G.R. No. L-60174 February 16, 1983 a.

declaring the defendants to be the lawful owners of the

property subject of the present litigation;
EDUARDO FELIPE, HERMOGENA V. FELIPE AND VICENTE V.
FELIPE, petitioners, b. declaring the complaint in the present action to be without
vs. merit and is therefore hereby ordered dismissed;
HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON, NAMELY: GIMENA ALMOSARA, SOFIA
ALDON, SALVADOR ALDON, AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF c. ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendants the amount of
APPEALS, respondents. P2,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees and to pay the costs of
the suit.
Romulo D. San Juan for petitioner.
The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which rendered the
Gerundino Castillejo for private respondent. following judgment:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby
ABAD SANTOS, J.: RENDERED, ordering the defendants-appellees to surrender
the lots in question as well as the plaintiffs'-appellants'
muniments of title thereof to said plaintiffs-appellants, to make
Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara in 1936. The spouses bought several
an accounting of the produce derived from the lands including
pieces of land sometime between 1948 and 1950. In 1960-62, the lands were
expenses incurred since 1951, and to solidarity turn over to the
divided into three lots, 1370, 1371 and 1415 of the San Jacinto Public Land
plaintiffs-appellants the NET monetary value of the profits,
Subdivision, San Jacinto, Masbate.
after deducting the sum of P1,800.00. No attorney's fees nor
moral damages are awarded for lack of any legal justification
In 1951, Gimena Almosara sold the lots to the spouses Eduardo Felipe and therefor. No. costs.
Hermogena V. Felipe. The sale was made without the consent of her husband,
Maximo.
The ratio of the judgment is stated in the following paragraphs of the decision
penned by Justice Edgardo L. Paras with the concurrence of Justices Venicio
On April 26, 1976, the heirs of Maximo Aldon, namely his widow Gimena and Escolin and Mariano A. Zosa:
their children Sofia and Salvador Aldon, filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Masbate against the Felipes. The complaint which was docketed as Civil
One of the principal issues in the case involves the nature of the
Case No. 2372 alleged that the plaintiffs were the owners of Lots 1370, 1371 and
aforementioned conveyance or transaction, with appellants
1415; that they had orally mortgaged the same to the defendants; and an offer to
claiming the same to be an oral contract of mortgage or
redeem the mortgage had been refused so they filed the complaint in order to
antichresis, the redemption of which could be done anytime
recover the three parcels of land.
upon repayment of the P1,800.00 involved (incidentally the
only thing written about the transaction is the aforementioned
The defendants asserted that they had acquired the lots from the plaintiffs by receipt re the P1,800). Upon the other hand, appellees claim
purchase and subsequent delivery to them. The trial court sustained the claim of the that the transaction was one of sale, accordingly, redemption
defendants and rendered the following judgment: was improper. The appellees claim that plaintiffs never
conveyed the property because of a loan or mortgage or
 antichresis and that what really transpired was the execution of a In the instant case, Gimena, the wife, sold lands belonging to the conjugal
contract of sale thru a private document designated as a 'Deed partnership without the consent of the husband and the sale is not covered by the
of Purchase and Sale' (Exhibit 1), the execution having been phrase "except in cases provided by law." The Court of Appeals described the sale
made by Gimena Almosara in favor of appellee Hermogena V. as "invalid" - a term which is imprecise when used in relation to contracts because
Felipe. the Civil Code uses specific names in designating defective contracts,
namely: rescissible (Arts. 1380 et seq.), voidable (Arts. 1390 et
After a study of this case, we have come to the conclusion that seq.), unenforceable (Arts. 1403, et seq.), and void or inexistent (Arts. 1409 et seq.)
the appellants are entitled to recover the ownership of the lots
in question. We so hold because although Exh. 1 concerning the The sale made by Gimena is certainly a defective contract but of what category? The
sale made in 1951 of the disputed lots is, in Our opinion, not a answer: it is a voidable contract.
forgery the fact is that the sale made by Gimena Almosara is
invalid, having been executed without the needed consent of her According to Art. 1390 of the Civil Code, among the voidable contracts are
husband, the lots being conjugal. Appellees' argument that this "[T]hose where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract."
was an issue not raised in the pleadings is baseless, considering (Par. 1.) In the instant case-Gimena had no capacity to give consent to the contract
the fact that the complaint alleges that the parcels 'were of sale. The capacity to give consent belonged not even to the husband alone but to
purchased by plaintiff Gimena Almosara and her late husband both spouses.
Maximo Aldon' (the lots having been purchased during the
existence of the marriage, the same are presumed conjugal) and
The view that the contract made by Gimena is a voidable contract is supported by
inferentially, by force of law, could not, be disposed of by a wife
the legal provision that contracts entered by the husband without the consent of the
without her husband's consent.
wife when such consent is required, are annullable at her instance during the
marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned. (Art. 173, Civil
The defendants are now the appellants in this petition for review. They invoke Code.)
several grounds in seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals. One
of the grounds is factual in nature; petitioners claim that "respondent Court of
Gimena's contract is not rescissible for in such contract all the essential elements are
Appeals has found as a fact that the 'Deed of Purchase and Sale' executed by
untainted but Gimena's consent was tainted. Neither can the contract be classified
respondent Gimena Almosara is not a forgery and therefore its authenticity and due
as unenforceable because it does not fit any of those described in Art. 1403 of the
execution is already beyond question." We cannot consider this ground because as a
Civil Code. And finally, the contract cannot be void or inexistent because it is not
rule only questions of law are reviewed in proceedings under Rule 45 of the Rules
one of those mentioned in Art. 1409 of the Civil Code. By process of elimination, it
of Court subject to well-defined exceptions not present in the instant case.
must perforce be a voidable contract.

The legal ground which deserves attention is the legal effect of a sale of lands
The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to annulment by her husband only
belonging to the conjugal partnership made by the wife without the consent of the
during the marriage because he was the victim who had an interest in the contract.
husband.
Gimena, who was the party responsible for the defect, could not ask for its
annulment. Their children could not likewise seek the annulment of the contract
It is useful at this point to re-state some elementary rules: The husband is the while the marriage subsisted because they merely had an inchoate right to the lands
administrator of the conjugal partnership. (Art. 165, Civil Code.) Subject to certain sold.
exceptions, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. (Art. 166, Idem.) And the wife
cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent, except in cases
provided by law. (Art. 172, Idem.)
The termination of the marriage and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership by despite the fact that Gimena and Hermogena were close
the death of Maximo Aldon did not improve the situation of Gimena. What she relatives? An these indicate the bad faith of the appellees. Now
could not do during the marriage, she could not do thereafter. then, even if we were to consider appellees' possession in bad
faith as a possession in the concept of owners, this possession at
The case of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is different. After the death of Maximo they the earliest started in 1951, hence the period for extraordinary
acquired the right to question the defective contract insofar as it deprived them of prescription (30 years) had not yet lapsed when the present
their hereditary rights in their father's share in the lands. The father's share is one- action was instituted on April 26, 1976.
half (1/2) of the lands and their share is two-thirds (2/3) thereof, one-third (1/3)
pertaining to the widow. As to the second question, the children's cause of action accrued from the death of
their father in 1959 and they had thirty (30) years to institute it (Art. 1141, Civil
The petitioners have been in possession of the lands since 1951. It was only in Code.) They filed action in 1976 which is well within the period.
1976 when the respondents filed action to recover the lands. In the meantime,
Maximo Aldon died. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified.
Judgment is entered awarding to Sofia and Salvador Aldon their shares of the lands
Two questions come to mind, namely: (1) Have the petitioners acquired the lands as stated in the body of this decision; and the petitioners as possessors in bad faith
by acquisitive prescription? (2) Is the right of action of Sofia and Salvador Aldon shall make an accounting of the fruits corresponding to the share aforementioned
barred by the statute of limitations? from 1959 and solidarity pay their value to Sofia and Salvador Aldon; costs against
the petitioners.
Anent the first question, We quote with approval the following statement of the
Court of Appeals: SO ORDERED.

We would like to state further that appellees [petitioners herein] Concepcion Jr., Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.
could not have acquired ownership of the lots by prescription in
view of what we regard as their bad faith. This bad faith is Makasiar, (Chairman), J., In the result.
revealed by testimony to the effect that defendant-appellee
Vicente V. Felipe (son of appellees Eduardo Felipe and Escolin J., took no part.
Hermogena V. Felipe) attempted in December 1970 to have
Gimena Almosara sign a ready-made document purporting to
self the disputed lots to the appellees. This actuation clearly
indicated that the appellees knew the lots did not still belong to
them, otherwise, why were they interested in a document of sale
in their favor? Again why did Vicente V. Felipe tell Gimena that
the purpose of the document was to obtain Gimena's consent to Separate Opinions
the construction of an irrigation pump on the lots in question?
The only possible reason for purporting to obtain such consent
is that the appellees knew the lots were not theirs . Why was
there an attempted improvement (the irrigation tank) only in AQUINO, J., concurring:
1970? Why was the declaration of property made only in 1974?
Why were no attempts made to obtain the husband's signature,
I concur in the result. The issue is whether the wife's sale in 1651 of an unregistered 20 SCRA 369; Bucoy vs. Paulino, L-25775, April 26, 1968, 23 SCRA 248;
sixteen-hectare conjugal land, without the consent of her husband (he died in Tinitigan vs. Tinitigan, L-45418, October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 619).
1959), can be annulled in 1976 by the wife and her two children.
With more reason, the wife cannot make such a disposition without the husband's
As a rule, the husband cannot dispose of the conjugal realty without the wife's consent since the husband is the administrator of the conjugal assets.
consent (Art. 166, Civil Code). Thus, a sale by the husband of the conjugal realty
without the wife's consent was declared void (Tolentino vs. Cardenas, 123 Phil. In the instant case, the Court of Appeals did not err in voiding the wife's sale of the
517; Villocino vs. Doyon, L-19797, December 17, 1966, 18 SCRA 1094 and L- conjugal land without the husband's consent. As that sale is contrary to law, the
28871, April 25, 1975, 63 SCRA 460; Reyes vs. De Leon, L-22331, June 6,1967, action to have it declared void or inexistent does not prescribe.
20 SCRA 369; Bucoy vs. Paulino, L-25775, April 26, 1968, 23 SCRA 248;
Tinitigan vs. Tinitigan, L-45418, October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 619).
Moreover, there are indications that the contract between the parties was an
antichresis, a transaction which is very common in rural areas.
With more reason, the wife cannot make such a disposition without the husband's
consent since the husband is the administrator of the conjugal assets.

In the instant case, the Court of Appeals did not err in voiding the wife's sale of the
conjugal land without the husband's consent. As that sale is contrary to law, the
action to have it declared void or inexistent does not prescribe.

Moreover, there are indications that the contract between the parties was an
antichresis, a transaction which is very common in rural areas.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result. The issue is whether the wife's sale in 1651 of an unregistered
sixteen-hectare conjugal land, without the consent of her husband (he died in
1959), can be annulled in 1976 by the wife and her two children.

As a rule, the husband cannot dispose of the conjugal realty without the wife's
consent (Art. 166, Civil Code). Thus, a sale by the husband of the conjugal realty
without the wife's consent was declared void (Tolentino vs. Cardenas, 123 Phil.
517; Villocino vs. Doyon, L-19797, December 17, 1966, 18 SCRA 1094 and L-
28871, April 25, 1975, 63 SCRA 460; Reyes vs. De Leon, L-22331, June 6,1967,
G.R. No. L-45418 October 30, 1980 on May 22, 1975, Severino Tinitigan Sr., as conjugal partner and shareholder of
Molave Development Corporation which is a family corporation filed a complaint
TEOFISTA P. TINITIGAN, EFREN TINITIGAN, ELSA TINITIGAN and captioned "Annulment of Ownership and Contract of witness Pre-Injunction" in
SEVERINO TINITIGAN, JR., petitioners, the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasig, 7th Judicial District (pp. 23-27, rec.).
vs. This case docketed Civil Case No. 21277 and which was assigned to Branch II
SEVERINO TINITIGAN, SR. and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. presided by the Honorable Judge Pedro C. Navarro principally sought to annul the
contract of lease executed by Payumo in favor of United Electronics Corporation
The property involved in this contract is entirely different from that leased to
G.R. No. L-45574. October 30, 1980.*
Pentel with option to buy.
PENTEL MERCHANDISING CO., INC. and TEOFISTA PAYURAN
The complaint, however, was later amended with leave of court granted by order of
TINITIGAN, petitioners,
August 20, 1975, to include in the prayer the following:
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE PEDRO C. NAVARRO, CHIU
CHIN SIONG and SEVERINO TINITIGAN SR., respondents. ... 2. to restrain the defendant-relatives of the plaintiff from
encumbering or disposing properties in the name of the Molave
Development Corporation or those in the name of Severino
Tinitigan Sr. and Teofista Payuran; ...
MAKASIAR, J.:
In the same order, the CFI of Rizal, Branch II enjoined petitioner from doing any
"act to dispose, mortgage or otherwise encumber the properties described in
Two petitions are herein filed to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of paragraphs 7 and 8 of the complaint" and set the case for hearing on the issuance of
Appeals dated June 1, 1976 in CA-G.R. No. 05387- SP docketed as L-45418 and a preliminary injunction on September 5, 1975. Paragraphs 7 and 8 pertain to the
L-45574 respectively, affirming the order of respondent Judge Pedro C. Navarro of factory building and the land on which it is erected covered by TCT No. 160998
the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasig, Branch II in Civil Case No. 21277 (p. 151, rec.).
dated September 29, 1975. On March 25, 1975, petitioners Pentel Merchandising
Co., Inc. (Pentel for short) and Teofista Payumo Tinitigan (Payuran for short)
At the hearing of the preliminary injunction the issue of the contract of lease of lot
entered into a contract of lease of a residential house whereby for a term of four
covered by TCT 160998 which was the main object of the complaint was settled
years Payumo shall lease to Pentel the premises at 205 Loring St., Pasay City
amicably. Severino Tinitigan Sr., however, on September 17, 1975, filed a motion
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15923, at a rental of P1,500.00 per
seeking judicial approval of sale of a two-storey residential house and a lot which
month with option to buy the same within the term of the lease for P350,000.00
are conjugal properties located at 205 Loring St., Pasay City, covered by TCT No.
[pp. 13-16, rec].
15923 (pp. 28-34, rec.). The house is tenanted by Quintin Lim Eng Seng (Quintin
Lim for short) who is President and General Manager of Pentel. Tinitigan contends
On April 22, 1975, Payumo and her three children, Efren, Elsa, and Severino Jr., all that the proposed sale of the property for P300,000.00 to Quintin who was given
surnamed Tinitigan, leased to United Electronics Corporation a factory building priority right to purchase, was necessary to pay outstanding conjugal obligations
together with the portion of land on which it is erected covered by Transfer that were overdue in the amount of P256,137.79 and to forestall the foreclosure of
Certificate of Title No. 160998 situated in Banwag, Parañaque, Rizal (pp. 17-20, mortgaged conjugal property. Earlier, the same property had been leased by Payumo
rec., L-45418). to Pentel with an option to buy for P350,000.00.

