Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,

vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR,respondents.
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEPARATION OF POWERS.—The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government
has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
2.ID.; ID.; SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES.—But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate
and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of various departments of
government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that his assent
is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding
the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly.
The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National
Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary
in the appointment of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties.
Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction
and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly exercises to a certain extent control over the judicial department.
The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
3.ID.; ID. ; ID. ; JUDICIARY THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONAL ARBITER TO ALLOCATE CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES.—But in the
main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and
the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several
departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MODERATING POWER OF THE JUDICIARY is GRANTED, IF NOT EXPRESSLY, BY CLEAR IMPLICATION.—As any
human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our
people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited,
has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and
balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no
uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended, it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels, for, then, the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere
expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions
embodied in the Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express constitu
tional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin
and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our
case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; WHAT is MEANT BY "JUDICIAL SUPREMACY".—The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is
to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary
as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW LIMITED TO ACTUAL LITIGATION; WISDOM, JUSTICE OR EXPEDIENCY OF LEGISLATION.—Even
then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and cantroversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by
the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could
only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this
manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord
the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments not only because the Legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice
of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.
7.ID.; ID.; ID.; SYSTEM ITSELF NOT THE CHIEF PALLADIUM OF CONSTITUTIONAL LlBERTY; SUCCESS MUST BE TESTED IN THE
CRUCIBLE OF FILIPINO MINDS AND HEARTS.—But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our
Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief
palladium of constitutional liberty * * * the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians * * * their eyes must
be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce * * * aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the last and ultimate
analysis, then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and
hearts than in the consultation rooms and court chambers.
8.ID.; OUR CONSTITUTION HAS ADOPTED THE AMERICAN TYPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT.—Discarding the English
type and other European types of constitutional government, the framers of our Constitution adopted the American type where the
written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to follow the
American example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret
the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition
courts are bound to assume what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that
courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (article 81, chapter IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a
similar declaration. In countries whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway,
Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakía (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to Constitutional Charter of the
Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitution of the Republic of 1931) especial
constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws.
9.ID. ; JURISDICTION OVER THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION.—The nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final
constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. If the conflict were
left undecided and undetermined, a void would be created in our constitutional system which may in the long run prove destructive
of the entire framework. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason
and authority, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy
for the purpose of deter mining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
10.ID.; THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION; CONSTITUTIONAL GRANT OF POWER TO THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION TO BE THE SOLE
JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY.—The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule
that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken from clause 1 of section
5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and
Qualifications of its own Members, * * *." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the
insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members, * * *" apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive character of
the jurisdiction conferred upon each House of the Legislature over the particular cases therein specified. This court has had occasion
to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete".
(Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
11.ELECTORAL COMMISSION; HISTORICAL INSTANCES.—The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the Legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan
tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the science of government. As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England
solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan settlement of the controverted elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative
to two judges of the King's Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with rules of court made for the
purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868
[31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act, 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt
and. Illegal Practices Prevention Act 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51], s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22];
Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were originally heard by the
Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the Commonwealth of Australia, election
contests which were originally determined by each house, are since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law
provides that all protests against the election of members of the Upper House of Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme
Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the
Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or
National Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests, the Constitution of the German Reich of
July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the
Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.
12.ID. ; ELECTORAL COMMISSION IN THE UNITED STATES.—The "creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is
recruited both from the legislature and the judiciary is by no means unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of
1876 there was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by each of the two opposing candidates. As the Constitution
made no adequate provision for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large,
vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission composed of five members elected by the Senate, five
members elected by the House of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the four
designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two houses voting separately.
Although there is not much moral lesson to be derived from the experience of America in this regard, the experiment has at least
abiding historical interest.
13.ID.; ID.; FAMILIARITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION WITH THE HlSTORY AND POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT OF OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD; ELECTORAL COMMISSION is THE EXPRESSION OF THE WlSDOM AND
ULTIMATE JUSTICE OF THE PEOPLE.—The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their
majority men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political development of
other countries of the world. When, therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and
invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the experience
of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which
the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its
creation, the plan was approved" by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the
Constitution, the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham
Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.) '
14.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; PURPOSE WAS TO TRANSFER IN ITS TOTALITY POWER EXERCISED PREVIOUSLY BY THE LEGISLATURE OVER
THE CONTESTED ELECTIONS OF THE MEMBERS TO AN INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL.—From the deliberations of our
Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the
Legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much
the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative
contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people acting through their delegates to the Convention to provide
for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority
parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper
by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
15.ID. ; ID. ; lD.; THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION is AN INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL CREATION ALTHOUGH FOR PURPOSES
OF CLASSIFICATION IT is CLOSER TO THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT THAN TO ANY OTHER.—The Electoral Commission is a
constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and execution of the limited and specific function
assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes,
when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to
any other. The location of the provision (sec. 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department"
of our Constitution is very indicative. Its composition is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the
Legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of the Legislature.
16.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; GRANT OF POWER TO THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION INTENDED TO BE AS COMPLETE AND UNIMPAIRED AS IF
IT HAD REMAINED ORIGINALLY IN THE LEGISLATURE.—The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired
as if it had remained originally in the Legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial
of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express
prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs. Whisman, 33 S. D., 260; L. R. A., 1917B, 1). If the
power claimed for the National Assembly to regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the
Electoral Commission to lay down a period within which protest should be filed were conceded, the grant of power to the commission
would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such a case would be invested with the power to determine contested cases
involving the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative
power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority
from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time
to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of
cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and wherever the National
Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to
regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of
the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is
obvious that this result should not be permitted.
17.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; THE POWER TO PROMULGATE INCIDENTAL RULES AND REGULATIONS LODGED ALSO IN THE ELECTORAL
COMMISSION BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION.—The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of
construction that where a general power isconferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one
or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence
of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission,
therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive powers to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary
implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
18.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; POSSIBILITY OF ABUSE NO ARGUMENT AGAINST GRANT OF POWER.—The possibility of abuse is not an
argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. If any mistake has been
committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through
the ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be corrected by the judiciary.
The people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the
specified cases assigned to it, as it has given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies
of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional organ working within its
own particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated with same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great
ends for which they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much to be
desired in given instances, is inherent in the imperfections of human institutions. From the fact that the Electoral Commission may
not be interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may
not be challenged in appropriate cases over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction.
19.ID.; ID.; ID.; FACTS OF THE CASE; EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS.—The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on
November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went
into effect. The new National Assembly convened on November 25, of that year, and the resolution confirming the election of the
petitioner was approved by that body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent against the election of the
petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was formally
organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution
fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of
December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met;
neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized. As a matter of fact, according to certified copies of official records
on file in the archives division of the National Assembly attached to the record of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the
three justices of the Supreme Court and the six members of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were
respectively designated only on December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming nonprotested
elections of members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of protests, the result
would be that the National Assembly—on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of regulation in such cases—had
already barred the presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the
mode and method to be followed in a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could
not have been contemplated, and should be avoided.
20.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; CONFIRMATION BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CAN NOT DEPRIVE THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF ITS
AUTHORITY TO FIX THE TlME WITHIN WHICH- PROTESTS AGAINST THE ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS
OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD BE FILED.—Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members
against whom no protests has been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon
the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation
of members of the Legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the Legislature, confirmation
alone by the Legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional
power to be "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members
against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. Confirmation of the election of any member
is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper
provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the National Assembly and to render him eligible to
any office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).
21.ID. ; EFFECT OF CONFIRMATION UNDER THE JONES LAW.—Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force,
each House of the Philippine Legislature fixed the time when protests against the election of any of its members should be filed. This
 was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each House the sole judge of the election, returns and qualifications
of its members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act !No. 3387) empowering each House respectively to prescribe by resolution the
time and manner of filing contest \a the election of members of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time fixed by its rules
for the filing of protests had already expired, each House passed a resolution confirming or approving the returns of such members
against whose election no protest had been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off the filing of further
protests against the election of those members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine
Legislature, Record—First Period, p. 89; Urgello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin
[Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record—First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth
Philippine Legislature, Record—First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record—
First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The Constitution has expressly repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387,
section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to determine all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to
prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus no law nor constitutional provision which authorized the National
Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the election of its
members. And what the National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection through the medium of confirmation.

Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.

LAUREL, J.:

This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and
prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another
respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of
Tayabas.

The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as follows:

(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel
Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of
the Province of Tayabas;

(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National
Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes;

(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;

(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the following resolution:

[No. 8]

RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES NO SE HA

PRESENTADO PROTESTA.

Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere presentado debidamente
una protesta antes de la adopcion de la presente resolucion sean, como por la presente, son aprobadas y
confirmadas.

Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.

(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest"
against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8
aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for
the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified;

(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides:

6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o antes de este dia.

(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed
before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging ( a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest",
alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative
to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its members should be presented; ( b) that the aforesaid
resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and ( c) that the protest in question
was filed out of the prescribed period;

(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that
there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National
Assembly after confirmation;

(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of
Dismissal";
 (10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936,
denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."

The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed for:

(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested
elections to the National Assembly;

(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of said election contests, which
power has been reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government or the National Assembly;

(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive jurisdiction relates
solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted to them for decision and to matters involving their internal organization,
the Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings only if the National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so
regulate such proceedings;

(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be respected and obeyed;

(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of article 7 of the
Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States) as well as under section 1 and 3 (should be sections
1 and 2) of article VIII of the Constitution, this Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question herein
raised because it involves an interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines.

On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the respondent Electoral Commission interposing
the following special defenses:

(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department
invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of
protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise
of the implied powers granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out the power and
functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the
motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of
said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions a an instrumentality of the Legislative Department
of the Commonwealth Government, and hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the Supreme Court;

(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the members of the National
Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not and did not deprive the electoral Commission of its
jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed within the time that might be set by its own rules:

(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions, created by the Constitution as an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person" within the
purview of section 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.

The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2, 1936, setting forth the following
as his special defense:

(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, there was no existing law
fixing the period within which protests against the election of members of the National Assembly should be filed; that in fixing
December 9, 1935, as the last day for the filing of protests against the election of members of the National Assembly, the
Electoral Commission was exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial
attributes;

(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, the last day
fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral Commission;

(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said respondent and over the parties
thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission of January 23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest
was an act within the jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;

(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of its members, and
that such confirmation does not operate to limit the period within which protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral
Commission of jurisdiction over protest filed subsequent thereto;

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution, endowed with quasi-judicial functions,
whose decision are final and unappealable;

( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person, within
the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that neither under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of
article II (should be article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it
be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;

(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the united States) has no
application to the case at bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner prayed for the issuance of a
preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral Commission which petition was denied "without passing upon the merits
of the case" by resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.

There was no appearance for the other respondents.

The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal propositions:

1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the
foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,

2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest
filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly?

We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy. However, the question of jurisdiction having
been presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a case primæ impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our
sense of duty to overlook the broader aspect of the question and leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the industry
and vehemence of counsel were we not to pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief
Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws.
This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by
a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the
Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the
sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence
of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than
the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly
controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the
judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative
and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several
departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude
or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of
conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of
our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited,
has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and
balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain
language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended
it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and
the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are
real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution,
the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest
by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not
expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act
of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial
review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after
full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed
as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than
that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide
by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and
justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the governments of the
government.

But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered
that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are
authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression
on the authority of their constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years
to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the herein petitioner
to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the
last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding
the previous confirmation made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National
Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission
of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has the
sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which
the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, should be upheld.

Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly
on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very nature of the republican government established in our
country in the light of American experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation
of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer
hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while
acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the
people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government,
and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the
government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other
European types of constitutional government, the framers of our constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution
is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to follow the American example,
provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law.
This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume
what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no power to
examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose
constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa.
Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920)
and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the
validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the
controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created
in our constitutional system which may be in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer
them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are
clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to
the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly."

Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second proposition and determine whether the
Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming
to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by
the National Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of
section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:

"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of
six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and
three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and history of this constitutional provision and inquire into
the intention of its framers and the people who adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.

The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule that "the assembly
shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the
Constitution of the United States providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own
Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as
follows: "That the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications
of their elective members . . ." apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the particular case s therein specified.
This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, as
"full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)

The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested elections to the legislature was taken
by the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which sub-
committee submitted a report on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to
hear legislature but also against the election of executive officers for whose election the vote of the whole nation is required, as well as
to initiate impeachment proceedings against specified executive and judicial officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the
tribunal was to be composed of three justices designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the house of the legislature to which
the contest corresponds, three members to be designed by the majority party and three by the minority, to be presided over by the
Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member in which case the latter shall preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by
the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to the Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting in the
reduction of the legislative representation to four members, that is, two senators to be designated one each from the two major parties
in the Senate and two representatives to be designated one each from the two major parties in the House of Representatives, and in
awarding representation to the executive department in the persons of two representatives to be designated by the President.

Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted to the Convention on September 24, 1934
subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative Department, reads as follows:
 The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either house and all cases contesting the election of any of their
members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each House, by three members elected by the members
of the party having the largest number of votes therein, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest
number of votes, and as to its Chairman, one Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice.

The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by the Committee on Constitutional
Guarantees which was probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned
in favor of the proposition of the Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar body with reduced powers and with specific and
limited jurisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified the proposal of the Committee on
Legislative Power with respect to the composition of the Electoral Commission and made further changes in phraseology to suit the
project of adopting a unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934,
reads as follows:

(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of
any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the party having the
largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number
of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one
of said justices.

During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others, proposing to strike out the whole
subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive
judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members", the following illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the
Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of the said draft:

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning of the first four lines, paragraph 6, page 11
of the draft, reading: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting
the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, . . ." I should like to ask from the gentleman
from Capiz whether the election and qualification of the member whose elections is not contested shall also be judged by the
Electoral Commission.

Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there is nothing to be judged; that is why the word
"judge" is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no question about the election of a member, there is nothing to be submitted
to the Electoral Commission and there is nothing to be determined.

Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Commission shall confirm also the election of those whose
election is not contested?

Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the action of the House of Representatives confirming
the election of its members is just a matter of the rules of the assembly. It is not constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man
files his credentials that he has been elected, that is sufficient, unless his election is contested.

Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have observed that for purposes of the auditor, in the matter
of election of a member to a legislative body, because he will not authorize his pay.

Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president who is elected? What happens with regards to the
councilors of a municipality? Does anybody confirm their election? The municipal council does this: it makes a canvass and
proclaims — in this case the municipal council proclaims who has been elected, and it ends there, unless there is a contest. It
is the same case; there is no need on the part of the Electoral Commission unless there is a contest. The first clause refers to
the case referred to by the gentleman from Cavite where one person tries to be elected in place of another who was declared
elected. From example, in a case when the residence of the man who has been elected is in question, or in case the citizenship
of the man who has been elected is in question.

However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it may do so by certain maneuvers upon its first meeting
when the returns are submitted to the assembly. The purpose is to give to the Electoral Commission all the powers exercised
by the assembly referring to the elections, returns and qualifications of the members. When there is no contest, there is nothing
to be judged.

Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.

Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.

Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos Norte when I arose a
while ago. However I want to ask more questions from the delegate from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites
cases contesting the election as separate from the first part of the sections which refers to elections, returns and qualifications.

Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of contested elections are already included in the phrase
"the elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase "and contested elections" was inserted merely for the sake of clarity.

Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its own instance, refuse to confirm the elections of the
members."

Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.

 Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?

THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.

Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.

Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this power is granted to the assembly, the assembly on
its own motion does not have the right to contest the election and qualification of its members?

Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is retained as it is, even if two-thirds of the assembly
believe that a member has not the qualifications provided by law, they cannot remove him for that reason.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the Electoral Commission.

Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.

Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the members.

Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has the right to question the eligibility of its members?

Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the Electoral Commission and make the question before
the Electoral Commission.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election is contested or not contested.

Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.

Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral Commission has power and authority to pass upon the
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly even though that question has not been raised.

Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only judge.

In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship Committee in response to an amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura,
Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the difference between the original draft and the draft as amended, Delegate
Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship Committee said:

xxx xxx xxx

Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, señor Presidente, consiste solamente en obviar la objecion apuntada por varios Delegados al efecto
de que la primera clausula del draft que dice: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly"
parece que da a la Comision Electoral la facultad de determinar tambien la eleccion de los miembros que no ha sido protestados
y para obviar esa dificultad, creemos que la enmienda tien razon en ese sentido, si enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se
lea como sigue: "All cases contesting the election", de modo que los jueces de la Comision Electoral se limitaran solamente a
los casos en que haya habido protesta contra las actas." Before the amendment of Delegate Labrador was voted upon the
following interpellation also took place:

El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera

El Sr. PRESIDENTE. ¿Que dice el Comite?

El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.

El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y tres a la Corte Suprema,
¿no cree Su Señoria que esto equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?

El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la Commission esta constituido en esa forma, tanto los miembros de la
mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema consideraran la cuestion sobre la base de sus
meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.

El Sr. CONEJERO. ¿Cree Su Señoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la
minoria prescindieran del partidismo?

El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo.

xxx xxx xxx

The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore the power to decide contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly to the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-
eight (98) against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the representation of the minority
party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two members each, so as to accord more representation to the majority
party. The Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan
character of the commission.

As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:

(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly shall be judged by an
Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the National
Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the
Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.

The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:

SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief
Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest
number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission
shall be its chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members
of the National Assembly.

When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style Committee, through President Recto, to effectuate
the original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the phrase "All contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of" and the
words "the elections", which was accordingly accepted by the Convention.

The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislature long lodged in the
legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the science of government.

Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives a vivid account of the
"scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in the disposition of contests by the House of Commons in the following
passages which are partly quoted by the petitioner in his printed memorandum of March 14, 1936:

153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive judges of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their members, until the year 1770, two modes of proceeding prevailed, in the determination of controverted
elections, and rights of membership. One of the standing committees appointed at the commencement of each session, was
denominated the committee of privileges and elections, whose functions was to hear and investigate all questions of this
description which might be referred to them, and to report their proceedings, with their opinion thereupon, to the house, from
time to time. When an election petition was referred to this committee they heard the parties and their witnesses and other
evidence, and made a report of all the evidence, together with their opinion thereupon, in the form of resolutions, which were
considered and agreed or disagreed to by the house. The other mode of proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the house
itself. When this court was adopted, the case was heard and decided by the house, in substantially the same manner as by a
committee. The committee of privileges and elections although a select committee. The committee of privileges and elections
although a select committee was usually what is called an open one; that is to say, in order to constitute the committee, a
quorum of the members named was required to be present, but all the members of the house were at liberty to attend the
committee and vote if they pleased.

154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to the right of membership gradually assumed a political
character; so that for many years previous to the year 1770, controverted elections had been tried and determined by the house
of commons, as mere party questions, upon which the strength of contending factions might be tested. Thus, for Example, in
1741, Sir Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks upon his government, resigned his office in consequence of an adverse vote
upon the Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial of election cases, as conducted under this system, that "Every
principle of decency and justice were notoriously and openly prostituted, from whence the younger part of the house were
insensibly, but too successfully, induced to adopt the same licentious conduct in more serious matters, and in questions of
higher importance to the public welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a distinguished member of the house of commons, undertook
to propose a remedy for the evil, and, on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the house to bring in a bill,
"to regulate the trial of controverted elections, or returns of members to serve in parliament." In his speech to explain his plan,
on the motion for leave, Mr. Grenville alluded to the existing practice in the following terms: "Instead of trusting to the merits
of their respective causes, the principal dependence of both parties is their private interest among us; and it is scandalously
notorious that we are as earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of the opposite sides, as if we were wholly self-elective, and not
bound to act by the principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of our own inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in
every contested election, many members of this house, who are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity between the
competitors, enlist themselves as parties in the contention, and take upon themselves the partial management of the very
business, upon which they should determine with the strictest impartiality."

155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill which met with the approbation of
both houses, and received the royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770. This was the celebrated law since known by the name of
the Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it "was one of the nobles works, for the honor of the house of commons,
and the security of the constitution, that was ever devised by any minister or statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of
the evil, or the apparent success of the remedy, may have led many of the contemporaries of the measure to the information
of a judgement, which was not acquiesced in by some of the leading statesmen of the day, and has not been entirely confirmed
by subsequent experience. The bill was objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief justice of the common pleas,
Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk of the house, and Mr. Charles James Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the introduction
of the new system was an essential alteration of the constitution of parliament, and a total abrogation of one of the most
important rights and jurisdictions of the house of commons.

As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan settlement of the controverted
elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of the King's Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota
in accordance with rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has become imbedded in English
jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act.
1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance
Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which
were originally heard by the Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the Commonwealth of
Australia, election contests which were originally determined by each house, are since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the
organic law provides that all protests against the election of members of the Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme
Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution
of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly in
the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests, the Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the
Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927
(art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.

The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the legislature and the judiciary is by no means
unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by
each of the two opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate provision for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on
January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission composed of
five members elected by the Senate, five members elected by the House of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the
fifth justice to be selected by the four designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the
two houses voting separately. Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the experience of America in this regard,
judging from the observations of Justice Field, who was a member of that body on the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the
Supreme Court of the United States and its Appellate Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913] — Relentless Partisanship of Electoral
Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the experiment has at least abiding historical interest.

The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority men mature in years and
experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political development of other countries of the world. When ,
therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of
passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so
not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation
of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant.
Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was
approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the constitutional the creation
of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural
Address, March 4, 1861.)

From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was
not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining
legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the Convention, to
provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority
parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by
including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.

The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and execution of the
limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to
all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative
department than to any other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled
"Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of
members of the legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express
lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this
is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution ( Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep.,
1; State vs.Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body
may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period within which
protests should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be
invested with the power to determine contested cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our
Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the
resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining
the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority effective
whenever and whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers
of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate
control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the
constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.

We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the importance and necessity of
respecting the dignity and independence of the national Assembly as a coordinate department of the government and of according validity
to its acts, to avoid what he characterized would be practically an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of protests against
members of the National Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex
necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a
settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise
of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the
absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission,
therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to
have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuse its regulative authority by
admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National
Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible
of abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with
exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is
political, not judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are
not intended to be corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as
much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme
Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve
specific purposes, and each constitutional organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be
animated with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which they were created by the sovereign will. That the
actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the perfection of human
institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate
power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenge in appropriate cases over which the
courts may exercise jurisdiction.

But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are considerations of equitable character that should
not be overlooked in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the controversy. The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on
November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into
effect. The new National Assembly convened on November 25th of that year, and the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner,
Jose A. Angara was approved by that body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election
of the petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was formally
organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing
said date as the last day for the filing of election protest. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3,
1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear
that said body had actually been organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified copies of official records on file in the archives
division of the National Assembly attached to the record of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme
Court the six members of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were respectively designated only on December
4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming non-protested elections of members of the National Assembly
had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of protests, the result would be that the National Assembly — on the
hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of regulation in such cases — had already barred the presentation of protests before
the Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in a matter entrusted
to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could not have been contemplated, and should be avoided.

From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against whom no protests had been
filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election
contests. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature
at the time when the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be
construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election
protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to
all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion
of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not
required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial
board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in
said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).

Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the Congress of the United States, confirmation is neither
necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The return of the proper election officers is sufficient, and the member-
elect presenting such return begins to enjoy the privileges of a member from the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of England,
vol. 12, pp. 331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of contested
elections where the decision is adverse to the claims of the protestant. In England, the judges' decision or report in controverted elections
is certified to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and the House, upon being informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker,
is required to enter the same upon the Journals, and to give such directions for confirming or altering the return, or for the issue of a
writ for a new election, or for carrying into execution the determination as circumstances may require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In
the United States, it is believed, the order or decision of the particular house itself is generally regarded as sufficient, without any actual
alternation or amendment of the return (Cushing, Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).

Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each house of the Philippine Legislature fixed the time when protests
against the election of any of its members should be filed. This was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each
house the sole judge of the election, return and qualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering
each house to respectively prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contest in the election of member of said bodies. As a
matter of formality, after the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already expired, each house passed a resolution confirming
or approving the returns of such members against whose election no protests had been filed within the prescribed time. This was
interpreted as cutting off the filing of further protests against the election of those members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs.
Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine
Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese
[Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine
Legislature, Record — First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No.
3387, section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to determine all contest
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to prescribe
regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus no law nor constitutional provisions which authorized the National Assembly
to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the election of its members. And what
the National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection through the medium of confirmation.
Summarizing, we conclude:

(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation of power into the
legislative, the executive and the judicial.

(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation
of the powers granted.

(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme
Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional
boundaries.

(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the
power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all
authority.

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and
perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the governments.

(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly.

(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was
respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members.

(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission.

(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with
it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.

( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ pass upon
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence
or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and
regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests.

(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the
Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also
section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against
the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and
to fix the costs and expenses of contest.

(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect
may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to
said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within
which protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.

We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming
to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and
that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules
of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as a constitutional creation and as to the
scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the present controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral
Commission is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
Supreme Court; Judicial Review; Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; The Supreme Court’s power of judicial review is conferred
on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution; In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the
only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof.—This Court’s power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution: SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis
supplied) Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case
of Angara v. Electoral Commission after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not
contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed: x x x In
times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The executive and legislative branches of the government effectively acknowledged the power of judicial
review in Article 7 of the Civil Code.—In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution,
the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts. And as pointed out by noted political
law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, the executive and legislative branches of our government in fact
effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit: Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent
ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts declare
a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders
and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together
with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast
powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.—As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review
is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation
of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of
the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government.It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept
separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution
has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
(Emphasis and italics supplied)

Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Verba Legis; Wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed.—To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court
must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction. First, verba legis,
that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando,
declared: We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where
we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.
They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever
be present in the people’s consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction
is reduced to a minimum. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

Same; Same; Same; The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers—ratio legis est
anima—the object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated
to effect that purpose.—Where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance
with the Intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary in this wise: A
foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that
the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any,
sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to
make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.” (Emphasis and italics supplied)

Same; Same; Same; The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole—ut magis valeat quam pereat.—Ut magis valeat quam pereat. The
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon, this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared: x
x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of
one person without considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said
provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not itself alone, but in con junction with all other provisions of
that great document. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

Same; Same; Same; If the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available; The proper interpretation
of a constitutional provision depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than the framers’ understanding thereof.—
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded: While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of
the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only
when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention “are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but
they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at
the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its
face.” The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers’
understanding thereof. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

Same; Same; Impeachment; American jurisprudence and authorities on impeachment, much less the American Constitution, are of
dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit as Philippine
constitutional law is concerned; Although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of
development have long since diverged—in the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord.”—Respondents’ and
intervenors’ reliance upon American jurisprudence, the Americana Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support
the proposition that the Senate’s “sole power to try and decide impeachment cases,” as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the
Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total
exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably
support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions
incident to impeachment proceedings. Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious
application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine
constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC, “[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not
be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional
settings and needs.” Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of
development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, “[w]e have cut the umbilical cord.”

Same; Same; Same; The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme
Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that
granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a
duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government
branch or instrumentality; There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect
to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings.—The major difference between the judicial power of the
Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the
U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided
for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any
grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S.
Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings.
While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution,
though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the
exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing,
required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.

Same; Same; Same; The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress—it provided
for certain well-defined limits, or “judicially discoverable standards” for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through
the power of judicial review.—Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may
also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the
principle that “whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the
perils of judicial willfulness and pride.” But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards
in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress.
Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr, “judicially discoverable standards” for determining
the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.

Same; Same; Same; Checks and Balances; There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances.—There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that
the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is
to be interpreted as a whole and “one section is not to be allowed to defeat another.” Both are integral components of the calibrated
system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the
Constitution.

Same; Same; Requisites for Judicial Review.—As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts’ power of judicial review,
like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for
the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.
Same; Same; Same; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; The gist to the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.—Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Real-Party-in-Interest; The rule on real-party-in-interest is a concept of civil procedure while the rule
on standing has constitutional underpinnings—the question as to “real party in interest” is whether he is “the party who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment, or the ‘party entitled to the avails of the suit’ ” while the question of standing is whether such party
have “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional issues.”—There is, however, a
difference between the rule on real party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure while the
latter has constitutional underpinnings. In view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the
ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest. The difference
between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by authorities thus: “It is important to note . . . that standing
because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is
the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties
can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to
the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas. Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought
not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers
or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have “alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” x x x On the other hand, the question as to “real party
in interest” is whether he is “the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the ‘party entitled to the avails of the suit.’
” (Citations omitted)

Same; Same; Same; Same; Citizen’s Suits; When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute
must be direct and personal.—When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be
direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in
imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite
way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled
or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Taxpayer’s Suits; In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law; Courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be
entertained.—In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest
in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement
of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public. At
all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer’s suit should be entertained. This Court opts to grant standing
to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the
ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Legislator’s Suits; For a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he
claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.—As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action
which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain
inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Association’s Suits; While an association has legal personality to represent its members, especially when it is
composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests, the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true,
does not suffice to clothe it with standing.—While an association has legal personality to represent its members, especially when it is
composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests, the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true,
does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a
reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues
presented by it.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Class Suits; When dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently
numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit, and
where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised, a class suit ought
to fail.—In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous
to fully protect the interests of all concerned to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit, for a judgment in
a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether
or not they were before the court. Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent
issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners additionally
allege standing ascitizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Transcendental Importance,” Explained; There being no doctrinal definition of
transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants are instructive—(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved
in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government, and, (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions
being raised; In not a few cases, the Supreme Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on locus standi of a petitioner where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance
to the public.—There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants formulated by
former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case;
(2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality
of the government; and, (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.
Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance. In not a few
cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public. Such liberality does not,
however, mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very
least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos’ case, he
failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Intervention; An intervenor must possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either
of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof.—With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court
requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an
officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy
the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A Senator possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against
which the petitions are directed.—Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making
of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President Drilon’s. He alleges that submitting to this Court’s jurisdiction as
the Senate President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of
Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter
in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all
substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Attorneys; A motion to intervene as a taxpayer will be denied where such party fails to allege that
there will result an illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper purpose; A lawyer’s mere
interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.—As to Jaime N. Soriano’s motion to intervene, the same
must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer’s suits
as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec, to wit: x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys,
nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is “being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional
protection against abuses of legislative power,” or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (Citations omitted) In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even
to allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper
purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.

Same; Same; Same; Ripeness and Prematurity; For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, “it is a prerequisite that something had
by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture.”—In Tan v. Macapagal, this Court,
through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, “it is a prerequisite that something had by
then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture.” Only then may the courts pass on the
validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.

Same; Same; Same; Justiciability; Political Questions; Separation of Powers; Words and Phrases; The term “political question” connotes,
in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy—it refers to “those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government.”—In the leading case of Tañada v. Cuenco, Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion defined the term “political question,” viz.: [T]he term “political question” connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to “those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government.” It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure. (Italics in the original)

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason,
the Supreme Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions; The frequency with which
the Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated
Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify the Court’s power of judicial review and its application
on issues involving political questions.—Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason,
this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind
the cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review. In other cases, however, despite the
seeming political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits
on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary which raised
the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took
cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity. The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain
cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this
Court’s power of judicial review and its application on issues involving political questions.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; From the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that
judicial power is not only a power—it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the
political question doctrine.—From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial
power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political
question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with
“truly political questions.” From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) “truly political questions”
and (2) those which “are not truly political questions.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Truly political questions are beyond judicial review while courts can review questions which
are not truly political in nature.—Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review
questions which are not truly political in nature.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Standards for Determining Political Questions; Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution does
not define what are justiciable political questions and non justiciable political questions, and identification of these two species of political
questions may be problematic.—Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution does not define what are justiciable political questions and
non-justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these two species of political questions may be problematic. There has been
no clear standard. The American case of Baker v. Carrattempts to provide some: x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to
involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual, need for questioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
(Italics supplied) Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and
(3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are
not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are
also present.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The problem in applying the standards provided in Baker v. Carr, 227 U.S. 100 (1993),
is that the American concept of judicial review is radically different from the current Philippine concept, for the Constitution provides our
courts with far less discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue; In our jurisdiction, the determination
of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.—The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the
American concept of judicial review is radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides
our courts with far less discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue. In our jurisdiction, the
determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to
examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this
standard to the present controversy.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Impeachment; Words and Phrases; A determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense
is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature—it is beyond the scope of the
Supreme Court’s judicial power; Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of
these—other high crimes and betrayal of public trust—elude a precise definition.—It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue
assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on
Elections, this Court held: x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law
to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some
other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable. [Emphasis and italics supplied] Succinctly
put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.

Same; Same; Same; Lis Mota; It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental
act should be avoided whenever possible.—The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this
Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Although Section 2 of Article
XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust,
elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could
find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and
negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor. Clearly, the issue calls upon this
court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court is guided by the related canon of adjudication that it “should not form a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied.”—Noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions,
while all seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the
outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues
should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related canon of adjudication that “the court should not form a rule of constitutional
law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied.”

Same; Same; Legislative Inquiries; Standard of Conduct for the Conduct of Legislative Inquiries.—En passant, this Court notes that a
standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, viz.: The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not,
therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the aforequoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein,
the investigation must be “in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure” and that “the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.” It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be
respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one’s self.

Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Political Questions; Judicial Restraint; The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not
an option before the Supreme Court, otherwise the Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the
Constitution—The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined,
because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may
be referred.” Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being
clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions. In the august words of amicus curiae
Father Bernas, “jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious,
would be a dereliction of duty.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit
itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do so.—Even in cases where it is an interested party,
the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority
to do so. On the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter “not
with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness.” After all, “by [his]
appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass
upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be
unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking
in [his] office.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Seven Pillars of Limitations of the Power of Judicial Review.—In Demetria v. Alba, this Court, through
Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the “seven pillars” of limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice
Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA as follows: 1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary
proceeding, declining because to decide such questions ‘is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of
real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the
legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.’ 2. The Court will not ‘anticipate a
question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.’ . . . ‘It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.’ 3. The Court will not ‘formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.’ 4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule
has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the
other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state
challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on
an independent state ground. 5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he
is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to
one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty
will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the
Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not
entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens. 6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a
statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits. 7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question,
and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction
of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided (citations omitted).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for the Supreme Court to
refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases.—Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et al. raise another argument for
judicial restraint the possibility that “judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress
and the [J]udiciary.” They stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the
scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded
the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official. Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to
enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in
the judiciary. Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the
occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases.
Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.

Impeachment; Statutory Construction; Words and Phrases; “Initiate” of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries
do, to begin, to commence, or set going.—The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term “initiate.” Resort to
statutory construction is, therefore, in order. That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz
Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of “initiate” as “to file,” as proffered and
explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner
Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added
that the act of “initiating” included the act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word “initiate”
as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. “Initiate” of course
is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means “to perform or facilitate the first action,” which jibes with Justice Regalado’s
position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003.

Same; Same; Same; It is clear that the framers intended “initiation” to start with the filing of the complaint.—It is thus clear that the
framers intended “initiation” to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that
“the obvious reason in deleting the phrase “to initiate impeachment proceedings” as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3
(3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the
complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which
was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution.” Amicus curiae
Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, that the word “initiate” as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be
accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.

Same; Same; Same; Reddendo Singula Singulis; The term “cases” must be distinguished from the term “proceedings”—an impeachment
case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate but before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a
“proceeding” must be followed to arrive at a conclusion, and such proceeding must be “initiated” in the House of Representatives.—
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is “to initiate.” The object in the first sentence is “impeachment
case.” The object in the second sentence is “impeachment proceeding.” Following the principle of reddendo singula singulis, the term
“cases” must be distinguished from the term “proceedings.” An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the
Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate.
It is in that sense that the House has “exclusive power” to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a
decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a “proceeding” must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be
“initiated.” To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun.
It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the
filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the
House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint
or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the
House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms
a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one third
of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that
the House “initiates an impeachment case.” It is at this point that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached.

That is, he or she is successfully charged with an impeachment “case” before the Senate impeachment court.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The framers of the Constitution understood initiation in its ordinary meaning.—The framers of the Constitution
also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that “A vote of at least one-third of
all the Members of the House shall be necessary . . . to initiate impeachment proceedings,” this was met by a proposal to delete the line
on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does. Thus the
line was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional
Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term “to initiate” refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’
taking initial action of said complaint; Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be
filed against the same official within a one year period.—To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate
impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says “The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases
of impeachment,” This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating
“impeachment cases” with “impeachment proceeding.” From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of
two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term “to initiate” refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint
coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and
referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the
members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period.

Same; Separation of Powers; The power of Congress to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry
out the purpose of this section.”—the rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution; If Congress had absolute rule-making
power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of
referendum.—Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and
only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that Congress
has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced. Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that “The
Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate
its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot
contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI
clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz.: It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution
which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule-making power, then it would by necessary implication have the
power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.

Same; Same; Where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes
judicial in nature.—In Osmeña v. Pendatun, this Court held that it is within the province of either House of Congress to interpret its rules
and that it was the best judge of what constituted “disorderly behavior” of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission
on Appointments, Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v.
Smith, declared that where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question
becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia, quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for
this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method
of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of
method are open to the determination of the Legislature.

Same; Same; The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article
XI as they give the term “initiate” a meaning different from “filing.”—The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding
of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement
before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of
the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term “initiate” a meaning different from
“filing.”

Separation of Powers; Judicial Review; The raison d’etre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative
of their own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.—
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the
impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond
this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political
questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the
government. Rather, the raison d’etre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers
to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.

Same; Same; To disqualify the entire institution that is the Supreme Court from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely
incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.—The institution that is the Supreme
Court together with all other courts has long held and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless
of the personalities involved in the suits or actions, This Court has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever
stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unafraid by whatever imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered
judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is
the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity
of a government branch’s official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any
member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now from the suit at bar
is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non
sequitur.

Same; Same; The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of the Court, but just because he is the Chief
Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else.—No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic
precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law’s moral authority and that of its
agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is
most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and
ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice
is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets
to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual’s rights irrespective of his station in life.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be,
over the determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional
powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.

Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these
co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal
luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.

There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of the instant petitions – whether the
filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the
one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis.
Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.

In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns
that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is
neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from,
the Constitution.

In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine
of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute
autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the
official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.

Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to insure that governmental power is
wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination among these branches where the
delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is
in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.

Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XI

Accountability of Public Officers

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers
and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon
a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days,
and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority
vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt
thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with
the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House,
the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
 (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office
under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and
punishment according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the
previous House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House
Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:
11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW
RULES

RULE II RULE V

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST INITIATION

OF IMPEACHMENT
Section 2. Mode of Initiating PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE
Impeachment. – Impeachment SAME OFFICIAL
shall be initiated only by a verified
complaint for impeachment filed Section 16. – Impeachment
by any Member of the House of Proceedings Deemed
Representatives or by any citizen Initiated. – In cases where a
upon a resolution of endorsement Member of the House files a
by any Member thereof or by a verified complaint of
verified complaint or resolution of impeachment or a citizen files a
impeachment filed by at least one- verified complaint that is
third (1/3) of all the Members of endorsed by a Member of the
the House. House through a resolution of
endorsement against an
impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings
against such official are deemed
initiated on the day the
Committee on Justice finds that
the verified complaint and/or
resolution against such official,
as the case may be, is sufficient
in substance, or on the date the
House votes to overturn or affirm
the finding of the said Committee
that the verified complaint and/or
resolution, as the case may be, is
not sufficient in substance.

