SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 162218. February 25, 2010.]

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs.

EDGARDO D. VIRAY, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J :p

The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the
Decision 2 dated 21 August 2003 and Resolution 3 dated 13 February 2004 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 43926, which reversed the
Decision 4 dated 21 September 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental, Branch 23, in Civil Case No. 91-309.
The Facts
On 7 July 1979, Rico Shipping, Inc., represented by its President, Erlinda
Viray-Jarque, together with respondent Edgardo D. Viray (Viray), in their own
personal capacity and as solidary obligors (the three parties collectively known
as the debtors), obtained two separate loans from petitioner Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company (MBTC) in the total amount of P250,000. The debtors
executed a promissory note promising to pay in four semi-annual installments
of P62,500 starting on 23 January 1980, with 15% interest and 2% credit
evaluation and supervision fee perannum. The two loans were subsequently
renewed and secured by one promissory note. Under the note, the debtors
made a total payment of P134,054 leaving a balance of P115,946 which
remained unpaid despite demands by MBTC.
On 5 June 1981, the debtors executed another promissory note and
obtained a loan from MBTC in the amount of P50,000, payable on 2 November
1981, with 16% interest and 2% credit evaluation and supervision fee
per annum. On the due date, the debtors again failed to pay the loan despite
demands to pay by MBTC. CIDaTc

On 3 September 1981, the debtors obtained a third loan from MBTC in

the amount of P50,000 payable on 14 November 1981, with 16% interest and
2% credit evaluation and supervision fee per annum. Again, the debtors failed
and refused to pay on due date.
MBTC filed a complaint for sum of money against the debtors with the
RTC of Manila, Branch 4. 5 On 28 April 1983, the RTC of Manila rendered a
judgment in favor of MBTC. 6 The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants to pay
jointly and severally plaintiff the following:
I — On the first cause of action:
(a) The sum of P50,000 with interest thereon at the rate of 16%
per annum from date of filing of the complaint until fully paid;
(b) The sum equivalent to 1% per month of the principal obligation
as penalty charge, computed likewise from the filing of the
complaint;
II — On the second cause of action:
(a) The sum of P50,000 with interest thereon at the rate of 16%
per annum from date of filing of the complaint until fully paid;
(b) The sum equivalent to 1% per month of the principal sum as
penalty charge, computed from date of filing of the complaint;
III — On the third cause of action:
(a) The sum of P115,946.00 with interest thereon at the rate of 1%
per annum from date of filing of the complaint until fully paid;
(b) The sum equivalent to 1% per month of the sum of P115,946.00
as penalty charge, computed from date of filing of the complaint;
IV —
(1) The sum of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(2) To pay the costs of suit. HICEca

SO ORDERED.
Meanwhile, on 29 December 1982, the government issued Free Patents
in favor of Viray over three parcels of land (lots) designated as (1) Lot No.
26275, Cad-237 with an area of 500 square meters; (2) Lot No. 26276, Cad-
237, with an area of 888 square meters; and (3) Lot No. 26277, Cad-237 with
an area of 886 square meters, all situated in Barangay Bulua, Cagayan de Oro
City, Misamis Oriental. Original Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos. P-2324, P-2325
and P-2326 were issued covering Free Patent Nos. [X-1] 10525, [X-1] 10526
and [X-1] 10527, respectively.
 The OCT's containing the free patents were registered with the Registry
of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City on 18 January 1983. Written across the face
of the OCT's were the following:
. . . To have and to hold said tract of land, with the appurtenances
thereunto of right belonging unto the said EDGARDO D. VIRAY and to his
heirs and assigns forever, subject to the provisions of Sections 118, 119,
121 as amended by P.D. No. 763, 122 and 124 ofCommonwealth Act No.
141, as amended, which provide that except in favor of the Government
or any of its branches, units or institutions, the land thereby acquired shall
be inalienable and shall not be subject to encumbrance for a period of five
(5) years from the date of this patent, and shall not be liable for the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period . .
..7
On 6 March 1984, the RTC of Manila issued a writ of execution over the
lots owned by Viray. On 12 October 1984, pursuant to the writ of execution, the
City Sheriff of Cagayan de Oro sold the lots at public auction in favor of MBTC
as the winning bidder. The next day, the sheriff issued a Certificate of Sale to
MBTC. 8
On 23 August 1990, the sheriff executed a Deed of Final Conveyance to
MBTC. The Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City cancelled OCT Nos. P-
2324, P-2325 and P-2326 and issued in MBTC's name Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) Nos. T-59171, T-59172 and T-59173, 9 respectively.
On 30 July 1991, Viray filed an action for annulment of sale against the
sheriff and MBTC with the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental,
Branch 23. 10 Viray sought the declaration of nullity of the execution sale, the
sheriff's certificate of sale, the sheriff's deed of final conveyance and the TCT's
issued by the Register of Deeds.
On 21 September 1993, the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City rendered its
decision in favor of MBTC. 11 The dispositive portion states: CaDSHE