In both transactions, the consent of Severino Tinitigan Sr. (Tinitigan for short),
husband of Payumo and private responded herein, was not secured. Consequently,
On September 29, 1975, the CFI of Rizal, Branch II issued an order granting On November 22, 1975, a notice of appeal was filed by petitioners Payumo and
Tinitigan "authority to sell the house and lot at No. 205 Loring St., Pasay City children appealing the order of November 3, 1975, it being allegedly final in nature
covered by TCT No. 15923 in favor of Quintin Lim, if he is a Filipino citizen, for in so far as the disposition of the Pasay property is concerned and there being no
P300,000.00" (pp. 35-37, rec.,). further issue left between the parties (pp. 72-73, rec.).

An urgent motion for reconsideration was filed by Payumo and children alleging By a deed of absolute sale dated January 16, 1976 (pp. 38-44, rec.). the husband
among others that the sale would result in substantial and tremendous losses Tinitigan apparently sold for P315,000.00 the Pasay property not to Quintin Lim
because the property sought to be sold is a suitable condominium and/or hotel site as contained in the order of the court in Civil Case No. 21277, but to herein
and would, therefore, command a higher price (pp. 56-57, rec.). private respondent Chiu Chin Siong (Chiu for short) who obtained a title thereto.
Pursuantly, TCT No. 20031 was issued cancelling TCT No. 15923.
On October 9, 1975, merely two days after the motion for reconsideration of the
September 29, 1975 order was filed in the CFI of Rizal, Branch II, the wife On February 23, 1976, a motion for the approval of the sale to Chiu was filed by
Payumo filed against her husband Tinitigan a complaint for legal separation and respondent Tinitigan in the CFI of Rizal, Branch 11 (pp. 203-205, rec.).
dissolution of conjugal partnership, docketed as Civil Case No. 4459-P before
Branch XXVIII of the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City presided by On March 3, 1976, the said court issued an order approving the sale executed by
the Honorable Judge Enrique A. Agana (pp. 17-21, rec.). Severino Tinitigan Sr. in favor of Chiu covering the parcel of land at 206 Loring
St., San Rafael District, Pasay City, for and in consideration of the sum of Three
On October 29, 1975, the Pasay Court after noting that "the parties had agreed to Hundred Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P315,000.00) [pp. 206-207, rec.).
the continuation of the administration of said conjugal properties by plaintiff (wife)
Teofista P. Tinitigan," appointed her administrative of the conjugal properties In a decision dated April 8, 1976, the same court denied the appeal filed by
subject to the following conditions: petitioners Payumo and children on the ground that the order appealed from is
merely interlocutory and cannot, therefore, be the subject of appeal. Furthermore, it
1) that all and any disposition and/or encumbrance of the real stated that "the sale in favor of Chiu Chin Siong is a right pertaining to the plaintiff
estate belonging to the conjugal partnership shall be subject to under Article 171 of the Civil Code and the exercise cise of said right is justifiable
the approval of the court; to relieve the rest of the conjugal properties from mortgage obligations which are in
danger of foreclosure" (p. 90, rec.).
2) that all rentals accruing from the properties in Angeles Civil
shall be collected by the defendant Severino Tinitigan for his On May 17, 1976, Payumo and children filed a petition for certiorari with
subsistence and support; and preliminary injunction against respondents Tinitigan and the Honorable Pedro C.
Navarro in the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. 05387 assuming the orders
3) that the disposition of the property located at Loring St., of respondent Judge and praying that a restraining order be issued immediately
Pasay City, shall be subject to the decision of the Court of First enjoining respondent Severino Tinitigan Sr. from selling or disposing of the
Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Rizal" [P. 22, rec.]. disputed property and if already sold to declare the sale null and void. Petitioners
likewise prayed that the order of the lower court dismissing the appeal based on the
grounds aforestated be declared a nullity and that the appeal be given due course
In Civil Case No. 21277 however, the CFI of Rizal, Branch II, presided by
(pp. 45-49, rec.).
respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration of
the September 29, 1975 order for lack of merit. Further, the court stated that "the
defendants (petitioners) have not even shown that there are offers from other
sources willing to buy the property for more than P300.000.00 (p. 92, rec.)
On June 1, 1976, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision upholding the orders is basically the avoidance of multiplicity of appeals in a single
of respondent Judge, particularly, the orders of September 29, 1975 approving the case which could considerably delay the final disposition of the
sale of the conjugal property in Pasay City, to quote: case (People vs. Rodriguez 24 SCRA 163, 167) [pp. 93-97,
rec.).
The ground for opposition to the sale is a claim that the
property is a 'choice lot' within 'the tourist belt and its Thereafter, on July 19, 1976, private respondent Chiu filed before the City Court,
potentials for a hotel or condominium site is very promising' Branch III, at Pasay City, presided by judge Pablo M. Malvar, a compliant for
(Ibid. p. 4). It does sound good but too abstruse to meet the unlawful detainer seeking an order to compel defendant therein, Quintin C. Lim to
immediate need for the liquidation of a big conjugal liability vacate the premises in question (pp. 331-335, rec.).
and to avoid foreclosure and loss of the properties mortgaged.
Besides the sale to liquidate the conjugal liability finds support On July 26, 1976, Quintin C. Lim filed his answer with motion to dismiss denying
from the provisions of Articles 161 and 171 of the Civil Code. that he 'was the lessee of the properly and moving to dismiss the detainer action for
We also see from the record before us that petitioner Teofista lack of jurisdiction, the issue of ownership not being capable of decision without
P. Tinitigan has filed a complaint for legal separation and resolving the issue of ownership pending in other courts (pp. 346-352, rec.).
dissolution of the conjugal partnership in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XXVIII in Pasay City, under Civil
On January 5, 1977, a petition for review docketed as L-45418 was filed with this
Case No. 4459-P. Private respondent agreed to the
Court by Payumo and her three children praying for the issuance of a writ of
appointment of petitioner Teofista P. Tinitigan as
certiorari directed to the Court of Appeals, and commanding it to send to this
administrative on certain conditions, which was approved by the
Court for review and determination the records and proceedings of Civil Case No.
Court (Ibid., p. 30). One of these is that the disposition of the
21277 assigned to the CFI of Rizal in Pasig, Branch II, presided by respondent
property in question shall be subject to the decision of the CFI
Judge Navarro. The main allegations of the petition are: lack of jurisdiction on the
of Rizal, Brapeh II in Pasig (Ibid., p. 30). As stated above,
part of the lower court since it did not have judicial authority to authorize the sale
respondent Judge, presiding over Branch II of the CFI of Rizal
of the conjugal property in Civil Case No. 21277 considering that the complaint in
appellant proved the sale of the conjugal property in question to
the said case referred to other properties to the exclusion of the one authorized to
liquidate certiorari conjugal obligations (Ibid., pp- 17-19). ...
be sold; and abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal since the order authorizing
the sale of the Loring property was not merely interlocutory but one that was final
But the petitioners would, nevertheless compel us to allow their and appealable.
appeal from the order dated September 29, 1975 approving the
sale of the conjugal property in Pasay City in order to liquidate
On February 15, 1976, another petition was filed with this Court, this time by
certiorari conjugal obligations (Ibid., p. 17) on the ground that
Pentel and Payuran, against respondents Court of Appeals. Honorable Pedro C.
the order dated November 3, 1975 denying the motion for
Navarro, Chiu Chin Siong and Severino Tinitigan Sr. The petition, docketed as L-
reconsideration of the order dated September 29, 1975 is
45574, seeks to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
already final (Ibid., p. 4, par. 14). But the respondent Judge
G.R. No. 05387-SP dated June 1, 1976 and order of respondent Judge in Civil
hold the questioned order as merely interlocutory (Ibid., p. 57).
Case No. 21277 dated September 29, 1975 on the ground that the said decision
We sustain the respondent Judge. ... The fact that what was
and order are void.
resolved by the respondent Court was a mere motion for judicial
authority to sell conjugal property to liquidate certiorari
conjugal obligations (Ibid., p. 8) indicates that the order Petitioners assigr. the following errors as grounds for the allowance of writ, to wit:
granting the motion (Ibid., p. 17) is interlocutory. The rationale
underlying the rule that an interlocutory order is not appealable
 (1) The questioned order authorizing Severino Tinitigan Sr., to Pursuant to said motion, the CFI of Rizal, Branch XXVIII, Pasay City issued an
sell the property in question is void because order dated November 22, 1977 in part stating that the "award of the Loring St.,
Pasay City property under TCT No. 15923 in favor of the plaintiff in the order of
(a) Tinitigan Sr. had no authority to sell the premises, they the court dated August 29, 1977 is understood to the subject to the outcome of the
being under the administration of Payuran; cases now pending before the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-45418 and G.R. No.
L-45574" (pp. 329-330, rec.).
(b) Respondent Judge had not acquired jurisdiction over the
premises and could not grant Tinitigan authority to sell them; Notwithstanding these proceedings, the City Court of Pasay, Branch III in the
unlawful detainer case, presided by Judge Malvar, issued a decision dated January
18, 1978 ordering the defendant Quintin Lim and all persons claiming under him
(c) The sale of the property was expressly authorized in favor of
to vacate the premises in question and to pay the corresponding rentals thereof to
Quintin Lim, not respondent Chiu;
the plaintiff Chiu at the rate of P1,500.00 per month from January 16, 1976, until
the defendant and all persons claiming under him actually vacate the said premises
(d) Pentel, whose President and General Manager is Quintin (pp. 367-371, rec.).
Lim, had the option to buy the premises; and
For this reason, Payuran, on February 14, 1978, filed a motion for leave to apply
(2) The Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law in denying for a writ of injunction to enjoin execution of the decision of Judge Malvar in the
Payuran's petition to enjoin or set aside the sale of the property unlawful detainer case and to prohibit further proceedings therein (pp. 259-273,
here involved. rec.).