In cases where a verified

complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or
endorsed, as the case may be, by
at least one-third (1/3) of the
Members of the
House, impeachment
proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the
filing of such verified
complaint or resolution of
impeachment with the
Secretary General.

RULE V Section 17. Bar Against

Initiation Of Impeachment
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT Proceedings. – Within a period
of one (1) year from the date
impeachment proceedings are
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No
deemed initiated as provided in
impeachment proceedings shall be
Section 16 hereof, no
initiated against the same official
 more than once within the period impeachment proceedings, as
of one (1) year. such, can be initiated against the
same official. (Italics in the
original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which
directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution which reads:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by
a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together
with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days
from receipt thereof.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to
dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been
sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint 11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.
This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3)
of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes
in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment
complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House
Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections
16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing
respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second
impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent
with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of
transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent
House of Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a
writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment
against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.

In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public funds
necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining
Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions
of this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition
for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in their petition
for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to the
Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment
to the Senate.

In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members
of the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated,
pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null
and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless
spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the
Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolution
endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court
enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint,
and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act
on the impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T.
Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that
the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House
Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility
to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently enjoined
from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House
Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which
they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of
Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further
proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint
and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.

In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of
national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest
in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays
for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the
Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.

In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and
Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted
without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."

In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofileña, alleging that as professors of law they have an
abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which they are
trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate
from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment
complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the
House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare
Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment
complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment
complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of
Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.

In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition
that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of
Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting
any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from
proceeding with the impeachment trial.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen which were filed before this
Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of Representatives
from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket
number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for
being unconstitutional.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In
addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the
administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of
the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second impeachment
complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of
quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.

Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or
before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban
inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate.

Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the
petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions
not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d)
appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the
status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the
petitions moot.

Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents,
by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin
the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance
of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf,
filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the
Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be
recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."22

Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated
petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral
arguments on November 5, 2003.

On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar
as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the
petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court
commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions
pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of Representatives.

On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292,
and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily
put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is
not yet ripe for judicial determination.

On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to
Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."

On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in
G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention
with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.

The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in
Intervention were admitted.

On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel
and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on
November 3, 2003, to wit:

Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time;
and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.

In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:

a) locus standi of petitioners;

b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);

c) political question/justiciability;

d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;

e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;

f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and

g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)

In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments
and opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows:
(1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings;
(2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive
issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.

Judicial Review

As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity of the second
impeachment complaint.

This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987
Constitution:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)

Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara
v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain
the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:

x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or
marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which
can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among
the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the
power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty
however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a
system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The
Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and
agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had
not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels,for then
the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they
should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the
possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been
set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is
granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such
powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the
power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question
raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions
of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government. 24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of
government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a necessary consequence
of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable."26

Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such
power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803
leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:

It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself
is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the
constitution, have that rank.
 Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle,
supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and
that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.28(Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was
exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and former Supreme
Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this power
of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter
shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the
laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and
balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government
and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be
kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings
of the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and
hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential for the maintenance
and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through
the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed
the only, medium of participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in that balancing operation."34

To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of
government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter
law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt
from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:

xxx

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact,
it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably
by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all,
the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain
principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political
detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense
of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The
Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely
request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof
during the martial law regime. x x x

xxx

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as
well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a
branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This
is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
 This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to
settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which
employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but
that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express
the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms
are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a
lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its
language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the
text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is
reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent
of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has
been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption,
and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the
times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason
which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it
declared:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given
effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the
framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying
the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court,
through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution
merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others.When they adopted
subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance
and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be

separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject
are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole
purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every
word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to
arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as
said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their
votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding thereof. 46 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review
that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded
impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.

Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a
judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of
judicial review.47

For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the
application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional questions relative to
impeachment proceedings.49

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents
Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the
case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate
since it runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs
the system of checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of
finality and difficulty in fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate
judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.

Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American authorities cannot be
credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI,
Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the
legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor
can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine
constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.

Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer
controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in
the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence
some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs." 53 Indeed, although
the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the
colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the
power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine
Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an
expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or
instrumentality.

There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House
of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article
XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one
and the same official.

Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between
Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible,
the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and
pride."56

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that
the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain
well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of
such discretion, through the power of judicial review.

The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment
power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to
compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago
v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v.
Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition
raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and
void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a
member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held
that the resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation
of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held
that the act of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial
review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this
does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral
Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is
contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National
Assembly.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would
upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another."67 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no
branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Essential Requisites for Judicial Review

As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the
Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity
of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt
at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed
as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More
than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies
must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.68 (Italics in the original)

Standing

Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.69

Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief
Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza
similarly contends.

Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to
taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest 70 and transcendental importance,71 and
that procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them. 72 Amicus
curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched
rule exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the
Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.

There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil
procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the
Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-
in-interest.

The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to
note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to
whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed
towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the
merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.

Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who
actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."

xxx

On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by
the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)

While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives,
none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke
the vindication of their own rights – as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar
and of the legal profession – which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.

In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have been met have been
given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be
able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the
person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. 77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of
the public.80

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. 81 This Court opts to grant
standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment
and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a
legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in his office.83

While an association has legal personality to represent its members, 84 especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the
outcome will affect their vital interests,85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal
profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing.
Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has
advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.

In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully
protect the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit, 88 for a judgment in a
class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether
or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the
divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since
petitioners additionallyallege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.

The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos,
in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme
Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence
of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.90 Applying
these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.

In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft
an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public.91 Such
liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party
must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner
Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.

With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of
right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing
intervention.92

In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No.
160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners
Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-
Intervention.

Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261.
Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of the House
of Representatives is successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied with.

Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of
transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to
Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based
on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.

Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires
of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of
view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does will
undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to
it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member
of Congress against which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the
matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.

Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed
to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:

x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said
petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against
abuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)

In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of
public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does
not suffice to clothe him with standing.

Ripeness and Prematurity

In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a
prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal
proceeding.

The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice
in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The
questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and
the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be
accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.

Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President
Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on
questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should first be exhausted.

Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going
attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House
Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of
Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles
are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.

The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the
House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second
impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution97 and,
therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.

Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is
shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule
with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is
exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body
which is bereft of power to grant it.

Justiciability

In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political question," viz:

[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In
other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.99(Italics in the original)

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of
taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political question
doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review. 100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the
therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
upon political bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the
1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification
by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.

The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the
Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of
judicial review and its application on issues involving political questions, viz:
 MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the
three major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with
which to enforce its decisions or commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God,
and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the
provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has
some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by
the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the
solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain
principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release
of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the
government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no
authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions
involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged
further violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar with this situation.
But for the benefit of the Members of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of
the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced
on September 22, although the proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was
that the administration had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So that when martial law was
announced on September 22, the media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not
only because our main writers were already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in their jobs were under
mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971
and by September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I
forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them,
were picked up. One of them was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution
was taken over by representatives of Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention had been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to the
President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation
of some provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less public discussions of certain matters of
public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite
was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the
interregnum, however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that Malacañang felt
the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would
consult the people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But the questions to be submitted in the
referendum were not announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not of the Commission
on Elections, but of what was then designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into existence.
The questions to be propounded were released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a
plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a
motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When the motion was being
heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that
the new Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored the
Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session room where the case was
being heard. I then informed the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had
been ratified by the people and is now in force.

A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the
government was that the issue was a political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.

xxx

The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the
Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any
referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did they participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw
any referendum proceeding.

In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members of the Court felt that there had been
no referendum.

Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference between a referendum and a
plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political question. Whereupon,
 they dismissed the case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of "political question" was set up. There
have been a number of other cases in the past.

x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly justiciable.

xxx

x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the following questions: What is judicial
power? What is a political question?

The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which
are demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In
a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell
your wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge
her main marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them
by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity."

This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:

Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or
enforceable . . .

The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of government,
the Supreme Court has, also another important function. The powers of government are generally considered
divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own
sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is
valid or not is vested in courts of justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as
well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a
branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction.
This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty
to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.

I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the subject of
the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:

MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is not vested in the Supreme
Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be created by law.

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.

MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?

MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions with jurisdictional
questions. But there is a difference.

MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?

MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a question as to
whether the government had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess
of jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.

xxx

FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme Court according to the new numerical need
for votes.

On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question doctrine?

MR. CONCEPCION. No.

FR. BERNAS. It is not.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
 FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away with the political question
doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.

When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will
notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the reason being that the definition that we might make may not
cover all possible areas.

FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political questions are beyond the pale of
judicial power.104 (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power;
it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice
Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From
this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not
truly political questions."

Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained.
On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in
nature.

As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken
jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.

In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas
which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide.106 x x x

In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:

The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in
a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival
claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that
obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the
applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we
were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it
under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. 110 x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and non-justiciable political questions, however.
Identification of these two species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American case
of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:

x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.112(Underscoring supplied)

Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not
separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are
also present.

The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review is radically different from our current
concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether they should
pass upon a constitutional issue.

In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question
of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts
are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall
thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.

These petitions raise five substantial issues:

 I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the
Constitution.

II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.

III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional
infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for
violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More
importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.113

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes
and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by
alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor. 114 Clearly,
the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section
1, Article VIII.

Lis Mota

It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever
possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:

x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents
some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question
will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of
Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that
the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual
case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have
been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the
decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]

Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the
controversy.

As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise
several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one,
some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that
"the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied."119

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid
since it directly resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry
petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of
legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy
of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the judiciary.121

Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the
constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the second
impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional
law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is required by the
facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in
support of their petition which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.

En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon,
Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:

The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus,
Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
 The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise
is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected,
including the right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's self. 123

In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of petitioners
Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article
XI of the Constitution which reads:

Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the
same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and
Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors
point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:

"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of Representatives
Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"124

Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for said second impeachment complaint to
automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed,"
not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having complied with this requirement,
they concede that the second impeachment complaint should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice
under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by
a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together
with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days
from receipt thereof.

Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply,
there should be 76 or more representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and
verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives as endorsers is not the
resolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one
Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.

While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to
the provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present
controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this
issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the
instant consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts
presented by the other petitioners as well.

Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases is made easier by the
fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments and
issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.

In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant
controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second
impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Judicial Restraint

Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the
sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power
of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.

On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume
jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to impeachment." 125But this argument is very much like
saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives
are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this
Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be
referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being
clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus
curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is
vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."

Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the
challenge because no other office has the authority to do so. 128 On the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the
controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always,
with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their
confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to
be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral
fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office."130

The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral
Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of
the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested
parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members
whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other
colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification,
if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can
perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.

To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone
has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed
by no less than the fundamental law.

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of
the possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senators—elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment
thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time,
all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations
or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations
must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal.
Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself
from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain
from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the
way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules
can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:

Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving
the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial
power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with
the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of
the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered,
would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its
entire membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the original)

Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial review.

In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review,
enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:

1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to
decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital
controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature
could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'

2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit
of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'

3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied.'

4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present
some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can
be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or
 general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question
under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.

5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its
operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who
lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty
will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to
have the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity
Act was not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.

6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.

7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it
is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided (citations omitted).

The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:

1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case

3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground

4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute

5. that the parties are not in estoppel

6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.

As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial review:

1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power

2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement

3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity

4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136

Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial review of impeachments
might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the appearance of
impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political
instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official. 137 Intervenor
Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution
of its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary.

Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence
of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot
abandon their constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.

Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.

x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court
has passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also political
consequences. Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an
act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a
decision for the respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138

Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end there were not enough votes either to grant the
petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the
establishment of the martial law regime.

Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of the government would behave in a
lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to
believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy
by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.

Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141
 Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public officers], under the guise of religious or
political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the
duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad
discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and
ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the
interference of their own personal beliefs.142

Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure

for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress

Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;"
that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution
provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of
Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the
House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate
Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.

The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.

That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate
Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong
during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral
arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking
initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the
Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.

"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third
New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with
Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November
5, 2003 in this wise:

Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an
end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments
leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its
referral to the Committee on Justice.

Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment
is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote
of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated."
The language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after
actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:

MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I
understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these would need some time for Committee action.

However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of
which have been furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First
Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the impeachment
proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the
report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.

xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by
Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing
of the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles
of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the
floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon
wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the
body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or
disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words
because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of
the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted
my proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
 xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at
all affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the
United States regarding impeachment.

I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17
to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line
19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace
the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."

I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the United States is
concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it
the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of
the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that
my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of
Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam President. 143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
udnerscoring supplied)

This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of Public
Officers.144

It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner
Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the
text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment
proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does
not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3,
paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."145

Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing
must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.

During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on
impeachment, viz:

Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

xxx

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year,
(Emphasis supplied)

refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."

Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment
case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term
"cases" must be distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the
Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate.
It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a
decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be
"initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun.
It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the
filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the
House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint
or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the
House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms
a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one third
of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that
the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he
or she is successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.

Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial
because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment
proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that
has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the
proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the
initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that
"A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by
a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of
a complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on
Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which
means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and
that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and
not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.

To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says
"The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision
and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without
a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said
complaint.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the
House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary
General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated,
another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.

Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a
finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House
itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance
or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution
of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules
give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.

In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the
interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions (referring to
Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our deliberations stand
on a different footing from the properly recorded utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this
Court likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent
spectators may know more about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced perspectives and disinterestedness. 148

Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present only two members of this Court who
participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken
part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members
of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.

Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has
the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that Congress
has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.

Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of
this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of
this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively
carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:

Section 3. (1) x x x

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon
a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days,
and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority
vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt
thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with
the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House,
the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule
making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need
of referendum.

In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was
the best judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v.
Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question
becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking
for this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method
of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of
method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for
courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that
we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the
United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial
power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view the issues before the Court. It is
in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules.
It held:

"x x x

"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that
in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:

Rule XV

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in
the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with
the names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do business.
(House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)

The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and
not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters
the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom
or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the
mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within
these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say
that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different
one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted.
It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and
beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."

Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether
they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore
any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable relationship with
the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere
invocation of the principle of separation of powers.154

xxx

In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political
question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our
Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not
also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous
power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were
shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive
and the Legislative departments of government.155

xxx

The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power which it can decline to
exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down
any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this
Court against the other branches of government despite their more democratic character, the President and the legislators being
elected by the people.156

xxx

The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government' constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis-à-
vis the other branches of government. This provision was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a
stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x x
 xxx

In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government committed with grave abuse of discretion,
the new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience
as nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary.Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached
constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress
– this Court is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do but what
it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case at bar
once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true
to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield
it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly
emboldened other branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed
the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its
interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar,
the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners. 157 (Italics in the original emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the violation of private
rights and the Constitution are involved.

Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the
constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply
provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever
as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not
hold with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated,
furnishes several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.

The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance,
or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is
not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified
complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI
as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."

Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee
on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint
has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article
XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003,
the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief
Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Conclusion

If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual and
collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean
the seriousness of the controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an exasperating,
mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively
believe to be the correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the
impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various
sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith – offered suggestions for a return to
a state of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability upon
areas of national life.

Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was specifically asked,
told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of the
impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the
doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction,"
"non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have a bearing on the impeachment
proceedings.

This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court found the existence in full
of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over an issue whose resolution
precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a
genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-
cut allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the Court's
jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of
judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.

This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the
impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond
this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political
questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the
government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers
to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.

It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice,
the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said issue is as much
at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been entrusted with the judicial power to
resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the
course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could
be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power
in these petitions just because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the fundamental
issue is not him but the validity of a government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are
rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire
institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party
to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.

No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the
law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there
is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme
Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind
in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he
is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights
irrespective of his station in life.

The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by this impeachment case against Chief
Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared
would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in our bedrock
of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve
differences without the use of force and aggression upon each other.

WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House
of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the
Constitution.

SO ORDERED.
[No. 45459. March 13, 1937]

GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner, vs. JUAN Ruiz, respondent,

1.PROHIBITION; ISSUANCE OF WRIT FOR ACTS PERFORMED WITHOUT JURISDICTION.—While, generally, prohibition as an
extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C.
J., 658), its issuance and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to "* * * inferior tribunals,
corporations, boards, or persons, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are without or in excess of the
jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person * * *." (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.)
2.ID.; ID.; DIRECTOR OF POSTS.—The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in the statute are
undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challenged act of the respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act
because alleged to be violative of the Constitution is a fortiori "without or in excess of * * * jurisdiction."
3.ID.; ID.; WRIT NOT CONFINED EXCLUSIVELY TO COURTS OR TRIBUNALS.—The statutory rule, therefore, in this jurisdiction is
that the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction
and to prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer or
person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the
orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a
multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)
4.CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES; RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.—What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not
mere religious toleration. Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence
is deeply felt and highly appreciated.
5.ID.; ID.; POSTAGE STAMPS ISSUED UNDER ACT No. 4052.—The respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in
question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature which appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for
the cost of plates and' printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the
Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated
in the manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government."
6.ID.; ID.; ID.—Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary
power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the
phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the
appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the
present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. The stamps
were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given
to that church.
7.ID.; ID.; ID.—The only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to
this country." The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity
to the Philippines and its people." The stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church
chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows:
"Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but
Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.—While the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a
religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the
Government. The Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious
in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose
should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs.Roberts, 175 U. S.,
295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Vicente Sotto for petitioner.
Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.

LAUREL, J.:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ
of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third
International Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance -of postage stamps
commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman
Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the
Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the
respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage stamps for printing as follows:

"In the center is a chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are blue, green, brown, cardinal red,
violet and orange, 1 inch by 1.094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos." The said stamps were actually
issued and sold though the greater part thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented
by the petitioner herein.

The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the instant case, although he admits that the
writ may properly restrain ministerial functions. While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or
control the performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J., 658), its issuance and enforcement are regulated by
statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to "* * * inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether exercising functions judicial
or ministerial, which are without of in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person * * *." (Secs. 516 and
226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly
comprehensive and include the challenged act of the respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act because alleged to be
violative of the Constitution is a fortiori "without or in excess of * * * jurisdiction." The statutory rule, therefore, in this jurisdiction is that
the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to
prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose
acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration
of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga
and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)

The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the respondent in issuing and selling postage
stamps commemorative of the Thirtythird International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative
of the provisions of section 13, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows:

"No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed
forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium."

The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state. Without the necessity of adverting
to the historical background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind,
has taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise when the state will use the church, and
the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their respective ends and aims. The Malolos Constitution recognized this principle
of separation of church and state in the early stages of our constitutional development; it was inserted in the Treaty of Paris between
the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898, reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions to the Philippine Commission, reaffirmed
in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied in the Constitution of the Philippines as
the supreme expression of the Filipino people. It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom.
All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend the Constitution, bind
themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized
implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its
influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized.
And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the
Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall
embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their
posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested their intense religious
nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in
human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3,
Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4, Ordinance appended thereto;

Assessment Law, sec. 344, par. [c], Adm. Code). Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious
teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium (sec. 13, subsec. 3,
Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5,
Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day,
Christmas Day, and Sundays are made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conducive
to beneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship are
considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal Code).

In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions of
Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. This Act is as follows:

"No. 4052.—AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS
IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS
WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature assembled and by the authority of the same:

"SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately available out of any funds in the Insular
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs, and other expenses incident
thereto.
"SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is hereby authorized to dispose
of the whole or any portion of the amount herein appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may be deemed advantageous
to the Government.
"SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to the Treasury.
"SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.
"Approved, February 21, 1933."

It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps with new
designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed advantageous to
the Government". The printing and issuance of the postage stamps in question appears to have been approved by authority of the
President of the Philippines in a letter dated September 1, 1936, made part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The respondent
alleges that the Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is granted. He estimates the revenue to be
derived from the sale of the postage stamps in question at P1,618,179.10 and states that there still remain to be sold stamps worth
P1,402,279.02.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when
the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the
Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public
money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage
stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian
feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the letter of the
Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the
stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to this country." The officials concerned merely took advantage of an
event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people" (Letter of the Undersecretary of Public
Works and Communications to the President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is significant to note that
the stamps' as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a
map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress,
Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that
congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of
a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the
Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results,
more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation.
The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated.
(Vide Bradfield vs.Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)

We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate the complete separation of
church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of
religious intolerance and persecution, care should be taken that at this stage of our political development nothing is done by the
Government or its officials that may lead to the belief that the Government is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or
institution, But, upon very serious reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come
to the conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar. Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to issue postage stamps with new designs "as often as may
be deemed advantageous to the Government." Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing
and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor
judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap. exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the
official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.

The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
G.R. No. 187167. August 16, 2011.*

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY
OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA MAY ALTEZ, FRANCIS
ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA,
EDAN MARRI CAÑETE, VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III,
GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE,
MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR
RAMOS, ENRIK FORT REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE ROA,
NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and
MARCELINO VELOSO III, petitioners, vs. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO
ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, respondents.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III); UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition or loss of
territory.—UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others,
sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles
from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.
UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of
States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited span
of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.

Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines (Republic Act No. 9522); Baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines
are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and
continental shelf.—Baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their
coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of
the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer: Article
48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf.—The
breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from
archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)

Same; Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)
States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves.—Baselines laws are nothing but
statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves.
In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which
States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce
customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living
resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).

Same; RA 9522 increased the Philippines’ total maritime space by 145,216 square nautical miles.—Petitioners’ assertion of loss of
“about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters” under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA
9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines’ total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea
and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III); Congress’ decision to classify the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the
Scarborough Shoal as ‘Regime[s] of Islands’ manifests the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation
under UNCLOS III.—Far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress’ decision to classify
the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as “‘Regime[s] of Islands’ under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121” of UNCLOS
III manifests the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servandaobligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of
UNCLOS III, any “naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide,” such as portions of the KIG,
qualifies under the category of “regime of islands,” whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

Same; The recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents
the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III.—The recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago and the waters
enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III. Separate
islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the
States’ territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III.

Same; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) creates a sui generis maritime space—the exclusive economic
zone—in waters previously part of the high seas.—UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates
a sui generis maritime space—the exclusive economic zone—in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to
coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles. UNCLOS III, however, preserves the
traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.

Same; Absent an United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State
like the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and
continental shelf is measured.—Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself
devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is
recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the
waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the country’s case in any international dispute over
Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.

Same; Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines (Republic Act No. 9522); The enactment of United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS III) compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an
internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf.—The enactment of UNCLOS
III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-
recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on
the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Harry L. Roque, Jr. Joel Ruiz Butuyan and Rommel Regalado Bagares for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

CARPIO, J.:

The Case
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting
the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.

The Antecedents
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic
State.3 This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I),4 codifying,
among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their “territorial sea,” the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined.
Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA
3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting
typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the
need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),5 which the
Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984.6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of
archipelagic States like the Philippines7 and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf.8 Complying
with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago
and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as “regimes of islands” whose
islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as “citizens, taxpayers or x x x legislators,”9 as
the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime
territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,10embodying
the terms of the Treaty of Paris11 and ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to
maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s
nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.13

In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a large
maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.14 To buttress their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners
facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included—its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of
UNCLOS III’s framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.

Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petition’s compliance with the case or
controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners’ alleged lack of locus standiand (2) the propriety of the writs
of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as the country’s
compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA
9522 does not undermine the country’s security, environment and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines’ claim over Sabah.

Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners’ assertion that what Spain ceded to the United
States under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the
Treaty of Paris.
We left unacted petitioners’ prayer for an injunctive writ.

The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
A. Preliminarily—
1) Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and
2) Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.
B. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

The Ruling of the Court

On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of certiorari and
prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522
unconstitutional.

On the Threshold Issues

Petitioners Possess Locus
Standi as Citizens
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petition alleges neither
infringement of legislative prerogative15 nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by the passage and implementation of RA 9522.
Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners’ locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the
case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA
9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing “a more direct and specific interest” to bring the suit, thus satisfying
one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing.17
The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition
Are Proper Remedies to Test
the Constitutionality of Statutes
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of the writs
of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners.18

Respondents’ submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review,
however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of
statutes,19 and indeed, of acts of other branches of government.20 Issues of constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of statutes
which, while having no bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court
inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of
procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is one such law.

RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional

RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demar-
cate the Country’s Maritime Zones and
Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III,
not to Delineate Philippine Territory
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 “dismembers a large portion of the national territory”21 because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III
demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national territory
under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory
provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris,
that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris’ technical description, Philippine
sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area
delineated in the Treaty of Paris.22

Petitioners’ theory fails to persuade us.

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use
rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the
baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.23 UNCLOS
III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States
in the world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters
and submarine lands along their coasts.

On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their
coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of
the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:

“Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental
shelf.—The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured
from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47.” (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their
maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime
space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial
waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and
the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).

Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the rectangular area
delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is
the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions
of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the “outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago.”24

UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory.
Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and
prescription,25not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s
terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead
governed by the rules on general international law.26

RA 9522’s Use of the Framework of

Regime of Islands to Determine the
Maritime Zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent
with the Philippines’ Claim of Sover-
eignty Over these Areas
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of islands framework to draw the baselines, and to measure the
breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, “weakens our territorial claim” over that area.27 Petitioners add that the KIG’s (and
Scarborough Shoal’s) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of “about 15,000 square nautical miles of
territorial waters,” prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.28 A comparison of the configuration of the baselines drawn under
RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and
its congressional deliberations, vis-à-vis the Philippines’ obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this view.

The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped
by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one
baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS III’s limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact
takes the wind out of petitioners’ argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines’ claim over the KIG, assuming
that baselines are relevant for this purpose.

Petitioners’ assertion of loss of “about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters” under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both
in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines’ total maritime space
(covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles, as shown in the table below:29

Extent of maritime area using RA 3046, as Extent of maritime area using RA

amended, taking into account the Treaty of 9522, taking into account
Paris’ delimitation (in square nautical miles) UNCLOS III (in square nautical
miles)

Internal or 166,858 171,435

archipelagic
waters

Territorial 274,136 32,106

Sea

Exclusive 382,669
Economic
Zone

TOTAL 440,994 586,210

Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the waters
covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping exclusive economic zones of
opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III.30

Further, petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not
enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines’ continued claim of sovereignty and
jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:

“SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and
jurisdictionshall be determined as “Regime of Islands” under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.” (Emphasis supplied)
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects
would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III
requires that “[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago.” Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that “the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles,” save
for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.31

Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG32 and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these
outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, such that any straight
baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably “depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of
the archipelago.”

The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to emphasize the foregoing during
the Senate deliberations:

“What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are outside our
archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating the provision of international law
which states: “The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.”
So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit
sila sa atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as our own.

This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the orange line which [we] call[]
archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba,
that is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines
para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule
that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.”34 (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS III’s limits. The need to shorten this baseline, and in
addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became imperative as discussed by respondents:

“[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its maritime zones including
the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446,
the baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to wit:
 1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06 nautical miles x x x. This
exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which states that “The length of such baselines
shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may
exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles.”
2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the baselines system. This will
enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water.
3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by geodetic survey methods. Accordingly,
some of the points, particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were later found to be located either inland or
on water, not on low-water line and drying reefs as prescribed by Article 47.”35

Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and
the Scarborough Shoal as “‘Regime[s] of Islands’ under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121”36 of UNCLOS III
manifests the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servandaobligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of
UNCLOS III, any “naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide,” such as portions of the KIG,
qualifies under the category of “regime of islands,” whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.37

Statutory Claim Over Sabah under

RA 5446 Retained
Petitioners’ argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines’ claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also
untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah:

“Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without
prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo,
over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.” (Emphasis supplied)

UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not Incom-

patible with the Constitution’s Delinea-
tion of Internal Waters
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally “converts” internal waters into
archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight.
Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards,
in violation of the Constitution.38

Whether referred to as Philippine “internal waters” under Article I of the Constitution39 or as “archipelagic waters” under UNCLOS III
(Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over
it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
“Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil.—
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in
accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil, and
the resources contained therein.
xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the status of the
archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters
and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.” (Emphasis supplied)

The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial
sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international
navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the
Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage.40

Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress.41

In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights
over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and conditions for their exercise.42 Significantly, the right
of innocent passage is a customary international law,43 thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law.44 No modern State
can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law
without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.

The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes
passage45 does not place them in lesser footing vis-à-vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right
of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through
archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward
of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More
importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents
the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III.46 Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the
waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States’ territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to
the rights of other States under UNCLOS III.47
Petitioners’ invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies) must also fail.
Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, “do
not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x.”49 Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting
implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran50 treated the
right to a healthful and balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to
substantiate the claimed constitutional violation. The other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article
XII, Section 2, paragraph 251) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 752), are not violated by RA 9522.

In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines
the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the international community
since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international
community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.

UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space—the exclusive
economic zone—in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the
resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles.53 UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of
other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.

RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones

Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522.54 We have looked
at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III55 and we find petitioners’ reading plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option
belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III
compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where
the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open
invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago;
and second, it weakens the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress
wisely avoided.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522,
allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is
therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our
national interest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.

Corona (C.J.), Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta,

Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Mendoza andSereno, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., Pls. See Concurring Opinion.
Abad, J., I certify that Mr. Justice Abad left his concurring vote.
Perez, J., On Leave.

CONCURRING OPINION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

I concur with the ponencia and add the following complementary arguments and observations:
A statute is a product of hard work and earnest studies of Congress to ensure that no constitutional provision, prescription or concept is
infringed. Withal, before a law, in an appropriate proceeding, is nullified, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with, the Constitution
must be demonstrated in such a way as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.1In the same token, if a law runs directly afoul of the
Constitution, the Court’s duty on the matter should be clear and simple: Pursuant to its judicial power and as final arbiter of all legal
questions,2 it should strike such law down, however laudable its purpose/s might be and regardless of the deleterious effect such action
may carry in its wake.

Challenged in these proceedings is the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA 9522) entitled “An Act to Amend Certain Provisions of
[RA] 3046, as Amended by [RA] 5446 to Define the Archipelagic Baselines Of The Philippines and for Other Purposes.” For perspective,
RA 3046, “An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines, was enacted in 1961 to comply with the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) I. Eight years later, RA 5446 was enacted to amend typographical errors relating to
coordinates in RA 3046. The latter law also added a provision asserting Philippine sovereignty over Sabah.

As its title suggests, RA 9522 delineates archipelagic baselines of the country, amending in the process the old baselines law, RA 3046.
Everybody is agreed that RA 9522 was enacted in response to the country’s commitment to conform to some 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention (LOSC) or UNCLOS III provisions to define new archipelagic baselines through legislation, the Philippines having signed3 and
eventually ratified4 this multilateral treaty. The Court can take judicial notice that RA 9522 was registered and deposited with the UN on
April 4, 2009.

As indicated in its Preamble,5 1982 LOSC aims, among other things, to establish, with due regard for the sovereignty of all States, “a
legal order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate international communication, and will promote the peaceful uses of the seas and
oceans.” One of the measures to attain the order adverted to is to have a rule on baselines. Of particular relevance to the Philippines, as
an archipelagic state, is Article 47 of UNCLOS III which deals with baselines:
1. An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost
islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands and an area in which the
ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1.

2. The length of such baseline shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing
any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles.

3. The drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago.

xxxx

9. The archipelagic State shall give due publicity to such charts or lists of geographical co-ordinates and shall deposit a copy of each
such chart or list with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.6 (Emphasis added.)

To obviate, however, the possibility that certain UNCLOS III baseline provisions would, in their implementation, undermine its
sovereign and/or jurisdictional interests over what it considers its territory,7the Philippines, when it signed UNCLOS III on December 10,
1982, made the following “Declaration” to said treaty:
 “The Government of the Republic of the Philippines [GRP] hereby manifests that in signing the 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, it does so with the understandings embodied in this declaration, made under the provisions of Article 310 of the
Convention, to wit:

The signing of the Convention by the [GRP] shall not in any manner impair or prejudice the sovereign rights of the [RP]
under and arising from the Constitution of the Philippines;

Such signing shall not in any manner affect the sovereign rights of the [RP] as successor of the United States of America [USA], under
and arising out of the Treaty of Paris between Spain and the United States of America of December 10, 1898, and the Treaty of
Washington between the [USA] and Great Britain of January 2, 1930;

xxxx

Such signing shall not in any manner impair or prejudice the sovereignty of the [RP] over any territory over which it exercises sovereign
authority, such as the Kalayaan Islands, and the waters appurtenant thereto;

The Convention shall not be construed as amending in any manner any pertinent laws and Presidential Decrees or Proclamations of the
Republic of the Philippines. The [GRP] maintains and reserves the right and authority to make any amendments to such laws, decrees or
proclamations pursuant to the provisions of the Philippine Constitution;
The provisions of the Convention on archipelagic passage through sea lanes do not nullify or impair the sovereignty of the Philippines as
an archipelagic state over the sea lanes and do not deprive it of authority to enact legislation to protect its sovereignty independence
and security;

The concept of archipelagic waters is similar to the concept of internal waters under the Constitution of the Philippines, and removes
straits connecting these waters with the economic zone or high sea from the rights of foreign vessels to transit passage for international
navigation.”8 (Emphasis added.)

Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RA 9522 on the principal ground that the law violates Section 1, Article I of the 1987
Constitution on national territory which states:
“Section 1. The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all
other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial
domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around,
between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal
waters of the Philippines.” (Emphasis supplied.)

According to Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., himself a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission which drafted the 1987 Constitution,
the aforequoted Section 1 on national territory was “in substance a copy of its 1973 counterpart.”9Art. I of the 1973 Constitution reads:

“Section 1. The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all
other territories belonging to the Philippines by historic right or legal title, including the territorial sea, the air space, the
subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction. The waters around,
between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal
waters of the Philippines.” (Emphasis added.)

As may be noted both constitutions speak of the “Philippine archipelago,” and, via the last sentence of their respective provisions,
assert the country’s adherence to the “archipelagic principle.” Both constitutions divide the national territory into two main groups: (1)
the Philippine archipelago and (2) other territories belonging to the Philippines. So what or where is Philippine archipelago contemplated
in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions then? Fr. Bernas answers the poser in the following wise:

“Article I of the 1987 Constitution cannot be fully understood without reference to Article I of the 1973 Constitution. x x x
xxxx
x x x To understand [the meaning of national territory as comprising the Philippine archipelago], one must look into the evolution of
[Art. I of the 1973 Constitution] from its first draft to its final form.
Section 1 of the first draft submitted by the Committee on National Territory almost literally reproduced Article I of the 1935
Constitution x x x. Unlike the 1935 version, however, the draft designated the Philippines not simply as the Philippines but as “the
Philippine archipelago.10 In response to the criticism that the definition was colonial in tone x x x, the second draft further designated the
Philippine archipelago, as the historic home of the Filipino people from its beginning.11

After debates x x x, the Committee reported out a final draft, which became the initially approved version: “The national territory
consists of the Philippine archipelago which is the ancestral home of the Filipino people and which is composed of all the islands and
waters embraced therein…”

What was the intent behind the designation of the Philippines as an “archipelago”? x x x Asked by Delegate Roselller Lim
(Zamboanga) where this archipelago was, Committee Chairman Quintero answered that it was the area delineated in the Treaty of
Paris. He said that objections to the colonial implication of mentioning the Treaty of Paris was responsible for the omission of the express
mention of the Treaty of Paris.

Report No. 01 of the Committee on National Territory had in fact been explicit in its delineation of the expanse of this archipelago. It
said:

Now if we plot on a map the boundaries of this archipelago as set forth in the Treaty of Paris, a huge or giant rectangle will
emerge, measuring about 600 miles in width and 1,200 miles in length. Inside this giant rectangle are the 7,100 islands comprising
the Philippine Islands. From the east coast of Luzon to the eastern boundary of this huge rectangle in the Pacific Ocean, there is
a distance of over 300 miles. From the west coast of Luzon to the western boundary of this giant rectangle in the China sea, there
is a distance of over 150 miles.

When the [US] Government enacted the Jones Law, the Hare-Hawes Cutting Law and the Tydings McDuffie Law, it in reality
announced to the whole world that it was turning over to the Government of the Philippine Islands an archipelago (that is a big
body of water studded with islands), the boundaries of which archipelago are set forth in Article III of the Treaty of Paris. It also
 announced to the whole world that the waters inside the giant rectangle belong to the Philippines—that they are not part of the
high seas.

When Spain signed the Treaty of Paris, in effect she announced to the whole world that she was ceding to the [US] the
Philippine archipelago x x x, that this archipelago was bounded by lines specified in the treaty, and that the archipelago consisted
of the huge body of water inside the boundaries and the islands inside said boundaries.

The delineation of the extent of the Philippine archipelago must be understood in the context of the modifications made
both by the Treaty of Washington of November 7, 1900, and of the Convention of January 12, 1930, in order to include the Islands
of Sibutu and of Cagayan de Sulu and the Turtle and Mangsee Islands. However, x x x the definition of the archipelago did not include
the Batanes group[, being] outside the boundaries of the Philippine archipelago as set forth in the Treaty of Paris. In literal terms,
therefore, the Batanes islands would come not under the Philippine archipelago but under the phrase “all other territories belong to the
Philippines.”12 x x x (Emphasis added.)

From the foregoing discussions on the deliberations of the provisions on national territory, the following conclusion is abundantly
evident: the “Philippine archipelago” of the 1987 Constitution is the same “Philippine archipelago” referred to in Art. I of the 1973
Constitution which in turn corresponds to the territory defined and described in Art. 1 of the 1935 Constitution,13which pertinently reads:

“Section 1. The Philippines comprises all the territory ceded to the [US] by the Treaty of Paris concluded between the [US] and
Spain on the tenth day of December, [1898], the limits of which are set forth in Article III of said treaty, together with all the islands in
the treaty concluded at Washington, between the [US] and Spain on November [7, 1900] and the treaty concluded between the [US]
and Great Britain x x x.”

While the Treaty of Paris is not mentioned in both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, its mention, so the nationalistic arguments went,
being “a repulsive reminder of the indignity of our colonial past,”14 it is at once clear that the Treaty of Paris had been utilized as key
reference point in the definition of the national territory.

