover of any of the Philippine that case, the fee simple concept really comes into play.
Constitutions, each decreeing that private property shall not There is really no occasion to apply the "fee simple concept"
be taken for public use without just compensation. The twin if the transfer is conditional. The taking of a private land in
elements of just compensation and public purpose are, by expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on its
themselves, direct limitations to the exercise of eminent continued devotion to its public purpose. As a necessary
domain, arguing, in a way, against the notion of fee simple corollary, once the purpose is terminated or peremptorily
title.1avvphi1 The fee does not vest until payment of just abandoned, then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek
compensation.40 its reversion, subject of course to the return, at the very least,
of the just compensation received.
In esse, expropriation is forced private property taking, the
landowner being really without a ghost of a chance to defeat To be compelled to renounce dominion over a piece of land
the case of the expropriating agency. In other words, in is, in itself, an already bitter pill to swallow for the owner.
expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property But to be asked to sacrifice for the common good and yield
against his will. Withal, the mandatory requirement of due ownership to the government which reneges on its assurance
process ought to be strictly followed, such that the state must that the private property shall be for a public purpose may be
show, at the minimum, a genuine need, an exacting public too much. But it would be worse if the power of eminent
purpose to take private property, the purpose to be domain were deliberately used as a subterfuge to benefit
specifically alleged or least reasonably deducible from the another with influence and power in the political process,
complaint. including development firms. The mischief thus depicted is
not at all far-fetched with the continued application of Fery.
Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired Even as the Court deliberates on these consolidated cases,
an expansive meaning to include any use that is of there is an uncontroverted allegation that the MCIAA is
"usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of poised to sell, if it has not yet sold, the areas in question to
general benefit [of the public]."41 If the genuine public Cebu Property Ventures, Inc. This provides an added
necessity—the very reason or condition as it were— dimension to abandon Fery.
allowing, at the first instance, the expropriation of a private
land ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent point Given the foregoing disquisitions, equity and justice demand
for the government’s retention of the expropriated land. The the reconveyance by MCIAA of the litigated lands in
same legal situation should hold if the government devotes question to the Ouanos and Inocians. In the same token,
the property to another public use very much different from justice and fair play also dictate that the Ouanos and Inocian
the original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit return to MCIAA what they received as just compensation
another private person. It has been said that the direct use by for the expropriation of their respective properties plus legal
the state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their interest to be computed from default, which in this case
productive possession to another citizen, who will use it should run from the time MCIAA complies with the
reconveyance obligation.43 They must likewise pay MCIAA
the necessary expenses it might have incurred in sustaining pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private
their respective lots and the monetary value of its services in property.
managing the lots in question to the extent that they, as
private owners, were benefited thereby. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use,
purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
=========================================== landless.

BELUSO vs. THE MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under
Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent
We find the petition to be impressed with merit. laws.

Eminent domain, which is the power of a sovereign state to 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
appropriate private property to particular uses to promote owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said
public welfare, is essentially lodged in the offer was not accepted. 30
legislature. 21 While such power may be validly delegated to
local government units (LGUs), other public entities and The Court in no uncertain terms have pronounced that a local
public utilities the exercise of such power by the delegated government unit cannot authorize an expropriation of private
entities is not absolute. 22 In fact, the scope of delegated property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking
legislative power is narrower than that of the delegating body. 31 R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local
authority and such entities may exercise the power to Government Code expressly requires an ordinance for the
expropriate private property only when authorized by purpose and a resolution that merely expresses the sentiment
Congress and subject to its control and restraints imposed of the municipal council will not suffice. 32
through the law conferring the power or in other
legislations. 23 Indeed, LGUs by themselves have no A resolution will not suffice for an LGU to be able to
inherent power of eminent domain. 24 Thus, strictly expropriate private property; and the reason for this is settled:
speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU
is in reality not eminent but "inferior" since it must conform x x x A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An
to the limits imposed by the delegation and thus partakes ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of
only of a share in eminent domain. 25 The national the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific
legislature is still the principal of the LGUs and the latter matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent
cannot go against the principal’s will or modify the same. 26 character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading
The exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless
involves a derogation of a fundamental right. 27 It greatly decided otherwise by a majority of all
affects a landowner’s right to private property which is a the Sanggunian members.
constitutionally protected right necessary for the preservation
and enhancement of personal dignity and is intimately If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent
connected with the rights to life and liberty. 28Thus, whether domain through a mere resolution, it would have simply
such power is exercised directly by the State or by its adopted the language of the previous Local Government
authorized agents, the exercise of such power must undergo Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the
painstaking scrutiny. 29 previous Local Government Code, Sec. 19 of R.A. [No.]
7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act
Indeed, despite the existence of legislative grant in favor of pursuant to an ordinance. x x x 33
local governments, it is still the duty of the courts to
determine whether the power of eminent domain is being As respondent’s expropriation in this case was based merely
exercised in accordance with the delegating law. on a resolution, such expropriation is clearly defective. While
the Court is aware of the constitutional policy promoting
Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which delegates to LGUs the local autonomy, the court cannot grant judicial sanction to an
power of eminent domain expressly provides: XXX LGU’s exercise of its delegated power of eminent domain in
contravention of the very law giving it such power. 34
It is clear therefore that several requisites must concur before
an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain, to wit:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council

authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local
government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or
REPUBLIC vs. C.C.UNSON COMPANY compensation, Section 5 of RA 8974 enumerating the
standards for assessing the value of expropriated land taken
The petition is without merit. for national government infrastructure projects. What escapes
petitioner, however, is that the courts are not bound to
Determination of just compensation
 consider these standards; the exact wording of the said
is a judicial function provision is that "in order to facilitate the determination of
just compensation, the courts may consider" them. The use of
In Republic v. Asia Pacific Integrated Steel Corporation,
the word "may" in the provision is construed as permissive
38 the Court defined just compensation "as the full and fair and operating to confer discretion. In the absence of a finding
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
of abuse, the exercise of such discretion may not be
expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the interfered with. For this case, the Court finds no such abuse
owner’s loss. The word ‘just’ is used to intensify the meaning
of discretion.44
of the word ‘compensation’ and to convey thereby the idea
that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken As a general rule, just compensation, to which the owner of
shall be real, substantial, full, and ample. Such ‘just’-ness of the property to be expropriated is entitled, is equivalent to the
the compensation can only be attained by using reliable and market value. The general rule, however, is modified where
actual data as bases in fixing the value of the condemned only a part of a certain property is expropriated. In such a
property. Trial courts are required to be more circumspect in case, the owner is not restricted to compensation for the
its evaluation of just compensation due the property owner, portion actually taken, he is also entitled to recover the
considering that eminent domain cases involve the consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the
expenditure of public funds."39 property."47

Section 6 of Rule 67 speaks of consequential damages. It

specifically provides:
This Court, however, is not a trier of facts; and petitions
brought under Rule 45 may only raise questions of law. Section 6. Proceedings by commissioners. — Before entering
1âwphi1This rule applies in expropriation cases as well. upon the performance of their duties, the commissioners shall
In Republic v. Spouses Bautista,43 the Court explained the take and subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform
reason therefor: their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in
court with the other proceedings in the case. Evidence may
This Court is not a trier of facts. Questions of fact may not be
be introduced by either party before the commissioners who
raised in a petition brought under Rule 45, as such petition are authorized to administer oaths on hearings before them,
may only raise questions of law. This rule applies in
and the commissioners shall, unless the parties consent to the
expropriation cases. Moreover, factual findings of the trial contrary, after due notice to the parties, to attend, view and
court, when affirmed by the CA, are generally binding on this examine the property sought to be expropriated and its
Court. An evaluation of the case and the issues presented surroundings, and may measure the same, after which either
leads the Court to the conclusion that it is unnecessary to party may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The
deviate from the findings of fact of the trial and appellate
commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the
courts. property not taken and deduct from such consequential
damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the
Under Section 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the trial
owner from the public use or purpose of the property taken,
court sitting as an expropriation court may, after hearing,
the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the
accept the commissioners’ report and render judgment in
carrying on of the business of the corporation or person
accordance therewith. This is what the trial court did in this
taking the property. But in no case shall the consequential
case. The CA affirmed the trial court’s pronouncement in
benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed,
toto. Given these facts, the trial court and the CA’s identical
or the owner be deprived of the actual value of his property
findings of fact concerning the issue of just compensation
so taken.
should be accorded the greatest respect, and are binding on
the Court absent proof that they committed error in Also in Republic v. BPI,48 the Court categorically stated that
establishing the facts and in drawing conclusions from them.
if as a result of the expropriation made by the petitioner, the
There being no showing that the trial court and the CA remaining portion of the property of the owner suffers from
committed any error, we thus accord due respect to their impairment or decrease in value, consequential damages
findings. were to be awarded.
The only legal question raised by the petitioner relates to the .
commissioners’ and the trial court’s alleged failure to take
into consideration, in arriving at the amount of just
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the There is no showing that the owner was denied payment of
D E PA R T M E N T O F P U B L I C W O R K S A N D the amount deposited by the Department of Public Works and
HIGHWAYS,Petitioners, vs. ARLENE R. SORIANO Highways in accordance with Republic Act No. 8974.
Furthermore, there is no complaint by the landowner of any
I concur in the result. delay in payment.1âwphi1 The property was subject to a writ
of possession dated March 27, 2011.
Republic Act No. 8974, Section 4 provides in part:
Should there be any delay, I am of the view that the value of
SEC. 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings. - the property should be at the time of the taking, but the actual
Whenever it is necessary to acquire real property for the price paid should be computed using the formula for present
right-of-way, site or location for any national government value as of the time of payment.4
infrastructure project through expropriation, the appropriate
implementing agency shall initiate the expropriation In other words, we compute for replacement value. Monetary
proceedings before the proper court under the following interest or compensatory interest will not be relevant.
guidelines:
Finally, I agree that documentary stamp taxes are not
a. Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to necessarily for the account of the seller. This is especially so
the defendant, the implementing agency shall immediately in expropriation cases where the sale is coerced and the
pay the owner of the. property the amount equivalent to the owner is unwilling. I, however, doubt whether the "Citizen's
sum of (I) one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the Charter" of the Department of Public Works and Highways,
property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the published in its website, should have the effect of a
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the regulation. At best, it is evidence that can lead to a finding of
improvements and/or structures as determined under Section estoppel if all the elements of that equitable defense are
7 hereof; alleged and proven by the proper party.