On February 23, 1977, this Court, after deliberating on the petition filed in case This Court, on February 22, 1978, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
G.R. No. L-45574 resolved without giving due course thereto to require the Judge Malvar from conducting further proceedings and from executing the decision
respondents to comment and to take up L-45574 with L-45418 since both involve dated January 18, 1978 (pp. 372-374, rec.).
the same Court of Appeals decision (p. 107, rec.).
The issues in both L-45418 and L-45574 related primarily to the question of
During the pendency of these petitions, the Pasay Court in the legal separation case validity of the challenged order dated September 29, 1975 issued by respondent
(Civil Case No. 4459-P), issued an order dated August 29, 1977 dissolving the Judge Navarro of the CFI of Rizal, Branch II, in Pasig and the decision of
conjugal partnership between Tinitigan and Payumo and approving the partition of respondent Court of Appeals.
their properties pursuant to an agreement (pp. 319-325, rec.). The Loring property
was adjudicated in favor of the wife Payuran.
WE pursue our discussion on the merits of the case as predicated on grounds raised
in the assignment of errors.
In consequence, defendant-respondent filed a motion to exclude TCT 15923 from
the list of properties that should belong to Payumo (pp. 208-210, rec.). An
Petitioners argue that the order authorizing Tinitigan to sell the Loring property is
amended motion was subsequently filed on October 25, 1977 praying that the
void; firstly, because Tinitigan had no authority to sell the premises, they being
order of August 29, 1977 be amended in such a way that the award of the Loring
under the administration of Payuran. This contention is without legal basis. Article
property be conditioned upon the final outcome of the cases pending before this
165 of the New Civil Code decrees that "the husband is the administrator of the
Court (pp. 326-328, rec.).
conjugal partnership." This is the general rule. Although Article 168 of the same
Code provides that "the wife may by express authority of the husband embodied in
a public instrument, administer the conjugal partnership property" and scattered
provisions in the Code likewise speak of administration by the wife pursuant to a This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal
judicial decree, the said provisions are not applicable in the instant case. The judicial partnership before the effective date of this Code (Emphasis
decree dated October 29, 1975 appointing Payumo as administrative of the supplied).
conjugal partnership cannot be treated as an exception because it was issued only
after the CFI of Rizal, Branch II had granted Tinitigan Sr. authority to sell the This was precisely the reason why respondent Tinitigan Sr. sought judicial approval
Loring property. Besides, the appointment of Payumo as administrative was not of sale of the Loring property. The filing of the said motion was, in fact, directed
absolute as it was made subject to certain conditions agreed upon by the parties. by a legal provision since it became almost impossible for private respondent to
Although the claim by Payumo that she was actually administering their conjugal obtain his wife's consent to the sale which transaction has not proven to be
properties even prior to this controversy may have some color of truth in it; legally, fraudulent. As the evidence warrants, the sale was necessary to answer for a big
however, such fact is not enough to make her administratix of the conjugal conjugal liability which might endanger the family's economic standing. Actually,
partnership for absent a public instrument or a judicial decree, administration still this is one instance where the wife's consent is not required and impliedly, no
pertains to the husband as explicitly set forth in Article 165 (supra). judicial intervention is necessary. According to Article 171 of the New Civil Code,
"the husband may dispose of the conjugal partnership for the purposes specified in
As held in the case of Ysasi vs. Fernandez (23 SCRA 1079, 1083 [June 25, 1968]). Articles 161 and 162." In general, these articles deal with the obligation of the
conjugal partnership. Specifically, Article 161, paragraph 1 provides that "the
The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. conjugal partnerships shall be liable for all debts and obligations contracted by the
This is a right clearly granted to him by law. More, the husband husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the
is the sole administrator. The wife is not entitled — as of right wife, also for the same purpose, in the case where she may legally bind the
— to joint administration. The husband may even enforce right partnership."
of possession against the wife who has taken over the
administration without his consent. And the wife may be It must be noted that Payumo did not dispute the existence of these conjugal
punished for contempt for her refusal to deliver to him the liabilities. What she questioned, in reality, was the propriety of the sale of the
conjugal assets. She may be required to render full and complete disputed property, which, according to petitioners, has bright prospects of
accounting of such properties. development and market value appreciation in the future. It was a 'choice lot' as
termed by them. Nevertheless, the sale was the surest and the most practical means
Necessarily, the conclusion is that Tinitigan Sr. had not ceased being the resorted to by respondent Tinitigan Sr. to save them from a serious financial
administrator of their conjugal properties at the time the motion for judicial setback. This consideration cannot be sidestepped by speculative allegations.
approval of sale was granted. Being administrator, however, does not give him Moreover, petitioners offer no acceptable and practical solution to remedy this
outright authority to alienate or encumber conjugal assets. This kind of transactions contingency.
requires the express or implied consent of the wife subject to certain exceptions.
Thus, Article 166 of the New Civil Code provides — Secondly, petitioners contend that the questioned order is void because respondent
Judge had not acquired jurisdiction over the premises and could not grant Tinitigan
Unless the wife has been declared a noncompos mentis or a Sr. authority to sell them. They would seem to capitalize on the fact that the
spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a complaint in Civil Case No. 21277 particularly mentioned only the lot covered by
leprosarium the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real TCT No. 160998 leased to United Electronics Corporation. Petitioners failed to
property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's note, however, that in the amended complaint, respondents prayed among others
consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her conscience the "to restrain the defendant-relatives of the plaintiff from encumbering or disposing
court may compel her to grant the same. properties in the name of the Molave Development Corporation or those in the
name of Severino Tinitigan Sr, and Teofista Payuran." This, in effect, brings the
Loring property by TCT No. 15923 within the jurisdiction of the court which
issued the order. Certainly, a motion in relation thereto is but proper. Furthermore, Consequently, there is no merit in the assertion of petitioner that it is the Court of
it is worth repeating that the said motion to seek judicial approval of sale in lieu of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City, Branch XXVIII which should have assumed
marital consent amounts to compliance with legal requirement delineated in Article jurisdiction over the disputed property upon the filing of the complaint for legal
166, supra. The issuance of the order dated September 29, 1975 was, henceforth, separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership To permit this would result in
pursuant to a validly acquired jurisdiction, in keeping with a well-entrenched the disregard of the order of September 29, 1975 issued by the Court of First
principle that "jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. It is Instance of Rizal, in Pasig, Branch II. Not even the court whose jurisdiction is being
determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the invoked sanctions this seeming attempt to contravene sound doctrines and long-
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein - a standing principles.
matter that can be resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Nor may the
jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer Thirdly, petitioners question the validity of the order appellant proving the sale of
or upon the motion to dismiss, for, were we to be governed by such rule, the the Loring property on the ground that the sale was expressly authorized in favor of
question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant. But it is Quintin Lim and not respondent Chiu. Obviously, this is but a collateral issue. It is
necessary that jurisdiction be properly involved or called into activity by the firing noteworthy that the motion was filed in order to secure judicial approval of sale in
of a petition, complaint or other appropriate pleading. Nothing can change the lieu of marital consent as Payumo would not grant the same. The order, therefore,
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. None of the parties to the was not intended to vest Quintin Lim exclusive right to purchase the Loring
litigation can enlarge or diminish it or dictate when it shall be removed. That power property but rather it was intended to grant Tinitigan Sr. authorized to sell the
is a matter of legislative enactment which none but the legislature may change" same. To construe otherwise would defeat the purpose for which the motion was
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I, 1970 ed., pp. 37-38). filed. The fact that Quintin Lim was favored as buyer is merely incidental, it having
been made pursuant to the desire of respondent Tinitigan Sr. premised on the
In addition, records further disclose that the action for legal separation and former's interest over the disputed property as tenant therein. Quintin Lim,
dissolution of conjugal partnership was filed almost right after the order of however, did not manifest his ability and willingness to buy the property. He had
September 29, 1975 in Civil Case No. 21277 was issued. As can be gleaned from practically every opportunity prior to the sale in favor of Chiu to exercise his pre-
the facts, the filing of Civil Case No. 4459-P was apparently a tactical maneuver emptive right but he failed to exercise the same for one reason or another. The
intended to frustrate the order of September 29, 1975 issued by respondent Judge urgency of the need to settle pressing conjugal obligations prompted respondent
Navarro granting Tinitigan Sr. authority to sell the Loring property. Aptly, Tinitigan Sr. to look for other buyers who could immediately pay for the property
however, the order of October 29, 1975 made the appointment of Payumo as Chiu, to whom the property was subsequently offered, immediately paid the full
administrative subject to the condition "that the disposition of the property located amount of P315,000.00 upon the court's approval of the sale in his favor on March
at Loring St., Pasay City shall be subeject to the decision of the Court of First 3, 1976. This March 3, 1976 order is a reaffirmation of the order of September 29,
Instance of Rizal Branch II, Pasig, Rizal." There can be no clearer indication of the 1975.
validity of the questioned order, as far as jurisdiction is concerned, than the latter
court's own recognition of the jurisdiction priorly acquired by the court issuing it. Fourthly, petitioners assail the validity of the order on purely circumstantial ground
The well-settled rule that "jurisdiction once acquired continues until the case is — that Pentel whose President and General Manager is Quintin Lim, had the
finally terminated" is hereby observed (Republic vs. Central Surety and Ins. Co., 25 option to buy the premises. While this may be so, petitioners seem to have
SCRA 641[1968]). "The jurisdiction of a court depends upon the state of facts neglected that the contract of lease between Payumo and Pentel with option to buy
existing at the time it is invoked, and if the jurisdiction once attaches to the person has been entered into in violation of Civil Code provisions. A close scrutiny of the
and subject matter of the litigation, the subsequent happening of events, although facts would reveal that Payumo has contravened the law by encumbering the
they are of such a character as would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in disputed property as well as other conjugal properties without her husband's
the first innocence, will not operate to oust jurisdiction almdy attached" (Ramos vs. consent. Article 172 of the new Civil Code provides that "the wife cannot bind the
Central Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 565, 583 [1971]). conjugal partnership without the husband's consent, except in cases provided by
law." Granting arguendo that she is the administrative still her act of leasing the lots
covered by TCT No. 15923 and TCT No. 160998 is unjustified, being violative
of Article 388 of the new Civil Code which states that "the wife who is appellant
pointed as an administrative of the husband's property cannot alienate or encumber
the husband's property or that of the conjugal partnership without judicial
authority." Consequently, Payuran's unauthorized transaction cannot be invoked as
a source of right or valid defense. True, the contract may bind persons parties to the
same but it cannot bind another not a party thereto, merely because he is aware of
such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof (Manila Port Service vs. Court
of Appeals, 20 SCRA 1214, 1217). So goes the "res inter alios acta nobis nocet,
nec prodest," which means that a transaction between two parties ought not to
operate to the prejudice of a third person.

Finally, petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law in
denying Payuran's petition to enjoin or set aside the sale of the Loring property.
This argument, however, is unsubstantiated. The facts as when as the evidence
presented by both parties leave no other recourse for the respondent Court of
Appeals except to apply the pertinent legal provisions respecting the matter.
Whether the order authorizing the sale of the Loring property is interlocutory or
not, becomes of no moment in view of the conclusion aforesaid.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, THE PETITIONS IN

THESE TWO CASES ARE HEREBY DENIED AND THE DECISION OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS DATED JUNE 1, 1976 AND THE ORDER OF
RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED SEPTEMBER 29, 1975 ARE HEREBY
AFFIRMED. WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONERS IN BOTH CASES.

SO ORDERED.

Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro * and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur

 G.R. No. 125172 June 26, 1998 2. Recognizing as lawful and valid the ownership and possession of plaintiff Gilda
Corpuz over the remaining one-half portion of Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409
Spouses ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG, Petitioners, vs. COURT which has been the subject of the Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh. "A");
OF APPEALS and GILDA COPUZ, Respondents.
3. Ordering plaintiff Gilda Corpuz to reimburse defendants Luzviminda Guiang the
amount of NINE THOUSAND (P9,000.00) PESOS corresponding to the
payment made by defendants Guiangs to Manuel Callejo for the unpaid balance of
the account of plaintiff in favor of Manuel Callejo, and another sum of P379.62
PANGANIBAN, J.:
representing one-half of the amount of realty taxes paid by defendants Guiangs on
Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409, both with legal interests thereon computed
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the from the finality of the decision.
wife. The absence of the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the
vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable. Only in the latter case can ratification
No pronouncement as to costs in view of the factual circumstances of the case.
cure the defect.

Dissatisfied, petitioners-spouses filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.

The Case
Respondent Court, in its challenged Decision, ruled as follow: 6
These were the principles that guided the Court in deciding this petition for review
WHEREFORE, the appealed of the lower court in Civil Case No. 204 is hereby
of the Decision 1dated January 30, 1996 and the Resolution 2 dated May 28, 1996,
AFFIRMED by this Court. No costs considering plaintiff-appellee's failure to file
promulgated by the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 41758, affirming the
her brief despite notice.
Decision of the lower court and denying reconsideration, respectively.

Reconsideration was similarly denied by the same court in its assailed Resolution: 7
On May 28, 1990, Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz filed an Amended
Complainant 3 against her husband Judie Corpuz and Petitioner-Spouses Antonio
and Luzviminda Guiang. The said Complaint sought the declaration of a certain Finding that the issues raised in defendants-appellants motion for reconsideration
deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of private respondent and her of Our decision in this case of January 30, 1996, to be a mere rehash of the same
husband, null and void. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of issues which we have already passed upon in the said decision, and there [being] no
Koronadal, South Cotabato, Branch 25. In due course, the trial court rendered a cogent reason to disturb the same, this Court RESOLVED to DENY the instant
Decision 4 dated September 9, 1992, disposing as follow: 5 motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is rendered for the plaintiff and against the The Facts
defendants,
The facts of this case are simple. Over the objection of private respondent and while
1. Declaring both the Deed of Transfer of Rights dated March 1, 1990 (Exh. "A") she was in Manila seeking employment, her husband sold to the petitioners-spouses
and the "amicable settlement" dated March 16, 1990 (Exh. "B") as null void and one half of their conjugal peoperty, consisting of their residence and the lot on
of no effect; which it stood. The circumstances of this sale are set forth in the Decision of
Respondent Court, which quoted from the Decision of the trial court as follows: 8
1. Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendant Judie Corpuz are legally married spouses. Sometime in January 1990, Harriet Corpuz learned that her father intended to sell
They were married on December 24, 1968 in Bacolod City, before a judge. This is the remaining one-half portion including their house, of their homelot to
admitted by defendants-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang in their answer, defendants Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her mother informing her. She [Gilda
and also admitted by defendant Judie Corpuz when he testified in court (tsn. p. 3, Corpuz] replied that she was objecting to the sale. Harriet, however, did not inform
June 9, 1992), although the latter says that they were married in 1967. The couple her father about this; but instead gave the letter to Mrs. Luzviminda Guiang so that
have three children, namely: Junie - 18 years old, Harriet - 17 years of age, and she [Guiang] would advise her father (tsn. pp. 16-17, Sept. 6, 1991).
Jodie or Joji, the youngest, who was 15 years of age in August, 1990 when her
mother testified in court. 4. However, in the absence of his wife Gilda Corpuz, defendant Judie Corpuz
pushed through the sale of the remaining one-half portion of Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC)
Sometime on February 14, 1983, the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz, with plaintiff- Psd-165409. On March 1, 1990, he sold to defendant Luzviminda Guiang thru a
wife Gilda Corpuz as vendee, bought a 421 sq. meter lot located in Barangay Gen. document known as "Deed of Transfer of Rights" (Exh. "A") the remaining one-
Paulino Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal, South Cotabato, and particularly known as Lot half portion of their lot and the house standing thereon for a total consideration of
9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 from Manuel Callejo who signed as vendor through P30,000.00 of which P5,000.00 was to be paid in June, 1990. Transferor Judie
a conditional deed of sale for a total consideration of P14,735.00. The Corpuz's children Junie and Harriet signed the document as witness.
consideration was payable in installment, with right of cancellation in favor of
vendor should vendee fail to pay three successive installments (Exh. "2", tsn p. 6, Four (4) days after March 1, 1990 or on March 5, 1990, obviously to cure
February 14, 1990). whatever defect in defendant Judie Corpuz's title over the lot transferred, defendant
Luzviminda Guiang as vendee executed another agreement over Lot 9, Block 8,
2. Sometime on April 22, 1988, the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz sold one-half (LRC) Psd-165408 (Exh. "3"), this time with Manuela Jimenez Callejo, a widow
portion of their Lot No. 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 to the defendants-spouses of the original registered owner from whom the couple Judie and Gilda Corpuz
Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The latter have since then occupied the one-half originally bought the lot (Exh. "2"), who signed as vendor for a consideration of
portion [and] built their house thereon (tsn. p. 4, May 22, 1992). They are thus P9,000.00. Defendant Judie Corpuz signed as a witness to the sale (Exh. "3-A").
adjoining neighbors of the Corpuzes. The new sale (Exh. "3") describes the lot sold as Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC) Psd-
165408 but it is obvious from the mass of evidence that the correct lot is Lot 8,
3. Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz left for Manila sometime in June 1989. She was trying to Block 9, (LRC) Psd-165409, the very lot earlier sold to the couple Gilda and Judie
look for work abroad, in [the] Middle East. Unfortunately, she became a victim of Corpuz.
an unscrupulous illegal recruiter. She was not able to go abroad. She stayed for
sometime in Manila however, coming back to Koronadal, South Cotabato, . . . on 5. Sometimes on March 11, 1990, plaintiff returned home. She found her children
March 11, 1990. Plaintiff's departure for Manila to look for work in the Middle staying with other households. Only Junie was staying in their house. Harriet and
East was with the consent of her husband Judie Corpuz (tsn. p. 16, Aug. 12, 1990; Joji were with Mr. Panes. Gilda gathered her children together and stayed at their
p. 10 Sept. 6, 1991). house. Her husband was nowhere to be found. She was informed by her children
that their father had a wife already.
After his wife's departure for Manila, defendant Judie Corpuz seldom went home to
the conjugal dwelling. He stayed most of the time at his place of work at Samahang 6. For staying in their house sold by her husband, plaintiff was complained against
Nayon Building, a hotel, restaurant, and a cooperative. Daughter Herriet Corpuz by defendant Luzviminda Guiang and her husband Antonio Guiang before the
went to school at King's College, Bo. 1, Koronadal, South Cotabato, but she was at Barangay authorities of Barangay General Paulino Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal, South
the same time working as household help of, and staying at, the house of Mr. Panes. Cotabato, for trespassing (tsn. p. 34, Aug. 17, 1990). The case was docketed by the
Her brother Junie was not working. Her younger sister Jodie (Jojie) was going to barangay authorities as Barangay Case No. 38 for "trespassing". On March 16,
school. Her mother sometimes sent them money (tsn. p. 14, Sept. 6, 1991.) 1990, the parties thereat signed a document known as "amicable settlement". In
full, the settlement provides for, to wit:
That respondent, Mrs. Gilda Corpuz and her three children, namely: Junie, Hariet consent of his wife is null and void as provided under Article 124 of the Family
and Judie to leave voluntarily the house of Mr. and Mrs. Antonio Guiang, where Code. It also rejected petitioners' contention that the "amicable sttlement" ratified
they are presently boarding without any charge, on or before April 7, 1990. said sale, citing Article 1409 of the Code which expressly bars ratification of the
contracts specified therein, particularly those "prohibited or declared void by law."
FAIL NOT UNDER THE PENALTY OF THE LAW.
Hence, this petition. 9
Believing that she had received the shorter end of the bargain, plaintiff to the
Barangay Captain of Barangay Paulino Santos to question her signature on the The Issues
amicable settlement. She was referred however to the Office-In-Charge at the time, a
certain Mr. de la Cruz. The latter in turn told her that he could not do anything on In their Memorandum, petitioners assign to public respondent the following
the matter (tsn. p. 31, Aug. 17, 1990). errors: 10

This particular point not rebutted. The Barangay Captain who testified did not I
deny that Mrs. Gilda Corpuz approached him for the annulment of the settlement.
He merely said he forgot whether Mrs. Corpuz had approached him (tsn. p. 13,
Whether or not the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly executed.
Sept. 26, 1990). We thus conclude that Mrs. Corpuz really approached the
Barangay Captain for the annulment of the settlement. Annulment not having been
made, plaintiff stayed put in her house and lot. II

7. Defendant-spouses Guiang followed thru the amicable settlement with a motion Whether or not the Cour of Appeals erred in not declairing as voidable contract
for the execution of the amicable settlement, filing the same with the Municipal under Art. 1390 of the Civil Code the impugned Deed of Transfer of Rights which
Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato. The proceedings [are] still pending was validly ratified thru the execution of the "amicable settlement" by the
before the said court, with the filing of the instant suit. contending parties.