On the other hand, the phrase “all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction,” found in the 1987
Constitution, which replaced the deleted phrase “all territories belonging to the Philippines by historic right or legal title”15 found in the
1973 Constitution, covers areas linked to the Philippines with varying degrees of certainty.16 Under this category would fall: (a) Batanes,
which then 1971 Convention Delegate Eduardo Quintero, Chairperson of the Committee on National Territory, described as belonging to
the Philippines in all its history;17(b) Sabah, over which a formal claim had been filed, the so-called Freedomland (a group of islands
known as Spratleys); and (c) any other territory, over which the Philippines had filed a claim or might acquire in the future through
recognized modes of acquiring territory.18 As an author puts it, the deletion of the words “by historic right or legal title” is not to be
interpreted as precluding future claims to areas over which the Philippines does not actually exercise sovereignty.19

Upon the foregoing perspective and going into specifics, petitioners would have RA 9522 stricken down as unconstitutional for the reasons
that it deprives the Philippines of what has long been established as part and parcel of its national territory under the Treaty of Paris, as
supplemented by the aforementioned 1900 Treaty of Washington or, to the same effect, revises the definition on or dismembers the
national territory. Pushing their case, petitioners argue that the constitutional definition of the national territory cannot be remade by a
mere statutory act.20 As another point, petitioners parlay the theory that the law in question virtually weakens the country’s territorial
claim over the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and Sabah, both of which come under the category of “other territories” over the Philippines
has sovereignty or jurisdiction. Petitioners would also assail the law on grounds related to territorial sea lanes and internal waters transit
passage by foreign vessels.

It is remarkable that petitioners could seriously argue that RA 9522 revises the Philippine territory as defined in the Constitution, or
worse, constitutes an abdication of territory.

It cannot be over-emphasized enough that RA 9522 is a baseline law enacted to implement the 1982 LOSC, which in turn seeks to
regulate and establish an orderly sea use rights over maritime zones. Or as the ponencia aptly states, RA 9522 aims to mark-out specific
base points along the Philippine coast from which baselines are drawn to serve as starting points to measure the breadth of the territorial
sea and maritime zones.21 The baselines are set to define the sea limits of a state, be it coastal or archipelagic, under the
UNCLOS III regime. By setting the baselines to conform to the prescriptions of UNCLOS III, RA 9522 did not surrender
any territory, as petitioners would insist at every turn, for UNCLOS III is concerned with setting order in the exercise of
sea-use rights, not the acquisition or cession of territory. And let it be noted that under UNCLOS III, it is recognized that
countries can have territories outside their baselines. Far from having a dismembering effect, then, RA 9522 has in a
limited but real sense increased the country’s maritime boundaries. How this situation comes about was extensively explained
by then Minister of State and head of the Philippine delegation to UNCLOS III Arturo Tolentino in his sponsorship speech22 on the
concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa with the LOSC:

“x x x x

Then, we should consider, Mr. Speaker, that under the archipelagic principle, the whole area inside the archipelagic base lines become a
unified whole and the waters between the islands which formerly were regarded by international law as open or international seas now
become waters under the complete sovereignty of the Filipino people. In this light there would be an additional area of 141,800 square
nautical miles inside the base lines that will be recognized by international law as Philippine waters, equivalent to 45,351,050 hectares.
These gains in the waters of the sea, 45,211,225 hectares outside the base lines and 141,531,000 hectares inside the base lines, total
93,742,275 hectares as a total gain in the waters under Philippine jurisdiction.

From a pragmatic standpoint, therefore, the advantage to our country and people not only in terms of the legal unification of land and
waters of the archipelago in the light of international law, but also in terms of the vast resources that will come under the dominion and
jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines, your Committee on Foreign Affairs does not hesitate to ask this august Body to concur in
the Convention by approving the resolution before us today.

May I say it was the unanimous view of delegations at the Conference on the Law of the Sea that archipelagos are among the biggest
gainers or beneficiaries under the Convention on the Law of the Sea.”
Lest it be overlooked, the constitutional provision on national territory, as couched, is broad enough to encompass RA 9522’s definition
of the archipelagic baselines. To reiterate, the laying down of baselines is not a mode of acquiring or asserting ownership a territory over
which a state exercises sovereignty. They are drawn for the purpose of defining or establishing the maritime areas over which a state
can exercise sovereign rights. Baselines are used for fixing starting point from which the territorial belt is measured seawards or from
which the adjacent maritime waters are measured. Thus, the territorial sea, a marginal belt of maritime waters, is measured from the
baselines extending twelve (12) nautical miles outward.23 Similarly, Art. 57 of the 1982 LOSC provides that the Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) “shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.”24 Most
important to note is that the baselines indicated under RA 9522 are derived from Art. 47 of the 1982 LOSC which was earlier quoted.

Since the 1987 Constitution’s definition of national territory does not delimit where the Philippine’s baselines are located, it is up to
the political branches of the government to supply the deficiency. Through Congress, the Philippines has taken an official position
regarding its baselines to the international community through RA 3046,25 as amended by RA 544626 and RA 9522. When the Philippines
deposited a copy of RA 9522 with the UN Secretary General, we effectively complied in good faith with our obligation under the 1982
LOSC. A declaration by the Court of the constitutionality of the law will complete the bona fides of the Philippines vis-a-vis the law of the
sea treaty.

It may be that baseline provisions of UNCLOS III, if strictly implemented, may have an imposing impact on the signatory states’ jurisdiction
and even their sovereignty. But this actuality, without more, can hardly provide a justifying dimension to nullify the complying RA 9522.
As held by the Court in Bayan Muna v. Romulo,27 treaties and international agreements have a limiting effect on the otherwise
encompassing and absolute nature of sovereignty. By their voluntary acts, states may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of their
sovereignty. The usual underlying consideration in this partial surrender may be the greater benefits derived from a pact or reciprocal
undertaking. On the premise that the Philippines has adopted the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution.

As a signatory of the 1982 LOSC, it behooves the Philippines to honor its obligations thereunder. Pacta sunt servanda, a basic
international law postulate that “every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”28 The
exacting imperative of this principle is such that a state may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure
to perform this duty.”29

The allegation that Sabah has been surrendered by virtue of RA 9522, which supposedly repealed the hereunder provision of RA
5446, is likewise unfounded.

“Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice
to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic
of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.”
There is nothing in RA 9522 indicating a clear intention to supersede Sec. 2 of RA 5446. Petitioners obviously have read too much into
RA 9522’s amendment on the baselines found in an older law. Aside from setting the country’s baselines, RA 9522 is, in its Sec. 3, quite
explicit in its reiteration of the Philippines’ exercise of sovereignty, thus:

“Section 3. This Act affirms that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion, sovereignty and jurisdiction over all portions of the
national territory as defined in the Constitution and by provisions of applicable laws including, without limitation, Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended.”

To emphasize, baselines are used to measure the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone
and the continental shelf. Having KIG and the Scarborough Shoal outside Philippine baselines will not diminish our sovereignty over these
areas. Art. 46 of UNCLOS III in fact recognizes that an archipelagic state, such as the Philippines, is a state “constituted
wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other islands.”(emphasis supplied) The “other islands” referred to in Art.
46 are doubtless islands not forming part of the archipelago but are nevertheless part of the state’s territory.

The Philippines’ sovereignty over KIG and Scarborough Shoal are, thus, in no way diminished. Consider: Other countries such as
Malaysia and the United States have territories that are located outside its baselines, yet there is no territorial question arising from this
arrangement.30

It may well be apropos to point out that the Senate version of the baseline bill that would become RA 9522 contained the following
explanatory note: The law “reiterates our sovereignty over the Kalayaan Group of Islands declared as part of the Philippine territory
under Presidential Decree No. 1596. As part of the Philippine territory, they shall be considered as a ‘regime of islands’ under Article 121
of the Convention.”31Thus, instead of being in the nature of a “treasonous surrender” that petitioners have described it to be, RA 9522
even harmonizes our baseline laws with our international agreements, without limiting our territory to those confined within the country’s
baselines.

Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the classification of KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as falling under the Philippine’s regime of
islands is not constitutionally objectionable. Such a classification serves as compliance with LOSC and the Philippines’ assertion of
sovereignty over KIG and Scarborough Shoal. In setting the baseline in KIG and Scarborough Shoal, RA 9522 states that these are areas
“over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction.” It is, thus, not correct for petitioners to claim that the
Philippines has lost 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters upon making this classification. Having 15,000 square nautical miles
of Philippine waters outside of our baselines, to reiterate, does not translate to a surrender of these waters. The Philippines maintains its
assertion of ownership over territories outside of its baselines. Even China views RA 9522 as an assertion of ownership, as seen in its
Protest32filed with the UN Secretary-General upon the deposit of RA 9522.
We take judicial notice of the effective occupation of KIG by the Philippines. Petitioners even point out that national and local elections
are regularly held there. The classification of KIG as under a “regime of islands” does not in any manner affect the Philippines’ consistent
position with regard to sovereignty over KIG. It does not affect the Philippines’ other acts of ownership such as occupation or amend
Presidential Decree No. 1596, which declared KIG as a municipality of Palawan.

The fact that the baselines of KIG and Scarborough Shoal have yet to be defined would not detract to the constitutionality of the law
in question. The resolution of the problem lies with the political departments of the government.

All told, the concerns raised by the petitioners about the diminution or the virtual dismemberment of the Philippine territory by the
enactment of RA 9522 are, to me, not well grounded. To repeat, UNCLOS III pertains to a law on the seas, not territory. As part
of its Preamble,33 LOSC recognizes “the desirability of establishing through this Convention, with due regard for the sovereignty of all
States, a legal order for the seas and oceans x x x.”

This brings me to the matter of transit passage of foreign vessels through Philippine waters.
 Apropos thereto, petitioners allege that RA 9522 violates the nuclear weapons-free policy under Sec. 8, in relation to Sec. 16, Art. II
of the Constitution, and exposes the Philippines to marine pollution hazards, since under the LOSC the Philippines supposedly must give
to ships of all states the right of innocent passage and the right of archipelagic sea-lane passage.

The adverted Sec. 8, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution declares the adoption and pursuit by the Philippines of “a policy of freedom from
nuclear weapons in its territory.” On the other hand, the succeeding Sec. l6 underscores the State’s firm commitment “to protect and
advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.” Following the
allegations of petitioners, these twin provisions will supposedly be violated inasmuch as RA 9522 accedes to the right of innocent passage
and the right of archipelagic sea-lane passage provided under the LOSC. Therefore, ships of all nations––be they nuclear-carrying
warships or neutral commercial vessels transporting goods––can assert the right to traverse the waters within our islands.

A cursory reading of RA 9522 would belie petitioners’ posture. In context, RA 9522 simply seeks to conform to our international
agreement on the setting of baselines and provides nothing about the designation of archipelagic sea-lane passage or the regulation of
innocent passage within our waters. Again, petitioners have read into the amendatory RA 9522 something not intended.

Indeed, the 1982 LOSC enumerates the rights and obligations of archipelagic party-states in terms of transit under Arts. 51 to 53,
which are explained below:

“To safeguard, in explicit terms, the general balance struck by [Articles 51 and 52] between the need for passage through the area
(other than straits used for international navigation) and the archipelagic state’s need for security, Article 53 gave the archipelagic state
the right to regulate where and how ships and aircraft pass through its territory by designating specific sea lanes. Rights of passage
through these archipelagic sea lanes are regarded as those of transit passage:

(1) An archipelagic State may designate sea lanes and air routes thereabove, suitable for safe, continuous and expeditious passage
of foreign ships and aircraft through or over its archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea.
(2) All ships and aircraft enjoy the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage in such sea lanes and air routes.
(3) Archipelagic sea lanes passage is the exercise in accordance with the present Convention of the rights of navigation and
overflight in the normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit between one part of the high
seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.”34

But owing to the geographic structure and physical features of the country, i.e., where it is “essentially a body of water studded with
islands, rather than islands with water around them,”35 the Philippines has consistently maintained the conceptual unity of land and water
as a necessary element for territorial integrity,36 national security (which may be compromised by the presence of warships and
surveillance ships on waters between the islands),37 and the preservation of its maritime resources. As succinctly explained by Minister
Arturo Tolentino, the essence of the archipelagic concept is “the dominion and sovereignty of the archipelagic State within its baselines,
which were so drawn as to preserve the territorial integrity of the archipelago by the inseparable unity of the land and water
domain.”38 Indonesia, like the Philippines, in terms of geographic reality, has expressed agreement with this interpretation of the
archipelagic con cept. So it was that in 1957, the Indonesian Government issued the Djuanda Declaration, therein stating:

“[H]istorically, the Indonesian archipelago has been an entity since time immemorial. In view of the territorial entirety and of
preserving the wealth of the Indonesian state, it is deemed necessary to consider all waters between the islands and entire entity.

x x x On the ground of the above considerations, the Government states that all waters around, between and connecting, the
islands or parts of islands belonging to the Indonesian archipelago irrespective of their width or dimension are natural
appurtenances of its land territory and therefore an integral part of the inland or national waters subject to the absolute
sovereignty of Indonesia.”39 (Emphasis supplied.)

Hence, the Philippines maintains the sui generis character of our archipelagic waters as equivalent to the internal waters of
continental coastal states. In other words, the landward waters embraced within the baselines determined by RA 9522, i.e., all waters
around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal
waters of the Philippines.40 Accordingly, such waters are not covered by the jurisdiction of the LOSC and cannot be subjected to the
rights granted to foreign states in archipelagic waters, e.g., the right of innocent passage,41which is allowed only in the territorial seas,
or that area of the ocean comprising 12 miles from the baselines of our archipelago; archipelagic sea-lane passage;42 over flight;43and
traditional fishing rights.44

Our position that all waters within our baselines are internal waters, which are outside the jurisdiction of the 1982 LOSC,45 was
abundantly made clear by the Philippine Declaration at the time of the signing of the LOSC on December 10, 1982. To reiterate,
paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the Declaration state:

5. The Convention shall not be construed as amending in any manner any pertinent laws and Presidential decrees of Proclamation
of the republic of the Philippines; the Government x x x maintains and reserves the right and authority to make any
amendments to such laws, decrees or proclamations pursuant to the provisions of the Philippine Constitution;

6. The provisions of the Convention on archipelagic passage through sea lanes do not nullify or impair the sovereignty of
the Philippines as an archipelagic State over the sea lanes and do not deprive it of authority to enact legislation to protect its
sovereignty, independence and security;

7. The concept of archipelagic waters is similar to the concept of internal waters under the Constitution of the
Philippines and removes straits connecting this water with the economic zone or high seas from the rights of foreign
vessels to transit passage for international navigation. (Emphasis supplied.)46

More importantly, by the ratification of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987, the integrity of the Philippine state as comprising both
water and land was strengthened by the proviso in its first article, viz.: “The waters around, between, and connecting the islands
of the [Philippine] archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines.” (emphasis supplied)

In effect, contrary to petitioners’ allegations, the Philippines’ ratification of the 1982 LOSC did not matter-of-factly open our internal
waters to passage by foreign ships, either in the concept of innocent passage or archipelagic sea-lane passage, in exchange for the
international community’s recognition of the Philippines as an archipelagic state. The Filipino people, by ratifying the 1987 Constitution,
veritably rejected the quid pro quo petitioners take as being subsumed in that treaty.

Harmonized with the Declaration and the Constitution, the designation of baselines made in RA 9522 likewise designates our internal
waters, through which passage by foreign ships is not a right, but may be granted by the Philippines to foreign states but only as a
dissolvable privilege.

In view of the foregoing, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.

Petition dismissed.

Note.—The sovereign people may, if it so desired, go to the extent of giving up a portion of its own territory to the Moros for the
sake of peace, for it can change the Constitution in any it wants, so long as the change is not inconsistent with what, in international
law, is known as Jus Cogens. (Province of North Cotabato vs. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain [GRP], 568 SCRA 402 [2008])
No. L-25843. July 25, 1974.*

MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant.

Civil law; Parent and child; The mother, as natural guardian is preferred over the uncle in the possession and administration of the
minor’s property.—In a dispute between the mother and the uncle of a minor over the possession and administration of the proceeds of
an insurance policy belonging to the child, the mother is entitled to a distinct preference in view of Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code.
With the added circumstance that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the
decision arrived at can stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. It is further fortified by the assumption, both logical and natural, that
infidelity to the trust imposed by the deceased is much less in the case of a mother than in the case of an uncle.

Constitutional law; Powers of the State; State acting as parens patriae will see to the best interest of the child.—The judiciary, as
an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord
priority to his best interest. ... What is more, there is this constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: “The State shall
strengthen the family as a basic social institution.” If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be
strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional
mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did.

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Mendoza, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Seno, Mendoza & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.
Emilio Benitez, Jr. for defendant-appellant.

FERNANDO, J.:
The disputants in this appeal from a question of law from a lower court decision are the mother and the uncle of a minor beneficiary of
the proceeds of an insurance policy issued on the life of her deceased father. The dispute centers as to who of them should be entitled
to act as trustee thereof. The lower court applying the appropriate Civil Code provisions decided in favor of the mother, the plaintiff in
this case. Defendant uncle appealed. As noted, the lower court acted the way it did following the specific mandate of the law. In addition,
it must have taken into account the principle that in cases of this nature the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration.

It is not an unreasonable assumption that between a mother and an uncle, the former is likely to lavish more care on and pay greater
attention to her. This is all the more likely considering that the child is with the mother. There are no circumstances then that did militate
against what conforms to the natural order of things, even if the language of the law were not as clear. It is not to be lost sight of either
that the judiciary pursuant to its role as an agency of the State as parens patriae, with an even greater stress on family unity under the
present Constitution, did weigh in the balance the opposing claims and did come to the conclusion that the welfare of the child called for
the mother to be entrusted with such responsiblity. We have to affirm.

The appealed decision made clear: “There is no controversy as to the facts."1 The insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian Pilapil,
with a married woman, the plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas. She was ten years old at the time the complaint was filed on October 10, 1964.
The defendant, Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the deceased. The deceased insured himself and instituted as beneficiary, his child,
with his brother to act as trustee during her minority. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to him. Hence this complaint by the mother,
with whom the child is living, seeking the delivery of such sum. She filed the bond required by the Civil Code. Defendant would justify
his claim to the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy.2

After trial duly had, the lower court in a decision of May 10, 1965, rendered judgment ordering the defendant to deliver the proceeds of
the policy in question to plaintiff. Its main reliance was on Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code. The former provides: “The father, or in
his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth
more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance."3 The latter
states: “The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title,
belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company
he lives; * * *."4

Conformity to such explicit codal norm is apparent in this portion of the appealed decision: “The insurance proceeds belong to the
beneficiary. The beneficiary is a minor under the custody and parental authority of the plaintiff, her mother. The said minor lives with
plaintiff or lives in the company of the plaintiff. The said minor acquired this property by lucrative title. Said property, therefore, belongs
to the minor child in ownership, and in usufruct to the plaintiff, her mother. Since under our law the usufructuary is entitled to possession,
the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the insurance proceeds. The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of
law, is pro tanto null and void. In order, however, to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should file an additional
bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5,000.00."5

It is very clear, therefore, considering the above, that unless the applicability of the two cited Civil Code provisions can be disputed,
the decision must stand. There is no ambiguity in the language employed. The words are rather clear. Their meaning is unequivocal.
Time and time again, this Court has left no doubt that where codal or statutory norms are cast in categorical language, the task before
it is not one of interpretation but of application.6 So it must be in this case. So it was in the appealed decision.
1.It would take more than just two paragraphs as found in the brief for the defendant-appellant7 to blunt the force of legal
commands that speak so plainly and so unqualifiedly. Even if it were a question of policy, the conclusion will remain unaltered.
What is paramount, as mentioned at the outset, is the welfare of the child. It is in consonance with such primordial end that Articles
320 and 321 have been worded. There is recognition in the law of the deep ties that bind parent and child. In the event that there
is less than full measure of concern for the offspring, the protection is supplied by the bond required. With the added circumstance
that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at can stand
the test of the strictest scrutiny. It is further fortified by the assumption, both logical and natural, that infidelity to the trust imposed
by the deceased is much less in the case of a mother than in the case of an uncle. Manresa, commenting on Article 159 of the Civil
Code of Spain, the source of Article 320 of the Civil Code, was of that view: Thus “El derecho y la obligacion de administrar el
patrimonio de los hijos es una consecuencia natural y logica de la patria potestad y de la presunción de que nadie cuidará de los
bienes de acquellos con mas cariño y solicitud que los padres. En nuestro Derecho antiguo puede decirse que se hallaba reconocida
 de una manera indirecta aquella doctrina, y asi se desprende de la sentencia cia del Tribunal Supremeo de 30 de diciembre de
1864, que se refiere a la ley 24, tit. XIII de la Partida 5. De la propia suerte aceptan en general dicho principio los Códigos
extranjeros, con las limitaciones y requisitos de que trataremos más adelante."8
2.The appealed decision is supported by another cogent consideration. It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the
judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who
is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. It may happen, as it did occur here, that family relations may press their respective
claims. It would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the country for a parent to be
preferred. It could have been different if the conflict were between father and mother. Such is not the case at all. It is a mother
asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae cannot remain insensible to
the validity of her plea. In a recent case,9 there is this quotation from an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: “This
prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or
in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the
great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties.” What is more, there is this constitutional provision vitalizing
this concept. It reads: “The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." 10 If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates,
it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for
the uncle, still deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did.
WHEREFORE, the decision of May 10, 1965 is affirmed. Costs against defendant-appellant.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., did not take part.
Decision affirmed.

Notes.—The parent as a guardian. Where a mother’s capacity to sue for the benefit of her minor children has not been questioned
and the Court has impliedly allowed her to sue in their behalf, the lack of a formal appointment designating the mother as the minor’s
guardian ad litemmay be overlooked. Vda. de Liboon vs. Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc., L-14893, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 434.

Where a person secured a life insurance policy with a face value of P5,000, and she designated her husband and minor child as irrevocable
beneficiaries, her act of securing a loan on said policy and the act of surrendering the policy because the loan was not granted are acts
of disposition or alienation of her minor child’s property rights and are not merely acts of management or administration. Nario vs.
Philippine American Life Insurance Co., L-22796, June 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 434.

Judicial authorization is required for alienation or incumbrance of minor child’s property rights. Id.

LEGAL RESEARCH SERVICE

See SCRA Quick Index-Digest, volume two, page 1678 on Parent and Child.
No. L-30671. November 28, 1973.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch I, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, and THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, THE CLERK
OF COURT, Court of First Instance of Cebu, P. J. KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINO UNCHUAN, and INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION, respondents.

Constitutional law; State immunity; The State cannot be sued without its consent.—It is a fundamental postulate of
constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it
gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: “A sovereign is exempt from suit,
not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.

Same; Same; Judgment against the State cannot be enforced by execution.—The universal rule that where the State gives its
consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action “only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the state of execution” and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government
funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted
by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioner.
Anders T. Velarde & Marcelo B. Fernan for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding challenges the validity of an order issued by respondent Judge
Guillermo P. Villasor, then of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, 1 declaring a decision final and executory and of an alias writ
of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines subsequently issued in pursuance thereof, the alleged
ground being excess of jurisdiction, or at the very least, grave abuse of discretion. As thus simply and tersely put, with the facts being
undisputed and the principle of law that calls for application indisputable, the outcome is predictable. The Republic of the Philippines is
entitled to the writs prayed for. Respondent Judge ought not to have acted thus. The order thus impugned and the alias writ of execution
must be nullified.
In the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 1969, a summary of facts was set forth thus: “7. On July 3, 1961, a
decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International
Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of
Special Proceedings. 8. On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision
of July 3, 1961 final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City [as well as] Manila to execute the said decision.
9. Pursuant to the said Order dated June 24, 1969, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution [was issued] dated June 26, 1969, *** 10.
On the strength of the afore-mentionea Alias Writ of Execution dated June 26, 1969, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal (respondent herein)
served notices of garnishment dated June 28, 1969 with several Banks, specially on the ‘monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines
in the form of deposits, sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution’; the Philippine Veterans Bank received
the same notice of garnishment on June 30, 1969*** 11. The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks,
particularly, with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are public funds duly appropriated
and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and
operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as per Certification dated July 3, 1969 by the AFP Comptroller, ***” 2. The paragraph
immediately succeeding in such petition then alleged: “12. Respondent Judge, Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, acted in excess of
jurisdiction [or] with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of execution
against the properties of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, hence, the Alias Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment issued
pursuant thereto are null and void.”3In the answer filed by respondents, through counsel Andres T. Velarde and Marcelo B. Fernan, the
facts set forth were admitted with the only qualification being that the total award was in the amount of P2,372,331.40.4

The Republic of the Philippines, as mentioned at the outset, did right in filing this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. What was
done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution.

It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government
is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: “A
sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.” 5 Sociological jurisprudence supplies
an answer not dissimilar. So it was indicated in a recent decision, Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the
Philippines,6 with its affirmation that “a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the
inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its
multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not
thus restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and
energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could
very well be imagined.”7

This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made explicit in the revised charter. It is therein expressly
provided: “The State may not be sued without its consent.”8 A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from such a basic concept
is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and
the state liability adjudged. Thus in the recent case of Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego,9 such a well-settled doctrine was
restated in the opinion of Justice Teehankee:

“The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit
claimant’s action ‘only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution’ and that the power of the Courts ends
when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed
or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.”10

Such a principle applies even to an attempted garnishment of a salary that had accrued in favor of an employee. Director of Commerce
and Industry v. Concepcion,11 speaks to that effect. Justice Malcolm as ponente left no doubt on that score. Thus: “A rule, which has
never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due government employees, is not
liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may
not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to
permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands
of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific
portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids it.”12

In the light of the above, it is made abundantly clear why the Republic of the Philippines could rightfully allege a legitimate grievance.

WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, nullifying and setting aside both the order of June 24, 1969 declaring
executory the decision of July 3, 1961 as well as the alias writ of execution issued thereunder. The preliminary injunction issued by this
Court on July 12, 1969 is hereby made permanent.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., did not take part.
Writs granted.

Notes.—State Immunity from Suit. It is the duty of the party to allege the State’s consent to be sued. Insurance Company of North
America vs. Republic, L-26532, July 10, 1967, 20 SCRA 627; L-24520, 20 SCRA 648; L-25662, 20 SCRA 699; North British & Mercantile
Insurance Company, Ltd. vs. Isthmian Lines, Inc., L-26237, July 10, 1967, 20 SCRA 629; Shell Refinery Company (Phil.) Inc. vs. Manila
Port Service, L-24930, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 919; American Insurance Co. vs. Macondray & Company, Inc. L-24031, August 19,
1967, 20 SCRA 1103; Equitable Insurance & Casualty Company, Inc. vs. Smith, Bell & Company (Phil.), Inc., L-24383, August 26, 1967, 20
SCRA 1121.

The failure of the Bureau of Customs to raise the defense of immunity is of no moment and does not constitute a waiver of such
immunity. Insurance Company of North America vs. Osaka Shosen Kaisha, L-22784, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 780.
[No. L-1648. August 17, 1949]
PEDRO SYQUIA, GONZALO SYQUIA, and LEOPOLDO SYQUIA, petitioners, vs. NATIVIDAD ALMEDA LOPEZ, Judge of
Municipal Court of Manila, CONRADO V. SANCHEZ, Judge of Court of First Instance of Manila, GEORGE F. MOORE ET AL.,
respondents.

1. COURTS; JURISDICTION; CLAIM OP TITLE AND POSSESSION OF PKOPERTY BY PRIVATE CITIZEN; AGAINST OFPICERS AND AGENTS
OF THE GOVERNMENT.—A private citizen claiming title and right of possession of a certain property may, to recover possession of said
property, sue as individuals, officers and agents of the Government who are said to be illegally withholding the same from him, though
in doing so, said officers and agents claim that they are acting for the Government, and the courts may entertain such a suit although
the Government itself is not included as a party-defendant.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; IF JUDGMENT WILL INVOLVE FINANCIAL LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT, SUIT CANNOT PROSPER OR BE ENTERTAINED
EXCEPT WITH GOVERNMENT'S CONSENT.—But where the judgment in the suit by the private citizen against the officers and agents of
the ,government would result not only in the recovery of possession of property in favor of said citizen but alsp in a charge against or
financial liability to the Government, then the suit should be regarded as one against the Government itself, and, consequently, it cannot
prosper or be entertained by courts except with the consent of said government,

3. ID.; ID.; SUIT BY CITIZEN AGAINST FOREIGN GOVERNMENT WITHOUT LATTER'S CONSENT; COURTS LACK OF JURISDICTION.—
This is not only a case of a citizen filin.g a suit against his own Government without the latter's consent but it is of citizen filing an action
against a foreign government without said government's consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his
country.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Mandamus.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Gibbs, Cribbs, Chuidian & Quasha, for petitioiiers.
J. A. Wolfson for respondent.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:
For the purposes of this decision, the following facts gathered from and based on the pleadings, may be stated. The plaintiffs named
Pedro, Gonzalo, and Leopoldo, all surnamed Syquia, are the undivided joint owners of three apartment buildings situated in the City of
Manila known as the North Syquia Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments located at 1181 M. H. del Pilar, 1151
M. H. del Pilar and 1188 A. Mabini Streets, respectively.

About the middle of the year 1945, said plaintiffs executed three lease contracts, one f or each of the three apartments, in favor of tihe
United States of America at a monthly rental of Fl,775 for the North Syquia Apartments, Fl,890 for the South Syquia Apartments, and
P3,335 for the Michel Apartments. The term or period for the three leases was to be "for the duration of the war and six months thereafter,
unless sooner terminated by the United States of America." The apartment buildings were used for billeting and quartering officers of
the U. S. armed forces stationed in the Manila area.

In March, 1947, when these court proceedings were commenced, George F. Moore was the Commanding General, United States Army,
Philippine Ryukus Command, Manila, and as Commanding General of the U. S. Army in the Manila Theatre, was said to control the
occupancy of the said apartment houses and had authority in the name of the United States Government to assign officers of the U. S.
Army to said apartments or to order said officers to vacate the same. Erland A. Tillman was the Chief, Real Estate Division, Office of the
District Engineers, U. S. Army, Manila, who, under the command of defendant Moore was in direct charge and control of the lease and
occupancy of said three apartment buildings. Defendant Moore and Tillman themselves did not occupy any part of the premises in
question.

Under the theory that said leases terminated six months after September 2, 1945, when Japan surrendered, plaintiffs sometime in March,
1946, approached the predecessors in office of defendants Moore and Tillman and requested the return of the apartment buildings to
them, but they were advised that the U. S. Army wanted to continue occupying the premises. On May 11, 1946, said plaintiffs requested
the predecessors in office of Moore and Tillman to renegotiate said leases, execute lease contracts for a period of three years and to pay
a reasonable rental higher than those payable under the old contracts. The predecessor in office of Moore in a letter dated June 6, 1946,
refused to execute new leases but advised that "it is contemplated that the United States Army will vacate subject properties prior to 1
February 1947." Not being in conformity with the continuance of the old leases because of the alleged comparatively low rentals being
paid thereunder, plaintiffs formally requested Tillman to cancel said three leases and to release the apartment buildings on June 28,
1946. Tillman refused to comply with the request. Because of the alleged representation and assurance that the U. S. Government would
vacate the premises before February 1,1947, the plaintiffs took no further steps to secure possession of the buildings and accepted the
monthly rentals tendered by the predecessors in office of Moore and Tillman on the basis of a month to month lease subject to cancellation
upon thirty days notice. Because of the failure to comply with the alleged representation and assurance that the three apartment buildings
will be vacated prior to February 1, 1947, plaintiffs on February 17, 1947, served formal notice upon defendants Moore and Tillman and
64 other army officers or members of the United States Armed Forces who were then occupying apartments in said three buildings,
demanding (a) cancellation of said leases; (&) increase in rentals to F300 per month per apartmerit effective thirty days from notice; (c)
execution of new leases for the three or any one or two of the said apartment buildings for a defmite term, otherwise, (d) release of said
apartment buildings within thirty days of said notice in the event of the failure to comply with the foregoing demands. The thirty-day
period having expired without any of the defendants having complied with plaintiffs' demands, the plaintiffs commenced the present
action in the Municipal Court of Manila in the form of an action for unlawful detainer (desahucio) against Moore and Tillman and the 64
persons occupying apartments in the three buildings for the purpose of having them vacate the apartments, each occupant to pay P300
a month for his particular apartment from January 1, 1947 until each of said particular defendant had vacated said apartment; to permit
plaintiffs access to said apartment buildings for the purpose of appraising the damages sustained as the result of the occupancy by
defendants; that def endants be ordered to pay plaintiffs whatever damages may have been actually caused on said property; and that
in the event said occupants are unable to pay said ?300 a month and/or the damages sustained by said property, the defendants Moore
and Tillman jointly and severally be made to pay said monthly rentals of P300 per month per apartment from January 1, 1947 to March
19, 1947, inclusive, and/or the damages sustained by said apartments, and that defendants Moore and Tillman be permanently enjoined
against ordering any additional parties in the future from entering and occupying said premises.

Acting upon a motion to dismiss filed through the Special Assistant of the Judge Advocate, Philippine Ryukus Command on the ground
that the court had no jurisdiction over the defendants and over the subject matter of the action, because the real party in interest was
the U. S. Government and not the individual defendants named in the complaint, and that the complaint did not state a cause of action,
the municipal court of Manila in an order dated April 29, 1947, found that the war between the United States of'America and her allies
on one side and Germany and Japan on the other, had not yet terminated and, consequently, the period or term of the three leases had
not yet expired; that under the well settled rule of International Law, a foreign government like the United States Government cannot be
sued in the courts of another state without its consent; that it was clear from the allegations of the complaint that although the United
States of America has not been named therein as defendant, it is nevertheless the real defendant in this case, as the parties named as
defendants are officers of the United States Army and were occupying the buildings in question as such and pursuant to orders received
from that Government. The municipal court dismissed the action with costs against the plaintiffs with the suggestion or opinion that a
citizen of the Philippines, who feels aggrieved by the acts of the Government of a foreign country has the right to demand that the
Philippine Government study his claim and if found meritorious, take such diplomatk steps as may be necessary f or the vindication of
the rights of that citizen, and that the matter included or involved in the action should be a proper subject matter of representations
between the Government of the United States of America and the Philippines. Not being satisfied with the order, plaintiffs appealed to
the Court of First Instance of Manila, where the motion to dismiss was renewed.

The Court of First Instance of Manila in an order dated July 12, 1947, affirmed the order of the municipal ccmrt dismissing plaintiffs'
complaint. It concedsd that under the doctrine laid down in the case of U. S. vs. Lee, 106 U. S., 196 and affirmed in the case of Tindal
vs. Wesley, 167 U. S., 204, ordinarily, courts have jurisdietion .over cases where private parties sue to recover possession pf property
being held by officers or agents acting in the name of the U. S. Govemment even though no suit can be brought against the Government
itself, but inasmuch as the plaintiffs in the present case are bringing this action against officers and agents of the U. S. Government not
only to recover the possession of the three apartment houses supposedly being held illegally by them in the name of their government,
but also to collect back rents, not only at the rate agreed upon in the lease contracts entered into by the United States of America but in
excess of said rate, to say nothing of the damages claimed, as a result of which, a judgment in these proceedings may become a charge
against the U. S. Treasury, then under the rule laid down in the case of Land vs. Dollar, 91 Law. ed., 1209, the present suit must be
regarded as one against the United States Government itself, which cannot be sued without its consent, specially by citizens of another
country.

The plaintiffs as petitioners have brought this case before us on a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to order the Municipal Court
of Manila to take jurisdiction over the case. On October 30, 1947, counsel for respondents Almeda Lopez, Sanchez, Moore and Tillman
filed a motion to dismiss on several grounds. The case was orally argued on November 26, 1947. On March 4, 1948, petitioners filed a
petition which, among other things, informed this Court that the North Syquia Apartments, the South Syquia Apartments and Michel'
Apartments would be vacated by their occupants on February 29, March 31, and May 31, 1948, respectively. As a matter of fact, said
apartments were actually vacated on the dates already mentioned and were received by the plaintiffs-owners.

On the basis of this petition and because of the return of the three apartment houses to the owners, counsel for respondents Almeda
Lopez, Sanchez, Moore and Tillman filed a petition to dismiss the present case on the ground that it is moot. Counsel for the petitioners
answering the motion, claimed that the plaintiffs and petitioners accepted possession of the three apartment houses, reserving all of
their rights against respondents including the right to collect rents and darnages; that they have not been paid rents since January
1,1947; that respondents admitted that there is a total of P109,895 in rentals due and owing to petitioners; that should this case be now
dismissed, the petitioners will be unable to enforce collection; that the question of law involved in this case may again come up before
the courts when conflicts arise between Filipino civilian property owners and the U. S. Army authorities concerning contracts entered into
in the Philippines between said Filipinos and the U. S. Government. Consequently, this Court, according to the petitioners, far from
dismissing the case, should decide it, particularly the question of jurisdiction.

On June 18, 1949, tfirough a "petition to amend complaint" counsel for the petitioners informed this court that petitioners had already
received from the U. S. Army Forces in the Western Pacific the sum of Pl 09,895 as rentals for the three apartments, fout with the
reservation that said acceptance should not be construed as jeopardizing the rights of the petitioners in the case now pending in the
courts of the Philippines or their rights against the U. S. Government with respect to the three apartment houses. In view of this last
petition, counsel for respondents alleging that both respondents Moore and TillmaD had long left the Islands for other Army assignments,
and now that both the possession of the three apartments in question as well as the rentals for their occupation have already been
received by the petitioners renew their motion for dismissal on the ground that this case has now become moot.

The main purpose of the original action in the municipal court was to recover the possession of the three apartment houses in question.
The recovery of rentals as submitted by the very counsel f or the petitioners was merely incidental to the main action. Because the prime
purpose of the action had been achieved, namely, the recovery of the possession of the premises, apart from the fact that the rentals
amounting to P109,895 had been paid to the petitioners and accepted by them though under reservations, this Court may now well
dismiss the present proceedings on the ground that the questions involved therein have become academic and moot. Counsel for the
petitioners however, insists that a decision be rendered on the merits, particularly on the question of jurisdiction of the municipal court
over the original action, not only for the satisfaction of the parties involved but also to serve as a guide in future cases involving cases
of similar nature such as contracts of lease entered into between the Government of the United States of America on one side and Filipino
citizens on the other regarding properties of the latter. We accept the suggestion of petitioners and shall proceed to discuss the facts
and law involved and rule upon them.

We shall concede as correctly did the Court of First Instance, that following the doctrine laid down in the cases of U. S. vs. Lee and U. S.
vs. Tindal, supra, a private citizen claiming title and right of possession of a certain property may, to recover possession of said property,
sue as individuals, officers and agents of the Government who are said to be illegally withholding the same from him, though in doing
so, said officers and agents claim that they are acting for the Government, and the courts may entertain such a suit altho the Government
itself is not included as a party-defendant. Of course, the Government is not bound or concluded by the decision. The philosophy of this
ruling is that unless the courts are permitted to take cognizance and to assume jurisdiction over such a case, a private citizen would be
helpless and without redress and protection of his rights which may have been invaded by the officers of the government professing to
act in its name. In such a case the officials or agents asserting rightful possession must prove and justify their claim before the courts,
when it is made to appear in the suit against them that the title and right of possession is in the private citizen. However, and this is
important, where the judgment in such a case would result not only in the recovery of possession of the property in favor of said citizen
but also in a charge against or financial liability to the Government, then the suit should be regarded as one against the government
itself, and, consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the courts except with the consent of said Government. (See case
of Land vs. Dollar, 91 Law. ed., 1209.)