Upon compliance with the guidelines abovementioned, the ===========================================

court shall immediately issue to the implementing agency an
order to take possession of the property and start the JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
implementation of the project. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied) ROSALES vs. SUBA

Clearly, the state through the agency causing the taking Clearly, as a general rule, there is no right of redemption in a
complies with the requirements for the issuance of a writ of judicial foreclosure of mortgage. The only exemption is
possession only when it pays the owner. when the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank or a
bank or a banking institution. Since the mortgagee in this
Of course, the owner may contest the proffered value by the case is not one of those mentioned, no right of redemption
agency1 or the power of the agency to exercise eminent exists in favor of petitioners. They merely have an equity of
domain, the necessity of the taking, or the public character of redemption, which, to reiterate, is simply their right, as
the use for which the property is being condemned. In such mortgagor, to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership
cases, the value required by Section 4(a) will be deposited of the property by paying the secured debt prior to the
with the trial court with jurisdiction over the case. confirmation of the foreclosure sale. However, instead of
exercising this equity of redemption, petitioners chose to
This case does not present these issues, and I am of the view delay the proceedings by filing several manifestations with
that the pronouncements should be limited only to cases the trial court. Thus, they only have themselves to blame for
where there are no objections to the taking of the property. the consequent loss of their property.

Legal interest, whether in the form of monetary interest (for ===========================================

forbearance) or compensatory interest (for damages) also
does not apply in this case. In Sun Life of Canada JUDICIAL PARTITION
(Philippines), Inc. v. Sandra Tan Kit,2 the two (2) kinds of
interest rates were distinguished.3 Monetary interest rate is ORIBELLO, v. COURT OF APPEALS
determined by parties that enter into a contract of loan, or
any other contract involving the use or forbearance of money. The respondent did not discharge her burden of proof as the
Thus, monetary interest represents the cost of letting another plaintiff to show that she was entitled to the partition
person use or borrow money. On the other hand,
compensatory interest rates are determined by courts as a 

penalty or indemnity for damages in monetary judgments. It is our studied conclusion that the RTC correctly ruled
against the right of respondent Remedios Oribello to demand
the partition of the real property belonging to the late Tomas judgment which needs no further proceedings. Thus, it has
Oribello on the ground that she had not substantiated her been held that execution was entirely proper to enforce the
right to the partition by preponderance of evidence.
 defendant's obligation to render an accounting and to exact

 payment of the money value of the plaintiffs' shares in the
Before going further, it is relevant to relive the nature of the personal property and attorney's fees due defendants, as well
remedy of judicial partition. The proceeding under Rule 69 of as the costs of the suit and damages. In this case, the CA has
the Rules of Court is a judicial controversy between persons declared that Remedios Oribello, being the adopted daughter
who, being co-owners or coparceners of common property, of the late Toribio Oribello, was entitled to the judicial
seek to secure a division or partition thereof among partition she hereby demanded by virtue of the decree of
themselves, giving to each one of them the part adoption of the CFI. Hence, it has remanded the case to the
corresponding to him.18 The object of partition is to enable RTC for the second stage of the partition proceedings.

those who own property as joint tenants, or coparceners, or 

tenants in common to put an end to the joint tenancy so as to
vest in each a sole estate in specific property or an allotment
in the lands or tenements.19 

This case is an action for judicial partition. As stated by the
As Justice Regalado discussed in De Mesa v. Court of Supreme Court in the case of Municipality of Biñan v.
Appeals:21 Garcia, December 22, 1989, a judicial partition has two
phases. The first phase is an inquiry as to whether there exists
The first stage of an action for judicial partition and/or co-ownership of properties by several persons. The second
accounting is concerned with the determination of whether or phase is on the actual partition and accounting, if applicable.

not a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper, 

that is, it is not otherwise legally proscribed and may be This Court finds that no-co-ownership exists between
made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in plaintiff and defendant. Hence, we cannot proceed to the
the property. This phase may end in a declaration that second phase.The foregoing findings by the RTC, that
plaintiff is not entitled to the desired partition either because the Tomas Orivillo who had legally adopted Remedios
a co-ownership does not exist or a partition is legally Oribello under the CFI's decree of adoption was not the same
prohibited. It may also end, on the other hand, with an person as the Tomas Oribello whose property was the subject
adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, that of her demand for judicial partition, were supported by the
partition is proper in the premises, and that an accounting of records. In finding so, the RTC did not interfere with the
rents and profits received by the defendant from the real jurisdiction of the CFI as a court of equal rank and category,
estate in question is in order. In the latter case, "the parties and did not negate the adoption decree, but simply
may, if they are able to agree, make partition among determined whether or not the claim of Remedios Oribello to
themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the the partition of the property of Tomas Oribello was
court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the competently substantiated by preponderance of evidence.
parties." In either case, whether the action is dismissed or What the RTC thereby settled was only whether Remedios
partition and/or accounting is decreed, the order is a final one Oribello was a co-owner of the property with Berlinda
and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.
 Oribello, the widow of Tomas Oribello. The RTC, being the

 trial court with jurisdiction over the action for partition,
The second stage commences when the parties are unable to undeniably possessed the fullest authority to hear and settle
agree upon the partition ordered by the court. In that event, the conflicting claims of the parties.

partition shall be effected for the parties by the court with the ===========================================
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This
second phase may also deal with the rendition of the
accounting itself and its approval by the Court after the
parties have been accorded the opportunity to be heard
thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties
thereto entitled of their just shares in the rents and profits of
the real estate in question. Such an order is, to be sure, also
final and appealable.



In the decision ordering partition, the execution of that part
of the judgment which will not necessitate any further
proceedings may be enforced. Further proceedings, such as
the appointment of commissioners to carry out the partition
and the rendition and approval of the accounting, may be had
without prejudice to the execution of that part of the
FEUD Petitioner questions the preference given by the Regional
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals to the unlawful detainer
PANGANIBAN, vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM case filed by private respondent. Petitioner maintains that
CORPORATION based on priority in time, the action for declaratory relief, the
case filed earlier, should not have been abated in favor of the
The Ruling of the Court ejectment suit, a case filed much later.

We find no merit in the petition. Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action
refers to that situation wherein another action is pending
The Court of Appeals correctly between the same parties for the same cause of actions and
applied Rosales[11] and University Physicians Services, Inc.
that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious.
[12] in sustaining the dismissal of the action for declaratory [22] We have set the relevant factors that a court must
relief to give way to the ejectment suit.
consider when it has to determine which case should be
dismissed given the pendency of two actions. These are:
At any rate, while the said case before the Court of First
Instance of Cavite appears to be one for specific performance (1) the date of filing, with preference generally given to the
with damages, it cannot be denied that the real issue between first action filed to be retained;
the parties is whether or not the lessee should be allowed to
continue occupying the land as lessee. (2) whether the action sought to be dismissed was filed
merely to preempt the latter action or to anticipate its filing
The situation is not novel to Us. and lay the basis for its dismissal; and
It has been settled in a number of cases that the right of a
(3) whether the action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating
lessee to occupy the land leased as against the demand of the the issues between the parties.[23]
lessor should be decided under Rule 70 (formerly 72) of the
Rules of Court. The mere fact that the action for declaratory relief was filed
earlier than the case for unlawful detainer does not
There is no merit to the contention that the lessees supposed necessarily mean that the first case will be given preference.
right to a renewal of the lease contract can not be decided in
the ejectment suit. In the case of Teodoro v. Mirasol, supra, An action for unlawful detainer is filed by a person from
this Court held that if the plaintiff has any right to the whom possession of any land or building is unlawfully
extension of the lease at all, such right is a proper and withheld by another after the expiration or termination of the
legitimate issue that could be raised in the unlawful detainer latters right to hold possession under a contract, express or
case because it may be used as a defense to the action. In implied.[25] Clearly, the interpretation of a provision in the
other words, the matter raised in the Court of First instance SLDA as to when the SLDA would expire is the key issue
of Cavite may be threshed out in the ejectment suit, in that would determine petitioners right to possess the gasoline
consonance with the principle prohibiting multiplicity of service station. When the primary issue to be resolved is
suits. And the mere fact that the unlawful detainer case was physical possession, the issue should be threshed out in the
filed later, would not change the situation to depart from the ejectment suit, and not in any other case such as an action for
application of the foregoing rule. declaratory relief to avoid multiplicity of suits.