8. As a consequence of the sale, the spouses Guiang spent P600.00 for the III
preparation of the Deed of Transfer of Rights, Exh. "A", P9,000.00 as the amount
they paid to Mrs. Manuela Callejo, having assumed the remaining obligation of the Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not setting aside the findings of the
Corpuzes to Mrs. Callejo (Exh. "3"); P100.00 for the preparation of Exhibit "3"; a Court a quo which recognized as lawful and valid the ownership and possession of
total of P759.62 basic tax and special education fund on the lot; P127.50 as the private respondent over the remaining one half (1/2) portion of the properly.
total documentary stamp tax on the various documents; P535.72 for the capital
gains tax; P22.50 as transfer tax; a standard fee of P17.00; certification fee of In a nutshell, petitioners-spouses contend that (1) the contract of sale (Deed of
P5.00. These expenses particularly the taxes and other expenses towards the transfer Transfer of Rights) was merely voidable, and (2) such contract was ratified by
of the title to the spouses Guiangs were incurred for the whole Lot 9, Block 8, private respondent when she entered into an amicable sttlement with them.
(LRC) Psd-165409.
This Court's Ruling
Ruling of Respondent Court
The petition is bereft of merit.
Respondent Court found no reversible error in the trial court's ruling that any
alienation or encumbrance by the husband of the conjugal propety without the First Issue: Void or Voidable Contract?
Petitioners insist that the questioned Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly A When I arrived here in Koronadal, there was a problem which arose regarding my
executed by the parties-litigants in good faith and for valuable consideration. The residential house and lot because it was sold by my husband without my knowledge.
absence of private respondent's consent merely rendered the Deed voidable under
Article 1390 of the Civil Code, which provides: This being the case, said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of
the Family Code, which was correctly applied by the teo lower court:
Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there
may have been no damage to the contracting parties: Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnerhip properly
shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disgreement, the husband's decision
xxx xxx xxx shall prevail, subject recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue such decision.
influence or fraud.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in court. the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
They are susceptible of ratification.(n) powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of
the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
The error in petitioners' contention is evident. Article 1390, par. 2, refers to
contracts visited by vices of consent, i.e., contracts which were entered into by a
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may
person whose consent was obtained and vitiated through mistake, violence,
be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
intimidation, undue influence or fraud. In this instance, private respondent's consent
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent.
(165a) (Emphasis supplied)
Gilda Corpuz, on direct examination, testified thus: 11

Comparing said law with its equivalent provision in the Civil Code, the trial court
Q Now, on March 1, 1990, could you still recall where you were?
adroitly explained the amendatory effect of the above provision in this wise: 12
A I was still in Manila during that time.
The legal provision is clear. The disposition or encumbrance is void. It becomes still
clearer if we compare the same with the equivalent provision of the Civil Code of
xxx xxx xxx the Philippines. Under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnershit without the wife's
ATTY. FUENTES: consent. The alienation or encumbrance if so made however is not null and void. It
is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an action to annul the said
Q When did you come back to Koronadal, South Cotabato? alienation or encumbrance. Thus the provision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, to wit:
A That was on March 11, 1990, Ma'am.
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the
Q Now, when you arrived at Koronadal, was there any problem which arose transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the
concerning the ownership of your residential house at Callejo Subdivision? husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act
or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the
conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her "A"). By express provision of law, such a contract is also void. Thus, the legal
heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property provision, to wit:
fraudulently alienated by the husband.(n)
Art. 1422. Acontract which is the direct result of a previous illegal contract, is also
This particular provision giving the wife ten (10) years . . . during [the] marriage to void and inexistent. (Civil Code of the Philippines).
annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is
thus clear that any alienation or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the In summation therefore, both the Deed of transfer of Rights (Exh. "A") and the
Family Code took effect by the husband of the conjugal partnership property "amicable settlement" (Exh. "3") are null and void.
without the consent of the wife is null and void.
Doctrinally and clearly, a void contract cannot be ratified. 16
Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the intimidation referred to by
petitioners were perpetrated in the execution of the document embodying the
Neither can the "amicable settlement" be considered a continuing offer that was
amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged during trial that barangay authorities
accepted and perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124.
made her sign said document through misrepresentation and
The order of the pertinent events is clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint
coercion. 13 In any event, its execution does not alter the void character of the deed
for trespassing against private respondent, after which the barangay authorities
of sale between the husband and the petitioners-spouses, as will be discussed later.
secured an "amicable settlement" and petitioners filed before the MTC a motion
The fact remains that such contract was entered into without the wife's consent.
for its execution. The settlement, however, does not mention a continuing offer to
sell the property or an acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private effect that private respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of the
respondent's consent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the imagination, can the Court interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned in
concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, 14 the Article 124.
last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the
Second Issue: Amicable Settlement challenged Decision and Resolution. Costs against petitioners.

Insisting that the contract of sale was merely voidable, petitioners aver that it was SO ORDERED.
duly ratified by the contending parties through the "amicable settlement" they
executed on March 16, 1990 in Barangay Case No. 38.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

The position is not well taken. The trial and the appellate courts have resolved this
issue in favor of the private respondent. The trial court correctly held: 15

By the specific provision of the law [Art. 1390, Civil Code] therefore, the Deed to
Transfer of Rights (Exh. "A") cannot be ratified, even by an "amicable settlement".
The participation by some barangay authorities in the "amicable settlement" cannot
otherwise validate an invalid act. Moreover, it cannot be denied that the "amicable
settlement (Exh. "B") entered into by plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendent spouses
Guiang is a contract. It is a direct offshoot of the Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh.
 G.R. No. 138497 - January 16, 2002 property and industry of defendant Lopez with minimal, if not nil, actual
contribution from petitioner Relucio.
IMELDA RELUCIO, Petitioner, vs. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ, Respondent.
"In order to avoid defendant Lopez obligations as a father and husband, he
PARDO, J.: excluded the private respondent and their four children from sharing or benefiting
from the conjugal properties and the income or fruits there from. As such,
defendant Lopez either did not place them in his name or otherwise removed,
The Case
transferred, stashed away or concealed them from the private-respondent. He placed
substantial portions of these conjugal properties in the name of petitioner Relucio.
The case is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to set aside the decision2 of
the Court of Appeals that denied a petition for certiorari assailing the trial court's
"It was also averred that in the past twenty five years since defendant Lopez
order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the case against her inclusion as party
abandoned the private-respondent, he has sold, disposed of, alienated, transferred,
defendant therein.
assigned, canceled, removed or stashed away properties, assets and income belonging
to the conjugal partnership with the private-respondent and either spent the
The Facts proceeds thereof for his sole benefit and that of petitioner Relucio and their two
illegitimate children or permanently and fraudulently placed them beyond the reach
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows: of the private-respondent and their four children.

"On September 15, 1993, herein private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez "On December 8, 1993, a Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by herein
(plaintiff below) filed a petition for "APPOINTMENT AS SOLE petitioner on the ground that private respondent has no cause of action against her.
ADMINISTRATIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES,
FORFEITURE, ETC.," against defendant Alberto Lopez and petition Imelda "An Order dated February 10, 1994 was issued by herein respondent Judge denying
Relucio, docketed as Spec. Proc. M-3630, in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, petitioner Relucio's Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she is impleaded as a
Branch 141. In the petition, private-respondent alleged that sometime in 1968, necessary or indispensable party because some of the subject properties are
defendant Lopez, who is legally married to the private respondent, abandoned the registered in her name and defendant Lopez, or solely in her name.
latter and their four legitimate children; that he arrogated unto himself full and
exclusive control and administration of the conjugal properties, spending and using
"Subsequently thereafter, petitioner Relucio filed a Motion for Reconsideration to
the same for his sole gain and benefit to the total exclusion of the private
the Order of the respondent Judge dated February 10, 1994 but the same was
respondent and their four children; that defendant Lopez, after abandoning his
likewise denied in the Order dated May 31, 1994."3
family, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with herein petitioner since
1976.
On June 21, 1994, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari assailing the trial court's denial of her motion to dismiss.4
"It was further alleged that defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio, during their
period of cohabitation since 1976, have amassed a fortune consisting mainly of
stockholdings in Lopez-owned or controlled corporations, residential, agricultural, On May 31, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision denying the
commercial lots, houses, apartments and buildings, cars and other motor vehicles, petition.5 On June 26, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for
bank accounts and jewelry. These properties, which are in the names of defendant reconsideration.6 However, on April 6, 1996, the Court of Appeals denied
Lopez and petitioner Relucio singly or jointly or their dummies and proxies, have petitioner's motion for reconsideration.7
been acquired principally if not solely through the actual contribution of money,
Hence, this appeal.8
 The Issues In Part Two on the "Nature of [the] Complaint," respondent Angelina Mejia
Lopez summarized the causes of action alleged in the complaint below.
1. Whether respondent's petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the
conjugal property, accounting, etc. against her husband Alberto J. Lopez established The complaint is by an aggrieved wife against her husband.
a cause of action against petitioner.
Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief is sought against petitioner.
2. Whether petitioner's inclusion as party defendant is essential in the proceedings Respondent's causes of action were all against her husband.
for a complete adjudication of the controversy.9
The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as administratrix
The Court's Ruling of the conjugal partnership or absolute community property arising from her
marriage to Alberto J. Lopez. Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of
We grant the petition. We resolve the issues in seriatim. action. Article 128 of the Family Code refers only to spouses, to wit:

First issue: whether a cause of action exists against petitioner in the proceedings "If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her
below. "A cause of action is an act or omission of one party the defendant in obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for
violation of the legal right of the other."10The elements of a cause of action are: receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole
administrator of the conjugal partnership property xxx"
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created; The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between them, to the
exclusion of all other persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her
husband. Therefore, her first cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate
right-duty relation between petitioner and respondent that can possibly support a
such right; and
cause of action. In fact, none of the three elements of a cause of action exists.
(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the
The second cause of action is for an accounting "by respondent husband."14 The
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff
accounting of conjugal partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage.
for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.11

Petitioner has nothing to do with the marriage between respondent Alberto J.

A cause of action is sufficient if a valid judgment may be rendered thereon if the
Lopez. Hence, no cause of action can exist against petitioner on this ground.
alleged facts were admitted or proved.12

Respondent's alternative cause of action is for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' share

In order to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint
in the co-owned property "acquired during his illicit relationship and cohabitation
must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been
with [petitioner]"15 and for the "dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
merely defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.13
between him [Alberto J. Lopez] and the [respondent]."
Hence, to determine the sufficiency of the cause of action alleged in Special
The third cause of action is essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' share in
Proceedings M-3630, we assays its allegations.
property co-owned by him and petitioner. It does not involve the issue of validity of
the co-ownership between Alberto J. Lopez and petitioner. The issue is whether
there is basis in law to forfeit Alberto J. Lopez' share, if any there be, in property Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in Special Proceedings M-3630. A necessary
co-owned by him with petitioner. party as one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as party if
complete relief is to be accorded those already parties, or for a complete
Respondent's asserted right to forfeit extends to Alberto J. Lopez' share alone. determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.20 In the context of
Failure of Alberto J. Lopez to surrender such share, assuming the trial court finds in her petition in the lower court, respondent would be accorded complete relief if
respondent's favor, results in a breach of an obligation to respondent and gives rise Alberto J. Lopez were ordered to account for his alleged conjugal partnership
to a cause of action.16 Such cause of action, however, pertains to Alberto J. Lopez, property with respondent, give support to respondent and her children, turn over
not petitioner. his share in the co-ownership with petitioner and dissolve his conjugal partnership
or absolute community property with respondent.
The respondent also sought support. Support cannot be compelled from a stranger.
The Judgment
The action in Special Proceedings M-3630 is, to use respondent Angelina M.
Lopez' own words, one by "an aggrieved wife against her husband."17 References to WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the decision
petitioner in the common and specific allegations of fact in the complaint are of the Court of Appeals.21 The Court DISMISSES Special Proceedings M-3630 of
merely incidental, to set forth facts and circumstances that prove the causes of the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 141 as against petitioner.
action alleged against Alberto J. Lopez.
No costs.
Finally, as to the moral damages, respondent's claim for moral damages is against
Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner. SO ORDERED.

To sustain a cause of action for moral damages, the complaint must have the Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
character of an action for interference with marital or family relations under the
Civil Code.

A real party in interest is one who stands "to be benefited or injured by the
judgment of the suit."18In this case, petitioner would not be affected by any
judgment in Special Proceedings M-3630.