From a careful study of this case, considering the facts involved therein as well as those of public knowledge of which we take judicial
cognizance, we are convinced that the real party in interest as defendant in the original case is the United States of America. The lessee
in each of the three lease agreements was the United States of America and the lease agreements themselves were executed in her
name by her officials acting as her agents. The consideration or rentals was always paid by the U. S. Government. The original action in
the municipal court was brought on the basis of these three lease contracts and it is obvious in the opinion of this court that any back
rentals or increased rentals will have to be paid by the U. S. Government not only because, as already stated, the contracts of lease were
entered into by snch Government but also because the premises were used by officers of her armed forces during the war and immediately
after the termination of hostilities.

We cannot see how the defendants and respondents Moore and Tillman could be held individually responsible for the payment of rentals
or damages in relation to the occupancy of the apartment houses in question. Both of these army officials had no intervention whatsoever
in the execution of the lease agreements nor in the initial occupancy of the premises both of which were effected thru the intervention
of and at the instance of their predecessors in office. The original request made by the petitioners f or the return of the apartment
buildings after the supposed termination of the leases, was made to, and denied not by Moore and Tillman but by their predecessors in
office. The notice and decision that the U. S. Army wanted and in fact continued to occupy the premises was made not by Moore and
Tillman but by their predecessors in office. The refusal to renegotiate the leases as requested by the petitioners was made not by Moore
but by his predecessors in office according to the very complaint filed in the municipal court. The assurance that the U. S. Army will
vacate the premises prior to February 29, 1947, was also made by the predecessors in office of Moore.

As to the defendant Tillman, according to the complaint he was Chief, Real Estate Division, Office of the District Engineer, U. S. Army,
and was in direct charge and control of the leases and occupancy of the apartment buildings, but he was under the command of def
endant Moore, his superior officer. We cannot see how said defendant Tillman in assigning new officers to occupy apartments in the
three buildings, in obedience to order or direction from his superior, defendant Moore, could be held personally liable for the payment of
rentals or increase thereof, or damages said to have been suffered by the plaintiffs.

With respect to defendant General Moore, when he assumed his command in Manila, these lease agreements had already been negotiated
and executed and were in actual operation. The three apartment buildings were occupied by army officers assigned thereto by his
predecessors in office. All that he must have done was to assign or billet incoming army officers to apartnients as they were vacated by
outgoing officers due to changes in station. He found these apartment buildings occupied by his government and devoted to the use and
occupancy of army officers stationed in Manila under his command, and he had reason to believe that he could continue holding and
using the premises theretofore assigned for that purpose and under contracts previously entered into by his government, as long as and
until orders to the contrary were received by him. It is even to be presumed that when demand was made by the plaintiffs for the
payment of increased rentals or for vacating the three apartment buildings, defendant Moore, not a lawyer by profession but a soldier,
must have consulted and sought the advise of his legal department, and that his action in declining to pay the increased rentals or to
eject all his army officers from the three buildings must have been in pursuance to the advice and counsel of his legal division. At least,
he was not in a position to pay increased rentals above those set and stipulated in the lease agreements, without the approval of his
government, unless he personally assumed financial responsibility therefor. Under these circumstances, neither do we believe nor find
that defendant Moore can be held personally liable for the payment of back or increased rentals and alleged damages.

As to the army officers who actually occupied the apartments involved, there is less reason for holding them personally liable for rentals
and supposed damages as sought by the plaintiffs. It must be remembered that these army officers when coming to their station in
Manila were not given the choice of their dwellings. They were merely assigned quarters in the apartment buildings in question. Said
assignments or billets may well be regarded as orders, and all that those officers did was to obey them, and, accordingly, occupied the
rooms assigned to them. Under such circumstances, can it be supposed or conceived that such army officers would first inquire whether
the rental being paid by their government f or the rooms or apartments assigned to them by order of their superior officer was fair and
reasonable or not, and whether the period of lease between their government and the owners of the premises had expired, and whether
their occupancy of their rooms or apartments was legal or illegal? And if they dismissed these seemingly idle speculations, assuming that
they ever entered their minds, and continued to live in their apartments unless and until orders to the contrary were received by them,
could they later be held personally liable for any back rentals which their government may have failed to pay to the owners of the
buildings, or for any damages to the premises incident to all leases of property, specially in the absence of proof that such damages to
property had been caused by them and not by the previous occupants, also army officers who are not now parties defendant to this suit?
Incidentally it may be stated that both defendants Moore and Tillman have long left these Islands to assume other commands or
assignments and in all probability none of their 64 co-defendants is still within this; jurisdiction.
On the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of the belief and we hold that the real party defendant in interest is the Government
of the United States of America; that any judgment for back or increased rentals or damages will have to be paid not by def endants
Moore and Tillman and their 64 co-defendants but by the said U. S. Government. On the basis of the ruling in the case of Land vs. Dollar
already cited, and on what we have already stated, the present action must be considered as one against the U. S. Government. It is
clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for imlawful
detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U. S. Goverment has not
given its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though. not in name- Moreover, this is not only a case of a
citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's consent but it is of citizen filing an action against a foreign government
without said government's consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law
behind this rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof.

In conclusion we find that the Municipal Court of Manila committed no error in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction and that
the Court of First Instance acted correctly in affirming the municipal court's order of dismissal. Case dismissed, without pronouncements
as to costs.
Moran, CJ., Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Tuason, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 142396. February 11, 2003.*
KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents.

International Law; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; Diplomatic Missions; Function; Conformably with the Vienna Convention,
the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, by and large, the representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting
friendly relations with the receiving state.—The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was a codification of centuries-old customary
law and, by the time of its ratification on 18 April 1961, its rules of law had long become stable. Among the city states of ancient Greece,
among the peoples of the Mediterranean before the establishment of the Roman Empire, and among the states of India, the person of
the herald in time of war and the person of the diplomatic envoy in time of peace were universally held sacrosanct.By the end of the
16th century, when the earliest treatises on diplomatic law were published, the inviolability of ambassadors was firmly established as a
rule of customary international law, Traditionally, the exercise of diplomatic intercourse among states was undertaken by the head of
state himself, as being the preeminent embodiment of the state he represented, and the foreign secretary, the official usually entrusted
with the external affairs of the state. Where a state would wish to have a more prominent diplomatic presence in the receiving state, it
would then send to the latter a diplomatic mission. Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission
involve, by and large, the representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the receiving state.

Same; Same; Same; Heads of diplomatic missions, classified.—The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include
(a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state, (b) envoys, ministers or internuncios accredited to the heads of states; and
(c) charges d’ affairs accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs.Comprising the “staff of the (diplomatic) mission” are the diplomatic
staff, the administrative staff and the technical and service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff,
excluding the members of the administrative, technical and service staff of the mission, are accorded diplomatic rank.

Same; same; Same; Diplomatic Immunity; Only “diplomatic agents”, under the terms of the Convention, are vested with blanket
diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits.—Only “diplomatic agents,” under the terms of the Convention, are vested with blanket
diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. The Convention defines “diplomatic agents” as the heads of missions or members of
the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding the same privileges from all others.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the
determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature.—It might bear stressing that even consuls, who represent their
respective states in concerns of commerce and navigation and perform certain administrative and notarial duties, such as the issuance
of passports and visas, authentication of documents, and administration of oaths, do not ordinarily enjoy the traditional diplomatic
immunities and privileges accorded diplomats, mainly for the reason that they are not charged with the duty of representing their states
in political matters. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination
of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself—the proscription is not
accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim—par in parem, non habet imperium.—
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely
identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not
just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts
giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but
acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing
a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual
but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim—par in parem, non habet imperium—that all states are sovereign equals and
cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Exception; The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official
is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.—(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may
not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection
afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation
usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law
that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice
and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Vicente D. Millora for petitioner.
Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for private respondent.

VITUG, J.:
Sometime in May 1986, an Information for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise also known as the “Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against petitioner Khosrow Minucher and one Abbas Torabian with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 151, of
Pasig City. The criminal charge followed a “buy-bust operation” conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in the house of
Minucher, an Iranian national, where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited drug, was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were
accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who would, in due time, become one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution.
On 08 January 1988, Presiding Judge Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision acquitting the two accused.

On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case No. 88-45691 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, of Manila for damages on
account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. The Manila RTC detailed what
it had found to be the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.

“The testimony of the plaintiff disclosed that he is an Iranian national. He came to the Philippines to study in the University of the
Philippines in 1974. In 1976, under the regime of the Shah of Iran, he was appointed Labor Attaché for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo,
Japan and Manila, Philippines. When the Shah of Iran was deposed by Ayatollah Khomeini, plaintiff became a refugee of the United
Nations and continued to stay in the Philippines. He headed the Iranian National Resistance Movement in the Philippines.
“He came to know the defendant on May 13, 1986, when the latter was brought to his house and introduced to him by a certain Jose
Iñigo, an informer of the Intelligence Unit of the military. Jose Iñigo, on the other hand, was met by plaintiff at the office of Atty. Crisanto
Saruca, a lawyer for several Iranians whom plaintiff assisted as head of the anti-Khomeini movement in the Philippines.

“During his first meeting with the defendant on May 13, 1986, upon the introduction of Jose Inigo, the defendant expressed his interest
in buying caviar. As a matter of fact, he bought two kilos of caviar from plaintiff and paid P10,000.00 for it. Selling caviar, aside from
that of Persian carpets, pistachio nuts and other Iranian products was his business after the Khomeini government cut his pension of
over $3,000.00 per month. During their introduction in that meeting, the defendant gave the plaintiff his calling card, which showed that
he is working at the US Embassy in the Philippines, as a special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice,
of the United States, and gave his address as US Embassy, Manila. At the back of the card appears a telephone number in defendant’s
own handwriting, the number of which he can also be contacted.

“It was also during this first meeting that plaintiff expressed his desire to obtain a US Visa for his wife and the wife of a countryman
named Abbas Torabian. The defendant told him that he [could] help plaintiff for a fee of $2,000.00 per visa, Their conversation, however,
was more concentrated on politics, carpets and caviar. Thereafter, the defendant promised to see plaintiff again.

“On May 19, 1986, the defendant called the plaintiff and invited the latter for dinner at Mario’s Restaurant at Makati. He wanted to buy
200 grams of caviar. Plaintiff brought the merchandize but for the reason that the defendant was not yet there, he requested the
restaurant people to x x x place the same in the refrigerator. Defendant, however, came and plaintiff gave him the caviar for which he
was paid. Then their conversation was again focused on politics and business.

“On May 26, 1986, defendant visited plaintiff again at the latter’s residence for 18 years at Kapitolyo, Pasig. The defendant wanted to
buy a pair of carpets which plaintiff valued at $27,900.00. After some haggling, they agreed at $24,000.00. For the reason that defendant
did not yet have the money, they agreed that defendant would come back the next day. The following day, at 1:00 p.m., he came back
with his $24,000.00, which he gave to the plaintiff, and the latter, in turn, gave him the pair of carpets.

“At about 3:00 in the afternoon of May 27, 1986, the defendant came back again to plaintiff’s house and directly proceeded to the latter’s
bedroom, where the latter and his countryman, Abbas Torabian, were playing chess. Plaintiff opened his safe in the bedroom and obtained
$2,000.00 from it, gave it to the defendant for the latter’s fee in obtaining a visa for plaintiff’s wife. The defendant told him that he would
be leaving the Philippines very soon and requested him to come out of the house for a while so that he can introduce him to his cousin
waiting in a cab. Without much ado, and without putting on his shirt as he was only in his pajama pants, he followed the defendant
where he saw a parked cab opposite the street. To his complete surprise, an American jumped out of the cab with a drawn high-powered
gun. He was in the company of about 30 to 40 Filipino soldiers with 6 Americans, all armed. He was handcuffed and after about 20
minutes in the street, he was brought inside the house by the defendant. He was made to sit down while in handcuffs while the defendant
was inside his bedroom. The defendant came out of the bedroom and out from defendant’s attaché case, he took something and placed
it on the table in front of the plaintiff. They also took plaintiff’s wife who was at that time at the boutique near his house and likewise
arrested Torabian, who was playing chess with him in the bedroom and both were handcuffed together. Plaintiff was not told why he
was being handcuffed and why the privacy of his house, especially his bedroom was invaded by defendant. He was not allowed to use
the telephone. In fact, his telephone was unplugged. He asked for any warrant, but the defendant told him to ‘shut up.’ He was
nevertheless told that he would be able to call for his lawyer who can defend him.

“The plaintiff took note of the fact that when the defendant invited him to come out to meet his cousin, his safe was opened where he
kept the $24,000.00 the defendant paid for the carpets and another $8,000.00 which he also placed in the safe together with a bracelet
worth $15,000.00 and a pair of earrings worth $10,000.00. He also discovered missing upon his release his 8 pieces hand-made Persian
carpets, valued at $65,000.00, a painting he bought for P30,000.00 together with his TV and betamax sets. He claimed that when he
was handcuffed, the defendant took his keys from his wallet. There was, therefore, nothing left in his house.

“That his arrest as a heroin trafficker x x x had been well publicized throughout the world, in various newspapers, particularly in Australia,
America, Central Asia and in the Philippines. He was identified in the papers as an international drug trafficker. x x x

In fact, the arrest of defendant and Torabian was likewise on television, not only in the Philippines, but also in America and in Germany.
His friends in said places informed him that they saw him on TV with said news.

“After the arrest made on plaintiff and Torabian, they were brought to Camp Crame handcuffed together, where they were detained for
three days without food and water.”1

During the trial, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, filed a special appearance for Scalzo and moved for extension of time to file an
answer pending a supposed advice from the United States Department of State and Department of Justice on the defenses to be raised.
The trial court granted the motion. On 27 October 1988, Scalzo filed another special appearance to quash the summons on the ground
that he, not being a resident of the Philippines and the action being one in personam, was beyond the processes of the court. The motion
was denied by the court, in its order of 13 December 1988, holding that the filing by Scalzo of a motion for extension of time to file an
answer to the complaint was a voluntary appearance equivalent to service of summons which could likewise be construed a waiver of
the requirement of formal notice. Scalzo filed a motion for reconsideration of the court order, contending that a motion for an extension
of time to file an answer was not a voluntary appearance equivalent to service of summons since it did not seek an affirmative relief.
Scalzo argued that in cases involving the United States government, as well as its agencies and officials, a motion for extension was
peculiarly unavoidable due to the need (1) for both the Department of State and the Department of Justice to agree on the defenses to
be raised and (2) to refer the case to a Philippine lawyer who would be expected to first review the case. The court a quo denied the
motion for reconsideration in its order of 15 October 1989.

Scalzo filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, there docketed CA-G.R. No. 17023, assailing the denial. In a decision, dated
06 October 1989, the appellate court denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Scalzo then elevated the incident in a
petition for review on certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 91173, to this Court. The petition, however, was denied for its failure to comply with
SC Circular No. 1-88; in any event, the Court added, Scalzo had failed to show that the appellate court was in error in its questioned
judgment.

Meanwhile, at the court a quo, an order, dated 09 February 1990, was issued (a) declaring Scalzo in default for his failure to file a
responsive pleading (answer) and (b) setting the case for the reception of evidence. On 12 March 1990, Scalzo filed a motion to set aside
the order of default and to admit his answer to the complaint. Granting the motion, the trial court set the case for pretrial. In his answer,
Scalzo denied the material allegations of the complaint and raised the affirmative defenses (a) of Minucher’s failure to state a cause of
action in his complaint and (b) that Scalzo had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice. Scalzo interposed a counter-claim of P100,000.00 to answer for
attorneys’ fees and expenses of litigation.

Then, on 14 June 1990, after almost two years since the institution of the civil case, Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity.
He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note No. 414 of the United States Embassy, dated 29 May 1990, addressed to the Department of
Foreign Affairs of the Philippines and a Certification, dated 11 June 1990, of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the note is a
true and faithful copy of its original. In an order of 25 June 1990, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
On 27 July 1990, Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with this Court, docketed G.R. No. 94257 and entitled “Arthur W.
Scalzo, Jr. vs. Hon. Wenceslao Polo, et al.,” asking that the complaint in Civil Case No. 88-45691 be ordered dismissed. The case was
referred to the Court of Appeals, there docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 22505, per this Court’s resolution of 07 August 1990. On 31 October
1990, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision sustaining the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordering the dismissal of the
complaint against him. Minucher filed a petition for review with this Court, docketed G.R. No. 97765 and entitled “Khosrow Minucher vs.
the Honorable Court of Appeals, et al.” (cited in 214 SCRA 242), appealing the judgment of the Court of Appeals. In a decision, dated 24
September 1992, penned by Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr., this Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and
remanded the case to the lower court for trial. The remand was ordered on the theses (a) that the Court of Appeals erred in granting
the motion to dismiss of Scalzo for lack of jurisdiction over his person without even considering the issue of the authenticity of Diplomatic
Note No. 414 and (b) that the complaint contained sufficient allegations to the effect that Scalzo committed the imputed acts in his
personal capacity and outside the scope of his official duties and, absent any evidence to the contrary, the issue on Scalzo’s diplomatic
immunity could not be taken up.

The Manila RTC thus continued with its hearings on the case. On 17 November 1995, the trial court reached a decision; it adjudged:

“WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff, who successfully established
his claim by sufficient evidence, against the defendant in the manner following:

“ ‘Adjudging defendant liable to plaintiff in actual and compensatory damages of P520,000,00; moral damages in the sum of P10 million;
exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00; attorney’s fees in the sum of P200,000.00 plus costs.

‘The Clerk of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is ordered to take note of the lien of the Court on this judgment to answer for the unpaid
docket fees considering that the plaintiff in this case instituted this action as a pauper litigant.’ ”2

While the trial court gave credence to the claim of Scalzo and the evidence presented by him that he was a diplomatic agent entitled to
immunity as such, it ruled that he, nevertheless, should be held accountable for the acts complained of committed outside his official
duties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and sustained the defense of Scalzo that he was sufficiently
clothed with diplomatic immunity during his term of duty and thereby immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the “Receiving
State” pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention.

Hence, this recourse by Minucher. The instant petition for review raises a two-fold issue: (1) whether or not the doctrine of conclusiveness
of judgment, following the decision rendered by this Court in G.R. No. 97765, should have precluded the Court of Appeals from resolving
the appeal to it in an entirely different manner, and (2) whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.

The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, or its kindred rule of res judicata, would require 1) the finality of the prior judgment, 2) a
valid jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties on the part of the court that renders it, 3) a judgment on the merits, and 4) an
identity of the parties, subject matter and causes of action.3 Even while one of the issues submitted in G.R. No. 97765—“whether or not
public respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that private respondent Scalzo is a diplomat immune from civil suit conformably with
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations”—is also a pivotal question raised in the instant petition, the ruling in G.R. No. 97765,
however, has not resolved that point with finality, indeed, the Court there has made this observation—
“It may be mentioned in this regard that private respondent himself, in his Pre-trial Brief filed on 13 June 1990, unequivocally states that
he would present documentary evidence consisting of DEA records on his investigation and surveillance of plaintiff and on his position
and duties as DEA special agent in Manila. Having thus reserved his right to present evidence in support of his position, which is the basis
for the alleged diplomatic immunity, the barren self-serving claim in the belated motion to dismiss cannot be relied upon for a reasonable,
intelligent and fair resolution of the issue of diplomatic immunity.”4

Scalzo contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which the Philippines is a signatory, grants him absolute immunity
from suit, describing his functions as an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency as “conducting surveillance operations on
suspected drug dealers in the Philippines believed to be the source of prohibited drugs being shipped to the U.S., (and) having ascertained
the target, (he then) would inform the Philippine narcotic agents (to) make the actual arrest.” Scalzo has submitted to the trial court a
number of documents—
1.Exh. ‘2’—Diplomatic Note No. 414 dated 29 May 1990;
2.Exh. ‘1’—Certification of Vice Consul Donna K. Woodward dated 11 June 1990;
3.Exh. ‘5’—Diplomatic Note No. 757 dated 25 October 1991;
4.Exh. ‘6’—Diplomatic Note No. 791 dated 17 November 1992; and
5.Exh. ‘7’—Diplomatic Note No. 833 dated 21 October 1988.
6.Exh. ‘3’—1st Indorsement of the Hon. Jorge R. Coquia, Legal Adviser, Department of Foreign Affairs, dated 27 June 1990
forwarding Embassy Note No. 414 to the Clerk of Court of RTC Manila, Branch 19 (the trial court);
7.Exh. ‘4’—Diplomatic Note No. 414, appended to the 1st Indorsement (Exh. ‘3’); and
8.Exh. ‘8’—Letter dated 18 November 1992 from the Office of the Protocol, Department of Foreign Affairs, through Asst. Sec.
Emmanuel Fernandez, addressed to the Chief Justice of this Court.5

The documents, according to Scalzo, would show that: (1) the United States Embassy accordingly advised the Executive Department of
the Philippine Government that Scalzo was a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic mission from his arrival in
the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his departure on 10 August 1988; (2) that the United States Government was firm from the very
beginning in asserting the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo with respect to the case pursuant to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations; and (3) that the United States Embassy repeatedly urged the Department of Foreign Affairs to take appropriate
action to inform the trial court of Scalzo’s diplomatic immunity. The other documentary exhibits were presented to indicate that: (1) the
Philippine government itself, through its Executive Department, recognizing and respecting the diplomatic status of Scalzo, formally
advised the “Judicial Department” of his diplomatic status and his entitlement to all diplomatic privileges and immunities under the Vienna
Convention; and (2) the Department of Foreign Affairs itself authenticated Diplomatic Note No. 414. Scalzo additionally presented Exhibits
“9” to “13” consisting of his reports of investigation on the surveillance and subsequent arrest of Minucher, the certification of the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice that Scalzo was a special agent assigned to the Philippines at all
times relevant to the complaint, and the special power of attorney executed by him in favor of his previous counsel6 to show (a) that the
United States Embassy, affirmed by its Vice Consul, acknowledged Scalzo to be a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States
diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his departure on 10 August 1988, (b) that, on May 1986,
with the cooperation of the Philippine law enforcement officials and in the exercise of his functions as member of the mission, he
investigated Minucher for alleged trafficking in a prohibited drug, and (c) that the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs itself recognized
that Scalzo during his tour of duty in the Philippines (14 October 1985 up to 10 August 1988) was listed as being an Assistant Attaché of
the United States diplomatic mission and accredited with diplomatic status by the Government of the Philippines. In his Exhibit 12, Scalzo
described the functions of the overseas office of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, i.e., (1) to provide criminal investigative
expertise and assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies on narcotic and drug control programs upon the request of the host country,
2) to establish and maintain liaison with the host country and counterpart foreign law enforcement officials, and 3) to conduct complex
criminal investigations involving international criminal conspiracies which affect the interests of the United States.

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was a codification of centuries-old customary law and, by the time of its ratification on
18 April 1961, its rules of law had long become stable. Among the city states of ancient Greece, among the peoples of the Mediterranean
before the establishment of the Roman Empire, and among the states of India, the person of the herald in time of war and the person
of the diplomatic envoy in time of peace were universally held sacrosanct.7By the end of the 16th century, when the earliest treatises on
diplomatic law were published, the inviolability of ambassadors was firmly established as a rule of customary international law,8
Traditionally, the exercise of diplomatic intercourse among states was undertaken by the head of state himself, as being the preeminent
embodiment of the state he represented, and the foreign secretary, the official usually entrusted with the external affairs of the state.
Where a state would wish to have a more prominent diplomatic presence in the receiving state, it would then send to the latter a
diplomatic mission. Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, by and large, the
representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the receiving state.9

The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state,10
(b) envoys,11 ministers or internuncios accredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges d’ affairs12 accredited to the ministers of foreign
affairs.13 Comprising the “staff of the (diplomatic) mission” are the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the technical and service
staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff, excluding the members of the administrative, technical and
service staff of the mission, are accorded diplomatic rank. Even while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for immunity
to the members of diplomatic missions, it does so, nevertheless, with an understanding that the same be restrictively applied. Only
“diplomatic agents,” under the terms of the Convention, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. The
Convention defines “diplomatic agents” as the heads of missions or members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding the same
privileges from all others. It might bear stressing that even consuls, who represent their respective states in concerns of commerce and
navigation and perform certain administrative and notarial duties, such as the issuance of passports and visas, authentication of
documents, and administration of oaths, do not ordinarily enjoy the traditional diplomatic immunities and privileges accorded diplomats,
mainly for the reason that they are not charged with the duty of representing their states in political matters. Indeed, the main yardstick
in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic
nature.

Scalzo asserted, particularly in his Exhibits “9” to “13”, that he was an Assistant Attaché of the United States diplomatic mission and was
accredited as such by the Philippine Government. An attaché belongs to a category of officers in the diplomatic establishment who may
be in charge of its cultural, press, administrative or financial affairs. There could also be a class of attaches belonging to certain ministries
or departments of the government, other than the foreign ministry or department, who are detailed by their respective ministries or
departments with the embassies such as the military, naval, air, commercial, agricultural, labor, science, and customs attaches, or the
like. Attaches assist a chief of mission in his duties and are administratively under him, but their main function is to observe, analyze and
interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or departments
in the home gov-ernment.14 These officials are not generally regarded as members of the diplomatic mission, nor are they normally
designated as having diplomatic rank.

In an attempt to prove his diplomatic status, Scalzo presented Diplomatic Notes Nos. 414, 757 and 791, all issued post litem motam,
respectively, on 29 May 1990, 25 October 1991 and 17 November 1992. The presentation did nothing much to alleviate the Court’s initial
reservations in G.R. No. 97765, viz.:

“While the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, the public respondent gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Civil Case No.
8845691 on the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because of the diplomatic note, the private respondent is clothed with
diplomatic immunity, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person.
“x x x xxx xxx

“And now, to the core issue—the alleged diplomatic immunity of the private respondent. Setting aside for the moment the issue of
authenticity raised by the petitioner and the doubts that surround such claim, in view of the fact that it took private respondent one (1)
year, eight (8) months and seventeen (17) days from the time his counsel filed on 12 September 1988 a Special Appearance and Motion
asking for a first extension of time to file the Answer because the Departments of State and Justice of the United States of America were
studying the case for the purpose of determining his defenses, before he could secure the Diplomatic Note from the US Embassy in
Manila, and even granting for the sake of argument that such note is authentic, the complaint for damages filed by petitioner cannot be
peremptorily dismissed.
“x x x xxx xxx

“There is of course the claim of private respondent that the acts imputed to him were done in his official capacity. Nothing supports this
self-serving claim other than the so-called Diplomatic Note. x x x. The public respondent then should have sustained the trial court’s
denial of the motion to dismiss. Verily, it should have been the most proper and appropriate recourse. It should not have been
overwhelmed by the self-serving Diplomatic Note whose belated issuance is even suspect and whose authenticity has not yet been
proved. The undue haste with which respondent Court yielded to the private respondent’s claim is arbitrary.”
A significant document would appear to be Exhibit No. 08, dated 08 November 1992, issued by the Office of Protocol of the Department
of Foreign Affairs and signed by Emmanuel C. Fernandez, Assistant Secretary, certifying that “the records of the Department (would)
show that Mr. Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., during his term of office in the Philippines (from 14 October 1985 up to 10 August 1988) was listed
as an Assistant Attaché of the United States diplomatic mission and was, therefore, accredited diplomatic status by the Government of
the Philippines.” No certified true copy of such “records,” the supposed bases for the belated issuance, was presented in evidence.
Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the executive branch of the government. In World Health
Organization vs. Aquino15 the Court has recognized that, in such matters, the hands of the courts are virtually tied. Amidst apprehensions
of indiscriminate and incautious grant of immunity, designed to gain exemption from the jurisdiction of courts, it should behoove the
Philippine government, specifically its Department of Foreign Affairs, to be most circumspect, that should particularly be no less than
compelling, in its post litem motam issuances. It might be recalled that the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law
of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction.16 The
government of the United States itself, which Scalzo claims to be acting for, has formulated its standards for recognition of a diplomatic
agent. The State Department policy is to only concede diplomatic status to a person who possesses an acknowledged diplomatic title and
“performs duties of diplomatic nature.”17Supplementary criteria for accreditation are the possession of a valid diplomatic passport or,
from States which do not issue such passports, a diplomatic note formally representing the intention to assign the person to diplomatic
duties, the holding of a non-immigrant visa, being over twenty-one years of age, and performing diplomatic functions on an essentially
full-time basis.18 Diplomatic missions are requested to provide the most accurate and descriptive job title to that which currently applies
to the duties performed. The Office of the Protocol would then assign each individual to the appropriate functional cate-gory.19
But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it was sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for
the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within the country on
the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions when he
committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity
from Suit.

The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely
identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit20 and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach
not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity.21 If the
acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage,
but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent.
Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an
individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim—par in parem, non habet imperium—that all states are sovereign
equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.22 The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would
require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.23

In United States of America vs. Guinto,24 involving officers of the United States Air Force and special officers of the Air Force Office of
Special Investigators charged with the duty of preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs, this Court has ruled—

“While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. x x x. It cannot for a
moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later testified against the
complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts
imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. x x x As they have acted on behalf of the government, and within
the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, [who were] responsible for their acts.”25

This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. Thus, Shauf vs. Court of Appeals26 elaborates:

“It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the
rights of the plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, et
al. (33 SCRA 368): ‘Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers
are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts,
for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has
been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while
claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or
under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State
may not be sued without its consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument
for perpetrating an injustice.
“x x x xxx xxx
“(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and
personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the
moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess
of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction.”27

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is
acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between
the two sovereigns. Guinto and Shauf both involve officers and personnel of the United States, stationed within Philippine territory, under
the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. While evidence is wanting to show any similar agreement between the governments of the
Philippines and of the United States (for the latter to send its agents and to conduct surveillance and related activities of suspected drug
dealers in the Philippines), the consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency, however, can be gleaned from the facts heretofore elsewhere mentioned. The official exchanges of communication between
agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the
United States Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the “buy-bust operation”
conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the “diplomatic status” of the latter but
they give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine
territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct
surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be
expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust
operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond
the scope of his official function or duties. All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United
States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem
on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit.WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the petition is DENIED.
No costs.SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 109095-109107. February 23, 1995.*
ELDEPIO LASCO, RODOLFO ELISAN, URBANO BERADOR, FLORENTINO ESTOBIO, MARCELINO MATURAN, FRAEN
BALIBAG, CARMELITO GAJOL, DEMOSTHENES MANTO, SATURNINO BACOL, SATURNINO LASCO, RAMON LOYOLA,
JOSENIANO B. ESPINA, all represented by MARIANO R. ESPINA, and MARIANO R. ESPINA, petitioners, vs. UNITED
NATIONS REVOLVING FUND FOR NATURAL RESOURCES EXPLORATION (UNRFNRE) represented by its operations
manager, DR. KYRIACOS LOUCA, OSCAR N. ABELLA, LEON G. GONZAGA, JR., MUSIB M. BUAT, Commissioners of National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City and IRVING PETILLA, Labor Arbiter of Butuan
City, respondents.

Remedial Law; Certiorari; Certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the
respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned errors.—Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended,
provides that decisions of the NLRC are final and executory. Thus, they may only be questioned through certiorari as a special civil action
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Ordinarily, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration
is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned errors (Liberty Insurance Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, 222 SCRA 37 [1993]). In the case at bench, petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration is fatal to the instant
petition. Moreover, the petition lacks any explanation for such omission, which may merit its being considered as falling under the
recognized exceptions to the necessity of filing such motion.

Constitutional Law; Doctrine of Immunity; The Philippine Government adheres to the doctrine of immunity granted to the United Nations
and its specialized agencies.—As a matter of state policy as expressed in the Constitution, the Philippine Government adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law (1987 Constitution, Art. II., Sec. 2). Being a member of the United Nations and a party to the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, the Philippine Government adheres to
the doctrine of immunity granted to the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Both treaties have the force and effect of law.

Same; Same; The reason behind the grant of privileges and immunities to international organizations, its officials and functionaries is to
secure them legal and practical independence in fulfilling their duties.—We recognize the growth of international organizations dedicated
to specific universal endeavors, such as health, agriculture, science and technology and environment. It is not surprising that their
existence has evolved into the concept of international immunities. The reason behind the grant of privileges and immunities to
international organizations, its officials and functionaries is to secure them legal and practical independence in fulfilling their duties (Jenks,
International Immunities 17 [1961]). Immunity is necessary to assure unimpeded performance of their functions. The purpose is "to
shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host
country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions"
(International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]).

Same; Same; There is no conflict between the constitutional duty of the State to protect the rights of workers and to promote their
welfare, and the grant of immunity to international organizations.—In the International Catholic Migration Commission case, we held that
there is no conflict between the constitutional duty of the State to protect the rights of workers and to promote their welfare, and the
grant of immunity to international organizations. Clauses on jurisdictional immunity are now standard in the charters of international
organizations to guarantee the smooth discharge of their functions.

Same; Same; The issue whether an international organization is entitled to diplomatic immunity is a "political question" and such
determination by the executive branch is conclusive on the courts and quasi-judicial agencies.—The diplomatic immunity of private
respondent was sufficiently established by the letter of the Department of Foreign Affairs, recognizing and confirming the immunity of
UNRFNRE in accordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations where the Philippine Government
was a party. The issue whether an international organization is entitled to diplomatic immunity is a "political question" and such
determination by the executive branch is conclusive on the courts and quasi-judicial agencies (The Holy See v. Hon. Eriberto U. Rosario,
Jr., G.R. No. 101949, Dec. 1, 1994; International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, supra).

Same; Same; Courts can only assume jurisdiction over private respondent if it expressly waived its immunity.—Our courts can only
assume jurisdiction over private respondent if it expressly waived its immunity, which is not so in the case at bench (Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, Art. III, Sec. 4).

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Public Attorney's Office for petitioners.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for private respondents.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the Resolution dated January 25, 1993 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City.

We dismiss the petition.

I
Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent, the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources
Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations. The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project
of the Philippine Government and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island.

Petitioners are the complainants in NLRC Cases Nos. SRAB 10-03-00067-91 to 10-03-00078-91 and SRAB 10-07-00159-91 for illegal
dismissal and damages.

In its Motion to Dismiss, private respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since it enjoyed
diplomatic immunity pursuant to the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. In support thereof, private
respondent attached a letter from the Department of Foreign Affairs dated August 26, 1991, which acknowledged its immunity from suit.
The letter confirmed that private respondent, being a special fund administered by the United Nations, was covered by the 1946
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of which the Philippine Government was an original signatory (Rollo,
p. 21).
On November 25, 1991, respondent Labor Arbiter issued an order dismissing the complaints on the ground that private respondent was
protected by diplomatic immunity. The dismissal was based on the letter of the Foreign Office dated September 10, 1991.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. Thus, an appeal was filed with the NLRC, which affirmed the dismissal of the
complaints in its Resolution dated January 25, 1993.

Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari without first seeking a reconsideration of the NLRC resolution.

II
Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, provides that decisions of the NLRC are final and executory. Thus, they
may only be questioned through certiorari as a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Ordinarily, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to
allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned errors (Liberty Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 37 [1993]).

In the case at bench, petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration is fatal to the instant petition. Moreover, the petition lacks
any explanation for such omission, which may merit its being considered as falling under the recognized exceptions to the necessity of
filing such motion.

Notwithstanding, we deem it wise to give due course to the petition because of the implications of the issue in our international relations.

Petitioners argued that the acts of mining exploration and exploitation are outside the official functions of an international agency
protected by diplomatic immunity. Even assuming that private respondent was entitled to diplomatic immunity, petitioners insisted that
private respondent waived it when it engaged in exploration work and entered into a contract of employment with petitioners.

Petitioners, likewise, invoked the constitutional mandate that the State shall afford full protection to labor and promote full employment
and equality of employment opportunities for all (1987 Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 3).

The Office of the Solicitor General is of the view that private respondent is covered by the mantle of diplomatic immunity. Private
respondent is a specialized agency of the United Nations. Under Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations:
“1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment
of its purposes.
“2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and
immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization.”

Corollary to the cited article is the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, to
which the Philippines was a signatory (Vol. 1, Philippine Treaty Series, p. 621). We quote Sections 4 and 5 of Article III thereof:

"Section 4. The specialized agencies, their property and assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from
every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case they have expressly waived their immunity. It is, however, understood
that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution (Italics supplied).

"Section 5. The premises of the specialized agencies shall be inviolable. The property and assets of the specialized agencies, wherever
located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference,
whether by executive, administrative, judicial or legislative action" (Italics supplied).

As a matter of state policy as expressed in the Constitution, the Philippine Government adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law (1987 Constitution, Art. II., Sec. 2).

Being a member of the United Nations and a party to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the
United Nations, the Philippine Government adheres to the doctrine of immunity granted to the United Nations and its specialized agencies.
Both treaties have the force and effect of law.

In World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), we had occasion to rule that:

"It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a
political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the
plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the
duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the
Solicitor General or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise
their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign
relations, it is accepted doctrine that "in such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch
and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction" (Italics supplied).

We recognize the growth of international organizations dedicated to specific universal endeavors, such as health, agriculture, science and
technology and environment. It is not surprising that their existence has evolved into the concept of international immunities. The reason
behind the grant of privileges and immunities to international organizations, its officials and functionaries is to secure them legal and
practical independence in fulfilling their duties (Jenks, International Immunities 17 [1961]).

Immunity is necessary to assure unimpeded performance of their functions. The purpose is "to shield the affairs of international
organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member
States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions" (International Catholic Migration Commission
v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]).

In the International Catholic Migration Commission case, we held that there is no conflict between the constitutional duty of the State to
protect the rights of workers and to promote their welfare, and the grant of immunity to international organizations. Clauses on
jurisdictional immunity are now standard in the charters of international organizations to guarantee the smooth discharge of their
functions.

The diplomatic immunity of private respondent was sufficiently established by the letter of the Department of Foreign Affairs, recognizing
and confirming the immunity of UNRFNRE in accordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations
where the Philippine Government was a party. The issue whether an international organization is entitled to diplomatic immunity is a
"political question" and such determination by the executive branch is conclusive on the courts and quasi-judicial agencies (The Holy See
v. Hon. Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr., G.R. No. 101949, Dec. 1, 1994; International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, supra).

Our courts can only assume jurisdiction over private respondent if it expressly waived its immunity, which is not so in the case at bench
(Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, Art. III, Sec. 4).

Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in the Philippines. Its presence here is by virtue of a joint project entered into
by the Philippine Government and the United Nations for mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. Its mission is not to exploit our natural
resources and gain pecuniarily thereby but to help improve the quality of life of the people, including that of petitioners.

This is not to say that petitioners have no recourse. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized
Agencies of the United Nations states that "each specialized agency shall make a provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a)
disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party."
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed.

Note.—It is not within the province of the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action. (Llamas vs.
Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 [1991])
 G.R. No. 106483.May 22, 1995.*
ERNESTO L. CALLADO, petitioner, vs. INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, respondent.

International Law; Immunity From Suits; The IRRI is immune from suit.—IRRI’s immunity from suit is undisputed. Presidential Decree
No. 1620, Article 3 provides: “Article 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and
administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his
authorized representatives.”

Same; Same; A categorical recognition by the Executive Branch that the IRRI enjoys immunities accorded to international organizations
is a determination which is considered a political question conclusive upon the Courts.—In the case of International Catholic Migration
Commission v. Hon. Calleja, et al. and Kapisanan ng Manggagawa at TAC sa IRRI v. Secretary of Labor and Employment and IRRI, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. After the Court noted the letter of the Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs to
the Secretary of Labor dated June 17, 1987, where the immunity of IRRI from the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment
was sustained, the Court stated that this opinion constituted “a categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that
x x x IRRI enjoy(s) immunities accorded to international organizations, which determination has been held to be a political question
conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarrass a political department of Government.”