Wherefore, based on facts and jurisprudence, the Auction Sale by the

Sheriff of the then lots of plaintiff covered by [free] patents to satisfy the
judgment in favor of Defendant Bank is considered valid. While plaintiff
had until April 2, 1991 to redeem the property, the former never attempted
to show interest in redeeming the properties, and therefore such right has
prescribed. Defendant Bank therefore is declared as the lawful transferee
of the three (3) lots now covered by Titles in the name of Defendant Bank.
SO ORDERED. 12
Viray filed an appeal with the CA alleging that the RTC of Cagayan de
Oro City committed reversible error in ruling solely on the issue of redemption
instead of the issue of validity of the auction sale, being the lis mota 13 of the
action.
 The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 21 August 2003, the appellate court reversed the decision of the RTC
of Cagayan de Oro City. The CA ruled that the auction sale conducted by the
sheriff was null and void ab initio since the sale was made during the five-year
prohibition period in violation of Section 118 ofCommonwealth Act No. 141 (CA
141) or the Public Land Act. The dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the decision
appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and plaintiff-appellant Edgardo
Viray is declared entitled to the return and possession of the three (3)
parcels of land covered by O.C.T. Nos. P-2324, P-2325 and P-2326,
without prejudice to his continuing obligation to pay the judgment debt,
and expenses connected therewith.
Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City is ordered to
cancel TCT Nos. T-59171, T-59172 and T-59173 in the name of
defendant-appellee Metrobank, and to restore O.C.T. Nos. P-2324, P-
2325 and P-2326 in the name of plaintiff-appellant Edgardo Viray.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 14
MBTC filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in a
Resolution dated 13 February 2004.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The main issue is whether the auction sale falls within the five-year
prohibition period laid down in Section 118 of CA 141. IaCHTS

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.
Petitioner MBTC insists that the five-year prohibition period against the
alienation or sale of the property provided in Section 118 of CA 141does not
apply to an obligation contracted before the grant or issuance of the free patent
or homestead. The alienation or sale stated in the law pertains to voluntary
sales and not to "forced" or execution sales.
Respondent Viray, on the other hand, maintains that the express
prohibition in Section 118 of CA 141 does not qualify or distinguish whether the
debt was contracted prior to the date of the issuance of the free patent or within
five years following the date of such issuance. Further, respondent asserts that
Section 118 of CA 141 absolutely prohibits any and all sales, whether voluntary
or not, of lands acquired under free patent or homestead, made within the five-
year prohibition period.
 Section 118 of CA 141 states:
Sec. 118.Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units,
or instruction, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions
shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the
approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the
date of issuance of the patent and grant, nor shall they become liable to
the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period,
but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged
to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years
and before twenty-five years after issuance of title shall be valid without
the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which
approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds.
The law clearly provides that lands which have been acquired under free
patent or homestead shall not be encumbered or alienated within five years
from the date of issuance of the patent or be liable for the satisfaction of any
debt contracted prior to the expiration of the period.
In the present case, the three loans were obtained on separate dates —
7 July 1979, 5 June 1981 and 3 September 1981, or several years before the
free patents on the lots were issued by the government to respondent on 29
December 1982. The RTC of Manila, in a Decision dated 28 April 1983, ruled
in favor of petitioner ordering the debtors, including respondent, to pay jointly
and severally certain amounts of money. The public auction conducted by the
sheriff on the lots owned by respondent occurred on 12 October 1984.
For a period of five years or from 29 December 1982 up to 28 December
1987, Section 118 of CA 141 provides that the lots comprising the free patents
shall not be made liable for the payment of any debt until the period of five years
expires. In this case, the execution sale of the lots occurred less than two years
after the date of the issuance of the patents. This clearly falls within the five-
year prohibition period provided in the law, regardless of the dates when the
loans were incurred. TcaAID

In Artates v. Urbi, 15 we held that a civil obligation cannot be enforced

against, or satisfied out of, the sale of the homestead lot acquired by the
patentee less than five years before the obligation accrued even if the sale is
involuntary. For purposes of complying with the law, it is immaterial that the
satisfaction of the debt by the encumbrance or alienation of the land grant was
made voluntarily, as in the case of an ordinary sale, or involuntarily, such as
that effected through levy on the property and consequent sale at public
auction. In both instances, the law would have been violated.
 Likewise, in Beach v. Pacific Commercial Company and Sheriff of Nueva
Ecija, 16 we held that to subject the land to the satisfaction of debts would violate
Section 116 of Act No. 2874 (now Section 118 of CA 141).
As correctly observed by the CA in the present case:
It is argued by defendant-appellee, however, that the debt referred to in
the law must have been contracted within the five-year prohibitory period;
any debt contracted before or after the five-year prohibitory period is
definitely not covered by the law. This argument is weakest on two points.
Firstly, because the provision of law does not say that the debt referred to
therein should be contracted before the five-year prohibitory period
but before the "expiration" of the five-year prohibitory period. (Defendant-
appellee deliberately omitted the word "expiration" to suit its defense.)
This simply means that it is not material whether the debt is contracted
before the five-year prohibitory period; what is material is that the debt
must be contracted before or prior to the expiration of the five-year
prohibitory period from the date of the issuance and approval of the patent
or grant. . . .
And secondly, while it is true that the debt in this case was contracted prior
to the five-year prohibitory period, the same is of no consequence, for as
held in Artates vs. Urbi, supra, such indebtedness has to be reckoned
from the date said obligation was adjudicated and decreed by the court. .
. . 17
It must be emphasized that the main purpose in the grant of a free patent
or homestead is to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that
portion of public land which the State has given to him so he may have a place
to live with his family and become a happy citizen and a useful member of the
society. 18 In Jocson v. Soriano, 19 we held that the conservation of a family
home is the purpose of homestead laws. The policy of the state is to foster
families as the foundation of society, and thus promote general welfare. The
sentiment of patriotism and independence, the spirit of free citizenship, the
feeling of interest in public affairs, are cultivated and fostered more readily when
the citizen lives permanently in his own home, with a sense of its protection and
durability.
Section 118 of CA 141, therefore, is predicated on public policy. Its
violation gives rise to the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land
and its improvements to the government at the instance of the latter.20 The
provision that "nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt
contracted prior to the expiration of the five-year period" is mandatory 21 and
any sale made in violation of such provision is void 22and produces no effect
whatsoever, just like what transpired in this case. Clearly, it is not within the
competence of any citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to
preserve. 23 DHITcS
 WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated
21 August 2003 and Resolution dated 13 February 2004 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 43926.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Del Castillo, Abad and Perez, JJ., concur.

(Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Viray, G.R. No. 162218, [February 25,
|||

2010])

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 161419. August 25, 2009.]

EUGENIO ENCINARES, petitioner, vs. DOMINGA

ACHERO,respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J : p

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision 2 dated April 28, 2003 which reversed and set aside the
Decision 3 dated January 20, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52. IcAaEH

The Facts
On July 13, 1989, petitioner Eugenio Encinares (petitioner) filed a
Complaint 4 for Quieting of Title and Reconveyance against respondent
Dominga Achero 5 (respondent). Petitioner alleged that he bought several
parcels of land from Roger U. Lim as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale of
Real Properties 6 dated April 9, 1980. Among these was the subject property, a
parcel of land dedicated to abaca production, containing 16,826 square meters,
known as Lot No. 1623, and situated in Sitio Maricot, Barangay Buraburan,
Juban, Sorsogon (subject property). He, however, discovered that, sometime
in June 1987, respondent was able to register the said property and cause it to
be titled under the Free Patent System.
 Petitioner asseverated that he is the owner and actual possessor of the
subject property which is covered by Tax Declaration No. 07132. He claimed
that, for more than thirty (30) years, he had been in actual, continuous, adverse,
and open possession in the concept of an owner of the subject property, tacking
the possession of his predecessors-in-interest. However, sometime in June
1987, the respondent, by means of misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, and
machination, caused one-half portion of the subject property to be titled in her
name under the Free Patent System. Petitioner alleged that, despite the fact
that respondent's application has no legal basis as she is not the owner and
actual possessor of the subject property, a free patent was issued in her favor
and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-23505, covering an area of 23,271
square meters, was issued in her name. Thus, petitioner postulated that, with
the inclusion of one-half portion of his property, the issuance of said title casts
doubt on his ownership over the same. Moreover, petitioner demanded that
respondent execute in his favor a deed of reconveyance involving the portion
of his land, which is now covered by respondent's title, but the latter refused,
compelling him to file this case. Petitioner, therefore, prayed that he be declared
the owner and actual possessor of the subject property and that respondent be
ordered to execute a deed of reconveyance in his favor.
In her Answer 7 dated September 7, 1989, respondent denied petitioner's
material allegations and, by way of affirmative defense, averred that the
complaint constituted an indirect and collateral attack on her title, which is not
allowed, and rendered the complaint defective, thereby requiring its dismissal.
Respondent alleged that OCT No. P-23505 was issued under her name and
the property covered by the OCT is exclusively hers and does not include
petitioner's property.
Upon joint motion of the parties, the RTC issued an Order 8 dated March
9, 1990, directing a duly authorized representative/surveyor of the Bureau of
Lands to conduct a relocation survey on the two (2) parcels of land involved in
the case, namely: Lot No. 1623 and the lot covered by OCT No. P-23505.
Subsequently, Engineer Eduardo P. Sabater submitted his
Commissioner's Report 9 (Report) on August 3, 1993. The Report stated that
the limits of the common boundaries of the parties were defined by large trees
and stones marked by "X". The Report also stated that the actual area as
claimed by petitioner contained 19,290 square meters, while that of respondent
contained 3,981 square meters. AIaDcH

On September 21, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to Amend

Complaint, 10 alleging that there were some mistaken and inadequate
allegations in the original complaint, and that the amendments to be made
would not substantially change the cause of action in the complaint. Because
no objection was interposed by respondent's counsel, the Motion was granted
by the RTC in an Order 11dated October 18, 1994.
On October 20, 1994, petitioner filed the Amended Complaint, 12inserting
the word "ENTIRE" in paragraph four (4) thereof. Thus, petitioner averred that
respondent, through fraud, caused the ENTIRE area of the above-described
land to be titled under the Free Patent System. For her part, respondent
manifested that she would no longer file an answer to the Amended Complaint.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. In January 1996, respondent passed
away. 13 Respondent was duly substituted by her son, Vicente Achero
(Vicente). 14
The RTC's Ruling
On January 20, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner,
declaring him as the absolute owner of Lot 1623-B, containing an area of
19,290 square meters. The RTC declared that while Section 32 15of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 (The Property Registration Decree)
provides that a decree of registration and certificate of title become
incontrovertible after the lapse of one year, the aggrieved party whose land has
been registered through fraud in the name of another person may file an
ordinary civil action for reconveyance of his property, provided that the same
had not been transferred to innocent purchasers for value. Thus, the RTC
disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, to wit:
1. Declaring plaintiff Eugenio Encinares the absolute owner of Lot 1623-B
containing an area of 19,290 sq. m. which is a portion included in
OCT No. P-23505 in the name of Dominga Achero of the Registry
of Deeds of Sorsogon;
2. Declaring OCT No. P-23505 covering Lot 1623 with an area of 19,290
sq. m. in the name of the defendant Dominga Achero as null and
void[;]
3. Ordering the defendant Dominga Achero and/or Vicente Achero to
reconvey that portion found in the Relocation Survey Report
marked as Exh. "R" and denominated as Lot 1623-B as surveyed
for Eugenio Encinares and Dominga Achero[;]
4. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Sorsogon to make an annotation on
the Certificate of Title No. P-23505 covering the land in question as
the same was fraudulently procured[;]
5. Dismissing the counterclaim of the defendants[;]
[6.] Ordering the defendant to pay the costs. cHITCS
 SO ORDERED. 16
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the CA. 17
The CA's Ruling
On April 28, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's ruling,
upheld the validity of OCT No. P-23505, and dismissed the complaint for
quieting of title and reconveyance filed by petitioner. The CA held that the RTC
erred in declaring OCT No. P-23505 as null and void because in an action for
reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible.
Moreover, the CA held that petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence his title to the subject property and the fact of fraud. Petitioner's
evidence, consisting of tax declarations and deeds of sale, acknowledged that
the subject property had not been registered. Likewise, the CA noted that
petitioner's evidence showed that the possession of his predecessors-in-
interest started only sometime in 1951; thus, petitioner could not be presumed
to have acquired a title pursuant to Section 48 (b) 18 of Commonwealth Act 141
(The Public Land Act) as amended by P.D. No. 1073. The CA opined that it was
erroneous for the RTC to award 19,290 square meters to petitioner when the
Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Properties, from which he allegedly derived his
rights, stated that the lot sold to him consisted only of 16,826 square meters.
Lastly, the CA found no irregularity in the issuance of the Free Patent and OCT
No. P-23505.
Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 19 which the
CA, however, denied in its Resolution 20 dated December 19, 2003. Hence this
Petition, raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.
II.
WHETHER THE PETITIONER HAS THE RIGHT TO SEEK THE
RECONVEYANCE OF THE SUBJECT LAND WHICH WAS
WRONGFULLY REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF THE
RESPONDENT. 21 cDICaS