It is to be noted that the Rules do not require as a ground for .

dismissal of a complaint that there is a prior pending
action. They provide that there is pending action, not a Petitioner erroneously believes that the unlawful detainer
pending prior action. The fact that the unlawful detainer suit case should have been dismissed because private respondent
was of a later date is no bar to the dismissal of the present was already guilty of laches when it filed the ejectment suit
action. (Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol, supra.) 269 days from July 31, 1995, the date private respondent
claims the SLDA expired. A complaint for unlawful detainer
The requirement that a motion to dismiss should be filed should be filed within one year after such unlawful
within the time for filing the answer is not absolute. Even deprivation or withholding of possession occurs.[28] When
after an answer has been filed, a defendant can still file a the action is to terminate the lease because of the expiration
motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) lack of of its term, it is upon the expiration of the term of the lease
jurisdiction, (2) litis pendentia (3) lack of cause of action, that the lessee is already considered to be unlawfully
and (4) discovery during trial of evidence that would withholding the property.[29] The expiration of the term of
constitute a ground for dismissal.[19] Litis pendentia is also the lease immediately gives rise to a cause of action for
one of the grounds that authorize a court to dismiss a unlawful detainer.[30] In such a case, a demand to vacate is
case motu proprio.[20] no longer necessary.[31] Private respondent therefore had
one year or 365 days from July 31, 1995 to file the case for LABASTIDA and C O N S TA N C I A
unlawful detainer. Laches definitely had not yet set in when LABASTIDA, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
private respondent filed the unlawful detainer case 269 days
after the expiration of the SLDA. Private respondent did not First. Although entitled For Recovery of Possession,
sleep on its right when it filed the unlawful detainer case well Damages, with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, it is
within the prescriptive period for filing the action. evident from the allegations of the complaint filed by private
respondents that the case was actually for unlawful detainer.
Petitioner implores us to reconsider the application
of Rosales[32] and University Physicians Services, Inc. Rule 70, 1 provides:
[33] to this case because this will, in the words of petitioner,
open a floodgate of abuses.[34] Petitioner claims that this can SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. -
happen where an earlier case filed by the lessee is already Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a
submitted for resolution and the lessor belatedly files an person deprived of the possession of any land or building by
ejectment suit to create a cause to dismiss the earlier case force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a landlord,
based on litis pendentia. vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession
of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
Petitioners contention is unfounded. expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by
virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
The action for declaratory relief was not yet submitted for representatives or assigns of any such landlord, vendor,
resolution when private respondent filed the action for vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year
unlawful detainer. There is also no proof that private after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession,
respondent filed the ejectment suit in anticipation of the early bring an action in the proper inferior court against the person
resolution of the action for declaratory relief. Private or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
respondent was not out to frustrate the impending resolution possession, or any person or persons claiming under them,
of the action for declaratory relief when it filed the ejectment for the restitution of such possession, together with damages
suit. In fact, the unlawful detainer case was already decided and costs. The complaint must be verified.
upon by the Metropolitan Trial Court even before the
Regional Trial Court dismissed the action for declaratory The provisions of this rule shall not apply to cases covered
relief. It appears that it is petitioner who wants to avoid the by the Agricultural Tenancy Act.
adverse ruling in the unlawful detainer case by insisting that
the action for declaratory relief be given preference even In their complaint, private respondents alleged that they were
after the ejectment suit was already decided. The abuse the registered owners of the lot subject of the case and thus
feared by petitioner does not apply in this case and yet, entitled to possession thereof; that petitioners were their
petitioner urges us to reevaluate the applicability of a lessees, paying rent on a month-to-month basis; and that
doctrine based on a feared hypothetical abuse. This, we despite repeated demands to vacate the land made by private
cannot do. We can only rule upon actual controversies, not on respondents, petitioners refused to leave the premises. This
scenarios that a party merely conjures to suit her interest. amounts to an allegation that petitioners were unlawfully
withholding possession of the land. A lease on a month-to-
month basis is deemed to expire at the end of the month upon
notice to vacate addressed by the lessor to the lessee.[7] The
refusal of the lessee to leave the premises gives rise to an
action for unlawful detainer.

Private respondents action is not for recovery of

possession. It is not for a determination which party has a
better right of possession. Both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals correctly found the action to be for ejectment.

Second. As the action below was for unlawful detainer, the

question is whether it was brought within one year after the
unlawful withholding of possession[8] so as to sustain
petitioners contention that the action should have been filed
before the Municipal Trial Court rather than in the Regional
Trial Court.

The Regional Trial Court would have jurisdiction if the

deprivation of possession had been committed through other
means than those enumerated in Rule 70, or if the period of action is due to the lessees failure to pay rent or to comply
dispossession under Rule 70 has lasted for more than a year. with the conditions of the lease.[13]

Clearly, the case was filed within one year from February ===========================================
20, 1983, the date of the last demand to vacate addressed to
petitioners. CO TIAMCO, petitioner, vs. POMPEYO DIAZ

Private respondents do not deny this. What they assert, We believe, and so hold, that the order of dismissal is
however, is that the one-year period should be reckoned from erroneous on the following grounds: (1) It relies on a wrong
the time oral demand was made by them on petitioners in construction of the Rules of Court; (2) it is unwarranted
1979.This is error. As we have already stated, where there are under the circumstances of the case; and (3) the complaint
several demands made, the period of unlawful withholding filed is sufficient in itself.
starts to run from the date of the last demand on the theory
that if the lessor brings no action shortly after the demand, it 1. We will begin by reviewing the construction placed by the
may be because he has agreed to the renewal of the lease. respondent court on a provision of our Rules of Court. The
position taken by the respondent court is that, in all actions
Third. The Court of Appeals held petitioners estopped from for unlawful detainer by a landlord against a tenant, a
questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground demand, as required by Rule 72, section 2, is jurisdictional.
that in the beginning they denied having received the notice Such provision of the Rules is as follows:
to vacate sent to them dated February 20, 1983 and it was
only in their answer later filed that they said that if ever there Landlord to proceed against tenant only after demand. — No
was any demand it was on February 20, 1983 for the purpose landlord, or his legal representative or assign, shall bring
of arguing that the case should have been filed in the MTC. such action against a tenant for failure to pay rent due or to
comply with the conditions of his lease, unless the tenant
The Court of Appeals said: shall have failed to pay such rent or comply with such
conditions for a period of fifteen days, or five days in the
. . . Now, considering that defendants effectively denied in case of building, after demand therefore, made upon him
both their motion to dismiss and answer having received the personally, or by serving written notice of such demand upon
notice to vacate dated February 20, 1983, they are now the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the court on the on the premises if no persons be found thereon. (Emphasis
particular ground that the complaint was filed less than one supplied.)
(1) year from the last letter of demand.[12]
It is apparent from this provision that a demand is a pre-
But if private respondents are to be bound by any requisite to an action for unlawful detainer, when the action
representation that no demand had ever been served on them, is "for failure to pay rent due or to comply with the
then, as provided by Rule 70, 2, all the more no action can be conditions of his lease," and where the action is to terminate
brought against them. Thus, Rule 70, 2 provides: the lease because of the expiration of its term.