Same; Same; An express waiver by the IRRI’s Director-General is the only way by which the IRRI may relinquish or abandon its
immunity.—The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by
which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.

Same; Same; A memorandum meant for internal circulation within the IRRI cannot be considered as an express waiver of diplomatic
immunity.—We agree with private respondent IRRI that this memorandum cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered the
express waiver by the Director-General. The memorandum, issued by the former Director-General to a now-defunct division of the IRRI,
was meant for internal circulation and not as a pledge of waiver in all cases arising from dismissal of employees. Moreover, the IRRI’s
letter to the Labor Arbiter in the case at bench made in 1991 declaring that it has no intention of waiving its immunity, at the very least,
supplants any pronouncement of alleged waiver issued in previous cases.

PETITION for certiorari to review an order of the National Labor Relations Commission.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Benedicto R. Palacol for petitioner.
Jimenez & Associates for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.:

Did the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-employee
relationship?

We rule in the negative and vote to dismiss the petition.

Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI from April 11, 1983 to December 14, 1990. On February 11, 1990,
while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an
accident.

Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI’s Human Resource Development Department
Manager in a Memorandum dated March 5, 1990.1 In view of the aforesaid findings, he was charged with:
“(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor;

(2) Serious misconduct consisting of your failure to report to your supervisors the failure of your vehicle to start because of a problem
with the car battery which, you alleged, required you to overstay in Manila for more than six (6) hours, whereas, had you reported the
matter to IRRI, Los Baños by telephone, your problem could have been solved within one or two hours;

(3) Gross and habitual neglect of your duties.”2

In a Memorandum dated March 9, 1990, petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him.3 After evaluating
petitioner’s answer, explanations and other evidence, IRRI issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner on December 7, 1990.4

Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint on December 19, 1990 before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and
indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

On January 2, 1991, private respondent IRRI, through counsel, wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity
from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620,5 and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as
an international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the same.6

IRRI likewise wrote in the same tenor to the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment.7

While admitting IRRI’s defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order issued by the Institute on August 13, 1991
to the effect that “in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its immunity,”8 and, accordingly, considered the defense of immunity
no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case. The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter’s decision dated October 31, 1991, reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent to reinstate complainant to his former position
without loss or (sic) seniority rights and privileges within five (5) days from receipt hereof and to pay his full backwages from March 7,
1990 to October 31, 1991, in the total amount of P83,048.75 computed on the basis of his last monthly salary.”9

The NLRC found merit in private respondent’s appeal and, finding that IRRI did not waive its immunity, ordered the aforesaid decision of
the Labor Arbiter set aside and the complaint dismissed.10
Hence, this petition where it is contended that the immunity of the IRRI as an international organization granted by Article 3 of Presidential
Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its Memorandum on “Guidelines
on the handling of dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620.”11

It is also petitioner’s position that a dismissal of his complaint before the Labor Arbiter leaves him no other remedy through which he can
seek redress. He further states that since the investigation of his case was not referred to the Council of IRRI Employees and Management
(CIEM), he was denied his constitutional right to due process.

We find no merit in petitioner’s arguments.

IRRI’s immunity from suit is undisputed.

Presidential Decree No. 1620, Article 3 provides:

“Article 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except
insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.”

In the case of International Catholic Migration Commission v. Hon. Calleja, et al. and Kapisanan ng Manggagawa at TAC sa IRRI v.
Secretary of Labor and Employment and IRRI,12 the Court upheld the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. After the Court noted the
letter of the Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of Labor dated June 17, 1987, where the immunity of IRRI from the
jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment was sustained, the Court stated that this opinion constituted “a categorical
recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that x x x IRRI enjoy(s) immunities accorded to international organizations, which
determination has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarass a political department of
Government.”13 We cited the Court’s earlier pronouncement in WHO v. Hon. Benjamin Aquino, et al.,14 to wit:

“It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a
political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the
plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the
duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government . . . or
other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction . . .
as to embarass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial
department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic
jurisdiction.”15

Further, we held that “(t)he raison d’etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by the
agencies concerned.

The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to x x x and IRRI is clearly necessitated by their international character and respective
purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal workings. The exercise
of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of
international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice
of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions.”16

The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by which it may
relinquish or abandon this immunity.

On the matter of waiving its immunity from suit, IRRI had, early on, made its position clear. Through counsel, the Institute wrote the
Labor Arbiter categorically informing him that the Institute will not waive its diplomatic immunity. In the second place, petitioner’s reliance
on the Memorandum with “Guidelines in handling cases of dismissal of employees in relation to P.D. 1620” dated July 26, 1983, is
misplaced. The Memorandum reads, in part:

“Time and again the Institute has reiterated that it will not use its immunity under P.D. 1620 for the purpose of terminating the services
of any of its employees. Despite continuing efforts on the part of IRRI to live up to this undertaking, there appears to be apprehension
in the minds of some IRRI employees. To help allay these fears the following guidelines will be followed hereafter by the Personnel/Legal
Office while handling cases of dismissed employees.
xxx xxx xxx
2.Notification/manifestation to MOLE or labor arbiter If and when a dismissed employee files a complaint against the Institute contesting
the legality of dismissal, IRRI’s answer to the complaint will:
1) Indicate in the identification of IRRI that it is an international organization operating under the laws of the Philippines including
P.D. 1620; and
2) Base the defense on the merits and facts of the case as well as the legality of the cause or causes for termination.
3) Waiving immunity under P.D. 1620

If the plaintiff’s attorney or the arbiter, asks if IRRI will waive its immunity we may reply that the Institute will be happy to do so, as it
has in the past in the formal manner required thereby reaffirming our commitment to abide by the laws of the Philippines and our full
faith in the integrity and impartiality of the legal system.”17 (Italics in this paragraphs ours)

From the last paragraph of the foregoing quotation, it is clear that in cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its
immunity, signifying that such waiver is discretionary on its part.

We agree with private respondent IRRI that this memorandum cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered the express
waiver by the Director-General. Respondent Commission has quoted IRRI’s reply thus:

“The 1983 x x x is an internal memo addressed to Personnel and Legal Office and was issued for its guidance in handling those cases
where IRRI opts to waive its immunity. It is not a declaration of waiver for all cases. This is apparent from the use of the permissive term
“may” rather than the mandatory term “shall” in the last paragraph of the memo. Certainly, the memo cannot be considered as the
express waiver by the Director General as contemplated by P.D. 1620, especially since the memo was issued by a former Director-
General. At the very least, the express declaration of the incumbent Director-General supersedes the 1983 memo and should be accorded
greater respect. It would be equally important to point out that the Personnel and Legal Office has been non-existent since 1988 as a
result of major reorganization of the IRRI. Cases of IRRI before DOLE are handled by an external Legal Counsel as in this particular
case.”18 (Italics supplied)

The memorandum, issued by the former Director-General to a now-defunct division of the IRRI, was meant for internal circulation and
not as a pledge of waiver in all cases arising from dismissal of employees. Moreover, the IRRI’s letter to the Labor Arbiter in the case at
bench made in 1991 declaring that it has no intention of waiving its immunity, at the very least, supplants any pronouncement of alleged
waiver issued in previous cases.

Petitioner’s allegation that he was denied due process is unfounded and has no basis.

It is not denied that he was informed of the findings and charges resulting from an investigation conducted of his case in accordance
with IRRI policies and procedures. He had a chance to comment thereon in a Memorandum he submitted to the Manager of the Human
Resource and Development Department. Therefore, he was given proper notice and adequate opportunity to refute the charges and
findings, hereby fulfilling the basic requirements of due process.

Finally, on the issue of referral to the Council of IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM), petitioner similarly fails to persuade the Court.

The Court, in the Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa at TAC sa IRRI case,19 held:

“Neither are the employees of IRRI without remedy in case of dispute with management as, in fact, there had been organized a forum
for better management-employee relationship as evidenced by the formation of the Council of IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM)
wherein ‘both management and employees were and still are represented for purposes of maintaining mutual and beneficial cooperation
between IRRI and its employees.’ The existence of this Union factually and tellingly belies the argument that Pres. Decree No. 1620,
which grants to IRRI the status, privileges and immunities of an international organization, deprives its employees of the right to self-
organization.”

We have earlier concluded that petitioner was not denied due process, and this, notwithstanding the non-referral to the Council of IRRI
Employees and Management. Private respondent correctly pointed out that petitioner, having opted not to seek the help of the CIEM
Grievance Committee, prepared his answer by his own self.20 He cannot now fault the Institute for not referring his case to the CIEM.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Feliciano (Chairman), Melo, and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Francisco, J., On leave.
Petition dismissed.

Note.—It is beyond question that the SEAFDEC is an international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. (Southeast Asian Fisheries
Development Center vs. Acosta, 226 SCRA 49 [1993])
 G.R. No. 115634. April 27, 2000.*
FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR),
CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA,
respondents.

Criminal Law; Revised Forestry Code; Section 78 of the Revised Forestry Code makes mere possession of timber or other forest products
without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in
Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal Code.—This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products without the
accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-
310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles were loaded with forest products at the time of the seizure. But
admittedly no permit evidencing authority to possess and transport said load of forest products was duly presented. These products, in
turn, were deemed illegally sourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised Forestry Code, although as
found by the trial court, the persons responsible for said violation were not the ones charged by the public prosecutor.

Same; Same; Seizure and Forfeiture Procedure; Actions; Replevin; It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and
hearing before a seizure could be effected where the vehicle owner and his driver immediately went to court and applied for a writ of
replevin.—Note further that petitioners’ failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990
was justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the
vehicle because on the 3rd day following the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded
vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the second
time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle
because private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was
done upon their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice
and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the circumstances.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure of the vehicles used in
transporting illegally cut timber was in accordance with law, the seized vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis, hence they could
not be subject to an action for replevin.—Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance
with law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is
property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise.

Same; Same; A property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the subject of a replevin suit.—Note that property that is
validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the subject of a replevin suit. In Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, we elucidated
further: “. . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel earlier taken for violation
of the Tariff and Customs Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution. Officers of the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff,
are implored to be vigilant in their execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and forfeiture proceedings could easily
be undermined by the simple devise of a writ of replevin . . .”

Same; Constitutional Law; State Immunity; A suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its
purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable—thus, a suit against officers who represent the DENR is a suit against the State and cannot
prosper without the States consent.—Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. And a suit
against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable. However,
the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good
faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption. In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were
performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature. In implementing and enforcing
Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as
officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against
the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the State’s consent.

Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing
the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss, otherwise such ground for dismissal would be deemed
waived.—Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the Solicitor General’s line for the defense of petitioners
concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies. We ought only to recall that exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time possible,
even before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time,
this ground for dismissal could be deemed waived and the court could take cognizance of the case and try it.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Fiel Marmita for petitioners.
Plaridel Bohol for private respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision1 dated May 27, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191, denying the petition filed by herein
petitioners for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in order to annul the Order dated May 27, 1992, by the Regional Trial Court of
Catbalogan, Samar. Said Order had denied petitioners’ (a) Motion to Dismiss the replevin case filed by herein private respondents, as
well as (b) petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of said trial court dated April 24, 1992, granting an application for a Writ
of replevin.2

The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are as follows:
On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles, described as follows:

1. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733 loaded with one thousand and twenty six (1,026) board feet of illegally sourced lumber
valued at P8,544.75, being driven by one Pio Gabon and owned by [a certain] Jose Vargas.
2. 2.
Motor Vehicle with Plate No. FCN-143 loaded with one thousand two hundred twenty four and ninety seven (1,224.97) board
feet of illegally-sourced lumber valued at P9,187.27, being driven by one Constancio Abuganda and owned by [a certain]
Manuela Babalcon. . . .”3
Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the
apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENR-PENR (Department of Environment and
Natural Resources-Provincial Environment and Natural Resources) Office in Catbalogan.4 Seizure receipts were issued but the drivers
refused to accept the receipts.5 Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed before the Provincial
Prosecutor’s Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against Abuganda, in Criminal Case No. 3795, for violation of Section 68 [78],
Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.6

On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon and Abuganda from the custody of the DENR, prompting
DENR Officer Calub this time to file a criminal complaint for grave coercion against Gabon and Abuganda. The complaint was, however,
dismissed by the Public Prosecutor.7

On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate number FCN 143, was again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENR
in Catbalogan and Philippine Army elements of the 802nd Infantry Brigade at Rarangay Buray, Paranas, Samar. It was again loaded with
forest products with an equivalent volume of 1,005.47 board feet, valued at P10,054.70. Calub duly filed a criminal complaint against
Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia, and several John Does, in Criminal Case No. 3625, for violation of Section 68 [78], Presidential
Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.8

In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and Abuganda were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. But note
the trial court ordered that a copy of the decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice, in order that the necessary criminal action may
be filed against Noe Pagarao and all other persons responsible for violation of the Revised Forestry Code. For it appeared that it was
Pagarao who chartered the subject vehicle and ordered that cut timber be loaded on it.9

Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint
for the recovery of possession of the two (2) impounded vehicles with an application for replevin against herein petitioners before the
RTC of Catbalogan. The trial court granted the application for replevin and issued the corresponding writ in an Order dated April 24,
1992.10 Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by the trial court.11

Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with
application for Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order. The Court issued a TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge
from conducting further proceedings in the civil case for replevin; and enjoining private respondents from taking or attempting to take
the motor vehicles and forest products seized from the custody of the petitioners. The Court further instructed the petitioners to see to
it that the motor vehicles and other forest products seized are kept in a secured place and protected from deterioration, said property
being in custodia legis and subject to the direct order of the Supreme Court.12 In a Resolution issued on September 28, 1992, the Court
referred said petition to respondent appellate court for appropriate disposition.13

On May 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit. It ruled that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant
to the authority granted by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277 does not automatically place said conveyance
in custodia legis. According to the appellate court, such authority of the Department Head of the DENR or his duly authorized
representative to order the confiscation and disposition of illegally obtained forest products and the conveyance used for that purpose is
not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws, regulations, or policies on that matter, added the appellate court. The DENR
Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the appellate court said. For it prescribes the guidelines in the
confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in the commission of offenses penalized under Section 68 [78] of P.D. No.
705 as amended by E.O. No. 277. 14

Additionally, respondent Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners failed to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative
Order No. 59, series of 1990. They were unable to submit a report of the seizure to the DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to the
owner of the vehicle, and to render a report of their findings and recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover, petitioners’ failure to
comply with the procedure laid down by DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by the admission of petitioners’
counsel that no confiscation order has been issued prior to the seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit. Therefore, in
failing to follow such procedure, according to the appellate court, the subject vehicles could not be considered in custodia legis.15

Respondent Court of Appeals also found no merit in peti-tioners’ claim that private respondents’ complaint for replevin is a suit against
the State. Accordingly, petitioners could not shield themselves under the principle of state immunity as the property sought to be
recovered in the instant suit had not yet been lawfully adjudged forfeited in favor of the government. Moreover, according to respondent
appellate court, there could be no pecuniary liability nor loss of property that could ensue against the government. It reasoned that a
suit against a public officer who acted illegally or beyond the scope of his authority could not be considered a suit against the State; and
that a public officer might be sued for illegally seizing or withholding the possession of the property of another.16

Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners based on the claim that the subject vehicles were validly seized and
held in custody because they were contradicted by its own findings.17 Their petition was found without merit.18

Now, before us, the petitioners assign the following errors:19

(1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MERE SEIZURE OF A CONVEYANCE PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A]
OF P.D. NO. 705 AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 277 DOES NOT PLACE SAID CONVEYANCE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS;

(2) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE OPERATIVE ACT GIVING RISE FOR THE SUBJECT CONVEYANCE
TO BE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS IS ITS LAWFUL SEIZURE BY THE DENR PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705, AS
AMENDED BY E.O. NO. 277; AND

(3) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN AGAINST THE PETITIONERS IS NOT A
SUIT AGAINST THE STATE.

In brief, the pertinent issues for our consideration are:

(1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, is in custodia legis.

(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit
against the State.
We will now resolve both issues.

The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78.
Section 78 states:

Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products without License.—Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forestland, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . . .

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected,
removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest
products are found.

This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and
punishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the present
case, the subject vehicles were loaded with forest products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit evidencing authority to
possess and transport said load of forest products was duly presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally sourced. Thus
there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised Forestry Code, although as found by the trial court, the persons
responsible for said violation were not the ones charged by the public prosecutor.

The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78 of the
Revised Forestry Code is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the same Code. They read as follows:

Sec. 78-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation.—In all cases
of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may
order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used
either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations
or policies on the matter.

Sec. 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions.—A forest officer or employee of the Bureau [Department] or any personnel of the Philippine
Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence
any of the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used
in committing the offense . . . [Emphasis supplied.]
Note that DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implements Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code, as follows:

Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture.—All conveyances used in the transport of any forest product obtained or
gathered illegally whether or not covered with transport documents, found spurious or irregular in accordance with Sec. 68-A [78-A] of
P.D. No. 705, shall be confiscated in favor of the government or disposed of in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on
the matter.

Sec. 4. Who are Authorized to Seize Conveyance.—The Secretary or his duly authorized representative such as the forest officers and/or
natural resources officers, or deputized officers of the DENR are authorized to seize said conveyances subject to policies and guidelines
pertinent thereto. Deputized military personnel and officials of other agencies apprehending illegal logs and other forest products and
their conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR field offices, and turn over said forest products and conveyances for proper action and
disposition. In case where the apprehension is made by DENR field officer, the conveyance shall be deposited with the nearest
CENRO/PENRO/RED Office as the case may be, for safekeeping wherever it is most convenient and secured. [Emphasis supplied.]

Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without pertinent documents that could evidence title to or right
to possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load was allowed under Sections 78 and 89 of the
Revised Forestry Code.

Note further that petitioners’ failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably
explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because
on the 3rd day following the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded vehicles from the
custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the second time, the petitioners,
again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because private
respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their
apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before
said seizure could be effected under the circumstances.

Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles
were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal
process and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise.20

In Mamanteo, et al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-1264, promulgated on July 28, 1999, the case involves property to be
seized by a Deputy Sheriff in a replevin suit. But said property were already impounded by the DENR due to violation of forestry laws
and, in fact, already forfeited in favor of the government by order of the DENR. We said that such property was deemed in custodia legis.
The sheriff could not insist on seizing the property already subject of a prior warrant of seizure. The appropriate action should be for the
sheriff to inform the trial court of the situation by way of partial Sheriff’s Return, and wait for the judge’s instructions on the proper
procedure to be observed.

Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the subject of a replevin suit. In Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff
Magumun, we elucidated further:

“. . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel earlier taken for violation of the
Tariff and Customs Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution. Officers of the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are
implored to be vigilant in their execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and forfeiture proceedings could easily be
undermined by the simple devise of a writ of replevin . . .”21
On the second issue, is the complaint for the recovery of possession of the two impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, a
suit against the State?

Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent.22 And a suit against a public officer for his official
acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable.23 However, the protection afforded to public
officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice
or corruption.24 In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the
discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature.25 In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89
of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and
did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who
represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the State’s consent.

Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the Solicitor General’s line for the defense of petitioners concerning
exhaustion of administrative remedies. We ought only to recall that exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time possible, even before
filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss.26 If not invoked at the proper time, this ground
for dismissal could be deemed waived and the court could take cognizance of the case and try it.27

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191 is SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the Order issued by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, dated May 27, 1992, and the Writ of replevin issued in the
Order dated April 24, 1992, are ANNULLED. The Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Branch 29, is directed to take possession
of the subject motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, for delivery to the custody of and appropriate disposition by petitioners. Let a
copy of this decision be provided the Honorable Secretary of Justice for his appropriate action, against any and all persons responsible
for the abovecited violation of the Revised Forestry Code.

Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
 [No. L-9990. September 30, 1957]
ENRIQUE J. L. Ruiz and JOSE V. HERRERA, in their behalf and as minority stockholders of the Allied Technologists, Inc.,
plaintiffs and appellants, vs. HON. SOTERO B. CABAHUG, Secretary of National Defense, Col. NICOLAS JIMENEZ, Head of the
Engineer Group, Office of the Secretary of National Defense, THE FINANCE OFFICER of the Department of National
Defense, the AUDITOR of the Department of the National Defense, PABLO D. PANLILIO and ALLIED TECHNOLOGISTS,
INC., defendants and appellees.

ACTION; PUBLIC OFFICERS; WHEN SUIT is NOT ONE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.—Where the facts and circumstances show that the
Government does not any longer have interest in the subject matter of the action which the defendants-officials have retained and
refused to pay to the plaintiffs, or to the person or entity to which it should be paid, and plaintiffs do not seek to sue the Government to
require it to pay the amount or involve it in the litigation, Held: That the suit is not one against the Government or a claim against it, but
one against the officials to compel them to act in accordance with the rights to be established by the contending architects, or to prevent
them from making payment and recognition until the contending architects have established their respective rights and interests in the
funds retained and in the credit for the work done.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Soriano, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Diokno & Sison for appellants.
L. D. Panlilio for appellee Pablo Panlilio.
Manuel Sales for defendant Allied Technologists, Inc.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Assistant Solicitor Jose G. Bautista for appellees Hon. Sotero Cabahug and Col. Nicolas Jimenez,
et al.

LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing plaintiffs' amended complaint.

The facts upon which plaintiffs' first cause of action are based are alleged as follows:
On July 31, 1950 the Secretary of National Defense accepted the bid of the Allied Technologists, Inc., to furnish the architectural and
engineering services in the construction of the Veterans Hospital at a price of P302,700. The plans, specifications, sketches and detailed
drawings and other architectural requirements submitted by the Allied Technologists through three of its architects, Messrs. Enrique J. L.
Ruiz, Jose V. Herrera and Pablo D. Panlilio were approved by the United States Veterans Administration in Washington, D.C. Because of
the technical objection to the capacity of the Allied Technologists, Inc. to practice architecture and upon the advice of the Secretary of
Justice, the contract was signed on the part of the Allied Technologists, Inc. by E. J. L. Ruiz as President and P. D. Panlilio as Architect.
When the defendants-officials paid the Allied Technologists the contract price f or the architectural engineering service, they retained 15
per cent of the sum due, for the reason that defendant Panlilio has asserted that he is the sole and only architect of the Veterans Hospital
to the exclusion of plaintiffs Ruiz and Herrera, assertion aided and abetted by defendant Jimenez. Unless defendants are prevented from
recognizing defendant Panlilio as the sole architect of the contract and from paying the 15 per cent retained, plaintiffs will be deprived
of the monetary value of their professional services and their professional prestige and standing would be seriously impaired.

Under the second cause of action the following facts are alleged: Under Title II of the contract entered into between plaintiffs and the
Secretary of National Defense, at any time prior to six months after completion and acceptance of the work under Title I, the Government
may direct the Allied Technologists, Inc. to perf orm the services specified in said Title II. But notwithstanding such completion or
acceptance, the Government has refused to direct the plaintiffs to perform the work, entrusting such work to a group of inexperienced
and unqualified engineers.

The prayer based on the first cause of action is that defendants desist from recognizing Panlilio as the sole and only architect of the
Veterans Hospital and from paying him the 15 per cent retained as above indicated, and that after hearing Ruiz, Herrera and Panlilio be
recognized as the architects of the Veterans Hospital. Under the second cause of action it is prayed that the defendants be directed to
turn over the supervision called for by Title II of the contract.

The court a quo dismissed the complaint on the ground that the suit involved is one against the Government, which may not be sued
without its consent. It is also held that as the majority of the stockholders of the Allied Technologists, Inc. have not joined in the action,
the minority suit does not lie. It dismissed the second cause of action on the ground that the optional services under Title II have already
been performed.

On this appeal the plaintiffs assign the following errors:

I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRESENT SUIT IS ONE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE
VALIDLY ENTERTAINED BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT BE SUED WITHOUT ITS CONSENT.

II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ACT 3083, AS AMENDED BY COMMONWEALTH ACT 327 ARE
APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE; IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED WITH THE AUDITOR
GENERAL.

III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE MINORITY SUIT IS UNTENABLE.

IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT INJUNCTION.

Evidently, the plaintiffs-appellants do not question the dismissal of the second cause of action. So, the appeal has relation to the first
cause of action only.

A careful study of the allegations made in the amended complaint discloses the following facts and circumstances: The contract price for
the architectural engineering services rendered by the Allied Technologists, Inc. and the plaintiffs is P231,600. All of that sum has been
set aside for payment to the Allied Technologists, Inc. and its architects, except the sum of P34,740, representing 15 per cent of the total
costs, which has been retained by the defendants-officials. Insofar as the Government of the Philippines is concerned, the full amount of
the contract price has been set aside and said full amount authorized to be paid. The Government does not any longer have any interest
in the amount, which the defendants-officials have retained and have refused to pay to the plaintiffs, or to the person or entity to which
it should be paid. And the plaintiffs do not seek to sue the Government to require it to pay the amount or involve it in the litigation. The
defendant Jimenez is claimed to have "aided and abetted defendant Panlilio in depriving the Allied Technologists, Inc. and its two
architects (Ruiz and Herrera) of the honor and benefit due to them under the contract Annex 'C' thereof." It is further claimed by plaintiffs
that the defendant-officials are about to recognize Panlilio as the sole architect and are about to pay him the 15 per cent which they had
retained, and thus deprive plaintiffs of their right to share therein and in the honor consequent to the recognition of their right. The suit,
therefore, is properly directed against the officials and against them alone, not against the Government, which does not have any interest
in the outcome of the controversy between plaintiffs on the one hand, and Panlilio on the other. The suit is between these alone, to
determine who is entitled to the amount retained by the officials; and if the latter did aid and abet Panlilio in his pretense, to the exclusion
and prejudice of plaintiffs, it is natural that they alone, and not the Government, should be the subject of the suit. Had said officials
chosen not to take sides in the controversy between the architects, and had disclaimed interest in said controversy, the suit would have
been converted into one of interpleader. But they have acted to favor one side, and have abetted him in his effort to obtain payment to
him of the sum remaining unpaid and credit for the work, to the exclusion of the plaintiffs. Hence, the suit.

We are not wanting in authority to sustain the view that the State need not be a party in this and parallel cases.

"There is no proposition of law which is better settled than the general rule that a sovereign state and its political subdivision cannot be
sued in the courts except upon the statutory consent of the state. Numerous decisions of this court to that effect may be cited; but it is
enough to note that this court, in banc in a recent case, State vs. Woodruff (Miss.), 150 So. 760, has so held; and therein overruled a
previous decision which had adjudicated that such consent could be worked out of a statute by implication, when express consent was
absent from the terms of that statute.
"But the rule applies only when the state or its subdivision is actually made a party upon the record, or is actually necessary to be made
a party in order to furnish the relief demanded by the suit. It does not apply when the suit is against an officer or agent of the state, and
the relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official action on the part of the state nor the affirmative discharge of any
obligation which belongs to the state in its political capacity, even though the officers or agents who are made defendants disclaim any
personal interest in themselves and claim to hold or to act only by virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and servants.

"Thus it will be found, as illustrative of what has been above said, that nearly all the cases wherein the rule of immunity from suit against
the state, or a subdivision thereof, has been applied and upheld, are those which demanded a money judgment, and wherein the
discharge of the judgment, if obtained, would require the appropriation or an expenditure therefrom, which being legislative in its
character is a province exclusively of the political departments of the state. And in the less frequent number of cases where no money
judgment is demanded, and the rule of immunity is still upheld, it will be found in them that the relief demanded would be, nevertheless,
to require of the state or its political subdivision the affirmative performance of some asserted obligation, belong to the state in its political
capacity.

"When, therefore, officers or agents of the state, although acting officially and not as individuals, seize the private property of a citizen,
the state having no valid right or title thereto, or trespass upon that property or damage it, the jurisdiction of the courts to eject the
officers or agents, or to enjoin them from further trespass or damage, in a suit by the owner against the officers or agents, is as well
settled in the jurisprudence of this country as is the general rule first above mentioned; for in such a suit no relief is demanded which
requires any affirmative action on the part of the state. Such a suit is only to the end that the officers and agents of the state stay off
the private property of the citizen and cease to damage that property, the state having no right or title thereto." (State Mineral Lease
Commission vs. Lawrence [1934], 157 So. 897, 898-899.)

We hold that under the facts and circumstances alleged in the amended complaint, which should be taken on its face value, the suit is
not one against the Government, or a claim against it, but one against the officials to compel them to act in accordance with the rights
to be established by the contending architects, or to prevent them from making payment and recognition until the contending architects
have established their respective rights and interests in the funds retained and in the credit for the work done. The order of dismissal is
hereby reversed and set aside, and the case is remanded to the court a, quo for further proceedings. With costs against the defendants-
appellees.

Parás, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepción, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
Order of dismissal reversed and set aside.
No. L-18524. June 30, 1964.
FRANCISCO S. OLIZON, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendant-appellant.

Taxation; Period for prescription of action for refund of tax not provided for in tax code and collected erroneously in six years.—In action
for refund of a tax not provided for in the tax code and paid by reason of a mistake in the interpretation of a law, is in the nature of
solutio indebiti, and, consequently, the law regarding prescription applicable thereto is Article 1145(2) of payment as the prescriptive
period for such action.

Same; Refund of tax; Refunding office should not be too technical.—Where the government office (the Central Bank in the case at bar)
admits its error in collecting the tax sought to be refunded and accepts the timeliness of the suit, it ought not to be too technical, but,
on the contrary,, it should earnestly endeavor to remove the technicalities that might stand in the way of prompt refund.

Same; Same; Action against Central Bank is not a wit against the State.—A suit brought against the Central Bank, an entity authorized
by its charter to sue and be sued, is not a suit against the State without its consent.

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Tan, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Bienvenido L. Garcia for plaintiff-appellee.
Nat. M. Balboa, & F. E. Evangelista for defendant-appellant.

REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, rendered in Case No. 40215, ordering the appellant Central
Bank to refund to the herein appellee the sum of P9,713.94 plus interest, cost and attorney’s

The facts giving rise to this suit, as recited in the lower court decision and borne by the records transmitted to Us, are as follows:

"x x x. The defendant on March 21, 1952, December 4; 1952, November 26, 1968, and January 4, 1955, collected from the plaintiff
(herein appellee) the amounts of P3,186.24, P840.65, P2,488.98, and P2,734.53, under Central Bank Official Receipts Nos. 047895,
052279, 491743, and 663389, respectively, in payment of Special Excise Tax on Foreign Exchange covering transactions, the details of
which are described in said receipts; that those amounts, as admitted by the defendant, were collected pursuant to its Monetary Board
Resolution No. 286, dated May 3, 1961 (Answer to Request for Admission, par. 7);

That on March 10. 1958, plaintiff requested the defendant to refund to him the amounts abovestated, plus the sum of P463.54, which is
supported by a statement from the Philippine National Bank; subsequently, requests were made by the plaintiff citing various rulings of
the Supreme Court in support thereof but the Central Bank refused to accede to these requests.”

The Central Bank concedes the illegality of the resolution under which it made the levy. It expressly adverts to the cases of PNB v.
Zulueta, G.R. No. L-7271, Au-gust 80, 1957, 55 O.G. pp. 222-231 and PNB and Central Bank v. Union Books, Inc. G.R. No. L-8490, August
30, 1957 and says that "there was no longer any necessity for this Honorable Court (the lower court) to declare Monetary Board Resolution
No. 286 dated May 3, 1951, as illegal. There is no dispute about this.”

Despite the above admission, however, the Bank still refused to grant the refund on, the ground that the claim for the same had already
prescribed. It vigorously argued the theory that "for purposes of recovering a tax paid illegally or erroneously x x x, the action should be
filed within five (5) years, from the date of payment of the tax," It arrived at the said period on the reasoning that since the tax code
does not provide for the same, the deficiency should be governed by Article 1149 of the Civil Code which says:

"All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five years from the time the right by
action accrues.”

After the dispute was tried in the lower court, the trial judge rejected the appellant's theory and ruled that the prescriptive period was
ten (10) years, holding that the obligation to refund was one created by law and which, therefore, under Article 1144 of the Civil Code,
prescribed in ten years. Hence, this appeal.

During the pendency of the appeal, however, this Court handed down its decision in the case of Belman Cia, Inc. v. Central Bank, G.R.
No. L-15044, May 30, 1960, expressly ruling (in the Resolution to a Motion for reconsideration filed thereto by the same Central Bank
herein) that the prescriptive period is six (6) years.

"Plaintiff-appellee has filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that this action was still timely because, it is argued, the period of
prescription applicable to the case is ten (10) years from date of payment. To support this contention, Article 1144, paragraph (2) is
cited, which provides:

'ART. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) x x x
(2)Upon an obligation created by law.

since, it is claimed, the payment here was made by reason of a mistake in the interpretation of Republic Act 601, the obligation to return
arises by virtue of Article 2155, in relation to Article 2154 of the New Civil Code and is therefore, one created by law.

"Movant-appellee is partly correct. However, Articles 2154 and 2155 relied upon, specifically refer to obligations of the nature of solutio
indebiti which are expressIy classified as quasi-contracts under Section 2, Chapter I of Title XVII of the New Civil Code. Consequently,
the law regarding prescription applicable to the action herein involved is not Article 1144 (2) cited by the movant, but Article 1146 (2) of
the New Civil Code providing:

'ART. 1145. The following actions must be commenced within six years:
(1)x x x
(2)Upon a quasi-contract.'"
In view of the ruling in the above-mentioned case, the Central Bank filed a memorandum conceding the refundability of all the claims
except for the amount of P436.54. The Bank claims that "there is no way to determine whether the action for refund of this amount has
already prescribed or not" as the papers necessary for its proper processing were no longer available or have been lost. Further more,
however, of the claims it concedes to have been filed within the prescriptive period and of which it accepts the obligation to refund, the
Bank asserts "should be refunded" only "upon presentation of satisfactory proof.”

We do not understand just what exactly the appellant Bank means by the "presentation of satisfactory proof." It admits it received from
the appellee the sum of P9,713.94.

"On various dates and under Central Bank Official receipts hereunder indicated, plaintiff-appellee paid as 17% special excise tax through
the Philippine National Bank, in settlement of various collection bills, due to foreign suppliers from plaintiff-appellee the total sum of
P9,713.94, itemized as follows:" (Statement of Facts, Appellant's Brief, p. 5.) (Italics supplied)
It likewise admits that the Monetary Board Resolution on the authority of which it exacted the said amount is illegal.

"We respectfully contend that there was no longer any necessity for this Honorable Court (the lower court) to declare Monetary Board
Res. 286 dated May 3, 1951, as illegal. There is no dispute about this. No allegation can be found in defendant's pleadings (Answer to
Request for Admission, and Answer to Interrogatories) to the effect that defendant still upholds the validity of said resolution. x x x" (pp.
239240, Record on Appeal)

Lastly, it admits its obligation to refund as well as the timeliness of the claim for the same.

"As shown by the letter of the Philippine National Bank to the Legal Counsel of the Central Bank dated June 15, 1959, the remittances of
the foreign exchange involved in the collection bills with respect to the seven items were made on various dates between August 23,
1949 and November 28, 1949. If the dollar proceeds for the account of Francisco Olizon were all made in 1949, before the effectivity of
the special excise tax law (March 28, 1951), therefore, the assessment and collection of the exchange taxes in question were erroneous
and illegal. In accordance with Arts. 2164 and 2155 of the new Civil Code of the Philippines, there would be an obligation on the part of
defendant Central Bank to refund the said amounts received by reason of a mistake in the construction or application of a doubtful
question of law." (p. 6, Memorandum in lieu of Oral Argument.)

"It has been verified from the Foreign Department, Philippine National Bank, that all foreign exchange (U.S. dollars) involved in said
collection bills were remitted to the United States on the various dates between August 23, 1949 and November 28, 1949, before March
28, 1951, when the Exchange Tax Law took effect. (pp. 6-7, Statement of Facts, Appellant's Brief., (Italics in the above two paragraphs
supplied.)

In the face of all these admissions, We do not see what else needs be proved. This case was submitted on the issue of prescription the
appellant contending that the period was five (5) years. It now admits its error and accepts the correct period to be six years. Therefore,
insofar as this suit is concerned, the inquiry need not go beyond determining whether the claim for refund was filed within the six-year
period or not. And, since the Bank explicitly and unequivocably confirms that the claims were made within that time, it ought not be too
technical, but, on the contrary, it should earnestly endeavor to remove or overcome the minor technicalities that might stand in the way
of a prompt refund.

It is next urged that inasmuch as the amounts here involved have already been turned over to the national treasury the present action
may no longer be maintained since it would, in effect, be a suit against the State without its consent.

We cannot agree to the proposition. This suit is brought against the Central Bank of the Philippines, an entity authorized by its charter
to sue and be sued. The consent of the State to thus be sued, therefore, has been given. As We said in the case of Central Azucarera
San Pedro v. Central Bank, G.R. No. L-7713, September 29, 1968, in suits for refund, "being a corporation that may sue and be sued,
the Central Bank is the proper party defendant pursuant to section 5 of Republic Act No. 601, which provides that "the refund of taxes
pursuant to sections two and three of this Act shall be made by the Central Bank of the Philippines.”

In the memorandum submitted in lieu of oral argument, the appellant Bank represented for the first time that the "plaintiff-appellee has
an outstanding liability of P4,963.62 by way of unpaid 17% special excise tax on the remittance of foreign exchange to import cotton
goods and gladiolus bulbs." It then urged that whatever items this Court should order to be refunded should be set off against the said
"outstanding liability" of the appellee.

The representation impresses Us as untenable. The matter of appellee's outstanding unpaid accounts with the Bank is a fit subject for a
counter-claim and the Rules of Court provide for the manner by which they may be impleaded or raised in this suit. These rules were
devised not only to provide a more adequate and elastic procedure for the prompt dispatch of litigation, but more importantly, to fully
protect the rights of the parties. Verily, therefore, the public policy involved in the observance of those rules should not be lightly
estimated, Within the perspective of the foregoing discussion, therefore, it would seem that the appellant has not only withheld proper
deference for the rules; it has been unfair to the appellee as well. For in raising a counterclaim at so late a stage in the proceeding as
the period for oral argument, it denies to the appellee full and complete protection of his rights since by then the proceedings in the
court have practically terminated and the appellee would hardly have time to explain or defend himself from the countersuit,

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from and the awards made thereunder are hereby affirmed. Costs
against the appellant.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Labrador, Barrera and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
Judgment and awards made thereunder affirmed.

Notes.—It is the duty of a party attempting to show liability on the part of the Government to allege in the complaint, as basis of the
cause of action, that the Republic of the Philippines has consented to be sued, either by special law covering special subject matter or
by general law expressing the terms on which such consent is given. Such an allegation is essential to create a justiciable cause of action
against the Government, without which the complaint suffers from a fatal defect. (American Insurance Co. v. Macondray & Co., Inc., et
al., L-24031, Aug. 19, 1967, 20 SCRA 1103.)