Petitioner claims that the subject property was sold by Simeon Achero
(Simeon), 22 eldest son of Eustaqio Achero 23 (Eustaqio), to Cecilia Grajo who,
in turn, sold the same to Cipriano Bardilo. 24 Subsequently, Cipriano Bardilo
sold the subject property to Pedro Guevarra, 25 who then sold the same to
Roger Lim, 26 from whom petitioner bought the subject property in 1980.
Petitioner asserts that he has been in actual, continuous, adverse, and open
possession in the concept of an owner thereof for more than thirty (30) years
 when tacked with the length of possession of his predecessors-in-interest; and
that he has introduced some improvements on the subject property and has
been enjoying its produce. Petitioner argues that contrary to the CA's findings,
he was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that he is the true and
actual owner of the subject property; that he has equitable title thereto; and that
there was fraud in the acquisition of the Free Patent. Petitioner also argues that,
as pointed out by the RTC, the tax declarations 27 of petitioner and his
predecessors-in-interest show that, in fact, petitioner, as well as his
predecessors-in-interest, has been in actual possession of the subject property
since 1951 or even prior thereto; that the factual findings of the RTC in this case
should not have been disturbed by the CA, as the former's findings were clearly
based on evidence; and that the law protects only holders of title in good faith
and does not permit its provisions to be used as a shield for the commission of
fraud or for one's enrichment at the expense of another. 28 acEHCD

On the other hand, respondent avers that the subject property had been
originally claimed, occupied and cultivated since 1928 by Eustaqio, father of
Simeon and father-in-law of respondent. Before Eustaqio died in 1942, he gave
the subject property to respondent, as evidenced by the Joint Affidavit 29 of
Dalmacio Venus and Elias Aurelio. Respondent continued the possession,
occupation and cultivation of the subject property in the concept of an owner up
to the present. On October 1, 1986, respondent executed a Deed of Ratification
and Confirmation of Ownership. 30 Documents were submitted to the Bureau of
Lands, which conducted an ocular inspection and relocation survey and issued
a Final Investigation Report. 31 Finding respondent's application for a Free
Patent to be proper in form and substance, and in accordance with law, the
same was granted per Order: Approval of Applications and Issuance of
Patent. 32Subsequently, OCT No. P-23505, covering the subject property with
a total area of 23,271 square meters, was issued in favor of respondent.
Respondent manifested that she was unlettered, and that her only
preoccupation was working on the land like other ordinary tillers. As such, in
the absence of evidence, petitioner could not validly claim that respondent
employed fraud in the application and issuance of a Free Patent, in the same
way that no fraud attended the issuance of OCT No. P-23505. Respondent
relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions
of the personnel of the Bureau of Lands.33
Simply put, the main issue is who, between petitioner and respondent, has a
better right over the subject property.
Our Ruling
The instant Petition is bereft of merit.
While factual issues are not within the province of this Court, as it is not
a trier of facts and is not required to examine or contrast the oral and
documentary evidence de novo, this Court has the authority to review and, in
proper cases, reverse the factual findings of lower courts when the findings of
fact of the trial court are in conflict with those of the appellate court. 34 In this
light, our review of the records of this case is justified. DTEScI

In essence, petitioner seeks relief before this Court, on the contention

that the registered Free Patent from which respondent derived her title had
been issued through fraud.
We reject petitioner's contention.
A Free Patent may be issued where the applicant is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines; is not the owner of more than twelve (12) hectares of land;
has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public land subject to
disposition, for at least 30 years prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6940;
and has paid the real taxes thereon while the same has not been occupied by
any other person. 35 EaIDAT

Once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is

issued, the land covered thereby ceases to be part of public domain, becomes
private property, and the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes
indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the date of such issuance.
However, a title emanating from a free patent which was secured through fraud
does not become indefeasible, precisely because the patent from whence the
title sprung is itself void and of no effect whatsoever. 36
On this point, our ruling in Republic v. Guerrero, 37 is instructive:
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud
proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of the
misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. Constructive
fraud is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public
interests and public or private confidence, even though the act is not done
with an actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other
persons. TcADCI

Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as

intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the
original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have
been litigated therein. The fraud is extrinsic if it is employed to deprive
parties of their day in court and thus prevent them from asserting
their right to the property registered in the name of the applicant.
The distinctions assume significance because only actual and extrinsic
fraud had been accepted and is contemplated by the law as a ground
to review or reopen a decree of registration.Thus, relief is granted to a
party deprived of his interest in land where the fraud consists in a
deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not contested when in fact
 they are; or in willfully misrepresenting that there are no other claims; or
in deliberately failing to notify the party entitled to notice; or in inducing
him not to oppose an application; or in misrepresenting about the identity
of the lot to the true owner by the applicant causing the former to withdraw
his application. In all these examples, the overriding consideration is that
the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from
having his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore,
is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.
We have repeatedly held that relief on the ground of fraud will not be
granted where the alleged fraud goes into the merits of the case, is
intrinsic and not collateral, and has been controverted and decided. Thus,
we have underscored the denial of relief where it appears that the fraud
consisted in the presentation at the trial of a supposed forged document,
or a false and perjured testimony, or in basing the judgment on a
fraudulent compromise agreement, or in the alleged fraudulent acts or
omissions of the counsel which prevented the petitioner from properly
presenting the case. 38
No actual and extrinsic fraud existed in this case; at least, no convincing
proof of such fraud was adduced. Other than his bare allegations, petitioner
failed to prove that there was fraud in the application, processing and grant of
the Free Patent, as well as in the issuance of OCT No. P-23505. Neither was it
proven that respondent actually took part in the alleged fraud. We agree with
the judicious findings of the CA, to wit: CSTEHI

It must be mentioned though that the records of the case do not show that
there has been any irregularity in the issuance of the Free Patent or the
OCT for that matter, as, despite the posting of the notice of appellant's
application for Free Patent, the appellee filed his
opposition/protest (Exhibit "O", Record[s], p. 31) thereto only after the
same had already been issued in favor the appellant. The fact that
appellee is in possession of several tax declarations and deeds of sale
over the property, the earliest of which was in the year 1951, does not in
any way refute appellant's allegation in her application that she inherited
the property and that her predecessor-in-interest possessed the property
even before the Japanese occupation. Moreover, the evidence also show
that the Bureau of Lands conducted an investigation (Investigation Report,
Exhibit "9",Record[s], p. 195) of the application and found that the
appellant was entitled to the parcel of land she was applying for. 39
Petitioner's heavy reliance on the tax declarations in his name and in the
names of his predecessors-in-interest is unavailing. We hold that while it is true
that tax declarations and tax receipts are good indicia of possession in the
concept of an owner, the same must be accompanied by possession for a
period sufficient for acquisitive prescription to set in. By themselves, tax
declarations and tax receipts do not conclusively prove ownership. 40 TIHCcA
 It was established that respondent was clearly in possession of the
subject property. 41 Thus, notwithstanding the existence of the tax declarations
issued in favor of petitioner, it was not refuted that respondent and her
successors were and are still in actual possession and cultivation of the subject
property, and, in fact, the respondent also declared in her name the subject
property for taxation purposes. These circumstances further boost respondent's
claim that, from the start, she believed that the subject property was exclusively
hers.
We reiterate our recent ruling in Rabaja Ranch Development Corporation
v. AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System, 42 to wit:
The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely
a system of registration of titles to lands, . . . justice and equity demand
that the titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of
the mistake or negligence of the State's agents, in the absence of proof of
his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. The real
purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever
to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted
in the certificate at the time of the registration or that may arise subsequent
thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be
sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials, who
are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their duties.
The general rule that the direct result of a previous void contract cannot
be valid[, is inapplicable] in this case as it will directly contravene the
Torrens system of registration. Where innocent third persons, relying on
the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over
the property, this Court cannot disregard such rights and order the
cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such outright cancellation will
be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title. The sanctity of the
Torrens system must be preserved; otherwise, everyone dealing with the
property registered under the system will have to inquire in every instance
as to whether the title had been regularly or irregularly issued, contrary to
the evident purpose of the law. Every person dealing with the registered
land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued
therefor, and the law will, in no way, oblige him to go behind the certificate
to determine the condition of the property.
All told, we find no reversible error which will justify our having to disturb, much
less, reverse the assailed CA Decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Court of
Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Encinares v. Achero, G.R. No. 161419, [August 25, 2009], 613 PHIL 391-407)
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 163125. April 18, 2012.]

JOSE ABELGAS, JR. and LETECIA JUSAYAN DE

ABELGAS,petitioners, vs. SERVILLANO COMIA, RURAL BANK
OF SOCORRO INC. and RURAL BANK OF PINAMALAYAN,
INC.,respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, J : p