SEC. 2. Landlord to proceed against tenant only after A lease ceases upon the expiration of its term without the
demand. - No landlord, or his legal representative or assign, necessity of any notice1 to the tenant who thenceforth
shall bring such action against a tenant for failure to pay rent becomes a deforciant withholding the property unlawfully
due or to comply with the conditions of his lease, unless the "after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
tenant shall have failed to pay such rent or comply with such possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied," as
conditions for a period of fifteen (15) days, or five (5) days in provided in Rule 72, section 1. In other words upon the
the case of building, after demand therefor, made upon him expiration of the term of a lease, the landlord may go into the
personally, or by serving written notice of such demand upon property and occupy it, and if the lessee refuses to vacate the
the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice premises, an action for unlawful detainer may immediately
on the premises if no persons be found thereon. be brought against him even before the expiration of the five
days provided in Rule 72, section 2.
Pursuant to this provision, no action could be brought against
petitioners for alleged violation of the terms and conditions Indeed, upon the expiration of the lease, there may be a tacit
of their lease agreement unless a notice to vacate is given to renewal thereof (tacita reconduccion), as when, with the
the lessee. On the other hand, if as the appellate court held, acquiescence of the lessor, the lessee continues enjoying the
the action for unlawful detainer is based on the expiration of thing leased for fifteen days, as provided in article 1566 of
the lease, no notice is required. Any notice given only serves the Civil Code; and the lessor's acquiescence may be inferred
to negate any inference that the lessor has agreed to extend from his failure to serve a notice to quit. (10
the period of the lease. Such a notice is needed only when the Manresa, Codigo Civil, 619.) But tacit renewal in such case,
being a new contract (10 Manresa Codigo Civil, p. 619), is a much less was it based on any contract, express or implied.
matter of defense which may be alleged by defendant in his We stress that the possession ofthe defendant in unlawful
answer, no allegation being necessary in the complaint by detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the
way of anticipation of such defense (Canfield vs. Tobias, 21 expiration or termination of the right to possess.18
Cal., 349).
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that
=========================================== the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been
present right from the start of the possession which is later
ZACARIAS, vs. ANACAY sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was
unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer
The invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the would be an improper remedy. As explained in Sarona v.
action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the Villegas:
case, are the allegations in the complaint.11 In ejectment
cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance
as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for of the owner, still, distinction should be made.
which Section 112 of Rule 70 provides a summary remedy,
and must show enough on its face to give the court If right at the incipiencydefendant’s possession was with
jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.13 Such remedy plaintiff’s tolerance, we do not doubt that the latter may
is either forcibleentry or unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior
the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the
building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or date of the demand to vacate.
stealth. In illegal detainer, the defendant unlawfully
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of xxxx
his right thereto under any contract, express or implied.14
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word
The MCTC and CA both ruled thatthe allegations in "tolerance" confirms our view heretofore expressed that such
petitioner’s complaint make out a case for forcible entry but tolerance must be present right from the start of possession
not for unlawful detainer. sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one
of unlawful detainer - not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold
In Cabrera v. Getaruela,15 the Court held that a complaint otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two
sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if reasons:First. Forcible entry into the land is an open
it recites the following: challenge tothe right of the possessor. Violation of that right
authorizes the speedy redress – in the inferior court -
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry
contract with or by toleranceof the plaintiff; is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases
to bespeedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second,if a forcible
plaintiff to defendant of the termination ofthe latter’s right of entry action in the inferior courtis allowed after the lapse of a
possession; number of years, then the result may well be that no action of
forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely
property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof;
make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court – upon a plea
and of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in - and summarily
throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable.
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to
Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings
vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in
ejectment.16
nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in
The complaint failed to allegea cause of action for unlawful pursuance of the summary nature of the action. (Italics and
detainer as it does not describe possession by the respondents underscoring supplied)
being initially legal or tolerated by the petitioner and which
It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which
became illegal upon termination by the petitioner of
determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or
suchlawful possession. Petitioner’s insistence that she
unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which
actually tolerated respondents’ continued occupation after her
may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If,
discovery of their entry into the subject premises is incorrect.
however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter
As she had averred, she discovered respondents’occupation
becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.
in May 2007. Such possession could not have been legal
from the start as it was without her knowledge or consent,
Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of NUÑEZ, Petitioner, vs. SLTEAS PHOENIX
an occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should SOLUTIONS, INC.,
embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly
within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a The Court’s Ruling
remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The
complaint must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction We find the petition bereft of merit.
without resort to parol testimony.
Designed to provide an expeditious means of protecting
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the actual possession or the right to possession of the property
complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive involved,19 there can be no gainsaying the fact that
of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not ejectment cases fall within the original and exclusive
state how entry was affected or how and when dispossession jurisdiction of first level courts20 by express provision of
started, the remedy should either be an accion publicianaor Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in relation to Sec. 1,
an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.21 In addition
to being conferred by law,22 however, a court’s jurisdiction
It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the
deforciant illegally occupying the land the moment he is complaint23 and the character of the relief sought,
required to leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer cases of 24 irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
this kind, that plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must recover all or some of the claims asserted therein.25 In much
have been present right from the start of the possession the same way that it cannot be made to depend on the
which is later sought to be recovered. This is where exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties,
petitioners’ cause of action fails. The appellate court, in full 26 jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon the defenses
agreement with the MTC made the conclusion that the set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss or in a motion for
alleged tolerance by their mother and after her death, by reconsideration.27
them, was unsubstantiated. x x x
The rule is no different in actions for forcible entry where the
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not following requisites are essential for the MeTC’s acquisition
contain any averment of fact that would substantiate of jurisdiction over the case, viz.: (a) the plaintiffs must
petitioners’ claim that they permitted or tolerated the allege their prior physical possession of the property; (b) they
occupation of the property by respondents. The complaint must assert that they were deprived of possession either by
contains only bare allegations that "respondents without any force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and, (c) the
color of title whatsoever occupies the land in question by action must be filed within one (1) year from the time the
building their house in the said land thereby depriving owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the
petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing has been said on physical possession of the property.28 As it is not essential
how respondents’ entry was effected or how and when that the complaint should expressly employ the language of
dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract existed the law, it is considered a sufficient compliance of the
between the parties. This failure of petitioners to allege the requirement where the facts are set up showing that
key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is dispossession took place under said conditions.29 The one-
fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry
requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the is generally counted from the date of actual entry on the land,
municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.It is in except that when the entry is through stealth, the one-year
this light that this Court finds that the Court of Appeals period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned thereof.
correctly found that the municipal trial court had no 30
jurisdiction over the complaint. (Emphasis supplied.)
Even prescinding from the fact that the parties had admitted
The complaint in this case is similarly defective as it failed to the MeTC’s jurisdiction,31 our perusal of the record shows
allege how and when entry was effected. The bare allegation that respondent’s 9 January 2004 amended complaint was
of petitioner that "sometime in May, 2007, she discovered able to make out a cause of action for forcible entry against
that the defendants have enterep the subject property and petitioner. As the registered owner of the subject parcel,
occupied the same", as correctly found by the MCTC and respondent distinctly alleged that, by its representatives and
CA, would show that respondents entered the land and built thru its predecessors-in-interest, it had been in possession of
their houses thereon clandestinely and without petitioner's the subject parcel and had exercised over the same all
consent, which facts are constitutive of forcible entry, not attributes of ownership, including the payment of realty taxes
unlawful detainer. Consequently, the MCTC has no and other expenses; that an ocular inspection conducted in
jurisdiction over the case and the RTC clearly erred in October 2003 revealed that petitioner and his co-defendants
reversing the lower court's ruling and granting reliefs prayed have succeeded in occupying the property by means of
for by the petitioner. stealth and strategy; and, that its subsequent demands to
vacate had been unheeded by said interlopers.32 Considering possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of
that the test for determining the sufficiency of the allegations his ownership
in the complaint is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the
court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the 

prayer of the plaintiff,33 we find that the Court of Appeals The petitioners, however, insist that the deeds of sale deserve
correctly ruled that the MeTC had jurisdiction over the case. more credence because they are valid contracts that legally
transferred ownership of the property to Melu-Jean.
Then as now, petitioner argues that, aside from the admission
in the complaint that the subject parcel was left idle and However, it should be noted that the CA merely affirmed the
unguarded, respondent’s claim of prior possession is clearly power of the trial court to provisionally resolve the issue of
negated by the fact that he had been in occupancy thereof ownership, which consequently includes the power to
since 1999. While prior physical possession is, admittedly, an determine the validity of the deeds of sale. As previously
indispensable requirement in forcible entry cases, the dearth stated, such determination is not conclusive, and the issue of
of merit in petitioner’s position is, however, evident from the ownership and the validity of the deeds of sale would
principle that possession can be acquired not only by material ultimately be resolved in the case for annulment of the deeds
occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the of sale.

action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities 

established for acquiring such right.34 Because possession In a number of cases, the Court had upheld the registered
can also be acquired by juridical acts to which the law gives owners' superior right to possess the property. the Court held
the force of acts of possession, e.g., donations, succession, that the court a quo correctly relied on the transfer certificate
execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of title in the name of petitioner, as opposed to the
of possessory information titles and the like, it has been held unregistered deeds of sale of the respondents.
that one need not have actual or physical occupation of every
square inch of the property at all times to be considered in 

possession.351avvphi1 In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioner is the
holder of a Torrens title over the entire Lot 83. Respondents
=========================================== have only their notarized but unregisteredKasulatan sa
Bilihan to support their claim of ownership. Thus, even if
GINA ENDAYA, Petitioner, v. ERNESTO V. VILLAOS respondents' proof of ownership has in its favor a juris
tantum presumption of authenticity and due execution, the

 same cannot prevail over petitioner's Torrens title.
The Petition must be granted.


 In Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño, the Court suspended the
In resolving the Petition for Review, the CA lost sight of the enforcement of a writ of demolition rendered in an ejectment
legal principle that in resolving the issue of possession in an case until after a case for annulment of title involving the
ejectment case, the registered owner of the property is property to be demolished was decided. The Court
preferred over the transferee under an unregistered deed of ratiocinated:
sale. In Co v. Militar,21 this Court held that -
x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer,
In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of
parties, it is the petitioner who has a Torrens Title to the the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in
property. Respondents merely showed their unregistered issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and
deeds of sale in support of their claims. The Metropolitan just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of
Trial Court correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience
in the name of petitioner.
 and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal

 possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to

 restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed
It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful
and binding upon the whole world unless and until it has detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more
been nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. It
existing statutory and decisional law, the power to pass upon is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of
the validity of such certificate of title at the first instance public policy the right to physical possession should be
properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession
proceeding for cancellation of title.
 regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be

 found to have superior claim to the premises involved,
As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru
force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts.
LIM, petitioners, vs. UNI-TAN MARKETING conducted. Even if the executed judgment is later on reversed
CORPORATION, on appeal, and there are provisions for restitution, damages
that cannot be fully compensated may oftentimes arise.
The Lim spouses allege that while the RTC correctly directed [15] That is why the Rules provide defendants with a remedy
respondent and/or the Branch Sheriff of the Metropolitan to stay execution. The problem is that petitioners failed or
Trial Court to return their personalties that had not been sold neglected to avail themselves of it.
on execution, it should have likewise ordered respondent to
return to them the items that had already been sold on Those who exercise their rights properly do no legal injury. If
execution. Since they had been prejudiced by damages result from their exercise of their legal rights, it
the ejectment suit, they assert that the RTC should have is damnum absque injuria -- a loss without injury, for which
awarded them actual, moral and exemplary damages as well the law gives no remedy.[16]
as attorneys fees.
The law always presumes good faith; thus, any person who
We are not convinced. As pointed out by the RTC in its seeks damages because of the tortuous acts of another has the
Order[12] denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith or with ill
neither the plaintiff nor the sheriff may be faulted for the motive. Certainly, petitioners have not discharged this
items sold on execution, because the Lim spouses had failed burden, and a recovery for damages under the circumstances
to file a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of the MTC is unwarranted.
judgment.
In sum, petitioners themselves were the ones who caused the
Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides damage which they claim to have suffered, because they had
the manner in which immediate execution in failed to follow the strict legal requirements for perfecting an
an ejectment case is conducted: appeal. If they had filed the requisite supersedeas bond, the
execution of the judgment would have been stayed. Hence,
Sec. 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay their loss or misfortune can be attributed to no less than their
same. -- If judgment is rendered against defendant, execution own inaction or failure to follow the law.
shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has
been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a ===========================================
sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial
Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, CONTEMPT
damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the
judgment appealed from, and unless during the pendency of Burgos vs Macapagal-Arroyo
the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of
The CA also held that the petitions for habeas corpus and
rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as
determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. contempt as against President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
x x x. must be dropped since she enjoys the privilege of immunity
from suit. The CA ruled that the President’s immunity from
Indeed, immediate execution in an ejectment judgment in suit is a settled doctrine citing David v. Arroyo.23
favor of the plaintiff is normal. The defendant may stay it
===========================================
only by perfecting an appeal, filing a supersedeas bond, and
making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable
LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION

compensation for the use and occupancy of the property
vs.