If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. An

indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final determination of an
action.19 Petitioner's participation in Special Proceedings M-36-30 is not
indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can issue a judgment ordering Alberto J.
Lopez to make an accounting of his conjugal partnership with respondent, and give
support to respondent and their children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez' conjugal
partnership with respondent, and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez' share in property co-
owned by him and petitioner. Such judgment would be perfectly valid and
enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez.
 FIRST DIVISION This agreement was handwritten by petitioner and signed by Edilberto.6 When
petitioner pointed out the conjugal nature of the properties, Edilberto assured her
G.R. No. 147978 - January 23, 2002 of his wife's conformity and consent to the sale.7 The formal typewritten Contracts
to Sell were thereafter prepared by petitioner. The following day, petitioner, the real
estate broker and Edilberto met in the latter's office for the formal signing of the
THELMA A. JADER-MANALO, Petitioner, vs. NORMA FERNANDEZ C.
typewritten Contracts to Sell.8 After Edilberto signed the contracts, petitioner
CAMAISA and EDILBERTO CAMAISA, Respondents.
delivered to him two checks, namely, UCPB Check No. 62807 dated April 15,
1992 for P200,000.00 and UCPB Check No. 62808 also dated April 15, 1992
KAPUNAN, J.: for P100,000.00 in the presence of the real estate broker and an employee in
Edilberto's office.9 The contracts were given to Edilberto for the formal affixing of
The issue raised in this case is whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a his wife's signature.
conjugal property without the wife's written consent.
The following day, petitioner received a call from respondent Norma, requesting a
The present controversy had its beginning when petitioner Thelma A. Jader-Manalo meeting to clarify some provisions of the contracts.10 To accommodate her queries,
allegedly came across an advertisement placed by respondents, the Spouses Norma petitioner, accompanied by her lawyer, met with Edilberto and Norma and the real
Fernandez C. Camaisa and Edilberto Camaisa, in the Classified Ads Section of the estate broker at Cafe Rizal in Makati.11 During the meeting, handwritten notations
newspaper BULLETIN TODAY in its April, 1992 issue, for the sale of their ten- were made on the contracts to sell, so they arranged to incorporate the notations
door apartment in Makati, as well as that in Taytay, Rizal. and to meet again for the formal signing of the contracts.12

As narrated by petitioner in her complaint filed with the Regional Trial Court of When petitioner met again with respondent spouses and the real estate broker at
Makati, Metro Manila, she was interested in buying the two properties so she Edilberto's office for the formal affixing of Norma's signature, she was surprised
negotiated for the purchase through a real estate broker, Mr. Proceso Ereno, when respondent spouses informed her that they were backing out of the agreement
authorized by respondent spouses.1 Petitioner made a visual inspection of the said because they needed "spot cash" for the full amount of the
lots with the real estate broker and was shown the tax declarations, real property tax consideration.13 Petitioner reminded respondent spouses that the contracts to sell
payment receipts, location plans, and vicinity maps relating to the had already been duly perfected and Norma's refusal to sign the same would unduly
properties.2Thereafter, petitioner met with the vendors who turned out to be prejudice petitioner. Still, Norma refused to sign the contracts prompting petitioner
respondent spouses. She made a definite offer to buy the properties to respondent to file a complaint for specific performance and damages against respondent spouses
Edilberto Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity of his wife, respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136 on April 29, 1992, to
Norma Camaisa in the presence of the real estate broker.3 After some bargaining, compel respondent Norma Camaisa to sign the contracts to sell.
petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price of P1,500,000.00 for the
Taytay property and P2,100,000.00 for the Makati property4 to be paid on A Motion to Dismiss14 was filed by respondents which was denied by the trial court
installment basis with downpayments of P100,000.00 and P200,000.00, in its Resolution of July 21, 1992.15
respectively, on April 15, 1992. The balance thereof was to be paid as follows 5:
Respondents then filed their Answer with Compulsory Counter-claim, alleging that
Taytay Property Makati Property it was an agreement between herein petitioner and respondent Edilberto Camaisa
6th month P200,000.00 P300,000.00 that the sale of the subject properties was still subject to the approval and
conformity of his wife Norma Camaisa.16 Thereafter, when Norma refused to give
12th month 700,000.00 1,600,000.00 her consent to the sale, her refusal was duly communicated by Edilberto to
18th month 500,000.00 petitioner.17 The checks issued by petitioner were returned to her by Edilberto and
she accepted the same without any objection.18 Respondent further claimed that the
acceptance of the checks returned to petitioner signified her assent to the stressed that the authority of the court to allow sale or encumbrance of a conjugal
cancellation of the sale of the subject properties.19 Respondent Norma denied that property without the consent of the other spouse is applicable only in cases where
she ever participated in the negotiations for the sale of the subject properties and the said spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
that she gave her consent and conformity to the same.20 administration of the conjugal property.

On October 20, 1992, respondent Norma F. Camaisa filed a Motion for Summary Hence, the present recourse assigning the following errors:
Judgment21asserting that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact on the basis
of the pleadings and admission of the parties considering that the wife's written THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY ERRED IN
consent was not obtained in the contract to sell, the subject conjugal properties RENDERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN DISMISSING THE
belonging to respondents; hence, the contract was null and void. COMPLAINT ENTIRELY AND ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF
NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS ON THE TITLES OF THE SUBJECT REAL
On April 14, 1993, the trial court rendered a summary judgment dismissing the PROPERTIES;
complaint on the ground that under Art. 124 of the Family Code, the court cannot
intervene to authorize the transaction in the absence of the consent of the wife since THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY ERRED IN
said wife who refused to give consent had not been shown to be incapacitated. The FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE SALE OF REAL PROPERTIES BY
dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads: RESPONDENTS TO PETITIONER HAVE ALREADY BEEN
PERFECTED, FOR AFTER THE LATTER PAID P300,000.00
WHEREFORE, considering these premises, judgment is hereby rendered: DOWNPAYMENT, RESPONDENT MRS. CAMAISA NEVER OBJECTED
TO STIPULATIONS WITH RESPECT TO PRICE, OBJECT AND TERMS
1. Dismissing the complaint and ordering the cancellation of the Notice of Lis OF PAYMENT IN THE CONTRACT TO SELL ALREADY SIGNED BY
Pendens by reason of its filing on TCT Nos. (464860) S-8724 and (464861) S- THE PETITIONER, RESPONDENT MR. CAMAISA AND WITNESSES
8725 of the Registry of Deeds at Makati and on TCT Nos. 295976 and 295971 MARKED AS ANNEX "G" IN THE COMPLAINT EXCEPT, FOR MINOR
of the Registry of Rizal. PROVISIONS ALREADY IMPLIED BY LAW, LIKE EJECTMENT OF
TENANTS, SUBDIVISION OF TITLE AND RESCISSION IN CASE OF
NONPAYMENT, WHICH PETITIONER READILY AGREED AND
2. Ordering plaintiff Thelma A. Jader to pay defendant spouses Norma and
ACCEDED TO THEIR INCLUSION;
Edilberto Camaisa, FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) as Moral Damages and
FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) as Attorney's Fees.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY ERRED
WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT CONTRACT OF SALE IS
Costs against plaintiff.22
CONSENSUAL AND IT IS PERFECTED BY THE MERE CONSENT OF
THE PARTIES AND THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS ARE ARTICLES
Petitioner, thus, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. On November 29, 2000, 1157, 1356, 1357, 1358, 1403, 1405 AND 1475 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF
the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal by the trial court but deleted the award THE PHILIPPINES AND GOVERNED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUD.23
of P50,000.00 as damages and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
The Court does not find error in the decisions of both the trial court and the Court
The Court of Appeals explained that the properties subject of the contracts were of Appeals.
conjugal properties and as such, the consent of both spouses is necessary to give
effect to the sale. Since private respondent Norma Camaisa refused to sign the
Petitioner alleges that the trial court erred when it entered a summary judgment in
contracts, the sale was never perfected. In fact, the downpayment was returned by
favor of respondent spouses there being a genuine issue of fact. Petitioner maintains
respondent spouses and was accepted by petitioner. The Court of Appeals also
that the issue of whether the contracts to sell between petitioner and respondent The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the
spouses was perfected is a question of fact necessitating a trial on the merits. contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur.

The Court does not agree. A summary judgment is one granted by the court upon Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale.
motion by a party for an expeditious settlement of a case, there appearing from the Even granting that respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for the
pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no important sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is
questions or issues of fact involved, and that therefore the moving party is entitled required by law for its validity. Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma
to judgment as a matter of law.24 A perusal of the pleadings submitted by both refused to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have been aware of the
parties show that there is no genuine controversy as to the facts involved therein. negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties. However, being merely aware
of a transaction is not consent.25
Both parties admit that there were negotiations for the sale of four parcels of land
between petitioner and respondent spouses; that petitioner and respondent Finally, petitioner argues that since respondent Norma unjustly refuses to affix her
Edilberto Camaisa came to an agreement as to the price and the terms of payment, signatures to the contracts to sell, court authorization under Article 124 of the
and a downpayment was paid by petitioner to the latter; and that respondent Family Code is warranted.
Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. The issue thus posed for resolution in
the trial court was whether or not the contracts to sell between petitioner and The argument is bereft of merit. Petitioner is correct insofar as she alleges that if the
respondent spouses were already perfected such that the latter could no longer back written consent of the other spouse cannot be obtained or is being withheld, the
out of the agreement. matter may be brought to court which will give such authority if the same is
warranted by the circumstances. However, it should be stressed that court
The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does
administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife, not give consent is incapacitated.26
otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus, Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
In this case, petitioner failed to allege and prove that respondent Norma was
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts. In the absence of such showing of
shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision the wife's incapacity, court authorization cannot be sought.
shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing Under the foregoing facts, the motion for summary judgment was proper
such decision. considering that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact. The only issue to
be resolved by the trial court was whether the contract to sell involving conjugal
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in properties was valid without the written consent of the wife.
the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of Appeals dated November 29, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 43421 AFFIRMED.
the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
SO ORDERED.
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may
be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur
(Underscoring ours.)
G.R. No. L-61700 September 14, 1987 allowance because whatever funds are in the hands of the
administrator, they constitute funds held in trust for the benefit
PRINCESITA SANTERO, FEDERICO SANTERO and WILLIE of whoever will be adjudged as owners of the Kawit property
SANTERO, petitioners, from which said administrator derives the only income of the
vs. intestate estate of Pablo Santero, et al.
HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, ANSELMA DIAZ,
VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA, MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, and In the Reply filed by the guardian-movant, she admitted some
REYNALDO EVARISTO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of her children are of age and not enrolled for the first semester
of PABLO SANTERO, respondents. due to lack of funds but will be enrolled as soon as they are
given the requested allowances. She cited Article 290 of the
Civil Code providing that:

PARAS, J.: Support is everything that is indispensable

for substance, dwelling, clothing and
medical attendance, according to the social
This is a Petition for certiorari which questions the order of the respondent court
position of the family.
granting the Motion for Allowance filed by private respondents. Said order reads as
follows:
Support also includes the education of the
person entitled to be supported until he
Acting on the Motion For Allowance dated June 30, 1982 filed
completes his education or training for some
by Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel, all surnamed
trade or vocation, even beyond the age of
Santero, thru their guardian, Anselma Diaz, the Opposition
majority.'
thereto dated July 8, 1982 filed by the oppositors, the Reply to
Opposition dated July 12, 1982 filed by movant Anselma Diaz
and the Rejoinder dated July 26, 1982 filed by the oppositors, citing also Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court which provides:
the Court was constrained to examine the Motion For
Allowance filed by the herein movant last year wherein the Allowance to widow and family. The widow
ground cited was for support which included educational and minor or incapacitated children of a
expenses, clothing and medical necessities, which was granted deceased person, during the settlement of
and said minors were given an allowance prayed for in their the estate, shall receive therefrom, under the
motion. direction of the Court, such allowance as
provided by law.'
In the Motion For Allowance in question guardian-movant
Anselma Diaz only followed the precedent of the Court which From the foregoing discussion alone, the Court cannot deviate
granted a similar motion last year to be spent for the school from its duty to give the allowance sought by the wards, the fact
expenses of her wards. In their opposition the oppositors that they need further education which should have been
contend that the wards for whom allowance is sought are no provided to them if their deceased father were alive.
longer schooling and have attained majority age so that they are
no longer under guardianship. They likewise allege that the On the allegation that the funds from which the allowance
administrator does not have sufficient funds to cover the said would be derived are trust funds, the Court, time and again had
 emphasized that the estate of the Santeros is quite big and the On September 10, 1985, an Amended Order was issued by respondent Court
amount to be released for allowances is indeed insignificant and directing Anselma Diaz to submit her clarification or explanation as to the
which can easily be replaced from its general fund if the so- additional three (3) children of Anselma Diaz included in the motion. In
called trust fund is adjudicated to the oppositors. compliance therewith Anselma Diaz filed her "Clarification" stating among others
that in her previous motions, only the last four minor children as represented by the
WHEREFORE, Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel, all mother, Anselma Diaz were included in the motion for support and her first three
surnamed Santero are hereby granted an allowance of two (3) children who were then of age should have been included since all her children
thousand (P2,000.00) pesos each for tuition fees, clothing have the right to receive allowance as advance payment of their shares in the
materials and subsistence out of any available funds in the hands inheritance of Pablo Santero under Art. 188, of the New Civil Code.
of the administrator who is ordered to reimburse to them the
said amount after this order shall have become final to enable On October 15, 1985, petitioners herein filed their Motion to Admit Supplemental
the oppositors to file their appeal by certiorari if they so desire Petition opposing the inclusion of three (3) more heirs. We denied that "Motion
within the reglementary period. for Extension of Time to file their Supplemental Petition" as per Our Resolution
dated October 23, 1985.
SO ORDERED.
On November 11, 1985, another Order was issued by the respondent court
Bacoor, Cavite, July 28, 1982. directing the administrator of the estate to get back the allowance of the three
additional recipients or children of Anselma Diaz apparently based on the
oppositors' (petitioners herein) "Urgent Motion to Direct the Administrator to
(pp. 35-36, Rollo)
Withhold Disbursement of Allowance to the Movants."
It appears from the records that petitioners Princesita Santero-Morales, Federico
The issues now being raised in this present Petition are:
Santero and Winy Santero are the children begotten by the late Pablo Santero with
Felixberta Pacursa while private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and
Miguel all surnamed Santero are four of the seven children begotten by the same 1. Whether or not respondent court acted with abuse of
Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz. Both sets of children are the natural children of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the
the late Pablo Santero since neither of their mothers, was married to their father allowance to the respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and
Pablo. Pablo Santero in turn, who died on November 30, 1973 was the only Miguel-P2,000.00 each despite the fact that all of them are not
legitimate son of Pascual Santero who died in 1970 and Simona Pamuti Vda. de minors and all are gainfully employed with the exception of
Santero who died in 1976. Miguel.