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, seeking to review the Court of Appeals (CA) 20 March
2003 Decision and 31 March 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 46241. The
assailed Decision nullified the Deed of Relinquishment, Renunciation of Rights and
Quitclaim executed by respondent Servillano Comia in favor of petitioner spouses
Jose Abelgas, Jr. and Letecia Jusayan de Abelgas, as well as the encumbrances
executed by the spouses in favor of respondent banks.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On 4 April 1971, Comia obtained a free patent over Lot No. 919-B situated in
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro with an area of 6,790 square meters. 1Pursuant to
this free patent, Lot No. 919-B was originally registered on 26 April 1976 as Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-8553.
Subsequently, on 1 May 1971, by virtue of a notarized Deed of Relinquishment,
Renunciation of Rights and Quitclaim, Comia voluntarily conveyed a 3,000-square-
meter (3,000-sqm) portion of Lot No. 919-B to the spouses Abelgas. It was stated
in the said Deed that the subject portion was the sole property of the spouses; and
that it had only been included in the title of Comia for it adjoined his land. Indeed,
based on the Subdivision Survey, the 3,000-sqm portion of Lot No. 919-B bordered
Lot No. 919-E owned by Jose Abelgas, Jr. 2
By virtue of this subsequent voluntary dealing over the property, the Register of
Deeds cancelled OCT No. P-8553 in the name of Comia and Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-46030 3 was issued on 3 May 1971 in the names of "CO-
OWNERS, (1) SERVILLANO COMIA, married to Estelita Amaria, and (2) SPS.
JOSE ABELGAS, JR. AND LETECIA JUSAYAN DE ABELGAS" 4 as co-owners of
Lot No. 919-B. There is no explanation in the records on how TCT No. T-46030
 came about to be recorded in the names of these people when the subject portion
should have been, as a consequence of the 1971 Deed of Relinquishment,
Renunciation of Rights and Quitclaim, in the name of the spouses Abelgas only.
Thereafter, the spouses subdivided their 3,000-sqm portion into twelve (12) lots as
evidenced by TCT Nos. T-46374 to 46375. 5 Using their TCTs, they used the lots
to secure their loan obligations with Rural Bank of Pinamalayan, Inc. (RBPI), Rural
Bank of Socorro, Inc. (RBSI), and the Philippine National Bank (PNB). DHaEAS

Specifically, on 6 July 1971, the spouses Abelgas constituted a mortgage on TCT

No. 46366 to secure a loan for P1,000. Then, to secure another loan for P600, the
spouses mortgaged on 23 August 1971 the lot covered by TCT No. T-46367.
Petitioners defaulted on their obligations and hence, the lots were sold at a public
auction, wherein RBPI prevailed as the winning bidder. 6 After the lapse of the
redemption period, TCT Nos. T-17448 and T-17445 were issued in the name of
RBPI. 7
As for the remaining lots, the spouses mortgaged most 8 of these to RBSI in 1971
to 1972 as security for the spouses' various loans. Petitioners defaulted on their
obligations, and, thus, the mortgagee bank foreclosed the securities wherein it
emerged as the winning bidder. Thus: 9
TCT Nos. Security Date Auction Date Loan (P)
46364 04 September 1971 19 December 1974 800
46365 15 June 1971 26 January 1976 1,000
46369 & 46370 13 November 1971 21 December 1973 1,000
46372 & 46373 19 April 1972 21 December 1973 2,000

Of these properties, lots covered by TCT Nos. 46369 and 46370 had certificates
that were cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 71198, 10 was issued in RBSI's name.
Comia contested the issuance of these titles. He claimed that he was the sole
owner of Lot No. 919-B; and that the Deed of Relinquishment, Renunciation of
Rights and Quitclaim, which resulted in the issuance of TCT Nos. T-46030, and T-
4634 to 46375, is fictitious and nonexisting. 11 Thus, Comia demanded the
recovery of Lot No. 919-B under OCT No. P-8553 and the cancellation of the
subsequent titles. 12
He pursued his action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) by filing a Complaint
for cancellation and recovery of, and/or quieting of title to real property and
damages against the Abelgas spouses, RBPI, RBSI, and PNB. 13For their answer,
the spouses asserted that they had been in possession of the 3,000-sqm portion
of Lot No. 919-B. 14 During trial, Jose Abelgas Jr. testified that before 1971, he had
already purchased the said portion from respondent. 15
In turn, the mortgagee banks, RBPI and RBSI, filed cross-claims against the
spouses for them to pay their obligations in the event that the TCTs offered as
security for their loans would be declared as null and void. Respondent assailed
the encumbrances in favor of the mortgagee banks as void ab initioand obtained
in bad faith as these were executed within the period of prohibition to dispose lands
subject of a free patent under Section 118 of the Public Land Act (CA 141).
Claiming lack of notice of any defect in the certificates, both banks denied Comia's
allegations.
Section 118 of CA 141 16 prohibits the alienation of lands subject to a free patent
within five years from the issuance of the grant. Additionally, any disposition made
after the prohibited period must be with the consent of the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources. Evidently, the Deed and the mortgages were
executed within the prohibited period and without the Secretary's consent.
The RTC dismissed the Complaint of Comia. 17 It found that the Deed as signed
by him voluntarily relinquished the subject parcel of land in favor of its rightful
owner and possessors — the spouses Abelgas. 18 The trial court also upheld the
validity of the mortgages, since encumbrances made in favor of banks are
exempted according to the amendatory laws of the Public Land Act. 19 Moreover,
based on Decolongon v. CA, 20 the approval of the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources is only directory.
Accordingly, the dispositive portion reads: 21
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of defendants spouses JOSE ABELGAS, Jr. and LETECIA
JUSAYAN DE ABELGAS; RURAL BANKS OF SOCORRO, INC. and
RURAL BANK OF PINAMALAYAN, INC., against plaintiff SERVILLANO
COMIA, as follows: HEScID