during the pendency of the appeal.[13]
DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF
The immediate execution of a judgment favorable to the THE PHILIPPINES
plaintiff is mandated, and the courts duty to order it is


practically ministerial.[14] Hence, petitioners cannot ascribe
Contempt of Court: Concept and Classes
any error, much less grave abuse of discretion, on the part of
the RTC. The execution sale was conducted in accordance Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or
with the rules and was well within the bounds of law. disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense,
contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or
Furthermore, there is no basis for petitioners claim for
orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of
damages, because respondent was in the lawful exercise of
its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language
its right at the time of the execution sale. Although the
in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings
judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court in favor of
or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted
respondent was eventually reversed by the RTC, the
and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of
execution sale was undeniably lawful at the time it was
the authority, justice, or dignity of a court.21 The phrase
contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal Plainly, therefore, the word summary with respect to the
signification a variety of different acts.22 punishment for contempt refers not to the timing of the
action with reference to the offense but to the procedure that
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, dispenses with the formality, delay, and digression that result
23 and need not be specifically granted by statute.24 It lies at from the issuance of process, service of complaint and
the core of the administration of a judicial system. answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to
25 Indeed, there ought to be no question that courts have the arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all
power by virtue of their very creation to impose silence, that goes with a conventional court trial.36
respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to their
lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and their A distinction between in-court contempts, which disrupt
officers from the approach and insults of pollution.26 The court proceedings and for which a hearing and formal
power to punish for contempt essentially exists for the presentation of evidence are dispensed with, and out-of-court
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the contempts, which require normal adversary procedures, is
enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the drawn for the purpose of prescribing what procedures must
courts, and, consequently, for the due administration of attend the exercise of a court’s authority to deal with
justice.27 The reason behind the power to punish for contempt. The distinction does not limit the ability of courts
contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability to initiate contempt prosecutions to the summary punishment
of their institution; without such guarantee, the institution of of in-court contempts that interfere with the judicial process.
the courts would be resting on a very shaky foundation.28 37

Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, The court may proceed upon its own knowledge of the facts
which is committed in the presence of or so near the judge as without further proof and without issue or trial in any form to
to obstruct him in the administration of justice; and punish a contempt
constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of willful
disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court.29 committed directly under its eye or within its view.38 But
there must be adequate facts to support a summary order for
The punishment for the first is generally summary and contempt in the presence of the court.39 The exercise of the
immediate, and no process or evidence is necessary because summary power to imprison for contempt is a delicate one
the act is committed in facie curiae.30 The inherent power of and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive
courts to punish contempt of court committed in the presence conclusions.40 The reason for the extraordinary power to
of the courts without further proof of facts and without aid of punish criminal contempt in summary proceedings is that the
a trial is not open to question, considering that this power is necessities of the administration of justice require such
essential to preserve their authority and to prevent the summary dealing with obstructions to it, being a mode of
administration of justice from falling into disrepute; such vindicating the majesty of the law, in its active manifestation,
summary conviction and punishment accord with due process against obstruction and outrage.41
of law.31There is authority for the view, however, that an act,
to constitute direct contempt punishable by summary Proceedings for contempt are sui generis, in nature criminal,
proceeding, need not be committed in the immediate but may be resorted to in civil as well as criminal actions,
presence of the court, if it tends to obstruct justice or to and independently of any action.42 They are of two classes,
interfere with the actions of the court in the courtroom itself. the criminal or punitive, and the civil or remedial. A criminal
32 Also, contemptuous acts committed out of the presence of contempt consists in conduct that is directed against the
the court, if admitted by the contemnor in open court, may be authority and dignity of a court or of a judge acting
punished summarily as a direct contempt,33 although it is judicially, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the
advisable to proceed by requiring the person charged to authority and dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly
appear and show cause why he should not be punished when forbidden act. A civil contempt consists in the failure to do
the judge is without personal knowledge of the misbehavior something ordered to be done by a court or judge in a civil
and is informed of it only by a confession of the contemnor case for the benefit of the opposing party therein.43 It is at
or by testimony under oath of other persons.34 times difficult to determine whether the proceedings are civil
or criminal. In general, the character of the contempt of
In contrast, the second usually requires proceedings less whether it is criminal or civil is determined by the nature of
summary than the first. The proceedings for the punishment the contempt involved, regardless of the cause in which the
of the contumacious act committed outside the personal
knowledge of the judge generally need the observance of all contempt arose, and by the relief sought or dominant
the elements of due process of law, that is, notice, written purpose.44 The proceedings are to be regarded as criminal
charges, and an opportunity to deny and to defend such when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when
charges before guilt is adjudged and sentence imposed.35 the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial.45Where
the dominant purpose is to enforce compliance with an order
of a court for the benefit of a party in whose favor the order considered.50 Where the act complained of is ambiguous or
runs, the contempt is civil; where the dominant purpose is to does not clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and is
vindicate the dignity and authority of the court, and to protect one which, if the party is acting in good faith, is within his
the interests of the general public, the contempt is criminal. rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in
46 Indeed, the criminal proceedings vindicate the dignity of some instances, held to be determinative of its character.51 A
the courts, but the civil proceedings protect, preserve, and person should not be condemned for contempt where he
enforce the rights of private parties and compel obedience to contends for what he believes to be right and in good faith
orders, judgments and decrees made to enforce such rights.47 institutes proceedings for the purpose, however erroneous
may be his conclusion as to his rights.52 To constitute
Indirect contempt is defined by and punished under Section contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an
3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which provides: illegitimate or improper purpose.53

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to
hearing. — After a charge in writing has been filed, and an embarrass the court or to bring it into disrepute have no place
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful purpose.
within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be On the contrary, they constitute direct contempt of court or
heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the contempt in facie curiae and, when committed by a lawyer, a
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: violation of the lawyer’s oath and a transgression of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of
his official duties or in his official transactions; II.

Utterances in Sea Transport Update,

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, Not Contemptuous
order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person
who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real The petitioners did not sufficiently show how the
property by the judgment or process of any court of respondents’ publication of the Sea Transport Update
competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces constituted any of the acts punishable as indirect contempt of
court under Section 3 of Rule 71, supra.
another to enter into or upon such real property, for the
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in The petitioners’ mere allegation, that "said publication
any manner disturbs the possession given to the person unfairly debases the Supreme Court because of the
adjudged to be entitled thereto; scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo therein
that the Court allowed itself to be influenced by the
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the petitioners as concocted in the evil minds of the respondents
processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct thus leading said respondents to unjustly conclude: Supreme
contempt under section 1 of this Rule; Court ruling issued in one month only, normal lead time is at
least 3 to 6 months,"54 was insufficient, without more, to
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to sustain the charge of indirect contempt.
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
Nor do we consider contemptuous either the phrase
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and contained in the Sea Transport Update stating: "The Motion
acting as such without authority;
for Reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court was denied
based on technicalities and not on the legal issue DMAP
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
presented",55 or the phrase in the Sea Transport Update
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property reading "Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only,
normal leadtime is at least 3 to 6 months." Contrary to the
in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of
a court held by him. petitioners’ urging that such phrases be considered as
"scurrilous, malicious, tasteless and baseless
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent innuendo" 56 and as indicative that "the Court allowed itself
the court from issuing process to bring the respondent into to be influenced by the petitioners"57 or that "the point that
court, or from holding him in custody pending such respondents wanted to convey was crystal clear: ‘defy the
proceedings. (3a) decision, for it was based on technicalities, and the Supreme
Court was influenced!’",58 we find the phrases as not critical
Misbehavior means something more than adverse comment of the Court and how fast the resolutions in G.R. No. 152914
or disrespect.48 There is no question that in contempt the were issued, or as inciting DMAP’s members to defy the
intent goes to the gravamen of the offense.49 Thus, the good resolutions. The unmistakable intent behind the phrases was
faith, or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor should be to inform DMAP’s members of the developments in the case,
and on the taking of the next viable move of going back to respect for court processes and impaired the judiciary’s duty
MARINA on the issues, as the ruling of the Court of Appeals to deliver and administer justice. Petitioner tried to impose
instructed.1avvphi1 his will on the trial court.

We have long recognized and respected the right of a lawyer, Contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure
or of any other person, for that matter, to be critical of the to do an act, in such a manner as to create an affront to the
courts and their judges as long as the criticism is made in court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed.6 It is
respectful terms and through legitimate channels. defined as "disobedience to the court by acting in opposition
to its authority, justice and dignity."7 The power to punish
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect contempt is inherent in all courts, because it is essential to
critical evaluation of their performance. For like the the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the
executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of the
in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic courts; and, consequently, to the due administration of
appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve. justice.8