Unlike the Central Bank of the Philippines, the Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the national government in the operation of the
arrastre "service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a necessary incident of its prime governmental function, is immune
from suit, there being no statute to the contrary (Shell Refining Co. v. Manila Port Service, L-24930, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 919; North
British Ins. v. Isthmian Lines, et al., L-26237, July 10, 1967; Insurance Co. of North America v. Republic, L-25662, July 21, 1967; Domestic
Ins. Co. of the Philippines v. Republic, L-29362, Sept. 27, 1968, 25 SCRA 231).
[No. L-15751. January 28, 1961]
BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR and MARIANO LEDESMA, petitioners, vs. THE BUREAU OF PRINTING
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU), PACIFICO ADVINCULA, ROBERTO MENDOZA, PONCIANO ARGANDA and TEODULO
TOLERAN, respondents.

1.JURISDICTION; FUNCTIONS OF BUREAU OF PRINTING NOT EXCLUSIVELY PROPRIETARY IN NATURE; COURT OF INDUSTRAL
RELATIONS WlTHOUT JURISDICTION OVER UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE BROUGHT AGAINST THE BUREAU.—The Bureau of Printing is
primarily a service bureau and is not -engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary profit, Although it receives outside jobs and many
of its employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days and on holidays, these facts do not justify the conclusion that its
functions are "exclusively proprietary in nature." Hence, the Court of Industrial Relations is without jurisdiction to hear and determine
complaints for unfair labor practice filed against the Bureau of Printing.

2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; SUITS AGAINST THE STATE; BUREAU OF PRINTING NOT SUBJECT TO SUIT WITHOUT ITS CONSENT.—As
an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued without its consent,
much less over its objection. (Angat River Irrigation System, et al. vs. Angat River Workers' Union, et al., 102 Phil., 789.)

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court,

Assistant Solicitor General A. A. Torres and Solicitor C. D. Quiason for petitioner.
Eulogio Lerum for respondents.

GUTIÉRREZ DAVID, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul certain orders of the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations and to restrain it from further proceeding in the action for unfair labor practice pending before it on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Giving due course to the petition, this Court ordered the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for without
bond.

The action in question was—upon complaint of the respondent Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU), Pacifico Advincula,
Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran—filed by an acting prosecutor of the Industrial Court against herein petitioners
Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, the Acting Secretary of the Department of General Services, and Mariano Ledesma, the Director of
the Bureau of Printing. The complaint alleged that Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma have been engaging in unfair labor practice by
interfering with, or coercing the employees of the Bureau of Printing, particularly the members of the complaining association, in the
exercise of their right to self-organization and discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their employment in order to discourage
them from pursuing their union activities.

Answering the complaint, the petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma denied the charges of unfair labor
practices attributed to them and, by way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things, that respondents Pacifico Advincula,
Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran were suspended pending result of an administrative investigation against them
for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations; that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be sued; that said
Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic performing governmental
functions. For relief, they prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, before the case could be heard, petitioners
filed an "Omnibus Motion" asking for a preliminary hearing on the question of jurisdiction raised by them in their answer and for
suspension of the trial of the case on the merits pending the determination of such jurisdictional question. The motion was granted, but
after hearing, the trial judge of the Industrial Court in an order dated January 27, 1959 sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the
theory that the functions of the Bureau of Printing are "exclusively proprietary in nature," and, consequently, denied the prayer for
dismissal. Reconsideration of this order having been also denied by the court en banc, the petitioners brought the case to this court
through the present petition for certiorari and prohibition.

We find the petition to be meritorious.

The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality
of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with the
execution of all printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by the National Government and such other
work of the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to
undertake * * *." (Sec. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code.) It has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the General
Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and is obviously, not engaged
in business or occupation for pecuniary profit.

It is true, as stated in the order complained of, that the Bureau of Printing receives outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid
for overtime work on regular working days and on holidays, but these facts do not justify the conclusion that its functions are "exclusively
proprietary in nature." Overtime work in the Bureau of Printing is done only when the interest of the service so requires (sec. 566, Rev.
Adm. Code). As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be paid, but such payment is discretionary with the
head of the Bureau depending upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for holding that the functions of said Bureau
are wholly proprietary in character. Anent the additional work it executes for private persons, we find that such work is done upon
request, as distinguished from those solicited, and only "as the requirements of Government work will permit" (sec. 1654, Rev. Adm.
Code), and "upon terms fixed by the Director of Printing, with the approval of the Department Head" (sec. 1655, id.). As shown by the
uncontradicted evidence of the petitioners, most of these works consist of orders for greeting cards during Christmas from government
officials, and for printing of checks of private banking institutions. On those greeting cards, the Government seal, of which only the
Bureau of Printing is authorized to use, is embossed, and on the bank checks, only the Bureau of Printing can print the reproduction of
the official documentary stamps appearing thereon. The volume of private jobs done, in comparison with government jobs, is only one-
half of 1 per cent, and in computing the costs for work done for private parties, the Bureau does not include profit, because it is not
allowed to make any. Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it cannot be pretended that it is
thereby an industrial or business concern. The additional work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its function, and
although such work may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the employees performing said proprietary function
are separate and distinct from those employed in its general governmental functions.

From what has been stated, it is obvious that the Court of Industrial Relations did not acquire jurisdiction over the respondent Bureau of
Printing, and is thus devoid of any authority to take cognizance of the case. This Court has already held in a long line of decisions that
the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the complaint for unfair labor practice filed against institutions or
corporations not organized for profit and, consequently, not an industrial or business organization. This is so because the Industrial Peace
Act was intended to apply only to industrial employment, and to govern the relations between employers engaged in industry and
occupations for purposes of gain, and their industrial employees. (University of the Philippines, et al. vs. CIR, et al., 107 Phil., 848;
University of Sto. Tomas vs. Villanueva, et al., 106 Phil., 439; La Consolacion College vs. CIR, 107 Phil., 636; See also the cases cited
therein.)

Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. (Sec. 1,
Rule 3, Rules of Court.) Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or
proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less
over its objection. (See Metran vs. Paredes, 79 Phil., 819; 45 Off. Gaz., [7] 2835; Angat River Irrigation System, et al. vs. Angat River
Workers' Union, et al., 102 Phil., 789.)

The record also discloses that the instant case arose from the filing of administrative charges against some officers of the respondent
Bureau of Printing Employees' Association by the Acting Secretary of General Services. Said administrative charges are for insubordination,
grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to public service committed by inciting the employees of the Bureau of Printing to walk out of their
jobs against the order of the duly constituted officials. Under the law, the Heads of Departments and Bureaus are authorized to institute
and investigate administrative charges against erring subordinates. For the Industrial Court now to take cognizance of the case filed
before it, which is in effect a review of the acts of executive officials having to do with the discipline of government employees under
them, would be to interfere with the discharge of such functions by said officials.

Wherefore, the petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The orders complained of are set aside and the complaint for unfair labor
practice against the petitioners is dismissed, with costs against respondents other than the respondent court.
Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J. B. L., J., concurs in the result
Writ granted.
No. L-23139. December 17, 1966.
MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE and BUREAU OF CUSTOMS,
defendants-appellees.

Pleading and practice; Parties; Constitutional law; Arrastre; Bureau of Customs and Customs Arrastre Service cannot be sued.—A
defendant in a civil suit must be (1) a natural person; (2) a juridical person or (3) an entity authorized by law to be sued. The Bureau of
Customs and (a fortiori) the Customs Arrastre Service are not persons. They are merely parts of the machinery of Government. The
Customs Arrastre Service is a unit of the Bureau of Customs, set up under Customs Administrative Order No. 8-62 of November 9, 1962.
It follows that they cannot be sued as natural or juridical persons.

Same; Arrastre; Its nature.—The arrastre service is a proprietary or nongovernmental function.

Same; Actions; Performance by a non-corporate governmental entity of a proprietary function does not make it suable.—The fact that a
noncorporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-
governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental functions, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity
from suit extended to such government entity (Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of Printing Employees Association, L-15751, Jan. 28, 1961).

Same; Tariff and Customs Code; Administrative law; Arrastre service is a necessary incident to the functions of the Bureau of Customs.—
The Bureau of Customs has no personality of its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental,
that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines, and
penalties (Sec. 602, Rep. Act No. 1937). To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. For practical reasons said revenues and
customs duties can not be assessed and collected by simply receiving the importer's or ship agent's or consignee's declaration of
merchandise being imported and imposing the duty provided in the Tariff Law. Customs authorities and officers must see to it that the
declaration tallies with the merchandise actually landed. And this checking up requires that the landed merchandise be hauled from the
ship's side to a suitable place in the customs premises to enable said customs officers to make it, that is, it requires arrastre operations.
Although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the
Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not
perform its governmental function without necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity granted as to the end should not be
denied as to the necessary means to that end.

Same; Constitutional law; State cannot be sued without its consent.—Regardless of the merits of the claim against it, the State, for
obvious reasons of public policy, cannot be sued without its consent. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the
national government in the operations of the arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a necessary incident of its
prime government function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary.

Same; Strict construction of statutory provisions waiving State immunity from suit.—Statutory provisions waiving State immunity from
suit are strictly construed and waiver of immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred.

Same; Remedy of consignee in case Customs Arrastre Service does not deliver all the landed cargo.—Where the Customs Arrastre Service
did not deliver all the landed cargo to the consignee, the latter's remedy is to f. ile a money claim with the General Auditing Office
pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 327.

APPEAL from an order of dismissal rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila. Cloribel, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Alejandro Basin, Jr. & Associates for plaintiff-appellant.
Felipe T. Cuison for defendants-appellees.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville" sometime in November of 1962, consigned to Mobil Philippines
Exploration, Inc., Manila. The shipment arrived at the Port of Manila on April 10, 1963, and was discharged to the custody of the Customs
Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered
to the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment.

On April 4, 1964 Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service
and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case in the amount of P18,493.37 plus other damages.

On April 20, 1964 the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being persons under the law, defendants
cannot be sued.

After plaintiff opposed the motion, the court, on April 25, 1964, dismissed the complaint on the ground that neither the Customs Arrastre
Service nor the Bureau of Customs is suable. Plaintiff appealed to Us from the order of dismissal.

Raised, therefore, in this appeal is the purely legal question of the defendants' suability under the facts stated.

Appellant contends that not all government entities are immune from suit; that defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of the arrastre
service at the Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private individuals.

The Rules of Court, in Section 1, Rule 3, provide:

"SECTION 1. Who may be parties.—Only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.”

Accordingly, a defendant in a civil suit must be (1) a natural person; (2) a juridical person or (3) an entity authorized by law to be sued,
Neither the Bureau of Customs nor (a fortiori) its function unit, the Customs Arrastre Service, is a person. They are merely parts of the
machinery of Government. The Bureau of Customs is a bureau under the Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Revised Administrative Code);
and as stated, the Customs Arrastre Service is a unit of the Bureau of Customs, set up under Customs Administrative Order No. 8-62 of
November 9, 1962 (Annex "A" to Motion to Dismiss, pp. 13-15, record on Appeal). It follows that the defendants herein cannot be sued
under the first two abovementioned categories of natural or juridical persons.

Nonetheless it is urged that by authorizing the Bureau of Customs to engage in arrastre service, the law thereby impliedly authorizes it
to be sued as arrastre operator, for the reason that the nature of this function (arrastre service) is proprietary, not governmental. Thus,
insofar as arrastre operation is concerned. appelant would put defendants under the third category of "entities authorized by law" to be
sued. Stated differently, it is argued that while there is no law expressly authorizing the Bureau of Customs to sue or be sued, dtill its
capacity to be sued is implied from its very power to render arrastre service at the Port of Manila, which it is alleged, amounts to the
transaction of a private business.

The statutory provision on arrastre service is found in Section 1213 of Republic Act 1937 (Tariff and Customs Code, effective June 1,
1957), and it states:
"SEC. 1213. Receiving, Handling, Custody and Delivery of Articles.—The Bureau of Customs shall exclusive supervision and control over
the recieving, handling, custody and delivery of articles on the wharves and piers at all ports of entry and in the exercise of its function
it is hereby authorized to acquire, take over, operate and superinted such plants and facilities as may be necessary for the recieving,
handling, custody and delivery of articles, and the convenience and comfort of passengers and the handling of baggae; as well as to
acquire fire protection equipment for use in the piers: Provided, that whenever in his judgment the recieving, handling, custody and
delivery of articles can be carried on by private parties with greater efficiency, the Commissioner may, after public bidding and subject
to the approval of the department head, contract with any private party for the service of recieving, handling custody and delivery of
articles, and in such event, the contract may include the sale or lease of government-owned equipment and facilities used in such service.”

In Associated Workers Union, et al. vs. Bureau of Customs, et al., L-21397, resolution of August 6, 1963, this Court indeed held "that the
foregoing statutory provisions authorizing the grant by contract to any private party of the right to render said arrastre services necessarily
imply that the same is deemed by Congress to be proprietary or non-governmental function." The issue in said case, however, was
whether laborers engaged in arrastre service fall under the concept of employees in the Government employed in governmental functions
for purposes of the prohibition in Section 11, Republic Act 875 to the effect that "employees in the Government x x x shall not strike,"
but "may belong to any labor organization which does not impose the obligation to strike or to join in strike," which prohibition "shall
apply only to employees employed in governmental functions of the Government x x x.

Thus, the ruling therein was that the Court of Industrial Relations had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, but not that the
Bureau of Customs can be sued. Said issue of suability was not resolved, the resolution stating only that "the issue on the personality or
lack of personality of the Bureau of Customs to be sued does not affect the jurisdiction of the lower court over the subject matter of the
case, aside from the fact that amendment may be made in the pleadings by the inclusion as respondents of the public officers deemed
responsible, for the unfair labor practice acts charged by petitioning Unions”.

Now, the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being
suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the
sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. This is the doctrine recognized in Bureau of Printing, et al. vs. Bureau
of Printing Employees Association, et al., L-15751, January 28, 1961:

"The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality
of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is 'charged with the
execution of all printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by the National Government and such other
work of the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to
undertake x x x.' (Sec. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code.) It has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the General
Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it is' primarily a service bureau and, obviously, not engaged
in business or occupation for pecuniary profit.

x x x x x

"x x x Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it cannot be pretended that it is thereby an
industrial or business concern. The additional work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such
work may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the employees performing said proprietary function are separate
and distinct from those employed in its general governmental functions.
x x x x x

"Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. (Sec. 1,
Rule 3, Rules of Court.) Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or
proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less
over its objection. (See Metran vs. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz. 2835; Angat River Irrigation "System, et al. vs. Angat River Workers Union, et
al., G.R. Nos. L-10943-44, December 28, 1957.)”

The situation here is not materially different. The Bureau of Customs, to repeat, is part of the Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Rev. Adm.
Code), with no personality. of its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing
and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602,
R.A. 1937). To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. For practical reasons said revenues and customs duties can not be
assessed and collected by simply receiving the importer's or ship agent's or consignee's declaration of merchandise being imported and
imposing the duty provided in the Tariff law. Customs authorities and officers must see to it that the declaration tallies with the
merchandise actually landed. And this checking up requires that the landed merchandise be hauled from the ship's side to a suitable
place in the customs premises to enable said customs officers to make it, that is, it requires arrastre operations.1

Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the primary and governmental
function of the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it
could not perform its governmental function without.necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity, granted as to the end, should
not be denied as to the necessary means to that end.

And herein lies the distinction between the present case and that of National Airports Corporation vs. Teodoro, 91 Phil. 203, on which
appellant would rely. For there, the Civil Aeronautics Administration was found have for its prime reason for existence not a governmental
but a proprietary function, so that to it the latter was not a mere incidental function:

"Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics Administration are, under Section 3, to execute contracts of any kind, to purchase
property, and to grant concession rights, and under Section 4, to charge landing fees, royalties on sales to aircraft of aviation gasoline,
accessories and supplies, and rentals for the use of any property under its management.
"These provisions confer upon the Civil Aeronautics Administration, in our opinion, the power to sue and be sued. The power to sue and
be sued is implied from the power to transact private business. x x x

x x x x x
"The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity. Although not a body corporate it was created, like
the National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if
revenues be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling public. x x x”

Regardless of the merits of the claim against it, the State, for obvious reasons of public policy, cannot be sued without its consent.
Plaintiff should have f. iled its present claim to the General Auditing Office, it being for money under the provisions of Commonwealth
Act 327, which state the conditions under which money claims against the Government may be filed.

It must be remembered that statutory provisions waiving State immunity from suit are strictly construed and that waiver of immunity,
being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred. (49 Am. Jur., States, Territories and Dependencies, Sec. 96, p. 314; Petty
vs. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Com., 359 U.S. 275, '2 L. Ed. 804, 79 S. Ct. 785). From the provision authorizing the Bureau of Customs
to lease arrastre operations to private parties, We see no authority to sue the said Bureau in the instances where it undertakes to conduct
said operation itself. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the operation of the arrastre
service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a necessary incident of, its prime governmental function, is immune from suit,
there being no statute to the contrary.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., concurs in the result.
Castro, J., reserves his vote.
Order of dismissal affirmed.

Notes.—The rule in the Mobil case was followed in Insurance Company of North America vs. Republic, L-26532, July 10, 1967; North
British & Mercantile Insurance Co., Ltd. vs. Isthmian Lines, Inc., L-26327, July 10, 1967; Insurance Company of North America vs.
Republic, L-25662, July 21, 1967; Insurance Company of North America vs. Republic, L-24520, July 11, 1967; Manila Electric Company
vs. Customs Arrastre Service, L-25515, July 24, 1967; Shell Refining Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Manila Port Service. L-24930, July 31, 1967;
American Insurance Company vs. Macondray & Co., Inc., L-24031, Aug. 19, 1967; Equitable Insurance & Casualty Co., Inc. vs. Smith,
Bell & Co. (Phil.) Inc., L-24383, Aug. 26, 1967 and Insurance Company of North America vs. Republic, L-26532, August 30, 1967, all
reported in 20 Supreme Court Reports Annotated.

It is well settled that the government cannot be sued without its consent (Metropolitan Transportation Service vs. Paredes, 79 Phil. 819;
Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. U.S. 104 Phil. 593; Syquia vs. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312; Johnson vs. Turner, 94 Phil. 807).

Where the judgment would result in a charge or financial liability of the Government, the suit should be regarded as one against the
Government itself and one which cannot be entertained without the Government's consent (Marvel Building Corporation vs. Philippine
War Damage Commission, 85 Phil. 27).

The principle that the State or its government cannot be sued without its consent has its root in the juridical and practical notion that the
State can do no wrong (Santos vs. Santos, 92 Phil. 281).

A suit against the State involving disbursement of f. unds cannot be maintained without its consent (Treasurer of the Philippines vs.
Encarnacion, 93 Phil. 610; Lim vs. Nelson, 87 Phil. 328).

A suit against a government irrigation system is 'essentially against the government itself and it cannot be maintained except with the
government's consent (Angat River Irrigation System vs. Angat River Workers' Union, 102 Phil. 790).

A suit against an officer or agent of the government . is maintainable where the relief demanded requires no official affirmative action
nor the discharge of any obligation belonging to the government in its political capacity (Ruiz vs. Cabahug, 102 Phil. 110).
No. L-30044. December 19, 1973.*
LORENZO SAYSON, as Highway Auditor, Bureau of Public Highways, Cebu First Engineering District; CORNELIO
FORNIER, as Regional Supervising Auditor, Eastern Visayas Region; ASTERIO, BUQUERON, ADVENTOR FERNANDEZ,
MANUEL S. LEPATAN, RAMON QUIRANTE, and TEODULFO REGIS, petitioners, vs. FELIPE SINGSON, as sole owner and
proprietor of Singkier Motor Service, respondent.

Constitutional law; State immunity; Mandamus; Action against the government auditors to approve payment to petitioner is a suit against
the State and may not prosper without the latter’s consent.—Actually, the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to
approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the
consent of the State * * *. In other words, the respondent should have filed his claim with the General Auditing Office, under the
provisions of Com. Act 327 * * * which prescribe the conditions under which money claim against the government may be filed * * *

PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioners.
Teodoro Almase & Casiano U. Laput for respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:
The real party in interest before this Court in this certiorari proceeding to review a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu is the
Republic of the Philippines, although the petitioners are the public officials who were named as respondents1 in a mandamus suit below.
Such is the contention of the then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice, Felix V. Makasiar,2 for as he did point out, what is involved is
a money claim against the government, predicated on a contract. The basic doctrine of non-suability of the government without its
consent is thus decisive of the controversy. There is a governing statute that is controlling.3 Respondent Felipe Singson, the claimant, for
reasons known to him, did not choose to abide by its terms. That was a fatal misstep. The lower court, however, did not see it that way.
We cannot affirm its decision.

As found by the lower court, the facts are the following: “In January, 1967, the Office of the District Engineer requisitioned various items
of spare parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer, * * *. The requisition (RIV No. 67/0331) was signed by the District Engineer, Adventor
Fernandez, and the Requisitioning Officer (civil engineer), Manuel S. Lepatan. * * * It was approved by the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, Antonio V. Raquiza. It is noted in the approval of the said requisition that ‘This is an exception to the telegram
dated Feb. 21, 1967 of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.’ * * * So, a canvass or public bidding was conducted on May
5, 1967 * * *. The committee on award accepted the bid of the Singkier Motor Service [owned by respondent Felipe Singson] for the
sum of P43,530.00. * * * Subsequently, it was approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications; and on May 16, 1967
the Secretary sent a letter-order to the Singkier Motor Service, Mandaue, Cebu requesting it to immediately deliver the items listed therein
for the lot price of P43,530.00. * * * It would appear that a purchase order signed by the District Engineer, the Requisitioning Officer
and the Procurement Officer, was addressed to the Singkier Motor Service. * * * In due course the Voucher No. 07806 reached the
hands of Highway Auditor Sayson for pre-audit. He then made inquiries about the reasonableness of the price. * * * Thus, after finding
from the indorsements of the Division Engineer and the Commissioner of Public Highways that the prices of the various spare parts are
just and reasonable and that the requisition was also approved by no less than the Secretary of Public Works and Communications with
the verification of V.M. Secarro, a representative of the Bureau of Supply Coordination, Manila, he approved it for payment in the sum of
P34,824.00, with the retention of 20% equivalent to P8,706.00. * * * His reason for withholding the 20% equivalent to P8,706.00 was
to submit the voucher with the supporting papers to the Supervising Auditor, which he did. * * * The voucher * * * was paid on June 9,
1967 in the amount of P34,824.00 to the petitioner [respondent Singson]. On June 10, 1967, Highway Auditor Sayson received a telegram
from Supervising Auditor Fornier quoting a telegraphic message of the General Auditing Office which states: ‘In view of excessive prices
charge for purchase of spare parts and equipment shown by vouchers already submitted this Office direct all highway auditors refer
General Office payment similar nature for appropriate action.’ * * * In the interim it would appear that when the voucher and the
supporting papers reached the GAO, a canvass was made of the spare parts among the suppliers in Manila, particularly, the USI (Phil.),
which is the exclusive dealer of the spare parts of the caterpillar tractors in the Philippines. Said firm thus submitted its quotations at
P2,529.64 only which is P40,000.00 less than the price of the Singkier. * * * In view of the over-pricing the GAO took up the matter with
the Secretary of Public Works in a third indorsement of July 18, 1967. * * * The Secretary then circularized a telegram holding the district
engineer responsible for overpricing.”4 What is more, charges for malversation were filed against the district engineer and the civil
engineer involved. It was the failure of the Highways Auditor, one of the petitioners before us, that led to the filing of the mandamus
suit below, with now respondent Singson as sole proprietor of Singkier Motor Service, being adjudged as entitled to collect the balance
of P8,706.00, the contract in question having been upheld. Hence this appeal by certiorari.

1. To state the facts is to make clear the solidity of the stand taken by the Republic. The lower court was unmindful of the fundamental
doctrine of non-suability. So it was stressed in the petition of the then Solicitor General Makasiar. Thus: “It is apparent that respondent
Singson’s cause of action is a money claim against the government, for the payment of the alleged balance of the cost of spare parts
supplied by him to the Bureau of Public Highways. Assuming momentarily the validity of such claim, although as will be shown hereunder,
the claim is void for the cause or consideration is contrary to law, morals or public policy, mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the
collection of such claim against the State * * *, but an ordinary action for specific performance * * * Actually, the suit disguised as one
for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be
entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State * * * In other words, the respondent should have filed his claim with the
General Auditing Office, under the provisions of Com. Act 327 * * * which prescribe the conditions under which money claim against the
government may be filed * * * ”5 Commonwealth Act No. 327 is quite explicit. It is therein provided: “In all cases involving the settlement
of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days,
exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their presentation. If said accounts or claims need reference to other persons, office or offices,
or to a party interested, the period aforesaid shall be counted from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received
by him.”6 Thereafter, the procedure for appeal is indicated: “The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the
settlement of an account or claim may, within thirty days from receipt of the decision, take an appeal in writing: (a) To the President of
the United States, pending the final and complete withdrawal of her sovereignty over the Philippines, or (b) To the President of the
Philippines, or (c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines if the appellant is a private person or entity.”7

2. With the facts undisputed and the statute far from indefinite or ambiguous, the appealed decision defies explanation. It would be to
disregard a basic corollary of the cardinal postulate of non-suability. It is true that once consent is secured, an action may be filed. There
is nothing to prevent the State, however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain administrative proceedings be had and be
exhausted. Also, the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be specified if thereafter an appeal would be taken by the party aggrieved.
Here, there was no ruling of the Auditor General. Even had there been such, the court to which the matter should have been elevated is
this Tribunal; the lower court could not legally act on the matter. What transpired was anything but that. It is quite obvious then that it
does not have the imprint of validity.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu of September 4, 1968 is reversed and set aside, and the suit for
mandamus filed against petitioners, respondents below, is dismissed. With costs against respondent Felipe Singson.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Decision reversed and set aside, suit for mandamus dismissed.

Notes.—State Immunity from Suit. A direct suit against the State cannot be maintained without its consent. Insurance Company
of North America vs. Republic, L-26532, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1159; Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. vs. Maersk Line Far East Service,
L-27189, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 519; Rizal Surety and Insurance Co. vs. Customs Arrastre Service, L-25709, April 25, 1969, 27 SCRA
1016.

Statutory provisions waiving State immunity from suits are strictly construed and waiver of immunity being derogation of sovereignty,
will not be lightly inferred. Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. vs. Customs Arrastre Service, L-23139, December 17, 1966, 18 SCRA 1120.
No. L-26400. February 29, 1972.
VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees.

Political law; Immunity of State from suit; Exception.—Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public
use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against
the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.

Same; Same; Same; Reason for exception.—The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint
would have been filed by it, and only upon pay ment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender of the party entitled to
such pay ment of the amount fixed, may it “have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the
public use defined in the judgment.”

Same; Relief available to aggrieved owner; Just compensation.—As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of
the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of
possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road
purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To
determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking.

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in its Civil Case No. R-5977, dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint.

Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City as shown by Transf er
Certificate of Title No. T-18060, which superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-3272 (T-3435) issued to her by the Register of
Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property appears at the
back of the certificate. W ithout prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot, with an area of 6,167
square meters, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.

It appears that said avenues were already existing in 1921 although “they were in bad condition and very narrow, unlike the wide and
beautiful avenues that they are now,” and “that the tracing of said roads was begun in 1924, and the formal construction in 1925.”*

On March 27, 1958 Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had
been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement dated
December 9, 1958. A copy of said indorsement was transmitted to Amigable’s counsel by the Office of the President on Janu ary 7, 1959.

On February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which was later amended on April 17, 1959 upon motion of the
defendants, against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the
recovery of ownership and possession of the 6,167 square meters of land traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. She also sought
the payment of compensatory damages in the sum of P50,-000.00 for the illegal occupation of her land, mo ral damages in the sum of
P25,000.00, attorney’s fees in the sum of P5,000.00 and the costs of the suit.

Within the reglementary period the defendants filed a joint answer denying the material allegations of the complaint and interposing the
following affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the Office of the
Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for the recovery of any amount which might be due the plaintiff, if any, had already prescribed;
(3) that the action being a suit against the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney’s fees and costs had no valid basis since
as to these items the Government had not given its consent to be sued; and (4) that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu that
appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.

During the scheduled hearings nobody appeared for the defendants notwithstanding due notice, so the trial court proceeded to receive
the plaintiff’s evidence ex parte. On July 29, 1959 said court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s
cause of action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of her lot in question on the ground that the government
cannot be sued withou t its consent; that it had neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and decide plaintiff’s claim for
compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00, the same being a money claim against the government; and that the claim for moral
damages had long prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the government had not given its consent to be sued.
Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed. Unable to secure a reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
subsequently certified the case to Us, there being no question of fact involved.

The issue here is whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts of the case.

In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu,1 involving a claim for payment of the value of a portion of land used for the
widening of the Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City, this Court, through Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando, held that where the government
takes away property from a private lando wner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale,
the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity
from suit without its consent. W e there said:

“x x x. If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken for public use were to be respected, as it should,
then a suit of this character should not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the
time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon pay ment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to
the party entitled to such pay ment of the amount fixed, may it ‘have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to appropriate
the same to the public use defined in the judgment.’ If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in
the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the
government would stand to benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom
if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public use, which is
conditioned upon the pay ment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of
a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked.”

Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed
any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered
owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the
attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at
this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation
which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value
thereof at the time of the taking.2

As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land from the time it
was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government.3 In addition, the government should pay for attorney’s fees, the
amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for the determination of
compensation, including attorney’s fees, to which the appellant is entitled as above indicated. No pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Decision set aside and case remanded to the court a quo for determination of compensation, including attorney’s fees.

Notes.—For more cases illustrative of the principle of state immunity from suit, see Notes, 34 SCRA 28-29.

For a comprehensive treatment of just compensation in eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, refer to 29 SCRA 871-884.
No. L-35645. May 22, 1985.*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E, GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER, petitioners, vs.
HON. V.M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC.,
respondents.

Actions; Public Corporations; Constitutional Law; Contracts; In suits against a foreign government, a distinction must he made between
acts jure imperil and acts jure gestionis. As to the former, the State immunity prevails.—The traditional rule of State immunity exempts
a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles
of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and
evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them—between sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now
extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom
and other states in western Europe. (See Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law, pp. 207-209 [1984]).

Judgments; An obiter has no value as an imperative authority.—It can thus be seen that the statement in respect of the waiver of State
immunity from suit was purely gratuitous and, therefore, obiter so that it has no value as an imperative authority.

Actions; Public Corporations; Constitutional Law; Contracts; States may be sued only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions. Infrastructure projects of U.S. Naval Base in Subic involve governmental functions.—The restrictive application of State
immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have
tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts, It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise
of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the
United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated
to commercial or business purposes.

MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:

Actions; Public Corporations; Contracts; After U.S. Naval authorities accepted the bid for repair of the wharves at Subic Bay Naval Base,
it waived the mantle of State immunity from suits.—When the U.S. Government, through its agency at Subic Bay, confirmed the
acceptance of a bid of a private company for the repair of wharves or shoreline in the Subic Bay area, it is deemed to have entered into
a contract and thus waived the mantle of sovereign immunity from suit and descended to the level of the ordinary citizen. Its consent to
be sued, therefore, is implied from its act of entering into a contract (Santos vs. Santos, 92 Phil. 281, 284).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Military Bases; Treaties; The majority opinion seems to mock the joint statement of Pres. Marcos and Vice-
President Mondale that Philippine sovereignty extends to U.S. bases here.—The majority opinion seems to mock the provision of
paragraph 1 of the joint statement of President Marcos and Vice-President Mondale of the United States dated May 4, 1978 that “the
United States re-affirms that Philippine sovereignty extends over the bases and that Its base shall be under the command of a Philippine
Base Commander,” which is supposed to underscore the joint Communique of President Marcos and U.S. President Ford of December 7,
1975, under which “they affirm that sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of all States are fundamental
principles which both countries scrupulously respect; and that “they confirm that mutual respect for the dignity of each nation shall
characterize their friendship as well as the alliance between their two countries.”

PETITION to review the orders of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Br. XV. Ruiz, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna & Manalo & Feliciano Law Office for petitioners.
for respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain the respondent judge from trying Civil Case No. 779-M of the defunct
Court of First Instance of Rizal.

The factual background is as follows:

At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in
the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.

Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for the following projects:
1.Repair fender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay, Philippines.
2.Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to shoreline revetment, NAV-BASE Subic; and repair to
Leyte Wharf approach, NAV-BASE Subic Bay, Philippines.

Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from the United
States two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company complied with
the requests. [In its complaint, the company alleges that the United States had accepted its bids because “A request to confirm a price
proposal confirms the acceptance of a bid pursuant to defendant United States’ bidding practices.” (Rollo, p. 30.) The truth of this
allegation has not been tested because the case has not reached the trial stage.]

In June, 1972, the company received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins, Director, Contracts Division, Naval Facilities
Engineering Command, Southwest Pacific, Department of the Navy of the United States, who is one of the 489 petitioners herein. The
letter said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating
on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The letter further said that the projects
had been awarded to third parties.

In the abovementioned Civil Case No. 779-M, the company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I.
Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the (U.S. Navy. The complaint in to order the defendants to allow
the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the
defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from
entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.
The defendants entered their special appearance “for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter
of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants
as agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for
the causes of action asserted in the complaint.” (Rollo, p. 50.)

Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction. The company opposed the motion. The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to
reconsider but to no avail. Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack
of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

The petition is highly impressed with merit.

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This
rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are
not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them—between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in
the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in western Europe. (See Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law,
pp. 207-209 [1984].)

The respondent judge recognized the restrictive doctrine of State immunity when he said in his Order denying the defendants’ (now
petitioners) motion: “A distinction should be made between a strictly governmental function of the sovereign state from its private,
proprietary or non-governmental acts.” (Rollo, p. 20.) However, the respondent judge also said: “It is the Court’s considered opinion that
entering into a contract for the repair of wharves or shoreline is certainly not a governmental function altho it may partake of a public
nature or character. As aptly pointed out by plaintiff’s counsel in his reply citing the ruling in the case of Lyons, Inc., [104 Phil. 594
(1958)], and which this Court quotes with approval, viz.:

‘It is however contended that when a sovereign state enters into a contract with a private person, the state can be sued upon the theory
that it has descended to the level of an individual from which it can be implied that it has given its consent to be sued under the contract.
x x x.

‘x x x xxx xxx

‘We agree to the above contention, and considering that the United States government, through its agency at Subic Bay, entered into a
contract with appellant for stevedoring and miscellaneous labor services within the Subic Bay Area, a U.S. Naval Reservation, it is evident
that it can bring an action before our courts for any contractual liability that that political entity may assume under the contract. The trial
court, therefore, has jurisdiction to entertain this case x x x.’ ” (Rollo, pp. 20-21.)

The reliance placed on Lyons by the respondent judge is misplaced for the following reasons:

In Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. The United States of America, supra, plaintiff brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to collect
several sums of money on account of a contract between plaintiff and defendant. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the court had no jurisdiction over defendant and over the subject matter of the action. The court granted the motion on the grounds
that: (a) it had no jurisdiction over the defendant who did not give its consent to the suit; and (b) plaintiff failed to exhaust the
administrative remedies provided in the contract. The order of dismissal was elevated to this Court for review.

In sustaining the action of the lower court, this Court said:

“It appearing in the complaint that appellant has not complied with the procedure laid down in Article XXI of the contract regarding the
prosecution of its claim against the United States Government, or, stated differently, it has failed to first exhaust its adndnistrative
remedies against said Government, the lower court acted properly in dismissing this case.” (At p. 598.)

It can thus be seen that the statement in respect of the waiver of State immunity from suit was purely gratuitous and, therefore, obiter
so that it has no value as an imperative authority.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not
apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base
which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest
order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is
shown in Syquia vs. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949). In that case the plaintiffs leased three apartment buildings to the United States of
America for the use of its military officials. The plaintiffs sued to recover possession of the premises on the ground that the term of the
leases had expired. They also asked for increased rentals until the apartments shall have been vacated.

The defendants who were armed forces officers of the United States moved to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
court. The Municipal Court of Manila granted the motion to dismiss; sustained by the Court of First Instance, the plaintiffs went to this
Court for review on certiorari. In denying the petition, this Court said:

“On the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of the belief and we hold that the real party defendant in interest is the Government
of the United States of America; that any judgment for back or increased rentals or damages will have to be paid not by defendants
Moore and Tillman and their 64 co-defendants but by the said U.S. Government. On the basis of the ruling in the case of Land vs. Dollar
already cited, and on what we have already stated, the present action must be considered as one against the U.S. Government. It is
clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful
detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S. Government has not
given its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen
filing a suit against his own Government without the latter’s consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign government
without said government’s consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law
behind this rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof.”
(At p. 323.)

In Syquia, the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but the contracts notwithstanding the United States was not
deemed to have given or waived its consent to be sued for the reason that the contracts were for jure imperii and not for jure gestionis.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case No. 779-M is
dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana,** Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay,
JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., did not take part.
Makasiar, J., see dissent.

Petition granted; orders set aside.

Notes.—The principle that the state or its government cannot be sued without its consent has its root in the juridical and practical
notion that the state can do no wrong. Demandable and enforceable obligations which may be the subject of judicial action come into
being either by law, contract, quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punishable by law, acts which do not constitute or amount to a crime or
a misdemeanor known at common law as torts and in civil law as culpa aquiliana or extra contractual. An obligation or liability of the
state created by statute is enforceable against the officer or agent charged with the duty to execute the law. If there should be anything
demandable which had been paid or delivered to or collected by officers or agents of the state without the authority of law, the action
would not be against the state but against the responsible officers or agents who received what was not due the state or made the
unauthorized collection, Punishable acts or omissions committed by officers or agents of the state are crimes and violations of law are
perpetrated by such officers or agents and not by the state. The same postulate may be applied to torts committed by officers or agents
of the State. Nevertheless, if, where and when the state or its government enters into a contract, through its officers or agents, in
furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional or legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits
accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, and if the law granting the authority to enter into such contract does not provide for
or name the officer against whom action may be brought in the event of a breach thereof, the state itself may be sued even without its
consent, because by entering into a contract the sovereign state has descended to the level of the citizen and its consent to be sued is
implied from the very act of entering into such contract. If the dignity of the state, the sacredness of the institution, the respect for the
government are to be preserved and the dragging of its name in a suit to be prevented, the legislative department should name the
officer or agent against whom the action may be brought in the event of breach of the contract entered into under its name and authority.
And the omission or failure of the legislative department to do so is no obstacle or impediment for an individual or citizen, who is aggrieved
by the breach of the contract, to bring an action against the state itself for the reasons already adverted to, to wit: the descent of the
sovereign state to the level of the individual or citizen with whom it entered into a contract and its consent to be sued implied from the
act of entering into such contract. (See Santos vs. Santos, L-4699, Nov. 26, 1952; Moreno vs. Macadaeg, 7 SCRA 700; Ruiz vs. Cabahug,
54 O.G. 351.)

The Court of Claims of the United States made a similar ruling to the effect that, “when the United States, through their duly authorized
agents and officers, enter into contract arrangements and stipulations with their citizens, in matters pertaining to the public service, and
in the mode provided by law, they, pro hoc vice relinquish their sovereign charter and subject themselves to those rules of justice and
right which all just governments administer and enforce between man and man.” (Mann vs. United States, 3 Ct. Cl. 404, 411; Wentworth
vs. United States, 5 Ct. Cl. 302.)
G.R. No. 76607. February 26, 1990.*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M. SMOUSE AND YVONNE REEVES, petitioners, vs. HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO,
Presiding Judge, Branch LVII, Regional Trial Court, Angeles City, ROBERTO T. VALENCIA, EMERENCIANA C. TANGLAO,
AND PABLO C. DEL PILAR, respondents.

G.R. No. 79470. February 26, 1990.*

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANTHONY LAMACHIA, T/ SGT. USAF, WILFREDO BELSA, PETER ORASCION AND ROSE CARTALLA,
petitioners, vs. HON. RODOLFO D. RO-DRIGO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 7, Regional Trial Court (BAGUIO CITY), La Trinidad, Benguet
and FABIAN GENO-VE, respondents.

G.R. No. 80018. February 26, 1990.*

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, TOMI J. KINGI, DARREL D. DYE and STEVEN F. BOSTICK, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSEFINA D. CEBALLOS,
As Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Capas, Tarlac, and LUIS BAUTISTA, respondents.

G.R. No. 80258. February 26, 1990.*

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MAJOR GENERAL MI-CHAEL P. C. CARNS, AIC ERNEST E. RIVENBURGH, AIC ROBIN BLEVINS, SGT. NOEL
A. GONZALES, SGT. THO-MAS MITCHELL, SGT. WAYNE L. BENJAMIN, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. CONCEPCION S. ALARCON VERGARA,
as Presiding Judge, Branch 62 REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Ange-les City, and RICKY SANCHEZ, FREDDIE SANCHEZ AKA FREDDIE RIVERA,
EDWIN MARIANO, AKA JESSIE DOLORES SANGALANG, ET AL., respondents.

Political Law; State Immunity from Suit; When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the
other contracting party, and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.—The general law waiving the immunity
of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, under which the Philippine government “consents and submits to be sued upon any
moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private
parties.” In Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, a special law was passed to enable a person to sue the government for an
alleged tort. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and
divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. Waiver is also implied when the government files a complaint, thus
opening itself to a counterclaim. The above rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected only by the will of the legislature
through the medium of a duly enacted statute. We have held that not all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a
waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts. As for the filing of a complaint by the
government, suability will result only where the government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant.

Same; Same; Same; Rule on waiver, not applicable when the contract entered into involves its sovereign or governmental capacity.—
There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if
it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental
capacity that no such waiver may be implied. This was our ruling in United States of America v. Ruiz, where the transaction in question
dealt with the improvement of the wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay. As this was a clearly governmental function, we held
that the contract did not operate to divest the United States of its sovereign immunity from suit.

Same; Same; Same; Officers acting in their official capacity cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal which has
not given its consent to be sued.—It is clear from a study of the records of G.R. No. 80018 that the individually-named petitioners therein
were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant and thereafter
testified against him at his trial. The said petitioners were in fact connected with the Air Force Office of Special Investigators and were
charged precisely with the function of preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs and prosecuting those guilty
of such acts. It cannot for a moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when they apprehended
and later testified against the complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be
directly im-pleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. As we observed in Sanders v.
Veridiano: Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that the petitioners were, legally speaking,
being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of their
authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts.

Same; Same; Express waiver of immunity cannot be made by a mere counsel of the government but must be effected through a duly
enacted statute.—We reject the conclusion of the trial court that the answer filed by the special counsel of the Office of the Sheriff Judge
Advocate of Clark Air Base was a submission by the United States government to its jurisdiction. As we noted in Republic v. Purisima,
express waiver of immunity cannot be made by a mere counsel of the government but must be effected through a duly-enacted statute.
Neither does such answer come under the implied forms of consent as earlier discussed.

Same; Same; By entering into an employment contract with Geno-ve in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested
itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.—From these circumstances, the Court can assume that the restaurant services offered at the
John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the United States government in its proprietary
capacity. Such services are not extended to the American servicemen for free as a perquisite of membership in the Armed Forces of the
United States. Neither does it appear that they are exclusively offered to these servicemen; on the contrary, it is well known that they
are available to the general public as well, including the tourists in Baguio City, many of whom make it a point to visit John Hay for this
reason. All persons availing themselves of this facility pay for the privilege like all other customers as in ordinary restaurants. Although
the prices are conced-edly reasonable and relatively low, such services are undoubtedly operated for profit, as a commercial and not a
governmental activity. The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the
dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove. Such defense will not prosper even if it be established that they were acting as
agents of the United States when they investigated and later dismissed Genove. For that matter, not even the United States government
itself can claim such immunity. The reason is that by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary
functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.

PETITION for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Br.
62.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Luna, Sison & Manas Law Office for petitioners.

CRUZ, J.:
These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not
impleaded in the complaints below but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not
consented. It is now contesting the denial of its motions by the respondent judges.

In G.R. No. 76607, the private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with
the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barbering services in the said base.
On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, U.S. Air Force, solicited bids for such contracts
through its contracting officer, James F. Shaw. Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia,
Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar. Valencia had been a concessionaire inside Clark for 34 years; del Pilar for 12 years; and
Tanglao for 50 years.

The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, over the objection of the private respondents, who claimed that he had made a bid for four
facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area, which was not included in the invitation to bid.

The private respondents complained to the Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX). The latter, through its representatives, petitioners Yvonne
Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse, explained that the Civil Engineering concession had not been awarded to Dizon as a result of the
February 24, 1986 solicitation. Dizon was already operating this concession, then known as the NCO club concession, and the expiration
of the contract had been extended from June 30, 1986 to August 31, 1986. They further explained that the solicitation of the CE
barbershop would be available only by the end of June and the private respondents would be notified.

On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel
the award to defendant Dizon, to conduct a rebid-ding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of
preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions pending litigation.1

Upon the filing of the complaint, the respondent court issued an ex parte order directing the individual petitioners to maintain the status
quo.

On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the
action was in effect a suit against the United States of America, which had not waived its non-suability. The individual defendants, as
officials/employees of the U.S. Air Force, were also immune from suit.

On the same date, July 22, 1986, the trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

On October 10, 1988, the trial court denied the petitioners’ motion to dismiss, holding in part as follows:

From the pleadings thus far presented to this Court by the parties, the Court’s attention is called by the relationship between the plaintiffs
as well as the defendants, including the US Government, in that prior to the bidding or solicitation in question, there was a binding
contract between the plaintiffs as well as the defendants, including the US Government. By virtue of said contract of concession, it is the
Court’s understanding that neither the US Government nor the herein principal defendants would become the employer/s of the plaintiffs
but that the latter are the employers themselves of the barbers, etc. with the employer, the plaintiffs herein, remitting the stipulated
percentage of commissions to the Philippine Area Exchange. The same circumstance would become in effect when the Philippine Area
Exchange opened for bidding or solicitation the questioned bar-ber shop concessions. To this extent, therefore, indeed a commercial
transaction has been entered, and for purposes of the said solicitation, would necessarily be entered between the plaintiffs as well as the
defendants.

The Court, further, is of the view that Article XVIII of the RP-US Bases Agreement does not cover such kind of services falling under the
concessionaireship, such as a barber shop concession.2

On December 11, 1986, following the filing of the herein petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, we issued a
temporary restraining order against further proceedings in the court below.3
In G.R. No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and
Peter Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. It had been
ascertained after investigation, from the testimony of Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion, that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock
used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. Lamachia, as club manager, suspended him and thereafter referred the
case to a board of arbitrators conformably to the collective bargaining agreement between the Center and its employees. The board
unanimously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. This was effected on March 5, 1986, by Col. David C. Kimball, Commander
of the 3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF Clark Air Force Base. Genove’s reaction was to file his complaint in the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City against the individual petitioners.4

On March 13, 1987, the defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Lamachia, as
an officer of the U.S. Air Force stationed at John Hay Air Station, was immune from suit for the acts done by him in his official capacity.
They argued that the suit was in effect against the United States, which had not given its consent to be sued.
This motion was denied by the respondent judge on June 4, 1987, in an order which read in part:
It is the understanding of the Court, based on the allegations of the complaint—which have been hypothetically admitted by defen-dants
upon the filing of their motion to dismiss—that although defen-dants acted initially in their official capacities, their going beyond what
their functions called for brought them out of the protective mantle of whatever immunities they may have had in the beginning. Thus,
the allegation that the acts complained of were “illegal,” done with “extreme bad faith” and with “pre-conceived sinister plan to harass
and finally dismiss” the plaintiff, gains significance.5

The petitioners then came to this Court seeking certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.

In G.R. No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O’Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested
following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners herein, namely, Tomi J. King, Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick,
officers of the U.S. Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators (AFOSI). On the basis of the sworn
statements made by them, an information for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, was filed against
Bautista in the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac. The above-named officers testified against him at his trial. As a result of the filing of the
charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners herein
claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed.6
During the period for filing of the answer, Mariano Y. Navarro, a special counsel assigned to the International Law Division, Office of the
Staff Judge Advocate of Clark Air Base, entered a special appearance for the defendants and moved for an extension within which to file
an “answer and/or other pleadings.” His reason was that the Attorney General of the United States had not yet designated counsel to
represent the defendants, who were being sued for their official acts. Within the extended period, the defendants, without the assistance
of counsel or authority from the U.S. Department of Justice, filed their answer. They alleged therein as affirmative defenses that they
had only done their duty in the enforcement of the laws of the Philippines inside the American bases pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement.

On May 7, 1987, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, having been retained to represent the defendants, filed with leave of court a
motion to withdraw the answer and dismiss the complaint. The ground invoked was that the defendants were acting in their official
capacity when they did the acts complained of and that the complaint against them was in effect a suit against the United States without
its consent.

The motion was denied by the respondent judge in his order dated September 11, 1987, which held that the claimed immunity under
the Military Bases Agreement covered only criminal and not civil cases. Moreover, the defendants had come under the jurisdiction of the
court when they submitted their answer.7

Following the filing of the herein petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, we issued on October 14, 1987, a
temporary restraining order.8

In G.R. No. 80258, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the herein petitioners (except the United States
of America), for injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the defendants.9 There is a conflict of factual
allegations here. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit them
in several parts of their bodies and caused extensive injuries to them. The defendants deny this and claim the plaintiffs were arrested for
theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest. The defendants stress that the dogs were called off
and the plaintiffs were immediately taken to the medical center for treatment of their wounds.

In a motion to dismiss the complaint, the United States of America and the individually named defendants argued that the suit was in
effect a suit against the United States, which had not given its consent to be sued. The defendants were also immune from suit under
the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official functions.

The motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court in its order dated August 10, 1987, reading in part as follows:

The defendants certainly cannot correctly argue that they are immune from suit. The allegations, of the complaint which is sought to be
dismissed, had to be hypothetically admitted and whatever ground the defendants may have, had to be ventilated during the trial of the
case on the merits. The complaint alleged criminal acts against the individually-named defendants and from the nature of said acts it
could not be said that they are Acts of State, for which immunity should be invoked. If the Filipinos themselves are duty bound to respect,
obey and submit themselves to the laws of the country, with more reason, the members of the United States Armed Forces who are
being treated as guests of this country should respect, obey and submit themselves to its laws.10

and so was the motion for reconsideration. The defendants submitted their answer as required but subsequently filed their petiton for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with this Court. We issued a temporary restraining order on October 27, 1987.11

II
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of
the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. This
latter provision merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also intended to manifest our resolve
to abide by the rules of the international community.

Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of
incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every
civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state
is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states.

As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that “there can be no
legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends.”12 There are other practical reasons for the enforcement
of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the
maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary
disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, “unduly vex the peace of nations.”13

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against
officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such
officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to
pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally
impleaded.14 In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.
The doctrine is sometimes derisively called “the royal prerogative of dishonesty” because of the privilege it grants the state to defeat any
legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. That is hardly fair, at least in democratic societies, for the state is not an
unfeeling tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of its citizens. In fact, the doctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may not be
sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that the state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly imports
that it may be sued if it consents.

The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a
special law. Consent is implied when the state enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation.

The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, under which the Philippine government “consents
and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis
of civil action between private parties.” In Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands,15 a special law was passed to enable a person
to sue the government for an alleged tort. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of
the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.16 Waiver is also implied when the
government files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim.17

The above rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected only by the will of the legislature through the medium of a duly
enacted statute.18 We have held that not all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability;
distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts.19 As for the filing of a complaint by the government, suability will
result only where the government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant.20

In the case of the United States of America, the customary rule of international law on state immunity is expressed with more specificity
in the RP-US Bases Treaty. Article III thereof provides as follows:

It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the rights, power and authority within the bases which are necessary for the
establishment, use, operation and defense thereof or appropriate for the control thereof and all the rights, power and authority within
the limits of the territorial waters and air space adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the bases which are necessary to provide access to them
or appropriate for their control.

The petitioners also rely heavily on Baer v. Tizon,21 along with several other decisions, to support their position that they are not suable
in the cases below, the United States not having waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is emphasized that in Baer, the Court held:

The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without its consent is appropriate. More specifically, insofar as
alien armed forces is concerned, the starting point is Raquiza v. Bradford, a 1945 decision. In dismissing a habeas corpus petition for the
release of petitioners confined by American army authorities, Justice Hilado, speaking for the Court, cited Coleman v. Tennessee, where
it was explicitly declared: ‘It is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by
permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place.’ Two years later, in Tubb and
Tedrow v. Griess, this Court relied on the ruling in Raquiza v. Bradford and cited in support thereof excerpts from the works of the
following authoritative writers: Vattel, Wheaton, Hall, Lawrence, Oppenheim, Westlake, Hyde, and McNair and Lauterpacht. Accuracy
demands the clarification that after the conclusion of the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement, the treaty provisions should
control on such matter, the assumption being that there was a manifestation of the submission to jurisdiction on the part of the foreign
power whenever appropriate. More to the point is Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, where plaintiffs as lessors sued the Commanding General of
the United States Army in the Philippines, seeking the restoration to them of the apartment buildings they owned leased to the United
States armed forces stationed in the Manila area. A motion to dismiss on the ground of non-suability was filed and upheld by respondent
Judge. The matter was taken to this Court in a mandamus proceeding. It failed. It was the ruling that respondent Judge acted correctly
considering that the ‘action must be considered as one against the U.S. Government.’ The opinion of Justice Montemayor continued: ‘It
is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful
detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S. Government has not
given its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen
filing a suit against his own Government without the latter’s consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign government
without said government’s consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law
behind this rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof.’
Then came Marvel Building Corporation v. Philippine War Damage Commission, where respondent, a United States Agency established
to compensate damages suffered by the Philippines during World War II was held as falling within the above doctrine as the suit against
it ‘would eventually be a charge against or financial liability of the United States Government because x x x, the Commission has no funds
of its own for the purpose of paying money judgments.’ The Syquia ruling was again explicitly relied upon in Marquez Lim v. Nelson,
involving a complaint for the recovery of a motor launch, plus damages, the special defense interposed being ‘that the vessel belonged
to the United States Government, that the defendants merely acted as agents of said Government, and that the United States Government
is therefore the real party in interest.’ So it was in Philippine Alien Property Administration v. Castelo, where it was held that a suit against
Alien Property Custodian and the Attorney General of the United States involving vested property under the Trading with the Enemy Act
is in substance a suit against the United States. To the same effect is Parreno v. McGranery, as the following excerpt from the opinion of
Justice Tuazon clearly shows: ‘It is a widely accepted principle of international law, which is made a part of the law of the land (Article
II, Section 3 of the Constitution), that a foreign state may not be brought to suit before the courts of another state or its own courts
without its consent.’ Finally, there is Johnson v. Turner, an appeal by the defendant, then Commanding General, Philippine Command
(Air Force, with office at Clark Field) from a decision ordering the return to plaintiff of the confiscated military payment certificates known
as scrip money. In reversing the lower court decision, this Tribunal, through Justice Montemayor, relied on Syquia v. Almeda Lopez,
explaining why it could not be sustained.
It bears stressing at this point that the above observations do not confer on the United States of America a blanket immunity for all acts
done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country
merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions.

There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if
it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental
capacity that no such waiver may be implied. This was our ruling in United States of America v. Ruiz,22 where the transaction in question
dealt with the improvement of the wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay. As this was a clearly governmental function, we held
that the contract did not operate to divest the United States of its sovereign immunity from suit. In the words of Justice Vicente Abad
Santos:

The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule
is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not
petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them—between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).

The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in
the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in Western Europe.

xxx
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not
apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base
which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest
order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or agents of
the United States. However, this is a matter of evidence. The charges against them may not be summarily dismissed on their mere
assertion that their acts are imputable to the United States of America, which has not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the defendants
are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the United States itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone
must satisfy the judgment.

In Festejo v. Fernando,23 a bureau director, acting without any authority whatsoever, appropriated private land and converted it into
public irrigation ditches. Sued for the value of the lots invalidly taken by him, he moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
suit was in effect against the Philippine government, which had not given its consent to be sued. This Court sustained the denial of the
motion and held that the doctrine of state immunity was not applicable. The director was being sued in his private capacity for a personal
tort.
With these considerations in mind, we now proceed to resolve the cases at hand.

III
It is clear from a study of the records of G.R. No. 80018 that the individually-named petitioners therein were acting in the exercise of
their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant and thereafter testified against him at his
trial. The said petitioners were in fact connected with the Air Force Office of Special Investigators and were charged precisely with the
function of preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs and prosecuting those guilty of such acts. It cannot for a
moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later testified against the
complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts
imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. As we observed in Sanders v. Veridiano:24

Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued
as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it
is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts.

The private respondent invokes Article 2180 of the Civil Code which holds the government liable if it acts through a special agent. The
argument, it would seem, is premised on the ground that since the officers are designated “special agents,” the United States government
should be liable for their torts.

There seems to be a failure to distinguish between suability and liability and a misconception that the two terms are synonymous.
Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that
a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be
sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign
immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.

The said article establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The government may be held liable under this rule only if it first allows itself
to be sued through any of the accepted forms of consent.

Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent even if he is so denominated, as in the case at bar. No less
important, the said provision appears to regulate only the relations of the local state with its inhabitants and, hence, applies only to the
Philippine government and not to foreign governments impleaded in our courts.

We reject the conclusion of the trial court that the answer filed by the special counsel of the Office of the Sheriff Judge Advocate of Clark
Air Base was a submission by the United States government to its jurisdiction. As we noted in Republic v. Purisima,25 express waiver of
immunity cannot be made by a mere counsel of the government but must be effected through a duly-enacted statute. Neither does such
answer come under the implied forms of consent as earlier discussed.

But even as we are certain that the individual petitioners in G.R. No. 80018 were acting in the discharge of their official functions, we
hesitate to make the same conclusion in G.R. No. 80258. The contradictory factual allegations in this case deserve in our view a closer
study of what actually happened to the plaintiffs. The record is too meager to indicate if the defendants were really discharging their
official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident in question occurred. Lacking this information, this Court cannot
directly decide this case. The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of
the parties on the basis of the evidence that has yet to be presented at the trial. Only after it shall have determined in what capacity the
petitioners were acting at the time of the incident in question will this Court determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine of state immunity
is applicable.

In G.R. No. 79470, private respondent Genove was employed as a cook in the Main Club located at the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center,
also known as the Open Mess Complex, at John Hay Air Station. As manager of this complex, petitioner Lamachia is responsible for
eleven diversified activities generating an annual income of $2 million. Under his executive management are three service restaurants, a
cafeteria, a bakery, a Class VI store, a coffee and pantry shop, a main cashier cage, an administrative office, and a decentralized
warehouse which maintains a stock level of $200,000.00 per month in resale items. He supervises 167 employees, one of whom was
Genove, with whom the United States government has concluded a collective bargaining agreement.
From these circumstances, the Court can assume that the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature
of a business enterprise undertaken by the United States government in its proprietary capacity. Such services are not extended to the
American servicemen for free as a perquisite of membership in the Armed Forces of the United States. Neither does it appear that they
are exclusively offered to these servicemen; on the contrary, it is well known that they are available to the general public as well, including
the tourists in Baguio City, many of whom make it a point to visit John Hay for this reason. All persons availing themselves of this facility
pay for the privilege like all other customers as in ordinary restaurants. Although the prices are concededly reasonable and relatively low,
such services are undoubtedly operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity.

The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage
suit against them by Genove. Such defense will not prosper even if it be established that they were acting as agents of the United States
when they investigated and later dismissed Genove. For that matter, not even the United States government itself can claim such
immunity. The reason is that by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it
impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
But these considerations notwithstanding, we hold that the complaint against the petitioners in the court below must still be dismissed.
While suable, the petitioners are nevertheless not liable. It is obvious that the claim for damages cannot be allowed on the strength of
the evidence before us, which we have carefully examined.

The dismissal of the private respondent was decided upon only after a thorough investigation where it was established beyond doubt
that he had polluted the soup stock with urine. The investigation, in fact, did not stop there. Despite the definitive finding of Genove’s
guilt, the case was still referred to the board of arbitrators provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. This board unanimously
affirmed the findings of the investigators and recommended Genove’s dismissal. There was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings. The
petitioners acted quite properly in terminating the private respondent’s employment for his unbelievably nauseating act. It is surprising
that he should still have the temerity to file his complaint for damages after committing his utterly disgusting offense.

Concerning G.R. No. 76607, we also find that the barbershops subject of the concessions granted by the United States government are
commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the United States Armed Forces nor are their facilities
demandable as a matter of right by the American servicemen. These establishments provide for the grooming needs of their customers
and offer not only the basic haircut and shave (as required in most military organizations) but such other amenities as shampoo, massage,
manicure and other similar indulgences. And all for a fee. Interestingly, one of the concessionaires, private respondent Valencia, was
even sent abroad to improve his tonsorial business, presumably for the benefit of his customers. No less significantly, if not more so, all
the barbershop concessionaires are, under the terms of their contracts, required to remit to the United States government fixed
commissions in consideration of the exclusive concessions granted to them in their respective areas.

This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the private respondents in the court below.
The contracts in question being decidedly commercial, the conclusion reached in the United States of America v. Ruiz case cannot be
applied here.

The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants as we have done in G.R. No. 79470, except for the paucity of
the record in the case at hand. The evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions is not before us. This
means that, as in G.R. No. 80258, the respondent court will have to receive that evidence first, so it can later determine on the basis
thereof if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek. Accordingly, this case must also be remanded to the court below for further
proceedings.

IV
There are a number of other cases now pending before us which also involve the question of the immunity of the United States from the
jurisdiction of the Philippines. This is cause for regret, indeed, as they mar the traditional friendship between two countries long allied in
the cause of democracy. It is hoped that the so-called “irritants” in their relations will be resolved in a spirit of mutual accommodation
and respect, without the inconvenience and asperity of litigation and always with justice to both parties.

WHEREFORE, after considering all the above premises, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
1.In G.R. No. 76607, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent judge is directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of
Civil Case No. 4772. The temporary restraining order dated December 11, 1986, is LIFTED.

2.In G.R. No. 79470, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 829-R(298) is DISMISSED.

3.In G.R. No. 80018, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 115-C-87 is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated
October 14, 1987, is made permanent.

4.In G.R. No. 80258, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent court is directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of
Civil Case No. 4996. The temporary restraining order dated October 27, 1987, is LIFTED.
All without any pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortés, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
In G.R. No. 76607, petition dismissed; G.R. No. 79470, petition granted; G.R. No. 80018, petition granted; G.R. No. 80258, petition
dismissed.

Note.—A direct suit against the State cannot be maintained without its consent. (Insurance Company of North America vs. Republic,
L-26532, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1159; Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. vs. Maersk Line Far East Service, L-27189, March 28, 1969, 27
SCRA 519; Rizal Surety & Insurance Co. vs. Customs Arrastre Service, L-25709, April 25, 1969, 27 SCRA 1016.)
G.R. No. 129406. March 6, 2006.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG),
petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) and ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO, respondents.

Certiorari; Courts; Sandiganbayan; Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment, upon showing that
the respondent tribunal or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion.—For sure, even if the Sandiganbayan were wrong in its findings, which does not seem to be in this case,
it is a well-settled rule of jurisprudence that certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Corollarily,
errors of procedure or mistakes in the court’s findings and conclusions are beyond the corrective hand of certiorari. The extraordinary
writ of certiorari may be availed only upon a showing, in the minimum, that the respondent tribunal or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.

Grave Abuse of Discretion; Words and Phrases; “Grave Abuse of Discretion” connotes capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to excess, or a lack of jurisdiction.—The term “grave abuse of discretion” connotes capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to excess, or a lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.

Constitutional Law; Immunity from Suit; When the State, through its duly authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a private
party, it thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the latter may
have against it.—In a last-ditch attempt to escape liability, petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit. As
argued, the order for it to pay the value of the delinquent shares would fix monetary liability on a government agency, thus necessitating
the appropriation of public funds to satisfy the judgment claim. But, as private respondent Benedicto correctly countered, the PCGG fails
to take stock of one of the exceptions to the state immunity principle, i.e., when the government itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case No.
0034. Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit cannot be effectively invoked. For, as
jurisprudence teaches, when the State, through its duly authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a private party, it thereby
descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens itself to whatever counter-claims or defenses the latter may have against it.
Petitioner Republic’s act of filing its complaint in Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a waiver of its immunity from suit. Being itself the plaintiff
in that case, petitioner Republic cannot set up its immunity against private respondent Benedicto’s prayers in the same case.

Same; Same; By entering into a Compromise Agreement with private respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of
its immunity from suit and placed itself in the same level of its adversary.—By entering into a Compromise Agreement with private
respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself in the same level of its
adversary. When the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant
to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State
may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of the
citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract, breach of which on its part gives the
corresponding right to the other party to the agreement.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Dominador R. Santiago for the administratrix of the intestate estate of R. S. Benedicto.
Balgos, Perez & Pacis for PCIB.

GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court is this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the March 28, 19951 and March
13, 19972 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, Second Division, in Civil Case No. 0034, insofar as said resolutions ordered the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to pay private respondent Roberto S. Benedicto or his corporations the value of 227 shares of
stock of the Negros Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc. (NOGCCI) at P150,000.00 per share, registered in the name of said private
respondent or his corporations.

The facts:
Civil Case No. 0034 entitled Republic of the Philippines, plaintiff, v. Roberto S. Benedicto, et al., defendants, is a complaint for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, reconstitution and damages. The case is one of several suits involving illgotten or unexplained
wealth that petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, filed with the Sandiganbayan against private respondent Roberto S. Benedicto and
others pursuant to Executive Order (EO) No. 14,3 series of 1986.

Pursuant to its mandate under EO No. 1,4 series of 1986, the PCGG issued writs placing under sequestration all business enterprises,
entities and other properties, real and personal, owned or registered in the name of private respondent Benedicto, or of corporations in
which he appeared to have controlling or majority interest. Among the properties thus sequestered and taken over by PCGG fiscal agents
were the 227 shares in NOGCCI owned by private respondent Benedicto and registered in his name or under the names of corporations
he owned or controlled.

Following the sequestration process, PCGG representatives sat as members of the Board of Directors of NOGCCI, which passed, sometime
in October 1986, a resolution effecting a corporate policy change. The change consisted of assessing a monthly membership due of
P150.00 for each NOGCCI share. Prior to this resolution, an investor purchasing more than one NOGCCI share was exempt from paying
monthly membership due for the second and subsequent shares that he/she owned.

Subsequently, on March 29, 1987, the NOGCCI Board passed another resolution, this time increasing the monthly membership due from
P150.00 to P250.00 for each share.

As sequestrator of the 227 shares of stock in question, PCGG did not pay the corresponding monthly membership due thereon totaling
P2,959,471.00. On account thereof, the 227 sequestered shares were declared delinquent to be disposed of in an auction sale.

Apprised of the above development and evidently to prevent the projected auction sale of the same shares, PCGG filed a complaint for
injunction with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 5348. The complaint, however, was
dismissed, paving the way for the auction sale for the delinquent 227 shares of stock. On August 5, 1989, an auction sale was conducted.
On November 3, 1990, petitioner Republic and private respondent Benedicto entered into a Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No.
0034. The agreement contained a general release clause5 whereunder petitioner Republic agreed and bound itself to lift the sequestration
on the 227 NOGCCI shares, among other Benedicto’s properties, petitioner Republic acknowledging that it was within private respondent
Benedicto’s capacity to acquire the same shares out of his income from business and the exercise of his profession.6 Implied in this
undertaking is the recognition by petitioner Republic that the subject shares of stock could not have been illgotten.

In a decision dated October 2, 1992, the Sandiganbayan approved the Compromise Agreement and accordingly rendered judgment in
accordance with its terms.
In the process of implementing the Compromise Agreement, either of the parties would, from time to time, move for a ruling by the
Sandiganbayan on the proper manner of implementing or interpreting a specific provision therein. On February 22, 1994, Benedicto filed
in Civil Case No. 0034 a “Motion for Release from Sequestration and Return of Sequestered Shares/Dividends” praying, inter alia, that
his NOGCCI shares of stock be specifically released from sequestration and returned, delivered or paid to him as part of the parties’
Compromise Agreement in that case. In a Resolution7 promulgated on December 6, 1994, the Sandiganbayan granted Benedicto’s
aforementioned motion but placed the subject shares under the custody of its Clerk of Court, thus:

“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the said “Motion for Release From Sequestration and Return of Sequestered Shares/
Dividends” is hereby GRANTED and it is directed that said shares/ dividends be delivered/placed under the custody of the Clerk of Court,
Sandiganbayan, Manila subject to this Court’s disposition.”

On March 28, 1995, the Sandiganbayan came out with the herein first assailed Resolution,8 which clarified its aforementioned December
6, 1994 Resolution and directed the immediate implementation thereof by requiring PCGG, among other things:

(b) To deliver to the Clerk of Court the 227 sequestered shares of [NOGCCI] registered in the name of nominees of ROBERTO S.
BENEDICTO free from all liens and encumbrances, or in default thereof, to pay their value at P150,000.00 per share which can be
deducted from [the Republic’s] cash share in the Compromise Agreement. [Words in bracket added] (Emphasis Supplied).

Owing to PCGG’s failure to comply with the above directive, Benedicto filed in Civil Case No. 0034 a Motion for Compliance dated July
25, 1995, followed by an Ex Parte Motion for Early Resolution dated February 12, 1996. Acting thereon, the Sandiganbayan promulgated
yet another Resolution9 on February 23, 1996, dispositively reading:

“WHEREFORE, finding merit in the instant motion for early resolution and considering that, indeed, the PCGG has not shown any justifiable
ground as to why it has not complied with its obligation as set forth in the Order of December 6, 1994 up to this date and which Order
was issued pursuant to the Compromise Agreement and has already become final and executory, accordingly, the Presidential Commission
on Good Government is hereby given a final extension of fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof within which to comply with the Order of
December 6, 1994 as stated hereinabove.”

On April 1, 1996, PCGG filed a Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration,10 praying for the setting aside of the Resolution of February
23, 1996. On April 11, 1996, private respondent Benedicto filed a Motion to Enforce Judgment Levy. Resolving these two motions, the
Sandiganbayan, in its second assailed Resolution11 dated March 13, 1997, denied that portion of the PCGG’s Manifestation with Motion
for Reconsideration concerning the subject 227 NOGCCI shares and granted Benedicto’s Motion to Enforce Judgment Levy.

Hence, the Republic’s present recourse on the sole issue of whether or not the public respondent Sandiganbayan, Second Division,
gravely abused its discretion in holding that the PCGG is at fault for not paying the membership dues on the 227 sequestered NOGCCI
shares of stock, a failing which eventually led to the foreclosure sale thereof.

The petition lacks merit.

To begin with, PCGG itself does not dispute its being considered as a receiver insofar as the sequestered 227 NOGCCI shares of stock
are concerned.12 PCGG also acknowledges that as such receiver, one of its functions is to pay outstanding debts pertaining to the
sequestered entity or property,13 in this case the 227 NOGCCI shares in question. It contends, however, that membership dues owing to
a golf club cannot be considered as an outstanding debt for which PCGG, as receiver, must pay. It also claims to have exercised due
diligence to prevent the loss through delinquency sale of the subject NOGCCI shares, specifically inviting attention to the injunctive suit,
i.e., Civil Case No. 5348, it filed before the RTC of Bacolod City to enjoin the foreclosure sale of the shares.

The filing of the injunction complaint adverted to, without more, cannot plausibly tilt the balance in favor of PCGG. To the mind of the
Court, such filing is a case of acting too little and too late. It cannot be over-emphasized that it behooved the PCGG’s fiscal agents to
preserve, like a responsible father of the family, the value of the shares of stock under their administration. But far from acting as such
father, what the fiscal agents did under the premises was to allow the element of delinquency to set in before acting by embarking on a
tedious process of going to court after the auction sale had been announced and scheduled.

The PCGG’s posture that to the owner of the sequestered shares rests the burden of paying the membership dues is untenable. For one,
it lost sight of the reality that such dues are basically obligations attached to the shares, which, in the final analysis, shall be made liable,
thru delinquency sale in case of default in payment of the dues. For another, the PCGG as sequestrator-receiver of such shares is, as
stressed earlier, duty-bound to preserve the value of such shares. Needless to state, adopting timely measures to obviate the loss of
those shares forms part of such duty and due diligence.

The Sandiganbayan, to be sure, cannot plausibly be faulted for finding the PCGG liable for the loss of the 227 NOGCCI shares. There can
be no quibbling, as indeed the graft court so declared in its assailed and related resolutions respecting the NOGCCI shares of stock, that
PCGG’s fiscal agents, while sitting in the NOGCCI Board of Directors agreed to the amendment of the rule pertaining to membership
dues. Hence, it is not amiss to state, as did the Sandiganbayan, that the PCGG-designated fiscal agents, no less, had a direct hand in the
loss of the sequestered shares through delinquency and their eventual sale through public auction. While perhaps anti-climactic to so
mention it at this stage, the unfortunate loss of the shares ought not to have come to pass had those fiscal agents prudently not agreed
to the passage of the NOGCCI board resolutions charging membership dues on shares without playing representatives.

Given the circumstances leading to the auction sale of the subject NOGCCI shares, PCGG’s lament about public respondent Sandiganbayan
having erred or, worse still, having gravely abused its discretion in its determination as to who is at fault for the loss of the shares in
question can hardly be given cogency.
For sure, even if the Sandiganbayan were wrong in its findings, which does not seem to be in this case, it is a well-settled rule of
jurisprudence that certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Corollarily, errors of procedure or
mistakes in the court’s findings and conclusions are beyond the corrective hand of certiorari.14 The extraordinary writ of certiorari may
be availed only upon a showing, in the minimum, that the respondent tribunal or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.15

The term “grave abuse of discretion” connotes capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or a lack of
jurisdiction.16 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion or hostility.17 Sadly, this is completely absent in the present case. For, at bottom, the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
did no more than to direct PCGG to comply with its part of the bargain under the compromise agreement it freely entered into with
private respondent Benedicto. Simply put, the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan have firm basis in fact and in law.
Lest it be overlooked, the issue of liability for the shares in question had, as both public and private respondents asserted, long become
final and executory. Petitioner’s narration of facts in its present petition is even misleading as it conveniently fails to make reference to
two (2) resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan. We refer to that court’s resolutions of December 6, 199418 and February 23, 199619 as
well as several intervening pleadings which served as basis for the decisions reached therein. As it were, the present petition questions
only and focuses on the March 28, 199520 and March 13, 199721 resolutions, which merely reiterated and clarified the graft court’s
underlying resolution of December 6, 1994. And to place matters in the proper perspective, PCGG’s failure to comply with the December
6, 1994 resolution prompted the issuance of the clarificatory and/or reiteratory resolutions aforementioned.

In a last-ditch attempt to escape liability, petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit.22 As argued, the order
for it to pay the value of the delinquent shares would fix monetary liability on a government agency, thus necessitating the appropriation
of public funds to satisfy the judgment claim.23 But, as private respondent Benedicto correctly countered, the PCGG fails to take stock of
one of the exceptions to the state immunity principle, i.e., when the government itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case No. 0034.

Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit cannot be effectively invoked.24 For, as
jurisprudence teaches, when the State, through its duly authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a private party, it thereby
descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the latter may have against it.25
Petitioner Republic’s act of filing its complaint in Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a waiver of its immunity from suit. Being itself the plaintiff
in that case, petitioner Republic cannot set up its immunity against private respondent Benedicto’s prayers in the same case.

In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its
immunity from suit and placed itself in the same level of its adversary. When the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents,
in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits
accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by entering
into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such
contract,26 breach of which on its part gives the corresponding right to the other party to the agreement.

Finally, it is apropos to stress that the Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. 0034 envisaged the immediate recovery of alleged ill-
gotten wealth without further litigation by the government, and buying peace on the part of the aging Benedicto.27 Sadly, that stated
objective has come to naught as not only had the litigation continued to ensue, but, worse, private respondent Benedicto passed away
on May 15, 2000,28 with the trial of Civil Case No. 0034 still in swing, so much so that the late Benedicto had to be substituted by the
administratrix of his estate.29
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez and Corona, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., In the result.
Petition dismissed.

Notes.—Generally, no suit may be maintained against the State because there can be no legal right against the authority which
makes the law on which the right depends, except when it gives consent whether express or implied. (Republic vs. Villasor, 54 SCRA 83
[1973])

Fifth class municipality mayors fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. (Layus vs. Sandiganbayan,
320 SCRA 233 [1999])
To invoke the Court’s power of judicial review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it must first be shown that respondent tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has indeed acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, and that there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. (Camacho vs. Coresis, Jr., 387 SCRA 628 [2002])
[No. 11154. March 21, 1916,]
E. MERRITT, plaintiff and appellant, vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant and appellant.
1.DAMAGES; MEASURE OF.—Where the evidence shows that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for six months it is an error to restrict
the damages to a shorter period during which he was confined in the hospital.

2.SPECIAL STATUTES; CONSENT OF THE STATE TO BE SUED; CONSTRUCTION.—The Government of the Philippine Islands having been
"modeled after the federal and state governments of the United States" the decisions of the high courts of that country may be used in
determining the scope and purpose of a special statute.

3.ID.; ID.; ID.—The state not being liable to suit except by its express consent, an Act abrogating that immunity will be strictly construed.

4.ID.; ID. ; ID.—An act permitting a suit against the state gives rise to no liability not previously existing unless it is clearly expressed in
the act.

5.GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; LlABILITY FOR THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF ITS OFFICERS, AGENTS, AND EMPLOYEES.—
The Government of the Philippine Islands its only liable for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees when they are acting
as special agents within. the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code, and a chauffeur of the General Hospital is not such
a special agent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Del Rosario, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Crossfield & O'Brien for plaintiff.
Attorney-General Avanceña for defendant.

TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum
of P14,741, together with the costs of the cause.

Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead
of P25,000 as claimed in the complaint," and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one
days and fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint.”

The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred: (a) in finding that the collision between the plaintiff's
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; (b) in holding that the Government
of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true that the collision
was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.

The trial court's findings of fact, which are fully supported by the record, are as follows:
"It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part
of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour, upon crossing Taft t Avenue and
when he was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue,
instead of turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed
by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into
the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already
six feet from the southwestern point or from the post placed there.

"By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, who examined him on the very
same day that he was taken to the General Hospital, he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the same
place and in the back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely, unconscious.

"The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey matter and brain mass had suffered material injury.
At ten o'clock of the night in question, which was the time set for performing the operation, his pulse was so weak and so irregular that,
in his opinion, there was little hope that he would live. His right leg was broken in such a way that the fracture extended to the outer
skin in such manner that it might be regarded as double and the wound would be exposed to infection, for which reason it was of the
most serious nature.

"At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby noticed that the plaintiff's leg showed a contraction of an inch
and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture. Examination of his head revealed a
notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. The patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a slight weakness in his
eyes and in his mental condition. This latter weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor, especially
when he attempted to use his memory for mathematical calculations.

