The Supreme Court ruled that the term "lumber" is included under the concept of "timber" in Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code). The petitioners were apprehended transporting 1,800 board feet of lumber without proper permits. They argued that Section 68 only refers to "timber" and not "lumber". However, the Court found that excluding lumber would allow the circumvention of the law, as timber could be processed into lumber to avoid penalties. The legislative intent in enacting the law was to maximize the protection and use of natural resources. Interpreting the law in a way that excludes lumber would weaken the law.
The Supreme Court ruled that the term "lumber" is included under the concept of "timber" in Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code). The petitioners were apprehended transporting 1,800 board feet of lumber without proper permits. They argued that Section 68 only refers to "timber" and not "lumber". However, the Court found that excluding lumber would allow the circumvention of the law, as timber could be processed into lumber to avoid penalties. The legislative intent in enacting the law was to maximize the protection and use of natural resources. Interpreting the law in a way that excludes lumber would weaken the law.
The Supreme Court ruled that the term "lumber" is included under the concept of "timber" in Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code). The petitioners were apprehended transporting 1,800 board feet of lumber without proper permits. They argued that Section 68 only refers to "timber" and not "lumber". However, the Court found that excluding lumber would allow the circumvention of the law, as timber could be processed into lumber to avoid penalties. The legislative intent in enacting the law was to maximize the protection and use of natural resources. Interpreting the law in a way that excludes lumber would weaken the law.
The Supreme Court ruled that the term "lumber" is included under the concept of "timber" in Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code). The petitioners were apprehended transporting 1,800 board feet of lumber without proper permits. They argued that Section 68 only refers to "timber" and not "lumber". However, the Court found that excluding lumber would allow the circumvention of the law, as timber could be processed into lumber to avoid penalties. The legislative intent in enacting the law was to maximize the protection and use of natural resources. Interpreting the law in a way that excludes lumber would weaken the law.
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G.R. No. 108619 July 31, 1997 EPIFANIO become a lumber.
On September 24, 1991, the
LALICAN, petitioner, vs. HON. FILOMENO A. lower court construed the interpretation of the VERGARA, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 52, law against the State thus the motion was Puerto Princesa City and PEOPLE OF THE granted. PHILIPPINES, respondents. The prosecution filed a motion for Issue: Whether the term lumber is included in reconsideration on the order underscoring the the concept of timber in order to constitute an fact that the accused presented Private Land offense as stated in Sec. 68 of Presidential Timber Permit No. 030140 dated February 10, Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code of 1991 which had expired; that while the the Philippines). certificate of origin indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz, the product actually came from Sitio Cadiz, and that Facts: the two jeeps bearing the product were not The petitioners were apprehended on the Sitio equipped with certificates of transport Cadiz, Barangay Bacungan Puerto Princesa for agreement. Added to this was the fact that, if violating Section 68 of PD No. 705 or known as the product were indeed lumber, then the The Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines. accused could have presented a certificate of There were 1, 800 board feet of lumber loaded lumber origin, lumber sale invoices in case of in two (2) passenger jeeps in different sizes and sale, tally sheets and delivery receipts for dimension that were confiscated. On August 9, transportation from one point to another. The 1991, all the accused were pleaded not guilty to motion was approved thus this case. the crime charged. Ruling: NO, The Court ruled that, the word Petioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the lumber includes timber. The primary reason why information filed against them contenting that, the law was enacted is to secure and maximize Section 68 of PD 705 does not include lumber the use of the natural resources; the non because the wording of the law categorically inclusion of lumber on the law may give rise for specify timber to be collected as to constitute the circumvention of law. Section 68 of the said the violation on the said law. He further law punishes these acts namely contends that, the law is vague because it does (a) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal specify the authority or legal documents of timber or other forest products from the required by existing forest law and regulation. places therein mentioned without any The prosecution opposed the motion to quash authority; or on the ground that it is not the courts to (b) possession of timber or other forest determine the wisdom of the law or to set the products without the legal documents as policy as rest by the legislature. He further required under existing forest laws and asserts that the word timber should include regulations. lumber which is a product or derivative of a timber. The position of the prosecution could Be that as it may, the legislative intent to include result to the circumvention of the law, for one possession of lumber in Sec. 68 is clearly could stealthily cut a timber and process it to gleaned from the expressed reasons for enacting the law which, under Executive Order No. 277. To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the law itself. A law should not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the law. After all, the phrase "forest products" is broad enough to encompass lumbers which, to reiterate, is manufactured timber. Hence, to mention lumber in Sec. 68 would merely result in tautology