Meanwhile before We could act on the instant petition private respondents filed 2. Whether or not respondent Court acted with abuse of
another Motion for Allowance dated March 25, 1985 with the respondent court to discretion in granting the allowance based on the allegations of
include Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito all surnamed Santero as children of the late the said respondents that the abovenamed wards are still
Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz praying that an order be granted directing the schooling and they are in actual need of money to defray their
administrator Reynaldo C. Evaristo, to deliver the sum of P6,000.00 to each of the school expenses for 1982-83 when the truth is that they are no
seven (7) children of Anselma Diaz as their allowance from the estate of Pablo longer schooling.
Santero. The respondent Court granted the motion of the private respondents but
oppositors (petitioners herein) asked the court to reconsider said Order. 3. Whether or not respondent Court acted with abuse of
discretion in granting the motion for allowance without
 conducting a hearing thereon, to determine the truth of Support also includes the education of the person entitled to be
allegations of the private respondents. supported until he completes his education or training for some
profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
Petitioners argue that private respondents are not entitled to any allowance since
they have already attained majority age, two are gainfully employed and one is Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be
married as provided for under Sec. 3 Rule 83, of the Rules of Court. Petitioners given to the surviving spouse and to the children during the
also allege that there was misrepresentation on the part of the guardian in asking for liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs
allowance for tuition fees, books and other school materials and other miscellaneous to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that
expenses for school term 1982-83 because these wards have already attained amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents
majority age so that they are no longer under guardianship. They further allege that pertaining to them.
the administrator of the estate of Pablo Santero does not have sufficient funds to
cover said allowance because whatever funds are in the hands of the administrator The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no
constitute funds held in trust for the benefit of whoever will be adjudged as owners moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to
of the Kawit properties from where these funds now held by the administrator are allowance under Art. 188. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow
derived. and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the
surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, the private
In this connection, the question of whether the private respondents are entitled to respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are
allowance or not concerns only the intestate estate of the late Pablo Santero and not entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their
the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti, parents of their late father Pablo Santero. Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives
legitimate son Pablo Santero. The reason for this is Art. 992 of the New Civil Code the surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support during the
which states that "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. Be it noted however that
relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child." The question of with respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate spouse" (not common-
whether or not the petitioners and private respondents are entitled to inherit by law spouses who are the mothers of the children here).
right of representation from their grandparents more particularly from Simona
Pamuti was settled by Us in the related case of "Anselma Diaz, et al. vs. Felisa It is not true that the Motion for Allowance was granted by respondent Court
Pamuti-Jardin" (G.R. No. 66574-R) wherein We held that in view of the barrier without hearing. The record shows that the "Motion for Allowance" dated June 30,
present in said Art. 992, petitioners and private respondents are excluded from the 1982 contains a Notice of Hearing (p. 2, Annex "A") addressed to the lawyers for
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. the petitioners and setting the hearing thereof on July 8, 1982 at 9:00 in the
morning. Apparently a copy of said motion was duly received by the lawyer, Atty.
The present petition obviously lacks merit. Beltran as he filed an opposition thereto on the same date of hearing of the motion.
Furthermore even the instant petition admits that the wards, (petitioners and private
The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the New Rules of Court respondents as represented by their respective guardians) "have been granted
but Arts. 290 and 188 of the Civil Code reading as follows: allowances for school expenses for about 8 years now." The respondent court in
granting the motion for allowance merely "followed the precedent of the court
which granted a similar motion last year." (Annex "F") However in previous years
Art. 290. Support is everything that is indispensable for
(1979-1981) the "wards" (petitioners and private respondents) only received
sustenance, dwelling, clothing and medical attendance, according
P1,500.00 each depending upon the availability of funds as granted by the court in
tothe social position of the family.
several orders. (Annex 1 to Annex 4).
WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforementioned circumstances, the instant
Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed judgment is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., took no part.

 [G.R. No. L-8190. May 28, 1958.] dismiss the complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action because "it
does not allege any of the grounds recognized by Article 191 of the Civil Code for
GONZALO GARCIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONSOLACION decreeing a judicial separation properties." Plaintiff vigorously opposed the motion
MANZANO, Defendant-Appellee. dismiss, claiming that he is entitled to some relief, legal or equitable, under the
allegations of his complaint, and that Article 191 of the new Civil Code may also be
Fernandez & Benedicto and Primo L. Agsaoay for Appellant. availed of by the husband where the administration of the administration of the
conjugal partnership property has been forcibly taken from him by his wife and she
Diokno & Sison and De Santos, Herrera & Delfino for Appellee. abuses the management thereof. Acting on the motion to dismiss, the lower court
held that plaintiff’s complaint is not included under the provisions of Articles 190
DECISION and 191 of the new Civil Code providing for judicial separation of the conjugal
separation of the conjugal partnership property, and that the husband being the
legal administrator of the partnership, he "continuo con suficientes remedios legales
REYES, J. B. L., J.: para asegurar y reafirmar su autoridad en cuanto al manejo de los bienes gananciales
dentro de la sociedad conyugal," and ordered the dismissal of the complaint
without prejudice. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence,
This is an action filed by husband Gonzalo Garcia against his wife Consolacion his present appeal.
Manzano for the judicial declaration of the separation of their conjugal partnership
property (Civil Case No. 23099, Court of First Instance of Manila). We agree with the court below that the complaint does not establish a case for
separation of property. Consistent with its policy of discouraging a régime of
Plaintiff Gonzalo Garcia alleged in his complaint that he and defendant are husband separation as not in harmony with the unity of the family and the mutual affection
and wife but they have been living separately from each other since 1948, all and help expected of the spouses, the Civil Codes (both old and new) require that
attempts at reconciliation between them having failed; that plaintiff, a duly licensed separation of property shall not prevail unless expressly stipulated in marriage
doctor of veterinary science, used to be employed in the slaughter-house of the City settlements before the union is solemnized or by formal judicial decree during the
of Manila, while defendant, with plaintiff’s knowledge and consent, engaged in the existence of the marriage (Article 190, new Civil Code; Article 1432, old Code);
business of slaughtering large cattle and selling the fresh meat in the city; that as a and in the latter case, it may only be ordered by the court for causes specified in
result of their joint efforts, plaintiff and defendant acquired and accumulated real Article 191 of the Civil Code:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
and personal properties; that upon the separation of the spouses, the defendant
assumed the complete management and administration of the conjugal partnership "ART. 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it
property, has been enjoying said property as well as its accessions and fruits to the shall be decreed when the spouse of the petitioner, has been sentenced to a penalty
exclusion and prejudice of plaintiff, and has even fictitiously transferred or alienated which carries with it civil interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal
a majority of property in favor of third persons; that since defendant assumed the separation has been granted.
management and administration of the conjugal partnership property, she has
neglected to file any income tax returns; and that defendant has failed and refused In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property of
to turn over and deliver to plaintiff his rightful share and participation in the the husband, or in case of abandonment by the husband, separation of property may
conjugal partnership property and its fruits. Wherefore, plaintiff prayed that also be ordered by the court according to the provisions of articles 167 and 173
judgment be rendered ordering defendant to render a complete accounting of the No. 3.
conjugal partnership property and its fruits, that judicial pronouncement be made
ordering the separation of the conjugal partnership property of the spouses, and that In all these cases, it is sufficient to present the final judgment which has been
the rightful share therein of each of them be adjudicated pursuant to law. entered against the guilty or absent spouse.

Upon receipt of copy of the complaint and summons, defendant filed a motion to The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the philosophy underlying the provisions in question. The wife is granted a remedy
husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership, shall be notified of against the mismanagement or maladministration of the husband because by express
any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal provision of law, it is the husband who has the administration of the conjugal
partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his partnership.
interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership,
the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third "ART. 165. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership."cralaw
persons. virtua1aw library

After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of Arts 214 and 215 "ART. 172. The wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband’s
shall apply. The provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in consent, except in cases provided by law."cralaw virtua1aw library
Arts. 498 to 501 shall be applicable."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the system established by the Code the wife does not administer the conjugal
This enumeration must be regarded as limitative, in view of the Code’s restrictive partnership unless with the consent of the husband, or by decree of court and under
policy. The appellant recognizes that his case does not come within the purview of its supervision (Arts. 168, 196) "with such limitations as they (the courts) may
the first paragraph of the Article quoted; but vigorously contends that the deem advisable" (Art. 197 in relation to Article 196). Legally, therefore, the wife
provisions of the second paragraph, like those of Articles 167 and 178, should be can not mismanage the conjugal partnership property or affairs, unless the husband
interpreted as applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the husband, even if the letter of the or the courts tolerate it. In the event of such maladministration by the wife (and
statute refers to the wife exclusively. disregarding the case of judicial authorization to have the wife manage the
partnership, since such a case is not involved), the remedy of the husband does not
"ART. 167. In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal lie in a judicial separation of property but in revoking the power granted to the wife
partnership property by the husband, the courts, on petition of the wife, may and resume the administration of the community property and the conduct of the
provide for a receivership, or administration by the wife, or separation of affairs of the conjugal partnership. He may enforce his right of possession and
property."cralaw virtua1aw library control of the conjugal property against his wife (Perkins v. Perkins, 57 Phil., 205)
and seek such ancillary remedies as may, be required by the circumstances, even to
"ART. 178. The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial the extent of annulling or rescinding any unauthorized alienations or incumbrances,
approval, shall not affect the conjugal partnership, except that:chanrob1es virtual upon proper action filed for that purpose. For this reason, the articles above quoted
1aw library contemplate exclusively the remedies available to the wife (who is not the legal
administrator of the partnership) against the abuses of her husband because
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just normally only the latter can commit such abuses.
cause, shall not have a right to be supported;
Appellant avers that even if separation of property is not available, the allegations of
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by his complaint entitle him to accounting and other relief. Unfortunately, the
law, judicial authorization shall be necessary; complaint not only expressly pleads the nature of the action as one for separation of
property, but its allegations clearly proceed on the theory that the plaintiff is
(3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year, entitled to such separation. Thus, the averments regarding fictitious or fraudulent
she may petition the court for a receivership, or administration by her of the transfers are incompatible with an action between wife and husband alone, for it is
conjugal partnership property, or separation of property."cralaw virtua1aw library elementary that the legality of such transfers can not be passed upon without giving
the transferees an opportunity to be heard.
In support of his thesis, appellant argues that in case of mismanagement and
maladministration by the wife, the husband should be entitled to the same relief as Everything considered, we believe that the action of the court a quo in dismissing
the wife, otherwise there would be a void in the law. This contention ignores the the action in view of the impropriety of the principal remedy sought, but without
prejudice to proper proceedings, would better suit the interests of equity and justice,
facilitating the clarification and simplification of the issues involved.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So
ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,

Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-20379 June 22, 1965 have executed the aforementioned agreement; that a voluntary dissolution of the
conjugal partnership during the marriage is allowed, under Article 191 of the Civil
IN THE MATTER OF THE VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION OF THE Code, subject to judicial approval; that petitioners and their conjugal partnership
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF JOSE BERMAS, SR. and PILAR MANUEL have no outstanding debts or obligations; and that the dissolution of said conjugal
BERMAS and SEPARATION OF PROPERTY, JOSE BERMAS, SR. and partnership and the separation of property agreed upon between the petitioners
PILAR MANUEL BERMAS, petitioners-appellants. would not prejudice any creditor or third person. Premised upon these allegations,
petitioners prayed for the dissolution of said conjugal partnership and the approval
of said agreement for separation of properties between them.
Virginia. M. Ramos for petitioners-appellants.
Upon the filing of the petition, the court issued an order setting it for hearing on
CONCEPCION, J.:
July 7, 1962, and caused a notice to that effect to be published in a newspaper of
general circulation in Zamboanga City, once a week, for three (3) consecutive
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City weeks. After said hearing, the court rendered the appealed decision, denying the
denying the petition of appellants Jose Bermas, Sr. and Pilar Manuel Bermas for the petition upon the ground that, under Article 192 of the Civil Code of the
voluntary dissolution of their conjugal partnership and the establishment between Philippines, a conjugal partnership shall only be dissolved once legal separation has
them of the regime of separation of property as set forth in the deed, Exhibit Q. been ordered, and this cannot take place, pursuant to Article 191 of the same Code,
except upon civil interdiction declaration of absence or abandonment. Hence, this
The same is entitled "Agreement for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership and appeal by the petitioners who maintain that, with judicial approval, a conjugal
Separation of Property." It was executed by the petitioners on May 31, 1962. It partnership may also be dissolved, upon agreement of the spouses. Indeed, the
states that they are and have been legally married since December 24, 1932; that fourth paragraph of said Article 191 reads:
they have two children, namely, Manuel T. and Ruben J. Bermas, both of age and
married; that, during their marriage, petitioners have acquired twelve (12) parcels of The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal
land and two (2) buildings, described in Exhibit Q; that believing that it will partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the
redound to their mutual advantage, benefit and gain, and preserve peace and husband and of the wife as well as of the conjugal partnership, shall be notified of
harmony in the family, as well as prevent friction, dissension and confusion among any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal
their respective heirs in the future, particularly because petitioner Jose Bermas, Sr. partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his
has two (2) sets of children, one by a former marriage, and another by his present interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership,
wife, the other petitioner, said petitioners have mutually agreed to dissolve their the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third
conjugal partnership, and to the establishment of a separation of properties in the persons.
manner specified in the contract. Thereupon, the same proceeds to enumerate the
properties that shall belong exclusively to Pilar Manuel Bermas and those that shall
It should be noted this connection, that, although petitioner Jose Bermas, Sr.
belong in fee simple to Jose Bermas. Sr. The contract, likewise, contains a
admittedly has children by a previous marriage, their names have not been given in
stipulation concerning the income derived from rentals, as well as a quitclaim by
either Exhibit Q or the petition for the approval thereof, despite the fact that his
each party in favor of the other, and provides that, thereafter, any property acquired
children with his co-petitioner have been named in both. Consequently, said
by any or both of the patties shall pertain to him or her exclusively, or to both as
children by first marriage of petitioner Jose Bermas, Sr. do not appear to have been
co-owners, as the case may be.
notified personally of the filing of the petition and of the date of the hearing
thereof. In fact, no similar notice appears to have been given to the children of the
Soon after the execution of this contract, or on June 11, 1962, the petitioners filed petitioners herein, although the danger of substantial injury to rights would seem to
with said court the aforementioned petition, alleging therein that they are married as be remote.
above stated; that they have the two (2) children abovementioned; that petitioners
The situation as regards the children by first marriage is, however, materially
different. Indeed, the contract, Exhibit Q, purports to dissolve and, hence, liquidate
the conjugal partnership between the petitioners. But, this liquidation should not
and cannot be effected without a liquidation of the conjugal partnership between
Jose Bermas, Sr. and his first wife, in which the children by first marriage certainly
have an interest (Onas v. Javillo, 59 Phil. 733, 737). At any rate, said Exhibit Q
could adversely affect the rights of said children by first marriage, for, "in case of
doubt, the partnership property shall be divided between the different (conjugal)
partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and to the property belonging to
the respective spouses," as provided in Article 189 of the aforementioned Code
(Article 1431 of the Spanish Civil Code). Hence it is essential that said children by
previous marriage be personally notified of the instant proceedings, and that, for
this purpose, their names and addresses, as well as the addresses of the children of
herein petitioners, be furnished by them.