"According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's mental and physical condition prior to the accident was
excellent. and that after having received the injuries that have been discussed, his physical condition had undergone a noticeable
depreciation, for he had lost the agility, energy, and ability that he had constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best
constructors of wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work because he had
lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. As a contractor, he could no longer, as he had before done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to reach
the highest parts of the building.

"As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor, he had to dissolve the partnership he
had formed with the engineer, Wilson, because he was incapacitated from making mathematical calculations on account of the condition
of his leg and of his mental faculties, and he had to give up a contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco building.”

We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the effect that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle
and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur.

The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the amount
awarded for permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was
incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We find nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing the amount of the first. As
to the second, the record shows, and the trial court so found, that the plaintiffs services as a contractor were worth P1,000 per month.
The court, however, limited the time to two months and twenty-one days, which the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. In
this we think there was error, because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period of six months.
The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only two months and twenty-one days while the remainder of the six months was spent
in his home, would not prevent recovery for the whole time. We, therefore, find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff,
without any fault on his part, is P18,075.
As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government, the inquiry at once arises
whether the Government is legally liable for the damages resulting therefrom.

Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:

"An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said
Islands to appear in said suit.

"Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr. E, Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting from
a collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital on March twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;

"Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to determine the amount of damages, if any, to which the
claimant is entitled; and

"Whereas the Director of Public Works and the AttorneyGeneral recommend that an Act be passed by the Legislature authorizing Mr. E.
Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in order that said questions may be decided: Now, therefore,

"By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that:
"SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of
the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and
the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the
Government of said Islands, to defend said Government at the same.

"SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.

"Enacted, February 3, 1915."

Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff
? If only the former, then it cannot be held that the Act created any new cause of action in favor of the plaintiff or extended the
defendant's liability to any case not previously recognized.

All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an individual without its consent. It is also admitted that the
instant case is one against the Government. As the consent of the Government to be sued by the plaintiff was entirely voluntary on
its part, it is our duty to look carefully into the terms of the consent, and render judgment accordingly.

The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt
is entitled on account of said collision, * * *." These were the two questions submitted to the court for determination. The Act was
passed "in order that said questions may be decided." We have "decided" that the accident was due solely to the negligence of the
chauffeur, who was at the time an employee of the defendant, and we have also -fixed the amount of damages sustained by the
plaintiff as a result of the collision. Does the Act authorize us to hold that the Government is legally liable for that amount? If not,
we must look elsewhere for such authority, if it exists.

The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the Federal and State Governments in the United States," we may
look to the decisions of the high courts of that country for aid in determining the purpose and scope of Act No. 2457.
In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when
expressly made so by legislative enactment, is well settled. "The Government," 'says Justice Story, "does not undertake to guarantee to
any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless
embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest." (Claussen vs. City of Luverne, 103 Minn., 491,
citing U. S. vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat, 720; 6 L. Ed., 199; and Beers vs. State, 20 How., 527; 15 L. Ed., 991.)

In the case of Melvin vs. State (121 Cal., 16), the plaintiff sought to recover damages from the state for personal injuries received on
account of the negligence of the state officers at the state fair, a state institution created by the legislature for the purpose of improving
agricultural and kindred industries; to disseminate information calculated to educate and benefit the industrial classes; and to advance
by such means the material interests of the state, being objects similar to those sought by the public school system. In passing upon the
question of the state's liability for the negligent acts of its officers or agents, the court said:

"No claim arises against any government in favor of an individual, by reason of the misfeasance, laches, or unauthorized exercise of
powers by its officers or agents." (Citing Gibbons vs. U. S., 8 Wall., 269; Clodfelter vs. State, 86 N. C., 51, 53; 41 Am. Rep., 440; Chapman
vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Green vs. State, 73 Cal., 29; Bourn vs. Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27 Am. St. Rep., 203; Story on
Agency, sec. 319.)

As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action arises out of either tort or
contract, the rule is stated in 36 Cyc. 915, thus:

"By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any
cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting
liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.”

In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided April 16, 1915, the Act of 1913, which authorized the bringing of
this suit, read:
"SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher, of the town of Summit, Waukesha County, Wisconsin, to bring suit in such
court or courts and in such f orm or forms as he may be advised for the purpose of settling and determining all controversies which he
may now have with the State of Wisconsin, or its duly authorized officers and agents, relative to the mill property of said George
Apfelbacher, the fish hatchery of the State of Wisconsin on the Bark River, and the mill property of Evan Humphrey at the lower end of
Nagawicka Lake, and relative to the use of the waters of said Bark River and Nagawicka Lake, all in the county of Waukesha, Wisconsin.”

In determining the scope of this act, the court said:

"Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on the part of the state for the acts of its officers, and
that the suit now stands just as it would stand between private parties. It is difficult to see how the act does, or was intended to do,
more than remove the state's immunity from suit. It simply gives authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiffs
controversies with the state. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit
shall depart f rom well established principles of law, or that the amount of damages is the only question to be settled. The act opened
the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the question of liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the absence
of the state's immunity from suit. If the Legislature had intended to change the rule that obtained in this state so long and" to declare
liability on the part of the state, it would not have left so important a matter to mere inference, but would have done so in express terms.
(Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth, 152 Mass., 28; 24 N. E., 854; 8 L. R. A., 399.)”

In Denning vs, State (123 Cal., 316), the provisions of the Act of 1893, relied upon and considered, are as follows:

"All persons who have, or shall hereafter have, claims on contract or for negligence against the state not allowed by the state board of
examiners, are hereby authorized, on the terms and conditions herein contained, to bring suit thereon against the state in any of the
courts of this state of competent jurisdiction, and prosecute the same to final judgment. The rules of practice in civil cases shall apply to
such suits, except as herein otherwise provided.”

And the court said:

"This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases, arising under different facts, and in both it was held that said statute
did not create any liability or cause of action against the state where none existed before, but merely gave an additional remedy to
enforce such liability as would have existed if the statute had not been enacted. (Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep.,
158; Melvin vs. State, 121 Cal., 16.)”

A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to the superior court "jurisdiction of all claims against the commonwealth, whether at
law or in equity," with an exception not necessary to be here mentioned. In construing this statute the court, in Murdock Grate Co. vs.
Commonwealth (152 Mass., 28), said:

"The statute we are discussing discloses no intention to create against the state a new and heretofore unrecognized class of liabilities,
but only an intention to provide a judicial tribunal where well recognized existing liabilities can be adjudicated.”

In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of the canal claims had, by the terms of the statute of New York, jurisdiction of
claims for damages for injuries in the management of the canals such as the plaintiff had sustained, Chief Justice Ruger remarks: "It
must be conceded that the state can be made liable for injuries arising from the negligence of its agents or servants, only by force of
some positive statute assuming such liability.”

It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to any cause not previously recognized, we
will now examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees.
Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:

"The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official
to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.”

The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:

"That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault or negligence is based, as is evidenced
by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or omission of
the third party who caused the damage. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the
damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts perf ormed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining
to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of the
public service and in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in
order that each branch of service serves the general weal and that of private persons interested in its operation. 'Between these latter
and the state, therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a
judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations." (Supreme Court of Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ,, 24.) ,

"That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations which arise out of fault or negligence; and whereas in the
first article thereof, No. 1902, where the general principle is laid down that where a person who by an act or omission causes damage to
another through fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage so done, reference is made to acts or omissions of the persons
who directly or indirectly cause the damage, the following article refers to third persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those
who maintain fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors of the damage, because the law presumes that in consequence
of such relations the evil caused by their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. This legal presumption 'gives way to proof,
however, because, as held in the last paragraph of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the persons mentioned
in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a f amily to avoid the damage, and among these persons,
called upon to answer in a direct and not a subsidiary manner, are found, in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case,
guardians and owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise, the state, but not always, except when it acts through the agency
of a special agent, doubtless because and only in this case, the fault or negligence, which is the original basis of this kind of objections,
must be presumed to lie with the state.

"That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in article 1902 respond for all the damage that
is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or negligence are made by branches of the central administration
acting in the name and representation of the state itself and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive
powers, yet said article is not applicable in the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official,
acting in the exercise of his powers, in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing by the owner of the property
which they hold in sublease.

"That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in
the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of
the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he
executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the active administration
and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated
by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)

"That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the 18th of
May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered
by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not
where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can
be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so
deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by
erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code." (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911;
122 Jur. Civ., 146.)

It is, theref ore, evident that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions
of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of
paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether the Government
intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent
acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine.
This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Moreland, JJ., concur,
Judgment reversed.
No. L-30098. February 18, 1970.
THE COMMISSIONER OP PUBLIC HIGHWAYS and the AUDITOR GENERAL, petitioners, vs. HON.LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO,
as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, sitting in Quezon City, TESTATE ESTATE OF N. T.
HASHIM (Special Proceedings No. 71131 of the Court of First Instance of Manila) represented by its Judicial
Administrator, Tomas N. Hashim, TOMAS N. HASHIM, personally, and as Judicial Administrator of the Estate of Hashim,
Special Proceedings No. 71131 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ALL THE LEGAL OR TESTAMENTARY HEIRS of the
Estate of Hashim, MANUEL^ C. FLORENDO,personally as Deputy Clerk, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City,
Branch IX, BENJAMIN GARCIA,as “Special Sheriff appointed by respondent Judge Lourdes P. San Diego, BENJAMIN V.
CORUfU, personally and as Chief Documentation Staff, Legal Department, Philippine National Bank, and the PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, respondents.

Remedial law; Actions; Parties; Doctrine of immunity from suit does not apply to expropriation proceedings.—It is elementary that in
expropriation proceedings, the state precisely submits to the court’s jurisdiction and asks the court to affirm its lawful right to take the
property sought to be expropriated for the public use or purpose described in its complaint and to determine the amount of just
compensation to be paid therefore. The doctrine of immunity of the state from suit does not apply.

Civil law; Agency; Third person cannot question lack of authority of agent—In an expropriation proceeding, the State cannot raise the
alleged lack of authority of the counsel of the owner of the property to bind his client in a compromise agreement because such lack of
authority may be questioned only by the principal or client.

Civil procedure; Execution; Remedial law; Expropriation; Execution of judgment against government; Need for a law appropriating money
for the purpose.—Although the government, as plaintiff in expropriation proceedings, submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court and
thereby waives its immunity from suit, the judgment that is thus rendered requiring its payment of the award determined as just
compensation for the condemned property as a condition precedent to the transfer to the title thereto in its favor, cannot be realized
upon execution. The legislature must first appropriate the amount, over and above the provisional deposit, that may be necessary to pay
the award determined in the judgment, since the government cannot keep the land and dishonor the judgment.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Deposit of government funds in PNB under a current account subject to withdmival by check; Effect.—All
government funds deposited with PNB by any agency or instrumentality of the government, whether by way of general or special deposit,
remain government funds, since such government agencies or instrumentalities do not have any nonpublic or private funds of their own.
They are not subject to garnishment or levy; even assuming that the funds become commingled with other funds of the bank, this does
not remove the character of the funds as a credit representing government funds thus deposited.

Same; Same; Same; Practice of appointing “special sher-iffs” for service of writs of execution not authorized by law.—The general practice
of lower courts of appointing “special sher-iffs” for the service of writs of execution is unauthorized by law. The duty of executing all
processes of the courts in civil cases, particularly, writs of execution, devolves upon the sheriff or his deputies, under Section 183 of the
Revised Administrative Code and Rule 39, Section 8 of the Rules of Court. Unlike the service of summons which may be mafle, aside
from the sheriff or other proper court officers, “for special reasons by any person especially authorized by the judge of the court issuing
the summons” under Rule 14, Section 5 of the Rules of Court,, the law requires that the responsibility of serving writs of execu-tion,
which involve the taking delivery of money or property in trust for the judgment creditor, should be carried out by regularly bonded
sheriffs or other proper court officers.(Sections 183 and 330, Revised Administrative Code.) The bond required by law of the sheriff is
conditioned inter alia “for the delivery or payment to the Government, or the persons entitled thereto, of alf the property or sums of
money that shall officially come into his or their (deputies’) hands” (Section 330, idem.), and thus avoids the risk of embezzlement of
such properties and moneys. Section 185 of the Revised Administrative Code restrictively authorizes the judge of the court issuing: the
process or writ to deputize some suitable person only when the sheriff is party to any action or proceeding or is otherwise incompetent
to serve process therein.” The only other contingency provided by law is when the office of sheriff is vacant, and the judge is then
authorized, “in case of emergency, to make a temporary appointment to the office of sheriff x x x’pending the appoint ment and
qualification of the sheriff in due course; and he may appoint the deputy clerk of the court or other officer in the government service to
act in said capacity.” (Sec. 189, idem.)

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari and prohibition.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Paredes, Poblador, Nazareno, Abada & Tomacruz for respondent Judge Lourdes P. San Diego.
Jesus B. Santos for respondent Testate estate of N. T. Hashim.
Jose A. Buendia for respondent Manuela C. Florendo.
Emata, Magkawas & Associates for respondent legal heir Jose H. Hashim.
Alberto 0. Villaraza for respondents Estate of N.T. Hashim and Tomas N. Hashim.
Conrado E. Medina for respondent Philippine National Bank.
Benjamin V. Coruna for and in his own behalf.

TEEHANKEE, J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, the Court declares null and void the two questioned orders of respondent Court
levying upon funds of petitioner Bureau of Public Highways on deposit with the Philippine National Bank, by virtue of the fundamental
precept that government funds are not subject to execution or garnishment.

The background facts follow:

On or about November 20, 1940, the Government of the Philippines filed a complaint for eminent domain in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal1 for the expropriation of a parcel of land belonging to N. T. Hashim, with an area of 14,934 square meters, needed to construct
a public road, now known as Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. On November 25, 1940, the Government took possession of the property
upon deposit with the City Treasurer of the sum of P23,413.64 fixed by the Court therein as the provisional value of all the lots needed
to construct the road, including Hashim’s property. The records of the expropriation case were destroyed and lost during the second
world war, and neither party took any step thereafter to reconstitute the proceedings.

In 1958, however, the estate of N.T. Hashim, deceased, through its Judicial Administrator, Tomas N. Hashim, filed a money claim with
the Quezon City Engineer’s Office in the sum of P522,620.00, alleging said amount to be the fair market value of the property in question,
now already converted and used as a public highway. Netting having come out of its claim, respondent estate filed on August 6, 1963,
with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, assigned to Branch IX, presided by respondent judge,2 a complaint for the
recovery of the fair market price of the said property in the sum of P672,030.00 against the Bureau of Public Highways, which complaint
was amended on August 26, 1963, to include as additional defendants, the Auditor General and the City Engineer of Quezon City.3

The issues were joined in the case with the filing by then Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz of the State’s answer, stating that the Hashim
estate was entitled only to the sum of P3,203.00 as the fair market value of the property at the time that the State took possession
thereof on November 25. 1940, with legal interest thereon at 6% per annum, and that said amount had been available and tendered by
petitioner Bureau since 1958. The parties thereafter worked out a compromise agreement, respondent estate having proposed on April
28, 1966, a payment of P14.00 per sq. m. for its 14,934 sq.m.-parcel of land or the total amount of P209,076,00, equivalent to the land’s
total assessed value,4 which was confirmed, ratified and approved in November, 1966 by the Commissioner of Public Highways and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications. On November 7, 1966, the Compromise Agreement subscribed by counsel for respondent
estate and by then Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, now a member of this Court, was submitted to the lower Court and under date
of November 8, 1966, respondent judge, as prayed for, rendered judgment approving the Compromise Agreement and ordering
petitioners, as defendants therein, to pay respondent estate as plaintiff therein, the total sum of P209,076.00 for the expropriated lot.

On October 10, 1968, respondent estate filed with the lower Court a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, alleging that petitioners
had failed to satisfy the judgment in its favor. It further filed on October 12, 1968, an ex-parte motion for the appointment of respondent
Benjamin Garcia as special sheriff to serve the writ of execution. No opposition having been filed by the Solicitor General’s office to the
motion for execution at the hearing thereof on October 12, 1968, respondent judge, in an order dated October 14, 1968, granted both
motions.

On the same date, October 14. 1968, respondent Garcia, as special sheriff, forthwith served a Notice of Garnishment, together with the
writ of execution dated October 14, 1968, issued by respondent Manuela C. Florendo as Deputy Clerk of Court, on respondent Philippine
National Bank, notifying said bank that levy was thereby made upon funds of petitioners Bureau of Public Highways and the Auditor
General on deposit, with the bank to cover the judgment of P209,076.00 in favor of respondent estate, and requesting the bank to reply
to the garnishment within five days. On October 16, 1968, three days before the expiration of the five-day deadline, respondent Benjamin
V. Coruña in his capacity as Chief, Documentation Staff, of respondent bank’s Legal Department, allegedly acting in excess of his authority
and without the knowledge and consent of the Board of Directors and other ranking officials of respondent bank, replied to the notice of
garnishment that in compliance therewith, the bank was holding the amount of P209,076.00 from the account of petitioner Bureau of
Public Highways. Respondent bank alleged that when it was served with Notice to Deliver Money signed by respondent Garcia, as special
sheriff, on October 17, 1968, it sent a letter to the officials of the Bureau of Public Highways notifying them of the notice of garnishment.

Under date of October 16, 1968, respondent estate further filed with the lower Court*an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an order
ordering respondent bank to release and deliver to the special sheriff, respondent Garcia, the garnished amount of P209,076.00 deposited
under the account of petitioner Bureau, which motion was granted by respondent judge in an order of October 18, 1968. On the same
day, October 18, 1968, respondent Coruña, allegedly taking advantage of his position, authorized the issuance of a cashier’s check of
the bank in the amount of P209,076.00, taken out of the funds of petitioner Bureau deposited in current account with the bank and paid
the same to respondent estate, without notice to said petitioner.

Later on December 20, 1968, petitioners, through then Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, wrote respondent bank complaining that the
bank acted precipitately in having delivered such a substantial amount to the special sheriff without affording petitioner Bureau a
reasonable time to contest the validity of the garnishment, notwithstanding the bank’s being charged with legal knowledge that
government funds are exempt from execution or garnishment, and demanding that the bank credit the said petitioner’s account in the
amount of P209,076.00, which the bank had allowed to be illegally garnished. Respondent bank replied on January 6, 1969 that it was
not liable for the said garnishment of government funds, alleging that it was not for the bank to decide the question of legality of the
garnishment order and that much as it wanted to wait until it heard from the Bureau of Public Highways, it was “helpless to refuse
delivery under th§ teeth” of the special order of October 18, 1968, directing immediate delivery of the garnished amount.

Petitioners therefore filed on January 28, 1969 the present action against respondents, in their capacities as above stated in the title of
this case, praying for judgment declaring void the question orders of respondent Court. Petitioners also sought the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction for the immedate reimbursement of the garnished sum of P209,076.00, constituting funds of petitioner
Bureau on deposit with the Philippine National Bank as official depository of Philippine Government funds, to the said petitioner’s account
with the bank, so as to forestall the dissipation of said funds, which the government had allocated to its public highways and infrastructure
projects. The Court ordered on January 31. 1969 the issuance of the writ against the principal respondents solidarity, including respondent
judge therein so that she would take forthwith all the necessary measures and processes to compel the immediate return of the said
government funds to petitioner Bureau’s account with respondent bank.5

In compliance with the writ, respondent bank restored the garnished sum of P209,076.00 to petitioner Bureau’s account with it.6 The
primary responsibility for the reimbursement of said amount to petitioner Bureau’s account with the respondent bank, however, rested
solely on respondent estate, since it is the judgment creditor that received the amount upon the questioned execution.

Strangely enough, as appears now from respondent bank’s memorandum in lieu of oral argument7 what respondent bank did, acting
through respondent Coruna as its counsel, was not to ask respondent estate to remburse it in turn in the same amount, but to file with
the probate court with jurisdiction over respondent estate,8 a motion for the estate to deposit the said amount with it, purportedly in
compliance with the writ. Respondent estate thereupon deposited with respondent bank as a savings account the sum of P125,446.00,
on which the bank presumably would pay the usual interest, besides. As to the balance of !P83,630.00, this sum had been in the interval
paid as attorney’s fees to Atty. Jesus B. Santos, counsel for the estate, by the administrator, allegedly without authority of the probate
court.9 Accordingly, respondent estate has not reimbursed the respondent bank either as to this last amount, and the bank has
complacently not taken any steps in the lower court to require such reimbursement.

The ancillary questions now belatedly raised by the State may readily be disposed of. Petitioners may not invoke the State’s immunity
from suit, since the case below was but a continuation in effect of the pre-war expropriation proceedings instituted by the State itself.
The expropriation of the property, which now forms part of Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, is a fait accompli and is not questioned by
the respondent estate. The only question at issue was the amount of the just compensation due to respondent estate in payment of the
expropriated property, which properly pertained to the jurisdiction of the lower court.10 It is elementary that in expropriation proceedings,
the State precisely submits to the Court’s jurisdiction and asks the Court to affirm its lawful right to take the property sought to be
expropriated for the public use or purpose described in its complaint and to determine the amount of just compensation to be paid
therefor.
Neither may the State impugn the validity of the compromise agreement executed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State with
the approval of the proper government officials, on the ground that it was executed only by the lawyer of respondent estate, without
any showing of having been specially authorized to bind the estate thereby, because such alleged lack of authority may be questioned
only by the principal or client, and respondent estate as such principal has on the contrary confirmed and ratified the compromise
agreement.11 As a matter of fact, the Solicitor General, in representation of the State, makes in the petition no prayer for the annulment
of the compromise agreement or of the respondent court’s decision approving the same.

On the principal issue, the Court holds that respondent Court’s two questioned orders (1) for execution of the judgment, in pursuance
whereof respondent deputy clerk issued the corresponding writ of execution and respondent special sheriff issued the notice of
garnishment, and (2) for delivery of the garnished amount of P209,076.00 to respondent estate as judgment creditor through respondent
special sheriff, are null and void on the fundamental ground that government funds are not subject to execution or garnishment.
1. As early as 1919, the Court has pointed out that although the Government, as plaintiff in expropriation proceedings, submits itself to
the jurisdiction of the Court and thereby waives its immunity from suit, the judgment that is thus rendered requiring its payment of the
award determined as just compensation for the condemned property as a condition precedent to the transfer to the title thereto in its
favor, cannot be realized upon execution.12

The Court there added that it is incumbent upon the legislature to appropriate any additional amount, over and above the provisional
deposit, that may be necessary to pay the award determined in the judgment, since the Government cannot keep the land and dishonor
the judgment.

In another early case, where the government by an act of the Philippine Legislature, expressly consented to be sued by the plaintiff in
an action for damages and waived its immunity from suit, the Court adjudged the Government as not being legally liable on the complaint,
since the State under our laws would be liable only for torts caused by its special agents, specially commissioned to carry out the acts
complained of outside of such agents’ regular duties. We held that the plaintiff would have to look to the legislature for another legislative
enactment and appropriation of sufficient funds, if the Government intended itself to be legally liable only for the damages sustained by
plaintiff as a result of the negligent act of one of its employees.13

The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit
claimant’s action “only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution” and that the power of the Courts ends
when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed
or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

Thus, as pointed out by the Court in Belleng vs. Republic,14 while the State has given its consent to be sued in compensation cases, the
pauper-claimant therein must look specifically to the Compensation Guarantee Fund provided by the Workmen’s Compensation Act for
the corresponding disbursement in satisfaction of his claim, since the State in Act 3083, the general law waiving its immunity from suit
“upon any money claim involving liability arising from contract express or implied,” imposed the limitation in Sec. 7 thereof that “no
execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of the (Philippines) under the provisions of this
Act;” and that otherwise, the claimant would have to prosecute his money claim against the State under Commonwealth Act 327.

This doctrine was again stressed by the Court in Republic vs. Palacio,15 setting aside as null and void the order of garnishment issued by
the sheriff pursuant to the lower Court’s writ of execution on funds of the Pump Irrigation Trust Fund in the account of the Government’s
Irrigation Service Unit with the Philippine National Bank. The Court emphasized then and re-emphasizes now that judgments against the
State or its agencies and instrumentalities in cases where the State has consented to be sued, operate merely to liquidate and establish
the plaintiff’s claim; such judgments may not be enforced by writs of execution or garnishment and it is for the legislature to provide for
their payment through the corresponding appropriation, as indicated in Act 3083.

2. Respondent bank and its Chief, Documentation Staff, respondent Coruña, have advanced two specious arguments to justify their
wrongful delivery of the garnished public funds to respondent estate. Their first contention that the said government funds by reason of
their being deposited by petitioner Bureau under a current account subject to withdrawal by check, instead of being deposited as special
trust funds, “lost their kind and character as government funds,”16 is untenable. As the official depositary of the Philippine Government,
respondent bank and its officials should be the first ones to know that all government funds deposited with it by any agency or
instrumentality of the government, whether by way of general or special deposit, remain government funds, since such government
agencies or instrumentalities do not have any non-public or private funds of their own.

Their second contention that said government funds lost their character as such “the moment they were deposited with the respondent
bank”,17 since the relation between a depositor and a depository bank is that of creditor and debtor, is just as untenable, absolutely. Said
respondents shockingly ignore the fact that said government funds were deposited with respondent bank as the official depositary of the
Philippine Government. Assuming for the nonce the creation of such relationship of creditor and debtor, petitioner Bureau thereby held
a credit against respondent bank whose obligation as debtor was to pay upon demand of said petitioner-creditor the public funds thus
deposited with it; even though title to the deposited funds passes to the bank under this theory since the funds become mingled with
other funds which the bank may employ in its ordinary business, what was garnished was not the bank’s own funds but the credit of
petitioner bureau against the bank to receive payment of its funds, as a consequence of which respondent bank delivered to respondent
estate the garnished amount of P209,076.00 belonging to said petitioner, Petitioner bureau’s credit against respondent bank thereby
never lost its character as a credit representing government funds thus deposited. The moment the payment is made by respondent
bank on such deposit, what it pays out represents the public funds thus deposited which are not garnishable and may be expended only
for their legitimate objects as authorized by the corresponding legislative appropriation. Neither respondent bank nor respondent Coruña
are the duly authorized disbursing officers and auditors of the Government to authorize and cause payment of the public funds of
petitioner Bureau for the benefit or private persons, as they wrongfully did in this case.

3. Respondents bank and Coruña next pretend that refusal on their part to obey respondent judge’s order to deliver the garnished
amount, “which is valid and binding unless annulled, would have exposed them for contempt of court.”18 They make no excuse for not
having asked the lower court for time and opportunity to consult petitioner Bureau or the Solicitor General with regard to the garnishment
and execution of said deposited public funds which were allocated to specific government projects, or for not having simply replied to
the sheriff that what they held on deposit for petitioner Bureau were non-garnishabie government funds. They have not given any cogent
reason or explanation,—charged as they were with knowledge of the nullity of the writ of execution and notice of garnishment against
government funds, for in the earlier case of Republic vs. Palacio, supra, they had then prudently and timely notified the proper government
officials of the attempted levy on the funds of the Irrigation Service Unit deposited with it, thus enabling the Solicitor General to take the
corresponding action to annul the garnishment—for their failure to follow the same prudent course in this case. Indeed, the Court is
appalled at the improper haste and lack of circumspection with which respondent Coruña and other responsible officials of respondent
bank precipitately allowed the garnishment and delivery of the large amount involved, all within the period of just four days, even before
the expiration of the five-day reglementary period to reply to the sheriff’s notice of garnishment. Failure on the State’s part to oppose
the issuance of the writ of execution, which was patently null and void as an execution against government funds, could not relieve them
of their own responsibility,

4. Respondents bank and Coruña further made common cause with respondent estate beyond the legal issues that should solely concern
them, by reason of their having wrongfully allowed the garnishment and delivery of government funds, instead assailing petitioners for
not having come to court with “clean hands” and asserting that in fairness, justice and equity, petitioners should not impede, obstruct or
in any way delay the payment of just compensation to the land owners for their property that was occupied way back in 1940. This
matter of payment of respondent estate’s judgment credit is of no concern to them as custcfdian and depositary of the public funds
deposited with them, whereby they are charged with the obligation of assuring that the funds are not illegally or wrongfully paid out.

Since they have gone into the records of the expropriation case, then it should be noted that they should have considered the vital fact
that at the time that the compromise agreement therein was executed in November, 1966, respondent estate was well aware of the fact
that the funds for the payment of the property in the amount of P209,076.00 still had to be released by the Budget Commissioner and
that at the time of the garnishment, respondent estate was still making the necessary representations for the corresponding release of
such amount, pursuant to the Budget Commissioner’s favorable recommendation.19 And with regard to the merits of the case, they should
have likewise considered that respondent estate could have no complaint against the fair attitude of the authorities in not having insisted
on their original stand in their answer that respondent estate was entitled only to the sum of P3,203.00 as the fair market value of the
property at the time the State took possession thereof on November 25, 1940, with legal interests thereon, but rather agreed to pay
therefor the greatly revised and increased amount of P209,076.00 at P14.00 per square meter, not to mention the consequential benefits
derived by said respondent from the construction of the public highway with the resultant enhanced value of its remaining properties in
the area.

5. The manner in which respondent bank’s counsel and officials proceeded to comply with the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
issued by the Court commanding respondent estate, its judicial administrator and respondents bank and Coruña, in solidum, to reimburse
forthwith the account of petitioner Bureau in the garnished amount of P209.076.00, does not speak well of their fidelity to the bank’s
interests. For while respondent bank had restored with its own funds the said amount of P209,076.00 to petitioner Bureau’s account, it
has not required respondent estate as the party primarily liable therefor as the recipient of the garnished amount to reimburse it in turn
in this same amount. Rather, said bank officials have allowed respondent estate to keep all this time the whole amount of P209,076.00
wrongfully garnished by it. For as stated above, respondent bank allowed respondent estate merely to deposit with it as a savings
account, of respondent estate, the lesser sum of P125,446.00 on which the bank presumably has paid and continues paying respondent
estate, besides the usual interest rates on such savings accounts, and neither has it taken any steps to require reimbursement to it from
respondent estate of the remainder of P83.630.00 which respondent estate of its own doing and responsibility paid by way of attorney’s
fees.

It thus appears that all this time, respondent bank has not been reimbursed by respondent estate as the party primarily liable for the
whole amount of P209,076.00 wrongfully and illegally garnished and received by respondent estate. This grave breach of trust and
dereliction of duty on the part of respondent bank’s officials should be brought to the attention of respondent bank’s Board of Directors
and management for the appropriate administrative action and other remedial action for the bank to recover the damages it has been
made to incur thereby.

6. The Solicitor General has likewise questioned the legality of respondent Court’s Order of October 14, 1968, appointing respondent
Garcia as “special sheriff” for the purpose of effecting service of the writ of execution, simply on respondent estate’s representation that
it was desirable “for a speedy enforcement of the writ.”

The Court finds this general practice of the lower courts of appointing “special sheriffs” for the service of writs of execution to be
unauthorized by law. The duty of “executing all processes” of the courts in civil cases, particularly, writs of execution, devolves upon the
sheriff or his deputies, under Section 188 of the Revised Administrative Code and Rule 89, section 8 of the Rules of Court. Unlike the
service of summons which may be made, aside from the sheriff or other proper court officers, “for special reasons by any person especially
authorized by the judge of the court issuing the summons” under Rule 14, section 5 of the Rules of Court, the law requires that the
responsibility of serving writs of execution, which involve the taking delivery of money or property in trust for the judgment creditor,
should be carried out by regularly bonded sheriffs or other proper court officers, (Sections 183 and 330, Revised Administrative Code).
The bond required by law of the sheriff is conditioned inter alia, “for the delivery or payment to the Government, or the persons entitled
thereto, of all the property or sums of money that shall officially come into his or their (his deputies’) hands” (Section 330, idem), and
thus avoids the risk of embezzlement of such properties and moneys.

Section 185 of the Revised Administrative Code restrictively authorizes the judge of the Court issuing the process or writ to deputize
some suitable person only “when the sheriff is party to any action or proceeding or is otherwise incompetent to serve process therein.”
The only other contingency provided by law is when the office of sheriff is vacant, and the judge is then authorized, “in case of emergency,
(to) make a temporary appointment to the office of sheriff xxx pending the appointment and qualification of the sheriff in due course;
and he may appoint the deputy clerk of the court or other officer in the government service to act in said capacity.” (Section 189, idem).
None of the above contingencies having been shown to be present, respondent Court’s order appointing respondent Garcia as “special
sheriff” to serve the writ of execution was devoid of authority.

7. No civil liability attaches, however, to respondents special sheriff and deputy clerk, since they acted strictly pursuant to orders issued
by respondent judge in the discharge of her judicial functions as presiding judge of the lower court, and respondent judge’s immunity
from civil responsibility covers them, although the said orders are herein declared null and void.20

ACCORDINGLY, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted. The respondent court’s questioned Orders of October 14, and
18, 1968, are declared null and void, and all further proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-7441 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City, Branch IX are abated. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction heretofore issued is made permanent, except as to respondent
judge who is excluded therefrom, without prejudice to any cause of action that private respondents may have, inter se. Respondent
estate and respondent Tomas N. Hashim as prayed for by respondent Philippine National Bank in its Answer, are ordered jointly and
severally to reimburse said respondent bank in the amount of P209,076.00 with legal interest until the date of actual reimbursement
Respondents Estate of N. T. Hashim, Philippine National Bank and Benjamin Coruña are ordered jointly to pay treble costs.

The Clerk of Court is directed to furnish copies of this decision to the Board of Directors and to the president of respondent Philippine
National Bank for their information and appropriate action. So ordered.
 Concepcion, CJ., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando and Villamor. JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.
Writs granted.

ANNOTATION EASEMENT

1. Meaning of “Formal Act”

Meaning of “Formal Act” in Article 538, Spanish Civil Code.—The “Formal Act” required in Article 538 of the Spanish Civil Code, by which
the owner of the dominant estate, in order to effectively establish a negative easement, should forbid the owner of the servient estate
to perform any act which would be lawful without the easement, refers to an instrument acknowledged before a notary public. That this
is the intendment of the law although not expressed in exact language is the reason for the clarification made in Article 621 of the new
Civil Code, which specifically requires the prohibition to be in “an instrument acknowledged before a notary public.” Cid vs. Javier, 108
Phil. 850.

2. Right of Way
A personal servitude does not inure to the benefit of tht successor-in-interest of the former owner of the dominant estate.—Under the
court order, the right of way granted was expressly limited to the plaintiffs and their “family, friends, drivers, servants and jeeps/’ The
right acquired by plaintiffs, therefore, was a personal servitude under Article 614 of the Civil Code and not a predial servitude that inures
to the benefit of whoever owns the dominant estate. Hence, the refusal of the defendants to extend the said easement to the plaintiffs’
successors-in-interest was not a defiance of the court order, since they had no right thereunder, Jabonete vs. Monteverde, 16 SCRA 462.

Preliminary injunction cannot be granted where the conditions for granting the writ have not been established.—The Central’s right
to use the railway across the lands of respondent subdivision expired with its milling contract, i.e., on 30 September 1965. From that
date the Central had to rely strictly on its being entitled to a compulsory right of way under the Civil Code, and it could not claim any
such Servitude without first establishing the pre-conditions for its grant fixed by the said Code, namely, (1) that it Is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Article 649, par. 1); (2) that proper indemnity has been paid (Art 649, Par.
I, end); (3) that the isolation was not due to the Central’s own acts (Art, 649, last par.); and (4) that the right of way claimed Is “at the
point least prejudicial to the servient estates; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest” (Art. 650). The burden of proof was on the Central to show that all the foregoing statutory pre-
conditions exist, and having failed in this regard, the issuance of a preliminary injunction became improvident and arbitrary, for the first
condition for the granting of the writ are “that plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded” (Sec. 3[a], Rule 58, Revised Rules of Court),
and “that the complaint in the action is verified, and shows facts entitling the plaintiff to the relief demanded.” (Sec. 4[a], Rule 58).
Bacolod-Murcia Milting Co.9 Inc. vs. Capitol Subdivision, Inc., 17 SCRA 731.

3. Light and View

Effect of failure to have the easement annotated on the certificate of title.—Granting that in the instant case an easement of light and
view was. acquired by prescription, it was cut off or extinguished by the registration of the servient estate under the Torrens System
without the easement being annotated on the corresponding certificate of title, pursuant to Section 39 of the Land Registration Act. Cid
vs. Javier, 108 Phil. 850.

Two adjoining estates formerly owned by one person.—-Where two adjoining estates were formerly owned by just one person who
introduced improvements on both such that the wall of the house constructed in the first estate extends to the wall of the camarin on
the second estate: and at the time of the sale of the f irst estate, there existed on the aforementioned wall of the house, doors and
windows which serve 33 passages for light and view, there being no provision in the deed of sale that the easement of light and view
will no* be established, the case is covered by Article 624, New Civil Code, which provides that the existence of an apparent sign of
easement between two estates established by the proprietor of both, shall be considered, if one of them is alienated, as a title so that
the easement will continue actively and passively, unless at the time the ownership of the estate is divided, the contrary is stated in the
deed of alienation of either of them, or the sign is made to disappear before the instrument is executed. The existence of the doors and
windows on the aforesaid wall of the house is equivalent to a title, for the visible and permanent sign of an easement is the title that
characterizes its existence. But while the law declares that the easement is to “continue”, the easement actually arises for the first time
only upon alienation of either estate, inasmuch as before that time there is no easement to speak of, there being but one owner of both
estates, (Article 613, New Civil Code). Gargantos vs. Tan Yanon, 108 Phil. 888.)

4. Extinguishment
How easements are extinguished.—Easements are extinguished: (a) By non-user for ten years; with respect to discontinuous easements,
this period shall be computed from the day on which they ceased to be used; and, with respect to continuous easements, from the day
on which an act contrary to the same took place; and (b) When either or both of the estates fall into such condition that the easement
cannot be used; but it shall revive if the subsequent condition of the estates or either of them should again permit its use, unless when
the use becomes possible; sufficient time for prescription has elapsed, in accordance with the provisions of the preceding number, xxx
(Art. 631, Nos. 2 and 8, Civil Code.) Benedicto vs. Court of Appeals, 25 SCRA 145.

Where easement is perpetual in character.—The easement in the case at bar is perpetual in character and was annotated on all the
transfer certificates of title issued in the series of transfers from Hedrick through to the respondent Heras, and in the transfer certificates
of title issued in the series of transfers from Recto through to the petitioner Benedicto. Since there is no evidence that would point a
mutual agreement between any of the predecessors-in-interest of the respondent nor between the petitioner, and the respondent
themselves with respect to the discontinuance or obliteration of the easement annotated on the titles, the continued existence of the
easement must be upheld and respected.

The fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as
a property right, which survives the termination of the necessity (Valicenti vs. Schultz, 209 N.Y.S. 2d. S3). Benedicto vs. Court of Appeals,
25 SCRA 145.—ATTY. JULIANA B. DE CASTRO.

Notes.—(a) Public property exempt from execution or garnishment.—The following, being public property, may not be executed or
garnished: (1) property held by municipal corporations for public use (such as municipal fisheries and waters and the usufruct thereof)
or which is necessary for governmental purposes (Paoay vs. Manaois, L-3485, June 30, 1950, 47 O.G. No. 12 Supp. 244); (2) the salary
due to a government employee before being paid to him (Director of Commerce & Industry vs. Concepcion, 43 Phil. 384).

(b) Who may act as sheriff.—Local chiefs of police are deputy sheriffs ex officio (De Borja vs. Borja,