1. Dismissing plaintiff's Amended Complaint;

2. Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-46030, and Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-46364 to T-46375 and
subsequent certificates of title thereto in the name of
defendants Rural Bank of Socorro, Inc. or defendant Rural
Bank of Pinamalayan, Inc. as valid and existing;
3. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the following:
(a) Defendants spouse (sic) Jose Abelgas, Jr. and Letecia
Jusayan de Abelgas the sum of P5,000.00 as
attorney's fees;
(b) Defendant Rural Bank of Socorro, Inc., the sum of
P50,000.00 as damages for besmirched reputation
being a bank institution with good standing;
 P2,000.00 as attorney's fee, and P1,000.00 as
litigation expenses;
(c) Defendant Rural Bank of Pinamalayan, Inc., the sum of
P50,000.00 as damages for besmirched reputation
being a bank institution with good standing;
P2,000.00 as attorney's fee, and P1,000.00 as
litigation expenses; and
4. The costs.
SO ORDERED.
Comia appealed to the CA, which modified the RTC's Decision. While the appellate
court sustained the due execution of the Deed of Relinquishment, Renunciation of
Rights and Quitclaim, it construed the document as an alienation prohibited by CA
141. The CA pronounced that in an attempt to circumvent the law, it was made to
appear that the 3,000 square meters adjoining the land of Comia was owned by
the spouses. However, based on testimonial evidence, Abelgas purchased the
said portion contrary to law. 22
Likewise, the CA nullified the mortgages, as the exemption of the banks had been
removed by Commonwealth Act 456 23 amending Section 118 ofCommonwealth
Act 141, which took effect on 8 June 1939. 24 Nevertheless, the banks may recover
the value of the loans with interest. 25
In view of the Deed's nullity, and in the absence of escheat proceedings, the CA
restored to Comia Lot No. 919-B. The appellate court ruled thus: 26
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and another one entered as follows:
1. Declaring the deed of relinquishment and renunciation of rights
and quitclaim as null and void;
2. Declaring the deeds of real estate mortgage executed by
defendants-appellees Jose Abelgas, Jr. and Letecia
Jusayan de Abelgas in favor of Rural Bank Pinamalayan,
Inc. and Rural Bank of Socorro, Inc., as well as the
foreclosure proceedings and certificates of sale, null and
void;
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of the Province of Oriental
Mindoro to cancel TCT nos. T-46030, 465364 to 465375,
46821, 71171 and 71198 and to reinstate OCT No. P-8553
in the name of plaintiff-appellant Servillano Comia;
4. Ordering defendants-appellees Jose Abelgas, Jr. and Letecia
Jusayan de Abelgas to pay Rural Bank of Pinamalayan, Inc.,
their indebtedness in the total amount of P1,600.00 plus
 interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of maturity of
promissory notes, attached as Annexes "1-A", and "2-A" to
its cross-claim, and the amount of P3,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
5. Ordering defendants-appellees Jose Abelgas, Jr. and Letecia
Jusayan de Abelgas to pay Rural Bank of Socorro, Inc. their
indebtedness in the total amount of P5,600.00, plus interest
thereon at the legal rate from the date of maturity of the
promissory notes, attached as Annexes "1", "2," "3" and "4"
to its cross-claim, and the amount of P3,000.00 as attorney's
fees. DTISaH

SO ORDERED.
Hence, the central issue in this Petition filed by the aggrieved spouses is whether
the CA gravely erred in declaring the Deed of Relinquishment, Renunciation of
Rights and Quitclaim and the mortgages in favor of mortgagee banks, as null and
void for being contrary to the provisions of CA 141 and its amendatory laws.
Section 118 of CA 141 27 requires that before the five year prohibition
applies,there should be an alienation or encumbrance of the land acquired
under free patent or homestead.
Section 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches,
units, or institutions, lands acquired under free patent or homestead
provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date
of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and
after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become
liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of
said period, but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged
or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years
and before twenty-five years after issuance of title shall be valid without
the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, which
approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds.
Thus, to ascertain the correctness of the CA's Decision, there is a need to
verify whether in executing the Deed of Relinquishment, Renunciation of
Rights and Quitclaim, Comia alienated the 3,000-sqm portion after the grant
of the free patent. Although this is a finding of fact generally beyond this Court's
jurisdiction, 28 this Court will consider the issue, considering the conflicting factual
and legal conclusions of the lower courts.
In real property law, alienation is defined as the transfer of the property and
possession of lands, tenements, or other things from one person to another. It is
the "act by which the title to real estate is voluntarily resigned by one person to
another and accepted by the latter, in the forms prescribed by law." 29 In this case,
Comia did not transfer, convey or cede the property; but rather, he relinquished,
renounced and "quitclaimed" the property considering that the property already
belonged to the spouses. The voluntary renunciation by Comia of that portion
was not an act of alienation, but an act of correcting the inclusion of the
property in his free patent.
The evidence on record reveals that prior the grant of the free patent, the spouses
already owned the property. This fact can be inferred from the following testimony
of Jose Abelgas, Jr.: 30
A: It was in 1971 when he (Servillano Comia) went to our house bringing
with him an Original Certificate of Title issued to him by the Bureau
of Lands. TaEIAS

Q: What was his purpose of bringing to you Original Certificate of

Title (sic) issued by the Bureau of Lands?
A: He wants to segregate the 3,000 square meters out of 6,790 square
meters from the Original Certificate of Title which I bought from
him, sir. (Emphasis supplied.)
This testimony was not contested or objected to by Comia. Neither did he put in
evidence that he sold the property during the period of the prohibition as he would
have been deemed to be in violation of the law. Rather, his argument has always
been the non-existence of the said Deed which both lower courts have already
concluded otherwise. 31
More important, Comia failed to dispute by clear and convincing evidence 32the
presumption that the spouses owned the property prior to the grant of his free
patent. This presumption is present in this case since the Deed of Relinquishment
and Renunciation of Right was annotated in a public document, specifically, the
original certificate of title. Documents consisting of entries in public records made
in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. 33 Entry No. 81908 annotating OCT No. P-8553 reads as: 34
MEMORANDUM OF INCUMBRANCES (sic)
Entry No. 81908; Doc. No. . . . [not legible] RENUNCIATION OF RIGHTS
AND QUITCLAIMS — In favor of the espouses (sic): JOSE ABELGAS JR.
AND LETECIA JUSAYAN DE ABELGAS, of legal age, filipinos, (sic) and
residing at Poblacion, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, — covering
this Original Certificate of Title No. P-8553, in conformity with the
conditions stipulated in the Deed of Renunciation of Rights and Quitclaim
executed by SERVILLANO COMIA married to ESTELITA AIMARIA, of
legal age, filipino, (sic) and residing at Socorro, Oriental Mindoro,
Philippines, on file in this registry.
Date of Instrument May 1, 1971
Date of Inscription May 3, 1971 at 8:10 a.m.
 (Sgd.) REYNALDO M. MAMBIL
REGISTER OF DEEDS
The Deed of Relinquishment, Renunciation of Rights and Quitclaim, as referred in
the title, recognizes the ownership of the spouses. Comia explicitly declared in the
said Deed that the subject portion belonging to the spouses Abelgas had
been included in his title for it adjoins his land. The Deed reads thus: 35
That I hereby relinquish, renounce, and quitclaim, and by these
presents have RELINQUISHED, RENOUNCED, and QUITCLAIMED, all
my rights, interests, possession, occupation, and participation of a portion
of THREE THOUSAND (3,000) SQUARE METERS, of the parcel of land
described above, free from all liens and encumbrances, together with all
its existing improvements that may be found there unto
the ESPOUSES (sic) JOSE A. ABELGAS Jr. and LETECIA JUSAYAN
DE ABELGAS, likewise of legal ages, filipinos (sic) and a resident of
Poblacion, Gloria, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, their heirs,
executors, administrators, and assigns, and agreeing further to warrant
and forever defend the title and peaceful possession of the herein
espouses (sic): JOSE A. ABELGAS JR. and LETECIA JUSAYAN DE
ABELGAS, their heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns against the
just and lawful claims of any or all persons whomsoever.
That the above described property, with an area of THREE THOUSAND
(3000) SQ. METERS, is the sole property of the above described
espouses (sic) and it had only been included in my title for it adjoins my
land situated in the barrio of Quinabigan, Pinamalayan Oriental Mindoro
and it was not my fault therefore so it being not mine (sic). I have
voluntarily renounced the area of three thousand (3000) square meters,
in favor of the said Jose Abelgas Jr. and LETECIA JUSAYAN DE
ABELGAS. (Emphasis and underscoring in the original). IDaEHC

In support of the fact that the alienation transpired prior to the grant of a free patent,
it is remarkable that Comia never contested that the spouses had been in actual
possession of the subject portion even before his patent application. The private
ownership of land — as when there is a prima facieproof of ownership like a duly
registered possessory information or a clear showing of open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession — is not affected by the issuance of a free
patent over the same land. 36
A prima facie proof of ownership is not necessarily defeated by a free patent,
especially if the title covers a portion not belonging to the grantee. Where an
applicant has illegally included portions of an adjoining land that does not form part
of the applicant's homestead, the title issued by virtue thereof should be
cancelled. 37 In Angeles v. Samia, 38 this Court explained that:
The Land Registration Act as well as the Cadastral Act protects only the
holders of a title in good faith and does not permit its provisions to be used
 as a shield for the commission of fraud, or that one should enrich himself
at the expense of another (Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil., 442; Angelo vs.
Director of Lands, 49 Phil., 838). The above-stated Acts do not give
anybody, who resorts to the provisions thereof, a better title than he really
and lawfully has. If he happened to obtain it by mistake or to secure,
to the prejudice of his neighbor, more land than he really owns, with
or without bad faith on his part, the certificate of title, which may
have been issued to him under the circumstances, may and should
be cancelled or corrected (Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil.,
590). (Emphasis supplied.)
Seeing that there is no alienation to begin with, this Court finds that the prohibition
is not applicable. Thus, the Deed of Relinquishment, Renunciation of Rights and
Quitclaim is not null and void for being contrary to the Public Land Act.
In a similar case, in Heirs of Manlapat v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that
where the alienation or transfer took place before the filing of a free patent
application, the prohibition should not be applied. In that situation, "neither the
prohibition nor the rationale therefor which is to keep in the family of the patentee
that portion of the public land which the government has gratuitously given him, by
shielding him from the temptation to dispose of his landholding, could be
relevant." 39
Consequently, this Court rules against the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-46030, and
T-46364 to 46375. Indeed, these subsequent certificates were issued based on a
duly executed instrument sanctioned by law.
As for the encumbrances, Comia also unsuccessfully assailed the mortgages by
virtue of an alleged violation of the Public Land Act.
For the prohibition in Section 118 of CA 141 to apply, the subject property must be
acquired by virtue of either a free patent or a homestead patent. In this case, the
3,000-sqm portion subdivided into twelve (12) lots as evidenced by TCT Nos. T-
4634 to 46375 has not been shown to be under a free patent. As it appears, what
was submitted to the mortgagee banks were TCTs not derived from a free patent.
Thus, the encumbrances thereon are not null and void, as these do not fall within
the ambit of the prohibition. This being the case, it cannot be said that the banks
were in bad faith for accepting the encumbered properties that did not originate
from a free patent. In any event, at the time of the mortgage, the Rural Banks
Act (Republic Act No. 720), as amended by Republic Act No. 5939, 40 already
allows banks to accept free patents as security for loan obligations. 41
Absent any finding of nullity, we sustain the RTC's ruling that the alienation and
encumbrances are valid. Consequently, there is no cause to cancel the
subsequent TCTs and the resulting mortgages thereon.
IN VIEW THEREOF, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed 20 March 2003
Decision and 31 March 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
areREVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Abelgas, Jr. v. Comia, G.R. No. 163125, [April 18, 2012], 686 PHIL 6-21)