WHEREFORE, the decision from is hereby set aside, and the case remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings in conformity with this decision. It is so
ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
Barrera, J., is on leave
G.R. No. L-26462 June 9, 1969 Yaptinchay who died in Hongkong on July 7, 1965. This is known in the record as
Special Proceedings 1944-P. Petitioner there alleged that the deceased Isidro Y.
TERESITA C. YAPTINCHAY, petitioner, Yaptinchay had lived with her continuously, openly and publicly as husband and
vs. wife for nineteen (19) years: from 1946 to 1964 at 1951 Taft-Avenue, Pasay City,
HON. GUILLERMO E. TORRES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and from 1964 to July 1965 at 60 Russel Avenue, Pasay City; that the deceased
Pasig Branch; VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY, in her own behalf and in her who died without a will left an estate consisting of personal and real properties
capacity as Special Administratrix in the Intestate Estate of the deceased Isidro Y. situated in the Philippines, Hongkong and other places with an estimated value of
Yaptinchay and JESUS MONZON, MARY YAPTINCHAY ELIGIR, about P500,000; that to petitioner's knowledge and information, the deceased left
ERNESTO YAPTINCHAY, ANTONIO YAPTINCHAY, ASUNCION three daughters, Virginia Yaptinchay, Mary Yaptinchay Eligir and Asuncion
YAPTINCHAY, JOSEFINA Y. YAPTINCHAY, ROSA Y. MONZON, Yaptinchay, all of age; that on July 7, 8 and 11, 1965, certain parties carted away
ISABEL Y. VALERIANO, REMEDIOS Y. YAPTINCHAY, FELICIDAD Y. from the residences aforesaid personal properties belonging to the deceased together
ARGUELLES, MARY DOE and JOHN DOE, respondents. with others exclusively owned by petitioner. It was averred that in these
circumstances the appointment of a special administrator to take custody and care
of the interests of the deceased pending appointment of a regular administrator
V. E. del Rosario and Associates for petitioner.
became an urgent necessity.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo and Feliciano for respondents.
Upon the foregoing allegations, the court issued on July 17, 1965 an order
SANCHEZ, J.:
appointing herein petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay special administratrix of the
state of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay upon a P25,000-bond.
The problem posed in this, an original petition for certiorari, is whether or not this
Court in the exercise of its supervisory powers should stake down as having been
To the petition of Teresita C. Yaptinchay, an opposition was registered by Josefina
issued in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the respondent
Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate wife, and Ernesto Y. Yaptinchay and other
judge's order of June 15, 1966 in Civil Case 8873 (Court of First Instance of
children, of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay, upon the ground that said Teresita
Rizal) directing petitioner to deliver to Special Administratrix Virginia Y.
C. Yaptinchay, not being an heir of the decedent, had no right to institute the
Yaptinchay of the estate of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay the North Forbes
proceeding for the settlement of the latter's estate, much less to procure
Park property hereinafter described, and to refrain from disturbing or interfering in
appointment as administratrix thereof; and that having admittedly cohabited with
any manner whatsoever with the latter's possession thereof, such order having been
the deceased for a number of years said petitioner was not qualified to serve as
amended by said respondent judge's subsequent order of June, 28, 1966 in turn
administratrix for want of integrity. At the same time, oppositors counter-petitioned
enjoining defendants in said case (private respondents herein) and/or their duly
for the appointment of Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, daughter of the deceased, as special
authorized agents or representatives from selling, disposing, or otherwise
administratrix and of Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged surviving spouse, as regular
encumbering said property in any manner whatsoever pending the termination of
administratrix.
said case. We granted the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction prayed for and
directed respondents to return the possession of the North Forbes Park property to
petitioner upon a P50,000-bond. To give oppositors an opportunity to be heard, the probate court, on July 19, 1965,
set aside its order of July 17, 1965 appointing petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay
special administratrix.
The controlling facts are the following:

On July 30, 1965, after the parties were heard, the probate court granted counter-
On July 13, 1965, herein petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay sought in the Court of
petitioners' prayer and named Virginia Y. Yaptinchay special administratrix upon a
First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, her appointment first as Special
P50,000-bond.1awphil.nêt
Administratrix and then as regular administratrix of the estate of Isidro Y.
On August 18, 1965, the special administratrix submitted a preliminary inventory administration over the assets registered in the name of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay
of the assets of the estate of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay. Included amongst and/or in the latter's possession at the time of his death.
these was "[a] bungalow residential house with swimming pool, situated at Park
corner Talisay Road, North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal" adverted to at the start of Came the herein disputed order of June 15, 1966 issued in said Civil Case
this opinion. 8873, the pertinent portion of which reads: "From the pleadings as well
as the evidence already submitted and representations made to the court
It was after respondent Virginia Y. Yaptinchay had been appointed special during the arguments, it appears that one of the properties in dispute is
administratrix that herein petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay made her second move. the property located at the corner of Park Road and Talisay Street, North
That was on August 14, 1965. This time, petitioner filed in another branch (Pasig Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal which at the time of the death of the deceased
Branch) of the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for replevin and for Isidro Y. Yaptinchay was still under construction and it also appears that
liquidation of the partnership supposedly formed during the period of her after his death said property was among the properties of the deceased
cohabitation with Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and for damages. This case was docketed as placed under the administration of the special administratrix, the
Civil Case 8873. 1 Pending hearing on the question of the issuance of the writs of defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay. Information has been given that in the
replevin and preliminary injunction prayed for, respondent judge Guillermo E. evening of August 14, 1965, the plaintiff was able to dispossess the
Torres issued an order of August 17, 1965 temporarily restraining defendants special administratrix from the premises in question and that since then
therein (private respondents here) and their agents from disposing any of the she had been in custody of said house.
properties listed in the complaint and from interfering with plaintiff's (herein
petitioner's) rights to, and possession over, amongst others, "the house now While the Court is still considering the merits of the application and
standing at North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal." counter-application for provisional relief, the Court believes that for the
protection of the properties and considering the Forbes Park property is
On August 25, 1965, defendants (private respondents herein) resisted the action, really under the responsibility of defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, by
opposed the issuance of the writs of replevin and preliminary injunction, mainly virtue of her being appointed Special Administratrix of the estate of the
upon these propositions: (1) that exclusive jurisdiction over the settlement of the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay, the Court denies the petition for the issuance
estate of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay was already vested in the Court of First of a writ of preliminary injunction of the plaintiff with respect to the
Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch in the special proceedings heretofore Forbes Park property and the restraining order issued by this Court is
mentioned (Special Proceedings No. 1944-P); (2) that the present liquidation case lifted. The Court also orders the plaintiff to cease and desist from
was filed to oust said probate court of jurisdiction over the properties enumerated disturbing in any manner whatsoever the defendant Virginia Y.
in this, the second case (Civil Case 8873); and (3) that plaintiff was not entitled to Yaptinchay in the possession of said property.
the remedy of injunction prayed for, her alleged right sought to be protected
thereby being doubtful and still in dispute. WHEREFORE, upon defendant's filing a bond in the amount of
P10,000.00, let a writ of preliminary injunction is requiring the plaintiff,
Said defendants (private respondents before this Court) in turn prayed the court for her representatives and agents or other persons acting in her behalf to
a writ of preliminary injunction to direct plaintiff (petitioner here) and all others in deliver the possession of the property located at the corner of Park Road
her behalf to cease and desist from disturbing in any manner whatsoever defendant and Talisay Street, North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal to the Special
Virginia Y. Yaptinchay's possession amongst others of the North Forbes Park Administratrix Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, and to refrain from disturbing
house and to order the removal from the premises of said North Forbes Park house interfering in any manner whatsoever defendant's possession thereof.
of the guards, agents and employees installed therein by plaintiff; to enjoin plaintiff
and her agents from entering the aforesaid house and any other real property Which, as aforestated, was amended by the court order of June 28, 1966, which in
registered in the name of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and from interfering with or from part recites:
disturbing the exercise by Virginia Y. Yaptinchay of her rights and powers of
 Considering that the present case treats principally with the liquidation of court, properly to be placed under administration. 5 One such property is the lot at
an alleged partnership between the plaintiff and the deceased Isidro North Forbes Park. 6
Yaptinchay and considering further that said house in North Forbes Park
is included among the properties in dispute, the Court hereby clarifies its With respect to the Forbes Park house, petitioner offers varying versions. In the
Order of June 15, 1966 by enjoining the defendants and/or their duly verified petition before this Court, petitioner avers "that the construction of said
authorized agents or representatives from selling, disposing or otherwise North Forbes Park property was undertaken jointly by petitioner and the deceased,
encumbering said property in any manner whatsoever pending the petitioner even contributing her own exclusive funds therefor." 7 This is a
termination of this case. reproduction of an allegation in petitioner's June 27, 1966 alternative motion for
reconsideration or for clarification/amendment of the herein controverted order of
Petitioner's motion to reconsider the June 15, 1966 order was overturned by June 15, 1966 in Civil Case 8873. 8 And again, in the affidavit of Teresita C.
respondent judge's order of August 8, 1966, which recites that: Yaptinchay dated August 3, 1965, she spoke of the acquisition of properties, real
and personal, in her own words, "through our joint efforts and capital, among
Considering that defendants, principally Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, took which properties are those situated" in "North Forbes Park." 9 All of which
actual or physical possession of the said properties which were formerly contradict her averment in the amended complaint dated October 25, 1965 — also
held by the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay and the plaintiff, by virtue of her verified — in said Case 8873 to the effect that she "acquired through her own
appointment and under her authority, as Special Administratrix of the personal funds and efforts real properties such as ... the house now standing at
estate of the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay, the plaintiff's Motion for North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal." 10
Reconsideration is hereby denied.2
But herein private respondents vehemently dispute petitioner's claim of complete or
The orders of June 15 and August 8, 1966 triggered the present proceedings in this even partial ownership of the house. They maintain that the construction of that
Court. house was undertaken by the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay without her
(petitioner's) intervention and the deceased paid with his own personal funds all
expenses incurred in connection with the construction thereof. 11
1. Petitioner's stance before us is this: As she was occupying the Forbes Park
property at the time of the death of Isidro Yaptinchay, grave abuse of discretion
attended respondent judge's order issuing an injunctive writ transferring possession It was only after hearing and considering the evidence adduced and the fact that
of said property to respondent Virginia Y. Yaptinchay. after the death of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay the Forbes Park house "was among the
properties of the deceased placed under the administration of" respondent Virginia
Y. Yaptinchay, that respondent judge issued the injunction order of June 15, 1966
A rule of long standing echoed and reechoed in jurisprudence is that injunction is
herein complained of. Worth repeating at this point is that respondent judge, in his
not to be granted for the purpose of taking property out of possession and/or
order of August 8, 1966, declared that defendants (private respondents herein),
control of a party and placing it in that of another whose title thereto has not been
"principally Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, took actual or physical possession", amongst
clearly established. 3 With this as guidepost, petitioner would have been correct if
others, of the North Forbes Park house — "by virtue of her appointment and
she were lawfully in possession of the house in controversy when Civil Case 8873
under her authority, as Special Administratrix."
(where the injunctive writ was issued) was commenced in the Pasig court, and if
respondent special administratrix, to whom the possession thereof was transferred,
were without right thereto. But the situation here is not as petitioner pictures it to On this score, petitioner herein is not entitled to the injunction she prayed for
be. It is beyond debate that with the institution on July 13, 1965 of Special below.
Proceedings 1944-P, properties belonging not only to the deceased Isidro Y.
Yaptinchay but also to the conjugal partnership of said deceased and his legitimate
wife, Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, 4 were brought under the jurisdiction of the probate
2. As well established is the rule that the grant or denial of an injunction rests upon marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of
the sound discretion of the court, in the exercise of which appellate courts will not them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by
interfere except in a clear case of abuse. 12 the rules on co-ownership." .

A considerate and circumspect view of the facts and circumstances in this case But stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil relationship
obtaining will not permit us to tag the disputed order of June 15, 1966 with the envisaged in Article 144 is circumscribed by conditions, the existence of which must
vice of grave abuse of discretion. It is quite true that, in support of the allegation first be shown before rights provided thereunder may be deemed to accrue. 13 One
that the house in North Forbes Park was her exclusive property, petitioner such condition is that there must be a clear showing that the petitioner had, during
presented proof in the form of loans that she had contracted during the period cohabitation, really contributed to the acquisition of the property involved. Until
when said house was under construction. But evidence is wanting which would such right to co-ownership is duly established, petitioner's interests in the property
correlate such loans to the construction work. On the contrary, there is much to the in controversy cannot be considered the "present right" or title that would make
documentary proof presented by petitioner which would tend to indicate that the available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of injunction. 14 For, the existence
loans she obtained from the Republic Bank were for purposes other than the of a clear positive right especially calling for judicial protection is wanting.
construction of the North Forbes Park home. And this, we gather from pages 17 to Injunction indeed, is not to protect contingent or future rights; 15 nor is it a remedy
18 of petitioner's memorandum before this Court; and the affidavit of Teresita C. to enforce an abstract right. 16
Yaptinchay, Annex A thereof, which states in its paragraph 4 that she obtained
various loans from the Republic Bank "for her own exclusive account" and that the At any rate, it would seem to us that the interests of the parties would be better
proceeds thereof "were also used by affiant both for her business and for the safeguarded if the controverted North Forbes Park property be in the hands of the
construction, completion and furnishing of the said house at North Forbes Park", bonded administratrix in the estate proceedings. For then, her acts would be subject
and which cites her seven promissory notes in favor of Republic Bank, Appendices to the control of the probate court.
1 to 7 of said affidavit. Not one of the promissory notes mentioned reveals use of
the proceeds for the construction of the North Forbes Park house. On the contrary,
Finding no error in the disputed orders of respondent judge, the herein petition for
there is Appendix 2, the promissory note for P54,000 which says that the purpose
certiorari is hereby dismissed, and the writ of preliminary mandatory
of the loan for "Fishpond development"; Appendix 3 for P100,000 for the same
injunction 17 issued by this Court is hereby dissolved and set aside.
purpose; Appendix 5 for P50,000, "To augment working capital in buying &
selling of appliances & gift items"; and Appendix 7 for P1,090,000, "For
Agricultural Development". In plain terms, the fact alone of petitioner's Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
indebtedness to the Republic Bank does not establish that said house was built with
her own funds. Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Fernando, Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.
It is in the context just recited that the unsupported assertion that the North Forbes Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., are on leave.
Park house is petitioner's exclusive property may not be permitted to override the
prima facie presumption that house, having been constructed on the lot of Isidro Y.
Yaptinchay (or of the conjugal partnership) at his instance, and during the existence
of his marriage with respondent Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, is part of the estate that
should be under the control of the special administratrix.

3. Nor can petitioner's claim of ownership presumably based on the provisions of

Article 144 of the Civil Code be decisive. Said Article 144 says that: "When man
and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011 Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5
October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.
ALAIN M. DIÑO , Petitioner,
vs. On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Piñas prosecutor found that there were no
MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO, Respondent. indicative facts of collusion between the parties and the case was set for trial on the
merits.
DECISION
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological
CARPIO, J.: report establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years.
Dr. Tayag found that respondent’s disorder was long-lasting and by nature,
The Case
incurable.
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 18 October 2006
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground
Decision2 and the 12 March 2007 Order3of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas
that respondent was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital
City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil Case No. LP-01-0149.
obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
The Antecedent Facts
The Decision of the Trial Court
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent) were childhood
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to
friends and sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to
establish respondent’s psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled that even
separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together again.
without Dr. Tayag’s psychological report, the allegations in the complaint,
On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas
substantiated in the witness stand, clearly made out a case of psychological
City.
incapacity against respondent. The trial court found that respondent committed acts
which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the family, and that
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage respondent failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity required of her under
against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent
Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love abandoned petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad and married another man.
and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing
instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would
at times become violent and hurt him.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of
the filing of the petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite 1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and
receipt of the summons, respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO on January 14, 1998, and all its
reglementary period. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and
divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family
upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. Code.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor The Ruling of this Court
General, Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Piñas City and the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, for their information and guidance. The petition has merit.