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an The Rules of Court penalizes two types of contempt, namely,
officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly direct contempt and indirect contempt.
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of
courts and judges. In relation to the foregoing, Section 38 of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court also provides that "a party or other person
The test for criticizing a judge’s decision is, therefore, may be compelled, by an order or subpoena, to attend before
whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good the court or commissioner to testify as provided in the two
faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and preceding sections, and upon failure to obey such order or
propriety. Viewed through the prism of the test, the Sea subpoena or to be sworn, or to answer as a witness or to
Transport Update was not disrespectful, abusive, or subscribe his deposition, may be punished for contempt as in
slanderous, and did not spill over the walls of decency and other cases." This provision relates specifically to Section
propriety. Thereby, the respondents were not guilty of 3(b) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
indirect contempt of court. In this regard, then, we need to
remind that the power to punish for contempt of court is Indirect contempt may either be initiated (1) motu proprio by
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive the court by issuing an order or any other formal charge
principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be
inherent power in order to retain that respect without which punished for contempt or (2) by the filing of a verified
the administration of justice must falter or fail.61 As judges petition, complying with the requirements for filing initiatory
we ought to exercise our power to punish contempt pleadings.10 In the present case, the trial court initiated the
judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the proceedings for indirect contempt by issuing two
end in view of utilizing the power for the correction and orders11 directing the petitioner to show cause why he
preservation of the dignity of the Court, not for retaliation or should not be punished for indirect contempt.
vindictiveness.62
Contempt, whether direct or indirect, may be civil or criminal
=========================================== depending on the nature and effect of the contemptuous act.
Criminal contempt is "conduct directed against the authority
MONTENEGRO vs MONTENEGRO and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an
act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to
The core issue to be determined is whether, based on the bring the court into disrepute or disrespect."12 On the other
facts found by the trial court, the latter erred in holding the hand, civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to
petitioner guilty of indirect contempt for willfully disobeying be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing
the orders of the trial court requiring him to appear for party therein and is therefore, an offense against the party in
purposes of examination as a judgment obligor at in the whose behalf the violated order was made.13 If the purpose
hearings scheduled on 22 March 2002, 10 April 2002, and 23 is to punish, then it is criminal in nature; but if to
October 2002. compensate, then it is civil.14

We rule in the negative. In the present case, the contemptuous act was the petitioner’s
refusal to attend a hearing for his examination as judgment
The totality of petitioner’s acts clearly indicated a deliberate, obligor, upon motion by the respondent Teresa. It must be
and unjustified refusal to be examined as a judgment obligor pointed out that the purpose of Section 36 of Rule 39 is to
at the time the examination was scheduled for hearing by the provide the judgment obligee a remedy in case where the
trial court. His Such acts tended to degrade the authority and
judgment obligor continues to fail to comply with its
obligation under the judgment. Petitioner’s refusal to be INOTURAN, Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati
examined, without justifiable reason, constituted indirect City, vs. JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR.,
contempt which is civil in nature.
For a judge to exhibit indifference to a resolution requiring
Petitioner’s deliberate willfulness and even malice in him to comment on the accusations in the complaint
disobeying the orders of the trial court are clearly shown in thoroughly and substantially is gross misconduct, and may
the pleadings he himself had filed before the trial court. even be considered as outright disrespect for the Court. The
office of the judge requires him to obey all the lawful orders
In the present case, the nature of the contemptuous acts of his superiors. After all, a resolution of the Supreme Court
committed are civil in nature. Section 7 of Rule 71 of the is not a mere request and should be complied with promptly
Rules of Court provides for indefinite incarceration in civil and completely. Such failure to comply accordingly betrays
contempt proceedings to compel a party to comply with the not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but has likewise
order of the court. This may be resorted to where the been considered as an utter lack of interest to remain with, if
attendant circumstances are such that the non-compliance not contempt of the judicial system.
with the court order is an utter disregard of the authority of
the court which has then no other recourse but to use its We also cited in that case our ruling in Josephine C. Martinez
coercive power.16 It has been held that "when a person or v. Judge Cesar N. Zoleta5 and emphasized that obedience to
party is legally and validly required by a court to appear our lawful orders and directives should not be merely
before it for a certain purpose, when that requirement is selective obedience, but must be full:
disobeyed, the only remedy left for the court is to use force to
bring such person or party before it."17 [A] resolution of the Supreme Court requiring comment on
an administrative complaint against officials and employees
The reason for indefinite incarceration in civil contempt of the judiciary should not be construed as a mere request
proceedings, in proper cases, is that it is remedial, from the Court. Nor should it be complied with partially,
preservative, or coercive in nature. The punishment is inadequately or selectively.
imposed for the benefit of a complainant or a party to a suit
who has been injured. Its object is to compel performance of Respondents in administrative complaints should comment
the orders or decrees of the court, which the contemnor on all accusations or allegations against them in the
refuses to obey although able to do so.18 In effect, it is administrative complaints because it is their duty to preserve
within the power of the person adjudged guilty of contempt the integrity of the judiciary. Moreover, the Court should not
to set himself free. and will not tolerate future indifference of respondents to
administrative complaints and to resolutions requiring
In the present case, however, the act which the trial court comment on such administrative complaints.
ordered the petitioner to do has already been performed,
albeit belatedly and not without delay for an unreasonable ===========================================
length of time. As such, the penalty of imprisonment may no
longer be imposed despite the fact that its non- SANTIAGO vs ANUNCIACION, JR.,
implementation was due to petitioner’s absence in the
It is well-settled that a contempt charge partakes the nature of
Philippines.
a penal proceeding. Being so, it is subject to the rules on
We are not unmindful of the nature of the judgment from criminal procedure and the rules on the intervention of the
which the present controversy arose. Six years have elapsed offended party in criminal actions. The rule is that: SEC. 16.
from the time the compromise agreement for the support of Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. —
the children of petitioner and respondent was executed. We Unless the offended party has waived the civil action or
take judicial notice of the amount of expenses which a travel expressly reserved the right to institute it separately from the
outside the country, particularly to Canada, entails, much criminal action, and subject to the provision of Section 5
more so when the person traveling to Canada is trying to hereof, he may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the
establish himself in the said country as an immigrant. offense. Aside from the above exceptions, the intervention of
Petitioner’s claim for insolvency is negated by his frequent the offended party is subject to the direction and control of
travels to Canada. We thus exhort the parties, specifically the the fiscal, and for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil
petitioner, to resort to all reasonable means to fully satisfy liability of the accused, and as we have held, "not of
the judgment for support based on the compromise demanding punishment of the accused." Thus: Consequently,
agreement, for the paramount interests of their minor where from the nature of the offense, or where the law
children. defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide
for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the
prosecution of the offense.



In the case at bar, there is no justification for the prosecution qualification in a ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Amoren
of the case by a private prosecutor. In this instance, the kind v. Pineda: "Likewise, the ruling that an acquittal from a
of contempt (indirect) for which the petitioner is sought to be contempt charge is not appealable, like an acquittal in a
held liable provides for no indemnity because the alleged criminal case (Pajao v. Board of Canvassers, 88 Phil. 588)
"obstruction" committed was an offense against the State, the does not apply to the case before us, since there has been no
respondent court in particular, which involves no private adjudication on the merits of the charge, but a ruling upon a
party. Thus, the appearance of Atty. Eleazar Ferry, on behalf motion to dismiss on jurisdictional ground."
of Mrs. Carolina Orozco, was unwarranted.


 ===========================================
It is true that in [Converse Rubber Corp. v. Jacinto Rubber &
Plastic Co., Inc., Nos. L-27425 & 30505, April 28, 1980, 97 CRUZ VS. GINGOYON
SCRA 158] we sought to distinguish between the civil and
criminal features of an accusation for contempt; our effort, A person may be adjudged in direct contempt of court
however, was not to halve contempt into a civil and penal pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of
proceeding, because contempt is inherently criminal in Court[34] without need of a hearing but may thereafter avail
character. (In the Converse case, contempt was said to be of the remedies ofcertiorari or prohibition.[35]
"criminal" "when the purpose is to vindicate the authority of
the court and protect its outraged dignity." It is "civil" "when Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:
there is failure to do something ordered by a court to be done
Section 2. Remedy therefrom. The person adjudged in direct
for the benefit of a party.") But whether the first or the
contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may
second, contempt is still a criminal proceeding in which
avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The
acquittal, for instance, is a bar to a second prosecution. The
execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending
distinction is for the purpose only of determining the
resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond
character of punishment to be administered. We held
fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and
thus: . . . the Supreme Court of the United States, through
conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment
Chief Justice Taft, said: "In the Gompers case this court
should the petition be decided against him. (Emphasis
points out that, it is not the fact of punishment, but rather its
supplied.)
character and purpose that makes the difference between the
two kinds of contempts. For civil contempts, the punishment In this case, we find that the respondent court properly
is remedial and for the benefit of the complainant, and a denied petitioners Ex-Parte Motion there being no proof that
pardon cannot stop it. For criminal contempts, the sentence is he already filed a petition for certiorari. Petitioner thus
punitive in the public interest to vindicate the authority of the cannot attribute abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
court and to deter other like derelictions."cralaw virtua1aw court in denying the Ex-Parte Motion. To reiterate, at the
library
 time the said Ex-Parte Motion was filed and acted upon by

 the respondent court, petitioner was not yet entitled to the
But the fact, say, that the punishment, in the words of Slade remedy prayed for.Clearly, the respondent court did not
Perkins, is "remedial and for the benefit of the commit error, nor did it overstep its authority in denying
complainant," (which makes contempt one of the "civil" petitioners Ex-Parte Motion.
kind), does not convert the criminal contempt proceeding
into a civil case, in which an appeal lies in the event of a All told, we take a similar stand as Judge Gingoyon and
denial. Thus: . . . It is not the sole reason for dismissing this affirm the Order adjudging petitioner guilty of direct
appeal. In the leading case of In re Mison, Jr. v. Subido, it contempt.
was stressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes as ponente, that the
contempt proceeding far from being a civil action is "of a ===========================================
criminal nature and of summary character in which the court
exercises but limited jurisdiction." It was then explicitly held: BACULI, vs. BELEN,
"Hence, as in criminal proceedings, an appeal would not lie
from the order of dismissal of, or an exoneration from, a Administrative complaint cannot

charge of contempt of court." Such a doctrine is traceable to substitute for lost judicial remedies
an opinion by Justice Street in Lee Yick Hon v. Collector of
Customs. A later decision is that of Pajao v. Provincial Board The OCA correctly found that these administrative cases
of Canvassers of Leyte. Justice Alex Reyes, speaking for the cannot be resorted to as substitutes for the remedies not
Court, pointed out that with contempt proceedings being "in availed of in the contempt proceedings. The complaints, in
their nature penal," its denial "after trial amounts to a virtual the main, challenge several Orders issued by Judge Belen in
acquittal from which an appeal would not lie. (II Moran’s the respective contempt proceedings, and the four contempt
Comments on the Rules of Court, 3rd ed. 125)." There is this Decisions issued on December 18, 2006 and June 7, 2007.
But as correctly observed by the OCA, issuances in the
exercise of judicial prerogatives may only be questioned Even assuming that the Orders are infirm, they have already
through judicial remedies under the Rules of Court and not become final and executory, which even this Court cannot
by way of an administrative inquiry, absent fraud, ill review or disturb. Public policy demands that even at the risk
intentions, or corrupt motive.24 The institution of an of occasional errors, judgments or orders rendered by a court
administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for of competent jurisdiction should become final at some
correcting the action of a judge alleged to have gone beyond definite time fixed by law and that parties should not be
the norms of propriety, where a sufficient judicial remedy permitted to litigate the same issues over again.27 Quieta non
exists.25 movere.

Rule 71, Secs. 2 and 11 of the Rules of Court lay down the Complainant failed to prove bad faith, evil motive
proper remedies from a judgment in direct and indirect
contempt proceedings, respectively. For direct contempt, the or corrupt intention on the part of Judge Belen
Rules states:
Complainant Baculi tags all the contempt proceedings
Sec. 2. Remedy therefrom.––The person adjudged in direct against him as sham, and were taken, so he claims, as a direct
contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may result of a prior incident between him and Judge Belen where
avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The he issued a Resolution recommending that Judge Belen be
execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending charged for libel. He has belabored this point in his
resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond complaint and supplemental complaints, pointing out that the
fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and judge has deep-seated hatred for him and is bent on
conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment repeatedly citing him in contempt.
should the petition be decided against him.
Aside from his bare allegations, the complainant, however,
In indirect contempt proceedings, the Rules states: has not presented any credible evidence to support his
allegations against Judge Belen. The fact that Judge Belen
Sec. 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond for stay.–– had initiated contempt proceedings against him, and in fact
The judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect convicted him in such contempt proceedings, does not by
contempt may be appealed to the proper court as in criminal itself amount to ill motives on the part of Judge Belen. The
cases. But execution of the judgment or final order shall not initiation of the contempt proceedings stemmed from the acts
be suspended until a bond is filed by the person adjudged in of the complainant himself. His unsupported claim that the
contempt, in an amount fixed by the court from which the prior libel case he filed against Judge Belen created
appeal is taken, conditioned that if the appeal be decided animosity between them is not sufficient to prove his claim
against him he will abide by and perform the judgment or of evil motives on the part of Judge Belen.
final order.
As the proponent of these allegations, the complainant should
The remedies provided for in the above-mentioned Rules are have adduced the necessary evidence to prove the claim of
clear enough. The complainant could have filed an appeal bad faith. This he failed to do. In the absence of any evidence
under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court on the Decisions in the to the contrary, the following presumptions stand: (1) that
indirect contempt cases. For the direct contempt citations, a official duty has been regularly performed;28 and (2) that a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was available to him. He judge, acting as such, was acting in the lawful exercise of
failed to avail himself of both remedies. He chose instead to jurisdiction.29
question the proceedings and the judgments in the form of
motions and manifestations, and administrative complaints. Judge Belen cannot be administratively liable on the

Due to the failure of the complainant here to avail himself of final and executory decision, in the absence of evil
these remedies, Judge Belen correctly ruled that the assailed
judgments have become final and executory. They cannot or corrupt motives or gross ignorance of the law
anymore be reviewed by this Court.
A judge cannot be held administratively liable at every turn
Time and again, We have stressed that disciplinary for every erroneous decision. The error must be gross and
proceedings and criminal actions brought against a judge in deliberate, a product of a perverted judicial mind, or a result
relation to the performance of his or her official functions are of gross ignorance of the law. This is as it should be, for no
neither complementary nor suppletory to the appropriate one tasked to determine the facts in light of the evidence
judicial remedies. They are also not a substitute to such adduced or interpret and apply the law, following prescribed
remedies. Any party who may feel aggrieved should resort to rules, can be infallible.30 All that is expected from a judge is
these remedies, and exhaust them, instead of resorting to to "follow the rules prescribed to ensure a fair and impartial
disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions.26 hearing, assess the different factors that emerge therefrom
and bear on the issues presented, and on the basis of the
conclusions he finds established, adjudicate the case discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge
accordingly." and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
35 (Emphasis added.)
As We have already stated, the complainant has failed to
adduce evidence in support of his claim of evil or corrupt Thus, where there is a verified petition to cite someone in
motives on the part of the judge. That, and the fact that the contempt of court, courts have the duty to ensure that all the
subject Decisions are already final and executory, lead Us to requirements for filing initiatory pleadings have been
conclude that no administrative liability can arise on the part complied with. It behooves them too to docket the petition,
of Judge Belen, if the contempt proceedings that he and to hear and decide it separately from the main case,
conducted followed the required procedure under Rule 71 of unless the presiding judge orders the consolidation of the
the Rules of Court. contempt proceedings and the main action.

Judge Belen followed the proper procedure
 But in indirect contempt proceedings inititated motu proprio
in citing complainant in contempt of court by the court, the above rules, as clarified in Regalado, do not
necessarily apply. First, since the court itself motu proprio
The OCA Report found that Judge Belen failed to follow the initiates the proceedings, there can be no verified petition to
mandatory procedure under Rule 71, because the contempt speak of. Instead, the court has the duty to inform the
proceedings were heard and decided under the same docket respondent in writing, in accordance with his or her right to
or case number. We cannot sustain this finding of the OCA. due process. This formal charge is done by the court in the
Under the Rules of Court, there are two ways of initiating form of an Order requiring the respondent to explain why he
indirect contempt proceedings: (1) motu proprio by the court; or she should not be cited in contempt of court.
or (2) by a verified petition.
In the case at bar, the Orders issued by Judge Belen are in the
In contempt proceedings, the prescribed procedure must be nature of a show-cause order.1âwphi1 The Orders clearly
followed. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court directed Baculi, as respondent, to explain within 10 days
provide the procedure to be followed in case of indirect from receipt of the Order why he should not be cited in
contempt. First, there must be an order requiring the contempt. These Orders are formal charges sufficient to
respondent to show cause why he should not be cited for initiate the respective indirect contempt proceedings.
contempt. Second, the respondent must be given the
opportunity to comment on the charge against him. Third, Second, when the court issues motu proprio a show-cause
there must be a hearing and the court must investigate the order, the duty of the court (1) to docket and (2) to hear and
charge and consider respondent’s answer. Finally, only if decide the case separately from the main case does not arise,
found guilty will respondent be punished accordingly. much less to exercise the discretion to order the consolidation
(Citations omitted.) of the cases. There is no petition from any party to be
docketed, heard and decided separately from the main case
As to the second mode of initiating indirect contempt precisely because it is the show-cause order that initiated the
proceedings, that is, through a verified petition, the rule is proceedings.
already settled in Regalado v. Go:
What remains in any case, whether the proceedings are
In cases where the court did not initiate the contempt charge, initiated by a verified petition or by the court motu proprio, is
the Rules prescribe that a verified petition which has the duty of the court to ensure that the proceedings are
complied with the requirements of initiatory pleadings as conducted respecting the right to due process of the party
outlined in the heretofore quoted provision of second being cited in contempt. In both modes of initiating indirect
paragraph, Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, must be contempt proceedings, if the court deems that the answer to
filed.34 the contempt charge is satisfactory, the proceedings end. The
court must conduct a hearing, and the court must consider the
The Rules itself is explicit on this point: respondent’s answer. Only if found guilty will the respondent
be punished accordingly.37
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be
commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars Complainant was afforded the opportunity

and certified true copies of documents or papers involved to present his defense, but he failed to do so
therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for
filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court In contempt proceedings, the respondent must be given the
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related right to defend himself or herself and have a day in court––a
to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for basic requirement of due process. This is especially so in
contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be indirect contempt proceedings, as the court cannot decide
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its them summarily pursuant to the Rules of Court.
It cannot be said that Judge Belen did not afford Baculi the encountered in respondent's sala, on one hand, and the filing
opportunity to be heard on the contempt proceedings. Even by complainant Carlos, through Atty. Guerrero, of the
as the respective hearings on the two indirect contempt cases damage suit against respondent, on the other. 23
set in February 2007 did not push through due to the
numerous motions filed by Baculi, Judge Belen still waited The fact that respondent did not accord complainants a
for the former to answer the charges against him. No answer hearing nor informed them beforehand of the charges relative
ever came, however––only numerous manifestations and to the contempt incident cannot, without more, be indicative
motions for postponement. of bad faith or malice. For, respondent labored under the
impression, mistaken as it turned out to be, that complainants
In all, Judge Belen cannot plausibly be blamed for the fact committed an act constituting direct contempt summarily
that the June 7, 2007 Decisions were issued without any punishable. 24 Assuming, as respondent did assume, that
answer from Baculi. The fault belongs to Baculi himself, complainants did indeed commit an act punishable by direct
who insisted on resolving the indirect contempt proceedings contempt, then a formal hearing would hardly be necessary.
in the form of an administrative complaint against the judge.
Baculi was afforded ample time and opportunity to present Needless to underscore, the utilization by respondent of the
his case in court, but he squandered the opportunity. long-terminated criminal cases as the vehicle for his
contempt order formed a part of his error. Bad faith,
=========================================== however, cannot be inferred from this particular error, per se.

GUERRERO vs.VILLAMOR .

The other charges, namely ignorance of the law and issuing In all, the assailed act of the respondent judge appears to be a
an unjust judgment, deserve consideration, since the direct case of error of judgment not subject to disciplinary action.:
contempt order of the respondent judge, under the attending
circumstances it was issued, appears to be clearly erroneous. While the quoted portion of the foregoing ruling speaks only
The supposedly contemptuous language used in a pleading of exemption from criminal or civil liability, there is no
was not submitted to respondent, but filed in another court reason not to include from its reach administrative liability as
presided by another judge stationed in Cebu literally miles well. After all, this Court had occasion to rule that:
away from where respondent holds court in Leyte. As this
Court ruled in Ang vs. Castro: 18 [A] judge may not be administratively charged for mere
errors of judgment in the absence of showing of any bad
Use of disrespectful or contemptuous language against a faith, malice or corrupt purpose. 26
particular judge in pleadings presented in another court or
proceeding is indirect, not direct, contempt as it is not Moreover, it is settled that judges cannot be held to account
tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a criminally, civilly, or administratively for an erroneous
court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. decision rendered by them in good faith. 27

However, administrative liability for ignorance of the law In sum, there is no legal basis nor convincing evidence, to
and/or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment does not support the proposition that the respondent judge, in issuing
immediately arise from the bare fact of a judge issuing a his controversial contempt order, acted in bad faith or with
decision/resolution/order later adjudged to be erroneous. ill-will or malice as to justify holding him liable for an error
in judgment.
From the record before us we agree with the finding of the
investigating Justice that respondent, in issuing his erroneous
contempt order, was not moved by ill-will or by an impulse
to do an injustice. To be sure, complainants have not
presented evidence or offered logical arguments tending to
show that bad faith accompanied the issuance of the
contempt order. It ought to be remembered that bad faith is
not presumed and he who alleges the same has the onus of
proving it. In this regard, complainants have not discharged
that burden of proof sufficiently.

Should a circumstance tend to becloud the bona fides of

respondent's actuation, it could only refer to the strained
relationship existing between him and complainants brought
about by the cumulative effect of the reverses Carlos
LAND BANK OF offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a verified
THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO petition with full compliance with the requirements therefor
LISTANA and shall be disposed of in accordance with the second
paragraph of this section.[22]
On the substantive issue of whether the order for the arrest of
petitioners manager, Mr. Alex Lorayes by the PARAD, was Therefore, there are only two ways a person can be charged
valid, Rule XVIII of the 2003 DARAB Rules reads, in with indirect contempt, namely, (1) through a verified
pertinent part: petition; and (2) by order or formal charge initiated by the
court motu proprio.
SECTION 2. Indirect Contempt. The Board or any of its
members or its Adjudicator may also cite and punish any In the case at bar, neither of these modes was adopted in
person for indirect contempt on any of the grounds and in the charging Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt.
manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of
Court. More specifically, Rule 71, Section 12 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, referring to indirect contempt against quasi-
In this connection, Rule 71, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of judicial entities, provides:
Civil Procedure, which deals with the commencement of
indirect contempt proceedings, provides: Sec. 12. Contempt against quasi-judicial entities. Unless
otherwise provided by law, this Rule shall apply to contempt
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for committed against persons, entities, bodies or agencies
indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court exercising quasi-judicial functions, or shall have suppletory
against which the contempt was committed by an order or effect to such rules as they may have adopted pursuant to
any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show authority granted to them by law to punish for
cause why he should not be punished for contempt. contempt. The Regional Trial Court of the place wherein the
contempt has been committed shall have jurisdiction over
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be such charges as may be filed therefore. (emphasis supplied)
commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars
and certified true copies of documents or papers involved The foregoing amended provision puts to rest once and for
therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for all the questions regarding the applicability of these rules to
filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court quasi-judicial bodies, to wit:
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related
to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for 1. This new section was necessitated by the holdings that the
contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be former Rule 71 applied only to superior and inferior courts
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its and did not comprehend contempt committed against
discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge administrative or quasi-judicial officials or bodies, unless
and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as
contempt of court, as is done in the second paragraph of Sec.
xxxxxxxxx 580, Revised Administrative Code. The provision referred to
contemplates the situation where a person, without lawful
The requirement of a verified petition is mandatory. Justice excuse, fails to appear, make oath, give testimony or produce
Florenz D. Regalado, Vice-Chairman of the Revision of the documents when required to do so by the official or body
Rules of Court Committee that drafted the 1997 Rules of exercising such powers.For such violation, said person shall
Civil Procedure explains this requirement: be subject to discipline, as in the case of contempt of court,
upon application of the official or body with the Regional
1. This new provision clarifies with a regulatory norm the Trial Court for the corresponding sanctions.[23](emphasis in
proper procedure for commencing contempt the original)
proceedings. While such proceeding has been classified as a
special civil action under the former Rules, the Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite
heterogeneous practice, tolerated by the courts, has been for persons for indirect contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the
any party to file a mere motion without paying any docket or Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them in the proper
lawful fees therefor and without complying with the Regional Trial Court. It is not within their jurisdiction and
requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is now required competence to decide the indirect contempt cases. These
in the second paragraph of this amended section. matters are still within the province of the Regional Trial
Courts. In the present case, the indirect contempt charge was
xxxxxxxxx filed, not with the Regional Trial Court, but with the
PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited Mr. Lorayes with
Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings indirect contempt.
initiated motu proprio by order of or a formal charge by the
Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an regard, Section 11, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court states that
unverified Motion for Contempt filed by the respondent with the judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect
the PARAD were invalid for the following reasons: contempt may be appealed to the proper court as in a
[24] First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a criminal case. This is not the point at issue, however, in this
verified petition with the Regional Trial Court, which was petition. It is rather the question of whether the dismissal of a
not complied with in this case. The charge was not initiated contempt charge, as in the present case, is appealable. The
by the PARAD motu proprio;rather, it was by a motion filed CA held that the NLRCs dismissal of the contempt charges
by respondent. Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB against the respondents amounts to an acquittal in a criminal
have jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the case and is not subject to appeal.
respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond
the power of the PARAD and the DARAB. Consequently, all The CA ruling is grounded on prevailing jurisprudence.
the proceedings that stemmed from respondents Motion for
Contempt, specifically the Orders of the PARAD dated In Yasay, Jr. v. Recto,[25] the Court declared:
August 20, 2000 and January 3, 2001 for the arrest of Alex A.
Lorayes, are null and void. A distinction is made between a civil and [a] criminal
contempt. Civil contempt is the failure to do something
=========================================== ordered by a court to be done for the benefit of a party. A
criminal contempt is any conduct directed against the
ROBOSA VS NLRC authority or dignity of the court.[26]

ISSUES: Is the NLRCs dismissal of the contempt charges against the

respondents beyond review by this Court? On this important
The parties submissions raise the following issues: question, we note that the petitioners, in assailing the CA
main decision, claim that the appellate court committed grave
(1) whether the NLRC has contempt powers; abuse of discretion in not ruling on the dismissal by the
NLRC of the contempt charges.[31] They also charge the
(2) whether the dismissal of a contempt charge is appealable; NLRC of having gravely abused its discretion and having
and committed reversible errors in:

(3) whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion

in dismissing the contempt charge against the respondents.
(1) setting aside its earlier resolutions and orders, including
On the first issue, we stress that under Article 218[22] of the the writ of preliminary injunction it issued, with its dismissal
Labor Code, the NLRC (and the labor arbiters) may hold any of the petition to cite the respondents in contempt of court;
offending party in contempt, directly or indirectly, and
impose appropriate penalties in accordance with law. The (2) overturning this Courts resolutions upholding the TRO
penalty for direct contempt consists of either imprisonment and the writ of preliminary injunction;
or fine, the degree or amount depends on whether the
contempt is against the Commission or the labor arbiter. The (3) failing to impose administrative fines upon the
Labor Code, however, requires the labor arbiter or the respondents for violation of the TRO and the writ of
Commission to deal with indirect contempt in the manner preliminary injunction; and
prescribed under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.[23]
(4) failing to order the reinstatement of the dismissed
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court does not require the labor petitioners and the payment of their accrued wages and other
arbiter or the NLRC to initiate indirect contempt proceedings benefits.
before the trial court. This mode is to be observed only when
there is no law granting them contempt powers.[24] As is
clear under Article 218(d) of the Labor Code, the labor
arbiter or the Commission is empowered or has jurisdiction In view of the grave abuse of discretion allegation in this
to hold the offending party or parties in direct or indirect case, we deem it necessary to look into the NLRCs dismissal
contempt. The petitioners, therefore, have not improperly of the contempt charges against the respondents. As the
brought the indirect contempt charges against the charges were rooted into the respondents alleged non-
respondents before the NLRC. compliance with the NLRC directives contained in the
TRO[32] and the writ of preliminary injunction,[33] we first
The second issue pertains to the nature of contempt inquire into what really happened to these directives.
proceedings, especially with respect to the remedy available
to the party adjudged to have committed indirect contempt or
has been absolved of indirect contempt charges. In this
Did the NLRC commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the contempt charges against the respondents? An
act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as
committed in grave abuse of discretion when it was
performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility.[35]

We find no grave abuse of discretion in the assailed NLRC

ruling. It rightly avoided delving into issues which would
clearly be in excess of its jurisdiction for they are issues
involving the merits of the case which are by law within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.[38] To
be sure, whether payroll reinstatement of some of the
petitioners is proper; whether the resignation of some of them
was compelled by dire economic necessity; whether the
petitioners are entitled to their money claims; and whether
quitclaims are contrary to law or public policy are issues that
should be heard by the labor arbiter in the first instance. The
NLRC can inquire into them only on appeal after the merits
of the case shall have been adjudicated by the labor arbiter.

The NLRC correctly dismissed the contempt charges against

the respondents. The CA likewise committed no grave abuse
of discretion in not disturbing the NLRC resolution.

In light of the above discussion, we find no need to dwell

into the other issues the parties raised.