SO ORDERED.4 Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner argues
the absolute community of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null
shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code. Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply to
Article 147 of the Family Code.
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and
modified its 18 October 2006 Decision as follows: We agree with petitioner.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered: The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void
marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the
1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the
defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO on January 14, 1998, and all its Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are
effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void,8 such as petitioner and respondent in the case
before the Court.
2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.

Article 147 of the Family Code provides:

A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code. Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
General, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City and the Local Civil
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Registrar of Las Piñas City, for their information and guidance.5

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
Hence, the petition before this Court.
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a
The Issue party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation,
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent
of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article
43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.10
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
cohabitation.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
present:
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other; adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.

2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common
children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual
void.9 agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the
of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and enforcement of the judgment.
respondent.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of
absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and either or both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received under
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their
ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases legitime.
governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the
Rule provides: It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule
applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the
declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under
issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for
Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Properties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous SO ORDERED.
marriage was contracted.1avvphil Under Article 40, "[t]he absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of ANTONIO T. CARPIO
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Thus we ruled: Associate Justice

x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for WE CONCUR:
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
previous marriage void.11
Associate Justice

Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages,
meaning, marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD
competent court in an action for annulment.12 In both instances under Articles 40 Associate Justice Associate Justice
and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of property13 or
conjugal partnership of gains14 unless the parties agree to a complete separation of JOSE C. MENDOZA
property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the Associate Justice
property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or
conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute ATTESTATION
the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for
annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the
Associate Justice
liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the
Chairperson
rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of
parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.16 The rules on co-ownership apply CERTIFICATION
and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil
Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
"[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage. opinion of the Court’s Division.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with RENATO C. CORONA
the MODIFICATION that the decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be Chief Justice
issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting for the liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code.
G.R. No. 176492 October 20, 2014 Marietta Nonato, the spouse with whom the majority of the common children
choose to remain.
MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, Petitioner,
vs. Furthermore, defendant’s counterclaim is hereby granted, ordering plaintiff to pay
LEONARDO V. NONATO, Respondent. defendant ₱10,000.00 as moral damages for the mental anguish and unnecessary
inconvenience brought about by this suit; and an additional ₱10,000.00 as
DECISION exemplary damages to deter others from following suit; and attorney’s fees of
₱2,000.00 and litigation expenses of ₱575.00.
PERALTA, J.:
SO ORDERED.4
For the Court's resolution is a Petition for Review filed by petitioner Marietta N.
Barrido questioning the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated November Nonato appealed the MTCC Decision before the RTC. On July 21, 2004, the
16, 2006, and its Resolution2 dated January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00235. Bacolod RTC reversed the ruling of the MTCC. It found that even though the
The CA affirmed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofBacolod City, MTCC aptly applied Article 129 of the Family Code, it nevertheless made a
Branch 53, dated July 21, 2004, in Civil Case No. 03-12123, which ordered the reversible error in adjudicating the subject property to Barrido. Its dispositive
partition of the subject property. portion reads:

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: In the course of the marriage of WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated September 17, 2003 is
respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N. Barrido,they were able hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered
to acquire a property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting ofa house and ordering the parties:
lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-140361. On March 15,
1996, their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. (1) to equitably partition the house and lot covered by TCT No. T-
Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the property, 140361;
Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. Thus, on January 29,
2003, Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before the Municipal Trial Court in (2) to reimburse Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato of the amount
Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City, Branch 3. advanced by them in payment of the debts and obligation of TCT No. T-
140361 with Philippine National Bank;
Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had already
been sold to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise moved (3) to deliver the presumptive legitimes of Joseph Raymund and Joseph
for the dismissal of the complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction, the Leo Nonato pursuant to Article 51 of the Family Code.
partition case being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
SO ORDERED.5
The Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision dated September 17, 2003, applying
Article 129 of the Family Code. It ruled in this wise:
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision on November 16, 2006. It held
that since the property’s assessed value was only ₱8,080.00, it clearly fell within the
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered,
MTCC’s jurisdiction. Also, although the RTC erred in relying on Article 129 of
ordering the conjugal property of the former Spouses Leonardo and Marietta
the FamilyCode, instead of Article 147, the dispositive portion of its decision still
Nonato, a house and lot covered by TCT No. T-140361 located at Eroreco,
Bacolod City, which was their conjugal dwelling, adjudicated to the defendant
correctly ordered the equitable partition of the property. Barrido filed a Motion for xxxx
Reconsideration, which was, however, denied for lack of merit.
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
Hence, Barrido brought the case to the Court via a Petition for Review. She possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the
assigned the following errors in the CA Decision: propertyor interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos
(₱20,000.00)or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does
I. not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as
THE MTCC HAD JURISDICTION TO TRY THE PRESENT CASE. amended by R.A. No. 7691)9

II. Here, the subject property’s assessed value was merely ₱8,080.00, an amount which
certainly does not exceed the required limit of ₱20,000.00 for civil actions outside
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT Metro Manila tofall within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the lower
THE LOT COVERED BY TCT NO. T-140361 IS CONJUGAL AFTER court correctly took cognizance of the instant case.
BEING SOLD TO THE CHILDREN, JOSEPH LEO NONATO AND
JOSEPH RAYMUND NONATO. The records reveal that Nonatoand Barrido’s marriage had been declared void for
psychological incapacity under Article 3610 of the Family Code. During their
III. marriage, however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their property
relations. Although Article 12911 provides for the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
ARTICLE 129 OF THE FAMILY CODE HAS NO APPLICATION IN THE procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147
PRESENT CASE, ON THE ASSUMPTION specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses’ property relations.
Article 147 reads:
THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.6
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
The petition lacks merit. under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
Contrary to Barrido’s contention, the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
real actions or those affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of
possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
real property.7 Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 1298 provides: together shall be presumed tohave been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall beowned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.– Metropolitan Trial Courts, shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Trial Courts shall exercise:

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the 147 of the Family Code and in ruling that the former spouses own the family home
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the
of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. liquidation and partition of the property that they owned in common, the
provisions on coownership under the Civil Code should aptly prevail.19 The rules
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the which are set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or voidable marriages, are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving between common-law spousesor spouses of void marriages.20
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent
party.1âwphi1 In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during
cohabitation. the subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained
by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering shares. Barrido, however, claims that the ownership over the property in question is
no illegal impedimentto marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and already vested on their children, by virtue of a Deed of Sale. But aside from the title
wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage.12 It is clear, therefore, to the property still being registered in the names of the former spouses, said
that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to document of safe does not bear a notarization of a notary public. It must be noted
marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) that without the notarial seal, a document remains to be private and cannot be
their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. Here, all converted into a public document,21 making it inadmissible in evidence unless
these elements are present.13 The term "capacitated" inthe first paragraph of the properly authenticated.22 Unfortunately, Barrido failed to prove its due execution
provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage.14 Any and authenticity. In fact, she merely annexed said Deed of Sale to her position
impediment to marry has not been shown to have existed on the part of either paper. Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in common by Nonato
Nonato or Barrido. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife. and Barrido, which should be divided in accordance with the rules on co-ownership.
However, their marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code
on the ground of psychological incapacity.15 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated November 16, 2006, as well as its Resolution dated
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00235, are hereby AFFIRMED.
and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal coownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima faciepresumed to have been obtained through SO ORDERED.
their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property
shall be considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party's efforts DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.16 Efforts in the care Associate Justice
and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the Acting Chairperson
acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or
industry.17
WE CONCUR:

In the analogous case of Valdez,18 it was likewise averred that the trial court failed
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a
Associate Justice
situation where a marriage is declared void ab initiobecause of psychological
incapacity on the part of either or both parties in the contract of marriage.The
Court held that the court a quodid not commit a reversible error in utilizing Article
 ESTELA M. PERLAS-
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
BERNABE**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013 (1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722
registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
vs. (2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent. name of Benjamin, married to Sally;

DECISION (3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos.

8782 and 8783 registered in the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and
CARPIO, J.:
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the
The Case name of Sally as a single individual.

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada,
Decision2 and the 14 March 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy
CV No. 94226. and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated
marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a
non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial
The Antecedent Facts
court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the
formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of
declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties during the
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate
docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September children. A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition
1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in
children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III. his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.

In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the
who was a customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamin’s trial court denied. Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court also
family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked
February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sally’s father for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction which the Court
was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to present any evidence before the trial
brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported court citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial
marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the court gave Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008,
marriage contract would not be registered. 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23
October 2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial
Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. court, Sally still refused to present her evidence, prompting the trial court to
During the period of their cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties: consider the case submitted for decision.

The Decision of the Trial Court

In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The 193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamin’s share
trial court gave weight to the certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.
Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License Series
Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982 and the The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin and
Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY
registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to
S. GO on March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared
Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena.
NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared NONEXISTENT.

The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not
Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37)
bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second marriage was void not because of
properties under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480,
the existence of the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack
and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035,
of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial court
194620, 194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628,
did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley because they
194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637,
were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sally’s claim for spousal support
194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is
because she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The registered owners, namely: Benjamin B.
for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for support.
Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan
are the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of Deeds
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 for Quezon City and Manila are directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go"
properties she named in her answer as part of her conjugal properties with from these thirty-seven (37) titles.
Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin.
Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamin’s parents
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and
who gave the properties to their children, including Benjamin, as advance
8783 are properties acquired from petitioner’s money without contribution from
inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the
respondent, hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife.
phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status in the
Consequently, petitioner is appointed the administrator of these five (5) properties.
title. As regards the two lots under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court
Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of her collections of income from
found that they were bought by Benjamin using his own money and that Sally failed
these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Except for lot
to prove any actual contribution of money, property or industry in their purchase.
under TCT No. 61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30) days from
The trial court found that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots covered by
notice hereof to turn over and surrender control and possession of these properties
TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two condominium units
including the documents of title to the petitioner.
under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot under
TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units were purchased from the
earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the properties under TCT On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are
Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the under co-ownership of the parties shared by them equally. However, the share of
conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamin’s respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley
right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding. Go Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership
with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and distribution of these two (2)
properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that
of March 15, 2003.
Benjamin was married to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the
trial court forfeited Sally’s share in the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution of
of A.M. No. 02-11-10. money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37 properties
Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no declaration of the status of the parties’
children. As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled
that only the properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the
No other relief granted. name of Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was able to establish that
they were acquired by him solely. The Court of
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the
Solicitor General and the Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan. Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and
under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence
of proof of Benjamin’s actual contribution in their purchase. The Court of Appeals
SO ORDERED.6
ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin
and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be shared equally. However, the
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his existing
Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August 2009,7 the trial court denied the marriage with Azucena while Sally’s share shall accrue to her in the absence of a
motion. Sally appealed the trial court’s decision before the Court of Appeals. clear and convincing proof of bad faith.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing
evidence that would show bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge that
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. would justify his inhibition from the case.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err in submitting the case
for decision. The Court of Appeals noted that there were six resettings of the case, The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:
all made at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception of evidence, and Sally was
duly warned to present her evidence on the next hearing or the case would be
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED.
deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to
The assailed Decision and Order dated March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009,
present her evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No.
was not subpoenaed despite the presence of her other witnesses.
04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720
and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee while the properties
The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783
action for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that shall be solely owned by the respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No.
Benjamin’s action was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there was no 61722 shall be owned by them and common and to be shared equally but the share
evidence that the marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted the of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his first
second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court marriage while the share of respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the
committed no error in declaring Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null and void. decision stands.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was SO ORDERED.8
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision. In its 14 Sally that in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted
March 2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied her motion. for decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other
available witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not even
Hence, the petition before this Court. subpoenaed on that day. Sally’s counsel insisted that the trial court could not dictate
on the priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial court’s prior
warning due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally could not complain that
The Issues
she had been deprived of her right to present her evidence because all the
postponements were at her instance and she was warned by the trial court that it
Sally raised the following issues before this Court: would submit the case for decision should she still fail to present her evidence on
28 November 2008.
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
affirming the trial court’s ruling that Sally had waived her right to present We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence,
evidence; she was deemed to have waived her right to present them. As pointed out by the
Court of Appeals, Sally’s continued failure to present her evidence despite the
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of interest to proceed with
affirming the trial court’s decision declaring the marriage between the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the case because she was
Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and non-existent; and waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the
trial court’s denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in Appeals did not issue any temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally
affirming with modification the trial court’s decision regarding the could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect marriage as an inviolable
property relations of Benjamin and Sally. institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds
despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the parties.10
The Ruling of this Court
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
The petition has no merit.
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence marriage to Benjamin because a marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same
time, null and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to present
her evidence, she would have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove her
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling that marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in acquiring real
she waived her right to present her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was "married to" her; that
present evidence that she and Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its Benjamin was the informant in their children’s birth certificates where he stated that
duty to protect marriage as an inviolable institution. he was their father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as
his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real property registered in the
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was not the
matter of right but is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.9 In this case, informant in the birth certificates of his children with Azucena.
Sally’s presentation of evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter,
there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established
and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all made at Sally’s before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract.
instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned
At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null
1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting. and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the
Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this
Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It
was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage
only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the
February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series issued for local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly
the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did falls under Section 3 of Article 3520 which made their marriage void ab initio. The
not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general
from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts
license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the
value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s
relative to the issuance of a marriage license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and
entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lack non-existent.
of a marriage license.12
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between affirmed in all aspects the trial court’s decision and ruled that "the rest of the
Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National decision stands."22 While the Court of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages,
Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring that "the
Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of rest of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial court’s
Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the Records discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not
Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the bigamous.1âwphi1 The trial court stated:
Arts;14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the
National Statistics Office.15 The documentary and testimonial evidence proved that On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article
there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the
court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest"16 and "a first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to
simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the
social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially from her contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their
parents seen as Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage. marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the
existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and of bigamy was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was
Bentley was not a proof of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court held that what was committed was contracting marriage against the provisions of
notes that Benjamin was the informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which stated laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding,
that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 198218 while Sally was the the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no marriage
informant in Bentley’s birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin and Sally license. The daring and repeated stand of respondent that she is legally married to
were married on 8 March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7 petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to
March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates. petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or
criminally as it would be invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner
and Azucena.23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of
requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage.24 In this case, Appeals is more in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered
there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as
marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married to Sally." The property covered by
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally28 with the
represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-
193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. We
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.29 Such words do not prove co-
ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and
can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.30
Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states:

Inhibition of the Trial Judge

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit
their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their himself from hearing the case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She further alleged that Judge
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his
partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of
in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge.31 To justify the call for
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or
paragraph of the preceding Article. corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the
decision or order itself.32In this case, we have sufficiently explained that Judge
Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision because of Sally’s continued
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
refusal to present her evidence.
faith.

We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the
used uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, they are not enough to prove
properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money,
his prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
that would justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.
respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by
Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March
petition before the trial court even admitted that "Benjamin’s late father himself 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
conveyed a number of properties to his children and their respective spouses which
included Sally x x x."25 SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice